MILTON'S 'PENDANT WORLD'

Epic Poetry, Affect and the Figures and Tropes of Paradise Lost

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Abstract

The thesis examines the role of affectivity in John Milton's *Paradise Lost,* focusing principally on poetic language in a discussion of the key poetic figures and tropes. As fluid and diverse experiences of the body, mind and, in the early modern period, the soul, affects are integral dimensions of the expression and reading of literary texts, captured by techniques of genre, form and poetic style.

Initially examining the broad parameters of modern debates on 'affect' according to its main theoretical groupings, I identify the features of an integrative approach which can be compared with Milton's early modern model exemplified in *Paradise Lost*. In this 'embodied' model, affectivity is understood as engaging a confluence of natural (bodily) and psychological dispositions, shifting away from the pronounced dualism that has traditionally characterised modern criticism of Milton. A corresponding theoretical emphasis on dimensions of experience shifts the critical focus from an expressive model of affective criticism based on the merely adjectival and descriptive to a model based on the performative and the adverbial.

The epic is conventionally understood as a literary genre that subordinates the subject to the discursive parameters of the historical 'grand narrative' and much critical attention has been given to Milton's emphasis on the Protestant doctrine of obedience. Yet the classical epic tradition also dramatises the relationship between subject and culture, and in *Paradise Lost* the experiences of poet and reader are central to the epic drama as it unfolds, a feature recognised by Stanley Fish. Building on a number of contemporary critical works on *Paradise Lost* by Fish, William Kerrigan and others, I examine how Milton's 'monistic' ontology blends early modern medicine, philosophy and theology on the relationship between body, mind and soul. Milton dynamically integrates the body, imagination, reason, experience and moral theory, recasting this relationship in ways which differ from traditional Cartesian and Neoplatonic dualist formulations and from the deterministic universe of Protestant Calvinism, with a powerful influence on Milton's poetics.

Paradise Lost's style of allegory depends on transforming through modes of affect the techniques of classical and Renaissance rhetoric and literary theory, a key element of which is ornament, a term which in the Renaissance refers to language, trope

and figure, and is not only a form of embellishment but also important for its 'affects' on reader experience. Identifying such an approach in Milton's epic reveals the essential relation of affective experience to the text: somatic, emotional, and spatially and temporally-unfolding.

Central to *Paradise Lost* is the body metaphor, which 'figures' in poetic language Milton's Renaissance understanding of the relationship between the microcosmic and macrocosmic. It expresses Milton's monistic relationship between matter and spirit, language and world, the fallen subject and the divine order, fundamental to which are notions of selfhood based on free will, self-determination and personal responsibility. For this relationship Milton's tropes and figures are indispensable, pre-dating the separation of the aesthetic from value and drawing on a voluntarism that is also intrinsic to the relationship between 'mere' artifice and 'true' artistry, with the latter understood for its closeness to the divine.

Affectivity in Milton's epic, it is argued, is central to the creative process of poetry as well as the reading experience, facilitating an early modern purpose of poetry to provide the potential for moral and spiritual regeneration. Yet while in Milton's epic the drama of subject and history ultimately draws on poetry's creative potential for transformation, it relies on the voluntary will of the reader as key to the fallen subject's capacity for regeneration. In my argument, Milton's model of poetry in *Paradise Lost* is neither predominantly rationalistic nor doctrinal, since it accords affectivity a major role in early modern creativity, personal and spiritual self-actualisation and moral and physical well-being.

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Of particular benefit has been a variety of research conducted by the ARC Centre for Excellence for the History of the Emotions, which is currently producing much useful scholarship in early modern emotions. I am grateful for all such contributions as well as the involvement of my supervisors, with special thanks to my principal and coordinating supervisor, Professor Andrew Lynch, whose insightful guidance spanned the entire period of research. Further thanks are due to Professor Robert White for his valuable input at various stages of the project, and to Professor Philip Mead for his helpful involvement in the earlier phases of the research. Thanks also to Graduate Research Coordinator, Professor Van Ikin and his successor, Associate Professor Kieran Dolin, and to Bruce McClintock for his editorial and proofreading skills. Finally, I extend my gratitude to my family for their continuous encouragement.

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Abbreviations

The Advancement	Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, (1605) 1893
The Anatomy	Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, (1621) 1832
The Apology	Sir Philip Sidney, *The Apology for Poetry*, (1595) 2007
AP	John Milton, *Areopagitica*, 1644
Comus	John Milton, *Comus, A Mask Presented at Ludlow Castle*, 1634
CF	Carey and Fowler (eds), *The Poems of John Milton*, 1968
CP	Merritt Hughes (ed.), *John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose*, 1957
DDC	John Milton, *De Doctrina Christiana*, (Undated, Posthumous)
DCD	St Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 423 CE
KJV	King James Version (Bible), 1611
NE	Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics.*
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., 1989
PL	John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 2nd ed., 1674
PR	John Milton, *Paradise Regained*, 1671
The Reason of Church Government	John Milton, *The Reason of Church Government Urged Against Prelaty*, 1642
SA	John Milton, *Samson Agonistes*, 1671
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1265–74

Introduction: Milton's Cosmic Epic

1. Ornament, Body, Cosmos

> And fast by hanging in a golden Chain
> This pendant world, in bigness as a Star
> Of smallest Magnitude close by the Moon.
>
> (*PL* II.1051–53)[1]

At the close of Book II of *Paradise Lost*, Satan departs the underworld of Hell and Pandemonium, travelling across the dark abyss in search of the newly-created world.[2] Moving 'by dubious light', he passes through the classical realm of Chaos, in Western theology also the primordial state that exists before Creation, until he reaches 'th' utmost Orb' or the outermost circle of the Earth delimited by the orbit of the moon.[3] With its characteristic enjambments, Milton's epic simile captures in dramatic shifts in scale the vast beauty of the created universe through the fallen eyes of Satan, as he 'weighs his spread wings' in full view of the 'pendant world', which in its golden-chained order reflects Milton's Renaissance understanding of the cosmos.[4]

Epic in the classical tradition has both a narrative and a cosmic patterning.[5] In *Paradise Lost* these patterns often coincide in a dynamic, structural tension with one another: the epic's narrative pattern unfolds temporally, as a record of the quotidian world of time; its cosmological pattern unfolds spatially, linking poetic form to culture, history and eternity in the universalist and totalising manner of the grand narrative.[6] Envisaging a full perspective of the subject in the world through history, the cosmic dimension of *Paradise Lost* brings together the Protestant sacred and the forces of culture, history and the ancient sacred exemplified by the classical epic tradition.[7]

Yet implicit in the polysemous adjective 'pendant', Satan's arrival at the edge of the abyss heralds a cosmic imbalance that is captured by poetic tensions produced by

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[1] CP 257. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Milton's poetry and prose are drawn from this edition.
[2] Genesis 1:2; CP 253n.
[3] CP 256n.
[4] While in *Paradise Lost* Milton explores both the Ptolemaic and the Copernican models of the cosmos, Merritt Hughes argues that the model finally adopted by Milton most closely approximates biblical understandings: CP 179–92.
[5] Curtius, 444; Fletcher, 70, 117.
[6] Lyotard, 1.
[7] Fletcher, 70; M. Mack, 117.

techniques of style in Milton's allegorical language, figuring his understanding of the sacred relationship between divine and human orders.[8] In *Paradise Lost*, the ornaments of language equally suggested by the noun 'pendant' carry a close association with the embodied subject, and express in an integrated way the material and spiritual life of body, mind and soul. The impending Fall is thus suggested by the figure of ekphrasis, in ways which are aesthetic, ethical and material, as Satan firms his resolve against the newly-created world ('thither full fraught'), captured in poetic language with cosmic import.[9]

It is a principal theme of this thesis that qualities of poetic 'affectivity' — the capacity of poetic language to express 'affects'; and in turn 'to affect' — to touch and move the mind, body and soul of the reader — are integral to both narrative and cosmic patterns of *Paradise Lost*. Poetic affectivity, it will be argued, is a quality intrinsic to how Milton recasts the conventions, genres, forms and rhetorical and poetic styles of inherited classical and Renaissance poetry to conform to the terms of his Protestant epic, transforming techniques and, with them, models of both subject and culture. Essential to this process is how Milton blends elements of sacred and secular literature through the metaphor and experience of the human body that 'figures' poetically the Renaissance relationship between microcosm and macrocosm.[10] Modern critic Stanley Fish associates the unfolding narrative pattern of *Paradise Lost* with the temporal, fallen world of time and lived experience, while the poem's cosmic, circular and spatial pattern is in turn associated by other critics with the sacred: by William Kerrigan, in what he terms the 'enfolded sublime'; and by Geoffrey Hartman as expressing a 'feeling' of 'divine imperturbability'.[11] In each pattern Milton applies poetic techniques in ways which make affective experience — of body, mind and soul — central to both the fallen, material subject and the divinely-inspired imagination.

A reading of *Paradise Lost* that examines the role of poetic affect, with its emphasis on the fallen faculties, invokes longstanding divisions between the Romantic (or 'Satanic') and traditional critics. An emphasis on the role of affect implies an intrinsic valuation of the lived world of experience, including of the positive potential of

[8] Fletcher, 113; Tate 1959 82.
[9] Martindale, 1986, 39; Fitzgerald, 210.
[10] Fletcher, 114.
[11] Fish (1967) 1997, 1; Kerrigan 1983, 233; Hartman, 3. The notion of the sublime is explored throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter 4, 5 and the conclusion, from its Epicurian and Longinian expression to its Christianised forms.

the embodied senses and emotions, thereby lending general support to Romantic readings. Yet while placing a value on the intensities associated with the world of experience, Milton's Protestant, eudaimonistic model of the self-authoring subject can also be distinguished from the Romantic readings that it generates.[12] Moreover, this thesis explores the role of poetic affect as a means of moving towards a dynamic reconciliation of the two opposing views associated with doctrine and experience, thought and feeling.

As will be argued, affect is an intrinsic dimension of Milton's aesthetic model, which connects poetic figure and form to his self-fashioning moral and spiritual subject through the central body metaphor in *Paradise Lost*. The relationships shape the notion of the 'pendant world', which is associated with the angelic figure by means of intensities and transitionary states that are important to the transformation of *thymos*, the spirit and vital body that underlies the potentialities of creative and embodied form in the classical tradition.[13] In turn, that transformation animates Milton's development of allegorical figure in ways which conform to his Protestant model. The remainder of this 'Introduction' contains a general outline of the modern and Renaissance critical relationships between language and affect, the critical methodology used in the thesis and finally an overview by chapter.

2. Poetry and Affect

> …elegancies, &c., which many so much affect.[14]

As states of body and mind and, in early modern Europe, of the soul, 'affects' are essential dimensions of lived experience. They are also expressed through and generated by literary texts, relying as much on inherited literary genres, forms, conventions and the structures of language as on the subtleties and particularities of poetic style, a notion recognised in the Renaissance and captured in Robert Burton's line above. This thesis is concerned with how these 'affects' are integral to *Paradise Lost*, and how recent theoretical debates on affectivity, and especially on affective poetics, might enrich both historical and more recent critical readings of Milton's major epic of the Fall.

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[12] See God's speech in *PL* III. esp.122–25.
[13] Peters, 166–67, 196; Mikics, 17.
[14] R. Burton, Democritus to the Reader.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* offers a plethora of meanings and historical usages for the term 'affect' as a noun or verb. It is normally distinguished from 'pure' thought, or the abstract processes of the intellect, by its dependence on a confluence of natural (bodily) and psychological states.[15] The dual aspect of the term 'affect' is significant because while the noun describes 'named' states, the verb 'affect' also carries a strong sense of the temporally active, adverbial and experiential, dimensions which are constituent of Milton's expression of the term 'pendant' at the close of Book II with its sense of an immediacy of impending fallenness. Describing its more experiential qualities, the verb 'to affect' means 'to have an effect on the mind or feelings of (a person); to impress or influence emotionally; to move, touch' (*OED*) although the definition does not capture the full subtlety and complexity of the word. As a noun, 'affect' is defined most expansively as 'a feeling or subjective experience accompanying a thought or action,' 'an emotion or mood' (*OED*), although this more traditional definition does not distinguish modern theories which abstract 'affect' from the emotions, a distinction which is sometimes invoked, sometimes ignored in contemporary usage of the term.[16] What the definition captures, however, is the importance of intensities and immediacies of transitionary states of experience to the understanding of 'affect'.[17]

In modern understandings, the noun 'affect' denotes a complex and somewhat enigmatic concept; although it is traditionally understood more generally to designate a range of embodied sensory and emotional experiences, it is also used alternatively in recent thought to distinguish the notion of 'affect' on a philosophical basis from the study of the emotions.[18] Both understandings of 'affect' reflect the complex relationship between body and mind that in the modern period is typically founded on René Descartes's seventeenth-century dualist model. While some recent thought emphasises the close relationship between mind and body that affective states engage, modern emotions theory is often influenced and shaped by discourses in classical ethics on the intelligent status of the emotions, or by discourses in neuroscience and behavioural psychology that favour a dualist approach.[19] By contrast, the branch of modern affect theory which creates the bifurcation in modern thought between the study of 'affect'

[15] Altieri, 3; R. Greene and others, 11.
[16] Jameson 2013a, 29; Trigg, 3.
[17] Massumi 1.
[18] R. Greene and others, 11.
[19] Calhoun and Solomon, 1984 3–40; Nussbaum, 2004b 443–49; Damasio, 1995 xi–xix.

and ‘emotions’ tends to be influenced by discourses of the body, which draw on studies in neuroscience and behavioural psychology to develop tools for understanding affect against the background of ‘non-existent vocabulary’ and the ‘historical baggage’ of emotions theory.[20] This thought tends to reduce affective states to bodily experience bound up with limited mental activity or agency; pre-discursive, ahistorical, amoral and non-personal. The model nonetheless provides a platform in the arts for aesthetic experience, drawing for this purpose on the dynamic immediacy and participatory energies of body and mind in affective states.[21]

While some current theoretical approaches to affectivity maintain a split between the realm of affect and the emotions, this thesis adopts a broadly-based understanding of ‘affect’ to encompass the range of experiences that include the bodily states identified in modern ‘affect’ theory as well as the emotions, and to recognise the fluidity and interrelatedness of affective states within the complex processes of mind and body, thought and experience. The breadth of modern theory recognises a range of affective states that include ‘feelings’, ‘moods’, sometimes encompassing the role of the imagination, consciousness and thought in their expression. Charles Altieri describes affects in such broad terms in his aesthetic study of art and poetry as ‘immediate modes of sensual responsiveness to the world characterised by an accompanying imaginative dimension’, a description which accords with the ‘umbrella’ approach taken in this thesis. His approach also incorporates the traditional aesthetic relationship between affectivity and the imagination, a relationship that is absent from the Deleuzian model but central to the Renaissance period.[22] In the broader understanding of this thesis, the term ‘affect’ is applied to a range of states that seem to be related to each other through the material condition of the body as well as their constituent role within psychological experience, and the term ‘embodiment’ is used to describe the experiences of mind and body in affective states, not just the role of the physical body per se.[23] On this basis, the term ‘affect’ encompasses psychological experiences (feelings, desires, emotions, moods) including their imaginative projections, the accompanying physiological

[20] Massumi.8.
[21] Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 163–199; Massumi1–21; Jameson, 2013a, 27–44.
[22] Altieri, 3; R. Burton, I.I.II.5–11; Sidney 2007, 135–59; Bacon 1893, II.12.1.
[23] Eliot 1921; Calhoun and Solomon, 1984, 9. In this thesis, the expression ‘affect’ is couched broadly to show the potential for its examination using a variety of techniques that can be applied alongside more traditional approaches to Milton’s poetry. Yet the thesis only endeavours to examine select aspects of the field of affect and emotions theory as it pertains to Milton’s work.

sensations and dispositions as well as, in certain influential emotions theory, their subsequent mental appraisal.[24]

The broader approach to affectivity, with its acknowledgment of the ways the relationship between the body, the emotions and the mind is one of constant interaction and engagement, is comparable with the approach taken in the early modern period and captures more fully the manner in which Milton incorporates affective states in *Paradise Lost*. A central argument of this thesis is that *Paradise Lost* draws upon early modern thought that assumes an integrated, hierarchical relationship between the various features of experience, particularly the body and its senses, reason and the mind, the imagination, the emotions (or passions and affections as they were known in the early modern period) and the soul.[25] In turn, relying on such a model of selfhood, Renaissance knowledge theory recognises a close relationship between thought and feeling through the synthetic role of the imagination, a relationship that is equally reflected in Renaissance criticism, rhetorics and poetics.[26]

Against this theoretical context, Milton constructs a 'monistic' ontology, which assumes an undivided relationship between the body and the soul.[27] Significantly for its period, *Paradise Lost* thus reconfigures the pronounced dualism inherent in both Renaissance Neoplatonist and seventeenth-century Cartesian formulations of the relationships between the body, mind and soul.[28] Milton's monism, in the argument of this thesis, ascribes a value to the regenerative potential of the fallen faculties of his Protestant humanist subject, based on an agency model that is consistent with his Arminianism.[29] By incorporating an Augustinian understanding of the compatibility of free will within the order of divine Providence and attributing such conditions of voluntarism and agency to the subject, Milton also departs from the more deterministic model of Protestant Calvinism.[30] A principal argument of this thesis is that more

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[24] Solomon 2004a, 76; Nussbaum 2004a, 184; R. Greene and others, 11; Altieri, 26. While 'desire' dominates theoretical discussions in the twentieth century and is intertwined with all kinds of affects with its emphasis on a combination of conscious and unconscious forces, it is considered amongst a range of affective states in this thesis. Milton recognises a separate notion of 'desire' in *Paradise Lost* that reflects erotic, as well as positive and negative emotional energies.
[25] The hierarchy of the soul is explained in Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*: R. Burton, I.I.II.5–11.
[26] Tuve 1947, 183.
[27] Kerrigan 1983, 247; Fallon, 98; Rogers 1996, 1.
[28] Fallon, 99; Kerrigan 1983, 247.
[29] The relationship between Milton's monism and his Arminianism is further discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.3 of this thesis.
[30] Kirby, 309–10.

integrated and 'embodied' experiences of body, mind and soul reflected by this model are also intrinsic to the literary expression of affectivity in *Paradise Lost*, with an essential bearing on its poetics, including the expression and reading of its key figures and tropes.[31]

In taking such an approach to Milton, I depart from the tendency in twentieth-century criticism to favour readings that foreground the cognitive and interpretive over the experiential and affective, which arises not only through the influence of Cartesian dualism, but also (amongst other things) from Immanuel Kant's division between modes of understanding based on thinking and feeling, logical positivism and structural linguistics.[32] Within these theoretical contexts, embodied experience is displaced to the extent that it is considered to be grounded in private, individual consciousness and thereby outside the measure of discourses in culture, science or psychology.[33] Early in the century, William Empson's study of literary ambiguity concerns itself with problems of establishing 'meaning', while I. A. Richards captures the New Critical preference for objectifying literary works when he claims much criticism to be too 'abstract' and 'impressionistic', advocating instead the critical precision of a 'science'.[34] In turn, Wimsatt and Beardsley's later-century 'affective fallacy' designates any approach to literature that comments upon the emotional, imaginative or physiological effects of a poem upon one or more readers as the 'confusion between the poem and its results', between judgment and 'feelings', a confusion leading directly to 'impressionism and relativism'.[35] The purpose of poetry criticism, for them, is a formal, epistemological practice of establishing a poem's meaning as an independent artefact.[36]

Throughout the twentieth-century, criticism increasingly favoured the ascertainment of identifiable 'public', universal or generic aspects of texts based on interpretive, discursive criteria. Popular approaches examined texts within contexts of relevant historical and cultural discourses, such as those applicable to the study of the emotions in any given historical period, or in relation to the thought which illuminated the dimensions of affective experience that were not particular to the individual but

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[31] The term 'poetics' is used in this thesis to describe techniques of style in poetry and other literary discourses.
[32] Kant 1914, 7, 14, 20, 27; Altieri 18–26.
[33] Mikics 11 –14; *Cf* Greenblatt 1980, 1–10.
[34] Empson 1930; Richards 1930, 2.
[35] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 45.
[36] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 31, 37; Abrams, 4.

which could be quantified by scientific or psychological studies. Even 'reader-response' criticism later in the century, which challenged the opposition between 'experience' and 'meaning' as a measure of 'value', nevertheless foregrounded semantic concerns, since they are intertwined with the development of reader-based approaches.[37] Stanley Fish's approach to *Paradise Lost* pioneers such a model and argues that the meaning of *Paradise Lost* cannot be separated from the experience of reading, producing an effect of being 'surprised by sin'.[38] Yet his approach to *Paradise Lost* favours a 'closed' reading model by contrast to the more 'open' models advocated by other critics.[39] His approach is also grounded in the interpretive practice that underpins modern criticism of Milton, reconciling on epistemological grounds the reader's experience of sinfulness to the Protestant doctrine of religious obedience, exemplified especially in the critical tradition associated with C. S. Lewis.[40] An important theme of this thesis is therefore to open the reading process and develop Fish's thesis into fields of affectivity that more fully accommodate the embodied and experiential dimensions of expression and reading.

The preoccupations of modern criticism are especially evident in poststructuralist approaches, where the emphasis on language as structure expressly departs from historical understandings of the relationship between language and the body that are found in oral and literary traditions of rhetoric and poetry. In poststructuralist criticism, Altieri argues, 'the play of artifice' 'creates *aporias*' within approaches to establishing knowledge, while 'deconstruction stresses the undoing of possibilities for belief' and 'an inability to treat the artifice as directly engaging powerful participatory energies from the audience'.[41] Within this context, some recent critical works on *Paradise Lost* recast older debates between 'traditional' and 'Satanic' readings, with key opinions about Milton's epic said to be divided, according to John Rogers, between so-called 'eternalist' critics, who tend to read Milton's work in terms of orthodox and determinable religious and other beliefs, while 'temporalist' critics are more inclined to affiliate Milton with poststructuralist principles of openness and ambiguity, thereby reading *Paradise Lost* as exhibiting 'irresolvable complexities' of meaning.[42] Yet this thesis develops a critical approach to affectivity with the broad

[37] Webb 2009, 23; Esrock, 2; Tompkins 1980a, 202.
[38] Fish (1967) 1997, 1–2.
[39] Fish 2001, 14; Newlyn, 10–13.
[40] Lewis, 69.
[41] Altieri, 115.
[42] Herman and Sauer, 14.

objective of examining the various ways in which Milton's poetic techniques depend on experiences of the embodied, as opposed to the dualistic, subject in *Paradise Lost*, according a value to embodied states in their own right as well as to their role in furthering the poem's underlying philosophies and themes.

3. Material Embodiment, Expression and Affect

> At this point we should remember that the idea of the world as composed of weightless atoms is striking just because we know the weight of things so well. So, too, we would be unable to appreciate the lightness of language if we could not appreciate language that has some weight to it.[43]

On the question of the relationship between material embodiment, expression and affect in poetic language, a millennial work by the late Italian writer Italo Calvino provides, in my view, some guidance. In his essay 'Lightness', Calvino describes the opposition between lightness and weight in literature, upholding for himself the values of lightness, explaining, on reflection, his own literary purpose as the 'subtraction' of weight from 'people', 'cities', 'heavenly bodies', and from the 'structure of stories and language'.[44] Yet he acknowledges the 'virtues of weight' as no less compelling. As a young writer the imperative for Calvino was to represent his time, and he identified himself with the 'ruthless energies' — both collective and individual — propelling the events of the last century. He saw his project as 'an attempt to find some harmony between the adventurous, picaresque inner rhythm that prompted him to write and the frantic spectacle of the world, sometimes dramatic and sometimes grotesque'. But 'between the raw materials and the quick light touch' was a 'gulf that cost [Calvino] increasing effort to cross', as he became aware of the 'weight', the 'inertia', and the 'opacity of the world' as 'qualities that stick to writing unless one finds some way of evading them'.[45] Discussing the differing approaches of Cavalcanti and Dante to his question of lightness, in which Cavalcanti's metaphors tend, in Calvino's view, to dissolve into 'abstraction', while Dante's 'assume a concrete reality in which the weight of things is precisely established' (an important comparison to which I will return in Chapter 3 of this thesis), Calvino says:

[43] Calvino, 15.
[44] Calvino, 3–4.
[45] Calvino, 3.

> We might say that throughout the centuries two opposite tendencies have competed in literature: one tries to make language into a weightless element that hovers above things like a cloud or better, perhaps, the finest dust, or better still, a field of magnetic impulses. The other tries to give language the weight, density, and concreteness of things, bodies and sensations.[46]

Calvino's distinction draws on a blending of Renaissance Neoplatonism and the existential themes of twentieth-century letters, features which in the argument of this thesis have some resonance with the model of affectivity that shapes *Paradise Lost.* With its corresponding emphases on the intensities of the world of experience, of affective 'pain' as much as the lighter constructions of the creative imagination, Milton's model of seventeenth-century selfhood can manifest in poetic language and underlie its modes of expression.[47] More importantly, Calvino argues that language can have either its own weighty substance or an almost ephemeral lightness, and this has everything to do with poetic affect.

Kerrigan and Stephen Fallon identify how the material body animates Milton's epic poetry of *Paradise Lost* and yet is always aspiring to sublimation, so that the relationship between the human body and the divine is understood through its graduation from lower and heavier, to higher and lighter, substances. This relationship is also reflected in poetic language and is intrinsic to Miltonic notions of invention and inspiration, dimensions of selfhood that depend on the expression of inner life and personal agency. Yet these are also each weighted by the fallenness of the Miltonic subject, both poet and reader, with their fallen bodies, senses and passions through the effects of Original Sin.[48]

The relevance of Calvino's comments to *Paradise Lost* is related to its similar discrimination between lightness and weight in language. For Milton, as for Calvino, 'things valued for lightness in the world ultimately show their true weight', the 'ineluctable' weight of lived experience, yet it is also the state from which the notion of lightness can be fully appreciated.[49] In Milton's epic, at times the weight of lived experience imposes a heavy burden on language that at other times seeks to approach an ethereal lightness, resulting sometimes in weight and *gravitas*, at other times in

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[46] Calvino, 15.
[47] Lerer (1999) 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, An Introduction'.
[48] Kerrigan 1983, 243; Fallon, 103.
[49] Calvino, 7.

lightness and flexibility; from this dynamic alternation Milton's language arguably derives much of its energy.[50] As will be argued, Calvino's understanding of qualities of weight and lightness in language has everything to do with the affective power of poetry, and with the project of the poet to capture the energy of language without creating a weight so heavy that the energy is extinguished, or so light that it expires by dissipation.

A central theme of this thesis concerns how the poetics of *Paradise Lost* depend on a model of embodiment that is based on Renaissance understandings of the relationship between language and the body, expressed in critical models and techniques of poetic artifice. The first chapter considers a triptych of seventeenth-century discourses that are significant to this relationship, and are reflected in Milton's critical model: the first is the tripartite role of the imagination in the expression of thought and feeling; the second is Milton's blending of monistic and Arminian theology; the third is the relationship between the body and moral theory. Each of these is examined in the first chapter for its powerful bearing in the poeticisation of affective states in *Paradise Lost* and their reflection in techniques of figure and trope.

Literary styles of rhetoric and poetry historically recognise close associations with the body through their connections to oral forms of expression and their impressions on the senses, which in turn, affect the imagination and emotions. Central to this relationship are classically-derived techniques of 'feigning', a notion that is associated with artifice, or the application of styles of poetic and rhetorical ornament. Feigning has dual associations with 'fakery' and 'moulding' or 'crafting', associations which nonetheless suggest a relationship to the body.[51] Ornament is intrinsic to techniques of rhetorical and poetic artifice in the Renaissance, understood both for their expression of affective experience and their 'affects' on the audience.

Renaissance rhetorics and poetics incorporate techniques of figural language which depend on giving figure and form to expression in an embodied way, drawing on their capacities to express both thought and feeling according to the Renaissance theory of knowledge.[52] In the Renaissance as in the modern period, feelings provide the impetus for poetic language, which can express the relationship between language and

[50] Calvino, 3–29.
[51] R. Greene and others, 89.
[52] Tuve 1947, 183.

experience of the world. Thus Milton's 'pendant' expresses its sensory effects of shape and form, including powerful symbolic associations through a circularity linked to notions of the eternal, not just its semantic meanings. Renaissance techniques that have their origin in the classics and which rely on the embodied model of literary affect include the imaginative styles extending from the Homeric epics, and those based on Longinian, Aristotelian and Platonic theory. Each of these is considered in this thesis to be important to the reconciliation of Renaissance and Reformation Protestant poetics in *Paradise Lost*.

Of particular significance to both modern and Renaissance figurative language is the metaphor, a figure of speech which incorporates comparisons based on the speaker's experience and is, therefore, associated with the language of experience. Metaphors are consistently applied to capture the experience and expression of affect, to overcome the complexity of the relationship between thought and feeling, and to address the longstanding belief that affective phenomena can evade, to a degree, the structures of language. In traditions of modern theory, metaphors provide the means by which poetic language is accorded the potential to capture new experiences otherwise considered outside the realm of theoretical understanding and therefore of semantic definition.[53]

In turn, the body itself becomes a metaphor in both the modern and Renaissance period to describe the way affectivity is expressed and experienced in poetic language, because of its close association with oral expression and sensory and emotional experience. In the Renaissance, the styles and techniques of rhetoric and poetry are often compared to physical attire as 'garments of thought' and the rhetorical corpus is often compared to a physical body or, in its most idealised form, an angelic body.[54] Accordingly, language is anthropomorphised; accorded a material quality that underscores its metaphorical understanding as dress or garment, but which can also merge with the body itself.[55]

Key modern Milton critics, including Kerrigan, David Mikics and Schoenfeldt, identify the significance of the body metaphor to the model of the subject that underlies *Paradise Lost*.[56] Schoenfeldt emphasises the relationships between early modern

[53] Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 163–199; Heidegger 2007, 614–21.
[54] Steadman 1985, 15; Tuve 1947, 61; Vickers, 272.
[55] Tuve 1947, 61; Kerrigan 1983, 238; Fletcher, 114.
[56] Kerrigan 1983, 238.

medicine, the body (particularly through the metaphor of digestion) and notions of selfhood that he considers are indispensable to the themes and poetry of *Paradise Lost*.[57] Mikics considers the importance of the Renaissance subject for the apparent irreducibility of affective experience to moral doctrine in *Paradise Lost* with reference to classical theory and unconscious forces that feature in modern psychoanalytic theory.[58] For Kerrigan, the body is manifested as a central poetic figure in *Paradise Lost* that has material, spiritual and linguistic significance.[59]

In turn, in modern and Renaissance poetics, language gives shape and expression to the embodied figure. Modern theorists as diverse as Paul Ricoeur and Susan Stewart identify the way in which the body is reflected in the notion of poetic figure and captured by the word 'figure' itself.[60] Ricoeur notes how, from the tradition of rhetoric:

> [t]he very expression 'figure of speech' implies that in metaphor, as in the other tropes or turns, discourse assumes the nature of a body by displaying forms and traits which usually characterise the human face, man's 'figure'; it is as though the tropes gave to discourse a quasi-bodily externalisation. By providing a kind of figurability to the message, the tropes make discourse appear.[61]

A similar emphasis on figure is traced by Erich Auerbach and is central to his theory of '*figura*' which acknowledges the sacred relationship between embodied figures and language in early modern exegetical traditions. *Figura* captures the relationship between Old and New Testament persons in biblical writing and later, in the allegorical poetry of Milton and Dante, between classical and biblical figures.[62] This tradition is in turn indispensable to Milton's blending of the rhetorical and allegorical traditions in *Paradise Lost*.

The notion of 'figure' especially captures the relationships between affectivity, the body and poetic language. Stewart emphasises the role of poetry as 'to make visible,

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[57] Schoenfeldt 1999, 11. Fletcher, 115.
[58] Mikics, 27.
[59] Kerrigan 1983, 243.
[60] In this thesis, the term 'figure' is used as an umbrella term to refer to all kinds of figures of speech and more generally to the figurative dimensions of poetic language with its sensory and embodied effects. The term 'trope' is used to denote specific devices and techniques that involve a 'turn' from the literal meaning of words: See Abrams, 63.
[61] Ricoeur 1978, 144.
[62] Auerbach 1984, 11.

tangible and audible the figures of persons', whether expressing 'particulars of sense impressions', or 'abstractions of reason'. Although Stewart does not directly consider the emotions, she challenges the model of cultural transformation that relies predominantly on the role of discourse in shaping the social and cultural as well as the subject in favour of one which works through the common experience of poet and reader. It is through the body that poetry engages 'intersubjectively'; through the senses of its maker and audience, giving 'figure' and form to the 'mind's rich elaborations of sense as common human experiences' which are in turn 'given back to culture', transforming individual experience into 'moral life'. For Stewart, such affects can escape the measure of the individual body, person, or subject, and are capable of being experienced as a more generalised notion of affect beyond the personal.[63]

Poetic language can thus capture not just meaning according to hermeneutic principles, but also a sense of energy and concrete reality in material shape and form, recording the temporality of embodied experience along with the more refined expression of abstract thought. Drawing from the work of Ricoeur, Stewart and other theorists, this thesis discusses the sometimes very subtle poetic expression of sensory and embodied experience. These qualities of affectivity include the intensities of vital or conative experience of bodily energy and its transitionary states, the experience of orientation in space and time and proprioception, the qualities of mood, and the more complex emotional qualities of poetic language.[64] The first chapter finds comparable examples in the poetic styles of *Paradise Lost* that are in turn examined in more detail in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

4. Critical Methodology

> For I want to use aesthetic models to foreground conative experiences of affective states as ends in themselves, experiences quite at odds with the philosophical tendency to treat affects primarily as means for generating actions and attitudes.[65]

Altieri's modern aesthetic approach to affect is indebted to traditions which subordinate the role of discourses to the intensities of experience associated with affective states in

[63] Stewart, 2.
[64] In modern affect theory by Deleuze, Guattari and Massumi, these kinds of affects are considered to be largely non-conscious although the bodily variation of intensity is felt (Massumi, 15, 16). This thesis examines affects to the extent that they can be felt and consciously expressed in language and experience.
[65] Altieri, 5.

their own right, as essential to models of being. In this thesis, I draw on these modern approaches and also consider the role of such states set within the broader historical and cultural contexts relevant to *Paradise Lost*. My critical approach consists of several interrelated components that are considered relevant to the text and designed to capture affectivity in poetic language, by harnessing the values ascribed to experiencing these states instead of just emphasising the epistemological preoccupations of modern criticism.[66] The first component focuses on expressivity rather than solely emphasising the reader, examining the way poetic language expresses and produces affects through its techniques of genre, form and style. This is the model that Milton appears to recognise in his prose and poetry.[67] Such an approach to Renaissance poetry presupposes assumptions about the role of the poet, poetic inspiration and invention, and their manifestations in literary language. Equally this kind of affective criticism, with its introduction of the psychological and subjective, presupposes an understanding of the processes of reading. Both are indispensable to the qualities of literary affectivity examined in this thesis, and recent expressive models distinguish their traditional associations with the Romantic ego that are more generally set aside by the 'death of the author' and the 'decentred subject' in modern theory.[68] The approach taken in this thesis acknowledges that the capacity of language styles to express 'affects' is related to their ability 'to affect' the reader, and a fundamental dimension of textual experience and creativity in both the modern and Renaissance periods. Affective criticism ideally focuses on all such dimensions of literary language, which affect the mind and body through a variety of sensible and intelligible forms, conventions, styles and techniques.[69] According to Altieri, recognition of the expressive role of literary language can bring to the reading equation 'perspectives that are not already held' within the reader's existing repertory, and thereby 'change' individual and collective reader perspectives.[70]

The second component of the expressive model of literary affect identifies the central nature of affective experience in *Paradise Lost*, modifying the critical emphasis from a more traditional hermeneutic analysis of textual 'meaning' and the

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[66] The approach represents an adaptation of that used by Altieri 2003, 1–36, with modifications from my wider reading.
[67] *AP* CP 716; Of Education. CP 630.
[68] Deleuze and Guattari 1994 163–199; Barthes 1967.
[69] Nussbaum 2001, 239.
[70] Altieri, 26; Cable, 2.

corresponding interpretation of descriptive terms of affect, to include a focus on understandings about the performativity of affective states through expression and reading in Milton's epic.[71] *Paradise Lost* reflects a combination of early modern discourses which shape how affects and emotions are understood and experienced.[72] It is usually considered in the context of Aristotelian empirical theories with their emphasis on the senses and a more 'traditional' emotions theory which, in broad terms, tends to apply a dualist framework, dividing the personal, bodily and sensory dimension of the emotions from their status as intelligent states that are 'named', subject to individual reason and shaped by historical-cultural discourses on the emotions.[73] Yet the performative, experiential dimension of poetic affect, its sense of being absorbed in body, mind and world, is considered in this thesis as being of special relevance to key critical debates surrounding *Paradise Lost* and is also a quality clearly identifiable in the theory and practice of the Renaissance period.[74]

A critical examination of literary performativity depends on the historical and cultural specificity of theoretical understandings of how affects are experienced, as well as traditions of rhetorical and poetic techniques that evolve in time and shape their expression. In turn, modern theoretical and critical approaches can supplement a reading of literary works in their historical contexts, to assist in drawing out elements of texts that may not otherwise be so apparent using traditional techniques. Affects are experiences of body and mind, and poetic affects are both means of expression and experiences of reading, key features of various phenomenologies that understand poetic language as an expressive form that is not accessible separately from the experience of its users. An affective criticism which describes the reading experience only according to traditional hermeneutic principles ignores, Altieri argues, the potential for art to engage the reader's affective 'participation' in ways that sometimes resist reduction to the discourses used to explain them.[75] Instead its value derives from absorption in the immediacy of mental and bodily experiences that are constituent of affective states, qualities that can be traced in Satan's perception of the created world at the close of

[71] Altieri, 26.
[72] Greenblatt 1980, 1–10.
[73] Steadman 1998, 58; Craik and Pollard, 1.
[74] Treip, 223, 229; Shuger 1988, 227.
[75] Altieri, 16.

Book II of *Paradise Lost*. Accordingly, central to understandings of performativity in this thesis is their basis in such temporalities of embodied experience.

The third component to the approach to literary affectivity recognises the importance of reading the detailed particulars of poetic style in conjunction with the broader historical and cultural discourses that shape understandings of the relationship between poetic language and the embodied subject.[76] This thesis avoids reducing affectivity solely to an analysis of cultural discourses relating to early modern senses and passions, an approach which tends to favour a doctrinal reading with its cognitive bias and discounting of the value of experience, or to emphasise the highly wrought, didactic and conventional elements of *Paradise Lost.* Such an approach can remove the subject from the text, find the poem to be a work of austere early modern Protestant neoclassicism, and miss the subtlety of Milton's techniques of artifice applied for the expression of affects.[77] For this purpose some critics, including Altieri in his study of affectivity in art and poetry, apply an approach to aesthetic judgment, adapting principles developed by Immanuel Kant in the *Third Critique* on 'reflective' judgment, which highlights the significance of focusing on the 'particular' as opposed to the merely 'universal', where the particulars are considered in an open-ended manner according to the free-play of reflection and without being reduced to any controlling 'top down' scheme or purpose.[78] A critical model based on this philosophy is consistent with more 'open' reading models and instead applies a 'bottom-up' approach, seeking to find how the particulars of poetry interact within and even themselves shape the broader historical and cultural contexts. Such an approach can assist in drawing out the subtlety of affective technique in Milton's poetry, particularly when considered in connection with his monistic and Arminian philosophies, which find forms of expression to be constituent of his model of selfhood and engage the embodied agency of the subject in a degree of imaginative free-play. When applied in conjunction with a consideration of how Milton adapts the historical traditions of literary techniques, forms and conventions within their broader contexts, this open-ended approach to detail also derives value from considering a broad range of affective experiences that are potentially captured in the poetry of *Paradise Lost*.

[76] Altieri, 14; see also Perloff 1981.
[77] Mikics, 6–7.
[78] Kant (1790) 1914, 132; Altieri, 20.

5. Overview of Thesis Chapters

> With other notes than to th' *Orphean* Lyre
> I sung of *Chaos* and *Eternal Night*.
>
> (*PL* III.17–18)

The first chapter of this thesis, entitled 'Poetic Affect in *Paradise Lost*', examines significant elements of present-day theories of affect and the emotions in comparison to those applicable to Milton's seventeenth-century context, and in turn the relationships understood to exist in each period between affectivity and literary language. Although the field of modern theory is diverse, it is possible to identify the features of a more integrated modern model of body and mind that departs from mainstream dualism and can be compared to Milton's monistic early modern model that is intrinsic to *Paradise Lost*. The first chapter examines the thought of a range of theorists, including Antonio Damasio, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Solomon and Brian Massumi, each of whom can provide some insights into readings of *Paradise Lost.* Despite their differing approaches, these theorists emphasise either the significance of embodiment to affective states, or the important role that feelings and emotions play in our thought processes and attitudes.[79] Such phenomena are arguably integral to the complexities of Milton's epic and its irreducibility to a purely doctrinal reading.[80]

The second chapter of the thesis, entitled 'Poetry and Creation', traces Milton's notion of poetic inspiration in *Paradise Lost,* from his incorporation of the prophetic mode that is traditional to classical and medieval epic style, to the Renaissance notion of divine inspiration as it is reflected in the true artistry, as distinct from mere artifice, of the poet. In this thesis, I argue that 'affect', with its basis in agency and the intensities of experience, is an essential dimension of Milton's model of poetic inspiration and invention, articulating the relationship between sacred and secular according to the imaginative experience of the Renaissance subject. It is fundamental to Milton's transformation of allegory, wherein he supplements the epic convention of the inspired muse with Renaissance rhetorical, Neoplatonist and allegorical traditions, each of which are examined in this chapter for their qualities of poetic affect. With its dependence on Milton's Arminian and monistic theology, Milton's formulation of poetic inspiration

[79] Damasio 1995, xi–xix; Nussbaum 2004a, 184–99; Solomon 2004a, 76; Massumi 2002, 1.
[80] Mikics, 26; Cable, 13.

introduces a degree of voluntarism to the prophetic mode by which inspiration received by the individual is not unduly forced, a feature which critics overlook when they focus too heavily on the doctrinal pedagogy of other parts of the epic.[81] In *Paradise Lost*, poetic inspiration is not deterministically driven by the divine, as it tends to be in medieval epic invocations of the prophetic mode, but depends on the divinely-guided agency and invention of the poet as an imitation of the Creation, especially as a reflection of nature and the embodied, earthly figure of Christ.[82]

In turn, Milton's model of poetic inspiration as a 'gift of God' depends on the embodied faculties.[83] In *Paradise Lost*, notions of 'affect' are integral to the divine energy of the Creation itself, in which the activity of the inspired poet partakes through the process of poetry-making. It forms the basis of Milton's distinction between 'false' artifice and 'true' artistry, based on the relative proximity of each to the divine. While poetic affect is intrinsic to the notions of both divinely-inspired and fallen poetry and reflected in the figures and tropes of *Paradise Lost*, a comparison is drawn between the idolatrous artifice associated with Satan and divine forms of artistry (and by association, the divinely-inspired poet). The former is associated with the unrefined senses, passions and desires and the latter, more refined quality is especially exemplified by the figure of the 'Creation dove' of the first *invocatio* to Book I.[84]

Chapter Three of this thesis, entitled 'Ekphrasis', examines how in *Paradise Lost*, Milton adapts ekphrastic techniques of classical and Renaissance rhetoric and poetry to the styles and themes of his Protestant epic. Despite their status as instruments of a fallen language, poetic 'ornaments' are a means of expression of the relationship between language and the body, mind and soul.[85] The principal focus of this chapter is an examination of the ways in which specific figures in *Paradise Lost* depend on a sense of integrated, embodied experience that is articulated through the concrete particulars of Milton's poetry. The chapter examines key ingredients of the classical heritage and Renaissance techniques of ekphrasis that are important to Milton's project

[81] M. Mack, 111; Shuger 1988, 232.
[82] M. Mack, 122, 125; Fletcher, 135.
[83] Milton, The Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*; CP 669.
[84] *PL* Book I (17–22).
[85] Tuve 1947, 61.

and its particular expression of the allegorical tradition, which involves some refinement to conform to his iconoclastic Protestant poetics.[86]

The tripartite Renaissance Aristotelian theory of knowledge, which depends on the senses, and especially valorises the 'visual' imagination, underlies the relationship between affective experience and understanding in the Renaissance with its experience-based model of knowledge.[87] This integrated model shapes a closer relationship between thought and feeling in Renaissance poetic theory and its application of classically-derived techniques of rhetorics and poetics. The principal means of influencing the reader's imagination, according to Renaissance Aristotelian theory, is through the senses, particularly through the visual capacity of the imagination, the 'mind's eye'. The dominance of visual imagery in poetry and rhetoric alike is reflected in rhetorical principles common to both and qualities of sensuous imagery are central to ornament and its styles of figural language. Affectivity is intrinsic to this model as it depends not only on the experience of the senses but is also closely aligned with the emotions in Renaissance theory.[88] The classically-derived Renaissance model of affective criticism that relies on the image and the visual imagination is the 'imaginative', also equated by Wimsatt and Beardsley with the theory of 'empathy', with qualities they describe as its 'transport of the self into the object, its vital meaning and enrichment of experience'.[89] The imaginative model underlies the principle of pathos and bears a close relationship to the expression of the emotions in Renaissance literature.[90]

The imaginative model, according to Wimsatt and Beardsley, is represented by the figure of vividness mentioned in the rhetorics and depends on the techniques of ekphrasis or *efficacia*, *enargeia*, or the *phantasiai* in Chapter XV of the *Peri Hupsous*.[91] Its powerful affective qualities make it important in Renaissance debates about truth in representation in the arts of poetry and painting, but it is directed towards involving the reader in the literary experience not by simple representation per se but by reproducing the process of perception in the mind's eye, by 'placing before the eyes'. The techniques are common to rhetoric and poetry, with their role in rhetoric directed toward the

[86] Auerbach, 1984, 11. Steadman 1959, 236–38; Gilman, 162.
[87] R. Burton, I.I.II.5–11.
[88] Harvey, 649.
[89] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 40.
[90] R. Burton I.I.III.2.
[91] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 40.

moving of the will, a chief objective of which is to influence through the imagination, to move the emotions and also affect the reader's judgment.[92] For the overlapping genre of poetry, the role of ekphrasis often depends on the more subtle recreation of the inner rhythms of experience.[93] Ekphrasis is used for the apprehension of the divine in Renaissance poetry and sacred rhetoric and, notwithstanding its close relationship to the senses and passions, is intrinsic to Milton's style of allegory in *Paradise Lost*.[94] The importance of the relationship between ekphrasis and the emotions is associated with the Longinian tradition that in the Renaissance becomes useful for the expression of the sublime.

The poetic and rhetorical techniques of ekphrasis, with their basis on the imaginative literary model, are central to divisive seventeenth-century moral debates about the role of the passions and affections in literature. The fourth chapter of this thesis, entitled 'Ethos, Pathos, Logos', examines more specifically how desires, passions and affections inflect Milton's poetics of *Paradise Lost* with reference to the reading of its poetic figures. The complexity of their poeticisation in *Paradise Lost* is not only underpinned by Milton's monistic and Arminian model of body, mind and soul but also intimately bound up with his iconoclastic Puritan theology. The chapter explores how these dimensions are expressed in the figures themselves.

The techniques are based on the modes of persuasion — ethos (the character of the speaker), pathos (the engagement of the senses and passions of the speaker and auditor) and logos (the logic of the speaker's argument). It is the interaction of the first two that is of particular concern to this chapter. The three modes are reflected in the triple aim of poetry, developed against the background of religious and Platonic controversies about the social utility of poetry, to 'teach, delight and move' an audience to 'virtuous action'.[95] Renaissance passions are considered central to both the imagination and virtuous conduct, but if misdirected, can infect the will, leading to vice, an understanding traceable to key Renaissance works by Edmund Spenser, Philip Sidney, Francis Bacon and Robert Burton.[96] Because of its effects on the senses, imagination and emotions, poetry, according to Sidney and others, has a didactic, moral

[92] Webb 2009, 20; Krieger 1992, 93.
[93]Tuve 1947, 399; Cf. Milton, *Of Education*, CP 630.
[94] Shuger 1988, 210.
[95] Sidney 2007, 139; *PL* XII.410.
[96] Sidney 2007, 151.

role.[97] Based on the alignment of classical *eudaimonia* and Renaissance Christian virtue ethics, poetic affect is therefore an important way to transform thinking and central to the pedagogical role of poetry: to influence the reader's imagination and through it, the reader's emotions and moral action. Because of the relationship between moral theory and physical health, poetry may also affect the subject's physical well-being.[98] Moreover, for Sidney as for Milton, poetry, with its invocation of creative energies associated with the divine as well as its effects on the moral improvement of the fallen subject, plays a role in spiritual regeneration.

Traditionally, Ernest Gilman argues, critics have tended to reduce Milton's poetics to an opposition between the 'plenitude of the Renaissance imagination' and the 'Reformation's chastening of language'.[99] Milton's later poetry is often associated with a Puritan distrust of the image, both visual and verbal. Critics therefore assume a Miltonic poetics of powerful didacticism and emotional restraint, which is considered to impede the poetic imagination due to the close relationship understood to exist in the Renaissance between the imagination and the passions.[100] Some critics therefore find in *Paradise Lost* an integral opposition between ethos and pathos, and understand Milton to privilege a moral clarity based on objective and identifiable principles over the experience and expression of passionate and embodied energy.[101]

Yet the thesis explores how Milton's epic is more complex in its treatment of the passions and their relationship to creative expression than such simple dichotomies permit. That treatment involves a positive valuation of the fallen faculties and the channelling of passions and affections in moral and creative self-fashioning. Milton's modelling of the passions in *Paradise Lost*, I argue, reflects the interaction that William Bouwsma identifies in the Renaissance between Stoic and Augustinian theory, with the former based on the principle of *apatheia* or indifference to the passions, and the latter emphasising the importance of the heart and the will in the experience of the subject.[102] I argue that while Milton favours the Augustinian position, he also draws extensively from the Stoic theories of the emotions and its traditions of rhetoric. Bouwsma's interaction is a strong feature of *Paradise Lost* and the expression of its figures, central

[97] Sidney 2007, 139; R. Burton I.I.III.2.
[98] Schoenfeldt 1999, 11; CP 543.
[99] Gilman, 151; Cable. 3.
[100] Gilman, 151.
[101] Gilman, 151.
[102] Bouwsma, 20.

to engaging intensities and intermediary states associated with the creative and moral agency of his Protestant humanist subject. With its basis in the Augustinian tradition, the interaction of three classical affective theories of emotions critiqued by Wimsatt and Beardsley has special relevance to the poetics of *Paradise Lost*, including (as they express it) 'Plato's feeding and watering of the passions (more correctly a moral theory)', 'Aristotle's counter-theory of catharsis' as well as 'Longinian "transport" of the audience in the *Peri Hupsous*'.[103]

The fifth chapter of the thesis, entitled 'Epic Similes', examines their 'ornamental' role in *Paradise Lost*, with particular focus on their expression of poetic affects. A central feature of classical epic style, the epic simile is a formal and sustained simile in which the secondary subject, or 'vehicle', is usually developed far beyond its specific points of parallel to the primary subject or 'tenor' to which it is compared.[104] The chapter explores the important role of the similes in the structure and themes of Milton's epic, encapsulating his philosophies of both poetic inspiration and selfhood, in turn depending for their expression and reading on the affectivities of body, mind and soul. The similes engage elements of embodied experience in processes of perception and moral discrimination; they depend on the active role of the will and agency of the subject that is central to the reader's entanglement. Such intensities and immediacies are in turn intrinsic to processes of moral and spiritual regeneration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of poetic affect in the transformation of Milton's epic from its classical heritage to styles that encapsulate the seventeenth-century Protestant sacred, reflecting with it a shift in corresponding models of selfhood and culture.

Finally, the thesis's conclusion, entitled 'Language and Monism', concludes the main arguments about poetic affect and suggests some expanded arguments regarding *Paradise Lost* and Milton's later works. The effects of Milton's materialist philosophy upon poetic language in his Renaissance context, including the concrete ways in which it inflects his poetic style, are considered along with the implications for language in embodied models in the modern period. The accommodation of affect, as an expression of creative and moral agency, within Milton's model of divine Providence, is examined for its effect on the poetry. In their expression of a reconciliation of classical and Protestant poetics, Milton's later works are considered for their therapeutic effects on

[103] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 40.
[104] Abrams, 52.

spiritual, moral and physical well-being, based on the integrated model of body, mind and soul, and in turn the relationship between poetic language and psychology, that is inherent to them.[105]

[105] Shuger 1988, 194.

Chapter One: Poetic Affect in *Paradise Lost*

1.1. 'The trouble of thy thoughts'

> The trouble of thy thoughts this night in sleep
> Affects me equally.
>
> (*PL* V.97–8)

Adam's words to Eve early in Book V suggest a loss of tranquillity in Paradise, foreshadowing their fallen state. The effects are associated with Satan's tainting of the innocence of Paradise after his intrusion into Eve's dream, and manifest, for the Paradisal couple, in 'perturbations' of the mind and an accompanying sense of foreboding.[1] The lines reflect Milton's model of literary affectivity in *Paradise Lost* by not only ascribing a spiritual, interpersonal dimension to affective states ('affects me equally'), but also recording a concretisation of the language of affect into the temporalities and immediacies of embodied experience, in Adam's shared sense of the newly-introduced weight of 'trouble' to Eve's 'thoughts'. Adam's words thus evoke the lived world of the experience of the reader, registering a new kind of intensity of feeling in Paradise through their evocation of experiential states, produced by a shift to the present tense and accompanying poetic tensions between literality and suggestiveness.[2]

Through their invocation of classically-derived principles of Renaissance epic, rhetoric and poetic theory, Milton's lines affect the reader by engaging the immediate and transitionary experiences of the fallen body. They depend on the Aristotelian tradition of mimesis, reinforced by the classical rhetorical principle of pathos, with its propensity to touch and move audiences. As will be argued, poetic affect is an essential and sometimes subtle element of Milton's epic style, integral not only to his model of poetic invention, but also to the themes and structures of *Paradise Lost*. The enigmatic quality of Adam's lines arises because evocation of the temporalities of experience is not merely associated with the fallen condition and sin, but equally engages the

[1] *PL* IV.800–09, CP 297n. 'Perturbations' refer to the experience of fluctuations of inner emotions and thoughts in the Renaissance and are associated with humoral balance and imbalance. See *OED*, s.v. 'perturbation' *n*. According to Steadman, they can also refer to the events of the tragic or comic plot in Renaissance criticism: Steadman 1985, 28. Here, in line with a theme of this thesis, I attribute to them a kind of 'weight' associated with their embodied effects.
[2] Tate 1959, 82.

regenerative potential of the subject through the vital and embodied techniques of poetic expression.

This chapter examines key elements of present-day theories of affect and the emotions by comparison to those applicable to Milton's seventeenth-century period, and in turn aspects of the relationship understood to exist in each period between affectivity and literary language that are relevant to *Paradise Lost*.[3] While modern dualism favours a cognitive approach to affective states, the performative approach to literary affect emphasises the qualities of immediacy, transitionary engagement, and the concrete experience of the embodied subject that are recorded in poetic and rhetorical language. In the contexts of Milton's seventeenth century, this chapter's consideration of performativity highlights (a) the role of the imaginative model of knowledge and literary theory in the mimetic tradition, with its blending of thought and experience, its basis in pathos; (b) his monistic model of the subject with its valuation of the regenerative potential of the embodied faculties and the human will that are expressed in humanist traditions of rhetoric and poetics; and (c) the Renaissance eudaimonistic model of the relationship between moral theory and the body which aligns, as a state of functioning, the physical, moral and spiritual well-being of the subject. In broad terms, it is Milton's monism which underpins the expression of poetic affects in *Paradise Lost*, and it can be compared to aspects of modern theory which, despite its difference, identifies features of a more integrated ('embodied') model that encapsulates a closer relationship between the mind and body than is usually recognised in critical approaches grounded in modern dualism.[4]

Poetic affects are essential to Milton's conversion of classical and Renaissance styles to the terms of his Protestant epic, yet the tensions between sacred and secular literature lie at the heart of literary affect in *Paradise Lost* and its transformation of allegory through the expression of the experience of the embodied subject. *Paradise Lost* is typical of the Renaissance epic, a 'heterocosm' consisting of multiple genres and forms, encapsulating classical, medieval and Renaissance styles of rhetoric and poetics that include biblical forms.[5] Milton's adaptation of Genesis in his epic, an Old Testament book traditionally considered to be compatible with literary story and myth,

[3] The purpose of mapping the broad scope of affect theory in this chapter is to use the material as a platform for discussion of Milton's poetry in later chapters.
[4] Damasio 1995, 249–50; Damasio 2010, 256.
[5] Lewalski 1985, 4.

typically draws on the affinities between myth, literature and the sacred that also extend from the classics.[6] Such a blending of sacred and secular subject matter and styles is of concern to critics who, following a tradition extending from Augustine, consider the techniques of the rhetorical corpus to be inadequate for the expression of the Christian sacred. The epic carries with it a freight of historical understandings associated with secular literature, including the suggestion of fabulation and of pagan error. Moreover, with its highly wrought, highly conventional form and the centrality of rhetorical and poetic ornament, epic is a form which is usually concerned with the 'public and external', whereas Protestant theology centres on the sublimity of the Christian sacred and its relationship to the introspective individual soul.[7] Yet within this Augustinian tradition, Renaissance poets attempt to translate the authentic sublimities of the Bible to the feigned sublimities of rhetorical style and ornament, and their combination with classical literary forms and conventions.[8]

While *Paradise Lost* draws on and blends the affective powers of both sacred and secular literary forms, tensions between sacred and secular remain intrinsic to its dynamics through the distance between the fallen state of language and the forms of divine expression more closely associated with biblical writings.[9] For this purpose, the temporal immediacies and transitions of affective states are essential, because in *Paradise Lost*, Milton not only engages the reader through the styles of secular literature in ways which express the fallen condition, but equally the regenerative potential of the embodied faculties according to his underlying eudaimonistic model of the seventeenth-century subject.

An important dimension of this engagement involves the classical epic hero, encapsulated by the principle of '*thymos*', which is associated with the vital energy and passion of the hero and defined by expression of the actions of heart and will set within a cosmic order governed by the fates.[10] These energies are also essential to the drama and poetics of *Paradise Lost*, founding Milton's ontology of the autonomous subject

[6] Cave, 175; Lewalski 1985, 4. Lewalski 1999, 115; Spingarn, 109; Abrams, 50.
[7] Martindale 1986, 34; Curtius, 462.
[8] Lewis, 132; Martindale 1986, 35.
[9] Martindale 1986, 40–41.
[10] Mikics, 17; Peters, 196; Cf. Jameson 2013a 30; Peters, 166–67 on psyche: In Homeric epic, *thymos* is the spirit of thinking and feeling, associated with the midriff, whereas the *psyche* is the 'breath of life' associated with the brain. Freud's preferred term, 'psyche', is thus associated with the mind and its Cartesian understandings.

and his model of creative expression. Yet they must be converted from their associations with the figure of Satan to align with the model of the Miltonic epic hero, based on the figure of Christ.[11] Such a transformation of the epic hero occurs according to Milton's model of the eudaimonistic subject, based on principles of Protestant virtue ethics and Arminian agency. The process depends on a 'state of functioning' that involves immediate and transitionary states of 'becomings' or, in Renaissance Aristotelian terms, of 'potentialities'.[12]

While poetic affect is integral to Renaissance principles of secular poetry, of poetic artifice and feigning, it is also essential to the transformation of Milton's allegorical style and its underlying poetic figure and '*eikon*'. Distinguishing the '*eidolon*' associated with classical and secular poetry is an important element of Milton's poetics of *Paradise Lost* outlined by John Steadman, and reflects a style of Milton's true allegory as intimately connected to the spiritual condition of the subject.[13] The *eidolon* is related to false appearances, and can be verbal as well as image-based, so is reflected in the characters as well as poetic figures and language styles. In Francis Bacon's formulation, idols of the human mind are the antithesis of the ideas of the divine mind, between 'falsehood and truth'.[14] The distinction underlies Milton's blending of sacred and secular literature and the expression of poetic figure through the refinements of his allegorical style according to the typological tradition of *figura*.[15] It is expressed in the metaphor of the angel figure, which captures the transformational potential of modes of affect linked to the spiritual condition of the subject through embodied expression.[16] Such a model depends on the refinements of affect brought about through the mimetic tradition and its styles of pathos, in which the potentialities of the subject depend on the eudaimonistic model that equally underlies poetic expression and its transformational role on the experience of the reader. It is intimately connected to the expression of poetic figure, the forms and shapes of which are underlined by the heroic figure with its refined principle of *thymos*. Such a reading accords with those who find in *Paradise Lost* a recognition of the *felix culpa* in

[11] Steadman 1959, 236.
[12] Ulreich, 71.
[13] Steadman 1959, 236–39.
[14] Steadman 1959, 238.
[15] Auerbach 1984, 11.
[16] Kerrigan 1983, 243.

Christian theology.[17] Yet it is one which accommodates Milton's Arminian emphasis on the importance of the will in the process of individual salvation, in which the fallen state of the will makes the regenerative process a difficult one.[18] The introspective processes of engagement of the agency and will of the subject are essential to expression of Milton's sense of the Protestant sacred engaged through the intermediary of the reader, and are consistent with the notion of 'reader intangling' that is central to Stanley Fish's reading of *Paradise Lost*.[19]

The first part of this chapter examines the embodied subject in modern thought, with an emphasis on temporalities of experience, immediacies and intermediary states (of 'becomings' or 'potentialities') and the role of human agency and creativity, drawing out particulars from a range of theory that is relevant to the expression of affects in poetic language. The second part in turn compares the principles of embodiment in poetic language in the context of the common influence of classical eudaimonistic philosophy in modern cognitive emotions theory and in Milton's milieu, where it has a shaping role in the creative imagination based on Milton's Arminian model of human agency.[20] Both the temporal experience of fallenness and sublimated states associated with the angelic body metaphor that William Kerrigan finds at the centre of *Paradise Lost* are essential to Milton's transformation of the epic hero and its underlying form, its expressions of poetic figure, drawing on a process which includes the attainment of refined states of feeling or affect. While in some modern theory affect is a secular force foundational to art and vital life, in *Paradise Lost*, a comparable power is inspired by the divine, captured in nature and expressed in poetic language through the human form.

1.2. Modern Theories of Affect

> If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realise more deeply than ever how much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame, in the strictest sense of the term.[21]

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[17] Augustine. *Enchiridion* viii. Aquinas, *ST* III, 1, 3, ad 3. *PL* 12 469–73; *cf* Mollenkott187–192.
[18] M. Mack, 126–27. The notion is traceable to the views on regeneration of St Augustine: See *Confessions* VIII in toto, esp. VIII.8.19–VIII.12.30; Augustine (1992) 2008, 133.
[19] Fish (1967) 1997, 1.
[20] Schoenfeldt 1999, 10. Kerrigan 1983, 233.
[21] W. James 1884, 188.

Making a case for the complex interaction between body and mind in the late nineteenth century, William James anticipates themes in modern theoretical understandings of the affects and emotions. While Cartesian dualism has led, in historical terms, to a diminution of the theoretical significance of the body in conscious life, a number of recent theorists address the limitations associated with mind/body dualism with its integral opposition of thought and experience. Neurologist Antonio Damasio, for example, challenges the separation of conscious experience from the body, and the modern understanding of emotions as manifestations of a 'disembodied mind'.[22] In this Part One, the 'affects' are divided broadly according to the modern nomenclature of 'emotions', 'feelings' and 'modern affect theory' although they are complex states that can resist reduction to a single analytic framework.[23] Before turning to a more specific discussion of Milton's seventeenth-century context in Part Two, the remainder of this part examines the principal modern theories of affect and their relationship to literary language in ways which have a bearing on the expression of poetic affect in *Paradise Lost*.

In broad terms, the philosophy of emotions reflects dualist influences, applying a 'cognitivist' approach, with emotions understood as social phenomena that are shaped by discourses, often with an ethical orientation.[24] An exception is Norbert Elias's popular view of a gradual civilising of the emotions since medieval times, seeing emotion as a kind of psychological and physical 'drive' that interacts with social structures.[25] Barbara Rosenwein's theory of 'emotional communities' treats medieval emotions as distinct discursive regimes developed and understood within communities with their own particular norms and modes of expression. Her approach is similar to that of William M. Reddy, although Reddy differs from Rosenwein by suggesting a more 'top-down', less negotiable, idea of 'emotional regimes'.[26] In some modern thought, emotions are considered essential to certain processes of reasoning, particularly when applied to judgments involving values.[27] Like its counterpart in the seventeenth

[22] Damasio 1995, 249–50; Damasio 2010, 256; Schoenfeld 1999, 10.
[23] Shuger 1988, 193; Altieri, 34.
[24] Greenblatt 1980, 1–10.
[25] Elias, ix, 5, 449.
[26] Rosenwein 2010, 11; Reddy, 34.
[27] Altieri, 48. Consider for example, philosopher Paul Bloom's argument against empathetic reasoning for its capacity to cloud judgment (see P. Bloom 2016). But compare Antonio Damasio on when emotions make better decisions (see Damasio 2009). Martha Nussbaum argues that the emotions are 'intelligent': Nussbaum 2001, 3.

century, modern emotions theory is influenced by classical eudaimonistic ethics which connects emotional judgments with personal excellence.[28] The process is traditionally associated with the identification and naming of emotional states within a hierarchy of moral values, although more recent theory avoids such sharp distinctions.

While the terms of mainstream emotions study suggest that emotions are influenced historically by cultural discourses that shape the subject, they are also personal experiences and feelings. While both 'modern affect theory' and 'feelings' theory incorporate the senses and energies of embodied experience in time and space into theories of affectivity, modern affect theory emphasises their temporal immediacy and transitionary nature in ways which hold them to be both non-personal and resistant to the shaping power of discourses. In critical theory, understandings of the notion of 'performativity' — of the expression and experience of affective states — are therefore as important as their descriptive terminologies and understandings.[29] They are integral to the literary expression of affectivity in *Paradise Lost* and captured poetically in Adam's lines in the opening quotation of this chapter.

The focus of 'modern affect theory' which has developed in express contrast to traditional emotions theory, is on distinguishing the features of a 'free-floating, subtly differentiated realm' of affect, anchored in bodily experience.[30] In this theory, 'affects' are expressly distinguished from emotions as bodily sensations, understood with reference to their temporal and somatic 'intensities' that involve limited mental activity or agency.[31] The delimitation of this kind of bodily affect in modern theory is also central to approaches which distinguish the physiological basis of the emotions from cognition, a distinction emphasised by Damasio's theory of 'primary' and 'secondary' emotions that incorporates a Cartesian division.[32] William James's late nineteenth-century theory also isolates the emotions primarily to their physiological basis, assimilating emotions to bodily sensations bound up with mental operations yet

[28] Calhoun and Solomon 1984, 3.
[29] Altieri 18–20; Reddy 1997, 327.
[30] R. Greene and others, 11.
[31] Massumi, 16, 28. Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 163–99; Jameson 2013a, 27–44. In this thesis, for the purpose of clarity, the term 'modern affect theory' refers to this narrower branch of affect theory that excludes both feelings theory and the theory of the emotions.
[32] Damasio follows such a division in spite of his critique of the Cartesian model. Primary emotions, in Damasio's approach, are limited mainly to physiological experiences that precede or accompany the secondary emotion, the 'self-conscious social dimension based in the unique history of humans'. Damasio 1995 Part 1, 137–9; Damasio 1999, 49–51, 122; Damasio 2001, 192; Damasio 2010, 95. Brennan, 5.

distinguishable from cognition.[33] Brian Massumi follows James's assimilation of affects primarily to physiological experiences, defining affect by its interpersonal, bodily dimensions distinguishable from the emotions. Emotions constitute a 'narrativisation of a quality of experience', but because of the largely non-conscious basis of affect, emotional states cannot encompass all the depth and breadth of our experience.[34]

Central to this branch of theory is its emphasis on intensities and intermediary states which are the basis of a subject's engagement in the temporal present and also account diachronically for transitions ('body-movement/sensation-change'), in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's formulation called 'becomings'.[35] In his notes on the terminology employed in Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, Massumi's translation defines the term 'affect' used in the volume as 'an ability to affect and be affected' and 'a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another'.[36] Massumi's understanding of affect draws on Baruch Spinoza's philosophy of '*affectus*', which denotes a range of emotions that are perceived by increases or decreases in the body's '*conatus*', or 'vital force'.[37] The 'vitalist' themes in Spinozan philosophy influence modern philosophies of affect, but they also have their parallels in the thought on affectivity in Milton's writings which are integral to the themes and poetics of *Paradise Lost*.[38] Subsequent philosophical understandings of affect by Deleuze, Guattari and Massumi, although expressly derived from Spinoza, depart from his work by distinguishing affect from emotions.[39]

Their respective formulations provide a contrast to the Cartesian valorisation of mind, by depending on Spinoza's integration of the dynamic energies of the mind and body into the world as participatory energies.[40] According to Massumi, 'affect and being affected' are transitionary states marked by 'shifting intensities': 'we are our experiences … our participations, not some abstract entity that is somehow outside looking in at it all'.[41] While Massumi's emphasis is on the sense of concrete, vital

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[33] W. James 1884; Calhoun and Solomon 1984, 3; Massumi, 16.
[34] 'Massumi, 27–28, 61; Zournasi.
[35] Massumi, 1.
[36] Deleuze and Guattari (1980) 1987, xvi.
[37] The relationship between *conatus* and *affectus* is not fully explained. Spinoza (1677) 2001, 141. Part III, Proposition 56.
[38] Rogers, 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 1'.
[39] Deleuze and Guattari 1994, esp. ch. 7, 163–99. Massumi, 1.
[40] Altieri, 142.
[41] Massumi, 27; Zournasi.

presence that affective states entail which are considered separable from the mind's intellective faculties, the key modern philosopher of the emotions, Robert Solomon, argues, by contrast, that subjects are in a constant process of reflecting on these states in ways which influence and resist strict isolation of affective experience from the more complex activities of the mind.[42] Despite Solomon's qualification, these theories of affect are insightful for identifying certain aspects of experience, including the intensities that are captured in Adam's opening lines to this chapter, although Milton characterises it according to his own understanding of the divine relationship to the experience of the embodied subject.

'Affects', according to Deleuze and Guattari, are not simple affections, as they are not personal to their subject.[43] Massumi uses psychological studies in an attempt to draw out general principles of experience that remove affectivity from the solely personal space.[44] Affect is a dimension of the social rather than the personal and is constitutive of social bodies.[45] Yet while the history of emotions is shaped by cultural discourses and in turn expressed in traditions of rhetoric, modern affect theory emerges instead without an established vocabulary, because dominant cultural models lack the tools to deal with the material and corporeal aspects of affect.[46] Affect disrupts 'conceptual ordering', and resists the hylomorphic shaping of matter into form according to the traditional Aristotelian model of experience.[47] Affect is a force for social change based on its dependence upon non-conscious phenomena, pre-discursive and sub-semantic, and therefore ahistorical and capable of being separated from the emotions' freight of historical, social, ideological and cultural determination.[48]

The split between modern affect theory and the study of the emotions has led Fredric Jameson to propose that the relationship between them is dialectical, with the former depending on the 'inchoate', the 'sensuous', the 'conative', the 'unconscious', the 'pre-discursive', the 'bodily', and the latter on traditional notions of 'human nature',

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[42] Calhoun and Solomon 1984, 3; Altieri, 142.
[43] Altieri identifies a number of earlier sources of the philosophical concept of 'intensity' including Henri Bergson's *Time and Free Will*, that influence Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. Altieri, 222–46. Deleuze is then reworked by Massumi, 24–34. In the literary field, Altieri refers to an older literary study of 'intensity' in Allen Tate's 'Tension in Poetry': See Altieri, 287n; Tate 1959, 82.
[44]See, e.g. Massumi, 23–45. Brennan, 95.
[45] Ahmed, 30; Trigg, 6.
[46] Massumi, 4, 5 16, 17, 20, 27–28; Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 163.
[47] D. Smith and Protevi 2015. The term 'hylomorphism' is discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
[48] Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 171–74.

‘convention’, ‘narrative’, ‘discourse’, and ‘history’.[49] For Jameson, bodily states of affect are ‘nameless’, while emotions are ‘reified states of consciousness’. While traditional literary models are thus based on emotions theory as it has evolved in history, they are, according to Jameson, ‘ill-equipped to register the kind of sensations that correspond to affects’. Emotions are ‘named, narrativisable and allegorical of social and psychological sociological states’, an aspect considered by a number of theorists to make emotion terms difficult to translate across historical periods.[50] Affects, by contrast, are not reducible to cultural or historical narratives but are ‘temporally and eternally present’.[51]

‘Feelings’ theory, by contrast, tends to be ‘inward and private’, emphasising the integral role of physiological sensations within conscious experience, including its emotional states and imaginative projections. Traditional aesthetic models are based on it, and endeavour to capture the inner complexity of experience, but the private and subjective aspect of ‘feelings’ suggests that some kinds of feelings are difficult to measure and therefore to reduce to theoretical terms.[52] Although emotions involve more complex engagements with the mind and depend on feelings, feelings are categorically broader than emotions, encompassing ‘simple’ sensory experiences and bodily states like ‘hunger’ or ‘pain’, as well as more ‘complex’ emotional experiences like ‘grief’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘happiness’ that have a distinct somatic dimension.

With its valuation of the temporalities and intensities of present experience in affective states, sensory experience is inherent to modern affect theory. While Massumi argues that the experience of the senses should be ‘unmediated’ by the nomenclature of language, the senses are also intrinsic to feelings theory with its integral processes of the imagination and consciousness.[53] In ways which are comparable to Milton’s seventeenth century, feelings theory captures the immediate relationship between the senses, the imagination and experience.[54]

Modern theory expands the categories of sensory experience beyond traditional Aristotelian theory, which adopts the most commonly recognised suite of five senses,

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[49] Jameson 2013a, 27–44.
[50] Rosenwein 2010, 5; White, 286.
[51] Jameson 2013a, 44.
[52] Damasio 2010, 115; Nussbaum 2001, 57.
[53] Massumi, 2.
[54] Altieri, 3.

with the sense of sight most valorised.[55] By contrast, modern theories of affect and feelings, with their respective emphases on aspects of physical embodiment, rely on a more broadly-defined range of sensory experiences with sometimes less emphasis given to the sense of sight. The range includes not only the five traditional senses derived from Aristotelian thought, but also the sense of motion, or movement in space and time, conation, proprioception, viscerality and their intensities, each of which is integral to the 'adverbial', present and active condition of experience.[56] The theory provides an enhanced platform for considering the scope of poetic affects, albeit recognising that the potentially unlimited range of experiences may also be principally non-conscious.[57]

Modern theories of knowledge tend to subordinate traditional experience-based Aristotelian theory with its centrality of the image, in favour of other models which are based on the cognitive processing of abstract thought. Yet the modern empirical model retains an emphasis on the role of memory. [58] Bergson proposes an interdependence of memory and sense perception in a way which is comparable to the thinking of Milton's seventeenth century:[59]

> there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousand details of our past experience.[60]

His approach can be compared with Massumi's acknowledgement of the role of non-conscious memory in affective states by comparison to the more limited range of memories Massumi considers to be accessed by the emotions.[61]

The sensible world is the realm of direct experience in Milton's understanding and equally the context for reorienting the subject toward the intelligible and divine. Although Milton's paradigm of sensory experience is based in the traditional Aristotelian classification of the five senses, this thesis explores the essential role of the

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[55] Steadman 1998, 57; R. Burton, I.I.II.6.
[56] Gregg and Seigworth, 1–4; Heidegger 1962, Part 1.2.2.5, 2.2.3.3; Wheeler 2017; Massumi, 16. The term 'proprioception' refers to 'the sensibility proper to the muscles and ligaments as opposed to tactile sensibility' (Massumi, 58); see also Altieri, 250 on its expression in aesthetics.
[57] Massumi, 16. The expanded senses are explored in Gregg and Seigworth, 1–4; and Altieri, 237–54.
[58] Modern theory disputes that images are either always produced or necessary for thought and understanding. See Damasio, who traces the relationship between image and consciousness. Damasio 2012, 67.
[59] *PL* V 100–113.
[60] Bergson 1929, 33; Stewart, 152.
[61] Massumi, 28; Zournasi.

more expanded range of sensory experiences recognised by modern theory and captured poetically in *Paradise Lost*.[62] One of these categories of sensory experiences is Milton's vitalism, which underlies his monistic understanding of the inseparability of body and soul.[63] Milton's vitalism draws on themes that feature in philosophy at least since Aristotle and the Stoics, and shares affinities with modern affect theory which identifies affect with bodily animation and movement, finding conation and kinetic or vital energy to be integral to affective states. Massumi, Deleuze and Guattari derive their understandings from Spinoza's notion of '*affectus*' with its links to the body's conative forces or '*conatus*'.[64] Each develops a materialist theory of affect, based on conative or vital process. Their respective works follow Spinoza in locating affective experiences in a philosophy of immanence, rather than in divine transcendence as is the case in mainstream Christian and Platonic thought. [65] Henri Bergson's modern notion of the '*élan vital*' is also a vitalist philosophy that influences the affect theories of Deleuze, Guattari and Massumi as a creative principle responsible for evolutionary development.[66] Like Spinoza, Milton formulates a materialist model of the vital relationship between the body and the soul that explains the relationship between the human and divine, yet Milton's model is animated by his compatibilist understanding of the relationship between free will and divine Providence rather than by reference to forces of physical determinism.[67]

Damasio finds sensory experience in its broadened understanding to be the basis for the emergence of 'feelings' which, in turn, generate conscious experience and are a necessary precondition for consciousness itself.[68] James's approach, like Damasio's, is notable for its focus on how consciousness adjusts to the way the world is sensed: his theory involves a 'subtle psychology', according to Altieri, that suggests that feelings can 'quicken consciousness and attune it to the world'.[69] James's emotions theory in turn recalls Spinoza's transitionary states of intensity, that range from very subtle states

[62] In Augustinian thought, the sensible realm provides the context for the fallen body's reorientation toward the spiritual realm: Mendelson 2016.
[63] Fallon, 98.
[64] Spinoza (1677) 1982, Part III.
[65] Massumi, 1; Zournasi. Damasio uses a similar concept which he refers to as 'primordial feelings' which are the most fundamental of all feelings: Damasio 2012, 108; Irvine, 29.
[66] Bergson 1911; Lawlor and Leonard 2016; Deleuze 1988, 13–14.
[67] On Spinoza's express rejection of the notion of free will see Nadler 2016.
[68] Damasio 2010, 10, 108.
[69] Altieri, 38; Stewart, 20; Damasio 2010, 122, 167; W. James 1884, 189; W. James (1890) 1950, 449.

of feeling to those which in modern theory would be characterised as emotions.[70] His account of the physiological responses of rapture and euphoria in some kinds of religious experience suggests that some states of emotion are not primarily forms of cognitive appraisal, a phenomenon integral to Edmund Burke's aesthetic theory of the sublime.[71] Milton's accommodation of the Longinian tradition upon which Burke's theory is based, with its dependence on a more embodied, aesthetic experience, is essential to the respective poeticisations of Adam and Eve, and in turn distinguish the worlds of Paradise and of postlapsarian Eden.

