"A Translation and Historical Commentary of Book One and Book Two of the *Historia* of Geōrgios Pachymerēs"

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Abstract

A summary of what a historical commentary should aim to do is provided by Gomme and Walbank in the introductions to their famous and magisterial commentaries on Thoukydidēs and Polybios. From Gomme:

> *A historical commentary on an historian must necessarily derive from two sources, a proper understanding of his own words, and what we can learn from other authorities . . . To see what gaps there are in his narrative [and to] examine the means of filling these gaps.*
>
> (A. Gomme *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* vol. 1 (London, 1959) 1)

And from Walbank:

> *I have tried to give full references to other relevant ancient authorities, and where the text raises problems, to define these, even if they could not always be solved. Primarily my concern has been with whatever might help elucidate what Polybius thought and said, and only secondarily with the language in which he said it, and the question whether others subsequently said something identical or similar.*
>
> (F. Walbank *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* vol. 1 (London, 1957) vii)

Both scholars go on to stress the need for the commentator to stick with the points raised by the text and to avoid the temptation to turn the commentary into a rival narrative.

These are the principles which I have endeavoured to follow in my Historical Commentary on Books One and Two of Pachymerēs' *Historia*. My focus has been twofold. On the one hand I have highlighted and elucidated the events which Pachymerēs narrates, glossing with prosopographical and topological notes the people, places and things mentioned in the text, and explaining other esoteric details, such as the range of many and varied, ornate Byzantine court honorifics. On the other hand I have made a critical comparison between Pachymerēs and the other important sources for the period, Greek, Western, and Eastern, to provide explanations for differences in the various narratives, to suggest which source is the more accurate for any given event, and to fill up the narrative 'gaps' of Gomme. While I have attempted to avoid turning the commentary itself into a narrative, I acknowledge that in some places I have not been completely successful in this aim. However, I believe that every divagation is justified by the arguments I put forward.

I must stress that both by training and inclination I am an historian, not a philologist, so the commentary will be historical rather than philological. This is despite the importance Pachymerēs himself places in the clever use of language and his frequent use of allusions to – and quotes from – other works, Classical, Byzantine or biblical. The question of *mimēsis*, how much Pachymerēs is directly trying to imitate or incorporate older texts, has received limited attention, and only where Pachymerēs' use of the earlier text is vital to the understanding of his own work. Similarly, questions of language, and the way in which

Pachymerēs uses it, have not been explored except in those instances where it directly affects the historical point our author is making.

Pachymerēs' *Historia* is an important source for a pivotal period in Byzantine Imperial history, and many scholars have not used it as efficiently as they could due to the denseness of his prose and his "tortuous syntax" (Bartusis 1992:55). While the situation is changing somewhat, especially through the on-going research of Albert Failler of the Institut Français d'études Byzantines, the *Historia* still contains many mysteries. It is hoped that this commentary can solve at least a few of these.

This was always going to be for Mrs Pickles, who first introduced me to the Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans.

Now it is also for Dad, though he won't read it;
Barbara, because she needs some return on her investment;
and for Mike Slackenerny, who showed me the way.



GEŌRGIOS PACHYMERĒS

(Cod. Gr. Monacen. 442. fol. 6vo)

Contents

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I also wish to thank all of the many scholars whose work I have used and abused in the course of completing this thesis. I cannot pretend to be standing on their shoulders, but they are giants nevertheless.

I offer Pachymerēs my apologies for any offence this thesis may cause him.

Abbreviations

Akrop.	*Georgii Acropolitae Opera, vol. 1: Historiam*, ed. A Heisenberg (Leipzig, 1903)
BH	Bar Hebraeus, Gregory Abu'l Faraj *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj, the son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician commonly known as Bar Hebraeus, Being the First Part of his Political History of the World,* vol. 1, tr. E. Wallis-Budge (London, 1932)
Chon.	*Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, ed. J-L. van Dieten (Berlin and New York, 1975)
CoM	*Chronicle of the Morea*, ed. J. Schmitt (London, 1904; repr. Groningen, 1967)
Dölger, *Regesten*	Dölger, F. and P. Wirth *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453, Teil 3: Regesten von 1204-1282* (Munich, 1982)
Festa	*Theodori Ducae Lascaris Epistulae CCXVII*, ed. N. Festa (Florence, 1898)
Greg.	*Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina Historia*, ed. L. Schopen, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1829)
Kant.	*Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris historiarum*, 3 vols. ed. L Schopen and B. Niehbuhr (Bonn, 1828-1832)
Laurent, *Regestes*,	Laurent, V. *Les regestes des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople, I: Les actes des patriarches, fasc. 4: Les regestes de 1208 à 1309* (Paris, 1971)
MM	Miklosich, F. and Müller, J. *Acta et diplomatica Graeca medii aevi sacra et profana,* 6 vols. (Vienna, 1860-1890)
Pach.	*Georges Pachymérès. Relations historiques*, ed. A. Failler, French tr. V. Laurent, vol. 1, 2 parts (Paris, 1984)
Pach (Bonn)	*Georgii Pachymeris de Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis*, ed. I. Bekker, 2 vols. (Bonn, 1835)
PK	Pseudo-Kodinos *Traité des Offices*, ed. and tr. J. Verpeaux (Paris, 1976)
PLP	Trapp, E. et. al. (1976ff.) *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit,* Vienna

Skout.	*Anōnumou Synopsis Chronikē*, ed. K. Sathas *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi,* VII (Paris, 1894)
TT	Tafel, G. and G. Thomas *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig* (Vienna, 1856-57)

Introduction[1]

Geōrgios Pachymerēs: Life and Career

The author of the *Historia* was, as he himself tells us, born in 1241/2, descended from refugees who fled Kōnstantinoupolis in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. Unfortunately we know nothing about his parents or family background beyond this. He may have become interested in joining the clergy at an early date, and some of this interest may have stemmed from growing up in Nikaia, the patriarchal seat. He appears to have held a life-long dedication to the secular clergy, and was proud of being a member of it (Failler 2001:131-132).

After the imperial restoration in Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261, Pachymerēs spent some time as a student in the capital, probably under the megas logothetes Geōrgios Akropolitēs, learning such subjects as logic, rhetoric, Euclidean mathematics and Aristotelian philosophy (Hunger 1978:1.447; Macrides 1978:29-33). How the young Pachymerēs gained access to such high-level education is unknown, but may hint at a familial background of some status.

He entered the clergy in the early 1260s, and he states that he was a notarios at the time of Patriarch Arsenios' second deposition in 1265 (Pach. 347^{28-29}). His steady advancement through the ranks of the church hierarchy indicates that his superiors saw promise and capability in him, and also suggest some element of ambition in the man. By 1277 he had become didaskalos tou apostolou, who read and interpreted (in both a literal and metaphorical sense) the Pauline Epistles and other Acts of the Apostles during the church communion (Darrouzès 1970:66-86, 532), and by 1285 he was hieromnemos, responsible for the day-to-day operations of the patriarchal basilica and acting as a valet and chamberlain to the patriarch (Darrouzès 1970:533).

The two positions Pachymerēs appears to have taken most pride in – protekdikos (an official in charge of issues related to Church-bestowed sanctuary [Darrouzés (1970:323-33) and Macrides (1988a:515, 537)]) and dikaiophylax (an imperial official, chosen from among the clergy, who dealt with legal cases which transcended the civil-ecclesiastic divide [Darrouzès (1970:109-111) and Oikonomides (1976:135)]) – were obtained sometime after 1285, and Pachymerēs may have held both positions at the same time. As protekdikos, a title which sat in the sixth rank of the patriarchal hierarchy, Pachymerēs reached the highest point in his career.

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[1] The important monograph by S. Lampakes, *Georgios Pachymeris, Protekdikos and Dikaiophylax: An Introductory Essay* (Athens 2004), has appeared too recently to have been utilised in this dissertation.

Although he did not reach the highest levels of either state or ecclesiastic hierarchies, Pachymerēs appears to have had familiar contact with numerous members of the patriarchal and imperial courts. In Books I and II of the *Historia* alone, Pachymerēs shows connections, even friendship, with two patriarchs – Iōannēs XI Bekkos (Pach. 171^{8-9}) and Theodosios of Antioch (Pach. 179^{2}) – and also a sister of a basileus, Eirēnē-Eulogia Palaiologina (Pach. 179^{27}-181^{6}).

Pachymerēs is assumed to have died shortly after 1307 – the date in which his narrative *Historia* abruptly ends.

Only one portrait of Pachymerēs exists. It was painted in the middle of the fourteenth century and we do not know whether the painter based his portrait on an image from life, so it may not be an accurate representation of the man. This portrait depicts an ascetic-looking man of middle-to-late age, with pronounced cheekbones, large ears and an imposing spade beard. This portrait is reproduced as the frontispiece to this dissertation.

Pachymerēs' entry in the *PLP* is no. 22186. He also has biographical entries in Krumbacher (1897:288-291) and Fryde (2000:199-200).

Pachymerēs' Writings

Pachymerēs was, for his time, a prolific writer. Apart from his *Historia*, his longest and best-known work, he wrote numerous other works, ranging in subject from science and mathematics to philosophy, poetry and theology. The bibliography of his known output, other than the *Historia*, is as follows:

1) The *Quadrivium*, a compendium and digest of late Byzantine knowledge of the subjects of mathematics and geometry (the later especially drawing heavily upon Euclid), astronomy and music.[2]
2) A twelve-book *Epitome* of the philosophy of Aristotle, combining long passages from the original Aristotelian writings with paraphrases of the remainder. As with the *Quadrivium*, Pachymerēs does not contribute anything original to this work, but it was thanks to his compilation of this Epitome that much of Aristotle's writings have survived to this day.[3]

[2] Edited by P. Tannery and E. Stephanou, *Quadrivium de Georges Pachymère* (Vatican City, 1940).
[3] This has not yet been published in Greek in its entirety. An old Latin translation exists: P. Becchius, *Georgii Pachymeris hieromnemonis, in universam fere Aristotelis philosophiam, epitome* (Basel, 1560)

3) A paraphrase of the writings of Pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite, dedicated to Patriarch Athanasios III of Alexandria.[4]
4) A theological work, written in the aftermath of the Union of Lyons in 1274, which discusses doctrinal orthodoxy.[5]
5) Two rhetorical exercises, the *Progymnasmata*[6] and the *Staseis*[7], written in imitation of the classical Greek orators.
6) Two letters, addressed to Patriarch Athanasios III of Alexandria (r.1276-1316).[8]
7) Several poems, including poetic introductions to both the *Quadrivium* and the *Epitome* of Aristotle; extracts of an autobiographical poem;[9] and a short poetic exercise.[10]

Compared with the *Historia*, these secondary works by Pachymerēs are unoriginal in form or content, and while we should thank him for preserving in them numerous pieces of classical writings, they are of less interest than his historical work.

The *Historia*

Pachymerēs' reputation is founded largely on his largest and most original creation, the *Historia*. It is a prose history of Byzantium and its neighbours, covering more than fifty years of time, from the reign of Theodōros II Laskaris (r.1254-58) until the text is quite abruptly ended, presumably through the death of the author, during the description of events occurring in 1307. It is traditionally broken into thirteen books, and into two parts. The first part, in six books, covers the rise and reign of Michaēl VIII Palaiologos (r.1259-1282) while the second part, in seven books, relates the first half of the reign of Andronikos II Palaiologos (r.1282-1328). The first sections of the Historia, which cover the period leading up to the retaking of Konstantinoupolis in 1261, overlap the historical work of Georgios Akropolitēs, while the later sections are overlapped by the history of the fourteenth century writer Nikephoros Gregoras. Nevertheless, Pachymerēs provides the most detailed and reliable of literary

[4] The 1634 edition by B. Cordier is reproduced in Migne *Patrologiae Graecae* 3-4.
[5] "Graecia orthodoxa", in Migne, *Patrologiae Graecae* 144, cols. 924-928.
[6] C. Walz *Rhetores Graeci* (Tübingen, 1832) 1.549-596.
[7] J. F. Boissonade *G. Pachymeris Declamationes XIII* (Paris, 1848).
[8] The first of these is the dedication to the paraphrase of Pseudo-Dionysios, and the second has been edited by A. Failler "Le séjour d'Athanase II d'Alexandrie à Constantinople" *Revue études Byzantines* 35 (1977) 62-71.
[9] One extract being part of the *Historia* (Pach. (Bonn) II.304-306) and the other, still unpublished, contained in the manuscript *Venetus Marcianus gr*. 452, f.231-233.
[10] This poem follows on from the autobiographical piece in the *Venetus Marcianus gr.* 452.

sources for the period 1261-1300, since his work has been shown to be a primary source for that of Gregoras.

Throughout the *Historia*, Pachymerēs' focus is primarily on two areas: politics and religion. On the one hand he covers the usual stamping ground of Byzantine historiography – the deeds of basileis, with particular emphasis on foreign, military and dynastic affairs – but he delves further than most Byzantine historians into the politics of the Greek Orthodox church. In part this is down to the unsettled nature of church affairs during his period, which saw patriarchs deposed by the basileus, the struggle of rival factions for ecclesiastic dominance and the controversial church Union with Rome declared at the Council of Lyons in 1274, but this focus is also in large part due to Pachymerēs' own predilections and interests. A churchman all his life, his attitudes and interests were necessarily different from other Byzantine historians of his era, such as Choniates, Akropolitēs and Kantakouzenos, who were statesmen and generals and who lived and worked in the secular world more than Pachymerēs did.

Books One and Two

The first two Books of the *Historia* are prime candidates for study. Not only do they combine into a discrete story of their own – the rise to power of Michaēl VIII Palaiologos and his "refounding" of the Byzantine Empire through his capture of Konstantinoupolis in 1261 – but because the events they describe are also treated in detail by the history of Akropolitēs. With Akropolitēs' work serving as a form of control, Books One and Two can be used as a sample of the whole *Historia*, to test the reliability of Pachymerēs' work as true historical text, to provide insights into the methods of composition and to highlight any biases and attitudes Pachymerēs may have inserted into the text.

Pachymerēs' Sources

Pachymerēs was, first and foremost, an independent writer. In the *prooimion* to the *Historia* (Pach. 23^{8-13}) he states his research methods:

> *He has not simply taken unconfirmed stories from the past, nor has he put faith in hearsay only – if someone says he has seen or heard something himself and considers the stories trustworthy for no other reason than because he says so – but*

> *he was himself a witness to the majority of the events as they occurred, or else he obtained accurate information from those who first saw them at the time they happened, and even then not without further attestation, but only after obtaining confirmation from many others.*

This is a clear claim to independence. Unlike many other authors, Pachymerēs says, he will be empirical in his history, relying only upon what he himself has seen, or else material which can be proven through comprehensive testing to be true.

The first thing that such claims would seem to rule out is the use by Pachymerēs of earlier histories written by other authors. The *Historia* does indeed seem to be free of any taint of cross-pollination from other extant sources. In part this is due to the nature of the period about which Pachymerēs wrote, and the time in which he wrote. Pachymerēs explicitly states that his *Historia* will begin at a point previously untreated by other authors. To cover historical ground already trodden by other writers whose work is more-or-less accurate was, to Pachymerēs' perspective, pointless (Pach. 27^{4-7}). In addition, Pachymerēs appears to have been writing in an historical vacuum, as it were, for no other historian wrote a history of the second half of the thirteenth century until Gregoras began his work in the years following Pachymerēs' death.

The one exception to these statements is the history written by the megas logothetes Georgios Akropolitēs, which covered the period 1204-1261, and which therefore overlaps the beginning of the *Historia*. Akropolitēs died in 1282, and therefore must have written his history before that date, and probably before Pachymerēs began writing his own. It is quite likely that the two men knew each other, possibly since Pachymerēs' school days in the early 1260s, and thus it is likely that Pachymerēs knew of the historical writings of the older man.

Despite this, Pachymerēs' work shows no sign of having been cribbed from the earlier work of Akropolitēs. Although both authors treat of the same events, they usually differ both in detail and in attitude. For full details the reader is referred to the commentary to the text, but this introduction will give some examples.

In the months following the death of basileus Theodōros II, Michaēl Palaiologos came to the throne, despite the legitimate claims of Theodōros' heir, Iōannēs IV. Akropolitēs record (Akrop. 154^{10}-159^{18}) is quite brief, and emphasises more than once that Michaēl was reluctant to accept the power that was being thrust upon him by the elite of the empire; an elite which was united in its desire to see Michaēl take the throne. Pachymerēs' account, on the other hand, is far longer and more detailed (Pach. 65^{23}-115^{6} and 129^{3}-147^{4}). It shows a completely different picture. According to him the elite was far from being united in its opinions regarding the succession. There were loyalists of Iōannēs, other claimants stepping forward from the nobility, and Michaēl Palaiologos himself is cast as a conniving and

deceptive politician, using others as catspaws to advance his claims, and employing widespread bribery and some threats to obtain his ambitions.

In the first half of 1260 Michaēl VIII made an attempt to capture the city of Konstantinoupolis from the Latins occupying it. This time the accounts by Akropolitēs (Akrop. 173^{19}-175^{19}) and Pachymerēs (Pach. 171^{25}-175^{11}) are of equivalent length and detail, but the stories they tell are almost completely different. Akropolitēs says that Michaēl was only half-serious in his actions, and that he hoped to take the city through the treachery of one of its inhabitants. This prospective traitor, however, failed in his task, and the Byzantines departed. Pachymerēs, on the other hand, goes to some pains to show that the basileus was in full earnest; that he took with him as big an army as he could muster and that a full-scale siege was begun. There is no mention by Pachymerēs of any Latin traitor. Only news from elsewhere of revolts and of Latin reinforcements persuaded Michaēl to lift his siege and depart.

On a smaller level again the accounts of the two historians are different. The Byzantine troops who surprised Konstantinoupolis on July 25 1261 entered the city by climbing the walls according to Pachymerēs (Pach. 195^{4}), but by going through a tunnel or gap in the wall, according to Akropolitēs (Akrop. 182^{8-13}).

In brief, all the evidence suggests that, although Pachymerēs was aware of the history written by Akropolitēs, he did not use it during the writing of his own history.

Pachymerēs claims, in his prooimion, to have relied on his own experience of events, or else on the proven testimony of others. This is certainly true. In Books One and Two we have numerous occasions where Pachymerēs indicates that he did indeed witness the incident being narrated (e.g. Pach. 103^{4-8}), or had received a report about it from a participant (e.g. Pach. 171^{8-9}, 179^{2}, 179^{27}-181^{6}, 195^{17-27}).

Although Pachymerēs, by grace of his functions in church and state, would have had access to a wide range of official documents, there is little evidence in the Historia for him having utilised their contents in any direct way. Book Two provides but a single possible example. Preparatory to the coronation of Michaēl VIII, the assembled bishops signed a *tomos* act, authorising that Michaēl be crowned ahead of the legitimate Iōannēs IV. Pachymerēs had obviously seen this *tomos*, since he records the words of an aside written there by one of the bishops, who was less than happy with the situation (Pach. 145^{3-26}). It is true, however, that the woeful lack of survival of official documents from this period may mask other, more subtle uses of said documents by Pachymerēs in the *Historia*.

One item that Pachymerēs does include several examples of is the speech. Book One contains two lengthy speeches, by Gēorgios Mouzalōn and by Michaēl Palaiologos (Pach. 65^{23}-77^{16}), and Book Two gives another by Michaēl Palaiologos (Pach. 209^{15}-213^{23}). The

historian sets down these speeches and claims that they are the actual words spoken on the day. In including these speeches Pachymerēs is drawing upon a Greek historical tradition that extended back to the days of Thucydides, and this makes his claims for the speeches' legitimacy questionable. However, of the three speeches (or rather the two, since the speeches by Mouzalōn and Palaiologos are a matched set), serious doubts can only be drawn on the speech by Michaēl VIII in Book Two (see below, pp.329-332). The speeches in Book One were witnessed by many individuals, and followed by dramatic events which would have stuck in the minds of the listeners. If the words used by Pachymerēs are not strictly the ones used on the day, they would have been a close approximation.

Pachymerēs' Attitudes

In his *prooimion,* Pachymerēs claims that his writings are free of any bias or partisanship (Pach. 25^{1-4}).

> *It is especially important to me not to exaggerate the facts, as if I were moved by hatred or favour, so that events which turned out badly would be disparaged, and successes praised excessively, in a style designed to beguile the audience.*

On one level, the *Historia* upholds this claim. This is so concerning Pachymerēs treatment of the individuals who populate his pages. Where Akropolitēs is quite blatant in revealing his favouritism for Michaēl Palaiologos and his intense dislike for Iōannēs III and, especially, Theodōros II (Macrides 1978:61-63), to the extent that the one is never shown to do anything wrong, whereas the latter pair are villains who could hardly do anything right, Pachymerēs is much fairer in his judgements.

This is perhaps best illustrated by his treatment of Theodōros II. Akropolitēs' record of that basileus was heavily coloured. From him we learn that, although Theodōros was apparently charming, cheerful and gentle, it was all a mask disguising his true self, and that all of his subjects thought he was a terrible ruler and wished they were dead (Akrop. 104^{23}-105^{14}). This is damning stuff.

Pachymerēs was far less partisan in his attitude towards Theodōros. He does admit that the basileus had faults, notably a certain rashness and a presumption in his dealings with others (Pach. 41^{6-8}), he lay the blame for most of them at the feet of Theodōros' long struggle with epilepsy. This disease, in Pachymerēs' view, caused Theodōros to become irrationally angry and paranoid (Pach. 53^{13}-57^{29}). Pachymerēs does not go so far as to use this illness as an excuse for Theodōros' excesses – such as introducing a witchhunt using torture and the

ordeal – which he condemns, but he does put it forward as a reason for why the basileus acted as he did. On the other hand, Pachymerēs was prepared to praise Theodōros for the good deeds he did – such as attempting to raise men of humble background but considerable ability to positions of authority (Pach. 41^{19}-43^{1}).

While on the small scale the *Historia* is free of partisan bias, Pachymerēs gives the work as a whole a certain slant. Unusually, he was quite open about this, stating it in his *prooimion* (Pach. 25^{12-15}):

> *I would not have undertaken the task of writing if I had not come to expect that with the passage of time things are still worsening, when I look to the future from the standpoint of the present, and even more so when I calculate events of the future from those of the past.*

The *Historia* is a pessimistic piece of work, with the author's viewpoint clearly anchored by hindsight. In Pachymerēs' eyes the Byzantine world was quite quickly coming apart. During his lifetime he saw the loss of almost all of Byzantine Anatolia to the Muslim Turks, the early promise of a restored strength in Europe whittled away through continual wars with Epiros and the Latins, and huge rifts, factionalism and heresy in the church. Pachymerēs, an extremely intelligent and erudite man, saw the signs of decay and believed that attempts to reverse the trend were futile and doomed to fail. As a result, Pachymerēs took every opportunity to point out, in his Historia, where the empire had gone wrong.

It is no accident that Pachymerēs begins his work with a small section, placed out of the chronological order he maintained throughout the rest of the text, detailing the plight of the borderers who lived on the Anatolian frontier (Pach. 27^{19}-35^{27}). To Pachymerēs, it was only the care bestowed upon these people by the Nikaian state in earlier generations that had safeguarded the prosperity enjoyed during the reigns of Theodōros I and Iōannēs III. When, under the Palaiologoi, these tough frontiersmen were conscripted into the armies thrown away in fruitless wars in Europe, the collapse of Byzantine rule in Anatolia and the end of security for the empire as a whole, was inevitable.

The coming of the young Michaēl VIII Palaiologos to the throne was seen by the people as a cause of celebration and hope, and optimism was rampant. The historian's response to this was rather snide: "Time showed whether these predictions were true, and as for us, we will speak of it in its place, without adding anything to the structure of the truth" (Pach. 149^{6-8}). Pachymerēs almost takes a perverse enjoyment out of suggesting that these hopes were ill-founded.

Behind Pachymerēs' pessimism lay a profound belief in fate, and in visions, omens and prophecies that revealed hints about this fate. On numerous occasions in the text of his

Historia Pachymerēs recorded prophecies, portents and dreams, and treated them in a less-than-sceptical manner. He mentioned the marpou prophecy given to Manouēl Disypatos of Thessalonikē (Pach. 49^{1-24}), and that the death of Theodōros II was preceded by an eclipse (Pach. 59^{4-6}). The Mouzalōn brothers were blinded by some spiritual force to the danger they were in at Sosandra (Pach. 85^{6-11}). He also recorded with great seriousness the dream of Iōannēs Bekkos (Pach. 2.19), and later he describes how his very own father had uncovered a prophecy which revealed that Kōnstantinoupolis would fall to the Greeks and hinted at the individuals who would accomplish the deed (Pach. 203^{10-21}). All of these things were un-historical in the modern sense of the word, and yet Pachymerēs paid them much heed. Although Pachymerēs wrote the scientific text the *Quadrivium*, and indeed warned in that work against belief in false prophets and astrologers (*Quadrivium* 391^{12-20}), it appears as though he, like so many of his contemporaries, was a believer in true signs and portents. If so, it may be because of a sense of historical determinism, rather than a sense of objectivity, that Pachymerēs did not condemn Michaēl VIII for his actions in dethroning Iōannēs IV.

Despite this tendency to slip into the strictly unhistorical, Pachymerēs is in general a reliable witness and guide to the events which befell the Byzantine world in the second half of the thirteenth century. He was an intelligent man who used a method in researching his work and who rarely included material that could not have been verifiable, either by him or by his contemporary audience. He cast a critical eye over the events he recorded and proposed reasons for how and why they happened as they did. While it is true that he left out some details which modern scholars would have preferred to have known, Pachymerēs himself stated at the beginning of his work that it would not be comprehensive – anything that could not be confirmed he preferred to ignore, rather than include anything which may not have been true and thereby lead his audience astray (Pach. 25^{4-11}). A few slips aside, it may be said with confidence that Pachymerēs was successful in achieving his stated objectives, and for that he must be congratulated.

Notes on the Translation and Commentary

This translation is based on the new Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae (CFHB) edition of the *Historia*, edited by Albert Failler, and maintains that edition's section divisions. All lemmata in the commentary are referenced by the page and line numbers in that edition. Some new paragraphs have been introduced for the sake of clarity, and for the same reason a number of Pachymerēs' more tortuous sentences have been split into two or more shorter sentences.

Throughout the translation the intention has been to follow Pachymerēs' text as closely as possible, but where a literal translation would be unnecessarily opaque and a hindrance to understanding, some liberties have been taken for the sake of readability and comprehension. In most places this has resulted in changes no greater than the substitution of a name for a pronoun, but a few passages have been heavily reworked. It is hoped that these bypasses upon the road of literality have not detracted from Pachymerēs' desired meaning in any way.

Vitalien Laurent's French translation of the text, published in Failler's edition, has justly acquired a great reputation throughout the field of Byzantine studies. It has been compared throughout with the present translation, and has been of much service in helping to elucidate many of the obscurities with which Pachymerēs abounds. Nevertheless the reader will notice several differences in interpretation between the French translation and the present one. Some of these differences are minor, while some have proved quite critical in their effect on Pachymerēs' meaning. These have been discussed in the commentary to the text.

Translations and transliterations from the Greek into English have always been a problem. The approach used in this thesis has been, for the most part, to transliterate every Greek personal name, placename and title as Pachymerēs wrote it, even if so doing goes against common usage. Pachymerēs is unique in using the form Tornikios, for instance, rather than the standard form Tornikēs, and the former spelling is used throughout this work. Likewise, the reader will encounter the kaisar Kōnstantinos Palaiologos, and not the caesar Constantine Palaeologus. The City is Kōnstantinoupolis, and not Constantinople. Just as I would not italicise the French title comte, I do not italicise such Greek titles as megas droungarios tēs basilikēs biglēs.[11]

The exceptions to this rule are references to non-Greek names and titles. In these instances I have endeavoured to render the correct native spellings. Thus the reader will find references to Sultān 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II of Konya, to Prince Guillaume de Villehardouin

[11] But note that individual Greek words that do not have any suitable English translations, such as *zeugēlateia* (Pach. 99[8]), are italicised.

and to Hülegü il-khan. As a special case, places which are seen from the view-point of a non-Greek are referred to by the name used by that person or people. Thus Baudouin II rules Constantinople, not Kōnstantinoupolis.

The intent behind this is to show simple respect to the native speakers of any given language. Just as I would personally prefer for a French speaker to refer to my native country as New Zealand and not Nouvelle-Zélande, I would not like to refer to an Iōannēs as John – at least not without his permission.

I believe that the anonymous composer of the *Chronicle of the Morea* (l. 2990) sums up my attitude quite successfully:

"*They named it Myzēthras, for that was how they called it.*"

The commentary has been intended to achieve the following goals: (a) to provide the basic factual information for people, places and things relevant to the text; (b) to discuss passages which are confusing or unclear – either through verbosity or brevity on the part of the historian; (c) to use Pachymerēs' text as a guide for the chronology of the period; (d) to compare the utility of the *Historia* as a historical source with the other major texts from and about the period, especially the *Historiam* of Geōrgios Akropolitēs. Where sources conflict, efforts have been made to determine which is the more reliable. Finally, whenever possible, Pachymerēs' own sources have been identified.

Some things have been deliberately treated with less depth. Attention is drawn, in particular, to the language of the text. The words Pachymerēs has used are generally ignored in this commentary, except in those instances when his language has affected the factual content of the *Historia*. Questions of political philosophy, which abound especially in the great speeches located midway through Book One, have also been left to one side, except in those cases where the political message intrudes into the substance of the *Historia*.



Map 1 The Thirteenth Century Byzantine World[12]

[12] Map adapted from Bartusis, M. *The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and society, 1204-1453*, Philadelphia 1992, following page 17.

The *Historia* of Geōrgios Pachymerēs

Book One

1.1 Author's Preface; About the truth of the tale

Geōrgios, of Kōnstantinoupolitan descent but both born and raised in Nikaia, who settled in Kōnstantinoupolis once more when, through God's intervention,[13] it came under the control of the Romans, he being at that time one year shy of twenty, and who was dedicated to the divine clergy and obtained eminence in the ecclesiastical ranks even as far as the rank of prōtekdikos, and was further honoured in the palace as dikaiophylax, wrote this account. He has not simply taken unconfirmed stories from the past, nor has he put faith in hearsay only – if someone says he has seen or heard something himself and considers the stories trustworthy for no other reason than because he says so – but he was himself a witness to the majority of the events as they occurred, or else he obtained accurate information from those who first saw them at the time they happened, and even then not without further attestation, but only after obtaining confirmation from many others. His purpose was that the infinity of time, whose nature it is to hide many things through frequent circular revolutions, might not obliterate these things also by making them small and forgotten with its passage, through that famous law of nature by which all things that exist become hidden, as one of the wise once said, creating this true maxim. Therefore one who relates these things must not deem truth to be less than falsehood. For truth, as someone might say, is the soul of history, and the business of truth is necessarily holy, and he who puts falsehood above truth is openly sacrilegious.

It is especially important to me not to exaggerate the facts, as if I were moved by hatred or favour, so that events which turned out badly would be disparaged, and successes praised excessively, in a style designed to beguile the audience. For since it is possible to relate the things that have happened in any place, if someone wishes to do so, and yet also possible to leave them unreported if there is no need to relate them, it is better, to my mind, to remain silent, rather than to report events in a different manner from the way in which they occurred, and it is undoubtedly preferable for those who listen to fail to learn anything at all rather than learn something which is not in accordance with historical truth, because in the one case a kind of simple ignorance is produced to which no blame can be attached, but in the other case there is a double

[13] Lit. "by a nod from God".

ignorance, for one believes that one knows something when one does not, and there is nothing worse than that.

I would not have undertaken the task of writing if I had not come to expect that with the passage of time things are still worsening, when I look to the future from the standpoint of the present, and even more so when I calculate events of the future from those of the past. For it is indeed more wonderful for the ear to hear that we have advanced from the peaceful and settled circumstances which we have enjoyed in the past to the present situation, than that now that this is manifest, and our affairs have collapsed from their previous blossoming state at the entry of a harsh winter, they will wither even more, so that far from blooming again, they will not have any share in the movement of life.

1.2 Reasons for not dealing with events from before the author's own time

To go back to those who were ruling before our time, and commence with an exposition of the events of their reigns, showing how they administered their affairs carefully and with the greatest prudence, which nobody has surpassed, and how they strengthened the empire when they found it circumscribed within a small region originally headed by only three cities, namely Nikaia, Prousa and the third Philadelpheia, when they had been banished from the fatherland for reasons which we know, after making inquiries – this seems to me to be inadvisable. Even if I were willing to tell of the achievement of the many great events that occurred in the course of their reigns, to speak of them it would be necessary to have ample leisure; and in any case I do not know precisely why and for what reasons every event occurred, and it would be pointless, since others have spoken of them, not inaccurately, I believe, or in such a way as not to inspire firm confidence in each of the details of their narratives, but with precision, because their information came from those who were in power, and lived throughout the events that took place. And thus the contrivance of time had no effect, since the recording of events, undertaken simultaneously with their occurrence, resisted it and opposed its designs, just as Hermēs stood against Leto, and even checked her advance. These events and others of that time I will omit, since the telling of them is not feasible and in any case they are irrelevant to the present work. Only one previous event should be mentioned which is perhaps not without relevance, for some hold it to be the sole cause not only of the secure and stable state of affairs of that time, but also of our present ruin and confusion, except that they were not caused in the same manner; but when it existed and was executed as it should have been,

it provided security, and when it disappeared and was neglected as it should not have been, it caused the present confusion.

1.3 How the ancients fortified the frontiers

They found themselves then, trapped between two enemies. In the east lay the Persians, while in the west were the Italians, who occupied not only the coast but also the hinterland. Thus they were confined on both sides in a very narrow space, and were unable to breathe freely. On the one side, if they made an alliance with the Italians, they could attack the Persians, and on the other side, if they enlisted the Scythians, whose appearance and recruitment was still recent, they could drive back the Italians. Their aim was to strengthen the heartland after securing the highlands. They could not strengthen the coastal regions with any other defence except the sea, for while the Italians had command of the sea and the hinterland beyond, it was impossible to maintain what remained in security, but it was possible for them to fortify the eastern borders because of the high mountains, if they took pre-emptive action. And because of this, while it was impossible to fight on both fronts at once, the eastern mountains, which were very high and guaranteed security to those who lived there, and which had not yet been fully occupied by the Persians, were ready for them to occupy and, through the security that they provided, to make their own situation safe. But they could not use the coastal regions for defensive purposes until they had expelled the Italians from them. Thus they preferred to sign a treaty with the Persians and called a halt to the war against them, undertaking to pay them an annual tribute – which they did not pay for very long – and they attacked the Italians with their whole strength. After great suffering and unceasing wars, they drove them away and, after opening the sea to their own ships, they gained for the Romans who lived there a sufficient security. Then, turning about, and with or without the consent of the Persians, they invaded the mountains, protecting them with many strong bodies of colonists assembled from all parts, and they secured them with fortifications, and they made them into strong ramparts of Roman territory which would be difficult to attack.

1.4 How they looked after the men and the affairs of the frontiers

They did not neglect those who lived in the mountains, as they were ready to go elsewhere, if the enemy in some way attacked them; they could not persuade them to remain and even if that situation arose, it was beyond their powers to resist the enemies

with courage; rather, they were favoured with tax exemptions and, for the most prominent amongst them and those who showed a daring spirit, with *pronoiai* through imperial letters. And with time their fortunes grew, and riches flowed to them in abundance. And the more they had an abundance of the means of livelihood, the bolder they grew towards the enemy and lived in luxury with what they could take from them, setting up ambushes at night, and daily breaking the spirit of the enemy and taking from them considerable booty.

It followed from this that their attacks against the enemy served to protect those living in the interior, and that those men, whose hopes depended upon them, lived freely on their own land and went about their proper occupations, while the military commanders, as sure as they could be of their rear, carried the war elsewhere, provoking it by their attacks where it did not exist and they made the first move to put the others at a disadvantage rather than, by waiting, having to suffer harm from the other side. Everything else remained in order so long as it went well on the borders and the inhabitants of that place were determined in no way to give in, whatever might happen if the enemy dared to oppose them and this was all the more so because the command was local, and ever ready to show resistance.

Such was the previous state of affairs, and such was the situation. The people of the borders carried themselves proudly, not only thanks to tax exemptions and the *pronoiai* which have been mentioned, but also by reason of the constant signs of affection from the basileis, and they had nothing which was not a mark of wealth; it followed that they mounted guard with greater spirit, attacking and pushing back more resolutely the ones who ravaged our lands, if by chance they were able to do so.

1.5 How, after the city was taken, the East weakened; the affair of Chadenos

From the day that Kōnstantinoupolis was taken by the Romans and it became necessary for their children to return to their country, especially those who governed it, on the one hand it happened there that those men were weakened because of the distance from the basileis, on the other hand it was entirely necessary to give *pronoiai* to them, above all so that they would not lose any of their courage, and use these riches, if nothing else, as the sinew of war. But at a later time, after the empire underwent a change, a certain Chadenos, upon whom the basileus afterwards bestowed the rank of eparchos and who had great influence with him for reasons which will be related - for the story at hand will be taken from there to the place which suits it - well then, that man, seeming to want to give good counsel to the basileus - who was Michaēl Palaiologos - proposed a plan, a

very dangerous one, as later events showed. And having been received as manifestly speaking advantageously, he was sent to accomplish what had just been resolved. And very quickly he inspected the regions – for he could hardly be slow in carrying out the orders which he himself had initiated – finding exceedingly rich men weighed down with property and herds, and he imposed military service upon them away from those things of their own by which the livelihood of each was constituted and, counting out forty nomismata for each, for the most part from their own property, he ordered that the balance of the tax which had been imposed, being not a little, be sent to the Imperial treasury. Doing this for the first time, when these men suffered something that they had never expected, he broke the courage of these willing men and compromised their strength.

1.6 How the Persians occupied the mountains of the Romans

Thereupon those Persians who were warlike and who lived by the sword – the others being subject to the Tocharioi, who had recently occupied the lands of the Persians – considered it advantageous to flee to the mountain fastnesses and, attacking the surrounding lands, eke out a living as brigands. When this happened, a great number of them banded together and fell frequently upon our people, who had become weak, so that those few who remained, being feeble, had to yield. They would, in daily giving ground, abandon their fortifications to the enemy quickly, if they did not receive the *rogai* assigned to them – for they had not retained their own properties – and they hardly obeyed their neighbours to hold their ground. They held for the moment, on the one hand for the most part from their own resources, and also because, when the enemy broke through in large numbers, our armies placed themselves there and made the enemy's situation impossible.

This is what happened while the customary payments were made at the due times. However, they could only defend themselves against the evil which was attacking them, not advance against it or prevail over it, nor could they attempt to do harm to the territory of the enemy by overrunning it, but each remained watching over their own lands, intending to fight when the enemy carried the war into our territory, but not fighting when the enemy did not want to make war. And as soon as the *archontes* were petty about these things, making difficulties over the pay and the dates on which it was due, and decreasing the value of the grants from the old level, and their rightful portion of the plunder was taken by the leaders of the army for themselves, most of the people were lost, either as victims of the sword, or through surrendering to the enemy, while others

migrated elsewhere, not waiting for avoidable dangers, but leaving to spend their lives as they had previously done. Meanwhile, in the absence of this opposition, the enemy occupied the fortified points, from which he attacked our lands as often as he desired, and harmed in this way not only the nearby lands – for they took these immediately – but also those lands far away.

These Persians rendered themselves not a little hindrance for the Roman armies that, in continually fighting against them, neglected the other regions, which had no small need, especially those regions in the West. At that time in which the East was emptied of all those troops which could be found – prior to the events in question – the West not only harmed the East, but also found itself in an unresolvable situation: the Westerners now turned against us, now against our enemies, and they provoked instability with their intent to use both sides. When our army was there they bowed before it without the need for force, but whenever a short armistice was called, they willingly turned back to the other side, if it only advanced in arms against them.

Such was the situation in the East, and such were the difficulties that faced us. We will relate later the state which affairs reached in that region, and give the reasons also. But for the moment, returning to our story, we will begin with an incident which makes a suitable starting point.

1.7 How, under basileus Iōannēs, Michaēl Palaiologos was confirmed in the trust of the basileus

When Theodōros Laskaris was ruling in succession to his father, Michaēl Palaiologos, who was married to a daughter of a cousin of the basileus, was honoured with the office of megas konostaulos – an office which had the responsibility, since the olden days, of the command of the Italian section of the imperial army – but Michaēl was always suspected of aspiring to the throne and, to judge from his stealthy behaviour, it was clear that if he could but grasp the opportunity, he would attempt a revolution. However, he had given tokens of his fidelity to the father of the basileus, in the form of solemn oaths and at the same time he had been bound by episcopal curses, which would remove him from the communion of the faithful, if he decided to withdraw his support and enter into open revolt against the dynasty.

These things occurred when, after being charged by the basileus with the governance of the western provinces, Palaiologos was accused of making a secret pact with Michaēl Angelos, the despotēs of the West, the terms of which were that the despotēs pledged his

daughter to him in marriage, and that, for his part, he would hand over to the despotēs the lands of the basileus and became the despotēs' subject, and, of course, share power with his father-in-law. Because of this he was denounced to the basileus by one of his household, to whom – according to him – Palaiologos had confided his plan. Palaiologos was seized at once and, after having been removed from office, was thrown, enchained, into prison.

As the charge could not be proven, given that it was uncertain whether the denouncer was telling the whole truth – as he claimed to be doing – or mere slanders, Palaiologos, rejecting the accusation, was ready to reveal the truth through single combat, following an ancient custom established by the basileis for cases of questionable accusations. Yet he did not remove these suspicions, nor escape the resulting accusation of unfaithfulness. He was kept chained in prison for a long time and the suspicion remained. There was no one who dared intervene on his behalf and mediate with the basileus, but the patriarch of the day, Manouēl, had lived with the basileus for many months in Lydia and was about to depart. It was clear that his master wished to do some favour for the holy man, so the latter, abandoning his other concerns, made an immediate request on behalf of the man in irons and implored the ruler to take pity on him as one wrongfully accused. Manouēl said: "Even if he is not absolutely exempt from this suspicion in your eyes, O basileus, he will give you tokens of his future loyalty after submitting himself to the censures of the Church. And when he is bound by them, it will be impossible to admit the idea of rebellion into his mind, but being a Christian and taking heed of the judgement of God, he will remain completely steadfast in his oaths of loyalty to you and your family."

When the patriarch had said this, the ruler granted the petition and consented to pardon the condemned man, and for his part he promised to show Palaiologos kindness, so long as the latter swore to him firm oaths of his future goodwill, as the priest had promised. As he approached Achyraous, along with a number of bishops, the priest sent to the ruler one of his household who had taken holy orders, in accordance with the agreement that had been arranged between the basileus and the leader of sacrifices. On receiving him, the ruler immediately relieved the prisoner of his bonds and sent him with joy to the patriarch, freeing his companions along with him. As soon as Palaiologos arrived, and had listened to the appropriate statements of the synod, he accepted their censure and gave a strong affirmation of his own oaths of loyalty to the basileus. Returning to the ruler, he received a very kindly welcome at court. That is the reason why, in the situation in which he found himself, and anxious to protect himself and remain above any suspicion, particularly since he had reached a very exalted rank, he

took much greater care to avoid becoming an object of suspicion to the one who was holding power after the basileus.

1.8 How the second Laskaris, slighting many of those holding honours, replaced them with others

But since that man was rash in all things, and also held the delusion that he was thought little of – for the illness which had struck him and afflicted him greatly persuaded him to hold secret fears of terrible things – he dismissed Alexios Rhaoul, who had been raised to the honour of prōtobestiarios, from his office, installing in his place Geōrgios Mouzalōn, of Atrammytion, to whom he married Theodōra, of the Kantakouzenoi family, who was a niece of Palaiologos, while he appointed Geōrgios' younger brother, Andronikos, as megas domestikos and betrothed to him the daughter of Rhaoul, and the third of the brothers was promoted to prōthierakarios. These men in no way shared in a noble descent, but had been attached as *paidopouloi* to the basileus when he was still heir to the throne. On the other hand he deprived two notable men of their eyes, one being Kōnstantinos, the son of Alexios Stratēgopoulos, who was esteemed for a marriage – he was married to a niece of the basileus Iōannēs – which was both excellent and quite splendid, and the other was Theodōros Philēs. In addition he took many other new measures to bring down the pride of those close to him and by doing this to provide, as he believed, for his own security. For the malady did not let him recover, and both night and day he appeared unwell.

1.9 How Kotys prepared Palaiologos to desert to the Persians

When Palaiologos, invested with the governorship of both Mesothinia and Optimatoi by order of the basileus, was working hard against the Italians, there came to him a certain man from the palace, a man named Kotys, who was one of his most intimate friends, and it was clear, from what he said, that he was afraid for him: "If you do not take to flight," he said, "a great disaster will overtake you in a few days and it will not be long after that before it is dangerous for me to remain also. We must both desert to the Persians, if you want to keep your eyes." Because he was a friend these things that he said completely persuaded Palaiologos, who always feared for himself due to the common suspicion that he was aiming for the empire. Such suspicion had also placed in similar danger his uncle, who held the rank of megas chartoularios and was also named Michaēl Palaiologos, but,

when he was asked about gaining power, replied very simply that, if God gave power to somebody then that person was above reproach. Due to this the basileus became highly indignant towards him, seeing a man of his rank raise his thoughts to such lofty heights, and he was put in prison in chains.

So then, in learning this, Palaiologos was naturally taken by fear, for to remain was to be exposed to danger, and he thought this a dangerous and pitiful thing to do. But to desert and go to strangers he thought safe, but shameful. However, between such a pair of possible evils, with fear adding itself, he chose the lesser. After considering as many ways as he could of taking precautions against the unexpected, he took with him some of his household and crossed the Sangarios River, heading for Persia at full speed and approached the sultān. The latter received him with gladly and with fitting honour. Then for a time he campaigned with his entourage under the imperial banner, although in foreign lands, with distinction against the enemies of the sultān, with the intention of mollifying the basileus by this, in case he learned of it. Then, being seized by a profound remorse, and resolving to return, he went to find the man who was at that time metropolitan of Ikonion, to use him as an intermediary to the basileus, to find out whether, if the latter gave reliable indications in writing that he had given up his anger, it would be possible for him to return. The bishop executed his mission by means of a quick letter, and the basileus gave his pardon in writing, assuring by imperial letter that he would come to no harm from his anger, and so he returned. The basileus graciously received him on his arrival, when he abased himself, and, embracing him, pardoned the man who confessed to be conscious of unpardonable crimes and restored him to his previous honours.

1.10 How that man, having returned and been well received, was sent as stratēgos to the West

Since the city of Epidamnos had been seized by our forces, and it had been announced, it became necessary for the inhabitants to have a bishop and it was also necessary to have a general[14] and a body of soldiers. The bishop despatched was Chalkoutzēs, who had the rank of megas skeuophylax of the Great Church. The basileus also sent, to act as governor for the region, Palaiologos, commanding him to make his decisions with assistance from the other leaders of the place, especially the priest. After they had

[14] The word used by Pachymeres, *hēgemōn*, could refer to either a civil or military leader. I have translated it general, since Michaēl's role seems to have been mainly military. See the commentary.

reached Thessaly with all speed, and had come to the crossing of the Bardarios River, the general first of all crossed with the soldiers and found the province in confusion and raised in revolt; and at the same time Manouēl, bastard son of the despotēs Michaēl, was there at the head of a strong army. He engaged him in battle. Straight away Manouēl came against the general, struck him with his lance and unhorsed him. Then the latter, picking himself up and remounting his horse, gave him a mortal wound, without receiving one himself.

1.11 How Chadenos was sent to bring Palaiologos back in chains

The metropolitan of Dyrrachion returned to Thessalonikē because of these troubles, and Palaiologos was naturally making an effort to drive back the enemy, when the advance was halted by a rumour which announced the impending arrival in Thessalonikē of Chadenos, the komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn, who had no other mission than to seize Palaiologos and take him in chains back to the basileus. Palaiologos, who at that time was staying in Thessalonikē, was indignant when he heard the news, and was endeavouring to understand the reasoning which might explain the basileus' intention, since he was recalling him in a manner different from that in which he had sent him out. After having despatched him with honour, suddenly he was obliging him to return in dishonour, and the man to whom the basileus had given letters of pardon and whose conduct had thus seemingly been completely forgotten – to the point of his being awarded a very high command – suddenly found that these gifts were being taken back and he was condemned as if for a confession of treason. Nevertheless, not knowing what to think or wherever to turn, he decided to seek refuge in God. He communicated his way of thinking to the metropolitan of Dyrrachion and besought him to join him in his plea to the Almighty. As it seemed that this thing would be agreeable to God, they without hesitation sang one *paraklēsis* in the monastery of Akapniou, through the evening and the rest of the night, since the bishop proposed to celebrate the divine liturgy as the following day dawned. As soon as dawn glowed and the bishop was about to recite the prescribed hours, he imposed silence on those outside so that he could perform the office, while he himself addressed God in private and carried out in more complete tranquillity the habitual prayers of the morning mass.

And at that very moment it is said that he heard one voice speak three times, not all at once, but with pauses of a certain time. The sound was of an unfamiliar word, which not only did not seem to be Greek, but also seemed to be from no other language. For "*marpou*" was said, and nothing else. Surprised by this word, the archbishop immediately

returned to the metropolitan of Thessalonikē, one Manouēl Disypatos, and he reported how he had stood communing with God in the psalmody, and how the voice unexpectedly arrived, at the moment when he was reflecting upon what he said it was that he was reflecting upon. After examining the word for a long time, Disypatos thought of what had happened in the case of the ancient "*beklas*" and, spelling out the letters of the word, he declared that the empire of the Romans was clearly promised to Palaiologos, for the word signified, he said, "Michaēl Palaiologos lord of the Romans will soon be glorified."[15] But some say that the metropolitan of Dyrrachion did not hear this thing and that the metropolitan of Thessalonikē did not make this prediction but that the latter – being a wise man and interested in the kind of book that describes future reigns – had come, by very hard research, to know these things and desired to bring this knowledge to the one to whom the supreme power was guaranteed and, at the same time, relieve the distress of this man who feared for his life. He could not confide to him that he knew through books, for he did not have a completely firm faith in books which dealt with uncertain outcomes, nor say that he had heard it from God, for fear that perhaps the prediction would be proved false. So, after conferring about these matters with the metropolitan of Dyrrachion, Disypatos suggested that the latter maintain he heard the voice, while he himself would pretend to explain the desired meaning of the word fabricated by him. In quietly confiding this to Palaiologos the two of them were able to raise his hopes, while at the same time – if the event did not come to pass – they reserved the excuse of there being a mistake in the interpretation, for the sound could easily have a meaning different from their interpretation.

At this point there arrived the komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn, the aforementioned Chadenos, who entered Thessalonikē with the speed of an arrow and immediately showed the veracity of the rumour by putting Palaiologos under secure guard. However, he could not bring himself to chain the man's feet, as he had been ordered to do. I do not know if this was out of respect for the nobility of the man or from a friendly sentiment, for the imperial anger gave no cause to expect that anything good was in store for him. However, he showed him those marks of honour that he was allowed to give safely; and so that he should not be dishonoured by appearing in chains before the masses inside the city, he left during the night. When they had travelled a good distance from the city, Chadenos informed him of his orders and how he himself had disobeyed them out of regard for his honour, adding that he did not want to carry on in this daring fashion – for it was not safe for either of them. The other, for his part, appeared very grateful and seemed ready to

[15] "***M**ichaēl gar **a**nax **R**hōmaiōn **P**alaiologos **o**xeōs h**u**mēthēsetai*"

obey every command. Chadenos put him in chains, of the type that allowed one to sit ahorse, and with him like this they both continued their journey. It is said that an omen and a good sign occurred while they rode, a portent of what would shortly take place. It was this: they moved on as usual, one anxiously thinking of the future, the other lifting him from his despair and endeavouring to bring him to a more cheerful state of mind. When, after a time, he recovered from his profound despair, he enjoined the other to sing and chant whatever came into his head – for his escort had, it seems, some knowledge of this art – "so that," he said, "we may get some relaxation from it." Then Chadenos immediately began tunefully chanting: "Now the prediction of the prophet is on the point of being fulfilled." And he said it not in a careless or casual manner, but with great enthusiasm, lifting his voice to an extreme point, beyond his ability. The prisoner was roused to greater courage and was impressed by the song, seemingly from the singing itself, but actually – although the singer did not suspect it – from the omen, which seemed an excellent one in the circumstances.

They continued on their journey day after day and they arrived before the basileus. The escort was presented most quickly to the sovereign and he announced his arrival, while prison received the other as a condemned man, without his having been charged with anything at all. It was supposed that when the ruler had the opportunity, this case would be subject to closer examination than it was at that time. But time passed, while the basileus was sick, and in prison he was enchained and guarded, not, however, on an official charge of treason – for not a single charge was laid against him. Only suspicion, and the fact that many secretly made reports to those who were ready to believe them, suggesting that the day of doom was at hand, provided a ground for accusation against the prisoner. So for a while this pretext seemed to stand in place of a formal accusation. And it was . . . but discussion of this must be deferred, so that we may be better informed of events.

1.12 How, in his sickness, the basileus suspected everyone of working magic; the affair of Martha

An illness had overtaken the basileus, and it was a severe one, for he was suffering from frequent seizures. It came, seemingly, from a natural inflammation of the heart. From this came, in my opinion, his air of excessively good health, because the organ is not able to support sickness and is turned by this from its normal functions, so that the useful vapours often do not arrive to be taken to the brain, that source of reasoning. In this way,

then, it is possible to reconcile the strife amongst the philosophers about the nature of understanding. For the heart is the source of thoughts but, once these are introduced into the brain, it is finally up to it, either proportionately or disproportionately, to transform the ideas with which it is transfused.

So at this moment, the illness having frequent recurrences, the patient, not knowing from whence it came, imagined that the cause of the sickness' fury was a demon summoned by magic. The mob outside the palace, which was accustomed to believe such things, accused the Mouzalōnes, who thus unknowingly became the object of accusations, which they had not expected. But for the patient anyone was suspect if only he was accused of engaging in magic. It was for this reason that a very great number of people, almost at random, were arrested, if they had had but the slightest accusation murmured against them. Anybody who pursued another for magic often found that he was bringing an accusation against himself rather than against his neighbour, so that he was punished for the denunciation; for as soon as the accusation was taken to the basileus – for whoever heard anything could not conceal it – he, not being concerned for anyone else but for himself, prescribed a full investigation. The proof the defendant had to produce to avoid being condemned by every vote did not consist in producing witnesses, in swearing oaths, making enquiry into their former conduct or in all the other things by which lies are confounded, but by only one means could the accused save themselves: by taking into their brave hands a red-hot iron which had already been heated in the fire, which they called the *hagion*, and, raising it up, take three steps. During the three days which preceded this event they were purified by fasting and prayer, and the hands bound in a cloth closed by a seal, so that no one might experiment with ointments which might prevent the fire from burning them. The author, when young, saw many suffer this ordeal, but escape it unharmed, which was extraordinary.

At this time there were others who, by order of the ruler, took in marriage women who had noble blood, though often they themselves were not of noble descent. Nobility had only been conferred upon them by the basileus, who, in view of the honour of the titles, set up these alliances in proportion to the benefactions which he had conferred upon the two parties. Thus these men naturally found themselves made great through their matrons, as a Roman might say, while the latter benefited from the rank conferred on those who married them. He ordained, among other examples, that one of those who, in his father's lifetime, had been assigned to him as a servant, Balanidiōtēs by name, should take in lawful matrimony Theodōra, daughter of Maria, also called Martha, the sister of Palaiologos, who had had a child by the megas domestikos Tarchaneiōtēs. The word of the basileus was a solid guarantee to them, and hence, as the parties were in

accord about this union, the bridegroom had, in his position as son-in-law, free entry into the home of the young girl. But only a short time after this engagement, when the ruler, yielding to I-do-not-know-what, but exercising his authority to override what was right, gave the noble maid in question to Basileios, son of Kaballarios, who was of noble lineage. For his part, Basileios accepted the gift with joy, and pressed for the marriage. But the ladies, who inclined towards the first match and held it as axiomatic that it would be a dishonour to change, had an aversion for the new fiancé. In the end – since this was the order of the basileus, whether it was desired or not – the traditional rites were observed and the marriage celebrated splendidly. But days passed without the young man fulfilling his manly duties to his young wife; and when the basileus inquired how this had come about, the husband at first gave an evasive answer, with an attitude of not wanting to explain. Later, when questioned more forcefully, he declared that the obstacle came from a magic spell.

At once the basileus suspected this in his own case, and his wrath was exceedingly terrible and it seemed that nothing could quell it except a confession of magic. So immediately the noble old woman was shut up, naked, in a chaff-sack with cats, which, stimulated from outside by means of willow-canes, pierced the sufferer with the points of their claws; so that, even though unwillingly, she might be compelled to tell her secrets. But there was nothing to be learned from her except that she had no consciousness of having done anything of this kind, and she did not know if the young husband had an aversion for her daughter, because she had earlier been promised to another. As for the basileus, he either remained steadfast in his suspicion that this lady, after becoming familiar with spells, would now naturally grow bolder and use them against himself, all the more so because her brother, whom she had raised and loved, was at the same time suspected by him; or he realised that Palaiologos, who would naturally hear of what had happened would, in his position as brother, resent the injury and be inclined to sedition. In this frame of mind he sent to have him relieved of his command and brought back in chains. On the surface Palaiologos was to answer to the charge of working magic; but in reality the measure undertaken was intended to remove the basileus' fear that, on being informed, Palaiologos would engage in revolt.

This was clear from the fact that not only did he shortly after recall Palaiologos from prison and pardon him, but that, fearing for himself and his affairs on account of his illness, he requested that Palaiologos protect his family and he reminded him of the favour which had been shown him in these matters. Although Palaiologos deserved to suffer for his recent acts, in his mercy the basileus had not inflicted anything bad upon him.

1.13 Death of the basileus Theodōros and the good deeds of his life

The same year was turning towards autumn when the ruler passed from this life, leaving four children: three girls and one boy of nine years, named Iōannēs after his grandfather. The elder daughters had been given in marriage, one to Kōnstantinos Teichos, lord of the Bulgars, the other to Nikēphoros, son of Michaēl, the despotēs of the West. A sign foreshadowed his death: for one hour, beginning at the third hour of the sixth day, there was an eclipse of the sun, and a deep darkness covered all things, to the extent that stars could be seen in the sky. Thus there was snatched away before his time a man both born and raised to be basileus. Although he did not resemble his father in the depth and the prudence of all that he said and did, nor again in the firmness and the fairness of his judgements, he retained his father's swift grasp of everything, his magnanimity and his manly courage, and he owed to his mother his great generosity, which was such that he emptied by handfuls his wealth into the hands of his subjects and that, far from feeling vexed about it, he took pleasure in the emptying. Indeed he was a man of the highest culture: he behaved on the one hand as a benefactor to men of letters, and on the other hand he himself was equally addicted to the pursuit of knowledge. His skill at writing came in equal measure from instruction and from nature, to the point that, if he but began, he composed many works in single sittings. I will remain silent about most examples and give but one: if the solemn commemoration of a saint was at hand, he needed no advance preparation, except to put aside his other affairs for a short time, then, while one of the clergy intoned in a leisurely manner the *hexapsalmon* which is preliminary to the *orthros*, he would compose a canon of the most excellent quality for the person who was being commemorated. He gave everybody the possibility of enjoying his beneficence, not only the singers but also the listeners of the hymns, those who were servants, soldiers or imperial bodyguards, or who served at court in other capacities, and others who came from elsewhere. For he poured the boundless imperial charity over all equally, but especially over the soldiers and those who were dedicated to literature.

There was no day, nor night, nor time of sadness or joy, no rising or setting of the sun, when one could not see or hear it said that he was doing good things; that this man was doing well, or that others were benefiting equally. However, because he possessed these qualities, he seemed troublesome to those who were powerful, because he selected those who participated in public affairs not on the basis of their nobility or connection with the imperial family, but according to merit and dignified them with appropriate honours. For those who were closely related to him by blood, he considered that such a privilege was enough, and sufficed as a mark of distinction. This was, if one thinks on it,

the behaviour of a lord who promoted excellence and encouraged his subjects to thrive; for he decided to distribute imperial favours not in response to flattery, but through consideration of merit and good conduct towards himself and the ability to lead others. Fear was present, because anyone who behaved wrongly was punished and anyone who performed well was rewarded swiftly; and when a great person is at fault it is not a small matter, just as a good action has a reverse effect. But this fault is similar to the experience of the eunuch, who, through the removal of that member which is by nature of great importance, is completely marginalized and set aside; but a good deed resembles the centre of a circle, which provides complete stability for the whole circuit so long as it remains in place. For how could he not manage the country in such a way as was necessary when, under such a father and without yet having the title of basileus, through being his only son, he was trained to drive out corruption without fail.

1.14 How Laskaris was instructed by his father, Iōannēs, while he was being raised as a ruler

One day [Theodōros] went hunting dressed in gold, and upon his return he happened to encounter his father who, when he greeted him, did not look at him and appeared to pay him no attention, seemingly uninterested in his son's approach. Rightly so, this seemed to Theodōros to be a sign of his father's anger at him. In consequence, being concerned, he searched his mind for any possible offence, and he went nervously to find his father in private. As soon as his father saw him, he immediately became angry with Theodōros and reproached him for the inappropriateness of his attire: "What good do you think you have done for the Romans," he said, "when you pour their blood into these completely unnecessary entertainments? For do you not know that both the blood of the Romans and these clothes of gold and silk are to be used in their service, since both belong to them? Do you want to know when they are to be used in their service? We must display their riches through the splendour of our clothing on the arrival of embassies sent by foreigners; for the riches of the basileus reflect the riches of the people. It is for this reason that our family, in the position it holds, has the absolute obedience of the people and of others. And do you, when you make use of these things for such a vain purpose, realise the magnitude of your offence?" It was in this way and by such words that Theodōros Laskaris, who was to be raised to the throne, was educated.

1.15 How the prōtobestiarios Mouzalōn assumed the regency for the young basileus Iōannēs

Before that man died, the prōtobestiarios Mouzalōn had been declared guardian for the young basileus by his imperial father, who had donned the monastic habit. Because this young lord, Iōannēs, was unable to wield power and provide security for himself on account of his age; he had an absolute need for someone to guard him from unforeseen misfortunes, for there were numbers of plotters ready, at the slightest sign, to undertake deeds of great audacity. It was for this reason that they bore him to the citadel of Magnesia-upon-Hermos and installed him there, and enrolled numerous spies into the imperial service. And as for the magnates, both those who remained in positions of rank and those who remained neglected, wherever in the land they were, leapt out wrathfully from their corners and were free to act as they wished but, because they were afraid to speak out – for the Mouzalōnes were in control – they repressed their anger deeply, and they all pretended to be obedient to them, as if they were serving the young basileus, even if, through experiencing the bite of the father, who had eaten of the grapes of wrath and had caused them to drink of the cup of bitterness, they were hoping to set the son's teeth on edge. But even though they were so full of hostility, which some of them felt towards the young basileus in his minority, and others towards those who were in power, at whose hands they had previously suffered, without allowing for the fact that Nemesis did not allow those men who had received honours beyond their due from injuring those who were not ill-disposed towards them, they lay low, because of the fear that they felt of the Mouzalōnes.

At this time the eldest of the Mouzalōnes, who was honoured with the position of prōtobestiarios, seeing the extent to which this terrible ill-will was quietly increasing, and noticing that many suspected him of desiring the throne and fearing the great danger to himself that resulted from this, resolved, being a prudent man, to test the army by a trial and at the same time to discover how well-disposed the nobles were towards him, by moving to display his support for his young master through words and deeds and signs of submission and servility. So he convoked the whole senate and all of the Imperial family, all the nobles and the military class. Also present were the brothers of Laskaris, the great-grandfather of the basileus, who had in the past donned the Imperial crown and relieved the Roman world of its confusion. Not even the blind men, Stratēgopoulos and Philēs, failed to come, and all the other magnates completed the gathering. Standing on a platform, so that both those in front and those at the rear could hear him, he began to speak.

1.16 Speech of the prōtobestiarios Mouzalōn

"My noble brethren, I believe that it is superfluous to set out before you at this time our previous history from the beginning, as it is irrelevant to the present time. Necessity forces us to put it aside and deal with contemporary matters. So, we were not only begotten in this palace, and raised here by a father who was also serving the dynasty, but we were taken up and received an education with our blessed basileus, at the time when his father was ruling. With what loyalty have we served, mindful of all that he ordered and with a mixture of love and fear of him, you could all bear witness. We could not turn in any other direction than that of honest service to our master, even if perhaps success did not accompany our fervent endeavours; but we all know that zealous fidelity, even if unsuccessful, prevails over the reputation of ill-will. So if we have received honours, even the greatest offices beyond our expectation, under the rule of this master, it was because he wished it. For what had we achieved that was so wonderful, that we should be honoured in this way? It was, however, the wish of the basileus, and we held these ranks without, of course, engaging in flattery or using the opportunity to do harm to anyone. This we know in our hearts. For this was not the way in which we entered our positions, and we considered it the greatest shame to rule in such a fashion thereafter because, when a man who has power under a ruler tries to supplant others by giving him unsuitable advice, he deserves to be cursed. What is more, we did not insinuate ourselves into the graces of the basileus by ignoble flatteries or servile indulgences and we did not pull shut the door of kindness behind ourselves and close it to others. This is indicated by the number of blows we bore, to the point that we were often beaten so that we were at the point of death. I think that many who have knowledge of it will vouch for the affection in which we held all of you, and the extent to which we valued more than anything else that you should be well received by him. If on occasion our pleas did not have success it should not be blamed on us. However, the difficulty of any time embraces in the gravest suspicions and unjust accusations those who, if it is examined, could never be accused of anything. And the difficulty of this time, which affected the magnates and those who do not justly deserve to suffer, brought misfortune to them and caused us to be suspected – although I would not say dishonoured – unfairly. However, the eye of God is everyone's judge, and He knows how to punish wickedness without any possibility of being deceived. Thus, if unbearable sufferings came upon certain people, we are for our part innocent of such things. For the will of that man overcame all of the obstacles it encountered. To oppose him, as well as being of necessity dangerous, was also wrong. For the basileus is superior, whenever he would raise his hand in anger.

"This is to prove that we did not seek the positions we held and that one cannot justly hold us responsible for the anger displayed by the basileus against certain nobles. But the cause of that was perhaps in one case a false step [by the noble], in another a spiteful suspicion, and for others again the will of the basileus was combined with anger. Then again, a worthy man appeared to be of no merit and was overlooked, although undeservedly. Such was the time, and that is what the stronger one decided, but now, I think, there is a time for relaxation. Behold, for the ruler is gone, and the one who was born to him and worthy to rule is only a boy, as you can see. This is why those who are faithful to him must take great care of him and pay constant attention, to the extent that they should keep a vigil at home and abroad, for fear that pernicious events may unexpectedly occur. And how it is good and right to engage in more righteous service to the ruler now than formerly, I will show without any hesitation.

"First, the fact that the basileus is growing up with the thoughts appropriate to his age, and not undermining the actions of his subjects, is likely to bring to him the goodwill of all, in the belief that they will not suffer anything from him. In the absence of fear, those who are unafraid will be ready to show their love; for the main motive for anybody to serve is either fear or love, and as we all must serve, if fear is absent, then everything will take place out of love; and if this love is pure and uncorrupted there is nobody who will reduce his service to the point of omitting it. That is the first point. The second is, that governed by a young boy who has been made our ruler, at a time when the occasion makes it essential for him to show kindness towards his subjects, as was not previously necessary, we might seek to escape being treated badly in the future, and hope and expect to be treated well. It is possible for each man to quickly obtain all that he desires, if he is judged worthy of it, and the benefits shall come in profusion, for the ruler, young as he is and ruled by his guardians, will be unable to give free expression to his own wishes, which is often the cause of mistaken judgements as to what is appropriate – the arrogance of power overcoming more reasonable arguments. As for the guardians, one is able to approach them immediately, and lobby them continually with words. Because one has a hope of easily obtaining what one desires, why should one not willingly serve the basileus? Without these things – and I shall not mention any others – in the past there was a danger that even after a success one might be cheated of reward, as others intrigued to gain the attention of the basileus with methods which were likely to steal it away. When there was no one who could speak to the basileus and testify on one's behalf, it was impossible to be zealous to achieve improvements or compete with others; and vain were the efforts of the zealous man, who was often defrauded and deprived of the honour his actions deserved. But now that affairs are in the hands of the guardians, it would be good

if the zeal of everyone were made public and rewarded with better things. Perhaps this is why, since the basileus is not to be feared, we should be zealous in fearing for the basileus' sake, as it is from that source that we can hope for a good outcome, if he is kept safe, and a bad one if he is not. This is what I say to you, you who are my brothers in arms and my comrades; to you who are of illustrious blood or distinguished by honours, It occurs to me to speak frankly and with the liberty which is allowed me, because I will speak honestly.

"For myself, it was not through a personal and premeditated choice, or with a particular goal in mind, that I accepted the role of guardian to the basileus, but primarily to carry out the written instructions of the basileus, and, furthermore . . . but I do not want to say more. However, I wish to continue to hold the position of guardian with your agreement only. And if you propose one of your own number to undertake the role of guardian in the future, I will be content to be placed in the lowest post. If someone takes suitable care of the basileus' safety, I will be content to be nothing but an ordinary subject, and I would beseech the ruler not to become angry if my honours seem to have displeased some of you, because it is better to live in security, serving as a simple soldier, than pass the days in fear and suspicion through taking high office.

"See now, thanks to the goodness of the providence of God, the people are completely obedient, the army is disciplined and our enemies are peaceful. And you are many and great, some linked to our ruler by blood, and others distinguished by their honours and surpassing anything that anyone could say about their goodness and noble birth. As it is necessary to train the basileus, let us elect a man who is suited to the task, and I myself will follow and accept the common vote, because it is the interests of the basileus, and not my own, which I place above all others. And if a man finds he cannot accept the vote of the rest, his refusal cannot be allowed, because your decision will override it. As for myself, I am so democratic in outlook that I will be satisfied if I am not deemed worthy of any higher position. If you strongly desire it, I will agree to remain at the head of affairs, but if you do not desire it, I will let everything go and voluntarily refrain from involvement, even if I suffer the worst penalties. So I beseech you also to speak truthfully without hiding anything. What need is there for fear to prevent you from saying what is on your mind? There is nothing to gainsay you, and nothing to fear, if you decide to express your thoughts. So immediately consider and enact that which is useful for the others; Everyone can in complete confidence declare that which is on his mind, assured that, whatever he says, he will be heard with goodwill because, although attacking our master is not without danger, the right place for freedom of speech is in a conversation of equals, since the right to judge belongs to someone greater than those

here present. But, as this person is not present at the moment, he who expresses his wish is protected from danger from both sides."

When the prōtobestiarios had finished this speech, the entire crowd shouted with a mingled noise, appearing to accept being governed by him on behalf of the basileus. They showed clearly that they were pleased with the basileus, but they also slipped in a large number of uncharacteristic compliments to Mouzalōn also, to the effect that he was worthy of ruling on behalf of the basileus, and they were not merely considering the circumstances of the time and avoiding running risks, but rather were speaking their minds. Among the nobles, although one at this time whispered one thing and another something else, it was obvious that they accepted the situation, speaking of Mouzalōn with reverence and giving him precedence over themselves. So far from appearing to hold him responsible for what had happened, they attached the blame for it to the basileus alone, and they agreed that they had not suffered any injustice, except for one thing: that when they were placed under the authority of a ruler who had their lives in his hands, it had at least appeared to them that they might be liable to be punished.

1.17 The defence of that speech by Palaiologos

Michaēl Palaiologos was at that time megas konostaulos and was in fact the uncle of Mouzalōn through that man's wife. Either imagining he had a part in his honour by being one of his family, or else seizing the opportunity to insinuate himself with him further through flattery, when the others had finished responding and showing their submission, he defended the speech with the greatest freedom.

"Why have you now decided to speak to us in this way, you who bear high honours and are raised above us by imperial fiat? What is this rumour that has reached you regarding us, that says we resent you managing the affairs of the basileus? Who could justly blame you for the things that he suffered as a result of the anger of the basileus? Nobody was in such a state of ignorance that they did not know of the anger of the basileus and did not acknowledge the difficulty of the times, how harsh they were and how they affected everyone, especially those close to him? This was impossible, unless it was someone who was not one of us, but of foreign origin. Since it happened that we were in a condition of slavery, and bound to be loyal through oaths and agreements, there was nothing surprising in our suffering unbearable things, because it suited him, even when he was not incited by someone speaking ill of the future victim. When the person who commits an action is freed from guilt by those who know the characteristics of the monarchy, others could hardly be condemned on suspicion of making denunciations or

inflaming his anger. These things happened but are now in the past; to go into the details of such matters would be like investigating the manner in which the dead depart from here. For just as in that case what must be, must be, whether sickness descends upon one or not, so here suffering is almost inevitable, whether or not it is instigated by the words of others. And just as being placed under the orders of another and being a slave is a cause of grief when it is deserved, so to suffer the severest penalties can be a source of consolation, if they are undeserved. What opportunity is there for us, situated as we are, to remember such things, and attach to you a charge that has nothing to do with you? When the basileus honoured you with the highest offices, this was not merely the whim of the basileus, and an inappropriate expression of fondness for you and a thoughtless act of excess. Anyone who believed this would be mad. On the contrary, the superior qualities which are yours in abundance, namely knowledge, eloquence, above average experience, total and loyal faith towards the basileus, the genuine concern you take over the affairs of the empire and the other virtues which are necessary adornments of the man who occupies an equivalent position, these are what persuaded the basileus to favour you and honour you as was befitting.

"Besides, who has been harmed in any way? As if there were no way of honouring others than to place you in the lowest rank. For if it had not been possible to honour others except by overlooking you, there would have been good reason to find fault with you, but since it was possible for you to be honoured, and for duties to be distributed to others as was fitting, and for some to keep what was theirs and others to receive from the basileus what they deserved, how would it be right – even if both possibilities were unavailable – that you, who were experiencing a favourable fortune, should be judged responsible for their misfortune since it was the basileus' pleasure? Stop turning over these thoughts in your mind, since they will have no effect except to bring grief to those who hear you. Although I could say much on these matters, I will say only one thing: that if you, being who you are, lived in a foreign land, I would have eagerly wished that, if it were possible, you should be placed at the head of our affairs without delay – particularly in the situation which now exists – or that we ourselves should with money or by other means seek to procure your arrival among us and ask you, when you had come, to take charge of our affairs. But you wait for our goodwill, as if there is another more worthy of assuming the guardianship of the basileus! Who here is empowered to vote against an imperial decision? Who more than you seems to offer a total guarantee, in holding this highest of positions and being in charge of the basileus' affairs? For you are made superior by your titles and, as if that is insufficient, you are superior in intelligence. Command stems from the basileus, and also from him comes the administration of the

affairs of the Romans, and we will follow docilely; for we cannot command you nor give you orders, because polyarchy equals anarchy. Since it is necessary that someone come first after the basileus, who else is worthy to command, if not the one who carries the titles?

"What I had to say I have said. As for those who have differing opinions, this is the best time to express them, because fear will not be a barrier, and we will listen, if anyone wishes to express another opinion. But nobody in this whole assembly, if he only learns from the facts and especially from the words I have heard spoken, will want to put what has been said in doubt."

When the megas konostaulos had completed this address all the magistrates, as if moved by a single impulse and one design, and seeming to have nothing to add, clearly approved all that he had said; moreover, the moment they suspected anyone in the audience of speaking against the things Palaiologos had said they became indignant and appeared aggrieved. Accordingly, each one attempted express his compliments before another and show to Mouzalōn that he believed it advantageous to be placed under his orders and be governed by him. But this was false and merely a deception, as it proved.

So then, when this assembly was dissolved, the prōtobestiarios, being assured, through the apparent consent of the magnates, that the responsibility for the basileus and his affairs belonged to himself alone, took all the army and left for Magnesia. He entrusted the guard of the basileus to loyal men and that of the imperial treasury to others equally loyal and worthy, men who had given many proofs of their loyalty. The logothetēs tōn agelōn, Hagiotheodōritēs, commanded them. He busied himself with the administration of public affairs and the future. At this time *prostagmata* began to be written which were intended to be sent everywhere in the cities of the Roman empire, relating to various matters, but principally and primarily to announce the death of the basileus, and at the same time to proclaim the young basileus, and to make each person swear the customary oaths of allegiance to him. The *prostagmata* were sent out in great numbers, and as the young basileus could not move his hand to sign them, it was given to the aforementioned logothetēs tōn agelōn the task of writing the imperial signature in red ink. Meanwhile the prōtobestiarios was occupied with everything, and did not rest, acting with complete freedom since he had no reason to suspect opposition.

1.18 Attack by the army against the Mouzalōnes

But the envy that was felt towards him swelled strongly and crept dangerously around him, although he himself knew nothing about it. The accusation of forbidden acts made

against that man seemed reasonable to the angry men, for they felt they were fighting for the basileis because one of them had fallen ill through spells cast by the Mouzalōnes and succumbed before his time to a pitiful death, and as for the other, that man, harbouring a desire to rule and to seize power, intended to hold a position much too grand for one of his station, spurning the basileus and taking power through stealth. The Italians of the foreign regiments, whom the megas konostaulos had close by his side, had other reasons of their own to attack the man: the Mouzalōnes, especially the elder, had deprived the soldiers, while the basileus was yet living, of what they had been awarded. They had been scorned rather than given their due honours, and at his instigation they had been forbidden their free access to the basileus. They had thus been humiliated by order of the prōtobestiarios. Incensed by these actions and others like them, this fair-haired and warlike people was ready, if given only a little encouragement, to kill them. The captain of this phalanx, by speaking to the crowd, was in part responsible for this circumstance: the men, having been roused by him in the past and still more enflamed when, freed from all fear and immediately ready to undertake the incurable and knowing the occasion, he encouraged them to boldly commit murder. The plausible rumour carried his followers along, for they would never have been as bold, if they had not been convinced of certain rumours, being of another race and for the most part foreigners. And if thus they could only be bold at this time, then even more must the suspicion rest upon their commander.

1.19 How the murder of the Mouzalōnes was dared by the army

It was now the ninth day since the death of the basileus, and it was necessary to hold the customary memorial service. So they went up to the monastery of Sōsandra, where the body of the basileus had been placed next to that of his father, and where many priests were standing by. All of the magistrates went up there, and separately so did their wives and the eminent matrons, as well as all those who served the men in power. The army, however, had been left below, around the basileus, as a precaution. So when the Mouzalōnes arrived with all of their people, to demonstrate the affection which they, more than any others, bore towards the deceased, the soldiers – especially those of the Italian and foreign contingents – seized the opportunity. Some were eager to take vengeance on those who had harmed them, and others rejoiced at the audacious act that they would accomplish, if they were successful. For men always take pleasure in revolution and anyone who sees a fresh act of wickedness brought to completion rejoices in the suffering of its victims more than he rejoices in the good which comes to its beneficiaries. Mixing with the crowd they began shouting terrible cries from the bottom

of the hill to basileus at the top, who was out of view, levelling accusations against the alleged traitors – referring to the Mouzalōnes – appearing, all the while, to show fervent support for the basileus and his family. So they would not come to take action without provocation, they pretended to be afraid, and urged those around the basileus to stand aside, indicating at the same time that the basileus should say so. If not, they would attack and finalise the matter.

During this time those who had been entrusted with the guard of the basileus spoke and murmured amongst themselves and, either because this audacious plan had been made known to them previously or because they were frightened by the clamour, immediately brought out the boy, hoping to cow them by displaying the sovereign in full view. At the appearance of the child their din grew louder still and they began to behave in an even more disorderly manner. Those in his retinue instructed him to make a gesture of assent. This gesture could do either of two things: quell the disturbance or approve it. To those around the young lord the assenting wave of the hand was seen as a sufficient sign for the archontes to defend them and bring the rioting under control, but the rest took it as an encouragement to go ahead. A cry arose, that the basileus approved, and at once the whole crowd rushed forward, and everybody moved as if to defend the basileus, ready to expose themselves to danger. Encouraging one another with shouts, they rushed towards the monastery of Sōsandra, with the aim of inflicting the greatest harm upon those who, as they claimed, were enemies of the rule of the dynasty. But there were some who remained behind, and who did not join in this movement. Preferring caution to daring, they stood ready, if they learned that any of the objects of this attack were out of the way, to burst into their pavilions with the greatest audacity and carry away their treasures. Nobody would be able to prevent them doing so, if the owners had been killed in this way.

When the Mouzalōnes, with some magistrates, were in the church while the service was being conducted, the crowd ran up making an insolent clamour and it became clear to those inside that the people were heading straight towards the monastery. A few of the servants, stationed outside, suspected from the uproar that the crowd might do something unlawful, because it was almost completely out of control, and so, guessing that a rebellion was taking place, they warned those inside, their faces pale. And the latter hurriedly carried the news to their masters and strongly insisted upon the need to close the monastery gates upon the newcomers. But when they heard this, they paid no attention, for they could not understand why the approaching crowd would want to do them harm, and they supposed that they were coming to participate in the public ceremonies. Going outside once more, the servants took account of the noise and the

disorder of the crowd which was still approaching; and they were seized by an even greater fear and earnestly reported what was happening; and others came running in after them, and others again, because no one who saw the crowd supposed that it were not coming to commit a very bad deed. This is why many, fearing for themselves because of the crowd's unfavourable suspicions about them, hid themselves in various places. Those who favoured the Mouzalōnes more than any others approached them again with expressions of dismay on their faces, pointing out the attack of the men. It was necessary, they said, to quickly anticipate their onrush by placing a bar across the gate, before they could get in, for their clamour was an indication of nothing good, rather of something bad. But the Mouzalōnes were absolutely not among those showing fear; for in my opinion their fate was leading them and the saying is true, that God steals the wits of those who he is about to destroy. But those magnates who were there, on hearing what was happening, no longer worried about it, either from some foreknowledge of events, or because they did not concerned at what the crowd might do.

Meanwhile the attackers had already won the entrances and become masters over them. They then spread further inside, and there were panic-stricken shouts, and it became clear, from their actions and from the threats they had made before entering the church, that they were bent on murder. In the household of the prōtobestiarios was a secretary, Theophylaktos by name, a relation of mine, who resembled his master in every way. As he was going out to get news, this resemblance fooled the attackers – his clothes contributed to this also, for great and small alike were in mourning clothes because of the death of the basileus. Supposing that this was the man for whom they were searching, the attackers immediately struck him down with countless blows. There was nobody who did not thrust his sword into his body, even when he was dead. As I heard from someone, being seized by a berserk madness they even went on to drink his blood. But they at once discovered their error, for the shoes upon his feet were revealed, and they were black; these clearly indicated to the murderers their mistake. Straight away they hastened, enraged and extremely agitated, and swords in hand, into the church. And at once, at the sight of these men thirsting to kill, the sacred hymns ceased and the singers fled hither and thither, slipping into corners and other places where they hoped to find safety. As for the Mouzalōnes, one ran to the sanctuary, where he eased himself under the altar, believing that it would provide safety, while the other squeezed himself behind the door of the church and pulled it to in front of himself as tightly as he could, so that the door sat over him flush with the wall, and when open it seemed to be resting closely against the wall behind it, with nothing in the way. Their brother-in-law, who, because he had had a share of their good fortune, was now to be associated in their misfortune, hurriedly hid

himself away from the view of others as best he could in a place near the imperial tombs. As for the prōtobestiarios himself, he also withdrew into the sanctuary of the church and, when he came to the apse of the prothesis, he hid behind one of the tall columns, trusting in the darkness and the inviolability of the sanctuary. But it was impossible to escape from the danger, for the attackers were very numerous, and they put everyone else to flight, because each of them feared for his own life; the magistrates, dumbfounded, went with them, unable to do anything. The attackers, noticing the great advantage which they had gained, in a fit of berserk fury charged in, searching meticulously, leaving no corner of the church unexplored. As a result, the Mouzalōnes were found one by one, and seized and killed at the whim of their captors. However, the others did not leave them in peace. On the contrary, many surrounded each one, cutting him down, striking and tormenting the wretch even after he was dead, so that a man who was one was cut into many. Thus their wickedness armed them and their fury gave them the spirit of enraged animals.

As for the prōtobestiarios, a certain Karoulos had dared to enter the sanctuary but after a long search had found nothing, and having found nothing was about to give up the search and retrace his steps. But fate did not allow Mouzalōn to escape suffering, for as Karoulos entered the prothesis, examining it and all around, he saw the unfortunate man on his knees on the ground; and upon seeing him he quickly moved to kill him without mercy. The man besought him, offering to ransom his blood for a great amount; but Karoulos had no regard for this attitude of supplication, nor was he deflected by his offers, and he immediately seized him and killed him with his dagger. When this deed became known, nobody departed from the place, but everyone approached, striking the body; insulting and tormenting it. They carved it up to such an extent that the undertakers had to put the pieces in a sack and carry him out to bury him. When these cruel men had completed their bold enterprise in this fashion, after sharpening their tusks like wild boars, so that not even the magistrates could withstand them and examine them, or even inquire for what reasons or under what impulse had they dared to commit these acts, they at once rushed to the pavilions of those who had been murdered. With an air of complete assurance they began cheerfully looting whatever they happened to find, as if nothing untoward had occurred, and the following accusation was often on their tongues: “These enemies, with ill-will towards the basileis, had ambitions to rule, and could have seized power by any means, if they had not been prevented, these sinners against the army, these men who, by means of magic, had subtly suborned the father and who, under the pretext of safety and security, were keeping watch on the son; what a just and due penalty they have received, how well this has been done, how willingly we will now serve our master, now that we are delivered from danger from that source.”

They said these words and made of the goods of the Mouzalōnes a Mysian booty, emptying out the riches of their pavilions. When this happened in this manner, no one seemed able to present any obstacle to the furious and wild crowd. Some were trembling with genuine fear, and others affected to do so. For example, the wife of the prōtobestiarios, present at that place, was indignant and spoke of their effrontery, but her uncle, the megas konostaulos, restrained her quite firmly, and enjoined her to keep quiet, for fear that she too would be killed, if she did not hold her peace. There was confusion everywhere, and both masters and servants were afflicted with the same fear, and everyone looked for a way of escape, and left that place, not caring about where they would go, but fleeing in total disorder. They took greater measures than previously to safeguard the basileus, out of fear that there might be some new revolt, while everyone, caught in the midst of this confusion, looked to provide security for themselves.

1.20 How some of the chief men left because of this, while others remained on their guard

The men around Karyanitēs, who was an old man and of great merits and who was then prōtobestiaritēs, ran away and deserted to the Persians. This was not because of any hatred for the basileus, but because they feared for themselves in the troubled situation. For the attackers had either risen up of their own accord, in which case they could do so again, since they had not been subjected to any punishment, or else others were inciting them to their actions, and might urge them to attack them also. Therefore many men, who had not expected it, were endangered, especially those who held office, seeing as a great and frightful envy was sneaking up on them. For these reasons some of them, in the same night, began fleeing directly to the Persian realm, while others began to withdraw to other places, suspecting the gravest dangers, and still others provided for their own security as best they could. As for the megas konostaulos, he established an appropriate guard for himself, appointing to it his brothers, young and intelligent men who had not yet been dignified with offices. The elder of these was named Iōannēs, the second one Kōnstantinos. This guard force thenceforth stayed close to the basileus, spending the day with him and with many of them also remaining with him through the night. They showed their goodwill and loyalty towards the basileus, the more so in that each strove against the others to show more clearly that they, and not another, was better.

1.21 How the *archontes* vied for the guardianship of the basileus

Nevertheless they began arguing and wrangling amongst themselves. The quarrel was the result of their pride. For while they disputed over the care of the basileus, none of these worthies seemed prepared to become subordinate to anyone else of the same rank.

On the one hand there were the Laskarid Tzamantouroi, who were adorned with great seniority and wisdom, and the fact that they were relatives – great-great-uncles – of the basileus gave an additional assurance to their claim for the position.

On the other hand there was the clan of the Tornikioi, the eldest of whom was megas primmikērios. They also had a strong claim to the object of the dispute: the fact that their father was the friend of the basileus Iōannēs Doukas, the grandfather of the young basileus, and had been called "brother" in letters from him.

Then there were the Stratēgopouloi, among whom was Alexios, the glory of his family, who was greatly admired both for his youthful old age and his many successes. His son was Kōnstantinos, nephew by marriage to the basileus Iōannēs, and celebrated for his bravery. Kōnstantinos had been deprived of his eyes during the reign of Theodōros Laskaris: he was accused of treating the basileus with disdain, and expressing contempt for him when he had but recently taken the sceptre in succession to his father.

Amongst the other nobles there were the young sons of the noble house of Rhaoul – they succeeded their father who, as we have already said, had been deprived of his rank – and the Palaiologoi. With them were the Batazai and the sons of Philēs, whose father, Theodōros, had been blinded at the same time and for the same reason as Stratēgopoulos. With the Kaballarioi there were the Nostongoi and the Kamytzai; with the Aprēnoi and the Angeloi there were the Libadarioi, the Tarchaneiōtai, the Philanthrōpēnoi and the noble Kantakouzenoi, and all the others for whom the golden chain of high birth had been welded together.

But Geōrgios Nostongos was particularly ambitious. Unlike the others he gloried in having the honour of being allied through marriage with the basileus. In fact the previous basileus, while he was still alive, had intended to give his daughter to Nostongos in marriage, confiding his intention to many others, and he would have completed the arrangement if death, in falling upon him, had not been an obstacle to the plan. When Nostongos, who remained encouraged about this proposal, thought that it would still be possible to obtain this alliance, his hopes caused him to have arrogant thoughts, and he boasted conceitedly to others, especially his cousin, who was megas konostaulos. He also installed himself without any ado in the hall of the palace and when, for pleasure and distraction, the nobles mounted their horses for the joust or to play their usual ball games,

he mounted his horse and he played with them with the greatest freedom, showing himself off to the princesses who stood nearby, watching.

1.22 How Palaiologos was preferred over others for this position

During this month, because the basileus, who was known to be of a young age and who had a "soft life", was not able to remain without a regent, the chief men gathered and decided that it would be imprudent to conduct this affair without the Church and its head, Arsenios. They sent as soon as possible to summon Autōreianos the patriarch from Nikaia, while in the meantime they deliberated, this man preferring one, that man preferring another for the guardianship of the basileus. They eventually agreed upon the megas konostaulos, the aforementioned Palaiologos, as he was the only one who, above all others, appeared suitable for the office. He was an excellent general and his nobility was ancient and of the highest level; and thirdly, he was himself related to the basileus, and also through his wife – the basileus was her second cousin, and the son of his own second cousin – and it was thus natural that he was chosen, above the rest, for the guardianship of the basileus. But this was only one part of the reason why he had been preferred, and the one that those who spoke in his favour placed first. It is also natural, on the other hand, to think that he himself had managed the affair, deceiving many men by his pretty promises, especially those who happened to have lost their positions of rank because of the harshness of the times. Without hesitation he agreed to shoulder the responsibility, though he was poor and did not have the means to live on the lavish scale that the position required. But in order not to appear in the debt of those who had offered him the position, nor to take the burden only through entreating them, he demanded, in addition, the consent of the patriarch who was coming, not so much out of necessity, but to confirm more surely the action that was being taken. However, he demanded that in return for becoming guardian of the basileus he be granted some very high positions.

1.23 How Palaiologos was promoted megas doux

The nobles wanted nothing less than the Church's confirmation of their own decisions, without, however, having to be forced to sacrifice anything that they had approved; for they recognized as a natural thing that whoever was promoted to the guardianship of the basileus should have a high rank, and on that point most of them were agreed. And the overseer of the affairs of the empire was made megas doux, as a grant of the basileus, of

course. Palaiologos was proclaimed megas doux and regent for the basileus, and they delivered public affairs into his care, and they gave him absolute command to assist him in these tasks. It was partially because of this, and partially because of the urgent need that existed, that he laid hands on the imperial treasury.

For there was a great amount of money held in reserve at Magnesia, an amount not easily measured, which had been received by and deposited in that place by the basileus Iōannēs Doukas – for the other funds that his son, Theodōros Laskaris, had collected, and which sufficed to cover the expenses of the empire, were safely kept in the fortress lying on the upper reaches of the Skamandros, known mockingly as Astritzios. And [Doukas' treasury] was not created through unjust collections and impositions, and the gold did not represent the vital life-blood of the poor. Rather, it was a treasure collected and augmented thanks to the foresight with which that man had managed his affairs, and from the contributions made by foreigners, for these riches were extracted partially from the cultivation of land, and partially from abroad. And it was not true that everything was stored away there and that no one had a share in it, for he withdrew from it all that was necessary for donations, the pay of soldiers, and exemptions, and especially for the gifts given to individuals and for the succour of the poor, to the point that the imperial mercy spilled like an inexhaustible flood. That which remained was placed in the treasury.

What was said in former times about Cyrus and Dareios was completely appropriate to them; so Iōannēs was the father of the Romans, and Theodōros could be termed the master. For Iōannēs provided for all with such wisdom, that because he considered the so-called *zeugēlateia* to be the personal responsibility of the imperial power, he established villages near each castle and fortress, by which means the adjoining fortress was supplied by the produce and taxes of these lands, and as a result the basileus was able to allow the channels of his beneficence to run unhindered to many, even to all. As for Theodōros, while he set about collecting gold from the public contributions quite energetically, he emptied out many times as much through the generosity of his soul, and as a result there appeared ebbings-and-flowings and whirlpools of money, like those of the sea. What was taken away was replaced swiftly by what was added, and those from whom property was removed received more in return than they had lost, since everyone contributed less to the public taxation, and received more than he had contributed because everything came from the basileus and he supplied what each person needed immediately and enjoyed giving more than receiving. And what more than this does the law of Christ require, that law which requires us to give to all who ask, and that everybody has enough so that none suffers from want, by virtue of this common law, according to which one is ready to give to another who, by giving in turn, will himself be in need? And even for the

fainthearted the amount that is demanded is guaranteed with restitution coming many times over, and the wonderful thing is that the guarantor is God.

1.24 How the basileus Iōannēs, on falling ill, made many donations to the poor

I wish to relate another matter in relation to this, and in view of its relevance I apologize for the interruption to the story.

A sickness once befell the basileus, Iōannēs. He had been robbed of his wife, the assistant – I know not how else to term her – in these good works, that Eirēnē of illustrious names, and this sickness was very serious: he was suffering from epileptic seizures on account, I think, of his advanced age. As the doctors were at a loss where to turn, he took refuge in God and imitated as best he could the divine mercy towards everyone. So, on his order, sackfuls of gold were channelled out and to each poor man, wherever he was found, was given thirty-six genuine nomismata, and this does not include that which was expended lavishly upon the divine churches, the monasteries and the men of God. These acts of mercy were measured by the mule-load, but measured out with them was the mercy of God. The patient recovered from his illness, and he rejoiced accordingly at this mercy.

Then, wanting to defend himself to the Romans against the charge of having reduced the common funds, when these acts of mercy had been carried so far, he affirmed to Patriarch Manouēl – calling to bear witness the One who had shown him mercy – that these monies had not come from the public purse but that he had obtained them through his wisdom and the especial care with which, unceasingly, he had cultivated his lands through capable men, and also from the care of the various animals that lived on his estates.

Thus, by these things, his love of God and his love for the Romans was made known.

1.25 How the megas doux, seizing the imperial treasure, procured much goodwill for himself

At this time, even though there was a great amount of money stored at Magnesia, it was not easily possible for the megas doux and guardian to take it and give it away whenever he desired, for the axe-bearing Celtic regiment which attended it was ready to seize anybody who reached out their hand to take from it, and the treasurers took care to give fairly, when a pressing need existed, but they also gave a little to some people when they

were instructed, under the pretext of a need that did not exist. By this means Palaiologos created the foundations of his popularity amongst those who would not forget his goodwill. He could justly have excused himself in not giving things to anybody because of his apparent poverty, but nevertheless he gave many the opportunity to receive gifts, not so much in a spirit of munificence as from a desire to provide for the future, as events showed.

The author, being present one day, heard that man speak of his poverty and, unafraid of being detected in a falsehood – especially since, for the speaker, poverty was a means to increase his glory – claim that he received an income which came to only three nomismata for the upkeep of his house when he was basileus. And he called on Angelos, the brother of his mother-in-law, whom he promoted to megas primmikērios upon his becoming basileus, to give evidence, so that the basileus might gain justice from him in the matter of the dowry of his niece; and he came and gave his evidence, and we heard him speaking and swearing to the truth of what was said. So, when for similar reasons he gave the imperial treasury to the people for them to enjoy – especially to the well-born nobles – with the intention of winning them over, he kept himself above the receiving of gifts.

1.26 How the megas doux, on the arrival of the patriarch, showed him much deference

At this time he heard that the patriarch was coming with select members of the clergy and the bishops. And as soon as he heard this, the megas doux and others travelled a great distance to meet him. He showed the patriarch and his holy retinue great honour in this way: holding the bridle of the priest's mule, he walked on foot until such time as the patriarch preceded him into the palace and he installed him there. To honour him, the megas doux gave an order to have an imperial residence prepared for him and he ingratiated himself with him in all respects and flattered him, for the compelling reason that the patriarch could easily approach the basileus when the occasion arose, and was not far removed from him at any time. He conceded everything to him cheerfully and agreed that he would not exercise guardianship except on his instructions and with the agreement of the synod. This is why he took the child and gave him into the keeping of the patriarch. While others also had a part in the council, he made matters dependant upon the patriarch; he often took him and showed him the treasures, tacitly indicating that his power depended upon the patriarch alone, to the point where, if the patriarch were to

command it, others would hold power in the future. It was very clever of him, on the one hand, to cede to the patriarch power over everything, while, on the other hand, through keeping the initiative in this way, to be able to receive freely what the other would have had to offer out of necessity.

Then, as it was necessary to draw monies from the public purse for the maintenance of the patriarch's retinue, especially of the bishops, the megas doux himself withdrew the money and made the distributions, but he liberally added to the amount; ostensibly this was done for reasons of evident necessity, but it was also undertaken because he was eager to close the eyes of the wise through these gifts and obtain their goodwill. Repeated each day, this measure produced in these men a very strong feeling of kindness towards him, the donator, and the signs of honour and deference which he gave to each of them were such that after a short time he held them all by their noses and was capable of leading them wherever he wished. For there was none among them who, even in the absence of the megas doux, did not make flattering mention of him to the council and did not judge Palaiologos to be more worthy than any other of being placed at the head of public affairs; and, among other very grand honours, he was spoken of as basileōpatōr. Such were the messages, reflections and promises for the future, which he nightly sent amongst them to great applause.

1.27 How those who spoke in favour of the megas doux convinced the majority, and how he became despotēs

At this point, during the course of the united assembly of nobles and bishops debating the matter of the government, everybody was so overcome by his ingratiating spirit and his flattering manner that when the order of the day turned to the question of who was to be chosen to direct affairs, all those who were in the priesthood spoke in his favour, while he himself remained silent. It is wrong, they said, for the guardian of the basileus – particularly such a man – to be on the same level as others. He should be removed from the common people and honoured by imperial dignities. Why should he labour continually over his cares and draw upon himself the greatest anxieties if, after assuming such a heavy responsibility, he did not gain something? In this way the accomplishment of this office would be easier if he occupied a position higher than the others. It would be well to honour the guardian of the basileus with the rank of despotēs. Thus he would preserve unbroken his good feelings towards the hereditary basileus, in his belief that the rank he had attained was fair recompense. Furthermore, there would be nothing strange in

his being called despotēs, since his maternal grandfather had been promoted despotēs and had scored great victories over the Italians. Are we not aware of his love of God, his zeal for good, his friendship towards the monks and his exceptional respect for the Church? Witness his air of modesty, affability and bonhomie towards everybody, while the very small size of his fortune is proof of his liberality and generosity. Therefore it would be an advantage to affairs, if the regent of the empire were honoured with the fitting title of basileōpatōr.

When these suggestions had been aired, a number of the bishops agreed with the words, which seemed to them to be just, and some dignitaries were of the same opinion; but the rest disagreed with the proposal and they did not manage to reach agreement. Some of them, especially the Laskarid Tzamantouroi, and with them Geōrgios Nostongos, had difficulty in agreeing with the decision – which was reached in spite of them – that Palaiologos was to be made and called basileopatōr. They forcefully maintained that the high rank of megas doux was sufficient for the guardian. As for favouring him with an office of imperial rank and honouring him with a position far above his station, they feared that this would be a crime against the greatest and most honourable matters. There were princesses of a marriageable age, and it was necessary to marry them to men who seemed of the greatest eminence; and in that case, they themselves – sisters of the basileus and princesses of the third or fourth generation of the imperial dynasty – had the greatest right to be honoured with these dignities, and their husbands along with them.

But Alexios Stratēgopoulos and his family, and the sons of Philēs, as well as the Tornikioi and especially those who had been blinded – who wanted to have vengeance for what they had suffered – and all those who were related to or expected to become close to the Palaiologoi, all replied with vehemence, affirming that it was fair and most useful that the man who was placed next to the basileus and bore the name of 'father' should also be honoured with the rank of despotēs, for in this way what had been agreed upon by all in regard to him would become effective and affairs would be better managed. Who would pay attention to a child as yet incapable of thought? And if the one who ruled in his place were only an ordinary citizen, he would not have any means to persuade them in a compelling way. It was therefore necessary to copy those aboard ships: they are each independent and free to make their own decisions, but when they need to put to sea, upon embarking they choose a captain. He is in charge of their affairs and they are obliged to carry out resolutely whatever commands he gives; whoever disobeys is justly punished for having gravely offended the master. But they do not place him in their own ranks, like one man amongst many, rather they invest him with a more

imposing mantle, and by thus making his position greater they create a fear of him in others. In this way every city and every state will stand firm where the chief is placed above the masses.

The blind spoke with even more freedom and determination: "Having a small child look after affairs," they said, "places the empire and many of its concerns in danger! Thus we needs must set up a government, if we expect to be saved. Do we not know what degree of misfortune befell the empire of the Romans – to the point that we were driven from our homeland and lost everything and became hemmed inside narrow frontiers – all while we still had basileis? Even so, because we had not been governed as was fit, after an admirable voyage there was a shipwreck. So then, if a great evil has arrived when we have not been ruled well and with the necessary rigour, what danger would there be, if we were not ruled at all? On the one hand we consider loyalty to the imperial majesty a fine thing, but that being safe, through keeping one's oaths, is a fine thing also; for where safety is not assured, loyalty is useless. On the other hand, what suffering is inflicted upon the imperial majesty, if honour is given to the one who bears the responsibility? This instead results in many great advantages, for, endowed with an august title, he affirms the authority of the basileus over affairs; with great superiority he will deal with ambassadors, address the people, give orders to the soldiers and officials and will administer everything correctly, for everyone will respect his rank. On the other hand, anyone who is dealing with his equals, though he may be first among them, will not easily be able to persuade them to do what he commands, since he will be unable to punish recalcitrants from a position of greater eminence. If the empire of the Romans wished to be run along other than monarchical lines, we would be amazed. Of course the monarchy must be retained, even if the ruler is ineffectual, for in that case at least the appearance would remain. Our country will then of necessity be ruled well, since it is accustomed to be governed by only one ruler, one ruler holding sway over the others, excelling in power and dignity. That he is one man will, on the one hand, provide the appearance of a monarchy; but the danger of powerlessness, through being only one man, will be overcome by his great dignity. Thus it is necessary for one who has been chosen to assume the guardianship of the basileus to also bear a high rank. Upon the one who has this responsibility, even if he is one of us, this distinction should be conferred. If not, let someone else be sought, for this man will not easily accept the burden of this office without being honoured. And even if he were to accept the management of affairs without any token of honour, the logic of necessity demands that the guardianship be practised in the manner which has been discussed."

1.28 How the patriarch agreed with those who spoke in favour of Palaiologos

When this speech had been delivered, the first sacrificer gave his warmest support to those who spoke for Palaiologos. This is a man who had himself already been won over to the idea that Palaiologos would make a good leader; he had long experience of him, and he was now carried away by the notion of doing something greater for many reasons. It is clear from this: when the news of the death of the basileus was announced in Nikaia, while others were still unaware of it, the patriarch confided the news to one of his friends, that Gemistos who was later to reach the position of megas oikonomaton in the city. And when he spoke with him regarding the management of affairs, the patriarch put Palaiologos ahead of all others.

So then, the patriarch, having earlier been won over, immediately agreed with those who had spoken in favour of Palaiologos and through his vote he gave him the rank of despotēs. Indeed, Palaiologos was raised from megas doux to despotēs, and the basileus, helped by the patriarch, conferred upon him the symbols of the office. Of course, as despotēs he simply took everything upon himself, and sought to win over the nobles by all sorts of liberalities and gifts taken from the imperial treasury – in doing this he made sure to fulfil his promises in the future – and he acted with the greatest generosity. To those in the holy service he showed an even more liberal hand, both openly and in secret: openly in giving to them the necessities of life, secretly by sending them extra by night. He continued to chip away and seek more, being only content in becoming co-basileus alongside the basileus. For he mentioned the dangers and terrors hanging over him, citing the example of the Mouzalōnes, who had died as victims of malice, and who represented the danger of jealousy. Palaiologos, too, would be in such a danger the moment he stopped focussing upon it. "You can give the guarding over to another, I have too many concerns about myself, and it is impossible for me to act as protector with such hindrances, having so many fears for myself. It is better to resign everything when the guardian himself needs protection."

1.29 How Palaiologos won over the majority and, through their support, claimed the supreme dignity

In giving these reasons and others like them, he was wholly concerned with claiming the higher office. It goes without saying that, in accordance with the authority that he would acquire and the total power which he would wield, he would dispose of all those whom he suspected of being discontented at the present time and potential troublemakers in the

future. Those who were willing were sent away to live by themselves, but in the meantime others were imprisoned, and he sent Tzamantouros to Prousa and provided him with guards as if for a condemned man. His supporters harboured the highest hopes and helped him as best they could without any limits. In conferring upon his brother Iōannēs, as if from the basileus himself, the position of megas domestikos, he made him famous and powerful in the course of affairs. So his followers – still burning with high hopes – proposed him to the patriarch and the synod, for them to declare that they would not prevent the despotēs from obtaining the higher office, for him and him alone to have the honour of ruling beside the hereditary basileus and with him, in the situation which they faced it was their duty to make him basileus for all that he would do. On the one hand, if they waited for the child to become a man, who would protect them from the risk that their future benefactor might die before he reached maturity? On the other hand, if one would pause to give to the basileus a guardian who was placed in charge of matters, they would enjoy good-will which was neither unstable nor uncertain. Such were their words and their leaders persuaded a patriarch who was already softened. For Palaiologos had not omitted anything which was needed to win over the holy synod. The day of the announcement was fixed; the new moon of Hekatombaiōn of the second indiction.

1.30 How Michaēl, the despotēs of the West, revolted against the state of affairs

In the meantime the despotēs of the west, Michaēl – who was a nephew of that Theodōros who had reigned there previously – heard about the state of affairs in the East, and how, with Laskaris having died and his son Iōannēs being a mere child, the empire of the Romans could be plundered by anyone who wished to do so. He thought then of his uncle Theodōros, and how he, being well-born and of the foremost nobility, lifted himself up when the first confusion fell upon the Romans, and after fighting valiantly in very many battles against the Italians, attained the Imperial power – being crowned by Iacōbos of Achrida – and how he won the western lands from the Italians and took them for himself, and appeared to be an important man in affairs until the day when, struck by misfortune and captured by Asan, he was deprived of his eyes. So then Michaēl considered these things in his mind, and he gloated over the poor state of affairs and, noting that the situation of the Italians who occupied the city was weak, he conceived a very bold scheme, one worthy of his noble dignity. This was the plan: he would assemble as large an army as possible and advance to the city, to besiege and endeavour to capture it, and in this way be proclaimed basileus of the Romans. For neither Laskaris nor anyone else was fitter to rule than he, being well-born and of the Angeloi.

And through his daughters he had his sons-in-law. First there was the king of Apulia, Manfred, who was also the brother of Anna, empress of the Romans, whom the basileus Iōannēs had married in his old age. So the despotēs had that man as his son-in-law through his daughter Helenē, and he also had as his other son-in-law Guillaume, prince of Achaia, through his daughter Anna. He sent to them and received from Manfred three thousand of the men that they call *kaballarioi*, brave men from Germany, while the prince came himself with his forces. He also had his illegitimate son, Iōannēs, who with his own army provided a very great amount of aid. For he already possessed on his own account a handpicked force through being married to a daughter of Tarōnas, and so he was able to campaign and conquer on his own. He brought with him men of the ancient Greek race which Achilleus led, whom he called the Great Vlachs; as a result he prevented the megas domestikos Iōannēs Palaiologos, Alexios Stratēgopoulos and thirdly Iōannēs Rhaoul from advancing beyond Berroia although they had a large force with them. Furthermore the despotēs, after assembling all the forces which have been mentioned and adding to them his own, which were considerable, turned his mind towards attacking the generals first and (as he anticipated) cutting them to pieces, then attacking Thessalonikē and, after overrunning the western lands, moving against Kōnstantinoupolis. These projects presented themselves to him at a timely moment, because Manfred, as a sort of inheritance from his father Friedrich, found himself in apostasy from the Church, so that it was not strange for the Germans to fight against the Italians in the city. The prince, who had inherited all of Achaia and the Morea, was also there on his own account. When these troops were concentrated in the same place and were preparing to give battle – for our generals could not stay quiet when they learned that such a force of Italians had been gathered together, and began making preparations on their side – then, when the despotēs' forces had just assembled, and were preparing to attack, the fabled Eris, who had cast the apple into the midst of the three goddesses in order to provoke a quarrel over beauty, came amongst them also. And the cause was almost the same.

1.31 How the Prince of Achaia was captured by the Romans

It is said that some of the chief men around the prince, those whom they call *kaballarioi*, cast lustful glances at the wife of Iōannēs Doukas, who as our account has already indicated was the daughter of Tarōnas. This was an obvious insult to her husband and a sign of contempt for him; so, greatly offended by these terrible deeds, he loudly threatened vengeance upon those who had insulted him. A fierce quarrel divided both

sides, and they began arming for battle, and those who had been called allies now were drawn up one against the other. Then, it is said, the prince himself, on seeing the strife, became displeased. He could not punish his own men, but he mocked and scoffed at Doukas, reproaching him exceedingly for his background, for being illegitimate. And he went on to say, indicating Nikēphoros, who had arrived, "This man is my brother, but you are a bastard and are not only not a free man, but the slave of this man." The prince uttered these words with vehemence and Iōannēs, in his anger, was another Achilleus. Then, to show that he was everything to the army and that whichever side he rallied to would be victorious, at night and in secret he sent word to the generals that he would go over to their side and attack the Italians who were with him, cowardly and effeminate men, if they would only launch an attack. However, while making this covenant with them, he wanted to keep faith with what he had promised to his father and Nikēphoros his brother, so that, while leaving them unharmed, they would attack those Italians who remained, especially those of the prince.

After they had concluded this agreement and exchanged holy amulets as a pledge for their oaths, a great and violent battle broke out between, on the one hand, the Romans, supported by Persians and a large contingent of Scythians and, on the other hand, the Italians of the prince. For Doukas, by dint of severe threats, made his father and brother and their troops hold aloof from the battle, and not only refrain from entering the fray, but walk away from it while, in attacking the Italians from the rear, he did terrible things. When the Italians realized that they were betrayed they began to run away; yet they were unable to escape battle and many, being caught in a group by the Scythians, fell pierced by many arrows, while others were caught by the Persians. Finally the prince himself, who had slipped under a bush in an heroic attempt to escape notice, altogether failed to do so, for those in pursuit found him as well and he was ingloriously captured. Thus a great victory was without effort and in a short space of time, and much was gained at little expense. Then, after carrying off a great amount of magnificent booty, and especially the Prince of Achaia himself, the generals returned to the East with their army, but not without first having strengthened the Western lands, so as to safeguard them as well as they could. And when they returned with these magnificent trophies, Stratēgopoulos found affairs to be in a state of disarray still, and he was not slow to undertake the will of Palaiologos.

As for the prince, for the time being they put him in prison, but later, after the capture of the city – this will be mentioned here, even if it happened later, so that the events may be linked and the continuity of the narrative be unbroken – after the capture of the city, when two years had passed, the prince bent his stiff neck to the basileus and for the first

time declared that he regarded him to be the lord of the Romans, in lawful possession of the throne, and added that he was ready to yield to him and fall at his feet, being the valid basileus; and if he wished it he would also give as ransom for himself that which he most valued. If the city had not been in their hands the Romans would not have attached any importance to this, but he was confident that they would now gladly accept the offer, for by accepting it they would greatly magnify their magnificence. While the prince offered these things, he also asked to bear forever the title of servant and to receive from the empire a distinction as a sign of his servitude.

The basileus, hearing on the one hand of the ransom and deeming it to be acceptable – for the prince was surrendering to him towns and lands of his dominions worthy of a great and august dignity – and, considering on the other hand that the Latin would be his subject in the future and that the Romans would gain magnificence and profit from this, decided to make a treaty with him regarding these things. After settling these things he released him from prison, along with those of his retinue who had survived the rigours of incarceration, and received him with the honour befitting his rank, and made him a member of his own family, at least to the extent that he made him, through a holy baptism, the godfather of his own son to show his complete confidence in him; and it is said that they confirmed their treaty with fearful oaths, and after holding aloft lit torches during the pronouncing of the oaths and the imprecations of vengeance, they then extinguished them, a rite practised by the Italians to confirm their excommunications.

The mutually agreed terms were that the prince would give to the Romans and their basileus immediate and permanent sovereignty over the following places in the Peloponēsos: Monembasia, Maïne, Hierakion and Myzēthras – with the status of Anaplion and Argos left undecided – and also the entire region around Kinsterna, a district very large and teeming with wealth, while the prince himself would be proclaimed a subject of the Romans and the basileus, obtaining from them an office as a token of his submission; and the basileus, after honouring him with the title of megas domestikos, would send him back with honour, along with all those of his retinue who were still alive. When the treaty had been made according to these articles, the basileus duly sent him back with the appropriate honours, and sent with him those whose duty it was to take possession of the ransom. And the prince returned to his lands with the titles of Prince of Achaia and megas domestikos of the Romans; and when he arrived he relinquished the ransom without delay, just as he had promised. He would have remained true to the terms of the treaty with the Romans, proud of his status in the empire of the Romans, if the pope had not heard the news and, incited by the king – who approached

him and appealed to him because perpetual peace with the Romans did not seem to be to his advantage - broke the treaty and annulled the oaths, because the prince had acted while in prison in unbreakable chains and without giving his full and voluntary consent. As a consequence a continuous and terrible war immediately broke out between the parties of the treaty. And this was the manner in which it began.

1.32 How the despotēs Michaēl defeated the Romans and captured the kaisar

However, the power of the despotēs Michaēl had been reduced by these events – for he had gained much through his alliance with the Prince of Achaia – and he later suffered heavy losses at the hands of the army of Iōannēs Palaiologos, at that time sebastokratōr, so that he found himself in dire straits in regard to both his dominions and his military strength. The despotēs then sent to Manfred, the king of Apulia, who was his son-in-law because of his daughter, and he received a strong force of allied troops from him and entrusted them to his son Nikēphoros, while helping him himself. That man, encountering the men of the kaisar near Trikoryphos, fought a terrible battle with them in which the ruin of most of the Nikaian soldiers was procured. Many were slaughtered and the others surrounded, and the kaisar himself was taken. He was released after a new treaty was concluded, and this is when he took part in the action against the city, about which more will be related later. Subsequently, while making another attack on the West, he was captured once more, and sent by the despotēs Michaēl to the king of Apulia, Manfred, and imprisoned by him. He was afterwards exchanged for the empress Anna, sister of Manfred. But of this we will speak later.

Book Two

2.1 How the patriarch had concerns about the government

The great and unrelenting pressure to establish Palaiologos on the throne created new concerns for Patriarch Arsenios. With the exception of a small number who did not have any chance to prevent it, because of the persistence of the rest, who were numerous and of high rank, everybody was clearly of one mind and one desire, that they were ready to be ruled by this man; for the best basileis, they said, are not those who succeed by right of birth, nor indeed those chosen by lot, who by some slip of fortune are undeservingly chosen so that often the worst men steal into power without it being realised – men whom in fact a good ruler would reject and refuse to accept among his subjects. Rather, the best are those who come to rule through merit and by proving that they are best fitted to rule. This benefits the people, since those who have been appointed to rule accept the reason for which they have been elected. We do not risk choosing the doctor capable of rendering health from illness on the basis of birth, and if we chose the man who must hold the tiller on the basis of birth, then we have placed a pirate, rather than a captain, in charge of the ship. And it is likely that the one who most needs to be pure and well educated, so that he may rule well, will be totally impure, since from his birth he is reared among imperial luxuries and soft living, and besieged by flatterers, while truth is banished and the most evil things are presented as the best. As the old story holds, when the prince was ill he heard from the flatterers that he had a harmonious cough, and if someone whispered a warning about it, he was denounced as a villain and an ill-wisher, for they saw this warning as a specific command. Those who were discontented flattered the prince no less, unduly praising him and enlarging his pride. Just like those people in the theatre who wear different masks, they imagined that birth guaranteed an excellent reign, as if the first effusions of sperm contained certain imperial virtues for governing perfectly.

Saying such things, they insisted even more on seeing the despot crowned and promoted, and they were united in pressing for it. Palaiologos, encouraged in this way, said the same thing, adding that, if his own son were judged unworthy to rule, he himself would put him aside for that reason. But he also promised to undertake a number of reforms; to raise the Church to a very high degree, and to honour the priests in an exceptional manner; to promote to a higher rank those of worthy ability; to accept fair judgements and appoint men who would judge without being swayed in one direction or another, of whom the most important was Michaēl Kakos, also called Senachēreim, who

was well versed in both letters and the laws; for this purpose he would bestow upon him the office of prōtasēkrētis, which had been left vacant for a long time, and would be willing to grant him subordinates, so that judgements might be given with integrity and impartiality. Furthermore, he would honour literature, and honour scholars above the rest; he would bear towards the soldiers an exceptional attachment, and if they fell in battle, or if they died, he would ensure that their *pronoiai* would pass as an inheritance to their children, even if their wives were only pregnant; he would not even speak of imposing unjust taxes; there would be no place for false accusations, the duels which they engendered would be ended, as would the ordeal by iron, so that a most terrible danger would hang over the head of anyone who dared impose the ordeal of the red-hot iron. The conditions of public life would be maintained so peacefully and without fear that the rich who had great fortunes would be able to show their wealth and gain glory without the slightest trepidation. Above all he obeyed the Church, regarding it as his mother and doing everything to strengthen it. He added this: the preceding emperor was suspected of having little regard for its privileges, and of behaving towards it with imperial arrogance, to the point that the patriarch was distressed on a number of occasions and gave up his championship of the people, since the emperor would not listen, even when the patriarch spoke with good reason in favour of certain individuals.

So then the patriarch and the bishops, considering the future, followed two lines of thought, and they were pulled with equal force in two directions. In considering the full exercise of the imperial power they thought it a good thing and beneficial to the people to be ruled by two basileis, one in training and the other fully active; and when they looked into the future, because of the adequate assurances which they had a long time previously heard this man give, and the promises which they heard him make at this time, they were all ready to accept immediately what was going to happen. However, when they reflected on the state of peace and tranquillity which sole rule offers and on the atmosphere of dissension and struggle when there are two rulers, on the intrigues of each and on the suspicion of one regarding the other, and lastly upon the danger that would await each from the other if he was overcome by him, they changed their minds and reversed their decision. From one point of view, imperial rank is above all the most desirable, but from another it brings jealousies, to the point that the ruler will be disposed to create the image of a non-existent danger because of his jealousies, and then pursue it when it has become real, so that he will only be able to rule securely, if he pursues imagined things as if they were real. Behind what excuse should one shelter for this purpose? One might argue that he who seeks to be a monarch can never – in the view of some – do any wrong, if he knows the wise and ancient tragic dictum that absolves him of blame if he appears to

have committed an injustice, saying that if one needs to do wrong it is best to do wrong for the sake of winning extreme power.

When the bishops considered these things, fear overcame them. But for this fear, they were ready to act, but because these things were an obstacle to their calculations, they dithered and did nothing, however many people came forward to speak. Yet fate prevailed. The greater number of the bishops, nearly all of them, agreed to place the empire in Palaiologos' hands; but they deemed it prudent to bind the basileis with dire oaths and force them to make mutual vows, that neither would plot anything harmful against the other.

2.2 How they relieved Palaiologos of the curses to which he was subjected

They then readily removed what seemed to be an obstacle to what was being done, in their desire to see it happen. Because the earlier oaths concluded by Palaiologos with the grandfather of the basileus, and his affirmations under pain of excommunication, that he would not plot anything against the dynasty, were being proposed as an obstacle by certain persons, the assembly of bishops set about destroying the pacts as if they were but cobwebs. [It was argued that] the proposed measure was not an evil plot directed against the basileus, but rather a partnership which would confirm his power and be a continual safeguard, because Palaiologos would join the young prince in ruling at a time when he needed help, and further, that these new sworn oaths would be much stronger and more indissoluble because they were added to the earlier ones, so that Palaiologos would be bound by both one and the other, if he were ever to plot against the young basileus. In return, however, he demanded that a vow be formulated, and oaths sworn, that if the young basileus thought to undertake any action against him, Iōannēs would also of necessity be bound by the same conditions. This was done, and the oaths were certified in writing; the writer was Kakos, who held the position of prōtasēkrētis.

2.3 How the Romans made oaths of servitude to the two and under what terms

The order was given that everyone throughout the empire of the Romans was to give the customary oath of service to the two basileis. However, an addition to the articles of the oath was appended, to provide greater security for them both, that the subjects must raise their hands in vengeance against either one if he conspired against the other. They added this oath to the rest out of fear, I think, rather than from genuine necessity, for anyone

who did not so behave would have been accused of nothing less than of supporting civil war among the population, if ever it came to pass. Nevertheless, it was decided in this way and the decision was put into effect. So the people stretched out their hands and, on the holy gospels, made an oath of submission to the two basileis and swore to keep these promises.

2.4 How Palaiologos and the magnates swore oaths to the child

At this time the appointed day arrived; this was, as has been said, the first of Hekatombaiōn. He who was being raised to the imperial rank was the first person to swear the agreed-upon oaths to the imperial child, not, however, that he would serve him, but that he would counsel him and attempt no deadly plot against him. The magnates also swore oaths to serve the two, and to immediately defend the victim of a plot, if ever there was one. The oaths being given in this way, the one who was about to take the imperial power sat down on the imperial shield after the symbols of imperial power had first been placed upon his feet; then, lifted on the one side by the hands of the bishops, and on the other side by the nobles, he was exalted and acclaimed by everybody with shouts and applause.

2.5 How Palaiologos, once installed in Empire, showed the greatest generosity

Thereupon the members of the senate were honoured with appropriate offices. Each was either given or promised a number of appointments; he decided to honour his brother Iōannēs, who at that time was still megas domestikos, with the title of sebastokratōr and he joined him in wedlock with the daughter of Kōnstantinos Tornikios, although the conferment of the dignity was postponed. While he was eager to grant the rank of kaisar to his other brother, Kōnstantinos, he kept him for the moment as a private citizen, though he united him in marriage to the daughter of Branas, who was of noble blood. He showed his wisdom and won over the nobles through these acts.

He treated the members of the senate with equal generosity, increasing their *pronoiai* and adding to them, delighting in giving so much to all his subjects that they received from him all that they could have wanted. For the soldiers and the people he assured the prosperity of the former by daily acts of generosity, putting in chrysobulls all the promises he made to them and making them more confident of the future, in the knowledge that they had would acquire for their children a perpetual title to their lifetime

pronoiai and their *sitēresia*; as for the rest, he took nothing from them, opened the prisons, pardoning those owing tax debts, gave the means of life in abundance to the poor, saw to the defence of victims of injustice and showering his gifts with great profusion; so it happened that someone would present a request relating to some matter, and instantly an imperial letter would arrive awarding him what he asked for. But two years later the basileus began taking back what had been granted; if perhaps someone who was being harassed about his property presented the document granting him that favour, as soon as it was noticed that the document was from the second indiction, the gift was revoked, under the pretext that the decision of the time was lacking in the required strictness and detail. At that time he also took great sums from the public treasury and then, while speaking to the assembled people with the intention of winning their complete support, he would pour out the money for them with both hands, throwing it in profusion to those people who snapped it up like dogs. Such was the situation.

2.6 How Palaiologos began fortifying the frontiers, even before he had been crowned

Thinking that it was a priority to fortify the frontiers, and at the same time desiring to make his proclamation as basileus known through his presence, he decided to go to Philadelpheia, leaving the young ruler at Magnesia, where he was treated royally, as was proper. Palaiologos was followed by the whole army, which protected its basileus with great care and was ready to display a great effort and fight in any place and against any foe. He sent the patriarch back to Nikaia, promising him that he would himself return there shortly with the young basileus for them both to be crowned. So the patriarch, and the clergy and bishops, having taken leave of the basileis in the customary manner, took the road to Nikaia. Meanwhile the basileus took with him the troops and put them into order of march and, accompanied by the nobles, advanced towards Philadelpheia. On his arrival in the city he fortified the frontiers from there: he sent out some men and received others who came down and by presenting them with most generous gifts, made them keen to mount guard and rendered them, through fine hopes, more resolute. From Philadelpheia he pressed on a little further and travelled the lands around. By making friendly approaches to some, and by making gifts and promises to others, mixing in some cases threats with gentleness, and attending to any matters which arose in the manner of a basileus, he restored the situation as best he could, and reinforced the defence with garrisons.

At this time he was focused on the West, which was ready to rebel, if it could seize the opportunity. This is why he sent envoys to the Persians, who would on the one hand announce the accession to power of one whom they had seen and knew well, and on the other hand would inform the sultān's courtiers of the situation, since they were not only aware of who the new basileus was, but held him in the greatest friendship. As for himself, he returned to Magnesia with all possible haste and, taking the child with him, he took the road to Nikaia with great magnificence and a very large escort. When they arrived, without delay – because they could not rest easy when they considered the affairs of the West – they immediately set about preparing the coronation, at which everyone expected that, according to convention the child would be crowned basileus and would be acclaimed first when he had been crowned, and would be placed at the head of the triumphal procession, while Palaiologos and his wife, crowned afterwards, would follow the first in the traditional order of the imperial procession.

2.7 How Palaiologos circumvented the conventions of the coronation

But there was deceit from the first, and a breaking of the agreement, and most of the people were by no means ignorant of the end to which it would lead. The magnates, who had been well treated and who hoped to obtain further benefits, were won over first and, except for a few, the gifts they received stilled their tongues, and they stood passively by whatever was done. Some of those who had been mistreated were looking on the slighting of the lad as a form of revenge, and they even rejoiced. As for the patriarch, for his part he still hoped that Palaiologos would not break any of the conventions, and did not attempt to look more closely at the matter. Palaiologos had indicated his intention to certain bishops, arguing that it would not be suitable for a child, who was not of a mature age, to receive the imperial crown and precede him, who was already of a mature age and who had spent his life running affairs, in the acclamation and triumphal procession. He was encouraged by the assurances that he received, that they approved of his arguments as correct, and that they could persuade the patriarch to postpone for the present the proclamation of the child, who should be crowned at a more opportune time. It necessarily followed that, if he were not to be crowned at this time, then in the acclamations and in all the other matters he should come after the one who was to be crowned. But they warned him that the operation should be disguised, and he should act only when the ceremony was taking place, for fear that as the time approached, he who was to bestow the diadem would postpone the coronation.

2.8 How Palaiologos was crowned and the child was sidelined

Such was the state of affairs, and the appointed day arrived and everything was ready; donning their sacred vestments the bishops prepared to conduct the rites of the ceremony and were waiting for the two basileis. But as soon as the plan was made apparent there was a commotion, with some holding one opinion and others a different one. Some of the senators even threatened to harm the child and put him to death, if the clergy decided to do otherwise [than accept the plan]. So discussion and quarrelling took place, and the patriarch was put in an awkward position and did not know which faction to support. The day progressed and agreement was not reached. And it was with difficulty and after long argument that the assembly of bishops finally accepted it, with the exception of some, namely Andronikos of Sardeis and Manouēl of Thessalonikē, also called Psaras and Disypatos. However, the metropolitan of Sardeis gave his consent when the patriarch gave his own; while Germanos of Adrianoupolis-in-Orestias, Grēgorios of Ankyra and Kōnstantinos of Melangeia contributed greatly to the agreement. Nikēphoros of Ephesos, a pious and venerable man, did not suspect what was being plotted, being a man who lived in simplicity, and he immediately joined them. This also happened to a number of others. The patriarch realized that he had been outwitted, but he could do nothing, since the need was so pressing.

These bishops began signing what had been decided, but the metropolitan of Thessalonikē would hear nothing of this, and was not willing to accept it even with the tips of his ears, because he held that the one who had inherited the empire should be first in all things. He was reminded of the word *marpou* and the basileus sent to him to rebuke him, because it was he who predicted, while the old basileus was still living and Palaiologos was still a private citizen, that the empire would fall to him. He then agreed and showed himself prepared to accept and consent, on condition that the heir be given precedence in all things. They brought the youth before him, and they explained that he consented to Palaiologos being crowned alone, and approved of it – and he stammered his consent to this to the bishop – if only he were left alive without having to suffer anything from anyone; for there were many who were threatening to rebel at once if he resisted, and the axe-bearing Celtic regiment was standing by, ready to protect him or to move against him, according to what was decided by those who had the most power. The bishop, who thought little of the remarks of the child, was the only one to put up any resistance on his behalf. But he could not resist to the end, for there were many who reproached and harried him, in indignation that he alone should oppose such a multitude. Then he too signed, after being convinced. However, to give a plausible excuse, he added

the expression "so to conform"; since the word *homoios* is used in a pejorative sense by the poet. In this way he exposed the forced nature and disloyalty of his signature, indicating that he did not accept the action with good grace and with pleasure, but out of necessity and in violation of his conscience. This is what is indicated by the word *homoios*, for the poet speaks of the "equalling war" and the "equalling old age".

So now the coronation ceremony was completed and when the newly-crowned rulers had to return to the palace, those who had received the diadems marched in front, while the child followed wearing not a crown, but only a headdress in the form of a *kekruphalos* adorned with precious stones and pearls. The child paid it no attention because he had no understanding, and everyone else was only looking out for themselves and gave no attention to his situation. But Dikē pursued the people afterwards, as we shall see.

2.9 How Michaēl, once crowned, won over the masses with his words and deeds

While the child paid no heed, being engaged in childish play, the man who was now reigning made speeches frequently on that day and afterwards, to endear himself to the people, throwing silver coins[16] to them with both hands; they gathered them and praised their benefactor, losing interest in the child and his affairs, without knowing what degree of evil they had reached, for this was the beginning of the plot of one basileus against the other. And what of the future? The ink on the documents was still wet, yet these men were unwilling to draw their swords in accordance with their oaths. As for the Church, although the lesser clergy took no interest, those who had been raised to episcopal rank, though incapable of resistance, kept binding the people with frightful oaths, telling them that one of two terrible things must happen to them: either they must fall into civil war and be slaughtered, or they would commit a grave sin against God by breaking their oaths. But as it seems, what the crowd shouts becomes the truth, and as a result, what happens is often the opposite of what wisdom would dictate.

Now, having finished his speeches, he set about riding with those who had positions of authority, and jousting and playing ball games with them, and these activities delighted the spectators. By his speeches he had brought the masses to a complete calm and he now suggested to them good hopes for the future, that they would live in prosperity, and he revived certain fashions of the citizens of the past, fashions that symbolized freedom. They consisted of twisting and combing the beard, and letting it fall untrimmed; certain people plaited their beards in two parts, and I saw them rejoicing because the basileus

[16] Lit. "pieces of silver".

was ordaining this, promising prosperity in the empire's affairs. But there were some who, predicting the future from I know not what source, also enjoined those who were so joyful in their hopes to plait their beards, so that they could tear them out in their grief, if they were starving at a later date. The people did not give any attention to such talk, which they regarded as thoughtless, and they remained optimistic, even if some expressed their fears. Time showed whether these predictions were true, and as for us, we will speak of it in its place, without adding anything to the structure of the truth.

So now, after spending several days at Nikaia, because he was obliged to return to Nymphaion, Palaiologos made his farewells to the Patriarch and, taking the child, over whom he had assumed responsibility, he left accompanied by the nobles and the army.

2.10 How, returning to Nymphaion with the child, he received ambassadors from all around

On his arrival at Nymphaion he received the ambassadors and the gifts of the Persians, and promised the sultān, who was tempest-tost by the ebb and flow of events, that if he came to the land of the Romans he would receive him with open arms and send him back with protection when the time was right and the situation was again peaceful. For Melēk had approached, and the sultān was fearful lest he would return with a strong and powerful force that he could not stand before. And as a guarantee to assuage his fear, the basileus offered their old friendship.

The Italians of the great city also sent an embassy to him, and he granted them a truce in the war that he was waging against them, in order to conclude a more solid accord with them a little later if they satisfied certain demands. However, as the envoys were Romans and the sons of Romans, he treated them as well as he could and, having nothing in the city, he offered them what they desired, if he were to obtain it; and he confirmed these grants in chrysobulls. At this time he behaved towards them as if they were his own subjects; and while offers and counter-offers were made and received,[17] he delayed making a formal treaty because, by what he learned from the ambassadors while negotiating with them, he anticipated that matters would improve in his favour.

[17] Lit: "trials were made of each other"

2.11 How Iōannēs, brother of the basileus, obtained his dignities

He also paid close attention to the affairs of the West, and this is the reason why he sent a large force of troops, led by his own brother Iōannēs, who was still megas domestikos. When he came upon the westerners, this man seemed to breathe terror over them, being excited both by the ardour of youth and by the army which surrounded him. Though without wings he rapidly seized, on the one hand, the castle near Kanina and, on the other hand, the fortresses of Bellagrada, Pologos and Kolōneia. He subdued Kastoria, Pelagonia and Deurai, Tzernikas, Diabolis and Prilapos, Bodeeina and Bostros, the island on the lake, Petra, Prespa, Steridola and Achrida and the strongholds of the Illyrians, and went so far as Dyrrachion, brandishing his spear. He also attacked Patra and Trikkē. After conquering the lands around this area through agreements, and mostly without fighting, he placed the despotēs in great fear and in dire straits. Then the ruler, judging this man worthy of a fortune approaching his own, appointed him sebastokratōr, sending him the insignia of that position.

2.12 How the despotēs Michaēl, reduced to such straits, sent his wife and son to the basileus

As for Michaēl, after he had captured the kaisar thanks to the allied troops received from his son-in-law Manfred, as I have previously said, he changed his mind following the capture of the City and despatched to the basileus his wife, Theodōra, and his son, Iōannēs, the former to negotiate a peace, the son to serve like a hostage, but for the full length of his life, and to be married to a wife worthy of his rank, as provided by the basileus.

Of course then that man, after fighting bravely and rapidly subduing these regions, organised them even more effectively, placing garrisons and setting guards; and he returned home with splendid and magnificent trophies, and encumbered by not a little booty. The basileus honoured him according to his merit, and rewarded many others with the highest offices along with him.

2.13 How the ruler awarded honours to the great

He raised Iōannēs, whose exploits had caused him to be spoken of as “great”, to the rank of despotēs; the second of his brothers, Kōnstantinos, was raised from kaisar to sebastokratōr, because he had appointed Iōannēs sebastokratōr and Kōnstantinos kaisar at

the same time. As for the new despotēs' father-in-law, Kōnstantinos Tornikios, he was raised from megas primmikērios to the rank of sebastokratōr also, but not in a manner equivalent to his brother; for Iōannēs was honoured, as was customary, with the imperial eagles, while Tornikios was gazetted sebastokratōr without these symbols, but with the blue vestments only. He bestowed the second daughter of this man, the despotēs already being married to the elder, upon Iōannēs the son of the western despotēs, the same Iōannēs who has already been mentioned in this account as being sent as a hostage to the basileus. And he promoted the old man Alexios Stratēgopoulos to kaisar and made the old man Laskaris megas doux – he was the brother of that Tzamantouros who had donned the monastic habit. As for both Iōannēs Rhaoul, son of Rhaoul the prōtobestiarios, and Alexios the son of blind Philēs, he made the former prōtobestiarios, after marrying him to Theodōra, the wife of the prōtobestiarios Mouzalōn, recently widowed in the manner narrated earlier – she was the niece of the basileus, being the daughter of his sister Eulogia who had borne her to Kantakouzēnos – and he made the latter megas domestikos, after bedding him down with Maria, sister of the aforementioned Theodōra. As for Theodōra, the daughter of his other sister, Martha, whom Basileios Kaballarios had to wife, he separated her from him at the request of his sister because of what had happened to her on account of him, and he gave her to Balanidiōtēs, whom he honoured with the rank of megas stratopedarchēs. Her brothers, sons of his sister Martha, who were still young, were cherished and raised by him in the palace. Their names were Michaēl, Andronikos and Iōannēs. Likewise, but much later, he married Andronikos Palaiologos, who was originally from the West, and who he called cousin in his letters, and who served in the company of the despotēs along with many other Western archons, to the daughter of Rhaoul – she was also the widow of Andronikos Mouzalōn who, as we have indicated much earlier, had been megas domestikos – and appointed him prōtostratōr. To this rank he also promoted Alexios Philanthrōpēnos. He named his wife's uncle Angelos megas primmikērios, as well as Michaēl Nostongos prōtosebastos and Michaēl Palaiologos mystikos – as we have said they were cousins by birth of the basileus. He also promoted many other archons to offices; in this way he raised the logothetēs tōn agelōn, Hagiotheodōritēs, to the superior rank of logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn and, after promoting him to prōtasēkrētis, he gave to Michaēl Kakos as wife a young noblewoman of the Philanthrōpēnos family. In brief, he honoured many of the ruling class.

2.14 How the basileus made efforts to take the City, and how he captured Selybria

At this time the basileus began to make very great efforts to capture the City, devising many ways to fight the Italians, and to increase the pressure on it he moved quickly to occupy all the lands that encircled it. And as Selybria was still in the hands of the Italians, he sent an expedition and took it by force, and without a struggle he added that place to the dominions of the Romans. Then our forces advanced still further, and occupied all the territory outside the City except Aphameia, a strong fortress held by the Italians. There were some people dwelling there who came from Chryseia and its neighbourhood. Having no firm loyalties, they were able to lean towards either the Romans or the Italians as and whenever it pleased them, for the Romans were attached to them for they were also Romans, while the Italians believed that they would receive protection from them because of the good relations between them - for they had nobody else to turn to. If they expelled the inhabitants from the area danger would arise on account of the empty space thus created. Hence they lived between the Romans and the Italians and for this reason they were called *thelēmatarioi*. They farmed the land outside the city and obtained their livelihood from it, and they were unmolested by either side; because both the one and the other had need of their friendship neither would trouble them since it was clear that they would then hate them for not being friendly towards them. The Italians, on their side, would be injured by these people leaving their lands, because of the resulting vacuum, and the Romans, if they attacked it,[18] would not be assisted, but would be repelled with great force by these people who, out of hatred for them, would give their entire support to the Italians. After the capture of Selybria there was now nothing separating these people from us; but if any chance meeting occurred between the two, they behaved as friends towards one another, and neither plundered the other in a warlike fashion.

The basileus now formed the plan of crossing the Hellespont, going to the recently occupied Selybria and, once encamped there, of determining the best way to capture the City. But events in the Church prevented him from making the crossing.

2.15 How the Patriarch Arsenios resigned the Patriarchate

For the Patriarch Arsenios had either thought about what had been done by the basileus, the way in which he himself had been tricked and how the scion of empire had been deprived of his honours and scorned, while all affairs were managed by Palaiologos; or

[18] I.e. Kōnstantinoupolis.

else another thing troubled him: that he had been caught napping, committing very serious actions which could not be forgotten; or perhaps some other thing pained him. He constructed excuses, saying that he was being disrespected and had obtained nothing from the basileus, when he had spoken to him about all the needs of the Church, but it was not clear whether this alleged reason for withdrawing was the true one. Be that as it may, he had no sooner spoken to the clergy than he departed hastily and came to the gates of Nikaia on foot. Then, after shaking off the crowd which followed him, he departed immediately with a small entourage. He then stayed in a monastery beside the wall, the monastery of Agalmatēs. Later, entrusting his progress to the night, he came to the monastery of Paschasios, a monastery well situated for peace and quiet, having the sea on one side and overlooking the Drakōn River on the other. Here Arsenios remained in silence. While he stayed peacefully in that place he did not carry out any of his patriarchal duties, having completely abandoned them, and he communed only with himself and with God. The clergy and bishops who lived in Nikaia, convinced of the seriousness of this matter, began sending letters of supplication to him lest the basileus, upon learning of it, would react badly. In addition, they wrote, if anyone were causing him displeasure, it was right for him to expose the person who was causing trouble through his insolence, and then to report the matter. If the basileus alone was the cause of the trouble, he should advise him, examine him and exhort him, with as much assistance as possible from the bishops; but, they concluded, to withdraw without giving a clear explanation of the cause could not be judged as anything but an act of folly. This move achieved nothing for either party, for those who sent the messages as well as for the man who remained silent, as the former seemed incapable of bringing him out, whatever they said, and the latter did not seem prepared to divulge the causes of his withdrawal, which is often the means of finding a remedy.

Time passed, and the affair became known to the basileus, who immediately considered it a serious matter. He consulted with the bishops in his entourage regarding the patriarch's action, and what he should do. They were encouraged to take his withdrawal very seriously because of the unusual nature of the action, and the state of peace which existed, and because they did not seem prepared to remove the head of the Church and, more than anything else, because of the appeal of the basileus Michaēl, who was extremely fearful that the withdrawal would be blamed on him. His conscience was a stern judge, and he was not unaware of the cause of the patriarch's troubles, even though the latter was not openly revealing anything more than a moderate amount of displeasure or scorn. At this point the synodal bishops assembled, specifically to investigate and examine the issue. Eventually, because the patriarch was at the time residing in the

monastery of Hagios Diomēdēs, they sent a party under Iōannēs of Nikomēdeia to inform him of the synod's position, that it was recalling him and considered his withdrawal to be a serious matter and that it was ready to hear his reasons from his own mouth. They were also, however, to rebuke him for not conducting his duties as he should, and for acting, perhaps because he was overstressed, in an unreasonable manner. Furthermore, because he was patriarch and attached great importance to the canons of the Fathers, he should explain this anger to the assembled bishops and ask them to put matters right, because how could he examine them, exhort them or judge them, when he himself was at fault? Finally, they added that they still desired to learn his reasons and that they were prepared, if they were able, to remedy the matter.

Such was their message to the patriarch. They also instructed the messengers that if the patriarch were in a gentler mood he would promise to return; if not, they should force him to do one of two things: either to return to take up his governance of the Church or, if he refused to do this, to give his written resignation, because it was not good for the Church to be without its shepherd. After receiving these letters, the metropolitan of Nikomēdeia and his entourage left for Nikaia, eager to fulfil the orders that they had been given. They came to the monastery where Arsenios resided, introduced themselves to the patriarch as best they could, and delivered the message of the synod. He replied by saying that the time for giving his reasons was over, and that he must retire from office without explanation, given that it was impossible to cure the incurable, and that he was determined to do so. Having tried many approaches to learn his thoughts, the messengers found themselves incapable of arriving at any conclusion or result, and in this situation they revealed what they were to do in accordance with their special instructions. He then offered his resignation immediately. But since it was necessary to draw up a formal letter of resignation, the metropolitan of Hērakleia dictated one and the expression "unworthy of the priesthood" was deemed necessary to make the resignation sound reasonable. This infuriated him, and he shouted at them "Why are you not satisfied by our resigning in word and deed, but want to involve us in dishonourable reasons? We are retiring willingly, with no interest in what may happen."

After being rebuffed, through being dismissed so firmly, they quickly travelled the intervening distance and presented themselves before the basileus and the synod. There they repeated the remarks of the patriarch and finally introduced the issue of his resignation, giving assurances that his resolve was fixed. There remained only the more certain test of whether, if messengers were sent, he would immediately allow them to take the staff and the candelabrum. This is what happened, and he agreed that they might take the objects if they wished.

At this point the basileus did not believe that he could wait any longer; he thought that the abundant respect that he had shown the patriarch was a sufficient excuse for what was about to happen, especially as Nikēphoros of Ephesos assured him that the ordination of Arsenios had not been conducted in a canonical manner, as Theodōros, the basileus at the time, had needed to be crowned to allow him to campaign against the Western troubles, and thus Arsenios received all the degrees of priesthood in succession without any day between them, and was raised in this way to the highest rank in the hierarchy. That is why the basileus left the bishops free to do what they wished. They therefore examined the issue for many days, concluding that the patriarch deserved no further tolerance, and had suffered nothing more than impatience and disregard, because when he could have spoken out and sought to correct matters, he had instead been pusillanimous and had therefore ceded his throne to someone else. So the bishops concluded, but in fact, as it became clear later, the matter, far from allowing a harsh cure, was absolutely without remedy. That is why Arsenios wanted to impose a purely voluntary punishment for his error, to excuse himself before God, because the situation had not developed in accordance with his hopes.

2.16 How Nikēphoros of Ephesos became Patriarch

When the metropolitans, especially the most eminent among them, upon whom the mass of the bishops depended, had searched widely for the one who would be most worthy to take charge of the Church, they finally agreed upon the metropolitan of Ephesos. He was a pious man celebrated for his virtue, adequately adorned with eloquence, already of an advanced age, with a passion capable of being ignited for the sake of the Church and its customs, if they were scorned. Something had happened which had tormented him during the entire duration of his episcopate, for he had already been chosen for the patriarchal throne, by a synod under Iōannēs Doukas, before Patriarch Manouēl's elevation, but the basileus annulled the vote, fearing the fire of the man, declaring that "If one cannot stand him even when he is archidiakonos, how could one cope with him as patriarch?" So, when he had been appointed to the see of Ephesos, he still continued to feel as if he had been robbed by the basileus of the dignity that belonged to him. This interruption in his career made him willing to agree to the new invitation and he accepted his election with joy, for he felt that he had been ordained to occupy this position by Divine grace, even if – and this in itself was a sufficient commendation for him – others had been forcibly installed in his place. In this way Nikēphoros, believing that his election came from one of God's just judgements, was proclaimed patriarch without delay. Then the basileus sent

him with great pomp to Nikaia, and he himself hurried to Lampsakos, intending to cross over to Kallioupolis on the opposite shore, for he was assembling many troops to fight the Italians, to besiege and carry the citadel facing Byzantium, called Galata.

2.17 How the metropolitans of Sardeis and Thessalonikē were not in agreement with the others in this matter

Now at this time Andronikos of Sardeis and Manouēl of Thessalonikē – for though Kalophoros of Smyrnē resigned, he put forward other valid reasons which were sufficient cause for his resignation – opposed the matter publicly, and outwardly supported the former patriarch who had been wrongly pushed aside, but secretly they favoured the cause which had led the patriarch to retire, since hitherto he had failed to achieve what he desired. The new patriarch, however – Nikēphoros, the former metropolitan of Ephesos – encouraged by the synod but still more so by the best wishes of the basileus, arrived at Nikaia bearing a great amount of gold collected from Ephesos. At first he made a variety of approaches to the rebel bishops, to reconcile them with himself, and make peace with them, and after this he threatened them severely. But far from calming them, he increased their fervour, and they mocked his threats. After failing to persuade them, he considered substituting others for them at the heads of their sees; this in fact took place at a later date. He approached others, and there was a great outcry; the scandal mounted against him and, with the exception of those who had the highest positions in the Church, they rejected his communion. However, some willingly and others grudgingly, all but a few began to bow before him, but, because they were confused in their opinions, they merely strengthened those who had not been persuaded. As for the mass of the laity, they forcefully rejected the new shepherd and demanded the true one.

Now, while affairs were agitated in this way, Nikēphoros learned that the basileus was at the point of launching a great attack against the fortress of Galata, intending to capture the place; because he hoped to be able to take the capital he needed to first hold this fortress. After a short stop at Nikaia the patriarch hurried his departure. Symbolically shaking the dust from his sandals when he reached the gate, he left. Then, by the arm of the sea which washes Helenopolis, he hastened to rejoin the basileus, to enjoy his hospitality, and took up a place with a great view from which he watched the attack against the City, for if it was captured he would then immediately take possession of the Church, away from Nikaia and the people there. During the crossing of the space between them the basileus found himself in Selybria, where he came across Andronikos of

Sardeis. For of the two bishops who were in schism – this man Andronikos and Manouēl of Thessalonikē – the latter had exiled himself and now lived in exile.

2.18 How the metropolitan of Sardeis received the monastic tonsure in Selybria

The metropolitan of Sardeis, believing it wise to not appear to be opposing the basileus while revolting against the patriarch, thought to creep into his good graces by another method. And indeed, when the metropolitan of Philadelpheia, Iōanikkios, at the request of the basileus, was performing the sacred rites in the monastery of the Saviour, with the basileus in attendance and the metropolitan of Sardeis also, the latter approached the basileus and suggested that he himself would take up the monastic things from the hands of the metropolitan of Philadelpheia. The basileus was not unaware of the secret plan of the man, who planned to use, if he could arrange it, the presence of the basileus as an excuse for taking the habit of that life, as he did not want to appear to be doing so from choice. The basileus asked Andronikos why he wished to undergo this transformation, and why he chose to observe the silence and be away from worldly affairs. He would not hinder him, he said, if such was his desire. While Andronikos listed his reasons, and claimed to be burying the scandalous reputation whispered by many, the basileus interrupted him and, when the liturgy was completed, approached the liturgist and made the sign. After taking the communion and the holy bread, he brought forward Andronikos and instantly departed from the church, so that they could do what they wanted in his absence. And then the latter came forward and took the habit, being called Athanasios and not Andronikos.

2.19 How a number of ecclesiastics died in a short time

One might then have admired the action of justice, for one cannot imagine that the deaths of so many holders of ecclesiastical offices happened by chance. At least a dozen of these very old and highly distinguished men died in the space of nine months; and it is said that someone spoke of them who saw their passing in a dream. This was Iōannēs Bekkos who afterwards became patriarch after being chartophylax and who suffered many dreadful things, as will be related at the appropriate point. As for the dream which he had, he described it thus: he seemed to see the ecclesiastics travelling on horseback across a flat plain, and after covering a great distance they came to the bank of a very wide and fiercely flowing river which ran at their feet; and they began to cross in the order in

which they died, first one, then the second, then the rest following on; for they did not cross two or three at a time, but each came alone in his place. And while the dreamer was dumbfounded as he stood and watched, being preoccupied with discovering how he himself could cross, he heard a voice come from the other side. "Why are you worried? This is not the time when you will cross the river; for there will be a time when you also will cross it, but for now you are to depart safe and sound, because you are being preserved for a time of troubles." Such was the tale related many years later by the man who had the dream, and we heard it in astonishment. This was a man who was not only dedicated to the truth, but in confirmation of his tale he also added an oath, marvelling at the same time at inescapable providence.

2.20 The attack of the basileus against Galata

Now the basileus, who had mustered an army of numerous and diverse troops, attacked Galata; he pitched his tent at a fair distance upon a hill to watch the things which were being done; at the same time he endeavoured to be easily seen by the enemy, in order to frighten them. On all sides those who came to fight flowed like a flood, and after pitching their tents out of the range of missiles, they remained drawn up in front of the gates, ready to attack. At once he ordered an assault by groups; and in some places they set up machines and began testing the walls. The army was much too great for an attack on a fortress of this size; for in addition to the rest, who were numerous and strong fighters, archers from the neighbourhood of Nikaia had been assembled there, on the orders of the basileus, who, shooting accurately, did not allow any of those inside to lean out, but they attacked them and frequently planted their arrows full in their faces if they ever showed themselves. But every day new Italians crossed continuously in fishing boats, burst through the water gate and forced their way inside; strengthening the inside of the wall with thick beams to make a walkway, they vigorously defended the wall; as a result many of the men outside the walls fell, hit from unseen places because, being steady on their feet, these fresh troops took it in turn to appear for a while and draw with ease the arrow-shooting apparatus' with which they were familiar, and protected by the merlons, fired through the embrasures. Those outside were stronger in attacking the walls, striking them with stone-throwing machines, while their opponents defended themselves against the shots which they fired by gathering vine branches and covering the damaged parts of the wall with them. As for themselves, they went into the covered galleries and protected their heads with screens of vine branches, and from there, using gaps to observe what was happening, they defended themselves to the best of their ability.

The things which encouraged our forces were their great numbers, their strength and experience and also the fact that they fought under the eyes of the basileus; the things which encouraged the Italians were their spirit and high intelligence, but also that day after day they faced danger by coming out from their base. They were not able to do this without risk, because they were greatly inferior in numbers to those outside, but excited by an audacity born out of fear, they persisted in doing so every day. The goals for both sides were, on the one hand to capture the place by force, for in holding the fortress one held the City, and on the other hand to resist, seeing that the loss of the fortress would necessarily lead to that of the City. But the battle, being drawn out between the armies, led to a noticeable feeling of shame in the entourage of the basileus, that in this fight such an army was not able to overwhelm a fort which was not imposing and only defended by a few men, while in the Italians it led to an ambitious desire to ensure that although the others were so numerous, they would not succeed, that although they were so few in number that they did not dare to sally forth, to appear to be victorious over the basileus and the whole of the army which came with him with the same objective. So great were the numbers which were hit every day from the wall and fell under the blows of arrow-shooting machines, that they felt pity and remarked ironically that they did not want to shoot at those who advanced within range, but, so they said, to send them away so that they could return safe to their wives; at the same time a rumour spread that a strong and powerful new force had come, sent as a reinforcement; very deeply affected by his vain effort and by the loss of the men killed, even if he were to be exposed to mockery by this failure, the basileus decided to stop the fight, but without concluding a treaty, so as to have a pretext to return to the attack when he had better hopes.

2.21 The body of Basileios Boulgaroctonos

When some of the household of the basileus went out to relax from their duties, they came across the monastery of the Theologian at Hebdomon, which kept only the name but not the appearance of a monastery. They entered into the church that was there, which was deserted and used as a sheepfold. As they looked over these things, judging with admiration the former beauty of the ancient edifice from its remains, these people - who were Dēmētrios Iatropoulos, the logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn, and his companions - suddenly saw, standing in a corner, the complete body of a man long dead, who kept all his limbs and was naked from head to toe. He had in his mouth a shepherd's reed flute, which some keepers of flocks had placed there in mockery. Upon seeing this, they were surprised that the corpse still had all of its limbs and they were wondering whose this compacted dust

could be, which still retained the form of a body, when they perceived to the right an empty tomb, upon which lines of verse had been graven which named the person buried therein. This was, as the inscription revealed, Basileios Boulgaroctonos. On their return they reported to the basileus what they had seen. The basileus, immediately seized by pity, sent a shroud of golden silk, despatching also hymn-singers and a number of archontes to place the remains in a worthy coffin and bring it to Galata, with great honour and in a large procession, singing psalms and hymns. He ordered his brother, the sebastokratōr, to place the coffin in his own tent, and after placing it in his own bed under the golden shroud, he honoured it fittingly under a continually burning light, until, when they returned to Selybria, they took it with honour and magnificence and laid it in the monastery of the Saviour. Then, while returning to Nymphaion via Orestias and beyond, they put in order the affairs of the West, for the reputation of the basileus had preceded them and checked the revolt.

2.22 How the Patriarch Nikēphoros reached Nymphaion in company with the basileus

The patriarch, accompanying the basileus, returned with all speed to Nymphaion. Since the metropolitans of Thessalonikē and of Sardeis, remaining steadfast in their opinions, had been sent into exile, he replaced them in their dioceses with others. He appointed Iōannikios Kydōnēs, the abbot of the monastery of Sōsandra, as metropolitan of Thessalonikē, and Iakōbos Chalazas, who had come from the west to join the basileus, as metropolitan of Sardeis. He also had another man of considerable seniority, Isaak, from the western monastery of Mesopotamon, elected to the see of Smyrnē. But around the time of that man's ordination the patriarch had fallen ill and it was on his orders, or maybe on those of his servant – for he was said to be unconscious and about to draw his last breath – that Nikētas from Thessalonikē was ordained bishop of Dyrrachion. The appointed day of his death then arrived for the patriarch; the monk Theodosios, of the family of the princes of the Peloponēsos - a pious man who had practised the religious life for many years and who was of good company and pleasant and varied discourse, so that if any saw him, even if they were experiencing the greatest anger, he would free them from it and fill them with joy, and who was called the basileus' 'uncle' on account of his noble extraction - was selected by the basileus to be the executor of the affairs of the dying man, because the latter had control of great riches from the see of Ephesos. And then, it is said, this executor nudged the dying man, asking whether he wished to receive

the monastic habit; however, not only did Nikēphoros not so wish, but he took the suggestion poorly, desiring to die as a bishop. Soon after, when he had passed from among men, his body was taken to Ephesos and buried in the metropolitan church. He was a man to inspire awe while he lived, undaunted by holders of temporal power, one who disdained fear, having been accustomed to virtue since childhood. But he was a cause of offence to many, not so much because of his being promoted, but because this promotion took place while the true patriarch was still alive.

2.23 How the basileus sidelined the young Iōannēs

Meanwhile the basileus succeeded in all of his plans through having no opposition. Little by little the child was cast aside, and his power weakened, to the extent that even the trappings of Imperial dignity were nothing but a meaningless burden, and it was arranged that he should abandon even these. For this reason he relaxed and lived delicately, being kept in the tender care of Michaēl's sisters, who served Michaēl in all ways. Martha had been like a mother to him, and raised him in her home; she was married to the megas domestikos, the celebrated Tarchaneiōtēs, who stood in high regard with the basileus. Eulogia was also well disposed towards him and was even more concerned than Martha with the basileus. I do not know if it was Eulogia who gave the basileus his good hopes that he was destined to capture the great city. However, after the capture of the city, she told of this destiny, and she told it wonderfully well, but it was necessary to flatter her beforehand. Her story was, that when the basileus, still a babe at the teat, was asleep in his cradle, he would often become disturbed and cry, banishing sleep. Eulogia, when she needed to calm his agitation with some lullabies, would gather him up with care and sing a number of songs, and not a single one of them would soothe him. But when she softly soothed him with half-closed lips, telling him of the city, and of the saying "Hail to the basileus of the city!" and how he would enter through the Chrysea Pylē and do such and such things with glory there, the child, charmed by these words as if by the Sirens, would fall silent immediately and drift into a deep and sweet sleep.

Such were the sisters of the basileus; in the past they had given him the consideration which was due to him, and in the present they were full of regard and affection for him, and as a result of their entreaties he did a great deal of good for some people and he paid attention to their advice and followed it. It is said that it was on their advice, but especially that of Eulogia, because her sister was generally more conciliatory, that he decided to reduce Iōannēs to the status of a private citizen.

2.24 The affair of the caliph and of the Persians; how they submitted to the Tocharioi

At that time the Tocharioi, who in common parlance are called Atarioi, poured upon Persia like a flood. The caliph died because he was fed pieces of gold, not because they needed to kill him, but rather out of mockery; for although he could have poured out gold and defeated his enemies, he valued it more highly than his own life, and so in truth he became an eater of gold. Thus while he choked on the consequences of his own decision, the situation in Persia weakened and became worse, to the point where not even the Sultān Azatinēs was allowed to be free from fear. For the Persians trembled in fright before this people and neglected to act, each seeking to save himself as best he could. The empire of the Persians was tempest-tost, with the satraps rising in revolt, to the extent that two of the nobles crossed over into the territory of the basileus, out of an open contempt for the sultān, who lived in indolence and private licentiousness. These nobles were the Basilikoi, men of Rhodian origin who passed from the theatrical profession into the sultān's circle, and who then not only gained the first place with him, because they were men of sound judgement, but were swamped with gold, some in the form of drinking cups and some as coinage stamped with the caliph's name; and as for carpets, precious stones and loose pearls, they had so much that those who knew of it were amazed. Now they remembered their former loyalty to the basileus, thinking it likely that the ruler, who had been well treated by them in times past, would subsequently return the kindness, now that he had become basileus and was well able to do so. After receiving secret assurances in an imperial letter, they put their affairs in order and started at full speed towards the basileus like deserters. The latter received them warmly, and honoured them fittingly, appointing Basileios parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos and naming the other Basilikos megas hetaireiarchēs; he made use of these men because they seemed well conversant with affairs, and the imperial favour was bestowed upon them. These men, who from their own resources had great riches, also received not a little in pensions from the basileus, becoming Romans and serving the basileus with complete loyalty and goodwill. For nothing generates goodwill towards the empire like an appropriate favour offered promptly to those who will be worthy of it.

Then, when those around him were in a state of agitation, both by reason of the appearance of the people of the Tocharioi and because of the state of their own affairs, and since there was nothing that he could do in this general panic, the sultān also decided to take refuge with the basileus along with all his wives and children and also with his aged mother, a devout Christian, and her sister; this was the only place from which he

could obtain help to return when the time was ripe with a stronger hand and in force; there was no one else to whom he could entrust his safety, as the Melēk previously mentioned, who had deserted him some years previously, was in the custody of the basileus, and every day the sultān feared that he would be released and would attack him with a strong force and that in consequence the exercise of authority would become impossible for him. He also trusted in the old signs of friendship that he had shown the basileus and he was confident that he would gain what he desired as soon as he arrived. So, after gathering together such a mass of gold that it could not easily be valued, and appropriating for himself the riches of the Persians, he crossed to the territory of the basileus with his wives and children, heralded by the metropolitan of Pissidia. Receiving them all with pleasure, as could be expected, the basileus did not know what to do with him; however, he showed the sultān great kindness and assured him that in due course he would return and recover his power with his help, and then allowed him to live in the style to which the ruler of the Persians was accustomed. As a result the sultān sat beside the basileus on the imperial dais, surrounded by his fearsome bodyguards and using the insignia of power, wearing red shoes. He trusted that things would go well because of the recent service that he had rendered, hoping to obtain better things from the one who had received it. That this hope was ill-founded was apparent to those who thought about it more clearly. But then the basileus, taking advantage of the opportunity, sent the followers of the sultān, especially his wives and children, to Nikaia for safekeeping; ostensibly this was to ensure their security, so that they would come to no harm through being unguarded. For it did not seem a good idea that they should join the basileus on campaign, being unaccustomed to it, belonging in the women's apartments; furthermore, their remaining behind in the East while the basileus went away from it would not lead to any danger. In taking the sultān with him, and treating him with fitting honour, the basileus veiled the measure undertaken regarding his family, a measure which he had ostensibly commanded for the sake of their protection, as has been said, when in reality it was intended, while assuring their safety, to secure the sultān without having to do so through force.

For the basileus was already concluding a peace treaty with Hülegü, the chief of the Tocharioi, to give Hülegü an opportunity to occupy the lands of the Persians easily, and the sultān was not even mentioned in this treaty. Because of this, as one day followed another, the country of the Persians began to be subject to the Tocharioi, even some whom one might call nomads and enemies of any settled society, because they preferred independence to submission; these occupied some of our fortresses, but since they suspected that it would be dangerous to attack openly, they bound themselves as a group

and in general to the basileus, but individually they engaged in nocturnal ambuscades and lived by conducting raids on our people. But since our people did the same to them there was no great loss. Since the basileus was totally convinced that the race of the Tocharioi, which had only recently arisen, would probably turn out to be irresistible he made vigorous attempts to win over the Persians in the fortresses, in the hope that they would act as a buffer if the Tocharioi attacked; he was even more concerned to conclude an agreement with the latter through marriage, for the very thought of making war on them seemed so frightening that even their name caused him to be filled with fear and dread.

2.25 The attitude of earlier basileis to the news of the Tocharioi

In the past Iōannēs Doukas only heard a report of them, and yet he strengthened the defences of the fortresses with grain and arms; he ordered that the stores be filled with a year's supply of grain, and by means of bulls sealed with lead he seized the grain he found with the inhabitants, and ordered them to eat supplies brought in from elsewhere; and he also provided all necessary things the holders of property, so that everything else which brought abundance would follow after. He decreed that when a dowry was arranged, weapons should be listed beside the holy icon. It was not possible to know who this people was which had emerged from its lair, or its customs, or whether it wanted peace or war. This people was until that time as yet unknown; many said that they had the heads of dogs, and it was rumoured that they practised forbidden acts, even to the point that they were believed to be cannibals.

But when Theodōros was ruling, and it was said that they were sending ambassadors to him through Persia – and this report was true – there was fear and confusion. Nevertheless the basileus sought to outwit them and put an image of fear in their minds. First he sent men to Persia in advance, supposedly to indicate to them that he was prepared to march against them, and these couriers were sent out. There was to be compensation for these emissaries, in case they ran into danger while proclaiming to all peoples the invincibility of the Roman empire, in the form of generous *sitēresia* for their wives and children. Following this he despatched guides to meet the ambassadors who were approaching, supposedly to show them the way, and he expressly instructed them to take them by a difficult route and, if anyone wearily inquired about the difficulty of the journey, to respond that all of the lands of the Roman empire were in a similar condition, knowing that they would be ready to believe this out of ignorance. When the ambassadors had arrived before the basileus, after these heavy exertions, he came up with other crafty stratagems, which would at once inspire terror at the spectacle. For he ordered the whole

army to gather in one place, with the men, drawn up in their phratries, tribes and battalions and he posted them, cataphracts in iron, on the roads at a number of points in order to make them fear like children. He also ordered the senate, all the high officials and those related to the basileus by blood, who presented a magnificent appearance because of their robes and their noble bearing, so they seemed ready to immediately overcome anything that got in their way, to pass by many times, approaching from unseen points and coming to the same place, so that although they were really the same people, they seemed to be different ones, always others and never the same, like a ring which does not have a bezel, and which one might look at on one occasion and again on another; it is the same object which is seen each time, but it seems to be another by being transferred. As for the basileus, dressing himself in his imperial garb and neglecting nothing which could inspire fear, he sat on his elevated seat, holding in his hands his sword and surrounded by precious tapestries, while other people, equally formidable, who were just as able by themselves to strike terror into the beholder, stood around him. And it was in this manner that he received the ambassadors, keeping them at a distance sufficient for them to infer the presence of the basileus, and see what passed; then suddenly the curtains were opened by mysterious means, and they were thus able to see him sitting in state upon his throne, and to speak and hear a few words through the agency of interpreters; and these words also seemed to be terrifying, in that their mere utterance inspired fear. Then, after completing the formal audience in a short while, he sent them away under the conduct of guides by difficult roads again.

Now that is what had previously happened, and in that way those who were fearful were able to inspire fear in return, through application of intellect. But at this time, with regularity and goodwill, ambassadors were sent to them and their ambassadors received in turn, with the result that a peace treaty cemented by a marriage was put in place. In this way the situation in the Eastern regions was brought under control, and promised high hopes, while the situation in the Western regions began to boil over again.

2.26 Of the affairs of the West, and how the kaisar attacked the City while passing

The despotēs Michaēl did not readily accept being deprived of strongholds and being driven from the lands which his uncle and his father Theodōros – the one who had been proclaimed basileus in the West and had been crowned by Iacōbos of Achrida - had captured at the point of the sword through great exertions, taking them from the Italians

and adding them to his own. Unable to accept this loss, Michaēl renounced the treaty which he had made with the basileus and, winning over the Western regions, easily persuaded them to rally to his cause once again, on account of the fickle character of the Westerners. For this reason the basileus ordered the despotēs Iōannēs to assemble a force quickly and go to make war on him. And, since the forces of the king of Sicily had annexed a large part of Illyria and New Epiros, he also sent troops thither to fight against them. And he placed under the kaisar Alexios the Scythians and a small number of other troops and sent them in the first place to Thrace, with the mission of improving the situation at Orestias, though he held this task to be secondary to the others. For the Bulgars were unwilling to live in peace, and were particularly hostile and full of hatred for the basileus because Eirēnē, the elder daughter of the basileus Theodōros Laskaris, was energetically inciting her husband Kōnstantinos, who was known as the basileus of the Bulgars, to ravage his lands, as a reprisal for the treatment being suffered by her brother Iōannēs. The kaisar also had additional orders from the basileus, that once he had crossed into Thrace, he should approach the City and, in marching by it, threateningly brandish the sword against the Italians there, but not to do anything more than this, because he lacked sufficient numbers of troops.

So, after completing the crossing and upon reaching Kallioupolis, the kaisar decided, before advancing further inland, to go to Selybria and approach the City from the western quarter - there being nothing to stop him, as all the people there were subjects of the basileus - to observe in what state the City was in and learn of the situation of those inside it and also to meet with the *thelēmatarioi*, who have previously been mentioned, and speak with their leaders about the city. So he went and pitched his tents in the outskirts of the city, meeting in secret with the leading men among the local people, confiding to them the things in his mind and giving them the greatest expectations, if they would but help. These people declared that the moment was favourable for an attack, as the whole Italian fleet stationed in the city had left for Daphnousia, in order to capture that island, and had been heavily engaged there for many days, while all that was left in the city was a crowd of people inexperienced in war. They pledged themselves and promised to aid him, because the rest of them were in agreement on this matter. Forthwith the kaisar, thinking on the words of these people and seeing their eagerness to be ready to aid him, was resolved to attack, but when, on the other hand, he thought about the difficulty of the venture and the danger which the affair presented if he wished to attempt to seize the city in this way - with so few people and as a secondary task – in an instant, when so many other forces had been unable to capture it, he hesitated and dithered. Yet he collected his thoughts and put forward for general consideration what course to follow.

As his nephew, Alexios, and one of the *thelēmatarioi,* named Koutritzakēs, forcefully insisted, confidently asserting that he should shoulder the task, for destiny is as inevitable for a city as it is in life, the kaisar regained his courage, and he showed himself ready to seize the City. Then, while others learned of and agreed to lend their support to a surprise attack, he himself, while at other times he would inspect the terrain, on this occasion he moved away to guard against suspicion, paying heed to the suggestions which were made to him, because he knew the area well; and he considered how the project might be achieved most successfully and quickly, lest anyone should shout a warning and uncover the secret.

2.27 How the City was captured

Now that every aspect of the plan was arranged, the time was settled also. They decided that the attempt would be most effectively undertaken at night, when it would be unexpected and unforeseen. The assignment of the *thelēmatarioi* was to scale the wall silently by means of ladders, to throw from the summit those who had been assigned guard duty, and to open the Pēgē Pylē by forcing wedges into it, after first tearing down the wall of unmortared stones built across it, while the kaisar was tasked with bringing up soldiers under the cover of night and being ready to attack and enter through the opened gate.

As soon as the designated night arrived, they were ready to begin, and, after deciding on a suitable place, the *thelēmatarioi* brought up their ladders there, carefully watching over everything in order to avoid being detected by the guards and alerting their prey and, in particular – this was the greatest danger – of being caught putting the plan into action. The kaisar hurried on that night towards the city, taking with him his force of Scythians and all his other troops. As they arrived before the others had begun to act, and since night was passing while they did nothing, he began to be concerned about the delay, suspecting double-dealing. But Koutritzakēs dispelled his fears and gave him good reason to hope that they were active within the city. Nevertheless the kaisar did not entirely lose his suspicion and he asked where the men were, and suspected that they were delaying the demolition of the wall of unmortared stones at the Pēgē Pylē. For this reason he began to expect great dangers to be revealed, and he was visibly furious that he was being made to look foolish, because the man who was expected to look after him was suspected of plotting, and so he decided to have him thrown in chains for being cognisant of the plans of those inside. So he had him chained up, while for his part the man consented to this and declared himself ready to suffer anything the kaisar wished to inflict upon him if the

others were indeed engaged in such a plot. These words were also approved by Alexios, who was comforting his uncle and soothing his fears. The kaisar then settled down near the Pēgē monastery, keeping his army quiet, and waiting in suspense for the signal. This was to be an acclamation of the basileis that would ring out loudly from the walls.

After climbing their ladders quietly, one after another, the attackers hurled themselves on the sleeping guards, who were Italians, and they appeared to them like a nightmare. They took hold of some by their feet before they realised what was happening, and they threw them down after first killing them; and as for those who became aware of the disturbance and turned to flee, they were overtaken and cut down also, so no one was left to report what was happening and, because their zeal was overcoming their fear of opposition, it was clear that they would attack anyone who resisted them. They then went to the Pēgē Pylē, and finding it barricaded with stones, they quickly pulled down the stones from the opening, and so provided a wide passage for the army, then they knocked out the pivots of the gate with bronze wedges and pulled them down. Immediately Lakeras, a priest who happened to be there and who was one of the *thelēmatarioi* and who was bravely taking part in the action, mounted the wall, accompanied by a certain Glabatos and some others. He was running out of courage, and his voice was almost lost out of fear, since his nervousness led him to think that the wall itself was trembling, and that anyone who acclaimed the rulers loudly would come crashing down; nevertheless, encouraged by the others he gave, with a shaky voice, the signal of the imperial acclamation; the ones below echoed those above them, and the sound spread and grew louder. Then, when those around the kaisar, who were waiting for the sound, heard it, they leaped from their ambush. They made for the gate at full speed, and on reaching it flowed through it en masse. The first rays of daylight were appearing when they suddenly rushed into the place, creating havoc and pillaging all that they found. The force of Scythians, who were well disciplined and did not scatter, penned in the crowd which was coming from the city, for many gathered there, wishing to learn what was happening, because when the fact was reported to them, it had seemed a mere fiction.

Meanwhile the kaisar, who had devoted much of his life to campaigning and who was aware of the difficulties of capturing cities, advanced slowly and with caution, until the time came when dawn had completely arrived and he was able to make a full assessment of the forces that were inside. Another fear then occupied his cowardly mind: the thought that there appeared to be quite large numbers of Italians under arms, apparently strong enough to mount a defence. Because of these dangers he nearly turned back and deferred any further action, for he thought that those who had entered were insufficient for battle, and at most suitable for a raid or ambush. But the *thelēmatarioi*

joined them; they were steadfast on other occasions, but the risks that they then saw from all directions made them even braver than was their wont, for they would not survive if the Italians prevailed. This is why they grouped together, drew their ranks, resisted and survived, and with only small losses they were victorious and put their opponents to flight, and as they turned their backs to flee, they covered them with a cloak of darkness[19] just as they were reaching safety. Then the company of Scyths indulged in unrestrained pillage, and throwing themselves upon the warehouses of useful merchandise, loaded themselves with necessary things. Nevertheless, they rallied around the kaisar many times that day and, surrounding him, gave protection and were in turn protected, so that if anyone appeared, they fell upon them eagerly.

The emperor of the Italians, Baudouin, was panic-struck at the news, and took leave of his senses, able to think of nothing but flight. And indeed, as if the earth seemed unable to defend him, and thinking the sea would better serve, he abandoned the palaces of Blachernai and withdrew swiftly to the Great Palace. Then, just as he was, shedding his headdress and sword, symbols of his imperium, he descended to the shore and entrusted his safety to a ship. On that same day the soldiers of the Roman division, who came to find and capture the emperor, gained possession of these symbols of his flight, these tokens of his regime; and from this point onwards their confidence was increased, since the one to whose care they had been assigned had run away. They gathered up the headdress and the sword, which they considered to be sufficient first fruit of the loot and booty taken in the City. And at the same time this possession signified to those who were still confident in him, that they would get nothing from him since he had preferred to flee.

While their achievement was becoming revealed to them, though they themselves, struck by amazement, still did not really believe that they possessed what they held in their hands, the rumour – and rumour is also divine – swiftly reached those who were besieging Daphnousia; those men no sooner heard it than they felt themselves lost, trembling in horror for their wives and children. Nevertheless they hastened to come to bring them succour, for it is said that they had used against Daphnousia about thirty long ships, both monoremes and triremes. Sailing at speed with all of these, they rushed towards the City, putting their trust also in the very great ship from Sicily that had many fighting men aboard, to defend their people and come to close quarters with their attackers; it was by such hopes that these men were animated as they rushed onwards. The kaisar, being made aware of their approach, called upon the people of Roman race, and they, being Romans, worked willy-nilly together with our forces. Baudouin had in his

[19] I.e. killed them.

retinue a certain henchman called Iōannēs Phylax, a cunning man to whom profound thoughts came easily. He gave advice, which was most opportune and suited to the situation, advice which any other would have hesitated to give, considering the destructive nature of the action. For he knew that the Italians would of necessity exert all their strength, and then some, for the sake of their wives and families, their homes and goods, attacking like wild boars to defend them, to either survive victorious or fall gloriously; he cut to the heart of the matter with sagacity, and advised them to light a fire, so that when the houses and all the extra and unnecessary things were burning hotly, the women and children would necessarily seek safety in flight, salvaging only treasures of a pure and valuable nature; while the men, on seeing from the ships on the one hand the fire reducing their houses to ash and, on the other hand their wives and children raising their arms in supplication, would pay no attention to their houses, which no longer existed, but would seek out and save the people; thus the ones seeking vengeance would give thanks and be content, if they could merely save their women and children, for they would have their triremes at their disposal to rescue the crowd, and if others wanted to leave, then they could also do so, as the Sicilian ship was capable of taking them on board.

The advice given in this way seemed sound, and all the more so because they could not resist an attack by those people because of the small number of their soldiers; so they lit a fire immediately, just where the houses and goods were; and as it spread, it reduced the houses to ashes. The inhabitants, panicking like smoked-out bees, fled outside, and took to the hills of the City in a state of undress, and at the same time, fearing for their safety, they tearfully called out to those who were watching from outside what was happening. Then the Italians were at a loss for what action to take – for if they pressed on, they would be in a difficult position because they were exposed, and their families would at the same time be in danger; and if they were not victorious, then they would be lost along with their women and children. So they had recourse to supplication, begging with great passion for their people, and for their property, if they would agree to it; if not, it would be enough for them to recover their relatives safe and sound.

Many dreadful and terrible things were done here, greater than any that have ever been seen or heard of; for respectable women and young girls, clad only in their shifts, and with even these being torn, or else wrapped up in anything they could find, ran ashamedly on bare feet towards their relatives under the gaze of many eyes. The Italians were therefore clearly repaid for what they had formerly done to the Romans; and at the same time the old prophecy was fulfilled: ‘Alexios, Alexopoulos and Koutritzakēs also.’ Previously, before these events occurred, the present writer had heard this from his father,

who was in conversation with another man and speaking these words. As they were of the City they enquired about their own home, and sought to know if their fatherland would ever be reconquered; this was at night and by candlelight, for it was I who held the candle for the illumination; and these words came to be spoken by them, as men who knew just when it would be taken. For they surmised that the capture of the City would take place under a future basileus, Alexios, together with the others named in the prophecy. However, it actually meant the kaisar Alexios, his nephew Alexios, who contributed much, and Koutritzakēs, who was the most important of the *thelēmatarioi*, and who first put forward the idea of capturing the City.

But these matters regarding the city were managed in the following way: since it was necessary to proclaim the event, and even more to say that it was an extraordinary occurrence, that such a city, so strong, was taken in passing, by men who had no orders to come and do this, couriers were sent throughout the land to call for rejoicing and to announce the capture of the great city, on a distinguished day, the feast of Anna the grandmother of God, in the month of July, almost without effort and without the captors ever having expected it. And as a symbol of the truth of their tale a red-dyed sarissa was displayed.

2.28 Of the prōtasēkrētis Senachēreim, what he did because of the capture of the City

When they arrived at Nikomēdeia, on the day of the festival of the great martyr Panteleēmōn, Kakos Senachēreim, who was honoured with the office of prōtasēkrētis, also happened to be there and he heard what was pronounced. At first he distrusted the news and rejected it as a fabrication but on going outside he heard the news and believed it. Straight away he returned inside and repeatedly tore out handfuls of his own beard. “O! What news I hear!” he said. “This was reserved for our time! What sins have we committed to live to see such a great disaster? Let nobody hope for anything good for the future, since Romans are again walking in the city.” Such were the words of this man, who obviously took badly what had gained the admiration of the majority. What then came to pass, the tale will relate in the proper place.

2.29 How the basileus was notified of the capture of the City

Then many hastened to find the basileus, who was staying near Nymphaion, and they competed with each other to be the first to announce the good news. The one who was the first to arrive in all haste did not, however, carry a letter from the kaisar. As no one could have the news before the basileus himself, and this man was unable to gain an audience, he went away and announced to Eulogia, the sister of the basileus, that Byzantium was indeed captured. As soon as she had received this information the princess made her way to the palace at dawn, against her habit, and burst in on the basileus who was asleep. She did not believe that it was right to wake him and tell him such news, for fear that he would be harmed by learning it suddenly and against all expectations as he slid out of sleep, thus showing a wisdom not normal for women. For just as the natural spirit is occupied with digestion after a meal and withdraws inwards, so the senses either do not function during sleep or are weak when awakening, the mind not being dominant. It follows that if sensations arise while the mind is not at its post during sleep, and the senses perceive an object, if that object is unremarkable and normal, then in suddenly becoming aware of it one perceives it without stress, but if it is harmful, or on the other hand pleasant but unexpected, then the senses, because they cannot perceive it satisfactorily, are troubled, and at once strike at the soul and create a disturbance.

So, no less concerned with assuring the safety of the basileus than with announcing the pleasant news, Eulogia took care to reveal it little-by-little: taking the big toe of his foot, she gently squeezed it between her fingers, in order to waken him slowly and he awoke at once; and on seeing the nun standing there, he asked what had caused her to do such a thing. It was clear from her laughter and her joyful bearing that she had something good to say; but she did not immediately announce what was in her mind, but waited until the faculties of his mind had resumed their normal state. When the basileus relaxed and questioned her again regarding the news, in his eagerness to know what, as he realised, was giving her such pleasure, she then revealed the good news: the City was taken; the kaisar firmly occupied the interior with the Scythian force; she had received the news just lately, from the mouth of a man who had just arrived and who stoutly maintained that he had been present at the time. When the basileus asked if the messenger had been sent by the kaisar, she said that she did not know, but that if he presented himself, he would be quite capable of answering the question. The basileus, however, thought on the one hand that the matter was strange, in that the kaisar was not sending a messenger about it; and he also thought that the number of troops that he under his command was too small for such an undertaking in any case, and that if he himself had wished to accomplish it, he

would have been unable to do so; so he did not totally accept what was said. And if, again, it was a joke, the one who made it was irredeemably foolish.

He therefore decided to interrogate the newcomer himself, seated on his throne; he hoped to discover the truth, not because he would immediately accept what would be said, but because he thought the man would tell the truth out of fear of the basileus; and when he was interrogated, he gave assurances that he had seen the capture of the City completed; by giving all the details he lent great credence to his story in many ways and created amazement in them all. But the basileus, wishing to appear more knowledgeable than the masses, particularly in military matters, and at the same time, if the report were false, not to merit the charge of jumping to a hasty conclusion, but also, with the appropriate precautions, to profit from the information were it the truth, ordered that he be bound and put under guard. But they were all happy to believe that the Italians might be being expelled from the City. On the same day there arrived more messengers, sent by the kaisar, and what was more, they bore with them as certain proof the headdress and sword of Baudouin, and a letter made it clear to the basileus how the City had been taken, after which he was no longer in doubt, but believed. In exchange for this news he gave great rewards; as for the leader who was the author of the success, he elevated him to the highest degree possible, for he thought it was not a little thing to have added to his empire in this way. Making this day a day of great festivity he put on his most splendid clothing, inviting those who would share his joy, they too being dressed in brightly-coloured garments, and made a speech of rejoicing to them; and as he did not want those who were far away to be deprived of the pleasure he sent letters to them inviting them to thank the Almighty.

2.30 Speech of the basileus about the capture of the City

"You know," he said to the people present, "you who are subjects of the Roman empire, those of you who are noble, and those who are related to me by blood, and all the rest of the people, how, because of divine wrath, our ancestors were in former times forced from their fatherland by the Italians, as if by violent winds, and how their country was reduced to a narrow space. I am not referring to the ancient situation, when the empire of the Romans was bounded in the east by the Tigris and the Euphrates and in the west by Sicily and Apulia, while in the south it reached the Ethiopians, and towards the Arctic regions of the north. All this I omit. But you who are listening know perfectly what I mean, that on this side of the sea the land occupied by us did not extend only two or three days' march inland, but sometimes ten or more, without counting all the islands, even the

largest of them. But by the will, or rather the permission, of God, as a penalty for the sins committed against Him, this City, which is as it were the heart of the fatherland, was made to succumb, and everything died along with it. The Italians took one part, and the Persians, the Bulgars and Triballians and the others took another part, and there were even those Romans, subjects of the empire, who seceded to live under independent masters. As for our possessions, they were defined as Nikaia, Prousa and, in the third place, Philadelpheia, along with their hinterlands. As for the other parts, what need is there to say how they came back to life and recovered little by little thanks to Divine mercy? But it was not possible to be sure of these when the capital city was missing. For who has not offended or insulted us, when we have sent them ambassadors, because we were without a capital and lived, by necessity, far from the imperial throne? When the fatherland[20] could only be marked in reference to the stars it was unreasonable for us to seek the rest and demand it of those who possessed it. Also, the basileis who preceded us toiled a great deal toward this goal, and we ourselves have recently suffered not a little pain, but gained nothing; for when a city is well guarded it is vain to stand over it, and it is equally vain and indeed painful to those who would retake it straight away, as this belongs to God most of all, to God who knows how to protect a city which is thought to be in danger because it is unprotected, and who allows a city that is defended by strong soldiers to fall into the hands of its enemies; but if, after conducting against it numerous and great expeditions, and experiencing so many difficulties, we have succeeded in nothing, even though our strength was greatly superior to that of the inhabitants, it is because God wished to leave the task for Himself, and for Himself alone, to give it in His mercy to those to whom its capture was destined. And now the appointed day of His mercy has come and, surprisingly, as it might be said, it is during our reign and on us that He has bestowed His kindness. So it is right that after recovering the fatherland we render our thanks, and hope that, just as after the fall of that city the rest fell at the same time, after its restoration it is impossible that the rest will not be restored, because Justice will retrace her steps in the reverse direction, and the necks which were formerly held high in arrogance – with the help of God – will be bowed in humility. If our fathers had not seen the mercy of God, it has been granted to us, their sons, to see it, because it is not to individuals, but to nations, that the kindnesses and punishments of God come. This also happened in ancient times. God had promised that happy land to the fathers, making this declaration in the past to Abraham: that they were to leave Egypt immediately and receive the land, and though He made their bones fall in the desert, He kept His word to

[20] The city of Kōnstantinoupolis.

their children, and His promise was unbroken. It is in this way that the Divine actions are ordered by just weights and measures.

"The time has now come to change our abode on the instructions of God, not covered by the shade of leaves in wagons, as was the case in the old days, but sheltering under the grace of God. And let each of the archontes send someone to at once to take possession of the residence where he will live with his whole family. If it comes to pass that his family home and the homes of his relatives still exist, all will be well; in the other case, let someone select a suitable residence, because, since God is showing us His favour, it is advisable to act in accordance with His laws and give generously, to each his share. For it is fair to think that it is not only us, but you also, that God favours. Just as our exile was our common fate when all together had drunk from the cup of His anger, thus the return of His kindness is received by us all universally; others will follow in succession, and in this way the void will again be filled by those who prefer to live in a city than in towns, a city with a name rather than in anonymous and obscure localities. However, it is necessary not to neglect these regions, for the greatest safety of the interior is found when the peripheries escape disturbance, and they will escape disturbance if the inhabitants take all precautions, together with the archontes who are sent to them. But this will be said and done at the appropriate time, with the aid of God's mercy. And for the moment, to those by whom this grace has been measured out abundantly for us – and this is deserved – we will grant just recompense in writing, for it is to them, after God, that we owe thanks."

This is why he ordered the immediate drawing up of lists of grants and also selected those who would be sent and entrusted with the distribution of land to the nobility; for he postponed giving to the masses, his pretext being that he had captured the city by the sword and there was nobody who had the right to claim his own property in it, supposing that he even had any; there still remained a great amount, and of above average quality, because the city had been occupied for only fifty-eight years, and during this time all would have been left untouched, if the basileis had lived in peace with them, because if they had not been short of the necessities of life, due to the unceasing wars, they would not even have touched the wonderful churches. But, because they were in possession of things strange to them, and found themselves in constant fear of being driven from what did not belong to them, one after another hastened to strip away and steal items belonging to others which they had in their hands, as if they would not possess them very long.

After speaking and acting in this way, the basileus sent couriers with great haste to the kaisar, not one on a single occasion only, nor all at once, but a great number every day one after the other, to learn from him as often as possible about each thing, and also

at the same to give orders for arrangements to made there, seeing that in a short time he and his suite would come to take up residence there; for he ordered the palace to be put in order. The grandees, for their part, each sent one of their own men to reclaim their residences and to take possession of them, because they knew it would be impossible to delay any longer once the basileus had set out. Upon their arrival these agents set about following, so far as each of them could, the orders that they had been given. The kaisar distributed the houses according to the quality and rank of the person; at the same time he was vexed by so many troubles that his concerns did not even allow him to breathe: he governed the populace, trusting the Romans and suspecting the Italians, for the latter were a great pile of people mixed together there, for the most part unsuitable for war and given to manual labour, but the fact that they had recently been stripped of their possessions and would be ready for sedition, since those who would resist them were not numerous, and at the same time had not ceased to be afraid, caused the kaisar to fear the assault of these people because they would attack him, since they were a foreign people. Taking these things into consideration, he daily endeavoured to contain the crowd, inspiring fear through being in sight; at night he arranged patrols, and like the nukteparchos he inspected every street, for fear that some malefactor might be abroad; for the wall had been broken everywhere, and it was easy to come and go, even if the gates were closed, for those who wanted to do so. But as the number of people coming in from outside increased every day, they shared the cares of the kaisar and began to remove the fears our men had.

2.31 How the basileus entered the city with the principal members of his entourage

After organising his affairs the basileus, taking with him the empress and the young child he had had by her, Andronikos – he had given him this name to honour his father, who was no more, and he swore at all times by his memory, through filial piety, for he always had on his tongue the name of the megas domestikos – and also taking with him the mother of the empress, whom the majority, out of respect for her, called the great lady, and in company with the whole council of the elders and the senate, travelled to the City and, having crossed the Hellespont, turned towards Byzantium. When he had arrived and halted outside the Chrysea Pylē he rested for a few days to organise his entrance into the City, in a way that was marked by a combination of piety and magnificence. He sent to have brought from the monastery of the Pantokratōr the ancient icon of the most holy

mother of God which, it is said, was painted by the divine Luke while in her presence and gazing upon her, and the icon later fell into the possession of the empress Poulcheria and was given to her sister-in-law the basilissa Eudokia of Athēnai, as a truly distinguished gift from Palestine. It was in the train of this guide, thanks to whom he had been confident that he would actually recover the city, that he entered into it, thinking that in this way he could show sufficient gratitude to her. He ordered one of the bishops present, Geōrgios of Kyzikos, to put on his vestments, recite the prayers and to give thanks for the event.

After considerable time the Chrysea Pylē was reopened and the bishop began to pray. As for the basileus, he entered with all his retinue into the City, with a slow tread and with his thoughts directed upwards in a great show of gratitude to God, marching on foot and casting aside the pomp of the Imperial dignity as being quite inappropriate to such an event. It was then the middle of the day, and the heat was excessive, as the Sun reached its zenith; the passion of the assembled multitude rivalled the heat to such an extent that they decided that, whatever happened, they would accompany the basileus to the Great Palace, since it was impossible to make the Blachernai palace ready to house the basileis – for it was filled with the smoke and soot of the Italians, since the table companions of Baudouin, through that man's uncouthness, had coated the walls of the palace, to the point that they needed to be cleaned – and also because this domicile offered suitable security for the basileis, who were entering the City for the first time and when its affairs were still unsettled. The people enjoyed the peace, seeing for the first time a Roman basileus in his palace, and they changed their stupor for joy, thinking themselves lucky to be under the rule of such a lord. It seems to me that the Italians living in the City were equally changed by this spectacle and would have been satisfied, once the act was done - for it did not dishonour them to serve such a master – if their arrogance had not blinded them, particularly in view of the fact that they had just suffered severely. But this day was completed, engulfed by applause of triumph and holy songs, and the palace was manned by guards for the night.

2.32 How the basileus dealt with the national groups of the Latins after his entrance

The morning having arrived, the basileus was asked by all as to how, after consolidating the situation in the City, he would provide for the security of the City and how, in dealing with the notables of the Italian nations – these groups being the Genoese, the Venetians

and, thirdly, the Pisans – he would submit them to his authority. For in this way, once he had won over these men, who were very capable of convincing the others to do as they suggested, the others, if unwillingly, would remain peaceful. In consequence he summoned them and all day negotiated what was acceptable; to obtain good promises he removed the bonds that bound them to their compatriots and, little by little, joined them and undermined their spirits by showering them with favours. These were as follows: they could live freely in a good-sized quarter of the City, receiving for this all the requisite space, and live according to their customary laws, obeying their own, under a leader sent out by the general council of their state, known as a podestà, that is, in the Greek tongue, an *exousiastēs*; on the other hand they obtained an exemption from taxes and complete autonomy in trade and travel.

These offers were made to the Genoese, but the same advantages were given to the Venetians and the Pisans, the first under a bailli, called in Greek an *epitropos*, and the Pisans under a consul, or *ephoros*; they utilised their time and lived without interference in their affairs, living in an autonomous manner. However, he was unable to trust the Genoese, who were confined to the City and were in great numbers, not grouped like the other two colonies; but the latter, who were reduced in strength, were no difficulty in keeping them inside. Keeping the nations apart, and behaving in a friendly manner towards those who were present, while weakening the aggressiveness of those who were not through gifts showed that he feared their coalition, even more so since Baudouin, after taking flight and associating himself with Charles, an arrogant man of excessive aims, contracted an alliance with him, joining the daughter of Charles to his son, and ceding to him as a bride-price the city which he no longer possessed; Charles accepted it even though Baudouin did not have it to give, in the expectation that he would gain it after fitting out a fleet.

2.33 How the basileus arranged the affairs of the City

Now the first task of the basileus was to bring in colonists and house them in the city, bringing back those who had previously settled near the sea. The second task was to allot to the men of position all the cultivatable land within and without the walls, excepting that part which he gave in hereditary title to the *thelēmatarioi*, as a reward and as thanks for their zeal and their kindness, such land that was well suited to produce crops and capable of germinating everything that they planted in it; he also offered up other extremely fertile land to the monasteries. For it was his aim to make them the equal of the monasteries outside, the ones standing in the East in great numbers that had abundant

riches and a sufficiency of necessities; and so he intended to set these monasteries up through such measures. The third task was to surrender land to the people who had collected there, so they would form a tax base. But the most urgent, and greatest, task was to help the monasteries return to their former appearance, and to rebuild the city, and to introduce very quickly lightly armed soldiers, because those who had previously occupied it would not remain in peace, but would attack with a great armament. This is why he also fitted out a fleet and began the construction of more ships, and he established there thousands of *proselōntes*, who came from the provinces. He took still more measures, some from necessity, others out of fear, in order to anticipate attacks.

2.34 What the intentions of the bishops were towards Patriarch Arsenios

The basileus was, of course, also concerned with the Church, deprived of its shepherd in the manner earlier related. He assembled the bishops and deliberated with them, wishing to learn what needed to be done. Some of them thought that he should recall the former Patriarch Arsenios, who was still alive, for the canons had not been followed in his case – they should have waited after summoning him, and not dismissed him immediately when he had not been found guilty. Others, however, held the opposite opinion, that the judgement against Arsenios should stand because his withdrawal was tantamount to resignation – in refusing to heed the synod's request and, in fact, sending away those who came to him in supplication, he clearly showed that he had renounced his position of authority. While these arguments and statements were being put forward, the basileus considered the two arguments in light of how they would affect his own position. On the one hand, it seemed to be a good solution to recall Arsenios and put him back at the head of ecclesiastical affairs if, under his patriarchate, matters proceeded according to plan and he could act as he hoped to do. There would be then no excuse remaining for anyone to create a scandal. However, he feared that if Arsenios was later again dismissed, he would not only fail to achieve his aims, but an abyss of troubles would open up under his feet. On the other hand, if he spurned Arsenios and substituted another, he thought that, although it would not be impossible to advance his agenda without hindrance, there would likely be a disturbance which would prevent certain people from welcoming what had occurred, which was in fact a serious matter. Caught in the horns of this dilemma, the basileus was at a loss to know which side he should support. However, he left the matter to be settled by time, the passing of which would bring a better solution, and he surrendered the matter to the bishops for further deliberation, so that they could come to

an agreement with each other without discord. He then turned to the running of secular affairs, but without losing interest in this issue.