Massumi, Deleuze and Guattari quarantine 'consciousness' from their theory of affect, whether understood in a more traditional way as an integrated sense of self or even soul, or in the Jamesian sense as a conduit or 'stream of consciousness', or Damasio's model of embodied consciousness.[72] In Massumi's philosophy, affect precedes significant conscious awareness.[73] He proposes that affect is bodily sensation without much conscious reflection; it is 'not yet a thought but a movement of thought' (a 'becoming', the term also used by Deleuze and Guattari), which he considers to provide a more integrated way of talking about experience.[74] Damasio, by contrast, argues from a neurological perspective that consciousness must be present in order for feelings to influence the subject, also explaining that if consciousness is suspended, so usually are the emotions.[75]

Although Massumi's affect theory is based on non-conscious experience, he distinguishes the Freudian 'unconscious' because of its emphasis on repression. Modern readings of Freudian theory often consider subjects to be principally driven by their unconscious emotions, desires and drives.[76] They generally equate the classical approach to moderation and mastery of such forces by the intellect with the repressive dictates of culture. The distinction is essential to *Paradise Lost*, which applies a model

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[70] W. James 1884.
[71] Burke, 1, 7, 10; W. James (1902) 1917; W. James (1884), 189; Nussbaum 2001, 249. In this thesis, the notion of the sublime is traced from its classical Longinian and Epicurian formulations, to their respective influences on Christian notions of the sublime; see esp. Chapter 4 and 5 and the Conclusion to this thesis.
[72] Damasio 2012, 24, 95.
[73] Massumi, 16.
[74] Massumi, 5, 7, 16; Zournasi.
[75] Damasio 2010, 115, 136.
[76] Freud 1915. There is some theoretical argument that Freud's emphasis on the primacy of the unconscious may have been overstated by his translators, and that he may have afforded more weight to the intellect and will: Solomon 2006.

of the emotions as subject to the shaping forces of the reason and will.[77] Freud's emphasis on the primacy of unconscious forces has been compared to a form of 'psychic determinism' that gives less weight to the shaping power of the will on the quality of desire or the exercise of the subject's cognitive faculties in the processing of affective states.[78] The Freudian model underlies later structuralist and post-structuralist thought, where the psyche is understood to be structured like a language, placing the forces of the unconscious, the bodily emotions, drives and desires outside of the social identity of the subject.[79] William Kerrigan and David Mikics take up this distinction in psychoanalytic readings of *Paradise Lost*.[80]

Despite their respective emphases on the realm of experience, Deleuze's, Guattari's and Massumi's approaches can be distinguished from modern phenomenologies where the essential quality of being in phenomenology is temporality, which is explained in terms of a subject's experience of being present in the world in time and space. In this theory, feelings (including what Massumi and Deleuze would consider to be 'affects') are generally considered to be experiences lacking the requisite degree of intentionality, and therefore incapable of being explained in phenomenological terms, because they are constituted by insufficient measurable mental activity or are simply phenomena of the body.[81] Ignoring the vital immediacies of the embodied subject as part of its processes of engagement, modern phenomenology is concerned with how the physiological dimensions of the emotions shape subjectivities as 'epistemologically important phenomena that complement reason's insight'.[82]

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[77] In this thesis, the term 'will' is used to refer to the directedness of the subject towards something as a balance of conscious and unconscious forces. The term 'desire' is only distinguishable due to its modern association with the dominant forces of the unconscious. The Aristotelian view of the emotions has them interspersed with desire: Calhoun and Solomon 1984, 3.
[78] Solomon 2006; *OED*, s.v. 'desire': 'The fact or condition of desiring; that feeling or emotion which is directed to the attainment or possession of some object from which pleasure or satisfaction is expected; longing, craving; a particular instance of this feeling, a wish'.
[79] Mikics, 6–15.
[80] Mikics, 6; Kerrigan, 9–21.
[81] Calhoun and Solomon, 16. To be measurable in phenomenological terms, experiences require a certain directedness; 'intentionality' refers to those orientations of consciousness that give it a directedness and so make it possible for the activity of the mind to engage a concrete world. Wollheim explains it as follows: 'intentionality is the thought content of a mental phenomenon, and it is intentionality that secures the directedness alike of mental states and mental dispositions': Wollheim 1999, 6; Altieri, 260.
[81] Calhoun and Solomon, 16.
[82] Calhoun and Solomon express it as 'epistemologically important mental phenomena that complement reason's insight by leading to the world of moral, aesthetic and religious values': Calhoun and Solomon, 17.

Mainstream phenomenology thus lacks recognition of the powerful participatory energies afforded to affective states by Spinozan philosophy and modern affect theory.[83]

Yet several recent approaches blend the ideas of key theorists to recognise the relationships between sensory, conscious, imaginative and emotional experience. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose thought is influenced by modern phenomenology but places embodiment and sensory-motor functions at the centre of perception and being, develops an approach that reflects a 'corporeity' of consciousness as much as an 'intentionality of the body'.[84] In some approaches, Heidegger's philosophy is read in conjunction with the work of Spinoza. The purpose is to explain how some forms of feeling are not simply internal bodily states but also ways of experiencing the world, capturing a sense of 'relatedness between self and world' which shapes all experience, as well as incorporating a sense of vital bodily experience, a participatory sense of 'conscious "thereness"' that would otherwise follow the Cartesian division into a 'split ego'.[85] In particular, Spinoza's emphasis on presence 'fulfils', according to Negri, 'what Heidegger left as a mere possibility', splitting being into a dichotomy that 'tended toward nothingness for Heidegger and toward fullness for Spinoza'.[86] The distinction between presence and absence is also evident in the poetics of *Paradise Lost*. Milton's monistic philosophy animates its poetry; especially visible in the body imagery of Paradise, with its 'shaggy hill' and 'breathing', *Paradise Lost* is often vitalised by such a sense of experiential presence, with Milton's prelapsarian world more closely capturing the Spinozan '*affectus*', a philosophy embodying an immanent and vital expression of the divine manifest in the world.[87] By contrast, Milton's postlapsarian world, with its breaking of the direct connection, retains its vitalist animation of the material body but is perhaps, due to the Fall, more Heideggerian.[88] Yet this thesis argues that the Heideggerian state of 'nothingness' is largely misplaced in a discussion of *Paradise Lost*, with its vitalist philosophy and Christian notion of divine presence being reflected in the world through divine works.[89] The distinction remains however,

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[83] Calhoun and Solomon, 16.
[84] Merleau-Ponty, 4–5, 408.
[85] Guignon, 197; Ratcliffe, 179–80. Massumi rejects this branch of theory for its perceived neglect of the role of discourse and power in shaping subjectivities: Massumi 2002, 191, 206.
[86] Negri, 60.
[87] *PL* IV.135, 224, 265. See discussion of Spinoza's theory in Nadler 2016.
[88] Or probably more accurately, Platonic. Not a complete loss, but 'No more', as is described at the start of Book IX.1.
[89] The state of nothingness is more often associated with Eastern rather than Western philosophy. Western philosophy tends to rest on a Platonic notion that accords presence rather than absence as a governing

essential to *Paradise Lost*, and is reflected in Milton's poetic treatment of the opposition between mere artifice and divinely-inspired artistry, with only the latter being an imitation and reflection of the divine.[90]

1.3. Affect in Modern Poetics

> 'the concreteness of things, bodies and sensations'.[91]

Calvino's words capture how poetic language, with its ability to express the experience of the embodied subject in ways which are immediate, transitionary and interpersonal, is more than a vehicle for recording abstract thoughts. This capacity of poetic language, in the view of modern theory, depends on recognition of its distinguishing features according to linguistic categories by comparison to other rhetorical and discursive forms.[92] Poetry achieves this through elements of style — or artifice — that are essential to the expression of the sensuous qualities of experience, especially poetry's characteristic, densely-concentrated sonic, visual and imagistic properties, features which are also integral to Elizabethan and early seventeenth-century poetry.[93] These elements of style are especially associated with traditions of lyric poetry, while overlapping traditions of rhetoric tend to be associated with techniques of persuasion through their effects on the choice and will of the auditor. Lyric poems, like epic poems, are recognised as performances addressed to another party, and their effects are produced by formal and stylistic tools that are shaped by discourses on the relationship between language and affect. Identification of these features of affect in this thesis involves a close examination of the particulars of poetic style alongside histories of genre, convention and form to explore how classical epic techniques in *Paradise Lost*, especially its figural techniques of ekphrasis, metaphor and simile, produce important poetic affects that are no less subtle than those usually attributed to the lyric.[94]

Mainstream aesthetics tends to be based on 'feelings' theory as it has evolved through the Kantian split between objects of feelings and judgment, a split that *Paradise*

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principle, including the principle of Stoic *apatheia* which is aligned with the will of God in Christian theory.

[90] *PL* IX.25–47.

[91] Calvino, 15.

[92] De Saussure (1972) 1986, 9–10, 15; Jacobsen, 852.

[93] Tuve 1947, 3.

[94] Leavis (1936) 1947, 42–61; Eliot (1936) 2003, 56–64; Hagstrum, 124; Ricks, 1–21; Kerrigan 1983, 230.

Lost predates, with its close link between aesthetics and moral theory. Modern affect theory, by contrast, provides the basis of an alternative aesthetics which is less driven by cognitive thought or ideas than by affective experience — with its intensities, immediacies and transitionary states or 'becomings'. Affect is the essential ingredient and resists the reduction to form associated with the Aristotelian hylomorphic model.[95] In this theory, traditions of rhetoric and poetry are considered to be 'contaminated' by historical discourses of the emotions. The aesthetic theory of Deleuze and Guattari isolates affect from any emotional subjectivism or socio-cultural determination, locating generalities of affective experience in the mutual 'joyful' encounters between artists and spectators as they participate in artworks. Affect is integral to the creative process as a kind of transcendent (or more correctly, immanent) experience of 'becoming', although it is not one based on divine forces, as it is in Milton's poetry of *Paradise Lost*, but on transformative interpersonal ('social') ones.[96] For Deleuze and Massumi, and contrary to the links between moral philosophy and aesthetics in traditional thought, the ethical dimension of affect is amoral, yet lies in its potential to alter human behaviour, transforming the social by 'mutually inhabiting spaces of uncertainty', 'without judgment by discursive categories of good and evil', but 'situationally' in terms of 'becoming' as the 'good' which brings 'maximum potential for connection'.[97] The role of the Freudian unconscious in creative expression is evident, albeit adapted, in Deleuze and Guattari's affect theory, which focuses on art's asignifying, vital, defamiliarising yet interpersonal potential for 'joyful encounters'.[98] The emphasis is on the transformative potential of these present immediacies of joyful experiences, or even *jouissance*.[99] Fredric Jameson applies such an approach in his examination of Wagnerian opera, which he considers to mark an historic shift in the expression of affects in music. Jameson's approach is similar to Massumi's, incorporating the temporal and transitional aspect of aesthetic affect, arguing that 'affects are not essentialisable in [the way emotions are], they are multiple, perpetually variable, they shimmer like the orchestra itself, in constant mutability': '[P]assionate emotions are a

[95] Colebrook, 12; D. Smith and Protevi 2015. The term 'hylomorphic' is explained on page 57 of this thesis.
[96] Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 166; Colebrook, 15–25.
[97] Colebrook, 21–25; O'Sullivan 2006 5; Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 165–199; Massumi, 5, 7; Zournasi; Deleuze and Guattari's thought redresses in its own terms the separation of the aesthetic enacted by Kant in *The Third Critique:* D. Smith and Protevi 2015.
[98] Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 166, 193.
[99] See Barthes 1973, 4.

succession of affects … interwoven by Wagner in his musical fabric' through 'an art of transition' based upon 'Wagner's own mood swings'.[100] In the more traditional aesthetics that is applicable to Milton's work and period, this quality of shared aesthetic experience is usually linked to moral if not religious discourses. Altieri, for example, notes the 'charged' surfaces of some Neoplatonist Renaissance paintings.[101]

Modern affect theory shares with other modern aesthetic traditions the tendency to try to isolate the qualities of affective experience from the traditional nomenclature of the emotions and, as a corollary, from the shaping role of accompanying traditional aesthetic models and rhetorical theory. Some traditions of Modernist poetry anticipate the work of Deleuze and Guattari on affect, largely endeavouring to distinguish the subtle realm of affect from the problematic realm of the emotions with its freight of personal and cultural associations. In *Paradise Lost*, by contrast, Milton identifies a comparable style of refined or rarefied affect as a reflection of the vital expression of the divine, a quality evoked in Adam's lines quoted in the epigraph to this chapter. Yet modern aesthetic models based on such an isolation or refinement of affect are distinguishable from the traditional triadic model that immerses it with the imagination and emotions. This model is the basis of 'feelings' theory, understood in more expansive terms than the more materialist approaches of Massumi and Deleuze, which quarantine consciousness and imagination from theories of affect. In the approach of this thesis, one that has its parallel in the early modern period, poetry acts on the sensory memory and the imagination through the interdependence of all these dimensions of experience.

Feelings provide the impetus for poetic language because of the way they can 'attune' consciousness to the way the world is sensed, experiences which are interpersonal in poetry through the shared parameters of experience recognised in memory and imagination.[102] The evocation of sensory and temporal immediacies is 'characterised by an imaginative engagement in the immediate processes of sensation' and can 'modify our experience'.[103] Feelings 'introduce *asness* to the core of sensation' and, according to Altieri, in the process elicit a 'momentary intentionality' concerned less with interpreting itself than with 'expanding or refining its mode of participation in

[100] Jameson 2013a, 40; Barthélemy.
[101] Altieri, 42, 236.
[102] Altieri, 48–49; Tuve 1947, 399.
[103] Altieri, 2.

the unfolding possibilities' of conscious engagement, so the conscious body itself becomes an intentional object.[104] He cites Susanne Langer, for whom intentionality is unnecessary for kinds of aesthetic feelings that require no cognitive involvement. Feelings are a 'phase of vital process instead of a new substantive element produced by such a process', like 'the incandescence of a heated wire'.[105] For Altieri such a 'concrete grounding' is readily idealised as establishing a 'rich connection between the mind and the processes or forces generating our sensations' and one which provides a 'springboard' for the imagination and the emotions.

A variation of feelings theory is the concept of moods, touched on briefly in the chapters of this thesis along with poetic techniques that are associated with their expression.[106] Moods, by contrast with other affects,

> are modes of feeling where the sense of subjectivity becomes diffuse and sensation merges into something close to atmosphere, something that seems to pervade an entire scene or situation.[107]

Feelings and moods differ from other kinds of affects in their 'pure absorption in the present' and, according to Altieri, their corresponding 'lack of concern for how the subject is oriented toward action or evaluation or commitment'.[108] Heidegger's discussion of 'mood', according to Altieri, 'positions the experiencing subject as contingent' and 'reflects enigmatic states which seem deeply personal' and yet over which the subject seems to have no 'control'.[109] This thesis identifies several examples of mood in Milton's poetics of *Paradise Lost* and explores how mood is produced by poetic techniques.[110] Through their enigmatic, descriptive and suggestive language, the

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[104] Altieri, 49; Nussbaum 2001, 249.
[105] Altieri, 49. Langer finds relations between organic life and art, which feelings express: 'The fact that expressive form is always organic or "living" form made the biological foundation of feeling probable. In the artist's projection, feeling is a heightened form of life; so any work expressing felt tensions, rhythms and activities expresses their unfelt substructure of vital processes, which is the whole of life. If vitality and feeling are conceived in this way there is no sharp break, let alone metaphysical gap, between physical and mental realities, yet there are thresholds where mentality begins, and especially where human mentality transcends the animal level, and mind, *sensu stricto*, emerges.' Langer 1974, xix.
[106] Altieri, 54.
[107] Altieri, 2.
[108] Altieri, 54.
[109] Altieri, 56. 'Moods can have a power over subjects stronger even that the power of ideas': Altieri, 54. Heidegger's most influential 'confrontation with this evasiveness' is his examination of 'anxiety'. Anxiety cannot be reduced to fear, but is the 'foundation of existential heroism', according to Altieri, for 'it reveals our contingency by forcing us to encounter subjectively the world's indifference toward subjective desire': Altieri 57. Anxiety is the state in which the subject realises its failure to assimilate to *Das Man*. Heidegger 1962, Part III.
[110] *PL* IV (73–78) and III (1–55).

opening lines of dialogue from Adam in this chapter capture the more diffuse effects of mood that are integral to the sense of impending cosmic shift in Paradise; they produce feelings of foreboding that have already been foreshadowed at the end of Book II.

The notion of poetic 'figure' itself captures the capacity of poetic language to express the experience of the embodied faculties through the process of figuration. In lyric poetry, feelings can be expressed and generated in the sensory aspects of language texture, including sonic, tactile and imagistic features as well as tropes and figures of metaphor and conceit.[111] Figural language thus animates expression and engages the imagination and emotions; sensory affects thus facilitate intersubjective experience in ways which are recognised in the rhetorical tradition through the principle of pathos. For Susan Stewart, lyric poetry is not the mere expression of private experience, but gives form to a more generalised notion of affectivity beyond the subject, a transformation that takes place through the imaginative figure of the body:

> The task of aesthetics production and reception in general is to make visible, tangible, and audible the figures of persons, whether such persons are expressing the particulars of sense impressions or the abstractions of reason or the many ways such particulars and abstractions enter into relations with one another. As metered language, language that retains and projects the force of individual sense experience and yet reaches toward intersubjective meaning, poetry sustains and transforms the threshold between individual and social existence.[112]

Of particular importance to poetic figure is the metaphor, an essential tool of language and an especially important ingredient of poetic figure in modern aesthetic theory. Metaphor, according to Susanne Langer:

> is our most striking evidence of *abstractive seeing*, of the power of human minds to use presentational symbols. Every new experience, or new idea about things, evokes first of all some metaphorical expression.[113]

Moreover, experience-based metaphor theory finds the metaphoric process to engage not just the intellect, but the imagination, feelings and emotions of the auditor. Because of its capacity to synthesise thought, imagination and feeling, metaphor thus also

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[111] Stewart, 1.
[112] Stewart, 2.
[113] Langer 1951, 125.

captures the concrete, embodied experience of the auditor through the process of figuration.[114] In poetic language, the process of figuration can produce tensions between literal meaning and suggestive readings, with the latter including the evocation of immediacies of sensory and emotional experience.[115] Accordingly, Adam's words at the opening of this chapter figuratively record through this process in material and physical terms the impact of Satan's tainting of Paradise in the mind of Eve.

Approaches to literary affect, both modern and historical, whether referring to oratory, lyric or epic, often rely on physical metaphors — including comparisons of abstract concepts with concrete experience — which are often directly applied to describe the way language affects the auditor (such as 'force', 'touch' and 'shimmer'). Stewart highlights the equation of 'animation' with a form of 'touch', tracing this notion to an important dimension of Aristotelian theory discussed in various chapters of this thesis and which is essential to the classical principle of pathos.[116] The notion underlies Calvino's idea of the weight, density and lightness of poetic language. When considering extended types of sensory experiences beyond Aristotle's five senses, to include spatial, temporal, visceral and proprioceptive as well as conative or vital forces, the notion of 'touch' or embodiment is extended to encompass the concretisation of experience in language as things', 'bodies' and 'sensations', including the felt changes in intensity that can be identified in the chapter's opening lines of Adam's.[117]

The metaphor of weight has a long history in poetic theory to describe the concrete expression and experiences of thought and feeling.[118] Calvino uses metaphors of 'lightness' and 'weight' to capture the relationship between language and experience as a reflection of concrete particulars attached to the body: affectivity gives language a kind of lightness, which can be associated with light objects of feeling as much as refined, abstract thought, and also weight, charging it with the 'concreteness of things, bodies and sensations'.[119] Similarly, James famously identifies the effects of spoken language beyond the strictly literary when he identifies the subtle relationship between

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[114] Ricoeur 1978, 143–59.
[115] See Tate 1959, 82.
[116] Stewart, 3.
[117] Calvino, 15; Altieri, 231.
[118] William James refers to the weight of sadness and John Calvin to the heaviness of the mortal body. See *OED* s.v. 'affect' *v*.2 2a for historical usages of the term 'affect', citing a ?1548 translation of John Calvin: 'So longe as we shall consyder but oure selues onely ...we must neades be miserably tormented, and affected with extreme heauynesse'.
[119] Calvino, 15.

affect and language as the 'relations … we *feel* to exist between the larger objects of our thought' (my italics):

> There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward coloring of its own. In either case the relations are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades. We ought to say a feeling of *and*, a feeling of *if*, a feeling of *but*, and a feeling of *by*, quite as readily as we say a feeling of *blue* or a feeling of *cold*.[120]

James points to the near-material quality of language and how abstract thought, by being integrated as an experience of the body, is capable of being charged with affectivity or embodied experience, and in this way ideas are capable of expressing a kind of gravitas as well as a kind of lightness through their embodied effects on the poet and the reader.[121] In Milton's poetic style in *Paradise Lost*, the higher and more refined faculties of reason and conscience are generally associated with rational and spiritual lightness.

While Deleuzian aesthetics draws on modern psychoanalytic theory for its expression of unconscious experiences, such forces are largely accommodated within the classical epic tradition through the transformation of heroic action encapsulated in the principle of *thymos*.[122] Key critics of Milton's work, including David Mikics and William Kerrigan, outline approaches to *Paradise Lost* based on the primacy of unconscious forces of desire and emotion, which they place in tension with readings which emphasise the importance of religious doctrine.[123] Chapter Four of this thesis examines the modern psychoanalytic readings of Kerrigan and Mikics and the extent to which *Paradise Lost* dramatises the classical epic basis of heroic action as an engagement and a triumph over unconscious forces of desires and passions.[124] By

[120] W. James (1890) 1950, 238.
[121] Trigg, 13.
[122] Eros is the usual basis of unconscious forces invoked by modern Freudian scholars: Mikics, 15–38.
[123] Kerrigan 1983, 3; Mikics, 6–7.
[124] Kerrigan 1983, 3; Mikics, 6–7.

aligning classical with Christian notions of virtue, Milton transforms the classic form, emphasising the dynamic processes involved in the engagement of temporalities of embodied experience of the subject's will.[125] The importance of this internal drama underlies the principal critical divisions associated with the Romantic ('Satanic') and the traditional doctrinal readings of *Paradise Lost*.

Although the approach of this thesis is to take a more traditional approach to aesthetic feelings and emotions in relation to Milton's epic, modern affect theory provides useful criteria for identifying experiences based on participatory states of materiality, temporality, and intensities in Milton's poetics. Yet while modern theory seeks to establish a notion of refined affective states uncontaminated by discourse and history, it will be argued that in *Paradise Lost* Milton aligns notions of rarefied affect with energies associated with the divine, based on a self-modelling and voluntary expression of virtue and creative expression that animates his eudaimonistic subject.

2.1. Early Modern Affect and *Paradise Lost*

> HOW FARRE THE HVMOVRS AND AFF[E]CTS OF THE BODIE, DOE ALTER OR WORKE VPON THE MIND.[126]

In 1605, Francis Bacon identified a relationship between body and mind that became integral to theoretical understandings of affectivity in the seventeenth century and also resonates with the recent thought of James and Damasio. In Milton's seventeenth-century period, understandings of the role of the body in affective states have important points of intersection with modern theoretical approaches, which are set against the parameters of a traditional Cartesian mind–body dualism.

Milton's understanding of the relationship between the body, mind and soul is integral to the expression of poetic affect in *Paradise Lost*, a relationship influenced by Renaissance discourses of science and psychology, philosophy and theology. Their effects shift the centre of gravity in Milton's epic to the body and embodied experience, according to Milton's materialist philosophy of the subject that also applies to the ethical, spiritual and even the intellectual sphere. The dynamic relationship between the

[125] In this thesis, the will is understood according to Burton's *Anatomy* as a separate faculty of the soul, subject to the reason and capable of influence by the affections and passions toward virtue or vice: See R. Burton, I.I.II.11.
[126] *The Advancement*: Bacon 1605, sig. Kk1v.

secular, temporal world of lived experience and the more refined and spatial, spiritual realm that develops from these influences is captured in the metaphor of the angel body that Kerrigan finds at the centre of *Paradise Lost* and that animates Milton's poetry.[127]

This part of my chapter considers the importance of three interrelated seventeenth-century understandings of the relationship between body, mind and soul which shape Milton's embodied model and underlie his approach to the expression of poetic affects and the techniques of style in *Paradise Lost*. Firstly, Milton's embodied model is integrated through the imagination according to Renaissance knowledge theory and faculty psychology, a tripartite model that is in turn reflected in Renaissance critical models of rhetoric and poetics. These techniques of style draw particularly on engaging the embodied faculties intersubjectively in the mimetic tradition through the principle of pathos. Secondly, the model rests on Milton's materialist 'monistic' theology that accommodates the regenerative capacities of the faculties according to Aristotelian 'potentialities' and Milton's Arminian philosophy, with consequences for poetic style. Finally, Milton's model is influenced by the relationship between the body and moral theory in Renaissance medicine and psychology, one that is intrinsic to the state of functioning associated with the classically-modelled eudaimonistic subject.

2.2. Mimesis, Pathos and the Imagination

in the Soul
Are many lesser Faculties that serve
Reason as chief; among these Fancy next
Her office holds; of all external things,
Which the five watchful Senses represent,
She forms Imaginations, Aery shapes,
Which Reason joining or disjoining, frames
All what we affirm or what deny, and call
Our knowledge or opinion; then retires
Into her private Cell when Nature rests.
Oft in her absence mimic Fancy wakes
To imitate her; but misjoining shapes,
Wild work produces oft, and most in dreams,

[127] Fish (1967) 1997, 1; Kerrigan 1983, 233; Schoenfeldt 1999, 8. The development of Milton's body metaphor is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 2.3 and is considered essential for the arguments elaborated in this thesis.

Ill matching words and deeds long past or late.

(*PL* V.100–13)

In Book V of *Paradise Lost*, Adam outlines the ambivalences associated with the processes of Renaissance knowledge theory that underlie its critical theory, identifying the 'phantasy' as a lesser faculty of the mind, second to reason.[128] The imagination has a synthetic role in Renaissance knowledge theory that is reflected in its faculty psychology. The model is based on the Aristotelian classification of Aquinas that holds all knowledge to be 'derived from sense experience' and by virtue of which 'the mind cannot think without the images of sensation'.[129] In Robert Burton's formulation of this model, the five external senses are part of the 'sensible soul' and subordinate to the 'rational soul'; they are necessary for 'outer apprehending', with the sense of sight being the most valued.[130] Aristotle's theory is 'almost wholly visual', according to Debra Shuger, with psychic activity constantly shifting from the imagination 'to the reason, memory and appetite'.[131] The imagination 'functions in both thought and appetition, transmitting the images of sense to the reason as the matter of thought and picturing the judgments of reason to the will and emotions in order to set them in motion toward praxis'.[132] Despite the hierarchical nature of the theory, the Renaissance knowledge model dynamically integrates the processes of the embodied faculties.[133]

Renaissance literary theory recognises a closer relationship between thought and feeling than does modern criticism, because in the empirical Aristotelian theory of knowledge, understanding is based on the perception and experience of the sensuous detail of the world, according to a classification of the senses which valorises the sense of sight.[134] Resting on the central role of the imagination in the mediation of reason and experience, the model emphasises the function of images in both thought and feeling, and by recognising the integral role of the feelings and emotions has consequences for

[128] The *OED*, s.v. 'fantasy' *n*. provides two early modern definitions of 'fantasy' that underlie its ambivalent understanding in the period. In scholastic psychology, it is defined as the 'mental apprehension of an object of perception; the faculty by which this is performed.' Its relationship to the creative imagination in the period is expressed as 'imagination; the process or the faculty of forming mental representations of things not actually present.' Milton's lines express the tension between these two functions of the fantasy, of representation and invention.
[129] Shuger 1988, 202, 209; R. Burton, I.I.II.6.
[130] R. Burton, I.I.II.6.
[131] Shuger 1988, 203.
[132] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.12.1.
[133] God in *PL* III.122–25 acknowledges the model when he refers to the self-authoring freedom of subjects to choose and yet to 'enthral themselves'.
[134] R. Burton, I.I.II.6.

both creative expression and moral theory.[135] The model recognises the broader range of sensory experiences that imagery evokes beyond the 'visual' representation model and is in turn reflected in traditions of rhetoric and poetry that shape the way imagery and figures are cast.[136] It is central to the mimetic tradition and forms the basis of the relationship between language and embodiment in *Paradise Lost*.[137]

Although the distinction between the two literary forms is recognised by Milton in his prose works, where he distinguishes poetry as more 'simple, sensuous and passionate' than rhetoric, the blending of the traditions of rhetoric and poetics mean that poetry is more than an instrument of instructional persuasion and depends on subtle poetic techniques that affect the contours of experience of the subject.[138] Bacon explains the Renaissance literary model when he discriminates between the body and affections being based on temporalities of the present, while the reason that judges and refines them is a future-oriented faculty:

> the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.[139]

Bacon's explanation envisages the importance of the time-bound and temporalising processes of present experience that are engaged by the body under the Aristotelian model, and their reconciliation with the faculty of reason that stands above the constraints of the present time. Bacon highlights the role of the orator in engaging the sensory memory and imagination of the auditor with objects refined by the higher faculties, rather than engaging lower level bodily experience. The basis of the model, in its captivation of the senses in the present time ahead of the mediating role of reason, is also an elementary feature of Renaissance traditions of rhetoric and poetics where such processes are engaged for didactic purposes. Its effects are recognised in techniques of Renaissance ornament that rely on the time-bound and immediate effects of pathos, which in the Aristotelian tradition applies to the effects language has on bodies through

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[135] Shuger 1988, 205.
[136] Fletcher, 97.
[137] Shuger 1988, 203; Tuve 1947, 79.
[138] Tuve 1947 27, 36; Eliot 1921, 669–70; Steadman 1985, 17.
[139] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.4.

the senses as well as the emotions.[140] The effects accord with the Aristotelian association of animation with 'touch' and are produced by rhetorical and poetic techniques such as *enargeia*.[141] The model underlies the development of Milton's poetic style in *Paradise Lost*, and is especially important for distinguishing his religious figures or '*eikones*' from antecedent '*eidola*' of classical literature, in line with his form of Protestant allegory.

A principal function of poetry lies in the effects it has on the moral and spiritual condition of readers. The imagination model is subject to Platonic critiques which question poetry's truth basis and its effects on the senses, passions and desires of the auditor. This model, with its split between present and future effects, depends on the powerful affective qualities that are central to the distinction Milton draws between secular and sacred experience in *Paradise Lost.* In Aristotelian and later Stoic poetic and rhetorical theory, literature affects the body and requires the refining powers of the intellect to temper its effects on the subject. The process is recognised in Milton's prose works, where his Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*, published in 1642, outlines a model of poetry that is divinely inspired ('the inspired gift of God') and which is equal to the 'office of a pulpit' for influencing the 'virtue and public civility' of the subject. Poetry has a didactic role in teaching by example, by engaging the faculties of the subject in an embodied way, a notion also recognised by Sidney, as for Milton: 'to allay the perturbations of the mind and set the affections in right tune'.[142] It can thus improve the condition of the subject by refining the higher affections from the lower fallen passions and bodily appetites. The effects of literature on the lower level senses and emotions of the body that lie beneath the governance of reason are recognised in classical Stoic theory, with Seneca referring to their effects as pre-emotions or bodily disturbances.[143] In this thought, the condition of pathos requires positive assent to the emotions.

The distinction is reflected in poetic and rhetorical figure. Underlying the Renaissance tradition of mimesis is the Platonic distinction between the eicastic and the phantastic, which is essential to Milton's development of poetic figure between *eikon* and *eidolon*, to accord with his allegorical style in *Paradise Lost*. The requirements for

[140] Aristotle 1961, Ch I–IV.
[141] Aristotle 1961, Ch I–IV.
[142] Sidney 2007, 139; Milton, Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 669–70.
[143] Seneca, *De Ira*, 2.3.5. Seneca 2010, 14–96.

truth, clarity and proportionality govern the expression of Renaissance figures where the eicastic begins to be associated with rhetoric, enabling greater scope for invention in poetry. The principles are reflected in Renaissance artifice, which emphasises invention, and more generally includes elements of rhetorical ornament, skill or eloquence, 'feigning' or fiction-making. Yet the perceived effects of poetic and rhetorical figures on the desires, passions and affections invoke moral consequences with their power to infect the imagination with false images. There is a general 'distrust of the imagination's creating and feigning capacity' with preference for the 'simple reproductive imagination' that is 'necessary for all feeling and cognition, including the knowledge of the supersensible' with its apprehension of the divine.[144] The reproductive imagination relies on sensory memory; without the 'images or phantasms' generated by it thinking is impossible in Aristotelian theory.[145] When governed by the reason, it is integral to the production of knowledge, yet if unchecked it can also make a subject prone to 'flights of fancy'.[146] Adam thus informs Eve, after her first dream provoked by Satan, that although the role of the fancy is to imitate Nature, in dreams it can produce 'wild work'.[147] In some styles of Protestant rhetoric and poetry, this manifests in a view indebted to Stoic rhetorical theory that imagery should move the reason without moving the passions and the will, which often involves its accompaniment with verbal instruction, a technique that Milton applies in the poetics of *Paradise Lost*, especially post-Fall.[148]

Yet the classical epic tradition is founded on the imaginative model and it is intrinsic to Milton's adaptation of the tradition to his Protestant epic.[149] Milton relies on the refinements of the tradition of Augustine and Dante in which a true expression of sacred subjects depends on the underlying typological model of *figura*. The distinctions are reflected in Renaissance styles of figure and trope, with their basis in metaphor. Yet the notion of metaphor, an inherent element of Renaissance figure and equally the technical basis of allegory, reflects the double-edged aspect of poetic language. Metaphor involves a transfer of meaning from tenor to vehicle: it is a 'false-seeming'

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[144] Derrin, 7; Shuger 1988, 201.
[145] Shuger 1988, 202; Newlyn, 223–24.
[146] Steadman 1998, 58.
[147] *PL* V.100–13.
[148] The iconoclastic position on the effects of imagery is particularly associated with the influence of Stoic theory. Bundy 1930, 535–366; Bouwsma 19; Curtius, 398; Gilman, 170.
[149] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 40.

that involves the description of a thing in foreign terms. George Puttenham refers to metaphor as a 'figure of transport', an equally double-edged description of its 'feigning capacity' and effect on the senses and imagination.[150] Metaphor is also referred to as a figure of inversion, and Satan's speeches often record the negative expression of these figural qualities in *Paradise Lost*.[151] Yet the transfer from tenor to vehicle is essential to Milton's model of poetic inspiration and allegory in *Paradise Lost*. Milton's figural style depends on his Arminian model of human agency which accommodates certain Renaissance humanist traditions of creative expression and invention. Furthermore, it is the latter quality of metaphor, its effect on the senses and emotions, that is essential to the Longinian tradition of the sublime and underlies the notion of 'transport' as an expression of refined feeling states.[152] Milton's approach to figure is based on his accommodation of this tradition, with its emphasis on such refinements of sublimity in poetic figure, which is essential to Milton's discrimination between the sacred and the secular in *Paradise Lost*.

A shift occurs in the Renaissance from a mimetic model of simple reproduction by the imagination to the notion of invention as an 'original act' that depends on the mediation of the poet.[153] Renaissance mimesis does not depend on modern understandings and styles of representational realism, but the elaborate styles of eloquence in techniques of rhetorical and poetic ornament underlie its forms of expression.[154] Sidney's *Apology* thus invests the power of invention with the 'zodiac' of the poet's 'wit', as an 'heroic' activity, although for Sidney it does not engage the free-play of the imagination to the extent that is found in Shakespearean poetics. It is circumscribed as an active emulation of the figure of Christ through its engagement of the regenerative, embodied faculties of the poet and reader. As such, it is an imitation of, and participation in, the divine powers of Creation that are reflected in nature as an earthly manifestation of the divine.[155] This shift in models of creativity also underlies Milton's poetics of *Paradise Lost*; exploration of such a notion of poetic inspiration is

[150] 'Puttenham 1589, Bk III. 3, 17, 18; Peacham 1577, sigs. Biir–v.
[151] Lerer (1999) 2007, '*Paradise Lost*'.
[152] Shaw, 12–23.
[153] Bundy 1930, 541. Bundy traces this development to the works of a number of English Renaissance figures including Puttenham and Pierre de Ronsard (Bundy 1930, 541–44).
[154] Tuve 1947, 27.
[155] M. Mack, 122.

intrinsic to his reconciliation of Protestant and Renaissance poetics and underlies its techniques of figure and trope.

Because the shift engages with the borderline between 'invention' and 'fantasy', the creative model depends on the distinction between 'feigning' and fashioning', with only the latter recognised as inspired poetics.[156] Although epic poetry is 'feigned' literature, a term used in *Paradise Lost*, the relationship between sacred and secular literature is more complex than simply oppositional when traced through classical and Renaissance literary traditions. The verb 'to feign' derives from the same Latin root as that for poetic and fictional artistry (Lat. *fingere*, 'to form' or 'to make,' 'to mould' or 'to sculpt' dough or clay), and prior to that, the Greek root of poetry-making (Gr. *poiēsis*).[157] In English Renaissance poetry and poetic treatises, 'feigning denotes imaginative literature (verse or prose) and its composition' and depends on artifice, which carried ambivalent moral associations of not only artistry and invention, but also pretence or deception.[158] From the classics and Renaissance poetics the term 'feigning' has dual associations of artifice as sophistry or inspiration, respectively feigning or fashioning, and Milton draws on this distinction in his alignment of classical and biblical notions of sacred poetry.[159] It is important for the distinction in *Paradise Lost* between divinely-inspired art and fallen artifice, as Milton's poem shows: God is the supreme artificer, who is said to 'fashion' Eve in his hands, whereas eloquent Satan is the 'Artificer of fraud' (IV.121).[160]

In turn, Milton's poetic style, with its recognition of the regenerative capacities of the fallen faculties, incorporates the Longinian tradition, with its style of sublimity which stands above the force of persuasion and produces feelings that are powerful and elevated. Longinus held the techniques to be integral to and yet to precede poetic figure as they are based on poetic genius or the skill of invention and concealment of the materiality of language. The style underlies Milton's development of allegorical figure and *eikon* based on the refinements of affect through the higher faculties, which emerges from a humanising of the tradition through the writings of Augustine and the

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[156] Schutz, 117.
[157] *OED*, s.v. 'feign' *v*. Fletcher identifies the relationship to Greek poetry-making in Aristotle's poetic theory. Fletcher, 108.
[158] Schutz, 119; R. Greene and others, 479. See Milton's reference to his 'true' material, the 'better fortitude' as opposed to stories of 'fabled knights / In battles feigned'. *PL* IX.28–31.
[159] Schutz, 119; M. Mack, 110.
[160] See also Ben Jonson, 'To the Memory of My Beloved the Author, Mr. William Shakespeare'.

typological tradition of *figura*.[161] The strongest expression of this tradition in Milton's later works involves the fusion of the humble diction of biblical language with the sublime.[162]

These principles underlie Milton's adaptation of figural techniques in his style of allegoresis of *Paradise Lost*, which retains a strong association with the embodied figure.[163] The notion of 'fashioning' carries a relationship to the embodied subject that is reflected in its metaphorical comparison to 'moulding' or 'crafting' of expression in poetic form. In *Paradise Lost*, that relationship is expressed through the figure of the angel body that Kerrigan finds at the centre of the epic. The angel body has both actual (synchronic) and potential (diachronic) form that is compared to an alchemical process.[164] It denotes clarity of expression and rarefaction of emotion, vigour and agency based on Milton's monistic subject. The metaphor is intrinsic to Milton's model of poetic inspiration, and its distinction from feigning or mere artifice. In Renaissance poetics, ornament is central to this equation of the body with poetic figure and form and also has cosmic dimensions through its association with *kosmos* or the cosmic body. With its emphasis on engaging the 'mind's eye' of the imagination through the refinements of the intellect, the model is important to the expression and experience of the sacred in Renaissance poetry and to Milton's reconciliation of its traditions with his Protestant poetics.[165]

Milton recognises the potential for the sacred in language through the divine inspiration of the poet, which links poetic creation and the reading experience as a participation in the Creation itself.[166] Ornament has an eternal quality, and Christianity provides a 'sanction for a cosmic poetry as the creation of the world involved the establishment of a universal symbolic vocabulary', understood as reflected in nature.[167] The poet can 'imitate the creation by his artistic efforts', while readers can regard themselves as 'participating in the creation by an active aesthetic response to nature, taking it "cosmically" rather than "hedonistically"' as cosmic poetry 'depends upon systems of status too strict to allow a free play of artistic imagination'.[168] In *Paradise*

[161] Shaw, 13, 17, 19. The Longinian tradition is discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
[162] Auerbach 1953 554–7; 1984 11; Lerer 2005.
[163] Fletcher, 125, 135; Tuve 1947, 36.
[164] Kerrigan 1983, 247.
[165] Augustine followed Plato, holding that subjects retained a memory of the virtues and the sacred, including that of God. Derrin, 7; Mendelson 2016.
[166] M. Mack, 111.
[167] Curtius, 398–401; Fletcher, 130–35; M. Mack, 122–23.
[168] Fletcher, 125.

Lost, that imitation and response to nature involves the Creation myth of Genesis itself and depends on expressions of the embodied faculties and refinements of feeling that are dimensions of Milton's allegorical figures. While the refined affect of modern theory is thus based on a secular model of art stripped of the weight of language and history, in Renaissance poetry a similar impulse is a reflection of God in nature, the divine artificer, of the regenerative potential of the human body modelled in art.

2.3. Poetry and Monism

> It is as if … [Milton] is saying that the deadness of the material world is too great a price to pay for the immortality of a separable soul.[169]

Stephen Fallon's comment captures a key principle of Milton's monist philosophy, with its essential denial of any distinction between the body and the soul: Milton's valuation of the embodied faculties, including the emotions and will of the seventeenth-century subject. By giving form and value to the material subject, it finds affinities with Milton's Arminianism which ascribes to the model a sense of active agency that animates moral and creative expression.[170] The combination has important consequences for poetic expression in *Paradise Lost*. Poetic language takes on the particulars of corporeal and concrete experience, in ways which dynamically animate in a graduated chain the relationship between the fallen and spiritual worlds. Such an argument runs counter to that of Stanley Fish, who opposes any valuation of the fallen state in *Paradise Lost*.

Prior to the Cartesian division of the seventeenth century between the world of matter known to the senses and the mental world, the Renaissance generally followed a Neoplatonist relation of body and soul. Original Sin severed the direct link between human and divine worlds, leaving fallen subjects to apprehend the spiritual world only by means of their higher faculties. An Aristotelian hierarchy of the soul, as framed by the medieval Aristotelian, Thomas Aquinas, upheld within a Christian framework the role of classical rationalism and the higher faculties of the soul, and placed all the other faculties, the senses, imagination, emotions, desires and the will, under the control of the most exalted faculties of conscience, and reason or intellective capacity.[171] The

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[169] Fallon, 107.
[170] Fallon, 79.
[171] R. Burton I.I.II.5–11.

distinction applied to the passions and affections, which were graduated according to their degree of governance by the reason and will.[172]

Yet according to Kerrigan, in an alternative Renaissance tradition to the dualistic Neoplatonist model, 'mind' was 'being fused with body'. Philosophers in this tradition sought 'to define the precise graduations of mind's articulation with matter: earth and heaven might communicate by means of substance'.[173] Within this tradition, Milton is understood to have adopted by the late 1650s the 'heterodox' philosophy of monism, otherwise referred to as 'animist materialism' or 'vitalism'.[174] In his posthumous prose work, *De Doctrina Christiana*, Milton thus recasts Neoplatonic dualism, as well as Cartesian and Christianised Aristotelian formulations to conform to his monistic model.[175] Milton there asserts that 'man' is not 'composed of two different and distinct elements, soul and body' but 'the whole man is the soul'.[176] The traditional formulation of soul or spirit exists in a parcel of what Milton calls in *Paradise Lost* 'one first matter', treating spirit and matter as 'manifestations, differing in degree, and not qualitatively, of the one corporeal substance'. Milton's spirit does not 'coexist with an alien matter', it 'contains matter'.[177]

By contrast to the dualist formulations of both Descartes and Renaissance Neoplatonism, Milton's formulation of 'first matter', according to Fallon, is necessarily sensible and represents a variation of classical Aristotelian hylomorphic theory.[178] For Aristotle the 'form is the organisation of body', not a 'superadded entity', and the 'soul is the form of a living body'.[179] Where Aristotle 'equivocates' on the inseparability and immortality of the soul, Milton refines Aristotelian hylomorphism 'towards a pneumatic form of materialism'.[180] The effect in *Paradise Lost* is a form of animist materialism that explains dynamically the cosmic relationship between the material world and the divine. The underlying philosophy is responsible for the vitalist quality that inflects

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[172] Aquinas, *ST* 1a2ae.24, 2; Scrutton, 175.
[173] Kerrigan 1983, 247.
[174] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 1'.
[175] Donnelly, 79; Fallon, 97; cf. Rogers 1996, 11.
[176] Fallon, 99; CP 979–80.
[177] Fallon, 102; CP 977.
[178] Fallon, 102, 117.
[179] Fallon, 99. The Aristotelian understanding of the soul is also evident in Robert Burton's treatise on melancholy, which defines the soul as 'the perfection or first act of an organical body, having power of life'. R. Burton, I.I.II.5.
[180] Aristotelian 'hylomorphism' conceives of being as a compound of matter and form: Fallon, 98; Shields 2016; Peters, 160.

Milton's poetry, including the energy of its lines, and his depiction of Paradise, with its powerful sensory and body imagery.[181]

Renaissance Christian Aristotelians generally followed Aquinas's distinction between soul and matter.[182] Yet Milton's *ex Deo* theory of the Creation set out in *De Doctrina Christiana* and *Paradise Lost* departs from Aquinas's Christian Aristotelian formulation of Creation *ex nihilo*, which 'excludes the production of the soul from the power of matter'.[183] By contrast, Milton's formulation, to which he refers in *Paradise Lost* as 'vital virtue' (VII.234–37), holds that spirit, as a bodily form of energy, yet virtuous and intelligent, was infused by God into the entirety of the material world at the Creation.[184] Milton's monism resembles the conative energies of Spinoza's '*conatus*', as well as Bergson's *élan vital*,[185] as a binding principle that governs the cosmological relationship between subject and divine.[186] Fallon and Rogers further ascribe Milton's monism with important features of free will and agency according to his Arminianism, since for Milton matter is 'endued at the Creation with a divinely-sanctioned capacity for self-motion, virtue and perhaps even reason'.[187] According to Rogers, by 'introducing figures of reason and sentience into the sphere of material process', Milton articulates a notion of agency 'distinct from the providential determinism of Calvin' on the one hand, and on the other, the 'amoral ascendancy of spiritless physical force implicit in the materialist philosophies of Hobbes and Descartes'.[188]

Kerrigan and Fallon identify this cosmic map in *Paradise Lost*, in Raphael's materialist account of the Creation in Book V. In Raphael's lecture to Adam on the continuity between human and angel, Milton expresses the relationship between body and soul or matter and spirit as 'one first matter all'. Individual beings, 'whether corporeal (bodily) or spiritual (insensible)', are 'differentiated out of the potential of

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[181] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 1'; Hagstrum 123.
[182] Fallon, 99.
[183] Fallon, 100.
[184] Rogers 1996, 9–10; *DDC* Ch. 7: CP 979.
[185] Although according to Leo there appears to be no evidence that Milton was familiar with Spinoza's philosophy, they share certain influences, including Calvin. See Leo 2009; Rogers 1996, 10.
[186] Rogers 1996, 10.
[187] Rogers 1996, 10; Fallon, 98, 98n. According to Fallon, Milton's monism is not isolated but resembles comparable ideas adopted by other key Renaissance thinkers within the context of a significant philosophical debate. Fallon, 1–18; Kerrigan 1983, 247.
[188] Rogers 1996, 10.

matter, according to their respective material forms determined by God', where matter is merely 'grosser and less vital spirit':[189]

> O *Adam*, one Almighty is, from whom
> All things proceed, and up to him return,
> If not deprav'd from good, created all
> Such to perfection, one first matter all,
> Indu'd with various forms, various degrees
> Of substance, and in things that live, of life;
> But more refin'd, more spiritous, and pure,
> As nearer to him plac't or nearer tending ….[190]

(*PL* V.469–76)

Fallon traces in Milton's explanation of the Creation in *Paradise Lost* a blending of Galenic medicine and the traditional Chain of Being popular in the Renaissance, with its gradient of spiritual and moral purity; in Milton's monistic model, 'moral purity is measurable in the degree of rarefaction of body, but even the most pure and spirituous substance remains corporeal'.[191] The chain is dynamic: Milton's devils are less corporeal than his human subjects, but they are 'moving toward greater relative corporeality'. In ways which resemble an alchemical process, the 'ascent of good creatures is modelled on metabolic sublimation, and the descent of the evil on excretion and expulsion'; 'At the upper end of the spectrum, or at the end of the process of digestion, come the spirits'.[192] Milton, according to Fallon, adapts Galen 'whose articulated theory of the spirits or *pneumas*' corresponds 'imperfectly with the Aristotelian tripartite soul'.[193] But Milton 'skips' Galen's first spirits, the natural spirits, to begin with the vital spirits, and adds the 'intellectual spirits' which 'give both life and sense / Fancy and understanding, whence the soul / Reason receives, and reason is her being' (*PL* V.485–87).[194]

Milton's formulation resembles Aquinas's Christianised Aristotelian theory of potentiality, in which subjects are moving closer or further away from moral perfection

[189] Donnelly, 79.
[190] *PL* V.477–90.
[191] Fallon 98–99.
[192] Fallon 98–99; The importance of digestion and cleansing is central to Schoenfeldt's study of models of subjectivity, the body and the soul. Schoenfeldt 1999, 24.
[193] Fallon 98–99; Aristotle's model of the soul is articulated in *De Anima*: Aristotle 1994–2000.
[194] Peters, 161; Kerrigan 1983, 248.

and therefore the divine.[195] His adaptation of Galenic medicine also forms a material, progressive continuity between moral purity and physiological health and well-being in the humours and spirits.[196] The further away from moral virtue, the more prone to physical distortion the subject becomes as he or she moves away from the divine. Such a pattern is reflected in the fall of Satan, Adam and Eve in *Paradise Lost*.[197]

Milton's graduated model of material embodiment has implications for both moral virtue and creative expression and manifests itself in poetic form. In *Paradise Lost*, poetic language mirrors the form of the material world, taking on material qualities that can often make language seem like part of the body itself or something that is worn rather than a mere structure, tool or instrument. In Kerrigan's argument, language is a 'mirror of the world', so undergoes the 'same kind of anthropomorphism' that matter undergoes.[198] Or, as Fletcher notes of this tradition of allegory: the ornament of wear can 'merge with the body itself'.[199] The association between language, the world and the body in *Paradise Lost* rests on parallels between Aristotelian hylomorphism and poetic form.[200] The link is important in the figures of fallen and unfallen angels, with the former prone to weight and distortion and the latter to lightness and flexibility, culminating in the Augustinian biblical symbolism of light associated with the divine.[201]

The body metaphor is central to *Paradise Lost*, with its emphasis on the graduation between secular and spiritual bodies.[202] Kerrigan identifies at the centre of Milton's epic a metaphor for the poem itself of the angelic body, inviting a comparison between the lines of Milton's poetry and the bodies of angels. According to Kerrigan, in composing Book III, the poet claims to have visited heaven and

> drawn Empyreal Air,
> Thy temp'ring ….
>
> (*PL* VII.14–15),

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[195] Aquinas *ST* 1.2; O'Callaghan 2014.The principles are also broadly compatible with certain traditions of Platonism including that of Plotinus with his doctrine of 'emanation'.
[196] Schoenfeldt 1999, 20.
[197]An example of such distortion is the figure of Satan 'disfigur'd' as observed by Uriel in *PL* IV.125–27.
[198] Kerrigan 1983, 238.
[199] Fletcher, 114, 114n.
[200] Fallon, 79.
[201] Fallon, 194–95.
[202] Kerrigan 1983, 243; Fallon, 103; Schoenfeldt 1999, 12–13.

thereby 'reclaiming in art the lost destiny of the human body'. Milton's poetics emphasises the conversion of embodied energy, refined according to physical, moral and spiritual purity. That conversion is underlined by principles of Aristotelian potentiality as a state of functioning or a dynamic process with synchronic and diachronic dimensions. It is integral to the regeneration of the soul and it is also reflected in poetic language.[203]

Milton's model of allegory is to be distinguished from what he sees as the distortions of false artifice and the inadequate personification allegory of the medieval period, which places abstract ideas in embodied form rather than figuring the divinely-sanctioned energies of the body. Kerrigan argues that despite its length, *Paradise Lost* coheres because Milton is able to 'root the entirety with logical and emotional force in certain privileged passages', especially that contained in Book V which outlines the relationship between spirit and matter (see V.469–503), what Kerrigan calls the 'enfolded sublime' which tends to function at a different level than the narrative pattern. The overall effect, the 'miniature effect of which occurs in the lyric', is not available in the initial linear reading but only 'afterwards on reflection'.[204] The body gives form, shape and expression to the poem through the experience given by its faculties and figures to its ornaments.[205] Moreover, as Fletcher notes, the body figure often occurs in allegory and mythopoeic poetry: Milton's epic is connected through a 'kind of cosmic digestive system', referring to V.414–31.[206] The body is essential to Kerrigan's notion of the 'enfolded sublime' and reinforces the sacred, cosmic patterning of *Paradise Lost*. In the 'fashioning' hands of the inspired poet, ornament is thus linked figuratively to the cosmic body and is more than mere 'outward shew' or embellishment that effects the lower faculties of the body.

Poetry in *Paradise Lost* is associated in its purest form with a refined form of divine energy which is the source of poetic inspiration. In its most ideal form it is light, and lower down the scale is represented as the ability of angelic bodies to blend together and change shape without distortion of their divine essence, features which are also

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[203] Altieri notes how an emphasis on subjectivity and embodiment 'breaks down' linear narratives. Altieri, 5; Kerrigan 1983, 243.
[204] Kerrigan 1983, 233. The model of graduation of material to spiritual forms in Book V is the basis of Kerrigan's argument about the 'enfolded sublime' and his identification of the body metaphor at the centre of *Paradise Lost*.
[205] Ricoeur 1978, 144.
[206] Fletcher, 108–09, 114, 138.

captured in the language of Paradise in Book V.[207] Milton's material substance translates into poetic figure and gives form or lack of form according to the closeness to or distance from the divine. Milton's angels are said to experience a blending of the senses, reflected in his use of synaesthesia (i.e., by blending sense perceptions) and their predominant kind of thinking is identified as intuitive by contrast to the reasoning and feeling activities of the more material, human body.[208] Thus when the fallen, yet still angelic, Satan watches Eve in Paradise in Book IX (424–26) a kind of elusive, supernatural quality is suggested in the possibility of seeing a scent, with Eve 'Veil'd in a Cloud of Fragrance' with all its equal connotations of impending fallenness in the word 'veiled'.[209]

W. B. C. Watkins argues that by introducing an unbroken chain from the physical to the ultimate divine, Milton's poetry in *Paradise Lost* comes close to making tangible what are ordinarily abstract concepts.[210] While the Neoplatonic terms of much Renaissance poetry thus treat the fallen body as anchoring the poet and reader to the world of the senses and passions, and uphold the superiority of soul over body, spirit over matter, in Milton's poetry affect is manifested in a corporeality of the senses, feelings and passions.[211] The result is an emphasis on the expression of concrete experience in a style of 'figural realism' in *Paradise Lost*. The style draws on the affective qualities of poetic ornament, distinguishing between graduated levels of more or less spiritually refined corporeal experience.[212]

In ways which are thus reflected in poetic figure, Milton's particular conjunction of classical, monist and Arminian philosophy emphasises a material universe that is connected through the self-determining and creative agency of the embodied subject, linking moral, physical and spiritual well-being within a cosmic order. It is distinguishable from each of the materialist models of Descartes and Hobbes and from the more deterministic universe of Calvinist predestination.[213]

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[207] See *PL* V.414–31.
[208] Fallon, 105; *PL* V.490. Kerrigan 1983, 248.
[209] Ricks, 94.
[210] Kerrigan 1983. 241; Watkins, 15–16.
[211] Bouwsma, 26; Ricks, 108.
[212] Ulreich, 81; Kerrigan 1983, 248; Fletcher, 115; Schoenfeldt 1999, 24.
[213] This is the view of Fallon, but in *Paradise Lost*, Milton sometimes adopts a more positive stance towards predestination, much like late Augustine, with the pessimistic view of the effects of Original Sin

2.4. The Passions, *Eudaimonia* and the Body

> Wherefore did [God] create passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly tempered are the very ingredients of virtue?[214]

Milton's question from his early prose work, *Areopagitica,* by recognising the material energies of the body as essential to his ontology of the subject, is consistent with the monist philosophy traced to his later works.[215] The philosophy accords a positive value to the passions and desires and the external things toward which they are directed, and involves a rechannelling of these energies towards moral and spiritual self-development, creative intensities that also underlie Milton's model of poetic expression. In *Paradise Lost*, Milton aligns Renaissance medicine, which originates in classical Galenic and Aristotelian theory and makes connections between moral theory and the body, with a system of Protestant virtue ethics based on classical eudaimonistic theory. These have the combined effect of directly integrating the moral, physical and spiritual well-being of the subject.[216] The philosophy explains the functioning state of the subject and its association with the attainment of 'potentialities' according to principles of Aristotelian metaphysics.[217] Ascribing a positive value to the fallen body is an important aspect of Milton's philosophy of free will, which assumes that the will is not fully bound by sin but capable of regeneration, thus according a role for the passions and desires in the regeneration of the subject.[218]

A positive valuation of the fallen faculties is also reflected in Renaissance humanist traditions of poetic and rhetorical expression, which are based on the imaginative model and mimetic tradition that recognise their close association with the senses and passions. While poetry is recognised as a vehicle for the expression of the passions and affections, it has a moral and spiritual role through its effects on the experience and will in the transformation of the quality of desire of the subject.[219] The transformation is essential to Milton's reworking of the classical principle of *thymos* and is based on the immediate and active agency of Milton's eudaimonistic hero through the vicarious engagement of the reader. With particular focus on the

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on the fallen will. See Mendelson 2016 and God's speech in *PL* III.114–15 (which sometimes divides critics on the question of Milton's approach to Predestination in *Paradise Lost*).

[214] Milton, *Areopagitica*. *AP*: CP 733.

[215] Fallon, 79–110; Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 1.

[216] See Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 41, for the Aristotelian connection.

[217] Aquinas *ST* 1.2.

[218] Erasmus and Luther, 1, 32.

[219] Shuger1988, 199, 205–10.

relationship between the expression of emotional experience, creative expression and the moral shaping of the subject, this section makes some comparisons between modern and early modern approaches to the emotions with the purpose of drawing out common themes surrounding embodied experiences that have implications for poetic style in *Paradise Lost*.

Not unlike its counterpart in the seventeenth century, modern 'cognitive' emotions theory draws on the classical 'Socratic' tradition with its basis in self-mastery and responsibility. It is influenced by classical eudaimonistic ethics, and tends to be dualist, based on a concept of mind as the domain of the emotions derived from classical and Cartesian thought. Although modern emotions theory adapts classical 'virtue ethics' in ways which are comparable to approaches taken in the seventeenth century, in modern theory the emphasis is on developing secular models, rather than the alignment of classical and Christian notions of virtue. The earlier theory rests on the Aristotelian hierarchy of the soul or *psyche* in which the conscious, reasoning parts are more highly ranked than the intuitive, emotional and appetitive parts.[220] While some modern theory recognises that the emotions are entangled with the body and mind in complex ways, 'cognitive' theories of the emotions tend to view them as more than the bodily experiences that sometimes accompany emotions.[221]

While Platonic theory finds the emotions to be intrinsic to the subject, approaches typically divide between the Aristotelian tradition, which accords a value to external things toward which the emotions and desires are directed, and the Stoic which does not, instead valorising self-sufficiency. Thus while Aristotelian philosophy emphasises emotional 'balance', the later Stoic emphasis is on the achievement of *apatheia* — tranquillity or indifference to the emotions.[222] For Aristotle, emotions are intrinsic to the subject and 'a more or less intelligent way of conceiving a situation, dominated by a desire'.[223] The quality of desire reflects the underlying emotional state, such as Satan's malice coupled with his desire for revenge at the end of Book II of *Paradise Lost*.[224] The Stoic tradition, by contrast, further divides according to approaches to *apatheia* based either on complete eradication of the passions or their

[220] See R. Burton I.I.II, I.I.III; Calhoun and Solomon, 36.
[221] 'Seneca, 2010, 14; *De Ira* 2.3.5, 2.4.2.
[222] Peters, 18; Schoenfeldt 2004, 46.
[223] Calhoun and Solomon, 3.
[224] *PL* II.1054–55; Calhoun and Solomon, 3.

refinement against negative emotions, which (at least in respect of the latter) in *Paradise Lost* also applies to Satan's malice.[225]

Modern theory tends to focus on Damasio's secondary stage, aligning the emotions with an 'evaluative' or 'appraisal' process, favouring the intelligent status of the emotions in their engagement of the faculties of the mind.[226] These approaches distinguish the Jamesian understanding of the emotions as 'feelings' or bundles of physiological and psychological sensations and sensory experiences.[227] The Socratic tradition thereby also departs from modern Freudian theory, which gives primacy to the unconscious forces of the emotions, drives and desires by contrast to the Aristotelian and Stoic emphasis on their mastery by the intellect.[228] Yet, as Nussbaum concedes, in those traditions particularly associated with the Longinian theory that is also the basis of the 'Dionysian' model examined by Burke and James, certain 'non-intentional' emotions are considered to be largely independent of cognition.[229] It is this tradition that founds the refined feeling states that this thesis argues underlie Milton's allegorical figures in *Paradise Lost*. The Longinian tradition in turn extends from a split in Platonic theory over the ambivalent status of the emotions, with the alternative tradition represented by Aristotle and the Stoics.[230]

Solomon and Nussbaum hold emotions to be 'evaluations' or 'judgments of value' based on a subject's 'engagements with the world'. As such they are voluntary processes for which the subject remains accountable.[231] Their respective approaches depend on modern adaptations of the principles of classical '*eudaimonia*', a term which translates loosely to 'flourishing' and which is not completely synonymous with modern understandings of 'happiness'.[232] Solomon emphasises the role the emotions play in the

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[225] Graver xi–xxxv.
[226] Damasio 1995, 139, 245, 249–50.
[227] Calhoun and Solomon, 8.
[228] Solomon 2006.
[229] W. James (1902) 1917, esp. 7; Burke 1756, esp. Part II; Nussbaum 2001, 249; Nussbaum 2004b, 443.
[230] Mikics, 17.
[231] 'The evaluative role of the emotions relates to theories of their connections to evaluative beliefs or judgments about what we value': Calhoun and Solomon, 16, 32; Nussbaum 2001, 3, 19; Nussbaum 2004b, 443. Whether the emotions are inherently directed to the social good is a debated issue in both classical and modern sources, although the Renaissance writings of Bacon and Burton suggest that they consider them to be so: R. Burton I.I.II.11; Bacon (1605) 1893, II.26; Shuger 1988, 194.
[232] Calhoun and Solomon use the term 'cognitive' as denoting an emphasis on 'belief about or an interpretation of a thing or state of affairs', 20.

formation of the subject and of the world according to personal and social values, which are directed towards self-development:[233]

> [Emotions are] our own judgments, with which we structure the world to our purposes, carve out a universe in our own terms, measure the facts of reality, and ultimately 'constitute' not only our world but ourselves.[234]

Solomon's modern model of the emotions is conceptual and indebted to Aristotelian principles.[235] Emotions involve 'weighing'; as 'appraisals' they 'reflect on a state of affairs', accordingly they involve 'measure' and 'balance' and, although they can also involve 'intensities of feeling', they are essentially cognitive processes.[236] Despite largely ignoring the vital immediacies of the embodied subject as part of its processes of engagement, Solomon's approach recognises the phenomenological basis of the emotions as experiences which complement the appraisal process.

Like Solomon, Nussbaum draws on classical eudaimonistic philosophy in her understanding of the emotions. Her approach thus recognises the interrelationship between emotions and the intellect but accords less importance to the body.[237] Yet Nussbaum's approach differs from Solomon's, in that while she aligns emotions with appraisals or value judgments, she adapts the basic analysis of the emotions by the classical Stoics, while de-emphasising its principle of self-sufficiency.[238] Her understanding of *eudaimonia* 'ascribes to things and persons outside the person's own control great importance for that person's own flourishing':

> It thus contains three salient ideas: the idea of a cognitive appraisal or evaluation; the idea of one's own flourishing or one's important goals or projects; and the idea of the salience of external objects as the elements in one's own scheme of goals.[239]

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[233] Calhoun and Solomon, 33, 37.
[234] Solomon 1976, xix. Solomon emphasises self-knowledge in his theory but his quote suggests more of a creative self-development role for the emotions, hence I use the term 'self-actualisation' in this thesis.
[235] Solomon 1976, xix.
[236] Solomon's approach is based on the Aristotelian principle of the 'mean' in which emotions involve balance between extremes, such as of courage as the mid-point between caution and risk-taking. There is an ethical basis to the emotions in this eudaimonistic theory. Solomon 1976, xix; Aristotle, *NE*, 31, 50, 82.
[237] Nussbaum 2001, 3.
[238] Nussbaum 2001, 4, 221; Nussbaum 2004b, 446; Merlan, 125; Seneca 1917–1925, vol. 2, Epistle LXXIV.16; Aurelius, VIII.1; Epictetus, III.24.
[239] Nussbaum 2001, 4.

In this theory, emotions become appraisals by directing personal judgment toward things to which the subject ascribes intrinsic value.[240] The notion of 'flourishing' is essential to both Aristotelian and Stoic philosophies because each depends on the perceived relationship between moral philosophy, personal character and 'purpose in living' that not only amounts to all-round well-being but also extends to the broader social level as a principle by which individuals form communities. By being based on judgments that connect self-actualisation with normative values, neo-classical approaches such as Solomon's and Nussbaum's apply a universalist framework.

Modern theories that emphasise the role of historical and cultural discourses in the shaping and understanding of the emotions also depend on cognitivist approaches, although not necessarily eudaimonistic models like those developed by Solomon and Nussbaum. Drawing on studies in anthropology and behavioural psychology, some modern cognitive approaches highlight the relationship between the subjective, psychological dimension of emotions, and the role of socio-cultural narratives.[241] Emotional appraisals reflect a combination of personal and cultural values. So, departing from the traditional view of the emotions as 'named' states identified and assessed by individuals, Jerome Kagan emphasises the range of possibilities that feeling states detected by a subject may engage, and argues that final appraisals may depend on both local (personal and situational) and cultural factors.[242] A significant feature of theories like Kagan's is their elaboration of the relationship the emotions play in the development of personal and cultural identities.[243]

Modern emotions theory, with its dualist basis and tendency to de-emphasise the experiences of the body, is mirrored in mainstream critical theory. Although modern literature reflects the influence of traditions of classical mimesis, which accord literature the status of philosophy and history by its elaboration of example, the process is less recognised for its engagement with participatory states. Yet literature is in the modern period, as it was in the Renaissance, integrated with the world in complex ways.[244] According to Richard Moran, literary artifice does not detract or disrupt the reader's

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[240] Nussbaum 2001, 4, 221; Nussbaum 2004b, 446.
[241] Mikics, 8; Kagan, 5.
[242] Kagan, 5.
[243] Calhoun and Solomon, 33.
[244] Scruton, 93; Altieri, 112. Richard Moran identifies how our 'paradigms of emotions' include those which are 'fundamentally constructs of the imagination', for example 'the work of memory and desire'. Altieri, 114; Moran 1994, 79.

engagement in the art experience, but enhances it through its role in 'elaborating a make-believe reality', because, in ways which are equally recognised in the Renaissance, the imagination functions synthetically. Moreover, 'fictive worlds' do not simply rely on 'vividness and convincingness for their sense of reality'; audiences 'participate in them through their emotional involvements'.[245] In the Renaissance, such participatory engagements are recognised in techniques of rhetorical and poetic theory and captured by its embodied, tripartite model of the imagination according to the principle of pathos.

Integral to this relationship in *Paradise Lost* is the body figure that stands, according to Kerrigan, at the centre of Milton's epic. The figure has far-reaching implications, drawing from a philosophical tradition that predates the separation of aesthetics and value, uniting Renaissance medicine, moral philosophy and the spiritual condition of the subject. Based on an ontology that recognises the regenerative potential of the fallen will, *Paradise Lost* thus finds the passions, desires and affections are intrinsic to the subject according to its foundation in the integration of classical *eudaimonia* and Christian virtue ethics.[246] The relationship between the body and the soul in Renaissance thought is often explained by the interaction of Platonic and Aristotelian theory: while Platonic metaphysics recognises a theory of the Forms, Aristotelian 'hylomorphic' theory is sometimes considered to be a hybrid metaphysics in which form (a lower order kind) is the realisation of matter.[247] The model is central to Aristotle's understanding of the relationship between the body and the soul.[248] As a corollary, while Plato holds an ambivalent attitude toward the passions, considering them to be innate to the subject albeit producing the potential for moral transgression, Aristotle provides a process for moderating such imbalances in his eudaimonistic ethics. As will be seen, Aristotle's corresponding model in the poetic tradition of mimesis is tragic catharsis.[249]

Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies underlie the principles of Renaissance medicine, explained dynamically through the interaction of the various 'faculties of the soul' in Burton's *Anatomy*, which also outlines the terms of Renaissance knowledge

[245] Moran 1994, 83–85; Scruton, 93; Altieri, 116.
[246] The classical virtues correspond loosely with the Christian virtues. R. Burton I.I.II, I.I.III; Schoenfeldt 1999, 8; Kerrigan 1983, 201.
[247] Shields 2016.
[248] Shields 2016; Sorabji, 42–43.
[249] Fergusson 1961, 1–41. Ulreich, 71.

theory. In this theory, discussed by Debra Shuger, ideally the imagination 'presents its "pictures" to reason', which, 'after having passed judgment, sends them to the will', which in turn, 'arouses appetite in accordance with reason'. In the Renaissance knowledge model, images of sensation are integral to moral judgment, and Burton's model of the soul includes the separate faculty of the will upon which the passions and affections operate toward the moral good.[250] Moral virtue depends on the shape of the will, which in turn determines the quality of desire, a condition evident in Satan's malice in *Paradise Lost*.[251]

Moreover, the affections and passions drive the imagination and if unchecked can produce 'wild work' or figures of the imagination which are not in accord with truth or virtue. The potential is mirrored in literary forms according to the mimetic tradition. The capacity of the passions and affections to influence the shapes of the imagination is thus reflected at the level of poetic figure as distortion of form in the grotesque figure of Sin (*PL* II.650) with its invocation of 'fierce' and 'terrible' 'furies'. Burton's treatise also examines the relationships between the passions, the body and creativity, through the early modern principle of melancholy, a relationship that underlies Milton's poetics in *Paradise Lost* and its ambivalent recognition of the importance of the passions and affections in the creative process.[252] Because of the powerful effects of imaginative literature on the passions and affections, Renaissance literary theory accords it a pedagogical role according to principles of moral virtue, combining poetic invention with the rhetorical principles of pathos and persuasion in the Ciceronian principles of '*docere, delectare et movere*'.[253] The role of pathos ensures that poetry's didactic function relies on more than persuasive argument and yet its effects on the passions and desires can be moderated by the eloquence of the poet.

Milton's positive valuation of the fallen faculties brings into relief another key Renaissance philosophical interaction that has a bearing on the dynamic experience-based model of affect that is essential to *Paradise Lost* and in particular the relationship between Milton's Arminian philosophy and poetic expression. Rather than focusing on the important interaction of Platonic and Aristotelian theory in the Renaissance,

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[250] R. Burton I.I.II.11; Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.2–4.
[251] See for example *PL* IV.73–78.
[252] *The Anatomy*, particularly in I.II.III.2 describes the imagination as 'the medium deferens of the passions': R. Burton I.II.III.2; Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 217.
[253] In the *Apology*, Sidney invokes Horace's twin aims of poetry, profit and delight, which he merges with the three ends of Ciceronian oratory: teaching, delighting and moving: Sidney 2007, 139; Scaliger 1594.

William Bouwsma traces the interaction between Stoicism and Augustinianism, which he calls the 'two ideological poles between which Renaissance humanism moved'.[254] That second interaction identified by Bouwsma is a theme of this thesis, which explores how in *Paradise Lost* Milton engages the dialogue between Stoicism and Augustinianism in his model of poetics.

Bouwsma considers the 'second interaction' to be essential to the emphasis on virtue, inwardness, sin, and moral responsibility in the Renaissance, which the two traditions of Augustinianism and Stoicism share in common. The traditions are otherwise opposed in their models of emotions: the more rigorous Stoic tradition emphasises *apatheia* or indifference to the passions, while the Augustinian tradition emphasises the heart and the will as essential human qualities.[255] Both strands are influential in Protestant theology, and Milton's apparent preference for Augustinianism over Stoicism, due to his Arminianism, further locates the passions in a dynamic relationship with the body, mind and soul as he accounts for the voluntary experience of the material body within his monistic ontology of the subject.[256] Yet the interaction between the two philosophies is highly complex. Milton's incorporation of elements of both in his work provides an integral dynamic in the reading of *Paradise Lost.*

St Augustine, whose thought is so influential in Protestant theology, emphasised both the weight of Original Sin and the importance of the Incarnation to the redemptive potential of Christianity. Good and evil are defined respectively as the presence and absence of love, according with Augustine's Platonic influence, with the focus on the body, the will and in some readings the agonistic dimension of sin and repentance.[257] The Atonement means that the spiritual reality cut off by Original Sin becomes present in and through the material world as Grace in religious sacraments, symbolised by the body of Christ. For Reformation Protestants, the significance of the Atonement was that the fallen body through its higher faculties could be the vehicle through which Grace worked its redemptive, regenerative process. Puritan thought from Martin Luther onward considered how fallen humans could prepare themselves through Grace for redemption, and come to resemble God, as the Bible decrees. Augustinian and Puritan theology also stressed the difficulty of bringing order to the will in the condition of

[254] Bouwsma, 20.
[255] Bouwsma, 21.
[256] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46.
[257] Bouwsma, 20–21.

fallenness, which manifests itself in a material bodily weight of sin, a will overborne by base emotions and desires, and a *psychomachia* or soul struggle, a notion that derives from the Christian literature of late antiquity.[258] As a corollary to this process, accompanied by the notion of predestination and providential design which precluded free will, Calvinist thought held a long view of history, beyond the initial act of Creation, continuing until Final Judgment.[259]

While Luther introduced the 'faith alone' principle, later Puritans considered Roman Catholic penance to be insufficient to restore Grace, due to the weight of Original Sin, and held that redemption also required good works or acts of love or charity. This evolving process is enacted in Book III of *Paradise Lost*, when God says 'I will clear their senses dark'. The monotonous repetitions of 'repent' and 'pray' (III.188) are overtaken by the intercession and self-sacrifice of the son 'in whom the fullness dwells of love divine': 'without redemption all mankind must have been lost' (III.222). For later Calvinists, through fear and love (manifested in faith, hope and especially acts of Christian charity) humans could move closer to God through the operation of Grace. The regenerative potential of the human soul and the freedom of the will featured in discourse between Erasmus and Luther, while Calvin's long view of history, with its emphasis on predestination, still emphasised the principle of choice and provided a dynamic focus on the active potential for regeneration.[260] This is despite the pessimistic views of Calvinism which associate it with cosmic determinism, an Augustinian emphasis on Original Sin, rigorous drive for self-control and hence the suppression of passions and the dualism associated with the Platonic tradition which highlights the superiority of the soul over the body.[261]

Augustine followed a tradition of classical theory that divides the emotions according to 'positive' or moderate emotions and 'negative' or violent emotions, between passions and affections.[262] According to this usage, 'the passion is a movement of the lower animal soul, which is involuntary in the sense of not in accordance with the will'.[263] Yet Augustine typically chose the Latin *passio* as his translation of Greek *pathē*, reserving 'perturbations' for derogatory senses of *pathē*. He considered it

[258] S. James, 225.
[259] M. Mack, Ch 4–5.
[260] Erasmus and Luther 2012, 1, 32; Oberman, 251.
[261] Oberman, 251; Kirby, 321.
[262] Scrutton, 170–71.
[263] Scrutton, 170–71.

inappropriate to assign *passio* a pejorative meaning as it is the term applied to the 'Passion' of Christ, 'which was a kind of suffering, but hardly a vicious, or even morally neutral, kind'.[264] The relationship between the fallen state, the condition of suffering and the redemptive potential of the soul is a common motif in early modern literature. The recognition of positive emotions is consistent with Augustine's free will theology and the *felix culpa*, which concludes that Redemption through attainment of a higher state of the soul is not precluded by sin.[265]

Views of the regenerative capacities of the human soul are supported by Renaissance humanist traditions of rhetoric and poetry and articulated in their role as vehicles for the expression of the embodied faculties. For the late sixteenth-century poet Philip Sidney, as for the later Civil War poet Milton, after the Atonement and its accompanying gift of divine Grace, Christians might approach the divine, not only through prayer and the administration of sacraments, but also through poetry as a vehicle for encouraging virtuous action through its influence on moral conduct and, by that process, spiritual regeneration.[266] Milton considered poetic ability to be a divine gift that might further such ends, enacted through the relationship between poetic inspiration and the reading experience. He describes poetic ability in his prose work, the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*, as 'the inspired gift of God'. Poets share such inspiration with ministers of religion, and poetry is therefore 'of power beside the office of a pulpit, to inbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of virtue and public civility'; it is a vehicle for instilling virtue and as an instrument of faith, of divine Grace itself.[267] Poetry's ability to 'allay the perturbations of the mind and set the affections in right tune' refers to an effect of inspired poetry that facilitates the separation of the Augustinian higher affections from the lower passions.[268] Although the theory is complex, the effect in Milton's poetry differs from more rigorous versions of Stoic *apatheia*, aligning the inner state of the subject with a state of temperate emotions, a precondition for the experience of refined feeling that is associated with the Longinian tradition of the sublime.[269] Yet even as the poet partakes of divine Grace, the fallen state

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[264] Mendelson 2016; Scrutton, 170–74; Augustine, *DCD*, esp. VIII.17, XIV.6, 7, 9.
[265] Augustine 1955, VIII; See also Aquinas *ST* 3.1.3 ad 3.
[266] Sidney emphasises the notion of the 'right poet' who, as well as being skilled and morally upright, approximates the prophetic inspiration of the Davidian psalmist. Sidney, 2007 137–9; M. Mack, 47.
[267] Milton, Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 669–70.
[268] In the classical tradition this refined state is referred to as *eupatheia*, as 'good or innocent emotion, affect': Peters, 66.
[269] Graver xi–xxxv.

of the subject in Augustinian theology impedes the will through the effects of the lower passions and desires and makes the regenerative task a difficult one.[270]

Poetry, with its morally regenerative, spiritual potential, can refine through modes of experience not only an apprehension of the sacred through the imagination and, with it, corresponding experiences of sublimation, but also through its effects on desire and the will, the changes to the subject that are necessary for moral and spiritual transformation. Poetic language expresses the experience, including the processes of intellectual abstraction, of the embodied subject, with the faculty of reason being 'future-oriented' with its powers to change the subject.[271] The distinction between the temporally present 'feelings' and the effects of the more refined, future-oriented and self-modelling application of the reason to affections provides an integral dynamic to *Paradise Lost,* engaged through its voluntary model of the Arminian subject. It underlies Milton's transformation of the epic heroic principle of *thymos*: animating the distinction between violent and moderate passions that emerges from the Homeric epics and extends through classical ethics and rhetorical theory into their Christian-era adaptations.[272]

Important to this process in *Paradise Lost* is the interaction between Stoic and Augustinian notions of *eudaimonia* for the integral role of the emotions on the will of the subject. When, in *Areopagitica,* Milton asks rhetorically whether passions and pleasures 'rightly tempered are the very ingredients of virtue?', he follows the Augustinian view that the passions are integral to virtuous life, against the Stoic upholding of reason, indifference and *apatheia*.[273] Yet the relationship between Stoicism and Augustinianism in *Paradise Lost* is complex, as Milton frequently incorporates elements of Stoic philosophy and rhetorical style. Stoicism rests on a largely determined physical universe, although subjects have the capacity for the exercise of choice to defy the divine will through error in their faculty of reason.[274] Classical Stoicism thus teaches that the virtuous character should be tested to strengthen the habit of choice toward *eudaimonia*. In *Paradise Lost*, Milton uses a Stoic technique of engaging the reader in considered examples designed to involve not just intellectual

[270] Sidney, in *The Apology*, refers to this as 'our infected wills'. Sidney 2007, 138–9.
[271] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.4.
[272] Peters, 196; Essary 2017b, 367.
[273] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46.
[274] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46; Merlan, 125.

discernment but also choice and agency.[275] He applies the Stoic emphasis on the testing of character by testing reason's ability to withstand the 'negative' emotions of vice and sin in Christian theology, incorporating the practice directly into the reading process itself, including with respect to poetic figures.[276] Thus for example, during Eve's corruption by Satan's rhetoric in Paradise, Milton invokes all of the senses as part of his engagement of the reader visually and affectively (IX.567). Yet contrary to the determinism of early Calvinist predestination, but following Augustine, for Milton the independent will is essential to the choice to exercise faith and love toward God, and the passions are necessary for the expression of the quality of the heart. In poetry and rhetoric that quality is associated with the Longinian tradition.[277] *Paradise Lost* thus marks a shift from the more Neoplatonic orientation of *Comus*, to the monistic and Augustinian epic with its emphasis on bodily experience, the heart and the will. Yet in its models of agency and personal responsibility as part of the moral life, it seems equally indebted to the Stoics.[278]

Although the role of the passions in Stoicism is complex and the meaning of *apatheia* much debated amongst scholars, Milton appears to associate the philosophy with the more rigorous forms of indifference to the passions.[279] Both the Stoics and Peripatetics rely on the controlling principle of 'right reason' on the passions. Yet in *Paradise Lost*, it is argued, Milton combines his Augustinian emphasis on the body and the will with an Aristotelian moderation of the passions.[280] Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* instead seeks their moderation through balance to states of 'just measure' by resort to 'right reason' or prudence (aligned by Renaissance Christians with 'conscience' and 'temperance').[281] The Aristotelian principle of 'moderation' and the later (and derivative) Renaissance principle of 'temperance' with the application of 'right reason', is integral to Milton's eudaimonistic model, invoked by the Archangel

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[275] Pearcy, 261; Stroud, 250; Webb 2009, 185.
[276] In *Paradise Lost*, understandings of negative emotions of vice and sin are derived from exegetical traditions, such as the seven deadly sins.
[277] Shuger 1988, 227–29; Krieger 1992, 94; Shaw, 12.
[278] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46; Bouwsma 19; cf. Steadman 1985, 83.
[279] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46.
[280] This is the approach taken by Steadman 1985, 69–83. It is also consistent with various pronouncements in *Paradise Lost*, namely, God's speech in Book III.80–134 (esp. 108 'Will and Reason') and Michael's speech in Book XII.83–84 ('Liberty … with right Reason dwells'). Temperance through moderation is the basis of rational self-government and a necessary precondition for 'true liberty'.
[281] The Stoics also use the principle of 'right reason' but with an emphasis on the intellect rather than the will.

Michael to Adam in the final book of *Paradise Lost*.[282] Milton's approach, with its reliance on the testing of virtue to influence habit, is common to both Aristotelian and Stoic ethics.[283]

Central to this process is Milton's combination of Aristotelian moderation from the *Nicomachean Ethics* with the principle of catharsis from the *Poetics*.[284] The principle of catharsis is the essential element of tragedy, and when engaged through the principle of mimesis, is an expression of Aristotle's metaphysics of form as the actualising of matter, a process of 'becoming' related to 'potentiality'.[285] Aristotle's theory of catharsis recognises the impact of tragic poetry on the body, in ways which emphasise its participatory energies. The balance is attained by purgation through reader affect, which in Renaissance poetry is associated with the removal of 'low' emotions of 'pity and fear'. Yet it is sometimes formulated as 'like cures like' due to associations between physical and moral health.[286] The process is consistent with ideas outlined in *Areopagitica,* where Milton, with his debt to the Stoic testing of character as a principle of living and virtue, rejects a 'fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary', a formulation that he applies against the licensing of publications.[287] The dynamic experience of moderation and purgation of the emotions is arguably integral to the expression and reading of *Paradise Lost* and important for the way it positions the temporal, fallen and responsible experience of poet and reader in the process of long term moral and spiritual regeneration. The process combines with Protestant inwardness as the locus of moral and spiritual conflict intrinsic to the drama of *Paradise Lost*. In *Paradise Lost*, poetic affect is thus important in the transformation of Protestant epic and with it the models of selfhood and culture upon which it is based.

Engagement of the passions and affections by rhetorical and poetic language invokes arguments in the Reformation about the positive valuation of the human faculties and the potential for movement toward virtue. Such arguments are reflected in

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[282] Its exercise is not just important for personal government but expands to the broader political level as a principle of the social in political government as well. (*PL* XII.84).
[283] The Stoic testing of character is also found in the earlier Aristotelian theory of virtuous habit and is to be distinguished from 'random' actions.
[284] The combination is common to Renaissance literature. See Steadman 1985, 69–83.
[285] 'Shepherd, 48–49; Ulreich, 71.
[286] CP 544, 549–50.
[287] *AP*: CP 728.

humanist traditions of rhetoric and poetics through their transformation from classical theory, that accord these literary modes a positive role in that process. As vehicles for the expression of the emotional experience of the subject, these literary traditions are intimately bound up with questions that preoccupied classical rhetors such as Cicero and Augustine, and later Erasmus.[288] Each understood the role the emotions played in the literary expression of the experience of the subject, their role in persuasion and effects on volition, and accordingly the relationship between literary expression and the will.[289]

The debate between Aristotelian and Stoic traditions on the positive role or otherwise of the emotions is thus reflected in classical rhetorical and poetic theory and, in turn, in their expression in the Christian era. These philosophies underlie the expression of poetic figure, trope and imagery in the Renaissance, and govern the central distinction between the eicastic and phantastic, between truth in images and images which 'infect the fancy with unworthy objects', including idols such as those associated with classical literature.[290] The views are tied to dual aspects of metaphor, which is recognised as a 'figure of transport', in which the transfer of meaning from tenor to vehicle is also the basis of its emotional effects that can produce either sublimity or distortions of form, intemperate passions and desires through the vitiated imagination. With this dichotomy in mind, the Stoic tradition in the Renaissance typically prefers figures and imagery that move the intellect without moving the emotions, while the Longinian tradition ties poetic figure, including metaphor, to the expression of the emotions through the refinements of styles associated with the sublime, released from its association with pagan literature. The distinctions underlie the Renaissance expression of Augustine's typological tradition and are found in *Paradise Lost*.[291]

In the Renaissance, the Stoic/Augustinian interaction results in an alignment of classical eudaimonistic theory with the positive potential of the will associated with both voluntary energies and refined emotions, a philosophy which also underlies the expression of poetic figure. The distinction is reflected in constraints on the imagination evident in Puttenham's aversion to 'monstruous imaginations or conceits', which can be

[288] Graver xi–xxxv; Erasmus and Luther, 1 32; Hathaway x.
[289] Erasmus and Luther, 1, 32; Graver xi–xxxv; Hathaway x.
[290] Sidney 2007, 151; Krieger, 120, 126; Steadman 1959, 236–8; Gilman, 162.
[291] Shaw, 19–23.

contrasted with Sidney's recognition of the powers of invention through the creative agency of the poet to produce a 'golden world' surpassing the existing one.[292] Milton and Spenser enlarge on the oppositions inherent in this model of invention, engaging the dynamic energies of the body, recognising agency, choice and will in the expression of poetic figures.[293] In *Paradise Lost*, these techniques are essential to the text, reinforcing what Stanley Fish refers to as 'reader intangling' that makes the reader's engagement central to the development of its themes. The focus of this thesis is on the importance of the intensities and transitionary states of temporal engagement to that process, as a reflection of the model of eudaimonistic philosophy that underlies poetic figure and trope in *Paradise Lost*.

Essential to Milton's reconciliation of Renaissance and Protestant poetics are classically derived figural techniques that are based on the Aristotelian model of the imagination. They include the rhetorical technique of ekphrasis with its integral quality of *enargeia,* which is defined in classical rhetorical treatises as a quality that appeals to the listener's senses, principally that of sight or visual memory. The theory of *enargeia* supposes a 'close reciprocal relation between mental images and pathos', a term that encompasses both bodily and emotional affects in classical thought.[294] *Enargeia* is thus linked to the 'notion of *psychagogia,* or leading or enchanting the mind', which is a kind of psychic enslavement that is the basis of Puritan and Platonic objections to literature and which is captured in classical and Renaissance poetic theory. Yet it is through the rhetorical techniques associated with the refinement of affect to evoke sublimity that the negative tendencies of such classical techniques are avoided. In *Paradise Lost* that process centres on the dual meanings of 'transport' and is necessary for Milton's adaptation of the Augustinian tradition of allegoresis.

Milton incorporates the figure of the Medusa to represent the quality of enslavement, which is associated in classical literature with the epic hero's engagement with unconscious forces. The Medusa figure is also integral to the poetics of fallen language in *Paradise Lost* and in particular for the reader's dynamic experience and engagement with its poetic figures against the potential paralysing effects of poetry. In *Paradise Lost*, in reconciling the competing claims (affects) of sensuous figures on the

[292] Sidney 2007 138; Puttenham 1589, I.8; M. Mack, 138–46.
[293] Campana, 33; Mikics, 4–5.
[294] Webb 2009, 100; Peters, 52, 55.

body and the emotions of the subject, Milton distinguishes a kind of poetry that gives expression to his Protestant concern with experiencing the inner light, as opposed to the outer form, of language.[295] It is a kind of authentic experience that he identifies with divine inspiration.

In Kerrigan's terms, when we engage the angelic body of *Paradise Lost*, with its expression of a desire for sublimation, we enter into the 'war between desire and history whose complex etiology is the subject of the myth of the fall', and although it 'empowers the creation of the epic' it is a largely futile exercise as it represents 'the full acknowledgment of a wish and the full mastery of its disillusionment'. In *Paradise Lost*, the problem for the poet and the reader lies in their fallen state, and according to Kerrigan, the three elements of the sacred, the 'demotic', 'human' and 'divine', are 'contiguous at the centre of which is a poet of temptation, conflict and crisis'.[296] Yet Kerrigan's argument does not recognise the importance in readings of *Paradise Lost* of the therapeutic potential of poetry as a vehicle for moral and spiritual transformation. [297] That potential is a central concern of this thesis and depends on a valuation of the fallen faculties that are expressed according to the participatory techniques of rhetorical and poetic traditions, processes which are in turn valued in their own right for their engagement of intensities and transitionary effects or 'becomings'.

Kerrigan's reading, like a number of twentieth-century critics', is indebted to modern interpretations of Freudian theory which give primacy to the unconscious drives, desires and emotions.[298] Freud's own interest in Milton's poetry is noted by critics, and *Paradise Lost* often understood as exemplifying the purported subordination of the forces of the unconscious to the conscious rule of reasoned self-governance according to the classical Socratic tradition. Instead of focusing on the closure, or failure of closure, of the text in epistemic terms, this thesis expands the scope of this inquiry to the application of rhetorical and poetic techniques that engage the participatory states of the auditor. These techniques draw on the interaction of conscious and unconscious forces in shaping Milton's model of the embodied subject, a 'balancing' or 'moderating' process that seems equally essential to the channelling of

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[295] The quality is also integral to sacred rhetoric in the Renaissance: Shuger 1988, 194.
[296] Kerrigan 1983, 216, 234.
[297] M. Mack, 109.
[298] Other critics who offer a Freudian reading of *Paradise Lost* include John Carey; Merritt Hughes; Summers; and Mikics.

creative energies for both poet and reader. 'Affect' is examined for its role in the creative process in *Paradise Lost* and as an integral dimension to the expression and reading of its figures, a theme which is taken up throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis.[299]

The 'balancing' of various energies of the body and emotions appears to be essential to creativity in the embodied models of both Renaissance and modern periods.[300] In this way in *Paradise Lost*, fallen language follows the contours of the fallen body, but also provides a vehicle to facilitate the moral and spiritual regeneration necessary for salvation through the higher faculties of the soul. In turn, that process is an integral component of Milton's search for the right language to express the sacred, in which the 'inner light' of language can be experienced through the refined senses and passions as a kind of immediate and rarefied affect associated with the divine. For this purpose, the body metaphor captures the embodied way in which poetry works its regenerative process on the human soul. Mikics makes such a connection:

> As Stanley Cavell remarks: 'Wittgenstein's statement 'the human body is the best picture of the human soul', suggests that the body offers the *only* truly answerable expression of the soul.[301]

The fall of language is a central crisis and theme in *Paradise Lost* (made emphatic by the pun on 'sin' and 'sign' in II.760, words which are understood to have been phonetically closer in sound in Milton's time).[302] Spiritual regeneration is a highly fraught process that depends on the fallen will and a sense of moral agency and personal responsibility, emphasised by the uncertain state in which Adam and Eve are left in the final book with their freedom to 'choose / Thir place of rest' (XII.646–47). Yet it is precisely the regenerative potential for language according to Milton's theological aims for poetry that dominates his purpose in searching for the right language in his later poetry, a theme that underlies the principal arguments of this thesis and which is revisited in its final conclusion.

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[299] Edwards, 498–99.
[300] One major modern study on creativity stresses this dynamic aspect: Serraimi 2016.
[301] Mikics, 140.
[302] Lerer (1999) 2007, 'Book 9 - The Fall'.

Chapter Two: Poetry and Creation

1. The 'Heav'nly Muse'

> Sing Heav'nly Muse, that on the secret top
> Of *Oreb*, or of *Sinai*, didst inspire
> That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen Seed,
> In the Beginning how the Heav'ns and Earth
> Rose out of *Chaos* ….
>
> (*PL* I. 6–10)

The first invocation to the muse in *Paradise Lost* coincides with the Creation of the Heavens and Earth in an alignment of inspired 'song' and biblical origin myth, by which Milton intertwines the Genesis story with an exploration of the relationship between divine and human powers of creativity. Blending classical, allegorical and Renaissance conventions of poetry, he develops a model of poetic inspiration as derived from the divine, a quality essential to his distinction between mere artifice and true artistry.

Although for Milton poetic inspiration is identified with the agency of the subject, it is distinguishable from Romantic or modern understandings of creativity.[1] In *Paradise Lost*, the power of invention draws on classical, medieval and Renaissance models that depend on the mimetic tradition, but is not based on the unrestrained imaginative free play of either the poet or the reader.[2] Instead it reflects a complex relationship between creativity and religious and moral life, which is in turn connected to the spiritually regenerative potential of poetry.[3] In this chapter, I explore how affectivity is essential to the model of poetic inspiration that Milton develops through the vehicle of poetic figure, metaphor and symbolism. A particular focus is the 'Creation dove' metaphor of the first *invocatio* to Book I, which I compare to a 'metaphysical conceit', an early modern trope which critics often identify as engaging both thought and feeling in accordance with integrated early modern models of body, mind and soul.

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[1] Detailed discussion of modern and early modern theories of the imagination are not part of this thesis. For early modern theory see generally Carruthers 1990; Bundy 1928, 1930. For a modern approach see Serraimi 2016.
[2] Fletcher, 125.
[3] Shuger 1988, 11; M. Mack, 110; Bundy, 535–37; Steadman 1998, 53, 57.

Paradise Lost depends on the architectonic role of the poet, invoking the epic source of poetic inspiration, the classical muses, yet demoting them beneath the 'Heav'nly Muse', incorporating an idealised motif of the Christian epic poet as divinely inspired by the Holy Spirit. The typically 'heterocosmic' epic style has a tendency to exhibit a range of available poetic techniques and understandings of its time, and several *invocationes* to the poetic muse address a different dimension of poetic inspiration. The first *invocatio*, at the start of Book I (1–26), is arguably the most significant, with its first invocation to the Holy Spirit ('Sing Heav'nly Muse'), to soar above the lesser classical muses ('Above th' *Aonian* Mount') of Homer's and Virgil's ancient 'Song' as the true muse of Milton's biblical epic (I.6). The 'Heav'nly Muse', the Holy Spirit derived from the Old Testament, is a spiritual power in Puritanism, considered to have inspired Moses and David the Psalmist.[4]

Milton's purpose is to surpass ancient epic poetry by replacing its model of poetic inspiration with that which inspired Old Testament Hebrew poets, placing his muse at the imaginative origin of the poem prior to the Creation itself, to recount 'things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhyme' (I.16). While Milton's claim is an ironic paraphrase of Ariosto's opening of the *Orlando Furioso*, through which Milton asserts the priority of his poetic endeavours, it is a claim resting not only on assertions about the precedence of his own epic within the classical, medieval and Renaissance traditions but also its record of sacred biblical history.[5] To support such a truth claim for *Paradise Lost*, and relying on the technique of 'retrospective anticipation', that is, to recount biblical stories retrospectively with an assertion of their historical priority and veracity, Milton assumes the full power of vatic poetry commensurate with the gravity of a Christian epic.[6]

In the *invocatio* to Book VII, where Milton calls upon the muse to assist his narration of the Creation of the universe, she is addressed as Urania, the patroness of astronomy in classical mythology, accorded some prestige in the Renaissance, rather than one of the nine muses of Olympus; she is older than the earth, having played with her sister Wisdom before Creation in the presence of God (Proverbs 8).[7] The divine muse is to raise Milton above Mount Helicon, and here she is called upon by 'meaning',

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[4] Curtius, 244; Lewalski 1985, 25.
[5] CP 212.
[6] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 1', 'God and Mammon'. Harold Bloom refers to this as 'transumption'; cited in Lewalski 1985, 39.
[7] Curtius, 244; CP 345n.

not name (Urania means 'heavenly'), with the antique muse dispatched and referred to as an 'empty dream'. Milton once again elevates the Holy Spirit above classical sources of inspiration and knowledge to claim a divine origin for universal knowledge, metaphysical and cosmological, beyond the reach of the classical muses and early modern science. Moreover, Milton repeats a theme from 'Lycidas' in which the classical muse of epic poetry fails to save her poet son.[8]

In addition to invoking the Holy Spirit as muse, Milton qualifies the notion of poetic inspiration, not only to acknowledge the embodied, fallen state of the poet's will, but also to introduce a sense of agency into it. In the *invocatio* to Book III, where Milton addresses the muse prior to recounting the events of Heaven, the poet is likened to a solitary, suffering Christ figure, as Milton seems reluctant to presume that he is the conduit for the full force of prophetic poetry ('May I *express thee* unblam'd?' (III.3)).[9] The poet compares his return from the underworld (the 'flow'ry Brooks' 'where the Muses haunt' (III.27–30)) to a kind of baptism ('wash thy hallow'd feet' (III.31)). The comparison suggests the cleansing of his poetry-making: baptism is a sacrament for washing away the effects of Original Sin.[10] The solitary figure of the artist represented as an apostle figure imitating Christ is a recurrent theme in Renaissance art and poetry, and is for example said to be a theme of Leonardo da Vinci's painting 'The Last Supper'.[11]

The precise terms of Milton's model of poetic inspiration with its ambivalences surrounding the poet's moral and spiritual capacity to express the divine, and the extent of prophecy claimed by Milton as epic poet, are much debated amongst critics. Barbara Lewalski traces this debate, arguing that:

> Milton's assumptions about the [poet's] prophetic role accord generally with those of the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist, John Smith, for whom the term ['prophesy'] encompasses all forms of divine illumination of the mind. Smith's … summary of Hebrew tradition identified many kinds of prophets [who had to devise appropriate conceptual and stylistic forms for the revelations they received]. [T]hose of the highest rank … (like Moses) were

[8] 'Lycidas' 58–63: CP 121–22.
[9] My italics.
[10] Gilman, 152.
[11] M. Mack, 151; Steadman 1959, 97. This chapter considers the influence of the Incarnation on Milton's poetry, a feature which I consider to be broadly compatible with his monistic emphasis on the embodied subject and which is often downplayed in modern Milton criticism.

> illuminated by direct impression upon their intellect; [then came] those several varieties of 'true' prophets who received their revelation through the imagination — in visions or the lower mode of dreams; and [then followed] those who (like David the Psalmist and other biblical poets) spoke 'by the Holy Spirit', as enlightened but not directly inspired.[12]

Lewalski suggests the final type is a status to which Milton seeks to be compared in *Paradise Lost*.[13] Other critics argue that Milton claims a higher level of prophetic insight, with the purpose of rewriting Genesis to accord with his particular vision of Protestantism. *Paradise Lost* includes a range of prophetic models that follow the forms identified by Lewalski, including direct inspiration (in Paradise), various versions of the dream motif, as well as the enlightened kind of inspiration of the Hebrew poets. While it is acceptable in Protestant religious contexts to fictionalise biblical story to arrive at the inner truth of scriptural teachings in Calvinist thought, as a literary work the poem remains somewhat (and probably deliberately) ambiguous on the point.[14] At the very least, the conventions of the prophetic mode serve a rhetorical purpose as interpretive guides to the text. According to Steadman, the poet's role as *vates* is a kind of ethical proof strengthening the correlation between the ethos of the poet and the nature of the illumination and inspiration that he receives from his celestial guide and therefore *Paradise Lost*'s status as 'true' poetry.[15] Yet this seems an unsatisfactory explanation on its own in a work of imaginative literature, and in my reading the ambiguity associated with the muse's status is more explicable when considered in the context of the broader theory of poetic inspiration that Milton develops in *Paradise Lost*.

Ernst Curtius considered Milton to be unsuccessful in his elevation of the muse to biblical sacredness, and that, unlike Dante, Milton failed to fill the Christian muse with life.[16] This chapter examines how Milton supplements the epic convention of the inspired muse with other Renaissance traditions of poetic inspiration and in adapting them to his monistic ontology draws on the affective qualities of poetic language. As a corollary, based on the humanistic tradition of Renaissance poetry, Milton's inspired muse of *Paradise Lost* is not a purely deterministic model, in which the poet is merely a passive channel for divine prophecy. With its dependence on his Arminian and monistic

[12] Lewalski 1985, 25.
[13] Lewalski 1985, 26.
[14] Martindale 1986, 28; Curtius, 462; Lewis, 132; Shuger 1988, 204–05.
[15] Steadman 1985, 5.
[16] Curtius, 244.

theology, Milton's formulation of poetic inspiration introduces a degree of voluntarism to the prophetic mode by which inspiration received by the subject is not unduly forced, a feature which critics overlook when they focus too heavily on the instructional didacticism of other parts of *Paradise Lost*.[17] In turn, Milton's readers rely on their own faculties. Affectivity — of sense, imagination and emotion — is essential to Milton's model of poetic inspiration and is especially exemplified in its tropes and figures. The next section considers Milton's figure of the 'Creation dove' for its techniques of expression in these terms.

2. The Creation Dove and the Metaphysical Conceit

> Thou from the first
> Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread
> Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss
> And mad'st it pregnant ….
> (*PL* I.19–22)

In a figure arising at the opening of *Paradise Lost* after the poet's *invocatio* to the Heavenly Muse, the Holy Spirit is likened to a dove in the act of Creation, forming the cosmos in the figure of a gestating bird. A powerful form of poetic ornament, the polysemous dove metaphor combines the techniques of a number of Renaissance poetic traditions that valorise the divinely-inspired role of the poet. Milton extends this figure to the process of poetic invention, to assist in his broader distinction in *Paradise Lost* between the false eloquence of Satan and Milton's inspired epic poetry. That distinction is encapsulated in Milton's poetic figures and depends on the quality of the expression as a reflection of the ethos of the poet, 'th' upright heart and pure' (I.18). In the remainder of this chapter, I compare the dove to a metaphysical conceit, and then examine its qualities of poetic affect that are underscored by Milton's monistic theology, the motif of melancholy and allegoresis.

A metaphysical conceit is an elaborate device popular in the early seventeenth century, that sets up an often sharply-contrasting analogy between one entity's spiritual qualities (abstract) and an object in the material world (concrete), but in the case of Milton's dove has additional purpose as a divine vision enabling the reader to

[17] Shuger 1998, 232.

apprehend the Holy Spirit in the act of Creation.[18] Accordingly it seems that Milton adapted rather than merely copied or avoided the metaphysical style.[19] The metaphysical conceit depends on techniques of metaphoric analogy, and Milton's comparison of the Holy Spirit to a dove has biblical (and symbolic and allegorical) precedent (the Holy Spirit appears as a dove in the Gospels; see for example John 1:32).[20] The figure captures the act of Creation and alludes to a number of classical origin myths which apply a similar androgynous figure to the act of creation.[21] Milton particularly uses Platonic myths to supplement scripture, and these myths incorporate the power of *eros*, a feature which also appears in classical philosophy, especially the procreative energies and creative force of *eros* central to Plato's dialogues, including *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*.[22]

Milton's 'Creation dove' is an expressive figure that draws on certain techniques of the metaphysical poets, and blends thought and experience according to the integrated Renaissance model of knowledge, imagination and feeling, for which the metaphor is often integral. T. S. Eliot addresses an essential aspect of metaphysical poetics when he identifies the 'fidelity of thought and feeling' exhibited by the metaphysical conceit. Referring to John Donne's comparison of two lovers and a pair of compasses, he identifies the conceit as:

> a device which is sometimes considered characteristically 'metaphysical'; the elaboration (contrasted with the condensation) of a figure of speech to the furthest stage to which ingenuity can carry it.[23]

These figures are characterised by 'brief words and sudden contrasts'; that is, the 'telescoping of images and multiplied associations' and the source of the works' ingenuity and effects,

[18] R. Greene and others, 289.
[19] Cormican, 179; R. Greene and others, 289.
[20] 'Then John testified, "I saw the spirit descending from Heaven like a dove and resting on him"': KJV John 1:32.
[21] Kirk, Raven and Schofield. 24.
[22] Samuel (1947) 1965, 39, 40, 151.
[23] Eliot 1921, 669–70.

> instead of the mere explication of the content of a comparison, a development by rapid association of thought which requires considerable agility on the part of the reader.[24]

Moreover, Eliot observes that 'a thought to Donne was an experience, felt as immediately as the odour of a rose; it modified his sensibility'. Eliot's observation accords with a more general Renaissance recognition of the close relationship between thought and experience based on the centrality of experience-based knowledge theory.[25] In his discussion of Milton's poetic theory outlined in the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*, Steadman traces a similar bodily relationship in Milton's reference to 'the wily subtleties and refluxes of man's thoughts from within' as referring to the inner flow and turmoil of thoughts that carry a distinct somatic dimension. The Renaissance position equally recalls the alignment of affect and mental experience in some modern theory by Damasio, Moran and others.[26]

According to Eliot, poets ranging from Ben Jonson, George Chapman and Donne

> were notably men who incorporated their erudition into their sensibility: their mode of feeling was directly and freshly altered by their reading and thought.[27]

These poets are so capable of 'amalgamating disparate experience' it is possible to detect a 'direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation of thought into feeling'. Eliot then famously suggests that after the Renaissance a 'dissociation of sensibility' set in, from which we have 'never recovered'. The position, according to Eliot, is aggravated by the influence of Milton and John Dryden who amongst other things, perfect certain skills in poetry so well that 'the magnitude of the effect concealed the absence of others'.[28]

Yet Milton's dove figure captures this blending of thought and feeling in its alignment of biblical Creation and poetic inspiration, by suggesting that the poet shares

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[24] Eliot 1921, 69–70.
[25] Tuve 1947, 27, 36.
[26] Steadman 1985, 28; CP 670.
[27] Eliot 1921, 669–70.
[28] Eliot 1921, 669–70. Eliot's views on Milton have been roundly criticised by other critics; see eg Ricks 2–3.

in both the vital energy of Creation represented by the Holy Spirit as well as the 'peace and width of the divine mind, in the divine wisdom'. The figure thus suggests the relationship of the dove to Platonic form, yet equally casts it as an expression of creative energy.[29] Moreover, despite the powerful symbolic and typological associations, the figure's power depends on the force of analogy. Modern theorists including Paul Ricoeur, Richard Moran and Marcus Hester explore the phenomenological reading of metaphor, arguing that the power of metaphor lies in its basis in experience by comparing the known to the unknown. Their respective approaches consider how the expression of metaphor blends processes of thought, imagination and feeling, although their examinations exclude modern thinking on affectivity and tend therefore to foreground sensory experience or 'feelings' in more general terms. Challenging Wittgenstein's theory of language which (in his view) tends to reduce poetic language largely to 'semantic effects', Marcus Hester argues that metaphor enacts, on the contrary, 'a fusion of sense and *sensa'*, in which the former term refers to logical sense and the latter refers to sounds, images and feelings that adhere to the sense. The 'fusion' between them arises because 'the "seeing"' in the metaphorical structure is 'half thought, half experience'; 'thought (sense) and sensation (*sensa*) touch in the fusion of sense, sound and imagery'.[30] Hester's approach is indebted to Susanne Langer's theory of aesthetics with its emphasis on how art embodies the expression of feeling.[31] Langer's theory also considers metaphor to be 'more revealing than a literal statement' as the 'natural instrument' of 'abstract thinking' which can especially give shape to human emotion.[32]

Paul Ricoeur similarly describes the metaphoric process as a combination of three distinct operations — cognition (thought), imagination (image) and feeling (as sensory experience and aesthetic emotion). All three are necessary to complete the activity that Ricoeur calls 'predicative assimilation', metaphor's 'productive and projective function', which can only be acknowledged by clearly distinguishing that function from the merely representational function usually attributed to figurative language. 'Predicative assimilation' starts with the 'suspension of the known for the sake of the unknown'; '*epoché* (from the Greek "abstention") or "split reference"' in

[29] Cormican, 179.
[30] Hester, 81.
[31] Langer 1953, 121; Altieri, 48–49.
[32] Hester, 81; Ricoeur 1978, 150; Langer 1957, Ch. 7.

Ricoeur's formulation which he adapts from Edmund Husserl. Through this tripartite activity — cognition, imagination and feeling — the metaphoric process is able to 'produce new kinds by assimilation', or to produce 'semantic innovation' which is the 'metaphor's creative function'.[33]

Ricoeur's theory is useful for grasping the metaphoric capacity for expressing new knowledge or invention. Moreover, his 'predicative assimilation' is valuable, according to Lana Cable, because it recognises that 'we cannot have a sufficient semantic theory of metaphor which accounts for metaphor's truth claims or insights without also accounting for metaphor's psychological features', 'the borderline between the verbal and the non-verbal', 'a semantics of metaphorical utterances and a psychology of imagination'. By including feeling among the three phases or levels of metaphor's predicative activity, Ricoeur demonstrates the necessity for theory to 'grant cognitive legitimacy to linguistic affect'.[34] Ricoeur's notion of the 'feelings' generated by metaphor resembles Eliot's idea of aesthetic feelings; he emphasises the 'specific kinship with language' enjoyed by feelings as opposed to emotions, a kinship expressed in the phrase 'poetic feelings'. To clarify the distinction, he says: 'Feelings are negative, suspensive experiences in relation to the literal emotions of everyday life. When we read, we do not literally feel fear or anger'. 'Poetic feelings imply a kind of *epoché* of our bodily emotions' that are otherwise responses to the first order objects of references. Literature, by contrast, with its simulations, produces 'second order' effects.[35] Ricoeur's approach can be usefully compared with Moran's alternative view, which offers a complex modern model of feelings in fiction, suggesting that some feelings experienced in fictional worlds are closer to first order or 'real' feelings, rather than merely simulated ones.[36]

Moran also develops the affective, experiential dimension of metaphor by basing the act of metaphorical 'seeing' in feeling, although his emphasis is on the image. According to Moran, the association of metaphor with images is part of a 'tradition of conceiving of metaphor as a sensuous or concrete representation of something that is non-sensuous or abstract; it involves the experience or feeling of something concrete and already known'. Importantly for Moran, although metaphor is a vehicle for

[33] Ricoeur 1978, 146, 148.
[34] Cable, 24.
[35] Ricoeur 1978, 154.
[36] Moran 1994, 75; Altieri, 112–16.

persuasion, metaphor does not 'force either a specific understanding, or total assimilation of the things being compared' on the reader as a concrete reality. Instead, metaphor has a 'force that goes beyond agreement about what it asserts', 'at a level beneath that of deliberation or volition'. This is an important distinction that arises in the overlap between the rhetorical use of metaphor with its influence on the will, and poetic theory with its expression of experience, to which I will return in Chapter Five in connection with the figural techniques of Milton's epic similes.[37] In other words, the dove figure does not force the truth of its comparison on the reader, introducing a voluntarism that underlies Milton's Arminian theology; yet the reader grasps the comparison at a level below ordinary deliberation, or, in Ricoeur's, Moran's and Hester's terms, visually ('sensuously') and affectively. Metaphor, as Moran suggests, is a 'powerful trope indeed'.[38]

Milton's dove metaphor, like many metaphysical conceits, derives its force from a particular quality of metaphor: the comparison of abstract ideas (the Holy Spirit) with concrete things (the 'dove'). The comparison gives the figure a temporal and immediate presence to the senses and experience. As Moran's analysis outlined above suggests, the dove image engages the reader by making the reader feel a little bit 'dovelike' and 'brooding'.[39] The dove is not only capable of being grasped according to early modern integrated knowledge models through its concrete representation, but derives its energy from the way it concretises feelings into the body ('sat'st brooding'). Applying Stewart's Aristotelian notion discussed in the first chapter, that poetic animation is a form of 'touch', affectivity emerges from Milton's incorporation of bodily references ('sat'st') and verb tenses in the continuous past ('brooding'), which implies continuous action, and reflects the continuing act of Creation, reinforced by the sensuousness of the word 'brooding'.

The figure also pushes aesthetic boundaries, taking a fine line between beauty and grotesquerie in its inventiveness. The highly sexualised nature of the comparison, with its strong sense of corporeality, is reinforced by the enjambed line commencing 'And mad'st', introducing a surprising dually-gendered contrast to the metaphor, a slightly confronting image. Yet it is not dissimilar to figures used in classical creation myths which offer a dually-gendered or androgynous figure. The male and female

[37] Moran 1989, 90.
[38] Moran 1989, 91.
[39] Moran 1989, 90.

dimensions reflect the duality introduced by the act of creation itself in pagan creation myths as they are read into Milton's monistic theology.

Samuel Johnson claims that a hallmark of metaphysical poetry is that 'the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together', and Eliot notes that Johnson was concerned with 'failure of the conjunction, the fact that often the ideas are yoked but not united'.[40] This failure of full assimilation is also a quality that Moran finds essential to metaphor, which in *Paradise Lost* accentuates its status as fallen language and its corresponding association with the embodied faculties. The metaphorical contrasts tend to be especially sharp in the metaphysical conceit, yet give a sense of intensity to Milton's figure, when considered according to Tate's model regarding the tension in poetry that arises between literal meaning and figural suggestions.[41] The sharpness of the contrasts thus underscores the inventiveness of the dove figure and is arguably a source from which this figure also derives much of its affective energy.

3. The Motif of Melancholy

> Then feed on thoughts, that voluntary move
> Harmonious numbers; as the wakeful Bird
> Sings darkling, and in shadiest Covert hid
> Tunes her nocturnal Note.
>
> (*PL* III.37–40)

In his exploration of the ingredients of poetic creation, Milton graduates generally in his career from invoking the motif of the melancholic Saturn figure in his earlier works to the idea of divine inspiration in his later works, although *Paradise Lost* retains elements of both: in the *invocatio* to Book III, the traditional melancholy motif is evident in the 'nocturnal Note' as 'the wakeful Bird / Sings darkling'.[42] What is characteristic of Milton's expression of this motif is his Arminian emphasis on the 'voluntary' movement of thought and embodied agency in the creative process.

The Creation dove is described as 'brooding', a term associated with creative energies in early modern understandings of melancholy, often identified with the brooding melancholy of the poet in the process of poetic creation, but which differs

[40] Johnson, 'Cowley'; Eliot 1921, 669–70.
[41] Tate 1959, 82; See also Altieri, 287n.
[42] Stewart, 264.

from Romantic and modern understandings of melancholy.[43] Although in Calvinist thought God is considered to be impassible, or understood as having constant emotions without the capacity to suffer (following Augustine and St Anselm), Milton draws on multiple expressions of creative activity to suggest how the divine act of Creation might be humanly perceived and thereby imitated.[44] In turn, suffering is associated with the lived world and moreover, Christ's Passion.[45]

In the Renaissance the melancholy motif is intertwined with Neoplatonism, which inspires poets to assert a kind of mysticism associated with poetic creation. Just as Neoplatonism separates the material and corporeal real from the spiritual ideal, poetic theory dwells upon the means of gaining access to the supersensible realm through the imagination.[46] The Aristotelian academy, according to Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, first brings about a union between the medical-humoral understanding of melancholy and the Platonic conception of divine frenzy after Plato's *Phaedrus*.[47] In Florentine Neoplatonism, Marsilio Ficino glorifies melancholy and Saturn and links them with genius.[48] The link between melancholy and creativity is outlined by Robert Burton's early modern treatise, *The Anatomy*, which notes that 'in melancholy men', creativity is 'especially strong and powerful'

> and often hurts, producing many monstrous and prodigious things …. In poets and painters imagination forcibly works, as appears by their several fictions, antics, images: as Ovid's house of sleep, Psyche's palace in Apuleius, &c.[49]

Milton's earlier works, 'Il Penseroso' and 'L'Allegro', explore both the positive association of the melancholic Saturn motif as nocturnal illumination, spiritual contemplation and genius (also illustrated in the preceding quote from the *invocatio* to Book III of *Paradise Lost*) and the negative side of melancholy as choleric and insomniac sadness through its associations with humoral theory, a dimension of melancholic states that 'L'Allegro' seeks to disperse to give way to the muses:[50]

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[43] Daiches, 67; See Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl for an historical discussion of melancholy.
[44] Scrutton, 169.
[45] Scrutton, 169.
[46] M. Mack, 109.
[47] Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 17.
[48] M. Mack, 112; Castor, 24.
[49] R. Burton, I.I.II.7.
[50] *PL* III.38–39: 'the wakeful Bird / Sings darkling'; Stewart, 264. Melancholia is associated with black bile (in humoral theory), earth and Saturn, associations which colour the figural references in 'L'Allegro' and other poetry discussed in this section.

Hence loathed Melancholy
Of *Cerberus* and blackest midnight born,
In *Stygian* Cave forlorn
'Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights unholy,
Find out some uncouth cell,
Where brooding darkness spreads his jealous wings,
And the night-Raven sings;
There under *Ebon* shades, and low-brow'd Rocks,
As ragged as thy Locks,
In dark *Cimmerian* desert ever dwell.[51]

In 'L'Allegro', melancholy is associated with the river Styx that divides the earth from the underworld in classical mythology and Cerberus, the guardian of the gates. The poem's refinements of melancholy recall Milton's later description of the darkness of the underworld in the first books of *Paradise Lost* ('dark illumine' (I.22); 'darkness visible' (I.63); 'His dark materials' (II.916)) and the winged image of Satan viewing the created world in Book II. Milton's invocation of melancholy in 'L'Allegro' is similar to examples by George Chapman who, following Ficino, describes the divine fury by which the true poet 'is elevated above the nature of man and translated into deity [*supra hominis naturam erigitur, & in Deum transit*]', and depicts the creative process as a nocturnal illumination that must emerge from the darkness of melancholy:

Where Gloweworme like doth shine
In nights of sorrow, this hid soul of mine:
And how her genuine formes, struggle for birth,
Under the clawes of this foule Panther earth.[52]

In the *invocatio* to Book I of *Paradise Lost*, Milton refers to nocturnal illumination in similar terms, yet seeks its elevation: 'What in me is dark / Illumine, what is low raise and support' (*PL* I.22–23). In Milton's later work, a clear association is made with the divine source of inspiration represented by the Heavenly Muse, where Milton's poetic inspiration is guided by the inner light of Protestant faith. George Chapman also uses the word 'brooding' in a context of melancholy in his poem 'Hymnus in Noctem', in

[51] 'L'Allegro' 1–10: CP 68.
[52] Chapman, 'The Dedicatory Epistles' to his translation of the *Odyssey* and 'Achilles Shield'; Tayler 2000, 33, 45; M. Mack, 109.

which his invocation of the muse is reminiscent of Milton's brooding wings of the dove figure in *Paradise Lost*. Chapman writes:

> A Step-dame Night of mind about us clings
> Who broods beneath her hell-obscuring wings,
> Worlds of confusion, where the soul defamed,
> The body had been better never framed ….[53]

Chapman's *The Conspiracy or Tragedy of Charles Duke of Byron*, reflecting on French political events of his day, also links 'brooding' to the creation of secular and political worlds. Such creation is rendered impious because God as supreme Artificer is solely empowered to create worlds:

> We must reform and have a new creation
> Of state and Government, and on our chaos
> Will I sit brooding up another world.[54]

The 'new creation' is an ironic allusion to St Paul's reference to Christ as a new creation in 2 Corinthians (5:17). The Duke's narcissistic creation is similar to the impious creative energy of Milton's Pandemonium, another newly-created world which also purports to usurp the divine power of Creation, and from which the work of the properly inspired epic poet is to be distinguished (see also I.650). Its creation out of Chaos is comparable to the vacuous waste from which Satan arrives at the edge of the world. The Satanic form of creativity in *Paradise Lost* is associated with vanity, rather than *spiritus*: the word *vanus* means empty, 'without substance'. It is etymologically related to *vacuus*, 'vacant' and *vastus*, 'waste'.[55] When Satan 'weighs his spread wings' to view the Creation at the close of Book II, he is to be contrasted with the dove's lighter wings and energies of creativity; the dove is the lightest form of the sublimated angel body that Kerrigan identifies as the central metaphor of the poem. Part of Milton's project is to distinguish the creative narcissism of Satan, whose erroneous view of his own absolute self-sufficiency makes him (like his world) 'self-begot, self-rais'd' (*PL* V.860). It is contrary to Milton's assertion in the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government* that artistic creation is an 'inspired gift of God' from whom all

[53] 'Hymnus in Noctem' (1594), 63–66; Chapman 1875, 4.
[54] Chapman (1608) 1988, 41, 1.2.29–31.
[55] See *PL* II.1045; Edwards, 499.

creative power derives, and its egoistic foundations are a potential pitfall for the fallen poet.

In *Paradise Lost*, as in much of his poetry, the poet's creativity is also dependent upon the secular body and the significance of the Incarnation.[56] Melancholy is a feature of fallen creativity and a melancholic mood pervades the *invocatio* of Book III ('from the cheerful ways of men / Cut off', III.46–47). The poet is likened to a Christ figure as Milton compares the activity of making poetry to the Passion; one may compare the introspective, agonistic dimension of 'May I express thee unblam'd?' (III.3). Moreover, the first invocation in Book I makes clear that the poet's inspiration depends not only on the heavenly status of the muse but 'th' upright heart and pure'.[57] Returning from the classical underworld, having retrieved the powers of creativity, the poet undergoes a kind of baptism which cleanses the effects of Original Sin, and suggests the regenerative dimension of his inspired poetry:

> the flow'ry Brooks beneath
> That wash thy hallow'd feet, and warbling flow,
> Nightly I visit ….
> (*PL* III.30–32)

The 'flow'ry brooks' with their 'warbling flow' link the rivers of the underworld to the world of Book III, its streams suggestive of transcendent poetic imagination and inspiration, while 'warbling' suggests an unhindered flow of expression and is reminiscent of Milton's somewhat ambivalent reference to Shakespeare 'warbl[ing] his native Wood-notes wild' in 'L'Allegro'. Yet here the washing of 'hallow'd feet' not only indicates a baptism but also alludes to Christ's miraculous curing of the blind man of Bethsaida (in Mark 8:22–26). The scriptural allusion suggests a clarification of Milton's 'inner vision' that is necessary for and associated with figural techniques of *enargeia* that are further examined in later chapters of this thesis. Moreover, it reflects the cleansing of his poetry-making, as he proposes that his sight may have been lost during his visit to the Satanic underworld, or as a result of his sinfulness. In Book III, Milton follows with an invocation of the positive sense of the melancholy motif, of the 'nocturnal note' as 'the wakeful Bird / Sings darkling':

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[56] Critics frequently identify the lack of emphasis Milton places in the Incarnation in his works; this chapter finds affinities between his monism and the more general influence of the Incarnation on Renaissance thought, which is then refined according to his model of allegory in *Paradise Lost*.
[57] *PL* I.17–18.

Nightly I visit: nor sometimes forget
Those other two equall'd with me in Fate,
So were I equall'd with them in renown,
Blind *Thamyris* and blind *Maeonides*,
And *Tiresias* and *Phineus* Prophets old.

(*PL* III.32–36)

By comparing himself to blind, yet prophetic poets who have special status in biblical and classical texts, Milton assumes the powers of vatic poetry deriving from the classical tradition, yet refined according to his Protestant imagination. The poet's baptism by the Holy Spirit repeats a symbolic association with the Creation dove at the opening of the poem, which in John 1:32 appears for the baptism of Christ.[58] The association with baptism is regenerative, through its cleansing of Original Sin, aligning the regenerative effects of the Incarnation with poetic inspiration, because to do its work the Holy Spirit 'dost prefer' to reside in ('before all Temples') 'th' upright heart and pure' (I.17–18).

Milton returns to the motif of melancholy in Book IX in a way which raises its negative associations, as (potentially) a poet 'deprest', with its reference to humoural imbalance ('cold' and 'damp'):

unless an age too late, or cold
Climate, or Years damp my intended wing
Deprest; and much they may, if all be mine,
Not Hers who brings it nightly to my Ear.

(*PL* IX.44–47)

Milton's application of the melancholy motif illustrates how early modern creativity is influenced by discourses on the relationship between the body and the imagination. Such understandings recognise the embodied role of the faculties and the emotions that are intertwined with creative expression according to a model of experience and affect. Yet the dual dimension of melancholy reflects the fine balance on which human poetic creation rests after the Fall. Kerrigan argues that Milton must 'secure his creative power from this weakness'; his poetic melancholy must conform to the type fitting for the inspired poetry to which he aspires; in Kerrigan's terms, 'sublimation' is the proper

[58] Cope, 157.

aspiration of the poet and the 'compensation for his blindness'.[59] Although Kerrigan's modern reading suggests that Milton's purpose ultimately results in his disillusionment, in the argument of this thesis, a number of elements of the style and underlying philosophy of *Paradise Lost* suggest that Milton believes in the regenerative powers of divinely-inspired poetry on the body, mind and soul.

4. Vitalism and Poetic Inspiration

> Darkness profound
> Cover'd th' Abyss: but on the wat'ry calm
> His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspred,
> And vital virtue infus'd, and vital warmth
> Throughout the fluid Mass ….
>
> (*PL* VII.233–37)

Book VII recounts the story of the Creation, returning to the figure of the Holy Spirit that is described in Book I. This account by Raphael introduces details of Milton's materialist philosophy to the act of Creation, apparently reversing the gender of the muse from male or at least androgynous (in the first Book) to female (Urania) which, along with the feminised imagery of gestation (the 'fluid Mass'), not only introduces a Platonic symmetry to the figure but also invests the figure with embodied form.[60]

The lines develop Milton's model of poetic inspiration in *Paradise Lost* as one deriving from his Arminian and monistic theology. That model not only counters the dualism of Neoplatonism and Cartesianism with an integrated model of body, mind and soul, but also introduces qualities of affective agency and voluntarism to an otherwise deterministic Calvinist universe. Milton's alignment of secular poetic inspiration and expressivity with the Creation in *Paradise Lost* is thus more than mimetic imitation; it is a partaking of the powers of Creation itself.[61] He transforms the Renaissance association between poetry and Creation by investing both with the forces of animist materialism that are central to his metaphysics. The poet's creative activity expresses the material energies associated with the metaphor of the body that is integral to the poem. In Milton's model of inspired poetry, invention thus depends on the affective power of

[59] The assumption of the male character of the muse in Book 1 runs counter to the views of some critics: see Lewalski 2013, 59–78; Kerrigan 1983, 257.
[60] Samuel 39. It may be noted that there is some debate amongst critics about the gender(s), kind(s) and number of muses in *Paradise Lost*.
[61] M. Mack, 109.

Creation which lends itself to the creative energy of the poet's work, in which the reader equally participates.

Milton's approach in *Paradise Lost* resembles that of Sidney, who also models his theory of poetic invention on the Christian doctrine of the Creation. In his *Apology*, Sidney uses a common Renaissance analogy, claiming that the poet 'bringeth things forth' 'with the force of divine breath': poetry is an expression of *spiritus*; 'the vital, creative, form-endowing breath of God' who creates the world by sending his spirit, his 'divine breath', out over the waters and 'bring[ing] things forth' through the power of the Word.[62] This type of inspiration is one which is received by the individual, yet unlike traditional prophecy, it engages the creative agency of the poet.[63] The poet's work is not simply to imitate nature but to partake of the same kind of energies that are reflected in nature, and the skill of the poet may even surpass nature, which is equally a visible manifestation of the divine powers of Creation.[64] The Renaissance understanding draws on principles of Aristotelian *poiesis* and is reflected in Sidney's distinction between *poesy*, the artifice of the poet, and poetry, the end product.[65] The concept is captured by Ben Jonson in his address to Shakespeare when he refers to the mimetic 'fashioning' by the poet's effort as the 'second heat' which emulates the act of Creation.[66] Such a notion is reflected in *PL* III (571–87) on the power of the sun in nature as a measure of divine works, apprehensible in language by the reader through the point of view of fallen Satan:

> By his Magnetic beam, that gently warms
> The Universe, and to each inward part
> With gentle penetration, though unseen,
> Shoots invisible virtue even to the deep:
> So wondrously was set his Station bright.
>
> (*PL* III.583–87)

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[62] M. Mack, 111; Edwards, 498.
[63] Shuger 1988, 70, 232; Bouwsma, 27, 115.
[64] The distinction drawn in the early modern period between *natura naturans*, which is the active process of nature, and *natura naturata*, which is the passive end product of nature, underlies the process by which poetry can imitate the creative force of the divine. Poets like Sidney consider the work of the poet to be to follow nature by expressing the equivalent of the active quality of *natura naturans*, which is an expression of the divine force in nature: see M. Mack, 122–24.
[65] Sidney 2007, 139; M. Mack, 122–24.
[66] From Ben Jonson, 'To the Memory of My Beloved the Author, Mr. William Shakespeare': Jonson 1910, 287–89.

The emphasis of nature's works is in turn on the instillation of 'virtue' or divine goodness. That restorative role is also attributed to poetry; Sidney's *Apology* suggests that poetry can be a vehicle for spiritual regeneration, applying a Calvinist emphasis on the regeneration of the faculties with Renaissance poetic theory that inscribes poetry as a vehicle of faith and instrument of Grace. The poet 'breathes forth' a 'golden' world that carries dual associations with the lost golden age of the classics and Neoplatonic Form, 'far surpassing [Nature's] doings'.[67] Through the powers of invention, the poet (and auditor) gain access to the divine mind through the imagination, and Sidney thus claims to deliver 'no small argument to the incredulous of that first accursed fall of Adam'.[68] Sidney, according to Mack, explains the good effect of poetry by exploiting a connection between Creation and regeneration, a connection that his contemporaries would have recognised: 'the relation is the traditional typological understanding of Creation as foreshadowing the recreation in Grace'. Sidney's allusion to divine breath thus

> points to a specific kind of inspiration: the spiritual regeneration that St. Paul speaks of, by which the fallen world becomes a 'new creation' and the fallen human person becomes a 'new creature'.[69]

Unlike much of Milton's poetry, Sidney's *Apology* seems less concerned with notions of melancholic genius or Neoplatonic formulations of divine furore that sometimes accord the poet near-divine status. Instead, according to Mack, Sidney introduces the idea of the heroic poet ('heroical poetry'), whose regenerative, redemptive potential attaches to the imitation of Christ as the earthly manifestation of the divine.[70] Yet the humanist shift is also evident in *Paradise Lost*: by emphasising the importance of the Incarnation, the centrality of the heart and the embodied faculties, the poem reflects the importance of the poet's ability to engage and move the fallen reader, introducing reliance on an affective and bodily voluntarism absent from models which make the poet a mere conduit for divine vision. It is an important qualification to the predestined Calvinist long view of history from Creation to the Last Judgment.[71] The regenerative potential of poetry is perhaps most simply evident in Milton's poetic 'resurrection' of

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[67] Sidney 2007, 139.
[68] Sidney 2007, 139.
[69] M. Mack, 114. The 'new creation' is a New Testament principle derived largely from the lines of St Paul in KJV Galatians 6:15; 2 Corinthians 5:17 referring to spiritual rebirth through Christ.
[70] Sidney 2007, 148; M. Mack, 139; Steadman 1959, 97–99.
[71] M. Mack, 119.

language in Paradise that has long exegetical and poetic etymology, bringing to life dead metaphors like 'wandering' and 'error', which have particular resonances within the providential design of *Paradise Lost*.[72]

Milton's central figure of the Creation dove in *Paradise Lost,* according to Rogers, reflects his monistic theology; with its formulation of the Creation *ex Deo,* he elevates the act of creation to the transfer of vital energy, 'not simply [to] breathe life into the world but to impregnate it with spirit and a potency of life': 'Dove-like sat'st brooding on the vast Abyss / And mad'st it pregnant'. The conceit captures the process by which the heavenly spirit creates the universe and is, according to Rogers, central to both Milton's theology and poetic theory.[73] God 'infuses' this energy at the beginning of time 'into the entirety of the material world at the Creation', a formulation also reflected in Milton's posthumously-discovered prose work *De Doctrina Christiana,* where he describes the process whereby God infuses the human body with soul:

> Nor did God merely breathe that spirit into man, but moulded it in each individual, and infused it throughout, enduing and embellishing it with its proper faculties.[74]

Milton's formulation emphasises the embodied and concrete expression of the 'moulding' and 'embellishing' of the 'faculties'. He departs, according to Rogers, from the process of Creation outlined in the first chapter of Genesis (and referred to by Sidney), whereby God is said to have moved upon the face of the waters, as in the King James or any modern English translation of the Bible. Instead Milton returns to the Vulgate Bible (St Jerome's Latin translation), which gives the Hebrew word for 'moved' as *incubabat*, a verb which literally means 'to brood' and is more typically used in relation to gestating birds.[75] Milton thus blends various associations of the participle 'brooding' to suggest not only poetic melancholy, but also procreative energy as an integral quality of both divine and human powers of creation. The dove's dually-gendered nature, the potent sexual overtones of its metaphor of inspiration and its vital energy reflect the interwoven quality of desire as a positive force manifesting in the process of artistic creation.[76]

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[72] Ricks, 58.
[73] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'.
[74] *DDC* Ch. 7: CP 979.
[75] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'.
[76] Summers, 13–14; Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'; Shawcross, 83.

Milton's dove carries the influence not only of Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, which identify the procreative power of *eros* with creative activity, but also the *Timaeus*, in which Creation involves an overflowing of goodness as part of the world soul. Milton integrates these Platonic myths with Christian theological understanding that virtues are instilled ('pour'd': *PL* IV.365) by God into humans at birth, a notion also reflected in the lines above from *De Doctrina Christiana*.[77] The vital energies are integral to the moral being of the Miltonic subject, and suggest a kind of rarefied affect that provides an interesting contrast to the type of refined affect elaborated in the theory of Massumi, Deleuze and Guattari. God is the supreme artificer, and the goodness of Creation, humbly mirrored in the human artifice of the poet at the level of the word, makes poetry a vehicle of divine Grace. In Book VII of *Paradise Lost,* the book of the Creation, it is imbued with vital life and intelligence. Milton gives nature, and by analogy, poetry, a 'freedom to organize itself' into the order of the created world, according to Rogers, referring to this creative energy as 'vital virtue', also a creative power, and 'vital warmth' (*PL* VII.236).[78]

The 'Creation dove', with its vital energies captured by fallen techniques of analogy according to Milton's monistic poetics, and its basis in dissimilation between tenor and vehicle that is responsible for generating feelings and emotions, is therefore a very specific figural expression of the process of poetic creation in *Paradise Lost*. Its figurative styles resemble the manner in which modern theorists endeavour to incorporate the dynamic energies associated with Spinozan thought into their models of expression. One can discern a broad similarity between Milton's vitalist model, the Spinozan principle of *conatus,* and other comparable Renaissance animist materialist models, including that of Paracelsus, with its 'designation of the unity of matter and spirit as a self-active entity'.[79] In Milton's dove metaphor, these conative energies are expressed by, and form part of, the feelings generated by the metaphor, reflecting the dynamic energies of the mind and body as attributes ultimately derived from the Godhead. Similarly, as Altieri points out, Spinoza challenges Cartesian dualism by placing the dynamic energies of the mind and body within the material world:

[77] M. Mack, 116; Samuel (1947) 1965, 39.
[78] Rogers 1996, 9–12; Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'.
[79] Charles Webster, 30; Rogers 1996, 10.

> As Deleuze would later emphasise, Spinoza gives us a world in which expression is not only a psychological activity but the fundamental force in the emergence of all being.[80]

Through its affective qualities, the dove metaphor adds temporal intensity, body and agency to Milton's model of poetic inspiration in *Paradise Lost.* These effects, with their emphasis on transitionary states or 'becomings', can be missed in traditional hermeneutic readings of *Paradise Lost* that endeavour to reduce the text to fixed meanings. Milton's figures particularly suggest that the epic is much more complex than the critical preoccupation with doctrinal instruction would otherwise admit.

An emphasis on the vital qualities of literature is often traced to Milton's earlier prose works. In *Areopagitica*, he refers to the 'potency of life' that books express in a way which mirrors his monistic ontology:

> For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are: nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them.[81]

'Books', according to Rogers's reading of *Areopagitica*, are not mere 'collections of signs pointing toward disembodied thought'; they are 'vital repositories of the body of living intellect'.[82] In his prose pamphlet *Apology for Smectymnuus*, discussing the relationship between eloquence and character, Milton argues that the author should strive to be the book itself, or, in Milton's terms, 'honest' 'not licentious'.[83] As God is the author of both purity and eloquence, He is the perfect example for the poet to imitate:

> he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things ought himself to be a true poem, that is, a composition and pattern of the best and honorablest things ….[84]

In *Paradise Lost*, the idea of a worthy poem cannot be set apart from the worth of the poet, and the quality of the expression, which captures the embodied experience of the

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[80] Altieri, 142.
[81] *AP*: CP 720.
[82] Rogers 2007, '*Areopagitica*'.
[83] CP 693.
[84] CP 694.

speaker, is a reflection of the speaker's inner state.[85] The question of whether the skills of eloquence are inherently good qualities that only the virtuous can possess is a debated question in the Renaissance, yet Milton resolves it in the negative in his depiction of eloquent Satan as the fraudulent artificer. Milton's statement of poetics in the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government* articulates the Renaissance view of virtue and learning as foundations for the poetic character with influences from Plato's *Republic*, Aristotelian ethics and poetics, and poets and theorists of the Italian and English Renaissance including Philip Sidney.[86]

The vital energy expressed in Milton's prose works, especially in the kinetic flow of language of *Areopagitica*, is identified with his Arminian theology and particularly casts itself as an expression of the classical Greek oral tradition. It is a quality also traced to his antiprelatical tracts and the expression of which Lana Cable argues lies 'within the affective domain of transformative desire'.[87] Desire is intertwined with the expression of affect in Milton's prose works as much as his poetry, and is a quality that can be directed through the active agency of the subject towards good or bad things depending upon the quality of the heart and will. A similar feature is also identified in the verse of *Paradise Lost*, particularly the highly enjambed, infrequently end-stopped, surging lines of blank verse, which for Milton

> is to be esteem'd an example set, the first in *English*, of ancient liberty recover'd to Heroic Poem from the troublesome and modern bondage of Riming. (CP 210)

In modern affect theory, this embodied, expressive quality is often linked to Spinoza's *conatus* or Bergson's notion of the *élan vital*, as containing a kind of vital and material, emergent sense of embodied life. In modern poetics, the same quality is sometimes referred to as '*élan*' or alternatively as volubility, a reference to the fluency and energetic turning, rolling, flow of words.[88] In *Paradise Lost*, Milton uses the word 'voluble' to describe Satan disguised as the serpent in Book IX:

> Nearer he drew, and many a walk travers'd
> Of stateliest Covert, Cedar, Pine, or Palm,

[85] Kerrigan 1983, 13–14; Wood, 283.
[86] CP 670; Samuel (1947) 1965, 45–67.
[87] Hoxby, 234; Cable, 118.
[88] The term '*élan vital*' is noted for its various dimensions of meaning that can be lost in translation.

> Then voluble and bold, now hid, now seen
> Among thick-wov'n Arborets and Flow'rs
> Imborder'd on each Bank, the hand of *Eve* ….
>
> (*PL* IX.434–38)[89]

The description is of the coiled movement of the snake. Ricks identifies the main meaning given by the *OED* for the seventeenth century as 'glib, fluent' and notes: 'the snake is to be all too voluble in the commoner sense as in 'so gloz'd the Tempter, and his Proem tun'd' (IX.549). It is to be contrasted with the details of the serpent in Book IV in the pre-fallen innocence of Paradise, where a comparison is drawn between the elephant who 'wreath'd / His Lithe Proboscis' and the 'insinuating' serpent's 'braided train' of 'Gordian twine' (IV.345–49). The 'moral and corporeal' references 'resonate together' in Milton's aesthetics, as Ricks suggests, and depend on the agency of the reader to discern the two senses of volubility associated with innocent or fallen speech, with the emphasis on the concrete experience of the body giving a sense of intensity of expression to the figure. The association of volubility with 'fluency' demonstrates how poetic language and the embodied state of the speaker are intertwined in *Paradise Lost*.

The quality of volubility can be compared with the quality attributed by Milton in 'L'Allegro' to Shakespeare's 'warbling' tendency of style (134: CP 71). In *Paradise Lost*, Milton's vital poetry is a reflection of his qualified idea of free will, one which is dependent for its existence on the divine and, by being shaped according to particular styles of allegoresis, is incompatible with styles which allow the 'free-play' of the imagination.[90] The force and action of Shakespeare's poetic style has been attributed (amongst other things) to his frequent use of transitive verbs which, because of their relation to the grammatical object, tend to record activities. In Shakespeare's work, such verb usage often provides a strong sense of animation, energy and immediacy.[91] A similar observation can be made of Milton's use of the continuous past tense when describing the dove figure which 'sat'st brooding', enhancing its effects of temporal immediacy and intensity. The adverbial quality of Shakespeare's and Milton's poetry reflects the more embodied Renaissance model of the subject and its close relationship between thought and feeling, a relationship that is reflected in critical models.

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[89] Ricks, 108.
[90] Fletcher, 125.
[91] Davie, 49.

Milton's deployment of the rhetorical 'grand' style in *Paradise Lost* carries an important relationship to this poetics of embodiment on several levels that draw on its affective qualities. The expression of agency is often attributed to a combination of the musical quality of the lines, Milton's use of energetic blank verse, and copious enjambment, techniques integral to the creative model expressed by Milton's style. Ricks thus refers to *Paradise Lost* as having a 'liquid texture', a feature which has 'exasperated' critics, but which combines a 'wide suggestiveness' with the 'momentum of statement'.[92] These techniques enhance the intensity of the lines and their effects on the auditor. Eliot refers to it as:

> an ability to give a perfect and unique pattern to every paragraph …. The peculiar feeling, almost a physical sensation of a breathless leap, communicated by Milton's long periods … is impossible to procure from rhymed verse.[93]

These qualities are especially evident in the opening lines of *Paradise Lost*, (I.1-2), where Milton's elevated eloquence is characteristic of the epic form. It is an important vehicle for the expression of emotional energies which are tied to its creative power and also inhere in the expression of its figures. This style, when directed at expressing the quality of the heart in poetry and oratory, is especially influenced by the Longinian rhetorical tradition as a means for articulating the sublime. With an emphasis on lofty language, rhythm and musicality, Milton's grand style is used at various intervals in *Paradise Lost* and is comparable to the passionate, expressive and figurative Christian grand style identified by Debora Shuger as characteristic of Renaissance religious oratory.[94] Milton strives for a kind of rarefied emotion in this style of verse that inheres in its vital energy and agency and is associated with the verse's sublimity. The style is distinguishable from that identified with Satan's creativity, which implies humoral imbalance and is based on sophistry, false eloquence and figural distortion.[95] Instead of reflecting a critique of poetry that some critics find as an underlying philosophy of the poem, Milton's dramatisation of the distinctions between the two styles in *Paradise Lost* suggests instead that eloquence is an outer reflection of the inner states of its speakers.

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[92] Ricks, 81.
[93] Eliot 1947, 33; Davie, 21.
[94] Shuger 1988, 7; Ricks, 22–23.
[95] For example, see *PL* IV.114–17.

According to Kerrigan's notion of the 'enfolded sublime', Milton's epic is metaphorically embodied by graduation from human to the angelic body and the Godhead.[96] Humans and angels are linked cosmically through the graduated material substance of which the human body provides a microcosmic model. They share the process of digestion, a metaphor used in the early modern period for the study of scripture and which Milton compares to an alchemical process. The metaphor also expresses figuratively the way poetic language affects the auditor in *Paradise Lost* (V.435).[97] In his prose work *Of Education*, Milton also makes a figural connection between the processes of study and good digestion.[98]

The effect of the body metaphor is to express and experience the verse of *Paradise Lost* like a body that conforms to Milton's underlying monist ontology with its emphasis on an agency that has divine origins.[99] This is also shared in a more refined way by Milton's angels:

> For Spirits when they please
> Can either Sex assume, or both; so soft
> And uncompounded is thir Essence pure,
> Not ti'd or manacl'd with joint or limb,
> Nor founded on the brittle strength of bones,
> Like cumbrous flesh; but in what shape they choose
> Dilated or condens't, bright or obscure,
> Can execute thir aerie purposes,
> And works of love or enmity fulfil.
>
> (*PL* I.423–31)

In *Paradise Lost*, both the good and fallen angels' bodies are remarkably metamorphic and correspondingly flexible, 'Not ti'd or manacl'd with joint or limb', exhibiting vital intensities that are also expressed in the figures of speech in Paradise.[100] This is a linguistic quality lost in the postlapsarian world, a major crisis of the epic, suggested by

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[96] Kerrigan 1983, 260.
[97] See Kerrigan 1983 on the comparison between poetry and digestion (236); on the imaginative process as digestion using body metaphors (239); and on Satan's inversions of digestion (240). Kerrigan 1983, 230; Schoenfeldt 1999, 131.
[98] CP 638.
[99] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'.
[100] A significant amount of critical attention has been accorded to the distinction between human and angelic bodies in *Paradise Lost*. See Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 1'.

the sonically-grating, brief return of rhyme ('eat' and 'seat' with the emphasis on the carnal experience of the body as opposed to the spiritual) in the early modern language of the Fall itself:[101]

> Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd, she eat:
> Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat
> Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe ….
> (*PL* IX.781–83).

The heaviness associated with the Fall and the corresponding loss of flexibility of language from the 'prompt eloquence' of Paradise is also manifested when the allegorical symbols of Sin and Death pave a rigid path between Hell and the Earth by 'a Bridge / Of length prodigious' (*PL* X.301–02). Fallon equates the ontological descent of the fallen angels to their being surrounded 'by a Cartesian or Hobbesian space', which, in its opposition to Milton's monistic body, equates to a mechanistic and spiritless form 'asserting a realm in which God's metaphysics do not apply'.[102] The initial effect on the fallen angels is to make them grossly physical, a source from which they derive their power and the force that animates their language, until they finally descend into the 'bodiless' forms of serpents.[103]

Fallon identifies how the figures of Milton's devils are prone to distortion and possess shape-shifting abilities; Satan is described by Uriel as seemingly 'disfigured', a reflection of the fallen, spiritual disfigurement in which his language becomes erratic and broken, disclosing his deception:

> Yet not anough had practis'd to deceive
> *Uriel* once warn'd; whose eye pursu'd him down
> The way he went, and on th' *Assyrian* mount
> Saw him disfigur'd, more than could befall
> Spirit of happy sort: his gestures fierce
> He mark'd and mad demeanor, then alone,
> As he suppos'd, all unobserv'd, unseen.

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[101] Lerer suggests that the seventeenth-century pronunciation resembles '*et*' and '*set*': Lerer 1999 (2007), 'Book 9 - The Fall'.
[102] Fallon, 194, 203, 206.
[103] Fallon, 207. By 'bodiless' I refer to the sense that the fallen angels appear to have all the vital life removed from them in an ontological descent described by Fallon that places them outside the reach of God's metaphysics. Significantly, they also lose the power of language expression in *PL*, Book X, 517.

(*PL* IV.124–30)

The same angelic flexibility enables Satan to disguise himself and inhabit the body of the serpent, but the sublimated bodies of the good angels are light, flexible, and able to mould their shape because they are closer to the divine.[104] In a mirroring technique that is frequently used in *Paradise Lost*, the Creation dove figure has a counterpart in the grotesque figure of Sin, signifying respectively as true and false products of the poetic imagination. Both contain an energy derived from a sexualised image, the first as vital Creation and the second as a creative violence of distortion:

> Before the Gates there sat
> On either side a formidable shape;
> The one seem'd Woman to the waist, and fair,
> But ended foul in many a scaly fold
> Voluminous and vast, a Serpent arm'd
> With mortal sting ….

(*PL* II.648–52)

Although the dove metaphor challenges the boundaries of poetic inventiveness to consolidate classical creation myths within Milton's Protestant model, its creative energies are drawn from the divine; the failure of full assimilation of its comparisons that is integral to the technique of metaphoric analogy between tenor and vehicle is a feature of fallen language, which loses its direct access to divine, unmediated and undivided sources of 'true' expression. Yet its emphasis on concrete particulars of experience is also the source of vital, creative energy. By contrast, the image of Sin is a perversion and distortion of the powers of Creation, identified in the poem with the 'infernal serpent' and the paralysing figure of the Medusa; its creative energy has the power to seduce and deform the soul. Yet it is also a reflection of the inner state of sin; matching its opposite in the Creation dove, that captures Milton's Protestant emphasis on the sense of inspired poetry as capable of reflecting the inner light or the expression of the internal state of the speaker, instead of merely the surface or outer form of language. In turn, the refinements of the inner state are associated with refined feeling, while the outer shape of language is associated with the unrefined or lower bodily passions and desires.

[104] Fallon, 186.

The figures of Creation are each indebted to the Platonic dialogues: in the *Symposium*, Eryximachus enlarges the realm of love to include the universe, explaining all sympathetic and antipathetic movements as the effects of love and hate, and further distinguishing love, as 'the true harmony of unlike elements', from the 'false conjoining of destructive forces that is hate'.[105] Infection and deformity are commonplace metaphors for the effects of Original Sin: 'infected with sin, the image of God in the soul is deformed', a notion that is also reflected in Sidney's *Apology* as 'our infected wills'.[106] The image of Sin represents the fallen soul as deformed with a kind of creative activity that manifests in distortions of the body and, in the case of Sin, the 'conjoining of destructive forces' by comparison to the true harmony at the centre of the dove metaphor. In this way Milton distinguishes his poetry from its classical antecedents. Because the figure of Sin is not divinely inspired, it resembles merely the grotesque combinations made out of fabulous images in the store-house of memory of classical literature, according to the early modern understanding of the relationship between the faculties of memory and imagination as part of the 'inner senses' outlined by Burton.[107] They are to be contrasted with the inspired inventiveness of Milton's divinely-sanctioned poetics of Creation expressed in the Creation dove figure.