2.35 How the basileus began ridding himself of the young Iōannēs and how the Italians were installed

But the plan forming in the depths of his mind did not leave his thoughts in peace. It was not hidden, since he brought charges of malevolence towards himself against those who were suspected of inclining towards Iōannēs and he was frowned upon for this. And sometimes also, fabricating charges, he punished them harshly; and he did not agree to regard Iōannēs, even in name, as his colleague in the empire, and he did many things to put him completely out of the way. While the person who urged him in this was his sister Eulogia, it was also true that his own son Andronikos was increasing in age, and he was annoyed that he was unable to raise him as a basileus and thought the matter insufferable; but what motivated him even more was his great ambition and his intemperate pride which did not permit him to remain in a modest position. The excuse he put forward to give this pretension a veneer of respectability was the capture of the city, which might be considered sufficient to authorise its captor's occupying the imperial throne alone; he, and he alone, he pointed out, had been responsible for this, inferring that he, and he alone, should rule. However, this intention still remained hidden from the masses and was not easily discernable by them, although those who examined closely did not find it difficult to suspect what he was plotting, after seeing a number of clues, especially the fact that Iōannēs had not made his entrance into the city at the same time as he had. Fed by a fierce greed, which pushed him to commit a very grave sin against God by breaking his sworn oaths, it was on a scale far too great to be jettisoned by its author. For the Romans this was the beginning of great evils and the cause of intolerable disturbance.

Looking to provide better security for the City, and considering that the Genoese, both those who were already present and those who were expected to arrive, were going to become very numerous and that they were too uncompromising to submit easily to the Romans, but that they were capable of exciting their pride and arrogance with the least excuse, he thought it not to be in his best interest to house them inside the City, but that they should live outside. He at first sent them to live in Thracian Hērakleia, but he later thought it wise to settle them at Pera, with the sole exception being the fortress of Galata. But as for the Venetians and Pisans, who were few in number, he considered that he was able to house them inside the City, separating them from the others. This is why, for

reasons of security, he ordered the demolition of two fortresses, one built inside on the side of the marketplace facing the sea, and the other constructed outside, namely that of Galata; and likewise he ordered that the Genoese, spreading themselves over a large area, should live in the western part of Pera near Galata, and that the others be assigned their own quarters for their homes. On the other hand he stipulated that each nation should have its own taxes without hindrance.

2.36 What Happened to the Ambassadors of the basileus to the Pope and the Italians

He also despatched speedily an embassy to the pope, to mollify him with gifts. There were two ambassadors, one named Nikephoritzēs and the other Aloubardēs. These men had aforetime served as under-secretaries to the Latin emperor, Baudouin, and had been accused of treason in favour of the Romans. As a matter of fact, in going to Italy they fell into a grave danger from which they were unprotected even by their status as ambassadors. And although the ruler had masked with honours the taint of treason on a dishonest embassage sent to him from the city, those people,[21] who were spiteful to begin with and who now were incited by the loss of the city to an even greater rage, were eager to condemn the envoys, when they were seen arriving, on a charge of treason. So, seizing Nikephoritzēs, they mercilessly flayed him from feet to head as punishment for his alleged crime, and as a mark of disrespect for the one who had sent him. As for Aloubardēs, on being informed of their intentions he ran away as fast as he could. And this was the manner in which things played out for the ambassadors despatched to Italy.

[21] The Italians.

Commentary on the Text

Book One

1.1 Author's Preface; About the truth of the tale

"Geōrgios" (23^{3})

The author of the *Historia* was, as he tells us, born in 1241/2, descended from refugees who fled Kōnstantinoupolis in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. Unfortunately we know nothing about his parents or family background beyond this. He may have become interested in joining the clergy at an early date, and some of this interest may have stemmed from growing up in Nikaia, the patriarchal seat. He appears to have held a life-long dedication to the secular clergy, and a pride in being one (Failler 2001:131-132).

It is unknown when he entered the clergy, but he states that he was a notarios at the time of Patriarch Arsenios' second deposition in 1265 (Pach. 347^{28-29}). By 1277 he had become didaskalos tou apostolou (Darrouzès 1970:66-86, 532), and by 1285 he was hieromnemos (Darrouzès 1970:533). The two positions Pachymerēs appears to have taken most pride in – protekdikos and dikaiophylax – were reached sometime after the latter date. Although he did not reach the highest levels of either state or ecclesiastic hierarchies, Pachymerēs appears to have had familiar contact with numerous members of the patriarchal and imperial courts. In Books I and II of the Historia alone, Pachymerēs shows connections, even friendship, with two patriarchs – Iōannēs XI Bekkos (Pach. 171^{8-9}) and Theodosios of Antioch (Pach. 179^{2}) – as well as a sister of a basileus, Eirēnē-Eulogia (Pach. 179^{27}-181^{6}). Pachymerēs is assumed to have died shortly after 1307 – the date in which his narrative *Historia* abruptly ends.

Pachymerēs was, for his time, a prolific writer. Apart from his *Historia*, he wrote epitomes of the works of Aristotle and Dionysios the Areopagite, a long treatise called the *Quadrivium*, dealing with the four sciences of arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy, studies on rhetoric and theology, as well as letters and poems. For a more detailed catalogue see Hunger (1978:1.447-453) and Failler (1984:xxi-xxii).

Pachymerēs' entry in the *PLP* is no. 22186. He also has biographical entries in Krumbacher (1897:288-291) and Fryde (2000:199-200).

"Nikaia" (23^{3})

For centuries Nikaia had been a large and important city, flourishing due to its proximity to the capital, its fertile hinterland, and its position astride trade and invasion routes into the interior of Anatolia.

Its selection by Theodōros I as his new capital in 1206 brought a renewed vitality and stature to the city. New churches and monasteries were built, a new school was founded by Theodōros II and the walls were given a second circuit and moat by Iōannēs III, perhaps in imitation of Kōnstantinoupolis. This increased grandeur was the subject of an encomium by Theodōros in 1250 (Foss and Tulchin 1990).

After the capital was returned to Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261 Nikaia returned to its former status as a regional centre. The scene of much fighting in the early 1300's, Nikaia finally fell to the Ottomans in 1331.

See Janin (1925:482-490).

"prōtekdikos" (23^{7})

The chairman-cleric of a tribunal of priests, founded by Justinian, whose main function was the hearing of cases involving appeals of asylum and sanctuary in the Hagia Sophia. The prōtekdikos was the priest who handed down sentence and penance upon the supplicant. The prōtekdikos was ranked sixth among the patriarchal officials.

See Darrouzès (1970:323-33) and Macrides (1988a:515, 537).

"dikaiophylax" (23^{8})

The dikaiophylax was, in the Palaiologan period, an additional office held by one of the six highest ranked of the patriarchal officials. The holder of the title was appointed by the basileus and served as judge and legal advisor in cases involving both civil and canon laws. The first dikaiophylax was the future historian and metropolitan bishop Theodōros Skoutariōtēs (MM 5.246).

See Darrouzès (1970:109-111) and Oikonomides (1976:135).

"He has not simply taken unconfirmed stories from the past" (23^{8-13})

This is a fairly rare statement for a late Byzantine historian to make, but was much more commonly found in the works of ancient historians. Josephus, for instance, wrote that "persons with no first-hand knowledge, accepting baseless and inconsistent stories on hearsay, wrote garbled accounts" while he, being an eye-witness, was better placed to record the truth of what happened (Josephus 1.7).

While it is probably true that Pachymerēs, with his deep familiarity with ancient literature, was consciously imitating old practice in writing this passage, it may also be true that he wrote it because it was a fair reflection of his actual research methods. In Books I and II we have numerous occasions where Pachymerēs indicates that he did indeed witness the incident being narrated (e.g. Pach. 103^{4-8}), or had received a report about it from a participant (e.g. Pach. 171^{8-9}, 179^{2}, 179^{27}-181^{6}, 195^{17-27}). There is some possibility, then, that Pachymerēs did not write this passage solely in slavish imitation of the ancients, but as a simple statement of his research methods. In this regard, it is perhaps not irrelevant to include the following passage, taken from a modern work of documentary journalism:

> Most of the dialogue in this narrative – perhaps 90 percent – comes from the scenes and conversations that I personally witnessed. In a few instances, however, important events occurred on shifts when I was not working or when I was busy reporting on the activities of other detectives. In those instances, I was careful not to use direct quotes for long portions of text, and I have tried to use only those quotes that were specifically recalled by the detectives. And when a character is shown to be thinking something, it is not mere presumption: In every case, subsequent actions made those thoughts apparent or I discussed the matter with that person afterward. And by reviewing the material with the detectives, I have tried to ensure that their thoughts have been portrayed as accurately as possible
>
> (D. Simon *Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets* (New York, 1991) 629)

This passage comes from an author who was almost certainly not thinking of Thoukydidēs – let alone Pachymerēs – while he was writing, but it demonstrates that such themes, and the desire to express them, can be spontaneously developed in the historian, without necessarily meaning that historian B is consciously imitating the structure of historian A.

"one of the wise" (23^{16})

This is the fifth-century BC Athenian tragedian Sophoclēs, from whose play, *Aias* (646), Pachymerēs has taken the reference to the law of time obliterating everything. As Failler (1984:22 n. 2) points out, this line was a favourite of Byzantine historians. We do not know whether Pachymerēs took the line second-hand from Anna Komnēnē or from Kinnamos, or whether he drew it direct from Sophoclēs' play.

"It is especially important to me" (25^{1-2})

This passage, however, is common enough in Byzantine historians that we can safely say that Pachymerēs was following standard practice. Tacitus said much the same thing, as did Josephus, and so on down through the ages to Anna Komnēnē, Akropolitēs, Pachymerēs and Grēgoras. See Guilland (1926:233-4).

"for one believes that one knows something when one does not" (25^{10-11})
This is a reference to the works of Plato, and especially to his *Apologia*, where Socrates refers several times to the sad state that others are in, when he finds that they believe they know something, when in actual fact they know nothing (*Apologia* 21D, 22E). Socrates, in knowing that he knows nothing, is in a better state than his interlocutors.

"with the passage of time things are still worsening" (25^{13})
The first focus of Pachymerēs' *Historia* is a lengthy description of the fate of the mountain borderers of Anatolia, and their transformation from a vibrant, wealthy and bellicose people under the early Laskarids, to a weak, poor and cowardly remnant under the Palaiologoi (Pach. 29^{21}-35^{23}). Pachymerēs lived through a period of imperial history that saw the loss of most of Anatolia to the Turks and a struggle to hold Makedonia and Greece. It is perhaps understandable that he had a pessimistic attitude regarding the future.

1.2 Reasons for not dealing with events from before the author's own time

"Prousa" (25^{26})
This is an unusual choice for Pachymerēs to have included in his short list of cities retained by the Byzantines following the Fourth Crusade. Nikaia was an obvious selection, since it became the capital and geographically marked one of the frontiers of the rump empire. Philadelpheia, too, marked a frontier and was an important centre in its own right. Prousa, however, was located only about seventy kilometres from Nikaia, and did not anchor one part of the imperial border. It was a large city – with perhaps as many as thirty thousand inhabitants in 1300 (Arnakis 1951:115) – but Magnesia was also a large city and was never lost to Greek control. Prousa was the seat of a metropolitan, as were Nikaia and Philadelpheia, but so was Ephesos, which Pachymerēs did not include in the list.

There are two possibilities. First, Prousa was the site of a long and ultimately fruitless siege by the Latin crusaders over the winter of 1204-05 (Chon. 602^{8}-603^{23}). This setback was the high-water mark for the Fourth Crusade's initial advance into Anatolia, and provided the opportunity for Theodōros I Laskaris to solidify his hold over the region and lay the foundation for the empire-in-exile and the ultimate return to Kōnstantinoupolis. For this reason, Prousa may have won the right to be included in the most important centres of the new realm.

The second possibility is that Pachymerēs is taking this quote from a speech given by Michaēl VIII Palaiologos after the retaking of Kōnstantinoupolis (Pach. 209^{30}-211^{1}). As

argued elsewhere, in the commentary, however, Pachymerēs is much more likely to have created Michaēl's speech himself (commentary to Pach. 61^{25}-63^{11} and 209^{30}-211^{1}). Even if Pachymerēs is reporting that speech accurately and took a line from it for his prooimion, we must still question the basileus' reasons for including Prousa in his short list cities retained by the Byzantines following the Fourth Crusade.

"Philadelpheia" (25^{27})

A large and important city in this period (Akrop. 105^{22-26}), Philadelpheia was the easternmost outpost of Nikaian rule in central Lydia. It lay on an easy route from the coast to the Anatolian interior, and flourished with trade – as indicated by the presence of Venetian and, later, Genoese commercial colonies. The city was a vital component in the continuing Nikaian and Byzantine occupation of western Anatolia, and basileis often travelled to the region to see to its affairs in person (Akrop. 105^{22}-106^{2}; Pach. 139^{22-23}).

Through a combination of physical strength and the judicious use of tribute, Philadelpheia remained an official part of the Byzantine Empire, though completely surrounded by Turkish dominions, until 1390.

"they had been banished from the fatherland" (25^{27}-27^{1})

Pachymerēs refers, of course, to the Fourth Crusade of 1203-1204, in which Frankish crusaders and Venetians conquered Kōnstantinoupolis and large areas of the Byzantine Empire. In the following years Theodōros I Laskaris managed to revive an empire-in-exile in Anatolia, but for many years it was but a shadow of the empire that had been lost.

"others have spoken of them" (27^{4})

The major extant Greek sources for the period 1204-1256 were written by Nikētas Chōniatēs and by Geōrgios Akropolitēs. These are probably the authors Pachymerēs refers to, though there is little evidence to suggest that Pachymerēs utilised either in the composition of his *Historia* – Chōniatēs wrote about a period well before that covered by Pachymerēs, and there are so many differences between the account of Akropolitēs and that of Pachymerēs, even when they are relating the same event, for Pachymerēs to have been drawing heavily upon the earlier historian. Other sources exist on the period, such as that penned by Theodōros Skoutariōtēs, but these have been shown to be based largely on the major works. There may have been other histories written in this period, but they have not survived to the present day. One such source was definitely used by Pachymerēs, since it was also apparently used by the Syriac chronicler Bar Hebraeus, and neither Pachymerēs nor Bar Hebraeus could have used the work of the other (see the commentary to 47^{12}).

1.3 How the ancients fortified the frontiers

"Persians" (27^{19})

"Persians", in Pachymerēs' language, refers to Muslims generally (see, for example, Pach. 181^{14-15}), and to the Turks of Anatolia more specifically (for example Pach. 43^{26}). Pachymerēs appears to make no distinction between the Turks subject to the Sultanate of Konya and the nomad Türkmen who lived in the borderlands between Nikaia and Konya, who answered to nobody but their own chiefs. "Persians" are the Muslims of the East – Anatolia and Mesopotamia. The inhabitants of Egypt, though Muslim, are not called "Persians". They are "Ethiopians" (Pach. 235^{5}). Pachymerēs uses the term "Persians" partly as shorthand, and partly as an archaism, in the same way that he uses "Scythian" to refer to Cuman nomads and "Triballian" to refer to the Serbs (Pach. 209^{28}). In general, the inhabitants of any given region receive from Pachymerēs the name of the people who dwelled there in classical times.

Deliberate archaicism, especially in regards to names, was a common Byzantine literary practise, and Pachymerēs was a particularly vigorous exponent of it. See Hunger (1969-70:21).

"Italians" (27^{20})

"Italians", in Pachymerēs' language, refers to Latin Christians from Western Europe. The name encompasses both the French-speaking inhabitants of the Latin Empire of Constantinople (Pach. 149^{22}) and the Principality of Achaia (Pach. 119^{4}, 121^{8}) and actual Italians, from Genoa or Venice or other cities (Pach. 193^{6}, 219^{21-22}). Pachymerēs uses this term in a slapdash way, as shorthand for "western Europeans" (Karlin-Hayter 1972:143). He is fully aware of the different European nationalities, and occasionally refers to Germans (Pach. 117^{24}), French (Pach. 411^{21}) or Catalans (Pach. 541^{18}).

In the current passage, Pachymerēs is referring to the Franks of the Fourth Crusade, who settled in former Byzantine lands in the period following 1204.

"Scythians" (27^{23})

"Scythians", in Pachymerēs' language, has both a general and a specific meaning. In both cases it refers to Cumans, a Turkic people, specifically to a community of them that had offered their services to Iōannēs III and which was settled by him in Anatolia in 1241 (Akrop. 66^{15-20}; Greg. 37^{3-9}; Skout. 486^{26}-487^{3}). Pachymerēs occasionally uses "Scythian" to refer to this entire community, as in this current passage. More commonly, he uses the

name in the sense of "the Scythian regiment (or contingent)", and refers to the company of warriors this community furnished for the Nikaian army (see, for example, Pach. $121^{8, 14}$, 191^{13}, 199^{6-7}).

Pachymerēs also uses the name 'Koman', but only in the form *ek Komanōn* (Pach. 237^{2}, 413^{5}). While it appears at first glance that this term is interchangeable with "Scythian" (Laiou 1993:108-109; and especially the references at Pach. 237 to the "Ethiopians" having a "Scythian" ruler, who came *ek Komanōn*), Pachymerēs only uses it in reference to the Cumans who lived, or came from, the areas to the north of the Black Sea, around the Sea of Azov. The Cumans who lived on the eastern shores of the Black Sea and especially around the Danube Delta, while called "Scythians", are never said to be *ek Komanōn*.

Cumans had been in contact with the Byzantine Empire since the late eleventh century. For their early history, see Golden (1992:270-277).

"They could not strengthen the coastal regions" (29^{1-2})

Pachymerēs is referring to the situation directly following the Fourth Crusade, when the Latins occupied large areas in the northwest of Anatolia, along the south shore of the Sea of Marmara (Akrop. 11^{23}-12^{2}). From this bridgehead they could strike at the nascent Empire of Nikaia with little difficulty. As Pachymerēs says, the Nikaians could not defend themselves easily until this bridgehead had been eliminated.

"a treaty with the Persians" (29^{10-11})

Theodōros I Laskaris fought and won a battle with the Selçuk Sultān Kaykusrau I at Antioch-on-the-Maiander in 1211 (Akrop. 15^{19}-17^{15}; Ibn Bibi 48-50; Cahen 1968:120-121). The sultān was killed, and his son and successor, 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us, (r. 1211-1220) arranged a treaty with Theodōros I (Ibn Bibi 57-58; Akrop. 17^{17-19}; Dölger, *Regesten*, 1682). Although there were frequent border skirmishes, especially between the Nikaian borderers and Türkmen nomads, there was little conflict between Konya and Nikaia and this treaty remained in force for the next fifty years or more.[22]

"they attacked the Italians" (29^{12})

In 1224 Iōannēs III won a great victory over the Latin Empire at Poimanēnon, inland from Kyzikos, which enabled Nikaia to recover almost all of the Latins' Anatolian strongholds. Pachymerēs agrees with Akropolitēs (Akrop. 34^{17-21}), that the renewed hostilities with the

[22] But see the arguments of Langdon (1992:15-33), who identifies several campaigns undertaken by Iōannēs III in the 1220's against the Selçuks.

Latin Empire were instigated by Nikaia, but this assessment is opposed by Grēgoras, who writes that hostilities were begun by the brothers of Theodōros I, allying themselves with the Latins in hope of overthrowing Theodōros' son-in-law Iōannēs (Greg. 25^{3-7}).

In the aftermath of this battle the Latins' holdings in Anatolia were reduced to a small area directly across the Bosporos from Constantinople itself. This area was subjected to frequent Nikaian attacks (see Pach. 43^{7-8}).

"secured them with fortifications" (29^{18-19})

The Laskarid emperors did not confine their new fortifications to the frontier, but built new or strengthened old defences throughout the empire. A notable example is the addition of an outer wall to the existing Late Roman circuit at Nikaia (Foss and Winfield 1986:81). On this wave of fortification, see the encomium of Skoutariōtēs for Iōannēs III: "he built tower after tower, parapet after parapet, and erected wall after wall" (Skout. 506^{24-26}). Modern archaeological surveys of western Anatolia confirm the great amount of construction undertaken by the Laskarids (Vryonis 1971:220).

1.4 How they looked after the men and the affairs of the frontiers

"those who lived in the mountains" (29^{21})

These people were the inhabitants of the regions on the Anatolian frontier, and especially the highlands around the upper reaches of the Sangarios and Maiander rivers. This was the area in the greatest danger from encroachments of Türkmen raiders and also provided the first line of defence for the easiest invasions routes from the interior of Anatolia to the Nikaian heartlands.

"tax exemptions" (29^{24})

This policy may have been introduced by Theodōros I. It was certainly in full effect under Iōannēs III (Bartusis 1992:25). The policy was designed solely to provide incentive for the inhabitants of these dangerous regions to remain living there and provide a buffer for the important coastal regions and their populous towns and cities. If the people living in these tax-exempt regions emigrated to other parts of the Empire they would then come under the usual tax regime. There was no direct military obligation demanded in return for these exemptions, but the borderers would have had to fight to retain their hold over the lands, so their position was akin to *de facto* settler-soldiers. The tax exemptions appear to been applied only to the land tax. Trade taxes would still have been levied.

"*pronoiai*" (29[24])

The nature of this grant has been the subject of much debate over the years, largely due to the apparent similarities between the Byzantine *pronoia* and the western European feudal fief[23]. This commentary is not the place to go into a long and detailed discussion on that debate. For that see Kazhdan (1995).

Consensus is now being reached among scholars that the *pronoia* was, at least in the mid-thirteenth century, a temporary grant to a private individual of revenues that would otherwise have gone to the imperial coffers. Such grants were usually made in the form of the revenue from a given territory and the villages within it. This diverted revenue provided a set income to the individual *pronoiar*. The entire institution was primarily geared towards the upkeep and maintenance of soldiers, though in rare instances non-soldiers held *pronoia* grants (Bartusis 1992:162). Being grants of revenues in both cash and kind, the pronoia enabled the imperial government to maintain more soldiers than it otherwise would if it were relying upon cash payments (as to mercenaries) alone. The *pronoiar* was usually able to supply his needs of survival from the produce of his assigned pronoia, could graze his horse on the lands from which his income came rather than from fodder provided for him, and only needed to pay for his weapons and armour using the cash he received.

Ideally the *pronoia* was a temporary measure. The empire retained the right to take the grant away from the recipient at any time (Heisenberg 1920:40-41), and the revenues awarded to the *pronoiar* were always claimed as imperial property. In later years, however, increasing numbers of *pronoiai* were made hereditary (Pach. 139[6-7]; Bartusis 1992:179-182). Yet even in this case the government claimed that the grant was still dependent upon itself, though in practise many *pronoiai*, especially those granted to members of magnate families, became alienated from imperial control, subsumed into the private possessions of the *pronoiar*. The *pronoiar* also gained an increasing influence over the lives his tenants. It was not unheard of for *pronoiars* to act very much like a western-European feudal lord, by exercising social and judicial powers over 'his' peasants (Charanis 1951a:340-344).

"their fortunes grew" (29[26])

Skoutariōtēs also remarks on the wealth of the Laskarid-era soldiery of these areas (Skout. 507[24-28]).

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[23] See, for example, the list of studies regarding *pronoia* provided by Bartusis (1992:162n.2).

1.5 How, after the City was taken, the east weakened; the affair of Chadenos

"after the empire underwent a change" (31^{28})

Chadenos' mission took place sometime after the regions in northeast Anatolia rebelled against Michaēl VIII's treatment of Iōannēs IV, which occurred in 1262 (Pach. 259^{24}-267^{23}; Arnakis 1947:39), but the date cannot be specified any more accurately.

"a certain Chadenos" (31^{29})

This is Kōnstantinos Chadenos, whose career began under the basileus Theodōros II Laskaris as komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn (Pach. 47^{10}), but who advanced quickly under Michaēl VIII to the offices of prōthierakarios (on this position see PK 184^{10-13}; Guilland 1967:600-601) and eparchos (for this position see below), becoming a pansebastos sebastos at some point, presumably in the late 1260's. The only contemporary reference to him, other than that given by Pachymerēs, is a *prostagma* issued by Michaēl VIII, either in 1259 or 1274, instructing Chadenos to supply two hundred *modioi* of salt to the monastery of Lembos (document published in MM 4.285, and discussed in Ahrweiler 1965:149).

"eparchos" (31^{29})

This title occupied the twenty-fifth place in the hierarchy of Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 300^{18}). Although there had been various eparchoi serving a number of different roles in the earlier Byzantine Empire (Guilland 1981), by the 1300s the eparchos had no traditional or courtly functions (PK 178^{10-11}), and the title was nothing but a remnant of earlier offices.

"reasons which will be related" (31^{30})

In 1258 Chadenos arrested Michaēl Palaiologos and escorted him back to court. They apparently became friends during the journey (Pach. 47^{8}-51^{31}).

"Michaēl Palaiologos" (33^{1})

Michaēl Palaiologos was born in 1224/5 (Akrop. 98^{16}; Pach. 667^{7-8}), the son of the future megas domestikos Andronikos Palaiologos and his wife Theodōra. He claimed descent from the former imperial houses of Doukas, Angelos and Komnēnos (TT III 7). For a period in his early life he was brought up in the household of his sister Maria and her husband Nikēphoros Tarchaneiōtēs, another future megas domestikos (Pach. 179^{22}), but he claims that he was soon brought into the imperial household of Iōannēs III Batatzēs (Grégoire 1959-60:451).

At the age of eighteen Michaēl was given his first command by Iōannēs III (Dimitrievskii 1895:790), and he served in a number of capacities for the next decade or more. Always ambitious, Michaēl became increasingly suspected by the Laskarid dynasty of harbouring dreams of empire, and he was made to swear his loyalty to the dynasty on a number of occasions (Pach. 39^{23-25}, 45^{9-12}, 57^{24-29}; Akrop. 101^{2-6}).

For Michaēl Palaiologos' early life, see the *PLP*, no. 21528; Polemis (1968:107-108); Geanakoplos (1959:16-26).

"imposed military service upon them" (33^{6})

By implication Pachymerēs informs us that the borderers had not previously been eligible for conscription into regular imperial armies. From this date, however, there is evidence for the borderers being incorporated into campaign armies operating in Europe and elsewhere (Pach. 317^{11-15}).

"counting out forty nomismata for each" (33^{6-7})

Pachymerēs does not give a very clear account of what exactly it was that Chadenos did. Arnakis (1963-64:40) argued that Chadenos confiscated the lands of the borderers, and gave each a one-time payment of forty hyperpera. Charanis (1951b:133) alters that theory by making the payment of forty hyperpera an annual one. This theory is attractive, and fits with Pachymerēs' comments at Pach. 33^{20-25}, about the borderers receiving "the rogai assigned to them" at "customary times". Bartusis (1984:270) and Oikonomides (1981:359-360) alter this theory again, arguing that Chadenos left the borderers just enough income from their lands to ensure they remained living on it, and supplemented the income from that with a cash benefit from the imperial coffers.

The mechanism for this policy of more firmly integrating the borderers into the imperial body politic and gain more control over these regions (Arnakis 1947:39), was the cadastral survey and the fiscal reassessment, or *exisōsis* (Oikonomides 1981: 359-60; Ahrweiler 1963-64:111; Mutafčiev 1973:596). Chadenos did three things. First, he withdrew the regions' tax-exemptions. Second, he reorganised the land-holdings of each individual living in these regions, granting to each a newly-defined holding worth an assessed annual income of forty hyperpera. Necessarily this would have involved large-scale imperial confiscations, but as well as stripping wealth from some, it would have left others better off than they had been before the reorganisation. These were not necessarily *pronoiai*, and may be more akin to the allotments of land given to soldier-colonies in ancient times. Forty hyperpera was a not inconsiderable sum (Zuckerman 1986:327), but it was still only about half as great a value as the smallest known *pronoia* grant (Bartusis

1992:172-173). As his third action, Chadenos offered the borderers an annual salary (*rogai*) from the imperial treasury. How great this salary was is unknown. This salary was intended to leave the borderers dependent upon the imperial government for their livelihood, and more amenable to being conscripted into the army and sent away from their homes (see commentary to 33^{6}).

1.6 How the Persians occupied the mountains of the Romans

"Thereupon those Persians who were warlike" (33^{13-16})

Pachymerēs refers here to the Türkmen pastoralists who lived in the regions just beyond the Anatolian frontier of Byzantium. These people lived in independent tribes, living off their flocks and from the profits of raiding and brigandage (Hendy 1985:115; Vryonis 1971:133-34; Cahen 1951). It was from these people that the *ghazi* emirates of Anatolia, and later the Ottoman Empire, developed in the fourteenth century. Pachymerēs implies that the Türkmen only became a problem in the second half of the thirteenth century, but they had been a disruptive force in the affairs of Anatolia since the twelfth century, when the great Selçuk sultānate began to decay (Kinnamos 5.3; Akrop. 136^{11-22}).

As for the chronology of this passage, Pachymerēs describes the first major incursions and loss of Byzantine territory as occurring before 1270 (Pach. 403^{19}-405^{4}; Failler 1981:194), and thereafter more and more territory was abandoned. The situation was stabilised whenever a basileus or general was in the region with sizeable forces, but continuing difficulties in Hellas and Epiros demanded constant attention (Laiou 1972:23-25, 76-79).

"Tocharioi" (33^{14})

This name for the Mongols, used by numerous Byzantine authors (e.g. Akrop. 67^{2}), dates back to Hellenistic times, when a Scythian people called the Tocharioi lived on the borders of the Bactrian kingdom (Torday 1997:284-85; Moravcsik 1958:2.301, 329). This name was also used as the basis for the Arab name for the lands north of the Oxus river in Central Asia: Tukharistan (Torday 1997:293-298). According to Laiou (1993:113) Pachymerēs used this name as a deliberate move to differentiate the Mongols from the Cumans and other 'Scythian' peoples, by showing that they came from a place further to the east than these others. Other Byzantine authors, such as Grēgoras (30), failed to make such a distinction, and referred to them all as 'Scythians'. Indeed, Pachymerēs does observe that

the Mongols referred to themselves as Mongols and not as Tocharioi or Atarioi (Pach. 445^{7}).

The Mongols became heavily involved in the affairs of Anatolia, and especially in the Selçuk sultānate, from the 1240s. See the commentary to Pach. 2.24.

"their rightful portion of the plunder" (35^{5-6})

There was a belief that the administration of affairs in Byzantine Anatolia was hampered by corruption. Along with this complaint of Pachymerēs we have a similar report from Theodōros Palaiologos, the son of Andronikos II who became ruler of Montferrat. His report bears such a likeness to Pachymerēs' that it bears repeating at length (Theodōros Palaiologos 108, my italics):

> When the enemy attacks everyone flees with their wives and families, leaving their lands and homes and seeking safety in castles and forts. But the forts in this country are small and badly equipped for a good defence. *For the castellans and captains entrusted with the defence and protection of these places take the money only for their own profit, and not for the defence and protection of the land.*

Discontent with this corruption, along with the high tax burdens imposed by the imperial government upon the people of Anatolia (Pach. 291^{22}-293^{29}; Hendy 1985:298) was a major reason for the popular support behind Alexios Philanthropēnos' bid for the throne in the 1290s (Pach. (Bonn) II.210-215; Laiou 1972:80-83).

"the West" (35^{16})

In Pachymerēs' parlance, the West (*dusis*) refers to Epiros, and Westerners (*dutikōn*), to the Epirotes (Failler 1980a). This region set itself up as an independent state in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, under the rule of a branch of the Angeloi family. During the thirteenth century Epiros proved itself to be a major rival to Nikaia, and fighting between the two realms was almost continual from the late 1240s. See the commentary to 115^{9-18} and, more generally, Nicol (1957, 1984a).

1.7 How, under basileus Iōannēs, Michaēl Palaiologos was confirmed in the trust of the basileus

"When Theodōros Laskaris was ruling" (37^{3})

There are two separate time-frames in this chapter. It begins by discussing the position of Michaēl Palaiologos during the reign of Theodōros II Laskaris (r.1254-1258), then includes

a 'flashback' to events that occurred during the reign of Iōannēs III Batatzēs (r.1222-1254). Finally, Pachymerēs' narrative returns to the 'present' – the reign of Theodōros II.

"a daughter of a cousin of the basileus" (37^{4})

The wife of Michaēl VIII Palaiologos was Theodōra, daughter of Iōannēs Doukas, nephew of Iōannēs III, and his wife Eudokia Angelina. She was therefore the second cousin of Iōannēs IV. Born c.1240, she married Michaēl soon after his treason trial in 1253. On her see Talbot (1992:295-303).

"megas konostaulos" (37^{5})

Michaēl Palaiologos is the first recorded megas konostaulos, but the Byzantine use of konostaulos, derived from the French *conestable*, dates back to at least the reign of Alexios I Komnēnos (r.1081-1118) (Anna Komnēnē 2.28). The official role of the megas konostaulos was, from before Pachymerēs' time to at least the fourteenth century (PK 175^{12-14}), to act as commander of the Latin mercenary troops employed by the empire, what Pseudo-Kodinos terms the *rogatorōn frangōn.* Although Palaiologos is shown to be in command of these troops, especially during the aftermath of the death of Theodōros II (Pach. 79^{26}-81^{3}), he was also given other commands and governorships while he held this title, at least one of which he carried out without having the Latins under his command (Pach. 45^{15}-47^{6} and commentary). This suggests that, although Palaiologos is the first megas konostaulos to be named in the extant sources, others had held the position before him and that by the mid-thirteenth century the title had already begun to have little relation to its official duties. The title's fairly low rank in the hierarchy – twelfth (PK 300^{8-9}) – would mean many of the earlier holders of the office went unmentioned in the sources.

The megas konostaulos wore ceremonial vestments in cloth-of-gold with pink highlights, like the megas primmikērios, but did not carry a sceptre (PK 155^{1-19}).

It is generally accepted that Michaēl Palaiologos received this title after he swore his oaths to Iōannēs III, at the same time as he was given Iōannēs' niece Theodōra as a wife (Akrop. 101^{7-9}; Macrides 1978:373; Geanakoplos 1959:26). Before this time he held no courtly title.

"these things occurred when" (37^{11-12})

It is generally accepted that this story of Michaēl's arrest and imprisonment for treason is a reference to the same incident as a lengthy account written by Akropolitēs, who claims he was present at the time and witnessed the incident (Akrop. 92^{26}-100^{14}). While there are many differences between the two versions, there are enough similarities between them to

make this conclusion almost certainly a correct one. Failler (1980b:11) argues that Akropolitēs testimony is more complete and accurate for the early part of the affair, while Pachymerēs is to be preferred regarding the later course of events.

It is apparent that Michaēl Palaiologos was arrested on the orders of Iōannēs III at the beginning of 1253, but that the trial was delayed until Iōannēs III had completed that year's campaigning season (Akrop. 93^{4-6}). The accusation, according to Akropolitēs, was in relation to events that took place years before, in 1247 (Akrop. 93^{10-11}). The resulting trial was inconclusive, and Iōannēs kept Michaēl imprisoned for perhaps the greater part of a year (Failler 1980b:12), until Patriarch Manouēl II became involved and Michaēl was released after swearing oaths of loyalty to the basileus and his family.

"the governance of the western provinces" (37^{12})

Michaēl had been serving under his father, Andronikos, who had been made governor of Makedonia after the conquest of Thessalonikē in 1246. Michaēl's responsibilities and duties as described by Pachymerēs appear to be those of a *kephalē*, or military commandant.[24] His area of responsibility was the northern regions along the river Strymon, including the towns of Serrai and Melenikon (Akrop. 84^{2}). This was an important post guarding an easy invasion route from Bulgaria to Makedonia, but it falls far short of the governance of the entire "western provinces". Unfortunately we do not know how long Michaēl served in this region, but he no longer held a garrison command in 1253 at the time of his arrest. He was, instead, serving in the field army of the basileus (Akrop. 92^{16-18}).

"Palaiologos was accused of making a secret pact" (37^{12-13})

Geography alone makes Pachymerēs' conspiracy a doubtful one. Serrai and Melenikon, the main centres of Palaiologos' earlier command, lay on the Bulgarian frontier, but far from the realm of Michaēl II of Epiros. If Akropolitēs' testimony is correct, and the accusations dated back to 1247 (Akrop. 93^{10-11}), then Michaēl Palaiologos, at that time, would have had little chance to deal with Michaēl II – he was far away and governed only a small area, with greater Nikaian forces surrounding him. If Akropolitēs' testimony is incorrect, and the charges were due to some incident closer to the time of Palaiologos' arrest, then Palaiologos would have had little chance to deal with Michaēl II – the basileus was in Makedonia with the entire Nikaian army, and Michaēl Palaiologos was not, in any case, governing any region at that time.

[24] On *kephalai*, see the commentary to 43^{6}.

Akropolitēs claims that one of the accusations against Palaiologos was that he had engaged in secret negotiations with the Bulgarian tsar (Akrop. 93^{12-14}). This accusation fits much better with the geography, but the time that had elapsed between the alleged conspiracy (in 1247) and the accusation itself (1253) suggests that it may have merely been a convenient pretext, covering some unknown motive of Manglabitēs. Gardner (1912:189) suggests that Manglabitēs was pursuing Palaiologos in revenge for some maladministration during his time as *kephalē* of Melenikon, but if so it begs the question why Manglabitēs did not bring these charges, rather than charges of treason, and at the time of the offence, in 1247, rather than in 1253?

"Michaēl Angelos" (37^{14})

Michaēl Angelos Komnēnos Doukas was born c.1210, an illegitimate son of Michaēl I of Epiros (r.1205-1215), himself an illegitimate child. He was a nephew of Theodōros Doukas Angelos, who briefly reigned as basileus in Thessalonikē (1224-1230).

Michaēl II gained independent control over Epiros in 1231, after his uncle's fall, and maintained his rule until his death in 1267/8 (Nicol 1984a:9). From 1246 onwards he was in a state of almost continual hostility, if not open warfare, against the Empire of Nikaia, which sought to incorporate Epiros into itself. It seems likely that he submitted, in form at least, to Iōannēs III after the basileus took Thessalonikē, and in return received from Iōannēs the title of despotēs (Macrides 1978:331-332). In 1249, during a brief diplomatic interlude, he agreed to marry his son Nikēphoros to Iōannēs III's granddaughter (Akrop. 88^{15-17}; Dölger, *Regesten*, 1799).

Michaēl II married Theodōra Petraliphina, and had by her three sons (Nikēphoros, Iōannēs and Demetrios-Michaēl) and three daughters (Helenē, Anna and Eudokia(?)). By another woman he also had two illegitimate sons, Theodōros and another Iōannēs.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 220.

"despotēs" (37^{14})

Simply a word meaning 'master' or 'lord', despotēs became an official title when Manouēl I Komnenos bestowed it upon his son-in-law Bela of Hungary in the 1160s (Chon. 126-8; Kinnamos 211-215). It occupied the highest rank in the imperial hierarchy – second only to the basileus himself (PK 300^{2}). It was one of the 'imperial' titles (Pach. 105^{27}), normally reserved for members of the imperial family, but occasionally given to important autonomous or foreign rulers the basileus wished to bind more closely to the empire, such as Bela of Hungary, mentioned above. There was only one familial despotēs at any time. Iōannēs Palaiologos, for instance, the brother of Michaēl VIII, resigned the office in favour

of his nephew, the future Andronikos II (Pach. 435^{19-25}). However, there could be more than one foreign despotēs. Both Michaēl II of Epiros and his son Nikēphoros held the title from the Nikaian Empire at the same time (Akrop. 84^{16-19}, 88^{15-17}).

Like the sebastokratōr, the despotēs had no set function. Rather, he could carry out whatever role or command the basileus assigned him (PK 167^{3-6}). As would be expected, the ceremonial vestments of the despotēs were very grand, from a pearl-encrusted crown (*skiadion*) to cloth-of-gold, to eagle-embroidered shoes (PK 141^{3}-146^{5}; Failler 1982a).

See Guilland (1967:2.1-24).

"he was denounced to the basileus" (37^{15})

Akropolitēs names the accuser as one Nikolaos Manglabitēs of the northeast Makedonian town of Melenikon (Akrop. 93^{2}). Manglabitēs was a prominent citizen of that town, and had been instrumental in its surrender to Iōannēs III in 1246 (Akrop. 76^{5}). He may have been seen as a reliable witness by the basileus in light of this previous service.

"single combat" (37^{23})

One reading of this passage suggests that Michaēl Palaiologos was ready to take part in a judicial duel himself to clear his name, and that this request was denied by Iōannēs III. This is the reading of Geanakoplos (1976:154) who claims that Iōannēs III refused this request of Michaēl Palaiologos in order to avoid giving him an honourable type of trial.

There is a second possible reading of this passage, based on information supplied by Akropolitēs. That author wrote that the two witnesses to Palaiologos' alleged treasonous remarks – citizens of Melenikon – were ordered by the basileus to engage in single combat to discover the truth (Akrop. 95^{5-9}). Pachymerēs may in this case be saying that Michaēl Palaiologos was prepared to accept the result of this duel. In the event, the duel proved nothing – the pro-Palaiologos witness was defeated, but refused to change his testimony, even when facing the headsman's axe. As Pachymerēs says, this duel "did not remove these suspicions".

The judicial duel was apparently a recent innovation taken, like the use of the ordeal, from Latin practice (on the ordeal see the commentary to 55^{4-10}). In Byzantine usage it appears to have involved a mounted combat – perhaps a joust – which ended when one combatant was unhorsed or killed in the saddle (Akrop. 95^{5-9}).

"Manouēl" (39^{5})

Manouēl II rose to the Patriarchate in 1244, after the seat had been vacant for nearly four years. Akropolitēs records (Akrop. 106^{4-6}) that Manouēl was a pious man, though he had

been married before joining the priesthood, and that he was a simple man who could barely read. Nevertheless, he was intensely involved in negotiations with the papacy regarding Church union, and reached a compromise position on the progression that, in 1254, seemed about to heal the schism (Norden 1903:756-759). Unfortunately Manouēl died shortly thereafter, as did Pope Innocent IV and Iōannēs III (Blemmidēs 1.43 states that Iōannēs III and Manouēl II died "as if by common accord").

"in Lydia" (39^{5})

After his return from Makedonia in February of 1254, Iōannēs remained in Lydia – near the main imperial palace at Nymphaion – for the rest of his life (Akrop. 102^{13-14}; Failler 1980b:12). The final illness of Iōannēs III, including the presence of the patriarch at the side of the basileus until close to the end, and the last-minute release of Palaiologos and others from political imprisonment, bears a striking similarity to the final illness of Theodōros II in 1258 (see the commentary to 57^{25}, 93^{8}, 95^{18}).

"Achyraous" (39^{18})

Located roughly half-way between Prousa and Smyrnē, Achyraous was originally an unimportant small town, it became important after the Turkish occupation of central Anatolia. It was then on the front line and was a strategic way-point on the road from Lydia to Bithynia. As a sign of this new status, Achyraous became the seat of a metropolitan archbishop in the twelfth century.

Despite its importance, and the strength of its Komnenian fortifications, Achyraous was one of the first Byzantine holdings to fall to the Turks in the 1300s.

"one of his household who had taken holy orders" (39^{21})

According to a manuscript gloss, this was one Alexios Phrangopoulos (Failler 1980b:10-11 and n.14). Theodōros II addressed a letter to him, in which he was referred to as a "master of rhetoric and poetry" (Festa 271).

There is a possibility that this Phrangopoulos can be identified with the patriarch's clerical secretary (*tou hierōtatou grammatikou*), who is mentioned in another of Theodōros' letters as bearing information regarding "the question of Palaiologos" (*peri de tēs tou Palaiologou hypotheseōs*) (Festa 130).

"his companions"(39^{23})

These individuals, their number and their role in this affair, are otherwise unknown. We can suggest two possibilities. Firstly, Akropolitēs recorded that the pro-Palaiologos combatant

at the judicial duel in 1253 was imprisoned (Akrop. 96^{2-3}). He could be one of these 'companions' (and, to our modern sense of justice, one can hope he was released at this time). Secondly, Iōannēs may have released other political prisoners at this time. There is evidence that, on his deathbed in 1258, Theodōros II ordered freed many, if not all, of those he had imprisoned out of personal or political hostility (Pach. 57^{25} and commentary).

"he accepted their censure" (39^{24})

Michaēl swore oaths of loyalty before the patriarch (Akrop. 101^{2-6}) and the synod (Pach. 39^{24}), and accepted the penalty of automatic excommunication in the event that he broke his promises in this regard (Skout. 503^{30-31}; Laurent, *Regestes*, 1320). This was the first of several times that Palaiologos was made to swear his eternal allegiance to the Laskarid dynasty,[25] and he was absolved of all of them before he was raised to the throne at the beginning of 1259 (Pach. 135^{10}; Akrop. 158^{22}-159^{4}).

"he took much greater care" (39^{27})

Skoutariōtēs reports that, even after Michaēl had sworn these oaths at this time the Laskarids still regarded him with suspicion (Skout. 504^{2-4}). Indeed, less than two years later Palaiologos was forced to flee the empire after warnings about Theodōros II's suspicions about him (see Pach. 1.9).

1.8 How the second Laskaris, slighting many of those holding honours, replaced them with others.

"for the illness which had struck him . . ." (41^{7-8})

Theodōros' illness may be diagnosed tentatively, from the evidence of his symptoms and behaviour provided in the sources, as interictal temporal lobe epilepsy. As well as occasional seizures, sufferers of this malady display several behavioural traits, including paranoia and emotional aggression (see Blemmidēs 1.48^{1-6}; Pach. 43^{13-14}, 53^{22}-55^{1}, $57^{9-10, 21-22}$), physical aggression (Akrop. 130^{25}-132^{7}), occasional psychotic episodes (Pach. 57^{9-16}), hypergraphia (Pach. 59^{13-20}; witness also the large volume of surviving personal correspondence of Theodōros) and a fascination with supernatural or metaphysical matters (all of Theodōros' writings were of philosophical or religious content, and many of the

[25] He also had to swear his loyalty after his return from Konya in 1257 (Greg. 59^{14-25}; Ephraim 9179), and again after his release from imprisonment before Theodōros' death in 1258 (Pach. 57^{27}).

recipients of his correspondence were intellectuals. Theodōros is a basileus often portrayed[26] as having his head in the clouds).

Such a diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy has been given to the maladies of Gaius Caligula (Benediktson 1988-89:370-375) and the Biblical prophet Ezekiel (*New Scientist Magazine* (vol.172, no. 2317, 17 November 2001, p.20)). For a summary of the symptoms of temporal lobe epilepsy, see Geschwind (1979:217-219).

"prōtobestiarios" (41^{8})

This office existed throughout the history of the empire. It was originally a position held by a eunuch, who was the keeper of the imperial wardrobe, but as with so many other such household appointments, prōtobestiarioi began to have other roles. By the eleventh century prōtobestiarioi were serving as ambassadors, commanding armies and undertaking other duties that had nothing to do with the position's original function. By the Palaiologan period prōtobestiarios was a very high-ranking position. Pseudo-Kodinos places it fifth in the official hierarchy (PK 300^{4}). The prōtobestiarios was distinguished by his green garments and boots (PK 134^{3-9}, 320^{12-18}) and Pachymerēs reports in a later passage how this distinctive colour revealed a case of mistaken identity (Pach. 85^{22-24}).

On this office, see Guilland (1967:1.216-236).

"Alexios Rhaoul" (41^{9})

Alexios was influential enough at the court of Iōannēs III to become married to a niece of the basileus, the daughter of his brother. He was made prōtobestiarios in 1242 (Akrop. 66^{19-20}), and served with Michaēl Palaiologos in Makedonia in the early 1250's (Akrop. 92^{15-21}). It is likely he was dead by 1258, as his sons are listed by Pachymerēs as being present at the debates after the assassination of the Mouzalōnes, but he himself is not (Pach. 93^{8-9}).

"Geōrgios Mouzalōn" (41^{10})

Geōrgios, the oldest of the Mouzalōn brothers, had been raised in the imperial household with Theodōros II (Pach. 65^{25-29}), so was presumably about the same age and was born c.1220. He became Theodōros' closest friend (Festa 214; Akrop. 124^{4}), and was awarded the title of megas domestikos shortly after Theodōros became basileus in 1254. During Theodōros' Bulgarian campaign of 1255 Mouzalōn remained in the east as some kind of viceroy (Akrop. 118^{23}-119^{1}). He later received more titles from Theodōros. As well as

[26] By, for example, Wolff (1947:647), Fine (1987:159), Bartusis (1992:35); Norwich (1995:204); Gardner (1912:198-206); Vasiliev (1952:534) and Ostrogorsky (1968:444).

becoming prōtobestiarios, he appears to have simultaneously been prōtosebastos and megas stratopedarchēs (Akrop. 124^{4-7}; Macrides 1978:366).

Although he was almost universally hated by the ruling classes of Nikaia, and receives a very bad press from Akropolitēs, Grēgoras (Greg. 62^{14-16}) praises him and commends his administrative powers.

"Atrammytion" (41^{10})

In the eleventh century this coastal town was of some considerable size (Anna Komnēnē 3.143). Devastated by the Turks it was rebuilt and strongly fortified against Turkish raids by Alexios and Manouēl Komnēnos (Anna Komnēnē loc. cit.; Chon. 150^{35-37}; Skout. 268^{1-19}). In the treaty of Nymphaion, signed in 1214 between Theodōros I Laskaris and the Latin Emperor Henri, it was assigned to Latin control (Dölger, *Regesten,* no. 1684; Gardner 1912:84-85). It remained in Latin hands until 1224. It was finally lost to the Empire sometime before 1334.

"Theodōra, of the family of Kantakouzenoi" (41^{11})

Theodōra was a niece of Michaēl Palaiologos, being the eldest daughter of Eirēnē-Eulogia and her husband Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos. Nicol (1968:16) suggests that she was born about 1240. Following the assassination of her husband Mouzalōn in 1258 she was given in marriage by Michaēl, now basileus, to his supporter Iōannēs Rhaoul. After his death she became a nun with the name Kyriakē.

Theodōra was a highly educated woman who composed her own academic works and who corresponded with many of the leading intellectuals of her time. She was imprisoned by Michaēl VIII for a time because of her anti-Unionist stance. She died in 1300.

On her see Nicol (1994:33-47), Papadopulos (1938:20), and Fassoulakis (1973:25-26). She is listed in the *PLP*, no. 10943.

"Andronikos Mouzalōn" (41^{12})

Little is known of the second of the Mouzalōn brothers. Like his siblings he had known Theodōros II since childhood. It cannot be said whether his elevation to megas domestikos was due to ability, the basileus' affection for him, or out of Theodōros' love for his brother Geōrgios. Akropolitēs (130^{31}-131^{1}), no friend of the Mouzalōnes, describes Andronikos as being "thin and weak of body". It is not known whether he and his wife had any children before his assassination in 1258.

"megas domestikos" (41^{12})

The megas domestikos was the highest-ranking military officer of the empire. Originally there were two megaloi domestikoi, one each for the eastern and western regions of the empire, but after the Fourth Crusade this distinction was understandably removed and thereafter there was only one megas domestikos. From the Nikaian period onwards, the megas domestikos' ranking in the hierarchy dropped a few places from its earlier position (PK 134).

Although earlier Nikaian megaloi domestikoi, especially Andronikos Palaiologos and Nikēphoros Tarchaneiōtēs were active soldiers, there is no evidence to suggest that either of the Mouzalōn brothers who held the position ever held military commands. In Geōrgios' case this may perhaps be excused, since during his brief time in the role Theodōros II was personally leading the army (Akrop. 118-119). Nevertheless, their lack of military experience, though they held military office, may have contributed in some way to the ease with which the army was later incited to assassinate them.

On this office, see Guilland (1967:1.405-425).

"the daughter of Rhaoul" (41^{12-13})

Like so many Byzantine women, nothing is known of this woman except who she was married to. After the death of her first husband Andronikos, she married the prōtostratōr Andronikos Palaiologos (Pach. 155^{13-16}). See Fassoulakis (1973:24).

"the third of the brothers was promoted to prōthierakarios" (41^{13})

The youngest of the Mouzalōn brothers was named Theodōros (Greg. 66^{2}).[27] Both Akropolitēs (155^{18-19}) and Grēgoras (66^{2}) refer to him as prōtokynēgos rather than as prōthierakarios, the former being of higher official rank, but similar function. It is possible, following Guilland (1967:1.600-601), to suggest that Theodōros Mouzalōn held both offices successively, but I would suggest instead that Pachymerēs is here merely confusing the two similar offices. Akropolitēs, the contemporary, is the more trustworthy here.

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[27] This Theodōros Mouzalōn is sometimes identified with the Theodōros Mouzalōn who attained high position under Andronikos II (for example, by Alexander Kazhdan in his article "Mouzalōn" in the *ODB*, 2.1420-1421, and Failler in the index to his edition of Pachymeres, (Failler 2000:36; but *cf.* Failler 1984:40 n.6). However, this identification is improbable. Akropolitēs explicitly records that all the Mouzalōn brothers died at Sōsandra (Akrop. 154-156), and while the later Mouzalōn is recorded as having a brother named Leon, no connection is made between them and Geōrgios or Andronikos. Papadopulos (1938:20) suggests that the second Theodōros is actually the son of Geōrgios and Theodōra Kantakouzēnē, but this suggestion must also be rejected. Geōrgios and Theodōra were only married for perhaps two years (1256-1258), and would have needed to have produced both Theodōros and Leon in this time. Twins cannot be ruled out, but are unlikely.

According to Guilland (1967:1.600-601), Theodōros was the only known holder of the office of prōtokynēgos.

"a noble descent" (41^{14})

Akropolitēs (67^{8}) refers to a certain Iōannēs Mouzalōn. A monk in 1243, he was a former mystikos of Iōannēs III. The mystikos is ranked thirty-first in the court hierarchy (PK 300^{23}) and was thus not very highly ranked. Unfortunately nothing else is known about this early Mouzalōn. However, if we assume that Iōannēs became a monk in later life, as many Byzantine men did, he would have been of the right generation to be the father or uncle of the Mouzalōn brothers, and certainly having a relation at court would help us explain why they were accepted at court as *paidopouloi* of Theodōros.

Even if Iōannēs was not a direct relation of Geōrgios and his brothers, it is by no means certain that their family background was humble. A number of Mouzalōnes are mentioned in sources dating back to the eleventh century (Polemis 1968:148-149), and while they were not of the highest level of the nobility, there was a history of Mouzalōnes receiving titles and offices from a number of basileis.

"*paidopouloi*" (41^{15})

This title, often translated as 'pages',[28] was held by young men selected by the basileus and given a place at court as an entry-level position in the imperial administration (Angold 1975a:176-177). Their tasks at court were varied, and had many ceremonial aspects (PK. 172^{4-6}, 174^{16-18}, 176^{7-8}, 191^{16-19}, 192^{2-4}, 211^{4-7}, 215^{1-2}, 226^{8-9}, 230^{13-14}, 232^{5-9}) though they were also sent on low-level missions of state (MM 3.72). They seem to have been under the supervision of the parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos (MM 1.14).

Angold (1975a:177) argues that the *paidopouloi* came from non-noble families, but I would suggest – from the fact that the Mouzalōn brothers enough time and freedom to gain a close friendship with an imperial prince, and the happy acceptance of the blue-blooded Palaiologoi family of a former *paidopoulos*, Balanidiōtēs, as a prospective in-law (Pach. 55^{17}-57^{1}) – that while the *paidopouloi* were not from the highest ranks of the nobility, they were not of common birth either. The Mouzalōnes, it appears, were members of the provincial aristocracy of Atrammytion.

[28] This translation has been avoided here due to the Western, feudal associations of the word.

"he deprived two notable men of their eyes" (41^{15-16})

Blinding was the traditional Byzantine way of removing political rivals, since a blind man, being imperfect, could not rule. Thus Isaac II, Iōannēs IV and others were blinded by those who usurped their thrones. Blinding was also used as a terrible form of punishment for various serious crimes, particularly treason.

The actual procedure was carried out by various means, typically by applying a red-hot iron to the eyes, pouring boiling vinegar into them, or physically removing them. The first two methods resulted in varying degrees of blindness. Some victims, such as Alexios Philanthrōpēnos in the 1290's, could still act as generals after previously being blinded. The sixteenth century writer Theodōros Spandounes mentions that under the old empire the method depended upon the rank of the victim; nobles were blinded, while the lower orders had their eyes removed (Spandounes 18). His testimony is unreliable, since Akropolitēs (155^{2-3}) writes that Theodōros Philēs had his eyes gouged out, while Kōnstantinos Stratēgopoulos was merely "blinded". Both of these men were from high-ranking noble families.

"Alexios Stratēgopoulos" (41^{16-17})

The Stratēgopouloi claimed a connection with the Komnēnoi (MM 4.390, where Alexios refers to himself as the kaisar Komnēnos Stratēgopoulos). In a later passage of Pachymerēs (93^{11}), the Stratēgopouloi are listed as one of the great families of the empire. Since his son was honoured with marriage to a niece of the basileus Iōannēs III, we can assume that the Stratēgopouloi, and especially Alexios, were held in high esteem by the basileus, even before Alexios' first appearance in the sources, in which he is leading a Nikaian force against Epiros (Akrop. 90^{4-5}). Alexios at this time was presumably not as young as his co-commander, Michaēl Palaiologos (born c.1224), but we cannot accept Nicol's comment (1957:191) that Alexios was "elderly" in 1261. That assumption stems in large part from Pach. 153^{19}, where Alexios is termed *ton geronta Stratēgopoulon*. The *ton geronta* does not refer to age, but merely the fact that Alexios was at the time an untitled member of the senate, which Pachymerēs always terms the *gerousia* (see Pach. 65^{14} and commentary).

In 1255-56 Stratēgopoulos had been joint commander, with Kōnstantinos Tornikios, of an expedition against the Bulgarian-held fortress of Tzepaina. The expedition was a complete failure and Theodōros II was furious (Akrop. 113^{24}-114^{19}; Festa 251-255). Alexios was imprisoned for a time, perhaps until Theodōros II's death in August 1258 (Akrop. 154^{26}-155^{2}). He certainly held no new command until his former comrade Palaiologos ascended to the throne.

"Kōnstantinos Stratēgopoulos" (41^{17})

Pachymerēs (93^{3-8}) later reveals that Kōnstantinos was blinded by Theodōros II because he had uttered disrespectful words about the basileus. Kōnstantinos was, according to Pachymerēs (93^{4-5}), "celebrated for his bravery", so it is possible that he had served in the army before his blinding, although he does not seem to have held any offices afterwards. He remained at court until his death in 1292. His son, Michaēl, was later prōtostratōr (*fl.* 1280's).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 26897.

Little is known about his wife. See Polemis (1968:109). Her father was the sebastokratōr Isaakios Doukas, brother of Iōannēs III (Akrop. 92^{5}). He took little active role in the administration of the empire, but was used by both Iōannēs III and, later, Michaēl VIII to give a royal face to various embassies.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 5691.

"Theodōros Philēs" (41^{19})

The Philēs family was a recent addition to the upper rank of the aristocracy, having only come into prominence under the Laskarids (Angold 1975a:70). Theodōros is the first Philēs to be singled out for mention by the contemporary authors. He took over the governorship of Thessalonikē after the unexpected death of Andronikos Palaiologos in 1247 (Akrop. 84^{15}). Pachymerēs (93^{10-12}) writes later that Philēs was, like Kōnstantinos Stratēgopoulos, blinded for expressing disdain for Theodōros II, though it is also true that Theodōros II had disliked Philēs for several years, and revealed his opinion in a letter to Akropolitēs (Festa 105^{23-24}), so it is possible that there was more behind his blinding than we know. Like many of those who were wronged by Theodōros II, Philēs became a supporter of Michaēl Palaiologos, and was sent by him as emissary to Michaēl II of Epiros (Akrop. 163^{18}-164^{13}).

"he took many other new measures" (41^{19}-43^{1})

This passage presumably refers to Theodōros' policy of weakening the power of the great noble families by promoting men of lesser breeding to positions of influence in the army and administration. As Pachymerēs (61^{6-13}) later admits, it was a policy designed to advance capable and talented men, rather than merely serve the ambitions of the nobly born. His father Iōannēs III had also adopted such a policy, but Theodōros, unlike Iōannēs, went about this worthy aim with a complete lack of respect and understanding of noble sentiment.

The feelings of the aristocracy were reflected in the comments of Akropolitēs regarding some of the basileus' new men, treating Kōnstantinos Margaritēs as an uncouth, beast-like

peasant from the country (Akrop. 123^{4-9}), dismissing the Mouzalōn brothers as childish and "not worth three obols" (Akrop. 124^{10-13}) and writing that other favourites of Theodōros "were little men unworthy of such notice, and that is why they were disregarded as despised men" (Akrop. 160^{14-15}, translated by Macrides 1978:172). However, Grēgoras, with the objectivity of one distanced from events, writes that Geōrgios Mouzalōn was a wise and good administrator (Greg. 62^{14-16}).

1.9 How Kotys prepared Palaiologos to desert to the Persians

"the governorship" (43^{6})

Although kephalē was, by the second half of the thirteenth century, increasingly used to denote a provincial governor, Pachymerēs always uses the word in an anatomical sense, and his use of kephalē in this passage may be coincidental, a metaphor meeting with reality.

Michaēl's position was probably in fact that of doux, the older Byzantine title for the governor of a theme (Angold 1975a:250-258), rather than that of kephalē, the new-style governor responsible for a *katepanikion*, a region much smaller than a theme (Maksimovic 1988:70-83, 117-163; Angold 1975a:293; Bartusis 1992:33-34). Two related pieces of evidence suggest this. The first is that Michaēl wrote letters to his subordinates, enjoining them to maintain law and order and see to the defence of their towns and castles (Akrop. 135^{27}-136^{4}). These instructions bear a close resemblance to the instructions normally given to a *kephalē* (Sathas 6.642-643). Secondly, Skoutariōtēs (Skout. 527^{14}) explicitly refers to the recipients of this memorandum as kephalai.

"Mesothinia and Optimatoi" (43^{6-7})

Michaēl's province is named Bithynia by the other sources (Akrop. 134^{8}; Greg. 57^{21-23}; Skout. 527^{9}; Ephraim 9119). Under Nikaia this theme extended from the Sangarios River in the east to the Troad in the west (Angold 1975a:244-245). Its capital was Nikaia itself (Festa 241^{21-22}). Included in this area was the old theme of Optimaton, being the peninsula between the Black Sea and the Gulf of Nikomedia.

Mesothinia is hard to pinpoint, though it lay outside Bithynia (Akrop. 135^{22}). Kantakouzēnos placed it near Pelekanon, southeast of Chalcēdōn (Kant. 1.341^{10ff}), and it may have been near Paphlagonia (see the remark of Pach. 403^{11-13}). It seems to have been located in much the same region as Optimaton, and it may have been merely another name for the same place (Angold 1975a:245 n.11).

"doing many things against the Italians" (43^{7-8})

Geanakoplos (1959:27n.44) suggests that this may be a reference to actions mentioned in a passage of Michaēl's autobiographical *typikon* (Grégoire 1959-60:451-453). This cannot be the case, since the latter actions occurred while Iōannēs III Batatzēs was still alive, while the former took place nearly two years after that basileus' death.

Pachymerēs' passage need not indicate any actions taken against the Latins in Kōnstantinoupolis itself, since there were still some Latin holdings on the Asiatic shore. It probably refers to nothing more than minor raiding and general harassment of these holdings, since no other source mentions them, and Pachymerēs himself gives no specifics.

"Kotys" (43^{8})

This man is known only through Pachymerēs. What position he held in the palace, if any, is unknown, though he must have been a man of some standing to have become an intimate friend of the aristocratic Michaēl Palaiologos.

He appears to history only once more. In 1280, Michaēl executed his old friend Kotys, now a monk named Theodōros, after suspecting him of engaging in anti-Unionist plotting with Iōannēs Doukas (Pach. 613^{15}-615^{8}).

"for me to remain" (43^{11-12})

Presumably Kotys is referring to the danger he would face for having informed Palaiologos, and not to some other matter.

"if you desire to keep your eyes" (43^{12-13})

Akropolitēs (Akrop. 134^{28-29}) and Ephraim (9126) also record the specific punishment feared by Michaēl. This fear was not without foundation: see Pach. 41^{15-19} for Theodōros II's blinding of Kōnstantinos Stratēgopoulos and Theodōros Philēs.

"feared for himself" (43^{14})

The sources are unanimous in recording that the danger Palaiologos faced stemmed from suspicions and malice (Akrop. 134^{15}-135^{1}; Skout. 527^{16-17}; Greg. 58^{1-2}; Grégoire 1959-60:453; Dimitrievskii 1895:790; Holobōlos 34^{24}). None of these authors gives any indication that these suspicions had any foundation in fact.

"megas chartoularios" (43^{15})

In the heyday of the Byzantine Empire, the megaloi chartoularioi were the heads of several of the larger bureaucratic departments, though they also occasionally acted as regional

governors or as army commanders. The megas chartoularios Iōannēs Petraliphas, for example, was a commander in the campaign against Thessalonikē in 1242 (Akrop. 66^{18-20}).

By the Palaiologan period, however, megas chartoularios was apparently another empty court honorific. The holder of this title had as his major ceremonial duty the leading of the basileus' horse (PK 168^{12-27}).

"Michaēl Palaiologos" (43^{15-16})

This man was the brother of Andronikos Palaiologos, and the paternal uncle of the future basileus. If we are to believe a marginal note on a manuscript, he was married to a daughter of Alexios V Mourtzouphlos (Heisenberg 1907:24 n.1).

Laurent (1933:148) writes that the elder Michaēl was imprisoned after offending Theodōros II, but Pachymerēs does not name the basileus involved, and it is more likely that it was Iōannēs III, since it was under that basileus that his brother Andronikos was active, and we can be sure that Akropolitēs, no friend of Theodōros II and a great partisan of Michaēl VIII, would have mentioned the persecution by the former of the latter's family.

"some of his household" (43^{25})

Palaiologos' company was obviously of small size, since it was waylaid by a band of Türkmen brigands (Akrop. 136^{9-22}; Skout. 527^{24-28}). From Akropolitēs' account it seems that the majority of Michaēl's men were personal servants. Of Michaēl's companions, only Kotys is named, so it seems likely that there were no other individuals of note accompanying him in his flight.[29]

"crossing the Sangarios River" (43^{25-26})

The most direct route between Nikaia and Konya was via Malagina, Dorylaion and Cotyaion, and thence southeastward through either Polybotos and Philomelion or Amorion and Laodikeia (Ramsay 1890:197-198). This route was an old Byzantine road of some commercial and military importance (Foss 1990:164-165, 173-174). If this was the route taken by Palaiologos, then the river he crossed would not have been the Sangarios, but rather the Gallos, which was bridged at Pithekas, located at the confluence of the Sangarios and Gallos (Ramsay 1890:201-202). At this time the 'official' border between Nikaian and Selçuk dominions lay between Malagina and Dorylaion, but in this period a no-mans land some two or three days travel wide lay between the Nikaian and Selçuk territories, an area dominated by bandits and robber nomads (Arnakis 1963-64:37).

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[29] But *cf.* Verpeaux (1965:89-99) and Bartusis (1984:275), who argue that a nobleman's *oikeios* was composed of friends and family of similar social standing.

Akropolitēs (Akrop. 136^{9-22}) and Skoutariōtēs (Skout. 527^{24-28}), write that Palaiologos and his followers were waylaid and robbed by Türkmen nomads while en route to the sultān. There is no reason to doubt that this happened. It must be remembered that the prōtobestiaritēs Karyanitēs was robbed and killed by Türkmen bandits after he had fled to Konya following the death of the Mouzalōnes (Akrop. 159^{19}-160^{3}). For the Türkmen and their habits, see Hendy (1985:114-117).

"the sultān" (43^{26})

This is 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II. He was born c.1235, a son of Sultān Ghiyath al-Dīn Kaikhosrau II. In 1256 he had been on the throne for ten years, but had only recently gained his independence from the atabeg, Karatay, who had acted as regent (Cahen 1968:274-275). Willem van Ruysbroeck, writing in 1255, states that Kayka'us II had little support from the Turkish nobility and had "no money, few soldiers and many enemies" (Willem van Ruysbroeck 219-220)

"received him gladly" (45^{1})

Akropolitēs writes that Kayka'us II treated Michaēl "like one related to him", since he saw in the Greek a skilful leader of men (Akrop. 136^{25-26}).

"he campaigned. . . against the enemies of the Sultān" (45^{2-3})

The cause of this fighting was the refusal of 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II to allow pasturage to a Mongol force serving under the *noyan* Baiju, a lieutenant of the Il-khan Hülegü (BH 424; Rashid al-Dīn 31; Juvainī 2.608-609; Ibn Bibi 271). This short conflict was ended in the autumn of 1256, when the sultān's army disintegrated at the battle of Akseray (Ibn Bibi 272-273, al-Aqsarayli 41).

It is not clear whom exactly Michaēl was commanding during this campaign. Grēgoras (Greg. 58^{19}-59^{1}) contradicts Pachymerēs and writes that Palaiologos commanded Greek subjects of the sultān, though still under Byzantine banners, while in an autobiographical *typikon*, Michaēl himself says he commanded "Persians", meaning Turks (Dimitrievskii 1895:791). In addition, a contemporary Turkish official, cited by Bombaci (1978:363), writes that the sultān bestowed the title of kundestabl upon Palaiologos, which made him commander of the whole Selçuk army.

We must assume that Michaēl told the truth about himself, for it would bring little credit to a good Christian to openly admit leading Muslim troops for a Muslim ruler, even against a pagan foe. Indeed Michaēl went to great lengths to justify his actions, stating that he had not served for gold, nor had he done anything to harm the empire, but that he had

fought alongside the Turks because of the great danger that the bloodthirsty Mongols posed to both their peoples (Dimitrievskii 1895:791). It can therefore be stated with some certainty that Palaiologos commanded Turkish troops during this campaign.[30]

However, this leaves two Greek accounts, Grēgoras and Pachymerēs, which have Michaēl serving with Greek troops under imperial banners. They cannot solely refer to the few members of his household who fled Nikaia with him, being too few to warrant inclusion in the Selçuk army as a separate command with its own banners.[31] We must also reject as folly the suggestion that Palaiologos, as a renegade suspected of aiming for the imperial throne, would risk increasing the paranoia of Theodōros II by raising imperial banners without authorisation, especially if we remember that, according to Pachymerēs, he was endeavouring to regain the basileus' trust.

The account of Akropolitēs (Akrop. 143-144) clears up the confusion. After fleeing from defeat at Akseray, 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II met with Theodōros II at Sardeis, where he agreed to cede the town of Laodikeia to the empire in return for military aid. Theodōros despatched a force of four hundred men to help restore the sultān to his throne.[32] In his account, Akropolitēs writes that Michaēl and Theodōros were reconciled after the successful completion of the mission of the four hundred soldiers (Akrop. 144^{20-23})[33]. It seems at least possible that this company is the force of Greek troops with imperial banners with which Michaēl served, perhaps in order to prove his trustworthiness to the basileus. Serving with imperial troops, and not commanding them, would explain why Michaēl himself does not mention the incident, and would also help soften the otherwise abrupt transition he made from renegade traitor to a trusted and powerful governor in the west.

For the chronology of this period, see Failler (1980b:17-18).

"imperial standard" (45^{2})

The different types of 'imperial standards' employed by the Byzantines from the 9th century onwards are discussed by Babuin (2001:22-31). The styles cover the gamut from Western-style gonfanons to vexilla to solid, Roman legion type eagles. Religious symbols, such as

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[30] We do know, however, that Greeks did serve with Turkish armies. There is the example of Michaēl Palaiologos, of course, but we also have evidence, from an Armenian source, of an illustrious Greek called "Halgam" who fought in a battle between Armenians and Türkmen (Cahen 1939:133). But these examples are of individuals, when the issue here is of large Greek units.

[31] In addition, if Akropolitēs' account is accepted, most of Michaēl's followers had been taken as slaves by the Türkmen raiders (Akrop. 136^{9-22}).

[32] The early fourteenth century Persian writer al-Aqsarayli (49) states that the force supplied by Theodōros consisted of three thousand Frankish cavalry. If accurate, this report bolsters the argument for the presence of Michaēl Palaiologos, who had been recently reinstated as megas konostaulos, the commander of the Frankish mercenaries (Greg.59^{25}-60^{1}).

[33] This force reinstalled 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II on his throne in Konya in May 1257 (Ibn Bibi 276).

crosses or portraits of angels or saints, are common but so too are images of the basileus and imperial symbols such as the Palaiologan eagle (Babuin 2001:36-38). For a contemporary list of banners and flags used in the empire, see Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 195[29]-196[15]). Considering the variety of standards used, it is impossible to identify that used by Palaiologos at this time.

"being seized by repentance" (45[4ff])

Pachymerēs is alone in writing that Palaiologos made the first approach to the basileus, rather than vice versa. Akropolitēs (Akrop. 144[20-23]), Skoutariōtēs (Skout. 531[15-17]) and Ephraim (9130-9131) are all silent on this matter, while Grēgoras (Greg. 59[11-12]) suggests that Palaiologos was encouraged to return by gracious imperial messages of love. Michaēl himself, in an apologetic, autobiographical *typikon* (Grégoire 1959-60:453), while admitting to feelings of homesickness, says that he was begged to return by the basileus. In these accounts Theodōros is shown to have appealed to Michaēl's feelings of family and homeland. According to Angold (1999:47), these feelings were at the core of a Byzantine aristocrat's identity.

I believe that Pachymerēs is here giving an inaccurate version of events, and that the approach to Theodōros II, made by Palaiologos through the good offices of the bishop of Konya, never took place. Pachymerēs' error is probably due to a poor second-hand report, which is indicated by the fact that the bishop of Konya, almost alone of all the bishops mentioned by Pachymerēs in the studied text, is not given a name.[34] Moreover, all the sources record that Theodōros first had to swear oaths to Michaēl, guaranteeing his safety, before the latter could be coaxed out of the mountains. This suggests that Michaēl was in a stronger bargaining position, and that it was Theodōros who desired his return.

On the "imperial letter" (Pach. 45[9]) see Dölger, *Regesten,* no. 1842.

"metropolitan of Ikonion" (45[5])

Though most of Anatolia was controlled and ruled by Turks, there still existed large numbers of Greek Christians, and they still had their traditional bishoprics. This is commented upon by both Marco Polo and by Willem van Ruysbroeck (Turan 1953:91-92).

"restored him to his former dignity" (45[12])

Grēgoras (Greg. 59[14-25]) and Ephraim (9179) record that Michaēl had to swear oaths of loyalty to Theodōros, his son Iōannēs and his future descendents before he was accepted

[34] The two other un-named bishops are the metropolitans of Hērakleia (Pach. 163[12]) and Pissidia (Pach. 185[3]).

back into the basileus' trust. Akropolitēs (Akrop. 144[21-22]) and Skoutariōtēs (Skout. 531[16-17]) mention that Palaiologos was allowed to rejoin Theodōros' *oikeios* and that he was once again allowed to "enjoy his own things." Grēgoras (Greg. 59[25]-60[1]) is alone in recording that Palaiologos was restored to the office of megas konostaulos at this time, and thus he provides our only evidence that Palaiologos had been stripped of the title by the basileus at all.

1.10 How that man, having returned and been well received, was sent as stratēgos to the West

"Epidamnos had been seized" (45[15])

Epidamnos is the classical name for medieval Dyrrachion, modern Durrës. This was an important Adriatic port and the western terminus of the Via Egnatia, and had long been held by the despotai of Epiros. In September 1256, however, Theodōros II Laskaris bullied Theodōra Petraliphina, wife of Michaēl II of Epiros, into ceding Dyrrachion and other territories to Nikaia as a condition of the marriage of Theodōros' daughter Maria to Michaēl II's son Nikēphoros (Akrop. 132[30]-133[18]). Dyrrachion was occupied by Nikaian troops sometime after November of that year.

"necessary for a bishop to be sent" (45[16])

Nicol (1957:161) suggests that it was the praitor Akropolitēs who requested that a bishop be sent to Dyrrachion, but Akropolitēs himself is silent on the matter.

"Chalkoutzes" (45[17])

Only Pachymerēs mentions this individual. From his account it is unclear whether he actually reached his see of Dyrrachion, though it is clear that he did pass further west than Thessalonikē (Pach. 47[8-9]). As a new bishop of Dyrrachion was ordained towards the end of 1260 (Pach. 177[23]) we can assume that Chalkoutzes had died sometime in that year, perhaps as one of the many high ecclesiastics who died in a short period (Pach. 171[5-8]).

"megas skeuophylax" (45[18])

This ecclesiastic official was, by the 13th century, ranked third in the patriarchal bureaucracy, behind the oikonomos and the megas sakellarios (Darrouzès 1970:538). He was in charge of the *mega skeuophylakeion*, the office which administered the liturgical

vessels and other sacred property held by the church. He had great authority over the physical establishment of the church, even the church buildings themselves. Every major foundation had its own skeuophylax, though that of the Hagia Sophia had precedence and alone was awarded the title *megas* (Darrouzès 1970:314-318).

"The basileus also sent…" (45^{19ff})

Pachymerēs' narrative ignores more than six months of activity at this point. After gaining Dyrrachion from Michaēl II, Theodōros II returned to the East, leaving Geōrgios Akropolitēs, as praitor, in charge of Western affairs. Akropolitēs, after a quick tour of the newly gained territories, abruptly found himself in the middle of an Epirote uprising. By the summer of 1257 the Nikaian armies were on the run and Akropolitēs himself was bailed up in Prilapos. For this period see Akropolitēs (Akrop. 139^{23}-143^{22}), and Nicol (1957:160-163).

In response to these defeats, Theodōros II despatched Michaēl Palaiologos, with an army described by Akropolitēs as "very small in size and worthless in quality" (Akrop. 145^{4-5}), and orders to reinforce the area. The force given him by Theodōros II was small for two reasons. The first being that the bulk of the army was retained in Anatolia, ready to defend the heart of the Nikaian realm from a possible Mongol incursion in retribution for Nikaian intervention in the affairs of the Selçuks of Konya (Akrop. 143-144; Pach. 187^{22}-189^{6} and commentary to 45^{2-3}). The second being the lack of trust Theodōros still felt towards Palaiologos.

Pachymerēs ignores this mission, just as he has ignored the entire conflict, and writes only that Palaiologos was travelling west to become governor of Dyrrachion, an appointment which Akropolitēs says nothing about. We need not reject Pachymerēs' testimony on this point, as Palaiologos might well have had additional orders to proceed to Dyrrachion after the Epirotes had been defeated.

"with commands to cooperate. . ." (45^{20})

Nikaian governorships in Makedonia at this time were basically military postings, as is indicated by Pachymerēs' use of the word *hēgemōn* to designate Michaēl's position, rather than the more usual gubernatorial title *kephalē*, which he applies to Michaēl when the latter was governing Mesothinia, a more peaceful province (Pach. 43^{6}). Pachymerēs' statement that Palaiologos was supposed to work with the local dignitaries may indicate how civil authority was exercised throughout the region.

Each governor was effectively independent and answerable only to the basileus. The sources indicate only two periods when the entire region was in the hands of a viceroy:

after Iōannēs III's conquest in the 1240's, when Andronikos Palaiologos governed from Thessalonikē, and again when Akropolitēs was named praitor by Theodōros II. Even with the broad powers given him by the basileus, Akropolitēs had difficulty making the local governors obey his orders.

For a summary on what is known about the provincial administration of Makedonia under the Laskarids, see Angold (1975a:290-293).

"When they had reached" (45^{21})

Palaiologos' Makedonian campaign was not as quick or as glorious as Pachymerēs reports. Arriving in the autumn of 1257, Michaēl joined forces with a small army under Michaēl Laskaris, Theodōros' great-uncle, but their combined force was too small to do anything more than raid and plunder Epirote possessions west of the Bardarios River. Michaēl II, in order to crush this small force, sent his bastard son Theodōros (Pachymerēs' 'Manouēl') with five hundred cavalry to attack the Nikaians. (Akrop. 145^{5}-146^{26}; Nicol 1957:163-164)

"Manouēl" (47^{2})

This individual's name was actually Theodōros. Polemis (1968:94) suggests that Theodōros was the oldest of Michaēl II's children, and was perhaps borne to him by an unknown woman of the Gangrenos family (Job Monachos 903-908). Theodōros may or may not have been the full-brother of Iōannēs of Thessaly.

The reason why Pachymerēs calls him Manouēl is uncertain. It is possible that he is confusing the Epirote commander with Manouēl Lapardas, a Nikaian officer defeated by Theodōros just before his battle with Palaiologos.

"He engaged him in battle" (47^{3-6})

Akropolitēs also praises the bravery of Palaiologos and describes the personal combat between the Nikaian and Epirote commanders (Akrop. 148^{4-19}). Akropolitēs differs from Pachymerēs, however, in saying that Theodōros was slain by a Turk, and not by Michaēl. We may assume that Akropolitēs, who met Palaiologos shortly after the battle, is the more reliable source.

Akropolitēs reports that Michaēl Palaiologos threw his spear at his opponent (Akrop. 148^{5}). He is merely indulging in a little Homeric imagery. Pachymerēs and Ephraim (9203) correctly write that the combat involved couched lances (which Pachymerēs terms *kontoi*, 'poles'). The Byzantine cavalry had increasingly utilized lances since at least the 11th century (Bartusis 1992:329; Haldon 1999:218-223). On the equipment of Byzantine cavalry

in this era, see the treatise of Theodōros Palaiologos, marquis of Montferrat (Theodōros Palaiologos 58)

The result of this engagement, not mentioned by Pachymerēs, was a tactical victory for the Nikaians (Akrop. 148^{12-16}).

Skoutariōtēs (532^{7}-533^{7}) repeats Akropolitēs' account almost verbatim.

1.11 How Chadenos was sent to bring Palaiologos back in chains

"Thessalonikē" (47^{8})

A major city ever since its founding by Kassandros of Macedon in the fourth century BC, Thessalonikē became the second city of the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh century. It was a major trading centre, and was home to several Italian mercantile colonies. It also occupied a strategic location at the end of the Via Egnatia, and was a crossroads for routes west to the Adriatic, south to Hellas, north to Bulgaria and Serbia and east to Kōnstantinoupolis. For these reasons it was attractive to would-be conquerors. The Normans of Sicily occupied it for a short time in 1185, and it fell to the crusaders of Boniface of Montferrat in 1205. Latin kings ruled the city until 1224, when it was taken by Theodōros Doukas. It was the capital of his empire until his defeat by the Bulgarians in 1230. In 1246 Iōannēs III seized it through a combination of force, stealth and negotiation (Akrop. 79^{17}-82^{14}).

Contested by domestic and foreign powers throughout the fourteenth century, Thessalonikē finally fell to the Ottoman Turks, who took it from its Venetian rulers, in 1430.

On many aspects of Late Byzantine Thessalonikē, see now Dumbarton Oaks Papers 57 (2003).

"the advance was halted by a rumour" (47^{9-10})

Akropolitēs gives another account of the campaign. According to him, after Michaēl Palaiologos had defeated the force led by Theodōros of Epiros, the Nikaian force advanced as far as the town of Prilapos, where it was decided that Palaiologos' army could be of little help because, according to Akropolitēs "they realised that those who had been assigned the defence of the town were of dubious loyalty" (Akrop. 149^{1}). Palaiologos withdrew. Afterwards Prilapos was besieged and taken by Michaēl II, and various other places were also captured by Epiros (Akrop. 149^{3}-151^{11}).

Palaiologos' activities between his departure from Prilapos and his arrest in Thessalonikē are completely unknown. What can be surmised, however, is that Palaiologos went into winter quarters in Thessalonikē. We know that he arrived in Makedonia only in autumn of 1257 (see commentary to 45^{19-21}), and we know that most of his army was composed of cavalry (Akrop. 146^{16}). We also know that Prilapos was located in a mountainous region, which is unsuited for cavalry operations, and in which it would be difficult to provide fodder for large numbers of horses during the winter months. These factors suggest that Palaiologos – and Michaēl Laskaris, with whom he was serving – decided to sit out the winter in well-supplied Thessalonikē and its hinterland, and perhaps wait for reinforcements to be sent from the east. While these generals were inactive in Thessalonikē, Michaēl II of Epiros overran the individual Nikaian garrisons in western Makedonia.

"komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn" (47^{10})

This position evolved from that of the komēs tou staulou, sometime during the 10th or 11th centuries. The holder of this post had the privilege of holding the bridle of the basileus' horse while the latter mounted, but then relinquished his position at the head of the horse to the prōtostratōr and megas chartoularios. He also had the right to ride any of the basileus' horses within the grounds of the palace for purposes of training the mounts. While with the basileus he could ride any of his master's horses, but could not ride in front of the basileus. Obviously this position called for a superior level of horsemanship (PK 168-169; Guilland 1967:I.471).

Guilland, using only this incident as evidence, suggests that basileis could entrust the komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn with "delicate and important missions". Rather than seeing this as a particular aspect of the position, however, it is more likely simply another facet of the increasingly centralized and "household" government of the Late Byzantine period. That this is the case is shown by the employment of Michaēl Palaiologos himself, at this time the megas konostaulos, as a provincial governor, presumably without having the direct command of all the Latin mercenaries then serving the empire (on this tendency towards household government in general, see Angold 1975a:151-181, esp. 154-155).

"no other mission" (47^{12})

Although Pachymerēs gives as the reason for Michaēl Palaiologos' arrest the alleged witchcraft of his sister Maria (Pach. 57^{22}), it may be suggested that the real reason for the arrest was the perceived failure of Palaiologos to prevent the loss of Prilapos and other Nikaian holdings to Michaēl II. Akropolitēs writes that he himself was initially suspected

by Theodōros of deserting to the Epirotes, but that his captivity showed that he had done his best (Akrop. 150^{21}-151^{20}). Earlier in his reign Theodōros had acted with furious anger towards two of his generals – Kōnstantinos Tornikios and Alexios Stratēgopoulos – who had failed him during a campaign (Akrop. 114^{2-19}). Tornikios was stripped of his title and Stratēgopoulos was imprisoned (Akrop. 154^{26}-155^{2}). For this theory of arrest due to military incompetence, we must also bear in mind that Michaēl Laskaris, Palaiologos' co-commander, was also apparently recalled at around the same time, for he was present at the assemblies at Magnesia following Theodōros' death in August of 1258 (Pach. 91^{21}).

It should also be noted that Akropolitēs' account of the fall of Prilapos makes much of the fact that the place was taken through treachery, despite his own best efforts, and also that Palaiologos had seen the treachery in the defenders' eyes before he withdrew from the place. Without going so far as to blame himself for the fall of the town, Akropolitēs says what he can to exonerate Palaiologos from the accusation that he did nothing to save the place from capture.

The Syriac chronicler Bar Hebraeus gives an intriguingly similar account of Michaēl's arrest by Chadenos to that of Pachymerēs. He identifies the arresting officer (Gadinos), the accused (Michaēl), the place of the arrest (Thessalonikē) and the reason (Theodōros' suspicions about Palaiologos' ambition). He even mentions the chains with which Chadenos shackled Palaiologos and the friendly bond which grew between Chadenos and Palaiologos before they returned to the east (BH 427-428). Bar Hebraeus, on another occasion, has a great similarity with Pachymerēs – their accounts of the attack upon Galata in 1260 (see commentary to 171^{25}). The parallels between the two histories are so striking, that the two historians must have been using the same source. This is especially so since Bar Hebraeus could not have used Pachymerēs' own *Historia*, for he died in 1286, before the accepted date of the *Historia*'s composition (Failler 1984:xx), and in any case he did not read Greek (Geanakoplos 1959:102 n. 30a, citing Nöldeke 1892:237). The case for Pachymerēs using Bar Hebraeus is equally feeble. Even if Pachymerēs could read Syriac, the language of Bar Hebraeus' *Chronicle*, the lesser detail of the latter work compared to Pachymerēs' own would seem to preclude the use by Pachymerēs of Bar Hebraeus' work.

"Akapniou" (47^{23})

This monastery was founded in the eleventh century by Photios of Thessaly, under the patronage of the Akapnēs family of imperial officials. It is not connected with any of the remaining ruins in Thessalonikē, but Janin (1975:347) places its probable location in the upper part of the eastern half of the city.

"he heard one voice" (49^{1-4})

This story had wide currency throughout the region. The word *marpou* appears in a fresco in the Serbian monastery of Arilje, built by the Serbian kral Dragutin in 1296 (Djurić 1976:61). This monastery was located deep in Serbia, about equidistant from Belgrad and Sarajevo, far to the north of the Byzantine frontier of the period.

"Manouēl Disypatos" (49^{6})

Manouēl bore the nickname Psaras, or Opsaras, apparently because of his fondness for eating fish (Akrop. 178 critical apparatus). He had been metropolitan of Thessalonikē since 1235/6 (Nicol 1957:124, but *cf.* Laurent 1963:295, who suggests that his accession may have been as late as 1250). Despite his favour for Palaiologos in this instance, Manouēl became hostile to Michaēl's ambition to become basileus (Pach. 145^{22-26}) and was bitterly opposed to the deposition of Patriarch Arsenios in 1259/60 (Pach. 167^{17}; Akrop. 179^{15-17}). For this opposition he was removed from his see by the new patriarch, Nikēphoros II, in 1260. He did not regain his position, and died sometime before 1276.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 5544.

"*beklas*" (49^{9})

This 'word' was made up by Patriarch Photios (r.858-867 and 877-886) to flatter basileus Basileios I and bring him back into favour with that ruler. The 'word' was an acronym for Basileios and his family – Eudokia (his wife), Kōnstantinos, Leo, Alexandros and Stephanos – supposedly showing the line of imperial succession.

See Failler (1984:48 n.2) for bibliographical details of sources for this acronym.

Prophetic acronyms were fairly common in Byzantine history. Manouēl I famously named his son Alexios to conform to an acronym '*AIMA*', which indicated the line of succession for the Komnenian dynasty (Chon. 169^{89-4}). Pachymerēs himself claims to have been personally involved in the revelation of a similar oracular utterance (Pach. 203^{9-21}).

"some say" (49^{12-21})

Elsewhere in the *Historia* Pachymerēs betrays a belief in visions and prophecy (see, for instance, Pach. 171^{7-9}, 179^{27}-181^{6}, 203^{11-21}). But he does not appear to have faith in the truth of this story.

Most importantly, Pachymerēs explicitly connects *marpou* with *beklas*, which was known to have been a fraud concocted by Photios. We must question why Pachymerēs would wish to associate something which he believed to be a genuine revelation with a recognised fake. Secondly, Pachymerēs dedicates a lengthy passage to a competing version

of the incident, which downplays the obvious supernatural aspect of the related incident – the voice heard by Chalkoutzes – and emphasises the machinations of Manouēl Disypatos. Without explicitly denying that there was a voice that said *marpou*, Pachymerēs says everything he can to suggest that the entire episode was conceived by Disypatos to provide succour to Michaēl Palaiologos. Certainly Manouēl later revealed that he did not believe in his own prophecy, in opposing the promotion of Palaiologos to the throne (Pach. 145^{5-26}).

Geanakoplos (1959:31-32) expresses confusion over Michaēl's "docility" in accepting his arrest, when in an earlier incident he had shown resourcefulness in fleeing to the Turks. Much of this docility can be attributed to the influence of the two bishops and this prophecy. The alternatives, if Palaiologos did not submit, would have been limited to Michaēl's rebelling against the basileus Theodōros, at best, or, at worst, allying himself with Michaēl II of Epiros, who was now in possession of all of the territory up to the Bardarios River. Moreover, many of the nobility of Nikaia, and no small part of the army, were supporters of Palaiologos. A civil war would not be beyond possibility. Michaēl was himself uncertain what to do – hence his appeal to prayer[35] – and the two bishops were in a good position to use their influence to bring Palaiologos to follow the less destructive course of action.

"respect for the nobility of the man" (51^{7})

The word Pachymerēs uses here for 'noble' (*eugenēs*), is used by him only to refer to those individuals and families that were both well-established in the aristocracy and were accustomed to hold imperial offices (Magdalino 1984b:64). The best example of this is shown later, at Pach. 55^{13}. There Pachymerēs refers to "noble women" being given by Theodōros II as brides to men who were not "noble", since "nobility had only been conferred upon them by the basileus." That is, "new men", who could only claim status through the holding of offices, were not true nobles in the sense that members of the old established families were.

"prison received the other" (53^{1-2})

We do not know how long Michaēl was kept imprisoned. See the commentary to 57^{25}.

[35] The paraklasis in which he took part was a special form of mass intended to bring comfort to those sick in body or mind.

1.12 How, in his sickness, the basileus suspected everyone of working magic; the affair of Martha

"An illness had overtaken the basileus" (53^{13})

Pachymerēs' narrative now covers the events that took place in the east while the war with Epiros was being waged in the west, and the actions of the basileus that led to his order for the arrest of Palaiologos. Thus this chapter is contemporaneous with chapters 1.10 and 1.11.

For Theodōros' epilepsy, see commentary to 41^{7-8}.

"This illness came, in my opinion…" (53^{15-21})

The belief that the heart was the seat, not only of good health, but also of the higher functions of the soul, had been proposed in ancient times by such thinkers as Chrysippos and Galen (Cambiano 1999:570). In this they were opposed by philosophers such as Erasistratos, who championed the brain as the seat of the soul and of the emotions. Pachymerēs makes a reference to this debate in this passage, and comes clearly down on the side of the champions of the heart.

"either in proportion or out of proportion" (53^{20})

This statement is important in the context of Pachymerēs' treatment of Theodōros' paranoid excesses. It is obvious that Pachymerēs did not see the persecution of many individuals for magic as justified, and he here gives his reasons for the basileus' unusual behaviour. Essentially, according to the historian, Theodōros' normal reasoning was disrupted by his illness, making him see threats and dangers that were not real.

"demon" (53^{23})

Nikēphoros Blemmidēs, in his autobiography (1.48), claims that the illness of Theodōros II was due to God abandoning the basileus on account of his bad acts and wicked policies.

For magic see the commentary to 57^{8}.

"a very great number of people" (53^{27})

This witch-hunt can be placed, from context, in the first half of 1258, in the last months before the death of Theodōros on 16 August. Blemmidēs (1.49) provides supporting evidence for such activity, with a long passage describing allegations brought against an unnamed nobleman on account of a statement made by one of his servants. Despite a lack

of evidence and credible witnesses the noble was condemned to death by the basileus, a decision supported by the court. According to Blemmidēs, it was only his own intervention with Theodōros that saved the man's life.

Other than this passage from Blemmidēs, however, we have no supporting evidence for a widespread witch-hunt carried out in the last months of Theodōros' life. Even Akropolitēs, who is normally very hostile towards Theodōros, says nothing about it. Although the use of the ordeal by hot iron suggests that there were some accusations of sorcery at this time, the "great number" of Pachymerēs should, given the lack of evidence, be seen as an exaggeration.

Even so, Pachymerēs' account is a suggestive vignette of the increasing paranoia and irrationality of the dying basileus.

"prescribed a full investigation" (53^{31}-55^{1})

Pachymerēs says this with not a small measure of irony, as he immediately makes clear that there was no official "investigator" of these accusations, but merely the immediate application of the ordeal to the accused.

"by only one means" (55^{4-10})

The trial by ordeal of hot iron seems to have been introduced into the Byzantine world after the Fourth Crusade. It was used in both Epiros and Nikaia and the method used bears a striking resemblance to the ordeal as conducted in Latin Jerusalem and Constantinople (Angold 1976:2-3; Geanakoplos 1976:152). It can be surmised that the ordeal entered Byzantine legal practice through a Latin conduit.

Akropolitēs (96^{6}-100^{3}) describes the attempt by Iōannēs III Batatzes to have Michaēl Palaiologos convicted of treason in 1253. This trial included an attempt to force Palaiologos to undergo an ordeal which appears to be the same as that described by Pachymerēs, even down to giving the name of the hot iron as the *hagion*, or the "holy thing" (Akrop. 97^{16}; Pach. 55^{5}). Akropolitēs account of this trial seems to indicate that the ordeal could only be used as an extraordinary legal method, at the express command of the basileus and, perhaps, for accusations of treason only. Akropolitēs certainly suggests that it was very unpopular, both at court and with the public (Akrop. 98^{4-9}, 98^{21}-99^{12}), and he has Palaiologos echo the sentiments of Pachymerēs, opposing the ordeal as a foreign custom which was alien to the Roman-Byzantine legal tradition of trials undertaken through written laws and the use of verifiable, empirical evidence (Akrop. 98^{13-14}. cf. Pach. 55^{2-4}: "*The proof the defendant had to produce to avoid being condemned by every vote did not consist*

in producing witnesses, in swearing oaths, making enquiry into their former conduct or in all the other things by which lies are confounded").

"as a Roman might say" (55^{15})

Pachymerēs normally uses 'Roman' to designate a citizen of the Byzantine Empire. On this occasion he is referring to an inhabitant of ancient Rome. The statement "as a Roman might say" may be by way of an apology for including a Latin term in his Greek text. These 'matrons' appear again, accompanying their husbands to the funeral of Theodōros II (Pach. 81^{9}).

"Balanidiotes" (55^{18})

Pachymerēs provides our only references to this individual. Like the Mouzalōn brothers he began his career as one of the Imperial pages, and we may guess that, like the Mouzalōnes his family was not of the greatest nobility, but still not of *"petite extraction"* as Failler (1984:54 n.3) claims in his edition of the text. This must be so, given the enthusiasm shown by the Palaiologoi, a noble house of great lineage, for his marriage to Theodōra. Michaēl VIII raised him to the rank of megas stratopedarchēs in 1260 (Pach 155^{9-10}). He died sometime before 1266.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 2057.

"Theodōra" (55^{20})

Theodōra Tarchaneiōtissa, in 1266 – sometime after the death of her husband Balanidiotes – became a nun with the name of Theodosia. She became a supporter of the former patriarch Arsenios, and died in 1283. She had no known children from either of her marriages.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 27510.

"Maria, also called Martha" (55^{19})

Maria Palaiologina was the eldest child of the megas domestikos Andronikos Palaiologos and his wife, Theodōra, and was born c.1214. She married the future megas domestikos Nikēphoros Tarchaneiotes sometime before 1237 (Akrop. 55^{18-19}), and the couple had three sons: Michaēl, Andronikos and Iōannēs (see commentary to 155^{11-12}) and one daughter, Theodōra. Very religiously minded, Maria became a nun during or shortly before the controversy surrounding the second deposition of Patriarch Arsenios in 1265-66 (Pach. 381^{5-10}), taking the name Martha. Together with her husband Nikēphoros, she had founded the monastery of Pammakaristos (Laiou 1985:71), and by herself founded the nunnery of

Kyra Martha in Kōnstantinoupolis, where she spent her last years (Janin 1969:324-326). She died sometime after 1267.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 21389, and see Papadopulos (1938:14-15).

On retirement to religious institutions see Constantelos (1968:88).