Kerrigan argues that the comparison Milton makes between poetry and the angelic body represents a desire for sublimation: 'the pure body has, besides the full authority of Christian myth, a powerfully dialectical setting'. The angelic figure equally constitutes 'wish fulfilment' and 'ultimate disillusionment' due to the effects the events of biblical history have on the condition of all humans:[108]

> As Adam discovers his happy state, and then in his second education prepares for a world negating his first happiness, so Milton relives through artistic invention his own agon with necessity, and particularly with blindness, necessity's epitome.[109]

In the postlapsarian world, language is altered by Original Sin and the fallen will, something critics find in the poem's changes in rhetorical and poetic styles after the Fall. Yet *Paradise Lost* also identifies the affective body as essential to the regenerative

[105] Samuel (1947) 1965, 151.
[106] M. Mack, 126.
[107] R. Burton, I.I.II.7; Carruthers, 34.
[108] Kerrigan 1983, 216.
[109] Kerrigan 1983, 216.

potential for Christians enabled through the Incarnation, difficult though that may be due to the weight of Original Sin and the necessary volition of the subject. Language, after the Fall, carries with it the weight, inflexibility and density of matter, yet after the Incarnation poetic language has a devotional if not near-sacramental value in the hands of the 'right poet' that is compared to an alchemical process.[110] Through its restitutional effects on the human faculties, such poetry also carries with it a vital energy linked to the Creation, regeneration, and the divine order of the universe.[111]

5. Allegory, Alchemy and the Fallen Body

So down they sat,
And to thir viands fell, nor seemingly
The Angel, nor in mist, the common gloss
Of Theologians, but with keen dispatch
Of real hunger, and concoctive heat
To transubstantiate; what redounds, transpires
Through Spirits with ease; nor wonder; if by fire
Of sooty coal the Empiric Alchemist
Can turn, or holds it possible to turn
Metals of drossiest Ore to perfet Gold
As from the Mine.

(*PL* V.433–43)

Book V of *Paradise Lost* introduces the angelic figure that stands as a central metaphor for the poem in Kerrigan's account, the basis of a cosmic pattern which he associates with the 'enfolded sublime'. The technique works in a similar way to the lyric, but in the longer epic poem form its effects are not immediately apparent but only 'afterwards upon reflection'.[112] By means of this angelic metaphor, Milton elaborates a graduated relationship between human and divine according to the dense or light quality of matter that is shared in common by them. The angelic figures of the poem are integral to its ontology and its poetics, sharing material qualities with humans, including digestive and sexual functions. Their embodied though light and flexible expression is equally reflected in the language of Paradise, with its figural emphasis on nature as vital and

[110] Schwarz 1999, 1; M. Mack, 127.
[111] A similar view is found in Sidney's *Apology* with its reference to the 'right poet': Sidney 2007, 139, 142; M. Mack, 127.
[112] Kerrigan 1983, 233.

embodied and the 'prompt eloquence' of Adam and Eve. While Kerrigan finds Milton's project to lead to his ultimate disillusionment, this thesis argues that Milton incorporates the symbolic language of allegory, which, by equating angelic digestion with transubstantiation, ascribes a near-sacramental role to poetry that takes place for the embodied Miltonic subject, and through which Milton's true material of sacred poetry has a regenerative effect on the soul.[113] This role, I argue, is afforded to poetry in spite of the shift that occurs post-Fall, when the 'infected will' of the subject makes that regenerative process a difficult one.

The figural technique of the metaphysical conceit represented by Milton's Creation dove is influenced by both the rhetorical and the allegorical traditions, a combination of influences critics find integral to both the work of the metaphysical poets and (somewhat contentiously) to Sidney's *Apology*, in which his 'idea' or 'fore-conceit' and notion of 'figuring forth' are recognisable in both allegorical and Neoplatonic art.[114] According to Mindele Treip:

> The poet is the Maker, emulating the Divine Artificer who realises his conceptions, his Idea(s) in his living creation and in the external world through the persons, deeds and events of the Bible, all of which act as His 'words'. In such a view, scriptural-typological figuration parallels the figuration with which secular poetry also may invest the living world of the imagination. But in neither case does the scriptural view of typology or the parallel Renaissance view of allegorical figure in poetry reduce the living world to any pallid shadow, despite the Neoplatonic aesthetic affiliations of the Renaissance outlook. The medieval bond between figure and the real literal level, reinforced by scriptural traditions of exegesis, remains strong.[115]

Tuve also recognises this connection between literal and figural levels in Renaissance and metaphysical poetry, noting how allegoresis provides vigour and clarity in the impression figures make on the reader's sensibilities.[116] The quality is directed towards

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[113] While Milton's prose works often indicate that Milton rejected the doctrine of the Eucharist, he does embrace the notion in *Paradise Lost*, albeit incorporating alternative attitudes to it in his figures which may suggest an implicit questioning of the doctrine. Thus, for example, Adam and Eve partake of their 'viands' in Paradise, a clear reference to Communion, but after the Fall Adam refers to Eve as a 'crooked rib'. The latter may suggest that the effects of the Fall on the human will make the Eucharist ineffectual or of limited effect on its own.
[114] M. Mack, 37–38, 100; Tuve 1947, 29, 30, 33, 61.
[115] Treip, 49.
[116] Tuve 1966, 33; Krieger 1992, 115; Bundy, 535.

expressing the concrete particularity of experience whilst equally engaging the shaping power of the imagination. In Milton's approach, the technique depends on the ethos of its maker, particularly when dealing with sacred subject matter or Milton's 'true' material. While Sidney's indebtedness to the allegorical tradition is much debated amongst critics, Milton's 'Creation dove' conceit and many of the other figures and tropes of his epic are indebted to the convergence between rhetorical and allegorical figure.[117] Milton's dove conceit relies on the symbolic power of allegoresis which, as a technique of fallen language deriving from scriptural exegesis and adopted in poetry, also imitates the embodied, regenerative power of the Incarnation. Drawn from the tradition of Augustine and Dante, allegory depends on the splitting of literal and figurative meaning according to the exegetical tradition surrounding interpretation of the relationship between Old and New Testament events and figures in Christian theology.[118]

In works by Dante, Milton and other epic poets, this typological classification extends to the relationship between classical and biblical figures. Moreover, according to Treip, Milton's allegorical poetics have a broader reach than the purely typological tradition, in order to accommodate his literary intentions.[119] Although utilising the epic form of secular poetry, Milton's subject matter accords it allegorical status, identifying *Paradise Lost* from its commencement as a theodicy, instructing the reader to match its form with underlying content in a splitting between two levels of literal and figurative meaning that is common in allegory.[120] Milton's monism, I argue, seeks to redress the traditional split through the figure of the body that is so central to *Paradise Lost*. Thus, for example, with the Creation dove carrying the force of religious symbolism (in John 1:32), Milton extends the allegorical reach of *Paradise Lost* by integrating the techniques of classical and Renaissance poetry and distinguishing his epic from other secular works by incorporating the cosmic, allegorical language of symbols. Symbol, upon which allegory depends for its effects, is more than mere comparison; it therefore differs from simple metaphor, as the symbol 'stands for' the tenor itself.[121] Symbolism,

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[117] M. Mack, 38.
[118] Auerbach 1953, 554–557; Auerbach 1984, 229; Lerer 2005.
[119] Treip, 227; Shuger 1988, 213.
[120] Martin, 18; Danielson 2013a, 144. Milton's monism, in turn, affects the expression of allegory by the figure of the body.
[121] Martin, 17; Fletcher, 71 refers to allegory as a large metaphor which can typically include features of synecdoche and metonymy.

especially religious, carries great affective weight in the early modern period, where it is thought not only to reveal the spiritual world in material form, but to reach deeper, making a more direct impression on the imagination and the soul.[122] It is an important aspect of Milton's Protestant poetics, where the focus on the word emphasises the 'inner light' as opposed to the surface 'show' of language, but its relationship to visual and verbal icon in the tradition of Protestant iconoclasm gives it an ambivalent status.

In *Paradise Lost*, a series of typological symbols relating to the body connect the secular narrative to the cosmic sacred. T. B. Macaulay says of Milton's style (using a somewhat old-fashioned metaphor) that its suggestiveness, associations and connecting ideas make it seem that 'he electrifies the mind through conductors'. Its effect is produced 'remotely': 'not so much by what it expresses as by what it suggests; not so much by the ideas which it directly conveys, as by other ideas which are connected with them'.[123] This description is useful when considering the way Milton deploys typological and other symbols throughout the epic. Allegory is a feature of the world of fallen poetry, a consequence of fallen language's broken link to the divine order of unmediated representation. By incorporating certain allegorical symbols, Milton aligns his poetics of inspiration very subtly and affectively with the body and suffering associated with the Passion, with which he distinguishes his poetry's reliance on the secular models of imagination, memory and poetic authority in poetic inspiration.

Milton, like Sidney, aligns the imitative, regenerative role of the poet to the imitation of Christ. Steadman reads Milton's interpretation of the divine image as the basis of his treatment of heroic virtue; Christ is 'the perfect image of God — the divine "archetype" (to echo Gregory) of the divine image in man'. 'In his image Adam was first created and the regenerate are renewed', a view also expressed by Milton in *De Doctrina Christiana* in which he aligns regeneration with a renewal of all of the faculties.[124] The Augustinian-Platonic conception of the progress of the soul upward from body to spirit, and from images to truth, is reflected in Raphael's counsel to Adam in Book VIII in which he warns that

[122] Tuve 1947, 399; R. Greene and others, 1392.
[123] McCaulay 9–11; Ricks, 132.
[124] Milton, *DDC* I.18; Steadman 1959, 99. In *DDC* (I.18) Milton defines regeneration as 'that change operated by the Word and the Spirit, whereby the old man being destroyed, the inward man is regenerated by God after his own image, in all the faculties of his mind'. In the same work (I.16) he states that the 'effect and design of the whole ministry of mediation is, the satisfaction of divine justice on behalf of all men, and the conformation of the faithful to the image of Christ'.

Love refines
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat
In Reason, and is judicious, is the scale
By which to heav'nly Love thou may'st ascend,
Not sunk in carnal pleasure ….
(*PL* VIII.589–93)

The expression of this ascent in language on a ladder leading to knowledge of the divine mysteries relies on a structure of 'symbolic progress', according to Catherine Gimelli Martin, that depends upon 'the ancient myths of purgation and return that form the central sacramental belief system of Christianity'.[125] According to Steadman:

> The scope of *Paradise Lost* enables Milton not merely to contrast the 'earthy' man and the 'heavenly' man in Adam and Christ, but also to portray three phases of the divine image in Adam himself — its original splendour, its obscuration through sin, and its gradual restoration through spiritual regeneration. The final books of Milton's epic, showing Adam's repentance and revived knowledge and trust in God, portray the gradual emergence of the 'new man', which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him.[126]

When Adam and Eve descend in the final book to the fallen world, they are armed with this teaching, which is also transformed by Milton's monistic theology that accords a value to the potential of the fallen condition.

In examining his debt to fallen literary precursors, with allusions to Homer, Spenser and others in Book II of *Paradise Lost*, Milton elaborates how his poem is distinguishable from and superior to their work, and links his creative art to the Fall and the Passion, in a lengthy and elaborate series of figures and tropes that continue into subsequent books of the poem. These techniques draw on powerfully affective religious (and sacramental) symbolism by connecting the gold ribs of ore at Pandemonium, the rib of Adam used to make Eve, and the wounds of the Passion, traditionally associated in Augustinian and Thomist thought with the effects of Original Sin.[127] Milton connects all three symbolic traditions with poetic creation and evocations of the Eucharist, and

[125] Martin, 7.
[126] Steadman 1959, 99.
[127] The relationship is discussed in Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*: see *ST* 1a2ae.85.3.

thereby, I argue, with the regenerative potential of poetry as a vehicle for Grace, albeit that the powerful effects of the Fall make the regenerative process a difficult one, as is suggested by Milton's development of the poetic imagery itself.[128] This figural association is a reflection of the influence of Renaissance humanism with its embodied and responsible model of the subject, which is represented more generally in the figural realism of characters of *Paradise Lost*. Moreover, feelings and emotions captured poetically, although associated with fallenness, are also valued for their regenerative potential for the soul.

Milton is commonly understood by critics to have largely rejected certain forms of medieval allegory (notably the personification allegory represented in *Paradise Lost* by Sin and Death) in favour of an adaptation of the typological *figurae* of biblical allegory.[129] In doing so, he not only asserts the superiority of his biblical story over pagan myths, but also distinguishes his work of divine inspiration from the mere imitation of prior works, including the classics and Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*. In Book II of *Paradise Lost*, Milton, who in *Areopagitica* acknowledges Spenser as a chief influence, incorporates an allusion to the Cave of Mammon scene from *The Fairie Queene*, which emphasises the testing of the hero by the temptation of classical literature.[130] Whilst incorporating Spenser's emphasis on active engagement of the embodied aspect of literary expression, with its influence on the moral character of the poet and reader, Milton equally dramatises the significance of poetic precedence and memory to the imagination, features integral to secular poetry that must be addressed to assert the inspired status of his epic.

The poetry of Pandemonium is fallen poetry; the fallen angels are led by Mammon to dig until they 'Op'n'd into the Hill a spacious wound / And digg'd out ribs of Gold' (*PL* I.689–90). Pandemonium is described as 'brazen' and is suggestive of the hidden word 'graven' applied to prohibited idols in the Ten Commandments. When constructed, it 'rose like an Exhalation' (*PL* I.711). It carries all the early modern association with a miasma, related to the Satanic 'unctuous vapor' (in *PL* IX.635), rather than the divine breath of God. It is comparable to the 'brazen world' distinguished by Sidney's *Apology* from the regenerative 'golden world' of true poetry

[128] Schwarz 1999, 1, traces the ambivalence Milton shows to the doctrine of the Eucharist in his prose works, but she argues it is instead embraced in *Paradise Lost* VI; M. Mack, 127.
[129] Auerbach 1953, 555; Auerbach 1984, 11; Martin, 18.
[130] *AP*: CP 729.

(to which Milton also refers as 'golden days' at *PL* III.337). While the 'golden world' also suggests the Neoplatonic ideal and the golden age of classical literature, Milton distinguishes a style of poetics that does not attract the pagan associations of brazenness, false alchemy or superficial gold. The 'ribs of gold' that are mined in the building of Pandemonium in Satan's underworld are proleptic of the rib of Adam used by God to make Eve. In Book VIII, God digs out a rib to make Eve from the left or sinister side 'form'd and fashioned with his hands':

> Who stooping op'n'd my left side, and took
> From thence a Rib, with cordial spirits warm,
> And Life-blood streaming fresh; wide was the wound,
> But suddenly with flesh fill'd up and heal'd:
> The Rib he form'd and fashion'd with his hands ….
>
> (*PL* VIII.461–65)

Eve is a figural creation of the poet and her creation is to be compared to the creation of Sin from the left side of Satan in Book II:

> All on a sudden miserable pain
> Surpris'd thee, dim thine eyes, and dizzy swum
> In darkness, while thy head flames thick and fast
> Threw forth, till on the left side op'ning wide,
> Likest to thee in shape and count'nance bright,
> Then shining heav'nly fair, a Goddess arm'd
> Out of thy head I sprung ….
>
> (*PL* II.752–58)

Yet in the case of Eve's creation, the figure of Adam's rib is also a reference to the wounds of the Passion — 'wide was the wound' — and accordingly the wounds that atone for Original Sin in Augustinian and Thomist thought. Milton's dual association of poetry with both divine inspiration and the Incarnation suggests that poetic creation is linked to the embodied subject. This is a vein that runs through the imagination of poetic influence as both inspiration and material suffering, yet the reference to the wound caused by the removal of the rib also suggests a birth ('wide was the wound'). It is therefore suggestive not only of Eve's role in the Fall and its effects on later generations but also the prophecy of the striking of the serpent's head by her progeny (Genesis 3:15). The wound mirrors the imagery of gestation in figural depictions of

Creation in both Books I and VII, thus figuring the procreative and regenerative dimensions of Milton's model of inspired poetry. Later (*PL* V.435–43), the process of angelic digestion is compared to transubstantiation, a central aspect of the angelic body metaphor of the epic identified by Kerrigan; a kind of alchemy that for angels is analogous to the alchemical process of turning 'drossiest Ore to perfet Gold / As from the Mine' (V.442).[131] The reference to the 'Mine' recalls the mines of Pandemonium. While Milton compares the opposing Renaissance attitudes towards the effects of poetry in this series of figures, I argue that in overall terms the 'golden rib' is a figural representation of the regenerative effects sacred texts have on the subject through their expression in inspired poetry. Milton is believed not only to have experienced digestive complaints in his mature years but also considered them a potential source of his blindness. The figural significance of the process of digestion in *Paradise Lost* suggests that Milton may have understood the effects of writing the poem to have a therapeutic value.[132]

Linda Gregerson argues that Milton rarely invokes the Passion as a direct response to the Fall, but instead emphasises intervals between the principal events of biblical history.[133] Yet in the cosmic poetry of *Paradise Lost*, these subtle symbolic references to the Passion arguably temper the effect of what occurs later in postlapsarian Eden, when Adam in his fallen and malicious outbursts against Eve in Book X compares Eve to a 'crooked rib' and questions the Creation of such a 'fair defect of nature' that had beguiled him, and of beauty which is 'but a show' and not reality:

> To trust thee from my side, imagin'd wise,
> Constant, mature, proof against all assaults,
> And understood not all was but a show
> Rather then solid virtue, all but a Rib
> Crooked by nature, bent, as now appears,
> More to the part sinister from me drawn,
> Well if thrown out, as supernumerary
> To my just number found.
>
> (*PL* X.881–88)

[131] Kerrigan 1983, 238; Schoenfeldt 1999, 131; *AP*, 716.
[132] Kerrigan 1983, 230–45; Schoenfeldt 1999, 20.
[133] In Book III, Milton's introduction to God and the Son clearly distinguishes the New Testament role of the Son with its emphasis on heroic self-sacrifice and love (III.138–43).

Human malice is traditionally considered one of the principal direct effects of the Fall on the human soul, which in Thomist thought is identified as a tendency toward evil due to the state of the will, similar to Satan's 'mischievous revenge' at the close of Book II. It is through his fallen state, with a will overborne by malice, that Adam distorts the earlier counsel of Raphael in Book VIII (575), when Raphael compares Eve to ornamental 'shows', 'Made so adorn for thy delight the more', but warns of her powers over his lower bodily passions and desires.[134] The state of his will distorts his powers of reason and accordingly his moral state. Adam's description of Eve's 'crooked rib' suggests a severing of the link to the divine that was evident in the communion of Adam and Eve in Paradise as they shared their 'viands' but which is broken post-Fall. Accordingly, the fallenness of the will casts some doubt on the value of the Eucharist, a theme of Milton's prose works.[135] The dire state of the will, as the outburst of Adam and the symbolism of the 'crooked rib' suggest, may purge or damn the subject. Yet inspired poetry as a vehicle for Grace provides the potential for such renewal. Moreover, although in Milton's respective poeticisations of Adam and Eve, Eve is considered by some critics to reflect the more carnal, Dionysian figure in Paradise, while Adam reflects the Apollonian model that is given definition by the reason, Milton clearly implicates both for their carnal sinfulness in Eve's initial, and Adam's subsequent, fall. Although the poem's Platonic influences hold beauty to be a window to the ideal which sin can mar, Milton's Augustinian emphasis on the heart and will do not reduce that ideal to a passionless state but instead find these qualities in their refined forms to be integral to the expression of the embodied subject's potential for renewal, themes that are explored in later chapters of this thesis.

Within this moral and spiritual landscape, Milton's model of poetic invention emerges. Language is aligned with the body in *Paradise Lost*, and Milton's creative powers are drawn from the classical underworld of unconscious forces that are consolidated in his Protestant poetics with the inspirational power of the Holy Spirit, through its vital energies. Aligned with it are the 'voluntary' movement of thoughts that produce 'harmonious numbers' associated with his Arminian theology and the effects of the Incarnation. In introducing a voluntary model of poetic invention, the poet thus navigates a clear path between fallen and inspired poetics. The path is intermediated by the Medusa, a pagan figure guarding the river Lethe in Milton's hell, which has a

[134] *PL* VIII.576–85.
[135] Schwartz, 1–17.

paralysing power associated in the classical tradition with unconscious forces related to the capacity of poetry to enslave and enchant; in *Paradise Lost* it is associated with the body via erotic imagery, a sexual energy that is contrasted with the sexual energy of the 'Creation dove'. The distinction underlies a further discrimination that Milton makes between surface and form, *eikon* and *eidolon*, in his development of allegorical figure. Eve is an artistic creation of the poet, a religious icon, and the Medusa figure often lies beneath the surface of her imagery in *Paradise Lost,* particularly in Book IV (288–311), in which the words 'As the Vine curls her tendrils' suggest a potential for erotic enthralment. A similar paralysing force is evident in Milton's earlier works; the lady in Milton's *Comus* is stuck to the seat in the presence of the Shakespearean magician Comus, and Milton himself in the poem 'On Shakespeare' addresses the earlier poet's tendency to 'make us marble with too much conceiving'.[136] Medusa, daughter of Mnemosyne, or memory, represents a force which, as in the Cave of Mammon in the allusion in Book II to Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, represents poetic temptation, not only by the riches of classical literature, a temptation that underlies *Areopagitica* and *Paradise Lost,* but also by the enthralling power of its poetry.

The Medusa's capacity to enslave and enchant is also to make language heavy, mortal, and inflexible. As a creation of beauty, Eve fulfils a Platonic role as a reminder of the Ideal, but is always at risk of being admired for her 'outward shew' and so inflaming secular desires and their poetic form, idolatry. Yet Milton suggests in the series of allegorical symbols examined in this chapter that his digging of ribs of poetic precedent draws on powers akin to the 'fashioning' (as opposed to the feigning) of Eve by God ('form'd and fashion'd with his hands': VIII.465): she is an expression of the divine, rather than merely a compilation of elements of poetic precedent from the store of memory, which is a characteristic of fallen poetry. In this way Milton's inspired poetry fulfils its regenerative potential by unifying the conscious and unconscious forces underlying the powers of invention as a reflection of divine energies that can have a restorative effect on the fallen Miltonic subject.

[136] CP 68; Rogers 2007, 'God and Mammon'.

Chapter Three: Ekphrasis

1. 'This pendant world'

> Far off th' Empyreal Heav'n, extended wide
> In circuit, undetermin'd square or round,
> With Opal Tow'rs and Battlements adorn'd
> Of living Sapphire ….

(*PL* II.1050–53)

Angus Fletcher's study of the cosmic, allegorical significance of ornament accords it an eternal quality in the classical tradition.[1] Tracing its etymological origin to the Greek *kosmos,* from which the term 'cosmetic' equally derives, Fletcher finds the allegorical function of ornament, both material and linguistic, to lie chiefly in the role its forms of expression have in shaping the historical, social and political body. In what he describes as an 'exornation of matter, which is primarily thought to be beautiful but which has hierarchical order for its basis', astral symbolism like that applied to the order of stars at the close of Book II of *Paradise Lost* emphasises '[t]he actual physical isolation of the heavenly bodies from our own sphere', yet shows humans to be subject to their powers.[2] While the presence of such forces suggests 'daemonic influences', in his adaptation of allegorical and rhetorical styles that are integral to the classically-influenced Renaissance, Milton captures in *Paradise Lost* the eternal quality of ornament from the profane and pre-Christian in terms which reflect his sense of the Protestant sacred. These influences are evident in the extended simile at the close of Book II with its application of both classical and typological traditions of ornament, respectively identified with the golden chain of planets and the bejewelled heaven of Revelation.[3]

Milton's epic figures incorporate a technique of classical epic poetry: ekphrasis, with its key ingredient, *enargeia,* is an integral feature of classical and Renaissance rhetoric considered essential to the display of the epic poet's craft after Homer and Virgil.[4] Ekphrasis is associated with 'clarity of style' and 'expression of detail' in

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[1] Fletcher, 117.
[2] Fletcher, 95, 97, 133; Curtius, 444.
[3] Revelation 21:19.
[4] From *ekphrazein* 'to speak out', also *diatupōsis*, *diagraphē* in Greek, *descriptio*, or *explicatio* in Latin. R. Greene and others, 393; Stein, 120; Scholtz, 23; Tuve 1947, 79; Sharpling, 173; Plett, 4, 7. Ekphrasis is essential to the epics of Dante, the Italian Renaissance epics of Tasso and Ariosto, and the English

oratory and other discourses, including poetry.[5] It involves the ability to raise vivid and engaging imagery that is integral to the expression of poetic figures and tropes, including metaphor, in the mimetic tradition.[6] This chapter examines some of the techniques of the classical heritage and Renaissance style of ekphrasis that are adapted to Milton's allegorical poetics in *Paradise Lost*. Although the range of experiences should be considered in a more integrated way, the emphasis here is on how the blended traditions of Milton's figurative language express the experience of the embodied subject through the senses and imagination. The equally integral role of the affections and passions in Milton's poetic figures is more fully discussed in the next chapter.

The next section outlines the principles of ekphrasis and relates them to the development of Milton's figures in *Paradise Lost*. Section 3 considers the Renaissance relationship between poetry and painting according to Horatian principles of '*ut pictura poiesis*', and how Milton's ekphrasis depends less on the production of vivid imagery than the expression of bodily feeling. Section 4 considers the role of ekphrasis in expressing the relationship between poetic and material form according to the underlying model of the Miltonic subject. The final section 5 considers how the ekphrastic style reflects the blending of Renaissance mimetic and allegorical traditions according to Milton's monistic and Arminian theology in *Paradise Lost*, and draws on concrete and bodily, as opposed to merely abstract, expression.

2. Ekphrasis

> The use of an *Allegorie* serveth most aptly to ingrave the lively images of things, and to present them under deepe shadowes to the contemplation of the mind, wherein wit and judgement take pleasure, and the remembrance receiveth a long lasting impression, and there as a *Metaphore* may be compared to a starre in respect of beautie, brightnesse, and direction: so may an *Allegorie* be truly likened to a signe compounded of many stars, which of the Grecians is called *Astron*, and of the Latines *Sidus*, which we may call a constellation, that is, a company or conjunction of many starres.[7]

Renaissance epics of Spenser and Milton. The term 'ekphrasis' is used in its broader Renaissance sense in this thesis, rather than its narrower modern understanding, and the term 'enargeia' is discussed in detail in section 3 of this chapter.

[5] R. Greene and others, 393; Tuve 1947, 79; Plett, 7–8.

[6] Krieger 1992, 117; Webb 2009, 3. Creating powerful audience engagement is not always the purpose of the orator or poet, and the style can be distinguished from that used when a sense of audience detachment is sought in circumstances requiring a more independent perspective.

[7] Peacham 1593, 27; Fletcher, 97.

Henry Peacham identifies the important classically-derived Renaissance identification of allegorical figure with cosmic patterning, which in *Paradise Lost* underlies Milton's transformation of rhetorical traditions associated with classical epic to the terms of his Protestant allegory. As is evident from the quote ('lively images'), that pattern also depends on the rhetorical traditions of ekphrasis.

Although it is not a necessary understanding in classical ekphrasis, some Renaissance Neoplatonist traditions identify ekphrastic techniques with divine inspiration, an association adopted in the prophetic style of *Paradise Lost*.[8] In his 'Introduction' to the 1715 edition of *The Faerie Queene,* John Hughes describes *enargeia* as having 'something in it like creation'; 'creation', a term introduced to describe human activity in the Renaissance, when used in such a context often interrogates the theological complexities of the relationship thought to exist between human and divine powers of creativity.[9] Moreover, the quality of *enargeia* is not only traced to the text of the Bible itself, including books of the New Testament, but is also found in styles of Renaissance religious rhetorics, a pattern to be recognised in any discussion of classical ekphrasis in the context of seventeenth-century styles of rhetoric and poetry.[10]

Ekphrasis is usually associated with the visual imagination, and although 'readerly visuality' has sometimes been 'neglected as a valid response' by modern criticism with its interpretive shift from image-based theories of knowledge, it is integral to classical and Renaissance literary theory.[11] Yet despite the importance of its visual appeal, ekphrasis involves more than just descriptive 'vividness', and is recognised in classical and Renaissance theory for its effects on the range of sensory experiences of the subject.[12] It is also more than simply an abstract 'idea' represented by a 'picture'. Ekphrasis depends on the experience-based Renaissance theory that understands the faculties of the poet and reader to operate in an integrated way. It also rests on a closer relationship between the 'creative (imaginative and synthetic)' and the

[8] Plett, 9. The association is also traced to Sidney's *Apology*: M. Mack, 111.
[9] Hughes (1715) 1959, 18; Campana, 354; Healy, 177; see also Puttenham 1589, III.3.
[10] Heath, 3–4; Shuger 1988, 218.
[11] Esrock 1994, 2.
[12] Fletcher, 97. Fletcher notes that the effects of imagery in poetic theory are more generally recognised as synaesthetic rather than merely visual.

‘interpretive (empirical and analytic)’ process that ‘extends from the medieval worldview’.[13]

In *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), George Puttenham explains the importance of principles of ekphrasis to Renaissance artifice when he describes figural techniques according to the distinction often drawn between ekphrasis’s key poetic qualities of *enargeia* and *energeia,* terms often conflated in the Renaissance.[14] For Puttenham, ‘Ornament Poeticall is of Two Sortes According to the Double Vertue and Efficacie of Figures’:

> This ornament then is of two sortes, one to satisfie & delight th’eare onely by a goodly outward shew set vpon the matter with wordes, and speaches smothly and tunably running, another by certaine intendments or sence of such wordes & speaches inwardly working a stirre to the mynde. That first qualitie the Greeks called *Enargia*, of this word *argos*, because it *geueth a glorious lustre and light*. This latter they called *Energia*, of *ergon*, because it *wrought with a strong and vertuous operation*.[15]

Puttenham classifies his figures in terms of their quasi-physical effects on the audience: as embellishment for ‘the ear’ or to give sense by ‘inwardly stirring the mind’ or both.[16] His principles emphasise the common effects in Renaissance poetry of an often ornamental lustre, vividness and a sense of energy and movement, each of which is characteristic of Renaissance ekphrastic style.[17] This section explores the importance of these qualities to the figures of *Paradise Lost*.

The figures of various books of *Paradise Lost* retain the sensuous vividness, highly embellished ‘lustre’, ‘light’ and energy of Renaissance ornament, which is related to illumination in ways which are both aesthetic and cognitive: as ‘harmony’ and ‘proportion of form’ (aesthetic qualities) and ‘clarity’ and ‘intelligibility’ (conceptual aspects).[18] The style reflects a different understanding of mimesis, which is more than a

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[13] Fletcher, 135; Tuve 1947, 58; Shuger 1988, 210, 218; R. Burton I.I.II.5; Altieri, 112–20.
[14] Puttenham 1589, III.3; Galyon, 29–30.
[15] Puttenham 1589, III.3 (my italics for explanatory phrases).
[16] Galyon, 29–30.
[17] The term ‘ergon’, when used in conjunction with Aristotle’s term ‘energia’ suggests the quality of active energy. ‘Argos’ is defined by Galyon (29–30) as referring to light, luminosity.
[18] Tuve 1947, 29–30.

simple reproduction of nature.[19] Renaissance ornament is identified not only with 'formal excellence' but also with the 'imitation of the intelligible as manifested in the visible' which, as noted earlier, is not simply limited to the 'visual' but is engaged through the broader range of sensory experiences of the embodied faculties.[20] Moreover, as will be explained, the figurative process underlies the transformation of verbal expression into poetic form. The emphasis on 'formal excellence' is on the poet's ordering of nature to convey truth according to the pedagogical function of art, rather than lifelike reproduction, a theme of Milton's Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*.[21] The relationship of 'lustre' and 'light' to intelligibility is an aspect of medieval and Renaissance rhetoric and poetry traced to Plato, Aristotle and subsequently in Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas, and Milton applies it in a Calvinist association between light, word and divinity, evident in the ornamental biblical symbolism of the opening quote to this chapter.[22] The figure of Satan, by contrast, has his lustre 'visibly impair'd' (*PL* IV.850) in ways which reflect both his form and moral condition.

The ekphrastic style is influenced by Renaissance emblem literature, evident in the emblematic quality of the 'pendant world' simile at the close of Book II, which draws on the symbolic significance of the word in visual form derived from the medieval period 'illuminating texts with suggestions of Platonic light', giving them a 'transcendent, sacred character'.[23] The quality underscores the two levels of Neoplatonist allegory, and the 'charged surfaces' of Renaissance art (including poetry); its 'sensuous vividness' recalling the shimmering quality identified by critics.[24] Renaissance artifice is understood to enhance, rather than diminish, the reader's imaginative involvement with a text, an understanding of the engaging function of artifice that is supported by Moran's twentieth-century approach discussed in Chapter One of this thesis.[25] In *Paradise Lost*, this highly embellished quality pervades in distinctive ways the descriptions of Pandemonium, Paradise and Heaven.

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[19] Tuve 1947, 29–30.
[20] Tuve 1947, 29–30; Fletcher, 97.
[21] CP 670; Tuve 1947, 29; Steadman 1985, 16–17.
[22] Steadman 1998, 69.
[23] Krieger 1992, 116.
[24] Tuve 1947, 61, 79; Altieri, 42, 236; Jameson 2013a, 40.
[25] Moran 1994, 83–85.

Puttenham's demarcation between *enargeia* and *energeia* distinguishes between the effects of ornament on the aural sense and on the mind, yet in the English Reformation and Civil War period an appeal to the sensuous vividness of poetry can invoke both the Platonic critique of the sensible and the more extended distrust of the image in Protestant iconoclasm.[26] Strong 'visuality' in both art and poetry is associated with the production of idols, and engaging styles of eloquence are considered to have the potential for enslavement of audiences to the passions, key dimensions of Satan's figural depiction and rhetoric in *Paradise Lost*.[27] Moreover, techniques like ekphrasis are features of fallen language that 'obscure the simplicity and directness of speech' and aid the propensity for 'falsity and disguise in language', as well as the capacity of language to 'please the eye' and 'enchant the mind' with its effects on the senses and the passions. The figures of Books I and II most express the classical style, and their imagistic and metaphorical amplitude and distortions are associated with the fallen world of temporality, sin and error.[28] Metaphors and highly elaborate figures are therefore largely absent, without refinement, from descriptions of Heaven in Book III, where certain styles of biblical symbolism, direct and unambiguous styles of speech and ornamentation are preferred.[29] Renaissance ornament is often associated with indecorous excess, or 'affectations' of speech, and in *The Anatomy* Robert Burton expresses a preference for avoiding some of the excesses of ornament which he calls: 'hyperbolical exornations, elegancies, &c., which many so much affect'.[30] Critique of the excesses of ornament is a theme of *Paradise Lost*, evident in Adam's questioning of whether this may be a characteristic of Eve ('on her bestow'd / Too much of Ornament' *PL* VIII.537–38) in Book VIII. It draws on an essential distinction between surface and form in Milton's poetic style, underlying the postlapsarian shift to the plain style that is associated with the Augustinian tradition of *humilis et sublimis.*[31]

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[26] Puttenham's approach associates the initial sensory experience of poetry with the aural sense. Krieger 1992, 21; Gilman, 149; Galyon, 30.
[27] Fish (1967) 1997, 122–23; Krieger 1992, 47; Gilman, 149. See Satan in his 'Sun-bright Chariot' as the 'Idol of Majesty Divine' (*PL* VI.100–101); Steadman 1959, 88; see also generally Satan's speeches in *Paradise Lost*, including in Books I (I.622–62) and IV (IV.119–23).
[28] For example, the description of Satan's shield and spear in Book I.
[29] Figures of speech rely on 'dissimilation' or indirect forms of speech that are characterised as being 'otherwise than what we mean'. By contrast, God's knowledge and speech is direct and unambiguous, in no need of rhetorical devices. See Lerer (1999) 2007, 'Book 3'.
[30] R. Burton, Democritus to the Reader. See also Tuve 1947, 29 and Chapter Three of her text.
[31] *PL* VIII.537–39; *PL* X–XII; Shaw, 20; Shuger 1988, 75 notes that the notion of an over-decorated garment goes back to Cicero and Quintilian.

Despite moral and religious objections in the English Reformation and Civil War period to imagistic literary styles and those that affect the senses and emotions of audiences, the importance of ekphrastic techniques in poetic and rhetorical style suggests that in *Paradise Lost*, the relationship is arguably more complex than the 'simple opposition', as Gilman notes, between 'the stifling impact of a dour Puritanism on an exuberant Renaissance imagination'.[32] While a distinction is often drawn between the relative freedom of description of the fallen angels and the apparent restraints imposed on descriptions of heavenly figures, this thesis explores how the differences arise from Milton's own development of style according to allegorical and symbolic traditions. Instead of restrictions per se, Milton incorporates, but perhaps does not resolve, the tensions between Renaissance and Reformation poetics, which remain a source of strength and complexity.[33] According to Erin Henriksen, Puritan iconoclasm offers Milton a point of departure, not an end in itself: Protestant literature 'no longer [seeks] to resolve the losses of the first generations after the schism with Rome' in its development of a new religious aesthetic. Rather, according to Henriksen, it looks to 'create something new out of the remnants, fragments and absences that [remain]'.[34] Moreover, Gilman argues, 'the creative power of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature is released at crucial moments when the visual resources of the poet are challenged by a conception of language disinfected, in its blind and often violent purity, of any appeal to the eye'.[35] Mindele Treip also argues that Milton, like his predecessors, Sidney and Tasso, tries to develop the right style of poetic language to express a relationship to the higher realities of spirit.[36]

Contrary to critics who tend, like Eliot, to find in *Paradise Lost* a 'failure of the visual imagination', this thesis examines how Milton's purpose is to 'transform the religious aesthetic rather than to suppress it', adapting classical techniques of ekphrasis to his allegorical style.[37] Gilman considers Milton's shift in emphasis from visual imagery to the centrality of plainer language in *Paradise Lost* — which includes a postlapsarian shift to 'see and tell' in Michael's lessons to Adam, by which images are followed by verbal instruction — to correspond with a broader Protestant shift, contrary

[32] Steadman 1998, 53; Gilman, 151; Martindale 1986, 20.
[33] Steadman 1998, 53.
[34] Henriksen, 3.
[35] Gilman, 2.
[36] Treip, 49.
[37] Eliot 1947, 33; Gilman, 149–52.

to Catholicism, from image- to word-based religious teaching. Such a transition accords with the linear reading and doctrinal emphasis of the postlapsarian world of *Paradise Lost*.[38] Yet Gilman also identifies Milton's emphasis on the 'inner vision' of the poet and the preference in *Paradise Lost* for the 'sweeter melodies' of language, each of which depends upon affective qualities of ornament associated with the body figure at the centre of the circular, cosmic pattern of the poem.[39]

Despite associations of figure and metaphor with Satan's world and the defective perception and understanding of the fallen subject, as instruments of fallen language, their expression is based in human experience and the sensible world, which in Augustinian thought, is the means for the reorienting of the subject toward spirit.[40] Ricoeur's phenomenological reading of metaphor resembles the Renaissance approach, providing a process that is more generally applicable to the reading of poetic figures and tropes, capturing the way they express the integrated relationship between thought, imagination and feeling. Moreover, techniques like ekphrasis, with their ability to express the experience of the embodied subject, are essential to the principle of pathos, providing the basis to touch and move audiences. By engaging the reader both imaginatively and affectively they draw on the close relationship understood to exist between the imagination, the senses, and the passions in the period.[41] In *Paradise Lost*, by engaging the temporalities of the reader's world, figures simultaneously distinguish and transcend the fallen state as the necessary condition for understanding, including the apprehension of the sacred through the higher faculties of the soul: or what Steadman refers to as 'the intelligible world of being' by contrast to 'the visible world of becoming'.[42] The effect is captured aesthetically, examined shortly in relation to Milton's figure of the 'pendant world', which is composed by the figures of Pandemonium and Paradise in various books of the epic in a variation of the classical epic shield in Homer and Virgil. Milton uses the shield to evoke both the fallen world of time and change, and the eternal world of timelessness.

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[38] In the argument of this thesis, the linear reading takes the reader to a condition that predates the regenerative potential for the human soul introduced by the Atonement.
[39] Gilman, 170.
[40] Lerer (1999) 2007.
[41] Shuger 1988, 208; Harvey 649–666.
[42] Steadman 1998, 69.

Allegory, according to Fletcher, with its accumulation of symbols, functions like a large metaphor.[43] In the cosmic allegory of the classical epic tradition, ornament is identified as fabric or garment, but the 'ornaments of wear can merge with the body itself'.[44] Classical ornament is associated with the cosmic body, in some traditions as a vital, sensible and intelligent being.[45] Ornament equally carries a relationship to the microcosmic body, where the symbolism of garment and human body reflects at a micro level the larger hierarchical structure of which the body forms a part.[46] The figural relationship between ornament and the embodied subject also inheres in Renaissance humanist traditions of rhetorics and poetics, where ornament is often likened to attire and the rhetorical corpus often compared to a body: thus 'sensuous vividness [is] a criterion of ornament as the garment of eloquence'.[47]

The microcosmic body metaphor in Renaissance traditions of rhetoric and poetry often makes tangible the role of human agency in their forms of expression. In Sidney's *Apology*, the body metaphor of his 'figuring forth' of poetry, (or 'bodying forth' as Tuve suggests) not only captures the way figure gives body and vigour to poetic expression, but also its role in the complex relation of poetic form as both concept and aesthetic effect.[48] Sidney relates it to the notion of the 'speaking picture' of the ekphrastic style as part of the tradition of Aristotelian mimesis:

> Poesie therefore is an arte of imitation, for so *Aristotle* termeth it in his word *Mimesis*, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring foorth: to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight ….[49]

Ekphrasis is also an important feature of Milton's mimetic model, and the didactic function of poetry as a vehicle for moral and spiritual understanding that he refers to in The Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*.[50] In *Paradise Lost*, poetic and rhetorical figure is expressed through the central body metaphor which articulates the relationship between ornament, the product of creative activity and the

[43] This broad understanding of allegory differs from those approaches which define allegory according to more specific criteria. See also Treip, xi–xii; Martin, 7.
[44] Fletcher, 114.
[45] Peters, 209.
[46] Fletcher, 110.
[47] Tuve 1947, 25, 26, 61; Krieger 1992, 81; Vickers, 272.
[48] Tuve 1947, 29, 30, 33, 61; M. Mack 37–38.
[49] Sidney 2007, 139.
[50] CP 670.

moral and spiritual standing of the embodied subject. With some refinement according to their Protestant theology, ekphrasis in the poetics of Sidney and Milton is associated in this way with the powers of Creation and adapted in their reconciliation of Renaissance and Protestant poetry.

In *Paradise Lost* poetic figure is shaped by Milton's monistic, Arminian model of the subject, for which forms of bodily and verbal expression and agency are important. While Milton expresses a preference for the capacities of the intelligible word over the visual and sensuous image, he refines, according to the terms of his Protestant poetics, the expressive potential of ekphrastic techniques to engage their intelligible, imaginative and affective qualities. The model, articulated in *Areopagitica* and Milton's earlier prose works, finds its expression in *Paradise Lost* in the refinements of the angelic figure that Kerrigan considers to act as a central metaphor for the text itself and which equally resembles Fletcher's allegory of the body. In Milton's adaptation of the classical epic tradition, narrative is more than simply plot, as it is driven by poetic language which, not merely an architectonic tool for shaping the cosmos of the poem, has life and momentum as a manifestation of embodied expression.[51] Its expressive energies are essential to Milton's ethical and spiritual subject, with its debt to classical, Renaissance humanist and Protestant traditions. Poetic expression is integral to the spiritual energy of the angelic figures in *Paradise Lost* with their flexible limbs and bodies; a corresponding loss of body in Milton's poetry and rhetoric is associated with loss of being, distortions of form and ontological decline.[52] Thus, drawing on the relationship between ornament, language and the body, Milton's simile at the close of Book II compares Satan's attire, within a nautical metaphor, to 'Shrouds and Tackle torn' (*PL* II.1044), suggesting a conflation of exterior ornament of clothing with language, equally a reflection of inner states. He is an empty 'vessel' and his environment is a 'waste', moral categories associated with his fallenness.[53] Satan approximates the *eidolon* of classical literature; a shadowy representation of the soulless figure in the underworld.[54]

By claiming the advantages of the sensible image — which draws on a broad range of sensory experiences in addition to the aural and visual — while also accessing

[51] *AP*: CP 716; Cable, 118; Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'.
[52] Fallon, 194, 203, 206; *PL* I.426, V.469–90.
[53] *PL* II.1040–45.
[54] Peters, 45–46.

the intelligible, ekphrasis is directed toward capturing a sacred quality that is intelligible through the imagination: a technique of carrying the inner meaning of a work into the reader's soul.[55] For this reason, *enargeia* is identified as an important feature of Renaissance religious rhetorics, for which the imagination is essential to the expression and experience of the divine in religious discourse.[56] It is associated with the understanding and experience of spiritual truth, with a corresponding expansion of the scope for rhetorical and poetic language from the medieval period's general restriction on the literary expression of sacred matters to specific forms of allegory.

In *Paradise Lost,* Milton distinguishes between the expression and apprehension of the sacred 'form' through the higher faculties of the mind and soul, from the 'outward shew' of language which is identified with 'surfaces' or the lower order of senses and passions ungoverned by the reason. In the Renaissance, the outer senses are associated with sin, fallenness and the material body, while the 'inner sense' of the 'mind's eye', properly managed, is associated with the higher faculties because it is considered more likely to be governed by the intellect or reason. In the Renaissance, the Platonic distinction between the sensible and the intelligible forms the basis of the two levels of Neoplatonic allegory, and correlates respectively with the Platonic distinction between the 'phantastic' and the 'eicastic' in poetry and rhetoric.[57] The distinctions manifest in *Paradise Lost* between poetic 'idol' and 'icon' associated respectively with the poetry of Satan and the Son, and captured in the relative styles of poetic figures of Pandemonium, Paradise and Heaven.[58]

Milton's monistic emphasis on embodied experience invests his rhetorical and poetic figures with material expression, which depends on engaging the agency and volition of the reader in such essential distinctions.[59] It is more than a merely abstract process and forms part of a strategy of entangling that deploys the sensuous vividness of poetic language to engage the embodied faculties of the auditor. There are a number of techniques in the figures of Pandemonium and Paradise that express the 'intensities' of experience of the time-based subject for this purpose — when considered according to Tate's model of the tension in poetry that arises between literal meaning and

[55] Braider, 169.
[56] Shuger 1988, 194.
[57] Krieger 1992, 123–24; Steadman 1959, 236–38; Steadman 1967, 169.
[58] Steadman traces the distinction between 'idol' and 'icon' back through Bacon's critique of the idols to Plato's distinctions: Steadman 1959, 236–38; Steadman 1967, 169; Gilman, 162.
[59] Some Stoic traditions also accord language a material or physical quality: Pearcy, 261.

suggestiveness — particularly those which involve references to the senses and bodily vigour and capture temporal immediacies.[60] Milton's ekphrastic style used for Pandemonium and Paradise is a reflection of the 'rind' referred to in *Areopagitica* of the fruit eaten by Adam and the 'Golden Rind' of Book IV (249).[61] Surface is an expression of outer form and Milton's engagement of the corporeal senses to which it relates is necessary for the discrimination of his reader. By contrast, the language of heaven lacks this splitting of surface and form, is relatively direct, and its figures rely on invocations of specific traditions of biblical symbolism with their direct impression on the intellect and affections.

Both Pandemonium and Paradise are depicted by means of highly wrought ornament: Pandemonium is 'bossy', a reference to its embossed surface, while Paradise is 'enamell'd'. Yet their highly embellished, ornamental surfaces stand above what is held in relief, essential forms which reveal the artifice of their surface expression. Pandemonium's aesthetic style resembles the highly ornamented Catholic churches of Milton's time, with its emphasis on grand or extravagant embellishment (as features of religious worship that the Puritan poet criticises in his prose works):

> and straight the doors
> Op'ning thir brazen folds discover wide
> Within, her ample spaces, o'er the smooth
> And level pavement: from the arched roof
> Pendant by subtle Magic many a row
> Of Starry Lamps and blazing Cressets fed
> With *Naphtha* and *Asphaltus* yielded light
> As from a sky.
>
> (*PL* I.723–30)

On the surface, Pandemonium's ornament seems indistinguishable from that which produces the world of Paradise and applies similar ekphrastic techniques: the words 'o'er the smooth' give a sense of the 'golden world', with an alchemical-like illusion suggested by the word 'Magic'.[62] Yet the language seems not only illusory but also hard-edged, forced and artificial. The creation of Pandemonium produces only a

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[60] Tate 1959, 82. Altieri, 287n.
[61] See *AP*: 'It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world'. CP 716.
[62] There is a degree of critical divergence on the architectural styles reflected in Pandemonium. See Hagstrum, 123–28.

‘brazen’ image, reinforced by the word ‘blazing’, recalling, with its allusions to neoclassical and baroque architecture, Sidney’s notion of the ‘brazen world’ in its ‘brazen’ and humanlike construction. Moreover, the style implies the production of idols or ‘graven images’.[63] Like the *eidolon* that underscores the figural depiction of Satan, Pandemonium’s figures are shadowy resemblances that reveal their fallen form.

The ornaments of Paradise, particularly in Books IV, V and IX, are often noted for their highly-embellished effects and sometimes over-embellishment.[64] They are identified with a lost golden age more closely resembling classical periods evoked in pastoral scenes, a ‘golden world’ like that referred to in Sidney’s *Apology.* Moreover, Eden is associated with the expression of nature which is ‘not nice Art’ or a mere extravagance of man-made design but of abundance that is subject to the refinements of culture:

> And now divided into four main Streams,
> Runs diverse, wand’ring many a famous Realm
> And Country whereof here needs no account,
> But rather to tell how, if Art could tell,
> How from that Sapphire Fount the crisped Brooks,
> Rolling on Orient Pearl and sands of Gold,
> With mazy error under pendant shades
> Ran Nectar, visiting each plant, and fed
> Flow’rs worthy of Paradise which not nice Art
> In Beds and curious Knots, but Nature boon
> Pour’d forth profuse on Hill and Dale and Plain ….
>
> (*PL* IV.233–43)

According to Jean Hagstrum, ‘Eden comes closer to being a visual scene than any other of Milton’s potentially paintable descriptions’; called alternatively a ‘Lantskip’ and a ‘Silvan Scene’ (*PL* IV.153, 140), it ‘embodies certain purely plastic values’. The ornament of Pandemonium and Paradise reflect the surfaces that are associated with the body’s fallen senses, which underscores the powerful sensory imagery of both. Milton avoids the purely imagistic in favour of the broader sensory power of poetic language (Pandemonium is described in evocative yet harsh sensuous terms of ‘breaths’,

[63] See for example the biblical prohibitions in Exodus 20:4; Leviticus 26:1.
[64] Ricks, 93; Empson 1961, 172.

‘throng’d’ ‘hiss’, while the ‘brooks’ of Paradise are ‘crisped’).[65] Yet while the ornaments of Paradise are ‘enamell’d’, highly embellished surfaces, they are matched in relief by the figure of the body that frequently occurs in its imagery (‘hairy’ and ‘breathing’) and stands at the centre of *Paradise Lost*. The beauty of Paradise may be ‘hyperbolically suggestive’, according to Ricks, and ‘indecorous’ if expressed literally for an epic, but Milton’s syntax, with its energy, combined with the mingling scents, sights and sounds, bring it to life.[66] Thus Eve ‘strews the ground / With Rose and Odors from the shrub unfum’d’ (V.348–49) and Milton makes them ‘magically visible and physical’. By contrast, the sensory effects of Pandemonium reinforce the status of its figures as *eidola*; mere semblances of form, and although these figures bear a relation to the body figure at the metaphorical centre of *Paradise Lost*, the relationship is one of distance, distortion and ontological descent.

The ekphrastic figures of Pandemonium and Paradise, with their ornamental lustre, recall the detail of the original ekphrases of the Homeric and Virgilian shields. The figures reflect language’s cosmic, symbolic and allegorical role, forming the basis of Milton’s simile at the close of Book II of *Paradise Lost*, reflecting its eternal status as both an expression of fallen language and as a transformed vehicle for the apprehension of the Protestant sacred. By invoking the circular symbol that recurs throughout the poem, the trope links the classical ekphrasis of Homer’s shield of Achilles with the circular biblical symbolism of Milton’s allegorical poetry.[67] ‘Empyreal Heav’n’ is ‘adorn’d’ of ‘living Sapphire’, alluding to Revelation’s account that the foundation of heaven’s walls is a sapphire. It thereby not only distinguishes pre-Christian ornament but also connects in a circular way poetic ornament and the biblical story: not only of Creation but of the Last Judgment and the regenerative potential of the human soul, the essential form of the body metaphor at the centre of *Paradise Lost*.[68]

Milton’s appeal to nature as the basis of his mimetic model takes place through the body, and his monistic philosophy depends on incorporating and channelling embodied energies for moral and spiritual regeneration and creative expression. The remaining sections of this chapter examine Milton’s adaptation of the ekphrastic

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[65] ‘Crisped’ means ‘rippling’. *OED* s.v. ‘crisped’ *adj*. 2a; *PL* I.709, 761, 768; *PL* IV.237.
[66] Ricks, 93.
[67] Fletcher identifies the classical belief of the universe as revealed in the circle: Fletcher, 91. *Paradise Lost* contains multiple references to circles. See, for example, the ‘pendant world’ of II.1052, and the circles of Book VI dealing with the war in Heaven (e.g. VI.304–05: ‘and in the Air / Made horrid Circles; two broad Suns thir Shields’).
[68] CP 256. Revelation 21:19.

technique in ways which capture the integrated experience of the subject as an expression in poetic form of his model of selfhood.

3. *Ut Pictura Poiesis*

if Art could tell ….

(*PL* V.236)

In the modern period ekphrasis, with its defining quality of *enargeia,* is more often associated as a literary genre with the verbal representation of artistic works.[69] Yet according to Ruth Webb, in classical theory it is a 'type of textual element' rather than a genre or text as a whole. It is 'not confined to an object', but 'may have as its subject matter any thing, action, person or event'.[70] Ancient discussions of ekphrasis define it as 'a type of speech that creates immaterial images in the mind': the result of a successful ekphrasis is a 'metaphorical painting', an analogy that appears in the classical rhetorics.[71] The broader understanding of the technique applies in the Renaissance, where ekphrasis is associated with picturability and the classical phrase invoked in Sidney's *Apology* that is originally attributed by Plutarch to Simonides, describing poetry as a 'speaking picture'[72]. In the classical tradition, ekphrasis is also associated with the Horatian concept of *ut pictura poiesis*, with generally-accepted (mis)interpretations of the expression that draw affinities between techniques of poetry, rhetoric and the plastic arts.

Ekphrasis is often considered to surpass the more superficial concept of *ut pictura poiesis*, which Ulreich argues 'correlates to a straightforward representation of pictures, things and actions through verbal discourse'. Yet the distinction between visual and verbal arts remains significant in the ekphrastic form, even though ekphrasis is more complex, applying the visual image in a way which has a quasi-physical impact on the reader with its imaginative, sensory and emotional effects. Renaissance theory absorbs this tradition of comparisons between poetry and painting that explore the relative capacities of each to express what is true of the world and the sacred, a distinction that is equally found in the aesthetic styles of *Paradise Lost*. In Book V and elsewhere, Milton places under scrutiny the veracity of art and poetry ('If Art could

[69] Krieger 1992, 8; Webb 2009, 7.
[70] Scholz, 5; Webb 1999, 13.
[71] Webb 2009, 27.
[72] Sidney 2007, 139.

tell') in ways which raise the distinction between visual and verbal arts. This section explores the broader reach of the language model of ekphrasis as not only a model of representation but also of affectivity, with implications for spiritual, physical and moral being.

Ekphrasis, as is argued earlier in this chapter, is not solely expressed by a style vivid with imagery. It is more than mere lucidity and involves engaging the body in sensory and emotional effects as a platform for both expression and intelligibility.[73] In the detailed terms of classical rhetorics, ekphrasis is the name for a rhetorical figure which is understood in terms of its affectual nature, its 'disposition to create a particular effect of *enargeia* in the mind of the reader', so that while the term ekphrasis refers to the rhetorical form, the term *enargeia* refers to the essential quality of the style.[74] The distinguishing features of ekphrasis arise in the way they are experienced by the poet and reader, qualities evident in Puttenham's classification of Renaissance ornament as visual ('lustre and light') affective and intelligible ('delight' and 'stir the mind'). With its emphasis on embodied experience, *enargeia* is integral to the principles of 'copious discourse' elaborated by the reforming theorist Erasmus as an important component of rhetorical expression for his model humanist subject.[75] In *De Copia*, Erasmus observes how the rhetorical expression of ekphrasis combines a 'theatrical depiction of living experience' with 'authentic portraits of dialogue and temporal and spatial verisimilitude':

> We employ this (*enargeia*) whenever, for the sake of amplifying or decorating our passage, or giving pleasure to our readers, instead of setting out the subject in bare simplicity, we fill in the colours and set it up like a picture to look at, so that we may seem to have painted the scene rather than described it, and the reader seems to have seen rather than read.[76]

While distinctions arise in the importance of verisimilitude to rhetoric, the techniques are equally characteristic of Milton's poetic figures, where discussion, according to Gilman, is divided between 'visual' and 'verbal' critics. While one group of critics credits *Paradise Lost* with a strong visual sense — 'picturability', 'theatricality' and

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[73] Tuve 1947, 29, 30.
[74] Scholz, 4; Webb 1999, 13.
[75] 'Copious discourse' is related to abundance in styles of eloquence essential to Erasmus's Protestant humanist subject. Erasmus (1512) 1999, I.1.
[76] Erasmus (1512) 1999, I.1*;* Sharpling, 174, 175.

painterly styles that carry the influence of Renaissance and baroque plastic arts — other critics foreground the 'verbal' and emphasise other 'non-visual' qualities of Milton's poetic language.[77] Thus Coleridge considers Milton to be more of a musical poet, while the well-known criticism of F. R. Leavis holds Milton's epic to reflect a monotony of sound and style rather than an emphasis on imagistic qualities.[78] Similarly, T. S. Eliot holds Milton to be a 'man whose sensuousness … had been withered early by book-learning', aligning him with critics who consider Milton to be a poet whose 'sharpness of visual imagery' is 'sacrificed to the monotony of pure sound'.[79] Yet perhaps, as Hagstrum suggests, 'no one who has considered the imagery of Milton in all its complex relations can be satisfied with any of these points of view'.[80]

The division between visual and verbal critics of *Paradise Lost* captures the complexities of ekphrastic technique. According to Webb '[a]s a special use of language to bring the subject matter "before the eye" of the listener, penetrating the mind and acting on the most intimate of faculties, ekphrasis [like *enargeia*] also lies at the intersection of word and image'.[81] An examination of either, she argues, has to take account of ancient theories of psychology, particularly the Aristotelian image-based theory of knowledge in which mental images (*phantasmata* or *phantasiai*) play a vital part from the classical period onwards. Such theories depend on a 'body of culturally contingent assumptions about language and its impact on the human mind'.[82] In *Paradise Lost*, Milton does not apply the technique to create vividness for its own sake, but draws upon a number of qualities directed at evoking experience that is sensuous, affective and intelligible in an integrated way. Because the temporalities of experience are intrinsic not only to feeling but also to understanding through the intellect, the overall effect is to engage the readers' fallen state as a condition of their fallen existence and as the basis of discrimination in (especially moral) understanding. Milton's innovation of technique occurs when, in the figural style of Paradise, he engages a

[77] Gilman, 149–52.
[78] Coleridge, *Literary Reminiscences*, I.169, *Table Talk* August 7, 1832, Coleridge 1853 409–10; also cited in Hagstrum, 124. See Krieger 1992, 25 where he explains the importance of music in the Burkean expression of internal human experience in music rather than in visual expression (Apollo vs Dionysus); Leavis, 1936, 42–61; Ricks 2–3.
[79] Eliot (1936) 2003, 56–64; Hagstrum, 124; Gilman, 151.
[80] Hagstrum, 124.
[81] Webb 2009, 27–28.
[82] Webb 2009, 27–28.

tension that Ricks finds, between the corporeal and moral meaning of language, such as in the description of the snake as 'insinuating' (IV.348).[83]

Enargeia, the integral quality of ekphrasis, is often associated in the Renaissance with the rhetorical and poetic styles of Shakespearean works, as in Enobarbus's recollection of Cleopatra's barge in *Antony and Cleopatra*, all the more effective because it is recounted from memory with a kind of nostalgia: 'The barge she sat in, like a burnish'd throne, / Burned on the water' (2.2.191).[84] Essential to ekphrasis, *enargeia* produces qualities of clarity and action by its engagement of the 'mind's eye' of the imagination. It is notable for its affective qualities — its invocation of the reader's senses, imagination and emotions, thereby enhancing the 'vital meaning' and 'enrichment' of the reading experience as well as a sense of 'empathy' through its recreation of the experience of the orator for the audience.[85] Integral to *enargeia* is the classical literary principle of pathos, which has an extended meaning in the classics to include bodily 'feelings', imaginative and emotional effects.[86] According to Webb, even when the effect is not strictly 'emotional',

> the physical understanding of the impact of *enargeia* means that a reader who conceives an image of any kind in his or her mind is still undergoing a pathos of some kind as he or she experiences the words' effects'; *phantasia* itself was understood as a type of pathos.[87]

Pathos, according to Peters, refers in the classics both to 'what happens to bodies' and also 'what happens to souls', the first under the 'general rubric of qualities, the second under that of emotions'. Pathos therefore in its classical formulation, involves not only the emotions, but also the quality or experience of sensory affectivity on the body:

> The bridge is provided by the materialist theories of sensation that reduce sense knowledge to a pathos of the senses that, in turn, is capable of triggering the *pathe* of the soul.[88]

Peters's 'materialist' explanation recognises the classical relationship between sensory experience, the imagination and the emotions that is also central to the integrated

[83] Ricks, 108.
[84] Plett, 2012, 29.
[85] Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949, 40.
[86] Peters, 52; Webb 2009, 100.
[87] Webb 2009, 100; See Ildefonse 1997, 116.
[88] Peters, 152.

Renaissance knowledge model with its debt to classical Aristotelian theory.[89] The principles underscore the animating qualities in *enargeia* to touch and move audiences. The distinction between the effects of pathos on the surface of the body as opposed to the 'refined' emotions has an important bearing on the expression of Milton's figures in *Paradise Lost*.

Although often associated with descriptive vividness, (the Greek adjective *enarges* means 'clearly visible'), *enargeia* is also described as the ability to 'place before the eyes' (*hup'opsin*), or to make listeners into spectators (*theatai*).[90] The first-century CE Roman rhetorician Quintilian draws a distinction between a plain statement of facts (*narratio*) and a narration with *enargeia* in terms of their physical impact on the listener. The plain statement reaches only the ears, while the vivid version 'displays the subject to the eyes of the mind'. Yet the rhetorical distinction equates to more than a difference between 'showing' and 'telling'. In twentieth-century theory, a corresponding distinction is explained as the difference between a 'participant' and an 'onlooker': Richard Wollheim distinguishes between 'central imagining' ('imagining doing something from his own or someone else's point of view') and 'acentral imagining' ('imagining someone doing something but from neither his nor anyone else's point of view'). 'When centrally imagining someone doing something, but not when acentrally imagining it, we also imagine what he or she feels and thinks'.[91] The distinction also inheres in Renaissance rhetorical styles of ekphrasis and underlies arguments about truth and authenticity of expression, making it characteristic of Renaissance religious rhetorics.[92] The power and complexity of the technique is enhanced when considered in conjunction with Moran's argument that feelings generated by imaginative literature are not always simply 'second-order' reproductions, but are sometimes much closer to the 'first order' — through the experience of 'memory and desire' — and thereby directly and independently experienced by audiences.[93]

The implication, according to Webb, extending from the classical theory of ekphrasis, is that 'vivid language reaches different parts of the mind', 'penetrating more

[89] Harvey 649, 651.
[90] Webb 1999, 20.
[91] Giovannelli, 16; Wollheim 1986, 71–3.
[92] Shuger 1988, 227–28.
[93] Moran, 83–85; Scruton, 93.

deeply into the listener' to reach the 'mind's eye'; the Latin sources distinguish between the 'inner' and 'outer' senses of sight, while the Greek sources do not:

> The distinction between words which stay on the surface of the body, by which Quintilian presumably means plain statements of fact and arguments, and those which penetrate inside to appeal to the 'eyes of the mind', reveals a conception of the human body as permeable and of words as a quasi-physical force, both of which are familiar in ancient sources.[94]

Quintilian describes 'the way each mode of discourse is received by the listener': '*enargeia* derives from the innermost recesses of the speaker's mind and works its way inside the listener to produce its intense effects'.[95] Importantly for Webb, what classical *enargeia* produces is not a representation of reality but a recreation of the '*process of perception itself*'.[96] As a quality that is integral to reader engagement and affect, 'the word does not seek to represent, but to have an effect in the audience's mind that mimics the act of seeing'.[97] The distinction between inner and outer sense with the access of the former to the intellect, and the association of the latter with the surface of the body, is the source of the 'inner vision' and 'inner voice' that is characteristic of Milton's inspired poetics of *Paradise Lost* ('shine inward': *PL* III.51–55). *Enargeia* 'belongs to a concept of language as a power acting on the world current through antiquity', able to 'affect' the listener and to 'penetrate' and 'change' the 'individual'.[98] According to Webb, *enargeia* 'reveals assumptions about language very different' from 'modern ideas about language as structure and literary work as object to be analysed': 'It is part of an intimate communication between speaker and addressee which has an impact on the recipient which is always imaginative, and often emotional'.[99] Underscored by the close relationship between thought, imagination and feeling in Renaissance culture, *enargeia* is an important aspect of the clarity of vision and

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[94] Webb 2009, 98.
[95] Webb 2009, 99. 'Aristotle and others frequently appeal to analogies with the visual arts to express the nature of the impressions made by sense perception upon the soul and their lingering form as memories. Famously, Aristotle compares the impact of sense perception on the soul to the impression (tupos) made by a signet ring on wax. This idea of imprinting is evident in the Greek terms for visual language, diatupōsis and hupotupōsis, implying that such language has an effect analogous to that of direct sensation. In the same passage, memory is compared to a painting (hoion zōgraphēma), an analogy which Aristotle also uses in *On the Soul* (427b 21–4) to explain the activity of contemplating an internal image (phantasma).' See Webb 2009, 112.
[96] My italics.
[97] Webb 2009, 37–38.; Scholz, 4.
[98] Webb 2009, 27; Ong, 31–32.
[99] Webb 2009, 6, 23, 27.

authentic 'inner voice' articulated at various intervals in *Paradise Lost* and distinguished from the rhetorical and poetic styles associated with Satan's world of the 'false dissembler'.[100]

In the rhetorical style of Quintilian, effective *enargeia* in oratory and poetry is the result of a 'controlled and conscious process of visualization'. According to Webb:

> Quintilian seems to assume that the orator's imagination, its verbal expression and the images which 'appear' in the audience's minds as a result of these words, are both simultaneous and identical, and that this image can be equivalent to the direct perception of a thing.[101]

Moreover, according to Webb, Quintilian's 'seamless progression from precept to practice, combined with his reticence about language, suggests that words are important to this process only as the means by which an internal, mental image is conveyed from speaker to listener'.[102] The speaker is said to 'summon up his own vision of the scene by means of *phantasiai* (a Greek term glossed in Latin as "*visiones*") from memory — from the stock of abstracted and remembered sense perceptions that Aristotle called *phantasmata* — "visions of absent things"'; that is, they are drawn from the sensory memory through the imagination. The matching of familiar images between orator and audience is achieved in classical rhetoric through memory exercises, a practice that is not formally adhered to in the Renaissance. Although mismatches between authorial intention and auditor reaction to an image may have been a source of concern in Renaissance rhetorical practice, Milton builds the potential for differences in reader response into *Paradise Lost* as a central dynamic, which becomes a measure of fallenness, agency and Arminian choice.

For Quintilian, orators should express their subject matter as if they are actually seeing those memories with their eyes and as if the contents are physically present; producing the quality of 'making absent things present' to the imagination. It is a process which he compares to the spontaneous habit of daydreaming and which, he claims, the speaker can cultivate in himself as part of his training as an orator:

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[100] Fletcher, 77; Puttenham 1589, III.18, on the relationship to allegory, refers to dissembling as to 'speake otherwise then we thinke'.
[101] Webb 2009, 93.
[102] Webb 2009, 95–96.

> What the Greeks call *phantasiai* (we shall call them '*visiones*', if you will) are the means by which images of absent things are represented to the mind in such a way that we seem to see them with our eyes and to be in their presence. Whoever has mastery of them will have a powerful effect on the emotions. Some people say that this type of man who can imagine in himself things, words and deeds well and in accordance with truth is 'good at imagining' (*euphantasiōto*s).[103]

The techniques are characteristic of the rhetoric and poetics of *Paradise Lost* although, as will be explained, the scope for expression of affective and imaginative experience is greater in poetry. When Satan arrives at the edge of the abyss at the close of Book II, Milton creates a vivid image of something absent and inaccessible other than to the imagination, of Satan observing the newly-created world, to give us this imaginative, fallen, yet angelic perspective, relying on *enargeia*'s power of illusion to 'make the absent thing present'. Murray Krieger states of the technique: 'The illusion helps us create in our minds the sense that something is being described that ought to be visibly apprehensible' albeit that it is not directly accessible by the physical senses.[104]

Enargeia is also closely linked to animation or movement in space and time rather than static imagery, a principle derived from the term *energeia* that is originally used by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*.[105] Aristotle refers to the ability of certain metaphors to place the image 'before the eyes' (*pro ommatōn*), and makes a distinction between metaphors that evoke an image of motion (*energeia*) which have this effect, and others, whose image is static, which do not.[106] Subjects in action (*energeia*) are more vivid (*pro ommatōn*), so, according to Webb, 'it seems that there [is] an association between movement, and its rendering of space through time, and vividness', between *energeia* and *enargeia*.[107] This is also found in the distinction raised earlier in this chapter by Puttenham when he refers to ornament's 'strong and virtuous operation'.[108] Quintilian equally considers that enargetic effects depend on the speaker conveying not just the basic facts, but the constituent actions.[109] Moreover, Aristotle identifies animation as a form of touch, a notion underlying his poetic theory and in its combination of vividness

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[103] Quintilian 1891, 6.2.29; Goldhill, 4; Webb 2009, 95.
[104] Krieger 1992, 121.
[105] Aristotle 1926, 1411b 24–5; Krieger 1992, 45.
[106] Webb 2009, 26.
[107] Webb 2009, 86.
[108] Puttenham's description derives *energeia* from '*ergon*'.
[109] Quintilian 1891, ch. 8, e.g. 8.3.67; Goldhill, 2–4.

and action, *enargeia*'s classical relationship to pathos with its sensuous effects on the audience.[110]

In *Paradise Lost,* depictions of both the divine and fallen characters draw on the animating techniques integral to ekphrasis, including vividness, action and amplitude, although there are important distinctions that are evident from the style used in relation to each of Pandemonium, Paradise and Heaven. Margaret Bottrell identifies key features of ekphrasis in the 'amplitude' and 'energy' in for example the dramatic epic flights of Satan as well as of the unfallen angels (see for example the descriptions of Satan and the good angels in *PL* IV. 977–1015).[111] In Book II of *Paradise Lost*, Satan's trip through the cosmos would not have the effect it has on the audience without its dramatic animation; the essential combination of vividness with movement captures an experience of bodily flight through its combined effects on the sensory memory and imagination.

The evocation of sensory experience, as already noted, is a key technique of ekphrasis, and Bottrell identifies in Milton's imagery throughout *Paradise Lost* a 'synaesthetic interpenetration of the senses', a suggestive quality typical of the style. Such effects are associated with the expression of temporal intensities in Milton's figures and of syntactical energy.[112] Milton de-emphasises the 'visual' by evoking a range of often synaesthetic sensory experiences related to the sense of touch in his figures of Pandemonium and Paradise, by which distinctions are made in the experiences evoked by the styles of each.[113] The contrast between Pandemonium and Paradise is captured in the distinction between the 'brazen' world of Pandemonium and the 'golden' world of Paradise, terms also used in Sidney's *Apology* to distinguish respectively between the fallen world of sin and the lost Eden in ways which equally draw on their associations with Neoplatonic Form. In Pandemonium, there is an emphasis on the mechanically and humanly built and constructed, as well as the sense of being absorbed in and limited to historical time. The figures of Pandemonium are, according to Hagstrum, 'only partially visual, and those visual details are swallowed up

[110] Aristotle, *De Anima* (Aristotle 1994–2000), Part II, esp. 3–11; Stewart, 20–21, 332n, 362n; Harvey 649; Shuger 1988, 218.
[111] Bottrall, 31–42; Hagstrum, 125.
[112] Bottrall, 31–42; Hagstrum, 125.
[113] Aristotle in the *De Anima* considers information from the external senses to transmit by way of touch to the internal senses. It is the basis of Milton's distinction between the physical and the inner sense. Aristotle 1994–2000, Part II., esp. 3–11; Stewart, 20–21.

in a kinaesthetic feeling of space and light in space'. Pandemonium is created by a 'stroke of masque-like magic'. Yet it is 'built like a Temple,' 'solidly'. The 'visual' descriptions are synaesthetic: highly sensory and tactile, with '*Pilasters*', 'Doric pillars', 'Golden Architrave', 'Cornice', 'Frieze', and 'fretted' roof.[114] The frieze is 'with bossy Sculptures grav'n', but once again the emphasis is on the tactile: Milton highlights the doors with 'brazen folds' and the 'smooth and level' pavement.[115] The light it yields is earthly, rather than divine, 'as from a sky'. Its effects are not only of distortion and illusion, of *eidolon*, but evoke in their distortions and harsh blended sensory effects the terrible sublime.[116]

The figures of Paradise equally emphasise the experience of the senses in evoking the experience of nature, where the 'wild' and 'hairy sides' present a contrast to the maintained inside, where the fruit produces a golden hue with 'gay enamell'd colors mixt' (*PL* IV.149), an allusion to the rind of the forbidden fruit. Yet Hagstrum argues that nothing is sharply visualised:

> Milton is more intent on having us feel in a kind of kinaesthetic sensation the full opulence of nature itself than in having us see its particulars. The fresh water, the orient pearl, the sands of gold, the purple grapes, the 'flours of all hue' — all create an idea streaked with sensuous recollection, in a sense the antithesis of a visual scene that implies an idea.[117]

In *Paradise Lost*, the synaesthetic style has a number of significant effects. Milton's technique of evoking sensory experience distinguishes the role of the fallen senses from the workings of the 'inner sense'. Rather than recreating a visual image of an abstract idea, the emphasis is placed on the experience of the material body, with its temporalities, immediacies and intensities. Arnold Stein's examination of the poetics of Milton's Pandemonium also identifies how it exhibits both a sense of 'active immediacy' and 'painterly' effects, which draw on the significance of the sense of presence, movement and visual penetration central to *enargeia* and the reader's fallen world and perspective, as well as its Renaissance affinities with the principles of *ut pictura poiesis*.

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[114] *PL* I.713–30. The term 'synaesthetic' is used to denote the evocation of one sensory effect by the effect on another sense (here touch is used to evoke an image). *OED*, s.v. 'synaesthetic' *adj*.
[115] Hagstrum, 125.
[116] Shaw, 33–35.
[117] Hagstrum, 121–22, 126.

While in Pandemonium this synaesthetic experience is associated with illusion and distortion, in Paradise the same techniques evoke a nostalgia for the sacred through their association with the angelic body figure and hence give Paradise an eternal quality associated with Platonic Form.[118] Despite its enamelled surface and theatrical staginess apparent in the references to 'Lantskip' and 'Silvan Scene', the underlying body of Paradise connects it to the divine. The distinction is essential to the essential form of each world, revealed in kinds of nostalgia that is evoked for lost worlds and the creation of new. While Pandemonium with its rich ornamentation is associated with the Catholic church, Paradise recreates a nostalgia for classical pastoral settings that are equally associated with the lost Eden in Christian mythology. Moreover, neither has been witnessed by Milton's fallen readers other than through the ornament of classical and biblical texts.[119] Such evocations depend on the illusionary qualities of ekphrasis.

The poetry of Paradise emphasises the contrast between surface and underlying spiritual reality — 'If Art could tell' — through nostalgic references to the golden age of classical myth ('Silvan') and the corresponding appeal of classical aesthetics.[120] Paradise also reflects the imitation of nature as an expression of the body figure: there is no sharpness of visual imagery; despite its painted surfaces the poetry of Paradise is distinguishable from the style of distorted and illusionary qualities of Pandemonium with its emphasis on humanlike, artificial construction. While the enamelled hues reflect its surface effects and 'artifice', the sensory effects of 'delicious Paradise', with its tastes, scents and images, are aimed at appealing to the reader's senses, as well as being interspersed with references anticipating the impending Fall ('pendant', noting the continuous present tense of the verb; and Satan's presence in the garden is suggested: 'wept odorous').[121] The poet's imitation of nature is an imitation of the Creation in the idyllic setting of Paradise, which itself seems alive and instilled with a vital sense of the divine body. Yet it is one which is also on the edge of fallenness, although the references to the 'golden world' and its bejewelled features are equally forward-looking typological allusions to the Last Judgment.[122] The sense of animated embodiment

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[118] Kerrigan 1983, 243; Tuve 1957, 1; Fletcher, 138; The synaesthetic experience of pure angelic senses is given at *PL* VIII.618–30, where they are described as not having the sense of touch without flesh.
[119] Pandemonium and Paradise have been identified with the new worlds of North and South America respectively, with the former associated with Protestant settlement and the latter with Spanish and Portuguese conquest by Catholic countries for gold: see Lerer (1999) 2007, 'Book 4'.
[120] *PL* IV.140.
[121] *PL* IV.132, 239, 248.
[122] M. Mack, 43, 123–24.

underscores its sensual effects as a form of 'touch' drawn from Aristotelian theory.[123] The emphasis on corporeality concretises the reading experience into the body, affecting the reader with a sense of physical presence in historical time and yet which equally evokes a sense of the eternal. The overall effect, drawing on common techniques of *enargeia*, which include invocation of sensory affects and appeals to synaesthesia, is to generate a powerful sensory experience of Paradise directed toward making its absence present to the imagination; one which, despite its self-conscious reliance on artifice, reminds the reader of both the eternal and the sense of loss of Paradise, and which presents a sharp contrast to the later, more austere postlapsarian books of the epic.

While Milton follows the Aristotelian classification of the senses, what is evident in his incorporation of synaesthetic effects in *Paradise Lost* is the more extended understanding of sensory experience recognised in twentieth-century theory. With it, Milton captures the experience of not only the temporal world but also of the sublime and sacred, evident, for example, in the blended synaesthetic senses of Milton's good angels and in the figures in Paradise. An essential dimension of the evocation of sensory experience in *Paradise Lost* relates to what Krieger identifies as a relation of the fixed, spatial form of natural sign arts with their superior access to the senses, to the temporal form of language arts, with their superior access to the intellect, capturing the features of both.[124] As ekphrasis reflects a balance between the fixed image (stasis) and the temporal flow (movement) of language, introducing with it both notions of 'visual' representation and the experiential dimensions of *enargeia*, it centres critical debates about Milton's imagery in *Paradise Lost.* When Milton gives the relationship between sacred and fallenness figural form by capturing effects associated with feelings of bodily sense and movement in space and time, this kind of kinaesthetic or proprioceptive experience also draws on the temporal movement of fallen language as a reflection of the time-bound nature of experience, a key feature of Fish's thesis.[125] Yet equally it captures the human apprehension of the spiritual world through the imagination.

The human perception or sense of the spatial and the temporal is an integral dimension of experience in twentieth-century phenomenology.[126] In *Paradise Lost*,

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[123] *PL* IV.236.
[124] Krieger 1992, 9–10, 32.
[125] Fish (1967) 1997, 26–27.
[126] This is a theme of Heidegger's *Being and Time*: Heidegger 1962, Ch. 24, 45; Altieri, 239, 246.

through their basis in time and experience (or 'presentist experiential terms'), space and time establish a relationship that recreates the sense of presence that is essential to Milton's distinction between the fallen world of the reader and the experience of the sacred.[127] Yet the spatial sense has an added timeless quality that is important to Milton's contrast with the temporal flow of fallen language associated with secular experience and draws on the evocation of the classical sublime, but its associated amplitude is to be distinguished from the distortions of scale associated with Satan's world.[128] The temporalities of the present accord with the reader's world; the spatial realm gives expression to the eternal, like the cosmic symbolism of stars. In *Paradise Lost* space and time give expression to the Calvinist emphasis on the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual worlds as a measure of human experience. Milton's treatment of spatial affect in *Paradise Lost* is equally indebted to Augustine, who imagines a sacred quality associated with spatiality in *The Confessions*, explaining the eternal in spatial, rather than temporal, terms.[129]

In *Paradise Lost*, Milton recreates these elements of movement and stasis in his figures of Pandemonium and Paradise in ways which both distinguish them from each other and yet relate them both to the surface of an ekphrastic shield that is modelled on those in Homer and Virgil. Despite their ornamental qualities and their equal emphasis on the senses and bodily engagement, the 'bossy' relief work of Pandemonium and the enamelled surface of Paradise reflect historical time, yet emerge from the bas-relief of the body metaphor at the centre of the epic, techniques integral to Milton's adaptation of the classical ekphrastic shield. The relationship is captured by the 'pendant world' figure that is linked to the circular symbol throughout the poem for the poem itself: Milton's 'pendant world' figures the relationship between the unfolding linear narrative of the secular world of temporal experience and the timeless, circular, spatial and cosmic pattern associated with the Protestant sacred. Both of these features are integral to the classical Homeric and Virgilian ekphrases, of which the pendant is an adaptation. One recalls that Homer's Shield of Achilles captures the movement of time on the decorative face of the shield, with the cosmic, classical sacred captured by the circularity of the shield itself.[130] The symbol has alchemical significance in the Renaissance, and applying this motif with its associations of aesthetic symmetry and a

[127] Lerer (1999) 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, An Introduction'.
[128] The distortions of scale associated with Satan's shield and spear occur in Book I.283–395.
[129] Augustine (1992) 2008, XII.13; Mendelson 2016.
[130]Martindale 1986, 39; Fitzgerald, 210.

sacred pattern that is spatially expressed, Milton adapts the pre-Christian classical form of ekphrasis to his Protestant epic.

4. *Enargeia*, Expression and Poetic Form

> So much the rather thou Celestial Light
> Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers
> Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence
> Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
> Of things invisible to mortal sight.
>
> (*PL* III.51–55).

In the *invocatio* to Book III of *Paradise Lost,* the fallen poet calls on a form of 'inner vision' associated with the enargetic power of ekphrasis. While the rhetorical concept of the imagination does not usually consider the insight to be inspired, as in some Neoplatonic approaches, but to originate in the skill of the orator, Milton associates this quality of ekphrasis with the power of Creation as a vehicle for divine inspiration. Although figurative language is associated in the early modern period with the fallen world, Milton's ability to make the eternal virtues of heaven apprehensible by the reader requires a kind of insight that depends on the distinction between the superior 'inner' vision and the 'outer' fallen senses, with the former dependent upon the refinements of the intellect to the imagination. With its access to the inner sense, *enargeia* is a 'major virtue' in the Renaissance 'for the language arts to attain' and is essential to Milton's transformation of allegory, a theme this section explores.[131] What is notable about Milton's invocation of an 'inner vision' is his association of the physical effects of divinely-inspired poetic language on the body with a therapeutic remedy for his own blindness, a physical condition which he also associates with his fallenness ('plant eyes'). Clarity of vision is impeded by the fallen senses and will of the subject and accordingly the poet asks the 'holy Light' to 'purge and disperse' his optic vision, a process associated with regeneration of the visual faculty. It is a capability Milton must secure against the countervailing effects of the fallen body. The visionary capacity of God, from whom this ability derives, is referred to in the most expansive terms in Book V as 'th' Eternal eye, whose sight discerns / Abstrusest thoughts' (V.711–12).

[131] Krieger 1992, 14.

Enargeia is likewise integral to a more refined and authentic 'inner voice' that makes it a key feature of Renaissance rhetoric, especially in religious contexts, and to poetry as a measure of the virtue of the humanist subject.[132] Enargetic expression follows the experience of the embodied subject in the contours of the speaker's thoughts and feelings.[133] In *Paradise Lost*, as will be shown in this and later chapters, both of these dimensions — of clarity of perception and expression — depend substantially on the affective qualities of poetry to touch, move and engage both poet and reader. In turn, the Milton's technique depends on both clarity of the senses and emotional moderation and balance. Ekphrasis is central to the tradition of religious rhetoric identified by Shuger in religious discourse, in which *enargeia* is integral to the understanding and experience of the divine in religious worship. Enargetic rhetoric can make 'the objects of reason, which are intrinsically excellent but also remote and difficult to grasp', and which include the Platonic virtues and concepts of God, 'imaginatively present by making them sensuous and vivid'.[134] In *Paradise Lost*, Milton's invocation of the ekphrastic style supports the relationship between poetic and rhetorical expression and the embodied figure, traced to *Areopagitica* and captured in the central angelic body metaphor at the centre of the epic. Through this metaphor, the quality of expression depends not only to the distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' sense but also the authentic articulation of experience that is characteristic of the engagement of poet and reader as a kind of communion through the 'body' of language or word integral to Protestant faith.[135] As a corollary, Milton's poetic depiction of Heaven returns to an idealised, unmediated model of ancient oratory in its direct and relatively unembellished speech, because heaven rests on a state of divine being, of timelessness, or essence, rather than of human 'becoming'.[136] This section examines that parallel relationship between ekphrasis, expression and both physical (embodied) and poetic form.

Aristotle's concept of *energeia* is as integral to his metaphysics as to his theory of poetic form. According to Ulreich, it is essential to the reconciliation between key principles of Platonism and Aristotelianism that is evident in Sidney's *Apology* and also

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[132] Bundy, 1927; Plett, 10.
[133] Shuger 1988, 227–28.
[134] Shuger 1988, 195.
[135] See *Areopagitica*: 'Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious lifeblood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life.': CP 716.
[136] For example, God sees 'past, present, future': *PL* III.78.

in the particulars of this thesis, *Paradise Lost*. Aristotle's term *energeia* is often translated as 'activity', 'actuality', or even 'act', but more literally rendered '(a state of) functioning'.[137] It is an idea pertinent to Aristotelian hylomorphism, which explains the relationship between matter and form to account for change and involves, to express it in modern Deleuzian terms, vital, transitionary states or 'becomings'. The principle of *enargeia* animates Aristotelian poetic and rhetorical theory, as explained by Ulreich:

> As Geoffrey Shepherd has observed, 'Horace usually thinks of imitation as a copying what is already created'; in these relatively superficial terms, 'the arts … imitate the appearance of things or the actuality of events.' For Aristotle, however, mimesis is not mere 'photographic representation'; on the contrary, 'a thing is most accurately represented in the fullest development of its potentiality,' so that 'imitation gives the essential character, not the surface copy.' Indeed, we should do well to press Shepherd's argument a little further by observing that Aristotelian mimesis is essentially a process forming a product, rather than the product formed. As Francis Fergusson and others have shown, Aristotle's conception of the tragic action as the mimetic 'soul, or first principle,' of tragedy is intimately related to his conception of form as the actualising of matter. In analysing the process of becoming, Aristotle consistently seeks to discern not the product merely but the process, the activity (*energeia*) by which matter is realised in form. For our present purpose, the crucial distinction between Aristotle's ideas and their various neoclassical redactions is simply this distinction between an internal, invisible process and an external, visible product. Once we have grasped the dynamic inwardness of Aristotelian mimesis, we have taken a major step toward reconciling Aristotelian and Platonic conceptions of poetic form.[138]

In Aristotelian theory, *enargeia* is not simply related to movement but to 'actuality', which is not the object's power to produce a change but rather its 'potentiality', which is its capacity to be in a different or more completed state.[139] The principles are integral to metaphysical theory elaborated by the medieval Aristotelian, Thomas Aquinas, who applies the term '*actus purus*' to God, for whom the notion of 'energy' is identical with 'essence'. Created beings, by contrast, are considered to be in a state of imperfection,

[137] Audi, 1999; Peters, 55–56.
[138] Ulreich, 71; Fergusson, 1961 2–41.
[139] Shields, 2016.

accordingly '*in actu*', either directed toward this state of perfection or toward its opposite of imperfection.[140]

Paradise Lost captures this animating Aristotelian quality of *energeia* in ways which connect Milton's vital, monistic theology to poetic form. It is expressed in Milton's ontology and poetics as a dynamic shaping process that is essential to the material relationship between the temporal world and the eternal. In this way embodied expression is intrinsic to Milton's ontological model in *Paradise Lost* and the emergence of the subject. *Enargeia* provides Milton's figures with a bodily dimension of vital feeling reminiscent of Spinoza's *affectus* and Bergson's *élan vital*, giving 'life and action' to discourse.[141] The principles underlie the intensities of Milton's figural expression of synaesthetic and kinetic sensory experience in each of Pandemonium and Paradise. Further, introduction of the 'vitality of sentient and acting beings' to bodily (including emotional) expression is the basis of pathos and engagement by poetry as a vehicle to touch and move audiences.

The principle of *enargeia* animates the dynamic process within Milton's hierarchical order of human and divine body in *Paradise Lost*; of the potential for humans for ontological ascent and descent between divinity and fallenness reflected in the distinction between lightness and flexibility, on the one hand, and weight and inertia, on the other. In the case of characters tainted by evil, Milton's application of *enargeia* reflects an ontological emptiness or total lack of being that manifests in lack of form and figure.[142] The distinctions are manifested in the styles of poetry of *Paradise Lost*, graduating between the elevated vital energy of the angels and the ontological descent of the fallen characters where ultimately all vital being is extinguished, and with it the power of linguistic expression.[143] It is central to Milton's transformation of the principle of *thymos*, especially evident in his discrimination between the aggressive, violent energy of Satan, which often resembles the wrath of the Homeric hero Achilles (as well as the 'tedious havoc' Milton associates with medieval romance in Book IX.30), in contrast to the celestial light and energy of the divine characters and the heroic martyrdom of the Son.

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[140] *ST* 1.2; Dubray 1913.
[141] Campana, 35.
[142] For example, the figure of Satan as viewed by Uriel in Book IV, who 'saw him disfigur'd': *PL* IV.127.
[143] This is the effect of Satan and the fallen angels' transformation into serpents in *PL* X.504–90, which also coincides with a loss of the powers of verbal expression.

In *Paradise Lost*, *enargeia* is thus a mimetic principle that is integral to both poetic and material form. Its poetic form is captured in Milton's epic shield represented by the 'pendant world', in the temporalities of present experience and movement of the fallen world on the surface of the pendant, by comparison to the timelessness of the eternal world expressed in the circular, spatial and intelligible form. Stein's examination of Milton's application of ekphrasis identifies this effect, focusing on Milton's use of the 'historical present', a technique traditionally associated with classical epic.[144] What Stein understands to be unusual to the technique is Milton's shifting back to the past tense immediately after the present tense has been used to 'bring a part of a picture forward' (producing the effect of bas-relief discussed in the previous part). The example he refers to is of Satan ordering his standard to be raised:

> All in a moment through the gloom *were seen*
> Ten thousand Banners *rise* into the Air
> With Orient Colors *waving*: with them *rose*
> A Forest huge of Spears: and thronging Helms
> *Appear'd*, and serried shields in thick array
> Of depth immeasurable ….
>
> (*PL* I.544–49; Stein's italics).

The scene is, according to Stein,

> in the past tense: *were seen* sets the time. But the effect of *rise* and *waving* is to move the action out of the past and make it seem out of time. (The infinitive *rise* dominates the passive *were seen*: partly because the preposition is omitted, and partly because *rise* is rhythmically the climax of its line and the preceding line.) Then the action returns definitely to the past with *rose*. … The banners *rise* with a kind of active immediacy that thrusts aside for the moment abstract logical time. For another moment, time is suspended in the flutter of the orient colours *waving*. Then the next details come into focus; their approach to us is in the past tense. … The past tense is the real tense of these lines, [while] the present tense was an illusion. To the eye, the first details perceived seem to be happening as they are seen. But the details that emerge later, since they are

[144] What my analysis attempts to add to Stein's approach here is the way Milton's use of the 'historical present' captures both the intensities and immediacies of present experience and equally captures aesthetically the raised surface of the shield.

> later, are more easily subject to logical order. What seemed to be happening all at once, assumes a pattern of sequence.[145]

All of these features — the idea of condensing, reordering time or making the future or past seem present — are techniques of classical ekphrasis.[146] Milton uses ekphrasis to combine linear movement with spatial effects, to overlap images and shift them into background as they dissolve, bringing new material into the foreground. Yet poetically it reflects the fallen world of time and of temporal and spatial distortions, of the terrible sublime associated with classical epic.

Pandemonium's figures capture the mediating role of history, human time and temporal distortions, and with them distortions of architectural construction and aesthetics. The phrase 'of depth immeasurable' gives the impression of depth common to backgrounds of Renaissance paintings. and the scene's theatricality is commensurate with the large-scale depth, vividness and action of epic.[147] The phrase 'in guise / of Warriors old' suggests a kind of nostalgia, yet it is evoked by means of illusion, artifice, distortion.[148] It is this tendency to illusion and distortions created by the language of ekphrasis that distinguishes Pandemonium from Paradise and Heaven as the fallen theatre of Satan's world. By contrast the form of Paradise, in spite of its highly 'enamell'd' artifice, has an essential form that is close to the angelic body and its nostalgic effects produce a near-timeless quality. The illusory effect is disturbed when Eve tastes the fruit, where the verb form of Milton's line emphatically stresses the past tense ('she pluck'd, she eat': IX.781) and the fallen world of historical time.[149] Yet as in Stein's examples, the strongly adverbial sense of the line introduces temporal intensities that frame them in the historical present.[150]

The qualities of *enargeia*, as an expression of both poetic and material form, are thus integral to the aesthetic model of *Paradise Lost* and equally to the production of intensities of experience. Milton's aesthetic model resembles that of Aquinas, in which the communicability of beauty is a participation in form as being.[151] Aquinas's principle

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[145] Stein, 120.
[146] Webb 2009, 100.
[147] Stein, 120–125.
[148] *PL* I.564–65; Stein, 120–125; Webb 2009, 103.
[149] It is equally arguable that the verb form of 'eat' reflects both present and past tense in this context.
[150] The lines also produce a kind of shock or jolt as they shift into historical time. The dimension that I add to Stein's analysis here is the dependence of the lines on the notion of affective intensities to produce their aesthetic effects.
[151] Aquinas's theory of beauty is outlined in the *Summa Theologica*: *ST* 1.5.39.8.

of *claritas* refers to ontological clarity — the logic of inner being — and has both a physical sense (light and colour) and a spiritual sense (the object must be in accord with the spiritual sense of reason). It is the fundamental communicability of form, which is made actual in relation to someone's looking at or seeing the object.[152] In Book III of *Paradise Lost*, Satan arrives at the wall of Heaven, the portal of which is said to be 'inimitable on Earth' in art or architecture.

> a Structure high,
> At top whereof, but far more rich appear'd
> The work as of a Kingly Palace Gate
> With Frontispiece of Diamond and Gold
> Imbellisht, thick with sparkling orient Gems
> The Portal shone, inimitable on Earth
> By Model, or by shading Pencil drawn.
>
> (*PL* III.503–09).

Instead of a detailed visual elaboration of the Gate, it is 'compounded exclusively of light and general splendour'. Heaven, with its ornate stairs, and the 'bright Sea' 'of Jasper, or of liquid Pearl' underneath (*PL* III.516–22), is 'not picturable in any naturalistic way', notes Hagstrum, yet 'recalls the light of [Dante's] *Paradiso* and Thomas Aquinas's principle of *claritas'*.[153]

Drawing on the aesthetic models of Dante and Aquinas, communicability of form depends on participation in the object of contemplation. The effect of works by Milton and Spenser before him is to further engage the intensities of bodily experience in the artwork and to make those energies integral to the work itself.[154] In the cosmos of *Paradise Lost*, objects express their essential form in ways which are not just visual but affective and intelligible and depend upon engaging the temporalising processes of experience.[155] The manner in which that engagement distinguishes the outer senses and lower bodily effects from the refined experiences governed by the intellect according to the agency and volition of the auditor is the basis of the distinction Milton makes between the various poetic styles of Pandemonium, Paradise and Heaven in *Paradise*

[152] Eco 1988.
[153] Hagstrum, 124–8.
[154] See Eco 1988.
[155] Hagstrum, 127.

Lost: between *eidolon* and *eikon*, time and timelessness, temporal and spiritual, surface and form.[156]

In *Paradise Lost*, the ekphratic qualities of luminosity as a measure of formal excellence, intelligibility and vital feeling are integral to the expression of poetic form.[157] The principles are evident in descriptions of heaven through the eyes of Satan ('the Portal shone, inimitable on Earth'). By contrast, the aesthetics of Pandemonium express its status as an *eidolon* or false semblance of form; its luminosity is 'brazen' and its light is earthly 'as from a sky'.[158] In turn, in the descriptions of Heaven in Book III that are discussed in more detail in the next section, there is an equation of energy and essence and a collapsing of the two levels of Neoplatonic allegory into the language of symbolism, direct speech and unadorned ornament (especially through the biblical symbolism associated with light itself). I have thus argued here through an examination of affect that modes of expression are essential to models of being in *Paradise Lost*.

Ekphrasis is a necessary ingredient in the transformation of Milton's epic according to his Protestant model; it is the basis of his styles of allegorical figure in which is asserted the superior role of language in expressing the sacred. Ekphrasis provides through its sensible form access to the intelligible world of being through the imagination, whilst revealing the underlying world and model of the subject as one of becoming and the temporalities of experience. Milton's incorporation of the style depends for its expression on the embodied subject as an articulation of the material energies of nature invoked by means of body imagery and concrete particulars of experience that are more fully explored in the next section.

5. Allegoresis, Ornament and the Embodied Subject

> All this dark Globe the Fiend found as he pass'd,
> And long he wander'd, till at last a gleam
> Of dawning light turn'd thither-ward in haste
> His travell'd steps; far distant he descries
> Ascending by degrees magnificent
> Up to the wall of Heaven ….
>
> (*PL* III.498–503)

[156] Steadman 1959, 236–38.
[157] Tuve 1947, 29–30.
[158] *PL* I. 724, 730.

In a sequence of figures unfolding in Book III of *Paradise Lost*, Satan wanders the 'dark Globe'. He arrives at the wall of Heaven, which is described through his fallen eyes, a distant gaze that is commonly employed for him and reflects his corresponding distance from the divine in both spatial and spiritual terms. The figure reflects the superior access of poetic language to the refinements of the intellect over a purely visual description, engaging the embodied faculties and the inner sense to express the form rather than the surface of the figures. In this section, I consider how Milton's allegorical style in *Paradise Lost* reflected in his figures draws on the expression of concrete particulars associated with embodied experience. These particulars add vigour, energy and agency to Milton's figural style in ways which depend on the temporalities and intensities of experience.

In Renaissance rhetorical and poetic theory, ekphrasis through its sensible forms is understood to give access to spiritual reality. Through its alignment with the principle of *ut pictura poiesis*, it accommodates the opposition between 'visual' and verbal', respectively 'natural' and 'arbitrary' signs. For many centuries, according to Krieger:

> this opposition overlapped crucially the related opposition derived from Plato between the so-called sensible and intelligible signs. … In the poetics of ekphrasis we find an ambivalence between, on the one hand, the defensive concession that language, as arbitrary and with a sensuous lack, is a disadvantaged medium in need of emulating the natural and sensible medium of the plastic arts and, on the other hand, the prideful confidence in language as a medium privileged by its very intelligibility which opens the sensible world to the free ranging imagination without being bound by the limitations of the sensible as revealed in the visual field. The superior access of natural signs to the sensible world received by our eyes can be countered by the superior access of language, composed of arbitrary signs, to the intelligible world received by our inner vision, conceived figuratively as 'the eyes of the mind'.[159]

Combining Aristotelian and Platonic theory, Florentine Neoplatonists align the principle of *enargeia* with the notion that poetry can give access to a 'transcendent and invisible reality' — the potential for auditors to apprehend the supersensible realm through the intellect — also capable of generating strong feeling, and in some more idealistic Florentine theory, the capability of seeing the virtues themselves.[160] The Neoplatonists,

[159] Krieger 1992, 12, 34.
[160] M. Mack, 109; Krieger 1992, 127.

according to Krieger, separate mimesis from its dependence on sensible experience and relate it to 'the intelligible as the supersensible by encouraging pictorial vividness'. The Renaissance critic Jacopo Mazzoni notes that 'poetry with its narrative may resemble a speaking picture', and explains that the 'image presented by the poet to the eyes of the mind must be as vivid as the image presented by the visual artist to the eyes of the body'. It thus becomes visible to the eyes of the intellect: 'a metaphorical use of image as an analogue for the sensible in the intellectual realm'. According to Krieger, ekphrasis is 'more than image, claiming the advantages of the sensible image while also accessing the intelligible, which it alone can make available to the senses, if only in the figurative way of language'.[161]

Francis Bacon identifies the interaction of Renaissance Neoplatonism and Aristotelian mimesis with a clear reference to the style of ekphrasis as 'lively representation':

> that virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection; so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporeal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation.[162]

Bacon's approach reflects the Renaissance discrimination of the faculty of the 'inner sense', which enables apprehension of the virtues and concepts of God, otherwise unavailable to the physical senses.[163] The 'inner vision' of the mind's eye of the imagination is capable of tempering by reason rather than being distracted by the wayward senses and affections of the body and can thus be a superior vehicle for understanding. Shuger's examination of the passionate Renaissance rhetorical grand style used in religious contexts identifies the significance of images, figures and tropes for their capacity to make what is unseen accessible to both thought and feeling due to the close relationship between the imagination, knowledge and embodied experience.[164] Metaphor, figure and trope are integral as they have both a 'cognitive and psychagogic value in sacred discourse'. Insofar as tropes 'give a sensible conception of the most abstracted thoughts', they create '*praesentia'* (or a sense of presence that is a quality integral to *enargeia*) and can therefore 'spur the emotions to love truth'. Further, the

[161] Krieger 1992, 119, 127.
[162] *The Advancement*: Bacon (1605) 1893, II.xviii.3; Krieger 1992, 21.
[163] Vickers 1988; Healy, 182; See also R. Burton I.I.II.6.
[164] Shuger 1988, 211, 208.

affective qualities of metaphor lead to a 'preference for concrete particularity over the sonorous generalities of Latin abstractions', a distinction between the expression of concrete experience and abstract ideas that is integral to the strategies of reader entanglement in *Paradise Lost*.[165]

Through its sensuous appeal as much as its appeal to the intellect, ekphrasis is key to Milton's blending of the mimetic and allegorical traditions. The techniques underlie distinctions between the effects of false and true imagery in *Paradise Lost* on the basis of how the technique is applied and the relative merits of the poetry of Pandemonium, Paradise and Heaven; between poetic 'idol' and 'icon' associated respectively with the poetry of Satan and the Son, with the former associated with techniques that exemplify spatial, figural and rhetorical distance from the divine. Ekphrasis is equally integral to the way Milton's monist philosophy is expressed in poetic figure and engages the corporeal and concrete experience of the embodied subject.

The Renaissance blending of mimetic and allegorical traditions results in more naturalistic, corporeal characters, a feature that is characteristic of *Paradise Lost* and also influences the moral shape of Milton's characters and the forms of his poetic figures. Representations of angelic and divine characters thus rely on degrees of detail relating to the concrete and corporeal.[166] Extending from Dante's *Commedia* into the Renaissance, figuration of spiritual ideas takes this more naturalistic, embodied form, engaging the imagination and the concrete experiences of the body by means of figurative techniques such as *enargeia*. Following Aristotelian knowledge theory, Aquinas argues that the 'mind cannot grasp intelligibles without the images or phantasms of corporeal things and, therefore, to remember spiritual truths, one must link them to concrete similitudes'.[167] The notion underlies Raphael's instruction that he will treat the discrepancy between heavenly and earthly apprehension of the sacred when he says 'I shall delineate so, /By lik'ning spiritual to corporal forms' (V.571–73).[168] Aquinas's approach accompanies the emergence of medieval personification allegory, a style which places abstract ideas into personified form. Yet in *Paradise Lost*, Milton rejects this form of allegory, associating his figures of 'Sin' and 'Death' with fallen

[165] Shuger 1988, 220.
[166] Ricks, 198.
[167] Shuger 1988, 205.
[168] Gregerson 1995, 246.

poetry, the poetry of surfaces, distortions of form and ontological descent into loss of being.[169] Moreover, the embodied figure underscores the clarity of vision and authenticity of poetic and rhetorical expression that Milton defines as necessary for articulation of sacred matters.

Milton's preference for the embodied figure of form and material substance gives life and vigour to his imagery, expressing the embodied energies in moral, spiritual and creative form. The embodied style is integral to the expression of states of being, becoming and beinglessness in *Paradise Lost* and can be contrasted with elements of Dante's *Commedia* to demonstrate the integral role of *enargeia* in the expression of the sacred. Calvino observes in his comparison between the poetry of Cavalcanti and Dante that while Cavalcanti's metaphors tend to articulate abstract ideas, Dante's are marked by their assumption of concrete particulars so that their 'precise weight' is established. In Dante's figures, the affective qualities of metaphor are expressed with concrete particularity in ways which give them affective weight according to the graduated level of experience that they articulate.[170] Krieger notes how Dante's metaphoric figure of the Trinity in *Paradiso* shows that 'its very brilliance depends on its evasion and transcendence of the limitations of precise sensory definition':

> Within the profound and clear substance
> Of the exalted light three circles appeared to me,
> Of three colours and one magnitude.
> And one in the other, like a rainbow in a rainbow
> Seemed reflected, and the third seemed like
> Fire breathed forth equally from the one and the other.[171]

It is 'not strictly picturable', according to Krieger, although the reader needs the previous experience of 'colour, shape and other sensations' to appreciate it or understand it. In Krieger's view: 'We could not represent it accurately on canvas, or even in the mind's eye — quite see it, and yet somehow we are moved by it as if we could'.[172] Yet I have tried to show that to engage the 'inner sense' through the sensory

[169] Fallon, 194, 203, 206.
[170] Shuger 1988, 220.
[171] Dante, *Paradiso* XXXIII.115–20, translated by Robert L. Montgomery, in Mazzoni, 77; Krieger 1992, 122.
[172] Krieger, 122.

memory to capture an experience of the divine, such a description relies on corporeal effects of synaesthetic experience (vision, breath). The ekphrastic quality of 'illusion and absence' therefore creates an illusion of a sacred image which invokes, for Dante's critic Mazzoni, the ideal, based on the Neoplatonic system of analogies.[173] Moreover, in Dante's allegorical poetry, the metaphor of the Trinity, which is represented as light and associated with a supersensible idea, is captured in the sensory and subtle yet concrete detail: 'breath' and 'rainbow': as Calvino identifies, with its 'weight precisely established'. In Dante, as in Milton, I argue, words are intelligible yet invested with their 'own weighty substance' that arises from their sensuous effects on the body.[174] The simultaneous sense of amplitude and lightness of detail is provided by its metaphoric emphasis on qualities of 'substance' or material that are nevertheless transparent, flexible and non-solid ('fire', 'rainbow'), rather than more solid and direct concrete particulars that would weight it too heavily toward the material rather than the spiritual. With a similar emphasis on substantial lightness of form and shape, Milton's figures of the Godhead, by contrast, are marked by his anti-Trinitarianism. He returns to the Calvinist symbol of light for the Holy Spirit and the Word ('Hail holy Light') which is also to revert to the Augustinian sublimity associated with the plain or simple style.[175] Milton's notion of light is purer, simpler, more direct, and a reflection of the superior quality of divine revelation. Moreover, as the most refined form of energy in the poem, the notion of light is associated with both physical substance and luminosity, which animate aesthetic experience and produce an intellectual clarity available to the mind's eye of the imagination.

In the Renaissance, the blending of the allegorical with the rhetorical tradition occurs in Sidney, Spenser and Milton in large part through the influence of Aristotelian poetic and rhetorical theory under the general principle of teaching by 'example'.[176] Although the allegorical tradition is 'rich and varied', according to Mack, '[a]s Tuve rightly claims, Sidney's theory, in which 'particulars shadow universals,' is… a version of typology, as is the allegory of *The Faerie Queene*'.[177] The position is equally adopted

[173] Krieger, 123.
[174] Krieger 1992, 117, 127.
[175] *PL* III.1. The emphasis on light is also reflected in the theology of Augustine and Aquinas.
[176] Shields 2016.
[177] M. Mack, 41–42; Tuve 1966, 122.

by Milton's Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*.[178] Aristotle's principle of mimesis in the *Poetics* represents a qualification of the Platonic distinction between phantastic and eicastic images, between images which 'infect the fancy with unworthy objects', and those which more closely reflect 'truth in images'.[179] This qualification occurs because Aristotle's qualifying principle of *mimesis* in the *Poetics* does not require strict representation of reality. Poetry can approximate philosophy by an exercise of emotionally-engaged imagination in picturing things that 'might happen'; poetry has the capacity to convey an awareness of 'universals'. Unlike philosophy itself, mimesis makes this possible 'not through analysis and abstraction but through vivid concentration of narrative and expressive form'.[180] The styles of ekphrasis make that process one of engagement of the faculties.

The blending of the mimetic and allegorical traditions coincides with the introduction of the more 'naturalistic' character in an expansion of the imaginative capacities of Renaissance epic and has consequences for poetic figures, which not only depend more on the expression of embodied experience but are also more prone to distortions of the imagination. Milton's approach contrasts with an alternative Renaissance view expressed by Puttenham's aversion to 'monstruous conceits' of the imagination. He accordingly draws fine distinctions in his figural expression of fallen and divine subjects using the ekphrastic technique which are essential to his discrimination between *eikon* and *eidolon*. In Aristotelian poetics, epic style is less restrictive than tragedy, so that in Renaissance allegory the irrational, on which the wonderful depends for its chief effects, has wider scope in epic poetry than in theatre because 'the person acting is not seen' and the reader is thereby permitted the more expansive capacities of the imagination.[181] While in Dante and the heritage of medieval allegory the image can 'seek to refer to the supersensible indirectly through a mediating code', as Gombrich argues, produced by 'symbolic images', the scope is expanded in the Renaissance.[182] In his examination of Dante, Mazzoni, according to Krieger, borrows Plato's distinction between the 'eicastic' and 'phantastic', while reversing the order of preference between them, thereby distinguishing the opposing position of

[178] The Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 670; Steadman 1985, 17–18.
[179] Sidney 2007, 151; Krieger 1992, 120, 126; Steadman 1959, 236–38; Gilman, 162.
[180] Aristotle 1961, 9; Shields 2016.
[181] Krieger 1992, 27, 42, 52; from Aristotle's *Poetics*, Ch 24.
[182] Krieger 1992, 115, 117.

Tasso. While Plato's *Theatetus* and *Sophist* 'set the terms of the debate in Italian criticism between Mazzoni and Tasso; the first maintaining that poetry is 'phantastic', a sophistical art of fallacious appearances only, the other that poetry is 'eicastic', an art of likeness and probability related to dialectic and more directly reflecting the truth in images'.[183] According to Krieger, Mazzoni seems to equate poetry with the phantastic, relegating the eicastic to rhetoric, a distinction anticipated in Longinian theory, where both poetry and rhetoric are credible, but in poetry's case, 'the credible as marvellous'.[184] Mazzoni thus 'free[s] the poet from a bondage to the mimetic, to exploit the special powers of the verbal imagination'. A similar expansion of mimetic poetry is traced in Sidney's *Apology*, which converts Aristotelian 'imitation' into a 'figuring forth' of 'speaking pictures' that the poet finds within 'the zodiac of his own wit' or his powers of invention.[185] In Sidney critics find a corresponding shift from the preference for the simple reproductive imagination to an appreciation of the powers of invention as the work of the imagination.[186] In Sidney's expanded Aristotelian poetics beyond the more restrictive allegories of the medieval period, the poet can produce a 'golden world' that rides free of the 'brazen' world of our normal reality, although, according to Krieger, the world of the poem 'turns out to be contained within the transcendent realm of Platonic moral universals':

> In Mazzoni, though perhaps even more so in Sidney, the conservative ideological needs of the moralistic inheritance from Plato drew him back from his more adventurous moments of indulgence.[187]

Critics of Sidney argue that the *Apology* emphasises the intellectual basis of the visual image. According to Forrest G. Robinson, Sidney's philosophy of the 'idea' reflects a notion that the poem is the visual manifestation of the logical structure beneath it.[188] Robinson stresses the role images play in Sidney's poetics for the expression of clarity of knowledge (he calls it Sidney's 'visual epistemology') rather than the expression of feeling, an approach to imagery that accords with the eicastic model associated with rhetoric and more conservative poetic theory. The position resembles the theory of the

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[183] Krieger 1992, 124–27; Steadman 1959, 236–38.
[184] Krieger 1992, 124.
[185] M. Mack, 147; Krieger 1992, 127.
[186] Bundy, 544.
[187] Krieger 1992, 127. The indebtedness of Sidney to the allegorical tradition is much debated amongst critics: See M. Mack, 147.
[188] F. Robinson, 108, 111; See also Lewalski, who identifies the approach to imagery in *Paradise Lost* as essentially 'Pauline'. Lewalski 1963, 25–35; Gilman 159.

image in Stoic philosophy, which in broad terms requires imagery to move the reason without moving the will and with it the body's affections and passions.[189] David Mikics, by contrast, emphasises the ambivalence Sidney demonstrates in the *Apology* when he tries to reconcile the contradictory forces of pathos and didacticism.[190]

Debates about Sidney's poetics of the 'visual' idea can be distinguished from Milton's poetry in *Paradise Lost* with its greater emphasis on embodied experience, a style he shares with Spenser.[191] Although *Paradise Lost* marks a shift from the idealism of some Renaissance poetry, Milton's epic inherits the blending of classical ekphrasis with the enhanced imaginative scope afforded to Dante's medieval allegoresis and later Renaissance poetry, including that of Sidney.[192] While Milton's figural style is less dependent upon the visual faculty, it draws on a more integrated sensory experience of the reader's temporal 'present' to engage the volition and will of the subject combined with the intelligible capacity of language to express forms of excellence including the divine. Although the 'Portal' of Heaven is thus 'inimitable on Earth / By Model or by shading Pencil drawn' (*PL* III.508–09), the figure can equally express an exalted quality of angels 'drawn by fiery steeds' (*PL* III.522). The style depends on a refinement of affectivity brought about by the interaction of the intellect, passions and imagination. Ekphrasis thus produces a kind of 'authenticity' of expression by providing access to spiritual reality that depends on the temporal and material experience of the embodied subject.

The 'illusionary' quality of *enargeia* derived from the techniques of classical poetry has the capacity to raise 'false' imagery. Ekphrasis in rhetoric and poetry relies not only on vividness but also on the quality of amplification, which is not only a standalone technique of rhetoric but is also integral to *enargeia* and provides '*magnitudo*', also a feature of Milton's 'grand style' that is adapted from ancient epic and other rhetorical sources. The quality of grandness is evident in Milton's panoramic theatrical scale, in his angelic and divine characters as much as his verse form. But it can equally result in distortions, which are evident not only in Satan's rhetoric and speeches but also in his large and distorted form, as distinguished from the proper amplification that is afforded to descriptions of the divine characters. Because *enargeia*

[189] Bouwsma 19–64.
[190] Mikics, 35; M. Mack, 121 traces the relationship between the Platonic 'Idea' and Sidney's 'Idea or fore-conceit'.
[191] Eg The Cave of Mammon in *The Faerie Queene*, II.7: Spenser, 361.
[192] Treip, 47, 137; Krieger 1992, 127.

has the power to raise images that have the appearance of truth, although they can equally be false, distorted or immoral, poets like Dante and Milton distinguish false from true figures as a reflection of their essential inner states.

In *Paradise Lost*, the potential for falsity and corruption lies beneath all poetic figures, and underscores the distinction between the distortions of the fallen characters and the flexibility and lightness of the good angels, yet the relationship is a dynamic one based on potentialities, in which the characters, as Fallon argues, are moving either towards, or away from, spiritual purity according to the moral shape of their will.[193] In Milton's underlying metaphysics of *Paradise Lost*, where the body metaphor figures the relationship between language, the body and the world (including the sacred), the poetic distortions of Sin and also Satan, whose sin visibly disfigures him (Book IV.127), make the outer form of language a reflection of inner states, albeit one which can be subject to disguised falsity or deception. The ekphrastic quality of 'illusion and absence' often evokes spiritual qualities or nostalgic effects, yet its associations with classical style raise the potential for expression of the profane. It is not only a reflection of Milton's graduation of fallen and divine bodies but is also key to his distinction between classical and biblical sacred, or the terrible and Christian sublime.[194]

In Milton's poetry of Paradise, the negative simile comparing Eden to the 'fair field of Enna' demonstrates the dual power of ekphrasis and depends on refinements of the technique.[195] In the 'Enna' simile Milton deploys the apophatic technique of allegorical poetry, which is analogous to the distinction between affirmation and negation in scriptural revelation, and involves the use of negative metaphors to avoid the potential for producing idols from the examples of classical literature. Yet the technique nonetheless enables apprehension of the biblical sacred. In Krieger's analysis, it is intended to 'yield a presence of the invisible sacred within the visible apophatic making a profane picture sacredly pictographic':

> Not that fair field
> Of *Enna*, where *Proserpin* gath'ring flow'rs
> Herself a fairer Flow'r by gloomie *Dis*

[193] *PL* I.426.
[194] Shaw 33–5.
[195] Leonard, 135.

Was gather'd, which cost *Ceres* all that pain
To seek her through the world ….

(*PL* IV.268–72)

Milton may be making a Longinian appeal to the exotic, but his technique is also a variation of the ekphrastic technique of 'illusion and absence', of 'making the absent thing present'; here it is the sacred idea of Paradise, evoked in ways which raise simultaneous and contradictory associations of Paradise with both the eternal (loss and Salvation) and the fallen worlds (classical pastoral poetry).[196] In classical ekphrasis, rhetoricians stress the ability of the word to create illusions; but the 'as-if'-ness of discussions of ekphrasis and *enargeia* and the 'ambiguous status of the mental images they produce' is according to Webb also 'betrayed' — 'the audience both sees (metaphorically) and fails to see (literally) the subject matter' — while at the same time revealing the dependence on technical artifice. In other words, while the illusion of the scene is apparent, the underlying sacredness of the scene is equally apprehensible to the mind's eye without associating the sacred and profane or creating the conditions for idolatry. And yet the figures produce strong sensuous and nostalgic effects in the classical imagery that emphasises the inaccessibility of Paradise, a loss and 'absence'. It is a variation of the principle of the apprehension of the 'excellent object' identified by Shuger that relies on the superior 'inner vision' of the mind's eye of the imagination that is tempered by reason rather than the wayward senses of the body. Yet it is one which also draws on the experiential qualities of language through the sensory memory, a technique of ekphrasis which is also acknowledged in classical rhetoric.[197] In his articulation of a style that draws on the material conditions of experience, Milton captures the nostalgia of the lost 'golden age' of classical figural traditions while avoiding the profane, and with it the 'terrible sublime' associated with the figures of the first two books of *Paradise Lost*.[198]

Milton most fully fuses the rhetorical and allegorical traditions in the descriptions of the Son and God in Book III in a way which still relies on the concrete and the corporeal, but weights them lightly toward the spiritual. In broad terms, the closer a setting is to the divine in *Paradise Lost*, the more the ornament depends on certain styles of biblical symbolism, the less emphasis is placed on figural techniques

[196] Krieger 1992, 122–23; Empson 1961, 172; Webb 2009, 103; Whaler 1931b, 1035n.
[197] Webb 2009, 10; Shuger 1988, 205–06.
[198] Healy, 185.

such as metaphor, and the language is more direct, plain and unembellished. In the description of the Son in Book III:

> Beyond compare the Son of God was seen
> Most glorious, in him all his Father shone
> Substantially express'd, and in his face
> Divine compassion visibly appear'd ….
>
> (*PL* III.138–41)

The description of the Son is marked by symbolic light, which carries biblical associations with the Creation and also the Word. It implies not only poetic creation but also an unadorned purity and a directness that is much like the direct oratory that is generally a feature of Book III. With the emphasis on 'qualities' or (that is) the condition or consistency of the subject matter (i.e. bathed in light), with reference to aspects of sensory affects that place the figure in a material setting, the lightness of the image of the pre-Incarnate Son is precisely determined by the equally light sensory detail used to describe him. The description thus creates a sense of presence without a full embodiment that would otherwise materially weight it too closely with associations of the fallen world. There are none of the 'brazen' effects associated with Pandemonium, nor the enamelled staginess of Paradise. The opposition of the Son and Satan in *Paradise Lost* is the difference between 'image' and 'idol', the 'eikon and eidolon of heroic virtue' according to Steadman, and it is a distinction carried through in the figures of *Paradise Lost*. The Son is the 'image of the father's glory'; Satan in his 'Sun-bright Chariot' is by contrast the 'false appearance or phantasm of that image', the 'Idol of Majesty divine' (VI.100–01).[199] Yet what is most essential for the terms of this thesis is its production of intensities relating to refined sensory experience associated with luminosity and in turn sublimity.

In *Paradise Lost*, the descriptions of God and the Son draw on the poem's important symbolism of light and lightness with their biblical associations with the Creation and language, where an association is also made between lightness and height.[200] Yet they have a kind of weight and force equal to their celestial qualities. Milton's description of the Son blends corporeal and concrete references to the body

[199] Steadman, 1959 98–99; Steadman, 1968, 123–136.
[200] Quint 2010, 229. Light and dark are integral aspects of classical epic, and in *Paradise Lost* the notion of light is essential to its thematic concerns and underlies discriminations of poetic figure.

and feeling ('expression', 'face', 'compassion'). Milton's description of God carries the same symbolic associations with light and relies on a lighter sense of corporeal embodiment with the focus on his 'eye', 'seat' and direct language that reflects a sense of power through its appeal to the rhetorical principle of amplitude or magnitude:

> Now had th' Almighty Father from above,
> From the pure Empyrean where he sits
> High Thron'd above all highth, bent down his eye,
> His own works and their works at once to view:
> About him all the Sanctities of Heaven
> Stood thick as Stars, and from his sight receiv'd
> Beatitude past utterance ….
>
> (*PL* III.56–62)

Such description is to be compared to the 'weight' of Satan's wings and tackle in Book II associated with his fallenness, and to his transformation into a serpent by God in Book X.514, which then accords him a weightlessness associated with loss of being, with his speech and expression reduced to a 'hiss' (X.1034–39). The approach can also be applied to the figural description of Milton's angels, including with reference to their flexible limbs, light bodies and their synaesthetic senses. God's apprehension by the reader also depends on the elusive quality of *enargeia* determined by the dynamic relationship between illusion and absence, and hence the techniques of artifice which underlie Milton's efforts to distinguish true from false religious poetry. He is not completely visually described; as Webb notes of classical rhetoric, the invisible can give an historical and spiritual significance to the image.[201] Yet the intensities are evoked by effects on the senses, that give also a sense of presence to the figure. The spatial detail indicated by the words 'above', 'highth' and 'works at once to view' provides a sense of limitless scale which draws on and challenges the reader's sense of orientation in space or proprioception, to create an effect of scale or magnitude attributable to the sublime. But the language is direct, without emphasising distortion, as in the descriptions of scale associated with Pandemonium.

Adapting techniques of ekphrasis to his biblical allegory, Milton's poetic expression of both sacred matters and the world of lived experience relies less on 'visual representation' according to modern understandings and more on the affective

[201] Webb 2009, 191–92.

dimensions of language with its access both to the faculties of the fallen body and the supersensible capacity of the ‘inner sense’ that is necessary for apprehension of the sacred. In *Paradise Lost*, with its integrated monistic model of the body, mind and soul, the poetic expression of both the sacred and the fallen world depend on degrees of concrete figuration of bodily experience, including sensory effects of spatiality, movement and energy, applying techniques of a poetics of fallen language. In turn, according to Milton’s monistic theology, apprehension of each depends on the agency and volition of the reader, themes further explored in the next chapter.

Chapter Four: Ethos, Pathos, Logos

1. 'What hinders then?'

> What fear I then, rather what know to fear
> Under this ignorance of Good and Evil,
> Of God or Death, of Law or Penalty?
> Here grows the Cure of all, this Fruit Divine,
> Fair to the Eye, inviting to the Taste,
> Of virtue to make wise: what hinders then
> To reach, and feed at once both Body and Mind?
>
> (*PL* IX.773–79)

In *Paradise Lost* the passions, desires and affections are embodied states that are integral to its modes of expression and influence the shape of the soul — its material, moral and spiritual condition — delineating the subject's relationship to the providential order.[1] Traditions of early Christian and later Calvinist theology, influenced by the Stoic tradition, align the unperturbed state of the soul with resignation to the will of God, or the logos.[2] It is a notion that requires the soul to be unfettered by the distracting power of external influences. In the providential design of *Paradise Lost,* a state of temperate emotions indicates religious obedience according to Milton's Protestant ethos.[3]

Yet traditions of rhetoric and poetry, as tools of fallen expression, affect the will and experience of the subject, highlighting a Stoic objection to the potential negative effects of eloquence.[4] Beguiled by Satan's rhetoric, Eve is thus prompted to question the consequences of tasting the fruit, a phenomenon that causes perturbations of her mind and disturbs its essential tranquillity.[5] Eve's questioning is an expression of human will, which in *Paradise Lost* is permitted a freedom that is compatible with the order of Providence. Moreover, the modes of rhetoric and poetics are equally essential for engaging the self-fashioning agency of the subject. Yet although Eve's words are

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[1] D. Robinson (1997) 2004; Schoenfeldt 1999, 7.
[2] D. Robinson (1997) 2004. The influence of the Stoics is said to be evident in the writings of St Paul, amongst others.
[3] See also the temptations of Christ in *PR* and esp. IV 560–1.
[4] The influence of the Stoics on traditions of rhetoric resulted in styles which generally object to strong visual or emotional speech and figural techniques.
[5] In this chapter, the term 'tranquillity' is applied more broadly than understandings of the Stoic model that sometimes associate it with passionless states. Debates about the term's meaning are integral to debates about the (im)passibility of God: Scrutton, 170–71.

framed by reasoned argument, she is in thrall to the fruit, her reason overborne by misdirected passions and desires, which leads to her error and self-justifying delusion, made explicit in the rhetorical assertion: 'what hinders then …?'[6]

In the monistic, Arminian world of *Paradise Lost*, the passions are rudimentary to Milton's model of selfhood and its relation to the vital body represented by the angelic figure.[7] Critics differ on Milton's approach to the emotions in his works, from Schoenfeldt's argument that they reflect a fundamental instability of literary treatment of the passions in the early modern period, Steadman's view that Milton's treatment is predominantly Aristotelian, to Fish's largely Stoic subordination of such values associated with lived experience to the theological doctrine of religious obedience.[8] This chapter considers the integral role of the emotions in *Paradise Lost* for their engagement of intensities and intermediary states as a basis for Milton's eudaimonistic model of agency and potentiality.

Examining Milton's poetic styles and techniques for their evocation of poetic affects, I also consider the extent to which Milton captures in his poetry an interaction that William Bouwsma finds integral to Renaissance thought: between the claims of the Stoics to *apatheia* or 'tranquillity' and the Augustinian emphasis on the heart and will.[9] The Stoic and Augustinian approaches to the passions and the will are reflected in their respective techniques of rhetoric and poetics.[10] While the traditions of Stoic *apatheia* reveal differing understandings of the term — from full eradication of (or 'indifference' to) the passions in order to remove their potential enslaving power, to their refinement against negative emotions —, in the argument of this thesis, Milton's approach departs from the more rigorous approaches of Stoic *apatheia* with their pronounced fatalism.[11] Although temperance is the precondition for physical and moral equilibrium, the passions and affections are also associated with experiencing higher states of feeling and understanding. Milton's poetry thus makes a case for the expression of strong

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[6] Lerer (1999) 2007, 'Book 9 - The Fall' identifies how Eve's comfort is dislodged by the presentation by Satan of a choice to her through the techniques of rhetoric.
[7] Kerrigan 1983, 243; Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*, Book 9'.
[8] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46; Steadman 1985, 83; Steadman 1959, 95–97; Fish 2001, 14.
[9] Schoenfeldt 2004, 46; Steadman 1985, 83; Bouwsma, 20.
[10] Both Augustine and Cicero develop rhetorical models which tend to conflict with the determinism of Stoicism. Graver xi–xxxv; Hathaway x.
[11] Bouwsma, 20 takes a view of Stoicism that emphasises the indifference to the passions; Irvine, Ch. 3 takes a view of Stoicism based on the elimination of only negative emotions. While Seneca's writings appear to be more reticent, Marcus Aurelius refers favourably to the control of the passions and the simultaneous expression of the affections. Seneca, 1917–25; Aurelius, Book 1; Graver xi–xxxv.

feelings toward the divine according to the Augustinian/Longinian tradition. Moreover, he departs from the indifferent model of Stoic cosmology associated with the Latin heritage.

Instead, *Paradise Lost* recognises a material role for the passions, desires and affections in shaping the quality of the will and the heart and in turn the agency of the subject. This role draws on the techniques of poetry to accord with Milton's monism and its accompanying Arminianism. Underlying both is his Augustinian emphasis on the Incarnation, as exemplified by the body of Christ, on the material and spiritual life of the subject.[12] The various techniques discussed in this chapter operate at different levels of the text: while the intricacies of poetic style function at the level of figure, the principles of Aristotelian catharsis function according to higher patterns within the epic.[13]

The next section of this chapter explores the role of literary 'example' in *Paradise Lost* as an engaged process that draws on the embodied faculties, rather than merely on detached reflection of abstract principles.[14] Section 3 explores the importance of passionate expression for refinement of the moral and spiritual condition of the subject, while section 4 considers the complementary role of Aristotelian catharsis. Section 5 considers the role of the passions in bringing about knowledge and understanding of the divine. Finally, section 6 applies the various principles under discussion to a central ekphrastic figure depicting Adam and Eve in Paradise, applying a modern aesthetic model by Richard Wollheim that draws on the shaping power of emotional expression.

2. A Poetry of 'Intanglement'[15]

> So gloz'd the Tempter, and his Proem tun'd;
> Into the Heart of *Eve* his words made way,
> Though at the voice much marvelling ….
>
> (*PL* IX.549–51)

[12] Bouwsma 19–64; Irvine, Ch 6. *PL* XII.582–87.
[13] Aristotle, 1961.
[14] Mikics, 152.
[15] Fish (1967) 1997, 1. Lewis, 65–71.

In Book IX, the 'tuning' of Satan's proem into Eve's heart is an essential element of her beguilement and Fall. In a technique of 'mirroring' oppositions that is typical in *Paradise Lost*, it is a negative form of the 'intangling' power of literature that is otherwise invoked in the text for the moral improvement of the subject.[16] The notion of 'intangling' is most closely associated with Fish's reading, which places the reader at the centre of the narrative unfolding of the biblical Fall, as its true subject.[17] The purpose of *Paradise Lost*, according to Fish, is to recreate the drama of the Fall in the mind of the reader, and his approach tends to favour the Stoic philosophy of the passions, will and techniques of rhetoric.[18] While the epic drama engages the fallen condition of the reader's faculties and especially the fallen faculty of the will through the limitations of fallen language, the engagement is ultimately directed, in Fish's reading, towards closure of the text around the theological principle of Augustinian obedience.[19] Lucy Newlyn also emphasises the importance of reader 'entanglement' in *Paradise Lost*, with a contrary argument that values the experience of the fallen world to the imagination and interiority of the Miltonic reader.[20] While Fish's approach invokes a 'closed' reading consistent with his earliest reader-response model, Newlyn favours a more 'open' reading, yet they both draw on the preoccupations with linguistic uncertainty that underlie modern hermeneutics.[21] My thesis extends Fish's notion of 'intangling' to encompass the central role of poetic affectivity, the power of Milton's epic poetry to touch and move audiences, which is accorded a value as an integral structural dimension of the text through the reading process and is essential to the underlying themes of *Paradise Lost*.[22]

The development of interrelated Renaissance rhetorical and poetic traditions is intertwined with discourses of the passions and affections, which shape their styles of expression. The pedagogical role of Renaissance poetry depends on the interaction of the three kinds of persuasion — ethos (the character of the speaker/auditor), pathos (the effects on the body and emotions) and logos (the argument of reason) — derived from Aristotelian theory. While modern theory tends to favour 'logos' as an expression of the power of reason which in Thomist theology is associated with the will of God, it is the

[16] See Safer, 55.
[17] Fish (1967) 1997, 1–2; See also Newlyn, 68–69.
[18] Fish (1967) 1997, 26.
[19] Fish 2001, 14–15, 53; Lewis, 69.
[20] Newlyn, 68–69.
[21] Newlyn, 5, 10.
[22] Fish (1967) 1997, 1; Fish 2001, 14–15.

interaction of the modes of ethos and pathos and their effects on techniques of style and figures of speech that are of concern to this chapter. An examination of the role of the emotions and feelings engaged by a performative reading illuminates their transformative power for the self-fashioning subject, which is the basis of the distinction between the Stoic and Augustinian reading of the emotions in *Paradise Lost*. While the former often depends on avoidance of the effects of the emotions, the latter draws on a process of their active engagement, although both do so for the moral and spiritual improvement of the subject. Because they engage the embodied faculties and experience of the subject, rather than just the intellect, of particular interest is how emotions involve ascribing a value to the volition of the subject for interrelated purposes of creative expression and self-fashioning. Deriving from modes of expression and experience of the embodied agency of both speaker and auditor, the emotions are central to questions of will and Providence in both classical and Renaissance contexts.[23]

Critical readings of *Paradise Lost* often emphasise constraints on style and correspondingly on the expression of imaginative and bodily energies. These readings characterise Milton's poetic style as one hampered by a moral conservatism that, through a close relationship between style and psychology, impedes the more abundant Renaissance imagination.[24] Restraints are recorded in Milton's techniques of rhetoric and poetry, which are often considered to reflect an integral opposition between the claims of ethos, or the exercise of temperate emotions which is conducive to the expression of moral clarity according to principles objectively discernible, in preference to the claims of pathos, or the expression and experience of passionate and bodily energy.[25] This chapter rejects that binarism, and considers the extent to which the claims of ethos and pathos are not simply opposed but interdependent in Milton's poetry, articulating a relationship in which the moral shaping of the subject does not necessarily arise at the expense of the expression of emotional energy.[26] The claims of pathos, with its engagement of the imagination and experience of the subject, are integral to reader 'intangling' in the poetry of *Paradise Lost*. In the terms of my thesis, when *Paradise Lost* is considered according to an experience-based, performative model of literary affect, the values ascribed to the intensities of engagement in transitionary states become evident for their own sake, and depend on the necessary engagement of the

[23] Seneca 1917–25 v II–III; Mendelson 2016; Graver xi–xxxv; Shuger, 1988, 3–13.
[24] Gilman, 151; Tayler 1979, 41; Blake 1790–93; Fish (1967) 1997, 22–37, 107–30.
[25] Lewalski 1985, 15–16; Campana, 33.
[26] Kerrigan 1983, 216, 234; Mikics, 35; Campana, 33.

expressive potential of poetic language. Such an approach captures the way emotional energies are channelled into personal virtue and creative form, shaping and redefining the styles of creative, moral and spiritual expression according to Milton's underlying Protestant humanist subject.[27] Milton therefore applies poetic figure for the purpose of engaging, through example, the active, embodied experience of the auditor according to his ontological model, rather than just as a passive process of intellectual abstraction. That engagement is in turn important for the understanding and experience of the sacred in *Paradise Lost*. Depending on the quality of the auditor's will, that process of moral agency can purge or damn the subject.

The eudaimonistic model that underlies the ontology of the subject in *Paradise Lost* and its modes of expression involves a valuation of the positive potential of the passions and affections. For Milton, the passions and desires are essential to virtue; in *Areopagitica*, he considers whether the passions and pleasures 'rightly tempered are the very ingredients of virtue', echoing both Sidney and Bacon on the positive role of the passions for the moral good of the subject.[28] Renaissance poetic and rhetorical principles develop in line with classically-derived eudaimonistic ethics, which underlie the model of the humanist subject and its modes of expression. In this theory, well-being (*eudaimonia* or 'flourishing') is the highest aim of moral thought and conduct and the virtues (*aretē* or 'excellence') are the requisite skills and dispositions needed to attain it.[29] Modes of expression such as music and linguistic eloquence are forms of excellence and therefore virtues integral to humanist ontologies. Moreover, Aristotelian *eudaimonia* is not merely a concept but also a 'state of functioning' which is synchronic (reflecting present experience) and diachronic (reflecting intermediary states of potentiality or 'becomings') which I argue ensures that the temporalities and intermediary states associated with the expression of such virtues are essential.[30] Moderation ('tempering') of the passions is broadly comparable to Stoic tranquillity and is associated with moral virtue and good judgment, physical and mental balance and well-being. Yet it is also a precondition for attaining refined emotional states that are associated with higher states of the soul — entailing higher knowledge and the apprehension of the sacred.[31] In *Paradise Lost*, *eudaimonia* underpins Milton's

[27] Vickers 1998; Bouwsma 19–61; Shuger 1988, 194, 227; Steadman 1985, 27; Widmer 258.
[28] *AP*: CP 733.
[29] Aristotle, *NE*: Aristotle 1953, Books II and III; Frede 2016; Kraut 2017.
[30] Aristotle *NE*: 1953, Book II; Kraut 2017; Ulreich, 71; Fergusson 1961, 2–42.
[31] Aristotle *NE*: 1953, Book II.

principles of Protestant virtue, 'vital virtue' and the form of the angelic body that are integral to its ontologies of the subject and its forms of expression.

Despite the potential in neoclassical and Protestant philosophy for the passions to unseat the reason, Renaissance understandings of moral virtue tie them positively to the passions. In these traditions, they are considered to be integral components of the virtuous life in both its active and contemplative forms, a division that is referred to in *Paradise Lost* as essential for the 'Paradise within' ('contemplative') and the ingredients of charity ('active').[32] The passions and affections are expressions of the energy and quality of the heart; the body and emotions are created by God and essential to human dignity: emotional expression is linked to truth, virtue and religious love.[33]

The positive valuation of the passions and their expression is associated with the Augustinian tradition, particularly through its alignment with Longinian rhetoric. While both Stoic and Augustinian thought consider the passions to be integrated with concepts of moral virtue or *eudaimonia*, the Augustinian emphasis on the effects of Original Sin and the fallen will, with its equally important notion of the affections as expressions of the strength and quality of the heart, make the passions and the will integral to the emphasis on interiority and the 'inner light', by which religious subjects work through their faith. Pure reason is considered insufficient for this process, since it also depends on the interaction of the passions and the will: for Augustine, the 'will is on equal footing with the rational powers of discernment'.[34] In Renaissance knowledge theory, the passions and affections are integral to the exercise of the will, the making of moral judgments and the expression of virtue; Burton's model of the soul includes the separate faculty of the will upon which the passions and affections operate toward the moral good.[35]

Milton's writing suggests that he is averse to certain aspects of Stoic tradition that are incompatible with the independent will, following Augustine against the Stoics' view of the passions as 'pernicious'.[36] The Renaissance Augustinian tradition accords a positive role for the passions, distinguishing between lower, involuntary passions associated with the animal body ('*anima*') and therefore not in accord with the will, and

[32] The distinction is referred to in *PL* XII.582–87; Steadman 1959, 236–38; Bouwsma 19–61.
[33] Bouwsma, 47; Shuger 1988, 227.
[34] Mendelson, 2016.
[35] R. Burton I.I.II.1; Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.
[36] *AP*. CP 733.

higher, rightly directed affections associated with reason and the will.[37] Such a distinction is made from the classical period onwards, between the passions, which include the intemperate and negative or sinful emotions, and the affections, which tend to refer to the refined emotions, a distinction to which Milton refers in his prose works.[38] For Milton, the loss of self-government through a will overborne by passions leads to enslavement, a principle which is also traceable to the Stoics and derives from the classical Socratic tradition's emphasis on reason and self-control. Loss of self-government results in the self-justificatory postlapsarian delusions of Satan, Adam and Eve that manifest in errors of judgment and sin; 'self-enthralment' can lead to external loss of liberty and to tyrannical forms of monarchy (*PL* IX.90–95).[39] These 'lower order' passions are associated with the surface-effect of figure in poetry and the 'rind' of the body.[40] Yet engagement of the embodied faculties is essential for Milton's autonomous self-fashioning subject. Refined emotional states by contrast are associated with the expression and apprehension or experience of the sacred.[41] In the Augustinian tradition, the ascent of the subject on a ladder to spiritual truth thus transcends reason and depends on the expression of refined emotion or love as the basis of religious faith.[42]

The development of Renaissance humanist rhetorical and poetic traditions, concerned as they are with affecting the will and the experience of the subject, is intertwined with the relationship between moral virtue and the expression of the passions. Techniques of classical rhetoric emerge from the principles of dialectic and the corresponding exercise of reason in classical political and philosophical debates, processes which are based not only on intellectual but often also on moral choice and

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[37] Scrutton, 170–71, 173.

[38] The distinction is not always applied strictly but is evident in the works of Marcus Aurelius (Book I), Augustine (e.g. *DCD* VIII.17) Thomas Aquinas (*ST* 1a2ae.22, 3.) and Milton, amongst others. See for example Milton's Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government* where he refers to the 'tuning' of 'the affections': CP 671. A further theoretical distinction is made in the Renaissance between 'calm' and 'vehement' passions: See Essary 2017b.

[39] See also God's speech in Book III in which he refers to the self-enthralment of humans (III.125). Moderation of the passions is essential for 'true liberty' under Milton's model of rational self-government. See Abdiel's rebuke of Satan in Book V 809*ff* and also Michael's discussion of 'rational liberty' in the final Book 12 79*ff*.

[40] See *Comus* 663–65; CP 105.

[41] A further distinction is made from the classical period between calm and violent passions, attributed to the distinction between Achilles and Aeneas. Essary 2017b, 5–6; Rummel 2017; Mendelson 2016; Bouwsma 19–61.

[42] Shuger 1988, 193–240; Martin, 7.

agency.[43] Yet language is a fallen medium and the potential for negative effects on the auditor is evident in the dislodging of Eve by Satan's rhetoric from her comfortable state of obedience. With a view to this heritage, Francis Bacon recognises the importance of enlisting and directing the affections in the moral process through the vehicle of rhetoric when he states that

> the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. … reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth.[44]

Renaissance theory is indebted to Aristotelian poetics in its teaching by example. Yet in the case of Sidney and more particularly of Spenser and Milton, 'exemplum' involves an engaged process, that (at least for Spenser and Milton) is not just an intellectual exercise in the engagement of abstract principles but envisages the active role of the passions in shaping the moral subject.[45] With clear indebtedness to Aristotelian theory, Sidney's *Apology* attributes a function of poetry to the attainment of ethical self-knowledge, defending poetry by showing that it can bring about

> knowledge of a man's self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end of welldoing and not of well-knowing only.[46]

Poetry provides a basis for ethical self-invention; in a competition between philosophy, history and poetry, poetry offers both 'the philosopher's "precept"' and 'the historian's "example"' in 'the poet's "perfect picture"'.[47] Yet it is not merely concerned with articulating an abstract, theoretical example that appeals to the intellect, but with engaging the subject in a process of ethical self-development through the experience of poet and reader. Despite critical emphases on the intellectual basis of Sidney's poetic theory in the *Apology* — its apparent leaning toward applying figural imagery for the illustration of an idea rather than the expression of bodily feeling —, Sidney's purpose

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[43] See for example God's emphasis on choice in Book III.108 that repeats principles from *Areopagitica*. Vickers 1998; D. Robinson (1997) 2004.
[44] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.2–4; Shuger 1988, 194.
[45] Campana, 33.
[46] Sidney 2007, 139–40.
[47] Sidney 2007, 142–3; M. Mack, 138. The ideas echo principles outlined by Aristotle in the *Poetics* (see Shields 2016; Aristotle 1961, 1451a 38–1451b 10).

for poetry is similar to Bacon's purpose for rhetoric: for the poet to 'move' his reader 'to take … goodness in hand' and to 'make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved':[48]

> To be moved to do [the good] which we know, or to be moved with desire to know, *hoc opus, hic labor est*.[49]

Although the importance of an emotional component in Sidney's philosophy of active virtue and self-knowledge is tempered by the polemical status of the *Apology* as a response to Puritan moral and religious objections to literature, there is a clear emphasis on the enlisting of the affections of the embodied subject for morally regenerative purposes.[50] Moreover, in Sidney's poetics as articulated in the *Apology*, this process of moral transformation is also spiritually regenerative, since 'true' poetry is a vehicle for the operation of Grace.[51]

Sidney's emphasis on the moral purpose of poetry in ethical development resembles applications of the self-actualising role of ethical assessment in modern emotions theory, with its comparable debts to classical *eudaimonia*.[52] The relationship between the expression of the passions in the moral shaping of the subject through the techniques of poetry is reflected in a commonplace of Renaissance literary theory: the triple aim of poetry is to 'teach, delight and move' an audience to virtuous action.[53] Meeting Puritan and Platonic objections that arise over the close relationship understood to exist between the imagination and the passions and affections in the Renaissance, this view of poetic affect, or the ability of poetry to touch and move audiences, is made an important component of poetry's ability to transform understanding and central to its didactic purpose.[54]

Although Renaissance theory accords poetry a moral role in the better movement of the will and influence over the moral habits of the subject, its techniques are more than the rhetorical tools of 'instruction and persuasion'. The Renaissance critical model, according to Tuve, is based on 'illumination and feeling', in a world

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[48] Sidney 2007, 139; M. Mack, 36–37.
[49] Sidney 2007, 145.
[50] Gosson 1579 (2000); Sidney, 132–34.
[51] M. Mack, 126–27; Sidney 2007, 139.
[52] Calhoun and Solomon 3; Nussbaum 2001, 19.
[53] Steadman 1985, 15–17.
[54] Gosson 1579 (2000); Craik and Pollard, 19.

which lacks the 'sharper contemporary distinction between thought and feeling'.[55] Poetry also articulates the sensory and emotional contours of experience.[56] Ideally, the reader 'learns' and 'feels', is 'moved to understanding and to action'.[57] This blending of thought and feeling through the imagination that occurs through the integration of the faculties according to the experience-based model of knowledge is the basis of a more embodied, poetic model in the Renaissance.[58] Milton recognises the distinguishing features of poetry and rhetoric in his prose works, identifying poetry's 'simple' effects on the senses and passions.[59] In *Paradise Lost*, he equally distinguishes the rhetorical manipulation of the emotions and poetic beguilement of the senses and imagination from the effects of true poetry.[60]

The close relationship between the imagination, reason and the passions is reflected in Renaissance knowledge theory and faculty psychology. In Burton's *Anatomy* the key terms are explained dynamically through the interaction of the various 'faculties of the soul', describing its basis in the experience of the subject.[61] In this theory, outlined by Debora Shuger, ideally the imagination 'presents its "pictures" to reason', which, 'after having passed judgment, sends them to the will', which in turn, 'arouses appetite in accordance with reason'. But sometimes the subject 'acts instinctively and rationally to the same object', and 'reason gets there too late' so 'the phantasms are sent straight to the appetite'.[62] In *Paradise Lost*, this potential is an important aspect of the Fall of Eve, who is said to act with 'rash hand' as she plucks the fruit; the hurried syntax of the line ('Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd': *PL* IX.781) emphasises her succumbing to appetite without thinking, usually characterised as the sin of greed or gluttony.[63]

While Aristotelian ethics associate emotions conceptually with the exercise of reason, coupled with a desire, in Shuger's study of Renaissance religious discourse, the affections are necessary for the proper apprehension and understanding of the sacred.[64].

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[55] Tuve 1947, 183.
[56] Shuger 1988, 228; Tuve 1947, 399.
[57] Hazard, 20.
[58] R. Burton I.I.II.5; Schoenfeldt 1999, 8; Tuve 1947, 183.
[59] Milton *Of Education*: CP 636–37; Steadman 1985, 10.
[60] *PR* iv. 347; Kermode (1960) 1963, 92–93.
[61] Both experience-based and instruction-based knowledge models are recognised in the Renaissance and reflected in *Paradise Lost*, where they are seen in the lessons of Michael and Gabriel.
[62] Shuger 1988, 207; R. Burton, I.I.II.5.
[63] *PL* IX.780–81; also 'Greedily she ingorg'd without restraint': *PL* IX.791.
[64] Calhoun and Solomon 3; Campana, 37; Derrin, 21; Shuger 1988, 227.

In Renaissance theory, the passions and affections can produce a desire for the 'excellent object', a process also alluded to by Bacon in the quote above.[65] The imagination acts directly upon both the understanding and the will; on the latter 'to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object'.[66] This dynamic, integrative process involving the faculties of reason, will and affections is necessary for spiritual self-development because it can create the apprehension of God by making the abstract (God) concretely present to (that is, felt by) the imagination.[67] Once the sacred object is made visible to the imagination, it can 'move great affection', an idea also found in Bacon's writings, where he compares the effects with the Platonic theory of Forms.[68] The quality of desire is a reflection of both conscious and unconscious forces and depends on the faculty of the will.[69] In the literary field, poetry and rhetoric act on the will and the experience of the subject, and their effects are determined by the quality of the insight that they express, an essential dimension of the rhetoric of *Paradise Lost*, evident in the contrast between the false rhetoric of Satan and the pure rhetoric of God.[70]

Milton's Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government* suggests that poetry can be a vehicle not only for moral development but also for spiritual regeneration, and it is in part through a moral appraisal process that such a transformation occurs. There Milton elaborates the ethical value of poetry in terms which resemble Sidney's positive role of the passions in moral development.[71] Yet poetry can also 'tune' the affections and the soul, a Neoplatonic notion that produces qualities that are appropriate for religious devotion:

> to allay the perturbations of the mind and set the affections in right tune, to celebrate in glorious and lofty hymns the throne and equipage of God's almightiness ....[72]

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[65] Shuger 1988, 199, 205–10. The 'excellent object' includes concepts of the sacred not visible to the physical eye.
[66] Shuger 1988, 207.
[67] Shuger 1988, 205–10.
[68] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.3; Krieger 1992, 21.
[69] Shuger 1988, 195, 206.
[70] Shuger 1988, 193–240. See the speeches of Satan in Book IX and the speeches of God in Book III. See also Fish (1967) 1997, 59.
[71] Sidney 2007, 137–8.
[72] CP 669.

Milton also finds in poetry a means of smoothing out the variability of inner and outer experience by example:

> Lastly, whatsoever in religion is holy and sublime, in virtue amiable or grave, whatsoever hath passion or admiration in all the changes of that which is called fortune from without, or the wily subtleties and refluxes of man's thoughts from within, all these things with a solid and treatable smoothness to paint out and describe.[73]

The variability of 'fortune from without' refers to the vicissitudes of the external world of experience. The 'subtleties and refluxes' of 'thoughts from within' suggest the inner flow and turmoil of thoughts and experiences seen as a kind of aberration requiring smoothing. The purpose of poetry, as a form of 'elegantly dressed' humanist eloquence, is to smooth out the 'rugged and difficult' world and the inner experience of the subject by good example 'with a solid and treatable smoothness to paint out and describe'.[74] Poetry for Milton can be a vehicle for emotional moderation and expression, channelling the energies both to creative expression and to moral development, which are key to its spiritual regeneration of the Protestant subject, through their role in the refinement ('tuning') of the affections. In turn, moderate emotions (or tranquillity) are a precondition for the tuning of the affections associated with elevation to knowledge of the sacred, and the experience of heightened feelings associated with the Christian sublime.[75]

Protestant poets Sidney and Milton are less idealistic than some of their Renaissance Neoplatonic precursors, and largely Augustinian in their understanding of the recalcitrance of fallen human nature. For Sidney, the 'infected will' is an effect of Original Sin which results in a formidable task of moving the reader's will toward the good, and keeps them from reaching the 'perfection' that their 'erected wit' can apprehend.[76] Even so, in Sidney's philosophy, envisaging the power to 'erect' the 'wit' of the reader and reveal the 'infected' state of the 'will', the poet can prepare the way for the action of Grace.[77] In a number of respects, Milton's approach draws from the Stoic tradition, especially its understanding of the potential enslaving power of the

[73] CP 670.
[74] CP 670; Steadman 1985, 83.
[75] CP 549n, 668–69.
[76] Sidney 2007 139; M. Mack, 126–7.
[77] Sidney 2007, 139; M. Mack, 126–7.

passions and desires, and its practice of testing the subject to improve moral habit, a practice that originally derives from Aristotelian ethics.[78] Yet the Aristotelian approach is to be contrasted with the more rigorous practices associated with Stoic *apatheia*, influential amongst some of the English Revolutionary Puritans.

The approach used by Milton involves the use of literary example to engage the agency of the reader, a rhetorical technique indebted to the Stoics.[79] It is upon this process that moral self-development depends. The Protestant identification of the human will with fallen Satan amplifies the difficulty of the voluntary process of regeneration, a characteristic element of Milton's adaptation of poetic and rhetorical techniques like ekphrasis to engage the experience of the reader (and poet) in Satan's fallen point of view.[80] It is made more effective by Milton's introduction of a dynamic process of introspective moral choice to the reading of *Paradise Lost*. Here Milton follows Spenser, whom he calls in *Areopagitica* a 'better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas'.[81] In *Areopagitica,* Milton emphasises his refusal to endorse 'a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary', a principle that he raises against the licensing of books.[82] In his discussion of the virtues of a person who can 'apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures' and distinguish 'that which is truly better', he refers directly to the episode of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, in which the character Guyon comes 'with his palmer through the cave of Mammon and the bower of earthly bliss, that he might see and know, and yet abstain'.[83] The principle of abstention, along with the notion of testing, is integral to traditions of Stoicism. Eve's temptation reflects this process of personal responsibility in choosing ('What hinders then?') yet suggests that the choice is not just a matter of the intellect but an experience of the monistic model of selfhood that is centrally figured in *Paradise Lost*. At times the process suggests an agonistic emphasis on the embodied faculties, and at other times an emphasis on the refining powers of the intellect.[84]

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[78] Aristotle *NE* 1953, 8, 29.
[79] Pearcy, 261; Stroud, 250; Webb 2009, 185.
[80] This is implicit in Satan's exclamation of 'Oh how fall'n!' in the first book, addressing Beelzebub with the biblical allusion to Isaiah 14:11–15: *PL* I.84.
[81] *AP*: CP 728–29.
[82] *AP*: CP 728.
[83] *AP*: CP 728–29.
[84] Examples from the lessons of Raphael and Michael include respectively *PL* VIII.589–93 and the visions and lessons of Books XI and XII.