"Tarchaneiotes" (55^{20})

Nikēphoros Tarchaneiotes was active during the reign of Iōannēs III, and was a noted military commander. As epi tēs trapezēs he commanded the garrison of Tzouroulon in 1237 (Akrop. 55^{15-19}) and he served under the basileus in the Thessalonikē campaign of 1242 (Akrop. 66^{18-20}). In 1252/3 he was promoted "brevet" megas domestikos for the campaign against Michaēl II of Epiros (Akrop. 89^{11-19}). He may have received the full rank of megas domestikos at either of two times: from Iōannēs III shortly before the death of the basileus (since we have seen that Theodōros II appointed Andronikos Mouzalōn to the position (Pach. 41^{12})), or in 1259-60, after Iōannēs Palaiologos had been promoted to sebastokratōr. If the latter is true, then Nikēphoros Tarchaneiotes may have died very soon after his promotion, since Alexios Philēs was promoted to megas domestikos at the end of 1259 (Pach. 155^{5-6}).

"Basileios Kaballarios" (55^{25-26})

Pachymerēs again refers to the marriage and subsequent divorce of Basileios Kaballarios and Theodōra Tarchaneiotissa Palaiologina in a later passage (155^{6-7}). This man is unknown outside of these two passages, though the Kaballarioi were a prominent Byzantine noble family and Basileios may be assumed to have been present at the assemblies which followed the death of Theodōros II (Pach. 93^{12}).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 10037.

"a magic spell" (57^{8})

Magic had been given as a reason for impotence on another occasion, when the megas domestikos Alexios Axouch had been accused of using potions provided by a western wizard to prevent basileus Manouēl I Komnēnos from siring an heir (Kinnamos 6.6).

Byzantine belief held that there were innumerable demons inhabiting the spiritual world, and that a skilled practitioner of magic could summon and bind the weaker and less intelligent of these demons through lead, wax and thread (Greenfield 1993:77, citing Gautier 1980:173). These demons were often bound into small figurines which were hidden near the intended victim of the spell.

It could be, then, that Theodōros II tortured Maria Palaiologina Tarchaneiōtissa not only for a confession, but also so she would reveal the whereabouts of the demon with which she had ensorcelled him.

"his own case" (57^{9})

Although the structure of Pachymerēs' writing would seem to suggest that Theodōros also suspected magic in the case of his own impotence, it is much more likely that Pachymerēs is referring instead to Theodōros' overall illness.

"the noble old woman was shut up" (57^{10-11})

The thirteenth century Near East was not kind on those accused of witchcraft. Bar Hebraeus relates the story of a Mongol matron accused of sorcery against the khan. She was starved for days, and then flogged until she confessed, whereupon she was mutilated, wrapped up in a sack and cast into a river to drown (BH 411-412).

In general Byzantine men were not prepared to inflict physical punishment upon women, especially those of the upper classes. Even treasonous women could usually expect no worse punishment than exile to a nunnery (Runciman 1984:16). Thus Maria's ordeal here at the hands of the basileus was extraordinary, even if the actual method of torture is ignored.

"sent to have him relieved of his command" (57^{22})

This order was, as we have seen, carried out by the komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn Chadenos. See commentary to Pachymerēs 1.11.

While Palaiologos was relieved of his command – to be replaced by the prōtostratōr Iōannēs Angelos, a favourite of Theodōros II (Akrop. 160^{4-10}) – Pachymerēs does not indicate whether he was also stripped of his title and rank of megas konostaulos. This had been done by both Iōannēs III and Theodōros II in earlier incidents (Pach. 37^{18-20}; Greg. 59^{25}-60^{1}) and we may suggest that the same practice was followed in 1258.

"recall Palaiologos" (57^{25})

The length of Palaiologos' captivity in 1258 is unknown. Theodōros II died on 16 August of that year, so Palaiologos must have been released before that date. Bar Hebraeus, who was surprisingly well informed about this affair, states that Michaēl was released by

Theodōros almost immediately upon his arrival at Magnesia (BH 427-428), though this account also emphasises the mercy shown by the basileus to Palaiologos.[36]

"he requested that Palaiologos protect his family" (57^{27})

Geanakoplos (1959:32) states that this was a "familiar scene" – that Palaiologos again swore oaths of loyalty to Theodōros and his family. Pachymerēs singles out Michaēl in this passage, and thereby encourages suggestions that he was a special case. Akropolitēs and Patriarch Arsenios state that before his death – and presumably before he accepted the monastic tonsure – Theodōros ordered everyone who was present at court to swear their loyalty to Iōannēs IV and to the chosen regent, Mouzalōn (Akrop. 154^{19-20}; Arsenios *Testamentum* 949^{C}). Only Michaēl Palaiologos' imprisonment may be a reason for him to have been singled out by the historian, but we also have evidence that others who had been in prison during the last months of Theodōros' life were released shortly before his death. Akropolitēs states that the sons of Alexios Rhaoul had been so imprisoned (Akrop. 155^{7}). There can be little doubt but that Pachymerēs draws attention to the situation of Michaēl Palaiologos because his story has been the focus of the *Historia* up to this point, in light of his later rise to the throne.

1.13 Death of the basileus Theodōros and the good deeds of his life

"the ruler passed from this life" (57^{32})

Theodōros II died on 16 August 1258 (Failler 1980b:21-22). The exact location of his death is given as Magnesia (Blemmidēs 2.23; Failler 1980b:23), but Pachymerēs states clearly that the meeting of the senate after Theodōros' death did not occur at Magnesia, which would seem to contradict Blemmidēs (Pach. 77^{28}). A manuscript note states that Theodōros died at the monastery of Sōsandra (Failler 1980b:22 and n.70), but Akropolitēs states clearly that Theodōros' body was taken to Sōsandra after his death (Akrop. 153^{23-24}). Bar Hebraeus records that the place of death was "Nîpî", which is presumably a reference to Nymphaion (BH 427). Nymphaion and Magnesia were the two main homes of the imperial

[36] Bar Hebraeus seems to have received a garbled account of the oath Michaēl was made to swear to Theodōros II and Iōannēs IV at this time – he reports that Michaēl, on his release, was made a "partner with the patriarch in the management of the young man" (BH 428). The composer of the *Chronicle of the Morea*, separated from these events by time and space, also claims that Michaēl was granted the regency by the dying Theodōros (*CoM* 1223-1230).

court in this period, and the probability is that if Magnesia was not the place of the basileus' death, as Pachymerēs' narrative suggests, then Nymphaion is the probable location.

Before he died, Theodōros accepted the monastic tonsure, leaving his name unchanged (Akrop 153^{5-6}).

"four children" (57^{32}-59^{1})

Pachymerēs refers to the children of Theodōros II who were unmarried at his death. Two of the daughters were borne to him by his wife Helenē (see the commentary to 95^{12}), while the third was illegitimate (Failler 1980b:73).

The name of this illegitimate daughter is unknown. Michaēl VIII married her to the Bulgarian lord Osphentisthlabos (Svetoslav) in 1261/2 (Pach. 243^{20-21}).

"Iōannēs" (59^{1})

Iōannēs Laskaris, the youngest child and only son of Theodōros II (Greg. 62^{24}-63^{10}) was born on Christmas Day (Pach. 257^{22}). The year is variously given as 1249 (Pach.) or 1250 (Akrop. 154^{10-11}; Skout. 536^{13-14}; Schreiner 1975:1.75). Iōannēs was initially proclaimed basileus on the death of his father, but Michaēl Palaiologos usurped his throne and eventually had Iōannēs imprisoned and blinded. He died, still in prison, sometime before 1305 (Polemis 1968:111).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 14534.

"the elder daughters" (59^{1})

Eirēnē Laskarina, the eldest of the daughters of Theodōros II and his wife Helenē (Akrop. 152^{15-22}). In the early 1250s she had been intended for Michaēl Palaiologos, but Iōannēs III decided against the match in light of Michaēl's evident ambitions (Akrop. 100^{5-13}). Evidently she was very young at that time, since no marriage was actually arranged for her until 1257/8, when she was given by Theodōros to Kōnstantinos Teichos, to bolster his claims to the Bulgarian throne (for she was a granddaughter of Iōannēs Asan, a former ruler) (Akrop. 152^{15-22}).

Eirēnē never forgave Michaēl VIII for the blinding of her brother Iōannēs IV, and constantly agitated for her husband to act against the Palaiologos. She died sometime before 1270, when Teichos took a new wife (Greg. 130^{19-20}; Pach. 441^{25}-443^{2}). Before her death she became a nun, with the name Theodōra.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 5976.

The second daughter of Theodōros II was Maria. From 1249, when she must have been very young, she was the object of a proposed hymeneal settlement between Epiros and

Nikaia, to be a bride for Nikēphoros Angelos Doukas, son of Michaēl II (Akrop. 88^{15-17}; Greg. 47^{5-6}; Dölger, *Regesten*, 1799). Negotiations were stretched out, however, and the actual marriage was not celebrated until September 1256 (Akrop. 134^{3-6}; Skout. 526^{27-28}; Failler 1980b:17). After a lengthy build-up the marriage was unfortunately brief. Akropolitēs reports that Maria died before her father (Akrop. 154^{4-5}).

"Kōnstantinos Teichos" (59^{2})

He was tsar of the Bulgars from 1257 to 1277. He was not a dynastic heir, but the choice of the Bulgarian nobility (Akrop. 152^{15-22}). In his *Historia*, Pachymerēs indicates that until her death Kōnstantinos was dominated by his first wife Eirēnē Laskarina, and especially by her hatred for Michaēl VIII Palaiologos, the man responsible for her brother's blinding (see, for example, Pach. 191^{15-19}, 247^{2-4}, 279^{5-7}, 303^{19-22}). Her goading combined with the traditional Bulgarian ambitions in Thrace and Kōnstantinos several times attacked Byzantium (Pach. 279^{4-25}). An attempt to mollify him through a marriage with Michaēl's niece Maria Kantakouzēnē (Pach. 441^{25}-443^{2}; Greg. 130^{29-20}) failed after Michaēl refused to hand over towns promised as part of the dowry, and he remained hostile to the Byzantines until his death..

Pachymerēs uses a number of different titles for him: basileus (191, 303), archon (59, 247), or no title at all (279, 301). Akropolitēs always refers to him as archon (for example, at 152^{14} and 176^{6-7}).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 27550.

"Nikēphoros" (59^{3})

Nikēphoros was the eldest legitimate son of Michaēl II of Epiros, and succeeded his father to the rule of Epiros, which he maintained until his death in 1290. No Greek source provides his family names, but western sources call him Doukas and Angelos (Nicol 1984b:82). Nikēphoros received the title of despotēs from Iōannēs III upon his engagement with Maria Laskarina (Akrop. 88^{15-17}), and this title was again given to him by Michaēl VIII on Nikēphoros' second marriage, to Michaēl's niece Anna, in 1265 (Pach. 317^{1-7})[37].

Nikēphoros, like his father, trod a path of precarious independence between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily. At all times his realm was dominated by one or other of those powers, but he succeeded in avoiding annexation. See Nicol (1972) for these relations.

His (revised) entry in the *PLP* is no. 91042.

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[37] This confirmation of Nikēphoros' title is another indication that Michaēl VIII saw his position as basileus in Kōnstantinopoulos as different from his previous position as basileus of Nikaia. See the commentary to 225^{16-19}.

"A sign foreshadowed his death" (59^{4-6})

Failler (1980b:21 n.63) argues, correctly in my opinion, that no such eclipse occurred, and that Pachymerēs is instead imitating the account in the Book of Luke of the eclipse preceding the death of the Christ.

"His skill at writing" (59^{14-20})

Not since Kōnstantinos VII Porphyrogennētos had a Byzantine basileus spent so much time putting pen to paper. Theodōros' literary output was considerable. As well as a large number of letters, some of great length (Festa 1898), numerous theological and hagiographical works composed by him have survived (Failler 1984:59 n.4 provides bibliographical details). Theodōros was proud of his skill, and accepted compliments with what seems to be false modesty (Festa 173-174).

"the boundless imperial charity" (59^{21}-61^{2})

Pachymerēs dwells on this generosity at great length in another passage of the *Historia*. See the commentary to 99^{11-19}. However, he also comments on the grievances of the Latin mercenaries, who complained that under Theodōros their pay was often in arrears (Pach. 79^{19-21}). The reality was probably not as rosy as Pachymerēs portrays it.

"he selected those . . . according to merit" (61^{6})

This is a repeat of the claims made by Pachymerēs in an earlier passage. See commentary to 41^{19}-43^{1}.

1.14 How Laskaris was instructed by his father, Iōannēs, in the leadership of the empire

"One day [Theodōros] went hunting dressed in gold…" (61^{25}-63^{11})

This entire passage appears apocryphal. There are no substantial details to suggest that it has a sound foundation in an actual event; Pachymerēs himself states that the discussion between Iōannēs and Theodōros occurred in private, which suggests that one of the two basileis must have been Pachymerēs' source – unlikely given that Pachymerēs was only sixteen when Theodōros died in 1258 (see commentary to 23^{4-6}), and therefore too young to know. In addition, it may be pointed out that the phrase Iōannēs III uses, "the life-blood of

the Romans", is echoed later by Pachymerēs (97^{27}: "the life-blood of the poor"). Pachymerēs on another occasion uses a phrase in both his own words and in a reported speech (Pach. 25^{26-27} and 209^{30}-211^{1}), and, just as in that instance, Pachymerēs is probably guilty of putting his own words into the mouth of a basileus.

That being said, the attitudes shown by Iōannēs III in this passage reflect on the historical basileus. According to Akropolitēs, Iōannēs III was very generous in the gifts that he gave to visiting ambassadors in order to gain their favour (Akrop. 103^{20-23}), and Iōannēs was in general a frugal ruler who always endeavoured to live within his means without needing recourse to outside help (Angold 1975a:116). One may cite here the pride Iōannēs showed in telling listeners how he had bought a new crown for his wife with the proceeds from the sale of eggs from the imperial flocks (Greg. 43^{9-15}). In holding such beliefs, Iōannēs was accepting a traditional view of the constitutional nature of the position of the Byzantine basileus *vis-à-vis* his subjects, and endeavouring to keep separate the "public" and "private" roles of the monarch (Magdalino 1984a:338-340).

If there is any truth behind this incident reported by Pachymerēs, Theodōros II seems to have learned from the lesson. Witness the sumptuousness of the reception he gave to the Mongol ambassadors in 1257/8 (Pach. 187^{22}-189^{25}).

1.15 How the prōtobestiarios Mouzalōn assumed the regency for the young basileus Iōannēs

"had been declared guardian" (63^{14-15})

Akropolitēs confirms that Geōrgios Mouzalōn was Theodōros II's chosen regent for his son Iōannēs IV (Akrop. 154^{13-20}). He claims that the will of Theodōros was written for the benefit of Mouzalōn than for Iōannēs, but this claim cannot be given much weight, in light of Akropolitēs' hostility to the Mouzalōn brothers. Patriarch Arsenios records that everyone present at court was made to swear their loyalty to Iōannēs and Mouzalōn (*Testamentum* 949^{C}). Skoutariōtēs says that two oaths were required, one before and one after Theodōros died. Arsenios refers to one of these, and Pachymerēs confirms the existence of the other (Pach. 77^{32}-79^{5}).

Ephraim claims that Mouzalōn was only the primary regent for Iōannēs (Ephraim 9299-9300). Grēgoras (62^{19}) and Pseudo-Sphrantzēs (12^{13-15}) claim that the patriarch, Arsenios, was made a partner with Mouzalōn in the regency. Arsenios himself, however, makes no such claim. Arsenios did have an important role to play in the period after the murder of

Mouzalōn, but this was precisely because Mouzalōn, the regent, was dead, and there was need for some authority to facilitate the creation of a new regency. There can be little doubt that Mouzalōn was selected as the sole regent for the under-age basileus, with complete control over imperial affairs.

The will of Theodōros is discussed by Dölger (*Regesten* no. 1846)

"bore him to the citadel" (63^{20})

It is uncertain whether Iōannēs was taken to Magnesia before or after the senate was assembled and Mouzalōn and Palaiologos spoke to it. On the one hand Mouzalōn did not move himself or the army to Magnesia until after this meeting, and he did not appoint guards to Iōannēs until that time (Pach. 77^{28-29}). On the other hand, Mouzalōn, in his speech, refers to one individual who had the right to judge the assembled senators and magnates, but that that person was "not present at the moment" (Pach. 73^{3-4}). This person is evidently the basileus Iōannēs, and if he was not present at Nymphaion for the senate meeting, then it seems likely that he had already been taken to Magnesia.

"Magnesia-upon-Hermos" (63^{20})

Located on the northern slopes of Mount Sipylos in Lydia, Magnesia was possibly the largest, certainly the richest, city in the Nikaian dominion, at least until the capture of Thessalonikē in 1246. Iōannēs III rebuilt the city wall, added a citadel and built a palace (Akrop. 37^{18}). The citadel was located at the top of the hill dominating the town, and today it takes about an hour's rough climb to reach. See Foss (1979:307).

"At this time" (65^{7})

From the context it is apparent that this assembly was called by Mouzalōn as possibly the first action of his regency. Only after he had received the support of the court and army did he formally take up the position of regent and begin governing (Pach. 77^{25}-79^{10}). After this assembly broke up Mouzalōn moved with Iōannēs IV, the court and the army to Magnesia (Pach. 77^{28}). Magnesia lay about sixty kilometres from Nymphaion by the road around Mount Sipylos (Foss 1979:map), and this distance would have taken two or three days for such a company to traverse. The memorial service for Theodōros was held at the Sōsandra monastery nine days after his death, on 25 August . If two days are allowed for the journey from Magnesia to Sōsandra and another two from Nymphaion to Magnesia, we find the latest departure date from Nymphaion to be 21 August. Leaving time for the journey to be organised, and more time for the assembly to gather, we can place this meeting of the

senate, and the speeches of Mouzalōn and Palaiologos, in the first days after the death of Theodōros II, perhaps on 17 or 18 August 1258.



Map 2 Nikaian Anatolia[38]

[38] Map from Angold, M. *A Byzantine Empire in Exile. Government and society under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204-1261)*, Oxford, 1975, facing page 243.

"he convoked the whole senate" (65^{14})

The senate (*synklētos*, *gerousia*) in this period seems to have been a fairly ill defined thing. On the one hand, as exemplified by this passage of Pachymerēs, the senate was a specific group, distinguished from the nobility and from the army command. According to Angold (1975a:73) the "senate" was comprised exclusively of the holders of imperial offices. This conclusion is supported by Raybaud (1968:128-129) who collated lists of known senators and showed that they all held an office of some description.

On the other hand, there was a senatorial class. Grēgoras writes that, when Iōannēs Palaiologos was sent by his brother Michaēl to go fight in Epiros, he was accompanied by several *tōn tēs synklētou lamprōn* (Greg. 72^{14}). If the senate was comprised of office-holders, then the senatorial class must have been the families that increasingly dominated the official hierarchy. In that case when Pachymerēs writes of "the senate and . . . all the nobles" he is referring to the members of the noble families that had offices, and their relatives who were untitled.

The role of the senate in this period was purely consultative and advisory. It could be called on the whim of the basileus, and its advice was not binding upon him (Angold 1975a:153).

"the brothers of Laskaris" (65^{16})

These two men are Manouēl and Michaēl Laskaris, younger brothers of Theodōros I Laskaris, the first Nikaian basileus (r.1204-1222) (Akrop. 34^{22-26}). Pachymerēs also calls them the Tzamantouroi (Pach. 91^{21}, 107^{13}). Both of them were largely ignored and sidelined during the reign of their nephew-in-law Iōannēs III, perhaps because of residual hostility from Iōannēs on account of the revolt of two other Laskaris brothers, Alexios and Isaakios, in 1223-4 (Akrop. 34^{17}-35^{12}). Both re-entered the political arena under Theodōros II.

Manouēl Laskaris appears to have become a monk, named Maximos, at some time under Iōannēs III (Akrop. 122^{1-2}), but Theodōros II called him out of retirement. He served during Theodōros' Bulgarian campaigns of 1255-6, but without covering himself in honour. Nevertheless he was promoted to the title of prōtosebastos at that time (Akrop. 123^{4-5}). Manouēl was sent by Theodōros to a safer posting, but he still managed to be defeated (Akrop. 126^{9}). After this Manouēl was not given another command. In the debates following the death of Theodōros Manouēl supported the legitimate basileus, Iōannēs IV, over the claims of Michaēl Palaiologos. After Palaiologos' success he was imprisoned, and may have returned to his monastic habit (Pach. 153^{20-21}).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 14551.

Michaēl Laskaris travelled during the reign of Iōannēs III, and became acquainted with foreign lands and leaders (Akrop. 109^{19-23}). He may be identified with the Michaēl Laskaris who was one of the conspirators who helped Iōannēs gain Thessalonikē in 1246 (Akrop. 79^{26}; *cf.* Macrides 1978:321-22). Under Theodōros II Michaēl served as a minor general, or perhaps as kephalē, with a small force of troops at Thessalonikē (Akrop. 139^{5}). He served with Michaēl Palaiologos in the autumn 1257 campaign against Epiros, and may have been recalled by Theodōros at the same time as Michaēl was arrested (see commentary to 47^{12}). At the assemblies following the death of Theodōros Michaēl Laskaris initially upheld the claims of Iōannēs IV, but changed sides during the proceedings and gave his support to Palaiologos. His reward was a promotion to megas doux (Pach. 153^{20-21}). He served on a diplomatic mission to his relative, Stephen V of Hungary, in 1271-72 (Pach. 413^{8-9}). He died c.1272.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 14554.

1.16 Speech of the prōtobestiarios Mouzalōn

"engaging in flattery" (67^{5-11})

Pachymerēs again mentions these themes in his discussion of the deliberations of Patriarch Arsenios and his synod regarding the possible promotion of Michaēl Palaiologos to the throne (Pach. 129^{19}-131^{6}). Court favourites are ever despised and mistrusted by outsiders for the influence they wield with the ruler. Mouzalōn seeks in these lines to defuse the suspicions the senate and nobility held for him and his brothers.

"blows we bore" (67^{11-12})

This appears to be an accurate account of Theodōros II and his penchant of imposing physical punishments upon his own ministers. The historian Akropolitēs describes a beating he received on the orders of the basileus (Akrop. 131^{10-13}). If Theodōros imposed such punishments upon his most-loved friends (see commentary to 41^{10}), then there must have been many beatings which went unreported in the sources. Not all of the victims of these punishments accepted them with as much sangfroid as the Mouzalōnes seem to. If Akropolitēs is indicative of the reaction of the victims, then grudges against Theodōros would have been nursed by many among Mouzalōn's audience.

"I accepted the role of guardian" (71^{9-10})

It was indeed Theodōros' written wish that Mouzalōn become the guardian and regent for Iōannēs. See the commentary to 63^{14-15}.

"I wish to continue to hold the position of guardian" (71^{12-18})

Theodōros' plans and desires needed to be discussed and confronted, not only by Mouzalōn but also by the nobility and the other influential subjects of the empire. This was the intention behind Mouzalōn's approach to the senate. It would have been an impossibility for him to attempt to govern the empire without the agreement of the nobles, and it was best to air his selection by the late basileus right at the beginning of his regency, to either gain the stamp of the senate's approval, or else their open rejection, so a new government could be formed.

Pachymerēs writes that Mouzalōn was ignorant of the hostility of the nobility towards him, but this seems an impossibility (Pach. 79^{12-13}). His offer to resign and retire into obscurity reveals that he was all-to-aware of the love in which he was held and the risks he would face in trying to govern when so many people were hostile towards him. He admits that he would have less chance of being killed as a soldier than as regent (Pach. 71^{17-18}).

The interesting thing is that his offer was not taken seriously by his audience, and he was not asked to stand aside for another, despite the antipathy with which he was regarded. Geanakoplos (1953b:423) argues that this can only be explained by a grand conspiracy among the nobility, determined to see Mouzalōn not only removed from office but assassinated as well. It is more likely, in my view, that the response from the audience was largely genuine. Geanakoplos appears to forget that many, if not most, of the audience were supporters of Theodōros II. Only some such individuals are mentioned in the sources: the Laskarid brothers (Pach. 65^{16}), the Nostongoi (Pach. 93^{12}, 95^{1}), Hagiotheodorites (Pach. 77^{31}), Karyanitēs (Pach. 89^{29}) and of course Mouzalōn's own brothers (Pach. 41^{12-13}); but this partial list alone is approximately equal in number to the list of those explicitly stated as being opponents of Theodōros (for this faction see the commentary to 95^{29}-97^{2}). There were undoubtedly others, on both sides of the political fence, but there would have been enough loyal subjects of the empire – who saw the basileus' will as a binding order and not a request or suggestion – to shout down Mouzalōn's offer of resignation. Michaēl Palaiologos himself, in his reply to this speech, argues that nobody present at the meeting had the authority to dismiss Theodōros' last command (Pach. 77^{4}), and while he himself may not have believed his own words, they struck a chord with the majority of the audience, which accepted Mouzalōn as the legitimate regent, even if they personally did not like him.

"our enemies are peaceful" (71^{20})

Mouzalōn appears to have forgotten the ongoing hostilities with Epiros. Although Pachymerēs does not mention the course of the fighting between the arrest of Michaēl Palaiologos and the arrival in Makedonia of Iōannēs Palaiologos, there was no peace or truce signed between Nikaia and Epiros. Perhaps fortunately for Nikaia, Michaēl II of Epiros was distracted in 1257/8 by the seizure of much of his Adriatic coastline by Manfred of Sicily (see commentary to 117^{5-8}).

1.17 The defence of that speech by Palaiologos

"he defended the speech with the greatest freedom" (73^{23})

Michaēl Palaiologos' speech, as recorded by Pachymerēs, is a defence of the imperial, monarchical privilege (Angold 1975b:58). The basileus was in absolute, autocratic control over the empire and of its inhabitants, who had no recourse and no appeal against his actions. Only one man could rule the empire. Rule by more than one resulted in anarchy. Geanakoplos (1953b:423) writes that this speech is "palpably deceitful". This is using hindsight and, while Pachymerēs was writing with hindsight firmly in view, this judgment is a little harsh. The content of his speech was received with almost universal acclaim and agreement by an audience which could, by no means, have all been party to a conspiracy to trick Mouzalōn to his doom. Most of the speech, then, must have appeared fair and accurate *at the time*.

This is not to say that Palaiologos believed his own words. It is almost impossible to believe, for instance, that he was genuine in his praise and flattery of Mouzalōn. His later actions show clearly that he considered himself, and not Mouzalōn, to be the best-fitted man to rule the empire. In one aspect Palaiologos was very truthful in his speech. He believed strongly that only a monarch could rule the empire, and that any attempt to govern it by committee or through a partnership would result in anarchy. He put this theory into practise after his accession to the throne in 1259. Iōannēs IV was sidelined and then deposed. There could be only one basileus.

"bound to be loyal through oaths" (75^{1})

This is, as Failler (1984:74 n.1) writes, undoubtedly a reference to the oaths Michaēl Palaiologos himself had been made to swear to Iōannēs III and Theodōros II (Pach. 39^{24}).

"the superior qualities which are yours in abundance" (75^{16-21})
Grēgoras comments on the administrative skills which Mouzalōn possessed (Greg. 62^{14-16}).

"took all the army and left for Magnesia" (77^{28})
This assembly of the senate was probably convened at Nymphaion, where the court was located during Theodōros II's final days. See the commentary to 65^{7}.

"the guard of the basileus to loyal men" (77^{29})
These men found themselves a few days later facing down a mob of soldiers and others who demanded to see Iōannēs. Their actions at that time led to the attack upon the Mouzalōn brothers at the Sōsandra monastery (Pach. 81^{25}-83^{3}).

Unfortunately we are not told anything about these guards – who they were and how numerous – or about their leaders. However, seeing as the treasury seems to have been assigned to the guard of the Varangians, it could be suggested that the protection of the basileus was assigned to another unit of imperial guards. If so, the Vardariotai are the logical choice. Not only did the unit exist at this time (Akrop 131^{26-29}), but they were also native troops, and not Latin mercenaries, who carried out most of the killing and looting at Sōsandra. On the Vardariotai, see Bartusis (1992:279-281).

"the imperial treasury to others" (77^{29})
The imperial treasury at Magnesia was entrusted at this time to "the axe-bearing Celtic regiment." On these guards see the commentary to 101^{22}. On the treasury (*bestiarion*) see the commentary to 97^{21} and 101^{24-25}.

"logothetēs tōn agelōn" (77^{31})
This official, first attested in the ninth century, was originally the minister in charge of the imperial-owned herds of horses and other draft animals. He had responsibility for the maintenance of post-horses and for the animal-train of armies.

By the fourteenth century this former function appears to have been abandoned. Pseudo-Kodinos says that the logothetēs tōn agelōn once had a function, but that it no longer applied (PK 184^{14-16}).

See Guilland (1971:71-75).

"Hagiotheodōritēs" (77^{31})
Of less than the highest nobility, Hagiotheodōritēs was another of Theodōros' inner circle. He served as some sort of secretary to the basileus, and wrote some of his correspondence

(Festa 37). At an unknown date he married a sister of the Mouzalōnes, and received a fulsome letter of congratulations from Theodōros (Festa 267-68). It may have been at this time that he received the office of logothetēs tōn agelōn, though this is mere conjecture.

Like other partisans of Theodōros and Mouzalōn, Hagiotheodōritēs eventually gave his allegiance to Michaēl Palaiologos, who rewarded him with the title of logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn in 1259 (see the commentary to 155^{22}-157^{1}). He did not enjoy Michaēl VIII's favour for long, however, since another man occupied the office of logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn in early 1260 (Pach. 175^{17-18}). Hagiotheodōritēs was then either dead, in disgrace or had been promoted by this time. Death or disgrace is the more likely.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 241.

"the customary oaths" (79^{4-5})

Although an oath of loyalty from the populace was demanded in the 770's by Leo IV for his son Kōnstantinos (Theophanēs 449), an oath of service towards the new basileus or his acknowledged heir did not become commonplace until the reigns of the later Komnēnoi (Svoronos 1951:109-110). Chōniatēs claims that it was the creation of Manouēl I's powerful megas domestikos, the Turk Iōannēs Axouch (Chon. 46^{49-56}). The involvement of the foreign-born Axouch, if true, suggests that the oath demanded from the people was inspired by the oaths of *douleia* that foreign soldiers entering imperial service had been making to the basileus since at least the time of Kōnstantinos VII Porphyrogennētos in the tenth century (*De administrando imperio* 52, cited in Pryor 1984:123).

The style and phrasing of the oath is unknown, but it was probably along the same lines as the pledge given to Alexios I Komnēnos by the crusader Raymond of Toulouse, who swore to "preserve the life and possessions of [the basileus] in that neither through himself or (sic) through another would he permit anyone to take anything from him" (*Gesta Francorum* 1.3-2.6). Such service could only be offered to one basileus at a time, so the phrasing would need to be adapted in this current case of a dual reign, in order to prevent anyone siding with one basileus against the other and arguing that service had never been sworn to the basileus they were opposing. Hence the codicil regarding inter-basileus conflict needed to be added, despite Pachymerēs' feelings on the matter.

1.18 Attack by the army against the Mouzalōnes

"Italians of the foreign regiments" (79^{18})

For Pachymerēs' use of the term 'Italians', see the commentary to 27^{20}.

Byzantine armies had long employed great numbers of Latin mercenaries. Even in the period directly following the Fourth Crusade the army of Theodōros I contained a large proportion of Latins in its ranks – the army which fought the Selçuk Turks at Antioch in 1211 had eight hundred Latins to twelve hundred native troops (Akrop. 16^{6-8}).

The prevalence of Latin troops in Nikaian armies diminished over time, however, especially under Theodōros II. By the time of Iōannēs IV's accession, the Latin mercenary presence appears to have been reduced to a single unit – Akropolitēs' 'Latinikon' – who were stationed at court (Akrop. 158^{16}). In part this reduction could be due to the needs of the time, for mercenaries were an expensive commodity, and no basileus wished to employ more than he needed at any given time (Bartusis 1992:142-144). A second consideration also must have played a part in this reduction: the personal attitudes and policies of Theodōros II. He famously wrote to Nikēphoros Blemmidēs of his intention to create a wholly Greek army, with no foreign elements (Festa 58). While this policy may never have been put into practise fully (Geanakoplos 1959:35-36), the intention behind it must have influenced recruitment by the imperial government. It may be pertinent to note that on the one occasion when we are told the composition of a force commanded by the megas konostaulos – officially the commander of the Latin mercenaries (PK 175^{12-14}) – there is no mention of any Latins, or even mercenaries, but instead the megas konostaulos commanded a rabble of useless conscripts (Akrop. 145^{4-5}). Only when the megas konostaulos was at court did he appear to have Latin mercenaries to command.

The composition of this one unit is uncertain. It seems to have been separate from the imperial bodyguards, even though at least one of those units was composed of Latins – Englishmen (see the commentary to 101^{22}). These bodyguard companies had been assigned by Mouzalōn to the guard of the treasury and the young basileus himself (Pach. 77^{29}), while the mercenaries who instigated the attack on the Mouzalōnes appear to have been unassigned, merely a part of the army accompanying the court on its travels from place to place. They were obviously mercenaries hired to form part of a permanent standing force of campaign-ready troops (the *tagmata* – Bartusis 1992:29), but their total number and their composition cannot be determined.

The Latin mercenaries appear to have been one regiment, but Pachymerēs writes as if there were several of these "foreign regiments". Akropolitēs records the presence at this time of a body of Cuman troops, the 'Skythikon', who also seem to have been a permanent regiment attached to the *tagmata* (Akrop. 158^{18}; Bartusis 1992:27). Their role in the succeeding attack on the Mouzalōnes is unknown. It is possible that they were involved, but that Pachymerēs downplays their role to emphasise the connection between the megas konostaulos and the Latin mercenaries, who are said to have done the killing.

"other reasons of their own" (79^{19-24})

The complaint of the mercenaries about the non-payment or reduction – Pachymerēs is unclear on this point – was by no means unique to this particular group or occasion. Mercenaries at all times were reliant upon the money provided by their employer. It was their livelihood, and failure to be paid was a threat, leading to desertion, mutiny or worse. Most of the Latin soldiers serving under Theodōros I, for instance, were doing so because he was better able to pay them than the Latin Emperors at Constantinople (Macrides 1978:222, citing a letter of Innocent III), and the Turkish mercenaries of Michaēl VIII serving in the Morea in 1263 also deserted to the enemy due to lack of pay (*CoM* 5099-5150).

"this fair-haired and warlike people" (79^{25})

It was accepted wisdom in Byzantium that Europeans, especially northern Europeans, were a strong and violent race, but lacking somewhat in intelligence and the civilised graces (Chon. 602^{4-7}; Kinnamos 185^{12-18}; Asdracha 1983:34). Such tendencies were not the fault of the northerners. Rather, it came from the influence of the cold climate of their lands (Pach. 237^{1-26}). This attitude was directly transmitted from ancient times, where Herodotos, Strabo and others had said the same thing (Laiou 1993:109-111).

"the captain of this phalanx" (79^{27})

The 'captain' was Michaēl Palaiologos, the megas konostaulos. 'Phalanx' is a term used by Pachymerēs and other Greek authors to refer to particular regiments or divisions of the army (see commentary to 199^{18}). Here the term is analogous to 'Italikon' (Pach. 273^{4}) or 'Latinikon' (Akrop. 158^{16}; Karlin-Hayter 1972:142-143).

1.19 How the murder of the Mouzalōnes was dared by the army

"It was now the ninth day" (81^{5})

The ninth day after the death of Theodōros II was 25 August 1258, and this date is accepted by Grēgoras (Greg. 65^{15-16}). Akropolitēs, however, states that the attack upon the Mouzalōnes occurred "when the basileus had not lain dead three days in his tomb" (Akrop. 154^{20-21}). There is no need for these two dates to be in opposition. Given that Theodōros probably died at Nymphaion (see commentary to 57^{32}), it would have taken several days for the body and its cortège to reach Sōsandra. Failler (1980b:27) comments upon this theory

but dismisses it, arguing instead that memorial services were conducted on the third, ninth and fortieth days following a death (citing Dimitrievskii 1895:788); that both Pachymerēs and Akropolitēs knew that the murders took place during one of these services; but that they were referring to different services – Akropolitēs to the ceremony of the third day and Pachymerēs to that of the ninth. Failler's ingenious suggestion, however, ignores the fact that Akropolitēs states that the murders took place *before* the third day.

"Sōsandra" (81^{7})

This monastery was one of the religious institutions founded by Iōannēs III (Greg. 44^{18}). It was dedicated to either the Virgin or Christ, but it is unknown which. Under the Laskarids and the early Palaiologoi it was one of the most important monasteries in the empire (Ahrweiler 1965:95).

While the exact location of Sōsandra is unknown, it was far enough away from Magnesia that visitors from that city would stay there overnight before the return journey, as is shown by Pachymerēs' references to the Mouzalōnes' pavilions (Pach. 83^{13}), and it was evidently beyond Magnesia for travellers coming from Nymphaion (see the commentary to 65^{7}). Ahrweiler (1965:90-91 and map) places Sōsandra on the northern slopes of Mount Sipylos, about twenty or thirty kilometres west of Magnesia, and this location seems reasonable. From Pachymerēs' account of the attack upon the monastery it is evident that Sōsandra was a large establishment, presumably of several buildings surrounded by an outer wall of some kind – suggested by the reference to both an outer gate (Pach. 83^{22}) as well as the main doors of the church itself (Pach. 85^{29}).

"The army" (81^{10-11})

The monastery seems to have been built on the slope of Mount Sipylos. The court and the army would have encamped on the flatter ground at the base of the hill, near the river Hermos.

"those who had been entrusted with the guard" (81^{25})

See the commentary to 77^{29}.

"Theophylaktos" (85^{15})

This man is otherwise unknown.

Geanakoplos (1959:39 n.38) suggests that it was Theophylaktos' presence and role in this assassination that led Pachymerēs to provide such a long account of the affair. He may be correct, but if Theophylaktos was the impetus behind Pachymerēs' account, we may

wonder why Theophylaktos does not feature more prominently in it. His relation to Pachymerēs is mentioned almost in passing, as if it is not of more than marginal interest to the author.

"the shoes upon his feet" (85^{23})

It was the prerogative of the prōtobestiarios to wear green shoes (PK 153^{5-6}). Theophylaktos would not have been wearing shoes of that colour. This incident is also related by Grēgoras, but he doe not name the individual involved (Greg. 66^{2-4}).

"the sacred hymns ceased" (85^{26})

Grēgoras states that the ceremony continued to be performed by the priests even as the Mouzalōnes were being cut down at the altar (Greg. 65^{22-23}). Needless to say, Grēgoras' testimony should be rejected immediately.

"As for the Mouzalōnes. . ." (85^{28})

The question as to whether the Mouzalōn brothers faced the beginning of the attack with such sangfroid because they believed the church would accord them sanctuary is an interesting one. Pachymerēs' reference to Geōrgios hiding under the altar, "believing that it would provide safety" could certainly be interpreted in this way. However, sanctuary is unlikely to have been provided by the monastery of Sōsandra. Even the great Hagia Sophia of Kōnstantinoupolis only had certain areas in which one could seek refuge, and they did not include the altar, so as to prevent possible interruption of services (Macrides 1988:514-515). Interestingly though, sanctuary at the Hagia Sophia was provided by the northern doors to the church, but Andronikos Mouzalōn's hiding behind the doors at Sōsandra is probably coincidental. On this matter see Macrides (1988:515).

"the other squeezed himself behind the door" (85^{29}-87^{3})

According to the testimony of Akropolitēs, Andronikos Mouzalōn had a "thin, weak body" (Akrop. 130^{31}-131^{1}), so Pachymerēs need not be exaggerating greatly when he says that the door of the church appeared flush with the wall when Andronikos was hiding behind it.

"their brother-in-law" (87^{3})

This man is otherwise unknown. We do know that Hagiotheodōritēs was a brother-in-law of the Mouzalōnes (see commentary to 77^{31}), but this individual should probably not be identified with him. While Pachymerēs does not explicitly state that the brother-in-law was

murdered, he does state that he was "associated with their misfortune", whereas we know that Hagiotheodōritēs prospered, at least for a while, under Michaēl VIII Palaiologos.

Akropolitēs does not mention his presence during the attack, and only refers to the Mouzalōnes themselves.

"apse of the prothesis" (87^{7})

The prothesis is that area of a church dedicated to the preparation of the sacred bread and wine used during the liturgy. It is situated to the left of the altar.

"the inviolability of the sanctuary" (87^{8-9})

While in theory a church was a place of refuge and sanctuary, history has shown many times that this customary protection was not enough. Frequently a church was instead seen as an ideal place to commit murder or assassinations. To cite just a few instances: Thomas à Becket was killed in Canterbury cathedral in 1170; Giuliano de Medici was assassinated in Florence cathedral in 1478, and the Jacobite Patriarch Dionysios was killed by his political enemies in his cathedral in 1260 (Nöldeke 1892:253). The Nika Riot of 532 was in part sparked by Justinian's intention to arrest a pair of fugitives claiming sanctuary in a church (Malalas 17.18).

Pachymerēs was a protekdikos, the church official who supervised the granting of sanctuary by the Church (see commentary to 23^{7}). He would have been quite aware of any rights to sanctuary that the Mouzalōnes could have claimed. His silence on this matter is telling.

"killed at the whim of their captors" (87^{14-15})

The savagery of the attack and the abuse of the bodies is confirmed by Akropolitēs (Akrop. 156^{4-8}).

"Karoulos" (87^{20})

Apparently a Latin mercenary named Charles, this man was not punished in any way for his murder of Geōrgios Mouzalōn. Failler (1984:86 n.1) indicates a certain surprise at this, but it must be remembered that the murders were a communal act carried out by the whole of the Latin regiment, and the punishment of one would demand the punishment of them all, and Michaēl Palaiologos, who quickly gained control of the situation, needed the Latin soldiery to remain loyal at under control. He cannot, in any case, have been very upset at the result of their action, even if he did not plan it.

Karoulos remained attached to the court after these events, and appears in 1265, informing the basileus of a treasonous conspiracy which he had been party to (Pach. 371^{8-13}), and which was a factor in the second downfall of Patriarch Arsenios. It is unknown what happened to Karoulos after this second affair.

His entry in the PLP is no. 11233.

"a Mysian booty" (89^{13})

Mysia was an ancient region of the northwest of Anatolia, located between Lydia, Bithynia and the Troad (which was occasionally treated as part Mysia). The frontiers were marked by Pergamon in the southeast (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.8), Kyzikos in the northeast, and the sea. The Mysians were traditionally held to be cowardly, unwarlike and weak (Failler 1984:88 n. 1).

The town of Atrammytion, the ancestral hometown of the Mouzalōn brothers (Pach. 41^{10}), lay within the borders of ancient Mysia, and Pachymerēs is surely making a reference to that in the current passage.

1.20 How some of the chief men left because of this, while others remained on their guard

"Karyanitēs" (89^{29})

Karyanitēs was a follower of Theodōros II, and was raised by him to the rank of prōtobestiaritēs in 1255 (Akrop. 124^{13-14}). According to Akropolitēs, Karyanitēs was in charge of that part of the army which was present at Magnesia at this time, and as such he had the ultimate responsibility for the deaths of the Mouzalōnes (Akrop. 159^{21-24}).

This Karyanitēs is sometimes identified with an imperial land surveyor of the same name who was active in Asia at some point before 1270, but this identification seems unlikely.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 11264.

Pachymerēs, while saying that the men around Karyanitēs fled to the Persians, does not say what the prōtobestiaritēs did on the fateful day at Sōsandra. Akropolitēs relates that he was taken under arrest on the orders of Michaēl Palaiologos, but that he somehow escaped and then fled to the Turks, being murdered by Türkmen bandits when he crossed the frontier (Akrop. 159^{24}-160^{3}). For a further possibility regarding Karyanitēs' 'escape' see the commentary to 113^{18-19}.

Geanakoplos (1959:45 n.65) argues that the arrest of Karyanitēs was designed solely to create a scapegoat for the murder of the legitimate regent and his brothers. I would suggest that Karyanitēs' arrest, while it may have served this purpose, was actually a *coup* intended to remove the leader of the army and ensure that the entire force present at Magnesia would fall under the command of Michaēl Palaiologos. The initial period after the killings in the church was very confused, with the soldiers running amok, and their officers being unable to approach them (Pach. 87^{31}-89^{3}). Their commander, Karyanitēs, had not been a target of the army's rage – these were strictly Geōrgios Mouzalōn, with his "accomplices" – and he would have been able to restore order in the ranks as the soldiers began to calm down if he had not been removed from authority. Who arrested him is unknown, but I suggest that it was either Michaēl or one of his brothers, acting on his authority.

With Karyanitēs out of the way – arrested on the pretext of being ultimately responsible for the conduct of his soldiers, the way was paved for Michaēl Palaiologos who, as megas konostaulos, was probably the most experienced and highest ranking military man in the area, to take charge of the murderous soldiers. We see that by that evening he had established some form of organisation of guards to protect the basileus (Pach. $91^{10\text{-}16}$).

"prōtobestiaritēs" (89^{29})

The prōtobestiaritēs was, in the late Byzantine Empire, the official in charge of the vestiaritēs. A unit of Imperial bodyguards, the vestiaritēs were used after the Fourth Crusade as, initially, heavy-handed tax-collectors and a kind of press-gang for the army of the Laskarids (MM 4.251). They later lost their military function altogether. The original title for their captain was primmikerios tēs vestiaritai, but the prōtobestiaritēs emerged as a new title in the course of the thirteenth century, probably after the loss of the military function of the vestiaritēs.

See Guilland (1967:2.203-11).

"many men" (91^{5})

While it is undoubtedly true that many of the witnesses to the attack in the church and its aftermath would have fled the scene immediately, most of these would have returned over the next few days. See the roll-call of noble families given by Pachymerēs in 1.21.

"As for the megas konostaulos" (91^{9})

Michaēl Palaiologos seems to have kept his head through the first day. Note his reaction to his niece's appeal (Pach. $89^{17\text{-}20}$). Whether or not he had arranged the murders beforehand, he had enough authority to gather a group of soldiers and instruct them to protect the young

basileus, Iōannēs IV. That he was able to appoint his brothers to what must have been officer positions, perhaps those that had been occupied by the "men around Karyanitēs" who had fled, indicates that he had seized command of the army. Geanakoplos (1959:41) suggests that by setting a guard over the basileus Michaēl showed himself as a perfect defender of the young ruler. Holding Iōannēs, however, was of key importance in the upcoming struggle for the regency, for it ensured that Michaēl Palaiologos would be centre-stage during the proceedings, and in a better position to obtain his goals. As it is said, possession is nine-tenths of the law.

"Iōannēs" (91^{10})

Iōannēs, the second son of the megas domestikos Andronikos Palaiologos and his wife Theodōra, was born shortly after his brother Michaēl, probably at the end of 1225 or beginning of 1226 (Papadopulos 1938:4). Little is known about his life under the Laskarids Iōannēs III and Theodōros II, and the absence of any advancement at court or military commands[39] may have been due to the hostility of those basileis to his brother Michaēl. After his brother took over the reigns of empire, Iōannēs' advancement was rapid.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 21487, and see Papadopulos (1938:4-5).

"Kōnstantinos" (91^{11})

The youngest of the sons of the megas domestikos Andronikos Palaiologos, Kōnstantinos may have been born in 1227 or 1228. Akropolitēs remarks that his mother was not Theodōra, who had borne Maria, Eirēnē, Michaēl and Iōannēs (Akrop. 161^{5}), but this fact is missed by Papadopulos (1938:6).

Kōnstantinos lived in obscurity until his brother's rise to power in 1258.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 21492.

"They showed their goodwill and loyalty towards the basileus" (91^{14})

This line echoes the defence put forward by the pillaging soldiers at Pach. 89^{10-12}. This, combined with the fact that the guards over Iōannēs were established by Palaiologos, the megas konostaulos, would suggest that the bodyguards provided for Iōannēs were made up of the very Latin soldiery that had killed the Mouzalōnes earlier in the day.

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[39] Macrides (1978:397), cites a reference to Iōannēs being in Rhodos in 1256, but indicates ignorance over his purpose there. 1256 was the year during which Michaēl Palaiologos went into exile with the Selçuks of Konya, and this strengthens a case for Iōannēs being also in voluntary or involuntary exile.

1.21 How the *archontes* contested for the guardianship of the basileus

"the Laskarid Tzamantouroi" (91^{21})

These men were Michaēl and Manouēl Laskaris. On them see the commentary to 65^{15-16}.

"the Tornikioi" (91^{24})

The sons of the mesazōn Dēmētrios Tornikios (see commentary to 91^{26}) were Kōnstantinos (see commentary to 91^{25}), and probably Iōannēs and Andronikos. They were second-cousins of the Palaiologoi brothers Michaēl, Iōannēs and Kōnstantinos (Schmalzbauer 1969:117).

Iōannēs was the doux of the theme of Thrakesion from about 1258 (Schmalzbauer 1969:121) to at least 1268 (Ahrweiler 1954:88 n.2). He later was promoted to sebastokratōr (Akropolitēs, *Scripta Minora*, 67; Schmalzbauer 1969:122).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 29126.

Andronikos Tornikios was named mesazōn in 1259 (MM 4.222; Ahrweiler 1965:149), but he died of disease shortly after (Schmalzbauer 1969:123). His funeral oration was written by the rhetor Manouēl Holobōlos.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 29121.

"the eldest of whom" (91^{25})

Kōnstantinos Tornikios (c.1220-c.1274) had been promoted to megas primmikērios c.1254, no doubt in large part thanks to the memory of his father, Dēmētrios. Together with Alexios Stratēgopoulos he botched a military campaign in Makedonia in 1255 and was stripped of his rank by a furious Theodōros II (Akrop. 114^{2-19}). Under Michaēl VIII he held various positions and was promoted to sebastokratōr (Pach. 155^{12-13} and commentary).

Guilland (1967:1.315), using this passage of Pachymerēs, suggests that Kōnstantinos Tornikios aspired to the regency. If so, his claim was quickly abandoned in favour of that of Michaēl Palaiologos (see commentary to Pach. 95^{29}-97^{2}).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 29129.

"megas primmikērios" (91^{25})

Officially, the megas primmikērios was the master-of-ceremonies of court ceremonial and was also in charge of the imperial household when the basileus was on campaign, having particular responsibility for the imperial banner (PK 174^{14}-175^{11}). The megas primmikērios occupied the eleventh rank of the hierarchy.

In reality, the megas primmikērios was another high-ranking official who was available to serve any number of duties. Both Kōnstantinos Tornikios (Akrop. 114^{2-19}) and Iōannēs Angelos (Akrop 115^{5-7}) had army commands as megas primmikērios.

See Guilland (1967:1. 312-313).

"their father" (91^{26})

Dēmētrios Tornikios was, for most of the reign of Iōannēs III Batatzēs, the second man of the empire, holding the title of mesazōn. His role was akin to that of a vizier or a prime minister, and gave him great authority to oversee the imperial administration. Apparently Iōannēs III regarded him as irreplaceable, since nobody was appointed to replace him after his death in c.1246 (Akrop. 90^{24}-91^{1}).

He married a cousin of Iōannēs' other chief minister, the megas domestikos Andronikos Palaiologos, and had four children. Though his daughter he became related to the despotēs Michaēl II of Epiros.[40]

"been called 'brother'" (91^{26}-93^{1})

This honour was not restricted to letters. Dēmētrios is also called Iōannēs III's 'brother' in numerous official documents. See, for example, MM 4.147, 193.

"Stratēgopouloi" (93^{2})

The presence of Alexios Stratēgopoulos at these councils is recorded by Akropolitēs (154^{26}). With him would have been his son Kōnstantinos (see Pach. 41^{17}) and perhaps his nephew, another Alexios (Pach. 193^{17}).

"young sons of the noble house of Rhaoul" (93^{8})

Akropolitēs indicates that Alexios Rhaoul had four sons (Akrop. 155^{6-7}). Iōannēs was the eldest of the four, and the names of two of the others were Manouēl and Isaakios. The name of the fourth is unknown (Fassoulakis 1973:17-23). Theodōros II had imprisoned them for a short time in 1258 (Akrop. 155^{7}), which may explain their support for Michaēl Palaiologos at this time.

Iōannēs was subsequently raised by Michaēl VIII to the position of prōtobestiarios, and served under Iōannēs Palaiologos in the Pelagonia campaign. He died in 1274 (Fassoulakis 1973:19; Nicol 1968:16).[41] On Iōannēs see also the commentary to 117^{17}.

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[40] His daughter had married Michaēl II's brother-in-law Theodōros Petraliphas (Akrop. 90^{19-20}), in a futile attempt by Iōannēs III to detach the Petraliphas family from the despotēs.

[41] Polemis (1968:173) gives the date as 1284 but this is due, I suggest, to a typographical error.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 24125.

Manouēl Rhaoul was initially favoured by Michaēl VIII, rising to the rank of pinkernēs sometime before 1276 (MM 4.420-21; Pach. 581^{15}) and serving as governor (*kephalē*) of Thessaly and perhaps marrying a cousin of the basileus. Manouēl was secretly an opponent of Church union, however, and his opposition was discovered in 1279 (Nicol 1962:6) and Manouēl was imprisoned (Pach. 581^{15}) and later blinded (Pach. 611^{25-27}). He died, still imprisoned, before 1295 (Fassoulakis 1973:21).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 24132.

Isaakios Rhaoul, like his brother Manouēl, was imprisoned and blinded for being an anti-Unionist. Unlike Manouēl, he was eventually reconciled with imperial policy and was released by Andronikos II some time before 1295, when he is recorded as being sent as an ambassador to the rebel Tarchaneiōtēs, Isaakios' nephew (Pach. (Bonn) II. 230). He died sometime after 1303.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 24120.

Little is known about the fourth of the brothers. See Fassoulakis (1973:23). He does not have an entry in the *PLP*.

"Palaiologoi" (93^{10})

The chief representatives of this family would have been Michaēl (see commentary to 33^{1}), the future basileus, and his brothers Iōannēs (commentary to 91^{10}) and Kōnstantinos (commentary to 91^{11}). Their uncle, also called Michaēl, may have been present as well (see commentary to 43^{15-16}).

"Batatzai" (93^{10})

These Batatzai were presumably distant relations of Iōannēs III, with one possible exception: Iōannēs' brother, the sebastokratōr Isaakios Doukas. He was present at the March 1261 signing of the Treaty of Nymphaion, and was almost certainly in attendance at the funeral of his nephew and the assemblies that followed. On him see the commentary to 41^{17}. As father-in-law to the anti-Laskarid Kōnstantinos Stratēgopoulos, and since he later served as ambassador for Michaēl VIII to Genoa, he presumably supported the Palaiologos in his push for power.

"sons of Philēs" (93^{10})

Akropolitēs (Akrop. 155^{2}) only records the presence of Theodōros Philēs, and not his sons also, at the Magnesia assemblies.

How many sons Theodōros had is unknown. The sources name one only: Alexios, who later rose to the rank of megas domestikos (Pach. 155^{5-8}).

"Kaballarioi" (93^{12})

Despite the Byzantine term *kaballarios*, designating a heavy Western-style cavalryman, this name does not necessarily indicate a Western origin for the Kaballarios family (see Nicol 1979:118-119 and Bartusis 1988a343-350).

One of the Kaballarioi present at this meeting was presumably Basileios Kaballarios, husband of Theodōra, niece of Michaēl Palaiologos (see Pach. 55^{25-26}). Others may have included Michaēl (d.1277), who was later megas konostaulos (Pach. 527^{2-3}) and perhaps Alexios (d.1273), who was later governor of Thessaly (MM 4.389) and domestikos tēs trapezēs.

"Nostongoi" (93^{12})

The origins of this family were Bulgarian, and it took several centuries for it to emerge into the highest ranks of the Byzantine nobility (Polemis 1968:150).

Two Nostongoi, cousins of Iōannēs III Batatzēs, committed treason in 1224 and were punished by the basileus (Akrop. 36^{16-23}). Their relationship with the Nostongoi who flourished in the 1250's is uncertain.

The Nostongoi who were present at the assemblies at Magnesia certainly included the pinkernēs Geōrgios (see commentary to 95^{1}) and may also have included the future prōtosebastos Michaēl (see commentary to 155^{19}), an Isaakios who had been epi tēs trapezēs in 1257 (Akrop. 142^{9-12}; *PLP*. no. 20200) and perhaps the Theodōros Nostongos who had been governor of Melenikon in Makedonia in 1255 (Akrop. 115^{6-7}).

Overall, the Nostongoi had been well-regarded by Theodōros II, and had fared well under his rule. With the exception of Michaēl, they did not fare so well under the reign of Michaēl VIII, which suggests more than anything else that the family had been opponents to his rise to power.

"Kamytzai" (93^{12})

Although Pachymerēs includes this family in his list of the great houses, the Kamytzai appear to have maintained a low profile. Pachymerēs does not mention an individual Kamytzēs in his Historia, and the *PLP* records only three Kamytzai for the entire Palaiologan period (*PLP*. nos. 10849-10851). The family were large landowners in the Maiander valley (TT I 479).

An Iōannēs Kamytzēs served under Theodōros I and Iōannēs III (Akrop. 38[16]), and rose to the rank of megas hetaireiarchēs (Akrop. 40[2]). Another Kamytzēs is mentioned in a letter of Theodōros II (Festa 222). It would have been the latter, or his relatives, who attended the Magnesia assemblies.

"Aprēnoi" (93[13])

Pachymerēs' inclusion of the Aprēnoi family in this list provides the earliest evidence for its arrival in the ranks of the higher nobility. Of the Aprēnoi present at this meeting we can possibly identify only one, an Andronikos Aprēnos who, according to a manuscript gloss from c.1350, was prōtostratōr and father-in-law of the megas domestikos Michaēl Tarchaneiōtēs (Heisenberg 1920:11). Less likely, but still possibly present at this meeting, was the Aprēnos who was later prōtobestiaritēs and who was killed fighting the Bulgars in 1279 (Pach. 589[17]).

On the Aprēnoi generally, and their later fortunes, see Polemis (1968:102-103).

"Angeloi" (93[13])

The greatest scions of this house in 1258 were Michaēl II of Epiros and his son Nikēphoros, but they would not have been invited to, and were certainly not present, at the Magnesia assemblies.

Of the Angeloi who were loyal to Nikaia, we know of two who were alive at this time. Confusingly, both are named Iōannēs. The first was, at the time of Theodōros II's death, prōtostratōr and controlling the Nikaian army in Makedonia. He had earlier been megas primmikērios (Akrop. 124[9]) and was a member of Theodōros II's inner circle (Skout. 539[12-15]). After his rise to the regency, Michaēl Palaiologos issued orders for Iōannēs Angelos to return home. Angelos died "of fright" before arriving at court (Akrop. 160[4-10]).

The second Iōannēs Angelos was said to be the brother of Michaēl Palaiologos' mother-in-law (Pach. 103[8]). His connection, if any, to Iōannēs Angelos the frightened prōtostratōr, is unknown. It is intriguing, however, that this Iōannēs Angelos later received the title of megas primmikērios once held by his namesake.

"Libadarioi" (93[13])

A Michaēl Libadarios was active in the 1240's and had the rank of megas hetaireiarchēs (Akrop. 67[10]). Macrides (1978:306) identifies Michaēl as being the Libadarios who betrayed the rebel Alexios Philanthrōpēnos to the empire in 1295 (Pach(Bonn) II 220); Greg. 195[23-25]; *PLP* no. 14859).

Contemporary with Theodōros II and Michaēl VIII was an unnamed Libadarios who became pinkernēs sometime before 1272 (*PLP* no. 14860), and another who was megas chartoularios in the 1270's (*PLP* no. 14858).

"Tarchaneiōtai" (93^{13})

Without doubt this group would have consisted of the megas domestikos Nikēphoros, brother-in-law of the Palaiologoi, (Pach. 55^{20}) and his three sons Michaēl, Andronikos and Iōannēs (Pach. 155^{11-12}).

"Philanthrōpēnoi" (93^{13})

It is generally accepted that this family's rise to prominence only began with the career of Alexios Philanthrōpēnos, who first gained attention only in 1255 (Akrop. 119^{15}; Macrides 1978:363; Polemis 1968:167; Angold 1975a:70). If so, the numbers of Philanthrōpēnoi at these assemblies would have been very small, and there is a strong possibility that Pachymerēs is here being guilty of including in his list of great families one whose time had not quite arrived.

"Kantakouzenoi" (93^{14})

With Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos, the husband of Eirēnē Palaiologina, having died before 1258 (see commentary to 155^{3}), the most prominent Kantakouzenoi who may have been present at these assemblies would have been Manouēl Kantakouzēnos, who was pinkernēs around 1250 (Nicol 1968:9; MM 4.215-216), and Michaēl Kantakouzēnos, the future megas konostaulos (Pach. 273^{6}).

"Geōrgios Nostongos" (95^{1})

Geōrgios first comes into historical prominence during 1256, when, as pinkernēs, he led a successful hunt for a group of troublesome Cumans (Skout. 524^{5-11}).

He may have been a brother of Michaēl Nostongos, who was also said to have been a cousin of Michaēl Palaiologos, and who was a supporter of Michaēl as basileus (Pach. 155^{19}).

The reasons why Theodōros II chose Geōrgios to be a future son-in-law are unknown, and it is equally uncertain which of the two unmarried Laskarid princesses he was intended for (on these princesses see commentary to 95^{12}). Geōrgios' claim to influence because of his proposed marriage to a daughter of Theodōros II is supported, in a round-about way, by the testimony of Michaēl Palaiologos, who wrote that Iōannēs III had at one time meant to give one of these princesses to him, but changed his mind at the last minute out of concerns

regarding Palaiologos' loyalty and the proximity to the throne such a marriage would provide him (Geanakoplos 1959:25 and n. 36).

On Michaēl VIII's rise to power, Geōrgios Nostongos fades into obscurity.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 20724.

"jousting" (95^{10})

Jousting had been introduced to Byzantium around the time of the early Komnēnoi, and was practised in a very similar way to Latin modes. Unlike in the west, however, the joust in Byzantium did not regularly receive regular state and religious denunciations. The basileus Manouēl I was a practised lancer (Chon. 108^{53}-110^{91}) and so, according to Pachymerēs, was Michaēl Palaiologos (Pach. 47^{3-6}).

On jousting in general, see Ducellier (1980:83-87).

"ball games" (95^{10-11})

Pachymerēs is probably referring to the sport that other Byzantine authors call *tzykanion*, a Persian-derived activity akin to polo. This game first became popular in the fifth century, and remained so for the rest of the empire's existence. The most notable difference between it and polo lay in the equipment: unlike a polo mallet, the players hit the ball with items whose description seems more like a modern tennis racquet or lacrosse *crosse*. The sport could be quite dangerous. The twelfth-century writer Kinnamos (263^{17}-264^{11}) provides the most detailed description of the game.

"princesses" (95^{12})

Theodōros II and his wife Helenē had four daughters. Two, Eirēnē and Maria, had already married by 1258. The younger two, Theodōra and Eudokia, were as yet unmarried (Akrop. 154^{1}). Unfortunately it is nowhere recorded to whom their care was entrusted after the death of their father, though this passage shows that they were still living in the palace at Nymphaion. Presumably their guardianship devolved on Michaēl Palaiologos, when he became regent for their brother Iōannēs IV.

Certainly Michaēl VIII later arranged marriages for them. Apparently deciding that to marry them to noble Byzantines could be risky – witness the claims Geōrgios Nostongos made based on an alleged engagement with one of the princesses – Michaēl VIII gave them in marriage to quite minor Latin lords (Pach. 243^{15-18}; Greg. 92-93). Theodōra married Matthieu de Vélicourt, the lord of Veligosti in the Peloponēsos, while Eudokia was given to the Italian count Guglielmo di Vintimiglia.

Their entries in the *PLP* are nos. 7304 (Theodōra) and 6234 (Eudokia).

1.22 How Palaiologos was preferred over others for this position

"During this month" (95^{14})

Theodōros II died on 16 August 1258. His funeral, and the death of the Mouzalōn brothers, was on 25 August. Pachymerēs here indicates that the gathered leadership of the Nikaian state remained in Magnesia, discussing the future regency, for nearly a month before Patriarch Arsenios arrived. Given the distance between Magnesia and Nikaia (two hundred kilometres or so), this time frame would be about right for a messenger to reach the capital and for the patriarch and his entourage to return to Magnesia.

"'soft life'" (95^{15})

Pachymerēs takes this phrase from *Iliad* 11.115. The full quote reads: "As a lion easily crunches up the infant young of a quick-running deer, when he has come to their den and caught them in his powerful teeth, and takes the *soft life* from them: and even if their mother is close by, she can be of no help to them." Our historian is writing from hindsight, and has included this quote as an allusion. Iōannēs IV is the young deer, and is helpless against the powerful teeth of those who wish to destroy him – namely Michaēl Palaiologos and his faction. In this none-too-subtle reference by Pachymerēs, the "mother" is Patriarch Arsenios, who was powerless to prevent the "attack" on Iōannēs IV.

"Arsenios" (95^{17})

The future Patriarch Arsenios was born Geōrgios Autōreianos, the son of Alexios Autōreianos and Eirēnē Kamatērē (Macrides 1981:77 n.74). He was born in Kōnstantinoupolis sometime shortly before the Fourth Crusade (Skout. 511^{2-6}). Akropolitēs accuses him of being uneducated (Akrop. 177^{7}-178^{2}), and even his supporter Skoutariōtēs says that he cut short his education in his zeal to enter the monastic life (Skout. 548^{19-26}).[42] Entering a monastic career, as Gennadios, Geōrgios rose to become abbot of the monastery of Oxeia, on the Isles of the Princes in the Sea of Marmara (Skout. 511^{11-12}). While abbot, Arsenios was sent by Iōannēs III on an embassy to Rome. It was on this embassy that Arsenios became friends with Andronikos, the metropolitan of Sardeis, who played an important role in Arsenios' later history (see Pach. 143^{23} and commentary). The abbot Arsenios was apparently chosen by Theodōros II to become patriarch after the basileus' first choice candidate, Nikēphoros Blemmidēs, turned the office down (Akrop. 106^{16}-107^{8}; Blemmidēs 1.45; Skout. 510^{1-26}; Greg. 55^{13-14}).

[42] Ševčenko (1981:308) says, of Arsenios' *Testamentum*, that it is a "stylisticly substandard" work.

Arsenios had two tenures as patriarch, 1254-60 and 1261-1264. Both reigns ended with Arsenios being forced to resign by Michaēl VIII. He died, again a monk, in 1273.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 1694.

"from Nikaia" (95^{18})

That Patriarch Arsenios was in Nikaia at the time of Theodōros II's death and funeral is confirmed by his own account (*Testamentum* 949^{C}). Although he knew Theodōros was dying – the basileus asked for and received a letter of absolution from the patriarch and from the synod (Skout. 533^{30}-534^{10}; Blemmidēs 1.47^{15-17}) – Arsenios still left him at his palace at Nymphaion and returned to Nikaia. Failler (1981:146-147) suggests that the reason was to attend the ceremonies to celebrate the 15 August feast of the Dormition of the Theotokos. In the absence of any known crises in the church, which may have demanded the patriarch's presence at Nikaia, this suggestion can be accepted.

"in the meantime" (95^{19})

Arsenios (*Testamentum* 949^{C}) also states that Michaēl Palaiologos was nominated by the gathered nobility before the patriarch arrived at Magnesia from Nikaia. Akropolitēs' *History* ignores this first meeting of the nobles and Michaēl Palaiologos' appointment as regent and megas doux, moving straight from the death of the Mouzalōnes to the second assembly at Magnesia, which was convened by Patriarch Arsenios in late September or October of 1258 (see commentary to 105^{21}).

"They eventually agreed" (95^{20})

The other major Greek authors also agree that Michaēl was the outstanding and obvious choice for the assembled nobles to make (Akrop. 158^{7-8}; Greg. 70^{8-16}).

This initial meeting of nobles appears to have been choosing somebody to act as an interim regent, to hold power over affairs until a full meeting of the senate, including the patriarch and other bishops, could assemble and debate the issue more thoroughly. Several points indicate this. Firstly, Michaēl Palaiologos had difficulties gaining full use of the monetary reserves of the bestiarion in the period leading up to the second assembly at Magnesia, given only enough funds for the day-to-day running of affairs, and not the total control that he had later, after the second assembly had elected him regent (Pach. 101^{24-25}; *cf.* Pach. 111^{27}-113^{1}). Secondly, Michaēl Palaiologos treated Patriarch Arsenios as the actual regent after the latter's arrival at Magnesia, giving the basileus Iōannēs IV into the patriarch's keeping and apparently giving Arsenios frequent accounts of the expenditures from the *bestiarion* (Pach. 103^{29}-105^{2}). Pachymerēs himself states that these actions were

undertaken as part of a plan by Palaiologos to get the backing of the patriarch for his regency, but this itself suggests that Palaiologos did not consider that his regency was already secure. Lastly, the second assembly at Magnesia is explicitly said to have been meeting to determine the regency for Iōannēs IV. Pachymerēs states at some length the arguments that were mad, and that other candidates came forward. It was apparent that this meeting was no mere rubber-stamp for the continuation of Palaiologos' regency.

"his nobility was ancient and of the highest level" (95^{23})

Grēgoras gives a summary of the Palaiologos family's history, dating back to before the Fourth Crusade (Greg. 69^{2-12}). See also the commentary to 33^{1}.

"he was himself related to the basileus" (95^{24})

Michaēl Palaiologos was the grandson of Eirēnē Angelina, daughter of basileus Alexios III Angelos. Eirēnē's sister Anna was a grandmother of Theodōros II and great-grandmother of Iōannēs IV. This made Michaēl and Iōannēs second cousins, once removed.

Michaēl's wife Theodōra (see commentary to 37^{4}) was the daughter of Iōannēs Doukas, cousin of Theodōros II, and was therefore a second cousin of Iōannēs IV.

See Failler (1982b:87-91).

"he himself had managed the affair" (95^{29}-97^{2})

In the following chapters of his *Historia* Pachymerēs constantly groups certain of the noble families into a faction which wholeheartedly supported Michaēl Palaiologos' push for higher honours. Prominent among these men were those who had been treated badly by Theodōros II, such as the sons of Kōnstantinos Rhaoul, who had been deprived of the rank of prōtobestiarios (Pach. 41^{8-9}), Alexios Stratēgopoulos, whose son had been blinded (Pach. 41^{17}) and who had himself been imprisoned (Akrop. 154^{26}-155^{2}), Theodōros Philēs (Pach. 93^{10-12}) and the Tornikioi, whose head, Kōnstantinos, as well as having been stripped of his rank by Theodōros II (Akrop. 154^{26}-155^{2}), was apparently promised a connection to the Palaiologoi through a proposed marriage between his daughter and Michaēl's brother Iōannēs (see Pach. 153^{16-17}). Akropolitēs states that Michaēl Palaiologos went out of his way to court those who had been mistreated by Theodōros II (Akrop. 161^{9-24}), and the list Akropolitēs provides of those nobles who came to Magnesia nursing grudges against Theodōros (Akrop. 154^{24}-155^{9}) corresponds quite closely with those nobles who appear in the *Historia* as allies of Palaiologos.

"the consent of the patriarch" (97^{7})

This statement tends to back the claims made by Grēgoras (62^{19}) and Pseudo-Sphrantzēs (12^{13-15}) that Patriarch Arsenios had been entrusted by Theodōros II with some kind of guardianship role over Iōannēs Laskaris. See commentary to 63^{14-15}.

1.23 How Palaiologos was made megas doux

"the overseer of the affairs of the empire was made megas doux" (97^{15-16})

This action was apparently undertaken by the gathered nobles of the assembly before the arrival at Magnesia of Patriarch Arsenios and his entourage, and can be dated to about mid-September 1258 (Angold 1975a:83). Of the major authors, only Pachymerēs mentions the promotion to megas doux but there is no reason to doubt him on this point.

"megas doux" (97^{15})

Another creation of Alexios I Komnēnos, the megas doux originally served as commander-in-chief of the Byzantine navy. Over time, and especially following the decline of Byzantine sea-power in the post-Komnenian period, the megas doux largely lost its function. As late as the fourteenth century the megas doux occasionally went to sea, but his original role was usually carried out in the person of his minion, the amēralēs (PK 183^{21-23}), or by another official altogether (Pach. 273^{11-16}, where the fleet is commanded by the prōtostratōr Alexios Philanthrōpēnos).

The megas doux instead became a largely honorary title, due in large part to its high position in the hierarchy. Pseudo-Kodinos places it in the fifth rank, behind the prōtobestiarios (PK 134^{10}). The title was carried by both those who had actual power and influence over affairs (such as the regent Michaēl Palaiologos and the fifteenth-century Loukas Notaras, chief minister of Kōnstantinos XI), as well as those individuals who seem to have held the title solely as an honorific, such as Michaēl Laskaris (Pach. 153^{20-21}).

See Guilland (1967:1.542-543).

"he laid hands on the imperial treasury" (97^{19-20})

Pachymerēs interrupts the narrative at this point to digress on the fiscal policies of the basileus Iōannēs III. The narrative continues in 1.25.

"money held in reserve at Magnesia" (97^{21})

For Magnesia, see commentary to 63^{20}. The location of the treasury in the city is uncertain. It may have been located in the citadel above the town, where there are still to be found the ruins of several large buildings (Foss 1979:309).

The treasury (*bestiarion*) at Magnesia was more than a repository for the cash belonging to the empire. It was also the home of all of the empire's fiscal records and the centre of the financial administration. It was the only department of the government that was not based at the imperial court (Angold 1975a:254). While the *bestiarion* no doubt had a permanent staff of notarioi and minor chartoularioi, and may have had a security force of Varangians (see commentary to 101^{22}), it is uncertain who was, for want of a better word, the governor. Angold (1975a:206 and n. 12) suggests that in 1258 the logothetēs tōn agelōn, Hagiotheodōritēs, was in control of the *bestiarion*, but Pachymerēs makes it clear that Hagiotheodōritēs was actually given command over the troops guarding the place only, and not necessarily of the entire department (Pach. 77^{31}). Hendy (1985:440) suggests that the official known as the prokathēmenos tou bestiariou, whom Pseudo-Kodinos states was in charge of state revenues and expenditure from the *bestiarion*, was the supervising official, even in Nikaian times, perhaps serving under a series of superior officials serving short terms.[43]

The *bestiarion*, or at least parts of it, could move, often as part of the train of the basileus. It was with Michaēl VIII in 1265, for instance, when he was defeated by the Mongol allies of the Bulgarian tsar (Pach. 307-309). Michaēl IX lost "the imperial money" to the Turks he was fighting in 1310 (Greg. 258). The prokathēmenos tou bestiariou, who was definitely in charge of the *bestiarion* by 1274, is recorded by Pachymerēs as being one of the envoys sent to the Council of Lyons (Pach. 493^{2-3}). He was probably there to escort the many and valuable gifts being sent by Michaēl VIII to the council (Pach. 493^{3-8}).

"Astritzios" (97^{25})

No other authority mentions this place, and it is certainly telling that Pachymerēs only gives an unofficial form of its name. It suggests that he did not know anything about the fort either, even its official name. The name Astritzios may be derived from the Greek *astragalos* – 'knucklebone,' perhaps referring to the physical appearance of the locality.

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[43] Certainly, the prokathēmenos tou bestiariou seems to have been a *working* position, rather than an honourary one. Pseudo-Kodinos gives that official no courtly functions, which would indicate that he spent most of his time away from the court.

Cook, in his study of the Troad region, (Cook 1973:319) suggests that the ruins atop the hill known as Kızkulesi are the remains of this fort, but his identification remains pure conjecture.

The Skamandros was the ancient river of Troy, and runs inland from the Aegean for about one hundred kilometres. The region through which it flows is a curious choice for Theodōros' treasury, being far from the centres of Nikaian political activity – the Hermos valley and around Nikaia itself. Perhaps its advantage lay in its position near the invasion routes from Anatolia into Europe via the Hellespont, and therefore provided a useful site for campaign war chests,[44] or perhaps as a subsidiary to the main *bestiarion* at Magnesia, intended to serve the financial needs of the entire European dominion of the Nikaian empire (Hendy 1985:443).

"life-blood of the poor" (97^{27})

Pachymerēs uses this phrase in the same context earlier in the *Historia* (63^{4}). The earlier reference comes in an alleged quote of Iōannēs III. We cannot know whether that quote is legitimate or whether Pachymerēs has put his own words in the basileus' mouth. See the commentary on 63^{4}.

"it was a treasure collected and augmented" (97^{27-30})

Iōannēs III, like his predecessor Theodōros I, had put in great efforts to gather revenue. The lands belonging to the great monasteries of Kōnstantinoupolis were confiscated and added to the imperial demesne (Ahrweiler 1959:57), and large areas of western Anatolia were put under cultivation (Greg. 41^{22}-42^{12}; Skout. 286^{7-8}), partially through the settlement of refugees displaced by Latin or Turk (Angold 1975a:104-105) and also of newcomers to the empire, such as the Cumans (Akrop. 53-54). Increased prosperity for his subjects resulted in increased revenue for the basileus.

International trade with the empire of Nikaia was light and sporadic, since the empire lay off the main trade routes, but internal trade flourished. As a result, the government's revenue stream was not greatly enhanced by takings of the *kommerkia* customs duties (Hendy 1985:592-98; Angold 1975a:227-228), though there was a steady flow from internal tariffs and tolls. Angold (1975a:117) ascribes the bulk of the bullion collected at Magnesia to the grain trade with the Selçuks, who purchased great amounts of foodstuffs in the 1240's and 1250's following several bad harvests (Greg. 42^{20}-43^{4}).

[44] A point also suggested by Angold (1975:205).

"he withdrew from it" (97^{31}-99^{3})

Pachymerēs elaborates on Iōannēs III's generosity in 1.24.

"an inexhaustible flood" (99^{2-3})

This is the first line of a long and sometimes cumbersome simile employed by the historian, in which he repeatedly refers to the finances of the Nikaian Empire as rivers, canals and seas. It was not uncommon for Byzantine authors to see the circulation of money in this way: Nikolaos Mesaritēs used the same imagery when describing the gold looted from the palace after a revolution as "flowing like a flood" (Heisenberg 1907:25-26).

"Cyrus and Dareios" (99^{4})

Pachymerēs has misremembered his Herodotos. The ancient author referred to Cyrus as the father, Cambysēs as the master, and Dareios as the merchant (Herodotos 3.89). In any case, this seems to be an instance of our historian being too clever for his own good. He does indeed portray Iōannēs as Herodotos portrays Cyrus: "always occupied with plans for his subjects' well-being", but his description of Theodōros' behaviour does not match either Dareios: "being out for profit wherever he could get it", or Cambysēs: "harsh and careless of his subjects' interests." He seems to show Theodōros as being like Cyrus also, but he could not have written that without ruining his allusion, and thus he has left us a none-too-convincing comparison.

"*zeugēlateia*" (99^{8})

The *zeugēlateia* was the demesne land of the Nikaian/Byzantine basileus. It was also the term used to designate any land taken from this demesne and awarded to great nobles or religious houses (Angold 1975a:126; Ahrweiler 1963-64:112-114). In this passage Pachymerēs is using the term solely to designate the lands still belonging to the crown.

Iōannēs III was renowned for his care of these lands, and famously bought a crown for his wife with the proceeds from the sale of eggs laid on his *zeugēlateia* (Greg. 43^{9-15}), but the extent of the imperial holdings had been greatly reduced by the 1270's through the provision of land grants to nobles and of *pronoiai* for soldiers (Bartusis 1992:167).

1.24 How the basileus Iōannēs, on falling ill, made many donations to the poor

"A sickness once befell the basileus" (99^{27}-101^{1})

This sickness of the basileus can probably be dated to 1244. Pachymerēs mentions that Iōannēs' first wife, Eirēnē, had died, but he makes no mention of Iōannēs' second wife, Constanza. Eirēnē died in 1239 (see commentary to 101^{2}) and Iōannēs married Constanza in 1244 (Polemis 1968:108). Secondly, Patriarch Manouēl is mentioned. Manouēl came to the patriarchal throne in 1244 (Laurent, *Regestes*, 111). The absence of Constanza but the presence of Manouēl would indicate that this incident took place in 1244, before the arrival of the German princess.

"Eirēnē" (101^{2})

Eirēnē was the first-born daughter of basileus Theodōros I Laskaris and his wife Anna, the daughter of Alexios III Angelos. She was born c.1200. Eirēnē was married to a Palaiologos for a very brief time before his death left her a widow. In 1212 her father gave her in marriage to Iōannēs Batatzēs. The couple had one son, the future Theodōros II, before an accident prevented any further children.

Eirēnē was a very pious woman who contributed, as co-founder, to many of Iōannēs III's religious foundations and the marriage was a highly successful one. She died in 1239 (Akrop. 64^{1-5}).

On her see Polemis (1968:139-140).

"epileptic fits" (101^{3})

Iōannēs suffered from this illness, just as his son Theodōros II later did (see commentary to 41^{7-8}). Given that he lived to his sixties it may be that his disease was milder than that of Theodōros, who died at thirty-six. It was epilepsy that finally killed Iōannēs, however. Akropolitēs (Akrop. 101^{23}-103^{2}) gives an extended description of Iōannēs' final days, and Grēgoras (Greg. 49^{21}-50^{19}) supports his statements.

"imitated as best he could the divine mercy" (101^{4})

The generosity of Iōannēs III is literally legendary. As early as 1300 he was being revered by the Greeks of western Anatolia, who remembered him as *hagios Iōannēs ho Eleēmōn*, Saint John the Almsgiver (Macrides 1981:69-171; Heisenberg 1905:166-171).

Contemporary and near-contemporary authors also praise the charity of Iōannēs, especially the number of churches, monasteries, almshouses, orphanages and hospitals he

built or refurbished. See the histories of Grēgoras (44^{15}-45^{4}) and Skoutariōtēs (508^{14}-509^{11}) and the *epitaphos* written for him by Geōrgios Akropolitēs (*Scripta Minora* 22-24).

In his final illness in 1254 Iōannēs once again turned to God, seeking mercy (Akrop. 103^{8-11}), but this time his prayers were not answered.

"to each poor man" (101^{5-7})

As Failler (1984:100 n. 2) says, the suggestion that Iōannēs III gave to every poor man in the empire a full thirty-six nomismata is absurd. Such an amount was equivalent to the annual income from a good-sized *pronoia*. Failler solves this apparent problem by stating that a word must be missing in the text, and that the word "polis" should be inserted. Thus Iōannēs instructed every poor man *in the city* to be given the money. Certainly this would have represented a much smaller expenditure from the treasury, and would have been much easier, not to say quicker, to implement.

This interpretation, however, ignores the purpose of this digression from Pachymerēs. The historian's intention here is twofold. On the one hand he wants to demonstrate the generosity of Iōannēs III, but on the other he wishes to draw a comparison between the uses of the treasury under the Laskarids, especially Iōannēs III, and the use of it by Michaēl Palaiologos, which is the subject of the next chapter of the *Historia*. While it was not for completely impersonal and merciful reasons, at least the expenditure of Iōannēs was made on good works and charity, whereas Michaēl Palaiologos used the money solely for his own benefit, with no real interest in the well-being of his beneficiaries. Neither of Pachymerēs' intentions is weakened in its impact by an exaggeration of the scale of Iōannēs' *eleos*. *Contra* Failler, then, I would argue that Pachymerēs meant exactly what he wrote, without leaving anything out but the total truth.

1.25 How the megas doux, seizing the imperial treasure, procured much goodwill for himself

"axe-bearing Celtic regiment" (101^{22})

This is the first reference to the Varangian guard being revived by the Nikaian Empire. Just as the regiment had been before the Fourth Crusade (Dawkins 1946), most members of this new unit seem to have been Englishmen – as well as Pachymerēs referring to them as

Celts,[45] we also have Michaēl VIII calling them the *Enklinobaraggoi* in a 1272 *prostagma* (Heisenberg 1920:39), and a reference from Pseudo-Kodinos in which they are said to speak English (PK 209^{26}-210^{1}). Their officers were termed primmikērioi tōn Baraggōn by Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 216^{13-14}), though we are not told who commanded them during this period,[46] nor their total number.

The primary role of this regiment, as it had ever been, was as a personal bodyguard for the basileus and his family. They are seen performing this role at Pach. 145^{15-16} and 485^{13} (where they are explicitly termed *sōmatophylakēs*), and Pseudo-Kodinos also assigns them this task (PK. 264^{13-17}).

Their presence guarding the Magnesia *bestiarion* at this time has led Blöndal (1978:172-173), Geanakoplos (1959:43), Bartusis (1992:274) and others to state that the Varangians had a permanent responsibility for the *bestiarion*. We should be wary of reaching such a conclusion based on this one example. In an earlier passage Pachymerēs had explicitly stated that one of the acts of Mouzalōn's brief regency was assigning loyal and reliable guards to the *bestiarion* (Pach. 77^{29-30}). It could legitimately stated that this one example shows that the placing of Varangians in the *bestiarion* was an unusual event, rather than standard practise. The incident of 1265, in which the campaign war chest was saved from capture by the Bulgars through being taken into the town of Ainos, cannot be proposed as further evidence of Varangians guarding the imperial treasures, for Pachymerēs does not refer to the Keltoi on that occasion (Pach. 307^{25}).

"treasurers" (101^{24-25})

The administrative staff of the *bestiarion* was comprised of low-ranking notarioi and chartoularioi (see commentary to 97^{21}), and it is doubtful whether even the most officious of these junior bureaucrats would resist the regent of the empire in this way.

It is more likely that the resistance was made by Hagiotheodōritēs, the logothetēs tōn agelōn, whom Mouzalōn had placed in charge of the *bestiarion* after the death of Theodōros II (Pach. 77^{30-31}). Hagiotheodōritēs was promoted later to the rank of logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn by Michaēl VIII (Pach. 155^{22}-157^{1}), and it may be that Michaēl was rewarding Hagiotheodōritēs for giving him the keys to the treasury, perhaps after the latter had used his position to obtain leverage.

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[45] Twelfth-century Byzantine historians also used the term *Keltoi* to refer to Germans and Normans as well as Englishmen (Asdracha 1983:32), but the reference by Pachymeres to the axes, which had been the signature weapon of the Varangian guard throughout its history (Bartusis 1992:273), confirms the identification of the *Keltikon* as Varangians

[46] Bartusis (1992:274) suggests that these primmikērioi were joint-commanders, each with their own independent companies.

The difficulty Michaēl Palaiologos experienced in gaining full access to the treasury may be an indication that he was indeed only filling the role of regent as an interim measure until a full council of the senate, including the patriarch and other bishops, could be convened to discuss the issue. We may compare the trickery and deception Michaēl used at this time to gain access to the *bestiarion* with his actions following his promotion to despotēs and acceptance as permanent regent (Pach. 111^{27}-113^{1}). In the later case, says Pachymerēs, Michaēl simply took control of everything, and began openly distributing the treasures from the *bestiarion* to noble and clergy.

"the author, being present one day" (103^{4-8})

This affair, for which we have no other evidence, cannot be dated with any precision. It occurred sometime after Michaēl Palaiologos became basileus.

The most intriguing point about this episode is that Michaēl called on Angelos, his mother-in-law's brother, to provide justice about Michaēl's wife's dowry, suggesting in the process that Theodōra's dowry was provided by her mother's side of the family. This appears to contradict Michaēl himself who, in an autobiographical typikon, states that he was given Theodōra as a bride by Iōannēs III, Theodōra's great-uncle on her father's side. Iōannēs "loved her like a father" according to this typikon (Gregóire 1959-60:451; Akrop. 101^{6-10}).

"only three nomismata" (103^{6-7})

Failler (1984:102 n.1) suggests that this figure must represent the daily expenditure of Michaēl VIII's imperial household.

Though the annual figure (over one thousand nomismata) was still quite a sum, it pales in comparison with the incomes available to other landed property holders. The annual income of the Lavra monastery on Mount Athos, for instance, has been calculated as about twelve thousand nomismata in the early fourteenth century (Bartusis 1992:267).

"Angelos" (103^{7})

This man rose from seemingly nowhere to the rank of megas primmikērios in 1259 (Pach. 155^{18}). He was most probably dead before 1266, when that rank and title were given to Michaēl Tarchaneiōtēs (Pach. 385^{6-7}).

"his mother-in-law" (103^{7})

Little is known about this woman, Eudokia Angelina. She was the daughter of Iōannēs Angelos (Skout. 504^{10}) and married Iōannēs Doukas, the nephew of Iōannēs III Batatzēs

(Akrop. 101^{9-18}). She is referred to as the "aunt" of Alexios Stratēgopoulos (Polemis 1968:109).

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 6228.

1.26 How the megas doux, on the arrival of the patriarch, showed him much deference

"At this time" (103^{18})

Patriarch Arsenios' arrival at Magnesia after travelling from Nikaia can probably be dated to the end of September, 1258. See the commentary to 95^{14}.

"holding the bridle of the priest's mule" (103^{21-22})

Geanakoplos (1959:44 n.61) discusses this incident in some detail. He identifies two possible inspirations for Michaēl's behaviour towards Patriarch Arsenios: western practice, in which the emperor led the pope's mule by the bridle, and the biblical account of Christ's entry to Jerusalem on Palm Sunday. Geanakoplos comes down strongly in support of Michaēl copying western practice. To his opinion we may add a two more potential reasons: that taking the bridle of the patriarch's mule (presumably from a patriarchal attendant who had been leading the mount) was a natural act of deference, and had not been inspired by anything, or that it was in fact inspired by imperial court protocol. The basileus' horse was held by the komēs tōn basilikōn hippōn while the basileus mounted, and the prōtostratōr and megas chartoularios replaced him after the basileus was in the saddle (see commentary to 47^{10}). Palaiologos, having spent a long time at court, would no doubt be aware of such demonstrations of honour and servitude.

Whatever the inspiration behind Michaēl's action, Geanakoplos is undoubtedly correct in his conclusion that Michaēl was only endeavouring to "flatter the Patriarch and secure his support."

"the palace" (103^{22})

Magnesia contained an imperial residence, smaller in size of that at Nymphaion, built by Iōannēs III early in his reign (Akrop. 37^{18}). This palace was possibly built inside the citadel atop the hill overlooking the town. See Foss (1979:307-308), and commentary to 63^{20}.

"he would not exercise guardianship" (103^{26-27})

This statement appears to support the argument that Theodōros II had given Patriarch Arsenios some form of supervisory role in the regency of Iōannēs IV, as suggested by Grēgoras (62^{19}) and Pseudo-Sphrantzēs (12^{13-15}).

Even if Arsenios had not been awarded any formal role in the regency, Michaēl, through gaining the support and agreement of the patriarch and the Church, was seeking legitimacy for his regency from the "most important legally-constituted authority remaining" following the death of the basileus (Geanakoplos 1959:42). By gaining the confirmation of his position from both the ecclesiastical and secular authorities within the empire, Michaēl was making his regency twice as secure, for it would the agreement of both Church and nobles to remove him. Pachymerēs wrote as much at 97^{4-8}.

"he took the child" (103^{29})

Iōannēs IV reverted to the care of Michaēl Palaiologos after Patriarch Arsenios departed for Nikaia at the end of 1258, to prepare for the coronation ceremony (Pach. 129^{22}). Michaēl then placed the boy-basileus under the supervision of his sisters (see commentary to 179^{20-21}).

"a very strong feeling of kindness" (105^{10})

Until Michaēl VIII became secure on his throne, he was always careful to treat the clergy with the utmost respect and generosity. He was very careful not to interfere directly with the functioning of the synod even on becoming basileus (Pach. 223^{11}), and even his ecclesiastical opponents were treated with respect (Pach. 169^{15}-171^{3}).

It is unknown what these current gifts comprised but, being from the imperial treasury, they could not have been grants of lands to the Church or the other grand gestures such as those he was later to make to the monasteries of Kōnstantinoupolis (Pach. 221^{23-24}), and were more likely to have been small presents made as bribes for each individual bishop and deacon.

This sort of treatment of the clergy was in great contrast to the relations between Church and basileus during the reign of Theodōros II. That basileus had taken a high-handed approach to ecclesiastic matters, frequently asserting the right of the basileus to intervene in areas that had customarily been the preserve of patriarch and synod, and even claiming the power to decide matters which even ecumenical councils could not agree on (Angold 1975a:57). Such an approach had not endeared Theodōros with many of the clergy.

In any case, the flattery and bribes worked. The bishops were the first to nominate Palaiologos as permanent regent and despotēs at the second assembly at Magnesia (Pach. 105^{24}.)

"basileōpatōr" (105^{16})

This title was briefly in vogue during the first half of the tenth century, but seems to have fallen into disuse thereafter. The holder of the title was an important minister during the minority of a young basileus, and served as a guardian to and tutor in matters of state for the basileus. Most basileōpatōrēs became fathers-in-law of their masters, but this was not a requirement for the title. The most famous holder of the position was Rōmanos Lekapenos, who was basileōpatōr under Kōnstantinos VII Porphyrogennetos. He married Kōnstantinos to his daughter Helenē then, in 920, used his position of power to usurp the throne of his son-in-law. He provides an interesting parallel with the rise of Michaēl VIII Palaiologos.

On this office see Karlin-Hayter (1968:278-280).

Pachymerēs is not clear on whether Palaiologos actually received this title at this time, or whether its bestowal was merely proposed. The Chronicle of the Morea, however, quite clearly states that Palaiologos did indeed receive this title (*CoM* 1230-1235).

1.27 How those who spoke in favour of the megas doux convinced the majority, and how he became despotēs

"At this point" (105^{21})

Patriarch Arsenios reached Magnesia towards the end of September 1258 (see commentary to 103^{18}). Pachymerēs then states that Michaēl Palaiologos spent some time, the duration of which cannot be known, in flattering the patriarch and bribing the bishops in his train. While he was doing this, the patriarch opened a new council, comprising both secular and ecclesiastic dignitaries (Geanakoplos 1959:42). This second assembly at Magnesia was intended solely to determine the permanent regent for Iōannēs IV.

Akropolitēs, who does not mention the first meeting of the nobility, refers to this second meeting (Akrop. 156^{19}-159^{9}; Geanakoplos 1953b:426; Failler 1980b:28).

"united assembly of nobles and bishops" (105^{22-23})

Patriarch Arsenios claimed that this meeting was attended by "both the synod and the senate" (Arsenios, *Testamentum*, 949^{C}). This seems likely. The first assembly, which

agreed to Palaiologos becoming provisional regent, was a meeting of the senate, and Patriarch Arsenios arrived at Magnesia accompanied by many bishops (Pach. 103^{21}).

For a discussion of the Nikaian senate, see the commentary to 65^{14}.

"who was to be chosen to direct affairs" (105^{23-24})

This is the key passage supporting the theory that Michaēl Palaiologos' initial election by the nobility as regent for Iōannēs IV was intended solely as an interim measure, and served only to ensure that somebody was in charge of affairs until a full assembly of church and state could be convoked to debate the matter of the regency. *Contra* Angold (1975a:83), this second assembly did not meet merely to act as a rubber stamp for Michaēl Palaiologos' regency. It was instead, in theory at least, open for new candidates to step forward and state their claims for the position.

The debates took some time. Michaēl Palaiologos was not confirmed as despotēs and regent until 13 November 1258 (Schreiner 75; Loenertz 1963:341), that is, some weeks after Arsenios and his train arrived. This factor suggests that the meeting and the decision did not occur all in a single day.

"imperial dignities" (105^{27})

Despotēs and sebastokratōr, the two highest ranks in the imperial hierarchy were typically reserved for members of the imperial family, though both were occasionally given to rulers of independent domains that the basileus wished to bind more closely to the empire, such as Michaēl II of Epiros and his son Nikēphoros, who seem to have been granted despotic rank after the marriage of Nikēphoros to Maria, the daughter of Theodōros II (Akrop. 92^{8-10}). It was very uncommon for subjects of the empire to receive these titles, and the recipient usually had some relationship with the imperial family. Such a man was Kōnstantinos Tornikios, who received the rank of sebastokratōr from Michaēl VIII (Pach. 155^{12-13}). Kōnstantinos was the father-in-law of Michaēl's brother Iōannēs.

"his maternal grandfather" (107^{2-3})

This man was Alexios Palaiologos, who became a son-in-law of Alexios III Angelos in 1199. He was promoted by Alexios III to the rank of despotēs at the time of this marriage. There is no historical record of him post 1201, and it may be assumed that he had died by 1203, when the Fourth Crusade reached Kōnstantinoupolis (Laurent 1933:126-127).

No other source indicates that Alexios Palaiologos had served against Latins. Chōniatēs only refers to him as participating in campaigns against the Bulgarian Ivanko in 1199 and against the rebel Iōannēs Komnēnos in 1201 (Chon. 510-511, 519).

"many of the bishops" (107^{10})

Pachymerēs here appears to contradict his earlier statement, that all of those in the clergy spoke in Palaiologos' favour (Pach. 105^{24}). It could mean, however, that there were lesser clergy present as well as bishops, and that the former opened the debate by nominating Palaiologos, while the bishops waited to see the response of everyone present to this suggestion.

"the Tzamantouroi" (107^{13-14})

This faction, which had earlier proposed Nostongos as regent during the first assembly at Magnesia, now brings out the same arguments as they had used then, in the hope of swaying the mind of the patriarch and the synod (see Pach. 95^{2-8} and commentary).

That this argument was put forward at the second assembly is another point supporting the theory that Michaēl Palaiologos' initial election as regent was intended as a temporary appointment only, and could have been replaced by a different regency chosen at this meeting.

"related to or who expected to become close to the Palaiologoi" (107^{25-26})

Isaakios Doukas was the grandfather of Michaēl Palaiologos' wife Theodōra (see commentary to 93^{10} and 95^{24-25}). Alexios Stratēgopoulos was related to Eudokia Angelina, Theodōra's mother (commentary to 103^{7}). Iōannēs Angelos was Theodōra's uncle (commentary to 103^{8}). Kōnstantinos Tornikios was probably promised a marriage alliance with Iōannēs Palaiologos (commentary to 155^{12-13}). Alexios Philēs later married Michaēl's niece Maria (Pach. 155^{3-8}). Nikēphoros Tarchaneiotes was the husband of Maria Palaiologina, and their three sons were nephews of Michaēl Palaiologos (commentary to 93^{13}).

"copy those aboard ships" (109^{3-12})

"misfortune befell the empire of the Romans" (109^{16})

This is a reference to the Fourth Crusade and the creation of the Latin Empire in 1204.