The immediate and transitionary states associated with *eudaimonia* are integral not only to moral shaping in *Paradise Lost* but to how Milton draws on the embodied faculties in ways that reflect both the fallen state and the regenerative potential of the human subject. Milton's poetic style is bound up with his monistic model of body, mind and soul, and his figures in Paradise evoke through concrete sensory and bodily references ('taste', 'eye', 'feed') with their evocation of temporal immediacies and intensities, the vital body at the centre of the epic.[85] The relationship between the passions and Renaissance Christian virtue ethics is associated with the concrete expression of feelings; the quality of the will depends on the higher faculties of the soul with their emphasis on the intellect and refined feeling. Eve's ironic claim of the fruit, 'of virtue to make wise', echoes Milton's lines of *Areopagitica*, that identify the Fall with the attainment of the knowledge of good and evil through the experience of Original Sin.[86] It is an aspect of the breaking of the 'rind'; rather than reflecting purely abstract principles, the basis of Original Sin in embodied experience reflects the importance of the material body to the moral and spiritual state of the subject.[87]

In *Paradise Lost*, poetry can facilitate the moral transformation necessary for spiritual regeneration, using 'right reason' not just by a detached reader appraisal but through the somatic and psychological experience of the affections and passions as they unfold in the reader's narrative time. Such an experience is also key to Milton's distinction between divinely-inspired and fallen powers of creativity, and involves a refining and channelling of the passions into poetic expression, which is shaped according to Milton's notion of vitalism or 'vital virtue'. The remaining parts of this chapter examine how Milton's expression of the passions and affections in his poetic theory in *Paradise Lost* reflects these principles and underlies its figures. The active engagement of the auditor depends on the temporalities of experience as a means of attaining both tranquillity and moral virtue, and involves not just the imposition of 'right reason' through the intellect but a process that is dynamically integrated in body, mind and soul. The experience is essential to the apprehension of the sacred that is facilitated by moderate emotions, which in turn enables the experience of refined

[85] Ricks, 108.
[86] See *AP*: 'It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world.' CP 728.
[87] *AP*: CP 728; *DDC* I.7: CP 980.

feeling, according to the closer relationship between thought, imagination and feeling recognised in Renaissance poetic theory.

3. Pathos and Expressivity

> Me miserable! which way shall I fly
> Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?
> Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell;
> And in the lowest deep a lower deep
> Still threat'ning to devour me opens wide,
> To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n.
>
> (*PL* IV.73–78)

Satan's soliloquy in Book IV of *Paradise Lost* is a powerful expression of intemperate passions and the effects they have on the physical, spiritual and moral state of the subject. Satan dwells in a state of perdition without the gift of Grace; a self-created Hell that is not unlike that of Christopher Marlowe's Faustus, a reflection of his inner and outer experience.[88] Satan's demeanour is an expression of misdirected will and reflects Milton's model of religious obedience in *Paradise Lost*, in which the complex relationship between Providence and free will depends on the exercise of choice unfettered by the effects of external forces on the passions and desires.[89] Satan's state of mind and body, which is neither moderate nor apathetic, reflects a departure from nature and thereby the divine; it is to be distinguished from the 'Paradise within' of Michael's instruction to Adam.[90] What is essential to the speech is its engagement of the emotional state of the speaker through the intensities of present experience; its unfolding captures the vital expression of embodied passions and their intermediary states or 'becomings', both of which are integral to pathos and reader engagement.

Much of the intensity of the lines arises from their capturing of the marked divergence between the expression of Satan's will and the will of God. His soliloquy is comparable to the principal soliloquy of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, in which a similarly intemperate emotional state is expressed.[91] Hamlet addresses an integral principle of

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[88] Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*: Marlowe (1604) 2009; Marlowe (1616) 2013.
[89] The exercise of choice occurs according to the dictates of reason in Calvinist theology. In *Paradise Lost* it is an expression of the will of the subject. The complexities are explained by God in PL III.99.
[90] PL XII.587.
[91] Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 3.1.1.

Stoic virtue, its fatalism, associated with accepting the dictates of fortune ('whether 'tis nobler in the mind').[92] Introspective questioning of personal virtue and the power of the subject to alter his fate, involving perturbations of the mind set against the forces of Providence, looms large in both soliloquies. It is a reflection of debates about Calvinist choice, interiority and predestination, essential dynamics of Reformation and seventeenth-century Protestantism.[93] The intensities produced by expression of interior states of the mind in the experience of the immediate and temporal enlivens the model of the subject in both works, revealing the complexities associated with expression of the will.[94] Yet in the emotional timbre of their expression, both Satan and Hamlet are affected by a melancholic mood which, if considered according to the terms of modern Heideggerian theory, equally reflects feelings of underlying lack of control over events, and colours the speakers' worlds.[95]

In this section, I explore the extent to which the expression, rather than the containment, of feeling is integral to the transformative power of Milton's epic and encapsulated in its poetic figures. The power of pathos for reader engagement in the emotional state of Satan's soliloquy depends on techniques of poetic and rhetorical affect, for which the expression of feeling is essential.[96] Pathos is equally integral to the figurative language that constitutes that expression of feeling, such as Satan's metaphor of 'hell' and 'depth' for his despair. Altieri notes how such metaphors give the emotional state of the speaker an almost literal colouring where objects of the environment 'no longer seem like independent entities but take on qualities consistent with the emotion and give a body to the attitude'.[97] Reddy refers to such expressive forms as 'emotives', because they combine the effects of both declaratory and performative utterances, expressing the emotions that they proclaim.[98]

In Renaissance poetic and rhetorical theory, *enargeia* relies for its attainment of reader engagement on *praesentia* and emotional expression, aligning the emotional state of the speaker with the audience, features characteristic of the soliloquies of both Satan

[92] *Hamlet*, 3.1.1. The reference to virtue ('nobler in mind') refers to the Stoic influence in Calvinist notions of Providence and choice or will: Shell, ch. 4; Kermode 1960 (1963), 115.
[93] Cannon, 203; Shell, ch. 4.
[94] Fisher, 117, 175.
[95] Heidegger 1962, 40, 228; Altieri, 54–57.
[96] Krieger 1992, 94; Webb 2009, 10, 20.
[97] Altieri, 76.
[98] Reddy, Ch. 3, 96.

and Hamlet. Although *enargeia* does not always involve strong emotional appeal, evoking the emotions is an important technique identified by Erasmus in humanist rhetoric. Erasmus identifies the capacity of *enargeia* to affect the emotions in his examination of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*; necessary qualities include the power to evoke a wide range of sense impressions, and through them the emotions.[99] Assuming a live performance situation in which the transmission of mental images and their concomitant emotions between a speaker and his audience form a vital part of rhetorical interaction, Quintilian notes that although the audience's emotions are not fully within the control of the orator, the potential emotional power of *enargeia*, in terms of expression and reception, lies in the orator's own display of it to the audience.[100] If, for example, an orator wishes to generate pity, first in himself and then in the audience, Quintilian suggests making the details of the pitiable situation not only present and visible to the mind's eye of the imagination but also making it personal, as if it affects the orator and the audience closely.[101]

Longinus describes the process in a similar way with similar vocabulary, yet combines the distinct elements of Quintilian's account into a single process, which he calls *phantasia*: integral to the speaker's imagination, the subject of an *enargeia* is displayed to the mind's eye of the audience to whom the speech is addressed and for whom it forms a set of moving impressions in their own imaginations.[102] It can be a powerful source of emotional pathos for Longinus, who explains that *phantasia* results

> when, under the effects of inspiration and passion, you seem to see what you are speaking about and bring it before the eyes of your listeners.[103]

Krieger examines how Longinus merges the notion of enargetic vividness with emotional power, in a shift that he considers to be

> of significant theoretical consequence: instead of presenting a vivid picture for us to apprehend as spectators in front of, but at a distance from, a tableau, this [type of] *enargeia* collapses distance between subject and object, in effect subjectifying the experience, since we obviously are being called upon to identify ourselves with the poet in participating similarly (or rather identically)

[99] Erasmus, *De Copia*, 1978, Book 1; Rigolot, 165; Quintilian 1891, 8.3.67, 4.2.123–24.
[100] Quintilian 1891, 6.2.29–30.
[101] Campana, 37; Derrin, 21; Shuger 1988, 227.
[102] Webb 2009, 111.
[103] Longinus 1899, XV; Webb 2009, 20–23; Krieger 1992, 94.

> in the described experience. This becomes the basis of a strikingly different aesthetic, one that is emotionalist rather than mimetic, that dissolves the dimensions of a structured object into the free-ranging consciousness of the reader.[104]

Webb identifies emotional responses as common features of the classical tradition of ekphrasis where the model of *enargeia* is more generally based on understandings of how language 'penetrates the emotions', making the audience's emotional alignment with the speaker integral to their experience and understanding of the speaker's words.[105] Yet Longinus most closely aligns *enargeia* with powerful bodily engagement and emotional appeal, a development which Krieger finds significant to the theory of ekphrasis. It is key to the notion of Longinian 'transport' and the theory in turn becomes essential to the Augustinian tradition with its emphasis on expression of the heart and of the sublime in religious rhetoric and poetry. By contrast, the Stoic view counters the principle of 'transport' by equating it with the negative effects of *enargeia* on the passions and desires.

The shift undertaken in Longinian rhetoric is integral to the expression of vital, emotional states necessary for engaging pathos and the experience and understanding of the Renaissance audience. The expression of the passions is intrinsic both to the clarity of vision and the authenticity of voice in Renaissance humanist and religious rhetoric and poetry. Bacon's discrimination between the body and affections based on temporalities of the present, and the future-oriented faculty of reason that judges them, underlies the pedagogical role of eloquence. The distinction, whereby the techniques of style, particularly of *enargeia*, can curb the wanton tendencies of the imagination by bringing the objects of reason to the immediate apprehension of the auditor, underlies the moral role of poetry and rhetoric and is characteristic of *Paradise Lost*.[106] Yet it is not simply a matter of vanquishing the passions by the reason, but their harnessing for the better channelling of desire. With their dependence on the faculties of the embodied subject, the passions engage temporalities that are essential to the expression of that desire toward objects of excellence or sacredness. The passions are in turn central to clarity of understanding through the refinements of the intellect expressed through the poet's eloquence. Both aspects of the passions, as manifested in expressive form, reflect

[104] Krieger 1992, 94.
[105] Webb 2009, 25, 112.
[106] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.4.

the moral shape of the will and the quality of the heart.[107] They are the basis of Renaissance principles which espouse the regenerative potential of poetry.

Along with *praesentia* and *magnitudo*, emotional expressivity is characteristic of the rhetorical 'grand style' and the power of the 'sacred grand style' in shaping audience understanding.[108] Emotional expressivity is also associated with the rhetorical plain style that is popular in Puritan religious instruction, with both styles featuring in *Paradise Lost*.[109] The 'plain style' is influenced by the *humilis et sublimis* style of Augustine, which is based on the language of the New Testament and, as an expression of the contrast between God and Christ, high and low, is both 'transcendent and material'.[110] Milton not only distinguishes the 'simple, sensuous and passionate' style of poetry by comparison to other discourses, but considers the Psalms to be the highest and most sublime form of poetry, with effects on the auditor that stand above the reach of reasoned argument.[111]

In her study of Renaissance religious rhetoric, Shuger finds that as a style of passionate discourse, it 'imitates the movement of thought and feeling', the 'contours' of the speaker's 'inner life', and it is therefore associated with a more authentic expression.[112] By identifying the power of discourse with the speaker's inner life, Renaissance sacred rhetoric acknowledges a contrast between sophistry and oratory, with the first dependent upon artifice (i.e. artificial ethos) and the latter on 'deep feeling and spirit'.[113] The latter is an important element of Protestant religious oratory, with its focus on reflecting the 'inner light' as opposed to the outer form of language, the integrity of which is key to the virtue of both poet and audience.[114] In *Eikonoklastes*, Milton draws on such a distinction when he objects to set forms of religious prayer, invoking by preference a sense of unmediated inspiration from the affections:

> they 'who use no set form of prayer', have words from their affections; while others are to seek affections fit and proportionable to a certain dose of prepared

[107] Sidney 2007, 137–8; Milton, *Eikonoclastes*: CP 781; Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 669–70; Longinus 1899, VIII.
[108] Shuger 1988, 193–240.
[109] Shuger 1988, 228; Fish (1967) 1997, 59.
[110] Shaw, 19.
[111] Kermode [1960] 1963, 92–93; Milton *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, CP 750; *PR*, iv. 347, CP 471.
[112] Shuger 1988, 227–28.
[113] Shuger 1988, 227–40.
[114] Shuger 1988, 229.

> words … so to imprison and confine by force … those two most unimprisonable things, our prayers, and that divine spirit of utterance that moves them ….[115]

Here, as in postlapsarian *Paradise Lost*, Milton's style is shaped by a Puritan distrust of the show and outer ornament of religious practice and instruction in favour of the directness of oral preaching, and the sense that prayer linked to the inner contours of experience is somehow moved by the divine and can touch the soul.[116] Such direct expression is also a feature of Book III, where the poet endeavours to capture a sense of unmediated illumination, which is associated with a return to the ancient oratorical model of direct speech. In the *invocatio*, the poet identifies himself as an orator in the Homeric tradition, referring to the 'Orphean lyre' of classical bardic poetry. In Milton's Heaven, God's speech features elements of the plain style in rhetoric; the language of God is of direct and largely unembellished speech ('I made him just and right, / Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall' (*PL* III.98–99)).[117] The rhetorical principles are central to Milton's distinction between *eikon* and *eidolon*, because only true poetry expresses authentic feelings and moves genuine affections. Yet Milton does not limit *Paradise Lost* to expression of a single style for distinguishing them, rather drawing on a variety of forms, including psalmic and other biblical language.[118]

The 'unmediated' style is key to the regenerative process afforded by poetry through refinement of the emotions in creative expression. Moral shaping depends on engaging the subject in modes of experience as much as the articulation of abstract doctrine as a regenerative, creative activity derived from the divine, according to Milton's underlying ontology of the self-authoring subject. An important corollary of the philosophy that speech reflects the inner life of the speaker is that rhetorical eloquence is a reflection of the ethos of the poet and in turn influences or engages the moral condition of the auditor. In *Paradise Lost*, the notion that outer expression is a reflection of inner ethos is not only a quality of character but also of poetic language, figure and oratory. Milton dramatises the distinction in Satan's speeches, which suggest the sophistry that underlies or complicates both classical and Renaissance discussions of the power of rhetoric and its relationship to *eidolon*; that the power of persuasion can be

[115] Milton, *Eikonoclastes*, Ch. 16: Milton 1847, vol. 1, 559.
[116] Shuger 1988, 230.
[117] The speeches of God in Book III can be characterised in this way.
[118] Lewalski 1985, 4; Martindale 1986, 28.

‘counterfeit’. Brian Vickers notes how the rhetorical tradition has always been dogged by the Platonic critique of the Sophists, and this is particularly evident in the speeches of Satan in Milton’s epic with their typical techniques of inversion and dissembling.[119] Yet eloquence is considered a humanist virtue, and Milton challenges an idealistic, Italian Renaissance tradition that only the morally ‘good’ orator can be eloquent.[120] Renaissance expression is considered an outer manifestation of inner states, and Satan’s rhetoric demonstrates his capacity for disguised falsity, which is yet still betrayed by the bodily manifestations of his passions.[121] His fallen state represents a downward shift in Milton’s graduated ontological scale from more spiritually refined angelic purity toward the more material and bodily:

> Whereof hee soon aware,
> Each perturbation smooth’d with outward calm,
> Artificer of fraud; and was the first
> That practis’d falsehood under saintly show,
> Deep malice to conceal, couch’t with revenge ….
>
> (*PL* IV.119–23)

The ‘false dissembler’ is associated with rhetorical counterfeiture in his speech as well as his emotional disguise of feigned tranquility (‘outward calm’) — perturbations are associated with the fallen condition with its fluctuations of thoughts, affections and passions.[122] Milton’s description accords with aspects of contemporary theory, where emotions are understood to be influenced by socio-cultural discourses and are, according to Damasio, capable of being ‘faked’, while the physical and psychological dimensions of feelings cannot be.[123] Satan’s inner feelings are capable of being ascertained by being manifested or expressed on the body and in his language, albeit also made subject to Satan’s disguise. Milton distinguishes good and bad rhetoric by pointing to the falsity and artifice of outer expression as reflecting equally false inner states, by contrast distinguishing the truth and virtue of the poet’s (and the divine characters’) rhetoric and good character. In Book IV, such distinctions are indebted in Satan’s speeches to his highly self-conscious dependence on acting and artifice,

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[119] Vickers 1998; Krieger 1992, 28–43.
[120] Vickers 1998. For Renaissance arguments for the nobility of the arts, see Steadman 1985, 4.
[121] Martindale 1986, 4 notes that Satan’s concealment of his passions is similar to the tendency to do so by Virgil’s Aeneas.
[122] *OED*, s.v. ‘perturbation’ *n*.
[123] Damasio 2010, 115.

reminiscent of Marlowe's Faustus: Satan has 'practis'd falsehood under saintly show'.[124]

In *Paradise Lost*, the relationship between ethos and expression manifests in Milton's figural style through the material, concrete and embodied experience of the subject. A dimension of the tragedy of the Fall occurs when Adam and Eve descend on the ontological ladder to become more materially 'embodied' and therefore subject to wayward senses, passions and desires, an effect understood by Aquinas and Augustine to be the direct consequence of Original Sin.[125] Eve acknowledges their bodily alteration when she notes that until her Fall she had not experienced the 'agony of love' (*PL* IX.858), a phrase which carries a distinct somatic dimension in both the mortal weight of sin and the corporeality of the body. Yet it also aligns her state with the state of suffering traditionally associated with the Atonement, where the 'ampler Heart' (*PL* IX.876) equally becomes central to the regenerative potential of Christianity in Augustinian traditions of salvation.[126] Such a notion depends on the figure of Christ, representing a shift to embodied aspects of Christian renewal from the constraints of classical rationalism that inhere in the Stoic tradition. The senses, passions and desires remain integral to Milton's monistic model of selfhood with its material emphasis on the regenerative dimensions of experience. This dimension of *Paradise Lost* is figured through the central angelic body metaphor with its essential relation to expressive form.[127]

The relationship between surface ornament and inner states in *Paradise Lost* also applies to poetic figures, and by extension, the metaphorical body of the poem, with its encapsulation of the graduated hierarchy between the fallen body and the angelic body. Eve is often attributed a status as the creation of a Pygmalion-like poet, and her being so may be acknowledged by Adam as such:

> …on her bestow'd
> Too much of Ornament, in outward show
> Elaborate, of inward less exact.
>
> (*PL* VIII.537–39)

[124] Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*: Marlowe (1604) 2009; Marlowe (1616) 2013; *PL* IV.122.
[125]The relationship is discussed in Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*: see *ST* 1a2ae.85.3.
[126] Bouwsma, 19–61.
[127] Kerrigan 1983, 243.

Eve is both a creation of the poet and there is a suggestion in Adam's lines that she may be adorned with poetic language as surface or 'outside' ornament. Yet the relationship between inner and outer here cannot be simple, for poetry can invoke an apprehension both of the sacred (the divine or angelic body) and of fallen desires — the distortions of poetic language reflected in the figures of Satan and Sin. This is the distinction that Milton's monism addresses in his approach to figures in *Paradise Lost*, in which such a splitting of surface and form is reduced in favour of a correlation between inner and outer.

Burton's *Anatomy* examines the relationship between the passions, the body and creativity or, more specifically, the relationship between creativity and the psychological and physiological dimension of melancholy.[128] He identifies the close association between the imagination and the affections and passions in ways which suggest that the passions can drive and enhance the imaginative process:

> this imagination is the medium deferens of passions, by whose means they work and produce many times prodigious effects: and as the phantasy is more or less intended or remitted, and their humours disposed, so do perturbations move, more or less, and take deeper impression.[129]

The ambivalent status of the passions and affections in imaginative literature acknowledged in Renaissance critical theory is reflected in *Paradise Lost*. The passions and affections contribute to the creative process, and influence its shapes and forms, yet they can equally produce distortions and exaggerations of form, which in *Paradise Lost* manifest at the level of poetic figure as either 'true' expressions of the sacred in the angelic and divine figures (*eikones*) or false forms of expression in the grotesque figure of Sin (II.650) with its invocation of 'fierce' and 'terrible' 'furies' (*eidola*).[130] Underlying the distinction between true forms of the imagination and false fantasies is the possibility that imagination may 'arouse desire before reason can judge the worthiness of the desired object', creating the potential for 'lawless phansie'.[131] The corruption of Eve's dream by Satan disguised as a toad, in which she impiously imagines her own ascent to Heaven, reflects this negative potential of the imagination and imaginative literature through Milton's invocation of the dream motif, a form also

[128] *The Anatomy*, particularly in I.I.III.5.
[129] R. Burton, I.II.III.2.
[130] Steadman 1959, 236–38; Gilman, 162; See also Satan as described in *PL* IV.127.
[131] Shuger 1988, 207; R. Burton, I.I.II.5.

associated with creative expression through the vehicle of allegorical poetry in the early modern period.[132] While the more sinister dimension of the imagination is suggested in Satan's appearance in Book IV, the more innocent role is described in Adam's speech on the imagination in Book V.[133]

The emotional effects of *enargeia* are historically associated with this Longinian/Dionysian tradition.[134] Both Quintilian and Longinus use powerful, physical imagery to express the impact of enargetic speech on the listener, a reminder, according to Webb, that 'theirs is still a predominantly oral conception of language'.[135] For Quintilian, vivid and emotionally charged language 'penetrates the emotions', while for Longinus rhetorical *phantasia*, the end result of which is *enargeia*, 'not only persuades but enslaves the listener'.[136] Longinus also draws a distinction between the effect of images in rhetoric and poetry:

> Poets and orators both employ images, but with a very different object, as you are well aware. The poetical image is designed to astound [or *enthral*]; the oratorical image to give perspicuity [or *vivid description*]. Both, however, seek to work on the emotions.[137]

His distinction overlaps the Platonic distinction between *eicastic* and *phantastic* figural imagery, which in the Longinian tradition are associated respectively with rhetoric and poetry.[138] Longinus continues:

> It is no doubt true that those [images] which are found in the poets contain, as I have said, a tendency to exaggeration in the way of the fabulous and that they transcend in every way the credible, but in oratorical imagery the best feature is always its reality and truth.[139]

In the Socratic tradition of emotional self-control with its primacy of reason, to be under the influence of the passions is to be 'enslaved', a notion which is also taken up in Stoic traditions. The notion of 'enthralment' is an important dimension of poetic language

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[132] Eve's dream reflects pride and presumption. The dream tradition extends from Cicero, especially exemplified by Macrobius, 'Commentary on The Dream of Scipio'. Curtius, 359.
[133] *PL* IV.800–09 and V.30; V.100–13.
[134] Krieger 1992, 94; Shaw 64.
[135] Webb 2009, 98.
[136] Quintilian 1891, 6. Preface.1–2; Longinus 1899, XV.2; Webb 2009, 101; Krieger 1992, 94.
[137] Longinus 1899, XV.2 (my italics); Curtius, 398; Webb 2009, 98, 101.
[138] See also Aristotle's discussion of the role of 'astonishment' in the *Poetics*, xxviii.
[139] Longinus 1899, XV.8.

explored by *Paradise Lost*, in respect of which Milton draws distinctions between the two Longinian notions of transport — enslavement and sublimation — which lie at the centre of his notion that the end of poetry is to 'transport' rather than merely persuade the reader by moving the senses and emotions.[140] The distinction arises due to the closeness of the imagination and the affections, which can drive its shapes.

In Book VIII of *Paradise Lost*, Milton distinguishes the dual Platonic effects of sublimity in the notion of 'transport' from the Platonic notion of 'enslavement' of the subject to the passions that poetry can evoke (see VIII.523–33). Moral peril is implicit in Adam's reference to 'transported touch': being transported is a potentially dangerous experience.[141] Adam thus describes his 'commotion strange' at the sight of Eve (*PL* VIII.531); the term 'commotion' is etymologically linked to the somatic, bodily dimension of emotional experience.[142] As Schoenfeldt notes, the etymology suggests something which can send into exile or ecstasy.[143] In these lines, tensions between literal meaning and figurative suggestiveness produce, through their engagement of states of temporal immediacy, intensities which simultaneously reflect both sublimated and fallen states: the emotional experience that Adam describes on beholding Eve is both integral to the expression of human love as a mirror of divine love and a risk to the moral integrity of the subject through its potential power over the fallen, lower passions and desires.[144] Milton's epic contains many references to the potential for such enthralment (see for example God's speech at III.125 when he refers to Adam and Eve's future Fall as when they 'enthrall themselves'). The potential is an important component of Milton's figural techniques, associated with the paralysing effect of the Medusa figure. Milton suggests, in the notion of 'transported touch', the finer experiences of poetry as a vehicle for apprehension of the sacred with feelings associated with sublimated religious experience, as well as the potential for enchantment and subjection to the passions and desires.[145] Puttenham also warns of the latter effects of 'lawless phansie' when he says:

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[140] Curtius, 398; Ricks, 59, notes that 'transport' means to 'carry away with emotion in its extended meaning'.
[141] Flannagan, 577; Schoenfeldt 2004, 45.
[142] Schoenfeldt 2004, 45.
[143] Schoenfeldt 2004, 45.
[144] Schoenfeldt 2004, 43; Milton approves of the conjugal form of love in marriage, e.g. see the reference to 'conjugal love' at IX.263. Eve's role is devotional rather than carnal. See also Flannagan, 576n.
[145] For example, CP 549n; CP 668–69; Longinus 1899, VIII.4.

> For as the euill and vicious disposition of the braine hinders the sounde iudgement and discourse of man with busie & disordered phantasies, … so is that part, being well affected, … nothing disorderly or confused with any monstruous imaginations or conceits ….[146]

Such unregulated 'phantasies' are at the centre of the self-delusory justifications that lead to error and sin for Satan, Adam and Eve.[147] They can be contrasted with the true figures of the imagination referred to by Sidney's 'golden world', a comparison which inheres in the distinction Milton draws between the *eicastic* and *phantastic* poetic figure in *Paradise Lost*.[148]

The regenerative potential of poetic language lies in its effects on the embodied faculties that occur through the agency of the subject, captured in the dual notion of 'transport' and expressed by poetic language through concrete bodily particulars.[149] Temporal intensities engage a sense of voluntarism and personal responsibility as readers experience a time-bound process of discrimination.[150] While the agency aspect is central to both Stoic and Augustinian traditions, only the latter accords a value to the embodied state.

In Book IX, newly-fallen Eve's passions take on a visibly embodied and immoderate form. They are manifested physiologically as 'distemper', associated with the humoral theory that underlies early modern passions. Kerrigan refers to Eve's tasting of the fruit as a 'pathogenic event', invoking connections between Renaissance medicine and psychology.[151] Yet breaking the 'rind' brings the knowledge of good and evil that is key to regeneration of the fallen subject engaged through concrete experience of the body.[152] Milton's incorporation of an Apollonian/Dionysian distinction between an idealised notion of beauty and the expression of passion reflects this drama. It produces the contrast between Paradisal innocence (exemplified by Eve's sonnet of Book IV, which is beautiful but largely passionless) and her newly-fallen state of experience, in which she refers to the 'agony of love' in terms of its intensities of emotional and bodily effects.

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[146] Puttenham 1589, I.8; Puttenham (1589) 1970, xxxii; Bundy, 543.
[147] The word is the same as used by Longinus, 'phantasia', but in medieval and Renaissance theory refers to products of the unregulated imagination. Puttenham (1589) 1904, I.8; Puttenham (1589) 1970, xxv.
[148] Sidney 2007, 137–8.
[149] Flannagan, 577; Schoenfeldt 2004, 43.
[150] *PL* VIII.523–33.
[151] Kerrigan 1983, 254.
[152] *AP*: CP 716.

The Fall causes Eve's descent from the spiritually refined state of Eden to a heavier, more embodied material state more akin to human form. With her will overborne, the reference to Eve's 'ampler Heart' alludes ironically to the Augustinian emphasis on the heart, but reflects her self-delusion as it is mistaken for attainment of the Godhead:

> I
> Have also tasted, and have also found
> Th' effects to correspond, opener mine Eyes,
> Dimm erst, dilated Spirits, ampler Heart,
> And growing up to Godhead …
> …….
> Thus *Eve* with Count'nance blithe her storie told;
> But in her Cheek distemper flushing glow'd.
>
> (*PL* IX.873–76, 886–87)

In Milton's epic, a fallen character's ethos is subject to the fallen, infected will, and Eve's 'distemper' here resembles Satan's. Satan's principal passions are in the main early modern vices, and Eve's 'ampler Heart' is a measure of her fallen body and will, according to Milton's graduated, monistic order. The reference to Eve's 'ampler Heart' recalls Raphael's earlier counsel to Adam in Book VIII in which he warns that

> Love refines
> The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat
> In Reason, and is judicious, is the scale
> By which to heav'nly Love thou may'st ascend,
> Not sunk in carnal pleasure ….
>
> (*PL* VIII.589–93)

When Raphael counsels Adam on the errors of being transported by the carnal and bodily, reflected as surfaces or 'outsides' of Eve's beauty, the pedagogical intent applies equally to the enthralling power of poetry that is encapsulated in poetic figure. Yet Raphael applies a material emphasis on the role of the heart and the will in the spiritual ascension of the subject to higher understanding of the sacred, through the refined affections and the reason, by which they can 'ascend' to Godhead.

4. Catharsis and the Tuning of the Soul

> Thus while he spake, each passion dimm'd his face,
> Thrice chang'd with pale, ire, envie and despair,
> Which marr'd his borrow'd visage, and betray'd
> Him counterfeit, if any eye beheld.
> For heav'nly minds from such distempers foul
> Are ever clear.
>
> (*PL* IV.114–18)

Early in Book IV of *Paradise Lost*, Satan articulates his fallen, inner feelings in ways which manifest themselves bodily as emotional and physiological imbalance, not only showing his speech to be marred by 'distemper' but also 'counterfeit'.[153] Although poetic and rhetorical ornament is like attire, it is also the outer expression of the inner state of its speaker in *Paradise Lost* and carries a distinct somatic dimension. Despite his angelic status, Satan displays the embodied effects of his fallenness visibly in humoral and physiological manifestations of inner emotional states of envy and despair, which are each associated with early modern vices.[154]

The relationship between expression and bodily states also evident when the poet speaks directly in *Paradise Lost*, as in the *invocatio* to Book III.[155] He is often concerned with his own psychosomatic states that he sometimes associates with melancholy and illness, and which have an important bearing on his fitness as an inspired bard.[156] Schoenfeldt identifies such physiological disturbances with major events of *Paradise Lost*, focusing particularly on Milton's references to bodily digestion as a reflection of health and well-being.[157] Kerrigan considers these embodied states of balance and imbalance to be integral to the cosmic body at the centre of the epic and manifested figuratively in its poetry.[158]

The passions in the seventeenth century have a material basis in humoral theory derived from Galenic medicine, with physical health and moral well-being determined

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[153] CP 280.
[154] Schoenfeldt 2004, 43; *PL* I.56–8, 126; *PL* II.6–9; *PL* III.80–81.
[155] Critics identify a number of 'voices' in the epic, that include those of the narrator, the poet, and various characters.
[156] *PL* III.1–55.
[157] Schoenfeldt 1999, 131.
[158] The notion of digestion carries associations with both alchemy and the learning of scripture: Kerrigan 1983, 238–48; Schoenfeldt 1999, 24.

by the relationship between passions and humours. Burton's *Anatomy* (1621) examines in detail the elements of this relationship between body and soul.[159] In *The Passions of the Minde in General* (1604), Thomas Wright claims the passions are inextricably bound up with the humours, bodily fluids whose excess is thought to cause most diseases: 'Passions engender humours', he writes, 'and humours breed passions'.[160] While Thomas Venner (1650) suggests that moderating the passions to achieve 'the tranquillity both of mind and body' is necessary for mental and physical health, it is more generally considered to be necessary for spiritual health.[161] The alliance of Renaissance medicine and moral theory identifies the 'infected will' with Christian notions of the effects of Original Sin on body and soul, an association which is integral to the body metaphor at the centre of *Paradise Lost*. In modern emotions theory, Solomon refers to this tradition of connecting psychic health to the body and its respective balances or imbalances as the 'hydraulic' theory of the emotions, which has its origins in classical thought, from Aristotelian theories of catharsis, Galenic medicine and, into the twentieth century, Freudian theory, including the therapy of the 'talking cure'.[162] Freud's interest in literary example in his own examination of catharsis is noted to extend to an appreciation for Milton's writings.[163] The interrelationships between physiological and psychic states underlie the 'tranquillity' of body and mind in a virtuous circle that is associated with moral and spiritual well-being.[164]

Milton follows Plato in holding the passions to be innate to the subject, and although his poetry and prose works express a range of viewpoints, like Augustine he appears to reject the more restrictive understanding of Stoic *apatheia* as it is adhered to by some English Revolution Puritans.[165] In a complex history that encompasses either full elimination of the passions or the elimination of only the negative passions for the purpose of experiencing states of Stoic joy, some of these Puritans follow the more rigorous forms of Stoic purgation. Milton's preference for the Augustinian understanding of the importance of the passions and affection to the exercise of the will and the expression of religious love manifests in an approach which relies instead on

[159] See, for example, R. Burton, I.I.II.1–5.
[160] Wright, sig. E6r; Craik and Pollard, 6–7.
[161] Venner; Schoenfeldt 2004, 43; Schoenfeldt 1999, 1; Craik and Pollard, 6.
[162] Solomon 2006.
[163] Kerrigan 1983, 4–5.
[164] Irvine, Ch 6.
[165] See Schoenfeldt 2004, 46.

emotional moderation according to classical Aristotelian theory.[166] I follow the view of Steadman here, although the differing approaches of the Augustinians and the Stoics may be largely a matter of degree; manifesting in the general distinction between the passions and affections that applies from the classical and medieval period, wherein the affections in some Stoic, Augustinian and other theories are associated with more refined emotions.[167]

Renaissance poetry, with its pedagogical impulse to affect the moral and spiritual condition of the subject, often applies a common blending of Aristotelian principles of moderation from the *Nicomachean Ethics* with principles of catharsis from the *Poetics*.[168] The literature is vast on the subject and can only be examined in outline here. This is the approach, according to Steadman, that Milton applies in *Paradise Lost*'s tragic epic narrative, which incorporates Aristotelian principles about the purging of the 'low' passions of 'pity' and 'fear' that are associated with theatrical tragedy: catharsis is a kind of purification of the passions.[169] As will be explained, Renaissance theory expands the reach of this process as the basis of tragic poetry's regenerative potential through the purging of immoderate passions for moral self-fashioning and the attainment of elevated states of the soul. Following classical Aristotelian theory, Renaissance theorists thus hold tragedy to be the highest form of poetry, which is acknowledged by Milton to have this capacity as the 'gravest, moralest and most profitable of all other poems' in the Preface to *Samson Agonistes*.[170] In the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government* Milton also refers to the important moral role of tragedy that arises from its effects in the moderation of the passions and desires.[171] Tragedy relies on the patterning of events in the plot for emotional effect, the key to its transformative power on the spirit of the subject.[172] It involves the 'imitation of an action', and 'action' or *enargeia* is the defining quality for expression of psychic energy and ultimately its purgative effects. *Enargeia* is thus the first principle of tragedy, and is central to its expression of 'becoming' or potentiality.[173]

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[166] Steadman 1985, 69.
[167] The Stoic emperor, Marcus Aurelius, makes such a distinction in his *Meditations* (Ch. 1) as does Seneca in the *Epistles*. The distinction is also found in Augustine and Aquinas: Scrutton, 169.
[168] Steadman 1985, 83–84.
[169] Steadman 1985, 83–84.
[170] Fergusson 1961, 6; Preface to *SA*: CP 545–46.
[171] Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 669–70.
[172] Fergusson 1961, ix–xix.
[173] Fergusson 1961, ix–xix.

For the purposes of this thesis, the salient feature of catharsis is its basis in the intensities and transitionary states of experience. Although in contemporary criticism, the principle of catharsis is often applied in more general terms to the therapeutic effects of literary works, in Aristotelian theory, catharsis applies to tragic poetry, which includes both epic and theatrical forms, with its effects considered to be more powerful in theatre but differing principally in degree rather than kind for these genres.[174] Milton outlines the role of tragedy in the purging of the passions in the Preface to his closet drama, *Samson Agonistes* in ways which reflect the Renaissance adaptation of Aristotelian poetics:

> OF THAT SORT OF DRAMATIC POEM WHICH IS CALLED TRAGEDY
>
> Tragedy, as it was anciently compos'd, has been ever held the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other Poems: therefore said by *Aristotle* to be of power by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such like passions, that is to temper and reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight, stirr'd up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion: for so in Physic things of melancholic hue and quality are us'd against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humors.[175]

Milton is 'paraphrasing', according to Merritt Hughes, the Aristotelian definition of tragedy which he partly quotes in the original Greek and in Latin translation as an epigraph.[176] Yet Steadman considers Milton to hold a broader view of tragic effect than the limitations to theatrical tragedy contained in the Preface to *Samson Agonistes*.[177] In the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*, Milton also alludes to tragedy's role in epic for moderating the passions, when he refers to 'whatsoever hath passion or admiration in all the changes of that which is called fortune from without'.[178] This allusion to fortune's 'changes', according to Steadman, refers to tragic incidents portrayed by fable, central to Aristotle's theory of tragedy, but omitted in the Preface to *Samson Agonistes*.[179]

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[174] Krieger 1992, 42–43; Fergusson 1961, 6. Following Aristotle, the principles of epic are corollaries of tragic form.
[175] From the Preface to *SA*; see CP 545–46 for the full text.
[176] CP 549–50; Steadman 1985, 82.
[177] Steadman 1985, 30.
[178] Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 670.
[179] Steadman 1985, 74, 83.

The principal features of Milton's discussion of purgation in the Preface to *Samson Agonistes* — the imitation of the passions, their reduction to 'just measure' instead of complete eradication, the analogy between poetry and medicine — are considered to be common in the critical treatises of the period.[180] The aspects of tragic, Aristotelian purgation that Milton emphasises counter the Platonic argument commonly directed against tragedy in the Renaissance, that it excites the passions and is therefore morally dangerous. Tragic catharsis raises 'pity and fear, or terror', concepts which are much debated amongst scholars, but which refer fairly broadly to the emotions generated by the genre.[181]

Milton then applies what is, according to Hughes, a common Renaissance medical analogy for the kind of purgation associated with Aristotelian catharsis.[182] His approach reflects the influence of earlier Italian Renaissance theorists who develop an extensive body of theory on Aristotelian poetics.[183] In his *Arte Poetica* (1564), the Italian critic Antonio Minturno, for example, applies a homeopathic principle of 'like cures like' to Aristotle's theory of tragic catharsis, arguing that:

> Medicine has no greater power, by means of poison, to expel poison from an afflicted body than tragedy has to purge the soul of its impetuous passions by the skilful expression of strong emotion in poetry.[184]

In *Samson Agonistes*, as in *Paradise Lost*, Milton harnesses the potential of the classical form for his own literary and philosophical objectives. He draws on the generic techniques of tragedy and poetics to make the process one of active rather than passive engagement. Like Spenser, Milton identifies poetry with an expression of agency and will and he engages rather than neutralises or avoids the passions and affections. It is the intensities and suspensory states associated with literary affect — including catharsis — that are intrinsic to *Paradise Lost*, equally reflecting Milton's monistic philosophy and consistent with both the notion of habit in Aristotelian ethics and the

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[180] CP 543; Steadman. 1985, 69; Harvey, 649.
[181] *SA*: CP 549. For a detailed discussion of the theory in the context of Milton's work see Steadman 1985, 69–107.
[182] *SA*: CP 549.
[183] See Merritt Hughes in CP 543–44, and Steadman 1985, 69–107 for detailed discussions of the Renaissance theory. See also Aristotle's *Poetics* and especially Fergusson's 'Introduction' 1961 for the classical theory.
[184] Minturno, cited in CP 549*n*.

derivative concept of Stoic testing.[185] This function is consistent with Milton's opposition to the licensing of books in *Areopagitica*, in which he opines that he 'cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary'.[186]

Milton expressly announces his turn to tragedy at the commencement of Book IX of *Paradise Lost*: 'I now must change / Those Notes to Tragic' (IX.5–6). Yet evidently the extent of reader identification with Satan in the earlier books should not be quarantined from the effects of catharsis brought about by the tragedy of the Fall of Adam and Eve. Satan's own Fall resembles that of the unworthy and unjust, the non-regenerative anti-hero of the tradition of Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus* and Shakespeare's *Macbeth*.[187] These characters reflect a departure from the strict terms of Aristotelian tragedy, which does not generally support the fall of an anti-hero for its beneficial cathartic effects on the audience.[188] Yet in *Paradise Lost* as in the other works, catharsis appears to be invoked.[189] Satan's soliloquy at the opening of Book IV consists of material that was intended for Milton's incomplete precursor to *Paradise Lost*, the theatrical tragedy *Adam Unparadised*.[190] Consistent with discussions of pathos earlier in this chapter, Satan's emotionally expressive speeches seem to be intended to attract the complementary principles of Aristotelian catharsis. The common Puritan identification with Satan is directed to a kind of purgation of the passions of 'pity and fear' associated with engagement by Satan's feelings of anger and despair, as in

> Me miserable! which way shall I fly
> Infinite wrath, and infinite despair? (*PL* IV.73–74)

Such a reading accords with the connections between health, psychology and spiritual states attributed to Renaissance poetry, based on the processes of Aristotelian poetics in the transformation of spirit.[191] The literary transformation of the material realm depends on the relationship between action and pathos, which in Aristotelian theory underlies conversion of spirit or, in the epic tradition, *thymos*. In *Samson Agonistes*, with its

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[185] Aristotle, *NE*: Aristotle 1953, Book II; Seneca 1917–1925, vol. 3, Epistles CVIII, CXVI ('On Self-Control'), CXXI, CXXIII–IV; Irvine, 85–86.
[186] *AP*: CP 728.
[187] Examples of this type of tragic anti-hero are also found in works by Seneca: see Seneca, 1973.
[188] Aristotle, *Poetics*: Aristotle 1961, Ch. 8.
[189] See Fergusson for a good discussion.
[190] CP 1034; Gilman 159.
[191] Fergusson, 6–7; Sidney 2007, 139; Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*: CP 669–70; Preface to *SA*: CP 549; Fergusson 1961, ix–xix.

substitution of 'passion' for 'action', a notion also evident in various speeches of *Paradise Lost*, Milton focuses that regenerative process on the interiority of the subject, an aspect that draws on both Stoic and Protestant influences.[192] Notably Longinus, in formulating the theory of the sublime, identifies 'pity' and 'fear' as examples of 'low' emotions.[193]

These regenerative effects more generally inhere in *poiesis*, articulated in Sidney's distinction between *poesy* and poetry, with the former capturing a processual expression of the divine in nature through the skill of the poet and the latter referring to the 'work itself'.[194] The highest aim of that expression is the understanding or perception of truth.[195] Aristotelian poetic theory thus provides a means by which Milton reinterprets the emotions of classical literature according to his model of Puritan virtue ethics in *Paradise Lost*, as an active process that involves the material transformation of vital energy or *thymos*.[196] The regenerative energies depend on the alignment of the potential for moral improvement granted by the Atonement through the power of Grace with the transformation of the embodied experiences of the subject through the vehicle of poetry permitted by Renaissance poetic theory.[197] In *Paradise Lost* that process is one of active engagement of the embodied faculties according to Milton's monistic model of the subject. It is associated with the Incarnation, the effects of which on the fallen subject invoke associations with the suffering of Christ's Passion and involve the expression of embodied experience including of affective 'pain' for transformation of fallen passions and desires.[198] Despite Milton's apparent downplaying of the effects of the Atonement in *Paradise Lost*, its importance cannot thus be excluded, as it works in the text through allusion and the principles of Renaissance poetic theory.[199]

By this means in *Paradise Lost*, not only are the passions of classical epic (especially the pre-Socratic) recontextualised as Christian vices and virtues, but those of Satan (pride, wrath) are accorded their appropriate place amongst the seven deadly sins.

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[192] Calvin, 1845, Bk 1; Seneca, 1917–25, v1.
[193] Longinus 1899, VIII.2.
[194] M. Mack, 124.
[195] Fergusson, 10.
[196] Milton aligns Satan with the gods and heroes of classical myth, notable for their moral ambiguities and ambivalences by comparison to the ethos of Milton's Protestant hero.
[197] Sidney 2007, 139; *Preface*: CP 669–70; M. Mack, Ch. 5.
[198] The notion underlies Eve's 'agony of love' and Satan's misery. Both have a complex relationship to the Augustinian theory of the Incarnation and its relationship to the passions.
[199] Sidney 2007, 139; *PL* III.217; M. Mack, Ch. 5.

The potent energy or *thymos* of Satan, like the wrath of Achilles that drives the Homeric epic hero to action, is recontextualised to favour the heroic self-sacrifice of the Son, often considered by critics to make Satan more appealing to readers in the literary terms of Milton's epic.[200] Moreover, Milton's association of Satan's anger with vigorous action recalls William James's modern association between them.[201] Milton's critique of medieval romance in Book IX as 'tedious havoc' seems to be linked to his objection to a kind of destructive energy associated with classical and romance heroes, that drives their action toward virtue in their own terms often through self-delusion and error. Yet it is reminiscent of the actions of secular leaders and military heroes in Milton's own time, a point emphasised by Christopher Hill in his study of the influence of the English Revolution on Milton's poetic style in *Paradise Lost*.[202]

In a parallel depiction of the amelioration of powerful divine passion, the anger of God, associated in the classics with vengeful pagan gods and in Christian history normally associated with the often capricious Hebrew God of the Old Testament, is tempered in Milton's regenerative, poetic treatment of the passions. This transformation is associated with the effects of the Atonement and its gift of divine Grace through the love and martyrdom of the Son, captured poetically in the shifting suggestiveness of the word 'incense' from the expression of powerful ('righteous') anger to the sensory appeal and spiritual symbolism associated with incense burning in churches.[203] The 'incense' figure not only draws on the immediate experience of the reader for its intensities of feeling, brought about by the tension between literal meanings and suggestiveness, but also expresses a refinement of affect through the intellect.[204]

In *Paradise Lost*, the relationship between moral virtue and moderate and refined emotional states is a virtuous one, in which progress towards tranquillity is interrelated with the attainment of virtue and vice versa. In *Paradise Lost*'s cosmic pattern, the experience of catharsis contributes towards tranquil states of moderate or refined emotions which are preconditions for the tuning of the soul, a further regenerative dimension of Milton's poetics associated in Renaissance poetic theory with the Platonic tuning of the spheres. The interaction suggests a reconciliation of

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[200] CP 177.
[201] W. James 1884, 188; Redding, 41–51.
[202] C. Hill, Ch 29; *PL* IX.30.
[203] Prynne, 1.
[204] Prynne 1.

Aristotelian and Platonic theory, the extensive scholarship on which can only be discussed briefly here.[205] When Milton refers to the ability of poetry to set 'the affections in right tune', he draws on principles of Renaissance poetic theory underpinned by Neoplatonism, whereby the heavens are tuned together by love, a theme of Milton's prose work, 'On the Music of the Spheres'. Poetry, like music, has the potential to tune the soul. In Book III of *Paradise Lost*, Milton refers to the 'ever tun'd' harps of Heaven:

> Then Crown'd again thir gold'n Harps they took,
> Harps ever tun'd, that glittering by thir side
> Like Quivers hung, and with Preamble sweet
> Of charming symphony they introduce
> Thir sacred Song, and waken raptures high;
> No voice exempt, no voice but well could join
> Melodious part, such concord is in Heav'n.
>
> (*PL* III.365–71)

This kind of refined feeling is particularly captured in the expression and musicality of Milton's grand style and is associated with the sublime tradition of Longinian rhetoric. In the early modern period as in the present, poetry is analogous to music, which can not only tune experience or 'bring order to the world', but also unleash emotions and feelings, a feature of Suzanne Langer's aesthetic understanding of music as the vehicle for embodiment of pure feeling.[206] Moreover, its effects transcend the cognitive and are associated in *Paradise Lost* with divine inspiration, unmediated poetry that is an expression of clarity and authenticity to be contrasted to the beguilement and 'marvelling' of Eve's heart as it is 'tun'd' by Satan's rhetoric in Book IX.549–51. It is a quality that is integral to Book V, where Milton introduces the tuned orisons of Adam and Eve and the parallel notion of 'prompt eloquence' (*PL* V.149), for poetry that springs effortlessly in their prelapsarian speech.

'Tuning' of the reader's affections is afforded by elements of the Miltonic grand style with its blending of principles of Longinian rhetoric, its *magnitudo*, *enargeia* and musicality, all of which engage the reader's embodied feelings and emotions. The pervasive musicality of Heaven (suggested by *PL* III.365–71, discussed above) reflects

[205] Steadman 1998, 57.
[206] Storr, 24; Davie, 49; Langer 1953, 24; Langer 1974, 3.

the idea of poetic rhapsody and the poet's ability to evoke such a state, for music works through 'musical tones' to temper the soul.[207] In the Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government*, Milton expresses interest in the relationship between tragic poetry and Revelation, which can evoke a kind of spiritual rapture that is associated with the quest for salvation through religious worship, to which he refers as

> the majestic image of a high and stately tragedy, shutting up and intermingling her solemn scenes and acts with a sevenfold chorus of hallelujahs and harping symphonies: and this my opinion the grave authority of Pareus … is sufficient to confirm.[208]

As the highest form of poetry, the elevated emotional experience engaged by the patterning of tragic poetry is key to its transformative power. Moreover, Greek tragedy employed a verse form near to prose, like the English blank verse utilised by Milton in *Paradise Lost*.[209] The significant feature of this kind of refined feeling is that it is associated with the experience of the fallen, embodied subject. Milton's engaging of such states of rarefied emotion recalls the dimension of religious experience William James identifies, producing emotional effects that are notable for their reliance upon mental and bodily feelings with little or no cognitive involvement.[210] Milton's 'mellifluous' grand style is clearly expected to produce such effects; music has a special significance in the musicality and song of Heaven in Book III of *Paradise Lost* due to the special status music had been afforded by Renaissance theory in the purifying process.[211] Yet such a role is also afforded directly to poetry in the Renaissance, and Milton also engages this Renaissance tradition in his expression of the Augustinian *humilis et sublimis* style of *figura* in *Paradise Lost*, particularly evident in its closing lines, blending humble diction and sublimity using plain styles of language.[212]

5. Moral Clarity and the Virtues

I see ye visibly

[207] Allen, 137.
[208] CP 549, 668–69.
[209] Fergusson 1961, 7.
[210] W. James (1902) 1917; Nussbaum 2001, 249.
[211] Arthos, 212.
[212] *PL* XII 641–649: CP 468–9; Lerer 2005; Steadman 1985, 94; Shaw, 12; Kerrigan 1983, 243; Burke, Part II and III.

(*Comus* 216)

In his early prolusion, 'On the Music of the Spheres', Milton poses a rhetorical question as to whether subjects can be so distracted by their own fallen desires and passions that they fail to hear the music of the spheres.[213] At the close of Book II of *Paradise Lost*, when Satan 'weighs his spread wings' in view of the created world, there is a sense that, overwhelmed by his desire for vengeance, he fails to apprehend its divine form and goodness. With a clear debt to a Platonic heritage, the virtuous relationship between temperance and the apprehension of the sacred is also examined in Milton's earlier masque, *Comus*. There the lady resists the temptations of the wizard-like Comus and retains her ability to apprehend the Godhead ('I see ye visibly'), with a sense of tranquillity that also provides the necessary conditions for her to experience powerful religious feelings associated with the Christian sublime.[214]

In Renaissance rhetoric and poetics, the distinction between the *eicastic* and *phantastic* is fundamental to the role that figure, with its strong basis in imagery, plays in the expression and understanding of truth, virtue and sacredness. Gilman finds in *Paradise Lost* a transition from image to word, especially the language of instruction and didacticism, to reflect a Puritan distrust of the image and preference for the word in religious instruction. He argues that Milton merely invokes the pictorial mode of classical epic to give due weight to the classical technique in his transformed Protestant epic, to accommodate the 'speaking picture' of the epic tradition to an ampler Christian view of the relationship of 'see and tell', only to ultimately condemn its 'luminous, visual style' as incompatible with his Puritan ethos.[215] According to Gilman:

> Milton applies the pictorial mode, but only to dissolve the image, as Michael does, in an appeal to the ear: 'so full of goodly prospect and melodious sounds on every side, that the Harp of Orpheus was not more charming'. The transition takes place in a text that first lends itself to visualisation, but then through the sweeter melodies of language.[216]

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[213] CP 602, 604. There are traditionally seven Christian virtues that are aligned in Christian Neoplatonism with the Form of the Good and apprehensible only to the intellect. The four cardinal virtues, from ancient Greek philosophy, are prudence, justice, temperance (meaning restriction or restraint), and courage (or fortitude): Plato, (1955) 1987, *The Republic* Book IV. The three theological virtues, from the letters of St Paul of Tarsus, are faith, hope, and charity (or Christian love): 1 Corinthians 13:13.
[214] *Comus*: CP 86.
[215] Gilman, 170.
[216] Gilman, 170.

Yet I argue that Milton's use of figure is more complex than Gilman's analysis permits. According to Renaissance rhetorical and poetic theory, imagery engages not solely qualities of visuality but also of broader sensory and emotional experience, which are central to the expression and clarity of the affections, in turn necessary for the apprehension of the divine and the ascension of the subject to higher knowledge.[217] Such clarity depends on the relationship between moral virtue and temperance, which in *Paradise Lost* is articulated through a material emphasis on the embodied faculties of the fallen reader. These intensities are valued for their dynamic engagement of the passions to achieve the imaginative insight necessary to affirm the subject's faith.

Sidney's *Apology* is a defence of poetry against Puritan and Platonic objections to poetry's effects on the passions and desires, and it is considered by some critics to appeal to moderate emotion with attention to the attainment of moral clarity over the expression of passions and bodily energies. Robinson stresses the role images play in Sidney's poetics for the expression of clarity of knowledge (Sidney's 'visual epistemology') rather than the expression of feeling.[218] The *Apology* is thus associated with the influence of the Stoic philosophy of the rhetorical image.[219] According to Joseph Campana, Sidney's appeal to *enargeia*, by which he conflates 'the power of raising images' and the attempt to convey 'life in action', places more emphasis on 'visual' clarity. *Enargeia* renders poetry a 'system of representation that restrains the energy of physical and affective experience in order to establish a moral clarity rooted in appeals to ethos or reasonable and moderate emotions'. By contrast, *energeia*, according to Campana, which appeals to pathos, or 'intense and painful affect', is the basis of Spenser's poetics in *The Fairie Queene*: Spenser foregrounds what is 'most vital and moving about poetry by turning away from forceful visuality and locating energy in intense experience of physical and affective pain'.[220] David Mikics finds a similar emphasis on affect in Spenser's work, but departs from the traditional view of Sidney, arguing for the ambivalences the *Apology* demonstrates in its reconciliation of contradictory forces of pathos and didacticism.[221] He finds parallel ambivalences between pathos and didacticism in works by Spenser and Milton.[222]

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[217] Mikics, 152 argues for Milton's use of engaged emotional imagery for didactic purposes.
[218] F. Robinson 1972, 108, 111. The view of Sidney is essentially an affirmation of the Stoic view of imagery and articulates the distinction between Stoic and Augustinian approaches to the image.
[219] Mikics, 18; Bouwsma 19–61.
[220] Campana, 33.
[221] Mikics, 35.
[222] Mikics, 4.

The distinction that accords imagery an epistemological role as a vehicle for representing abstract ideas in concrete form, on the one hand, and one which stresses the role figures play as vehicles for the expression of embodied energies, on the other, tends to feature strongly in the division of Milton criticism between traditional and 'Satanic' readings. While the traditionalists find in *Paradise Lost* a tendency to give primacy to doctrine, the Satanic or Romantic readers find that the poetry accords a value to fallen experience. In this section I attempt to reconcile the approaches by focusing on the importance of transitionary states of thought and feeling to the potentialities of the subject. I argue that the expression of embodied energies, including of affective 'pain' (or the experience of uncomfortable, intense or uncertain feeling states), is an important reflection of Milton's monistic ontology that underlies its moral and creative forms.

The rhetorical interrelationship between ethos and pathos depends on the interdependence of thought and feeling in the Renaissance imagination and its experience-based models of understanding, for which the image is essential.[223] The model blends the processes of thought and feeling in the expression of imagery, and in *Paradise Lost* the moral improvement of the subject depends on this model to provide a sense of moral clarity through the embodied faculties. Yet the movement of the fallen will towards virtue is intimately bound up with the passions and desires, and requires both the voluntary channelling of the affections of the heart as well as an inner resistance to temptation, achieved through the application of 'right reason'. The relationship between ethos and pathos is therefore not merely an opposition between abstract principle and feeling but is recognised for the dynamic engagement of the faculties. Such engagement depends on the concrete experience of the embodied subject; 'affective pain' occurs in parallel with the heavy embodiment that fallenness engenders, although equally the embodiment of the subject after the Atonement is the essential means by which the subject moves towards redemption in the Christian tradition. For Milton, the possibility for the subject to apprehend the sacred on an Augustinian ladder of understanding occurs according to the virtuous relationship between temperance and moral purity, yet, as in Sidney's *Apology*, the reader's moral condition and potential for regeneration is constrained by the 'infected will'.

In Shuger's study of the Renaissance Christian 'grand style', which provides useful guidance on techniques applied for the expression of the affections and passions

[223] Shuger 1988, 203–05; Tuve 1947, 79.

in Milton's epic style, she argues that Renaissance religious rhetorics tend to emphasise the power of images for moving the will and emotions over their cognitive function as a vehicle to enhance perception and feeling: 'Our hearts respond to what is concrete and sensible, just as phantasms of imagination awaken the sensible appetite'.[224] This connection between vividness and passion blends, for Shuger, with the understanding of the imagination in Longinian theory. The Augustinian interrelationship between expression of love and the attainment of sacred knowledge on the ladder of accession to understanding draws on techniques of Longinian rhetoric, styles that produce sublime effects associated with the alignment of the principles of *enargeia* with powerful bodily and emotional experience:

> These rhetorics accept the Augustinian interrelation of love and knowledge; it is by love that man moves from an initial confused apprehension to the full knowledge of union.[225]

Shuger's argument stresses the importance in religious rhetoric of the sacred object's being brought close to the imagination where it can be perceived and where it moves into the realm of the affections and passions.[226] In turn, passions are integral to expression by making things more appealing as objects of desire.

The powerful relationship between passion and perception inheres in discourses other than sacred rhetoric, including poetry, and underlies Milton's techniques of blending sacred and secular literary forms in his Protestant epic.[227] Milton dramatises the opposition between sacred and secular literature by engaging opposing effects associated with each of higher affections for sacred objects and lower passions for the carnal and lower-order effects of secular literary figure. In turn, the distinctions are central to his discrimination of allegorical figure, between *eikon* and *eidolon*. Figural examples in *Paradise Lost* in turn test and engage the agency of the reader, and underpin its drama, which draws on the intensities and transitionary states associated with the expression of poetic affects that are shaped by Milton's model of the self-fashioning subject.

These intensities underlie the way *Paradise Lost* dramatises the distinction between principle and experience as a drama of agency and choice, and hence are

[224] Shuger 1988, 11, 108, 193, 201.
[225] Shuger 1988, 227–37.
[226] Shuger 1988, 227–37.
[227] Shuger 1988, 227–37.

central to the principal critical division between the traditionalists and the Satanic or Romantic critics. C. S. Lewis's foregrounding of Augustinian 'obedience', including Augustine's statement in *De Civitate Dei* that obedience is easy, is thus a doctrine also declared by God in *Paradise Lost* about pre-fallen Adam (VII.48).[228] For Augustine, truth relies on authority; and authority is central to religious faith in Puritan theology. Elsewhere, however, in *Paradise Lost*, including in reference to prelapsarian Adam and Eve, Milton introduces a dialectically opposed view of the difficulty of assent of the will; foreshadowed in the corruption of Paradise, but hardening in the postlapsarian world as a consequence of Original Sin, into a view of humans as basically flawed and susceptible to failures of the will. Augustine identifies as part of his personal experience in *The Confessions* a 'phenomenology of introspective moral conflict' that appears to be central to Milton's depiction of the postlapsarian world, a kind of *agon* that is textually central to the 'drama of choosing' that critics identify as a principal theme of *Paradise Lost*.[229]

In *Paradise Lost*, the condition of the will underpins the expression of the quality of desire by which the poet may be (as in Sidney's *Apology*) a moral exemplar ('th' upright heart and pure'), and is equally integral to the clarity of the mind's eye.[230] In the *invocatio* to Book III of *Paradise Lost*, Milton attributes his blindness to the embodied effects of sin and asks the holy Light to clear his inner vision, to 'purge and disperse':

> but thou
> Revisit'st not these eyes, that roll in vain
> To find thy piercing ray, and find no dawn;
> So thick a drop serene hath quencht thir Orbs,
> Or dim suffusion veil'd.
>
> (*PL* III.22–26)

The notion is also found in Sidney's *Apology*.[231] Moreover, for Milton as for Sidney, poetry can be a vehicle for Grace by which readers may experience higher knowledge of the divine. But in order to do so, they must first clear their fallen senses and moderate

[228] *DCD*, XIV.12; Lewis, 69.
[229] Mendelson 2016; Newlyn, 5, 65–69; Lewalski 1985, 8; Lewalski 1999, 116.
[230] *PL* I.18; Psalms 119:7.
[231] Sidney, 2007 137–9.

their fallen emotions.[232] Developing over his poetic career, Milton's poetry explores how poetic language can best facilitate this process according to Renaissance poetic theory which accords such a purifying role to 'true' poetry.[233] His work evolves from the more Neoplatonic (and Stoic) philosophy of *Comus*, with its emphasis on the Lady's detached purity, to the more Augustinian and monistic stance of the later poetry with its emphasis on the materially-embodied process of purification; yet the earlier and later works each emphasise the purging of bodily passions and desires.[234] In *Comus,* the emphasis is on resistance to the effects of temptation which results in the attainment of visual clarity so the sacred 'Idea' becomes visible ('I see ye visibly') as the Stoical lady resists the temptations of the magician Comus, who resembles a Shakespearean player:

> What might this be? A thousand fantasies
> Begin to throng into my memory,
> Of calling shapes and beck'ning shadows dire,
> And airy tongues that syllable men's names
> On Sands, and Shores, and desert Wildernesses.
> These thoughts may startle well, but not astound
> The vertuous mind, that ever walks attended
> By a strong siding champion Conscience.——
> O welcome pure-ey'd Faith, white-handed Hope,
> Thou hov'ring Angel girt with golden wings,
> And thou unblemish't form of Chastity,
> I see ye visibly, and now believe
> That he, the Supreme good, t' whom all things ill
> Are but as slavish officers of vengeance,
> Would send a glist'ring Guardian, if need were,
> To keep my life and honor unassail'd.
>
> (*Comus* 205–20)

The lady will not be 'astounded' because her mind is virtuous in the Christian, rather than the pagan, sense. The notion of 'astonishment' recalls the Longinian distinction between the effects of poetry and rhetoric on the auditor, a distinction that Milton

[232] See also Bundy, 214.
[233] Milton refers to the notion of the 'true' poem in his prose works. *Apology for Smectymnuus*: CP 690. See Samuel (1947) 1965, 16–17 for the Platonic influences.
[234] Samuel (1947) 1965, 40; Schoenfeldt 2004, 46; Martindale 1986, 22–23.

invokes to distinguish between the pagan and Christian sublime.[235] The lady is not therefore 'enthralled' but 'transported' according to the alternative meaning of the Longinian attainment of rhetorical sublimity, a distinction equally taken up by Augustine.[236] In *Comus* a virtuous mind is required to avoid poetry's perceived negative effects of producing mental and physical incapacity or paralysis: this effect is partially evident, as the lady is stuck to a chair.[237] Yet if this kind of 'astonishment' or captivation by the imagination can be resisted through the lady's 'conscience' or 'right reason', then the lady may obtain a glimpse of the sacred associated with strong feelings and an alternative kind of epiphanic 'shock' or insight. Of note is the original wording from the Trinity Manuscript, reminiscent of Milton's 'Paradise within' of his later epic *Paradise Lost*, that suggests that once the temptations are resisted and the senses cleared, the lady can apprehend the Platonic Idea and affirm her faith:

> I see yee visibly, ~~& while I see yee~~
> ~~this dusky hollow is a paradise~~
> ~~& heaven gates ore my head~~ , & now ~~I~~ believe
>
> (*Comus* 239 (216) Luxon)[238]

The lady's glimpse of Hope as a 'hovering angel girt with golden wings' and her cry 'Thou unblemish't form of Chastity! / I see ye visibly' (214–16), reflect the Platonic conception of the virtues as capable of making their forms visible; that 'the very form and shape of moral goodness, if it could be seen with the physical eye, would', as Cicero said in *De Officiis* I.5.15 'awaken a marvellous love of wisdom'.[239] The principle is echoed by Bacon when he paraphrases Plato:

> And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, 'That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection'; so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation: for to show her to reason only in subtlety of argument was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.[240]

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[235] Shaw 33–5.
[236] Shaw, 12.
[237] See Mikics, 140, where he notes that in *Comus* Milton opts for stasis rather than kinesis.
[238] Milton 1645, Trinity Manuscript, hyperlinked to line 216; Comus CP 86.
[239] Cicero 1913, I.5.15; Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.3; CP 669–70.
[240] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.3; Shuger 1988, 194–95; CP 94.

Bacon's distinction raises the possibility of apprehending the virtues through the effect of *enargeia* on the imagination ('lively representation'), an effect that evokes strong emotion ('great love and affection'), and depends on the exercise of the faculty of the will. The form of the most good for Plato is divinely revealed through physical vision but mainly to the eye of Reason.[241] In the Renaissance Aristotelian model of knowledge, with its emphasis on the image, this takes place through the mind's eye of the imagination. Following Augustine, it is not sufficient to show virtue to reason alone but it must be presented to the refined affections, and Bacon (above) critiques the Stoic approach with its preference for the reason as opposed to the will. Significantly, clarity of mind and purity of desire are identified with the expression of strong religious feelings associated with the Christian sublime for Bacon as for Milton's lady and depend upon the agency and will of the subject. Yet Milton's *Comus* predates the monistic emphasis on the body that I find in his late works, in which there is a much clearer, positive enlisting of the embodied faculties in favour of the moral and spiritual agency of the subject.

Milton's poetry often invokes the apprehension of sacred virtues by analogy to Platonic Forms as shapes visible to the intellect rather than as simple abstract ideas, an aspect also found in Bacon (above). The notion is also related to an understanding of figure as a reflection of the form of the body and the shapes of experience. In *Paradise Regained,* the idea of virtue is conceived of as a perfect 'shape', capable of being apprehended upon the resistance by Christ against temptation and the powers of errant senses and passions:

> I see thou know'st what is of use to know,
> What best to say canst say, to do canst do;
> Thy actions to thy words accord, thy words
> To thy large heart give utterance due, thy heart
> Conteins of good, wise, just, the perfect shape.
>
> (*PR* III.7–11)

While *Comus* suggests a kind of rapture associated with detached purity, a shift occurs in *Paradise Regained* to a model of embodied engagement through the 'large heart' and a clear association with the Incarnation. Milton also refers to the shape of virtue in

[241] Plato, *Timaeus*: Plato 1892b, 45d.

Paradise Lost, when Satan views the angel Zephon in Paradise as the classically-defined image of Apollonian beauty:

> So spake the Cherub, and his grave rebuke
> Severe in youthful beauty, added grace
> Invincible: abasht the Devil stood,
> And felt how awful goodness is, and saw
> Virtue in her shape how lovely, saw, and pin'd
> His loss; but chiefly to find here observ'd
> His lustre visibly impair'd; yet seem'd
> Undaunted.
>
> (*PL* IV.844–51)

There Satan views the angel from the detachment of his fallen perspective. Yet Satan, whose external appearance reflects his inner reality, is said to be 'abash'd' and otherwise his angelic 'lustre' is 'visibly impair'd'. With its Neoplatonic influences, the notion of lustre bears a direct relation to the power of ornament and its enargetic effects on the embodied faculties. In Platonic theory, the Forms are incapable of being viewed by human eyes, or even by angelic Satan who is 'abasht': blushing is the visible expression of a kind of involuntary psychosomatic feeling at the sight of the divine. Moreover, the apprehension of sacred form is associated with a kind of physical shock ('abasht') as Satan is awestruck ('awful'). Yet he 'seem'd undaunted', which suggests the depth of his fallenness. While passions, according to Damasio's modern theory, can be feigned, feelings cannot, principles which are evident in *Paradise Lost* and 'visibly' register the truth of Satan's fallen state. That state is one of full engagement in the world of experience.

The notion of resistance to temptation is essential to Milton's later works: in *Paradise Lost*, Eve refers to a 'virtue unassay'd' (IX.335) in terms which allude to Milton's 'fugitive and cloistered virtue' in *Areopagitica*. Yet a survey of these works tends to emphasise that the mature Milton entertained a more complex notion of active engagement with, and accommodation of, the effects of embodied experiences of the passions and desires rather than resistance to emotional engagement which would be incompatible with his Arminianism. Such an approach also accords with his monistic ontology. The shift occurs more generally through the Augustinian influence attaching significance to the Incarnation, which manifests itself in *Paradise Lost* in the embodied

figure.[242] Milton's later works thus suggest a more bodily form of visibility as 'shape' to the mind's eye or intellect, which manifests itself in the concrete bodily reference to the 'large heart' of Christ in *Paradise Regained*, a figuration which is similar to the 'ampler Heart' ironically referred to in newly-fallen Eve in *Paradise Lost*.

By contrast to the Stoic purity of the lady in *Comus*, in *Paradise Lost* the Fall of Adam, Eve and Satan is associated with submission to temptation in ways which involve full engagement of the embodied experiences of the passions and desires, including of affective 'pain' and the lower order of passions associated with the body, error and sin. Mikics thus notes that when Adam describes his and Eve's fate as 'A long day's dying to augment our pain' (X.964) 'all human tragedy becomes a perpetual present'.[243] Milton distinguishes such experiences from the higher states of feeling compatible with temperance and religious feelings. The shift is captured in figural style: The Fall of Eve is marked by the words: 'she pluck'd, she eat' (*PL* IX.781). The line introduces effects that approximate a thunderbolt, suggestions of discord by their abrupt and hurried sharpness. Yet unlike the sudden epiphanic awareness that similar states engender in both *Comus* and *Paradise Regained*, associated with sudden Revelation of sacred truth, in *Paradise Lost* the opposite effect is engaged, of bodily or embodied shock, with an emphasis on the overwhelming physicality of that engagement ('pluck'd', 'eat'). In *Samson Agonistes*, there is a similar moment of corporeal or embodied shock associated with Samson's succumbing to his emotions and desires. When he pulls down the temple pillars, the words 'he tugg'd, he shook' (*SA* 1650) are comparable to the language used to describe the actions of Eve in *Paradise Lost*. Instead of the revelatory insight attached to such moments in *Comus* and *Paradise Regained*, this action is associated with the succumbing of Samson to the throes of unmediated passion ('all passion spent') and its associations with error and fallenness.[244]

Milton is noted to articulate a more refined moral sense than Shakespeare.[245] In *Paradise Lost*, as in *Samson Agonistes*, I argue, the fuller bodily engagement is important for the way Milton explores complex moral scenarios using the generic forms and conventions of classical literature. Critics differ over whether Samson's demise,

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[242] Auerbach 1984, 11; Shaw, 12–23.
[243] Mikics, 16.
[244] *SA* 1758: CP 549.
[245] Milton's moralism is often thus invoked to explain how his rhetorical and poetic styles are shaped by moral concerns; see eg Lewalski 2011, 245.

like Satan's, reflects the fall of the anti-hero or the unworthy or whether he is in fact regenerate, based on a typological relationship that is found to exist between Samson and Christ.[246] Here I argue that Samson and Satan are both, and the basis of that claim lies in the particular role of affective engagement of intensities and transitionary states in the auditor through the moral and spiritual refinements afforded by Renaissance tragedy and poetics. Milton, I argue, uses the techniques of secular poetry to examine complex moral issues for which a clear position is not apparent. In spite of intractable moral dilemmas, he invokes the tools of tragic poetry (tuning and catharsis) for the pedagogical purposes of moral improvement and spiritual regeneration.[247] Such processes involve the active engagement rather than simply passive involvement of the reader.

When Samson pulls down the temple of Dagon in his final slaughter of the Philistines, the question that concerns critics is whether he acts in accordance with God's will or indulges in a pointless act of violent suicide. Critics generally try to reconcile Samson's violence with Christian morality, but some question the ethical basis of Samson's final act of violence.[248] Milton, like Seneca before him, I argue, uses classical literary form to elaborate complex moral examples according to his model of *eudaimonia*. Yet, departing from Seneca, he develops a model of active engagement of the passions and desires for moral agency, rather than of *apatheia*, making the passions essential to the intricacies of the moral scenarios that he describes in ways that show them to be part of the condition of the lived world. *Samson Agonistes* is modelled on Greek tragedy, a genre which typically gives voice to both sides of an ethical issue.[249] Samson's actions may be excused by their association with the actions of an Old Testament figure, but Derek Wood argues that Renaissance literary theorists were aware of the true meaning of *hamartia,* which is not psychological flaw but 'error … committed in ignorance'.[250] Samson's actions, which occur according to his 'rousing motions' and yet which are nonetheless shown to be deliberative, may thus reflect either a 'spiritual blindness' or the Augustinian sanction of 'righteous violence'.[251] Yet, more importantly, Milton departs from the classical Latin sources and models a complex

[246] CP 543.
[247] See also Lewalski 2011, 247.
[248] Those who question Samson's ethics include W. Empson, J. Carey, I. Samuel and J. Wittreich.
[249] Wood 2001, 60.
[250] Hebrews 11:32; Wood 2001, 80; Mikics, 126.
[251] *SA* 1381–3; CP 584; See also next footnote for Augustinian references.

moral drama around the scholarly divisions over exegetical readings of the figure of Samson, drawing in that drama on his ontology of the Protestant humanist subject.[252] In spite of the lack of moral clarity or self-evident truth in such scenarios, the example of Samson appears to be designed to engage the moral and spiritual self-development of the subject, a theme to which I return in the conclusion of this thesis.

6. Ekphrasis, Affect and Fallenness

> His fair large Front and Eye sublime declar'd
> Absolute rule; and Hyacinthine Locks
> Round from his parted forelock manly hung
> Clust'ring, but not beneath his shoulders broad:
> Shee as a veil down to the slender waist
> Her unadorned golden tresses wore
> Dishevell'd, but in wanton ringlets wav'd
> As the Vine curls her tendrils, which impli'd
> Subjection, but requir'd with gentle sway,
> And by her yielded, by him best receiv'd,
> Yielded with coy submission, modest pride,
> And sweet reluctant amorous delay.
>
> (*PL* IV.288–311)

The figure of Book IV depicting Adam and Eve in Paradise carries the influence of traditions of classical epic and pastoral as well as seventeenth-century religious iconography. It encapsulates Renaissance principles of *ut pictura poiesis* and equally recalls the narrower, more modern understanding of an ekphrasis as an evocation of a work of art.[253] Critical focus is typically on the extent to which the figure reveals suggestions of Protestant iconoclasm: of a distrust of visual and verbal idols, of the power that poetic imagery has over the senses and passions, and of the limitations of fallen language.[254] In this section, I broaden the discussion by considering how the figure of Adam and Eve expresses the embodied experience of the senses, passions and desires, applying a performative approach to poetic affect, one that ascribes a value to the temporalities of the immediate and the transitionary, which, in *Paradise Lost*, are integral to self-fashioning through moral and creative agency. For this purpose, I

[252] Augustine, *Reply to Faustus the Manichaean*: Augustine 1956, XXII.74; *DCD* I.8.
[253] Hagstrum, 125; Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Lost*'.
[254] Fish (1967) 1997, 38; Gilman, 150–51.

consider an aesthetic model developed by Richard Wollheim to explain the expression of emotions in the arts.

By reconciling reader experience to the doctrinal basis of the epic in religious obedience, Fish's approach lies at the centre of a long-standing critical controversy over the reading of *Paradise Lost*. Language mirrors the fallen state of readers, whose acknowledgment of the limitations of their faculties and tools of understanding underlie an Augustinian justification for religious obedience. Assuming a certain uniformity of response that prompts Peter Herman to refer to it as articulating a 'will to order' in the reading of *Paradise Lost*, Fish's reconciliation of experience and doctrine on hermeneutic grounds tends to occur at the expense of a more open reading experience.[255] Lucy Newlyn, by contrast, in her examination of Milton's influence on the English Romantics, draws out the role in *Paradise Lost* of suspensory states of choice, ambiguity of reference and creative agency, features which she considers important for the emergence of aspects of the Romantic tradition.[256]

Herman's poststructuralist reading of *Paradise Lost* also departs from the critical resolve for doctrinal certainty exemplified by Fish, emphasising instead uncertainty and indeterminacies of meaning in the text.[257] Herman and Newlyn hold a common interest in linguistic ambiguity, identifying elements of Milton's poetic play of meanings, yet their respective approaches are largely unconcerned with poetic affect and are unconcerned with the important role of the senses, passions and desires in shaping Milton's figures.

Modern psychoanalytic approaches by Mikics and Kerrigan, by contrast, challenge the closure of the text on fixed principles based on the mediating role of unconscious desire. Mikics examines the role of affect in classical literary oppositions between the claims of *logismos* and *thymos*, duty and loyalty, ethos and pathos.[258] Arguing for the encapsulation of such principles of the classical epic tradition in *Paradise Lost*, Mikics explores the irreducibility of affective experience to moral doctrine, capturing a temporalising drama that animates the text. The purely doctrinal reading has limitations, according to Mikics, due to 'the way in which all forms of

[255] Newlyn, 10–13; Fish 2001, 14.
[256] Newlyn, 2.
[257] Herman (2005) 2008, 25–26; Fish (1967) 1997, 1; Fish 2001, 14; C. S. Lewis, 67.
[258] Mikics, 16.

poetic affect, whether best described as *delectare* or *movere* (delight or turbulent emotion) strain against the efforts of both critics and poets to convert affect to moral use (*docere*)'.[259] For Kerrigan, Milton's desire for sublimation associated with the central figure of the angelic body in *Paradise Lost* represents a poetic crisis, a kind of Freudian 'wish fulfilment' associated with frustrated desire that ultimately results in the poet's disillusionment.[260]

Wollheim's aesthetics is also based on psychoanalytic principles, with which he traces the links between emotional experience and expression in the arts.[261] In the remainder of this chapter, I introduce Wollheim's approach to an expanded discussion of poetic affect in an examination of the figure of Adam and Eve in Paradise, focusing on how Milton engages the voluntary and involuntary dimensions of embodied expression for the self-fashioning of his seventeenth-century subject. That engagement at the level of poetic figure, I argue, is intrinsic to a central drama surrounding both the tragedy of the Fall and the capacity for regeneration.

Drawing on his work in the aesthetics of painting, Wollheim argues that expression does not simply refer to an emotion as an objective quality, but also embodies the state which is being referred to.[262] Paintings are not just 'pictures of events that have emotional impact'; rather they are 'composed surfaces that actually give physical presence to certain affective states'.[263] As such, artworks 'metaphorically' possess the qualities that they express.[264] In *Paradise Lost*, I argue, applying Wollheim's model, this process produces intensities and complexities of engagement that are constituent of Milton's iconography. In this way, the figure of Adam and Eve expresses the philosophy of 'intangling' that some critics find characteristic of the poem. That philosophy depends on the evocation of transitionary states for their own sake through techniques of poetic style which depend on the agency and active engagement of the auditor.

Wollheim's aesthetics incorporates a psychoanalytic framework to explain how we construct emotions by developing attitudes that give a shape to the 'frustration or the

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[259] Mikics, 3, 26–27.
[260] Kerrigan 1983, 216, 234.
[261] Altieri, 124.
[262] Altieri, 73; Wollheim 1987, 80–89.
[263] Wollheim's theory, according to Altieri, illustrates how 'feelings take on force', are 'deployed to bring intensity, complexity and precision to the arts': Altieri, 73–88.
[264] Altieri, 77; Goodman, 87.

satisfaction of desire'.[265] With an emphasis on intensities and transitionary states, the core of this transformation of immediate frustration or satisfaction, Wollheim attributes to the developing attitude the power to organise a range of 'correspondences'. As Altieri explains:

> Tracing correspondences provides a path from sensation to feelings to their roles in the larger frameworks emotions provide. As we trace that process of attitude-formation, we see some of the powerful roles that can be played by the forming of correspondences, for their content as metaphoric elaborations of the emotion and for the sensuous qualities that bind the affects to this particular imaginative understanding. These correspondences create complex relations forming something like an affective field of particulars that together establish the figurative colourings giving a tonality to the agent's affective world.[266]

Correspondences reflect 'the power of the object of the emotion to distribute an inner state over an objective situation'.[267] Thus:

> When anger takes hold, for example, it almost makes sense to speak literally about seeing red. Many of the objects of one's environment no longer seem independent entities but take on qualities consistent with the emotion and give a *body* to the attitude.[268]

Wollheim limits the 'forming of an expression' so that it applies simply to 'how the subject manages to personalise the forming of an attitude': 'Expression is not specifying what the emotion is, but forming an active stake in what the correspondences produce'. Until we develop an attitude, the affects make us 'hostages to the moment, with its changing demands'.[269] Wollheim's notion of correspondences not only recalls Massumi's reference to capture and abduction in contemporary affect theory, but is also not unlike Milton's potential threshold states of enslavement or astonishment derived from classical theory.[270] And, as Webb notes in respect of classical ekphrasis, the power of the image is immediate, with the appraisal of the image (in its rational and ethical sense) delayed until afterwards.[271] The notion lends support to Kerrigan's argument

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[265] Altieri, 73.
[266] Altieri, 76–77.
[267] Altieri, 76–77; Wollheim 1999, 80.
[268] Altieri, 76 (my italics).
[269] Altieri, 77; Wollheim 1999, 82.
[270] Zournasi.
[271] Webb 2009, 122.

about the angelic figure constituting an expression of the poet's desire for literary and spiritual sublimation in *Paradise Lost*.

In the context of poetry, correspondences that reflect a desire-shaping attitude are recorded in figural expression through a path from sensory experience to feelings and the larger frameworks of the emotions. The effects are apparent when considered alongside a phenomenological approach to figurative language, such as Ricoeur's metaphor theory, which finds in metaphoric expression a blending of thought, imagination and feeling and resonates with Wollheim's theory of correspondences that underlies the 'metaphoric' dimension of artworks. The basis in experience of this model generates the intensities of Milton's figure of Adam and Eve, with its vital and kinaesthetic sensory and emotional effects.

Milton's ekphrasis of Adam and Eve captures the fine balance between constraint and will in embodied expression at the dramatic core of his epic. Constraints are a necessary condition of creative activity and a vehicle for invention, a philosophy Milton alludes to when he refers to the gardens of Paradise as having grown 'luxurious by restraint' (*PL* IX.209). Milton uses the context of Paradisal language to express powerful sensory and emotional experiences, which simultaneously reflect pure and fallen states. The highly tactile, visual and spatial affects often involve a synaesthetic blending of the sensory that is, according to Webb, a feature of Sophistic rhetoric.[272] In turn, sensory affects contribute to a sense of presence that aligns the readers' experience with the text in ways which engage them through the concrete particulars of embodied experience ('hair', 'tendrils'). The poetic qualities of 'curls her tendrils' produce sensory immediacies and the verb tense unfolds temporally in present time to create a sense of readerly presence.

The techniques of ekphrasis produce these effects and reflect the way poetic figures express the states of feeling, desire and emotion described in Wollheim's approach. They not only enable the representation of unfallen Paradise to the fallen condition of the senses and experience of the auditor, but also reveal how the aesthetic plane in *Paradise Lost* has both sacred and secular significance. Poetic dissimilation in figural language incites embodied effects of sensory and emotional experience, and in the Longinian tradition the distrust of figure is allayed by invoking sublimity and

[272] Webb 2009, 189.

refined emotion.[273] Milton introduces such oppositions directly into the figures, emphasising the distinction between form and surface, *eikon* and *eidolon*. While temporalities and intensities evoke the vitalist themes of the epic with their basis in the embodied subject and Arminian free will, the in-built tensions produced in the figure arising from dialectical oppositions are a dimension of agency, choice and potential of the subject, located in the immediacies of present experience.

Apprehension of the sacred quality of the figure depends on temperate passions and clear senses, while the tranquil state enables the discrimination between the experiences associated with higher and lower passions and affections. These principles are captured in Augustinian theory, with its emphasis on the refined emotions, and designation of unconscious lower passions to *anima*.[274] Evocation of the passions and desires is thereby important for the distinctions Milton draws between the carnal, temporal and material, on the one hand, and the spiritual, spatial and intelligible, on the other. Clarity of the senses and passions is essential for the apprehension of the sacred forms, which depends on the refining function of intellect. The indefinite detail and accompanying sense of the tantalising elusiveness of the Paradisal forms of Adam and Eve require acts of imagination to fill in what is unsaid. Yet this elusiveness, or sense of the 'invisible presence', is equally a key ingredient in the way the figure of Adam and Eve retains its sacred quality. In classical ekphrasis, elusiveness often implies historical or sacred significance.[275]

In *Paradise Lost*, the refined affections are associated with the apprehension of the sacred, but they depend on the virtuous relationship between temperance and tranquillity, as moral clarity depends on moderate emotions. Here Milton's figural style reflects the philosophy of Stoic testing of the subject through engaged example with its debt to principles of Aristotelian habit. Intensifying his figures in this approach, Milton incorporates an opposition between innocent and fallen readings, emphasising embodied effects that are particularly expressed in the sensory, carnal and corporeal. These effects are apparent through the play of 'literal' meanings and suggestiveness when considered according to Tate's theory of tension in poetry.[276] The description of 'curl[ing] tendrils' is suggestive of the serpent and the Gorgon figure that stand behind

[273] Longinus XVII; Mikics 18–19.
[274] Scrutton, 170–71.
[275] Webb 2009, 191.
[276] Tate 1959, 82.

the imagery of Eve, and with it a potential for enslavement through incitement of the senses, passions and desires. The emphasis on the carnal gives an Augustinian sense of *agon* to the figure. Incorporating a Stoic technique of jolting the reader to make him or her aware of the potential for illusion and capture, the figure simultaneously draws attention to the potential for moral danger brought about by the illusion of ekphrasis, through its suggestion of the Medusa-like 'tendrils'.

Milton goes on to express the fine balance between innocent and sinful 'insinuation' in his comparison of the elephant's proboscis and the serpent's 'braided train':

> th' unwieldy Elephant
> To make them mirth us'd all his might, and wreath'd
> His Lithe Proboscis; close the Serpent sly
> Insinuating, wove with Gordian twine
> His braided train, and of his fatal guile
> Gave proof unheeded ….
>
> (*PL* IV.345–50)

The serpent's coiling 'insinuation' captures tensions between the literal meaning and sensory effects associated with the bodily movement of the snake, anticipating the condition of human fallenness. Milton's suggestive use of the word 'insinuating' invokes the vital body with its intrinsic relation to poetic style and Arminian will: the vital energies produced through these intensities are characteristic of Milton's interrelated models of creative expression and morality. Similar emphases on terms like 'wanton', 'wander' and 'error', which produce a tension between the literal etymology and suggestiveness of words, reflect Milton's Arminianism by capturing aesthetic and spatial freedom of movement.[277] Yet here in the context of Paradise they are to be distinguished from the suggestions of hedonism, a loss of social decorum and religious error that they also produce.

While Fish emphasises that such tensions remind readers of their fallen condition, they are equally an expression of the regenerative capacities of the human soul that poetry engages, important regenerative effects that are captured in creative

[277] Milton's emphasis on the etymologies of words reflects a Stoic tradition of investigating linguistic etymologies to discover truth.

expression as a reflection of Milton's moral and spiritual subject. The condition of temporal engagement is associated not only with the fallen experiences of the subject, but is also integral to the expression, feeling and apprehension of the sacred. Higher states of experience are associated with temperate and refined emotions, essences and spirit, while lower states are associated with the carnal, surfaces and exterior body 'rind'.[278] These regenerative effects take place through the higher faculties of the soul — the imposition of reason and refined affections — key to the dual meaning of the term 'transport' as either exile or sublimation, which I argue is evoked and tested by the figure of Adam and Eve.[279]

The relationship between secular and sacred is expressed in the ekphrasis of Adam and Eve by the combination of spatial effects (stasis) and temporal experience (movement), in the orientation of Adam and Eve in space and time. The effects arise through the progressive layering of lines, simultaneously captures both the fixed, spatial form of art and the movement of language.[280] Milton incorporates a number of the key features of classical ekphrasis identified by Webb to achieve these effects, such as its sense of energetic movement in the immediate tense of the historical present ('wav'd', 'sway', 'curls'). The distinctions in turn articulate aesthetically the relationship between Providence and will in *Paradise Lost*.

The figure of Adam and Eve captures, in accordance with his monistic and Arminian model of selfhood, a sense of embodied energy essential to poetic inspiration and its regenerative effects on the soul.[281] Aesthetic techniques drawn from the classical techniques of ekphrasis reflect the finely-balanced symmetry of the relationship of sacred and secular authority in Milton's cosmic order. Ekphrastic technique underlies the notion of 'divine imperturbability' that Hartman finds integral to the spatial quality of the figures.[282] By this means the figure reflects both the eternal and secular realms of experience, with the reader's understanding of the eternal worked out in the world of time, space and kinaesthetic movement.

Such tensions also underlie Milton's principle of religious obedience, when considered in terms of the figure's emphasis on sexual hierarchy and authority ('by her

[278] Ricks, 108.
[279] Schoenfeldt 2004, 45.
[280] Krieger 1992, 1–30.
[281] Kerrigan 1983, 216, 234.
[282] Hartman, 2.

yielded'). Sexual hierarchy is reinforced in the way the figure is spatially expressed: Eve's submission is depicted psychologically and sexually by her lower position in ways which also capture aesthetically Milton's pattern of social and religious authority. The concrete, bodily emphasis on Adam and Eve's hair carries early modern associations with social and gender hierarchy and sexuality. Although the figure is not without Ovidian influences in the style of submission — 'amorous … delay' suggests a kind of playfulness and moral uncertainty, yet— it is equally a reflection of Eve's measured exercise of free will in favour of Adam's authority: 'yielded with coy submission'. Yet there is a kind of affective resistance linked to the fallen condition and agency of the reader ('sweet, reluctant … delay'). The opposition with its moral uncertainty captures the notion of desire as a reflection of the quality of the will expressed through the interiority of the auditor. The poetic play of meaning on the word 'subjection', with its sense of alternatively forced and voluntary submission, carries a poetically powerful somatic dimension of capture and resistance applicable to religious and secular obedience, reflected in the early modern models of authority based on state and home. This sense of 'capture' recalls Wollheim's reference (above) to the audience being made 'hostage to the moment' that is reiterated by Massumi, Webb, and a feature of Milton's classically-derived style.[283] The drama is integral to early modern concerns with submission to true and false authority, and an important element of the poetics of *Paradise Lost.*

The final stage of Wollheim's approach attaches the process to notions of identity-formation that are consistent with modern theories of the emotions: 'once the attitude is formed' and the 'related correspondences are established', it is at least possible to proceed as if our emotion 'derives from how we are, and from how we perceive the world, and ultimately from the history that we have led'.[284] What is expressed is not 'need and desire *per se*, but the relation the person maintains toward the attitude being developed'. Expression then is the 'process by which this sense of personal activity becomes articulate about itself'. It depends on the subject's 'bringing to bear a particular life history as he or she composes correspondences and links a projected cause to a single interpretive stance'.[285] It is in this way that the artwork is integrated with notions of identity, whilst carving a clear relationship to a subject's

[283] Altieri, 77; Wollheim 1999, 82.
[284] Wollheim, 1999, 82.
[285] Altieri, 66–67.

‘becomings’. When considered in relation to the figures of *Paradise Lost*, the outcome of that process is attached to the agency of the auditor.

I have argued here that a performative approach to literary affect reveals how creative expression depends in *Paradise Lost* on the balancing of such conscious and unconscious energies. Classical literature emphasises the role of reason in opposition to the forces of unconscious emotions and desires, from which the powers of creativity are to be captured; these are reflected in *Paradise Lost* by the underworld of Pandemonium. The Medusa-like ‘curl[ing] tendrils’ reflect the dual Renaissance attitude toward the effects of figural images. They may be both positive, by which the Platonic Forms may be apprehended through the intellect and toward which religious love may thus be expressed. Yet they may also be negative, through the capacity of the image to enchant or enslave by inflaming the readers’ desires and passions and preventing their apprehension of the sacred. The affective ‘field of particulars’ formed by the ekphrasis gives expression to identity as a matter of personal and cultural experience, and is underpinned by Milton’s Arminianism with its emphasis on agency and choice in the process of discernment, intrinsic to both creative and moral shaping.

Underlying Wollheim’s approach are the unconscious, psychic forces integral to Freudian theory that determine the subject’s expressive activity; the ‘involuntary’ dimensions of expression in artworks that are often identified in twentieth-century theory with the creative process itself. Wollheim’s approach also captures the role of conscious forces in shaping emotional states as subjects form identities according to personal and cultural parameters. Milton’s Augustinian emphasis on the fallen will and the strength of the heart in *Paradise Lost* recognises the interaction of conscious and unconscious forces, and facilitates a role for self-determination through choice and personal responsibility, principles which underlie his model of the moral and spiritual subject and its forms of expression. Moreover, despite his eudaimonistic emphasis, Milton does not close the text around fixed principles, as the reader might lose his or her moral agency to choose or be ‘free to fall’ — that sense of vital, creative agency is expressed in the suspensory states of temporal intensities and ‘becomings’ that are powerful features of the ontology of Milton’s Protestant humanist subject.

Chapter Five: Epic Similes

1. 'Great things by small'

> That *Satan* with less toil, and now with ease
> Wafts on the calmer wave by dubious light
> And like a weather-beaten Vessel holds
> Gladly the Port, though Shrouds and Tackle torn;
> Or in the emptier waste, resembling Air,
> Weighs his spread wings, at leasure to behold
> Far off th' Empyreal Heav'n ….
>
> (*PL* II.1041–47)

The close of Book II of *Paradise Lost* unfolds in a comparison between Satan and a space vessel, alluding to the political analogy originally attributed to Plato, of a ship of state.[1] With his attire likened to 'shrouds' and 'tackle', Satan emerges out of Chaos as a haunting presentiment. The series of similes culminates in Satan's arrival at the edge of the world, expanding spatially to introduce his view of the created universe. Blending classical with biblical allusions to describe Satan's fallen perspective, Milton's figures capture at a literal level the lustrous order of the stars of the Creation, where they equally evoke its eternal dimensions.[2] Such poetic moments 'stand out' (to quote Geoffrey Hartman) 'from a brilliant text as still more brilliant'.[3] They are powerful expressions of Renaissance ornament and the rhetorical tradition of ekphrasis, particularly the qualities of enargetic vividness and action combined with the amplitude of the epic 'grand' style.[4]

The simile, understood as a figure of speech expressed (with some variation) in a 'comparison using like or as', is an integral component of the classical epic style.[5] In turn, the complex form of extended 'epic' simile is central to the form since Homer's *Iliad*, and is imitated by Virgil, Dante, Spenser, Milton and other epic poets. It tends to be a 'lengthy and sophisticated comparison between two highly complex objects,

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[1] Plato uses the analogy of the ship in *The Republic* VI to describe the governance of state: Plato (1955) 1987, Book VI; Samuel (1947) 1965, 109.
[2] Curtius, 444; Fletcher, 70–146.
[3] Hartman, 1–12.
[4] Hartman, 1–12.
[5] R. Greene and others, 1306, 1307.

actions or relations'.[6] Distinguishable from the simple simile, the epic simile is a formal and sustained simile in which the secondary subject, or 'vehicle', is usually developed far beyond its specific points of parallel to the primary subject or 'tenor' to which it is compared, hence the expression 'long-tailed' is often applied to these comparisons.[7]

Apart from their formal properties, the similes fulfil an important role in the transformation of Milton's epic style from its classical and Renaissance influences. Integral to this function are their affective qualities, which are expressions of Milton's underlying monistic model of the subject with its valuation of the regenerative capacities of the embodied faculties. That potential is reflected in poetic language, which, despite its limitations of form and figure, requiring the expression of 'great things by small', is a vehicle for a transformation that takes place largely through affective states engaged in its auditors. If the 'pendant world' is a mere shadow of an ideal order, it is thus equally a world created from fallen language, an idea which is not only deeply implicated in the poem's underlying metaphysics, as form necessarily follows matter in the cosmic design of *Paradise Lost,* but also its poetics.[8] The use of Old Testament language to describe Satan's fallen perspective of Heaven is important as much to the circular and cosmic as to the narrative epic pattern, because it reflects equally the world of history and of the eternal.[9]

The condition of fallenness informs the relationship Milton carves out between *Paradise Lost,* its precursors in classical epic and the Shakespearean tradition, from which the refinements of his allegorical style are made. Milton's figure of the 'pendant world' is an allusion to Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure,* an allusion which reflects the relationship language has with the state of fallenness. Shakespeare's figure equally captures the ornamental, cosmic significance of language. Yet it is an irreligious and discomforting view of death that the character Claudio constructs, in which we are

> To be imprisoned in the viewless winds
> And blown with restless violence round about
> The pendent world; or to be worse than worst
> Of those that lawless and incertain thought
> Imagine howling — 'tis too horrible!

[6] Whaler 1931b, 1034–1074; R. Greene and others, 1307.
[7] Abrams, 52.
[8] Kerrigan 1983, 238; Martindale 1986, 39; Fitzgerald, 210.
[9] From Revelation.

> The weariest and most loathed worldly life
> That age, ache, penury, and imprisonment
> Can lay on nature is a paradise
> To what we fear of death.[10]

In this and surrounding lines, Shakespeare uses plain words with wide suggestiveness, like 'sensible' and 'motion', which produce intensities of present experience through their evocation of embodied senses, animation and emotion.[11] Shakespeare's allusion is in turn, to Dante's circle of the lustful of the *Commedia*, so the powerful allusions in Book II of *Paradise Lost* suggest in a circular way both the impending Fall and Final Judgment.[12] Satan's 'shrouds' are apocalyptic, prefiguring not only death but also the resurrection, and Revelation's notion of the false prophet is also reflected in their allusion to a dubious Roman Catholic relic.[13] Milton's allusive and symbolic associations express the world of time and change, set against the Calvinist long view of history or eternal Providence.[14]

As is suggested by the temporalities evoked in both Milton's and Shakespeare's lines, the basis of Renaissance figure in poetic and rhetorical techniques of a language of experience makes it a form of expression that engages the embodied faculties. In poetic language, affect is the intrinsic quality of pathos, and it is central to Milton's model of creative expression and moral self-fashioning. Equally, through the refinements of the affections, it contributes to his transformation of allegorical figure from the *eidolon* of fallen literature. For this process, the intensities and intermediary states or 'becomings' are significant. While capturing a sacred dimension of language that extends respectively from the classics and the Bible, Milton's 'pendant world' figure simultaneously implies a state of suspension prior to fallenness. As is suggested by Hartman's 'jewelled bearing' or Coleridge's 'fiery chariot', the figure evokes the forces of Providence through the immediacy of its expression of concrete sensory effects of the spatial and temporal.[15] Yet through the near-adverbial force of the

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[10] Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, 3.1.124–25.
[11] Kermode 2001, 163; *Measure for Measure*, 3.1.118–23.
[12] Kermode 2001, 163.
[13]Lewalski notably identifies the preponderance of apocalyptic imagery in *Paradise Lost*: Lewalski 1985, 51. Milton may be alluding to the Shroud of Turin. In 1543 John Calvin in his *Treatise on Relics* questioned the authenticity of the Shroud: Calvin (1543) 1870. Milton shows a lack of religious fear of relics in his prose works: see Martin 2010, 122.
[14] Kirby, 321.
[15] Hartman, 1; Coleridge, 67.

adjective ('pendant'), it equally evokes a sense of imbalance or asymmetry, and the cosmic scale and magnitude of the impending Fall.

With a focus on the extended 'epic' simile, this chapter explores the important role of Milton's similes in the structure and themes of *Paradise Lost,* encapsulating his philosophies of both poetic inspiration and selfhood, and the extent to which they depend for their expression and reading on the affectivities of body, mind and soul. The second section of the chapter, using classically-derived Renaissance rhetorical and metaphor theory, examines the formal and technical aspects of the similes and the way a consideration of poetic affect can enliven the accompanying critical debates. It traces a critical divergence between 'formalist' readings of the similes which emphasise technical and semantic precision and tend to favour arguments about theological and moral certainty, and views of critics who find ambiguities of reference and meaning in the similes that they argue complicate such certainties in *Paradise Lost*.[16] The section in turn considers how applying phenomenological theories of metaphor shifts the emphasis from the logical structure of the similes to the intrinsic value attaching to temporalities of engagement.[17] The third section considers the integral role of the Miltonic 'observer figure' in the reading of the similes, and the fourth section considers the important role the similes play in moral discernment by expressing a Renaissance integration of aesthetics, ethics and the body. Finally, Part Five brings the material together to consider the role of poetic affect in the transformation of Milton's epic from its classical heritage to a style that encapsulates the seventeenth-century Protestant sacred, reflecting with it a shift in corresponding models of selfhood and culture.

2. 'The Miltonic Simile'[18]

> in bulk as huge
> As whom the Fables name of monstrous size,
> *Titanian,* or *Earth-born,* that warr'd on *Jove,*
> *Briareos* or *Typhon,* whom the Den
> By ancient *Tarsus* held, or that Sea-beast
> *Leviathan* ….
>
> (*PL* I.196–201)

[16] Ricks, 118–50; Herman (2005) 2008, 25–26; Martindale 1986, 119–32.
[17] Altieri, 16–18.
[18] Title taken from James Whaler's study of the same name. Whaler 1931b.

The extended simile has its origins in the Homeric epics, where it fulfils a variety of formal and aesthetic functions, providing decoration or contrast, narrative relief or thematic amplification.[19] Subsequent epic poets, including Virgil, Dante, Spenser and Milton, are considered to refine the device, employing it for decorative purposes, while also integrating it with the themes and structure of their epics.[20] In an extended simile of Book I, Satan is compared to the 'Sea-beast *Leviathan*' and a series of giant mythical and biblical monsters. The simile, in which figures of classical and biblical myth are invoked to demonstrate the immense size of Satan, shows the amplitude of the epic style, in ways which suggest exaggerations and distortions of form rather than the grandness that is expressed in Milton's divine figures. Such distinctions underlie Milton's development of allegorical figure in *Paradise Lost*.

The simile, as a figure of speech based on analogy, is distinguishable from the more direct comparison of metaphor, which is preferred in Aristotelian theory for its greater economy and precision.[21] Dispersed throughout *Paradise Lost* are multiple examples of both figures, with the similes consisting of a variety of forms.[22] James Whaler divides Milton's similes diagrammatically into 'simple' and 'complex' forms.[23] In a simple form the poet 'presents only two terms', so that 'all the salient points' of resemblance or correspondence are 'instantly recognisable', even though 'one may surpass the other'.[24] In a 'complex' simile, by contrast, of which the extended epic simile is a form, the poet is 'not satisfied with a plain statement of likeness', 'but amplifies' the simile by adding details to it.[25]

Milton's similes are adaptations of classical and Renaissance epic forms, yet they are also distinctive in style and notable for their inventiveness and scope of reference.[26] Brooks compares the elaborate comparisons of Milton's similes to the richness of the condensed metaphor of the metaphysical poets.[27] Whaler concludes that they are employed by Milton to perform one or several functions: 'to explain or to

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[19] Whaler 1931b, 1034, 1036, 1065.
[20] Abrams, 52; Martindale 1986, 119–32.
[21] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*: Aristotle 1926, II.9*;* R. Greene and others, 1306.
[22] Whaler 1931b, 1034.
[23] Whaler 1931b, 1038, 1040.
[24] Whaler 1931b, 1038.
[25] Whaler 1931b, 1040. Whaler identifies 84 instances of 'simple pattern similes' and at least 90 instances of 'complex pattern similes' which include the extended simile in its formal variations.
[26] Ricks, 118–19; Whaler 1931b, 1034, 1065; Martindale 1986, 119–32.
[27] Brooks 1951a, 1.

emotionalise or to ennoble or to relieve or to anticipate'.[28] Their highly condensed and elaborate detail often consists in dense layers of classical and biblical references and allusions that reflect Milton's blending of techniques of classical epic style and poetic and rhetorical figure to his particular style of allegorical poetry.[29]

Appearing at key points of the narrative in various books of *Paradise Lost*, the similes are especially associated with styles of fallen language that are features of the world of Satan. Critical attention typically focuses on the high concentration of similes in Books I and II in Pandemonium. They are relatively absent from the descriptions of Heaven in Book III and from postlapsarian Eden until the final stages of Book XII. Due in part to this pattern, critical debate recurs on whether Milton's similes represent a renunciation of significant styles and techniques of classical and medieval poetry, and in particular the opulent Renaissance imagination represented in English poetry by the Shakespearean tradition.[30] Yet a theme of this thesis is the importance to Milton's poetry of these traditions, which are adapted in significant ways to Milton's allegorical style.

Epic similes are formal devices, and critics traditionally apply a formalist approach to their reading in *Paradise Lost* based on classical and Renaissance poetic and rhetorical principles.[31] The style of Milton's similes is compared to antecedent formal models as part of a modern hermeneutic process of establishing their parameters of meaning. The tendency is thus to examine *Paradise Lost*'s epic similes for their degree of 'homologisation' or relevance to the narrative, by interpreting the semantic basis of 'correspondences' between tenor and vehicle according to Renaissance Aristotelian metaphor theory.[32] Whaler explains:

> The more the poet amplifies, the more careful the poet must have been in the original choice of comparison, for the reason that every explicit detail of the simile may be capable of challenging correspondence with some detail of the thing compared.[33]

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[28] Whaler 1931b, 1036.
[29] Ricks, 118; Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[30] Widmer, 258; Fish (1967) 1997, 22, 122; cf. Steadman 1998, 53 for a reading of Milton's work that allows greater scope for Renaissance traditions.
[31] Ricks, 118; Herman (2005) 2008, 26.
[32] Ricks 118–9; Herman (2005) 2008, 26; Whaler claims that Milton, like Homer, subordinates metaphor to simile: Whaler 1931b, 1034.
[33] Whaler 1931b, 1040–41.

The general principles of Renaissance metaphor theory lie behind both the techniques of rhetorical and (with a recognition of the distinctive role of symbolism) of allegorical figure in *Paradise Lost*.[34] In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle proposes that metaphors should be proportional to their subject:[35]

> we must make use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate …. We must consider as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one; for the same garment is not suitable for both.[36]

For Aristotle, to create good metaphors is to 'contemplate similarities' or to 'have an insight into likeness'.[37] In the *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian proposes in similar terms that the best metaphors are those in which 'the correspondence between the resemblances [is] exact, an effect produced by *reciprocal representation*'.[38] The classical emphasis on formal proportionality of metaphoric analogy is equally an element of both Aristotelian and Horatian principles of rhetorical and poetic decorum.[39]

In Aristotle's analysis of the constituents in the *Poetics*, he distinguishes between several types of metaphor according to a class categorisation of 'giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, on the grounds of analogy'.[40] In this tradition, according to Ricoeur, metaphor is described in terms of deviance in denomination, so instead of giving a thing its usual common name, one designates it by means of a borrowed or 'foreign' name:

> the rationale of this transfer of name is understood as the objective similarity between the things themselves or the subjective similarity between the attitudes linked to the grasping of these things. As concerns the goal of this transfer, it is supposed either to fill up a lexical lacuna, and therefore to serve the principle of economy which rules the endeavour of giving appropriate names to new things, new ideas, or new experiences, or to decorate discourse, and therefore to serve the main purpose of rhetorical discourse, which is to persuade and to please.[41]

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[34] The function of metaphor in allegory is discussed in M. Mack, 34; Treip, 49; Tuve 1947, 33; Fletcher, 70–146.
[35] Herman (2005) 2008, 26.
[36] Aristotle 1926, III.7; Herman (2005) 2008, 26.
[37] Ricoeur 1978, 145.
[38] Quintilian 1891, 8.3.77; Herman (2005) 2008, 26.
[39] Aristotle 1926, III; Cicero 1822, 3.208; Horace 2007.
[40] Aristotle 1961, ch. 21; Ricoeur 1978, 145.
[41] Ricoeur 1978, 145; Ricoeur 1977, 4.

Renaissance theory also reflects these formal and rhetorical principles that rely on the objects under comparison being compared on the basis of 'similitude' or likeness. Milton, according to Peter Herman, invokes this aspect of Aristotelian metaphor theory in *The Art of Logic* (1672), when he asserts that an 'argument of similitude [is] when like is explained by like', and

> [to] the short form of similitude pertains the metaphor for, as the rhetoricians teach, the metaphor is a similitude contracted to one word without signs, which, however, are understood.[42]

The Art of Logic also considers the necessity for comparisons to be kept to points of similitude, although Milton recognises that the vehicle and tenor cannot match in identical terms:

> Warning, however, should be given that likes whether of short or full form are not to be urged beyond that quality which the man making the comparison intended to show as the same in both. Thus a magistrate is likened to a dog, yet merely for the fidelity of his guardianship, whence came the sayings of the schools: 'Nothing similar is identical; likeness does not run on four feet, every likeness hobbles'.[43]

The Art of Logic, composed in Latin, considers the use of metaphor in the context of Ramist logic and rhetoric. Their influence on *Paradise Lost* is noted by scholars, and Fish adopts a parallel alignment in his approach to metaphor in *Paradise Lost*, which he describes in classical theory as 'a figure of speech whose operation bears the closest resemblance to the operation of dialectic and logic'.[44] In seventeenth-century theory, such an approach is in accord with certain styles of Protestant rhetoric that are influenced by the Stoic and Ramist traditions.[45] Yet the approach ignores a considerable body of experience-based metaphor theory that applies to usage in poetic language.

Milton's recognition of the inherent distance between tenor and vehicle in metaphor theory resonates with both modern and Renaissance metaphor theory. The identification of metaphor with disparity invokes, with its ambivalent moral associations, a Renaissance understanding of the basis of metaphoric comparison in

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[42] Milton (1672) 1935, 126.
[43] Milton (1672) 1935, 195; Herman (2005) 2008, 26.
[44] Wilson 55; Fish (1967) 1997, 26; Whitehead 1962 13–14.
[45] Pearcy 261.

describing something by what it is not, or of 'saying other than what you mean'.[46] George Puttenham refers to metaphor as a 'figure of transport', an equally double-edged description of its 'feigning capacity' and, as is argued in Chapter Four of this thesis, its effect on the senses, imagination and emotions.[47] It is also referred to as a 'figure of inversion', and Satan's speeches and his own physical form reflect distortions of figural styles in *Paradise Lost*.[48] The similes that are closely associated with the figure of Satan draw especially on classically-derived Renaissance poetic and rhetorical techniques of ekphrasis, with their qualities of animation, vividness and amplitude. These similes often emphasise the basis of metaphorical comparisons in 'dissimilation' or the divergence between tenor and vehicle in ways which associate the technique with imaginative distortion, exaggeration and 'false semblant'. [49] Yet as will be argued, the effects are important for the transformation of classical styles to accord body with agency according to Milton's model of poetic invention, and his discrimination of allegorical figure based on the Longinian principles of the sublime.

The mainstream critical focus on formalism and rhetorical decorum in Milton's similes often leads, somewhat paradoxically, to an acknowledgment of their apparent irreducibility to the strictly formulaic. Christopher Ricks poses a question of concern to critics about the epic similes: whether they 'fasten on a broad point of resemblance and then drift beautifully away' (that is, more like Homer's) or whether they 'are more closely related to the poem' (that is, more like Virgil's).[50] Despite their theoretical emphases on formal and technical features of Milton's similes, modern critics identify a marked lack of 'assimilation' between tenor and vehicle. In *Paradise Lost*, according to Fish, 'the components of a simile often do not have a point of contact that makes their comparison possible in a meaningful (relatable or comprehensible) way'.[51] Equally Eliot finds that Milton introduces 'distracting extraneous matter'; Broadbent that the similes 'intensify and complicate'; Rogers that they are 'overstuffed' and always 'breaking out of any kind of theoretical constraints that are imposed upon them'; and

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[46] In 1589 when George Puttenham calls metaphor the 'figure of transport', he translates into English the moving power for which the figure was named: the Greek *μετα* ('meta') means 'trans- or across' and '*φορά*' means 'port or carry'. Puttenham explains metaphor as a style of transport, suggesting the movement between the things compared in figure, an alienating power that causes both admiration and unease in the Renaissance. Puttenham 1589, III.17. See also *OED* s.v. 'metaphor' *n*.
[47] Puttenham 1589, III.3, 17, 18; Peacham 1577, sigs. Biir–v.
[48] Lerer (1999) 2007, '*Paradise Lost*'.
[49] Puttenham 1589, III.18; Ricoeur 1978, 145.
[50] Ricks, 118; Martindale 1986, 119–20.
[51] Fish (1967) 1997, 26.

Herman that they manifest ambiguities and ambivalences that in turn reflect a crisis of philosophical doubt for Milton.[52] Herman argues that correspondences are often neither close, nor is the quality that 'the comparison is intended to show self-evident and unambiguous'. Milton thus 'embraces the very capacity to generate multiple and contradictory meanings that he warns against in *The Art of Logic*'. The ambiguities and often irreducible and contradictory suggestions generated by the similes, according to Herman, challenge the moral and theological certainties that traditional critics find in the text.[53]

These critical arguments can be explored in a reading of some of Milton's similes. Whaler's examination of the various types of complex simile in *Paradise Lost* include 'complex patterns with perfect homology'; 'complex patterns with a logical digression'; and 'complex patterns with multiple terms', examples of each of which are examined in this chapter.[54] In general, Whaler finds that Milton's similes are predominantly 'homologous' or 'reducible to logical patterns, which exceed in variety those of any ancient poet'. He explains:

> A typically complex Miltonic simile directs each detail to some application in the fable …. Milton's similes are organically related to a degree beyond those of his epic predecessors.[55]

In *Paradise Lost*, 'homologisation rather than heterogeneity between terms is the rule'. Whaler's finding about the strong 'homologisation' in Milton's similes is in part based on a common comparison with the similes of Virgil and Homer, with Homer's similes usually considered to be more digressive, their aim to provide aesthetic relief. Virgil's, by contrast, tend to emphasise more detailed correspondences with the actual narrative, and on this basis, Milton's similes are considered to be more Virgilian. Yet Virgil, the proto-Christian poet, is associated with Rome and, according to Linda Gregerson, Protestant poets Milton and Spenser distinguish their allegorical figures from this tradition while retaining the important transformational effects of the rhetorical style.[56]

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[52] Eliot 1947, 74–75; Broadbent 1956, 409; Herman (2005) 2008, 25–26; Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'; Ricks, 122, 128–29; Martindale 1986, 121.
[53] Herman (2005) 2008, 25–26; Rogers, 'Epic Similes'.
[54] Whaler 1931b, 1040–64.
[55] Whaler 1931b, 1037. Whaler's argument was developed and modified by Lerner, 297; Ricks, 118.
[56] Gregerson 1995, 4.

Of particular interest to critics in the similes of *Paradise Lost* are comparisons of 'unlikenesses' and those which 'emphasise differences' rather than similarities. Such comparisons are seemingly technical departures from Aristotelian metaphor theory, yet capture anxieties attached to metaphoric usage in the Renaissance.[57] These 'differences' often obscure the view of Satan and God as sympathetic or unsympathetic figures, for example, in the simile that introduces the figure of the ploughman observing the squadron of good angels:

> the careful Plowman doubting stands
> Lest on the threshing floor his hopeful sheaves
> Prove chaff.
>
> (*PL* IV.983–85)

The ploughman figure is, according to Ricks, irrelevant to the narrative; 'beautiful' although 'digressive'.[58] Yet Empson differs, comparing the ploughman figure with God to support his argument that in *Paradise Lost,* Milton questions the omnipotence of God and therefore the principle of Providence, with the figure of the doubting Ploughman making God seem 'unsure' and the good angels 'seem weak'.[59] By contrast, in the simile comparing Satan to a vulture,

> Here walk'd the Fiend at large in spacious field.
> As when a Vultur on *Imaus* bred,
> Whose snowy ridge the *roving Tartar* bounds,
> Dislodging from a Region scarce of prey ….
>
> (*PL* III.430–33)

Ricks find the correspondences to be 'astonishingly precise' based on the affinities between Satan and preying vultures: 'To gorge the flesh of Lambs or yeanling Kids' (*PL* III.434).[60] Yet although 'the exactness has not killed the imaginative life of the lines', according to Ricks, 'common sense' is still required when the simile apparently digresses with the introduction of the perspective of the Chinese: 'where *Chineses* drive / With Sails and Wind thir cany Waggons light' (III.438–39).[61] Despite the 'imaginative

[57] Herman (2005) 2008, 26; Ricks, 128–29; Martindale 1986, 119–32.
[58] Ricks, 130.
[59] Empson 1935, 172.
[60] Ricks, 127.
[61] Ricks, 127.

life' that Ricks finds in Milton's similes, underlying his reading is a perceived necessity for restraint on the potential for indecorous associations that seem to reflect Milton's Puritan milieu. For Ricks it is still necessary to 'curb one's wanton imagination'.[62]

In an extended simile comparing Satan to biblical Jacob, a comparison which some critics consider impious, illustrating a technique often invoked in *Paradise Lost,* it is the contrast between the two figures that is more significant. In the simile, critical attention centres on the 'dissonance' or 'unlikeliness' of the comparison between a fallen angel and a significant biblical figure:

> The Stairs were such as whereon *Jacob* saw
> Angels ascending and descending, bands
> Of Guardians bright, when he from *Esau* fled
> To *Padan-Aram* in the field of *Luz*,
> Dreaming by night under the open Sky,
> And waking cri'd, *This is the Gate of Heav'n*.
> Each Stair mysteriously was meant ….
>
> (*PL* III.510–25)

Satan is compared to Jacob when he sees the gate of Heaven, a comparison that Ricks finds troubling as it seems to suggest 'either that Satan was good, or that Jacob was bad'. Further:

> The length and power of the allusion forces us to choose between damaging irrelevance, or likeness turning grimly into disparity.... My own view is that the disparity is meant to be recognised ....[63]

Although such a comparison may be termed 'ironic disparity', while 'Satan so often is a hideous parody of the good', it is a 'dangerously useful weapon'.[64] Herman objects to Ricks's approach, arguing that although he recognises that the comparison implicitly suggests a likeness between Satan and Jacob, Ricks resolves the problem by refining its terms and 'carefully defuses the potential contradictions'.[65]

An essential component of Fish's argument is that figures and tropes are instruments of a fallen language and take effect on the temporal level of experience,

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[62] Ricks, 125.
[63] Ricks, 128.
[64] Ricks, 127, 129.
[65] Herman (2005) 2008, 14–15.

with its dependence on fallen perception and human time; fallen language is an inadequate vehicle for the articulation of the eternal. In *Paradise Lost*, a series of 'verbal traps' foreground the state of fallenness and corresponding linguistic limitations that underlie the inaccessibility of the sacred. Unlike critics who explore the potential of poetic ambiguities in *Paradise Lost*, including the importance of incomplete assimilation between tenor and vehicle to the semantic, aesthetic and emotional potential of figurative language, for Fish the limitations of language place meaning out of reach, by separating the time-bound and fallen world of the reader, an approach which, in the views of some critics provides 'a perspective equivalent finally to the suppression of the poetry'.[66]

Milton's figure comparing Satan and Jacob exemplifies his common use of dialectical oppositions in *Paradise Lost*, which underlie its drama of engagement.[67] Yet by categorising the figure of speech as a tool of logic and dialectic rather than poetics, approaches based on these metaphoric traditions tend to de-emphasise the aesthetic/decorative function of metaphor with its effects on the senses, imagination and emotions. This is a distinction that Milton recognises in *Of Education*, when he discriminates between logic, rhetoric and poetry, emphasising the 'simple, sensuous and passionate' styles of poetry, styles which are intrinsic to techniques of reader entanglement in *Paradise Lost*.[68] Charles Martindale makes an important point about the limitations of the formalist approach when he suggests that more attention be given to how the similes 'affect' the reader's response, noting that the links may be 'emotional' rather than 'diagrammatic':

> surely the success of the simile does not depend primarily or even substantially on the number of correspondences we can find (this would turn the whole matter into an intellectual game).[69]

This chapter seeks to redress these perceived limitations by applying a performative reading of metaphor, concerned less with logical relations than with expressions of style which take into account the temporalising processes of the senses, imagination and emotions in the reading of poetic figure. Such an approach shows how non- or in-complete assimilation is an essential quality of metaphor, providing its creative impetus

[66] Edwards, 498–99; Martindale 2009, 458–59.
[67] Safer, 55.
[68] Milton, *Of Education*: CP 636–37.
[69] Martindale 1981, 232–33.

and manner of generating novelty. Samuel Johnson's identification of the importance of the incomplete assimilation of tenor and vehicle matches Milton's prior view in *The Art of Logic*, and is a feature also highlighted by modern critics as essential to the metaphoric process.[70] Of particular relevance is the modern metaphor theory discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, with its emphasis on the performative 'assimilation' of thought, imagination and feeling that seems equally relevant to the Renaissance. These include the emphases by Eliot, Ricoeur, Hester and others on the experiential process of metaphor, with its dependence on blended thought and feeling (of 'seeing in experiencing') to the production of insight and novelty.[71] With its basis in experiential processes as opposed to comparisons based solely on abstract principles, the metaphor is an integral feature of the pedagogical role of Renaissance poetry in 'teaching, delighting and moving' an audience toward virtue. This role differs from the more direct styles of persuasive argument, and depends on the more subtle role of proof by example (as it is known in rhetoric) which, when used in poetry, relies on the evocation of experience through the expression of poetic figure.[72] This process is important for the way the similes provide a means of 'educating the reader', using an 'alternative mode of vision' apprehensible through the vehicle of metaphor and figure, by contrast to 'more straightforward linear, narrative boundaries'.[73] Such techniques of metaphor, Moran argues, can operate below the level of consciousness, harnessing both voluntary and involuntary dimensions of embodied experience. These qualities underlie the expression of Milton's poetic figures which are shaped by his monistic and Arminian model of the subject and which draw on processes of active engagement rather than merely passive reflection.

Whaler's finding about strong homologisation in Milton's similes rests on his identification of a key narrative function the similes fulfil, one which also underpins Milton's transformation of allegory. He finds Milton's similes to be 'proleptic', that is, 'anticipating something that happens later in the fable' in a way which makes some apparent digressions more relevant to the narrative. Milton, according to Whaler, 'is the

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[70] Milton (1672) 1935, 195; Johnson, 'Cowley'; I. A. Richards (1930), Empson (1930), Martindale (2009, 458–59), Moran (1989, 87) and others find incomplete assimilation to be an essential component of metaphoric style.
[71] Gregerson 2003, 87 also identifies the sensuous and experiential qualities of the similes in *Paradise Lost.*
[72] Tuve 1947, 183; Whaler 1035–6.
[73] Rogers, 'Epic Similes'.

first epic poet to add to simile the function of prolepsis', a principal rhetorical means by which this 'homology' is enacted in the narrative.[74] He concludes that as a definitive narrative device, this 'function of anticipating events in the fable by means of simile' seems to be 'distinctive with Milton, though it may occur sporadically in the classics'.[75] By way of example, Whaler recalls the ill-fated expedition of the classical Persian leader Xerxes, to which Sin and Death are compared as they build a bridge to the world in Book X:

> So, if great things to small may be compar'd,
> *Xerxes*, the Liberty of *Greece* to yoke,
> From *Susa* his *Memnonian* Palace high
> Came to the Sea, and over *Hellespont*
> Bridging his way ….
> (*PL* X. 306–10).

The same, according to Whaler, 'is to be the history of Sin and Death. There will come a harrowing of hell; Paradise will be regained.'[76] Prolepsis is an important poetic technique of *Paradise Lost* that is especially encapsulated in the simile which creates 'anticipatory' associations based on Christian and pagan myth. As a narrative device, it facilitates the integration of the rhetorical tradition of classical epic with the typological tradition of allegorical poetry and yet retains its literary quality associated with classical figure. Erich Auerbach's study of the typological tradition in *Mimesis* explains a broader development under the term *figura*, with particular reference to Dante's work, that involves the blending of literary allegory, developed from the hermeneutics of Augustine and biblical exegetics, with the classical principles of rhetorical style.[77] Developing in the medieval period, the tradition explains the relationship between Old and New Testaments, by which 'one historical personage or event prefigures or signifies a second, later one whereby the latter will, effectively, fulfil the former such that while the two remain distinct historical realities, their full significance is to be sought in the figural relationship between them'.[78] The tension that arises between the rhetorical tradition and the expression of sacred matters that emerges from the style of Augustine

[74] Whaler 1931b, 1034.
[75] Whaler 1931b, 1036; Puttenham identifies this rhetorical device of 'prolepsis' in his *Arte of English Poesie*: Puttenham 1589, III.12.
[76] Whaler 1931b, 1049.
[77] Auerbach 1953, 554; Auerbach 1984, 11; Lerer 2005.
[78] Auerbach 1953, 554; Auerbach 1984, 11; Lerer 2005.

has a special function.[79] According to Auerbach, figure transforms when it is applied in allegorical literature. Its 'historicity accords with the interpreter's own temporality, but lodges necessity elsewhere, in the eternal'.[80]

The typological tradition shapes the expression of poetic figures in *Paradise Lost* and the splitting that occurs between the rhetorical and allegorical traditions preserves their transformative power. Milton's technique of prolepsis expands the scope of typological prefiguration to include classical literary figures and narrative events, a process which draws extensively upon the rhetorical qualities of the similes, in ways which retain their basis in historical and perceptual time yet express the sacred and eternal poetic quality afforded to allegory.[81] In turn, the transformation depends on the affective qualities of poetic language through the concrete and embodied dimensions of experience that are intrinsic to the process of figuration. The distinctions between sacred and secular poetry depend on Milton's monistic model with its dynamic graduations between higher and lighter, and lower and heavier substances, a process that is mirrored in language forms. The model of agency underlies the creative energies of invention and the refinements of Milton's *eikon* according to principles associated with the Longinian sublime.

Prolepsis is a narrative device that contributes to the expansion of the scope of Milton's allegory and is reflected in his figures. It draws on Aristotle's principle of mimesis in the *Poetics,* a qualification to the Platonic distinction between *phantastic* and *eicastic* images, which is recognised in Sidney's *Apology* between images which 'infect the fancy with unworthy objects', and those which more closely reflect 'truth in images'.[82] Mimesis does not require strict representation of reality but works through example, by which poetry has the capacity to convey an awareness of 'universals'.[83] The blended styles permit figural language greater flexibility to represent the world and the sacred through inventions of the imagination. This blending of the rhetorical and allegorical within a more expansive style accords with traditions of Renaissance humanism and the result is a style of figure in *Paradise Lost* which facilitates

[79] Gregerson 2003, 87.
[80] Gregerson 1995, 250.
[81] Gregerson 1995, 249; Fletcher, 70–146.
[82] Sidney 2007 137–9; Krieger 1992, 127–31, 139–40.
[83] Shields 2016.

imaginative expression through the concrete and the corporeal expression of the experience of the embodied faculties.

A performative approach to the similes, I argue, captures the way the similes engage the intensities of present experience and thereby the potentialities associated with Milton's eudaimonistic model, where vital agency is the basis of creative expression and self-modelling. The 'Satan and Jacob' simile reflects such a dynamic, and Milton typically makes a strong distinction between classical and Christian understandings of virtue, exemplified respectively by Satan and Jacob.[84] Jacob's ladder is often interpreted as a symbol of ascesis through contemplation, implying that entrance to Heaven is by repentance, devotion and meditation. Satan, like Jacob, although heroic in the classical sense, has fled retribution and chooses damnation, whereas Jacob chooses to repent.[85] In the 'ploughman' simile, the spiritual resolve of the good angels, to stand without proving to be 'chaff', is thus a key feature of the comparison. Milton's technique resembles the stoic rhetorical tool of invoking *phantasia* by example, with the purpose of engaging the agency of the reader in a process of philosophical judgment.[86] Both of these similes incorporate a regenerative model of virtuous choice that draws on the underlying ethos of his Arminian philosophy.

The similes are important for transforming the model of Renaissance epic according to Milton's underlying monism, with its valuing of the regenerative potential of the world of experience through the operation of Grace on the virtues of the Renaissance subject. The blending of allegory and rhetorical figure in the similes is intrinsic to the epic's circular, cosmic and sacred reading that Milton aligns with the Calvinist long view of providential history.[87] Yet a dramatic tension between the figural tradition (associated with time and history) and the allegorical (associated with the eternal and sacred) remains in Milton's epic and is key to the transformative process of regeneration afforded by the reading experience. The remainder of this chapter explores how the similes engage processes of perception and moral discrimination performatively through the senses, imagination and emotions. These integrated

[84] Widmer, 259.
[85] Carey and Fowler, 591n to *PL* III.510–15.
[86] Stroud, 254–56; Webb 2009, 185.
[87] Gregerson 2003, 87; Hartman, 1.

processes form the basis of reader entanglement, and are necessary for spiritual and moral self-development according to Milton's underlying eudaimonistic model.

3. The Observer '*ab extra*'[88]

> his ponderous shield,
> Ethereal temper, massy, large and round,
> Behind him cast; the broad circumference
> Hung on his shoulders like the Moon, whose Orb
> Through Optic Glass the *Tuscan* Artist views
> At Ev'ning from the top of *Fesole,*
> Or in *Valdarno* ….
>
> (*PL* I.284–90)

With their origins in the Homeric epics, Milton's 'observer' similes are examples of a special kind of complex, 'long-tailed' simile that introduces the '*ab extra*' figure as an observer to the main action. Instead of a straightforward comparison between tenor and vehicle, Milton's observer similes expand the terms of the comparison to incorporate the actions and perspectives of an onlooker, often introduced after the midway point of the simile as it unfolds.[89] The '*Tuscan* Artist' appears in such a manner, as part of an extended series of similes in Book I. The observer is notable for its addition of depth, richness and complexity of detail, providing more than aesthetic relief in its digression from the main narrative and fulfilling interrelated formal, aesthetic and philosophical functions.[90]

A much-debated figure, the distinctive Miltonic observer has been variously identified by critics with the point of view of God, Satan, the poet or the reader.[91] The complexity arises because in *Paradise Lost*, the observer figure is a reflexive tool which engages processes of reader perception, 'illuminat[ing] the act of perception itself', a feature which in Milton's monistic epic tends to foreground the experiential dimensions of expression and reading.[92] This section explores an essential manner in which the observer figure functions performatively by engaging fallen processes of perception

[88] Coleridge uses this term '*ab extra*': Coleridge, 67; from whom it is adopted by Hartman, 1.
[89] Hartman, 4, 6; Whaler 1931b, 1052; Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[90] Whaler 1931b, 1037; Martindale 1981, 232–33.
[91] Fish (1967) 1997, 22–37; Hartman, 3, 4; Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[92] Gregerson 2003, 87.

using techniques invoked by artists and poets to represent the world and the sacred. The complex role the figures play in moral discernment is discussed in the next section.

Epic similes are unique in their combination of elements of narrative (which develop the story in a linear direction) and poetics (which tend to arrest the linear flow of narrative with more condensed 'circular' techniques of poetic figure, symbol and metaphor). They can thus capture both the movement of language and the stasis of art.[93] As will be argued, that combination in Milton's figures is a means of discrimination between the secular world of time and change, and the timeless world of the sacred. As an element of Milton's similes, the observer figure influences reader perception, affecting point of view (in narrative terms) and perspective (in aesthetic terms).[94] By engaging the overlap between art and literature, the similes invoke a Renaissance debate over the relationship between poetry and painting according to the principle of *ut pictura poiesis*, and in particular, which form is superior for imitating nature and expressing the sacred.[95] Milton applies the technique in *Paradise Lost* to make discriminations in favour of his style of allegorical poetry as a superior vehicle for the expression of the relationship between human and sacred.

In each of the observer similes of the first books, the interposed figure intensifies the reading process, creating depth of perspective as the observer becomes part of the scene itself. Gregerson suggests that the observer figure's position in the foreground to the action can 'draw out' or 'take in' in scale.[96] Yet with its emphasis on processes of perception, the observer is also a technique for evoking, in its reflexivity, some critical detachment. In the simile in which Satan's shield is compared to the moon (above), the observer figure is Galileo who uses a telescope to view Satan, comparing the figure of Galileo as proto-scientist and astronomer with the '*Tuscan* Artist', thereby directly invoking comparisons between poetry and painting.[97] Moreover, Milton's '*Tuscan* Artist' simile places under aesthetic, moral and theological scrutiny the veracity of Galileo's perception through the faculties of the observer and his optical

[93] Krieger 1–33.
[94] Hartman, 4; Fish (1967) 1997, 22–37.
[95] The notion that poetry and painting are alike derives from Horace's *Ars Poetica* and earlier pronouncements of Simonides of Keos first recorded by Plutarch, *De gloria Atheniensium*, 3.347a, more than a century after *Ars Poetica*: 'Poema pictura loquens, pictura poema silens' (poetry is a speaking picture, painting a silent [mute] poetry). Aristotle in the *Poetics* also considered that poetry and painting as arts of imitation should use the same principal element of composition (structure), namely, plot in tragedy and design (outline) in painting. see Aristotle 1961, 6.19–21.
[96] Gregerson 2003, 87; Gregerson 2013, 252.
[97] Krieger 1992, 119.

glass as a tool of perception. Satan's shield is an important poetic figure through which Milton enacts the transformation of classical epic to Protestant allegory.

The shield is a variation of the epic motif of the shields in Homer and Virgil and evokes the circular symbol that recurs throughout *Paradise Lost*. It is identified with the tradition of ekphrasis and Milton preserves its associations with the circular *ouroboros* of classical myth, while distinguishing the motif from its identification with the pagan sacred.[98] The shield is thus compared to the moon, a perfect astral body, yet which contains visible imperfections and is equally associated with illusion, error and obscurity of truth through the limitations of the optic glass.

The 'ponderous shield' invites and implicitly questions not only the observer's but the reader's process of pondering, and is initially of an 'ethereal' or perfect Heavenly substance, of which both the sun and moon are thought to have been made in the Renaissance. Yet Galileo challenges this assumption in the *Siderius Nuncius* (1610) by describing geological imperfections on the moon viewed with his optic glass, a complication that produces moral and theological uncertainty in the Renaissance.[99] It is the perfect form of the moon with its corresponding theological certainties that the simile places under scrutiny through the vehicle of the observer and his astronomical tools of perception.[100]

Milton's refinement of the allegorical style depends on establishing the superior access of poetry to the intelligible refinements of the imagination, truth claims that Milton tests by interrogating the processes and tools of reader perception. The empirical basis of Aristotelian knowledge theory depends on perception by the senses and memory, particularly the visual imagination.[101] It is these processes that Milton places under scrutiny, using a technique which recalls certain styles of Stoic rhetoric that invoke reflexive tools and examples in consideration of the veracity of truth claims and their basis in rhetorical techniques.[102]

Despite placing the techniques and truth basis of both poetry and painting under scrutiny, Milton suggests limitations of both art and science to which the refinements of

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[98] Krieger 1992, 119.
[99] Galileo; Carey and Fowler, 479n.
[100] Homer also compared Achilles' shield to the moon in the *Iliad*. See Carey and Fowler, 478n.
[101] Shuger 1988, 201.
[102] Webb 2009, 185; Bartsch, 83–85; Stroud, 254–56.

his inspired allegory will prove superior. In turn, the superior access of language to the apprehension of the sacred, by reason of its intelligibility, depends on the role that reason plays in the refinements of the imagination.[103] Yet to make such a claim for poetry, Milton must also address the potential for falsity and distortion in classically-derived Renaissance traditions of rhetoric and poetry that arises because of the fallen condition.

The observer similes with their basis in styles and techniques of classical ekphrasis, contribute to Milton's blending of rhetorical and allegorical traditions in *Paradise Lost*. Of particular concern in this section is how the similes evoke aesthetic feelings through the production of temporal and spatial effects that engage the orientation of the reader in space and time, techniques that are associated with the ekphrastic style, and by which Milton expresses the experience of both the secular and sacred. In modern phenomenology, the orientation of the subject in space and time is an essential component of lived experience.[104] In *Paradise Lost*, evocations of such sensory phenomena are key dimensions of reader engagement, including of sensory and emotional states associated with the sublime.[105]

The basis of poetic figure in the metaphoric process, with its Renaissance grounding in the language of experience, engages the sensory detail of the world through the faculty of memory and imagination. The process underlies the affective qualities of metaphoric expression in *Paradise Lost* and Milton's discriminations between higher affections refined by the intellect and lower body experiences that lie beneath the threshold of the will. The ekphrastic tradition supports Milton's expression of his monistic model of the subject through the embodied experience of the faculties, by which he refines affective states associated with the Christian sacred from pagan influences. Previous chapters of this thesis consider how Milton's Arminianism is expressed in the momentum of language and its concrete, embodied effects associated with the lived world of time and history. It is equally engaged by the simile of the '*Tuscan* Artist', with its emphasis on the concrete experience of the faculties of perception. To this end, a performative reading emphasises transitionary states of engagement of the experience of the reader for their own sake, and reflexively invites

[103] Krieger 1992, 19.
[104] This is a theme of Heidegger's *Being and Time*: see Ch. 24, 45.
[105] Webb 2009, 117–18.

readers to consider how they ascribe value to the process that their reading entails.[106] The remainder of this section compares the respective approaches of Fish and Hartman to illustrate the role of sensory, imaginative and emotional experience associated with the expression of spatial and temporal effects in Milton's figures.[107]

Fish focuses on how the similes engage the fallen situation of readers as they unfold in time according to the limitations of reader perception and rhetorical styles. Because the reader views the world through his or her sinfulness, the similes record the limitations of the reader's perception and tools of perception, which are through the reading process discovered to be 'impasses, props that characterize and maintain the reader in its fallen state'.[108] In Fish's analysis, figural interpretation is distinguishable from allegory and symbolism precisely by the nature of its existence in human time.[109] Rhetorical figures are associated with the fallen world of limited perception, experience and fallen language as an inadequate vehicle for the apprehension of the sacred.

The simile comparing Satan's spear to the mast of a large warship confines the reader to the world of limited perception, highlighting a rhetorical technique central to the temporal process associated with reading, that the simile necessarily unfolds over time:

> His spear, to equal which the tallest Pine
> Hewn on *Norwegian* hills, to be the Mast
> Of some great Ammiral, were but a wand,
> He walkt with to support uneasy steps ….
>
> (*PL* I.292–95)

The simile thus 'affirms nothing, and yet at least temporarily encourages an affirmation that Satan's spear is as large as the mast of a ship'. The succession of 'complex relations' 'unrolled' in the time-based movement of language means that this 'happens very quickly in the mind of the reader who does not have time to analyze the cerebral adjustments forced upon him by the similes'. Fallen language limits the reader's perspective because of its temporal unfolding, which restricts the reader's perception and reinforces his or her sense of fallenness. And '[p]aradoxically, our awareness of the

[106] Altieri, 16–18.
[107] Fish (1967) 1997, 22–37; Hartman, 1–12.
[108] Gregerson 2003, 87; Fish (1967) 1997, 22–37.
[109] Gregerson 2003, 87.

inadequacy of what is described and what we can apprehend provides, if only negatively, a sense of what cannot be described and what we cannot apprehend'. 'Thus', according to Fish, 'Milton is able to suggest a reality beyond this one by forcing us to feel, dramatically, its unavailability'.[110] Further, the formalist approach to the simile highlights its inadequacy:

> Of course, one can construct, as James Whaler does, a statement of relative magnitudes (spear is to pine as pine is to wand) but while this may be logical, it is not encouraged by the logic of the reading experience which says to us: If one were to compare Satan's spear with the tallest pine the comparison would be inadequate.[111]

The reading process is part of a larger pedagogical design of reinforcing the reader's fallen state as time-bound and temporally-constrained. Integral to Fish's explanation of fallen perceptual habits is the 'assumption that Milton's poem is designed to train its readers to cast these habits off'[112]:

> [T]he experience of reading the simile tells us a great deal about our limitations. How large is Satan's spear? The answer is, we don't know, although it is important that for a moment we think we do.[113]

For Fish, metaphor and the drawing of likenesses remains superfluous to religious faith: 'The superfluousness of the simile as an instrument of perception is', according to Fish, 'part of Milton's point …. [T]hose who walk with faith are able, immediately, to discern the unity in diversity'.[114]

Fish's approach omits consideration of the blended Renaissance traditions of rhetorical and allegorical poetry in Milton's style, in which he distinguishes fallen styles of classical poetics and refines their techniques, accommodating them within his Protestant allegory. Figures and tropes, with their basis in metaphor theory, are intrinsic to this blending of traditions. The similes are rhetorical devices which capture the illusionary powers of ekphrasis, which enable the apprehension of the sacred (the symbolic status of the moon) but which is also capable of distortion and falsity (through

[110] Fish (1967) 1997, 26–27.
[111] Fish (1967) 1997, 27.
[112] Gregerson 1995, 245–46.
[113] Fish (1967) 1997, 27.
[114] Fish (1967) 1997, 311.

the lens of Galileo's telescope). Milton thus incorporates the tension between the temporal and quotidian, and the spatial and eternal, into his observer similes, a tension that is reinforced by ekphrasis with its powers of illusion and of 'making the absent thing present' to the mind's eye of the imagination. This tension between secular and sacred underlies the typological tradition of *figura*.[115]

In the simile of Satan's spear, as in his shield, figural expression may manifest as distortion. The type of metaphor used to describe the spear (A:B :: C:D, or, shield is to moon, as spear is to ship's mast) is an example of the 'multiple term' form identified by Whaler in *Paradise Lost* and is equally an example of a metaphorical type described by Aristotle in the *Poetics*.[116] Milton's figure evokes a sense of amplitude that is characteristic of the imagination of the sacred, but which equally produces a sense of distortion and disorientation associated with the 'terrible sublime'.[117] Aristotle, for Milton, is the pagan philosopher without understanding or comprehension of the Christian sacred and for whom language may, when addressing sacred matters, simply retain its power to distort in the classical tradition exemplified by the fallen context of Satan's underworld.

Fish's approach thus excludes certain aspects of Renaissance humanist traditions of rhetoric and poetry, particularly the influence of the Longinian tradition with its emphasis on the bodily and emotional impact of metaphor, figure and trope. By contrast to Fish's emphasis on the time-bound limitations of the reader and language, Hartman identifies a further spatial dimension to the similes which produces sensory, imaginative and emotional experiences associated with the eternal. Hartman's recognition of the spatial and temporal dimensions of the reading experience finds that the Miltonic simile permits the reader a perspective of Providence. Fish, by contrast, argues that insight is impossible due to the fallen perception of the reader.[118]

The process of such engagement through the vehicle of language is, however, a difficult one in Milton's fallen world. Perception of what is true is mediated by the experience of the subject, and that experience depends on the fallen faculties and the rhetorical and poetic tools of expression. Galileo's human perspective is fallen and

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[115] Auerbach 1953, 554; Auerbach 1984; Lerer 2005; Gregerson 2003, 87.
[116] Whaler 1931b, 1038; Aristotle 1961, Ch. 21: 'that from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A) as the fourth (D) is to the third (C)'.
[117] Hartman, 1–2.
[118] Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.

flawed, and his telescope only a human invention: 'his capacity for vision is insufficient to see the cosmological truths of the Heavens'.[119] Clarity of perception in the simile is complicated by the shifts in perspective (from Fiesole to Valdarno) and the indistinctness of twilight, in which the normal distinction between light and dark, with all its moral associations, becomes uncertain, reinforcing the potential for illusion and deception or error and obscurity in which the simple identification of good and evil is never available. According to Hartman:

> Just as the Tuscan artist sees the moon through his telescope, so the artist of *Paradise Lost* shows hell at considerable remove, through a medium which, while it clarifies, also intervenes between reader and object. Milton varies points of view, shifting in space and time so skillfully that our sense of the reality of hell, of its power vis-a-vis man or God, never remains secure.[120]

Milton's emphasis on processes and techniques of perception in *Paradise Lost* recalls the aesthetic styles of sixteenth-century Mannerism with their oft-featured distortions of scale and perception.[121] Moreover, the propensity for distortions is inherent in classical techniques of metaphor and ekphrasis. In *Paradise Lost*, these distortions are associated with Satan's world and reflect its fallen moral and theological status. Yet the distinctions are necessary for the careful discriminations that Milton makes between true and false poetry, *eikon* and *eidolon*, in his adaptations of classical and Renaissance techniques, because only true poetry is capable of creating an apprehension of the divine. Milton's descriptions of Heaven and Paradise, the angelic and the divine characters, also depend on adaptations of these techniques to his allegorical style.

A further reference to Galileo arises in a simile contained in Book III, which once again examines the observer and his tools of perception. Satan lands on the sun, and is dwarfed by its scale:

> There lands the Fiend, a spot like which perhaps
> Astronomer in the Sun's lucent Orb
> Though his glaz'd Optic Tube yet never saw.
>
> (*PL* III.588–90)

[119] Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[120] Hartman, 4.
[121] Fletcher, 101, 101n.

Drawing on techniques of ekphrasis, with their power of illusion and distortion, the figure of Satan is capable of being apprehended only in the mind's eye of the imagination. A Stoic rhetorical technique of evoking the image (in this case, Satan) only to retract it in order to show its basis in illusion ('yet never saw') is apparent in Milton's lines as a method of highlighting the limitations of language and associating Satan's figural distortions with both fallen perception and metaphysical flaws.[122] While the illusion of the figure of Satan produces moral obscurity, a key Renaissance objection to classically-derived rhetorical techniques of figure, metaphor and ekphrasis, it is also recognised in Renaissance theory as enabling imaginative apprehension of the divine.

Hartman traces Milton's use of the rhetorical technique of prolepsis to distinguish his allegorical poetics from its pagan antecedents, based on its engagement of both the temporalising flow of narrative and the more circular and spatial technique of poetic figure. The technique facilitates Milton's alignment of his poetry with the typological tradition while also expanding the literary quality of the figures. The figures engage the experience of the material body, by which the clarified inner sense of the mind's eye is capable of apprehending the sacred and, through the refined affections, of experiencing forms of spiritual sublimation associated with the Christian sublime. That distinction is essential to Longinian rhetorical theory, which aligns in the Renaissance with the Augustinian tradition and is distinguished from its pagan associations through a refinement of affect.[123]

Hartman recognises this important function of the similes of the first books in Milton's use of 'aesthetic distancing', a style that also has theological and moral effect.[124] These 'instances of relief or distancing' rely on evocation of a sense of spatiality and of orientation in space and time, emphasising a perspective of distance, for which the observer figure is essential, between the reader and the heavens. The figure of the moon captures the notion of eternity in the terms of Protestant sacredness, with its powerful metaphoric and metonymic associations with both the material cosmos and the order of Providence.[125] The '*Tuscan* Artist' simile simultaneously engages the temporal process of unfolding narrative, equally bringing into relief the scale of eternity. In doing so, the figure engages two key affective qualities of ekphrasis, the temporal

[122] Webb 2009, 185.
[123] Shaw, 12; Shuger 1988, 227.
[124] Hartman, 4.
[125] See Fletcher, 87, who finds forms of synecdoche and metonymy integral to allegorical relationships.

effects associated with the flow of historical action, and the spatial sense associated with the cosmic and sacred. Through the performative effects of spatial and temporal experience, the simile facilitates alignment of Milton's themes of divine Providence and free will in what Hartman terms the 'counterplot':

> Milton's feeling for this Divine imperturbability, for God's omnipotent knowledge that the creation will outlive death and sin, when expressed in such an indirect manner, may be characterised as the counterplot.[126]

The narrative pattern unfolds with the activities of Satan and his fallen angels' 'mock or erring activity'. Against this, 'imperturbable Providence' exudes 'a calm prescience which sees that no fall will ultimately disturb the Creation'.[127] It is an idea Hartman develops from Coleridge's brief comment in his *Table Talk* that:

> Milton is the deity of prescience: he stands *ab extra* and drives a fiery chariot and four, making the horses feel the iron curb which holds them in.[128]

Implicit in Hartman's approach is the way the similes draw on the combined techniques of narrative (prolepsis) and poetry (spatial and temporal aesthetic) to express this 'feeling' of the sacred. Hartman refers to it, appropriately, as 'the root feeling (if feeling is the proper word)'.[129] The rhetorical technique of prolepsis that Milton uses to evoke this perspective of eternity, that Hartman calls 'Milton's counterplot', depends upon layers of biblical and classical literary allusions and symbols blended with techniques of poetic figure. By this means, Milton's allegory unfolds at a higher ('transcendent') level than the literal and rhetorical level of the text.

An important dimension of Milton's spatially-imagined aesthetic is the manner by which it evokes, and seeks to distinguish, the notion of the terrible sublime, associated with the fallen world of Satan and the pagan classics, from the effects of Christian sublimity. In *Paradise Lost*, the distortions of sense, both spatial and temporal, evoke effects of both the sacred and profane in their respective challenges to ordinary human perception through sensory experience of orientation in space and time. These are dimensions recognised in modern theories of the sublime and in the classics divide Stoic and Longinian rhetorical approaches.[130] The similes of Book I, in

[126] Hartman, 3.
[127] Hartman, 3.
[128] Coleridge, 67; Hartman, 1.
[129] Hartman, 1–12.
[130] Webb, 116–17; Shaw, 12.

particular, frequently test the boundaries of human perception through the vehicle of fallen language, of which distortions of perception induced by a comparison of the scale of Satan, his shield and spear are notable examples. By contrast, the divine figures are associated with necessary amplitude using similar rhetorical techniques.

The metaphoric device, with its basis in analogy, produces the distinction between sacred and profane in *figura*. Yet, Hartman notes, 'Milton rarely uses straight analogy, in which the observer and observed remain, relative to each other, on the same plane'. For Hartman, Milton's finest effects employ 'magnifying and diminishing similes'; 'Satan's shield, for example, is described as hanging on his shoulder like the moon, viewed through Galileo's telescope from Fiesole or in Valdarno'. The similes 'not only magnify or diminish the doings in hell but invariably put them at a distance'.[131] As in the sequence of figures at the close of Book II, where Satan views the universe with a distant gaze, it is an example of Milton's application of the bodily sense of orientation in space to reflect a character's relative distance or closeness to the divine. Milton invokes these techniques in the similes to distinguish Satan's world, associated with the pagan imagination, which is in its evocation of sublime effects 'wedded ... to evocations of natural terror'.[132] The effects arise, according to Shaw, because '[t]he classical imagination lacks the ability to comprehend the abstract and the ideal', 'qualities that raise' later Christians 'to the level of the divine'.[133] Invocations of the 'terrible sublime' instead accompany feelings of 'delighted horror' or shock, derived from a residual antagonism between the sacred and the profane.[134] In *Paradise Lost*, such effects are enhanced by evocations of flux and chaos using sea and space imagery to describe Pandemonium.[135]

It is through elevation of refined emotional states associated with this tradition that the Christian sublime depends. The reader's attempt to fix on the figure of Satan's shield evokes spatial effects that arrest the flow of language and temporally suspend the reader's engagement. This effect is reminiscent of Augustine's explanation in the *Confessions* of the notion of eternity in spatial, rather than temporal, terms; such a suspension of time can be analogous to an experience of the eternal.[136] These affective

[131] Hartman, 4.
[132] Shaw, 33–35.
[133] Shaw, 33–35.
[134] Shaw, 33–35.
[135] See, for example, the simile at *PL* I, 192–210.
[136] Augustine (1992) 2008, XII.13; Mendelson 2016.

qualities inhere in the classical Longinian tradition, with its emphasis on the role of metaphor in evoking emotional elevation associated with nature, a quality that is evident in Hartman's spatial aesthetic and reader discrimination through the reflexive function of 'aesthetic distancing' in *Paradise Lost*.[137] The importance of the Longinian tradition, with its emphasis on effects of sense, imagination and emotion, of the use of metaphor for the evocation of the sublime, provides a qualification to the rhetorical decorum stressed by Horace and the formalism of Aristotle that dominates mainstream critical approaches to the similes.[138]

In the early books of *Paradise Lost*, the Christian sublime is evoked in a contrast with the 'terrible sublime', dual associations that the figure of the moon evokes. Drawing on its progenitors in classical ekphrasis, Satan's shield introduces the relationship between spatial fixity and the temporal flow of language, with the latter associated with time and movement and the former evoking notions of the sacred.[139] The shield evokes the cosmic and providential, against the action of Satan and his fallen angels, with their classically-heroic, erring and feigned activity. The terrible sublime reflects classical understandings of the sacred, identified with the foreground of the action with its proneness to distortion, against which the cosmos provides the sacred context of Christian Providence. The overall structural effect is to separate the two understandings of the sublime in the first two books in order to differentiate a sense of the Christian sacred essential to the development of Milton's allegorical style that is expressed in later books of the epic, including the Heaven of Book III. In this way, Milton adapts and elevates classical ekphrasis to be the appropriate vehicle for apprehension of the Protestant sacred, by creating an experience of the Christian sublime which, although it may be beyond the limitations of human perception, is still capable of being seen in the mind's eye of the imagination through the refinements of the intellect. The association of spatial effect with Providence also evokes feelings of temperate emotions or a sense of tranquility that Hartman refers to as 'Divine imperturbability'. The evocation of states of sublimity therefore depend on the effects of pathos in the imaginative model.