"keeping one's oaths" (109^{22})

This may be a reference to the numerous oaths of loyalty and submission Michaēl Palaiologos had sworn to Iōannēs III and Theodōros II. These were later seen as a

stumbling block for his assumption of imperial power, and were removed by the assembled patriarch and synod (see commentary to 135^{7}-137^{4}).

1.28 How the Patriarch agreed with those who spoke in favour of Palaiologos

"the first sacrificer" (111^{14})

This is the only occasion in which Pachymerēs uses this title to refer to a patriarch. If his reasons for doing so go beyond simple *variatio elegans*, they escape this author.

"when the news . . . was announced in Nikaia" (111^{17-18})

This is an interesting incident. Pachymerēs' source was undoubtedly Gemistos, whom he would have known during his service in the patriarchal bureaucracy (see commentary to 23^{7}). News of the death of Theodōros II would probably have reached Nikaia a few days after the event, certainly before the funeral at the Sōsandra monastery and the murder of the Mouzalōnes took place.

If Gemistos gave Pachymerēs a true report,[47] the incident suggests an unsuspected dynamic between Arsenios and Michaēl Palaiologos. In later years Michaēl and the patriarch had a stormy relationship, with the basileus forcing the patriarch to resign twice, and Arsenios excommunicating Michaēl. But this remark recorded here suggests that, before Michaēl usurped the throne of Iōannēs IV, Arsenios was quite partial to the nobleman. His reasons for this cannot be known, but may have been similar to the reasons put forward by the other nobles for Michaēl's suitability for the regency (see Pach. 95^{20-26}).

Arsenios' comment to Gemistos, made when the patriarch knew Geōrgios Mouzalōn was the chosen regent, if combined with Arsenios' strange absence from Nymphaion when he knew Theodōros II to be dying, could lead to the thought that Arsenios was aware of Michaēl's supposed plot to remove the Mouzalōnes, but the evidence is not available to support this hypothesis.

"Gemistos" (111^{19})

This is Michaēl Gemistos, whose friendship with Arsenios at this time (for which see Laurent, *Regestes*, 1338) proved to be no constraint upon his later advancement through the ranks of the Church hierarchy. He became hypomnematographos in 1265/66, under Patriarch Germanos (Pach. 377^{22}), protekdikos in 1270 under the Arsenite Patriarch Iōsēph

[47] A fact that, unfortunately, we will never know.

(MM 5.248), and in 1277 reached his final office, that of megas oikonomos, under the Unionist Iōannēs Bekkos.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 3636.

"megas oikonomos" (111^{20})

This was the highest-ranked official in the patriarchal bureaucracy. The megas oikonomos was the overseer of the patriarchal finances, and had great influence over the finances of those monasteries and other holdings dependent upon the patriarchate. Perhaps surprisingly, few holders of this office succeeded to the patriarchal throne itself.

See Darrouzès (1970:303-309).

"through his vote" (111^{24-25})

This passage implies that Patriarch Arsenios had full power to elect the regent. This supports the statements of Grēgoras (62^{19}) and Pseudo-Sphrantzēs (12^{13-15}), who wrote the Theodōros II had given a special role in the guardianship of Iōannēs IV. Angold (1975a:86-88), while writing that Arsenios' position was critical in the meetings which led to Michaēl Palaiologos' regency, denies that he had any official role from Theodōros. He rightly states that Arsenios himself, in his *Testamentum*, does not claim any such role for himself.

In light of this, it becomes clear that all of Michaēl's lobbying and bribery of noble and ecclesiastic alike served only one purpose: to enable him to exert more pressure upon the patriarch's decision, forcing Arsenios to accede to what seemed a popular choice.

"conferred upon him the symbols of the office" (111^{26-27})

The ceremony in which the basileus bestowed despotic rank was described by Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 274^{1}-275^{24}). In brief, the despotēs prostrated himself at the feet of the enthroned basileus, who then instructed him to rise, saying "my majesty crowns you despotēs" (PK 274^{24-25}) and then crowned him with a crown adorned with pearls and precious stones. This crown was known as the *stemmatogyrion* (PK 275^{14}; Pach. 321^{17}-322^{1}).

On the crown and other insignia related to the rank of despotēs, see Failler (1982a:178-180).

"he made sure to fulfil his promises" (113^{1-2})

Pachymerēs refers here to the rewards Michaēl VIII gave to the senators following his accession. These rewards included grants of land and *pronoiai* (Pach. 139^{3-6}) and promotions to higher ranks, as well as marriage connections with the (by then) imperial

family of Palaiologos (Pach. 153^{12}-157^{3}). Charanis (1951a:353-355) argues that for Michaēl to have done any different would have been political suicide – the late Byzantine basileus was totally dependent upon the support of the great magnate families to rule effectively and with security.

1.29 How Palaiologos won over the majority and, through their support, claimed the supreme dignity

"Those who were willing" (113^{18-19})

This passage provides a new suggestion for the fate of Karyanitēs, the prōtobestiaritēs who had been arrested after the murder of the Mouzalōn brothers (Pach. 89^{29}). Akropolitēs (159^{24}-160^{3}) stated that Karyanitēs escaped custody and fled across the frontier. If it is true that Palaiologos offered his political enemies the choice of going into exile, as Pachymerēs suggests in this passage – and it must be pointed out that no other source supports Pachymerēs on this point – then Karyanitēs may have been one of them. We may also propose that the same offer may have been made to Geōrgios Nostongos, who suddenly disappears from the historical record at this point.

"others were imprisoned" (113^{19})

Frustratingly, Pachymerēs does not elaborate on this matter, and we are left in the dark regarding who, apart from Manouēl Laskaris, was imprisoned by Michaēl Palaiologos at this time.

"Tzamantouros" (113^{20})

Previously in the *Historia*, Pachymerēs has referred to both Michaēl and Manouēl Laskaris as the Tzamantouroi (Pach. 91^{21}, 107^{13}). From this point on, however, he only refers to Manouēl Laskaris as Tzamantouros. His brother, Michaēl, is called Laskaris (Pach. 153^{20}, 273^{13}, 401^{18}, 413^{10}). The reason for this is the political split that developed between Manouēl, who opposed the accession of Michaēl VIII as basileus, and Michaēl, who supported the usurper, and the need for Pachymerēs to be able to distinguish between them.[48]

[48] This political split may also be the reason behind Akropolitēs' harsh dismissal of Manouēl Laskaris as "an utter simpleton and bad commander" (Akrop. 123^{4-5}).

"conferring upon his brother, Iōannēs" (113[22-23])

Iōannēs Palaiologos was sent immediately to Makedonia, to take command of the Nikaian forces there. He replaced Iōannēs Angelos, the prōtostratōr, who was removed from his command because of his loyalty to Theodōros II (Akrop. 160[4-20]). With Palaiologos were two of Michaēl Palaiologos' chief supporters: Alexios Stratēgopoulos and Iōannēs Rhaoul. Their departure at this point in time indicates that Michaēl had a growing sense of security regarding his hold on power.

"proposed him to the patriarch" (113[25])

Michaēl Palaiologos himself appears to have not pushed for his own promotion. Akropolitēs (159[9-15]) states that Palaiologos was forced to accept the position, at least in part against his own wishes. Michaēl himself, in one of his autobiographical *typika*, says that he was only accepted the crown after being persuaded by God himself (Grégoire 1959-60:453-455). The difference in the historiographical approaches of Pachymerēs and Akropolitēs is highlighted here. Both historians show Michaēl as reluctant to claim the throne overtly, but Akropolitēs presents this as proof of Michaēl's humility and therefore his suitability for the position as basileus, while Pachymerēs instead shows Michaēl as using others as catspaws for his claim, to enable himself to be seen as a reluctant and humble candidate. If Akropolitēs is an example, it would appear that Michaēl's manoeuvres were successful.

Palaiologos again used his supporters to push for his solo coronation in 1259, rather than appear to be urging it himself (Pach. 143[16]-145[14]). It hardly needs stating that is was in Palaiologos' best interests for his rise to be seen as the result of popular support for a reluctant candidate, rather than the result of political machinations and the exercise of power.

"The day of the announcement was fixed" (115[5])

This passage indicates that there was some delay between the acceptance by Arsenios of Michaēl Palaiologos' rise to the throne, and the proclamation of the fact to the people. The duration of this delay is unknown.

Grēgoras states that the proclamation took place on 1 December 1258 (Greg. 78[12]), but the accuracy of Pachymerēs' date has been verified beyond doubt (Failler 1980b:40-41).

"Hekatombaion" (115[6])

Throughout his *Historia*, Pachymerēs uses the ancient Athenian names for the months, although he does not use the Attic calendar. He simply transcribes the Athenian names onto

the months of the Julian calendar. By doing this he is archaising. Contemporary Greek authors comfortably use the Julian names (e.g. Greg. 78^{12}; Akrop. 7^{22-24}; Skout. 547^{13}).

For Pachymerēs' use of the Attic names for the months, see Arnakis (1945-49:144-153).

"second indiction" (115^{6})

The indiction was the fifteen-year long cycle of time often used by the Byzantines. Its origins lay in a fiscal device designed by Constantine I to ensure stability in imperial taxation. This financial aspect was later abandoned, but the cycle had entered common usage as a measure of time, and was used for the life of the empire. The "second indiction" refers to the second year of the current cycle.

1.30 How Michaēl, the despotēs of the West, revolted against the state of affairs

"that Theodōros" (115^{9})

Theodōros Angelos (r.1215-1230) was the half-brother of the first despotēs of Epiros, Michaēl I (r.1205-1215). An extremely capable strategist, Theodōros destroyed the Latin Kingdom of Thessalonikē (1224) and later extended his writ eastward nearly to the walls of Kōnstantinoupolis itself. He was crowned basileus in 1225, but his empire fell apart after his defeat at the hands of Iōannēs Asan of Bulgaria in 1230. Released by Asan in 1237, he installed his son Manouēl as King of Thessalonikē and remained as the power behind the throne until 1241. He died in honourable captivity in Nikaia some time after 1253.

For Theodōros, see Nicol (1957:47-112, 134-139) and Polemis (1968:89-90).

"highest rank of the nobility" (115^{13})

This is presumably a reference to the familial ties of Theodōros to the emperors Isaac II and Alexios III Angelos. Theodōros was the son of Iōannēs Angelos, and was thus a cousin to those emperors. He was also a descendent of two other former imperial dynasties, the Doukoi and Komnēnoi. His pedigree was thus as blue-blooded as that of the Laskarids or Palaiologoi.

"after fighting valiantly" (115^{14-15})

Theodōros was a bellicose ruler who spent most of his reign fighting his neighbours, both Latin and Bulgar. His most notable successes were the defeat and capture of the Latin Emperor Peter de Courtenay in the Albanian mountains in 1216 (Akrop. 25^{17-22}) and the

capture of Thessalonikē in 1224 (Akrop. 33^{14-19}). It is a mark of his success that he was undefeated for fifteen years before the disaster of 1230 (Nicol 1957:109-110).

"attained the imperial power" (115^{15})

Theodōros had himself raised to imperial rank following his capture of Thessalonikē. However, since the official Patriarch of Kōnstantinoupolis, Germanos II, recognised Iōannēs III Batatzēs as the legitimate basileus, Theodōros encountered some difficulty in obtaining clerical blessing for his elevation. A synod of bishops from his realm met in Arta in 1225 and, after some wrangling, the archbishop of Achrida, Dēmētrios Chomatenos, was selected to crown Theodōros. Chomatenos argued that, as his see was technically independent of patriarchal authority, he could crown a basileus as legally as the patriarch himself (Akrop. 33^{19}-34^{5}). Pachymerēs is plainly wrong in ascribing the coronation to Iacōbos of Achrida, who only succeeded to the see in 1240.

On this affair see Akrop. 33^{14}-34^{5}; Nicol (1957:64-66); Prinzing (1984:21-64); and Macrides (1992:187-196).

"until the day" (115^{17-18})

At the height of his success Theodōros was defeated and captured by his former ally Iōannēs Asan of Bulgaria at Klokotnitza, near Philippoupolis, in April 1230 (Akrop. 41^{11}-42^{15}; Greg. 28). Originally treated well by his captor, Theodōros later angered him and was blinded (Akrop. 43^{14-19}).

"he conceived a most grand scheme" (115^{21}-117^{4})

Geanakoplos (1953a:105-107) argues that Pachymerēs' description of Michaēl's plan is substantially accurate. He bases this opinion largely on the illogicality of Michaēl's summoning large and unreliable Latin armies into Epiros if he had only small aims in mind. Geanakoplos then proceeds to hypothesise a grand anti-papal alliance between Michaēl and Manfred which would first use Guillaume of Achaia to crush Nikaia and then turn against the papal supporters in Kōnstantinoupolis and the Morea, and which would ultimately see Michaēl ruling a restored Byzantine empire and Manfred dominant over a cowed papacy in Italy (Geanakoplos 1953a:116-118). Such an hypothesis is attractive and easily seizes the imagination.



Map 3 Epiros and Makedonia[49]

[49] Map from Nicol, D. *The Despotate of Epirus [1204-1267]*, Oxford, 1957

Unfortunately, imagination is all it can be. Other than the testimony of Pachymerēs, and a very vague reference by Akropolitēs (164^{6-7}) to Michaēl's "grandiose ideas", we have no evidence regarding the aims of the alliance. However, we can identify much circumstantial evidence that suggests that Michaēl's goals were limited.

Firstly, Michaēl II was on the defensive. His campaign in 1257/58 may have gained him far more territory than he had lost to Theodōros II in 1256, but there is no indication that his forces advanced further eastward than the Bardarios valley between the recall of Palaiologos to Nikaia in the spring of 1258 and the great Nikaian counterattack of 1259. For a man with great ambitions to remain quiescent for so long is unusual, especially given the disturbed state of Nikaian politics at the time, but it would not be so unusual for someone who was content to hold what he already possessed (Hatzidimitriou 1988:275). Secondly, there is the timing of his call for assistance. This did not come until Iōannēs Palaiologos had already routed Michaēl II at Kastoria and forced him to flee to the Adriatic coast (Akrop. 165^{14}-166^{7}, 167^{25}-168^{16}). At this time he had not even arranged an alliance with Manfred. Although negotiations may have already have begun in 1258^{50}, it was only in May-June 1259, in the middle of the Nikaian invasion, that Manfred married Helenē, received her dowry of Albanian coastline and sent his contingent to Michaēl (Berg 1988:279-283; Nicol 1957:177-178). Again, this factor stands against the theory of a long-planned conspiracy to crush Nikaia.

It follows, then, that there was no such conspiracy, and that Michaēl formed the allied army not for attack, but for defence, to counter the Nikaian army which was carrying all before it (Hatzidimitriou 1988:278). Of course it is possible that the allies might have gone on the offensive if the battle at Pelagonia had been a victory for them,[51] but the original purpose of the alliance was defensive, and not offensive, as Pachymerēs claims.

"Manfred" (117^{5})

Manfred (1232-1266) was an illegitimate son of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (r.1212-1250). At the death of his father he was appointed as Sicilian viceroy for his half-brother Conrad (r.1250-1254). When Conrad died prematurely Manfred seized control of the Kingdom of Sicily in his own right.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 16779.

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[50] This might explain the rejection by Manfred of Michaēl VIII's proposals at the beginning of 1259 (Akrop. 165^{4-13}).

[51] This is especially true of Guillaume of Achaia, who may have brought his whole army with him because he intended to conquer new territories. See the commentary on 117^{10-11}.

Manfred first involved himself in Greek affairs sometime in 1257, when his forces occupied Dyrrachion and several other points on the Adriatic coast (MM 2.239*ff*). Geanakoplos (1953a:103-104) argues that this was in pursuance of the old Sicilian-Norman goal of conquering the Byzantine empire, but Berg (1988:272-4) argues more convincingly that Manfred's goal was much more modest, and was primarily to force the return of his sister Constanza, held in Nikaia.

"Anna" (117^{6})

She was born c.1230 as Constanza, natural daughter of Friedrich II Hohenstaufen, and was married to Iōannēs III Batatzēs in 1244 (Polemis 1968:108) to cement the alliance between the two emperors, changing her name to Anna upon arrival at the Nikaian court. She remained at court after Iōannēs III's death (Greg. 92^{3-6}). According to Pachymerēs, Michaēl VIII made some efforts to put aside his wife Theodōra in favour of Anna in late 1261, but he was rebuffed by the former empress and soon afterwards returned her to her brother Manfred (Pach. 245^{2}-249^{11}). After the conquest of Sicily by Charles d'Anjou, Constanza made her way to Aragon, where she died in 1313.

For a biography of Constanza, see Diehl (1964:259-275). For a discussion of the proposed marriage between her and Michaēl VIII, see Geanakoplos (1959:144-145) and the commentary to 127^{3}.

"through his daughter Helenē" (117^{7-8})

Born c.1242, Helenē was one of the daughters of Michaēl II and his wife, Theodōra.[52] The date of her wedding to Manfred is reliably given as 2 June 1259 (*Anonimo Tranese* 11). However, there is considerable debate as to whether the negotiations for the marriage were completed immediately before her departure from Epiros or sometime in the previous year. A passage in Akropolitēs (157^{21-23}) is often interpreted by scholars (e.g. Nicol 1994:13-14; Geanakoplos 1953a:103-105) as implying that the marriage details were agreed upon in 1258, and that the marriage itself was merely put off until 1259, but there is no logical reason for such a delay, considering that Helenē was of marriageable age in 1258. Berg (1988:275) argues that Akropolitēs is being deliberately inaccurate, in order to create an image of a large anti-Nikaian coalition when one did not exist in reality. It would appear, then, that even if preliminary negotiations had taken place in 1258, it was not until the spring of 1259 that the details were agreed upon.

[52] No source clearly states whether Helenē or Anna was the elder. Although it is often assumed that Helenē was (eg Nicol 1957:171-172), it is also possible that Anna was older than her sister. Certainly Anna married before Helenē, in an age when older daughters were married first. Rodd (1907:200) and Merendino (1980:250) also suggest that Anna was the elder of the sisters.

While both Michaēl II and Manfred stood to gain from the marriage alliance – Manfred by receiving as Helenē's dowry legitimate title to his Albanian possessions as well as the island of Corfu (Anonimo Tranese 38-41; Sanudo, *Istoria,* 107), and Michaēl by receiving in his dire need the support of Manfred's Albanian garrisons and other forces from Italy in the fight against Nikaia – it is probable that it was Michaēl who instigated the match.[53]

After Helenē's marriage she spent seven happy years as queen of Sicily, but after the conquest in 1266 of the kingdom by Charles d'Anjou she was imprisoned by the new king and died, still in prison, in 1271. For her tragic later history, see Nicol (1994:18-23).

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 6001.

"Guillaume, Prince of Achaia" (117^{8-9})

Born c.1212, Guillaume de Villehardouin was the second son of Prince Geoffroy I of Achaia. He came to the throne in 1246 after the death of his older brother Geoffroy II. Guillaume, an ambitious and warlike ruler, completed the Latin conquest of the Morea by subduing Monembasia and the Slavic tribes of the southeast in the first years of his reign. He also engaged in an ultimately successful war against rebellious vassals and their Venetian allies in Euboia in the years 1256-1258. Guillaume, like his predecessors, was on good terms with his Greek subjects and spoke their language fluently. He died in 1278, leaving his Principality to Charles d'Anjou.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 4359.

"through his daughter Anna" (117^{8})

Anna was another daughter of Michaēl II and Theodōra. Her marriage to Guillaume is normally placed in the summer of 1258, following Michaēl's backing of Guillaume during his quarrel with Duke Guy de la Roche of Athens over territories in Euboia (*CoM* 3111-3137, 3177-3269; Sanudo, *Istoria,* 104-107; also Dandolo 363-364, who confuses Michaēl Doukas with Michaēl Palaiologos). The dowry given by Michaēl II is variously given as sixty thousand hyperpera and other fine gifts (*CoM* 3127-3130) or as the castle of Likonia and other territories at the head of the Gulf of Demetrias (Sanudo, *Istoria,* 107) or as both land and gold (Nicol 1957:173). Likonia lay very close to northern Euboia, where Guillaume had been campaigning, so it is not beyond possibility that the Prince's troops

[53] Not only does Michaēl's awarding as dowry title to lands already in the possession of his future son-in-law follow the same pattern as his awarding Likonia to Prince Guillaume (see commentary to 117^{8}), but he also needed to firmly bind Manfred to his camp. For though the threat posed by the Nikaian army towards Manfred's eastern territories may have induced Manfred to join with Michaēl in any case, the fact that Michaēl VIII was attempting to woo Manfred (Akrop. 165^{4-10}) required Michaēl II to secure the Sicilian king's friendship more firmly.

had occupied it and Michaēl II was merely legitimising the occupation, as he later did over Manfred's seizure of the Albanian coast. Berg (1988:274-275) suggests that the prince never took control of the castle, but it is more likely that it was retaken by Iōannēs Doukas during his march through Thessaly with Iōannēs Palaiologos after the battle of Pelagonia (Akrop. 171^{8-16}; Pach. 151^{14}).

Anna bore two daughters to Guillaume and after his death in 1278 married the lord of Thebes, Nicholas St. Omer. She died c.1284.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 1000.

"received from Manfred" (117^{9-10})

Pachymerēs' figure of three thousand seems greatly inflated. Akropolitēs (168^{5-9}), Skoutariōtēs (543^{18-20}) and Sanudo (*Istoria* 107) reduce this figure to four hundred cavalrymen, but all heavily armed and "each one an eminent member of his race", as Akropolitēs puts it. The actions of this company during the battle of Pelagonia, where they surrendered en masse to a mere four men (Akrop. 170^{19}-171^{1}) certainly do not support the suggestion that they were an elite band of knights; Akropolitēs is probably exaggerating both the quality of the force and the circumstances of their surrender in order to heighten the Nikaian victory.

What is certain is that Manfred himself did not cross the Adriatic, as claimed by Grēgoras (71^{25}-72^{2}) and Spinelli (641). See Geanakoplos (1953a:122 and n.8).

For the term *kaballarioi*, see Bartusis (1988a:343-350).

"the prince came himself with his army" (117^{10-11})

The Principality of Achaia made a huge effort to create an army. Prince Guillaume imposed a full levy of his feudal host (*CoM* 3625) and amassed large numbers of both his Latin and Greek subjects (Akrop. 168^{10-16}; *CoM* 3960).[54] In addition to his own direct subjects, Guillaume also summoned the great Latin lords of Athens, Thebes, Negropont and the Aegean islands (*CoM* 3632-3633; Grégoire 1959-60:455). There is also a suggestion in the *Chronicle of the Morea* (*CoM* 3519-3520) that Guillaume hired additional mercenaries to supplement his army. While the figures given in the *Libro de Los Fechos* (256) for the size

[54] Note that Akropolitēs does not mention any Greek *archontes* in the army, as Miller (1908:109), Geanakoplos (1953a:110), and Bartusis (1992:37) claim. The *Rhomaioi* who are mentioned are quite clearly lesser subjects, presumably for the most part peasants conscripted to increase the size of the army (France 1999:72-73). In any case the military role of the Moreote Greek *archontes* was far more limited than that of the Latin barons (Ilieva 1991:205-208). Although we have a reference in the *Libro de Los Fechos* (311-331) to Geoffroy of Karytaina dubbing Greek knights in 1262 (Jacoby 1973:892), this was after the great loss suffered at Pelagonia, when the principality needed all the men it could arm.

of the army – eight thousand heavy and twelve thousand light troops – are unreliable, the army thus assembled was undoubtedly of great size and presumably far exceeded the number envisaged by Michaēl II.

For a discussion of Guillaume's intentions in leading such a large army into a war which was not his own, see the commentary on 119[1-2].

"an illegitimate son, Iōannēs" (117[11])

Born sometime in the early 1230's, Iōannēs Doukas was one of two sons of Michaēl II by his mistress Gangrene (Job Monachos 903-908). The other son was Theodōros (see commentary on 47[2]). It is unknown which of the two was the elder.

On Iōannēs, see Polemis 97.

"through being married to a daughter of Tarōnas" (117[12-13])

How and why Iōannēs Doukas came to be involved with the Vlachs of Thessaly and how he gained control over them is nowhere recorded. Nevertheless, by 1259 he seems to have been exercising a de facto rule over them, while being closely aligned with his father Michaēl II (Sanudo, *Istoria,*107; *CoM* 3085-3098). It is likely that the lands around Likonia given by Michaēl to Guillaume as dowry for his daughter Anna were actually possessions of Iōannēs (Berg 1988:275), who could not have been happy at their loss.

The birth name of Tarōnas' daughter is unknown. Contemporary sources call her Komnēnē Doukaina, though this is clearly a name adopted on her marriage to Iōannēs Komnēnos Angelos Doukas (Polemis 1968:97 and n.2). She survived her husband, who died sometime before March 1289, and subsequently became a nun at her own foundation of Lykousada in Thessaly, taking the name of Hypomoni. See Nicol (1984a:35-36), and MM 5.253-256.

"Tarōnas" (117[13])

Pachymerēs provides our only reference to this individual, though Nicol (1957:73 n.27 and 156 n.17) suggests that he is to be identified with the Tarōnas mentioned by Iōannēs Apokaukos as having been captured by the forces of Theodōros Angelos of Thessalonikē in 1222. This is certainly possible, as a Tarōnas who in 1259 was too old to lead his own men to war, entrusting them instead to the command of his new son-in-law, or who was already dead, would almost certainly have been of military age in 1222. The only doubt is whether the 1259 Tarōnas would have had the stature in 1222 to have been singled out as worthy of mention in a private letter of such a highly placed individual as Apokaukos.

Geanakoplos (1953a:112 n.61), suggests as a possible etymology for the name a conflation of *tou* and Aaron, and sees it as a sign of Vlachish delight in Old Testament names, but note also the arguments of Magdalino (1989:101-102), who suggests that Pachymerēs' Tarōnas was not a Vlach at all, but rather a local Greek aristocrat of regional standing and importance.

"Great Vlachs" (117^{15})

During the Middle Ages Vlachs were found throughout the Balkan Peninsula, but who they were and where they originated is an issue that has long been debated by scholars, though most modern opinion tends to accept that they were originally the Latin-speaking inhabitants of the Danube basin. For a summary of the debate up to the 1940's, see Wolff (1949:174-180) and, for the debate from then to the 1980s, see Dvoichenko-Markov (1984:508-526).

Insofar as it is extremely rare for a new people to settle in an area without any intermarriage with the native inhabitants, Pachymerēs' claim that the Thessalian Vlachs were descended from Achilleus' Myrmidons must be at least partly true,[55] but of course by the thirteenth century the "ancient Greek race" had become very diluted.

Nikētas Chōniatēs refers to the Thessalian highlands as "Great Vlachia", and gives us some indication as to the centre of Iōannēs' power (Chon. 637^{38}-638^{56}). This area had been under the control of the Angeloi of Epiros since at least the 1220's, and of Michaēl II since 1237 (Magdalino 1976:131). When Michaēl ceded regional control to his son Iōannēs cannot be determined.

"he prevented the megas domestikos" (117^{15-18})

Soon after his elevation to the rank of despotēs, but before he became basileus, Michaēl Palaiologos had sent an army to Makedonia, under the command of his brother Iōannēs (Pach. 151^{5-6}; Akrop. 160^{16-20}; Greg. 72^{8-13}; Failler 1980b:30-39; Nicol 1956:68). This expedition was obviously sent to bolster the defences of Makedonia and prepare for the reconquest of the lands lost to Michaēl II in 1257/58. Since the army was under instructions to remain on the defensive pending diplomatic activity (Akrop. 165^{14-19}), it is understandable how it could have appeared to have been halted by the menacing Vlach force of Iōannēs Doukas.

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[55] Or, at least, they were descended from the Bronze Age inhabitants of Phthia, Achilleus' reputed kingdom.

"Berroia" (117^{16})

This was a large city at the southwestern end of the Makedonian plain, and was one of the two guardians of Thessalonikē against an attack from the west (the other was Bodena). It may have served in earlier days as a thematic capital. Lost to the empire in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, it became part of the dominion of Theodōros Angelos, but was finally recovered by the Nikaians in 1246.

Its greatest age seems to have been under the first Palaiologoi. From being the seat of a simple bishop in 1259 it had become the seat of a metropolitan archbishop in 1300.

"Iōannēs Rhaoul" (117^{17})

He was the eldest son of Alexios Rhaoul (Akrop. 160^{22}). Michaēl VIII awarded him both the widow and the former office of Geōrgios Mouzalōn in 1260 (Pach. 155^{1-4}), quite possibly as a reward for the strong support shown him by the Rhaouls during his rise to the throne. He died c.1274 (Nicol 1968:16).

"his own, which were considerable" (117^{19})

The *Libro de Los Fechos* (256) gives a very improbable figure of eight thousand heavy and eighteen thousand light troops for the Epirote army. In reality Michaēl's force was quite small, and he was easily routed by Iōannēs Palaiologos' surprise attack at Kastoria towards the end of winter, 1259 (Akrop. 165^{20}-166^{7}). Although he subsequently regrouped on the Adriatic coast he still felt too weak to take on the Nikaian army without aid from Manfred and Guillaume (Akrop. 168^{4-16}).

"turned his mind" (117^{19-22})

Pachymerēs here reiterates his version of Michaēl's goals in 1259. See the commentary to 115^{21}-117^{4}.

"as a sort of inheritance" (117^{22}-119^{1})

Ever since Frederick II's father, Henry VI, had gained control over Sicily in 1194 the Papacy had felt itself threatened in being surrounded by Hohenstaufen territory, and had been hostile towards Frederick throughout his reign. This quarrel was continued with Manfred, even though the new king had only limited influence in northern Italy. At the time of the Pelagonia campaign Manfred was indeed excommunicated and was actually fighting against Papal forces in the Romagna (Geanakoplos 1953a:122 and n.108). However, while Manfred may not have had any qualms about fighting the Pope or his supporters, there is

little evidence to support a claim that he was intending to aid an Epirote attempt upon Kōnstantinoupolis (Berg 1988:279).

"the prince . . . was also there on his own account." (119^{1-2})

The reasons behind Guillaume's intervention, with such a large army, in a quarrel which was not his own, are murky. The only comment from a contemporary is Akropolitēs' (165^{12}), that Guillaume "expected to gain much". While he was undoubtedly obligated to send some aid to his father-in-law, Michaēl II cannot have anticipated the arrival of Guillaume's entire army. The answer for this cannot be as simplistic as Nicol's comment (1957:173) that Guillaume "enjoyed fighting for its own sake", nor could he have been intending to subdue the Latin lords of central Greece, as Geanakoplos (1953a:109-110) claims, for he had already done so and they were now marching with him (*CoM* 3632-3633; Grégoire 1959-60:455). Nor is it likely that he marched to the aid of the Greeks of Epiros to win favour with the Greek population of the Morea, as Miller (1908:109) suggests.[56] Sanudo (*Istoria* 107) testifies that Guillaume intended to conquer Kōnstantinoupolis, throw out the Venetians and rule there himself, but this cannot be so in the face of the loyal support he had shown Baudouin II, both before and after the loss of the city in 1261.[57]

The simplest explanation is that Guillaume was embarking on a campaign to conquer large areas of northern Greece to increase his dominions. Longnon (1942:134*ff*) notes that the treaty of Viterbo mentioned that Baudouin II had granted certain territories to Guillaume on his marriage to Anna, but that in 1267 these territories were in the possession of the Angeloi of Epiros. We have seen that Michaēl II had given lands in Thessaly to Guillaume as Anna's dowry (commentary to 117^{8}), and Berg (1988:275) connects these lands to those territories granted by Baudouin II.

There is in fact evidence to suggest that Baudouin actually awarded Guillaume title to much more than a piece of Thessalian coastline. The *CoM* (3652-3658) clearly indicates that the Moreotes were approaching the campaign with a view to conquering Thessalonikē and all of Vlachia (Thessaly). Of course, the account of the *CoM* was written in the belief that Thessaly and Iōannēs Doukas were arrayed on the side of Nikaia, but it is noteworthy that the lands mentioned, Thessaly and Thessalonikē, match the original extent of the ill-

[56] Miller provides no reason for the Greeks of the Morea favouring an alliance with their kindred in Epiros against their Greek kindred of Nikaia.

[57] Geanakoplos (1953a:110-111). In addition to Geanakoplos' evidence we may also point out the warmth of the fictional account of the welcome Baudouin received from Guillaume in his flight in 1261 (*CoM* 1230*ff*) and the willingness of Guillaume to join Baudouin in the 1267 treaty of Viterbo (for which see Geanakoplos (1959:197-200), as well as the haste in which Guillaume had his oaths of vassalage to Michaēl VIII absolved by the pope (see commentary to 125^{7-13}).

fated Kingdom of Thessalonikē granted by Baudouin I to Boniface of Montferrat in 1204.[58] I would argue that the lands granted to Guillaume by Baudouin II were those of the old kingdom.[59] However, the recovery of Thessalonikē would not be easy, and if Michaēl II could help Guillaume defeat the Nikaians then so much the better. The Moreotes planned well, and knowing Iōannēs Doukas' connections with Michaēl II they tried not to anger Doukas during their march through Thessaly. In this they were unsuccessful and, presumably because of the unexpected size of the Moreote army, incidences of plundering occurred (*CoM* 3659-3684).

"these troops were concentrated" (119^{2-6})

Pachymerēs does not mention the opening moves of the campaign at this point, instead directly moving to the confrontation at Pelagonia. Later on, in a quick summary of the towns captured in the campaign (Pach. 151^{9-16}) he includes those taken before the battle, but the best account of the fighting before Pelagonia is given by Akropolitēs (165^{14}-169^{19}).

In brief, Iōannēs Palaiologos attacked Michaēl II at the end of winter, 1259, and the despotēs' army routed to the Adriatic coast. While Michaēl regrouped and joined his sons-in-law, Palaiologos seized town after town in western Makedonia and Albania, returning to the lands around Pelagonia and Kastoria to face the approaching coalition army.

1.31 How the Prince of Achaia was captured by the Romans

"It is said" (119^{11}-121^{5})

All of the sources agree that the coalition broke up on the eve of battle with the Nikaian army. For good summaries of the various reasons they give see Geanakoplos (1953a:127-132) and Bartusis (1992:38). Of all the sources, the one which comes closest to agreeing with Pachymerēs is Sanudo (*Istoria* 107), who records that Iōannēs Doukas deserted because of an insult from Guillaume. However, unlike Pachymerēs, Sanudo does not

[58] This idea is explicitly stated by the *Libro de Los Fechos* (55-56).

[59] This is not an original idea, and was propounded by Miller (1908:108) in 1908. Despite the legitimate title to the kingdom having been acquired by Friedrich II in 1227 (Nicol 1957:107), Baudouin II was very prepared to offer the kingdom to any who could provide aid to his empire. In 1266, for example, Baudouin granted the title to the Kingdom of Thessalonike to Duke Hugh IV of Burgundy (Wolff 1954:67). That Guillaume took grants from Baudouin II seriously is indicated by his involvement in the war with the triarchs of Negroponte in 1256-1258. Baudouin had in 1236 granted Guillaume's brother Geoffroy II the suzerainty over the island (Longnon 1949:175), and Guillaume fought the triarchs to assert this authority (Setton 1976:78).

indicate what the insult was.[60] While they do not indicate any falling out between Iōannēs and Guillaume, Iōannēs' desertion to the Nikaians is also recorded by Akropolitēs (170^{5-9}) and the *CoM*, the whole account of which is based on Iōannēs' siding with the Nikaians. From this we may accept that Iōannēs Doukas was of primary importance in the breaking up of the coalition.

There is less certainty regarding the reasons given by Pachymerēs for the turning of Doukas' coat. While there is no evidence for rejecting Pachymerēs regarding the lustful eyes cast at Iōannēs' wife, other than questioning why she would be accompanying her husband on campaign at all, the entire account smacks of literary invention and that it was written by Pachymerēs just so that he could employ several Trojan War metaphors: of Eris and the golden apple (see 119^{5-9}); of the connection between the Vlachs and Achilleus' Myrmidons (Pach. 117^{15}) and the connection between Iōannēs Doukas' behaviour at Pelagonia and those of Achilleus at Troy.[61]

A more logical cause for the quarrel between Iōannēs and Guillaume is, I think, put forward by Berg (1988:278), who suggests that it was over Anna's dower lands around Likonia. We have seen (commentary to 117^{8}) that Likonia lay in Iōannēs Doukas' Thessalian dominion, and that he cannot have been well pleased at its loss. On this matter it is very important to take note of Iōannēs' actions after the battle. He and his Vlachs joined the army of Iōannēs Palaiologos that marched south through Thessaly, attacked Neopatras and sacked Thebes (Pach. 151^{14}; Akrop. 171^{8-10}, 171^{27}-172^{3}). Immediately after Palaiologos had departed for the east, Iōannēs deserted the Nikaian cause and returned to his old allegiance to his father, Michaēl II (Akrop. 172^{3-5}). Most important here is the attack on Neopatras. This was Doukas' capital (Sanudo, *Istoria,* 107; *CoM* 3098), and an attack upon it by him must indicate that it was occupied by his only enemies, the Latins. A Latin occupation of Neopatras indicates the extent of Latin penetration of Thessaly, and Iōannēs' desertion back to his father after Palaiologos had returned to the east indicates that his allegiance to Nikaia was a temporary expedient aimed at punishing the Latins and recovering his own dominions from their occupation.

The true cause, it seems, of Iōannēs' quarrel lies in Guillaume's aspirations and conquests in Thessaly, but he was not the only member of his family who was concerned about Guillaume. The ease with which Doukas persuaded his father to abandon the Franks, and the happiness with which Michaēl II received his son's return to the fold after the

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[60] Sanudo (*Istoria* 107): "*li Greci lo tradirono, e trà li altri suo Cognato Sevasto Cratora per offesa, che avea riceputo da Latini.*"

[61] The way Pachymeres introduces the chapter, "*It is said . . .* ", seems to indicate that Pachymeres himself does not really believe the story either.

Thessalian campaign, seem to show that the size of the prince's army and his probable intentions for it, disturbed the despotēs. Probably thinking that he stood to gain little in any battle, regardless of the outcome, Michaēl II made the reasonable decision to stay out of it and let his rivals batter each other. That the ensuing victory for Nikaia was one-sided must have been unexpected by him.

"were now drawn up" (119^{16-17})

Geanakoplos (1953:128 n.142) argues that Pachymerēs is indicating that this conflict was more in the manner of a duel than a larger scale fight between armies, and certainly the ease with which Guillaume could appear to break up the fighting would indicate this. However, since Pachymerēs' whole account, centred on Doukas' wife, is to be questioned, so too is this fighting.

"He could not punish his own men" (119^{18-19})

Pachymerēs leaves us guessing as to why this would be so. Perhaps they were followers of one of the other Latin lords and Guillaume had no right to punish them himself?

"he mocked and scoffed at Doukas" (119^{19-22})

The vehemence shown by Guillaume here, to a man with whom, at least according to Pachymerēs, he had no previous quarrel, over an issue which did not directly involve him, seems odd. However, such vehemence is more understandable if the speaker believed he had rightful title to lands held by the other, and who had already seized some of them by force.

"a great and violent battle broke out" (121^{7})

Despite this statement, and the epic account in the *CoM* (3952-4091), the battle itself seems to have been an anti-climax. After the departure of the despotēs and Doukas and their troops, the remaining Greek contingents with the coalition forces seem to have dispersed or surrendered (Akrop. 170^{5-9}) and the Franks of Achaia, after giving little resistance, also routed (Akrop. 170^{10}). Thus there was little more to the battle than a long pursuit and massacre of fleeing men.

The exact location of the battle is unknown. From what Akropolitēs writes, we may assume that the engagement occurred somewhere between Prilapos, where the Epirote leaders seem to have fled (Akrop. 169^{22-23}) and Kastoria, where Prince Guillaume was found after fleeing away from the battle (Akrop. 170^{10-11}).

"Romans, supported by Persians and . . . Scythians" (121^{7-8})

This composition of the Nikaian army is also given by Akropolitēs (169^{3-4}) and Holobōlos (40^{9}). The *CoM* (3591-3608) is much more fanciful, and claims that the army also contained Germans, Hungarians, Serbs and Bulgars. However, if the army contained any such peoples it is doubtful that they served in identifiable ethnic units.[62] Geanakoplos (1953a:125) comments that there must also have been some Latins serving in the Nikaian army, but this is not necessarily the case, considering that the Latin mercenaries were the most trustworthy troops available to the new basileus, and he would therefore have wished to keep them close to his own person. In addition, Michaēl VIII later made a policy of not sending his Latin troops to fight his Latin enemies, as illustrated in 1263, when he sent his Turkic mercenaries to fight in the Morea and his Latins to fight in Epiros (Pach. 273^{4-5}). For the same reason the presence of German troops fighting for Nikaia is to be doubted.

"made his father and brother" (121^{8-11})

The despotēs, perhaps influenced by the whisperings of a Nikaian agent (Greg. 74^{1-7}) was suspicious of the motives of his son-in-law the prince, and needed little encouragement to abandon him. He may also have been discouraged by losses to his men and a drop in morale amongst his rapidly mustered army (Akrop. 169^{16-19}).

However, contrary to Pachymerēs, the entire Epirote army did not suddenly decamp in the middle of the night and march away unnoticed. The bulk of the common soldiery were abandoned by the despotēs and his cavalry. Deprived of their leaders, the main body of the army disintegrated, some fleeing and others surrendering to the Nikaians (Akrop. 170^{5-9}; Greg. 74^{16-21}).

The way in which the Epirotes could easily flee suggests strongly that they had a separate encampment away from that of the prince's army.

"attacking the Italians from the rear" (121^{11-12})

It is doubtful whether Doukas and his Vlachs were in a position to directly attack the rear of the Latin army, unless it was by means of an ambush, but through their treachery they certainly stabbed the Latins in the back.

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[62] There were Bulgars present (Grégoire 1959-60:457^{4}), but it is uncertain whether they were an official contingent sent by Kōnstantinos Teichos, as argued by Setton (1976:85 n.3) on the basis that Teichos was a was a loyal treaty ally of Nikaia at this time.

"they began to run away" (121^{12ff})

All of the sources, even the very pro-Latin *CoM*, agree that there was a great massacre following the rout of the Latin army (Akrop. 170^{9}-171^{7}; Greg. 74^{21}-75^{7}; Holobōlos 40^{30-35}; *CoM* 4087-4091).

"Finally the prince himself" (121^{15-17})

Akropolitēs (170^{10-14}) also indicates that the prince sought to avoid capture by hiding under a pile of hay,[63] but that he was pulled out and recognised from his protruding front teeth, to which he probably owed his life, since men of lesser status would have been butchered out of hand.

"and much was gained at little expense" (121^{18})

This may be a reference by Pachymerēs to the aftermath of the battle, in which all of Epiros and Thessaly was occupied for a time by Nikaian forces (Akrop. 171^{8}-172^{23}). Pachymerēs himself lists many of the gains made in a later passage (151^{8-14}).

"and especially the Prince of Achaia himself" (121^{19-20})

In addition to the prince, the army had also captured thirty of the leading lords of Achaia (Holobōlos 42^{8-12}). One of them, Matthieu de Vélicourt, the lord of Veligosti, ended his captivity by marrying Theodōra Laskarina, daughter of Theodōros II (see commentary to 95^{12}).

"the generals returned to the east" (121^{19-22})

Towards the end of 1259 Iōannēs Palaiologos took most of the army back eastwards, leaving Alexios Stratēgopoulos and only a small force of troops to maintain Nikaian control of what appeared to be a beaten and cowed Epiros (Akrop. 173^{15-18}; Nicol 1957:187-189). Akropolitēs (172^{19-22}) claims that Iōannēs Palaiologos was at fault for leaving the west too soon, in his hurry to return in triumph and be rewarded by the basileus. But it appears, on the other hand, that it was Michaēl VIII who erred and recalled his brother and the army, which he needed for his intended assault upon Kōnstantinoupolis. If it was not the basileus who ordered the recall it is difficult to understand why his brother was rewarded and not later censured, when the despotate quickly bounced back in early 1260, for not finishing the conquest.

[63] This gives us another clue as to the date of the battle, since hay is cut and gathered in late summer.

"And when they returned" (121^{22-25})

This passage has been misinterpreted by Failler (1980b:32 n.39, 39 n.67) as referring to Stratēgopoulos' return east with magnificent trophies, where he found affairs in disarray and then helped Michaēl in his thrust to the throne. Naturally, since Stratēgopoulos did not in fact return to Nikaia following the battle at Pelagonia, and as Michaēl was already well established on the throne at this time, this has caused Failler some confusion.

However, a second reading of the passage clearly shows that it is referring to the state of affairs still existing in Epiros after the departure of Iōannēs Palaiologos for the east, and that Stratēgopoulos was carrying out the last orders of his commander. By 'Palaiologos', Pachymerēs is referring to Iōannēs and not his brother, Michaēl. This reading removes the problems encountered if we accept Failler's interpretation, and also links much more smoothly with the narrative which is continued in 1.32.

"As for the Prince" (121^{26})

Iōannēs Palaiologos had sent his noble prisoners to the basileus immediately after the battle (Akrop. 170^{14-18}). According to the *CoM* (4204-4216), Michaēl VIII received them graciously, as befitted their ranks. This is not to be doubted – consider the politeness with which Saladin treated Guy de Lusignan after the battle of Hattin in 1187 (Runciman 1951-54:2.459-460).

"after the capture of the city" (121^{29})

The *CoM* (4222-4323) has a different account of events. There it is stated that Michaēl VIII, soon after the arrival of Guillaume, had offered the prince and his followers large sums of cash with which to buy lands and estates in France if they would relinquish to him their holdings in Greece. Guillaume rebuffed this offer, stating that the Morea was not his to sell, and countered with an offer to pay a cash ransom for himself. The basileus, refusing this in turn, cast the prince into prison for three years.[64] While the *CoM*'s account is internally consistent – why would Michaēl VIII accept a cash ransom when he was wealthy enough to offer large sums of cash for the Morea? – its account is probably inaccurate and merely a slur on the un-knightly attitudes of the Greeks, who offer to buy the Prince's patrimony as if it were merely a chattel to be bartered for. While it is highly unlikely that the Prince would have languished in prison for years without the basileus making demands of him, as Pachymerēs would suggest, it is much more likely that Michaēl, from his

[64] The *Chronicle of the Morea* is here presumably confusing the period in which Guillaume was in prison (until late 1261) with the total time he was in Nikaian custody (until early 1262). See Failler (1980b:90).

position of strength, would have merely demanded the cession of the Morea, rather than buy it.

"the prince bent his stiff neck" (121^{29}-123^{3})

While the *CoM* (4256) has Guillaume call Michaēl "basileus" in 1259, there is reason to accept Pachymerēs' statement that he did not consider Michaēl's claim to be valid until after the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261. That is, by right of conquest Michaēl had gained the right to the title and honour formerly held by the Latin emperor Baudouin II, just as Baudouin's claim stemmed from his ancestor Baudouin I's conquest of Kōnstantinoupolis and Alexios V in 1204. It is an interesting indication that Guillaume considered that he, as a vassal to the empire, owed his allegiance to the crown, and not to the individual wearing it.

"he would also give as ransom" (123^{4})

With hindsight Pachymerēs considered the deal with Guillaume to have been of no advantage for the empire, and thus his account of it is skewed to show that Michaēl was duped by the cunning Latin Prince. This is why he has Guillaume make the offer, rather than have Michaēl suggest it. Pachymerēs highlights the cunning of Guillaume and the gullibility of Michaēl by using the same word – *megalunesthai* – to describe both how Guillaume expected the deal to appear to the basileus, and how Michaēl actually did see it.

"he also asked" (123^{7-8})

Zakythinos (1932:18), following the *Libro de Los Fechos* (68), suggests that the title Guillaume asked for was that of Grand Seneschal of the Empire, a title he had held under Baudouin II. He cannot have asked to become megas domestikos, for this was a position only held by one man at any time, and at this time it was held by Alexios Philēs (Pach. 155^{1-6}). Pachymerēs probably uses megas domestikos as the title bestowed because it was the closest Byzantine equivalent to the French title. That Guillaume asked for Michaēl VIII to bestow upon him an old Latin Empire title is another indication that Guillaume saw Michaēl as the legitimate successor to the Latin emperors.

It is also important to note that Guillaume held his title while Alexios Philēs was megas domestikos (Pach. 155^{5-6}), which indicates that his rank was not the standard Byzantine one. He could not have become megas domestikos after the death of Philēs, since Achaia was by then (1262) at war with the empire.

"The basileus . . . decided to make a treaty with him" (123^{9-13})

This treaty was made sometime during the winter of 1261/2. On it, see Dölger, *Regesten*, nos. 1895-6.

"he released that man from prison" (123^{13-14})

Guillaume was released from prison after signing the treaty, but his departure for the Morea was delayed until the treaty had been ratified by a *parlement* of his leading vassals. It is a sign of the damage wrought on the nobility of the Morea by the defeat at Pelagonia that only two members of this *parlement* were men, with all the others being women standing in for husbands or relatives lost in the battle (*CoM* 4362-4498). This *parlement* sat in the early spring of 1262.

"he made him . . . godfather to his own son" (123^{16-17})

This is confirmed by the *CoM*, which indicates in three places that the basileus and the prince were linked by ties of godparentage. In line 5542, as noted by Geanakoplos (1959:n.75) and Failler (1984:122 n.1), a prisoner berates the prince for fighting against the father of his godchild, while in lines 4336-4337 it is explicitly stated that Michaēl asked Guillaume to stand as godfather for his young son, and in lines 4559-4562 Michaēl orders Makrēnos to lead an expedition to the Morea and "wage war with his relative through baptism, Prince Guillaume".

The son in question is Kōnstantinos, who was born shortly after the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261 (Pach. 247^{16-17}).

Quasi-sacred ceremonies, similar to the one described by Pachymerēs, were treated with seriousness and regarded as binding by contemporaries. Although she does not deal directly with baptism or godparentage, see Horníčková (1998:245-246) for more on this type of ceremony and the exchange of oaths. The use of lighted candles during ceremonies invoking oaths was indeed a Latin custom. Pope Innocent III refers to the Latin Patriarch Morosini anathematising a group of Venetians with candles as part of the ceremony (Migne PL 215, 1077, cited by Wolff 1948:320).

"The mutually agreed terms were" (123^{22}-125^{3})

Failler (1984:122 n.3) suggests that Pachymerēs' detailed account of the terms of the treaty may have been the result of viewing the original document. For the best modern discussions of the treaty, see Zakythinos (1932:15-25) and Bon (1969:1.122-125).

"the following places" (123[23])

In addition to the places listed by Pachymerēs, who agrees in the main with the lists provided in the *CoM* (4329-4333) and Sanudo (*Istoria* 108), Grēgoras (80[1-2]) also adds "the castle in Maïne near Leuktra", or the castle of Beaufort, built by Guillaume on the coast south of Kalamata in the early 1250's (*CoM* 3036-3027). That this castle was ceded seems likely when we look at a map and see that it is completely surrounded by other lands ceded – Kinsterna, Myzēthras and Maïne. The *Libro de Los Fechos* (67) also adds Corinth to the list, but it seems very unlikely that this was part of the ransom, being part of the dominions of the Duke of Athens rather than of the Prince of Achaia, though it may have been suggested by Michaēl, given its strategic location and the extremely strong prospect of the Akrocorinth.

"Monembasia" (123[24])

The great coastal fortress-town of Monembasia, located on a promontory forty kilometres to the north of Cape Malea, had only been won by Prince Guillaume from its independent Greek lords in 1248, after a long siege (*CoM* 2901-2959).

"Maïnē" (123[24])

This castle, built in the early 1250's by Guillaume at the southern end of the Taygetos Mountains (*CoM* 3005-3007), has been variously identified by modern scholars. For the most recent attempt, which identifies Maïne with the fortress known as Kelephá, see Wagstaff (1991:142-148).

"Hierakion" (123[24])

This castle, also known as Geraki, lay on the Lakonian plain, about equidistant from Monembasia and Myzēthras and on the shortest, easiest route between those places (Bon 1969:642-644). It was built by a second-generation Moreote Frank, Jean de Nivelet (*CoM* 3365), in emulation of the prince's castle of Myzēthras. The position is remarkably defensible, a hill-top with cliffs falling away on two sides (Hetherington 1996:96).

"Myzēthras" (123[24])

Commonly called Mistra, Myzēthras was another castle built by Guillaume to secure Frankish control of the southeastern Peloponēsos (*CoM* 2985-3001; Bon 1969:637-39). It is located on a hill about five kilometres from ancient Sparta. Myzēthras became the seat of the local Byzantine governors (*CoM* 4527-4528). On the etymologies of 'Mistra' and 'Myzēthras' see Kahane (1942-43:355).

"Anaplion and Argos" (123^{24-25})

This short passage indicates that Pachymerēs is wrong in claiming that Guillaume initiated the deal with Michaēl, for the prince would have known that these two places, having been ceded by Prince Geoffroy to the Duke of Athens in 1212 (*CoM* 2875-2883) were not in his power to give away, while Michaēl may not have known or understood this.

Anaplion, usually called Nauplion, was the port of Argos, and was located about fifteen kilometres to the southeast of that place.

"Kinsterna" (123^{25})

The theme of Kinsterna covered most of northwest Lakonia, including Myzēthras. According to the *CoM* (4592-4593), the Byzantines had not fully occupied this area before the peace between the prince and the empire was broken.

"megas domestikos" (125^{1-2})

See the Commentary to 123^{7-8}.

"the basileus duly returned him" (125^{4-5})

According to the *CoM* (4494-4512) the castles were actually handed over to imperial castellans by one of Guillaume's barons while the Prince remained in custody at Kōnstantinoupolis. It was only after the castles had been occupied and the new province garrisoned that the prince was allowed to return home, and even then two noble women of Achaia were sent to Kōnstantinoupolis as hostages in his place.

"He would have remained true" (125^{7-13})

Pachymerēs is suggesting that Guillaume secretly desired to return to a state of war with the empire, but that he was held back by his fidelity to the oaths he had sworn to Michaēl. This fits in with Pachymerēs' theory that Guillaume was only dealing with Michaēl in order to escape bondage, and that he was not interested in serving a Greek basileus. Pachymerēs may be correct, since it was during his return journey to the Morea from Kōnstantinoupolis that he buried the hatchet with his old enemy, Venice, and signed a treaty with the republic.[65]

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[65] The Venetians, of course, were seeking friends in the Aegean in the aftermath of the treaty of Nymphaion between the empire and Genoa, which was so damaging to Venetian interests in the region.

"the pope" (125^{9})

This was Urban IV, who was elected shortly after the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261 and one of whose first actions was to preach a crusade against the empire. He was no friend of either Michaēl VIII or Manfred of Sicily, and he did much to nurture the ambitions of Charles of Anjou, who was to overthrow Manfred and cause great concern to Michaēl VIII.

The letter in which Urban released Guillaume from his oaths to Michaēl is published by Guiraud (47-48).

"the king" (125^{9})

It is uncertain to whom Pachymerēs is referring. Geanakoplos (1959:156 n.82) suggests Baudouin II, while Failler (1980b:81 n.75), says it is Charles d'Anjou. If Failler is correct, then Pachymerēs is inserting Charles and his ambitions at much too early a date. There is no reason to suggest that anyone influenced Urban IV's actions in releasing Guillaume from his oaths. His own dislike of the "schismatics" would have been enough.

"As a consequence" (125^{13-15})

Guillaume returned to the Morea in the middle of 1262, after signing the treaty of Thebes with Venice in May of that year (Zakythinos 1932:27-28). Hostilities with the empire had broken out before the end of that year (Pach. 273^{10} says that a Byzantine troop fleet had been sent to Monembasia from Kōnstantinoupolis in the autumn of 1262). The causes of the outbreak are uncertain, but the *CoM* (4513-4545) gives as the reason an overreaction on the part of the Byzantine governors in the Morea to a movement near Myzēthras by Guillaume and his men. On this see Zakythinos (1932:28*ff*).

1.32 How the Despotēs Michaēl defeated the Romans and captured the kaisar

"he had gained much through his alliance" (125^{18-19})

Akropolitēs (164^{3-7}) also records that the sources of Michaēl II's strength were his Latin sons-in-law, and that Michaēl VIII's peace embassy at the start of 1259 was rebuffed only because of the anticipated support of Latin armies.

"he had later suffered heavy losses" (125^{19-21})

Following the victory at Pelagonia, Iōannēs Palaiologos divided his army in two. He himself, accompanied by the treacherous Iōannēs Doukas, marched southwards and occupied Thessaly (Pach. 151^{14}; Akrop. 171^{8-12}), while the second column, under Alexios

Stratēgopoulos, crossed into Epiros itself, and occupied the capital, Arta (Akrop. 171^{12-16}). With virtually all of his territory occupied, Michaēl II fled to his Orsini relatives on Kephalonia (Akrop. 172^{5-11}). These actions took place in the autumn of 1259.

"sebastokratōr" (125^{19})

Iōannēs Palaiologos had been raised to the rank of sebastokratōr *in absentia*, during his campaign against Epiros and Achaia. See commentary to 137^{20-21}.

The title of sebastokratōr was a largely honorary one, first introduced by Alexios I Komnēnos at the end of the eleventh century. It was the second-highest rank in the official hierarchy, after despotēs, and was normally confined to members of the imperial house, most often brothers of the basileus. This changed slightly during the Nikaian period, when the Laskarids began the practise of awarding the title to influential and autonomous rulers whom the basileus of the day wished to tie more closely to the empire. This practise continued under Michaēl VIII, who awarded Iōannēs Doukas of Thessaly the title in 1267 or 1268 (Pach. 401^{12}), and lasted well into the fourteenth century, when Iōannēs VI Kantakouzēnos awarded the title to the Asan brothers of Bulgaria (PK 147^{17}-148^{3}). There was usually only one domestic sebastokratōr, but on this see the commentary to 153^{12-13}. The sebastokratōr had no defined function, and served instead in whatever capacity the basileus assigned him. Sebastokratōres were often at the head of imperial armies in this period.

For the trappings of the office, see Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 147^{17}-148^{11}). For a description of the ceremony of promotion to the title see Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 276 *passim*).

"the despotēs then sent to Manfred" (125^{22})

This further request of the despotēs to Manfred is confirmed by the contemporary Italian chronicler Spinelli (1095-1096), who records that in December 1259 the "despotēs of the Morea (sic)" visited Manfred. This, despite the misleading title, was Nikēphoros, son of Michaēl II (Nicol 1957:188-189, 195n4; Berg 1988:286). Nikēphoros, with the troops lent him by Manfred, was back in Epiros early in 1260.

"received a strong force of allied troops" (125^{23})

Manfred had good cause to send more troops to assist Michaēl II, since several of the towns and fortresses listed by Pachymerēs (151^{9-13}) as having been seized by Nikaian forces during the Pelagonia campaign were previously occupied by his own troops. Dyrrachion and Bellagrada (Berat) were both mentioned in a document from 1258, which lists

Manfred's Epirote holdings (MM 3.239*ff*), and the two towns are also in Pachymerēs' list. The size and composition of the Italian reinforcements is unknown.

"near Trikoryphos" (125^{24-25})

The location of this battle is unknown. As Failler (1984:125n6) points out, there are numerous places in northwestern Greece and Albania which have names similar to "Trikoryphos", and the battle could have been fought near almost any of them. Hatzidimitriou (1988:280-281) argues for a southern location, and says it was between Nikēphoros and the Nikaian force which had marched to Thebes. Two points stand against this theory and suggest a northern location. First, the army which had marched on Thebes was led by Iōannēs Palaiologos, not Stratēgopoulos, who was defeated at this battle. Secondly, we have seen how Nikēphoros received reinforcements from Manfred of Sicily, and there are doubts whether Manfred would aid the Epirotes so far from his own holdings in north Epiros.

"fought a terrible battle" (125^{25})

The defeat of Stratēgopoulos and his Nikaian force is not necessarily due to poor generalship on his part. The large army assembled for the 1259 campaign had accompanied Iōannēs Palaiologos back to the east (Akrop. 172^{24}-173^{3}; Pach. 153^{3-7}; Greg. 79^{17-22}) and only small Nikaian garrisons remained to safeguard the empire's hold on Epiros. In the face of a regrouped Epirote army, along with its Vlach and Latin allies, such small, scattered forces were greatly outnumbered. The difference in the size of the armies involved in the battle may be indicated by the fact that Stratēgopoulos' troops were "surrounded".

"the kaisar" (125^{25})

Towards the end of 1259, after news of the victories in the west had reached him, Michaēl VIII raised Alexios Stratēgopoulos from the rank of megas domestikos to kaisar, and had the insignia of that office sent to him in Makedonia (Pach. 153^{19}; Akrop. 173^{15-18}; Greg. 79^{18-19}).

"he was released after a new treaty was concluded" (127^{1-2})

On this treaty see Dölger, *Regesten* no.1882. The new agreement, as Pachymerēs says, was signed in time for Stratēgopoulos to return to the east and take Kōnstantinoupolis, and can therefore be dated to anytime between mid-1260 and early 1261, though an earlier time in this period is likely. In a later passage (151^{20}-153^{2}) Pachymerēs connects the capture of Stratēgopoulos with the embassy of Michaēl II's wife Theodōra, who negotiated a peace

and handed over their son Iōannēs to Michaēl VIII. It is therefore quite likely that Alexios was returned to his basileus as part of this agreement.

On this see the commentary to 151^{21-22}.

"the action against the city" (127^{2})

This is the 25 July 1261 capture of Kōnstantinoupolis. Pachymerēs describes its capture at 191^{2}-203^{29}.

"while making another attack on the west" (127^{3ff})

The chronology of Stratēgopoulos' second capture and his exchange for Constanza-Anna is uncertain. Only two clues are clearly dated. Firstly, Alexios was still present in Kōnstantinoupolis on 15 August 1261 and was sent back to the west after this date (Greg. 90^{9-18}). Secondly, a document in which Constanza-Anna surrenders her dowry rights to Michaēl VIII, and which is usually seen as a precursor to her departure for Italy, is clearly dated to December of 1261 (Marinesco 1924:460-462; Failler 1980b:79-80; Berg 1988:286). It is therefore usually accepted that Alexios was captured before December 1261, at which time the exchange was made.

Such a timeframe, however, provides very little time for the actions proposed for it. Michaēl VIII entered Kōnstantinoupolis on 15 August 1261. Sometime after that date a triumph was organised for the kaisar and his troops (Greg. 90^{9-10}). At the earliest, Alexios could not have been sent west before September, and therefore could not have reached the war zone in Epiros until at least October, and probably later. Once there, he had to be captured by the Epirotes, sent by Michaēl II to Manfred, and have had that king send at least one message to Kōnstantinoupolis suggesting the exchange, and have that offer accepted. Under the usual chronology, these actions all had to be completed before December, which would have meant a very busy four months following Stratēgopoulos' departure from Kōnstantinoupolis in September. The assumptions implicit in this chronology are too many: Stratēgopoulos would have had to have been captured almost as soon as he set foot in Makedonia, then both Michaēl II and Manfred would have had to have reached their respective decisions on his fate without any time for thought, and Michaēl VIII would have had to agree to Manfred's proposal as soon as he received it. There is also the question as to why Michaēl II handed Alexios over to Manfred at all. He did not do so the first time he captured him (Pach. 125^{25}-127^{2}).

All this seems unlikely, but the arguments put forward by Failler (1980b:77-85) for the dating of the dowry document to December of 1261 are convincing, so Michaēl VIII must

have reached the decision to send Constanza-Anna back to her brother before the end of 1261, and therefore independently of Stratēgopoulos' capture in Epiros.

The reason for Michaēl's release of Constanza-Anna and the drawing up of this document is easy to determine. Pachymerēs (245^{2}-249^{11}) records that after taking Kōnstantinoupolis, Michaēl VIII fell passionately in love with Constanza-Anna, but that she rejected his overtures, even when he proposed marriage to her. It would be natural for a spurned lover to wish to be rid of the object of his failed advances, and Michaēl also would have seen political benefits for sending her back to her brother, Manfred, perhaps a reduction in the flow of Sicilian assistance to Epiros.[66] Thus the document in which Constanza-Anna surrendered her rights to her dowry was signed up in December 1261. However, the dowager empress was not sent back to Sicily right away, since the season was not a good one for travel between Kōnstantinoupolis and Italy, either by sea or by land through Albania. Her departure would be delayed until spring and the resumption of the sailing season.

Meanwhile, in Epiros, Michaēl II captured Stratēgopoulos (Greg. 90^{16-18}). Word of this would soon have reached Kōnstantinoupolis. It is easy to see how Michaēl VIII, desiring the release of his general, but not willing to deal with Michaēl II, who had after all broken several previous agreements, would have sent instead to Manfred, Michaēl II's ally, threatening to withhold Constanza-Anna if Manfred did not arrange the return of Stratēgopoulos. Thus Manfred, who dearly wanted his sister back, requested that Michaēl II hand Stratēgopoulos over to him.[67] After this the swap was made, sometime in 1262, though the original agreement for the return of Constanza-Anna was made in 1261, which is chronologically where Pachymerēs places it. Such an explanation would go a long way to avoid the congested time frame implicit in a dating of December 1261 for the swap, and also explains why Michaēl II willingly handed over Alexios to Manfred, rather than using him as a bargaining counter in his own right, as he had done on a previous occasion.

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[66] A parallel could be drawn between Michaēl's use of Constanza-Anna as a lever to gain concessions from Manfred and Henry IV of England holding hostage the widow of Richard II, Isabelle of Valois. In the latter case Henry attempted to withhold her return to France until he could gain diplomatic and political advantage from France, especially official recognition of his legitimacy as king of England (Phillpotts 1998:69).

[67] Greg. 91^{22-24}. Berg (1988:274*ff*), argues that desire to see Constanza returned was the main reason for Manfred's involvement in affairs east of the Adriatic. *Cf.* Pach. 247^{4-7}, where Michaēl VIII himself claims that "the relatives of Anna" were only his enemies because of her mistreatment by the Nikaians.

Book Two

2.1 How the patriarch was worried about the empire

"a small number" (129^{5-6})

Pachymerēs has already indicated that some of Michaēl Palaiologos' most vocal opponents had been removed (Pach. 113^{18-19}), and others had changed their allegiance to him (see the commentary to 113^{20}), so the anti-Palaiologos faction was ever decreasing in number and influence. Several of the bishops were opposed (Pach. 145^{8-26}), but the support for Palaiologos' elevation to the throne was irresistible.

"the worst things are presented as the best" (129^{20-21})

This bears a similarity to the accusations made against Socrates, that he "made the weaker argument the stronger" (Plato, *Apologia*, 19B).

"saw this warning as a specific command" (129^{23}-131^{1})

Pachymerēs evidently means that the individual who warned the ruler about his illness was accused of wishing the illness upon the ruler.

"his own son" (131^{9-11})

This reference from Michaēl Palaiologos would seem to indicate that his first-born son, Manouēl, was still alive at this time. Manouēl had been born some time previously (Talbot 1992:295), and apparently died young (Pach. 247^{14-15}). Michaēl cannot be referring to his second son, Andronikos, since he was not born until 1259 (see the commentary to 217^{3}).

It is possible that this entire passage is inaccurate. Michaēl Palaiologos was attempting to be crowned basileus on the premise that he would only hold the throne until Iōannēs IV came of age. Mentioning his own son as a possible imperial candidate of the future would shatter this premise, and for this reason is is doubtful that Michaēl would have said any such thing.

"to promote to a higher rank those of worthy quality" (131^{12})

By agreeing with those of his faction who nominated him on the basis of his merit (Pach. 129^{11-14}), Palaiologos was in no position to deny the same kind of advancement to others. During his reign, however, the highest offices were almost always occupied by members of

the higher ranks of the nobility, regardless of their skills and experience (Angold 1975a:151-181).

There is still a kind of irony in Michaēl Palaiologos, the champion of the backlash against Theodōros II and his policies of sidelining the aristocracy, paying lip-service to exactly the meritocratic policies that Theodōros had espoused (Pach. 41^{19}-43^{1}, 61^{6}).

"appoint men who would judge" (131^{13-14})

This concern with traditional Roman law is connected with Palaiologos' outlawing of trials by combat and ordeal (Pach. 131^{22-24}), and reflects both his own experience of trial by combat and ordeals, in which Akropolitēs reports him as being a champion of old written law (Akrop. 94^{15}-98^{9}), and the Byzantine theory of renewal by good basileis, who reinvigorate old institutions (Alexander 1962:349-351).

An early novel of Michaēl VIII highlights his concern with the state of the empire's legal system, and publicised his intention to end the abuses and irregularities of the earlier reigns (Burgmann and Magdalino 1984:386).

"Michaēl Kakos, called Senachēreim" (131^{14-15})

The Senachēreim family claimed from "la célèbre dynastie des Ardzrounni, qui prétendait descendre du roi d'Assyrie, Sénachérim" (Guilland 1967:1.506). At some point during the reign of Theodōros II Michaēl Kakos served as a teacher of rhetoric at the imperial school in Nikaia (Festa 273). How he went from that role to being in a position to receive a promotion to a senior judicial post is uncertain, but at the start of 1259 he was created prōtasēkrētis by Michaēl VIII. The new basileus thought highly of Michaēl Kakos. In the period prior to the recapture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261 Michaēl Kakos was given a bride from the Philanthrōpēnos family (Pach. 157^{1-2}), and he served as a mesazōn, or senior minister (MM 6.214).

A patriarchal document of 1247/8 names a Senachēreim as prōtasēkrētis (Laurent, *Regestes*, 1308). Angold (1975a:160 n.63) argues that this document should either be redated to post-1259, or else the prōtasēkrētis mentioned, perhaps our Senachēreim, is a patriarchal and not an imperial official. We could add a third possibility, that this earlier Senachēreim is not our Senachēreim but is perhaps a relative – maybe his father, given that Michaēl Kakos was of an age to marry in 1259.[68]

His entry in the PLP is no. 25154.

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[68] In this period it was quite common for sons to "inherit" titles once held by their father. In this work we have seen Alexios Rhaoul and his son Iōannēs hold the title of prōtobestiarios (Pach. 41^{8-9}, 155^{1-3}), and Nikēphoros Tarchaneiōtēs and his son Michaēl hold the title of megas domestikos (Pach. 55^{20}, 419^{2}).

"prōtasēkrētis" (131^{16})

This office was originally created to be the head of the imperial chancery and its clerks, and made responsible for the production of imperial documents such as chrysobulls and prostagmata. Around the turn of the twelfth century, however, the prōtasēkrētis lost his connection to the chancery and instead was made into a judge. This role is first attested for 1166 (Oikonomides 1976:131). In the official hierarchy the prōtasēkrētis occupied the thirty-second rank (PK 300^{23-24}). Pseudo-Kodinos assigns no ceremonial duties to the prōtasēkrētis, so it is likely that this position was a working role and not an honorary one (see the commentary to 97^{21}).

A prōtasēkrētis named Senachēreim is mentioned in a document dating to 1247/8 (Laurent, *Regestes*, 1308), and Failler (1984:130 n.1) uses this as evidence that Pachymerēs errs in stating that the prōtasēkrētis was reintroduced by Michaēl Palaiologos after a long hiatus. There are some doubts about the dating of this document, however. See the commentary to 131^{14-15}.

"their *pronoiai* would pass as an inheritance" (131^{19-21})

See the commentary to 29^{24} and 139^{6}.

2.2 How they relieved Palaiologos of the curses to which he was subject

"the earlier oaths" (135^{7})

This refers to the oaths Michaēl Palaiologos swore before the synod in 1254, in which he pledged his loyalty to Iōannēs III Batatzēs (Akrop. 101^{2-6}) and to the Laskarid dynasty generally (Pach. 37^{9-11}), on pain of excommunication (Skout. 503^{30-31}). These oaths were made after Palaiologos had been arrested on suspicion of treason with foreign powers (see commentary to 37^{12-13}). On these oaths see Dölger, *Regesten*, no.1814, and Laurent, *Regestes*, no.1320.

"the assembly of bishops" (135^{10})

The negotiations surrounding the swearing of oaths between Michaēl and Iōannēs IV took place in late December 1258, since Pachymerēs (115^{5}) is explicit about the date on which they were given – 1 January 1259.

Akropolitēs (158^{22}-159^{4}) refers to the patriarch and synod signing a *tomos* absolving Michaēl of any transgression of his earlier oaths, if he took up the throne alongside Iōannēs

IV, but Akropolitēs places this as occurring before Michaēl was raised to the rank of despotēs. Considering the brevity of Akropolitēs' account, however, we can be confident that Pachymerēs is the more reliable author regarding the timing of these events.

"he demanded that a vow be formulated" (135^{14-18})

This statement appears to contradict Pachymerēs' earlier comment, that the bishops were the instigators of the reciprocal oaths made between Michaēl and Iōannēs IV (Pach. 135^{2-4}). It was Michaēl who had the position of greater strength at this time – he had all but been promised the throne, he had the backing of the nobility and the army, and he had already gained the support of most of the synod. Forcing Iōannēs IV, the rightful basileus, to swear an oath of loyalty to Michaēl Palaiologos, who was officially to be the junior basileus, benefited Michaēl more than Iōannēs. It would put Michaēl's position on a much more equal footing with that of Iōannēs, and make his hold on the crown much stronger. Taken together, these points would suggest that the proposal, that Michaēl and Iōannēs should swear oaths of mutual loyalty, originated from Michaēl's camp. Whether the instigation was from the man himself, or from his supporters in the synod, is a moot point, and does not mean that Pachymerēs can be shown to be contradicting himself in these two passages.

2.3 How the Romans made oaths of submission to the two and under what terms

"the customary oath of service" (135^{23-24})

For this oath see the commentary to 79^{4-5}.

"on the holy gospels" (137^{3-4})

As in many modern courtrooms, most Byzantine oaths were made binding by evoking the power of the divine, usually through the medium of the bible or a book of scripture. The crusader Bohemund of Taranto thus pledged his oath of loyalty towards Alexios I while holding his hands upon a holy book (Guillaume of Tyre 1.74-76).

2.4 How Palaiologos and the great swore oaths to the child

"the first of Hekatombaion" (137^{7})

See note to 115^{5}. Michaēl VIII appears to have been proclaimed basileus at Magnesia (Pach. 139^{23}; Blemmidēs 2.23).

"he who was being lifted to the imperial rank" (137^{8})

Michaēl Palaiologos, as the newcomer to the throne, was still technically subordinate to Iōannēs IV, the legal heir of Theodōros II. Being thus a subject of Iōannēs IV he had to swear an oath to him like every other subject. The phrasing of his oath was different from that of the other subjects, and its essentials are given by Arsenios (*Testamentum* 952^{A}).

It appears, if Pachymerēs is accurate regarding this matter, that Michaēl did not break the oath he swore. There was indeed a later plot by him against Iōannēs IV, but not a "deadly" one. Michaēl had Iōannēs dethroned, blinded and imprisoned, but did not kill the boy (Pach. 255^{24}-259^{4}).

"the symbols of imperial power" (137^{13-14})

These were the red shoes that only the basileus was entitled to wear. See the commentary to 185^{7}.

"sat down on the imperial shield" (137^{13-16})

Lifting a newly proclaimed basileus on a shield was an old Roman tradition, but one which died out sometime before the seventh century. It seems to have been unknown in Byzantium between that time and the thirteenth century (Ostrogorsky 1955:253). If it was a Byzantine custom during the intervening centuries then Kōnstantinos VII Porphyrogennetos would have mentioned it in his *De Administrando Imperio*. Instead, shield-raising is said by him to be a Khazar ceremony (*De Administrando Imperio* 172^{51-54}). Kazhdan (1984:51) suggests that the custom was alive in Byzantium during the eleventh century, citing two passages from Psellos (4.40^{21-22}, 6.104^{4-5}). However, both of these passages provide less than compelling evidence for shield-raising as part of the official coronation process. One refers is to a Bulgarian rebel, and the other to an usurping nobleman whose "coronation" was, according to Psellos, an ad-hoc affair conducted under less than ideal circumstances using what materials could be found in a rebel army's camp. Neither passage describes actual court ceremonial, and their evidence cannot be stretched too far, especially given the lack of supporting evidence from the twelfth century.

For unknown reasons raising a new basileus on a shield was reintroduced into Byzantium in the thirteenth century by the Laskarid dynasty. Ostrogorsky (1955:255-56) suggested that it was a habit picked up from the Latin emperors of Constantinople, while Kazhdan (1984:51) suggests that the reasons were more psychological, being a demonstration of the more martial outlook of the aristocracy in general, and of the basileus in particular. It is just as likely that it was introduced as yet another way to legitimise the Laskarid claim to be the true heirs of the pre-1204 empire.

By the fifteenth century the ceremony of shield-raising had come to symbolise the new basileus' assumption of the supreme command of the imperial army (Symeon of Thessalonikē, PG 155 352^{D}), and the course of the ceremony, and who was to participate in it, had been formalised (PK 255^{20}-256^{14}). As the elevation of Michaēl VIII demonstrates, the ceremony of shield-raising and acclamation did not necessarily immediately precede the coronation. Some time could elapse between the two events (Walter 1975:164-165).

On shield-raising in this period, see Raybaud (1968:49-51).

2.5 How Palaiologos, once installed in the Empire, showed the greatest generosity

"the senate" (137^{19})

For a discussion about this august body's existence in the late Byzantine period, see the commentary to 65^{14}.

"with the title of sebastokratōr" (137$^{20-21}$)

At the time of Michaēl's acclamation as basileus at the beginning of 1259, Iōannēs was in Makedonia, preparing the campaign against Michaēl of Epiros that led to the battle of Pelagonia (see commentary to 117$^{15-18}$). When the fighting began in late spring Iōannēs had been raised to the rank of sebastokratōr (Pach. 151^{17} and commentary). Although Pachymerēs states that the conferment of the dignity was deferred, it is apparent that little time elapsed between Michaēl's decision and the insignia being delivered to Iōannēs at Berroia

Iōannēs' presence in the west also means that his wedding to the daughter of Kōnstantinos Tornikios was unlikely to have been celebrated at this time. Pachymerēs clearly states that the wedding took place at this time, after Michaēl's acclamation as basileus, and not before Iōannēs departed for the west, as suggested by Macrides

(1978:397). Although Tornikios was himself with Iōannēs during this campaign (Akrop. 173^{1-2}), we must assume that such a high-society wedding was not celebrated in the field, but only took place after the return of the sebastokratōr in the autumn of 1259. Pachymerēs may in fact be referring to a betrothal arranged at this time between Iōannēs and the Tornikina.

"the daughter of Kōnstantinos Tornikios" (137^{22})

As is the case with so many aristocratic women who are mentioned by Pachymerēs, the first name of this woman is not known. Iōannēs Palaiologos, in his own words, had eyes for no other woman than her (Pach. 287^{2-3})[69], so we can assume that their marriage was a happy one.

The marriage produced at least one son, who may have been the later megas droungarios tēs biglēs Dēmētrios Palaiologos Tornikios (Papadopulos 1938:5).

This Tornikina is mentioned by Schmalzbauer (1969:119-120).

"grant the rank of kaisar to his brother, Kōnstantinos" (137^{24-25})

Kōnstantinos did not have to wait long for his title to be awarded. Pachymerēs (153^{10-11}) states that Kōnstantinos received this honour at the same time as Iōannēs received the title of sebastokratōr. This presumably means that Kōnstantinos was made kaisar sometime later in 1259, as Iōannēs was promoted sebastokratōr in the spring of that year.

Akropolitēs (161^{5-8}) states that after being bestowed with this title, Kōnstantinos was despatched by Michaēl to inspect the castles and towns of Paphlagonia.

"the daughter of Branas" (137^{25}-139^{2})

Eirēnē Branaina and Kōnstantinos Palaiologos had five children before the couple took monastic vows, giving their children into the care of Michaēl VIII. Eirēnē died c.1270 as a nun named Maria. Four of their five children are known to have become monks or nuns, and one daughter married Tsar Smiltzas of Bulgaria.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 3149, and she is also mentioned in Nicol (1968:10-11).

"Branas" (139^{1})

Nothing else is known about this gentleman.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 3153.

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[69] Though he had at least one illegitimate child, a daughter who married King David of Georgia (Pach. 287^{3-5}; Papadopulos 1938:5).

"increasing their *pronoiai*" (139^{3-4})

The nobility did not hold pronoiai in the normal sense of the word. What Pachymerēs is describing is a distribution of lands cut from the imperial demesne, the *zeugēlateia* (see commentary to 99^{8}), by Michaēl VIII, and given as grants to the great nobility (Ahrweiler 1959:59-60). Whether these grants were gifts, bribes or part of a deliberate policy to increase the power and influence of the nobility is uncertain.

"putting in chrysobulls all he had promised to them" (139^{6})

These were the promises Michaēl had made while he was still lobbying to be crowned co-basileus (see Pach. 131^{18-21}). The wording of Pachymerēs suggests that Michaēl made all *pronoiai* hereditary, but this was not the case. Other evidence shows that only some *pronoiai* were made hereditary at this time (Bartusis 1992:180-181). As well as promising to the soldiers that their pronoiai would, in the case of their death in action, pass on to their families, Michaēl also awarded hereditary rights to those pronoiar soldiers who served well.

Even though a grant of *pronoia* may have been made hereditary, the grant could still be taken away by the empire. Normally this was through escheat – sometimes the pronoiar may have had no family to inherit the grant – but in other cases the grant could simply be taken away. In 1325, for instance, the widow of a soldier named Sarakenos was not allowed to inherit her late-husband's *pronoia* grant (Laiou 1973:145), though again, in this case the reason may have been an absence of sons who could take up Sarakenos' military obligations. In 1272 Michaēl instructed his son, Andronikos, on how to govern in a prostagma outlining his rights and responsibilities. One of the items he discusses is the grant of *pronoiai*, and he specifically reserves the right to take back the grant of a soldier who does not perform adequately, and award it to someone else (Heisenberg 1920:40-41; Bartusis 1988b:271; Karyannopoulos 1996b:74-75). Whether the poorly-performed soldier was the original holder of the grant or his son did not matter, as the pronoia grant, though hereditary, was still in the gift of the basileus. Bartusis (1992:374-375) discusses the case of two brothers who appear to have lost the *pronoia* that had been granted to their father.

In the same document Michaēl does warn Andronikos to avoid awarding grants of *pronoiai* created from property that was already held in *pronoia* by another. Ostensibly this was from a concern that this would cause a diminution of the abilities of the original pronoiar, but behind it is the same acknowledgement of the soldier's feeling of possessiveness over the property, which he regarded as his own, which lay behind Michaēl's granting of hereditary rights.

"*sitēresia*" (139^{8})

Pachymerēs uses two words in relation to payments made to soldiers: *sitēresion* and *roga*.[70] While both of these words mean "pay", with *roga* normally being seen as a less formal word, Pachymerēs differentiates between them. The key passage for Pachymerēs use of the word *roga* is 97^{31}-99^{1}. This occurs in a discussion by the author of the fiscal discipline maintained by Iōannēs III and Theodōros II, and deals exclusively with the cash reserve kept in the treasury at Magnesia. Here *rogai* are one of the things for which money was withdrawn by the government. What these *rogai* were is made clear at 79^{21}. According to Pachymerēs, Geōrgios Mouzalōn had become unpopular with the Frankish mercenaries because he had reduced and delayed their *rogai*. *Roga*, then, is a word used by Pachymerēs to indicate monetary payments to soldiers.

Sitēresion is used less frequently by the historian. As well as the current passage, it occurs only twice in the first three books of the *Historia*. At 187^{29} the term is used to refer to the pensions to be awarded to Nikaian envoys who died during the course of their duties. At 257^{25}, the word is used to describe the awards given by Michaēl VIII to the guards looking after the blinded Iōannēs IV at the castle of Dakibyza. Bartusis, in his exhaustive study of late-Byzantine army administration, translates *sitēresia* as "provisions", though he also says the word is "problematic" (Bartusis 1992:374). In the eleventh century *siteresia* had been used to mean "rations" (Ostrogorsky 1932:303), at least on campaign, and there is no reason to suspect that Pachymerēs does not mean the same thing. As we have seen, *rogai* were payments of cash, whereas *sitēresia* were payments of something else. In all of the situations where Pachymerēs uses the word, payment in kind, of food and other necessities of life, is a sensible interpretation.

2.6 How Palaiologos began fortifying the frontiers, even before he had been crowned

"he decided to go to Philadelpheia" (139^{22-23})

Before his coronation, Theodōros II too had marched to Philadelpheia, and for much the same reasons as those given here for Michaēl VIII's journey. Akropolitēs (105^{22}-106^{2}) states that, because Philadelpheia was located so close to the border with the Selçuk Turks,

[70] A third word, *misthos*, which is often used in other sources to explicitly refer to payment in cash, is only used by Pachymeres in a general sense of 'payment'. He refers to Charles d'Anjou receiving the title of King as his payment (*misthos*) from the pope for attacking Manfred of Sicily (Pach. 411^{21}).

it was the best place from which to send envoys to the sultān at Konya, which is what Theodōros II proceeded to do (Greg. 56).

Michaēl VIII took with him "the whole army" (Pach. 139^{24}), so this expedition was not intended to be the flying visit, designed solely to despatch some ambassadors, that Theodōros had made.

"upon arrival he fortified the frontiers from there" (141^{3})

With all of its pronouns this passage is rather vague. In general, however, it appears that Michaēl did not fortify the frontier in the sense of erecting new defences. Rather he saw to the well being, both mentally and materially, of the border *akritai*, the farmer-militia of the Anatolian highlands whom we last saw in chapter 1.6. Pachymerēs goes on to say here that the basileus made gifts to some of these men, despatched fresh drafts to reinforce them, and attended to any "matters" which came to his attention. The latter were presumably of the type that he had already treated at Magnesia (Pach. 139^{11-14}) and involved the adjudication of disputes over land, rights and property. The former gifts would have been increased *pronoiai* and confirmation of tax exemptions granted by the Laskarid rulers (Pach. 29^{24-25} and commentary). Details are lacking, but we can assume that, like those grants awarded at Magnesia, many of these gifts were revoked in later years, even before the reforms of Chadenos drastically altered the lives of the borderers (see commentary to 1.5).

"ready to revolt" (141^{10-11})

This is an interesting comment from Pachymerēs. At the beginning of 1259, when Michaēl VIII travelled to Philadelpheia, Epiros – the West – was already fighting Nikaia. It had in fact been doing so since at least the reign of Theodōros II. In the winter of 1256/7 the despotēs Michaēl II had revolted against imperial control, and Geōrgios Akropolitēs, as praitor, had lost control of most of the region (Akrop. 139^{23}-143^{22}). The then megas domestikos Iōannēs Palaiologos had been sent with some troops to Makedonia in the autumn of 1258 (Akrop. 160^{16-20}), but he did not undertake any offensive actions until the spring of 1259, staying encamped in Berroia (Pach. 117^{15-18}). Michaēl's haste to return north because worrying about the western situation may actually have been a desire to send the troops under his command to his brother. The *Chronicle of the Morea* states that Michaēl sent Cuman reinforcements to Iōannēs in the new year of 1259, reaching him by March (*CoM* 3600-3607). While March may have been too soon for troops who were with Michaēl at Philadelpheia in February to reach Makedonia, the reference to reinforcements is telling, especially in light of Pachymerēs assertion that Michaēl took "the whole army" with him.

"he sent envoys to the Persians" (141^{11-12})

The "situation" of which Pachymerēs speaks is a reference to Michaēl's assuring the Selçuk court that the change of Nikaian ruler would not cause an outbreak of hostilities between Turk and Greek. In other words, that the status quo would be maintained and all existing treaties would continue to be in force.

The sultān responded to this embassy from Michaēl with one of his own. It arrived at Nikaia after the coronation of the new basileus (see 149^{15-21} and commentary).

"held him in the greatest friendship" (141^{14-15})

Michaēl Palaiologos was well known at the Selçuk court, having spent some time there during his exile in 1256 (see 43^{24}-45^{4}). Included in the sultān's court were two Greek brothers named Basilikos. These two were particular friends of Michaēl, and deserted the Selçuks for the Nikaian court shortly after Michaēl's elevation to the throne (see 183^{1-19} and commentary).

"he returned with all possible haste" (141^{15})

The expedition to Philadelpheia and the Selçuk border beyond the town would not have taken long. Arsenios, in his *Testamentum* (952^{B}), says just that ("*chairos ou polus parelthōn*"). Magnesia lay less than one hundred kilometres from the frontier and a marching army would have covered the distance in a week or less. Dölger (*Regesten* 1859) assigns the despatch of the Konya-bound envoys to January, and this date can be accepted, though it was probably late January, given that Michaēl remained at Magnesia for an unknown time after his proclamation as basileus, dispensing largesse and dealing with matters that were brought to his attention. In all likelihood the army had returned to Magnesia by early spring and arrived at Nikaia, two hundred or more kilometres distant, several weeks after. Grēgoras (78^{13}) states that only a month separated the proclamation of Michaēl at Magnesia and the coronation at Nikaia, but he is surely underestimating the time involved. On this see Failler (1980b:41-42).

"according to convention" (141^{19-20})

Angold (1975a:89) argues that the order of coronation had been agreed at the same time as Michaēl VIII had been raised to the throne. This may have been so, but it is more likely that the order had not been discussed. As Pachymerēs says, everyone merely assumed that Iōannēs, as the dynastic heir, would be crowned first, before the incoming co-basileus Michaēl. If the order of coronation had in fact been discussed at an earlier time, it begs the

question why Michaēl did not push for his own primacy at that time? Instead, what occurred was a subtle propaganda campaign, run by partisans of Michaēl and aimed solely at convincing the patriarch that Michaēl had better qualifications to be the senior basileus. See Pachymerēs 143^{1-7} and commentary.

2.7 How Palaiologos circumvented the conventions of the coronation

"the magnates" (141^{25})

Michaēl Palaiologos had begun giving gifts to the higher aristocracy, as well as to the clergy, immediately after he was named regent for Iōannēs IV (see Pach. 103^{12-15}, 111^{27}-113^{3}, 137^{19}-139^{2}), and those of the nobility who had earlier been opposed to his increasing power had either changed their views in the meantime or, like Manouēl Laskaris (Pach. 113^{20-21}) and Iōannēs Angelos (Akrop. 160^{3-15}), had been removed as threats. A combination of carrot and stick, then, was used to get the aristocracy behind Palaiologos' imminent act of usurpation (Geanakoplos 1959:45).

"those who had been mistreated" (141^{28})

Surely this is another reference to Theodōros Philēs and Kōnstantinos Stratēgopoulos, who were prominent partisans of Michaēl Palaiologos in the debates over the regency conducted after the death of the Mouzalōnes. See Pachymerēs 107^{23-28} and commentary. Pachymerēs is quite emphatic that those men, who had suffered at the orders of Theodōros II, were keen to revenge themselves against the former basileus' successor.

"the patriarch" (141^{29}-143^{1})

Patriarch Arsenios, by his own admission (*Testamentum* 949^{B-C}, 952^{A}), was placing great importance on the oaths Palaiologos had sworn regarding the rights of Iōannēs IV. It would probably be correct to say that he had his head in the sand during the rise of Palaiologos, but it is also true to say that his position as protector of the legitimate basileus Iōannēs had become untenable. The aristocracy and most of the higher clergy were all in Michaēl's pocket, as it were, and Arsenios had used most of the weapons available to him, up to and including threats of excommunication should Michaēl usurp the throne. All that was left to him was the legitimising power of the coronation, which only the patriarch was entitled to perform (Angold 1975a:92). Thus all Arsenios could do at this time was wait for the two basileis to come to him at Nikaia for the coronation.

"Palaiologos had indicated his intention" (143^{1-7})

Pachymerēs is the only author to suggest that Michaēl Palaiologos had co-conspirators who actively assisted and advised him in his usurpation. Unfortunately he does not identify who these bishops were. The only ones that can be ruled out completely are the metropolitans Andronikos of Sardeis and Manouēl of Thessalonikē, who later came into prominence as opponents of Michaēl's usurpation (Pach. 143^{22ff}, 167^{14}-169^{13}; Akrop. 178^{10}-179^{17}). What is clear from Pachymerēs' account is that Michaēl and the bishops had this discussion before the newly-acclaimed basileus left Magnesia for Philadelpheia. Certainly it took place before Michaēl and Iōannēs arrived at Nikaia. Arsenios admits that during this period he was being continually pestered by partisans – both ecclesiastic and secular – of Michaēl singing their favourite's praises and urging the patriarch with great vehemence to give Palaiologos primacy by deferring the coronation of Iōannēs IV and crowning Michaēl only. Arsenios agrees that this campaign had some effect on his later actions during the coronation (*Testamentum* 952^{B-C}).

This was a new approach by Michaēl and his partisans. Arsenios had earlier only agreed to raising Michaēl to imperial rank on condition that he be crowned after Iōannēs IV, and then to resign his rule when Iōannēs reached maturity (Greg. 79^{3-8}). On the agenda at that time was a double-coronation, with both Iōannēs and Michaēl being crowned as part of the one ceremony. Now talk was shifting to there being two ceremonies, with one basileus being crowned at each.

Michaēl and his supporters may have had in mind the recent example of Jean de Brienne who, when called by the pope (in 1228) to be regent of Constantinople during the minority of Baudouin II, insisted that he be invested with the title of emperor, with the official coronation of Baudouin to follow only after Jean's death, or when the youth reached twenty years of age (Norwich 1995:197). Jean held on to his throne tenaciously until his death in 1237, keeping Baudouin sidelined the whole time, even sending him to western Europe for a time. In both Jean's and Michaēl's case, we have an older, ambitious statesman refusing to accept a regency for a boy not yet old enough to have any say in decision making, without first himself being raised to sovereign power. In both cases the non-dynastic rulers cited the need for legitimacy – that their authority would not be respected at home or abroad unless they had all of the trappings of imperial rank. Pachymerēs does not mention it here, but the main reason why Michaēl's rise to the top was largely unopposed was the Byzantine desire for there to be a strong hand on the throne. This was the message Michaēl had given in his response to Mouzalōn, and it was also the message his supporters used in the arguments and negotiations after Mouzalōn's murder. Michaēl's elevation was hardly the result of a democratic election, but the fact remains that,

as in modern politics, if Michaēl's message had not been received sympathetically by those who had the power to prevent his rise, then that rise would have not occurred.

2.8 How Palaiologos was crowned and the child was sidelined.

"the appointed day arrived" (143^{13})

Unfortunately we do not know the exact date of the coronation ceremony. It would have been at least well into February 1259, and perhaps later. See commentary to 141^{15} for more discussion.

Pachymerēs provides us with by far the most detailed account of the coronation of Michaēl VIII. Other writers, notably Akropolitēs (159^{15-18}), Grēgoras (78^{13}-79^{11}) and Patriarch Arsenios (952^{C}-953^{A}), refer to the coronation in brief or vague terms.

"everything was ready" (143^{13})

The coronation of a Byzantine basileus was a largely ecclesiastic affair, held in the Hagia Sophia and conducted by the reigning patriarch, assisted by his bishops and deacons. Few secular officials had any role to play in the ceremony. Pseudo-Kodinos gives an extended description of the ceremony as conducted in the mid-fourteenth century (PK 252^{2}-273^{18}), and we may assume that the ceremony, apart from the change in location from Kōnstantinoupolis to Nikaia, had changed little in the hundred-or-so years that separated him from the events Pachymerēs narrates. For the ceremony and its significance see also Raybaud (1968:69-79).

The ceremony was begun by the new basileus travelling from the palace to the Hagia Sophia, where the patriarch and his assistants waited for him. The basileus sent before him a document, written in his own hand, in which he had recorded his faithfulness to the Orthodox Church and his intention to live by its precepts as found in the gospels and as ordained by the church fathers and by the oecumenical councils (PK 253^{4}-254^{14}).

From Pachymerēs' narrative it seems that, instead of these letters from Michaēl and Iōannēs, the patriarch and his staff received a message stating that only Michaēl was to be crowned in the upcoming ceremony.

"Some of the senators" (143^{16-18})

These unknown individuals were presumably the men who brought the patriarch the message informing him that only Michaēl was to be crowned in the ceremony. Certainly the presence of "senators" in the Hagia Sophia so early into the discussion amongst the

clergy gathered there can be explained in no other way. While some of the bishops present had been aware of Michaēl's intentions and were "senators" in the loose sense in which Pachymerēs uses the term (see Angold 1975a:72-74), they would not have been in a position to threaten harm to Iōannēs.

It is impossible to say whether these men, in issuing these threats, were following instructions from Michaēl or were merely getting carried away by what must have been a highly-charged situation. Certainly Michaēl was ready to use force, or the threat of it, as a last resort if the decision of the clergy ever appeared about to go against him (Pach. 145^{15-17}), but to make such a vulgar display of his power so early in the affair seems out of character for such a subtle man. There is also the possibility that Pachymerēs, or his source, has exaggerated what exactly was said by these messengers, who may merely have reminded the assembled clergy of the support Michaēl had from the army and how much more secular power he wielded than Iōannēs did, or some such statement.

"Andronikos of Sardeis" (143^{22})

Andronikos, a native of Paphlagonia (Akrop. 179^{9-12}), became metropolitan of Sardeis in 1250 (MM 1.119). Iōannēs III sent him as a senior ambassador to Rome to discuss church union with the pope in 1253. He was a correspondent with Theodōros II, and complimented the basileus on his literary skill (Festa 173-174). We do not know whether his alliance with Manouēl of Thessalonikē, which Pachymerēs alludes to here for the first time, was created at this time, or whether it had existed for any time beforehand.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 959.

"Germanos of Adrianoupolis-in-Orestias" (143^{25})

Germanos Malkoutzas (or Markoutzas) Gabras trained as a monk in Jerusalem and Antioch in the 1230's. Returning to the empire c.1240, he became metropolitan of Adrianoupolis in 1250. A constant supporter of Michaēl VIII, he was appointed patriarch by the basileus in 1265, and served in that capacity for just over one year, before being replaced. In his later years he served, on a number of occasions, as an imperial ambassador; most notably during the negotiations with Hungary to secure a Hungarian princess as wife for Andronikos II in 1272, and to the Council of Lyon in 1274, where his stature as a former patriarch favouring Union with Rome was important. He died c.1278.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 17091.

"Grēgorios of Ankyra" (143^{25})

Grēgorios was metropolitan of Ankyra from 1250-1261. He was present at the synod that elected Nikēphoros II to the Patriarchate at the beginning of 1260 (Laurent, *Regestes*, no.1351), and it is possible that he is one of the prelates who died soon after and who Pachymerēs refers to in passing at 171^{5-8}.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 4543.

"Kōnstantinos of Melangeia" (143^{26})

This prelate is otherwise unknown.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 92494.

"Contributed greatly to the agreement" (143^{24-25})

Pachymerēs gives us the only detailed report about the deliberations of the synod over this issue, and even he is brief. It seems that Germanos, Grēgorios and Kōnstantinos were firmly on the side of Michaēl Palaiologos, while Andronikos and Manouēl stood by the rights of Iōannēs Laskaris, with Patriarch Arsenios sitting uncertainly in the middle. From the support they showed to Michaēl's cause, it may be possible that any of the former three were the bishops who proposed this plan to Michaēl in the first instance (see commentary to 143^{1-7}). According to Pachymerēs, the supporters of Michaēl won the debate when Arsenios gave in to their arguments, bringing Andronikos across with him. Manouēl stayed opposed even then.

"Nikēphoros of Ephesos" (143^{26}-145^{1})

As an archdeacon of the palace clergy in 1240, Nikēphoros Pamphilas was voted to succeed Methodios as patriarch, but his elevation was vetoed by Iōannēs III Batatzēs because of personal dislike (see Pach. 165^{19-24}). Perhaps as a consolation he was awarded the rich see of Ephesos no later than 1244. He was again mentioned as a possible patriarch in 1254, though he was passed over in favour of Arsenios. His history of dealings with the Laskarid dynasty would suggest that he owed Iōannēs IV no favours, and he later proved, when in 1260 he was finally elected patriarch, as Nikēphoros II, to be a firm backer of Michaēl VIII. Pachymerēs gives a character sketch of him at 165^{16-18} and at179^{12-15}.

His entry in the *PLP* is no.21596.

"The bishops began signing" (145^{5})

Pachymerēs does not actually spell out what was decided at this meeting. It certainly had been decided that Michaēl Palaiologos had the right to be crowned alone at this time, ahead

of Iōannēs Laskaris, as Laurent (*Regestes* 1343) says. But this in itself may not have needed such an official document. Angold (1975a:90) states that by signing this document the signatory bishops were in fact taking upon themselves the responsibility for the breaching of Michaēl's oaths to Iōannēs that being crowned first and alone entailed. Angold is probably correct in this argument, if the reactions of Manouēl of Thessalonikē are taken into account. He seemed very concerned that crowning Michaēl first was but the initial step in a larger plan to usurp all power from Iōannēs (Pach. 145^{10-11}). Once convinced that Michaēl had no such intention, and that his coronation was merely a practical step to legitimise his authority during Iōannēs' minority, and that the oaths he made to Iōannēs were being bent rather than broken, Manouēl withdrew most of his objections.

"the word *marpou*" (145^{8})

See Pach. 49^{4-12} and commentary. Under the circumstances we could be forgiven for believing that *marpou* is Greek for *petard*.

"They brought the youth before him" (145^{12-14})

Of all the events of this day that Pachymerēs relates this is the most curious. Pachymerēs' narrative is the only evidence we have regarding it. Pachymerēs gives no indication that Iōannēs was brought forward on the insistence of Manouēl, nor does he identify who actually did bring him forward and issue threats, though obviously they were partisans of Michaēl.

There is quite a striking resemblance between this action and that of Michaēl's senatorial messengers (Pach. 143^{16-18}). In both cases supporters of Palaiologos threatened violence against the boy-basileus if the clergy did not bow to their demands that Michaēl be crowned alone. In both circumstances Pachymerēs does not connect Michaēl himself to these threats, and for obvious reasons, since Palaiologos was intent on gaining as much legitimacy for his rule as he could get. It was in his interests that his coronation be seen as legal and undertaken voluntarily by the patriarch. Whatever his long-term ambitions, he did not wish to be seen as an illegal usurper. It was this desire that makes the threats of rebellion and violence, made by his supporters, look unauthorised by their principal.

Opposed to this argument stand two points. Firstly, on this day above all others, Michaēl would surely have gone to lengths to ensure that Iōannēs was kept out of the public eye as much as possible. Although it was necessary for him to appear sometime during the coronation ceremony itself (Pach. 145^{28}-147^{1}), the boy would have spent most of the day under close supervision, possibly that of Michaēl's sisters, who were later entrusted with his care (Pach. 179^{21}). If it was not them, then it would have been someone else high in

Michaēl's confidence. In any case, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to bring Iōannēs before the clergy without permission.

Secondly, there is the explicit statement of Pachymerēs that the "axe-bearing Celtic regiment" was ready to use violence if ordered to by "those who had the most power" (Pach. 145^{15-17}). There can be no doubt that the latter is a reference to Michaēl himself. Not only was he acclaimed co-basileus, but he had earlier gained the obedience of that regiment (Pach. 101^{20-25}). Although the partisans of Palaiologos, who were issuing these threats to Manouēl and the other clergy, may have only pointed to these soldiers to indicate the power held by Michaēl, only implying that their principal was actually prepared to gain his way through violence rather than stating a fact, the mentioning of the Celts does raise question marks over Palaiologos' involvement.

In any case, this passage does reveal quite clearly that some of Michaēl's supporters, if not the man himself, were ready to use violence on his behalf, making his solo coronation tantamount to a *coup d'etat*.

"axe-bearing Celtic regiment" (145^{15-16})

These soldiers were last seen guarding the imperial treasury at Magnesia (Pach. 101^{20-25}). Their presence in Nikaia on this occasion may, as Angold (1975a:187) says, be evidence that a contingent always accompanied the basileus on his travels, but for this period we cannot state this with great certainty. We do know, however, that the Varangian guards had a role to play in later coronation ritual (PK 264^{13-17}), and this may explain their presence in Nikaia in the current circumstance. How many were present cannot be stated.

"he added the expression" (145^{22-26})

Manouēl's expression, and Pachymerēs' commentary on it, requires further discussion. In large part this is due to Pachymerēs using one word, the adverb *homoiotropōs*, for the expression used by the bishop, and then drawing a different, though related, word – the adjective *homoiōs* – into his commentary. *Homoiotropōs*, simply translated, means "agreeingly" or "similarly", but Pachymerēs adds context, in the form of Homeric usage of *homoiōs*, which indicates that a simple translation does not do full justice to Manouēl's subtle protest. In the *Iliad* Homer twice uses *homoiōs* in the sense of levelling things, of making things the same. Thus Nestor is affected by old age, which is suffered by all, making no exceptions and bringing every individual to the same state (*Iliad* 4.318), and later in the poem Zeus and Poseidon, supporting opposing sides in the battle, causing the Greeks and the Trojans to be level in strength and thus causing destruction to be evenly wrought upon both the Greeks and the Trojans, with neither side being able to tilt the

balance (*Iliad* 13.358). In a like way, if we were to translate the modern phrase "level playing field" into Classical Greek, we would use the word *homoiōs*.

It is this sense, of becoming the same, which Manouēl is using through the word *homoiotropōs*. Pachymerēs makes clear that Manouēl was being pressured by the other clergy to sign the document in order to show a united front and a unanimous decision. Manouēl was pressured to become of the same mind as the others, to match them. Thus the current translation has used the phrase "so to conform" for the Greek *homoiotropōs*.

"the coronation ceremony was completed" (145^{27})

After the new basileus' declaration of faith has been received by the patriarch, the former entered the church, where he was garbed in his coronation robes in a vestibule before entering the nave. Hymns were sung before the patriarch invited the basileus to the ambon, where he was anointed by sacred oil, in the shape of a cross on the top of the head, at the hands of the patriarch, and is then crowned with the imperial diadem by him. The patriarch then declared the deed, and the basileus, as holy (*hagios*) and the assembled audience responded that it was right (*axios*). The wife of the basileus was then crowned, but not anointed, by her husband. A mass was celebrated before the newly-crowned monarchs were escorted from the church, and the pair mounted horses for the journey back to the palace, accompanied by the assembled court (PK 256^{18}-269^{25}).

From a line in one of Holobōlos' encomia for Michaēl VIII (Holobōlos 92^{19-20}) it has been argued that the coronation ceremony was accompanied by another acclamation, by shield-raising, of Michaēl as basileus (Dölger 1940:185; Wirth 1961:85-86). Failler (1986:238-9) argues against this, stating that Holobōlos is referring not to additional acclamations, but rather to the coronation ceremony itself. We must bear in mind, however, the conditions of that particular day in Nikaia. For a basileus who was negotiating with the patriarch for a coronation ceremony to cement his legitimate claim to the throne, there would be good reason to conduct another ceremony of acclamation. Such an act would have once again showed popular support for his position, and that he had the backing of the aristocracy and the military.

"a headdress in the form of a *kekruphalos*" (147^{1})

The exact form of this piece of costume is not known. A *kekruphalos* is thought to have been some sort of kerchief, and in this present case would appear to have been little more than a headband or circlet of unknown material, studded with gems. Failler (1984:146 n.1) argues, in my view correctly, that the headgear worn by Iōannēs was what Pseudo-Kodinos terms a *stephanos*, a lesser form of crown than the full imperial *stemma*, commonly worn

by the sons of basileis, by junior, uncrowned basileis and by empresses (e.g. PK 203^{7}, 225^{18}, 257^{24-25}). Such headgear would, considering that Michaēl VIII had not yet abandoned the pretence that Iōannēs was still a reigning basileus, be fitting for a boy who had yet to be crowned with the *stemma*, and would suggest to the audience that it was still the intention to crown and enthrone the boy at a more suitable time.

2.9 How Michaēl, once crowned, won over the masses with his words and deeds

"made many speeches" (147^{8})

Pachymerēs does not provide details of what these speeches contained, even though by his own admission he was personally present at Nikaia for these events (149^{1-2}). He does remark that these speeches had a theme of future prosperity and a return to the "good old days" when the empire and life were bigger and better. Akropolitēs (161^{9-24}) also describes how Michaēl VIII showed great largesse to the people after his accession, and how his elevation to the throne was met with rejoicing and great hopes for the future.

According to Pseudo-Kodinos, the festivities that followed the coronation of a new basileus customarily lasted for about ten days (PK 271^{24}-272^{3}).

"throwing silver coins to them" (147^{9-10})

Pachymerēs' claim, that this largesse provided by the new basileus to the people was nothing more than a publicity stunt designed to gain popular support for the future overthrow of Iōannēs IV, ignores the great tradition of Byzantine rulers dispensing money and gifts to all and sundry at the time of their accession. This tradition dated back to the Roman Empire and achieved institutionalised status by the fifth or sixth century. At the apogee of the empire in the ninth century the amount of money distributed by a new basileus was impressive, with hundreds of pounds of gold being given away (McCormick 1986:229). Of this amount, the coinage distributed directly to the common people would have been a mere fraction, although it was undoubtedly the most visible portion of the whole, being distributed immediately after the coronation ceremony, while the new basileus was riding from the church to the palace (PK 271^{10-24}). Most of the largesse was instead given to the Church, the army and the aristocracy. As we have already seen, Michaēl VIII also gave large donations and promotions to these groups following his accession (Pach. 2.5).

The Nikaian rulers, as was normal at that time, minted fewer pure silver coins than either gold hyperpera or copper small-change (*kerma*) (Hendy 1985:530-535). The "silver

coins" of Pachymerēs were more likely billon, and alloy of silver and copper, than pure silver. Depending on the denomination of the particular coin, "silver" coins ranged in value from one-half to one-twentieth of a hyperperon. We may surmise that the coins distributed by Michaēl were largely of the smaller denominations, though of course we have no evidence either way.

For images of the types of coin distributed, see Hendy (1969:plate 35 nos. 1-5). Note the forked beard sported by the basileus on these coins and see the commentary to 147^{24}-149^{2}.

"The ink . . .was still wet" (147^{12-14})

This is a reference to the oaths made by the people that they would rise up against either of the two basileis, should one act against the other. See commentary to 2.3.

"jousting and playing ball games" (147^{21})

See commentary to 95^{9-11}.

"certain fashions of the past" (147^{23}-149^{2})

Over the centuries the beard had come to be seen as an essential symbol of Byzantine manhood. As Iōannēs VIII was to say in 1437, the beard was "for a man, a sign of dignity and honour" (Bréhier 1950:47). Not only did the beard differentiate men from eunuchs, it had also become an outward sign of the differences between Byzantine culture and that of the smooth-cheeked Latins. During the twelfth century, however, the Latin custom of shaving had become more fashionable. With the increased confidence of the Nikaian state, this habit was dying out as beards were revived.

There is some suggestion in this passage that Michaēl VIII had himself been beardless until his accession, but that he grew one afterwards. Considering his former position as megas konostaulos, the command of the Latin mercenaries, this is certainly a possibility, for how better to gain the loyalty of the troops under your command than by showing solidarity with them by appearing as they do? If Michaēl had been beardless, his decision to grow a beard at this time would have been the result of several considerations. First, the new basileus' decision to grow a beard would have been seen as a strong symbol of his "Byzantine-ness", an outward affirmation of where his allegiances lay and an indication of what his policy towards the West, and in particular towards the occupiers of Kōnstantinoupolis, would be. Second, the growth of a beard would have highlighted, in a physical manner, the differences in age and experience between himself and the boy Iōannēs IV (*cf.* Pach. 143^{2-4}).

It is almost certain that Michaēl VIII wore a forked beard during his reign, as Pachymerēs implies. Coin portraits of him show him with a beard in this style (Bendall and Donald 1982:123), and a western image of the basileus also shows him with a forked beard (Geanakoplos 1959:picture between 194-195). Styling his beard, whether newly grown or not, into a fork, would be seen as a sign that the Laskarid basileis who had preceded him would not be forgotten, and that he would continue as they had begun – for the Laskarid rulers had all worn forked beards, according to the evidence provided by their coin portraits (Hendy 1969:plates 30-35).[71]

"tear them out" (149^{2-5})

The prōtasēkrētis Senachēreim did this very thing when he heard of the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis to the forces of the empire in 1261 (Pach. 205^{6-7}), but we cannot say with any certainty whether Pachymerēs intended any connection to be drawn between this passage and that.

2.10 How, returning to Nymphaion with the child, he received ambassadors from all around

"On his arrival" (149^{15})

Contra Geanakoplos (1959:97 n.18) who, while claiming no knowledge of when these embassies were received, places that of Baudouin at least in the context of the attack on Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261; Pachymerēs clearly indicates that the events narrated in this chapter occurred directly after Michaēl VIII returned to Nymphaion following his coronation at the start of 1259 (as Dölger, *Regesten* no.1867b, rightly indicates).

"he received the ambassadors . . . of the Persians" (149^{15-16})

These Turkish emissaries were undoubtedly despatched by the sultān in response to the Nikaian envoys sent earlier by Michaēl VIII to announce his coronation (see Pach. 141^{11-15} and commentary). In all likelihood the sultān's embassy probably returned to Nikaian territory with the Greek envoys. It is unknown what gifts were carried by them for the basileus.

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[71] But note also that Andronikos I Komnēnos (r.1183-1185) also appears on his coinage with a forked beard (Hendy 1969:plate 18), which suggests that the fashion predated the Nikaian period (*contra* Failler 1984:148 n.1). Michaēl VIII almost certainly would not have wanted to align himself with Andronikos of maligned memory, but he may have wished to associate himself with the greater age that preceded the Fourth Crusade than with the truncated empire of later times.

"promised the sultān" (149^{16-18})

That Michaēl made such a promise can only be explained if it was in response to a direct query from the sultān. It is interesting to note that this promise, given in 1259, was not actually utilised by the sultān for another two years, since 'Izz ad-Dīn Kayka'us II did not flee his kingdom for the empire until 1261 (Pach. 183^{20}-185^{21}; Failler 1980b:54-55). It is possible, given this long delay, that Pachymerēs is unwittingly combining two embassies – one which congratulated Michaēl on his accession, and a later one, sent when the sultān's position was rapidly crumbling, asking for refuge.

"Melēk" (149^{19})

Failler indicates that this individual is unknown, and terms him a rebel. However, looking at the history of the Selçuk state during this period, we can reach the conclusion that the Melēk who so frightened 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II at this time was his brother Rukn al-Dīn Kilij Arslan IV, who ruled over the eastern portion of Rum, and who indeed was to attack Kayka'us' western portion in 1260.[72] The 15th century Ottoman writer Yazijioghlu Ali, following the 13th century Ibn Bibi, states explicitly that Kayka'us II fled away from his brother to the Byzantines (Wittek 648^{1-5}).

"Melēk" is the name commonly given by Byzantines to Turks of high station. This name derives from the Turkish word *mālik*, meaning king (Laurent 1956:360). Cahen (1968:125) refers to a Trebizondine document of 1223, which also mentions a "Melēk", who is probably a certain Turkish lord named Mughith al-Dīn Tughrilshah, while Laurent (1956:361-62) provides a list of Melēk's mentioned by 13th-14th century Byzantine authors. All of these individuals are of high rank, of noble or princely family. The situation would be akin to non-Greek sources using the name 'Basileios' to refer to any number of Byzantine basileis.

This Byzantine usage of a title in place of proper Turkish names can sometimes confuse even the Byzantines themselves. Grēgoras (82^{5}), for example, says that 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II was accompanied into exile by his brother Melēk. Grēgoras is confused, however, and has probably assumed that the man called Melēk who did accompany the sultān was the man called Melēk who was the sultān's brother.[73]

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[72] A good narrative of this period of Selçuk history is provided by Cahen (1968:271-279).

[73] It may be argued that the Melēk whom Grēgoras mentions as being a follower of 'Izz al-Din Kaikaus II should be identified with the Melēk who later served first the Byzantines and then the Latins in the Morea (*CoM* 5117*ff*). Certainly Bartusis (1992:52-53) argues that the Turkish troops in the Morea came at least in part from the followers of Kaikaus II. Laurent (1956:361n.) rejects this suggestion. Whether these two Melēks are the same man may remain unknown.

"The Italians of the great city also sent an embassy" (149^{22})

Despite the almost total difference between their accounts, and contra Dölger (*Regesten*, no. 1858), this embassy may be identified with that described by Akropolitēs (161^{25}-163^{17}) and Skoutariōtēs (540^{10}-541^{10}), in which arrogant and wildly optimistic Latin demands for Greek territory are countered by Greek demands for Latin tribute, and nothing was achieved. That Pachymerēs and Akropolitēs are referring to the same embassy is indicated not only by the timing of each (for both are mentioned as being received by Michaēl soon after his coronation) but also by allusions by one to details mentioned by the other.

In the syntax of medieval diplomacy, these envoys would have been procurators rather than nuncii, since they were authorised to negotiate on behalf of their master rather than only express a pre-determined position on a matter (Queller 1960:204-5).

"he granted them a truce" (149^{23})

While Akropolitēs does not refer to any truce offered by Michaēl to the Latins at this point, that one was agreed to does not seem unlikely. The embassy was received at the beginning of 1259, just as the great Nikaian attack against Epiros was about to be launched. With almost all of his forces away in the west, Michaēl would not be desirous of the distractions of continual fighting in the east. Michaēl was not true to his word, launching preparatory raids against Latin holdings outside the city in the second half of 1259, and even seizing Selybria, which was the largest town, other than Kōnstantinoupolis itself, still in Latin hands (Pach. 157^{7-12}).[74]

"if they satisfied certain demands" (149^{24})

In Akropolitēs' account (163^{10-15}) Michaēl VIII offers the Latins of Kōnstantinoupolis peace if they would but undertake to pay the empire one half of their revenue from their mints and one half of their commercial duties. However, as the payment of such a large tribute would cripple the already parlous state of the Latin Empire's finances, no deal could be made and Michaēl's demands were not satisfied. On the weakness of Baudouin's finances at this time, see Wolff (1954:47-50).

[74] This treachery may be the reason why the Latins did not wait until the expiry of a year-long truce with the basileus, agreed to in June/July of 1260 (Akrop. 175^{16-19}), to launch their attack against Daphnousia.

"the envoys were Romans, and the sons of Romans" (149^{24-25})

Neither Akropolitēs nor Skoutariōtēs mention the ethnic origins of the ambassadors. The former refers to them as "the ambassadors of the Latins" (163^{16}), while the latter simply calls them "ambassadors" (541^{10}). However, apart from the evidence provided in the chrysobulls, which Pachymerēs had probably seen, there is a passage in Akropolitēs' account that corroborates Pachymerēs' claim. Quoting a speech given by the basileus to the ambassadors, Akropolitēs writes: "if *you* want peace from me, then I want *the Latins* in Kōnstantinoupolis to pay . . ." (Akrop. 163^{6-10}, my italics). Thus a distinction is here made by the emperor between the ambassadors themselves and the Latins in Kōnstantinoupolis, and this suggests that the envoys were not Latins themselves, and were presumably Greeks.

"he offered them what they desired" (149^{26})

This passage raises several questions. We would be inclined to reject it as a fabrication of Pachymerēs if it were not for the reference to chrysobulls, which would have been a matter of public record.[75] We must then look for Michaēl's granting of such open-ended concessions to foreign ambassadors. Pachymerēs' implied reason, that Michaēl was merely treating them in such a generous manner because he saw them as his own countrymen, cannot be the case, for Michaēl had many thousands of subjects whom he did not treat as well. It may have been a propaganda exercise designed to promote Nikaia to the Greeks of Kōnstantinoupolis, but if this were so then the concessions would have had to be publicised and the ambassadors, having thus openly and traitorously dealt with the basileus, would have been unable to return home in safety, as Akropolitēs (163^{16-17}) states they did. We are left with the idea that Michaēl was rewarding the ambassadors for a service either already rendered or promised, or perhaps both. Pachymerēs says that the basileus received much information from the envoys, some of which may have been highly sensitive, and of course the promise of gain in the event of Kōnstantinoupolis' capture would be a great incentive to work towards that goal. If this was the case then the chrysobulls must have remained secret.

Unfortunately it is unknown what role, if any, this fifth-column played in the events at Kōnstantinoupolis in 1260 and 1261.

[75] It is to be regretted that Pachymerēs does not see fit to inform us whether these ambassadors received what they desired following the capture in 1261, and this may be a ground for further suspicion regarding the accuracy of the passage.

2.11 How Iōannēs, brother of the basileus, obtained his dignities

"he sent a large force of troops" (151^{5-6})

The despatch of Iōannēs Palaiologos and his army occurred in November or December of 1258. On this see the commentary to 117^{15-16}. The army, initially quite small, was reinforced during the Pelagonia campaign of 1259 (*CoM* 3600-3606).

"he rapidly seized…" (151^{9ff})

Akropolitēs (163^{18}-165^{19}) makes it clear that the Nikaian army did not begin its offensive until the unsuccessful embassy of Theodōros Philēs to Michaēl II, which itself was not sent until after Michaēl Palaiologos' elevation to the throne. He also states (Akrop. 167^{23-24}) that the opening operations of the campaign took place "in the spring."

Akropolitēs' account helps to impose order on Pachymerēs' collection of place names. According to the former writer (165^{14}-168^{16}), the Nikaian army, in the lead-up to the battle of Pelagonia, occupied Achrida, Diabolis, Kastoria and the areas around them. After the battle, the Nikaian army split, with one force going south to Thessaly, and the other crossing the Pindos Mountains into Epiros proper (Akrop. 171^{8-26}). With Akropolitēs' aid we can tentatively re-order Pachymerēs' list, and suggest that the occupation of at least Dyrrachion, Bellegrada, Kanina, Patra and Trikke took place after the battle of Pelagonia,[76] while the other places mentioned in the list were captured beforehand.

On the regions conquered at this time by Nikaian forces, see Michaēl VIII's own testimony (Grégoire 1959-60:455), in which he mentions *"Akarnania and Aitolia . . . Epiros and Illyria . . . Epidamnos . . . Phocis . . . Lebadeia . . . the Cadmeia."*

"Kanina" (151^{9})

A fortress just south of the harbour at Avlona, Kanina was strategically very important, since it guarded the easiest point of access to the Via Egnatia from the southern Epirote coast (Nicol 1972:177).

"Bellagrada" (151^{10})

Normally called Berat, Bellagrada was a fortress town lying on the river Osumi, about fifty kilometres northeast of the port of Valona. Held by Epiros since 1204, it was among the gains made by Manfred of Sicily in 1257. Taken by Nikaia in 1259, it was shortly regained

[76] Kanina at least had to wait, since it lay extremely close to Avlona, where the army of Michaēl II regrouped and received Manfred's reinforcements (Greg. 73).

by Manfred's lieutenant Chinardo, only to be recovered by Byzantium again in 1274. It held a key position on the route from Dyrrachion to the east, and was the site of a Byzantine victory against Charles d'Anjou in 1281 (Nicol 1984a:25-26; Ducellier 1981:20-21).

"Kastoria" (151^{10})

A large lakeside town on the shore of the lake with the same name, Kastoria was a great trading centre for northern Makedonia, and had a thriving fur-based economy, as it still does. It was one of the towns taken by Michaēl II in his 1256/7 offensive against Nikaia, and was finally lost to Serbian control in 1342.

"Pelagonia" (151^{11})

Once the site of a city known as Hērakleia Lynkestis, Pelagonia in the thirteenth century was the name for a small region or valley, not one specific settlement (Akrop. 78^{21}).

"Diabolis" (151^{11})

The location of this fortress town is uncertain. Ducellier (1981:18-19) places it in the mountains somewhere between Achrida and Kastoria.

"Prilapos" (151^{11})

Another important fortress, located near the modern Prilep. It was the site of a long siege and the capture of Geōrgios Akropolitēs in the winter of 1257/8 (Akrop. 149^{3}-150^{21}; Nicol 1957:165-166). It was lost to Serbian control in 1334.

"Bodeeina" (151^{12})

Normally spelled Bodēna, this was a town on the ancient Via Egnatia, located where that road descended from the Pindos Mountains onto the Makedonian plain. Along with Berroia, it was one of the key defences of Thessalonikē against attack from the west. It was the site of Michaēl Palaiologos' victory over Theodōros of Epiros in 1257 (see commentary to 47^{1-6}). Like the rest of the region, it fell into Serbian hands in the 1340s.

"Achrida" (151^{13})

The most important ecclesiastic centre of the Epiros-Makedonia region, Achrida was the seat of an autocephalous archbishop. It was located on the lake of the same name, and may have been the capital of the First Bulgarian Empire in the tenth century. It was part of the

Epirote domain, and the archbishops of the early thirteenth century were commonly allied politically with the Angeloi against attempts by Nikaia to crush their independence.

"Illyrian forts" (151^{13})

"Patra" (151^{14})

Normally called Neopatras, this town was located in southern Thessaly. The seat of a metropolitan archbishop, Patra became politically important in the 1250s, when it became the capital of the dominions of Iōannēs Doukas, the son of Michaēl II of Epiros. It appears to have been occupied by the troops of Guillaume de Villehardouin in his march to Pelagonia. See the commentary to 119^{11}-121^{5}.

"Trikkē" (151^{14})

An important agricultural centre, Trikkē (modern Trikala) was located at a major crossroads in northern Thessaly, linking Thessalonikē to the north with southern Epiros and central Hellas.

"through agreements and mostly without fighting" (151^{14-15})

This statement agrees with the more detailed report of Akropolitēs (165^{14}-168^{16}), who writes that the defenders of most of these places readily surrendered, eliciting a disparaging remark from the historian about the fickle cowardice of the "westerners" (167^{20-23}).

"placed the despotēs in great fear and in dire straits" (151^{15-16})

After his withdrawal from the field at Pelagonia, Michaēl II suffered a rapid disintegration of his army and dominions, as Nikaian forces pursued him. His capital of Arta captured by them and the despotēs and his family were forced to flee to Kephalonia. See commentary to 125^{19-21}.

"appointed him sebastokratōr" (151^{17})

After Michaēl's proclamation as basileus on 1 January 1259, when the new basileus was distributing largesse to all and sundry as part of the celebrations, he had decided to raise his brother Iōannēs to this rank (Pach. 137^{20-23}; Akrop. 160^{24}-161^{3}; *cf.* Skout. 539^{26-27}). Iōannēs' new insignia were sent to him in Makedonia, and he was officially sebastokratōr when the campaign against Epiros began in the spring (Akrop. 165^{14-15}; *cf. CoM* 3498, where the author clearly identifies the Nikaian commander as "the sebastokratōr, brother of [Michaēl VIII]").

Pachymerēs' inclusion of this passage at this point in his narrative, after the Pelagonia campaign has been concluded, is confusing. Its subject matter belongs earlier, no later than the beginning of chapter 2.11. It could be speculated that it was a hurried inclusion by the author, who realised, as the narrative neared Iōannēs' elevation to despotēs (Pach. 153^{9}), that he had inadvertently forgotten to mention Iōannēs' holding of the rank between megas domestikos and despotēs.

2.12 How the despotēs Michaēl, reduced to such straits, sent his wife and son to the basileus

"after he had captured the kaisar" (151^{20-21})

Alexios Stratēgopoulos had been defeated and taken prisoner by the despotēs' son Nikēphoros at Trikoryphos early in 1260. See the commentary to 125^{22}-127^{2}.

"he came to his senses following the capture of the city" (151^{21-22})

Pachymerēs' claim to the time of Theodōra's embassy, "following the capture of the city", is accepted at face value by most scholars (Failler 1984:152 n.1; Nicol 1957:192; Polemis 1968:95; *PLP* no. 205; Schmalzbauer 1969:120 n.3). However, there are a number of reasons for rejecting Pachymerēs' testimony on this point and opting instead for an earlier date.

Firstly, there is the matter of Pachymerēs' placement of the embassy in his narrative. He clearly places it in the context of the campaigns in Epiros prior to the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis, and also connects it with the first capture of the kaisar Stratēgopoulos.

Secondly, and more importantly, there is no place in the period 1261-1264 for a treaty of this kind between Epiros and Michaēl VIII. Stratēgopoulos was sent west again soon after his capture of Kōnstantinoupolis, whereupon he was captured in the winter of 1261/2 (Pach. 127^{3-7}; Failler 1980b:77-85). To recover the imperial position, Michaēl VIII then sent his brother Iōannēs, in the spring of 1262 (Pach. 271^{22}-275^{15}; Failler 1980b:87-88). Iōannēs also led another expedition in 1263 (Pach. 283^{25}-285; Failler 1980b:91-92). The important point to note here is that Iōannēs' army wintered in Makedonia over the winter of 1262/3 (Pach. 285^{3-4}), which gives a strong indication that the war was ongoing, without truce or treaty. Iōannēs and Michaēl II signed a treaty later in the campaign of 1263, but this was evidently not taken seriously by Michaēl II (Pach. 285^{8-16}), and is unlikely to have

involved his family. Nor, indeed, does the immediacy implied in Pachymerēs' statement "he came to his senses following the capture of the city", agree with a date of 1263 or later.

If we disregard Pachymerēs' claim, and look at events before the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261, a logical date for this embassy reveals itself. In early 1260 Stratēgopoulos was defeated and captured at the battle of Trikoryphos. A treaty was concluded between Epiros and Nikaia before the end of that year and the kaisar was released (Pach. 127^{1-2}), but this treaty was broken before July 1261, since Iōannēs Palaiologos was sent west at the same time as Stratēgopoulos was sent on his mission against Kōnstantinoupolis (Pach. 191^{2-12}). The breaking of this treaty led to continual hostilities until the short-lived peace of 1263.

I would suggest that the embassy of Theodōra, and the handing over of her son Iōannēs Angelos, took place towards the end of 1260, or very early in 1261, following the capture of Stratēgopoulos. This is where Pachymerēs places it in his narrative. There was no further opportunity until 1263, well after the fall of the city. It can be reasonably suggested that news of the defeat of Trikoryphos, and the danger to the Nikaian position in the west, was the main reason behind the lifting of the siege of Galata in April 1260, and it is likely that the period between April, when Michaēl VIII left Kōnstantinoupolis, and August, when he agreed to a one year truce with the Latins and returned to Asia (Akrop. 175^{18-19}), was spent in an effort to secure the west. We could suggest that the size of the basileus' army, probably as great as that which fought for the empire at Pelagonia, frightened Michaēl II into signing a treaty and handing over Stratēgopoulos.[77] The basileus being in the field himself at the head of the full muster of the empire would have also represented the level of immediate danger required for Michaēl II to willingly offer the surrender of his son as surety for his conduct. It is important to note that Michaēl II did not again undertake such an extreme act of submission until the basileus returned to the west in 1264.

"Theodōra" (151^{22})

A member of the Petraliphas family, Theodōra was married to Michaēl II c.1230. They had at least six children (Greg. 47^{18-19}). Theodōra was a peaceful and holy woman who became a nun after her husband's death in 1267. After her own death she was canonised by the Orthodox Church.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 5664, and see also Polemis (1968:166) and Nicol (1957:129-131).

[77] The size of the imperial army would have been even more impressive relative to the forces of Epiros, when we consider that in 1260 Michaēl II did not have the additional strength of Achaia to draw upon.

"Iōannēs" (151^{23})

Iōannēs Angelos Doukas was the second son of Michaēl II and Theodōra (Greg. 47^{18}). His date of birth is unknown, though in the face of Pachymerēs' evidence of his marriage (Pach. 153^{16-19}), Grēgoras' claim (110^{4-6}) that he was still a child in 1267 is to be rejected. He died in 1280, the result of the same conspiracy which saw the execution of Michaēl VIII's old friend Kotys, for which see the commentary to 43^{8}.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 205, and see also Polemis (1968:95).

"to serve as a hostage" (151^{23}-153^{1})

Although Pachymerēs uses the word *homēron*, translated here as 'hostage', the position of Iōannēs Doukas Angelos at Michaēl VIII's court seems in actuality to be closer to that of a ward. Certainly the duration of his stay at court, "for the full length of his life," and the favours and freedoms granted to him by the basileus, do not fit with the standard treatment meted out to hostages, who were usually to be held for a limited time only, and who were kept under some form of arrest, however comfortable their captivity may have seemed.

The responsibilities accepted by the basileus for the son of his enemy bear a close resemblance to those of a *synteknos*, or godfather (Macrides 1988b:147-148), who undertook to oversee the spiritual and physical well being of his godchild. It seems that Michaēl II was attempting to prove his loyalty to Michaēl VIII by entering into a spiritual relationship with him (Macrides 1988b:150-151), just as it was common to choose as godparent for one's child someone whom you wished to have as a friend and ally.

"honoured him according to his merit" (153^{6})

This is a reference to Iōannēs' advance in rank from sebastokratōr to despotēs. See commentary to 153^{9}.

2.13 How the ruler awarded honours to the great

"He raised Iōannēs" (153^{9})

Pachymerēs continues his narrative directly from where he ended 2.12. Both Grēgoras (79^{17-22}) and Akropolitēs (173^{4-18}) confirm Pachymerēs' account, with the latter author adding the important information that the promotions were made while the basileus was encamped at Lampsakos (Akrop. 173^{2-3}). This was at the beginning of January 1260 (Skout. 546^{24-25}; Failler 1980b:47).

Iōannēs Palaiologos had been promoted early in 1259 to the rank of sebastokratōr (Pach. 137^{20-21}, 151^{16-17}), and on his return from the successful campaign in Epiros, his brother Michaēl raised him to the rank of despotēs. He did this, according, to Akropolitēs (173^{5-7}), not only because of the victories he had won, but also to give Iōannēs the same rank as the man he had been fighting, Michaēl II of Epiros.

"Kōnstantinos" (153^{10-12})

Kōnstantinos Palaiologos had been raised to the rank of kaisar early in 1259 (Pach. 137^{24-25}) and was now awarded the title of sebastokratōr left vacant by his brother's promotion to despotēs. It is interesting that Iōannēs was promoted only after distinguishing himself in the field, but that Kōnstantinos' promotions were automatic. We can speculate that Michaēl felt obliged to honour his younger brother merely as a matter of form and out of fraternal loyalty, and attention should be drawn to the fact that Kōnstantinos Tornikios, who was on Iōannēs' staff during the campaign (Akrop. 173^{1-2}), received the same title as Kōnstantinos Palaiologos. It is quite possible that Michaēl VIII had his doubts about Kōnstantinos' abilities, since he did not give him an independent command until he was given the charge of making war on Prince Guillaume of Achaia in late 1262 (Pach. 273^{1-2}), and then only with experienced advisors.[78] The doubts of the basileus, if they existed, were well founded, since Kōnstantinos' campaign in the Morea was a disaster, with the sebastokratōr returning to Kōnstantinoupolis in the middle of the operation (Geanakoplos 1959:158-159, 171-173). He never held a command again.

"Kōnstantinos Tornikios" (153^{12-16})

Tornikios' promotion was very large – up from eleventh ranked megas primmikērios, which he had been before stripped of the title by Theodōros II (Akrop. 154^{26}-155^{2}) to second ranked sebastokratōr – and were it not for the corroboration provided by Akropolitēs (173^{8-9}) we might have had cause to doubt Pachymerēs on this point. Since there was normally only one domestic sebastokratōr at any given time, Tornikios' rank was junior to that of Kōnstantinos, who was appointed sebastokratōr first. To show that Tornikios was a *sebastokratōr mikros*, his shoes were not accoutred with the golden eagles normally found on a sebastokratōr's footwear (PK 148^{3-6}). Note that subtle changes in vestments could differentiate two ranks. For example, the sebastokratōr's tunic differed from that of a despotēs only in its lack of certain embroidery (PK 147^{12-14}). On the vestments of the sebastokratōr generally, see Pseudo-Kodinos (147^{9}-148^{21}).

[78] These were the megas domestikos Alexios Philēs and the parakoimōmenos Iōannēs Makrēnos, who may have been an old comrade of Michaēl VIII (Akrop. 90^{5-6}; Angold 1975:184 n.6).

"the second daughter of this man" (153^{16-17})

The given names of this woman are unknown. All that is known about her is that, although her marriage was an unhappy one (Pach. 613^{10-12}), she bore a daughter, Helenē, to Iōannēs Angelos (Schmalzbauer 1969:120-121; Polemis 1968:95).

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 29138.

Failler (1984:152 n.6) indicates that Pachymerēs' mentioning of this marriage at this time (the beginning of 1260), is an anticipation. He is correct, but is not necessarily so when dating the marriage to some time after the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261. Iōannēs Angelos was given to Michaēl VIII as a hostage in the autumn of 1260 (commentary to 151^{23}-153^{1}), and the marriage could have been arranged any time after that. Pachymerēs' inclusion of it here is probably an aside, mentioned here due to its connection with Kōnstantinos Tornikios, who has just featured in the narrative.

"Alexios Stratēgopoulos" (153^{19})

Stratēgopoulos was still in Epiros at this time, and the insignia of his new title were sent out to him by messenger (Akrop. 173^{15-18}). He received them before his capture at the battle of Trikoryphos (Pach. 125^{25} and commentary).

"old man Laskaris" (153^{20})

Pachymerēs distinguishes the brothers of Theodōros I Laskaris, Michaēl and Manouēl, by calling the former 'Laskaris' and the latter 'Tzamantouros'.[79] The position of megas doux had been vacant for over a year, since Michaēl Palaiologos had held it briefly during his rise to the throne in late 1258 (Pach. 111^{25}). The official duty of the megas doux, to command the imperial fleet, was meaningless at this time, as there was no fleet to speak of. Michaēl Laskaris' actual role was to assist the basileus with his counsel and help in the administration of the empire (Pach. 273^{14-16}). When the empire did build a fleet in the 1260's, command of it was vested in Alexios Philanthrōpēnos, who remained prōtostratōr until the death of Laskaris (c.1272) made the position of megas doux available (Pach. 273^{18-21}, 401^{17-20}, 435^{17-18}).

"Iōannēs Rhaoul" (153^{21})

This Rhaoul was last seen in autumn 1259, crossing the Pindos Mountains and besieging Arta with Alexios Stratēgopoulos (Akrop. 171^{14}). He must have returned to the east with

[79] He differs here from earlier passages, where both brothers are called 'Laskaris' (Pach. 65^{16}) or 'Tzamantouros' (Pach. 91^{21}).

Iōannēs Palaiologos, since he is not listed as present at the battle of Trikoryphos (Pach. 125^{25}), and Pachymerēs says he received his new title after the end of the Pelagonia campaign (Pach. 117^{17}). His promotion to a higher rank is consistent with the promotions given to all of the other Nikaian commanders of that campaign at the beginning of 1260.

"Alexios Philēs" (155^{1})

A trusted follower of Michaēl VIII Palaiologos, Philēs was sent to the Morea in 1262 and served under the basileus' brother Kōnstantinos. He held joint command of the Byzantine army that was decisively defeated by a Latin-Turkish army under Ansel de Toucy at Makryplagi. Philēs was captured and died in prison sometime before 1264.

Alexios Philēs appears to have had very good relations with his in-laws, as his co-commander at Makryplagi, Makrēnos, was later accused of treason by his mother-in-law, Eulogia Palaiologina, and subsequently blinded (Pach 277^{4-16}).

"recently widowed" (155^{2-3})

See commentary to 87^{20}-89^{26}.

"Eulogia" (155^{3})

Michaēl VIII's second sister was Eirēnē. She was born c.1220, and was thus about five or six years older than Michaēl. Around 1240 she married the pinkernes Iōannēs Komnēnos Kantakouzēnos Angelos. The couple had four daughters before they took mutual vows of monasticism, probably in the late 1250's, shortly before Iōannēs' death and after their daughters had matured. Eirēnē changed her name to Eulogia. Unlike her sister Maria/Martha (see commentary to 55^{19}), Eulogia appears to have maintained a great interest in worldly matters. She wielded a great amount of influence over her brother, Michaēl, and was, according to Pachymerēs, a driving force behind his overthrow of Iōannēs IV Laskaris (Pach. 179^{24}, 225^{13}). In later years she became an opponent of Michaēl's policy of church union with the West, and Michaēl sent her into confinement at the Hagios Grēgorios abbey on the Gulf of Nikomēdeia. She died in the early 1280's.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 21360, and see Papadopulos (1938:18-19). For a discussion on couples who took monastic vows together, see Talbot (1985:107-108).

"Kantakouzēnos" (155^{3})

Iōannēs Komnēnos Kantakouzēnos Angelos, to give his full name, reached only a modest rank in the hierarchy for a man of his family background, the fifteenth-ranked office of pinkernes. He was governor of the theme of Thrakesion in Asia Minor from 1244-1249,

and led an expedition against Genoese raiders in 1249. He became a monk with the name of Iōannikios before his death, which occurred sometime before 1257 (MM 6.70).

See Nicol (1968:14-16).

"made the latter megas domestikos" (155^{5-6})

Although the megas domestikos was the highest ranked military officer of the Byzantine Empire, there is no surviving evidence to suggest that Alexios Philēs had any military experience before being awarded this position. But it is certainly possible that he took part in the Pelagonia campaign of 1259, since the basic pattern for Michaēl VIII's awards at this time was to promote all those who led the army in that expedition. In addition, it would be unlikely that Michaēl would have sent two untried commanders to the Morea in 1262, and it has already been shown that Kōnstantinos Palaiologos, who led in that campaign, was raw and inexperienced.

"Maria" (155^{5})

Maria was the second daughter of Michaēl VIII's favourite sister, Eirēnē, and her husband, the pinkernes Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos. She may have been born about 1242.

The date of her marriage is uncertain, although it is usually placed between the battle of Pelagonia in 1259 and the recapture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261, since it is connected with Alexios Philēs' rise to megas domestikos, which did not occur until Alexios Stratēgopoulos vacated that office in January 1260.

After Philēs' death in the Morea in 1264, Maria married twice more, firstly to Kōnstantinos Teichos of Bulgaria (c.1270) and later to the Bulgarian usurper Ivaljo (c.1278). The date of her death is unknown.

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 16910, and see also her entries in Nicol (1968:19-20) and Papadopulos (1938:20).

"And the daughter of his other sister" (155^{6-10})

For this family drama, see Pachymerēs 55^{17}-57^{24} and commentary. It is likely, considering the grief and anger of the Palaiologoi over Theodōros II's handling of the matter, that overturning Theodōra's marriage to Kaballarios and giving her, as initially intended, to Balanidiōtēs, was one of Michaēl VIII's earlier acts as basileus. Therefore it does not chronologically belong in the narrative at this point, but its inclusion is a matter of thematic unity with the rest of chapter 2.13, detailing as it does the marriage alliances of great families and the granting of high office by the basileus.

"megas stratopedarchēs" (155[9])

Pseudo-Kodinos has this to say about the megas stratopedarchēs: "the megas stratopedarchēs is overseer of the necessities of the army, namely food, drink and everything necessary" (PK 174[10-13]). In other words, the megas stratopedarchēs served as chief quartermaster of the Byzantine armies.

The first attested megas stratopedarchēs was Geōrgios Mouzalōn, who was given the title by Theodōros II in 1256 (Akrop. 124[6-7]; Macrides 1978:366). According to Bartusis (1992:247), the nomination of Mouzalōn to the office indicates that the position's role, as given by Pseudo-Kodinos, is false. This is because Mouzalōn was of a distinctly non-martial character and never had military experience. However, we know from Pachymerēs (79[20-22]) that Mouzalōn maintained some sort of administrative role regarding the pay of mercenaries, and it is quite possible that he had been in charge of the peacetime maintenance of those soldiers permanently on duty, stationed in garrisons throughout the empire, even if he was not responsible for the victualling of armies on campaign.

On the office of megas stratopedarchēs, see Guilland (1967:1.498-513).

"Michaēl, Andronikos and Iōannēs" (155[11-12])

The basileus' nephew, Michaēl Tarchaneiōtēs[80] was the second of the Tarchaneiōtēs brothers, born perhaps in 1240. In 1263 he married Maria Philanthrōpēnē, the daughter of the prōtostratōr Alexios (Pach. 273[16-18]). They had six children. Michaēl was successively megas primmikērios in 1266 (Pach. 385[6-7]), megas domestikos in 1272 (Pach. 419[2]) and prōtobestiarios in 1280 (Pach. 593[8-9]).

His entry in the *PLP* is number 27505.

Andronikos Tarchaneiōtēs was, despite the order given by Pachymerēs, the oldest son of Maria and Iōannēs, born perhaps in 1238. He was made megas konostaulos in 1266 (Pach. 385[8]) and married the daughter of Iōannēs Angelos of Thessaly in 1267 (Greg. 130[17-18]). He died in 1283.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 27475, and also see Papadopulos (1938:14).

Iōannēs Tarchaneiōtēs was the youngest of the three brothers. He grew up having very strong pro-Arsenite loyalties, for which he suffered various periods of exile and imprisonment under both Michaēl VIII and Andronikos II. He did, however, lead the army in Anatolian campaigns in 1298-99, though he held no official rank. He is identified by Nicol (1968:139-140) with a certain Komnēnos Tarchaneiōtēs Doukas Kantakouzēnos, who died in 1321 and who was an uncle of the later basileus Iōannēs VI Kantakouzēnos.

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[80] He is often confused with Michaēl Tarchaneiōtēs Glabas, who was also prominent during the reign of Michaēl VIII (Polemis 1968:121; Papadopulos 1938:15).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 27487, and also see Papadopulos (1938:17).

All of these brothers served with Iōannēs Palaiologos in Epiros in 1262 (Pach. 273[6-7]). As we can see, Pachymerēs' implication, that they were still children, being 'raised' in the palace in 1260, is deceptive. He is presumably indicating no more than the fact that they were yet to obtain official titles and take part in a military campaign.

"Andronikos Palaiologos" (155[13])

This man, according to Pachymerēs, was one of many archons from northwest Greece who sided with the Nikaians during the campaign of 1259. He no doubt received special notice from the despotēs Iōannēs and the basileus Michaēl because of his cognomen. That Pachymerēs mentions his promotion and marriage is yet another indication that some mass 'honours list' was issued by the basileus after the return of the victorious army from the west.

Andronikos kept the rank of prōtostratōr for the rest of his life. He was also on very good terms with his Rhaoul in-laws, since Pachymerēs twice connects his name with theirs in lists of notable anti-Unionists imprisoned by Michaēl VIII in the late 1270's (Pach. 581[14-16], 611[20-24]). As the last of these passages reveals, he died in prison shortly before 12 July 1280.

Failler (1984:154 n.6) argues that, if Michaēl VIII did refer to Andronikos as his 'cousin' (*exadelphos*), he did so in a non-literal, symbolic, way and that they were related in only a distant fashion, if at all. However, Pachymerēs later also claims that Andronikos was a cousin (*autanepsios*) of Michaēl VIII's nephew Iōannēs Palaiologos Kantakouzēnos (Pach. 581[16]; Nicol 1968:26-27), so there may be grounds for believing that the relationship between Andronikos and the basileus was as close as Pachymerēs claims.[81]

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 21432.

"prōtostratōr" (155[16])

Originating in the eighth century as the captain of the imperial grooms and stablemen (the *stratores*), this title and office later lost its specific role and became subsumed into the overall official hierarchy. By Pachymerēs' day, the prōtostratōr held the eighth position in the hierarchy, and the holders of the office had no defined role other than several ceremonial obligations (PK 168[1-27]), although late Byzantine prōtostratōres were often generals (most notably the prōtostratōr Alexios Philanthrōpēnos (*fl.* 1290's)). The ubiquity

[81] There is also a suggestion that Pachymerēs was indirectly quoting another source, possibly a letter written by Michaēl VIII himself, in which the relationship is referred to. Certainly Pachymerēs' use of the word *exadelphos* is unique in the *Historia*. The word he uses elsewhere is *anepsios* (Failler 1982b:189-190).

of military prōtostratōres perhaps led Pseudo-Kodinos to err in his account of the official's original role (PK 173[16-26]; Bartusis 1992:250).

See Guilland (1967:1.478-97).

"Alexios Philanthrōpēnos" (155[17-18])

Philanthrōpēnos, despite proving his worth as a naval commander, had to wait thirteen years before his next promotion, when the death of Michaēl Laskaris left the position of megas doux vacant (Pach. 435[17-18]).

"He named his wife's uncle" (155[18])

Pachymerēs, after recording the promotions and marriages of those military commanders recently returned from Epiros, now turns his attention to more civil appointments. There is no reason to suggest that the promotions that follow were made at the same time as those already mentioned. Rather, since they are all of a more administrative or honorific nature, it may be that Michaēl VIII made them earlier in 1259 – while removing those ministers beholden to Theodōros II and replacing them with his own men.

"Angelos" (155[18])

Angelos had vacated this office, either through death, promotion or removal, by 1266, when Michaēl Tarchaneiōtēs received the title (Pach. 385[6-7]).

"Michaēl Nostongos" (155[19])

Michaēl was presumably the brother of Geōrgios Nostongos, referred to earlier as a cousin of Michaēl Palaiologos (Pach. 95[1-8]), and also of Alexios Nostongos, who is said to be the cousin of the basileus in a surviving official document (Polemis 1968:151). Michaēl died sometime after 1281.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 20726.

"prōtosebastos" (155[19])

Although this position occupied the fourteenth rank in the Byzantine court hierarchy (PK 137[9]), and the vestments for it were very grand (PK 155[20-26]), the title was totally honorary, with Pseudo-Kodinos laconically commentating that "the prōtosebastos performs no service" (PK 175[15-16]).

"Michaēl Palaiologos" (155^{20})

Pachymerēs claims that he has said that Michaēl Nostongos and Michaēl Palaiologos were cousins of the basileus, when he has in fact said no such thing. It is implied that Michaēl Nostongos is a brother of Geōrgios Nostongos, whose relationship to the basileus was stated directly (Pach. 95^{7-8}), and we must assume that a similar, implied relationship is to be found for Michaēl Palaiologos. The best guess, as Failler (1984:155 n.10) says, is that this Michaēl Palaiologos was the son of the megas chartoularios Michaēl Palaiologos who was an uncle of the basileus (Pach. 43^{15-16}). If so, this Michaēl Palaiologos was the cousin of Michaēl Palaiologos the basileus, but we cannot be certain.

Unfortunately, the fact that Michaēl Palaiologos was promoted to the position of mystikos in 1259 is all we know about him.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 21524.

"mystikos" (155^{20})

The mystikos occupied the thirty-first rank in the Byzantine court hierarchy (PK 138^{11}). As the name of the title suggests, the mystikos was in charge of the basileus' personal correspondence – an early form of private secretary – and he was also charged with the supervision of the monasteries beholden to the imperial crown. See Guilland (1968:279-96) and Magdalino (1984:229-240, especially 235).

"Hagiotheodōritēs" (155^{22})

It may be suggested that Hagiotheodōritēs' promotion at this time may have been a reward for changing his allegiance to Michaēl VIII Palaiologos in the aftermath of the murder of Geōrgios Mouzalōn, Hagiotheodōritēs' brother-in-law. Pachymerēs goes out of his way to state his loyalty to Mouzalōn (Pach. 77^{28-32}), and also the difficulty Michaēl VIII had in gaining access to the imperial treasury at Magnesia that was in the care of Hagiotheodōritēs (Pach. 101^{20-25}). Hagiotheodōritēs would have been in a good position to demand a reward in return for opening the treasury to Palaiologos.

The promotion of Hagiotheodōritēs to logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn presumably took place soon after Michaēl VIII's accession to the throne, if not before, and not in January 1260 like many of the promotions discussed here by Pachymerēs. An earlier promotion is the likelihood, since Dēmētrios Iatropoulos is said to be logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn in March/April 1260 (Pach. 175^{17-18}).

"logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn" (155^{22}-157^{1})

This office was initially in charge of the basileus' private wealth: his estates, herds and personal money. By the later Byzantine period, however, the distinction between the personal wealth of the individual basileus and the wealth of the imperial crown was becoming blurred, and this office, like so many others, was essentially honorific.

See Guilland (1971:85-100).

"Michaēl Kakos" (157^{1-2})

Pachymerēs has already signalled the promotion of Kakos to prōtasēkrētis (Pach. 131^{14-16}), which occurred earlier in 1259. It is, however, the first reference to his marriage with the Philanthrōpēnoi.

"a young noblewoman" (157^{2})

Nothing else is known about this woman at all. She is not even listed in the *PLP* among the other Philanthrōpēnoi.

2.14 How the basileus made efforts to take the City, and how he captured Selybria

"Selybria" (157^{8})

Selybria was a small, fortified city located on the shores of the Marmara Sea at the southern end of the Thracian long wall. Sixty kilometres from Kōnstantinoupolis, Selybria was an important centre on the road from the capital to the west. From the twelfth century it was the seat of a metropolitan archbishop, and the city was the last Byzantine possession in Thrace to fall to the Ottoman Turks, only capitulating after the loss of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1453.

It may be that the Nikaian conquest of the town in 1259 was facilitated by the decrepitude of the old fortifications, since Iōannēs VI was forced to rebuild the walls almost in their entirety during the fourteenth century civil wars.

"he sent a force to seize it" (157^{9})

Contra Geanakoplos (1959:76), who claims that Selybria was captured by the basileus himself during his march to Kōnstantinoupolis at the beginning of 1260, Pachymerēs clearly indicates that town was already in Nikaian hands when the basileus' army reached

it, though its capture was recent (Pach. 159[1]) and undertaken in preparation for an offensive against the last vestiges of the Latin Empire.

Exactly when Selybria fell to the Nikaians is uncertain, though a logical date would be the autumn of 1259, after news of the apparent victory in the west had reached Michaēl VIII and he had issued orders for his armies there to return to the east. Since this operation must have entailed a breach of the cease-fire agreed with the Latins in January 1259,[82] Michaēl VIII would have wished to be sure of his western frontiers before preparing for his great attack upon Kōnstantinoupolis.

"occupied all the territory outside the city" (157[10-11])

This is an exaggeration. While Nikaian forces may have advanced to the city itself at this time, Pachymerēs' description of the *thelēmatarioi* indicates clearly that there remained a no-man's-land between the Nikaians and the Latins, firmly held by neither side, in which the *thelēmatarioi* lived. Though the *thelēmatarioi* were on good terms with the Nikaians, firm imperial control seems to have extended only as far as Chryseia (Pach. 157[12]).

"Aphameia" (157[11])

This was a fortified locale situated on a hilltop to the northwest of Hebdomon. Chōniatēs records that Kōnstantinoupolis could be seen from its summit (Chon. 504[61-64]). Janin (1950:443) identifies it with the modern suburb of Bosna Virani, some fourteen kilometres from the Theodosian walls and eight from Hebdomon. Residual Latin outposts such as Aphameia would have contributed to the maintenance of the no-man's-land outside the walls, since Nikaia could not claim total control over the region while garrisons existed to dispute their dominance. Failler (1984:157 n. 6) interprets the text to mean that this place was used as a refuge by the *thelēmatarioi*. However, as Pachymerēs makes it clear that the place was held by the "Italians" and that the Nikaians were careful to not harm the *thelēmatarioi*, it is doubtful that Aphameia was used, or needed to be used, by the local farmers as a refuge.

"Chryseia" (157[12])

Because this locality is otherwise unknown, it is tempting to identify it with the Golden Gate (*Chrysea pylē*) of Kōnstantinoupolis, as Karyannopoulos (1996a:167) does. However, the two are obviously different words, and if there is any connection between the two at all,

[82] Obviously, since Skoutariōtēs states that Michaēl left for Nikaian-held Selybria in January 1260, after the town had already been taken (Skout. 546[24-25]).

it may be because Chryseia was a point on the road leading to the Golden Gate.[83] Bartusis' contention (1984:275), that Chryseia was actually Chrysopolis, on the Asian side of the Bosporos, must be rejected immediately.

"*thelēmatarioi*" (157^{12-28})

There is a problem with Pachymerēs' account of the origins and activities of the *thelēmatarioi*. On the one hand our historian seems to be implying that they had existed in their free-willed way of life for the duration of the Latin Empire, swaying to and fro between the Greeks of Nikaia (Pachymerēs' "Romans") and the Latins. This implication has led numerous scholars to make broad statements. Bartusis (1990:13-14) for example, writes:

> Thus, during the period of the Latin Empire, the Thelematarioi were free native farmers that lived around Kōnstantinoupolis and maintained their independence by serving as middlemen in the economic activities between the Nikaian and Latin territories.

On the other hand Pachymerēs immediately goes on to say that the *thelēmatarioi* only came into direct contact with the Nikaian dominion after the capture of Selybria, which occurred sometime in 1259. Thus they could only have lived their pendulum-like existence for two years or less, from the capture of Selybria in 1259 to the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261. This seems to be a very short time for this group to have acquired a name which Michaēl VIII subsequently made official, when he formed an hereditary military unit out of the *thelēmatarioi*, out of thanks for their aid in the capture of the city (Pach. (Bonn) II 549^{10-18}; Bartusis 1992:43-44). Two years may be sufficient time for a nickname to develop for a group of people, but such a recently formed moniker would not receive official acceptance in tradition-bound Byzantium. The name, and thus the people known by it, must have had a longer existence.

If we accept that the *thelēmatarioi* had been an identifiable group for the duration of the Latin Empire, but that their name had nothing to do with being economic middlemen, as claimed for them by Bartusis, we are left with the question of their origins. It has been suggested that they were Byzantine soldiers disarmed by the crusaders in 1204 and settled by them around the city (Kalomenopoulos 1931:12.487), an action which is highly unlikely, as the crusaders, few in number, would not risk having an army of trained and possibly hostile soldiers living permanently right on their doorstep. Geanakoplos (1959:95-96) suggests that they were Greek farmers dispossessed by the crusaders, who subsequently

[83] Mango (2000:174-175) discusses the roads leading away from Kōnstantinoupolis in terms of their use in ceremonial processions and triumphs.

regained their property. But this answer does not address the question of their unusual name.

In this case it is best to accept a simpler solution, which is to say that the first *thelēmatarioi* were the Greek farmers who willingly chose to remain on their lands after the crusader conquest of Kōnstantinoupolis, rather than join the exodus of refugees so famously described by Chōniatēs (Chon. 589-593).[84] It is perhaps significant that Akropolitēs, in his account of the aftermath of the conquest, uses the words *tous thelontas* to describe those choosing to stay under the Latin regime.

These first *thelēmatarioi*, being at the heart of the then extensive Latin Empire, would not have been in a position to behave in the fickle manner described by Pachymerēs, nor would the Latin Emperors have tolerated such behaviour at that time, when they had the power to enforce obedience. It is logical to think that the switching between Nikaian and Latin began to occur only in the few years before 1261, when Nikaian influence was growing in the area and a succession of Nikaian armies operated right to the base of the city walls, and when the Latins, as Pachymerēs says, were too enfeebled and too dependent upon the goodwill of the *thelēmatarioi* to drive them away. This was a period, we must remember, when the Greek population of Kōnstantinoupolis were so dismissive of the failing Latin regime that even official ambassadors of Baudouin II were happy to deal openly with Michaēl VIII regarding the benefits he would give them after he took the city (Pach. 149^{24}-151^{3}).

"they farmed the lands outside the city" (157^{18})

Koder (1995:51-54) suggests that this area of farmland extended some ten kilometres beyond the walls, that being the maximum convenient distance that fresh produce could be brought to the city's markets. He cites the *Chronicon Paschale*, which mentions farmers travelling up to ten miles, that is fifteen kilometres, from the city "to harvest a little produce."

As for what the *thelēmatarioi* grew, Koder gives a list that includes salad greens, dill, carrots, cabbages, kohlrabi, cress, leeks, radishes, beetroot, turnips, onions and others (Koder 1995:50). Grains, being far less perishable than vegetables, were imported from other regions.

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[84] Karyannopoulos (1996a:167 n.3) argues that the *thelēmatarioi* lived inside the city, and were only occasionally allowed beyond the walls by the Latin regime. While this may have been the case for some, the vast bulk of the *thelēmatarioi*, being farmers, would have lived on their farms, rather than within the nearby walls.

"the Italians would be injured" (157^{21-22})

The dependence of the Constantinopolitan Latins on the food produced by the local Greeks was understood very early on in the Latin occupation. A Greek priest wrote to Innocent III during the reign of Emperor Henri, saying that "without us, the granaries will not be filled, or the wine presses; no bread, no meat, no fish will be eaten, nor can human life and society continue to be maintained" (cited by Wolff, "Latin Empire" in Setton 1969:211).

2.15 How the Patriarch Arsenios resigned the Patriarchate

"For the Patriarch Arsenios" (159^{6-12})

Contemporary writers give various reasons for Arsenios' retirement, though all of the suggestions centre on a conflict with Michaēl VIII. Akropolitēs (178^{5-10}) states that Arsenios, who had been a supporter of Michaēl before the latter's rise to the throne, suddenly turned on the new basileus for no reason other than personal malice. This version is a very superficial one, and hides much. Skoutariōtēs accepts the version that Pachymerēs dismisses as a fabrication, that Arsenios resigned out of frustration at the basileus' refusal to listen to his advice and requests on behalf of the Church (Skout. 549^{23}-550^{16}). Arsenios himself, in his *Testamentum*, refers to Michaēl acting more "violently" (*bias*) after his coronation, and draws the link between his resignation and the fact that he crowned Palaiologos before the rightful basileus, Iōannēs IV (*Testamentum* 952^{C}-953^{A}), an unholy action in which many other bishops were complicit. It is perhaps not surprising that Pachymerēs confesses to an inability to sort out the patriarch's real reasons for leaving office. It is likely that the real reason was a heady mixture of personal issues between patriarch and basileus, professional differences and guilt on Arsenios' part over his role in Michaēl VIII's accession.

"spoken to the clergy" (159^{12-13})

Presumably Arsenios announced his intention of going into retreat to the patriarchal staff, and gave his reasons for doing so; i.e. that Michaēl VIII was proving unfavourable to himself and the Church generally. Arsenios' departure from Nikaia occurred while the basileus was at Lampsakos, preparing his army for marching on Kōnstantinoupolis, in early winter 1259.

"monastery of Agalmatēs" (159^{15})

This monastery did not stand as close to the walls of Nikaia as Pachymerēs implies. It stood some way off, on the road leading north from the city to the town of Prainetos (Failler 1984:158 n.2; Janin 1969:111, citing Ramsay 1890:178).

"monastery of Paschasios" (159^{17})

From the lack of references to this monastery in other sources, it was presumably only a modest foundation, located on or near the Gulf of Nikomēdeia on the banks of the Drakōn River (modern Yalak Dere). It lay, therefore, very close to the town of Helenopolis (see commentary to 169^{6}). Arsenios did not stay here long, despite its peaceful location, since he was soon found at the monastery of Hagios Diomēdēs (Pach. 161^{17}).

"he communed only with himself and with God" (159^{20-21})

Throughout this chapter Pachymerēs paints a powerful portrait of a man who is consumed by guilt and endeavouring to atone spiritually for perceived misdeeds. If Pachymerēs is at all accurate regarding Arsenios' state of mind at this time, his account supports the theory that Arsenios' retirement was brought about by reasons greater than those he claimed (see commentary to 159^{6-12}).

"The clergy and bishops who lived in Nikaia" (159^{21})

This passage indicates the haste with which Arsenios made his decision and left his position, as the clergy of his own church had not had time to remonstrate with him before his departure, and had to resort to letters. Given that the letters from the Nikaian clergy specifically mentioned Arsenios' troubles with the basileus, and urged him to come back to Nikaia and basically "give it another go", we can confirm that the patriarch had given them the excuse Pachymerēs records for him at 159^{11-12}, that the problems between Arsenios and Michaēl were fairly minor and could be solved by better communication and more effort.

"Time passed" (161^{6})

The chronology of this affair is very vague. We have only small clues from the contemporary sources. These are ably summarised by Failler (1980b:45-47), and mainly concern the preparations of the basileus for the attack on Kōnstantinoupolis and the actual campaign. The one firm date we have is 1 January 1260. This was the day on which Nikēphoros II issued a decree concerning the metropolitan of Trebizond (Laurent, *Regestes*, no.1351). From this we can see that Nikēphoros II had been elected by this date, and thus Arsenios had been dethroned before 1 January 1260.

In this chapter Pachymerēs gives us by far the most detailed account of the process of Arsenios' deposition. He mentions a great number of missions, missives and messages that travelled to and fro from Nikaia to the monasteries on the Gulf of Nikomēdeia in which Arsenios was residing, and between the camp of the basileus near the Hellespont and the Gulf of Nikomēdeia. A short list is given here:

- Journey of Arsenios from Nikaia to the Gulf of Nikomēdeia (159^{13-17})
- Letters sent by the clergy of Nikaia to Arsenios, in the hope of finding a solution before Michaēl VIII became involved (159^{21})
- News of Arsenios' departure from Nikaia reached Michaēl VIII at the Hellespont (161^{6})
- Bishops are summoned to a synod at the Hellespont (161^{15})
- Iōannēs of Nikomēdeia sent from the Hellespont to the Gulf of Nikomēdeia (163^{2-3})
- Iōannēs returns to the synod after discussions with Arsenios (163^{18-19})
- Messengers are sent by the synod to recover the patriarchal insignia from Arsenios (163^{21-22})
- They return to the Hellespont with the insignia (163^{23-24})

Given that the distance between Lampsakos and Nikaia is approximately 250 kilometres, and that it would have taken several days to travel between the two towns, the time spent on the road by envoys and messengers would total nearly a month. Already we are looking at a date in late November for Arsenios' departure from Nikaia.

We must also add to the transit time, however, the days spent by the synod discussing Arsenios' fate, both before and after the mission of Iōannēs of Nikomēdeia and again after the delivery of the patriarchal insignia; the initial meetings of basileus Michaēl with his attendant bishops; the negotiations between Iōannēs of Nikomēdeia and Arsenios at Hagios Diomēdēs and, lastly, the urgent consultations between the bishops and clergy of Nikaia immediately after Arsenios' departure. Unfortunately, a total time for these meetings and negotiations cannot be given, since we do not know how long any of them took. A conservative estimate of a total time of two weeks would still push back the date of Arsenios' departure from Nikaia to mid-November, and it may have been earlier. Failler (1980b:53) is less specific, allowing only that Arsenios left Nikaia in the autumn of 1259. A later date is probably preferable, or else the news would have reached the basileus before he had begun his preparations for the attack on Kōnstantinoupolis, and before he had left for the Hellespont.

By this reckoning news of Arsenios' flight from his responsibilities as patriarch would have reached Michaēl VIII towards the end of November, 1259.

"At this point the bishops" (161[15])

Pachymerēs makes clear (161[18]) that these bishops were those that made up the patriarchal synod, the *endemousa synodos*. That is, all the metropolitans and archbishops residing in the patriarchal seat of Nikaia, as well as those found in the retinues of basileus and patriarch. This synod, once an *ad hoc* and occasional advisory panel had, by the twelfth century, become a permanent fixture in the church organisation and had become responsible for much of the day-to-day administration of ecclesiastical affairs. It is to be differentiated from a more general synod of all available bishops, which were assembled far less frequently and to debate specific issues.

See Hussey (1986:318-325) and, for the creation of the synod as a permanent fixture, Hajjar (1962:179-184).

In the current case, the synod summoned by Michaēl VIII would have been largely made up of the clergy from Nikaia (Pach. 159[21]) and the bishops of his own entourage (Pach. 161[7]).

"monastery of Hagios Diomēdēs" (161[17])

The connection drawn between this monastery and the selection of Iōannēs of Nikomēdeia as leader of the mission to Arsenios is more explicit in the original Greek text than it is in the English translation. The Greek clearly shows that the monastery of Hagios Diomēdēs lay somewhere within the domain of the metropolitan of Nikomēdeia.[85] That the location cannot be pinpointed more precisely is the conclusion of Failler (1984:161 n2) and Janin (1975:89). Although the mission to Hagios Diomēdēs apparently went via the town of Nikaia, this provides us with no further clues to the monastery's location, since Nikaia was an obvious waypoint for travellers heading from the west to destinations further east and north.

"Iōannēs of Nikomēdeia" (161[16-17])

Iōannēs was a senior member of the synod, having been metropolitan of Nikomēdeia since 1232 (MM 3.65), and had been selected as chef de mission for the embassy to Arsenios because the monastery of Hagios Diomēdēs, where Arsenios was residing, lay in his diocese (Failler 1979:150). Long lived, Iōannēs was still metropolitan in 1278 (MM 4.379).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 8620, and see also Trapp (1969:189-190), although Trapp seems unaware of the early date of Iōannēs' rise to the metropolis.

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[85] Pach. 161[16-18]: *Kai telos pempousi tous peri ton Nikomēdeias Iōannēn – etuche gar tote kai patriarchēs tēi monēi tou Hagiou Diomēdous prosmenōn – aggelouvtas men pros auton kai ta apo tēs sunodou . . .*

"Unworthy of priesthood" (163^{12-13})

The metropolitan envoys of the synod, having had no success in drawing from Arsenios the reasons for his withdrawal, were left with no choice by the patriarch than to officially record that Arsenios' dereliction of duty was due to nothing more than the personal failings of the patriarch himself. By abandoning his position he showed that he had no right to hold it. As Failler (1984:162 n.2) says, this was not a resignation by the patriarch so much as an involuntary renunciation of the position. Arsenios' outburst at this finding is understandable in that he did have his reasons for his actions, but by being unwilling to share them he gave Nikētas of Hērakleia no other option than to include this generic phrase in his letter of resignation.

"staff and candelabrum" (163^{22-23})

The staff (*baktērion*) and candelabrum (*lampadoukon*) were the two greatest physical insignia of the patriarchal office. The former was important in the investiture of a new patriarch (Laurent 1947:232; PK 279^{24-26}), and both featured in various aspects of the liturgical ceremony.

It is interesting to note that Arsenios appears, in Pachymerēs' text, to have taken these items with him into his monastic exile. This may indicate that his original intention had not been to retire permanently, although it is difficult to believe that Arsenios was caught by surprise by the uproar his actions caused.

"the ordination of the former" (163^{27-28})

This verdict from Nikēphoros of Ephesos is also that of Nikēphoros Blemmidēs (1.49), who also adds that Arsenios' election was doubly illegal – not only had Arsenios been raised through the ranks of priesthood on successive days, though not on the single day claimed by Akropolitēs (107^{12-13}), but he had also been chosen by Theodōros II alone, with no input from the standing synod, without the selection of three suitable candidates and without having one of those three elected by the synod, as was the law (Hussey 1986:319-320).

Skoutariōtēs (512^{1-2}) states that Arsenios had in fact been elected canonically, but he was writing from a partisan viewpoint at least as strong as that of Akropolitēs and on this matter he too should be ignored in favour of the testimony of Pachymerēs and Blemmidēs.

2.16 How Nikēphoros of Ephesos became Patriarch

"When the metropolitans" (165[13])

According to Akropolitēs (179[20-21]) this synod was assembled, at the behest of the basileus, at Lampsakos on the Hellespont. Pachymerēs, however, later reports that Michaēl travelled to Lampsakos after the synod had enthroned Patriarch Nikēphoros II (Pach. 167[7-8]). There are other indications that the synod was actually convened across the Hellespont at Kallioupolis. Bar Hebraeus writes that the new patriarch was elected there (BH 428), and the first synodal act of the new reign was recorded at Kallioupolis (Laurent, *Regestes*, no. 1351). Failler (1980b:52), points out the redundancy of transporting the entire synod across the straits just to use the greater facilities of the episcopal church at Kallioupolis to publish an act, if they had already conducted more important business on the Asian shore. He concludes that the synod must have met at Kallioupolis in the first place, even if that means we have to accept that Pachymerēs is in total error on this point.

While it may seem odd that the patriarchal synod was transported across the Hellespont, there is a possible reason for it. During a normal patriarchal election and investiture the new patriarch was invested by the metropolitan of Thracian Hērakleia, because Kōnstantinoupolis, although the seat of the patriarch, was technically a suffragan see of Hērakleia (PK 281[17-23]; Hussey 1986:313). The bishopric of Lampsakos was a suffragan of Kyzikos, but Kallioupolis was beholden to Hērakleia. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the election was moved across the straits to enable one of the key players in the investiture, the metropolitan of Hērakleia, to perform his role in his own domains rather than in those of a rival metropolitan.

"the most eminent among them" (165[13-14])

Although the situation in which the clergy found itself in relation to the patriarchal throne was unusual, the election of the new patriarch followed the established rules and forms. The patriarchal synod consisted of all the metropolitan bishops present in the capital or wherever the synod was convened. The patriarch and the basileus both had the power to convene the synod, though the basileus only rarely did so – usually to discuss matters of imperial religious policy *vis-à-vis* the papacy or on equivalent occasions. In matters of patriarchal successions, the synod was charged with considering suitable candidates for the position, and forming a list of three individuals for presentation to the basileus. The basileus then chose one of these three to be the new patriarch (Hussey 1986:318-19). In theory the basileus' role was limited to this final choice, but in reality most rulers chose to

exert their influence to ensure that at least one nominee was a supporter of the current regime and its policies.

"the metropolitan of Ephesos" (165^{15})

Pachymerēs appears to have been an admirer of the new patriarch. His praise for Nikēphoros in this passage is echoed in a later passage (Pach. 179^{12-15}). This admiration is unlikely to have been based on personal impressions, since Pachymerēs was little more than a boy at the time of Nikēphoros' death. More likely it is a second-hand impression gained from Patriarch Theodosios of Antioch, a great friend of Pachymerēs who also served as oikonomos to Patriarch Nikēphoros (see commentary to 179^{2}), though it may certainly be true, as argued strongly by Failler (2001:131-132) that Pachymerēs had an ingrained hostility towards monks and a preference for those high ecclesiastics who rose from the secular clergy. The one probably influenced the other.

"something had happened" (165^{18-24})

Only Pachymerēs gives this tale about Nikēphoros having been passed over for patriarch in 1243 following the opposition of basileus Iōannēs III. We do know, from the autobiography of Nikēphoros Blemmidēs (1.39), that Nikēphoros had served as "first of the imperial deacons" before rising to the see of Ephesos (on these deacons see Darrouzès 1970:31-35), so we cannot rule out the comment recorded by Pachymerēs as having been made by Batatzēs. Skoutariōtēs states that Nikēphoros had also been nominated for patriarch in 1254, but that Arsenios had been selected (Skout. 510^{16-17}).

It is certainly true that Nikēphoros' actions on his deathbed – the refusal to give up the throne and the determination to die as patriarch (Pach. 179^{8-9}) – would suggest that the assessment given here by Pachymerēs regarding the impact of this previous rejection is substantially correct. It must also be pointed out that a new patriarch who felt a grudge against the Laskarid dynasty (witness also the dislike felt for him by Theodōros II; Festa 147^{19ff}) would be perfectly acceptable to Michaēl VIII, who was planning on usurping totally the imperial throne from Iōannēs IV Laskaris.

"archidiakonos" (165^{22})

Individuals holding this title are known from the very first centuries of the empire (Guilland 1967:1.300), and they frequently appeared at church councils.

In later centuries, the archidiakonos became one of the curators of the palace chapels (the other was the prōtopapias: PK 232-234), and his primary role was to conducting the

personal services for the imperial family, although he also served occasionally as the intermediary between basileus and patriarch (PK 238^{19-22}, 240-241).

As Pseudo-Kodinos says, the archidiakonos was largely indistinguishable from a normal diakonos. "[the archidiakonos] is a diakonos carrying a cross" is his helpful advice (PK 223^{19-21}).

"The basileus sent him with great pomp to Nikaia" (167^{7-8})

Nikaia was, of course, the headquarters of the patriarchal administration and the seat of the patriarch. It was also, as comes clear in the next chapter, the focal point for several bishops who were unhappy at the deposition of Arsenios and the election of Nikēphoros. It seems that Michaēl intended Nikēphoros to take formal charge of the administration and to come to terms with the rebellious bishops there before joining the imperial army at Kōnstantinoupolis (see commentary to 169^{4}).

2.17 How the metropolitans of Sardeis and Thessalonikē were not in agreement with the others in this matter

"Kalophoros of Smyrnē" (167^{15})

Pachymerēs provides all the information we know about this man. He was not long on the episcopal throne, since his predecessor Theodōros Kallistos was certainly still alive in 1256, and possibly so in 1259 (MM 4.212; Ahrweiler 1965:105). Kalophoros is a family name, and his given name remains unknown. Also unknown are the reasons he gave for his resignation as metropolitan.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 10735.

"outwardly supported" (167^{17})

Pachymerēs here draws a distinction between the public position taken by these metropolitans – that the resignation of Arsenios was forced and uncanonical and therefore that Nikēphoros II was not a legitimate patriarch – and their private view, that Michaēl VIII Palaiologos was being impious and tyrannical in his endeavours to sideline the rightful basileus, Iōannēs IV Laskaris. This is certainly the position taken by Pachymerēs about the two rebel metropolitans at 143^{21-23}, where they are said to have been in opposition to the Patriarch Arsenios in the matter of the imperial coronation.

Regardless of the real motives behind their rebellion, the two bishops' situation remained connected with that of Arsenios, to the extent that Andronikos of Sardeis attempted to regain his see after Arsenios was reinstated in late 1261. It may be notable that Arsenios rebuffed Andronikos' attempt (Pach. 355^{17}-357^{6}).

"arrived at Nikaia" (167^{21})

Michaēl VIII dismissed Nikēphoros II at Kallioupolis and sent him, with some of the patriarchal synod which elected him, to take up the patriarchal administration at Nikaia. Nikēphoros may have had orders to join the basileus at Kōnstantinoupolis at a later time (see commentary to 169^{4}). While it appears from the text that both Andronikos of Sardeis and Manouēl of Thessalonikē were accompanying Nikēphoros, the likelihood is that only Manouēl may have been with the patriarch, for Andronikos is very shortly placed at Selybria with the basileus (Pach. 169^{14-18}). It is tempting to suggest that the two rebels arranged between themselves to separate to better exert pressure on the basileus and the Nikaian clergy, but that may be reading too much from too little information.

"gold collected from Ephesos" (167^{21})

This wealth is again mentioned by Pachymerēs (179^{7-8}), where he claims that there was so much that it needed its own oikonomos to administer it.

Ephesos had long been one of the wealthier dioceses of the Orthodox church, and a much sought-after prize for ambitious clergy. In the mid twelfth century Geōrgios Tornikios was offered Corinth as a see but turned it down for the richer see of Ephesos (Geōrgios and Dēmētrios Tornikios 169-171). While Pachymerēs' statement may suggest that Nikēphoros had acquired personal wealth from his former see, we must assume that he means nothing of the sort. Early canon law, unsurprisingly, had banned the alienation of church property to individuals, and the rules had become more rigorous as the centuries passed (Rapp 2000:392; Hussey 1986:327). While Nikēphoros was accused by basileus Theodōros of being greedy (Festa 147^{19ff}), no other source, even those which are very pro-Arsenios, claims that Nikēphoros stole the property of the church for his own enrichment.

On the sources of episcopal revenues, see Angold (1995:143-146) and also Hussey (1986:332-335).

"he considered substituting others" (167^{25})

See commentary to 177^{13-18} for the personnel changes which Nikēphoros II made during his short term as patriarch.

"he approached others" (167^{26})

There is a clear connection in the text between the *tōn allōn* of 167^{26} and the *allous* of 167^{25}. It is impossible that these "others" were the individuals who eventually did receive promotions from Nikēphoros II (Pach. 177^{13-18}), since they were mostly from the west, and not at Nikaia at this time. From the context of this passage it would appear that Nikēphoros made overtures to members of the lesser clergy – the officers and deacons of the patriarchal administration – seeking those willing to receive sees then held by the rebellious bishops. That he did so openly, before actually dismissing the rebels from their positions, caused the outcry. The refusal of the Nikaian clergy, other than those few metropolitans who had supported his election, to take communion with Nikēphoros, was a very bad beginning to the new patriarchal reign, and would have cut Nikēphoros' authority off at the knees.

"some began to bow before him" (167^{29})

That many of the Nikaian clergy began to accept Nikēphoros may perhaps suggest that the personal qualities of the patriarch as reported by Pachymerēs (165^{15}, 179^{12-15}) and Nikēphoros Blemmidēs (1.39^{5-27}) may be an accurate representation of the man. Certainly Pachymerēs indicates here that most of these clergy were still unsure about Nikēphoros' legitimacy as patriarch, so much of the acceptance he received must have been down to factors other than his rank and title (see also Pachymerēs' comment at 179^{14-15}).

"the crowd of the laity" (167^{31})

The inhabitants of Nikaia and the Bithynian countryside were the most fervent supporters of the Laskarid dynasty and the pro-Laskarid Patriarch Arsenios. After the blinding of Iōannēs IV Laskaris by Michaēl VIII on 25 December 1261, these people rose up in open revolt against the usurper (Pach. 259^{23}-267^{23}).

"After a short stop at Nikaia" (169^{4})

Nikēphoros II's sojourn at Nikaia was indeed a brief one. He was at Kallioupolis on 1 January 1260, and the siege of Galata was lifted in April of that year. Failler's estimate (1984:168 n.1), of "*un mois ou deux"* seems reasonable, but it may have been even shorter, if Pachymerēs is correct in his assertion that Nikēphoros had left Nikaia before Michaēl VIII had even begun the siege, being still at Selybria (Pach. 169^{10-11}).

The reasons Pachymerēs gives for Nikēphoros' travelling to the encampment of the basileus at Kōnstantinoupolis are likely enough. Michaēl VIII was a great supporter of the new patriarch; he had indeed hand-picked Nikēphoros for the job. In addition, the capture and occupation of the old patriarchal seat – the Hagia Sophia – would have added a

tremendous amount of lustre to Nikēphoros' claims to be the legitimate patriarch, just as possession of the city would have bolstered Michaēl VIII's claim to the empire (see commentary to 2.35).

There is also a suggestion from Bar Hebraeus that Michaēl ordered Nikēphoros to attend the siege, probably out of a desire to be crowned in the old capital immediately upon its capture (BH 428). If true, such an order would in no way invalidate the reasons given by Pachymerēs for the patriarch's hurried departure from Nikaia.

"Helenopolis" (169^{6})

A town on the southern shore of the Gulf of Nikomēdeia. A suffragan bishopric of Nikomēdeia, Helenopolis is the modern Turkish town of Hersek.

2.18 How the metropolitan of Sardeis received the monastic tonsure in Selybria

"The metropolitan of Sardeis" (169^{15-25})

The story of the taking of monastic vows by Andronikos is also told by Akropolitēs (179^{1-15}) and Skoutariōtēs (549^{2-12}). The only point of divergence between their version and that of Pachymerēs is that they report that Andronikos first argued with Michaēl VIII that he should be allowed to return to his homeland of Paphlagonia. This request was rebuffed by the basileus, who feared that Andronikos would merely stir-up anti-imperial feelings in that region. With no other options, Andronikos accepted the habit and tonsure.

There is nothing in this version which contradicts Pachymerēs' account. In fact it may fill a hole in it. Pachymerēs gives us no reason for Andronikos' decision to become a monk, other than a passing reference to a "scandal" (169^{26}). Refusal on the part of the basileus to allow the metropolitan to retire out of opposition to the new patriarch would be sufficient cause for the step undertaken by Andronikos. Becoming a monk would be a strong sign of opposition to basileus and patriarch.

"Iōannikios of Philadelpheia" (169^{17})

Formerly ton topon epechon to the titular Orthodox archdiocese of Syracuse (MM 1.119), Iōannikios was raised to the see of Philadelpheia in 1256. His presence with the army of the basileus, along with metropolitan Andronikos, is the firmest evidence we have that the synod that met at Kallioupolis was divided into two groups, one travelling with the new patriarch to Nikaia (see 167^{21} and commentary). That the metropolitan of Philadelpheia was officiating in a town under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Hērakleia does not

necessarily indicate that Iōannikios was of higher rank, or that the metropolitan of Hērakleia was not with the party.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 8829.

"monastery of the Saviour" (169^{17-19})

This foundation was a patriarchal monastery (that is, one which owed its allegiance to the patriarch, rather than to a particular family or institution) (Pach. (Bonn) II. 281; Magdalino 1978:314-315). It was a place favoured by Michaēl VIII. It was in the crypt of this monastery that he reburied the body of Basileios II (Pach. 177^{7}), and in which he was himself buried in 1282 (Polemis 1968:108).

"and the latter came forward" (171^{2-3})

The ceremony of being ordained a monk is described by Dionysios the Areopagite (PG III, 533). During it, the candidate is asked by the presiding priest if he understands and accepts the duties and obligations of the monastic state, especially regarding the oaths of poverty, chastity and obedience. The candidate's hair is then tonsured and he is dressed in the monastic habit (*schēma*). The presiding priest then celebrates the Divine Liturgy and gives the new monk communion.

Normally the presiding priest would be the hegoumenos of the monastery the aspirant intended to join. The case of Andronikos was unusual in this regard.

2.19 How a number of ecclesiastics died in a short time

"at least a dozen" (171^{6-7})

This current work has identified two possible members of this group: Chalkoutzes of Dyrrachion (Pach. 45^{17}), and Grēgorios of Ankyra (Pach. 143^{25}). The others are unknown.

"nine months" (171^{7})

Pachymerēs seems to be connecting the deaths of the high ecclesiastics with the elevation of Nikēphoros II to the Patriarchate. This passage would then suggest that Nikēphoros II was on the throne for only nine months. This commentary has shown that Nikēphoros was patriarch for a period longer than nine months. See the comments regarding the circumstances of the beginning of his reign (Pach. 161^{6}) and his death (Pach. 177^{20-21}).

This does not necessarily mean that the reference by Pachymerēs to a period of nine months is an incorrect calculation of the length of a patriarchal reign. But, without any other evidence relating to this matter, we are left with a mystery.

"a dream" (171^{8})

It was widely accepted in Byzantine times that dreams could be divinely-sent messages, predicting the future or awarding the dreamer insight, advice or understanding, though the Byzantines also admitted that most dreams were simple manifestations of what would now be called the subconscious. Of the dreams that were from ultra-mundane sources, some were simple and straightforward in their meaning, while others were cryptic and needed to be interpreted before their message could be understood.

To answer that need, numerous books of oneiromancy (dream analysis) were written and circulated throughout the empire's existence. Many of these dream books were attributed to holy men of historic importance, such as the prophet Daniel, or Patriarch Nikēphoros I.

On dreams and their import in Byzantium, see Dagron (1985:38-41).

"Iōannēs Bekkos" (171^{8-9})

Iōannēs Bekkos was probably born in the 1230's. He embarked on a clerical career, and rose to the rank of chartophylax in 1263, holding that position until 1275. He was initially a trusted supporter of Michaēl VIII, who sent him on two foreign embassies in the late 1260's (Pach. 453^{8-10}, 465^{1-2}), but in opposing Michaēl's plans for church Union with the West he was imprisoned on the basileus' orders. In prison he changed his opinion on the matter and, on his release in 1275, was made patriarch, as Iōannēs XI (Pach. 5.24). He held the position for the rest of Michaēl's reign, but was dethroned by a synodal decision under Andronikos II. He was imprisoned in the monastery of Hagios Grēgorios on the Gulf of Nikomēdeia in 1285[86], and died there in 1297 (Gill 1975:264).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 2548.

Pachymerēs knew and respected Bekkos, even if he did not agree with his policies. He seems to have obtained this report of Bekkos' dream first-hand, and comments favourably on his character and wisdom, most notably at Pach. 515^{13-17}.

"chartophylax" (171^{9})

The chartophylax was perhaps the most influential and important official of the patriarchal administration, even though the office was only the fourth-ranked in the hierarchy. The chartophylax was in charge of the *chartophylaxeion*, the office responsible for the patriarchal archives and secretariat. The role of the chartophylax himself was something of

[86] It was perhaps an ironic choice of prison. It had previously held anti-Unionist prisoners, notably Michaēl VIII's sister Eulogia. See the commentary to 155^{3}.

a cross between a modern personal assistant and a presidential chief-of-staff, being responsible for the patriarch's correspondence, acting as an intermediary between the patriarch and lesser clergy, and having the power to stand in the patriarch's place for administrative tasks, such as chairing meetings of the synod.

See Darrouzès (1970:334-344).

2.20 The attack of the basileus against Galata

"Now the basileus" (171^{25})

Of the surviving narrative Greek sources, only Pachymerēs, Akropolitēs (173-175) and Grēgoras (80-81) mention any attempt by Michaēl VIII to take the tower of Galata by siege. Of these, Pachymerēs and Grēgoras assert that the attempt was a full-scale investiture by a powerful Nikaian army, while Akropolitēs writes of a diversionary attack carried out while Michaēl VIII was waiting for a Latin traitor named Asel to open a gate for his army.

On the surface it would seem merely to be a matter of choosing which of the two stories is to be accepted, but both are supported by other evidence. Akropolitēs' account of an "Asel" is backed by a reference in a contemporary northern Italian chronicle which, though it confuses the siege of Galata with the seizure of the city in the next year, nevertheless confirms the existence of an "Asel" (Thomas Tuscus 518). However, Pachymerēs, as well as being followed by the fourteenth-century Grēgoras, is also supported by the contemporary oriental Christian Bar Hebraeus, who, although he is writing of an unsuccessful siege of Kōnstantinoupolis and not Galata, nevertheless corresponds with Pachymerēs in many other details, such as the presence of Patriarch Nikēphoros (BH 428). Barring great coincidence, Bar Hebraeus' account tends to suggest that he is writing of the same event as Pachymerēs, that is, a major but unsuccessful siege of Galata by Nikaian forces.[87]

Obviously, if they are both telling the truth, the two conflicting Byzantine accounts need to be reconciled. A convincing theory has been put forward by Geanakoplos(1959:77-79), who proposes that it is Akropolitēs who is twisting the tale, by downplaying the unsuccessful siege and emphasizing "Latin duplicity", in order to avoid casting a shadow over his hero, Michaēl VIII. In this theory the account of Pachymerēs is basically accepted at face value. The only fault with this account of Geanakoplos is that he does not lay

[87] This is a second uncanny parallel between the historical writings of Bar Hebraeus and of Pachymerēs, and further suggests that both writers were drawing upon some third, lost text. See the commentary to 47^{12}.

enough emphasis upon Michaēl's intention to not only take Galata, but also to move on and take Kōnstantinoupolis. As the following passages will show, this was most definitely the basileus' intention.

"Galata" (171[26])

At the time of the Fourth Crusade Galata was located in Stenon - the 'Estanor' of Villehardouin's account – which was the Jewish quarter of Kōnstantinoupolis. Villehardouin (1.158) comments upon the suburb's affluence. The area was unfortified, however, except for the large tower built on the shore of the Golden Horn, directly across from the acropolis of Kōnstantinoupolis. The first reference to this tower in extant sources is in the chronicle of Theophanēs (396), which mentions the tower in connection to events of 717. The primary purpose of this tower was to protect the northern end of the chain that crossed the mouth of the Golden Horn and blocked ships from entering the harbour. That the fortification of Galata was of no great size is evident from the words used by Villehardouin and the Greeks to describe it.[88] The suburb of Galata was extensively fortified by the Genoese in the fourteenth century, during which time the old tower was incorporated into the new wall.

"he pitched his tent at a fairly good distance and upon a hill" (171[26-27])

An anonymous 10th century Byzantine military treatise writes that *"the imperial tent . . . should be in the strongest and highest location"* of the camp, which should itself be about two bowshots away from the walls (Dennis 1985:307).

The 60-metre high summit of the hill of Pera stands about 600 metres north of the old tower. The modern 'Tower of Galata', constructed by the Genoese in the fourteenth century, stands about halfway up the slope.

[88] Villehardouin (1.158) calls it a '*tor*', a word which corresponds with the modern French *tour*, while Pachymerēs uses the word *phrourion*, as do the earlier Byzantine writers Theophanēs and Patriarch Nikēphoros I. These words can be translated as 'tower' or 'watch-post' and imply a small structure. But against this is the list of names provided by Dellegio (1961:315), which includes the 'Castel de Père' and the 'Castrum Galathae', which might suggest a larger construction. The position of the fortification is marked by the modern Turkish Yer Altı camiı mosque (Schneider and Nomides 1944:6). The remains of the later Genoese tower are approximately 30 x 30 metres, and the old tower, upon which the Genoese built, could hardly have been larger. It is now about 80 metres from the shoreline, but originally it was only about 20 metres inshore.

"he endeavoured. . . to make them afraid" (171^{27})

The same 10th century treatise also recommends coming upon the city to be besieged suddenly and in full strength, so that the abrupt appearance of the army will cause the defenders to become *"confounded and lose heart"* (Dennis 1985:307).

Though these passages taken from the old treatise and from Pachymerēs appear more similar in the English translations than in the original Greek, the sentiments expressed by authors are almost identical. This leads to the suspicion that Pachymerēs, out of ignorance of what really occurred during the siege, inserted stock phrases and advice from military manuals into his account in order to add detail and verisimilitude to the text (see also the commentary to 173^{1-2}). That Pachymerēs' seemingly detailed and exact account should be read less as a truthful report of the siege and more as a rhetorical battle-piece is evident throughout the narrative. Compare this action with the two others described in the studied text. The first, regarding the battle of Pelagonia, is different in tone to the narrative of the Galata siege. Not only is Pachymerēs obviously vague regarding the details of the battle, and gives it only a very brief treatment, but he also indulges in gratuitous Homeric allusions that give the entire narrative a semi-fictionalised and unbelievable tone. The other battle narrative in the text concerns the retaking of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261. Here Pachymerēs gives a very lengthy account of the action, and includes many incidental details which give his report an air of accuracy. These small details should be contrasted with the total lack of details provided in his account of Pelagonia and also with the more 'generic' details of his account of the siege of Galata. The account of the retaking of Kōnstantinoupolis is very firmly rooted to an actual place and to actual participants, but the account of the siege is featureless and without a solid foundation in place and time - with the sole exception of the Latins crossing the Golden Horn to reinforce the garrison, Pachymerēs' account of the siege of Galata could be an account of any siege of any fortress of any time from ancient days to at least the coming of gunpowder artillery.

This generic quality of the report, combined with the apparent use of old military manuals to pad out the narrative and the ignorance of Pachymerēs regarding both the existence of 'Asel' and the operations undertaken outside the Theodosian walls, this provides good reasons to doubt the veracity of Pachymerēs' account of the siege.

"out of range of missiles" (171^{29})

Pachymerēs goes on to record the use by the Latins of crossbows (173^{13}) and ballistae (175^{3-4}). The former had a range of perhaps 150 metres (Morillo 1994:149) while the latter could possibly shoot their projectiles a distance of upwards of 400 metres (Payne-Gallwey 1903:303). This gives us a minimum distance from the walls of the Nikaian camp.

"he ordered an assault by groups" (173[1-2])

This may be another instance of Pachymerēs 'borrowing' from military manuals. The 7th century *Stratēgikon* of Maurikios recommends just this tactic.[89]

It may, however, have been a common tactic of besiegers attempting to assault a fortress. A similar term is used by the crusader historian Guillaume of Tyre, referring to the 1137 siege of Montferrand in the Crusader kingdom by Zengi of Aleppo.[90] It is likely that Michaēl was performing a comparable operation, but in this case Latin reinforcements arriving from Kōnstantinoupolis countered his constantly refreshed assaulting divisions.

"machines and began testing the walls" (173[2])

"machines and began testing the walls" (173[2])

Pachymerēs is here certainly referring to siege artillery, and especially to counterweight trebuchets. These machines had largely superseded other forms of artillery in the previous century; being first attested in the West in 1199 (Hill 1973:104), and in the East in the first half of the thirteenth century (Cheveddin 2000; Dennis 2000). Their use in the Aegean in this period is recorded in the Chronicle of the Morea (*CoM* 1412, 2920), so that it is certain that the Nikaians knew of them.[91]

Trebuchets were quite formidable, some being capable of hurling stones weighing as much as 250 kilograms to a distance of around 300 metres (Hill 1973:106). The evidence of Pachymerēs' narrative tends to suggest that the machines employed by Michaēl VIII were not of this magnitude of power, as the "*stones thrown by their machines*" could be somewhat countered by the arrows shot from the walls, implying that the Nikaian trebuchets were placed within range of the Latins' weapons.[92]

Such large and complex machines required the services of specialist siege engineers (France 1999:123) and Michaēl VIII's inclusion of numbers of such specialists in his army is further evidence that he intended from the start to make an all-out effort to take the city, and not merely make a diversionary attack, as Akropolitēs suggests.

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[89] Maurice 10.1 (Dennis tr. 107): "*. . . the army should be divided into various sections and a certain number of troops assigned to work so many hours each day.*"

[90] Guillaume of Tyre (2.37-39): *"He* [Zengi] *arranged his men in alternative divisions and, by using successive relays, renewed his strength. When the first detachment became weary, fresh men were brought into line, so that the battle seemed continuous rather than begun anew."*

[91] Cheveddin (2000) argues that counterweight trebuchets were actually a Byzantine invention dating from the early Komneni.

[92] Though, according to France (1999:124), trebuchets were frequently placed so close to the walls that protective measures had to be put in place to protect the crews.

"The army was much too great . . ." (173^{3})

On the size and composition of the Nikaian army, see the commentary to 171^{25-26}.

This passage is one of the first indications in the text that in this campaign the basileus was aiming not merely to seize Galata, but to reconquer Kōnstantinoupolis itself. It would make little military sense for Michaēl, who had so many enemies on his borders, to gather the bulk of his empire's armed forces for an expedition of moderate aims or less than vital importance. Obviously then, if the army was large, then so must have been his goals. Bar Hebraeus sums up the basileus' probable aims: ". . . *he determined within himself to go and attack Constantinople, because he heard that there was a small army therein with Bô'dwîn (sic), the Frankish king its lord*" (BH 428). The attack upon Galata was therefore but one aspect of a larger plan.