Despite their differing outcomes, both Hartman's and Fish's readings depend on Milton's poetic evocations of the experience of the embodied faculties and are therefore

[137] Hartman, 6; Shaw, 33–35.
[138] Shaw, 14–15.
[139] Krieger 1992, 9–10.

relevant to observations about the role of poetic affect in the figures of *Paradise Lost*. While Fish identifies the temporalising process of reading that contributes to reader engagement, Hartman's approach recognises the relationship Milton invokes between the spatial and temporal dimensions of reading that the rhetorical tradition of ekphrasis enables through its evocation of both time-bound effects and the sublime. Moreover, while Milton's observer similes challenge the fallen faculties and tools of perception, they depend on, rather than resist, the invocation of concrete embodied experiences, including the refined emotions, that are integral to the condition of fallenness. The similes are thus important for Milton's expression of the typological tradition of *figura*, engaging the active agency of the reader to discern the veracity of truth claims according to an experiential model of understanding. The figures equally rely on a sense of vital experience that, through the refinements of the intellect to the imagination, can create an apprehension of the divine. The role of the heart and will in both moral discernment and creative expression is important to this process and is addressed in the next section.

4. Epic Similes, Ethos and the Fallen Will

> he stood and call'd
> His Legions, Angel Forms, who lay intrans't
> Thick as Autumnal Leaves that strow the Brooks
> In *Vallombrosa* ….
>
> (*PL* I.300–04)

In Book I, Satan raises himself from the burning marl to begin an oration to his legions. They are compared, by an allusion to Dante's 'spirits numberless' in the *Inferno*, to fallen souls imagined as autumn leaves, and in turn to the corresponding motif of falling leaves in epic precursors Homer, Bacchylides, Tasso and Virgil.[140] Biblical and classical literary allusions to the masses of seaweed in the Red Sea blend with descriptions of the Virgilian constellation Orion as cloudy and stormy. The simile culminates in an allusion to Exodus, with the destruction of Pharaoh, overwhelmed in an effort to stop the flight of the Hebrews. Milton's 'Angel Forms' invoke the central angel body metaphor of the poem and often confound critics who, admiring their

[140] Dante, *Inferno*: Dante, III.110; CP 219n; Carey and Fowler, 480n.

aesthetic qualities, question the casting of Satan's legions in a scene so beautiful.[141] The aesthetic qualities of the simile appear to obfuscate the moral and theological certainties that are elsewhere articulated in *Paradise Lost*.[142]

The simile of the leaves records, through temporal effects produced by an emphasis on the immediate and transitionary, the negative transformation ('hideous change') of the legions from their ideal 'Angel Forms' according to Milton's graduated hierarchy of form.[143] Such emphasis is placed on intermediary states by the verb tense in the continuing present ('lay intranst'), which creates aesthetic intensities enhanced by a tension between literal meaning and figural suggestiveness of the effects of the leaves falling in historical time. This section of the chapter considers how these intensities and transitionary states express Milton's vitalist model of creative expression and *eudaimonia*. The leaves are symbols of fallenness, particularly through their associations with the classical epic tradition, and the seventeenth-century relationship between aesthetics and ethics appears to open up provisional narrative spaces for moral uncertainty. Yet the basis of Milton's poetics in the potentialities of the embodied faculties through the regenerative role of poetic expression ensures that the aesthetic qualities of the simile of the leaves depend on, rather than resist, the condition and language of fallenness.

Fish's reading of *Paradise Lost* finds the condition of fallenness to be a defective state that is mirrored in language. The experience of reading reveals the fallen condition of the reader by highlighting limitations of human understanding and invoking frequent pedagogical correction in the text.[144] Fish's reading recalls an element of Augustinian theology that upholds the importance of faith and obedience over epistemological uncertainties that mark the fallen condition.[145] By devaluing the experience of the fallen world, Fish's approach also rejects the transformative potential of poetic language according to Milton's model of poetic inspiration, with its basis in monism, and the regenerative potential of the human faculties according to his model of Arminian agency. To this process the basis of figural language in metaphor theory is instructive. Metaphor, with its grounding in experience (Ricoeur's metaphor theory

[141] Kerrigan 1983, 243; Rogers, 'Epic Similes'; Ricks, 123–24; Hartman, 1–2.
[142] Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[143] Fallon, 98–100; Kerrigan 1983, 243.
[144] Fish (1967) 1997, 22.
[145] Fish 2001, 12–13; Lewis, 68–69; Mendelson 2016.

outlines the process by which comparisons are made between the known and the unknown based on experience and memory) opens aesthetic and narrative spaces for the expression of sensory and emotional effects. When considered in this way, the non-assimilation between tenor and vehicle produces suspensory states that withhold closure on competing truth claims and processes of moral appraisal.[146] The creation of such suspensory conditions underlies the engagement of intensities and the expression of 'becomings' that are suggested by the transitionary states of Milton's falling leaves. They are intrinsic to poetic figure itself, and enhanced by the observer '*ab extra*' with its reflexive emphasis on the processes of experiencing through the intermediation of the senses and language.

The figure of Satan observing the created world at the close of Book II, a prelapsarian world that seems precariously tilted towards fallenness, appears incapable of seeing the Platonic perfection of the spheres through the corruption of his will. The magnitude of his state is responsible for the cosmic ('pendant') imbalance towards the Fall. Milton's trope yokes together the various Latin meanings of the word 'pendant': not just to the notion of ornament almost literally reflected in Milton's figure, but also the sense of 'in the balance undecided' and 'hanging', a suggestion which carries significant affective weight in its concrete figuration and adverbial suggestiveness, a technique which also invites a performative reading.[147] The model of fully-autonomous selfhood that the figure of Satan represents in his shift away from divine authority to the 'self-raised' stands in contrast with Milton's model of 'reasoned' free will, and triggers the cosmic imbalance that causes the Fall.[148] In *Paradise Lost*, transitionary states of experience are characteristic of the Arminian model of choice and responsibility, which depends on the agency of the reader and they are also intrinsic to the achievement of clarity of understanding and expression of feeling states necessary for apprehension of the Christian sacred.

Incomplete assimilation between tenor and vehicle in the simile comparing the 'Angel Forms' and fallen angels produces ambiguities and *aporia*s of interpretation that involve a suspension between, or lack of clear direction towards, competing values.

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[146] Newlyn, 220; Herman (2005) 2008, 42; Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[147] Carey and Fowler, 558n; Traupman, 304. Elsewhere, Milton uses the word 'hang' with these poetic suggestions in relation to the flying Satan (see *PL* II.634) by contrast to the lighter flight that is characteristic of the good angels.
[148] The notion is captured in Book VII where in the creation of the Earth it is recounted that (also echoing Ovid's Ptolemaic view of the universe) the 'Earth [is] *self*-balanc't on her Centre hung' (VII.242, my italics).

Rogers considers particular features of the similes to thus complicate the doctrinal lessons of *Paradise Lost*: 'Milton's similes work to support, undermine, and complicate both the depiction of Satan and the broader thematic concerns of the poem, such as the idea of free will and Divine Providence'. In the simile of the leaves, the 'rigid polarities between light and dark and good and evil, all of these absolute oppositions, begin to collapse'.[149] He finds the similes to obscure the theological certainties that traditional critics like C. S. Lewis find predominant in the text.[150]

Yet arguably Milton shows by these poetic means the difficulty of perceiving such truths in the fallen state, and the need to apprehend them imaginatively rather than by recourse to dry doctrine, as a strategy of entanglement rather than of instruction. In an examination of the effects of such disparity and difference that she finds integral to some of *Paradise Lost*'s similes, Lucy Newlyn captures the importance of suspensory states of engagement when she argues that often 'disparity [turns] suggestively into likeness', and ostensibly discrete categories start to blur. *Paradise Lost* as more than 'a transcription of the Divine word', an 'ideal reading ... would consistently hold opposites in tension'; as a poem that, instead of offering 'a sequence of textual choices' or 'a simple moment of irrevocable choice', occupies 'an intermediate position in which no final "decision" is reached'.[151] Newlyn refers here to a common critical observation in what Lewis describes as Milton's 'hesitation between ... two antinomies'.[152]

For Newlyn, Milton's 'poetry of choice' is thus 'less a scene of instruction than of entanglements'.[153] His poetry of 'perplexing indeterminacies and haunting contradictions' portrays 'through its profound interiority', 'the 'evolving' mind 'in transition'.[154] Yet, as will be argued, Newlyn's approach does not address the importance of embodied, reader engagement in processes of moral choice in *Paradise Lost*, processes for which these intermediary states are an important measure of the agency of the subject. Moreover, in a finding that runs counter to Aristotelian and Augustinian *eudaimonia* and Miltonic morality, she argues that it is from this hesitation between oppositions that we learn, through 'the suspension of choice', to 'choose not to

[149] Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[150] Lewis, 65, 81. Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.
[151] Newlyn, 5, 65–69.
[152] Lewis, 112.
[153] Newlyn, 69–70.
[154] Newlyn, 122, 195, 209, 213, 220.

choose'.[155] Although in my argument Milton does not 'close' the text around fixed principles which would detract from the Arminian agency of the subject with his or her 'freedom to fall', that process of choice is still to be guided, where possible, by Grace and the virtues, according to the quality of the will, of Milton's eudaimonistic subject.

While, for Rogers, the similes introduce a 'provisional kind of moral relativism where black and white theological categories simply do not apply', Herman relates the uncertainties that the similes record to Milton's ambivalent attitude toward the English Revolution and its outcomes:

> these troublesome metaphors, particularly those in Book I, encrypt Milton's incertitude about the republic, kingship, Cromwell, the tenability of rebellion, in short, about the political values explored in Milton's earlier political tracts.[156]

Where Milton either compares 'like' to 'unlike' (such as in the similes comparing Satan and Jacob, the fallen angels and the leaves in Vallombrosa, the demonic host and Virgilian bees) or introduces a figure whose 'mythographic interpretations are decidedly mixed' (such as in the figure of Briareos, where Satan is compared to figures appropriated as emblems by both sides of the English Revolution), Milton's metaphors, according to Herman, produce shifting and unresolved value judgments in the text.[157]

Herman and Newlyn rely on twentieth-century linguistic theory to support their claims about the ambivalences and ambiguities of meaning that they find in Milton's similes and the lack of closure of the text around fixed doctrinal principles. According to Herman, Milton's 'strategy of inventing comparisons that invite multiple and contradictory interpretations' rather than 'guiding the reader to a precise 'quality', invokes Derrida's discussion of Plato's *Phaedrus*'. The metaphors offer 'multiplicities' of contrary possible meanings, but critics like Fish generally 'privilege only one aspect', that usually supports 'unconflicted … unambivalence' in the author, according to Herman. Newlyn also criticises previous treatments of Milton's allusive language in *Paradise Lost* for privileging 'singleness' rather than 'doubleness of meaning', applying Wittgenstein's 'duck-rabbit' principles.[158] While Herman points to ambivalences in Milton's philosophy, Newlyn traces through several Romantic readings of *Paradise*

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[155] Newlyn, 69, 70, 122. Newlyn appears to refer to a principle of modern Heideggerian theory which relates to the condition of *Dasein* who can entertain a refusal of choice or to 'choose not to choose'.
[156] Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'; Herman (2005) 2008, 25–26.
[157] Herman (2005) 2008, 42.
[158] Newlyn, 66–69; Herman (2005) 2008, 27.

Lost a poetry of suspension of choice and valuation of the 'evolving' mind in 'transition'.

Fish, by contrast, resolves the various tensions evident in the poetry over competing truth claims by reducing the valuation of the fallen world to the primacy of the theological doctrine of 'obedience'. He takes issue with critics like Herman, Rogers and Newlyn who celebrate the 'doubleness' of an art in which 'a valuation of the fallen world conflicts with the poem's moral design.'[159] According to Fish, these critics 'reinstate and reinvoke the dualism Milton so often rejects' and that denies the importance of God as 'not one of a number of contending forces'.[160] If *Paradise Lost* contains ambiguities, then for Fish applying an aspect of Augustinian theory, 'we must forsake the letter for the spirit' which 'can be taught only in the discursive forms the letter provides', forms which 'are at once the vehicles of our instruction and the habitation of temptation'.[161] The 'double game going on in the poetry, and the prose', is 'a doubleness impelled by the desire for its own erasure' as 'there are no moral ambiguities, because there are no equally compelling values' and 'not only is it a mistake to grant independence to values other than the value of obedience, it is a temptation'.[162] Yet Herman concedes that Fish's arguments are 'the most forceful and uncompromising articulation of the will-to-order in Milton'.[163]

While each of the approaches tends to acknowledge the importance of exploration of complex moral examples in Milton's poetics, the competing critical readings of Herman, Newlyn and Fish are based on traditional hermeneutic approaches to establishing meaning, and tend to divide according to Fish's favouring of a reading based on religious orthodoxy, while the others argue the contrary. For Fish, Milton's purpose is to remind the reader of his or her fallenness and to submit uncertainties to faith. Hartman's reading, as Rogers notes, also aligns the poem with religious orthodoxy when the similes are instrumental in the poem's larger theme of the coexistence of free will and divine Providence. Newlyn, Herman and Rogers, on the other hand, come to opposite conclusions based on application of similar hermeneutic frameworks. For them, similes like that of the 'Autumnal Leaves' tend towards dualism because they are difficult to incorporate into a moral or theological reading. In their view, the similes

[159] Fish 2001, 14.
[160] Fish, 2001, 14.
[161] Fish 2001, 14–15. Lewis, 65
[162] Fish 2001, 14–15, 53.
[163] Herman and Sauer, 11.

question the poem's doctrinal conclusions, making it impossible to maintain a clear moral distinction between good and evil.

The limitations of Fish's approach arise in his devaluation of the world of experience, which runs counter to Milton's poetic model; one which depends on the regenerative capacities of the embodied faculties that are captured in the figural aesthetics of *Paradise Lost*. Fish's approach subordinates the experience of the embodied subject in favour of the closure of the text upon fixed meanings, ignoring the positive role performance of the affects has in itself for the expression of creative and moral agency. The tendency is also evident in Herman's and Newlyn's approaches, due to their common dependence on the interpretive biases evident in twentieth-century criticism and its subordination of modes of experiencing to the interpretation of meaning.[164] Yet I argue that Milton's development of complex moral scenarios in *Paradise Lost* depends on such a strategy of entanglement, with its active engagement of the embodied faculties of the reader, rather than simply arguing by subtlety of reason alone. The distinction is particularly evident in the style of lessons of Michael to Adam, which avoids simply 'thrust[ing] virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions', as Bacon describes the approach of the Stoics.[165] Moreover, I argue that the application of a performative approach captures the more integrated relationship between thought and experience in Renaissance poetics, by contrast to an approach which endeavours to determine a fixed philosophical interpretation on the text itself. It favours a reading process that engages the intensities and concrete aspects of experience for its own sake as a mode of expression and self-development for Milton's humanist subject. Equally it depends on refinements of the Stoic rhetorical emphasis on the auditors' own agency, with their powers of discrimination and capacity to choose, toward the accommodation of the independent will and accordingly the emotions.[166]

Milton's Arminian theology, I argue, precludes the forced closure of the text on the basis of doctrinal principles. Instead Milton adapts techniques of Stoic rhetoric, which often incorporate rhetorical questioning and examples that invite consideration of competing choices according to reader agency, to conform to his monistic and Arminian model of the subject as fundamental to the expression of figures in *Paradise Lost*. The

[164] While Newlyn places a value on experience, she tends to take a traditional approach which looks for meaning in experiencing.
[165] Bacon (1605) 1893, II.18.3; Shuger 1988, 194.
[166] Pearcy, 261; Stroud, 250; Webb 2009, 185.

simile of the 'Autumnal Leaves' introduces suspensory states which create provisional moral uncertainty, an essential element of the process of reader 'intangling' so central to arguments by Fish, yet, exploiting the potential for affective resistance ('temptation') between the appeals of doctrine and the time-bound and embodied response of the reader.[167] With their competing expressions of moral virtue, similes comparing the fallen angels with leaves, or Satan with Jacob, accord with the principles of *Areopagitica* in its aversion to 'cloistered virtue', and a Stoic emphasis on moral testing through rhetorical examples.[168] Hartman finds the figures thus important for the reconciliation between the major themes of the epic, namely the principles of free will and divine Providence, through a resistance to the appeal of Satan:

> These similes must persuade us that man was and is 'sufficient to have stood, though free to fall' (3.99): that his reason and will, however fiercely tempted and besieged, stand on a pinnacle as firm and precarious as that on which the Christ of *Paradise Regained* (4.541ff.) suffers his last, greatest archetypal temptation. They must show the persistence, in the depth of danger, passion or evil, of imperturbable reason, of a power working *ab extra*.[169]

In *Paradise Lost*'s Protestant ethos, the reader may make the choice that furthers his or her course toward spiritual salvation, but that choice depends on the quality of the will. Moreover, as the similes produce competing or opaque distinctions between the appearance and the reality, *eikon* and *eidolon*, the fallen state of the will ensures that, as in modern ethics, choice between the appeal of competing values may be a fraught process with both uncertain moral claims and the potential for error. This is a dimension of Milton's exposition of complex moral exempla to which I return in the conclusion to this thesis.

The aesthetic qualities of the figures are produced according to related principles of creative agency associated with the vital energies of the poet and reader in historical time. These aesthetic qualities in turn impinge on the moral expression of the figures through the Renaissance connection between aesthetics and ethics. Underlying their expression is the moral state of the subject — it is useful to consider the similes in terms of Wollheim's aesthetic theory of correspondences — the way artworks

[167] Mikics, 3, 26–27; Hartman, 5.
[168] *AP*: CP 728; *PL* IX.335.
[169] Hartman, 5.

‘metaphorically’ express feelings and emotional states based on intensities and transitionary states which are valued in their own right as spaces of self-definition.

In *Paradise Lost*, the moral relationship to creative expression entails a distinction between higher and lower states of experience. In Milton’s eudaimonistic model, moral virtue is thus virtuously related to the tranquility of the soul, upon which clarity of understanding and the expression of refined feelings associated with the sacred in turn depend. The expression of the sacred depends on spatial effects associated with classical traditions of the sublime, producing the providential context of the falling leaves, in what Hartman refers to as a ‘feeling’ of ‘Divine imperturbability’ through intensities, by ‘stretching’ time spatially across the lines of the simile in repeated references to dispersal of leaves, ‘floating’, ‘scatter’d’ and ‘change’. The refined effects of timelessness on the senses and emotions are associated with the Christian sublime, which stands in relief of what lies in the foreground, the human action associated with layers of classical and biblical allusions, mirrored in the narrative where the initial heroic actions of Satan form the plot, whereas the ‘counterplot’ unfolds as the biblical defect of the Egyptians and the triumph of the returning Israelites.[170] The effects reflect a Calvinist emphasis on the distinction between the temporal and spiritual, enacted through the long view of providential history.[171] Hartman’s counterplot suggests, although it does not elaborate upon, the importance of the figural basis of the similes to the circular and cosmic reading that the compounding series of allusions engages.

While the heroic appeal of Satan’s army is difficult to distinguish from classical and biblical allusions to their fallen condition, despite their fallen status, the ‘Angel Forms’ reveal a sacred quality identified with Platonic Form to the ‘mind’s eye’ moderated by reason. Neither Fish nor Hartman consider the way the simile expresses Milton’s mode of poetic inspiration in *Paradise Lost* for its regenerative effects. Engagement of the reader’s voluntary faculties creates the potential to achieve moral and sensory clarity in order to see the broader, sacred context defined by the spatial limits of the similes. Otherwise, if the reader succumbs to the fallen, ‘lower’, senses and passions, poetic language can enslave and enchant like the Medusa figure that stands behind the figure of Eve. If this discernment can be made, then the similes may evoke for the reader the apprehension of the sacred and with it, feelings associated with the

[170] CP 219.
[171] Kirby, 321.

Christian sublime. The emphasis of the similes on interiority reflects the Stoic style of deliberation as a shift from the outer world of events and actions to the inner world of moral and spiritual experience.[172]

The effects of these principles are apparent in the 'belated Peasant' simile (*PL* I.777–88), where the peasant mistakes the fallen angels for faery elves and is 'charmed' by them in a way that suggests the potential 'enslaving' effect of poetic imagery on the faculties of the reader:

> or Faery Elves,
> Whose midnight Revels, by a Forest side
> Or Fountain some belated Peasant sees,
> Or dreams he sees, while over-head the Moon
> Sits Arbitress ….
>
> (*PL* I.782–88)

While Harman associates the moon with the eternal and hence to the notion of Providence, the moon is equally a symbol of change and, as a force that can madden, is a chancy arbitress.[173] According to Rogers, Milton's emphasis on darkness and 'midnight' is an 'emphasis on moments of blurriness and of visual indistinctness' that 'suggests that the distinction between good and evil is actually never that clear'.[174] Associated accordingly with the world of time and change as well as the eternal, the moon 'Sits Arbitress', and depends on the virtues and faculties that are instilled at birth are sufficient to enable the reader to 'stand' or be 'free to fall'. The figure of the 'belated Peasant' is charmed and misled by the figures of fallen angels.

These are important dimensions of the return of the epic simile in Book XII, which also introduces the observer figure as a labourer that recalls in a circular way the early simile of the 'belated Peasant', and is similarly about the obscurity of truth for the autonomous subject and the potential for poetic language to enchant, with equal references to twilight and its illusionary effects: 'Ev'ning mist'. Of significance is the reintroduction of the epic simile only after Adam has accepted the lessons of Michael and his own sense of contrition and personal responsibility for the Fall, where his earlier

[172] Stroud, 251.
[173] Carey and Fowler, 507.
[174] Rogers 2007, 'Epic Similes'.

recalcitrance is a feature of his fallen and corrupt will. This recognition is important for his own moral and spiritual regeneration:

> all in bright array
> The Cherubim descended; on the ground
> Gliding meteorous, as Ev'ning Mist
> Ris'n from a River o'er the marish glides,
> And gathers ground fast at the Laborer's heel
> Homeward returning.
>
> (*PL* XII.627–32)

In ways which are comparable to Eve's recognition of the inadequacy of a 'virtue unassay'd' in Book IX (335), such a pattern is repeated in *Paradise Regained*, where the epic simile is reintroduced only after Christ resists the final temptation of Satan and 'stands', triggering Satan's fall by asserting his identity and obedience: 'Tempt not the Lord thy God; he said and stood. / But Satan smitten with amazement fell' (*PR* IV.561–62).[175] In *Paradise Regained*, the reclaiming of Paradise is associated with regeneration of the soul through processes of active moral engagement, expressed figuratively in the return of the epic simile. That process of transformation is in turn directed towards the attainment of self-knowledge through the association of human experience with the Incarnation.[176] The eudaimonistic process is suggested when Christ declares his identity, articulated in the contrast between the shock associated with Christ's epiphanic realisation and that of 'smitten' Satan's fall.

The interrelationship of aesthetics and ethics is intrinsic to the regeneration of both poet and reader, expressed in the figures as moral and creative agency, principles integral to identity-formation in Milton's ontology. The appearance of the two epic similes in *Paradise Regained* in quick succession thus make a connection between *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*.[177] Satan is compared to the '*Theban* Monster' (*PR* IV.572), a reference to the Sphinx in Hesiod's *Theogony* and also an allusion to the scaly creature of Sin in *Paradise Lost*, suggesting both the effects of failure of the will and the corresponding effects of the seductive power of language.[178]

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[175] *PR* IV.560–68.
[176] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Regained*'; Steadman 1959, 95–97.
[177] Rogers 2009, 589.
[178] *PR* IV.572–80. See Apollodorus, III.5.8; C. Hill, 420; CP 528; Carey and Fowler, 1164.

Moreover, the comparison is significant for its blending of the classical and Christian literary styles through the Augustinian typological tradition.

It is precisely these integrated, experiential processes of aesthetic feeling and moral discernment, guided by Grace, that inhere in creative expression and moral and religious self-development in *Paradise Lost*. The similes are important not only for Milton's transformation of the epic genre, but also of models of subjectivity, topics discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

5. Affectivity and Transformation in *Paradise Lost*

> Men call'd him *Mulciber*; and how he fell
> From Heav'n, they fabl'd, thrown by angry *Jove*
> Sheer o'er the Crystal Battlements: from Morn
> To Noon he fell, from Noon to dewy Eve,
> A Summer's day; and with the setting Sun
> Dropt from the Zenith like a falling Star ….
>
> (*PL* I.740–45)

Within the profusion of unfolding figures in Book I, Milton describes the building of Pandemonium, which ends with a description of the fall of its architect, Mammon, or Mulciber as he is also known in the classics. While many critics identify parallels with the mythic Fall at the centre of *Paradise Lost*, Hartman questions the placement of the imagery: 'Why the caught imagination should respond with a pastoral image, evoking a fall gradual and cool like the dying of a summer's day and the sudden, no less aesthetically distant, dropping down of the star, is not explained'.[179] He compares it to 'similar moments of relief or distancing, especially in the cosmic fret of the first books', that include the simile of the autumn leaves, the springtime bees, the dreaming peasant and the arrival of Satan at the edge of Chaos in view of the heavens and the created world. The 'evident purpose of the Mulciber story', according to Hartman, is 'to emphasise Mammon's building is as shaky as its architect'. Yet this notion of 'aesthetic distancing', disclosed through the 'almost decorative character' of the figures in the early books, is responsible for what he terms the 'counterplot', that evokes a 'feeling' of

[179] Hartman, 1.

‘calm prescience, which sees that no fall’, whether Satanic, fabled or human, ‘will ultimately disturb the creation’.[180]

Toward the end of the description of Mulciber’s fall is the correction that Fish finds inherent in Milton’s pedagogical style of *Paradise Lost*, when in the course of the temporal unfolding of the narrative the reader discovers that the fablers ‘err[ed]’ and that the architect ‘fell long before’ (*PL* I.747–48).[181] The effect, recalling a technique of Stoic rhetoric which is commonly employed in *Paradise Lost*, and the styles of which support Fish’s thesis, is to invite scrutiny of the figure by retracting the vivid and engaging ekphrasis of Mulciber’s fall, or by drawing attention to its basis in figural illusion, long after capturing the reader’s imagination.[182] Yet the figure is also, somewhat paradoxically, integral to Milton’s transformation of classical to biblical epic through the recasting of Mulciber’s fall to coincide with the earlier fall of the rebellious angels of Christian myth.[183] Such a recasting takes place almost seamlessly in Milton’s adaptation of figural techniques of metaphor and ekphrasis to the allegorical style of his Protestant epic.

This final section considers the manner in which Milton’s epic similes facilitate the shift from classical to biblical epic. Bringing together material from this and earlier chapters, I briefly examine the extent to which the performance of poetic affects of the sensory, imaginative and emotional kind is central to this transformation. As in the figure of Mulciber’s fall, the shift is founded upon poetic techniques which perform the pedagogical function privileged by Fish, yet develops through a strategy or entanglement that depends on the engagement of the audience according to the particular qualities of figural and metaphorical effects on the reader’s embodied faculties. Such an approach coincides with Milton’s monistic model of the subject, which accords a value to the potential of fallen experience through the voluntary agency of the subject (with the aid of Grace) in moral development and creative expression. Moreover, I argue, it is the use of a performative model of literary affect which captures the way Milton’s similes create narrative and aesthetic spaces, engaging the auditor in

[180] Hartman, 3.
[181] Hartman, 1.
[182] Webb 2009, 116, 185–6.
[183] *PL* I.740–48.

temporal experiences of sense, imagination and emotion, by which shifts are transacted in the epic form and its underlying models of selfhood and culture.

The epic simile is a particularly elaborate tool of analogy and, according to Angus Fletcher, 'ornament *par excellence*'.[184] In *Paradise Lost*, tropes and figures capture the cosmic dimension of ornament, exemplified by the etymological relationship traced by Fletcher between the words 'cosmic' and 'cosmetic'. From the ornamental function the eternal quality of poetic figure derives and underlies Milton's transformation of classical forms according to his allegorical poetics. The 'decorative character' of the similes is essential to their transformational function which in turn depends on the way they affect the auditor.[185] Gregerson thus notes: 'Discussions of "ornament" therefore mislead insofar as they conjure optional, detachable figures of speech'.[186] With its recognition of a more integrated relationship between thought and feeling that is captured in the decorative style of ornament, the quality of *enargeia*, an integral feature of Renaissance poetics, is understood to have quasi-physical effects on the senses, imagination and emotions.[187] The quality is responsible for the *praesentia*, energy and amplitude of the lines of Mulciber's fall, which capture the narrative action and *magnitudo* of the building of Pandemonium and the fall of its architect: 'thrown by angry *Jove*/ Sheer o'er the Crystal Battlements'.[188]

Renaissance metaphor theory, upon which the figural qualities of the similes are based, when supplemented with modern theoretical observations, explains their function in the production of novelty and insight. These dimensions of the metaphoric process contribute to the refinement of Milton's poetic figures according to regenerative qualities associated with embodied agency and divine inspiration. The non- or in-complete assimilation between metaphoric tenor and vehicle, the observer figure and the technique of prolepsis, three key aspects of the similes discussed in this chapter, are integral to that process of transformation.

The non- or in-complete assimilation between tenor and vehicle is recognised in both Renaissance and modern metaphor theory as an important component of the technique of analogy. As a figure of 'Transport', metaphor raises the potential for untrue

[184] Fletcher, 117–46.
[185] Hartman, 2.
[186] Gregerson 2004, 87.
[187] Puttenham 1589, III.3.
[188] Shuger 1988, 201.

statements in its artificial comparisons. The elaborate similes of the early books of *Paradise Lost* are thus central to Milton's discrimination between true and false poetry, which involves preserving the transformational quality of poetic *eikon* based on Milton's model of poetic inspiration against the negative power of *eidolon*.[189] Such comparisons open up linguistic and imaginative possibilities through which Milton's blending of the rhetorical and allegorical style occurs.[190] With their metaphorical capacity to synthesise the new, aid invention and create novelty, the similes produce by this process of analogy insights that accord with Milton's Protestant worldview.

The metaphoric process thus produces new ways of seeing and experiencing the world, achieved through its principal mimetic ability to imitate and reinterpret reality.[191] In her study of the rhetorical style of Milton's prose works, Lana Cable applies Ricoeur's metaphor theory, arguing that a phenomenological reading reveals the importance of reader affect as an intrinsic component of Milton's iconoclastic transformation of classical figure to confirm to his Protestant ethos. She invokes Ricoeur's principle of 'predicative assimilation', arguing that it is 'on the affective level of linguistic immediacy that the arguments and ideas of Milton gain the reader's assent'. Through its integration of thought, imagination and feeling, this is metaphor's 'productive and projective function', which 'can only be acknowledged by clearly distinguishing that function from the merely representational function' usually attributed to metaphor.[192] In his theory of 'predicative assimilation', Ricoeur borrows the principle of epoché from Husserlian philosophy, a term based on the Greek *epokhē* ('abstention'), arguing that the metaphoric process involves such a 'suspension of the known for the sake of the unknown'.[193] According to Ricoeur's approach, '[i]magination is able by predicative assimilation to produce from the cognitive differences between "there was" and "there wasn't", not only a concept that would accommodate the contradiction (for example, an "ambiguous reference" to God), but a new kind in spite of and through the contradiction ("nevertheless God").[194] In Milton's simile of the 'Autumnal Leaves', the process produces the sacred difference between 'Angel Forms' and fallen legions, between classical and biblical allegory, according to

[189] Steadman 1959, 95–97.
[190] Puttenham 1589, III.7.
[191] Ricoeur 1977, 1–7.
[192] Cable, 23–30; Ricoeur 1978, 152.
[193] Ricoeur 1978, 152.
[194] Cable, 23–30.

Milton's graduated hierarchy between human and divine forms. It is the basis of the transformative aspect of Miltonic metaphor and the truth-claims of 'insights' that arise on the 'borderline between the verbal and the non-verbal'.[195] Moreover, the synthetic process of metaphor is intrinsically iconoclastic, according to Cable, by breaking idolatrous associations with existing patterns, a feature which is also key to its creative function in the innovative recasting of associations.[196] With their incorporation of the capacity of metaphor to shift perspective, Milton's epic similes in the early books are thus integral to the pedagogical design of *Paradise Lost* in transforming the reader's perception and understanding.

Ricoeur's metaphor theory recognises the relationship played by metaphor in the development of myth, an important aspect of Milton's reshaping of the Genesis story.[197] The theory holds metaphor to be a fundamental vehicle for perception and understanding of reality, and a significant relationship Ricoeur identifies is that between metaphor, mimesis and the mythologising process.[198] By rethinking the narrative pillars of myth and mimesis at work in metaphors, reality is redefined as a new world is generated.[199] As a literary technique that blends Christian allegory with classical literary epic poetry, Milton's technique of prolepsis, a rhetorical figure, is a significant element of this process of transformation of literary myth.[200] In *Paradise Lost*, with its dense layers of biblical and classical allusions, classical myths and figures and events of history point to outcomes of Christian myth, so the autumn leaves are proleptic of the Fall, a shift exemplified by the distortion of the fallen angels' 'hideous change'. In the Renaissance, notes MacCaffery, 'all myths are reflections, distorted or mutilated though they may be, of the one true myth'.[201] Prolepsis makes connections and contrasts between the various biblical and classical sources in the detail of narrative, and the similes are especially relevant to this process on a number of levels that include the affective, through their layering of allusions.[202] Moreover, that process involves the intensities and intermediary states that are essential to the creative and moral subject.

[195] Ricoeur 1978, 149; Cable, 20–21, 24–25.
[196] Cable, 23–30.
[197] Ricoeur 1978, 143.
[198] Ricoeur 1977, 1–7.
[199] Duffy 2009, 72–75; Ricoeur 1977, 288–89.
[200] Puttenham (1589) 1904, III.11.
[201] McCaffery, 14; Fish (1967) 1997, 35.
[202] Fish (1967) 1997, 35–36.

Milton's epic similes equally depend for their veracity on a degree of volition afforded by metaphor that includes its powerful sub-cognitive effects, qualities which are intrinsic to reader agency, because Milton's model of Providence accommodates a voluntary subject. The process involves transitionary states or 'becomings' that accord with his model of the eudaimonistic subject. Moran's examination of the effects of metaphor as a 'way of feeling' or 'experiencing' highlights how metaphors can shift the reader's perspective by drawing on a voluntary process without forcing a specific understanding or total assimilation of the comparison, yet operating at a level beneath the level of conscious deliberation.[203] To this end, the figures involve the qualities associated with the classically derived Renaissance technique of *enargeia,* which 'belongs to a concept of language as a power acting on the world current through antiquity', able to 'affect' the listener and to 'penetrate' and 'change' the 'individual'.[204] In the lines relating Mulciber's fall, the mythologising process takes place through the juxtaposition of various kinds of classical and biblical falls, accommodated within Milton's long historical purview of Calvinist Providence. In turn, the transformation of reader perspective takes place temporally and spatially across the lines ('fell', 'thrown', 'sheer', 'fell') according to the experience of the embodied faculties of the auditor. The figure draws on the ekphrastic quality of 'illusion and absence' to evoke the 'Crystal Battlements' of Heaven, a vision only accessible through the 'mind's eye'. The figure of the autumnal leaves likewise draws on the technique to evoke the sacred 'Angel Forms'. It equally combines multiple epic allusions to falling leaves within a temporally- and spatially-imagined aesthetic and depends on experiential modes of reading that evoke sensory experience associated with both historical time and the eternal.

In this way, the similes capture the cosmic reading of *Paradise Lost*, reinforcing the eternal nature of poetic ornament as a vehicle for apprehension of the divine, raising it above classical and medieval allegory. Yet that process depends on figural techniques of fallen language because '[t]here is no straighter rendering; we have only the translation into time'.[205] Moreover, the fallen condition is an embodied one, and in a way which parallels the transformation of literary figure in Auerbach's examination of the rhetorical style of *figura*, Milton's similes rely on the relationship between figure and the body including its expression of the sacred, through the association with the

[203] Moran 1989, 90–91.
[204] Webb 2009, 98.
[205] Gregerson 2004, 87.

Incarnation, to transform literary to sacred myth.[206] Such a process is articulated through the body metaphor that Kerrigan finds integral to *Paradise Lost*, and through which the notion of poetic figure is transformed from *eidolon* to *eikon*. The metaphoric process, with its dependence on the integration of thought, imagination and feeling, is thus an important component of this process of mythmaking. In the 'Autumnal Leaves' simile, Milton applies such a process, to transform associations with the antecedent epics of Homer, Virgil and Dante to his Protestant style through the experience of the embodied subject. The experiential process is expressed through the intensities produced by the repetitions of past and present participles relating to fallen leaves 'strow', 'scatter'd', 'floating', 'bestrown', which suggest passing time, captured within the circular aspect of poetic figure.[207]

Evoked through a performative reading, the 'hideous change' (*PL* I.313) of the fallen angels reflects the status of figural interpretation as a tradition existing in human time and experience, of fallen language. The fallen angels' 'hideous change' expresses the difference between the temporal and the eternal significance of poetic language. The 'Autumnal Leaves' not only allude to literary precedent in classical and medieval poetry, but also capture this eternal quality, the sense of timelessness central to Milton's notion of the sacred, through the imagination, a point implicit in Hartman's acknowledgement of how the aesthetic techniques of the figure capture the eternal qualities of the counterplot. These eternal qualities are invoked using the techniques of ekphrasis and metaphor, with the Renaissance emphasis on engaging the mind's eye of the imagination that can capture the sacred significance of the eternal state of the autumnal leaves, associated with apprehension of Platonic form. The simile also reflects the dual existence of figural language in the fallen world of historical time where it captures the effects of the angels' 'hideous change'. Ornament has a material quality that is associated with garment and the body, and although it has the power to distort, it is capable of being transformed through the 'inner sense'. When the affections are refined through the intellect, poetic ornament reflects the temporal affectivities of the body that through the imagination give access to the eternal. These are the 'contrapuntal' effects that Hartman identifies, aptly with a musical metaphor because

[206] Ricoeur 1978, 143–59; Fletcher, 70; Auerbach 1953, 554; Auerbach 1984, 11; Lerer 2005.
[207] *PL* I.302–11.

the transformation of figure also involves a refinement of feeling associated with sublimity that is similar to that experienced in certain styles of music.[208]

The classical principle of *thymos* is integral to the epic tradition. Engaged within the forces of fate, it dramatises the relationship between subject and culture.[209] An important role of the similes is to reinscribe Milton's monistic model of selfhood, which includes the embodied faculties of the will, the senses and emotions in ways which are compatible with his model of Providence.[210] Ascribing a positive role for the human faculties, Milton's figural style works through example, in ways which actively engage the faculties of the reader and accommodate, rather than avoid the Stoic problem of the passions at the 'contested periphery of the will'.[211]

By focusing on reader engagement through the vehicle of poetic affect, my account in this chapter of the transformative qualities of poetic figure in *Paradise Lost* is consistent with the studies of its key critics, although not all of them discuss poetic affect. For instance, affect plays a major role in Mikics's attempt to reinscribe the subject back into Renaissance criticism. He offers a positive hermeneutic which aims at recuperating the 'subjective event that occurs between reader and book'.[212] Such a model of reading counters what he views as a tendency amongst New Historicists to reduce the early modern self to an effect of discourse.[213] Gregerson's study of the transformation of the political subject that takes place through Milton's reformed epic in turn considers how Milton distinguishes his allegorical figure while retaining the shaping power associated with the rhetorical tradition, a distinction that depends on his underlying models of subjective agency.[214] And Catherine Gimelli Martin's study of the transformative aspects of *Paradise Lost* through the interaction of the autonomous subject and the Reformation Protestant world identifies it as a meta-allegory that reshapes the traditional form according to the model of the self-authored subject through the unpredictability of human consciousness.[215]

I have endeavoured to show here that the epic similes in *Paradise Lost* reflect the transformative potential of art to ascribe agency and to shift perspective through its

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[208] Storr, 28.
[209] Mikics, 15; Martindale 1986, 20–41.
[210] Mikics, 8.
[211] Fisher, 117, 175.
[212] Mikics, 8.
[213] See for example, Greenblatt 1980, 1–10; cf. Greenblatt 2007, 176–95.
[214] Gregerson 1995, 8.
[215] Martin, 22.

sensory, imaginative and emotional power. Milton's poetic figures achieve this in their engagement of processes of creative expression and moral self-examination, which rely on the vital, voluntary and embodied faculties of the reader — such is the effect of Milton's 'Autumnal Leaves' and 'falling Star', each of which captures this sense of Miltonic agency in its allegorical form. His similes articulate the relationship between the subject and the divine, free will and divine authority, as the auditor engages in a dynamic process of self-fashioning according to the eudaimonistic model that underlies Milton's Protestant worldview.

Conclusion: Language and Monism

1. 'This wilde Abyss'

> Into this wilde Abyss,
> The Womb of nature and perhaps her Grave,
> Of neither Sea, nor Shore, nor Air, nor Fire,
> But all these in thir pregnant causes mixt
> Confus'dly, and which thus must ever fight,
> Unless th' Almighty Maker them ordain
> His dark materials to create more Worlds ….
>
> (*PL* II.910–16)

In *Paradise Lost*, poetic language follows Creation, emerging out of the primordial state with a material quality ('His dark materials') that animates literary expression in Milton's cosmos.[1] Satan's travels through the realm of Chaos in Book II are replete with allusions to classical cosmology: from the 'disorder, darkness and temporal infinity' of Hesiod's *Theogony*; Ovid's 'uniform waste' of the *Metamorphoses*; the cosmic elements of the Stoics ('Sea', 'Shore', 'Air' and 'Fire'); and Lucretius's 'energetic, atomistic poetry' of *De Rerum Natura*.[2] Milton's Chaos is shaped by the classical forms which provide its literary foundation in myth, and the cosmologies of the Stoics and the Epicureans, the interaction of which provide the materialist background to Milton's Protestant model of eternity.

In the *Institutes*, Calvin reflects on the Stoic and Epicurean models in the development of his providential theology. Clearly separating the human from the divine, Calvin then fuses them in the figure of Christ.[3] In developing the theological effects of the Incarnation, he blends the principles of divine transcendence and material, human agency of Epicureanism with his radical adaptation of the providential philosophy of Stoicism, a combination that manifests in the doctrine of Predestination.[4]

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[1] The Stoics also attributed language with a material quality: Pearcy 261.
[2] N. Smith 2009, 514; Ovid, I.5–9; Lucretius 1916.
[3] Kirby, 310; Calvin (1536) 1845, 2.14.1.
[4] Kirby, 315; Calvin (1536) 1845, 1.5.1.

In *Paradise Lost*, Milton's Chaos also integrates both the Epicurean and Stoic providential models, yet departs in important respects from Calvin's formulation.[5] The four elements thus animate the physical universe,

> and to Battle bring
> Thir embryon Atoms ...,
>
> (*PL* II.899–900)

giving way to the model of *ex Deo* Creation that founds his monist materialism, with its intrinsic accommodation of the compatibility of Providence and free will. Rogers traces the material basis of Milton's ontology in the seventeenth-century revolutionary subject ('the matter of revolution'), a notion also captured above by allusion to the freedom of Lucretius's 'warring' atoms.[6] From Chaos the universe is circumscribed by God with 'golden compasses':

> One foot he centred, and the other turn'd
> Round through the vast profundity obscure ….
>
> (*PL* VII.228–29)

The figure recalls Donne's use of such a conceit to describe the relationship between human and divine, expressed in a figure invoking the sacrament of marriage.[7] Elsewhere, Donne describes Calvin's remote and transcendent, yet intimately involved, God whose 'hands' 'span the poles' and 'tune all spheres at once'.[8] Yet at this point in Milton's Creation, in a process described by Raphael in Book VII, God 'infus[es]' 'the fluid Mass' with 'vital virtue' and vital warmth', with a 'downward purg[ing]' of the 'dregs' (*PL* VII.232–37). In turn, the poet's 'fashioning' of matter through the form-giving qualities of *poiesis* is an imitation of the God of Genesis in the dark formlessness of Chaos ('Matter unform'd and void': *PL* VII.232).[9] The powers of human invention are a reflection of Creation and with their basis in the creative agency of the inspired poet, are an expression of the divine in nature.

In this conclusion, I explore the implications of Milton's materialism for the expression of poetic figure, expanding on a number of features of his poetics from the

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[5] Norbrook 2013.
[6] Rogers 1996, ix–xiii; Lucretius 1916; *PL* II,890–920.
[7] Donne (1896) 2000b: 'A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning'.
[8] Donne (1896) 2000a: 'Good Friday 1613, Riding Westward'. Kirby, 321.
[9] N. Smith 2009, 514; Stewart, 8–9; Ovid, I.5–9; Kirby, 309. Identification of the material quality of language is traceable to the Stoic tradition: Merlan, 124–29.

various chapters of the thesis in a consideration of *Paradise Lost* and Milton's later works. I consider the material basis of the allegorical split between secular and sacred that manifests in Milton's blending of classical and Protestant poetics. Emphasis is placed on his development of a language of experience, based on the accommodation of free will, the human senses and passions, including sinful and intemperate passions, and on complex examples of moral agency with their potential for moral obscurity, error and sin in Milton's model of human history. I briefly reflect on the implications of his embodiment model for modern critical theory.

The style of allegoresis, from its classical antecedents to its Christian forms, emerges from the splitting of language and world which follows the condition of separation from the whole that occurs in the original act of exile.[10] The division underlies the development of Milton's allegorical poetry in *Paradise Lost*, which is reformed according to his monistic philosophy through the vehicle of poetic figure. The transformation depends on refinements of the rhetorical tradition that emerge from tensions between sacred and secular literature, tensions which nevertheless remain integral to the transformative power of poetic language in his epic.[11]

In *Paradise Lost*, the separation is reimagined according to the allegory of the cosmic body, based on the Renaissance analogy of the human body, a metaphor intrinsic to Milton's transformation of the rhetorical tradition according to the styles of Christian allegory, to express the relationship between human and divine.[12] The process depends on the condition of secular experience, of the fallen body, and refinements of expression associated with the embodied faculties for its access to the eternal through the intelligible world of the imagination. According to its materialist philosophy, *Paradise Lost* thus engages the sensory and emotional effects associated with rhetorical figure not only in ways which express the fallen condition, but equally the regenerative potential of the embodied faculties according to the eudaimonistic model that underlies his Protestant humanist subject. The temporal immediacies and transitions associated with affective states are integral to poetry's regenerative potential through their role in creative and moral self-fashioning of the subject, qualities that for Milton are equally accessible in the interior world of contemplation as the external one of action. In this

[10] Fletcher, 23, 70.
[11] Martindale 1986, 28–29.
[12] Kerrigan, 243.

way, the body metaphor underlies Milton's reconciliation of his monist ontology, with its accompanying Arminianism, to the providential pattern of the *felix culpa*.[13]

The literary transformation of the material realm depends on the relationship between action and pathos, which in Aristotelian theory forms the basis of conversion of spirit or in the Homeric tradition, *thymos*.[14] The transformation occurs in *Paradise Lost* from the figure of Satan associated with the heroes of classical literature and the knights of medieval fables, to that of Christ through the typological tradition:[15]

> the better fortitude
> Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom
> Unsung.
>
> (*PL* IX.31–33)

The shift incorporates the autonomous role of the human will, which is the basis of the self-modelling agency of Milton's Protestant humanist subject. The intensities and intermediary states of 'becoming' are the kernel of free will, as the basis of creative and moral agency in *Paradise Lost*. The embodied energies are expressed and transformed according to the potentialities of the angel body, which articulates the essential role of language expression to the active, creative and morally transformative potential of the self-defining subject. They are integral to the emergence of subjectivity in their own right as spaces of agency and expression, aligning in Milton's poetry with the Stoic, Augustinian and Calvinist emphasis on interiority as a grounding for spiritual states.

Milton's development of his allegorical style in *Paradise Lost* involves the separation of 'higher' forms of language expression from the 'lower' forms of classical figure. With its close relationship to the embodied subject and expression of the experience of its users, Milton likens Renaissance ornament to the 'corporal rinde', which marks an essential distinction in his allegory between surface and form, *eidolon* and *eikon*, the passions or *anima* associated with the lower 'carnal' body and the affections associated with the higher faculties of the soul.[16] The distinctions are features of Renaissance Augustinianism, with its emphasis on the Incarnation and eudaimonistic

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[13] Augustine 1955, VIII; Aquinas, *ST* 3.1.3 ad 3; *PL* XII.469–73; Cf. Mollenkott, 187–92.
[14] Fergusson 1961, ix–xix.
[15] *DDC* I.18; Steadman 1959, 99.
[16] See *Comus* 663–65; See also *AP*: CP 716; Steadman 1959, 99.

models which accord a value to the regenerative potential of the fallen faculties and the tools of humanist virtue.

The dual aspect of allegory generates intrinsic tensions between literal meaning and figural suggestiveness afforded by Milton's poetic language, which include effects on the body. This ability to express the realm of affective experience intersubjectively underlies Milton's transformation of allegory according to the typological tradition of *figura* with its expression of both historical time and the eternal through the imagination.[17] In this model of 'figural realism', language takes on styles of concrete expression related to the underlying vital, material body of the seventeenth-century subject. The techniques are associated with a capacity to invest language with substance — of weight associated with the moral and physical experience of the world, or as lightness associated with the finer constructs of the imagination, including, for Milton's purposes, notions of the sacred. In its sublimated states, it is associated with the angelic body, an expression of the circular, spatial dimension of poetic figure that is intrinsic to the cosmic design of Milton's epic.[18] The creative and moral basis of the angelic body is identified with luminosity, lightness, intelligence, purity and vital energy, all qualities desirable for Milton's spiritual subject. Integration of this dimension of figure with the linear narrative associated with time and history makes up the providential pattern of *Paradise Lost*.

2. 'Of true experience'

All is best, though we oft doubt,
What th' unsearchable dispose
Of highest wisdom brings about,
And ever best found in the close.
….
His servants he with new acquist
Of true experience from this great event
With peace and consolation hath dismist,
And calm of mind, all passion spent.

(*SA* 1745–48, 1755–58)

[17] Auerbach 1953, 554; Auerbach 1984, 11; Lerer 2005; Stewart, 1; Tate 1959, 82; Gregerson 1995, 250.
[18] Kerrigan, 243.

The final Chorus of *Samson Agonistes* invokes the motif of wisdom through experience that is characteristic of the distinction between Paradise and postlapsarian Eden in *Paradise Lost*, a motif later explored by William Blake.[19] It is a component of Milton's epic and tragic poetry, which accounts for the role of the expression of the passions, desires and embodied experiences associated with conscious life in shaping the subject. Milton typically applies the forms of secular literature for his own literary and philosophical objectives, and the shift to engaging the fallen faculties for the purposes of moral pedagogy, to exemplify complexities of active emotional engagement, coincides with refinements of Milton's poetic style.[20] The evolution is traceable in Milton's career from the detached model of temperance exemplified by the lady in *Comus*, to the more complex engagement of the embodied faculties of Milton's later works.[21] Milton's figurative style in his later works thus depends on reconstituting the realm of affect back into the more complete world of experience.

In *Comus*, the lady's attainment of higher states of the soul is associated with enlightened experience of the divine, and incorporates epiphanic insight ('I see thee visibly') and elevated states of religious feeling identified with the Christian sublime. Yet such experiences depend on her resisting the temptations offered by the magician ('I did not err') and thus her active exclusion of the vicissitudes, moral uncertainties and pains of experience.[22] *Paradise Lost* and *Samson Agonistes*, by contrast, explore more fully the subject's experience of temptation and sin through the complexities and obscurities of experience, including by exploring the role of affective 'pain' — or intemperate, uncertain, sinful or uncomfortable emotional states — in defining the subject. In *Paradise Lost*, Satan, Eve and Adam succumb to intemperate passions and it is their internal states and the unfolding consequences that *Paradise Lost* examines.[23] The Fall of Eve is marked by an emphasis on the overwhelming physicality of the human Fall introduced by the words 'she pluck'd, she eat', and mirrored in *Samson Agonistes* with a similar moment of corporeal or embodied shock. Instead of the revelatory insight attached to such moments in *Comus* and *Paradise Regained*, this action is associated with the succumbing of the character to the condition of fallen experience.

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[19] Blake 1784, 1789: 'Songs of Innocence and Experience'.
[20] Cf Fish 2003, 2.
[21] Baruch, 321.
[22] *Comus* 222–26: CP 95; Mikics, 141; Schoenfeldt 2004, 45.
[23] Mikics, 126.

The forms of secular literature are unconstrained by real historical time, and enable Milton's exploration of a range of emotional states and their relationship to error, sin and moral responsibility. The figures of Satan and Samson resemble the fallen anti-hero figure of classical and Elizabethan drama which, although a technical departure from the terms of Aristotelian poetics, in Milton's works are explored in the process of moral improvement and self-authoring of the auditor. *Samson Agonistes* reflects a Renaissance fascination with Seneca's theatre of excessive or 'overreaching' passions or '*furor*', through the expression of violent passions.[24] Like Seneca, Milton models a form of tragedy that conforms to his theory of the passions.[25] Seneca's is typically based on the valorisation of a Stoic resistance to the passions to achieve the state of *apatheia*, and is therefore sometimes referred to as an anti-tragedy.[26] In his *Medea*, a Latin adaptation of Euripides' *Medea* of 431 BCE, Seneca identifies Medea's excess passions with foolishness in a critique of Aristotelian moderation.[27] The Stoic model of the indifference to the passions underlies the development of Medea's identity, in which such destructive emotions require full elimination. In *Samson Agonistes*, by contrast, Milton draws on the genre of tragic poetry to articulate his Arminian model of accommodation of the passions, a complex moral drama for the self-fashioning of the audience. He adapts classical forms to meet his Protestant humanist preoccupations, rather than offering a neoclassical restatement of rationalist Stoic ethics. In ways which are comparable to Medea's act of violence, Samson succumbs to his vengeful passions, destroying the temple. The action is one in which the release of powerful passions coincides with events of historical moment in Old Testament story yet ends with the death of Samson and the catharsis of the audience: 'calm of mind, all passion spent' (*SA* 1755–58).

Engagement in the experience of the text is a reflection of the agency of Milton's subject and involves the articulation of complex moral scenarios which accommodate the implications of free will within his providential model. The expression of the emotions through moral and creative agency is intrinsic to poetry's renewal of the faculties of poet and reader according to the transformative potential of Milton's model of selfhood. Such engagement involves a valuation of the role of the

[24] Lehmann, 115; Marlowe (1604) 2009; Marlowe (1616) 2013.
[25] Lehmann, 105.
[26] Lehmann, 103–05.
[27] Nussbaum 1997, 221.

tools of humanist language expression in poetry and rhetoric, a notion at the centre of a Reformation debate between Erasmus and Luther.[28]

In his Preface to *Samson Agonistes*, Milton identifies the tragic form as the 'moralest and gravest' and the highest form of secular poetry, a notion also found in his prose works.[29] He centralises the role of the 'passions', aligning them with 'action' in the Aristotelian model and homeopathic forms of Aristotelian catharsis.[30] For auditor and poet alike, the process is understood to be therapeutic, because it involves a refinement of experience engaged by the form of tragedy. In *Samson Agonistes*, the conventions of this classical form provide Milton with a vehicle for the transformative potential of emotional expression in physical, moral and spiritual states, invoked through the notion of 'true experience' that results in 'peace and consolation'.

Not unlike Seneca's figure of Medea, Eve, Adam and Samson elaborate complex emotional states through which the auditor is actively engaged in processes of moral agency and self-development, a notion which is indebted to the principles of testing of the auditor's virtue put forward by Spenser and the early Stoics.[31] Rather than attempting to purify the world of experience, to stand outside the moral culpability attaching to the fallen state, in both works by Milton the passions are intrinsic to the human condition and with it, the potential for error and sin. Unlike the error-free lady of *Comus*, the pathos of the later works lies in the drama and *agon* associated with negotiating this reality that is exemplified for Milton in the patterns of history. While it has been said that it is the heart that stands in opposition to itself that makes great literature, such a phenomenon is reflected negatively in the Gospels.[32] This is the challenge of the *felix culpa*, which anticipates Milton's reconciliation of the forces of providence to his model of human agency.

While critics identify the parallels between Samson's actions and Milton's own experience during the English Revolution, the moral obscurity of Samson's figure remains.[33] In the context of *Paradise Lost*, Fish argues more generally that such

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[28] Erasmus and Luther, 1, 32.
[29] Preface to the Second Book of *The Reason of Church Government* CP 669–70.
[30] Kahn, 207, 262.
[31] *The Faerie Queene*, II.7.7: Spenser, 361; Aristotle 1953, *NE* Book II; Seneca 1917–1925, vol. 3, Epistles CVIII, CXVI ('On Self-Control'), CXXI, CXXIII–IV; Irvine, 85–86.
[32] See, for example, Mark 3:25. The notion of the 'opposition of the heart' is attributed to William Faulkner's Nobel Prize acceptance speech, reproduced at www nobelprize.org.
[33] Serjeantson, 613–31; Schwartz 2009, 632–48; Harvey, 649–66; Bennett, 219–35.

conundrums require the reader to submit their uncertainties to faith.[34] Yet in my argument, Milton's active model of the responsible agent in his or her condition of dire fallenness requires such moral uncertainties to be purged of their morally ambiguous status. In *Paradise Lost* and *Samson Agonistes* the process centres on characters whose internal states and actions are marked by taint of human error and for whom the historical consequences are catastrophic.[35] Central to the drama of each fallen character is the gravity and significance of their error in a personal and cultural sense, expressed through its relationship to personal fate and Providence.[36] Milton's expression of Samson's 'rousing motions' (*SA* 1382) reflects his literary technique of harnessing the ambivalences and uncertainties attaching to emotionally-charged states, around which arises the question of whether Samson is a regenerate figure. While Samson's actions can only be justified if they are an expression of God's will, this is not clear in the text. What I think is clearer is the absolving of any sinfulness of the poet through the interaction of the principle of catharsis with the Atonement.

Milton's approach is therefore one of justification — an active removal of Samson's guilt and penalty of sin and claim for righteousness through Christ's atoning sacrifice — in ways which have a semi-autobiographical resonance.[37] Samson figures the notion of excessive passions, and their relationship to *furor* in the Platonic tradition associated with either madness or sublimation.[38] While Samson's passions may only be otherwise justified if they express the righteous anger of God, the association of affective 'pain' in the condition of fallenness with the attainment of sublimated states emerges in the Augustinian tradition from the underlying model of Christ's Passion, a complex state of suffering that is equally associated with experiences of spiritual elevation.[39] *Samson Agonistes* exemplifies Milton's use of poetic language and literary form to explore complex ideas with emotional and ethical resonances, leading to a more 'profound' understanding of them and depends on the role of fallen, secular literary form in opening up spaces for the expression of will and agency of the poet and

[34] Fish 2001, 14–15.
[35] Mikics, 15–16.
[36] Lehmann, 103–05.
[37] Job 9:2, 25:4; Acts 13:38, 39.
[38] CP 543; Lehmann, 115; Compare Adam's 'commotion strange' in *PL* VIII.531; Schoenfeldt 2004, 45.
[39] Campana, 33; see eg St John: 'The purest suffering bears and carries in its train the purest understanding'. St Augustine: 'Trials and tribulations offer us a chance to make reparation for our past faults and sins. On such occasions the Lord comes to us like a physician to heal the wounds left by our sins. Tribulation is the divine medicine'.

reader.[40] The drama of Milton's style lies in the tensions or *agones* that it engages between lower and higher states of the body and soul, between fallen error and spiritual elevation. In this sense, the regenerative potential of the subject lies in Milton's model of agency, volition and self-fashioning which is also key to his model of poetic expression and articulated in figural style.

3. The Riddle of the Sphinx

> And as that *Theban* Monster that propos'd
> Her riddle, and him who solv'd it not, devour'd,
> That once found out and solv'd, for grief and spite
> Cast herself headlong from th' *Ismenian* steep ….
>
> (*PR* IV 572-5)

Milton's comparison between Satan and the Theban Sphinx in *Paradise Regained* is associated with a fusion of the classical tradition and the doctrine of the Incarnation. The answer to the riddle of the Sphinx, a classical figure who devours all those unable to answer her riddle until Oedipus solves it, is 'Man', just as in Milton's work, where the Incarnate Christ defeats Satan.[41] The riddle's suggestiveness of divine mystery depends on its figural qualities of dissimilation and the feelings and emotions that they generate. In important ways, it bears on the relationship between *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*.[42] The motif of the riddle also appears in *Samson Agonistes* in its formulation of the Book of Judges.[43]

In *Paradise Regained*, the fall of Satan is related to an assertion of identity in a conflation of God and human in the figure of Christ.[44] The motif inflects the work's semi-autobiographical undercurrent in Christ's resistance to Satan's temptations, which bear a strong relation to things associated with Milton's own life and career, as Milton draws on examples from his own history, of a life of engagement and responsibility, rather than a catalogue of hypotheticals. As in each of Milton's later works, active engagement with the world, rather than resistance by the subject, is the key to regeneration. According to Rogers, with express acknowledgement of Freudian readings based on the principle of repression, the semi-autobiographical reading of *Paradise*

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[40] Lewalski 2011, 277.
[41] Apollodorus, III.5.8; C. Hill, 420.
[42] Rogers 2009, 589; Radzinowicz, 202–18.
[43] Judges 14:14.
[44] *PR* IV.561.

Regained is also intended to resolve the underlying oppositions that critics find at the centre of Milton's earlier epic, *Paradise Lost*. Milton is attempting to scrutinise his own history to 'purify his past by differentiating it in some way from its satanic double', from a 'dark version of his own virtue'.[45]

Two interrelated aspects of Milton's blending of the classical and Christian traditions figuratively in the riddle of the Sphinx, which I now discuss, draw on the experience of poet and reader in ways which affect the shaping power of poetic figure and elucidate the relationship between the later works. These are Milton's early Christian, Stoic-style renunciation of the power of external objects in the temptations of classical literature and philosophy (*PR* IV.240–41) and his rejection of classical and Renaissance eloquence in favour of the plain and simple style associated with the typological tradition of *figura*. [46]

Despite his accompanying repudiation of Stoic philosophy, the style of Christ's renunciation of the importance to him of the classics reflects the influence of Stoic philosophy — of self-sufficiency and the rejection of the powers of external objects over the subject — on early Christianity and on its shaping of doctrine.[47] Christ limits the importance of such things to his formative years, recalling the approach of Seneca, who distinguishes the early Cynics by claiming the pleasures to be acceptable so long as the subject acknowledges that they exert no external control.[48] Milton's repudiation of classical literature and philosophy is arguably tied to spiritual ascension on the Augustinian ladder, by which the Christ of *Paradise Regained* attaches importance to the attainment of higher states of the soul associated with Protestant light.[49] Once Christ shows his obedience by demonstrating the lack of control over him that external objects exert, a sequence of epic similes fusing classical and Christian traditions introduces the riddle of the Sphinx (*PR* IV.285–364). The idea of using the principles and tools of classical philosophy as building blocks to a higher level of Christian knowledge is characteristic of the Augustinian tradition.[50] The return of the simile is a dimension of the blending of traditions and with it, preservation of the shaping power of poetic figure, which expressed as a riddle produce intensities and suggestions of ineffability and

[45] Rogers 2007, '*Samson Agonistes*'.
[46] *PR* IV.285–364; Auerbach 1953, 554; Auerbach 1984, 11; Lerer 2005.
[47] Irvine 2009, Ch. 6; D. Robinson (1997) 2004.
[48] Seneca 1917–25 II XV; Irvine, Ch. 6.
[49] Quint 2004, 847.
[50] Augustine 2008, 72; CP 543; Apollodorus, III.5.8.

sublimity. In Christ's defeat of Satan, Milton thus uses secular literature as a vehicle for the power of Revelation, which is made possible in poetic form through the techniques of figure with its embodied effects. Moreover, the experiential dimensions of poetic figure involve poet and reader in processes of identity formation as imitators of Christ.

This Senecan principle suggests the permissibility of ornament to the reader who has been appropriately taught through 'right reason' in the examples of *Paradise Lost* and *Areopagitica*.[51] The return of the epic simile reinforces the principles of choice and agency that underlie *Paradise Lost* and are expressed in the figure of the Incarnate Christ, key to the vanquishing of temptation and the regaining of lost Paradise (*PR* IV.604).[52] With his repudiation of the powers of eloquence over the subject, the reader is thus permitted an epic simile which in the form of a riddle recognises the significance of the principles of creative and moral agency that underlie Milton's blending of classical and Christian literature.

While *Paradise Regained* is otherwise written in the plain style, the return of the epic simile also marks a return to the sublime style of epic grandeur. Yet an element of Milton's repudiation of eloquence in *Paradise Regained* relates to his development of an allegorical style that conforms to the typological tradition. With its reflection of both 'figural realism' and the *humilis et sublimis* style, this is the tradition that Auerbach finds in the Christian response to the classical literary style. It draws on a separation of styles extending from Aristotle, a low or humble diction used to express sacred matters, in a synthesis of the plain and sublime enacted by Augustine's accommodation of the Longinian tradition, 'through the power of the Christian word stripped of the trappings of classical eloquence'.[53] When Milton thus refers to the superiority of psalmic poetry over all other forms with its simple and sublime style as 'to all true tastes excelling' (*PR* IV.347), he suggests (in the aesthetic term of 'tastes') that this simple diction can be a vehicle for both clarity of expression and powerful feelings. Here Milton's reference to the 'plain style' cannot be conflated to a tool of logic, as some critics infer, but is rather an expression of its synthesis within a multivalent style.[54] The style is also used in the Heaven of Book III and the closing lines of *Paradise Lost* to reflect spiritual 'lightness'.

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[51] *PL* I.777–88; *AP*: CP 728.
[52] Rogers 2007, '*Paradise Regained*'.
[53] Lerer 2005; Shaw, 19–23; Shuger 226
[54] Fish (1967) 1997, 26.

The aesthetic qualities associated with the embodied dimensions of rhetorical figure are key to its shaping power and to Milton's transformation of allegorical figure. By identifying his allegoresis with the transformation of experiential states from outer sense to inner vision, Milton expresses a model of poetic figure which accords with the inner light of faith of Protestantism without any dependence on external distractions — or *eidola* — associated with the effects of classical style. These adaptations of style underlie the Revelatory dimensions of Christ's sudden insight into his identity, available through the mind's eye of the imagination afforded by the rhetorical tradition.

The significance of Milton's 'pendant world' figure lies in its symbolic role in the transformation of allegorical figure in *Paradise Lost*. It is a reflection of the rhetorical virtuosity of the poet to draw on multiple styles of grand and plain to express the Christian sublime in which both are equally associated with creative agency through the effects of the Incarnation. Milton's sublime style draws on the various classical Epicurean, Stoic, Longinian and Incarnation models of materialist philosophy. The last is arguably the most important, with its basis of sublimity arising from the intensities produced by the divine kernel of vital, human agency. The fine artifice employed by Milton to achieve these effects is averred by Andrew Marvell in his dedicatory poem, in which he refers to Milton's sublime style with its 'preservation' of the 'inviolacy' of the divine.[55]

What Fish calls 'intangling' in language is thus an ambivalent process: poetic ornament, especially imagery, can be idolatrous, distracting the reader from the truth by inflaming the senses and passions; alternatively, it can, properly conceived by the poet, give the reader access to the eternal through the purified senses and passions, lifting the ornament of language to reveal an ultimate reality, or, as Longinus argues, 'transporting' through the imagination and the emotions rather than invoking the fallen senses and passions associated with objects of the external world.[56] Integral to the cosmic design of *Paradise Lost*, with its etymological origin in the Greek '*kosmos*', poetic 'ornament' is like a pendant that forms the world through language, yet shimmers on the surface and hangs suspended between these possibilities of fallen and divinely-inspired poetry. Moreover, the 'shimmering' quality is a feature of the ornaments of Renaissance poetic language that results from its often elaborate artifice, its material

[55] Andrew Marvell, 'On Paradise Lost': CP 209–10.
[56] Curtius, 398.

quality as garment and its simultaneous embodied effects on the imagination, thought and feeling.[57] Most notably, Satan seems to fail to see its true significance as he regards the 'pendant world' at the close of Book II, where Milton yokes together the various meanings of the word 'pendant' in his description of the 'pendant world' as both ornament and as suspension between fallen and unfallen states.[58]

4. 'I Sing with mortal voice'

> Standing on Earth, not rapt above the Pole,
> More safe I Sing with mortal voice, unchang'd
> To hoarse or mute, though fall'n on evil days,
> On evil days though fall'n, and evil tongues;
> In darkness, and with dangers compast round,
> And solitude; yet not alone, while thou
> Visit'st my slumbers Nightly, or when Morn
> Purples the East: still govern thou my Song,
> *Urania*, and fit audience find, though few.
>
> (*PL* VII.23–31)

The mortal state of the poet, 'Standing on Earth' in his material and spiritual distance from the divine, is not merely a reflection of his fallenness. It is the condition from which he expresses his inspired poetry, drawing on experiential states which are important in his poetic model for the regeneration of the subject. The emphasis on experience also gives us a glimpse of the inner world of the poet, whose centrality to the epic equals that of the reader. In *Paradise Lost*, the poet in his blindness is in a kind of exile 'cut off' in his darkness (*PL* III.47), as he composes the poem. In this *invocatio*, Milton alludes to the personal dangers and accusations against him after the English Revolution, accusations dismissed by Marvell when he describes the poet as 'blind, yet bold'.[59] The significance of Milton's illness and blindness, alternatively traced to digestive complaints and sinfulness, becomes a locus for the therapeutic role of poetry on the interrelated physical, moral and spiritual well-being of the Miltonic bard.[60]

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[57] Fletcher, 108.
[58] *PL* II.1052; *OED*, s.v. 'pendant' *n*.
[59] Marvell, 'On Paradise Lost': CP 209–10.
[60] Schoenfeldt 1999, 131–68.

In this thesis, I have compared modern theories of affect with their seventeenth-century counterparts, seeking points of intersection and difference which are then applied to a reading of *Paradise Lost* and, to a lesser degree, Milton's other works. In doing so, I hope to have uncovered dimensions of experience that assist in our understanding of the seventeenth-century world and its modes of expression articulated through the vehicle of poetic figure. In the modern period as in the seventeenth century, that dimension reveals a space where expression is the essential component for modelling the contours of human experience, a process that draws on the intensities of transitionary states or 'becomings'. For Milton, language expression is intrinsic to his ontology as a vehicle for an open-ended process of ethical and creative self-fashioning. Such engagement with the complex patterns of moral, physical, imaginative and spiritual dimensions of lived experience runs counter to aspects of modern Deleuzian theory, with its exceptionally vital and pure formulation of affective experience, yet radical exclusion of the moral, historical and imaginative mind, and with it the vicissitudes of experience.

A number of Milton critics, including Kerrigan, apply a Freudian reading to *Paradise Lost* which is based on the principle of unconscious repression. Yet Anthony Storr argues that Freud is in error, when according to his 'Nirvana principle', he emphasises the attainment of states of tranquility through the discharge of all tensions produced by powerful emotions, rather than by accommodating them in human experience and especially recognising the importance of the expression of emotions in music and other arts.[61] The Freudian principle appears to fit Seneca's stoic condemnation of the excessive, negative emotions of Medea and the emotional purging of Milton's Samson. Yet in Milton's epics, I argue, the principle of regeneration of the ordinary subject requires the expression of feelings, and is more likely to be based on Renaissance Augustinian traditions which recognise Aristotelian notions of the balancing of forces and Platonic notions of the refinement of feeling.

Milton's refinement of the principle of *thymos* reflects these principles in his incorporation of intensities of experience as well as dialectical oppositions in *Paradise Lost.* There they reflect a dynamic balancing of internal forces that are integral to the creative imagination, represented by Satan's departure from the underworld with the

experience of the unconscious forces that shape the powers of poetic invention.[62] While the 'wild Abyss' articulates the potential of the creative imagination with its origins in the classical underworld, it is associated with the rhetorical tradition and is also the basis of Milton's transformation of allegory. Albeit suggesting a more conservative Milton, the return of the epic simile in *Paradise Regained* demonstrates his affirmation of the transformational power of poetry through its effects on both poet and auditor, which includes retention of the shaping power of poetic figure as he navigates the poles of invention in Reformation poetry between Sidney's 'golden world' and Puttenham's 'monstruous imaginations and conceits'.[63] The classical and Shakespearean literary traditions are important to the dynamics of Milton's epic, because they draw on the intensities and transitionary states of agency intrinsic to such self-modelling against the dictates of Stoic and Calvinist determinism.[64]

Despite the constraints of Puritanism, Milton's figural style is both revolutionary and iconoclastic. It is the rebellious aspect of the creative mind, with its access to sublimity or transcendence, that troubles Plato, according to Mikics, resulting in a split in Platonism between the Aristotelian and Longinian traditions. The alternative Greek tradition exemplified by Longinus captures the role of affective states in this process, for whom the expression of 'genuine passion … bursts out with a kind of "fine madness" and divine inspiration, and falls on our ears like the voice of a god'.[65] In its extreme form, it is reflected in the figure of Satan in *Paradise Lost*. In Milton's later work, both the Epicurean and Longinian traditions provide a sublime style that can be reconciled in the figure of Christ, as a model for the complex ambivalences evident in Augustinian traditions of the fallen body and its senses and passions.

The interrelationship between aesthetics and value means that the dynamic balancing process is as significant for Milton's model of poetic inspiration as it is for moral shaping through reader 'intangling' and the 'drama of choosing' which surround the notion of 'obedience', features of *Paradise Lost* identified by a number of critics, including Barbara Lewalski and Stanley Fish.[66] The principle of obedience, so essential

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[62] In Book III.13–20 Milton the poet refers to his visit to the underworld to claim the powers of poetic invention.
[63] Sidney 2007 138; Puttenham 1589, I.8.
[64] Mikics, 15. The drama is central to the interplay of *iustitia* and *pietas* in the classics, a dynamic that is equally referred to in Sidney's *Apology*.
[65] Mikics, 15–18; Longinus, VIII.4.
[66] Fish 1967, 1; Lewalski 1985, 1.

to Puritan theology, yet with a fraught history in the early modern period when conferred upon kings and magistrates, is harnessed in Milton's poetics to generate a central moral and, in turn, spiritual drama in *Paradise Lost* when applied to competing sources of authority in Satan and God.[67] Such a balancing of oppositions is recognised by Sidney, when he refers in the *Apology* to the classical opposition between duty and loyalty, or *iustitia* and *pietas* in Virgil's *Aeneid*.[68] Yet the experience-based reading shows that because of the dire state of the will, in which poetry may purge or damn the reader, the potential for multiple readers of *Paradise Lost* emerges, a potential Sidney's *Apology* anticipates.[69]

Milton's approach has implications for language in the modern embodied model, in which the understanding of poetic and literary language as garment or body recognises its potential as a space where linguistic expression is an important component of the model of the subject. Language, at least in literary genres, has a body, and return to organicist notions of the cosmic body is unnecessary for this function. While the cosmic body model loses its relevance, according to Fletcher, with the emergence of the Cartesian mind and Enlightenment rationalism, the embodied subject remains integral to expression in poetic language and other literary modes, subcategories of language usage where the embodied model still recurs — poetic language is a recognised category in modern linguistics.[70] As a mode of performance, poetry articulates the contours of thought and experience and depends on the bringing into form of the figure of the body, expressed through the figural techniques of language. Such elements are captured in a performative reading of *Paradise Lost*, of the shaping powers at work in the expression of intensities and transitionary states identified with engagement of the senses and emotions of the embodied subject through styles of language. Poetic tensions express this realm of affect, with its transformational energies associated with the intersubjective experience of the embodied faculties.

In the darkness of his composition of *Paradise Lost*, Milton grapples with Puritan concerns for the moral basis of literary figures, blending classical and Christian traditions to accommodate forms of fallen literature to styles of allegoresis. Preserving the shaping power of figure, Milton combines the qualities of sensory impression and

[67] C. Hill, Ch 29.
[68] Sidney 2007, 148.
[69] Sidney 2007, 151–3; M. Mack 147–56.
[70] Jakobson, 852; de Saussure 2007, 842; Curtius, 444; Fletcher, 70, 117.

insight with the expression of states of refined feeling associated with the Christian sublime. Focusing on the embodied, fallen form of the seventeenth century subject, his engagement of modes of affect within styles of secular literature occurs in accordance with a materialist philosophy that recognises the potential for their refinement in the regeneration of the soul through the divinely-inspired, creative expression of the poet. While the recompense for loss of Milton's sight is a clearer inner vision, the price for the loss of the Puritan republic is the Paradise of the mind — the internal state of existential potential that is the domain of creative expression for the seventeenth-century subject.[71] Such is the Miltonic legacy that history bears — enacted within a long Calvinist history that in Final Judgment will ultimately make up for all that has been for Milton, the blind poet of the failed republic in the finite world of time and experience, irretrievably lost.

[71] The importance of clarity of vision in *Paradise Lost* is discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis; see also Gilman 170.

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