Pachymerēs appears puzzled as to why the basileus would employ such a large army for such a small task. In making this statement, however, he ignores his own testimony. In a later passage Pachymerēs relates how members of the imperial retinue were able to go to Hebdomon, only a few kilometres from the walls, without harassment from the garrison (Pach. 175^{14-15}). They were able to do this safely because the Nikaian troops were not merely attempting to take the Galata tower, but were employed by Michaēl VIII to dominate the territory outside the city and attempt to blockade the Latins occupying it (Greg. 81^{5-8}).[93] According to Grēgoras, the effect of the blockade was such that the inhabitants of Kōnstantinoupolis were forced to demolish houses to obtain firewood.[94]

That Nikaian troops were stationed not only in Pera but also outside the Theodosian walls is also suggested by the hoped-for treachery of 'Asel' (Akrop. 175^{5-7}). A position across the Golden Horn around Galata was not a very practical one from which to take advantage of someone opening a gate in the Theodosian walls, as a shift in the whole army from Galata to the west side of the city would bring every defender rushing to man the walls and put them on high alert, making the seizure of a gate by traitors that much harder. If the defenders grew accustomed to small parties of Nikaians positioned outside the walls, parties that were too small to pose a threat to the walls by themselves, then the defenders would become more relaxed and less vigilant, making it easier for traitors to open a gate,

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[93] *"Wherefore he strengthened the forts in front of Byzantium and despatched soldiers to them, ordering them to make attacks and ambushes on the Latins . . ."*

[94] Koder (2002:113-114) suggests that for much of its history Kōnstantinoupolis obtained its firewood from Anatolia, as it did in Ottoman times. If this is so - and Koder stresses that it is not known for sure - and if Grēgoras is also giving an accurate report, then this would suggest that the Nikaians had some sort of naval control over the Bosporos crossing. Given the lack of supporting evidence for this, however, we must conclude that Grēgoras is referring only to the inability of the Kōnstantinoupolitans to forage beyond the walls of the city.

and would also enable them to be reinforced quickly, hopefully allowing enough time for the main army to arrive and take advantage of the situation.

"archers from around Nikaia" (173^{4-5})

Troops from the northwestern provinces of Asia Minor were famed in this period for their skill and discipline.[95] The archers from the region of Trikokkia, in particular, were famed for their archery, as Pachymerēs emphasizes again in his *Historia*.[96]

The presence of these troops adds evidence to the suggestion that Michaēl VIII ordered the army that was victorious at Pelagonia to return to the east in order to participate in this campaign (see the commentary to 121^{19-22}), since the presence of Bithynian archers in that army is also recorded (Akrop. 169^{3-5}; *cf. CoM* 3600*ff*).

"attacked . . . showed themselves" (173^{5-7})

That a sharpshooter would strike any defender who dared peer over the battlements at the besieging army was a literary commonplace of the time. See, for example, the *CoM* (1482-1483): "*The crossbowmen did not allow any man to lean forward out through the teeth of the wall to see who was doing the shooting.*"

"strengthened the inside of the wall with thick beams . . ." (173^{9-10})

This may refer to the construction of hoards by the defenders. Hoards were supported by beams that were about twenty-five centimetres square and *"long enough to stretch across the wall walk, pierce the parapet, and project as a bracket about 4ft. beyond the outer face"* (Toy 1939:205).

"arrow-shooting apparatus with which they were familiar" (173^{13})

This refers to the Latins' use of the crossbow. The word *skeuos,* here translated as 'apparatus', certainly suggests some type of mechanical device, and is unlikely to indicate the larger forms of siege artillery, which Pachymerēs usually terms *teichomachia* (Pach. 173^{14}) or *mēchanē* (Pach. 421^{24}, 597^{13}, 641^{21} etc.). Although the normal Byzantine name for crossbow was *tzangra*, this word was of recent introduction to the Greek language (Bartusis 1992:332), and as such it is unlikely that Pachymerēs, with his archaising tendencies, would choose to use it[97]. Hence he uses a cumbersome multi-worded description for the weapon.

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[95] For instance, Akropolitēs singles them out for praise at 139^{6} and 161^{6-7}.

[96] Pach. 259^{25}-261^{1}. The inhabitants of Trikokkia, rebelling against Michaēl VIII's treatment of Iōannēs IV, were *"confident in their bows"*.

[97] Only once in his entire history does he even refer to crossbowmen as *tzangratoi* (Failler ed. vol. IV 455^{17}).

The crossbow, at least as far back as the First Crusade, had been seen by the Byzantines as a weapon that the Latins, more than any other people, were accustomed to using. See Bartusis (1992:331-332) for examples of Byzantine attitudes to the weapon.

Crossbows of the thirteenth century, having composite bows made from wood, horn and sinew, had an effective range of perhaps 150 metres (Morillo 1994:149). At such ranges they were more than capable of punching through the mail armour of the day.

Laurent's translation incorrectly has "poisoned arms" rather than "arrow-shooting apparatus". This is no doubt a simple mistranslation of the word *iobolos*.

"vine branches to cover the damaged areas" (173^{15-16})

The use of natural or artificial padding, especially wicker-work made of vine branches, to soften the blows of siege machinery is ancient. Aeneas Tacticus in the 4th century BC recommended sacks filled with wool or inflated ox-hides, while a 6th century AD Byzantine manual suggests hanging netting over the walls to absorb the shock of missiles. An example more contemporary to Pachymerēs is the use of vines by the Venetians of the Fourth Crusade to protect their ships from Byzantine engines.[98]

Both attackers and defenders used vine branches as protection, the former building huts and movable mantlets, called laisai, of that material (McGeer 1995:158^{86-107}).[99]

"Going down into the galleries" (173^{16-17})

Crusader castles built in the thirteenth century regularly included passages within the walls, from which the defenders could shoot with even less risk than from the battlements (Kennedy 1994:117). However, the presence of such galleries in an old Byzantine work such as the tower of Galata is highly improbable. More likely, then, Pachymerēs is referring to the use of hoards, covered wooden walkways constructed on the outside of the battlements, which enabled the defenders to strike at the attackers at the base of the wall.[100]

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[98] Aeneas Tacticus 32.3; Dennis (1985:43); Robert of Clari 73: "*mais les nes estoient si bien couvertes de mairen et de sarment de vingne ker ne leur faisoient mie grant mal…*". A particularly crude, though effective method was employed by the Muslim defenders of Ascalon in 1153, when the bodies of slain attackers were hung from the battlements. It would demand very hard hearts to continue aiming the artillery at such grisly defences. (Runciman 1951-54:2.339; France 1999:114-115)

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[100] Toy (1939:205): *"Hoards. . . were temporary wooden galleries, constructed outside of the parapets in the time of siege to protect the base of the walls and towers against sapping operations. These galleries were built upon rows of beams."*

"their spirit and high intelligence" (173^{20-21})

It is very interesting that Pachymerēs chooses to praise the Latins in this passage. His normal attitude towards them is one of scorn and derision (e.g. 197^{3-4}, 199^{12-13}, 227^{19}). Although at one point (79^{25}) he does refer to them as a 'warlike race', it is not in terms of approbation but as a condemnation for their rash and impetuous ways. Only in this passage does Pachymerēs credit the westerners with acting in an intelligent fashion.

The reason for this *volte-face* is his lack of any other cause for the Nikaian defeat and withdrawal from Kōnstantinoupolis. Pachymerēs appears not to have possessed knowledge of the dealings with 'Asel', nor does he seem aware of the activities of the Nikaians outside the city proper, as Grēgoras is. He also fails to draw a link between the defeat at Trikoryphos and Michaēl's abandonment of the siege. Pachymerēs' account, focussing solely on the fighting at Galata, leaves no room for any other explanation for the defeat than that the vastly more numerous Nikaian army was defeated by superiority of the Latin defenders in skill and intelligence.

"faced danger by coming out from their base" (173^{21-22})

At first glance there is an apparent contradiction in Pachymerēs' account on this point. Soon after this passage is another, in which the author explicitly states that the Latins were too few in number to dare sally forth against the Nikaian army (173^{30}-175^{1}). The use of the word *oikothen*, "from home", and the similarity of the Greek phrasing in 173^{7-8} and 173^{21-22}, however, indicates quite clearly that Pachymerēs is here referring to the daily reinforcements arriving by boat from Kōnstantinoupolis, and not to offensive sorties from the keep at Galata.

"holding the fortress. . . led to that of the City" (173^{25})

This is a common opinion, both of contemporary (Grēgoras 80^{24}-81^{1}) and modern authors (Guilland 1969:2.125: *"La prise du château était un coup mortel pour Constantinople, car l'entrée de la flotte ennemie dans le port devait paralyser la defense"*). This belief stems largely from the success of the Fourth Crusade and of the Ottoman Turks in taking the City after first gaining the Golden Horn. It is not applicable on this occasion, however, as a Nikaian success against Galata would not have endangered the city very much, since Michaēl VIII did not have a fleet to use in the Golden Horn. Even if he had, the seizure of the tower would have been unnecessary, given that the chain that was formerly anchored to it and which was the reason for the crusader assault upon it, was not used by the Latin Empire. Michaēl himself had to replace it after his reoccupation of the city in 1261

(Geanakoplos 1959:130). Thus at the time of the siege any Nikaian ships would not have been prevented sailing directly into the Golden Horn.

It could perhaps be suggested that he intended to occupy the northern shore of the Golden Horn and by dominating the harbour with his siege artillery prevent use of the harbour by enemy shipping. But thirteenth century siege artillery did not have the range, accuracy or speed of fire necessary to sink ships, and the southern harbours of the city would have remained open to the Venetians in any case.[101] A Byzantine garrison could have been installed in the castle, but once the main army retired from the city, as it would be forced to do sooner or later, any company left behind at Galata would have been isolated and must have swiftly fallen to the superior Latin forces still residing in Kōnstantinoupolis itself. There would have been some prestige to be gained by taking the place from the Latins, but this gain would in no way compensate for the shame which would accrue for failing to then take the city which was, after all, the publicly avowed aim of the whole expedition. Nor did the castle have to be captured to neutralise the threat that it could have been used as a base by the Latins from which to harass the Byzantines. The castle did not dominate the northern shore of the Golden Horn to such an extent, and the Latins did not have enough manpower to risk any in dangerous raids and sorties in a non-critical sector.

This is not to say that Galata had no strategic value. It did, but not in and of itself. It had value only when it was held in conjunction with Kōnstantinoupolis and the two were connected by the great harbour chain. Thus it could, under certain circumstances, contribute in a meaningful way to the defence of the city but these circumstances were not in evidence in 1260. The castle was only built in the first place to protect the northern end of the harbour chain. Without the chain, the fort was virtually redundant.[102]

However, in establishing that attacking Galata made no military sense we have merely deepened the puzzle regarding Michaēl's reasons for doing so. He had begun his campaign early in the year to avoid the sailing season and any Latin reinforcements arriving in time to prevent the fall of the city. He therefore could not afford to waste unnecessary time besieging an irrelevant castle. Obviously the fort of Galata occupied an important place in Michaēl's plan.

Akropolitēs' testimony would have us believe that Michaēl encamped near Galata and "pretended" to besiege the place, but that in reality he was prepared to pull camp and rush

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[101] It was not until the advent of gunpowder artillery that such a blockade could conceivably be mounted. The Ottoman Turks famously used artillery to close the Bosporos to western shipping in the period before the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1453 (Doukas 35), but even they were unsuccessful in dominating the Golden Horn from its northern shore.

[102] Norwich (1995:209) is the only modern scholar who has also reached this conclusion, writing that even if Michaēl had managed to take the castle, in the end it *"would yield him only a limited advantage"*.

to the gate opened by Asel.[103] We have seen how impractical an encampment at Pera would have been for such a plan to succeed (see the commentary to 173^{3}), but with troops also stationed outside the main city walls it can perhaps be seen how Michaēl attacked Galata, using all his siege machinery and many troops, as a diversion. With Latin eyes focussed on the activity across the Golden Horn, and hopefully endeavouring to keep it through reinforcement, it would be easier for Asel to open the gate without being noticed.[104]

"they did not dare to sally forth" (173^{30}-175^{1})

This passage provides a clue as to the confidence of the Latin defenders. As Morillo (1994:142) points out, sorties were *"usually used only in extreme circumstances against a specific target"*, one which typically posed a mortal threat to the defence of the fortification, such as an attempt to destroy a siege tower nearing completion. That the Latins in Galata attempted no such sallies is evidence that the Nikaian army, despite its size, was not posing a serious danger to the integrity of the keep.

"great, arrow-shooting mangonels" (175^{3-4})

These were presumably ballistae, which were very large, crossbow-like machines designed to fire spear-sized bolts (Prokopios 5.21.14-18). They had a range of perhaps 400 metres (Payne-Gallwey 1903:303) and were of great power: Prokopios (5.23.9-12) relates that during the siege of Rome in 537 a ballista bolt impaled an armoured man on a tree.

"rumours of reinforcements" (175^{6-7})

Although such rumours would be common at all sieges and would have been circulated by both attackers and defenders, this passage may be a garbled reference by Pachymerēs to news of the defeat of Alexios Stratēgopoulos by the Epirotes at Trikoryphos filtering into the Nikaian camp. It is easy to see how both Nikaian and Latin alike would have envisioned an Epirote army advancing through Makedonia and Thrace towards Kōnstantinoupolis to reinforce the Latins, since the Epirotes and the Latins had cooperated the previous year at Pelagonia.

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[103] Akropolitēs 174. See especially the *men dokein…d'alatheia* construction.

[104] We must remember that Pera was the favoured location for the camp of the army of the fourth crusade, the favoured location for the Genoese colony at the city and, in more modern times, the northern shore of the Golden Horn has become the centre of the city of Istanbul. So it cannot be ignored that Michaēl may have chosen Galata as the site of his main camp fore logistical reasons rather than tactical or strategic ones. Any enemy fortifications within close proximity to the camp would have posed the threat of sallies and harassment of the camp, which could not be ignored, and the enemy castle would have been invested, even if it was not assaulted, in order to keep that threat at bay.

"the basileus decided to stop the fight" (175^{9})

The siege of Kōnstantinoupolis was abandoned by Michaēl VIII in April of 1260 (Skout. 547^{13}).

Unsurprisingly, given their differences in emphasis, Akropolitēs (175^{15-16}) gives a different reason than Pachymerēs for Michaēl's withdrawal. He states that the basileus gave up the attempt upon Kōnstantinoupolis after learning definitively of the refusal of Asel to open a gate for him. Grēgoras (81) is much less useful. While he clearly implies that the Latins were suffering from the Nikaian blockade, he gives no reason for Michaēl's sudden withdrawal, unless it is on account of the Mongol incursion into Asia Minor, which he immediately relates.

The real reason for the withdrawal of the Nikaian army from Kōnstantinoupolis seems to have been the need for Michaēl to head west and attempt to recover the Nikaian position in Makedonia after the defeat of Stratēgopoulos at Trikoryphos. Certainly this is what he proceeded to do after his abandonment of the siege. See the commentary to 177^{6-10}.

"without concluding a treaty" (175^{9-10})

Pachymerēs differs from Akropolitēs on this point also. The latter writer (175^{16-19}) claims that Michaēl made a treaty with the Latins for one year. Grēgoras (81) does not mention a treaty at all. However, we can assume that Akropolitēs is right on this point. In July 1261 Alexios Stratēgopoulos was specifically instructed not to attack the city (Pach. 191^{20-23}), implying some sort of truce was in force, and we may also point to the evidence that the Genoese flotilla outfitted and despatched immediately after the signing of the treaty of Nymphaion could be expected to arrive in Greek waters around September 1261, coinciding with the expiry of Akropolitēs' one-year truce.

2.21 The body of Basileios Boulgaroctonos

"monastery of the Theologian" (175^{14})

Pachymerēs is actually referring to a church, that of St. John the Evangelist, and not to a monastery. This large church was built in the fourth century and remained an important foundation until at least the eleventh century, after which it fell into ruin. Archaeological excavations at Hebdomon in the early decades of the twentieth century failed to find any traces of the church.

See Janin (1969:267-269) and Van Millingen (1899:336-337).

"Hebdomon" (175[15])

This suburb of Kōnstantinoupolis was named for the seventh milestone from the *milion* in the heart of the city, and lay approximately five kilometres from the Theodosian walls on the Sea of Marmara. During the heyday of the empire Hebdomon was a place of churches, palaces and mansions, and it had a fortress overlooking the bay. It was also used as a waypoint on the road to the city. It appears, from Pachymerēs' comments, that the suburb, by the mid-thirteenth century, had been reduced from its former grandeur into little more than a rural village.

On Hebdomon, see Van Millingen (1899:316-341) and Janin (1950:446-449).

"a sheepfold" (175[16])

This indicates that the suburb was not completely deserted, but was now a farming community. It also indicates that the *thelēmatarioi*, who dwelt in this region, (see commentary to 157[18]) maintained herds of animals as well as grew crops.

"Dēmētrios Iatropoulos" (175[18])

This man had been, during the reign of Theodōros II, governor (*prokathēmenos*) of the city of Philadelpheia in Asia Minor (Festa 197). He was promoted sometime before 1260 to the office of logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn, which he held, along with several other positions, until at least 1282 (Pach. 657[2]).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 7968.

Akropolitēs (79[25]) names an Iatropoulos as one of the conspirators who, in 1246, opened the city of Thessalonikē to Iōannēs III. *Contra* Angold (1975a:176 and 265), it is doubtful if this man should be identified with Dēmētrios. It is by no means certain that the two Iatropouloi are even related (*cf.* Macrides 1978:320).

"suddenly saw" (175[19]-177[7])

Pachymerēs is the only contemporary author to relate this event, and the absence of any corroborating evidence must lead us to question its veracity.

It is without doubt that there is some basis of truth to the story Pachymerēs records. Details such as the verse inscription on the tomb and the correct identification of the church of Basileios II's interment indicate so. Moreover, the procession of mourners bringing the body from Hebdomon to the encampment at Galata would have been a memorable event witnessed by many.

Some aspects of Pachymerēs' account, however, especially the preservation of a 235 year old corpse which had been removed from its tomb, stripped of its finery (presumably by grave-robbers) and mishandled, give an almost hagiographical cast to the affair. As Stephenson (2000:116-129) reports, the legends around Basileios II were beginning to assume their final form in the thirteenth century, so Pachymerēs or his sources may be exaggerating the discovery of Iatropoulos – from possibly a few bones to an almost miraculously well preserved body – in order to reflect the beliefs of his day.

There does remain a more sinister theory regarding the discovery of Basileios II's body. It must be remembered that Michaēl Palaiologos was engaged at the time in an unsuccessful siege of Galata. Pachymerēs' account shows how Michaēl endeavoured to maximise the propaganda benefit provided by the body. By discovering the miraculously well-preserved remains of a great, almost legendary, warrior-basileus and then bringing it through his camp, rather than sending it straight to Selybria, Michaēl was able to bolster morale in his troops, possibly lower the morale of the defenders of Galata and, by treating it with great respect and placing it in his own bed, the basileus was able to suggest a link between himself and the former ruler, and thus provide a modicum of semi-divine favour for his usurped rule.

Looking at the skilful way in which Michaēl attempted to maximise the advantages provided by the discovery, it is not beyond belief that the entire 'discovery' was stage-managed by the basileus or his confidantes. An obvious parallel to this affair is the discovery of the Holy Lance at Antioch at the lowest ebb of the First Crusade (Runciman 1951-54:1.241-246), an event that has ever since been suspected as a carefully planned propaganda exercise. It is possible that, on learning of the tomb at Hebdomon, Michaēl arranged for a body to be 'found' and which could then be displayed as Basileios II.

Without proof such a theory is of course impossible to confirm, but Michaēl VIII has always had a reputation for cunningness[105] and such an action would not be surprising from such an unscrupulous and intelligent individual.

"an empty tomb" (175[24])

The phrase used by Pachymerēs, *to kenērion* (the empty thing), is of no help in determining what form the tomb took, whether free-standing sarcophagus, an *arcosolium* built into a wall or a more simple grave embedded in the floor of the church. The context of the passage, however, suggests that the tomb was standing, so a sarcophagus was the most likely receptacle for Basileios II's mortal remains.

[105] Geanakoplos (1959:138): "the finesse of his statecraft, though verging frequently on sheer intrigue, is remarkable even in the annals of Byzantine history."

A sarcophagus was uncovered during excavations at Hebdomon in 1914 and proclaimed to be that of Basileios, but it was subsequently dated to the fifth century (Stephenson 2000:111)

"as the inscription revealed" (175^{25-26})

The inscription that adorned the tomb survives in several manuscript copies and was published by Mercati (1921:141-142) but as Stephenson (2000:129) points out, the inscription itself does not use the term 'Bulgarslayer', though the manuscript headings, which date from the 13th and 14th centuries, do.

"shroud of golden silk" (177^{1})

This was presumably sent by Michaēl VIII to act as a replacement for the now-missing shroud which covered Basileios at the time of his burial, and was of a golden hue as a sign of Basileios' imperial rank.

It is curious to note that Michaēl could despatch golden, silken shroud on such short notice. It is quite possible that the 'shroud' was merely a piece of cloth used for another purpose, but it is certainly also possible that the basileus was required to have one on hand in case death befell him on campaign.

"his brother, the sebastokratōr" (177^{4})

This is a reference to Michaēl's younger brother Kōnstantinos, who received the rank of sebastokratōr at the end of 1259, when their brother Iōannēs was raised to the rank of despotēs (see the commentary to 153^{10-12}).

"when they returned to Selybria" (177^{6})

Michaēl VIII broke off his siege of Galata in April 1260 (Skout. 547^{13}), when news had reached him of the defeat of Alexios Stratēgopoulos at Trikoryphos (see the commentary to 127^{1-2}, 151^{21-22} and 175^{6-7}). While marching westward to retrieve the situation, the army would have passed through Selybria on the Via Egnatia.

"monastery of the Saviour" (177^{7})

On this foundation, see the commentary to 169^{17-18}.

"while returning to Nymphaion" (177^{8-10})

Akropolitēs (175^{16-26}) writes that after leaving Kōnstantinoupolis Michaēl VIII went straight back, via the Hellespont, to Asia Minor, where he remained for the rest of the year.

A closer reading of Akropolitēs' text, however, indicates only that the basileus had reached the area around Pegai sometime before the end of summer (175^{22-23}), which could mean anytime before the end of August. Akropolitēs therefore leaves a possible gap in his narrative covering up to the four months between April and September.

Though Pachymerēs' writing is unclear, he indicates that Michaēl VIII spent this period marching westward to quell some 'troubles'. Pachymerēs seems to suggest that the troubles were in the region of Orestias, or around Adrianoupolis, but two things militate against this interpretation. On the one hand Pachymerēs always uses the word *dusis* to refer to lands in Greece and the Balkans, and more specifically in reference to Epiros and Makedonia (Laiou 1993:97). Pachymerēs' reference to Orestias, on the other hand, is justified when we consider that Adrianoupolis was the usual mustering point for Nikaian armies sent against the despotate of Epiros (*CoM* 3600-3607). Combining these two factors with the news of the defeat of Trikoryphos, which precipitated Michaēl's withdrawal from Kōnstantinoupolis, we may state with some assurance that the 'trouble' which Michaēl's reputation put down was the warfare waged by Michaēl II of Epiros against the empire.

It is unlikely that Michaēl VIII and his army had to march far beyond Adrianoupolis. As Pachymerēs says, his reputation preceded him as did, undoubtedly, reports of the size of the Nikaian army. It appears that Michaēl II, still recovering from the disaster of Pelagonia, and exhausted from years of defensive war against Nikaian attacks, hurried to make his peace with the basileus, offering to return Stratēgopoulos and also to hand over his son Iōannēs as a hostage (see the commentary to 151^{21-22}).

It would have been after western affairs were settled and when Michaēl was returning to Asia Minor that emissaries from Baudouin II asked for, and obtained, a year long truce, which would expire in August 1261 (Akrop. 175^{16-19}).

2.22 How the Patriarch Nikēphoros reached Nymphaion in company with the basileus

"returned with all speed to Nymphaion" (177^{13})

There is another little contradiction here. We have seen how the basileus was in no hurry to return to Nymphaion after the lifting of the siege of Galata; how, in fact, he could not do so, being heavily involved in bringing about the submission of the despotate of Epiros, and also in negotiations with the Latins of Constantinople (see 177^{6-10} and commentary). But here Pachymerēs states that after the siege of Galata the patriarch both stayed in the

basileus' company and made a hurried return to the capital. Unfortunately the few known official acts of Nikēphoros II's patriarchate provide little evidence as to the whereabouts of their composition (Laurent, *Regestes*, 1348-1352), and we must look elsewhere for clues.

Pachymerēs' narrative here provides some circumstantial evidence that the Patriarch stayed in the imperial entourage throughout 1260. Chapter 2.22 lists four appointments made by Nikēphoros II in the post-Galata period of his patriarchate. Three of these four new appointees, Iakōbos Chalazas, Isaac of Mesopotamon and Nikētas of Thessalonikē, are expressly indicated by Pachymerēs as having their origins in "the West". Pachymerēs affirms (Pach. 169^{3-6}) that Nikēphoros had only a very brief stay in the patriarchal capital, Nikaia, before leaving for Kōnstantinoupolis, and had little time to deal with the consequences of the rebellion of the bishops before leaving for Europe. If replacements for the vacated sees were not determined before leaving Asia, it would have been only natural for the patriarch to look to the men around him once he finally had time to deal with the problem. If he was in Nikaia at that time he would have chosen eastern clergy. But he was in the west, so it was to westerners that he turned. It is pertinent to point out that another of Nikēphoros' appointments, unmentioned by Pachymerēs, was the transfer of Iōannēs Kondoumnes from the see of Peritheorion to that of Trajanoupolis (Laurent, *Regestes*, no. 1350). Both of these sees were in western Thrace.

On a human level it was quite understandable for the new patriarch to remain in the company of the basileus. His elevation to the Patriarchate was not viewed with great favour by the church establishment in Anatolia, and his greatest partisan was the basileus himself. The authority of his position would be much easier to enforce once Michaēl returned from Europe and could lend more direct support, and this may have contributed to Nikēphoros' decision to stay with the basileus through the year.

"had been sent into exile" (177^{14-15})

See Pach. 2.17-2.18 and commentary. Andronikos of Sardeis had been outwitted by the basileus at Selybria before the attack on Galata, and had taken monastic vows. Manouēl of Thessalonikē had presumably been removed from his see by orders sent to him before the imperial army and the patriarch arrived in the west, for the man chosen to replace him, Iōannikios Kydōnēs, was an easterner apparently picked before the patriarch left for Kōnstantinoupolis.

New metropolitan bishops were selected by the reigning patriarch from a short list of three candidates chosen by the patriarchal synod, which consisted of other bishops of metropolitan rank. In theory the basileus had no influence on these elections, but a basileus

who felt strongly for or against certain candidates had means at his disposal to make his feelings known to the synod (Hussey 1986:320).

"Iōannikios Kydōnēs" (177^{16})

This man had been made hegoumenos of the Sōsandra monastery in 1254 (Skout. 510^{22-23}). He remained as the archbishop of Thessalonikē until 1272. As he is the only easterner to have been appointed by Nikēphoros to an empty see, it is probable that his appointment was made very early in the year, before Nikēphoros departed for Europe.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 13880.

"Iakōbos Chalazas" (177^{17})

Pachymerēs' phrasing "came from the west to join the basileus", strongly implies that he was some ecclesiastical figure from Epiros who threw in his lot with the empire rather than the despotate. His appointment by the patriarch may thus have been a reward to him and an encouragement to other western clergy to support the basileus. He remained a firm supporter of Michaēl VIII, and in 1266 acted on the basileus' behalf during a dispute between Michaēl and Patriarch Germanos III (Pach. 385^{24}-387^{19}). He was a supporter of Church Union, and thus was deposed by Andronikos II in 1283, when the new basileus repudiated his father's policy.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 30364.

"Isaak, from the western monastery of Mesopotamon" (177^{19-20})

The manuscripts of the *Historia* differ at this point. Two, called by Failler (1984:176 n.8) manuscripts A and B, record that Isaak was from the monastery of Xēropotamon, on the Athos peninsula, and was raised to the see of Ephesos. This is also recorded in the margin of manuscript C, though the main body of that text says that an Isaak from the Epirote monastery of Mesopotamon was raised to the see of Smyrnē. Failler (1979:152-153) discusses this passage in some detail, and determines that manuscript C is accurate while A and B contain an alteration by a later copyist. Failler's arguments are that Isaak, the bishop of Ephesos, was a far more prominent figure in later years than Isaak of Smyrnē, and since both were ordained at about the same time, the later copyist assumed that Pachymerēs must have been referring to the bishop of Ephesos and not that of Smyrnē. To his arguments we can only add the obvious point that Pachymerēs must have had the bishop of Smyrnē in mind since shortly afterwards he records that even on his death Nikēphoros II was still in control of the riches of the see of Ephesos (Pach. 179^{7-9}), which would not have been the case had there been a new bishop in the see.

It is understandable that the scribes of manuscripts A and B did not think that Pachymerēs could have been referring to Isaak of Smyrnē. He was certainly a man of little notoriety – this passage of Pachymerēs tells us all we know about him. His promotion occurred shortly before the death of Nikēphoros II at about the end of 1260. His mother monastery, that of Mesopotamon, was located in the heart of Epiros on the Bistrica River (Soustal and Koder 1981:206-207), and this inspires us to ask why he was chosen to become a bishop in far off Anatolia. We could postulate that if he was an abbot he could well have been sent as part of the peace embassy of despoina Theodōra, wife of the despotēs Michaēl II, to Michaēl VIII, which can be dated to the summer of 1260 (Pach. 151^{21-22} and commentary). Certainly the appointment of the westerner Isaak must have been part of a plan to tie the Epirote clergy, who had acted increasingly independently from the Nikaian patriarchal hierarchy, more closely to the eastern church, paralleling the attempts by Michaēl VIII to bring Epiros back into the empire's political orbit.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 8252.

"around the time of his ordination the patriarch had fallen ill" (177^{20-21})

We have no indication as to what this fatal illness was, but since Nikēphoros II was an old man (Pach. 165^{17}), and he had spent much of the year 1260 travelling about the empire, we must assume that it was just one of the many ailments of old age, perhaps nourished through unwonted exertion.

Unfortunately we are not able to accurately determine the date of Nikēphoros' death. Akropolitēs (177^{4-5} and 180^{4-5}) twice asserts that Nikēphoros II was patriarch for a full year and, as we have discussed, Nikēphoros was elected at the end of 1259. Thus Akropolitēs' testimony would suggest that the patriarch died towards the end of 1260. Akropolitēs is, however, generally vague over dates and times (see, for instance, his preferred method of referring to seasons, as at Akrop. 173^{20}, and the discussion of Failler 1980b:51), so we cannot be certain about his accuracy.

There is a reference by Pachymerēs to the unusual number of high ecclesiastics who died in a nine-month period at this time (Pach. 171^{5-6}). Failler (1980b:51-52) argues that Pachymerēs is obviously stating that these deaths were the result of heavenly displeasure at the reign of Nikēphoros, but he shies away from stating that Nikēphoros' reign was only nine months long. Such caution is justified, since Pachymerēs does not explicitly draw a connection between Nikēphoros and the nine months; indeed it would appear that Pachymerēs only mentioned it at all because he wished to record the dream-prophecy related by his friend Iōannēs Bekkos (see commentary to 1.19).

According to the testimony of Akropolitēs (Akrop.180[5-15]), Michaēl VIII was first approached about reinstating Arsenios in the spring of 1261. This statement is supported by that of Pachymerēs (225[1-4]), who tells us that the basileus was very hesitant about reinstating the former patriarch and left it to a long-sitting synod to decide, but which reinstated Arsenios sometime before the recapture of Kōnstantinoupolis in July 1261. Although we can only state with certainty that Nikēphoros became ill and died sometime between his return to Nymphaion in September 1260 and about March (early spring) of 1261, the date probably lay towards the end of this period, since those factions that were opposed to the deposition of Arsenios and the election of Nikēphoros would not have remained quiet for long after the latter's death before beginning to call for the old patriarch's reinstatement. These calls, as we have noted, reached the basileus' ear in the early spring of 1261.

"Nikētas of Thessalonikē" (177[23])

Nikētas remained in his see for a long time. He survived the great earthquake that flattened Dyrrachion in 1270 (Pach. 459[29-30]), and was still bishop in 1297 (Pach. (Bonn) II.248[6-7]).

Dyrrachion had been reclaimed for the empire from the Sicilian kingdom during the campaign of Iōannēs Palaiologos after the battle of Pelagonia in 1259 (Pach. 151[13]).

"the monk Theodosios" (179[2])

Theodosios' connection to the Villehardouin family is unclear, but the reference to Michaēl VIII calling him uncle provides us with perhaps some clue. We have seen how Guillaume de Villehardouin entered into a symbolic, spiritual kinship with the basileus through godparentage (Pach. 123[16-17]; *CoM* 4559-4562). If Michaēl and Guillaume shared a type of 'brotherhood', we can understand how the basileus would consider the relatives of the prince to be as relatives of himself. Thus we may postulate that Theodosios was of an older generation than the prince, perhaps an actual uncle, maybe merely an older cousin. The *PLP* (no. 7181) suggests that Theodosios was indeed a son of a Palaiologina who married a Villehardouin, but Pachymerēs, who knew the man well, is very sure of saying that Michaēl's reference to him as uncle was merely on account of his noble descent and connection with the Villehardouin, not the Palaiologoi.

In any case, the decision by a scion of the Latin princely family of Villehardouin to turn his back on the Roman church and become an Orthodox monk is remarkable.

Theodosios achieved high ranks in the Orthodox church, including becoming the heads of the Pantokratōr (1261-1265) and Hodēgos (1266-1278) monasteries in Kōnstantinoupolis, and finally became the absentee Patriarch of Antioch (1278-1283/4). He

was a very good friend of Pachymerēs (Pach. 557^{13-14}), which explains the very favourable report of him that the author includes in this passage.

His entry in the *PLP* is no.7181.

"the executor of the affairs" (179^{6-7})

It seems that the see of Ephesos remained vacant between Nikēphoros' promotion and the reinstatement of Arsenios in 1261 which saw the election of Isaak to the see (see commentary to 177^{19-20}). In such cases the affairs of the vacant see were overseen by the Patriarchate itself, so Nikēphoros would have retained de facto control of the revenues of the archdiocese of Ephesos. On his death the basileus exercised his right to appoint an executor (oikonomos) to oversee the administration of the see's affairs until a new archbishop could be raised to the throne.

The oikonomos was one of the highest ranked officers of the Church, and was the administrator of all the worldly possessions, revenues and finances of the diocese, province or patriarchate, including the monasteries beholden to each. Early canon law had established the necessity for all clergy of the rank of bishop to have an oikonomos controlling his finances (Hussey 1986:327). For an extended discussion of the oikonomos see Darrouzès (1970:303-309).

"whether he wished to receive the monastic habit" (179^{8-9})

The decision of Nikēphoros to remain a member of the secular clergy until his death and not become a monk at the last minute, as so many Byzantines did (Charanis 1971:77-80), is mentioned by Pachymerēs with some evident surprise. When we consider Nikēphoros' character, however, it is less of a surprise. We know that he was attached to material things, even avaricious (Festa 147^{19ff}), and perhaps not suited for a more ascetic lifestyle, and we also know that he had long coveted the patriarchal throne (Pach. 165^{23}-167^{5}), believing that it was his by right, and had been his since 1243. With attitudes such as these it is no surprise at all that he decided to stay patriarch until the end of his life.

"he was a man to inspire awe" (179^{12-15})

Akropolitēs (177^{1-5}) and Nikēphoros Blemmidēs (39^{5-27}), are also complimentary about Nikēphoros of Ephesos' character and worthiness for the position. Blemmidēs, in particular, is vocal about his own respect and affection for Nikēphoros. The reasons Pachymerēs puts forward for the bad reception he received from the clergy are probably valid – at any other time he would have been welcomed as patriarch, but the manner of his

election and the controversy surrounding the fall of Arsenios were black marks against the validity of his reign.

2.23 How the basileus sidelined the young Iōannēs

"Meanwhile the basileus succeeded" (179[17])

Pachymerēs is commenting not on a specific event, but rather a gradual trend in the relations between Michaēl VIII and Iōannēs IV. Therefore we cannot assign a specific date to any of the matters referred to in this chapter. It is clear that Michaēl had long-held intentions of completely usurping all authority, as his actions at the coronation ceremony at the beginning of 1259 demonstrate (see commentary to 2.8), but the steps he undertook to undermine Iōannēs were slow and deliberate. Although Pachymerēs places this chapter between events which occurred at the end of 1260 – the death of patriarch Nikēphoros II – and the flight to the Nikaians of the Selçuk sultān Kayka'us II sometime early in 1261, which would suggest that Iōannēs was delivered into the safe-keeping of the Palaiologina sisters at the beginning of 1261, this chapter seems to have been intended as a bridging passage between the last appearance of Iōannēs in the text, at the coronation in 1259, and the next major passage, where Michaēl, now the victorious holder of Kōnstantinoupolis, has Iōannēs formally deposed and blinded (Pach. 3.10). Pachymerēs wishes to ensure that his readers do not forget that Iōannēs was the legitimate basileus, and to inform them of his life under Michaēl VIII's authority. Thus the chapter does not provide specific details or dates, but rather is an attempt by Pachymerēs to describe the process by which Michaēl usurped the throne.

"the trappings of Imperial dignity" (179[19])

We know that Iōannēs, though he was completely removed from governance, was still treated as basileus, even if it was in name only. Pachymerēs himself provides a prime example of this, when he records that the signal for the troops waiting to attack Kōnstantinoupolis was an acclamation of both Iōannēs and Michaēl (Pach. 197[18]). Iōannēs was increasingly out of the public eye, however, and there is no evidence that he was present at such state functions as the reception of the Selçuk sultān. In that case Pachymerēs very clearly states that 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II was granted the right to sit on the imperial dais next to the basil*eus*, and not next to the basil*eis* (Pach. 185[7-9]). Michaēl would have wished to keep Iōannēs out of sight as much as possible, in order to keep him out of the minds of his subjects.

"the tender care of Michaēl's sisters" (179^{20-21})

At this point (1260-61), Michaēl's oldest sister, Maria, was yet to take the veil, and was still living wither her husband Tarchaneiōtēs (see commentary to 55^{19}). His other sister, Eulogia, had been a nun for a number of years, but was still living at court (commentary to 155^{3}). Since nuns were largely forbidden to have many dealings with worldly affairs, and even with the teaching of children (Laiou 1985:79-98), the more likely candidate for Iōannēs' guardian is Maria Palaiologina.

"Martha had been like a mother to him" (179^{22})

There was perhaps a ten-year age difference between Maria and her younger brother Michaēl (Papadopulos 1938:13). With their mother having apparently died shortly after the birth of the youngest child, Kōnstantinos, and with their father Andronikos frequently away from home on campaign or in governorships, it would have been natural for Maria and her husband Nikēphoros Tarchaneiōtēs to provide a home for and supervision of her younger siblings.

Michaēl himself, however, in his monastic typikon for Hagios Michaēl, claims that he was taken at an early age to the court of Iōannēs III Batatzēs, who raised him like a son (Grégoire 1959-60:451). The time he spent in the household of his sister and brother-in-law may have been brief.

"she told of this destiny" (179^{27}-181^{6})

This passage provides a rare insight into Pachymerēs' research techniques. He stated at the beginning of his work that he sought out witnesses to the events he narrates (Pach. 23^{9-12}), and here is one of the few sources he identifies. He provides a wonderful word-picture of Eulogia's character, but the story he then repeats is unfortunately completely anecdotal and impossible to confirm, as he himself says. If Eulogia had told the tale of the young future-basileus before Michaēl's rise to the throne and capture of Kōnstantinoupolis then there might have been some significance to the tale, but the fact that Eulogia only began telling the tale after the events it alludes to, make it dubious, and there must be another, non-historical reason for Pachymerēs' inclusion of it.

On the one hand, Pachymerēs may have included it merely as a literary tool, designed to allude to events further on in the text – in this case the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis and Michaēl's ceremonial entry through the Chrysea Pylē. This explanation seems unlikely, however, since the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis would have been common knowledge

amongst his target audience, and there would have been no need for him to have included such an allusion.

On the other hand, is it possible that Pachymerēs believed the tale told him by Eulogia, and was genuinely convinced that the baby Michaēl had indeed been marked out for future greatness. We may recall that on numerous occasions in the text of his *Historia* Pachymerēs has recorded prophecies, portents and dreams, and treated them in a less-than-sceptical manner. He mentioned the *marpou* prophecy given to Manouēl Disypatos of Thessalonikē (Pach. 49^{1-24}), and that the death of Theodōros II was preceded by an eclipse (Pach. 59^{4-6}). He also recorded with great seriousness the dream of Iōannēs Bekkos (Pach. 2.19), and later he describes how his very own father had uncovered a prophecy which showed that Kōnstantinoupolis would fall to the Greeks and who would accomplish the deed (Pach. 203^{10-21}). All of these things were un-historical in the modern sense of the word, and yet Pachymerēs pays them much heed. Strange as it may seem for the author of the *Quadrivium*, it appears as though Pachymerēs, like so many of his contemporaries, was a believer in signs and portents.[106] If so, it may be because of a sense of historical determinism, rather than a sense of objectivity, that Pachymerēs does not condemn Michaēl VIII for his actions in dethroning Iōannēs IV.

"their advice" (181^{10-12})

Pachymerēs repeats this claim at 225^{12-16}. It is possible that the information came from Eulogia herself, as we know that Pachymerēs had been in communication with her, and if so it would indicate a particularly cold-blooded attitude on her part, in admitting to being the driving force behind the overthrow and blinding of a young boy.

2.24 The affair of the caliph and of the Persians; how they submitted to the Tocharioi

"Atarioi" (181^{14})

This name seems to be a corruption of the common European term for the Mongols: Tatars. For the name given to them by Byzantine authors, Tocharioi, see the commentary to 33^{14}.

[106] In his *Quadrivium* (391^{12-20}), Pachymeres does warn against false astrologers and makers of horoscopes, who "speak vain and empty words." This does not in any way suggest, however, that Pachymeres was not a believer in genuine divine signs and miracles.

"poured upon Persia like a flood" (181^{14-15})

In 1253 the khan of the Mongol empire, Möngke, had sent his brother Hülegü to the west with orders to extend the empire into the Middle East. Hülegü's advance was, however, leisurely, and he did not arrive in Persia until 1256 (Spuler 1939:48-53), when his arrival pushed the *noyan* Baiju into Anatolia (see commentary to 45^{2-3}). Hülegü proceeded to destroy the Muslim sect of the assassins (1256-1257) before marching into Iraq and demanding the submission of the caliph in Baghdad (Saunders 1971:108-112).

According to Smith (1984:307-345), Hülegü commanded an army of ninety thousand men, which could well be described by a Byzantine historian as a 'flood'. Saunders (1971:114) puts the total even higher, to perhaps four hundred thousand.

"they executed the caliph" (181^{15-18})

Baghdad fell to Hülegü on 10 February 1258, after a short siege. The city was pillaged and looted for a week, and thousands of its inhabitants were massacred.

The caliph, al-Mustasim, was apparently executed on 20 February, by being rolled in a carpet and trampled under the hooves of Hülegü's cavalry (Juzjani 1252-53; BH 431). Both the Arabs and the Mongols had a superstitious dread of shedding royal blood. Thus the Mongols executed Prince Michaēl of Chernigov in the late 1230's by having a Mongol soldier "trample on his chest with his boots" (Carpini 43).

Pachymerēs' tale apparently stems from the report by Hülegü's personal astronomer, Nasir al-Dīn Tusi, of the interview of the khan with the caliph. According to him, Hülegü put one of the caliph's gold plates in front of him and told al-Mustasim to eat it. When the reply came that such a thing was impossible, Hülegü reproached the caliph for not using his gold to pay for more soldiers and the defence of his city. Another version of the same story is found in Marco Polo (53) and several other western sources. According to this the caliph is locked up in his own treasure room with no food and left to starve with his wealth.

On this whole episode see Boyle (1961).

"the situation in Persia weakened" (181^{19-23})

After the fall of Baghdad the Mongols rapidly extended their empire through Iraq and Syria, meeting with little resistance from the local Muslim and Christian rulers, who surrendered one-by-one to the il-khan rather than unite against the common threat. Anatolia, and especially the Selçuk kingdom, had been Mongol vassals since the 1240's. The Selçuks were themselves in a state of unrest, with the Mongol-backed Rukn al-Dīn Kilij Arslan IV vying for power with his brother, the Nikaian-friendly 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us

II (al-Aqsarayli 50). Both brothers were compelled to join Hülegü's Syrian campaign of 1258-59 (Cahen 1968:278).

"this people" (181^{21})

The Byzantines used the term *ethnos* to refer to any identifiable body of foreigners not under the authority of the basileus. By Pachymerēs' time this term was limited to those groupings of people "capable of forming states by themselves" but who had not yet done so (Pach. 445^{13-14}). Thus the Mongols and the Rus were *ethnoi*, but the more civilised 'Italians' and 'Persians' were not.

"indolence and private licentiousness" (181^{24}-183^{1})

Bar Hebraeus also attacks Kayka'us II's lifestyle, reporting that:

> he gave himself up to a life of riotous luxury and to the gratification of lusts of various kinds. For whenever he heard [about] a wife, or a daughter, or a son of any of the nobles or of the people generally, he took them by force and debauched them (BH 422).

Akropolitēs also accuses Selçuk sultāns, in this case Ghiyath al-Dīn Kaikhusrau II and his father Ala al-Dīn Kaykubad II, of licentiousness (Akrop. 69^{1-6}). Condemnation of Islam as a religion of lascivious carnality was also a common tool of Christian polemicists at this time (Vryonis 1971:431-433). See also the comments of Lippard (1984:193).

"Basilikoi" (183^{1-19})

These two men, Basileios and his un-named brother (the 'other Basilikos'), appear only in the pages of Pachymerēs' *Historia*. Pachymerēs' comment that they had been in the theatrical profession should presumably be understood to mean that they had been musicians, since theatre proper had died under the Christian empire. Their rise to wealth and power under the sultān and basileus seems to be a rags to riches tale, and it may well be that Pachymerēs' ascribing a lowly origin to them may be an attempt to slander them, especially since Basileios was a keen supporter of Michaēl VIII's policy of Church union with Rome, a policy the historian abhorred, and even personally put out the eyes of Iōannēs Angelos, an anti-unionist (Pach. 615^{11-16}). We must also question why Michaēl VIII, as a firm believer in the rights of aristocratic privilege, would raise two commoners to positions in the higher court hierarchy.

The flight of the Basilikoi to the empire cannot be dated with any precision, but occurred sometime between January 1259, when Michaēl VIII became basileus, and the

middle of 1261, when the sultān reached Nikaian territory. It is clear that they deserted to the basileus before the sultān fled his kingdom.

Their entries in the *PLP* are nos. 2458 (Basileios) and 2452 (his un-named brother).

"parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos" (183^{12-13})

The office of the parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos was the descendent of the praepositus sacri cubiculi, and the role of the office-holder was to act as the bodyguard of the imperial person when the basileus was asleep and therefore most vulnerable. It was obviously a position of some trust. Even in the late Byzantine period, when many old titles were purely honorific, the parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos appears to have retained his old role. There may have been more than one at any given time, since Basileios Basilikos held the office until the end of Michaēl's reign (Pach. 615^{11-15}), but Michaēl also employed others during the 1260's and 1270's: Makrēnos, Isaak Doukas, a Sphrantzēs and a Nostongos. See Guilland (1967:1.202-215).

"megas hetaireiarchēs" (183^{14})

Dating to the tenth century, the office of the megas hetaireiarchēs provided the chiefs of security for the imperial palaces, and thus had much de facto control over the various units of imperial bodyguards. A quasi-military position, the megas hetaireiarchēs was occasionally put in command of armies or sent on diplomatic missions. The office was usually held by members of noble, but not the greatest, families, though this was changing under the Palaiologoi. See Karlin-Hayter (1974:101-143).

"pensions" (183^{16})

Failler (1984:183 n.6 and 29 n.3) claims that Pachymerēs uses the word *oikonomia* as a synonym for *pronoiai*. A close look at the Greek text would suggest otherwise. In the first three Books of the Histories, Pachymerēs uses the word *oikonomia* seven times, and only two of those references can possibly refer to pronoiai of any kind (Pach. 183^{16} and 287^{16}), with the other references obviously having different meanings (Pach. 179^{6}, 233^{14}, 237^{11}, 241^{14} and 293^{4}). On the other hand, Pachymerēs is not afraid to use the actual word *pronoia* in the sense of a grant of land revenues. He uses the word fifteen times in the first three Books alone (Pach. 29^{24}, $31^{16,26}$, 51^{12}, 63^{18}, 71^{19}, 81^{11}, 99^{7}, 103^{3}, 131^{19}, $139^{3,8}$, 171^{23}, 309^{13}, 311^{11}). Thus we may be sure, with Kazhdan (1995:162), that Pachymerēs would use the correct word to describe each situation, and that the financial benefits awarded to the brothers Basilikos by Michaēl VIII did not come in the form of *pronoiai*.

"the state of their own affairs" (183[21])

The Selçuk kingdom was in turmoil at this time. After his return to Konya at the head of Nikaian troops in May 1257, 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II had servilely submitted to Hülegü (Rashid ad-Din 323), who confirmed the division of the sultānate into western and eastern halves ruled respectively by Kayka'us II in Konya and Kilij Arslan IV in Kayseri. Relations between the brothers remained tense. Al-Aqsarayli (50) suggests that Kayka'us' authority over his emirs, who deserted him in large numbers, was weakened because of his close relationship with the Christian empire and the questionable purity of his own faith. This suggestion is also made by Willem van Ruysbroeck (219). The situation in Anatolia was made worse by the rebellions of Türkmen nomads in the west and by Kurds in the southeast (Cahen 1968:277-279).

After making no effort to repay loans made by Hülegü, Kayka'us II was accused, in early 1261, of plotting rebellion and being in league with the Mamlûks. His brother Rukn al-Dīn Kilij Arslan IV supported the accusation, Kayka'us II's own vizier deserted him and the sultān was left with no option but flight (Ibn Bibi 284-285; BH 442). For the timing of the flight see the argument of Spuler (1939:54), who says that Kayka'us II arrived in Nikaian territory in April 1261, a much more reasonable estimate than that of Dölger (*Regesten* 1887) who makes an argument for autumn of 1260.

"all his wives" (183[22-24])

According to Cahen (1968:204), who does not cite his sources, at least two of Kayka'us II's sons were of Christian mothers. How many wives he had, and their identities, is unknown, although a contemporary Armenian writer records that in 1246 Kayka'us II married a woman of the Laskaris family (cited by Langdon 1998:120 and n.136). Cahen's argument (1968:274) that this was a daughter of Iōannēs III himself – since Kayka'us always looked to Nikaia first for safety and succour – must be questioned in light of his generous welcome to Michaēl Palaiologos, the enemy of Kayka'us' supposed brother-in-law Theodōros II, and Theodōros' subsequent willingness to provide the sultān aid despite this sheltering of Palaiologos.

The mother of 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II was the daughter of a Greek priest, and was named Barduliya or Börduliye (Ibn Bibi 204). She may have been a concubine, rather than a wife, of Kaikusrau II (Willem van Ruysbroeck 219).[107]

[107] Turan (1953:80) incorrectly states that Willem van Ruysbroeck is listing the wives of Kaikaus II, when he is in fact describing the wives and concubines of Izz's father Kaikhosrau II.

"the Melēk previously mentioned" (183^{26-29})

As argued in the commentary to 149^{19}, Pachymerēs' 'Melēk' is Rukn al-Dīn Kilij Arslan IV, 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II's younger brother and the ruler of the eastern half of the Selçuk dominions.

Pachymerēs' claim, that 'Melēk' was at this time a prisoner of the basileus, Michaēl VIII, and was being used by him as some sort of diplomatic threat against Kayka'us II, is incorrect.

The entire passage would make more sense if the word 'basileus' was replaced by 'khan', for at this time (1260-61) Rukn al-Dīn Kilij Arslan IV was a loyal vassal of Hülegü, to the extent that much of the day-to-day running of his sultānate was overseen by Mongol officials. His freedom to act independently of the il-khan was severely curtailed, and since Kayka'us II, too, was a vassal of the Mongols, albeit a much more loosely controlled one, Kilij Arslan IV was prohibited from re-igniting the fratricidal power struggle with his brother (Cahen 1968:275-276). Kayka'us II's position was therefore totally at the mercy of Hülegü, who might at any time remove his protection and permit Kilij Arslan IV to seize the whole sultānate.

It is tempting to suggest that Pachymerēs was basing his account upon some other work, and misinterpreted a general term such as 'archōn' as 'basileus', when it really referred to Hülegü Il-khan. Hülegü is usually called archōn by Pachymerēs (Pach. 235^{4-5}, 185^{22}).

"old signs of friendship" (183^{29}-185^{1})

This is a reference to the warm reception given by Kayka'us II to Michaēl Palaiologos in 1256 when the then megas konostaulos was fleeing from the wrath of Theodōros II (Pach. 43^{25}-45^{4} and commentary).

"what he desired" (185^{1})

Grēgoras (82^{11-14}) claims that 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II wanted one of two things from the basileus: either an alliance against the Mongols (and presumably also his brother Rukn al-Dīn) or else estates in some mountainous area of the empire on which he and his followers could settle.

"a mass of gold" (185^{2})

Grēgoras also mentions that 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II fled while in the possession of a great mass of treasure (Greg. 82^{15}). That the sultān had all this wealth, and yet refused to repay a loan from Hülegü, would be good cause for the break with the il-khan (Ibn Bibi 284).

"heralded by the metropolitan of Pissidia" (185^{3})

This metropolitan bishop of Antioch-in-Pissidia is presumably Makarios, who is mentioned later in the *Historia* as a partisan of Patriarch Arsenios against Patriarch Iōsēph I (Pach. 339^{10}, 349^{10-11}).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 16271.

Pachymerēs' testimony seems to indicate that Makarios was used by the sultān as a go-between to Michaēl VIII, to ensure that the sultān would be provided with a safe-conduct to Nikaian territory. In much the same way Michaēl had himself used a bishop to pave the way for his return from exile in Selçuk territory in 1257 (Pach. 45^{4}).

"the basileus did not know what to do with them" (185^{4})

The reason for this was the ongoing negotiations between Michaēl VIII and Hülegü Il-khan (see Pach 185^{22} and commentary). Giving shelter to an old friend was the honourable thing to do, but the basileus could ill-afford to anger the il-khan by harbouring his enemy.

"live in the style" (185^{7})

Cahen (1968:220) gives a summary of the trappings of Selçuk royal power. The adoption of red footwear by the sultān, a practice not otherwise attested for the Selçuks in our sources, may have been a singular honour bestowed on Kayka'us II by the basileus. The importance of the red shoes as an imperial symbol is illustrated by an anecdote of Psellos, in which Basileios II refused to accept the surrender of the would-be basileus Skleros until the latter had removed the red shoes he was wearing (Psellos 27, cited by Jacoby (1993:149 n.24).

"the followers of the sultān" (185^{13})

Pachymerēs does not give any suggestion here that the sultān had more than a handful of followers, and neither does Grēgoras (82^{14-17}).

The Persian chronicle of Yazidjioghlu Ali, however, indicates that an army of unknown size followed the sultān into exile (Wittek 1952:648), and that it later fought for the empire, being settled in the Dobrudja region between the Danube River and the Black Sea.

Bartusis (1992:53) argues that these soldiers were the same Turks used in 1262 against the Franks of the Morea, but this is unlikely, given that the sultān's Turks were settled in the empire with their families, and would not have gone over to the enemy, as the Turkish soldiers in 1262 were to do. The deserters were undoubtedly mercenaries recruited from Anatolia.

"join the basileus on campaign" (185^{15-18})

The accompanying of 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II on Michaēl VIII's campaign at this time is problematic. Pachymerēs obviously refers to an expedition that took place in Europe soon after the sultān's arrival in the empire, since he speaks of Kayka'us' family 'staying behind' in the East, where they were first received.

The best candidate for Michaēl's campaign is his planned late-summer attack against Kōnstantinoupolis. We are not aware of any actual fighting in which Michaēl VIII was involved in 1261, but the campaign to which Pachymerēs refers took place in Europe. This is certainly implied by the fact that the Selçuk royal family stayed behind in the East. We know that Iōannēs Palaiologos was sent to Makedonia at this time (Pach. 191^{9-10}) and Alexios Stratēgopoulos was ordered to Thrace, but no other military activity took place in the Nikaian Europe in 1261. That Michaēl VIII was planning an attack on Kōnstantinoupolis will be argued later (commentary to 191^{27}-193^{2}). This attack did not eventuate, because Stratēgopoulos caught the city by surprise on 25 July. Michaēl did then make a rapid journey from Anatolia to Kōnstantinoupolis, arriving on 14 August. We know that Kayka'us II was with the basileus on this journey, since he was in Kōnstantinoupolis shortly after the capture (Pach. 235^{6-7}).

Pachymerēs is not necessarily saying that an actual campaign took place, but that the basileus intended to have Kayka'us accompany him in order to separate the sultān from his family and therefore hold them as hostages to his good behaviour. Nevertheless the basileus did take the sultān with him when he left Anatolia on his victorious progress to Kōnstantinoupolis.

"to secure the sultān" (185^{19-21})

'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II's captivity was not uncomfortable (Pach. 235^{6-7} has him spending his time feasting and drinking with a coterie of retainers), but captivity it was. The sultān did not initially seems aware of his situation, but the basileus' dealings with the il-khan, and his determination not to help Kayka'us II regain his throne eventually became apparent to him. He therefore began plotting with Kōnstantinos Teichos, the Bulgarian tsar, and with the Qipchaq Mongols of the Ukraine. In early 1265 a Bulgar-Mongol army managed to free the sultān and he retired to the Crimea (Pach. 301^{11}-313^{18}; Greg. 99^{12}-100^{19}; Wittek 1952:648; BH 445; Cahen 1968:279).

"a peace treaty" (185^{22})

This agreement with the il-khan predated the arrival of 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II at Nikaia, and thus we may accept the suggestion of Dölger (*Regesten* 1887) that it was made in the

autumn of 1260. Pachymerēs' explanation for Michaēl VIII's seeking of an alliance with the Mongols was his fear of their power (Pach. 187^{8-10}). Certainly, after personally witnessing the Mongol-wrought destruction of the Selçuk army at Akseray in 1256, Michaēl would have had no illusions about the empire's chances should the Mongols have decided to attack. In the light of 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II's obvious inability to maintain his authority over the sultānate, the choice Michaēl faced – between the all-conquering Mongols of Hülegü and the politically impotent sultān and a chaotic Selçuk sultānate – was no choice at all.

Langdon (1998:137 n.241) claims that Michaēl sought to invite the Mongols into Anatolia in order to cow the Turkmen on the Nikaian frontier. But Pachymerēs clearly indicates that this was not the case, and in fact that Michaēl sought to come to an arrangement with the Turkmen to recreate the buffer, between the empire and the khanate, that was lost when the sultānate collapsed.

"some of them" (185^{25})
See commentary to 33^{13-24}.

"through marriage" (187^{8})
This hymeneal alliance was finally formed, after years of negotiation, in 1265. The union was intended to be between Hülegü and Michaēl VIII's natural daughter Maria, but the bride-to-be arrived at the il-khan's court at Tabriz after Hülegü had died. She then instead married Hülegü's son and successor, Abaqa (Pach. 235^{11-13}, 301^{15-16}; Lippard 1984:159; Runciman1960:48-49; Dölger, *Regesten*, 1932).

2.25 The attitude of earlier basileis to the news of the Tocharioi

"Iōannēs Doukas" (187^{12-13})
These defensive measures of Iōannēs III seem to have been undertaken in the aftermath of the battle of Köse Dagh, fought in the summer of 1243, in which the ability of the Selçuk Turks to act as a buffer between Nikaia and the Mongols was destroyed (Akrop. 69^{14-16}). Reports of the battle reached the basileus while he was engaged in the siege of Thessalonikē, and were treated so seriously by Batatzēs that he felt obliged to come to terms with Iōannēs Angelos of Thessalonikē, rather than continue the siege, and return to the eastern frontier (Akrop. 67^{1-25}).

Up until the battle of Köse Dagh, the Mongols had been largely uninvolved in Anatolian and Balkan affairs, and were thus beyond the horizon of the Nikaian world.

"grain and arms" (187^{13})

Skoutariōtēs also records Iōannēs III's efforts to prepare the empire for invasion, especially singling out the stockpiling of arms of all types "in order that when there should be need of them the defenders would have them in plenty", and of grains of all types, "saving them for a time of barrenness and need" (Skout. 506-507).

"he also provided all necessary things" (187^{15})

This appears to be a reference to an increase of imperial benevolence towards the inhabitants of the Anatolian frontier of the empire. Pachymerēs has already commented on the good treatment of these people by the Laskarids (Pach. 29^{24}-31^{10}). This current passage, with its mentioning of future abundance, reflects the attitude of his earlier comments. It would appear, then, that at least some of the benefits awarded to the borderers came as a direct consequence of the Mongol influence in Anatolian affairs.

"they had the heads of dogs" (187^{20})

The existence of the *cynocephalae*, a race of dog-headed humans was an ancient myth, extending back to at least Hesiod's time (Hesiod fr.150 Merkel-Bach-West). Such people always dwelt beyond the borders of the contemporary known world, and by the 13th century they had moved from Ethiopia (Strabo 16.4.16) to the Far East. Thus Friar Giovanni di Plano Carpini, writing in the 1240's, records that the Mongols, during their conquests, had come upon a race of monsters with human bodies but faces of dogs (Carpini 69), though Friar Willem van Ruysbroeck rejects the existence of such monstrosities on the testimony of Mongols he talked with (Willem van Ruysbroeck 170). Marco Polo and Friar Odoric record the presence of dog-heads in the Indian Ocean (Marco Polo 258; Odoric 232-3). For modern studies on *cynocephalae* see White (1991), Romm (1992) and Wittkower (1977). Even the Arab traveller, Ibn Battuta, claimed that a dog-headed race existed, which shows that the myth was not limited to Europeans (Wittkower 1977:73).

"they were cannibals" (187^{21})

This was another common rumour spread about the Mongols in 13th century Europe. To give one contemporary example, Matthew Paris (131) reports that the Mongols "feed on raw flesh, and even on human beings". Even one who had travelled all the way to the

Mongol court, John di Plano Carpini (52), wrote that the Mongols would eat human flesh "when in difficulty".

This rumour may be nothing more than the continuance of a tradition which extends at least as far back as Herodotos who wrote that the *Anthropophagi*, who lived on the Eurasian steppe, were nomadic, dressed as Scythians but who spoke a language peculiar to themselves (Herodotos 4.106). Herodotos may well in this passage be the originator of a literary topos that survived to the Middle Ages. Pachymerēs himself obviously disbelieved such tales, and knew a great deal about the Mongols and their way of life (see Pach. 445^{23}-449^{11}).

"they were sending ambassadors to him" (187^{22-23})

It is unfortunate that no other Byzantine sources mention this Mongol embassy to Theodōros II, because Pachymerēs' account, with its emphasis on the clever ruses, deceptions and stratagems of the basileus, and the absence of any substance regarding the purpose of and results from the embassy, appears more like a contrived anecdotal story than an accurate account of events. It is relevant to compare Pachymerēs' account of this embassy to those encountered in chapters 2.10 and 2.12 of his *Historia*. All of the embassies contained in those chapters are discussed very briefly, yet Pachymerēs is still able to give the reasons why they were all sent, and say how successful they were in their missions. But although the Mongol embassy under discussion here is treated at some length by Pachymerēs, he gives neither a reason for its despatch to Nikaia, nor any clues as to whether it was successful or not.

Thus this Mongol embassy to Theodōros II has been the subject of some scholarly debate. Both Lippard (1984:181-183) and Langdon (1998:131) argue that the embassy came right at the beginning of the basileus' reign, while Andreeva (1926:192) gives a different account, saying that it must have arrived late in the reign, in 1257 or 1258. Lippard bases his dating on two things. The first is the absence of any other Mongol embassies in the Byzantine sources for the reign of Theodōros II, and the second is the testimony of Willem van Ruysbroeck (187), who says that he encountered a Mongol embassy at the eastern Anatolian town of Erzerum in February 1255, and that this embassy was returning to the east after being sent away from Iōannēs III. In the absence of any other Mongol embassies to the Nikaian court, argues Lippard, this embassy encountered by the western friar must also be the one written about by Pachymerēs. Lippard (1984:184-185) agrees that there is a problem, in that the embassy in Erzerum was no way connected to Theodōros II, but he argues that Willem van Ruysbroeck was simply mistaken, and that the embassy may have been received by Iōannēs III, but had been sent back by Theodōros II

after the death of his father.[108] If Lippard is right about this, however, it is then impossible for Pachymerēs' account to be correct, since Theodōros would then have been unable to anticipate the despatch of the embassy to him. More important, however, is Lippard's first assumption, that the two embassies in our contemporary sources must be the same. This is an argument from silence, and cannot be accepted without much more circumstantial evidence to support it. This support is lacking. We are told by Willem van Ruysbroeck that the embassy he encountered was originally sent from the khan to the Pope, and was merely intending to pass through Nikaian territory. This does not agree at all with Pachymerēs, who writes that the embassy was sent especially to meet with the basileus, and that the approach of the embassy was known to the Nikaians. It is questionable whether Theodōros would have made such efforts to cow the ambassadors as he did, or indeed to meet with them at all, if the mission was merely seeking transit through his realm. Akropolitēs (105^{18}-111^{8}), who gives a lengthy narrative for the opening months of the reign, makes it clear that Theodōros was in a great hurry to leave Anatolia and campaign against the Bulgars, so we may also question whether the basileus would have had the time to engage in such diplomatic posturing as Pachymerēs records.

Similar arguments can be used against Langdon's proposal. According to him the embassy arrived soon after Theodōros' accession, and was actually a coda to the embassy's primary mission, which was to carry an order from Batu of the Qipchaq Mongols to Sultān 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II, ordering the sultān to attend Möngke Khan at Qaraqorum. Once again we have a scholar connecting two embassies, but for a second time we encounter problems in the fit. We know that the summons to Qaraqorum was received by Kayka'us II in the middle of 1254, and yet Pachymerēs explicitly states that Theodōros was on the throne when word of the embassy's approach reached him. If the ambassadors had orders from Batu to proceed from the Selçuk court to the Nikaian, Langdon's thesis would have us either accept that their journey from Konya to Nikaia took nearly half a year, or else that the ambassadors, after passing the order to the sultān, then remained in Konya for several months before continuing their mission. In addition, Langdon gives no reason why Batu, the khan of the Qipchaq Mongols of the Ukraine, would desire to have diplomatic discussions with the Nikaian basileus in 1254.

Andreeva's dating, on the other hand, makes more sense. In 1256 the Selçuks under 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II were heavily defeated in the battle of Akseray by the Mongols under Baiju. This defeat precipitated the return of Theodōros II and his whole army to Anatolia from Europe (Akrop. 138^{21}-139^{2}). He made an alliance with Kayka'us II and then

[108] This is a fair argument, since if the embassy had been sent back by Iōannēs III then its travelling speed was very low, having taken more than three months to traverse the length of Anatolia.

sent a force to reseat the sultān on his throne in Konya in May 1257 (see commentary to 45^{2-3}). In this episode we have both a cause for Theodōros to send bellicose messages to the Mongols – the Mongol dethronement of Nikaia's ally Kayka'us II – as well as a reason for the Mongols to send envoys to Nikaia – the alliance of Nikaia with the Mongols' enemy Kayka'us II. We also have adequate time for Theodōros to prepare for the Mongol mission, and also the presence in Anatolia of the bulk of the Nikaian army (Akrop. 145^{4-5}), both of which are required for Pachymerēs' tale to be accepted. Fear of a Mongol attack on Nikaia would have been very real in 1257, while it would have been far less conceivable in 1254, when the Selçuks under 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II still served as a buffer-state.

The only possible objection to this theory is the lack of any Mongol military action in response to the provocations, in both word and deed, of the empire. But we must remember that Kayka'us II, once back in Konya, was very quick to make his peace with the Mongols and pledged his submission to Hülegü Il-Khan (Cahen 1968:278), and that Mongol attention was at the time diverted by Hülegü's campaigns against Baghdad and Syria. By the time Hülegü had finished in the south and began to look once more at Anatolian affairs, in 1260-1261, the hostile basileus Theodōros II had been replaced by the much more submissive Michaēl VIII who, as Pachymerēs has said, was very afraid of the Mongols and quick to come to terms with Hülegü (Pach. 187^{4-10}).

"sent men to Persia" (187^{25})

While Pachymerēs usually uses 'Persia' to designate all the lands under the Selçuk sultāns, in this instance he is actually referring to Persia itself, where Hülegü Il-khan had his capital at Tabriz.

"he was prepared to march against them" (187^{26})

This was presumably not a declaration of war, but rather a warning to the Mongols that the position of Sultān 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II, newly restored to Konya, was being guaranteed by the empire, and an undertaking by the empire that it was prepared to fight on his behalf should the Mongols or their vassals seek to topple him again.

"there was to be compensation" (187^{26-29})

Such a precaution was probably unnecessary, since the Mongols were firmer believers than most in the inviolability of envoys and ambassadors. Indeed, the execution of Mongol envoys was viewed with outraged horror in 1218 and 1241, the former instance sparking the invasion and destruction of the Khwarizm kingdom, and in the latter instance the great invasion of Eastern Europe.

Nonetheless the journey of ambassadors from Europe to the Mongol court was not without its travails. Giovanni di Plano Carpini bemoans the plight of Western ambassadors, who, he says, are given only meagre allowances from both their masters and from their hosts, were fed only once per day and were constantly hounded by lesser nobles and officials for "gifts" (Carpini 66).

"for their wives and children" (187^{28-29})
Pachymerēs uses the word *sitēresion* to designate a payment made in kind rather than cash (see commentary to 139^{8}). Here Theodōros II is promising to ensure the survival of the wives and children of his envoys if the envoys died in the course of their duty. Cash payments would have been unnecessary for the families, who would instead be ensured of receiving adequate food, clothing and perhaps a place to live.

"to show them the way" (187^{30})
Unfortunately we are given no idea as to the actual path taken by the embassy and its guides.

"to take them by a difficult route" (189^{1})
There is a remarkable continuity between the actions Theodōros II took to impress the Mongol envoys and the instructions given to another Mongol mission by Möngke Khan. According to Willem van Ruysbroeck (186), the ambassador was "to take stock of the routes, the terrain, the towns and castles, and the people and their weapons" of those lands he passed through. Since Theodōros acted as if he knew that instructions like these had been given to the envoys coming to see him, we may suppose that the envoys of all rulers of this period had instructions to report on all they saw during their missions.

"he ordered the whole army" (189^{5-6})
We know of only two occasions during Theodōros II's reign when the Nikaian army was concentrated in Anatolia. The first is the period after the accession of the basileus, and the second is in the aftermath of the battle of Akseray in 1256-57. As argued above (commentary to 187^{22-23}), the later date is the more logical for these events to have occurred.

"phratries, tribes and units" (189^{6})
This imaginary division of the late Byzantine army into the units of Classical Athens, something Pachymerēs does not do anywhere else in his *Historia*, adds considerably to the

set-piece, rhetorical quality of this whole episode. Of the three terms Pachymerēs uses here, only *taxeis* dates from the Byzantine period, and even that had largely been replaced by this time by the term *allagia* (Bartusis 1992:256).

Nevertheless, Pachymerēs seems to be saying that formations of soldiers were drawn up along the roads leading to the basileus' camp, and not all in one place, where an observer would have an easier time calculating their number.

"he also ordered the senate" (189^{8})

Pachymerēs uses a very cumbersome simile here. By comparing the nobles of the empire to an unadorned ring, Pachymerēs is saying that the richly garbed aristocrats and officials were constantly coming and going, giving the appearance of a never-ending procession, when in fact the same individuals were recycled numerous times.

It would be questionable whether official ambassadors, chosen for their observational as much as for their diplomatic skill, would have been taken in by such a deception, but it does add to the rhetorical power of Pachymerēs' account.

It is also interesting to note that, as far as we are told by Pachymerēs' narrative, there was no participation by clergy in the reception, and the emphasis placed on the appearance of strength on the part of the empire may have precluded any such participation. Was Theodōros' plan to give a martial reception for representatives of a warlike race?

"As for the basileus" (189^{15})

As noted first by Andreeva (1926:192-200), Pachymerēs' description of all the pomp and ceremony surrounding the reception of the Mongol embassy bears a close resemblance to the ceremony of *prokypsis* – presentation – which is described in some detail by Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 195^{11}-204^{23}) and which was used for important public occasions when the basileus needed to be presented in the most impressive of ways.

"dressing himself in the imperial garb" (189^{15-16})

The vestments of the basileus for the *prokypsis* ceremony are described by Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 198^{16}-202^{24}). He differentiates it from the basileus' "ordinary costume" (PK 195^{13}).

We may note that by this display Theodōros II shows that he absorbed the lesson given by his father, Iōannēs III, about the proper uses for imperial finery (Pach. 63^{6-9}).

"his sword" (189^{16})

In late Byzantium, as in other medieval societies, the sword was an important symbol of rulership (see commentary to 199^{16-17}). Pseudo-Kodinos mentions the imperial sword on

numerous occasions, usually in reference to the individuals permitted to carry it and the ceremonies in which it was used (e.g. PK 175^{32}-176^{14}). It served, according to that writer, as a symbol of power (PK 202^{6-7}). In the ceremony of *prokypsis* the sword was carried to the imperial dais by the megas domestikos (PK 190^{17-21}).

"other people" (189^{17-18})

According to Pseudo-Kodinos (PK 203^{11-22}), the basileus is accompanied onto the dais during the *prokypsis* ceremony by a retinue of ranking officials, including the prōtobestiarios and the megas domestikos, but that they then move to the sides of the platform, away from the curtains shrouding the throne.

We may also feel confident that the basileus was accompanied by some bodyguards, probably Varangians, as well as the nobles. We can guess this because Sultān 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II, who was permitted by Michaēl VIII to have the trappings of imperial rank, was surrounded by his guards while on his throne (Pach. 185^{7-9}).

"the curtains were opened" (189^{19-21})

Pachymerēs differs from Pseudo-Kodinos on this point. The latter author mentions the presence of a choir of clergy who begin chanting when the curtains are pulled back to reveal the basileus (PK 203^{23-27}). The absence of any clerical participation in the ceremony depicted by Pachymerēs has been mentioned previously (commentary to 189^{8}).

"he sent them away" (189^{24-25})

It is unlikely that Theodōros II would have dealt with an important embassy from the il-khan in such an abrupt manner. Pachymerēs is probably ignoring the discussions and negotiations that would have taken place after this initial audience. We have already noted that Pachymerēs seems to know nothing about the purposes of the Mongol mission, or what resulted from it (commentary to 187^{22-23}).

"and in that way" (189^{26})

Pachymerēs here draws a didactic lesson from the narrative, and this may betray his reason for including the extended digression on this early meeting of Byzantine and Mongol, which appears far out of chronological order in his *Historia*. The point he is making may be a comparison between the way in which the Laskarids dealt with the Mongols – using bluff and showing themselves ready to fight – and the cowardly actions of Michaēl VIII, who was unnecessarily craven in his dealings with the khans. See Pachymerēs' attitudes as expressed at 187^{8-10}.

"But at this time" (189^{27})

Pachymerēs' narrative returns to its proper chronological sequence, with a general comment about Byzantine-Mongol relations and the frequency of diplomatic contact between them. The marriage he mentions is the proposed wedding between Hülegü Il-khan and Maria, natural daughter of Michaēl VIII (see commentary to 187^{8}).

2.26 Of the affairs of the West, and how the kaisar attacked the City while passing

"the despotēs Michaēl did not accept" (191^{2})

This passage is similar to an earlier one in which Pachymerēs gives as motive for Michaēl II's hostility towards Nikaia the lost grandeur of the empire of Theodōros Angelos (Pach. 115^{9-18}). This new passage differs from the earlier one in one important respect: here Michaēl is made to lament the loss of specific but unspecified places to the Nikaians. It thus strongly implies that the treaty he had signed at the end of 1260 had required him to renounce his claim to lands lost during 1259, and that the recovery brought about by the victory at Trikoryphos (Pach. 125^{23-25} and commentary) was only a partial one. On this see also the commentary to 151^{21-22}.

"Iacōbos of Achrida" (191^{4-5})

This is a repetition by Pachymerēs of an earlier mistake (115^{15}). Theodōros was crowned basileus by Dēmētrios Chomatenos, not Iacōbos of Achrida.

"renounced the treaty he had made" (191^{6-7})

This treaty between the despotēs and the basileus was signed in the summer of 1260, when Michaēl VIII was poised to unleash a great army upon Epiros for the second consecutive year. See the commentary to 151^{21}-153^{1}.

"ordered the despotēs Iōannēs" (191^{9-10})

Of the extent sources only Pachymerēs mentions this expedition of Iōannēs Palaiologos against Epiros. The other major Greek sources, Akropolitēs (181^{1-3}), Grēgoras (83^{3-12}), Skoutariōtēs (550^{17-18}) and Ephraim (9483-9485) all equate the new operation in Epiros with the mission of Stratēgopoulos which resulted in the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis.

Akropolitēs (181^{5-6}) even goes so far as to make the strange claim that Stratēgopoulos was sent to the west, but was to threaten the Latins in Kōnstantinoupolis on his way, since '*the road [to Makedonia] runs near the city.*' The absurdity of this assertion is made clear when one considers that the crossing point for armies from Asia to Europe, at this time, was almost always across the Hellespont, between Lampsakos and Kallioupolis, towns nearly as far away from Kōnstantinoupolis as they are from Thessalonikē!

There is no real reason to doubt that Iōannēs would have had the command over any army sent to Epiros at this time, but there are reasons to suspect that Pachymerēs is in error over the purpose and scale of the expedition. In the first place there is the question whether Michaēl II would be ready to renounce his treaty with the basileus after less than one year. It must be remembered that Michaēl II was greatly concerned with reaching an agreement with Nikaia in 1260, to the extent that he returned the captive Stratēgopoulos, handed over his own son Iōannēs to be a hostage at the Nikaian court and relinquished his claim to most of Makedonia. If he had gone to such trouble to secure peace from the basileus, why would he voluntarily return to war after only a few months? Epiros was largely on the defensive and restarting the war was not to its advantage, especially considering the great losses sustained in the fighting in 1259.

In the second place we must consider the division of the empire's resources in 1261. The military strength of the empire was not infinite, and the previous two years' fighting alone demonstrated that the imperial army was only large enough to sustain a major effort in one theatre at a time. Thus while the Pelagonia campaign was undertaken in the west, the east was kept in a state of peace through treaties and alliances, but in 1260, when Epiros seemed to have been beaten into submission, a major attack was launched against Kōnstantinoupolis. That great effort had to be abandoned when Epiros bounced back at Trikoryphos and the empire's strength was again directed west. It will be covered in more detail later, but it seems that in 1261 Michaēl VIII was planning another great attack against Kōnstantinoupolis, this time with Genoese naval assistance, and that Stratēgopoulos' mission was to reconnoitre the city and its defences as a prelude to the major attack. If this is the case it argues against any earlier despatch of large forces to Epiros, since it could be expected that the basileus would employ at least as large a force as he had in 1260, in order to avoid a second failure. There simply would not have been many troops available for a western campaign.

In the third place we have the evidence provided by Pachymerēs in a later passage (Pach. 271^{22}-273^{1}). According to this passage, which describes events of autumn/winter 1261, Iōannēs Palaiologos was already in the west when Michaēl VIII sent to him "the Anatolian forces as well as the Scythian contingent" in order to make war on the Epirotes,

Albanians and Serbs.[109] That Iōannēs Palaiologos needed to receive such reinforcements before embarking upon offensive measures strongly indicates that he could not have undertaken such measures earlier in the year, as Pachymerēs claims.

All things considered, it would appear that Michaēl VIII only agreed to the peace treaty with Michaēl II to ensure that Epiros remained calm until Kōnstantinoupolis was taken, and that Iōannēs was sent to the west early in 1260 with only a small force, to provide for the defence of the area if Michaēl II proved false while the basileus concentrated on the attack upon Kōnstantinoupolis. Iōannēs was not to engage in any offensive campaigning, and it is not even likely that Michaēl II had renounced the treaty of 1260, as Pachymerēs claims.

"the forces of the king of Sicily" (191^{10-11})

These are undoubtedly the troops which had been sent by Manfred in late 1259 as reinforcement for the despotēs, and which helped win the battle of Trikoryphos (see Pach. 125^{22-25} and commentary). It appears that after the defeat of the Nikaian army this force recovered most, if not all, of the areas claimed by Manfred on the Adriatic coast, including Dyrrachion and Avlona. Pachymerēs must be exaggerating the extent of the Sicilian-occupied territory, for most of Illyria and New Epiros was still held by Michaēl II, Manfred's father-in-law and ally, and Manfred would not have angered the despotēs by taking lands from him.

"Illyria and New Epiros" (191^{11})

Grēgoras provides a definition of Old Epiros, saying that it comprised the western Greek lands bordered by the Pindos and Akrokeraunian mountains in the north and the river Acheloös in the east (Greg. 110^{7-20}). New Epiros was the land directly north of the Pindos and Akrokeraunian mountains, especially the lands around the towns of Dyrrachion, Berat and Avlona. Illyria was the Albanian territory to the north and northeast of New Epiros.

"he sent troops thither to fight them" (191^{12})

As with the reported expedition of Iōannēs Palaiologos against Epiros (see above), Pachymerēs is probably in error here, and for much the same reasons. There is no mention of the Sicilians in Iōannēs' orders for 1262 (Pach. 271^{22-24}), which would be expected had

[109] Note especially the presence among these reinforcements of the 'Scythians'. These were the heart of Stratēgopoulos' army just a few months before, and it is likely that when they went west he was still in command of them, as we know that he was captured in Epiros towards the end of 1261 (see the commentary to 127^{3ff}). On these reinforcements see also Grēgoras, who writes that Stratēgopoulos had orders to reconnoitre Kōnstantinoupolis and then to march to Makedonia, mustering reinforcements for Iōannēs Palaiologos as he advanced through Thrace (Greg. 83^{11-12}).

operations against them been conducted in 1261. In addition, the ease with which the negotiations for the return of Manfred's sister Constanza were conducted at the end of 1261 is suggestive of a state of truce between Manfred and Michaēl VIII. The Sicilian king would not have been so easily dealt with had his Albanian possessions been under threat.

"the Scythians and a small number of other troops" (191^{13})

Akropolitēs (181^{2}) uses the very vague word 'some' (*tinōn*) to describe the forces given to Stratēgopoulos, and Holobōlos (66^{29-30}) states that the force was 'small' (*brachu*), while Grēgoras, more precise, says that the army was composed of "not many more than eight hundred Bithynian soldiers" (Greg. 83^{10}).[110] Despite the precision of Grēgoras' figure we must be careful before stating that this total represented the entire force. Grēgoras makes no mention of the Cuman troops who figure so prominently in the accounts of Pachymerēs and Akropolitēs. We cannot assume that Grēgoras has merely added their number to the "Bithynian" soldiery, since in an earlier passage he states clearly that the Cumans settled in Anatolia by Batatzēs were given lands in Phrygia and up the Maiander valley (Greg. 37^{3-9}), not Bithynia.

There are two obvious possibilities for Grēgoras' omission of the Cumans. The first is a desire on his part to show that the retaking of the imperial city was achieved solely through Roman arms, and not through the aid of foreigners and barbarians. The second possibility is that the Cuman contingent was small and unimportant, easily overlooked in the greater mass of Bithynian soldiery. The phrasing of Pachymerēs, however, refutes this possibility. By speaking of "the Scythians and a small number of other troops", Pachymerēs is clearly indicating where the strength of the force lay. It is important to note that Pachymerēs talks of "the Scythians" and not "some of the Scythians"[111]. Does he mean the entire muster of the Cuman settlers – who could turn out at least two thousand men (*CoM* 3606) – or the smaller contingent which we see present at the debate over Michaēl Palaiologos' accession (Akrop. 158^{18-21}; also Bartusis 1992:26)? I would suggest, from the discipline shown by the Cumans during the seizure of the city (Pach. 197^{25-27}), that the latter is the case, and that the heart of Stratēgopoulos' army was a *corps d'élite* of Cumans, perhaps only a few hundred strong. If this unit was so small, we can understand how Grēgoras, writing so many years *post eventum*, could have overlooked it. We have no reason to reject his figure of eight hundred, but also no particular reason to accept it. All we may say is that the available

[110] Though by Grēgoras' own account Stratēgopoulos may have had more than this initial number, since he was under orders to recruit extra soldiers as he marched through Thrace, for eventual deployment in Makedonia (Greg. 83^{11-12}).
[111] He does so again at 271^{22-23}, where the 'Scythians' are sent to Epiros.

evidence suggests that the force that retook Kōnstantinoupolis was very small, and that under normal circumstances it should not have posed any threat to the Latin Empire.

"to Thrace" (191^{14-19})

No other source indicates that Stratēgopoulos' mission had anything to do with putting down the Bulgars. In fact it seems that relations between Bulgaria and Nikaia were, at this time, quite cordial. A Bulgar contingent had fought on the Nikaian side at Pelagonia in 1259 (Grégoire 1959-60:457^{4}), and Geōrgios Akropolitēs had spent the Christmas period of 1260 at the Bulgar court, being received warmly by the tsar (Akrop. 175^{26}-176^{10}). At this time there was little to cause friction with Kōnstantinos Teichos or Eirēnē Laskarina, since Iōannēs IV was still official co-basileus with Michaēl VIII and had not yet been blinded, deposed and imprisoned by his colleague. While rumours may have reached the Bulgar court of the increasing sidelining of Iōannēs, there seems to have been no cause for a violent breach with Nikaia. Note that Kōnstantinos Teichos responded to Iōannēs IV's eventual deposition with an unsuccessful invasion of Byzantine territory (Greg. 99^{21ff}; Pach. 279^{4-25}). If there was any cause for trouble between Nikaia and Bulgaria in this period, we can assume that Akropolitēs, whose *History* is reasonably full in its treatment of Bulgarian affairs, would have mentioned it (Fine 1987:173).

Because no other author mentions the Bulgars as a target for Stratēgopoulos' small army, and since Bulgaria and Nikaia were at peace in 1261, the conclusion must be that Pachymerēs is incorrect on this point. The sole objective of his mission was, then, to be found at Kōnstantinoupolis.

"he should approach the city" (191^{21})

On first glance it may seem odd that Stratēgopoulos was sent, with a small force, to Kōnstantinoupolis merely to engage in a bit of sabre-rattling and attempt to frighten the Latins living there, yet that is exactly what three important Greek authors specifically state. As well as this passage of Pachymerēs, we find that Akropolitēs (181^{7-9}) writes that Stratēgopoulos was to approach the gates of the city 'so as to frighten the Latins inside', while Holobōlos (66^{30-32}) goes even further, stating that Stratēgopoulos was to invoke the power of Ares' get: Phobos and Deimos, against the Italians.

If inspiring fear was the sole aim of the mission it does seem rather pointless. As argued below, however, there was more to Stratēgopoulos' expedition than mere fearmongery.

"after completing the crossing" (191[24])

Considering the distance from the Hellespont to Kōnstantinoupolis (about 300 kilometres), Stratēgopoulos' little army probably crossed from Asia to Europe at about the beginning of July 1261. This suggests that the expedition was sent at the start of summer and not at the beginning of the year, as suggested by Meliarakes (1898:589).

"to go to Selybria" (191[25-26])

The western approaches to Kōnstantinoupolis, including the city of Selybria, had been occupied by Nikaian forces in late 1259 (see commentary to 157[8-11]). That Stratēgopoulos decided to head first to Kōnstantinoupolis rather than to pacify the Bulgars around Orestias – his primary mission according to Pachymerēs – is another argument against Pachymerēs' accuracy over the Bulgar disturbance. The moribund Latin empire, after all, was not going anywhere and the secondary task at Kōnstantinoupolis could wait.

"to observe in what state the city was in" (191[27]-193[2])

Here Pachymerēs gives us a true statement of Stratēgopoulos' mission at Kōnstantinoupolis. If his task had indeed been simply to give a show of force outside the walls and try to frighten the Latins, there would be no need to engage in any of this intelligence gathering. If, on the other hand, Stratēgopoulos had been sent in order to reconnoitre the city and its defences, and make contact with possible Nikaian sympathisers in the area, in preparation for a later attack by a larger force, then his actions on his arrival in the district are more understandable.

No source states directly that Michaēl VIII intended in 1261 to lay a second siege of the city[112] but there is good circumstantial evidence to suggest that such was the basileus' intention.

Most important is the fact that Michaēl had on 13 March signed the Treaty of Nymphaion with Genoa, in which he gave the Genoese extensive commercial and political privileges in the empire in return for a fleet of up to fifty Genoese warships being put at his disposal at any time, as long as his own treasury paid for their upkeep and provisioning.[113] While Michaēl clearly entered the alliance out of a desire for future naval support against

[112] But note that Bar Hebraeus states that the basileus really did come and take the city in person in 1261 (BH 428). His account is garbled, however, and we cannot give much credence to him here.

[113] For the terms of this famous treaty, to which none of the major Greek sources refer, see Manfroni (1896:791-809). The benefits of this treaty were greatly weighted towards Genoa, not the empire, and this in itself may be an indication of the basileus' perception as to the necessity of having a naval ally to offset the Venetians.

Venice and Kōnstantinoupolis,[114] in itself the treaty does not indicate when the basileus intended to call upon this support. Evidence for this is provided by the *Annali genovesi* (4.42-43), in which it is recorded that sixteen Genoese galleys left Genoa for imperial waters immediately after the treaty was ratified by the Genoese government on 10 July 1261. As Geanakoplos (1959:86-87) states, this is an indication that the fleet had already been prepared, in anticipation of the ratification of the treaty. This fleet would have arrived in Aegean waters during August, at about the same time as the one-year truce between Kōnstantinoupolis and Nikaia was due to expire.[115] Michaēl VIII would have seen in his failed attempt on Kōnstantinoupolis in 1260 just how useful a friendly fleet would have been to the endeavour, and since the empire was not at this time fighting a maritime campaign anywhere in the Aegean, or embarking on any amphibious adventures in Epiros, the logical objective for this Genoese fleet would have been Kōnstantinoupolis and the Venetian squadron stationed there. Each of these galleys cost the Nikaian treasury three hundred hyperpera per month, in wages for the crew alone, from the time they left Genoa (Epstein 1996:150-151), and Michaēl would not have called on them unless he had plans to put them to immediate use.

Another indication of Michaēl's plans for Kōnstantinoupolis is given by Akropolitēs who says that news of the city's capture reached the basileus while he was 'encamped' (*skēnoumenou*) at Meteorion, somewhere north of Nymphaion, in the middle of the Nikaian heartland (Akrop. 183[24]; *cf.* Holobōlos 66[13]). Four points suggest that he was camped here while mustering an army. The first is the location. Meteorion lay so close to Nymphaion that the basileus would have been based there had he been engaged solely in the normal peacetime administration of the empire. Second, he was not so permanently settled there that he could not decamp and head for Kōnstantinoupolis at great speed, along with most of his court, as soon as the news reached him. Third, the messengers sent by Stratēgopoulos knew where to find the basileus without delay (Pach. 205[15-16], 207[2-6]), implying that

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[114] Note especially the terms of the treaty which promised the Genoese a quarter in Kōnstantinoupolis, and also pledged to give them the Venetian quarter there as well, but only if Genoese galleys took an active and important role in the city's capture (Manfroni 1896:794-795).

[115] *Annali genovesi* 4.48-49 states that four Venetian ships, trapped in the Black Sea by the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis, were caught by Greco-Genoese flotilla while attempting to escape to the Aegean. This shows that the Genoese ships were in imperial waters soon after the city fell on July 25.

From the evidence of Canale (Polidori ed. 480), the basileus had also arranged for a further thirty ships to be sent east later. This new fleet, if it was not sent by the Genoese on their own account, must have been pre-ordered, as the *Annali genovesi* states that Michaēl's first official communication with the commune after the capture of the city reached Genoa on May 5, 1262, and surely an earlier official request for more ships would have mentioned the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis (*Annali genovesi* 4.45). *Cf.* Dandolo (311), who writes that Genoa sent thirty ships after the blinding and deposition of Iōannēs IV.

The initial Genoese flotilla would have taken longer than normal to reach the northeastern Aegean, since the Mediterranean *meltemi* wind blows in summer (Pryor 2002:47).

Michaēl had arranged beforehand to receive messages from the kaisar at a certain place. Finally, that troops from the Asian provinces were mustered at this time is suggested by the despatch, shortly after the fall of the city, of "the Anatolian forces" to Iōannēs Palaiologos in Makedonia (Pach. 271^{22-23}).[116]

Again, considering that Michaēl VIII considered Epiros to be peaceful, and the Turks and Bulgars in alliance with Nikaia, the only real possibility for the intended target of this new army was Kōnstantinoupolis.

It must also be remembered that the basileus' failure to take the city in 1260 would have been still fresh in people's memories, and that the best way to remove this stain on his reputation, as well as cement his right to the throne, would have lain in a rapid return to the city and a successful seizure of the old capital (Geanakoplos 1959:94).

"to meet with the *thelēmatarioi*" (193^{1-2})

Pachymerēs (157^{25-28}) has already mentioned how the *thelēmatarioi* were friendly towards the Greeks of Nikaia. Stratēgopoulos seems to have had instructions to encourage their active support against the Latins during the upcoming attack. Considering that they controlled, to a large degree, the food supply of the city, their aid would have been invaluable to the attackers.

"outskirts of the city" (193^{3})

Grēgoras writes that Stratēgopoulos and his force halted at Rhegion, about thirty kilometres from Kōnstantinoupolis, and received there the *thēlemattariot* leaders (Greg. 83^{19}).

"confiding to them" (193^{3-5})

Pachymerēs has, up to this point, given no indication that Stratēgopoulos was himself contemplating attacking the city himself, and in fact had express orders not to try it, so this passage must refer to information Stratēgopoulos was carrying regarding the upcoming attack of the basileus. The 'greatest expectations' mentioned by Pachymerēs may indicate that Michaēl VIII was already offering inducements to the *thelēmatarioi* in the form of rewards and honours, such as those he gave to them after the fall of the city – including free title to their farmlands, and their enrolment in an hereditary military formation which may have been more of an honorary than fighting force (Pach. 221^{20-23}; Bartusis 1990:13-15).

[116] That they were sent shortly after the capture of the city, but before the new year, is suggested by the connection of this reinforcement with the despatch of Stratēgopoulos and his Cumans, who was, as we have seen, captured in Epiros early in the winter of 1261/62 (Pach. 127^{3f} and commentary).

Stratēgopoulos may have been in possession of written promises from the basileus to this effect, in order to prove his words to the fickle *thelēmatarioi*.[117]

"the whole Italian fleet" (193^{6})

Based on the testimony of Pachymerēs (199^{30}-201^{1}), the Venetian squadron stationed at Kōnstantinoupolis is commonly assumed to have had a permanent strength of thirty galleys, but this number is probably too high. The Venetian historian Sanudo writes that in the last years of the Latin Empire the Venetians were hard-pressed to support Kōnstantinoupolis (Sanudo, *Fragmentum*, (Hopf) 170). This is not surprising, given that Venice's attention was focused on the War of St. Sabas, which broke out between Venice and Genoa in Palestine in 1256, and was to last until an armistice negotiated in January 1261 (Runciman 1951-54:3.283-286). That Venice maintained, on a permanent basis, a purely defensive fleet of thirty galleys in such a time of war with its great naval rival, in a region untouched by that war, seems unlikely.

This is also suggested by the size of Venetian fleets despatched to the Aegean after the loss of Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261, when Venice was acting more aggressively in the Aegean: eighteen were sent immediately on news of the capture, and thirty-seven more at the start of 1262 (Canale (Polidori ed.) 480-482). At the battle of Settepozzi in 1263, thirty-two Venetian galleys fought a combined Genoese and Byzantine fleet of thirty-eight vessels (Canale (Polidori ed.) 490-492, *Annali genovesi* 4.51).[118] In the context of these numbers, we can see that a fleet of thirty ships was a sizable one, and large enough to engage in offensive operations, but it was too large to sit idly in Kōnstantinoupolis, when the only real threat to that city was from the Nikaians, whose naval strength was negligible. If the Genoese were active in the region at the beginning of summer 1261, then such numbers would be warranted, but the Genoese only became involved in Aegean affairs in autumn, after the Treaty of Nymphaion, signed in March, had provided Nikaian harbours as bases for their fleets. There was insufficient time between the signing of the treaty in March and the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis in July, for news of that treaty to reach Venice and for the

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[117] Certainly Michaēl VIII had shown himself quite prepared to issue promissory chrysobulls in the past. See Pach. 149^{26ff} and commentary.

[118] That the number of ships involved at Settepozzi was not unusual for the time we may cite as evidence the battle between Genoa and Venice fought off Acre in 1258, where forty-eight Genoese ships were defeated by thirty-eight Venetian and Pisan vessels (Dandolo 366).

The *Chronicle* of Dandolo is particularly useful for the precise numbers he gives for Venetian galley fleets in this period. Over the period 1258-1263 (Dandolo 364-367) the sizes of fleets range from seven galleys to the forty-eight in action off Acre. But we see that the most common size is between thirteen and seventeen, and that in all cases where more than twenty galleys are gathered in one place it is because two or more separate flotillas have been combined into a larger fleet, and often the admirals of each flotilla in the fleet are named.

Republic to have sent reinforcements to Kōnstantinoupolis to counter the expected Genoese fleets.

That the normal size of the Venetian fleet at Kōnstantinoupolis was less than the thirty vessels claimed by Pachymerēs is also indicated by the numbers given by the Venetian chroniclers Andrea Dandolo and Martin da Canale for the earlier years of the Latin Empire. According to Dandolo (298) the podestà commanded only sixteen galleys during a naval battle with Nikaian ships off Kōnstantinoupolis in 1240, while for the same fight Canale (Polidori ed. 366) gives the Venetian strength at only ten vessels. It is true that Canale (Polidori ed. 364) states that twenty-five Venetian galleys were based in Kōnstantinoupolis in 1235, but it must be remembered that in 1235 Kōnstantinoupolis was under serious attack by a Nikaian and Bulgar alliance, and reinforcements had been rushed to the city from the Latin and Venetian holdings throughout Greece, and the fleet's size was likely swollen by ships based elsewhere (Langdon 1979:224). While no doubt basing his account on that of Dandolo, the later chronicler Morosini adds a note that these twenty-five galleys were sent to Kōnstantinoupolis when it was placed in danger from Iōannēs III and his Bulgar allies (Morosini 32).

It seems likely that the fleet of thirty galleys at Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261, like the fleet of twenty-five vessels found there in 1235, represents the total force available to Venice in the Aegean at the time. It is important to note that when the Venetian fleet fled Kōnstantinoupolis and arrived at Negropont, which was the main Venetian naval base in the Aegean, the Venetian leaders immediately sent for reinforcements from home. Therefore there were not enough vessels at Negropont to increase the size of the fleet by any noticeable amount. It would be strange if Negropont, the major Venetian base in the Aegean, an area which was less sheltered than Kōnstantinoupolis against piracy or Genoese raids, possessed a fleet any weaker than that stationed at Kōnstantinoupolis, but this must have been the case if the Constantinopolitan fleet arrived at an empty base. More probably, the squadron from Negropont had been called to Kōnstantinoupolis by the podestà and added to the flotilla already there, for the purpose of engaging in offensive duties. On this see the commentary to 193[7].

A further point in favour of there being normally fewer than thirty Venetian galleys at Kōnstantinoupolis is provided by the fact that the initial fleet ordered by Michaēl VIII from Genoa numbered only sixteen vessels. This squadron, together with whatever ships the Nikaians could provide, was obviously seen as sufficient to deal with the Venetians at Kōnstantinoupolis.

"left for Daphnousia" (193^{7})

Daphnousia was a small town and harbour on the island of the same name, located just off the Asian shore of the Black Sea about one hundred kilometres from the Bosporos. It was the only safe anchorage between the Bosporos and Pontic Hērakleia, another hundred kilometres further east (Ramsay 1890:182)

There are a number of problems associated with the expedition against Daphnousia, most importantly in regards to the motive behind the attack, which stripped Kōnstantinoupolis of its strongest defence, and in regard to the timing of the attack, which occurred while the one-year truce between Baudouin II and Michaēl VIII was still in force.

We must reject outright any idea that the whole affair was orchestrated by Michaēl VIII, who planned to lure the Venetian fleet to Daphnousia, through a false report of a possible surrender of the place, so that Stratēgopoulos would arrive to find the city defenceless. To the good analysis of Geanakoplos (1959:99-104) we may also add our conclusions regarding the objectives of Stratēgopoulos' mission (commentary to 191^{27}-193^{2}), and those regarding the size and strength of the Venetian fleet (commentary to 193^{6}). We may especially question why thirty ships, from two separate commands, were needed to receive the surrender of a small outpost.

An important point, overlooked by Geanakoplos in his discussion of the sources for this episode, regards the respective roles played by the Latin emperor Baudouin and the Venetian podestà, Marco Gradenigo. In virtually all of the Western sources, and also in Akropolitēs and his plagiarisers, the decision to launch the attack upon Daphnousia is attributed to Gradenigo, and none of the sources make mention of any participation of Baudouin's small army.[119] This unusual unanimity in the sources makes it clear that the attack upon Daphnousia was a solely Venetian venture, made at the instigation of the Venetian podestà, and it is quite possible that little, if any, thought may have been given to the truce between Baudouin and Michaēl VIII. After all, this truce only involved the two emperors, and had nothing to do with Venice.[120]

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[119] Sanudo, *Fragmentum*, (Hopf) 172; Sanudo, *Istoria,* 114-115; Canale (Polidori ed. 480); Morosini 54; Akrop. 181^{18-22}; Skout. 551^{31}-552^{3}; Ephraim 9488-9491. A lone voice in the wilderness, the *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae* (47) records that while the attack was a Venetian enterprise, it had the consent of Baudouin. Geanakoplos (1959:102) believes that much credence should be awarded to the account of this *Chronicon*, as it may stem from reports of refugees from Kōnstantinoupolis. It is quite possible, however, that these refugees claimed imperial backing for the attack in order to avoid allegations that the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis was solely due to a reckless Venetian adventure. Two other sources which narrate the fall of the city, Bar Hebraeus (BH 428) and the *Chronicle of Morea* (1277-1315), are too inaccurate to be of any use.

[120] The 1204 Partitio treaty between the Crusaders and Venice stated that the doge and Venice were exempt from military service to the empire, and thus were free agents (Wolff 1953:553), but an agreement of 1205 stated that the podestà was to obtain the agreement of the emperor and his council before embarking upon any independent military endeavours (TT 1.517*ff*). Thus it cannot be ruled

There still remains the question of motive. For many years Venice's attitude towards Nikaia, while hostile, was largely passive and defensive.[121] Venice, with its far-flung commercial, maritime empire, did not have the strength to vigorously act against Nikaia, which makes the sudden descent upon Daphnousia even more striking.

The reason for this dramatic shift in Venetian policy *vis-à-vis* Nikaia is to be found in the Treaty of Nymphaion between Nikaia and Venice's enemy Genoa.[122] Not only did this treaty reiterate the offensive intentions of Michaēl VIII towards the Latin holdings in Greece, it also heralded the irruption of Genoese warfleets into the Aegean and Black Seas, areas which had effectively been Venetian lakes since the Fourth Crusade. Rumours and news of the signing of this agreement would have reached Kōnstantinoupolis soon after it occurred on 13 March, and it is surely no coincidence that the Venetian fleet was gathered for an attack soon afterwards, to get in a pre-emptive strike before the expiration of the Latin-Nikaian truce and the arrival of Genoese fleets in the area would force the Venetians to guard Kōnstantinoupolis more closely against an expected Nikaian-Genoese attack upon the city.

We must also consider what the purpose of the expedition was. The Greek sources are unanimous in stating that when Stratēgopoulos arrived at Kōnstantinoupolis the Venetians were engaged in an attack upon the island of Daphnousia, but the western sources are remarkably different. Not one of the contemporary or near-contemporary authors mentions the island at all, and they speak instead in more general terms of raiding and 'inflicting damage' over a wider area.[123] Only the early fifteenth century writer Morosini gives a specific target for Gradenigo's expedition: a castle he calls "La Fornace" (Morosini 54). This may or may not be the castle at Daphnousia, but the long time separating Morosini from the events he narrates makes his evidence less reliable than the contemporary accounts. It is quite possible that the Venetians only attacked Daphnousia as one target

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out that Baudouin II was fully aware of the Venetian expedition. But consent to this expedition may have been little more than a rubber-stamping of a *fait accompli*, given Baudouin's powerlessness to stop the Venetians from doing what they wanted regardless of his wishes. In any case it seems clear that none of his troops took part in the campaign.

[121] Dandolo (309) records that a small Venetian fleet was sent to Kōnstantinoupolis in 1258 to guard against '*incursionibus Graecorum Imperium*', and after the failed siege of the city in 1260 Venice tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit a thousand-man garrison for the city from the Latin states of Greece (Norden 1903:759).

[122] This runs directly contra to the arguments of Lopez (1938:210), who asserts that the Venetians would not have attacked Daphnousia if they had been aware of the treaty.

[123] Sanudo (*Istoria* 114-115) writes that the Venetians were on a mission 'to ravage the lands of their Greek enemies', and more generally (*Fragmentum* (Hopf) 172) that they were 'inflicting damage on the Greeks', while the *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvinisae* (47) records that they had gone 'to the Black Sea to inflict damage upon the enemy.' Most important here is the word used by Sanudo (*Istoria* 115), *corsizar*, which certainly does not suggest that the Venetians were out for permanent territorial gain but rather to spread destruction and gain plunder *à la* the Vikings.

among many, or even that they seized the island as a base of operations for their raids.[124] As an island it would certainly serve very well as such a base, being inaccessible to the largely land-bound Nikaians. It was centrally located off the Black Sea shore of Nikaian Anatolia, and yet still close enough to Kōnstantinoupolis that the fleet could sail back in a short time if required, as indeed it did.[125] That this sort of raiding expedition was not out of character for the Venetians is indicated by the report of Dandolo (308) who records that in 1257 the Venetians of Kōnstantinoupolis raided the Bulgarian-held port town of Mesembreia, sacking it and stealing a famous icon. The aggressiveness of the 1261 expedition fits in nicely with what Sanudo tells us about the personality of the podestà, Marco Gradenigo. According to Sanudo (*Istoria* 104), Gradenigo had a violent temper and had earlier killed a relative of his during a heated argument on Negropont, but Sanudo also credits Gradenigo with several warlike achievements. We can suggest that the podestà intended the expedition to be sabre-rattling, designed to show Michaēl VIII that Venice was still a force to be reckoned with, and that he had best be cautious, even if he had Genoese support.[126] It was mere misfortune that Stratēgopoulos and his small army arrived at the city while the fleet was absent.

"engaged there for many days" (193[7-8])

The garrison of such a small outpost of Nikaian rule must have been of only a modest size, and would undoubtedly have retreated into its fortifications when the large Venetian fleet arrived. It is unknown whether the Venetians even made a serious attempt to reduce the garrison through assault or siege, or whether they were happy to sit watch on the garrison to ensure it stayed quiet while the Venetian fleet sailed up and down the coast. Pachymerēs' comment of being engaged there for many days would suggest that the fleet left Kōnstantinoupolis sometime in early July.

"a crowd of people inexperienced in war" (193[8-9])

Akropolitēs also comments on Constantinople's paucity of capable defenders at this time, saying that the city was held by 'women, children and Baudouin, their so-called emperor,

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[124] For a discussion of the vital interplay between galley-fleets and their bases, see Guilmartin (1974:95-102). Galley crews of the period were well suited for such raiding activity. Not only were there more than one hundred men per ship, but they were well provided with the weapons and armour necessary for them to act as infantry when required (Pryor 1993:79-81).

[125] The army there under Baudouin, while small, could still be counted upon to hold the walls long enough for the fleet to be notified and return. Given that a thirteenth century galley could travel an estimated seventy-five kilometres per day (Dotson 2001:121), the fleet at Daphnousia could return to Constantinople in two or three days after being alerted.

[126] Gardner (1912:256-57) also suggests that the attack upon Daphnousia was part of a wider anti-Genoese strategy on the part of Venice.

with only a few men' (Akrop. 182[1-3]). The city, however, was not held as weakly as it appears. The walls must have been provided with many reliable Latin guards along their length – or else the *thelēmatarioi* would have chosen a less-defended stretch of wall to assault than they ultimately did (Pach. 197[3-4]) – and Baudouin II seems to have had a body of soldiery which was numerous enough to cause Stratēgopoulos, who was leading probably fewer than one thousand men (see commentary to 191[13]), to consider withdrawing from the city.[127] The relative size of the force in the city is indicated by the fact that the Venetians, in their plan to get the Latin states in Greece to jointly contribute a permanent garrison for the city (Norden 1903:759), believed that the thousand men they tried to raise would have been a significant addition to the overall strength of the defence.[128]

"the rest of them were in agreement" (193[10])

Presumably this statement refers to widespread support for the Nikaian cause among the *thelēmatarioi* (the 'them' of the passage), as communicated by their leaders to Stratēgopoulos.

"Alexios" (193[17])

Apart from his role in the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis this man is unknown. We do not know whether he was a blood nephew of Stratēgopoulos or if he was the nephew of Stratēgopoulos' wife. An anonymous poem of the fourteenth century refers (Müller ll. 555-556) to Alexios as the *adelphopaida* of Stratēgopoulos, but this still leaves us unsure of the exact relationship between the two men. His family name is unknown.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 625.

It is possible that he was still active at the time when Pachymerēs wrote his history, since in this passage he is referred to as Alexios and not by the diminutive form Alexopoulos, by which he is called in the anonymous poem (Müller ll.556-557: "or better called Alexopoulos, since he was a young man at the time.") and also by Pachymerēs himself, when in a later passage he refers to the prophecy of the three liberators of Kōnstantinoupolis (203[10-21]). It may be possible that Pachymerēs received his version of the taking of the city from Alexios.

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[127] That Baudouin II still commanded such a body of troops is further indication that the Daphnousia expedition did not involve imperial forces.

[128] It has been estimated that the entire *cavalry* force of the Latin Empire, in its strongest period, directly following the Fourth Crusade, was less than one thousand men (Hendrickx 1971:29-41). If so, then the number of men available to Baudouin II, at the weakest period of the Empire's history, must have been very small indeed.

"Koutritzakēs" (193[18])

As well as his leading role in Pachymerēs' account, Koutritzakēs also appears in the anonymous poem (Müller ll.547-576). He appears to have been de facto spokesman for the *thelēmatarioi* in their dealings with Stratēgopoulos, but it is uncertain whether he took any personal part in the fighting.[129] Later tradition had it that Stratēgopoulos was guided to the hole in the wall by "an old farmer" (Spandounes 14), who might well have been Koutritzakēs. Following the retaking of the city he disappears from the historical record.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 13659.

"while the others" (193[21])

Once again Pachymerēs seems to be referring to the mass of the *thēlemataríot* population, as opposed to the small group of their leaders who negotiated with Stratēgopoulos.

"he himself" (193[22-26])

Failler (1984:192 n.5) ascribes all of these actions to Koutritzakēs, while at the same time indicating confusion over the meaning of the Greek text. The last sentence of the Greek has as its subject only the word *autos*, and the actions described therein make much more sense if *autos* is referring to Stratēgopoulos, and not Koutritzakēs. Koutritzakēs, after all, had no army to move away, as Stratēgopoulos did, had not been in the military situation where he would normally scout the defences of a town, as the kaisar had, and already did know the area well, while Stratēgopoulos did not.

This entire passage also suggests that some time elapsed after the arrival of Stratēgopoulos, and his meeting with the *thēlemataríot* leaders, before the plan of attack was ready to be implemented. At least a few days would be required for the plan to be circulated among the people, volunteers armed and readied and the best way into the city established. We may thus tentatively suggest that the kaisar and his army came into the region no later than 23 July.

The accounts of Akropolitēs and Grēgoras, which give no indication of how quickly Stratēgopoulos acted after he arrived, do not refute this argument (Akrop. 182[8-21]; Greg. 83[19]-85[20]).

[129] The anonymous poem (ll.570-572) asserts that Koutritzakēs led the commando that opened the gate, though this stands opposed to Pachymerēs, who states that he was chained up at the time the gates were opened.



Map 4 The Capture of Kōnstantinoupolis, 24-26th July 1261[130]

[130] Map adapted from Queller, D. and T. Madden *The Fourth Crusade, the conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd ed. Philadelphia, 1997, p.100.

2.27 How the City was captured

"the time was settled also" (195^{2})

The time and date chosen for the attack was the night of 24 July.

"scale the wall" (195^{4})

Pachymerēs does not reveal which wall of the Theodosian system, the inner or the outer, he is referring to. Considering, however, that there were numerous guards, some of whom were sleeping, we may tentatively suggest that it was the larger, inner wall, which alone had chambers in the towers large enough for the sentries to stretch out in a modicum of comfort and shelter (Van Millingen 1899:52-53).

"by means of ladders" (195^{4})

Pachymerēs' account of the initial entrance into the city raises several issues, because it differs in a number of important aspects from that of Akropolitēs, our other main source for the operation. Far from having the *thelēmatarioi* as the main executors of the plan, the latter author limits their role to a mere advisory one, showing Stratēgopoulos where his men could penetrate the wall (Akrop. 182^{8-13}). It is, in this version of events, Nikaian troops who do all of the work in taking the city. This is not surprising, since it seems that Akropolitēs gained his information for the capture from the official reports sent to the basileus by the kaisar, the commanding officer of these troops (Pach. 205^{3-4}). Stratēgopoulos would naturally have had every reason to promote his own role and that of his troops in an event as important as the recapture, and would have downplayed the role played by others not under his direct command. In all probability the initial party of commandos would have comprised both soldiers of the kaisar's army and *thelēmatarioi*, with the former to provide a disciplined and reliable fighting core and the latter to act as guides. After all, the *thelēmatarioi* were farmers, not soldiers, and the experienced general would not have left this important phase of the attack in the hands of amateurs of unknown dependability, but he was equally dependent upon the knowledge of the locals to ensure success.

Akropolitēs records that the attacking group penetrated into the city by a gap in the walls. Geanakoplos (1959:109-110) suggests that Akropolitēs is here merely using an ancient Byzantine literary *topos*,[131] but the account of the megas logothetes should be allowed to stand, since though Pachymerēs does not say that the advance party made use of

[131] i.e. the capturing of cities through use of a tunnel, sewer or other such means of entrance.

such an entrance, he does not explicitly give any other explanation of the means whereby the *thelēmatarioi* entered the city, and by his own account there did exist holes in the walls large enough to permit a man to pass through (Pach. 215^{25-27}).

Pachymerēs' conviction that the *thelēmatarioi* used ladders is also perplexing.[132] Both the inner and outer walls of Kōnstantinoupolis were provided with frequent staircases climbing from ground level to the parapet and from there to the fighting tops of the towers. It is these fighting tops, and not some random stretch of wall situated between the stairs, that were the logical points to station guards.[133] We must wonder, then, why Pachymerēs' *thelēmatarioi* needed to use ladders – the practicalities of whose use must also be questioned, especially if the commandos had just passed through narrow tunnels[134] – to reach the guards, rather than merely mounting the stairs, which is what Akropolitēs says they did (Akrop. 182^{13-15}).

The reason for this introduction of ladders is, I think, simply a matter of Pachymerēs, or his source, attempting to add more excitement to the tale, and make the escapade seem more daring.

"Pēgē Pylē" (195^{5-6})

Now known as the Silivrı Kapı, this gate was located between the 25th and 26th towers north of the Golden Gate, and about two kilometres from the Marmara shore. Its name came from its proximity to the famous monastery and shrine of Hagia Maria of the Spring (*Pēgē*). Like all the other gates breaking the Theodosian walls, the Pēgē Pylē pierced both the inner and outer walls in a direct line. Both inner and outer gate were protected by twin towers rising alongside.

On the Pēgē Pylē, and the gates in the Theodosian walls in general, see Janin (1950:255-257) and Van Millingen (1899:75-77).

"As soon as the designated night arrived" (195^{10})

This phrase provides clear evidence that Stratēgopoulos did not act against the city immediately upon his arrival in its environs, but that there was instead a delay of some few days while the *thelēmatarioi* organised themselves. See commentary to 193^{22-26}.

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[132] Although the word Pachymerēs uses, *klimax*, can refer to either a ladder or stairs, it is obvious from his text (especially from 195^{11}), that he means ladders.

[133] According to Grēgoras they were used thus in the fourteenth century (Greg. 408).

[134] The other option, that the *thelēmatarioi* had somehow stashed inside the city, some ladders long enough to reach the summit of the wall, is just as unlikely as bringing them through the wall from outside the city.

"being caught" (195^{13-14})

Pachymerēs does not see fit to tell us what the *thelēmatarioi* feared the Latins would do if they caught the attackers, but we may assume, from the Latin reliance upon the *thelēmatarioi* and their labour and produce (Pach. 157^{12-18} and commentary) that punishment would be restricted to those directly involved, and not the community in general.

"towards the city" (195^{15})

This passage is a counterpart to 193^{23-24}, where Stratēgopoulos is said to have "moved away" from the city. How far he withdrew is unknown.

"But Koutritzakēs . . ." (195^{17-27})

This entire passage, not very complimentary to the kaisar, but which shows Koutritzakēs in a very favourable light, provides us with a clue regarding Pachymerēs' main source of information regarding the recapture of the city.

In his *prooimion* (Pach. 23^{8-11}) Pachymerēs writes that he obtained information from eyewitnesses, if he did not observe the events in question himself. This particular event, the chaining of Koutritzakēs because of the kaisar's suspicion, would have been witnessed by three distinct groups: the Cuman soldiers, the Bithynian soldiers and the *thelēmatarioi,* as well as the named individuals. We can eliminate the first two groups as possible sources, for the homes of both groups lay in Anatolia, both quite distant from Pachymerēs' home in Kōnstantinoupolis and, by the time he began writing his *Historia*, under Turkish dominion. Also, in the case of the Cumans, there would have been language difficulties. In addition, neither of these two groups, especially the Bithynians, figures prominently in Pachymerēs' account.

This cannot be said about the third group that witnessed the exchange between the *thelēmatariot* leader and the kaisar. The *thelēmatarioi*, who are hardly mentioned in our other sources, stand out in Pachymerēs' version of events. Not only is their leader, Koutritzakēs, named and said to be the prime instigator of the recapture, but the only two common soldiers who rate a mention by Pachymerēs, Lakeras and Glabatos, are also *thelēmatarioi* (Pach. 197^{14-15}). Throughout the account the *thelēmatarioi* are described in glowing terms as loyal subjects of the empire who, while they may have served the Latin usurpers, did so only because it served their own interests at the same time. They are also shown to be the saviours of the whole venture, bravely leaping into the fray when the kaisar and his men were on the verge of retreating (Pach. 197^{34}-199^{3}). They are the only troops whom Pachymerēs does not show engaging in plundering the city. It cannot be ignored,

either, that the *thelēmatarioi*, dwelling in the suburbs of Kōnstantinoupolis, were easily accessible to Pachymerēs, who resided in that city, and veterans of 1261 were quite possibly still alive when he was writing his *Historia* at the end of the century.

It may be asserted with some confidence that Pachymerēs' source for the operation was of *thelēmatariote* origin, either a participant, or else another member of the community who was familiar with the recapture and the role played by the *thelēmatarioi* in it. We should accept Pachymerēs' account of the recapture as largely accurate, if perhaps exaggerated in regards to the importance of the *thelēmatarioi* and downplaying the role played by the Nikaian army and its commander.

"Pēgē monastery" (195^{27})

The monastery of Hagia Maria of the Spring has occupied the same site continuously since early Byzantine times, though it has been destroyed and rebuilt several times during that period. The current building dates to the mid-nineteenth century. The monastery, built around a famous sight-restoring spring, is located perhaps five hundred metres west of the Pēgē Pylē. On it, see Janin (1975:223-228) and Baynes (1955:257).

The kaisar must be commended for bringing his army of over one thousand armed and mounted men so close to the walls without drawing attention and alerting the guards to his presence. His use of the monastery as cover is confirmed by Grēgoras (85^{12-13}).

"the sleeping guards, who were Italians" (197^{4})

Bartusis (1984:187) argues convincingly that late Byzantine authors drew a distinction between a *phrourios* and a *phylax*, with the former being a soldier of the military garrison, while the latter was, at most, a poorly armed paramilitary watchman.

An analysis of Pachymerēs' text (especially Pach. 153^{4}) indicates that he makes this distinction. Thus when he says that the guards at the Pēgē Pylē were Italian *phrourioi*, he is indicating that they were soldiers of Baudouin II's Latin garrison.[135] We can then reasonably ask why the soldiers of Baudouin's garrison, which is unanimously described as 'small', were spread out along the length of the wall – for surely if they were posted along some of its length only, then the *thelēmatarioi* would have selected an unguarded section for their attack. As Bartusis (1984:189) points out, unless the wall was in imminent danger of attack, the best use of the city garrison was to keep it grouped in an easily accessible, central, location from where they could react *en masse* to any emergency; not for it to be

[135] Akropolitēs (182^{14}) and Grēgoras (85^{15}) say that the guards were *phylakes*, not *phrourioi*, but we can prefer the eyewitness account of Pachymerēs' *thelēmatariote* source over Akropolitēs' second-hand report.

spread along the wall in small handfuls, when its superior armament, training and discipline would be of little consequence. From the testimony of Pachymerēs it appears, however, that groups of Latin soldiers were located at every gate, at least, if not more frequently along the walls. But this also seems like an odd waste of limited manpower, considering that the Latins were unaware of any danger, and especially, in the case of the Pēgē Pylē, because the gate itself was blocked off by a sealing wall of stone.

This stone wall is the key to the conundrum. The wall was comprised of unmortared stones (Pach. 195^{6}, 197^{10-11}, *cf.* Müller ll.577-578), and was therefore a recent, hastily thrown-together obstruction designed as a temporary measure. An older structure, or one intended as a permanent construction, would have been mortared together, and probably anchored to the surrounding walls. The doors of the gate, too, would probably have been removed entirely, rather than merely closed and barred in front of the new wall.

It appears that, contrary to what at first glance seems to be the case, the Latin authorities were well aware that Stratēgopoulos and his army were close to the city, and that they threw together hasty obstacles (stone walls) and strengthened the guard at the gates, ever the weakest points in any fortification. The speed of the Latin response to the penetration of the walls, with a battle being fought at dawn (Pach. 197^{30}-199^{6}), as well as the nearly simultaneous return of the Venetian fleet from the Black Sea,[136] are also indicative of a lack of surprise on the part of the city's defenders. Finally, that at least some of the soldiers at the gate were asleep is suggestive of their being at their posts for some time, which is unlikely to have been standard peacetime practice. The large towers of the inner wall had large rooms suitable for the guards to use as billets, whereas the smaller towers of the outer wall did not, and this fact makes it likely that the towers scaled by the attacking *thelēmatarioi* were those of the inner wall (Haldon 1995:153).

"knocked out the pivots of the gates" (197^{13-14})

This was an obvious precaution designed to prevent the defenders regaining control over the gate and closing it again, though in the event it was unnecessary.

"Lakeras" (197^{14})

This individual is otherwise unknown to history.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 14381.

It is interesting to note the presence of a priest in this advance party, which numbered either fifteen (Akrop. 182^{12}; Skout. 551^{13}) or fifty (Greg. 85^{15}) men.

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[136] The fleet had obviously returned and been turned back by the Nikaians either late on the 25th or on the 26th of July. See Pach. 205^{3-4} and commentary to 199^{25}-201^{4}.

"Glabatos" (197^{15})

Pachymerēs' use of the phrase 'and some others' may indicate that Glabatos had some leadership role among the *thelēmatariot* commandos.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 4229.

For a suggestion on why Pachymerēs refers to Lakeras and Glabatos by name, see the commentary to 195^{17-27}.

"the signal of the imperial acclamation" (197^{19-20})

It would be very interesting to know who was acclaimed first: Iōannēs IV or Michaēl VIII, but unfortunately no source tells us.

"the army" (197^{1})

As well as his own force of Cuman and Bithynian troops, the kaisar's little army included a force of *thelēmatariote* irregulars. According to the anonymous poem (Müller ll.571) this force numbered five hundred men, giving a total for the army between one and two thousand. See commentary to 191^{13}.

"The first rays of daylight" (197^{23-24})

It seems surprisingly coincidental that the gates were opened to the army just before dawn would have revealed its presence to the defence. It is probable that Pachymerēs is indulging in a little poetic licence here.

"creating havoc" (197^{24-25})

Such havoc as was created at this point, if any, must have been of a fairly limited quality, since the kaisar's army maintained cohesion and soon advanced in good order, and was watched by a crowd of civilians (Pach. 197^{25-27}), who would hardly have dared to approach a rampaging army.

"advanced slowly and with caution" (197^{28-29})

Pachymerēs contradicts his earlier statement (197^{23-24}) and here records that the army entered the city before dawn, which is more likely than an entrance just as dawn was cracking.

The logical direction of the army's advance would be due east from the gate, and then joining the main thoroughfare of the Via Triumphalis, the *mese*, which ran from the Chrysea Pylē in a northeasterly direction into the centre of the city. In a hostile urban

environment, especially with only a small force, the kaisar would have wished to keep his men in the more open areas, away from possible ambush sites and in order to prevent the army splitting into smaller columns in the side streets.[137]

"appeared to be quite large numbers of Italians under arms" (197^{30}-199^{6})

Despite the downplaying of this encounter by modern scholars (e.g. by Geanakoplos 1959:110; Guilland 1959:59, who suggests that the kaisar was confused over the size of the defending force because of dawn rays glinting off their weapons), the anonymous poem (Müller ll.584-588) confirms Pachymerēs' report of a large battle between the attacking army and the defending Latin garrison.

It has already been argued (commentary to 197^{4}) that the Latins were not caught totally by surprise by the attack, and also (commentary to 193^{7-9}) that the entire Latin garrison remained in the city and did not accompany the Venetian fleet to the Black Sea.

If Pachymerēs and the anonymous poem are accurate, this garrison, whose size and composition is unknown, confronted the attacking army shortly after dawn on 25 July. Considering that the defenders were fighting for their homes and families, we can guess that the battle was hard-fought, though ultimately victory went to the Nikaians and the Latins scattered and fled.

There are two issues relating to this battle which merit discussion. First, there is the question of the location of the battle within the city, and second is the role played in it by Emperor Baudouin II.

Baudouin receives very poor press from the Greek sources. They universally report that he fled in terror as soon as word reached him of the penetration of the walls, throwing off all of his regalia and abandoning his people, his birthplace and his throne in a mad rush to escape.[138] The western authors, not so scathing, merely mention that he departed the city.

Neither Greek nor western author saw any profit in suggesting that Baudouin II, instead of fleeing headlong, tried to fight in defence of his patrimony. The Greeks saw more value in denigrating their enemy as a coward and weakling, and highlighting the conquest as the will of God and not the deed of men, while the western authors found it easier to pass over any fighting in silence. To them there was no need to glorify the Greeks by crediting them

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[137] While it is true that much of the city was desolate in 1261, to the extent that large numbers of livestock could be grazed within the walls (Pach. 251^{19-23}), the main roads linking the city centre with the major gates would still have remained fairly densely populated. *Cf.* Pachymerēs' reference to the crowd of civilians who approached the army on its entrance.

[138] Pach. 199^{12-17}; Akrop. 182^{26-27}; Greg. 86^{5-13}; Skout. 551^{25-26}; Müller ll.591-592. Holobōlos (68^{14-19}) mocks Baudouin's cowardice and calls him a "pitiful little manling."

with a victory in battle, and everything to gain by emphasizing the sneaky, treacherous way in which the Greeks took the city.

Despite their intentions, however, the authors let slip enough details for us to suggest that Baudouin II did in fact try to fight for his throne and that it was he who was leading the Latin force that encountered the kaisar in battle. Grēgoras writes that Baudouin's first inclination on hearing of the attack was to gather his garrison and fight back, but that the large fire caused him to change his mind and instead flee to the ships (Greg. 86^{5-10}). Important here is the reference to the fire, which was, according to Pachymerēs (201^{24-26}) and Akropolitēs (183^{8-12}) clearly set after the battle. Sanudo (*Istoria* 115) records that at some stage in the day Baudouin received a wound in his arm, so that at the very least he had come into contact with hostile forces. Akropolitēs (183^{16-17}) states that the emperor was very close to being captured and Pachymerēs (199^{17-19}) writes that a large part of the 'Roman' division of the army was sent after him to the Great Palace, which shows not only that the Nikaians had seen the direction of his retreat, but that it was noted by someone high up the Nikaian chain of command, probably Stratēgopoulos himself. Pachymerēs and Akropolitēs both find support in the anonymous poem (Müller l.592), which states that Baudouin was "shut up in the Great Palace".

The emperor's final location, the Great Palace, is also telling. This is in the exact opposite corner of the city from his starting point, the Blachernai. We must ask ourselves why Baudouin, if his only intention was to find a ship and flee the city, did not merely leave Blachernai and move east along the Golden Horn, which was the main harbour of the city, and find a ship there, but rather decided to cross the entire length and breadth of the city, across the path of the invading army, to the abandoned Great Palace and the small Boukoleon harbour? If his sole thought was to flee, this decision forces us to believe that there were no ships of any kind in the Golden Horn, that the emperor knew this fact, and also that he knew that a Venetian merchantman was tied up in the Boukoleon harbour. Such a scenario, outside the pages of a fantasy novel, is unlikely in the extreme.

It is much more likely that Baudouin, upon hearing of the attack, gathered his garrison from Blachernai and marched roughly southeastwards, towards the attackers. Encountering the Nikaians probably somewhere in the region of the aqueduct of Valens, Baudouin II was defeated, wounded in one arm, and somehow during the fighting cut off from the Golden Horn and his base in Blachernai. He decided to flee to the Great Palace, while Stratēgopoulos sent his Greek troops to follow and capture him. With whatever of his own troops were still with him, the emperor was besieged in the Great Palace. No other explanation can, in my opinion, account for all the hints and discrepancies to be found in the various sources.

"the warehouses of useful merchandise" (199^{7})

Presumably Pachymerēs is here referring to the warehouses belonging to the Italian traders and not to any owned by Greeks, though of course this possibility cannot be ruled out entirely.

The main strip of Italian trading ventures lay on the southern shore of the Golden Horn, running from the foot of the Third Hill in the west to the harbour entrance in the east, a distance of about fifteen hundred metres. See Brown (1970:73-76) and Janin (1950:245-251).

It is quite possible that the Cumans ransacked these warehouses at the same time as the great fire was set in the Latin quarter. See commentary to 201^{24}-203^{5}.

"Baudouin" (199^{12})

Baudouin II (1217-1273), the last Latin Emperor of Constantinople, was the son of the ill-fated Peter of Courtenay (d. 1218(?)) and Yolanda, sister of Baudouin I (r.1204-1206) and Henri (r.1206-1216). In 1234, during the regency of Jean de Brienne (r.1229-1237) Baudouin married Jean's daughter Marie. He spent much of his reign travelling to and from the west in largely futile efforts to win support for his tottering empire (see Wolff 1954:52, 60-64). In 1240-41, with a French army, he succeeded in retaking much of eastern Thrace (Akrop. 58^{2-18}; Alberic Trium Fontium 946-7; Mathew Paris 295).

After his eviction from Kōnstantinoupolis Baudouin II was a dependant at the courts of Manfred of Sicily and, after 1266, Charles d'Anjou.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 2070.

"was panic-struck" (199^{12-16})

For arguments against this assertion see the commentary to 197^{30}-199^{6}.

"headdress and sword" (199^{16-17})

Akropolitēs describes Baudouin II's crown as being "Latin in shape, decorated with pearls and with a red gem on the top" (Akrop. 185^{27-28}). Seals of Baudouin show him wearing a crown of distinctively Byzantine style, but still surmounted by a gem (Zacos and Veglery 1972:1.104 and plate 28). There is no particular reason to doubt Akropolitēs' testimony, as he was present when the crown was delivered to Michaēl VIII.

Akropolitēs also refers to the captured sword, describing it as being wrapped in a red silk scabbard (Akrop. 185^{28}-186^{1}). The use of a sword as a royal insignia, designating secular authority, was a western tradition dating back at least to 1000 (Crouch 1992:190-

198; Mason 1986:121-137; Nelson 1986:313). Seals of Emperors Henri and Robert show the emperor armed and mounted, bearing aloft a naked sword (Zacos and Veglery 1972:I.102-103 and plate 28).

As well as the crown and sword, Akropolitēs also states that the red slippers of the Latin Emperor were taken at this time.

That Baudouin abandoned his heavy metal accessories, and took off his shoes may suggest that he was forced to swim from the Great Palace to his rescue ship. We must remember that Akropolitēs records that the emperor was nearly captured (Akrop. 183^{16-17}), and it must be expected that Baudouin would have taken his imperial insignia if his escape was more orderly.

"he descended to the shore" (199^{17})

This would have been literally true. There was a large staircase descending from the Boukoleon palace to the imperial landing stage, where Baudouin boarded the Venetian ship. See Talbot-Rice (1958:190-192).

"entrusted his safety to a ship" (199^{17})

One version of Sanudo's *Fragmentum* (ed. Hopf, 172) records the detail that the ship that picked Baudouin up from the palace belonged to the company of Ca-Pesaro, though this detail is absent in another version of the *Fragmentum* (ed. Wolff, 151) and cannot be confirmed.

That Baudouin's rescue ship was Venetian places his departure from the city to the period after the return of the fleet from the Black Sea and its repulse by the dockland fire.

"soldiers of the Roman division" (199^{18})

According to Akropolitēs (183^{16-17}) these soldiers came close to capturing the fugitive emperor.

The word used by Pachymerēs, *phalanx*, was used by late Byzantine authors to designate a part of the army, not the army as a whole (Bartusis 1992:256). Thus the expression "the Roman *phalanx*" refers to the Greek troops of the kaisar, and not to his Cuman unit or to the *thelēmatarioi*. This is Pachymerēs' only reference to the role played in the city's capture by the Bithynian troops, who seem to have been sent after Baudouin II at the same time as the Cuman division moved down the hill to the docks. See commentary to 199^{7}.

"this possession signified. . ." (199^{23-24})

As Geanakoplos (1959:111) states, the crown and sword would have been displayed to any Latins who still thought to resist, in order to proclaim that their own leader had fled and that any further fighting would be pointless.

"the rumour" (199^{27})

While Grēgoras agrees with Pachymerēs that the fleet was still at Daphnousia on the 25th (Greg. 86^{13-14}), Akropolitēs states that the fleet was on its way back to Kōnstantinoupolis and was indeed already halfway down the Bosporos on the morning of the 25th (Akrop. 182^{28}-183^{4}).

Since there is evidence to suggest that the Latins were aware of Stratēgopoulos' presence (see commentary to 197^{4}), it is probably best to accept Akropolitēs' testimony on this point. The fleet arrived at Kōnstantinoupolis in the afternoon of the 25th, for the fleet had arrived before Baudouin was rescued (see commentary to 199^{17}), and he was rescued on the same day as he left the Blachernai palace (Pach. 199^{18}). In addition, the fleet spent all night rescuing refugees (Greg. 86^{16-21}).

"about thirty long ships" (199^{30})

See commentary to 193^{6}.

"a very great ship from Sicily" (201^{2-3})

This ship also attracted the attention of Holobōlos, who says that it was a "monster wondrous to behold" (Holobōlos 67^{32-33}). This ship, unmentioned by Pachymerēs at the time of the fleet's departure for the Black Sea (Pach. 193^{6}), was presumably a large merchantman that was overtaken and co-opted by the Venetian fleet while travelling through the Bosporos.

Pryor (1984:375) claims that such vessels would have a crew of between eighty and one hundred men, and could hold about four hundred passengers.

"Romanised people" (201^{6})

It is uncertain what Pachymerēs means by this phrase. He cannot simply be using the word *Rhōmaizontas* as a synonym for 'Roman' (*Rhomaioi*), but in the next line of text he says that they were indeed Romans. Perhaps the best suggestion, taken from the context of the passage, is that the *Rhōmaizontas* were the Greek inhabitants of the city, differentiated from the Latin inhabitants by their ethnic 'Roman' background, but not technically true 'Romans' since they did not live in the realm of the basileus.

"Iōannēs Phylax" (201^{7})

Iōannēs is otherwise unknown in our sources, and thus we cannot know for certain whether Phylax is a proper name or merely descriptive. Common opinion is in favour of it being a proper name (e.g. Geanakoplos 1959:111; *PLP* no. 30197) but it is certainly possible that Phylax is descriptive. The format of the name as given by Pachymerēs: "x *legomenos* y" is unique in his *Historia*, and elsewhere *legomenos*, when used, is referring to individuals who are given one name only (e.g. 91^{10-11}, 227^{13}). Also, the position of the reference to Iōannēs, coming directly after a possible reference to Greek watchmen may be significant. The commander of the civil wall guards would have been both a member of the emperor's government and well known to the *thelēmatarioi*, and this knowledge may explain his prominence in Pachymerēs' *thelēmatariote*-derived account. Could he really be Iōannēs the *phylax*, commanding the civil watch? It is tempting, but far from proven.

Nevertheless the inclusion of a Greek among the close retinue (*oikeios*) of Baudouin is interesting in light of the emperor's own letter to the queen of France, in which Baudouin had protested that "we have never made use of the advice of Greeks, nor do we now make use of it, nor shall we ever make use of it" (cited by Setton 1969:224).

Guilland (1959:60) gives Iōannēs' motive for assisting the invaders a desire to prevent a massacre of the Latins by the Greeks, since an attack by the Venetian fleet would be followed by one.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 30197.

"because they could not resist an attack" (201^{24-25})

We must question the veracity of this statement. While it is true that the number of trained soldiers available to Stratēgopoulos was small, he could draw upon large numbers of volunteers from the citizenry and, since he had gained control over the city, he now had the advantage of using the sea-walls in his defence, whereas the Venetian sailor-soldiers would have to fight their way over the walls to regain the city.

While it is true that the Venetians had forced these very walls during the Fourth Crusade, this was only after much planning and effort, and the construction of special equipment. The fleet of 1261 was not only smaller than the fleet of 1204, but also did not have such equipment fitted to its ships, nor time, on the occasion of an immediate attack, to construct such equipment. An attack without such devices, no matter how ferociously it was conducted, would founder on the walls. Despite what Pachymerēs says, the Byzantine possession of the city was probably quite secure.

Thus the decision to fire the docklands was probably not made out of fear of an immediate attack, but rather designed as a ploy both to get the Latins to abandon the city and force the Venetian fleet to withdraw from the area.[139]

"they lit a fire" (201^{25})

Akropolitēs states that the Venetian quarter was fired first, and then the quarters of the other Italian peoples further east along the shore (Akrop. 183^{12}). This was not necessarily deliberate, but may merely reflect the respective locations of the quarters. The fire presumably consumed the residential areas within the walls as well as the commercial areas outside the walls (Brown 1970:74), since the refugees at first fled their homes "to the hills of the city" (Pach. 201^{28}), that is, away from the docks and the fleet and into the arms of the Greek forces.

"recourse to supplication" (203^{3})

As Finlay (1877:3.2.344) suggested long ago, this passage may indicate that the Venetians came to an arrangement with the kaisar regarding the rescue of the refugees and the departure of the fleet. There is further evidence to support this view. First, Pachymerēs implies that the refugees were able to take some of their possessions with them (Pach. 201^{15-17})[140], and second, Grēgoras writes that the fleet operated all through the night to collect the refugees, sailing all around the city and picking up "everyone who was easily reached" (Greg. 86^{16-21}). This suggests that the new occupiers of the city did not molest the rescue effort. Then, when the fleet left the city on the morning of the 26th, many of the refugees tearfully bid farewell to their "illegitimate fatherland" which, if it is not mere rhetoric on Grēgoras' part, could be taken to mean that they knew they would not return, which is more likely to have been thought after an agreement was reached than if the Venetians were full of warlike intentions.

Negotiation on the part of the Venetians is even more understandable when we consider that their homes, businesses and goods had been destroyed and were beyond reclamation, and their families were *de facto* hostages behind the walls, and would undoubtedly suffer if an attack was made. As Pachymerēs says, their best option was to cut their losses and withdraw (Pach. 203^{4-5}).

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[139] Because, of course, the Venetians could easily have beached their ships near the city and invested it, making preparations for an assault. They would be far less likely to do so if their camp was filled with non-combatants who needed to be cared for and protected. It would have been much better to take them to safety and then return.

[140] Though the general state of undress of the refugees (Pach. 203^{6-7}) would otherwise suggest that they lost even the clothes on their backs.

"Many dreadful things were done here" (203[6])

Pachymerēs must have lived a very sheltered life if he thought that the forcing of women to run half-clothed through city streets was the worst thing ever done. If he is to be trusted, however, his reference to torn shifts and general lack of possessions may well indicate that the Latins were robbed of their valuables and even clothing, and that incidents of rape and other crimes may have taken place. He may have been too reticent to describe them in more overt terms. An intelligent, well-read man, Pachymerēs was probably familiar with the account by Chōniatēs of the brutal crusader capture of the city in 1204 (Chon. 571-582), and his comment that the Latins were repaid for it may be an oblique reference to similar scenes taking place in 1261.

According to the *Chronicle of the Morea* (1305) there were three thousand refugees. Many died of illness and hunger on the voyage to Negropont (*Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae* 48).

2.28 Of the prōtasēkrētis Senachēreim, what he did because of the capture of the City

"Nikomēdeia" (205[3])

Located at the head of the Gulf of Nikomēdeia, about one hundred kilometres from Kōnstantinoupolis, Nikomēdeia had been a long-time rival of nearby Nikaia, but by the thirteenth century it had lost much of its former importance and grandeur, and was little more than a provincial town.

It had been in Latin hands almost continually from 1206 to about 1240, and was lost to the Turks in 1337.

"on the day of the festival" (205[3-4])

The festival of Hagios Panteleēmōn, the patron saint of Nikomēdeia, was held on 27 July.

If Pachymerēs' dating is accurate, the arrival of official messengers at the town, one hundred kilometres from Kōnstantinoupolis, so soon after the capture is more evidence for a very early return of the Venetian fleet. If the fleet had been at Daphnousia on the 25th, then it could barely have arrived back at the city on the 27th, yet Stratēgopoulos, a cautious general, would not have sent premature word to the basileus but would instead have waited until the city was secured and all threats, including the fleet, had been accounted for.

"Kakos Senachēreim" (205^{4-10})

This story of Senachēreim tearing his beard out in despair over the recapture of Kōnstantinoupolis is probably apocryphal and the product of historical hindsight. It is doubtful that any contemporary could foresee that the strong empire of 1261 – which had recently subdued both Greek and Latin rivals in the west, enjoyed favourable relations with Bulgaria and the Selçuk state, and which had just retaken the ancient capital – would lose almost all of its Anatolian heartlands to the Turks within sixty years.

The story is perhaps an invention of Pachymerēs himself, since the attitudes expressed by Senachēreim here are suspiciously similar to those opinions held by the historian and propounded elsewhere in his *Historia*, notably at 25^{22}-35^{27}. Pachymerēs firmly blames the reconquest of Kōnstantinoupolis and the European focus of the basileus for the loss of Anatolia to the Turks.

It may, however, be a more general tradition, since a similar tale was told until at least the sixteenth century, when the Italo-Greek writer Spandounes wrote that a certain Theodore Tornichio (Tornikios) responded to news of Kōnstantinoupolis' recapture by proclaiming it as a death-knell for the empire and a prelude to the loss of Anatolia. The tradition followed by Spandounes may of course have originated with Pachymerēs, but no link can be proven.

2.29 How the basileus was notified of the capture of the City

"staying near Nymphaion" (205^{14})

Akropolitēs states that Michaēl VIII was encamped at a place called Meteorion when he heard the news of the city's capture (Akrop. 183^{24}). According to Ramsay (1890:131) this otherwise unattested locale was located on or near the Hermos River between Magnesia and Sardis. Akropolitēs' testimony does not invalidate that of Pachymerēs, since such a position for Meteorion could still be said to be "near Nymphaion". Grēgoras, however, is most certainly incorrect in saying that Michaēl was at Nikaia when word reached him (Greg. 86^{22}).

Considering the distances involved[141] it is most probable that the basileus did not hear of the capture until at least the first few days of August.

[141] The Hermos valley is nearly four hundred kilometres from Nikomedia, where the news arrived on July 27.

"The one who was first to arrive" (205^{16})

The general outline of Pachymerēs' narrative agrees with that of Akropolitēs and Skoutariōtēs, although the latter say the news was brought by a servant of Eulogia who heard the word from the official messenger while travelling to Meteorion through Bithynia (Akrop. 183^{26}-184^{1}) and not by a man who had come directly from Kōnstantinoupolis ahead of the official messenger, as Pachymerēs would have it. Either version may be true.

"Eulogia" (205^{19})

That Eulogia was the first to tell Michaēl about the capture is confirmed by Holobōlos (68^{24-35}), Akropolitēs (184^{5-6}) and Skoutariōtēs (552^{21-22}), and the tales they tell about her gentleness in waking her brother, and the conversation they then had, are all strikingly similar. The only noticeable difference is the timing of the matter. Pachymerēs says it took place at dawn, while Akropolitēs and Skoutariōtēs say it was the middle of the night.

Only two people, Michaēl and Eulogia, were present during this conversation, and therefore the source of the story must be one of them. I would suggest that it was Eulogia who spread the story, basing my suggestion on an earlier passage of Pachymerēs, in which he states that Eulogia, if approached in the right manner, was more than happy to tell the story of the prophetic lullabies she sang to the infant Michaēl (Pach. 179^{29}-181^{6}).

"She did not believe" (205^{21}-207^{6})

In his own inimitably erudite way, Pachymerēs seems to be saying here that it is not good to be awakened suddenly or unexpectedly. Holobōlos comments on the vulnerability of the body when asleep also (Holobōlos 68^{30-35}).

"the matter was strange" (207^{20-21})

Grēgoras also indicates Michaēl's doubts about the truth of the tale, because he had sent far too few men, in his opinion, to take the city (Greg. 86^{22}-87^{3}).

"On the same day" (209^{2})

According to Akropolitēs, Michaēl had already set out for Kōnstantinoupolis before he received the crown and sword of Baudouin II, and also that the first official messenger was not bearing these items (Akrop. 185^{8-25}).

"as for the leader" (209^{6-7})

Although Alexios Stratēgopoulos had already reached the highest rank possible for a man outside the imperial family, Michaēl VIII honoured his achievement by granting him a

triumph (Greg. 89^{10-13}) and by ordering the inclusion of the kaisar's name alongside those of the basileus and patriarch in the diptychs for one year (Pach. 233^{26-28}). This was high praise indeed.

"Making this day a day of festivity" (209^{9-12})

There need be no dispute between Pachymerēs' account, which has the basileus stay near Nymphaion for a short period before departing for Kōnstantinoupolis, and that of Akropolitēs, who implies that Michaēl and his entourage left Meteorion immediately. Preparing the imperial suite for such a move was not as simple as kicking over the tent-poles and dousing campfires, and a Byzantine basileus could not simply ride off without his retinue. Michaēl would have required at least a day before his caravan was ready to move, which would have granted ample time for a celebration and the delivery of a victory speech.

2.30 Speech of the basileus about the capture of the City

"the people present" (209^{15})

Pachymerēs portrays this speech as being given in public view, with commoners and nobles alike being in attendance. This setting is appropriate for such a celebratory occasion. However, we have an immediate hint that Pachymerēs' version of the event may not be entirely based upon actuality. Compare the detailed list of the grandees present for the speeches given following the death of Theodōros II and the lack of such detail in connection with the current speech. It may be important, too, that no other source mentions the giving of a speech by the basileus on this occasion, so there is no corroboration for Pachymerēs' account.

"because of divine wrath" (209^{17})

The destruction wrought by the Fourth Crusade was often described by Byzantine writers as a punishment meted out by God for the sins of the empire and its people. In this speech, Michaēl VIII is made to emphasize repeatedly the return of divine favour to the empire, as made manifest by the miraculous nature of the recovery of the old capital. In this passage Pachymerēs introduces both of these themes.

"the ancient situation" (209[19-22])

At no time in its long history did the empire possess the exact frontiers Pachymerēs gives it in this passage, so it is impossible to give a precise period for his "ancient situation". It perhaps refers to the reign of Justinian I in the mid sixth century, although at that time the Romans ruled almost all of Italy, not just Apulia, and also the North African coast as well as Egypt. But it is more likely, however, that Pachymerēs is conflating the political reach of the empire with its spiritual reach. At no time did the empire extend into the Arctic or to Ethiopia, but these areas[142] were both early converted to the Orthodox branch of Christianity, and gave varying amounts of primacy to the Kōnstantinoupolitan church. This would also explain the absence of North Africa and northern Italy from Pachymerēs' frontiers – these were regions that looked to Rome – but the inclusion of Apulia, whose Greek-speaking inhabitants long held ties to Kōnstantinoupolis.

It may be for similar reasons that Pachymerēs ignores the earlier Roman Empire, describing only the greatest extent of Greek political or religious influence within it, and not the Latin zones.

"sometimes ten or more" (209[24])

Pachymerēs' estimate for the size of the empire's Anatolian territory before 1204 seems low, even if his "march" was the ideal twenty-four miles per day of the old Roman legion. A statement like this would be expected from a poorly-travelled individual like Pachymerēs, not a widely-travelled and militarily experienced man like Michaēl VIII. This may be an indication that Pachymerēs is not reporting the basileus' speech as accurately as he claims.

"The Italians took one part" (209[28-30])

Pachymerēs gives a quick list of all of the invaders of the empire in the wake of the Fourth Crusade. The Italians – crusaders and Venetians – occupied most of the empire's European provinces after 1204, as well as most of the Aegean islands. The Selçuk Turks attempted to seize Anatolia, but were defeated by Theodōros I Laskaris at Antioch-on-the-Maiander in 1211 and forced to relinquish their conquests. The Bulgars repeatedly inflicted heavy defeats on the crusaders in 1205-1207 and overran much of Thrace and Makedonia, holding it until the 1240's and beyond. The Triballians – Serbs – occupied northern and western Makedonia, clashing often with the Epirotes and Bulgars, and separatist Greek splinter-

[142] Assuming that we can equate Russia with Pachymerēs' "Arctic".

states grew up in Epiros, Trebizond and western Anatolia, although the latter statelets were absorbed by the Nikaian realm before 1210.

"they were defined as Nikaia, Prousa and Philadelpheia" (209^{30}-211^{1})
This phrase is a duplicate of one used by Pachymerēs in his introduction to his entire work (Pach. 25^{26-27}). This suggests one of two things: either Pachymerēs drew this phrase from Michaēl's speech and used it himself, or else he composed this speech himself and that it does not record the basileus' actual words. Considering the way in which the *Historia* appear to have been composed in a linear, sequential manner (see, for example, the commentary to 151^{17}), the latter option is more likely.

"For who has not insulted us" (211^{4-6})
Unfortunately none of our extent Greek sources provide any examples of imperial ambassadors being insulted for this reason.

"we ourselves" (211^{9})
This refers to the failed attempt to seize Kōnstantinoupolis in 1260. See 171^{25}-175^{11} and commentary.

"this belongs to God" (211^{11-26})
Again Michaēl is made to say that only God had the power to award Kōnstantinoupolis to the empire, and that with divine favour Kōnstantinoupolis could fall to the smallest army, though defended by the greatest. Michaēl VIII disowns any claim to the credit for the victory, an attitude he maintained from the moment he first heard the news (Akrop. 184^{12-21}) to his entry into the city on 14 August (Pach. 217^{9}-219^{3}). According to Pachymerēs, however, Michaēl abandoned this modesty soon afterwards (225^{16-19}) and claimed the victory for himself and his dynasty.

At least one later reader noticed the hypocrisy of the basileus' speech here in the light of his later actions. A marginal comment on one of the surviving manuscripts of the *Historia* bluntly blames the destruction of the empire on Michaēl's breaking of his oaths to Iōannēs IV (Failler 1979:213-214). This comment provides yet another example of the Byzantine perception that worldly events were determined by God as a reaction to the virtues and sins of the Byzantine people.

"let each of the archontes send someone" (213^{8-13})

Once again Michaēl VIII displays his favouritism towards the nobility (see commentary to 221^{20-21}).

In most cases the agents of the nobles would have arrived at Kōnstantinoupolis armed with documentary proof of ownership over specific properties, in the form of wills, contracts of sale and the like, of the sort surviving in monastic archives and published by Miklosich and Müller. In some other cases a family's ownership of a particular property would have been a matter of common memory. Some sort of evidence would have been vital or else the reoccupation of the city would have degenerated into an undignified land-grab, with everyone out to seize the best estates. It would have been in order to prevent such actions that Michaēl claimed the entire city and its contents as imperial property won by right of conquest, and for him and his agents to assign (Pach. 499^{24-27}). One such beneficiary of this imperial benevolence was the megas logothetes Geōrgios Akropolitēs, who was given a large house which had been occupied by an Italian, after nobody could determine who rightfully owned it (Kougeas 1949:61-64).

In cases where ownership was disputed, we may assume that the imperial adjudicators stepped in, awarding rights to one claimant and placating the others with different but suitable properties.

"it is necessary not to neglect those regions" (213^{17})

Pachymerēs' inclusion of this pledge by Michaēl VIII, to maintain the defences of the Anatolian frontier, is a subtle but damning indictment of the basileus by the historian. It must remembered that Pachymerēs, at the beginning of his work, laid the blame for the collapse of the empire on the neglect of the Anatolian borderlands, and that neglect was highlighted by the reforms of Michaēl VIII carried out by his official Chadenos (Pach. 31^{23}-33^{11}).

"to those by whom" (213^{21-23})

After his entrance into Kōnstantinoupolis, Michaēl VIII awarded a triumph to his general, Stratēgopoulos (Greg. 90^{9-11}), and gave to the *thelēmatarioi* a hereditary title to their farmlands (Pach. 221^{21-23}). Since it was they who were instrumental in winning the city for the empire, we may state with some confidence that it is Stratēgopoulos and the *thelēmatarioi* to whom Pachymerēs here refers.

For the grants drawn up to confirm these favours, see Dölger (*Regesten* no. 1894).

"he postponed giving to the masses" (213^{26})

The delay in giving property to the common people may not have the sinister aspect Pachymerēs gives it, but may instead have been on account of the impossibility of dealing with a mass of people – most of whom would not have had the ability to lodge claims until their arrival at Kōnstantinoupolis – from the distant town of Nymphaion. It would have been a more efficient administrative task if it was delayed until Kōnstantinoupolis was firmly controlled and the claimants had time to reach the city.

On Michaēl's claims as conqueror, see commentary to 221^{20-21} and 225^{16-19}.

"only fifty eight years" (213^{29})

This is a mistake. From April 1204 to July 1261 is a period of just over fifty-seven years, not fifty-eight.

"the wonderful churches" (215^{2-5})

Kōnstantinoupolis had suffered a great loss of its physical and spiritual treasures during the Latin occupation. As recently as 1260 the Latins had destroyed many great houses simply to obtain firewood (Greg. 81^{8-11}), but they had also stripped roofs of lead to sell (Skout. 508^{24}-509^{1}; Sanudo, *Fragmentum* (Hopf), 170). Many of the city's relics, accumulated over a millennium, were seized and sent to the west. A list of the relics known to have been taken makes for lengthy reading.[143] Iōannēs III Batatzēs attempted to halt the process of spoliation by sending money to the Latins in return for keeping the relics *in situ*, but he enjoyed only moderate success (Skout. 509^{1-4}).

Much of the pillaging was undertaken by those who had no intention of making Kōnstantinoupolis their home, as Pachymerēs complains. Consider the example of the avaricious Latin abbot described by Gunther of Pairis, who obtained a large haul of relics, including some Blood of Christ, a fragment of the True Cross, relics of Sts. John the Baptist, James, Christopher, George, Theodore, Cosmas, Cyprian, Pantaleon, Laurence, Demetrius, Stephen and many others (Gunther of Pairis 57-126).

"the basileus sent couriers" (215^{6-10})

It is questionable how many answers the basileus received from the kaisar regarding the enquiries he made "about each thing". Assuming that the couriers travelled at twice the speed of the imperial party, and also that the turn-around time at Kōnstantinoupolis was negligible, then even a courier who was sent out on the same day as the basileus departed

[143] See Riant (1875)

for the city would, on his return leg, encounter the imperial party when the latter was only two or three days away from Kōnstantinoupolis. Obviously, then, if Michaēl found any of Stratēgopoulos' arrangements to be not to his liking, there would have been very little time for a new message to reach the kaisar so that the matter could be corrected before the basileus himself arrived. We can therefore presume that Michaēl sent an initial order requesting constant updates on the city's affairs from Stratēgopoulos, and therefore most messages to the kaisar would have been instructions based on the daily information sent from Stratēgopoulos from Kōnstantinoupolis.

"he ordered the palace to be put in order" (215^{10-11})

Pachymerēs does not specify which palace was to be put in order, but elsewhere when he uses the word *palation* to refer to an actual building, it always refers to the Great Palace on the Marmara Shore, rather than to the Blachernai palace at the other corner of the city (compare his usage at 199^{15-16} and $219^{5, 8}$ with 199^{14}, 219^{5-6}, 363^{19} and 537^{12}). Thus we can assert that the basileus had given instructions to Stratēgopoulos to prepare the Great Palace, probably after hearing about the condition of the Blachernai palace (Pach. 219^{5-9}).

"the grandees" (215^{11-14})

The nobles would have been aware that if they delayed in claiming their rightful properties then they would have risked them being recorded as unclaimed and distributed to another family by the kaisar or another imperial commissioner. Hence the rush to send their agents to Kōnstantinoupolis.

"The kaisar distributed houses" (215^{14-15})

This statement seems to disagree with Pachymerēs' earlier statement that the basileus selected several people to act as housing commissioners, and sent them, armed with imperial warrants, to Kōnstantinoupolis (Pach. 213^{24-25}). This earlier statement cannot refer to the agents of the nobles, or else a new contradiction develops with 215^{11-12}. The current passage may mean no more than that the kaisar, being the highest-ranked official in the city, acted as a final arbiter in disputes over individual properties on those occasions when the housing commissioners' decisions were not accepted by the claimants.

"so many troubles" (215^{16})

Stratēgopoulos' main problem was his being a de facto military governor of the largest city in Europe, but having only a small force with which to garrison, police and defend the city against an expected counterattack by superior forces – nobody knew when the Venetian

fleet would return with Latin reinforcements. A possible Greek backlash against the remaining Latin civilians was also a danger to be guarded against. The basileus' haste to reach the city is indicative of the need for a larger Byzantine presence in the reoccupied capital.

"the Italians" (215[17])

Most of these indigents would have been Venetians who failed to find a place in one of the galleys during the evacuation of the city. That they were, for the most part, common labourers and members of the lower classes, is a further indication that the evacuation was an organised process conducted peacefully and unopposed, since the wealthy and important inhabitants of the Venetian quarter all managed to find places in the fleet and leave the city. See the commentary to 203[3].

"recently been stripped of their possessions" (215[18-19])

The possessions were stripped not by the Greeks, but lost in the fire of 25 July that burned most of the Venetian and neighbouring quarters. See Pachymerēs 201[25].

"the wall had been broken everywhere" (215[26])

Stratēgopoulos would have been very aware of this problem, since it was probably through such gaps that his men first entered the city (commentary to 195[4]).

2.31 How the basileus entered the city with the principal members of his entourage

"Andronikos" (217[3])

Andronikos was the second son of Michaēl and Theodōra. The first son, Manouēl, had died while he was still very young (Pach. 247[14-15]).[144] Andronikos was born in 1259, probably on 25 March (Ševčenko 1962:137 n.6). He became co-basileus sometime in 1264/5 (Failler 1986:243-245) and sole basileus in 1282 after Michaēl's death. His long reign was not a happy one for the empire, which lost control of almost all of its Anatolian territories to the Turks. Andronikos was forced to abdicate in May 1328 after fighting a long civil war with

[144] Papadopulos (1938:22), basing his argument on the later passage of Pachymerēs, suggests that Manouēl was already dead before Andronikos was born, but this is by no means certain. It appears that he was still alive at the end of 1258 (see commentary to

his grandson Andronikos III. He became a monk and died on 12/13 February 1332. See Polemis (1968:158).

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 21436.

"his father" (217^{4})

The father of Michaēl VIII, Andronikos Palaiologos, was a trusted follower of Iōannēs III Batatzēs and rose to the rank of megas domestikos. He died while governing Thessalonikē in 1247, when Michaēl was about 22 years old (Akrop. 83^{15}-84^{15}).

"the mother of the empress" (217^{6})

Eudokia Angelina was the daughter of Iōannēs Angelos and the wife of Iōannēs Doukas, a nephew of Iōannēs III Batatzēs. After her husband died in the early 1240's she devoted herself to religion rather than remarry, though she was still young (Akrop. 101^{11-18}). According to a later synopsis of Akropolitēs' *History*, she was also an aunt of "the Stratēgopouloi" (Akrop. 253^{18}). Eudokia was still alive in 1282 (Pach. 635^{18-20}). We are given no clue as to why she was called "the great lady".

Her entry in the *PLP* is no. 6228.

"travelled to the city" (217^{8})

Akropolitēs (185^{14}-186^{6}) describes the haste of the basileus to get to the retaken capital. From Meteorion to Kōnstantinoupolis is a distance of over three hundred kilometres, and the route also involved a sea crossing at the Hellespont. The basileus and his large retinue covered this distance in about two weeks, with an average speed of about twenty five kilometres per day. This was no mean feat considering that at least one small child, Andronikos, was in the party.

"When he had arrived" (217^{9})

Pachymerēs is contradicted by Akropolitēs (187^{1-5}), who writes that Michaēl VIII reached the city on the fourteenth of August 1261, the day before he entered the city, and not a few days earlier, as Pachymerēs says. Akropolitēs, who was with the basileus, also states that Michaēl stayed the night at the Kosmidion monastery outside the Blachernai district, rather than outside the Chrysea Pylē, several kilometres away.

"in a way that was marked by a combination of piety and magnificence" (217^{11})

The general tenor of Michaēl VIII's entry into Kōnstantinoupolis was one of humble thankfulness before God. This is confirmed by the reports of Akropolitēs (187^{6}-188^{3}) and Grēgoras (87^{11}-88^{12}) as well as an encomium to the basileus by Holobōlos (71^{11}-77^{3}).

"Pantokratōr" (217^{12})

The monastery of Christ Pantokratōr in Kōnstantinoupolis was one of the largest and most important foundations in the empire. It was founded by Iōannēs II Komnēnos in 1136, and it was built near the summit of the Fourth Hill in the city. It had been richly endowed with estates throughout the empire, but it had been occupied by the Venetians in 1204, and suffered the loss of most of its estates located in the European provinces of the empire. It housed some Latin monks until 1261.

"the ancient icon" (217^{12-16})

The actual existence of the most famous of Byzantine icons, the Hodēgetria, was first attested in the tenth century, when it was housed in its own special church near Hagia Sophia, though belief in a painting by Luke of the Virgin dated to at least the eighth century (Wolff 1948:323). By the twelfth century it had been established as a holy symbol of the Virgin's special protection of the imperial capital (Chon. 381^{46}-382^{61}; Baynes 1955:254). The crusader Robert de Clari mentions an icon that was "the first image of Our Lady that was ever made or painted" (Robert de Clari 114). In 1206 it was given by Emperor Henri to the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, but it was later stolen from its place in the Hagia Sophia by agents of the Venetian podestà in a brazen act of robbery. It was placed in the monastery of Christ Pantokratōr, where it remained until 1261 (Wolff 1948:320-321).

The icon itself depicted Mary holding the infant Jesus in her left arm, with the baby in turn holding a scroll in his left hand while making a sign of blessing with his right. It was painted on a large panel encrusted with abundant gold, silver and gems, which took four men to carry (Clavijo 44).

"It was in the train of this guide" (217^{16})

The Virgin was the focus for the day's ceremonial. The Hodēgetria was brought out and venerated, and the very day itself, 15 August, was a feast day in honour of Mary's *koimēsis*. The recovery of the city was widely attributed to Mary, and this intervention was depicted on coinage issued by Michaēl in the following years (Hendy 1969:261 plate 36). We may also add here the coincidental role played by the monastery of Hagia Maria of the Spring in the recapture of the city (Pach. 195^{27}).

Pachymerēs indulges in a pun here, with the Greek word *hodēgos* (guide) referring to the icon of the Hodegētria at the front of the procession.

"Geōrgios of Kyzikos" (217^{19})

Geōrgios Kleidas, metropolitan bishop of Kyzikos (c.1253-1261) was a prominent churchman, who had been on an embassy to Rome (Pach. 471^{13-17}) and who was a correspondent of Theodōros II (Festa 198). He was critical of Theodōros' rule, and his presence at Kōnstantinoupolis at this time indicates that he supported Michaēl VIII and was a member of the anti-Arsenios faction.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 11779.

"recite the prayers" (217^{19})

The prayers recited by Geōrgios had been composed by Akropolitēs during the journey to the city from Anatolia (Akrop. 186^{19-28}). They numbered thirteen individual prayers, all with their own themes. These themes are listed by Holobōlos (73^{27-31}). The reciting of the prayers took some time, and Pachymerēs says that the basileus did not enter the city until midday (Pach. 219^{2-3}).

"on foot" (217^{22}-219^{2})

That Michaēl chose to enter on foot, rather than on horseback as was customary for a basileus entering in triumph through the Chrysea Pylē, is confirmed by Akropolitēs (187^{20-21}) and Holobōlos (75^{23-29}). This was another sign of the basileus' humility and thankfulness to God.

The solemn procession marched through the city as far as the monastery of Hagios. Iōannēs Stoudios, about five hundred metres beyond the gate (Akrop. 187^{29-31}). Here the Hodēgetria was deposited and the basileus mounted a horse for the rest of journey to the Hagia Sophia and the Great Palace.

"the passion of the assembled multitude" (219^{3})

The festive nature of the day, and the happiness of the people of Kōnstantinoupolis, is confirmed by Akropolitēs (188^{4-7}) and by Michaēl VIII himself (Dimitrievskii 1895:771).

"offered suitable security" (219^{9})

The advantage of the Great Palace over the Blachernai palace was at this time the ease of escape it offered in case of Latin attack. The Blachernai, being located in the extreme northwest corner of the city, could easily become a trap if hostile ships blocked the Golden

Horn and an attacking army was encamped outside the walls. The Great Palace, on the other hand, offered an easy escape route via its landing stage opening to the Marmara Sea. This was demonstrated by the flight of Baudouin II on 26 July (Pach. 199[12-18]).

2.32 How the basileus dealt with the national groups of the Latins after his entrance

"The morning having arrived" (219[20])

Of all the things that needed the basileus' attention after the recapture of the city, the most pressing, because the threat posed to the Byzantine hold on the capital by any hostile action undertaken by the Italian cities, was the determination of the fate of the various Italian peoples dwelling in the city. Venice, especially, was in a state of war with the empire, and a Venetian fleet was expected to arrive from the Aegean daily. The Genoese, too, needed to be dealt with and agreement reached with them over the implementation of the provisions of the Nymphaion treaty, now that Kōnstantinoupolis was restored to the empire. Here the basileus needed to walk a fine line between giving the Genoese too little – a temptation, given that the Genoese did not actually contribute to the capture as was a requirement for many of the treaty provisions – and too much, which would lead to Genoese arrogance and further demands. We can believe Pachymerēs' claim that negotiations with the Italians were undertaken immediately after the basileus' arrival in the city, and that they began on 16 August.

"these men" (219[23])

Pachymerēs indicates (219[21]) that "these men" are the "notables" of the resident Italian peoples. For the most part they would have been whatever officials of the various Italian quarters who could be found, along with the wealthier and more influential of the merchants and captains residing in Kōnstantinoupolis. It would be interesting to know who negotiated on behalf of Venice, since the podestà had fled the city along with most of the wealthy Venetian merchants.[145] Certainly there had been little opportunity for the Venetian population at Kōnstantinoupolis to reorganise itself after the mass exodus of 25/26 July.

[145] Heyd (1959:1.431 n.1) argues that it was Michaēl's policy to keep Kōnstantinoupolis free of large numbers of Venetian merchants and officials, limiting Venetian presence in the city largely to sailors, labourers and other commoners.

"the others" (219^{24-25})

It is uncertain who these people were. A simple reading would suggest that "the others" are the rest of the Kōnstantinoupolitan Italians, whose representatives were conducting the negotiations with the basileus. But in the context of the prevailing situation this reading makes little logical sense. Of the three groups present at Kōnstantinoupolis in August 1261, none can be described as a threat to the city. The Genoese, allies of Michaēl VIII, stood to gain much from the Byzantine recapture; the Pisans were few in number and may also have been treaty partners with Byzantium (Geanakoplos 1959:88 n.60); while the Venetians were in disarray, with many of their natural leaders having fled from the city and those remaining presumably more interested in rebuilding their razed quarter than in provoking the Greeks further by behaving truculently. It is just possible that Pachymerēs is referring to the possibility of the Genoese using the treaty of Nymphaion as *carte blanche* permission to commit violence upon the Venetians and their remaining possessions, but this seems highly unlikely.

It is more probable, given the situation prevailing on 16 August, that Pachymerēs' "others" are the Italian peoples generally, the citizens of Venice, Genoa and Pisa and, especially, their governments. By coming to agreements with the Italians in the city, and awarding them generous privileges, Michaēl could hope to present the home governments of the Italian cities with a *fait accompli*. In the case of Venice, especially, it was worthwhile to reconfirm immediately most of the trading privileges Venice had held under the Latin Empire, so that Venice would have little cause to launch or support a counter-attack on Kōnstantinoupolis. By dealing favourably with the few Genoese already present, Michaēl was able to negotiate from a position of strength and avoid drawn-out horse-trading with the commune over the implementation of the Nymphaion treaty's articles.

This identification of "the others" with the non-resident Italians is supported by Pachymerēs' later comment that Michaēl removed the bonds holding the Italian negotiators to "their compatriots" by offering advantages that served all of the resident Italians, and not merely the negotiators alone (Pach. 219^{26-28}).

"These were as follows" (219^{28}-221^{3})

These "favours" were merely the empire's obligations as drawn up in the Nymphaion treaty. Among other things the treaty stipulated that the empire would give Genoa a generous quarter in Kōnstantinoupolis, and that the residents of that quarter would live under a Genoese magistrate and under their own laws, both civil and criminal. In addition, under the treaty the Genoese were granted the right to trade without let or hindrance, and without paying duties, throughout the empire. They alone among foreigners were to be

permitted to trade in the Black Sea, which had always been an Imperial preserve (Zepos and Zepos 488-495; Nicol 1988:176; Geanakoplos 1959:87-88).

Michaēl VIII did, however, go beyond his obligations in one respect: he handed over to the Genoese the fortified Venetian palace, which he was only constrained to do if the Genoese had directly contributed to the city's capture (*Annali genovesi* 4 45).

"a leader . . . known as a podestà" (219^{30}-221^{1})

Although we have no Genoese evidence, several Greek documents indicate that the head of the Genoese settlement in Kōnstantinoupolis before the Fourth Crusade was a vicecomes, or viscount (Day 1988:124-125). Vicecomites ranked below podestà in the Genoese colonial official hierarchy (Byrne 1928:167), and the fact that a podestà was the Genoese *chef de mission* in post-1261 Kōnstantinoupolis indicates the importance the commune placed on the settlement within the Byzantine capital, if not the actual size or population of that settlement.

"given to the Venetians" (221^{4-5})

While it appears that Michaēl VIII dealt with the Venetians at this time, he did not extend sweeping privileges to them in 1261. At most he may have granted an amnesty to those Venetians who did not flee on 25/26 July. The empire was at war with Venice over the next few years, and it is inconceivable that the basileus would have allowed hostile foreigners to live in his capital and allow them to come and go at will to trade. Any Venetian vessel attempting to land at Kōnstantinoupolis would have been boarded and confiscated, and the crew imprisoned. This was indeed the fate of a Venetian ship soon after the recapture (*Annali genovesi* 4.48-49; Canale (Limentani ed.) 184; Dandolo 311).

In this passage Pachymerēs is getting his chronology wrong[146]. The Venetian-Byzantine war dragged on until 1268. At that time a treaty was signed between Venice and the empire and Venetian merchants were once again permitted to reside at Kōnstantinoupolis, under an official called a bailo, and to trade duty-free throughout the empire (TT III.358; Nicol 1988:191-192; Geanakoplos 1959:214-215).

"the Pisans" (221^{4-5})

There is no reason to doubt that the Pisans obtained these privileges, or similar ones, at this time. Unlike the Venetians, Pisa was not at war with the empire and, if anything, may have

[146] As is Grēgoras who seems to be drawing heavily upon Pachymerēs for his information (Greg. 97^{22}-98^{2}). For Grēgoras' use of Pachymerēs in general, see Guilland 1926:244-248.

been allied to it. Pisa is specifically excluded from the clauses of the Nymphaion treaty regarding the Genoese trading monopoly in Imperial waters (Zepos and Zepos 488-495).

"keeping the nations apart" (221^{10})

Pachymerēs again leaps forward in time to 1268. Failler (1984:220 n.3) suggests that Pachymerēs' discussion of the alliance between Baudouin II and Charles d'Anjou is premature. It may be early, but it is not without design on the part of the historian. Pachymerēs' subject in this chapter is the dealings of Michaēl VIII with the various Italian cities, and how he attempted to keep them on his side by granting their citizens widespread benefits in his empire. As far as Pachymerēs is concerned this was especially important after the imperial claim of Baudouin II became wedded to the power and ambition of Charles through the treaties of Viterbo in 1267. An alliance of one or other of the maritime cities with Charles would have been disastrous for Byzantium, and Pachymerēs appears to be saying that Michaēl's efforts were redoubled after the signing of the Viterbo treaties.

Pachymerēs can only be referring to the two important rapprochements the basileus made with Genoa and Venice at this time. In late 1267 Michaēl sent ambassadors to Genoa to negotiate the return of the Genoese from Hērakleia in Thrace to Kōnstantinoupolis, and offered to give Genoa a new quarter at Pera (Pach. 227^{1-2} and commentary), while in early 1268 he agreed to the five-year truce with Venice mentioned above.

Because Pachymerēs is usually very good at avoiding digressions from the chronological narrative unless absolutely necessary, he must be here considering the treaties of 1267 and 1268, even though the chapter's foundation is from 1261.

"contracted an alliance with him" (221^{13-14})

On 27 May 1267, Baudouin II of Constantinople and King Charles of Sicily signed a treaty at the papal palace of Viterbo. The main purpose of this treaty alliance was the reconquest of the Latin Empire which had fallen in 1261. Charles undertook to put Baudouin back on his throne, in return for one third of the retaken territories, the title to the Principality of Achaia for his son Philippe, son-in-law of Guillaume de Villehardouin, and a claim to the imperial title should Baudouin's line fail. Note that Pachymerēs incorrectly states that Baudouin II surrendered Kōnstantinoupolis to Charles at this time. The text of the treaty states explicitly that the capital would not be claimable as part of Charles' one-third share.

For the text of the treaty see del Giudice II.30-41, and see also the commentary of Geanakoplos (1959:197-200).

"Charles" (221[13])

Charles d'Anjou was a younger brother of King Louis IX of France. He was born in March 1226. In 1262 Pope Urban IV called on him, as a scion of the pro-papal Capetian dynasty, to overthrow the Hohenstaufen King Manfred of Sicily, whom Urban regarded as a danger to the Papacy. Charles set out to take the Sicilian throne and in 1266 won a decisive victory over Manfred at Benevento in southern Italy. Following Manfred's death in the battle Charles ascended the throne and claimed the kingdom by right of conquest and as a gift from God. As well as Sicily and southern Italy Charles also took possession of Manfred's holdings in Epiros and Albania, and thus immediately became a factor in Byzantine affairs.

Charles married twice, first to Beatrice of Provence in 1246, and second to Margaret of Burgundy, in 1268. He had seven children, including his heir Charles II and Beatrice, who married Philippe de Courtenay. Charles died in 1285, with his long-held dream of retaking the Latin Empire unfulfilled.

His entry in the *PLP* is no.11232.

"his son" (221[14])

Philippe de Courtenay was called Porphyrogennetos due to his being born (in 1243) to a reigning emperor, Baudouin II (r.1237-1261). As a child Philippe spent several years in Venice as surety for some of his father's debts to Venetian merchants (Sanudo, *Historia*, 115; Sanudo, *Fragmentum* (Hopf) 171; Sanudo, *Fragmentum* (Wolff) 151; Wolff1954:52-54). He was not in Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261, when his father lost his crown. He spent the following years with Baudouin in Italy and France seeking aid to regain the empire. His 1273 marriage to Beatrice d'Anjou produced only one child, a daughter named Catherine, who inherited the imperial claim on Philippe's death in 1283. Catherine later married her cousin Philippe of Taranto, son of Charles II of Sicily, and thus the Angevins consolidated their claim to the Latin Empire.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 29865.

2.33 How the basileus arranged the affairs of the City

"to bring in colonists" (221[18-19])

Grēgoras also mentions the pressing need to repopulate the city, after much of its former population had departed during the *Latinokratia* (Greg. 88[12-16]). Only Pachymerēs, however, indicates that many of the new colonists were refugees returning to their old home in the capital. What he means by 'near the sea' is unclear. Geanakoplos' suggestion

(1959:123), that it refers to the Bosporos, is possible, though it is also likely to refer to the southern shore of the Marmara Sea, which had been under the control of the Laskarids since 1224. We can assume that many individuals left Kōnstantinoupolis during the Latin occupation and defected to the Nikaians, as Akropolitēs did in 1233 (Akrop. 46^{13-14}).

"allot to the men of position" (221^{20-21})

Michaēl VIII claimed the rights of a conqueror over Kōnstantinoupolis, both in terms of disposing of its land and buildings (Pach. 499^{24-27}) and also in terms of inheriting whatever claim the Latin emperors had to be the heirs of the pre-1204 empire (Pach. 225^{16-19}).

In distributing the spoils of the city, the basileus made sure to appease the nobles with generous shares. He began this process even before he had arrived at the city (Pach. 215^{8-13}), and continued the pattern of his entire reign, where the oldest, noblest families of the empire were foremost in his favour (see Pach. 103^{12-15}, 111^{27}-113^{3}, 139^{3-5}, 141^{25-28}, 153^{9}-157^{3}).

"excepting that part" (221^{21-23})

As Bartusis (1990:13-15) has convincingly shown, the *thelēmatarioi* were formed into a unit of hereditary small-holding soldiers at this time, liable to serve the basileus in return for title to their lands around the city. Bartusis does confess to a lack of knowledge about their precise military role, since they appear in a wartime context only once, at the battle of Apros in 1305 (Pach. 599^{21}), where it appears that only some of the *thelēmatarioi* soldiers were present. We can surmise, however, that their military role was largely nominal, perhaps being some sort of suburban militia liable to be called out to defend the city only. Such a role would explain the lack of references to *thelēmatarioi* troops on campaign, as well as their less than whole-hearted response to Michaēl IX's recruitment drive for the Apros campaign of 1305.

For the fertility of the *thelēmatarioi* lands at Kōnstantinoupolis, see commentary to 157^{18}.

"to the monasteries" (221^{23-24})

Orthodox monasteries did not fare well under the Latin empire. Some were abandoned by their occupants, others were seized by Latin monks and still others were taken over as secular residences, the most famous of the latter being the transformation of the Pantokratōr monastery of Kōnstantinoupolis into the palace of the Venetian podestà (Greg. 85^{24}; TT II 284). Those monasteries that did remain in Greek hands suffered the confiscation of much of their property, both inside and outside the city (Charanis 1948:94-95; Geanakoplos

1979:109). Thus in 1261 the monasteries of Kōnstantinoupolis, and of the empire's European provinces generally, were much poorer than their Anatolian counterparts.

The way in which Michaēl VIII restored the wealth of the monasteries was probably similar to the way in which he awarded land and property to the church of Hagia Sophia: that is, by means of an official *chrysobull* handing over imperial property to the Patriarchate (this *chrysobull* is analysed by Geanakoplos 1979:104-117). In this same *chrysobull*, dated to 1271, Michaēl comments on how he "re-established and rebuilt the monasteries" of Kōnstantinoupolis (Geanakoplos 1979:114).

Charanis (1948:99) doubts whether Michaēl's motives for restoring the wealth of the Church were sincerely religious, but the influence and position of monks were "*grands dans le monde byzantin*" (Rouillard 1937:73), and since his accession the basileus had made it policy to treat the clergy with as much generosity as he had the nobility (Pach. 103^{18}-105^{9}, 107^{3-5}, 113^{3-6}, 115^{3-5}, 133^{1-2}).

One of the monasteries Michaēl VIII restored at this time was that of Hagios Dēmētrios, located at the foot of the First Hill at the entrance to the Golden Horn. The basileus refounded it entirely, giving it a new *typikon* in c.1280. This monastery became known as the imperial monastery following the patronage of the Palaiologoi (PK 242^{18-21}; Janin 1969: 92-94).

"to surrender land to the people" (223^{1})

In what almost seems like an afterthought, Pachymerēs tells us that Michaēl VIII acted to do what he could to get the city on its feet economically and to get his newly-grown population working to fill the imperial coffers. The treasury relied upon the taxes of the peasants, since the other groups that Pachymerēs has indicated were given land in Kōnstantinoupolis – the Italians (219^{20}-221^{10}), the nobles (221^{20-21}) and the Church (221^{23-24}) – were largely exempt from imperial imposts.

"to rebuild the city" (223^{3})

Grēgoras described the Kōnstantinoupolis of 1261 as being full of ruins and totally desolate (Greg. 88^{1-7}). But within a few years the encomiast Holobōlos congratulated the basileus on rebuilding or restoring "public buildings, hippodromes . . . a teeming marketplace, theatres, law courts, streets, stoas, a multitude of baths and old age homes everywhere" (Holobōlos 58^{31-37}). Much of this would have been necessary restoration of the city's infrastructure, to make it able to cope with the increased population.

"to introduce very quickly light armed soldiers" (223[3-4])

Pachymerēs uses exactly the same phrase in a later passage to describe the *tzakōne* marines brought to Kōnstantinoupolis from Lakonia[147] in the Morea by Michaēl VIII sometime after 1262 (Pach. 253[5-6]), so it is probable that Pachymerēs is also referring to the *tzakōnes* here. Therefore, despite the stated urgency behind the need for a garrison, Pachymerēs' narrative is again jumping chronologically.

According to Pachymerēs and Grēgoras the *tzakōnes* were moved from the Morea to serve as marines in the fleet, and also as garrison troops for the city (Pach. 251[16-17]; Greg. 98). They were given their own quarter in the city, which still had a distinct ethnic character in the 1280s (Bartusis 1992:46-47).

Not all of the imperial marines were actual *tzakōnes* from Moreote Lakonia, but enough of them were for the name to be applied to every soldier who performed that function. See Pach. 401[26-27], where he refers to non-Moreotes as *tzakōnes*. The position of the tzakōne corps was similar in this respect to many ethnic regiments of armies through the centuries, such as the Scots Archers of the French kings, the Swiss guard of the Vatican or the Highland regiments of the British army. Most of these regiments were not composed of one exclusive ethnic group, except at their initial formation.

"he fitted out a fleet and began the construction of more ships" (223[5-6])

This refers to a two-fold action of the basileus. First, Michaēl made makeshift warships out of whatever vessels he could find, to act as a stop-gap measure until his Genoese allies arrived.[148] Secondly, the basileus began forming a proper Byzantine fleet, a sight unseen since the reign of Manuel I Komnēnos. He did this to reduce the empire's reliance on foreign naval allies of uncertain loyalty (Pach. 403[4-6]). This was an expensive and lengthy process, since not only did dedicated warships need to be constructed, but crews of rowers and marines needed to be enrolled and trained. It is not until 1263 that we find a reference to a Byzantine squadron operating independently of the Genoese (Pach. 271[10-19]).

Michaēl VIII's fleet was important throughout his reign, but his successor Andronikos II, in a move to reduce government expenditure, disbanded most of it in the 1280s (Bartusis 1992:68-69).

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[147] The question of the origins of the Tzakones is a minefield and what is presented here is but one theory among many. See the exhaustive study of Caratzas (1976), especially pp. 130-197.

[148] The *Annali genovesi* tells us that some of these ships helped capture four Venetian vessels trying to escape from the Black Sea shortly after the fall of the city (*Annali genovesi* 4.48-49).

"*proselōntes*" (223^{6})

The *proselōntes* were established as the lowest class of land-holding soldier. They were given plots of land in special settlements in coastal areas throughout the empire (Bartusis 1990:17-19, lists Kōnstantinoupolis, Lemnos, the Khalkidike, and the Makedonian coast near Thessalonikē). Their sole task was, according to Pachymerēs, to row the galleys of the imperial navy, not to fight (Pach. 277^{19}). In this respect, says Pachymerēs, they were like servants to the marines, and their purpose was to transport the marines into battle (Pach. 403^{2-3}).

"He took still more measures" (223^{7-8})

Of primary importance among theses measures was the strengthening of the city walls, especially those along the Golden Horn. That line was heightened by two metres, with wooden extensions being added to the crest of the wall (Pach. 251^{8-14}; Geanakoplos 1979:114; Talbot 1993:249). This move was necessary, because until the city was defended by an adequate fleet, the sea-walls were as vulnerable to attack as they had been in 1204.

The basileus, who shared the common Byzantine fear of a surprise descent on the city by the Latins (Pach. 249^{25}-251^{2}), also made preparations for a possible siege of the city. He collected large amount of grain and other food to feed the garrison and population, grazed cattle on empty land within the walls, and stored fodder for horses. All land in the city that could be used to grow crops was so used[149] (Pach. 251^{18}-253^{2}).

The Byzantines may also have replaced the great chain across the Golden Horn (Geanakoplos 1959:130), but this is questionable if Pachymerēs is correct in saying that the fortifications of Galata, including the chain-tower, were razed on the basileus' orders (Pach. 227^{4-6}).

2.34 What the intentions of the bishops were towards Patriarch Arsenios

"deprived of its shepherd" (223^{10})

Pachymerēs refers here to the death of Patriarch Nikēphoros II at the end of 1260. See Pach. 177^{20}-179^{15} and commentary.

[149] This land was presumably that given to the *thelēmatarioi* (Pach. 221^{21-23}).

"He assembled the bishops" (223^{11})

According to Akropolitēs (176^{22}-180^{15}), the discussions, which led to the recall of Arsenios to the patriarchate, took place in the spring of 1261, before the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis. In addition, Akropolitēs represents the matter as being instigated by the secular official Kōnstantinos Tornikios, sebastokratōr and father-in-law of Iōannēs Palaiologos, and not by the basileus calling together a synod of bishops. Akropolitēs claims that Tornikios, a friend of Arsenios, approached the basileus out of concern that the Church was leaderless and backed his call for Arsenios with claims of miracles wrought by the former patriarch (Akrop. 180^{5-11}). Like Pachymerēs, Akropolitēs says that Michaēl VIII's decision to restore Arsenios was not without opponents. This claim is also made by Skoutariōtēs (549^{19-21}).

Arsenios himself, in his *Testamentum* states only that he was reinstated after the death of Nikēphoros II, but he too implies that this occurred before the capture of the capital in July 1261 (*Testamentum* 953^{B}). He also refers to the demand, made as a condition for his return, that he sign a *tomos* prepared by bishops allied with Michaēl VIII. This reference to a body of bishops is highly suggestive, and provides supporting evidence for Pachymerēs' version of events. Interestingly, Akropolitēs also mentions a written oath that Arsenios did sign as a condition of his return, in which the restored patriarch swore to maintain good and friendly relations with the basileus in the future (Akrop. 180^{12-15}). While Failler (1980b:60-61) argues against Arsenios and Akropolitēs referring to the same document, we must consider the two extreme views held by the two men at the time when their works were written. Akropolitēs was a partisan of Michaēl VIII, and fully supported the basileus' usurpation of the empire, while Arsenios was a supporter of Iōannēs IV Laskaris and bitterly opposed Michaēl VIII after the boy was blinded and finally deposed at the end of 1261. For the former, a claim that Arsenios had sworn to support Michaēl VIII would discredit the patriarch, whereas the patriarch's case could only be strengthened by a denial of any such oath.

It is true that neither Akropolitēs nor Arsenios contradicts Pachymerēs' account on any point other than on a chronological one. Happy as Michaēl VIII may have been to have had no patriarch, such a situation could not last indefinitely, and we may accept Akropolitēs' statement that Tornikios approached the basileus to tell him just that. It is only to be expected that a synod of bishops would have been convened to discuss the issue for it was, after all, only slightly different to a standard patriarchal succession, which was handled by synod. Arsenios confirms the participation of such a synod in the negotiations leading to his restoration.

"the basileus considered the two arguments" (223^{18})

Pachymerēs implies much but says little in this passage. It is clear, however, that he considered the matter uppermost in Michaēl VIII's thoughts to be his plans for removing Iōannēs IV Laskaris from every aspect of rule, and for inserting his own son Andronikos into the succession (Pach. 225^{12-16}; Akrop. 188^{25}-189^{8}). Arsenios had already resigned once over Michaēl's pushing aside of the young Laskaris (see Pach. 159^{6}-165^{11} and commentary), and Michaēl hoped to avoid having the same thing happen again, especially since Arsenios' earlier departure had caused such ructions in the Church and society. Michaēl would have preferred to have Arsenios return, and thus seal the breach made by Nikēphoros II's brief reign, but only if Arsenios could be brought to heel and made to act the lapdog to the basileus' dynastic ambitions.

Recognition of the legitimacy of Michaēl's usurpation, by the man regarded by everyone as the rightful patriarch, would advance the basileus' plans a long way, and this is the avoidance of scandal that Pachymerēs refers to. If, however, Michaēl was forced to impose a second quasi-legitimate patriarch on the Church out of Arsenios' refusal to accept Michaēl's authority, would merely continue if not deepen the schism created by the election of Nikēphoros II in 1259/60.

"he left the matter to be settled by time" (225^{1})

It is possible that Michaēl VIII hoped that no agreement would be reached before his anticipated capture of Kōnstantinoupolis in the summer of 1261, which would usher in a new Empire to replace the Nikaian state. It seems that Michaēl believed that possession of the old capital would make all of his previous oaths and pledges, made as basileus of Nikaia, null and void, for he would then be a basileus of Byzantium, and Nikaia would cease to exist (Pach. 225^{16-19}). He hoped that Arsenios, if he returned to the patriarchal throne, would also see things in such a light, and said as much to the patriarch, effectively declaring that Nikaia was dead, subsumed into the new order based on Kōnstantinoupolis (Arsenios, *Testamentum*, 953^{A}).

"without losing interest in this issue" (225^{4})

Arsenios was eventually returned to his former position, but only after long negotiations and an admission by him that Nikēphoros II was a legitimate patriarch and all of the latter's actions were valid and would stand (Laurent, *Regestes*, no. 1353). Arsenios reached Kōnstantinoupolis in the second half of 1261 (Akrop. 188^{8-18}).

2.35 How the basileus began ridding himself of the young Iōannēs and how the Italians were installed

"the plan" (225^{7})

The course of events from the death of Theodōros II onwards showed clearly that Michaēl Palaiologos intended to claim the imperial throne for himself and for his dynasty, and to dethrone the legitimate basileus Iōannēs IV. Thus the boy basileus had not been crowned in the customary manner (Pach. 145^{5}-147^{4}) and was totally absent from the victory procession through Kōnstantinoupolis on 15 August, 1261 (Pach. 217^{2}-219^{18}). Since Iōannēs IV was a young boy it is only natural that he took no part in the diplomatic, administrative and military activity of the empire, but the constant slighting by Michaēl VIII of the honours due to his rank and status, as well as the presence of Michaēl's son, Andronikos, at the Kōnstantinoupolis procession, amply demonstrates the intentions of the senior basileus.

"he brought charges of malevolence" (225^{8})

Pachymerēs uses the same phrase to describe the charge brought against Michaēl Palaiologos himself in 1253, when he had been accused of dealing treacherously with Michaēl II of Epiros (Pach. 39^{1-2}). It is hard to understand how a standard treason law would operate when there were two legitimate rulers and the accused traitor was acting for one against the other, so Michaēl VIII was presumably invoking the oaths made by all of the Romans to uphold the rule of both basileis, and to act against anyone found conspiring for one against the other (Pach. 135^{24-26}).

It is unfortunate that Pachymerēs gives us no details about any of the individuals so accused or about their punishments. We may suggest, however, that the lack of any names is indicative of the low status of the alleged conspirators, since he would have named any people of noble rank. In a period where judicial blinding and mutilation were common, and when trials were conducted with occasional torture, "harsh" punishments were presumably executions and confiscations of property.

"he did many things" (225^{11-12})

In a later passage (257^{1-6}) Pachymerēs lists some of these measures. They included leaving Iōannēs' name out of the diptychs, his absence at the second coronation of Michaēl VIII at Kōnstantinoupolis and, eventually, the blinding of the boy-basileus on Christmas Day 1261 (Pach. 257^{18-21}).

"Eulogia" (225^{13})

For Pachymerēs' view of the influence of Eulogia over Michaēl VIII's plans for a change of dynasty, see 179^{24}-181^{12} and commentary, and also 375^{2-4}.

"Andronikos" (225^{13})

Grēgoras states that Andronikos was two years old when Kōnstantinoupolis was regained by the empire (Greg. 87^{13-14}). He contradicts Pachymerēs, however, in saying that Andronikos was "the young basileus", having already been crowned, whereas Pachymerēs claims that Michaēl VIII was angry at his inability to raise his son to the purple. Grēgoras is likely to in the wrong in this matter, and Andronikos was probably not crowned co-basileus until 1264/5. See Failler (1986:243-247).

"The excuse he put forward" (225^{16-19})

Michaēl VIII saw himself as the second founder of Kōnstantinoupolis, and called himself the "New Constantine". This was because, although the city had been lost and recovered numerous times in its history, usually by rival claimants for the throne, engaged in civil conflicts, it had never fallen into non-Byzantine hands until 1204. The Latin Empire marked a break in imperial history.

Just as Michaēl VIII regarded the lands and buildings of the city to be his by right of conquest (Pach. 499^{24-27}), he also saw himself as the heir of the Latin emperors by the same right of conquest. Thus he dealt with Guillaume de Villehardouin of Achaia as if he now occupied the position formerly held by Baudouin II (Pach. 121^{29}-123^{3} and commentary). In seeing that Michaēl treated the reoccupation of Kōnstantinoupolis as a rebirth of the Byzantine Empire of old, and also his belief that he somehow inherited the status of the Latin emperors, it becomes apparent that Michaēl saw his position – as a Byzantine basileus of Kōnstantinoupolis – as transcending his earlier rank as basileus of Nikaia. Logically, then, he was no longer the colleague of Iōannēs IV, even in law, but in possession of a superior rank in his own right. The regime of the Laskarids of Nikaia was over, and their empire was subsumed and annexed by the newly restored Byzantine Empire. Michaēl expressed this opinion to the newly-restored Patriarch Arsenios, saying that "you shall not return to Nikaia now you have been ordained bishop of Kōnstantinoupolis" (Arsenios, *Testamentum*, 953^{B}), and a similar attitude is recorded in the *History* of Bar Hebraeus, where Michaēl is said to have offered to restore Iōannēs IV to his throne in Nikaia, though he himself would continue to hold Kōnstantinoupolis, which he had by right of conquest (BH 429).

"breaking his sworn oaths" (225^{24})

These were the oaths Michaēl had made in which he undertook never to plot against his young colleague Iōannēs IV (Pach. 135^{13-18})

"those who were already present" (225^{28})

The Genoese had been largely driven from Kōnstantinoupolis by the Venetians after the Fourth Crusade, and had only been permitted to return in 1218, when they regained all of their former quarter in the city and the rights they held under the Byzantine Empire (Nicol 1988:155). During the period of peace between Genoa and Venice, from 1218 to 1256, the Genoese cooperated with the Venetians in defending the city against the Nikaians (Akrop. 46-48; Canale (Limentani ed.) 80-84; Longnon 1949:173), but when war broke out again between the two city-states over the Levant trade, the Genoese of Kōnstantinoupolis, being on the losing side, no doubt suffered from attacks made against them by the Venetians. Total numbers for the Genoese in Kōnstantinoupolis in 1261 are impossible to determine, but there cannot have been very many.

"those who were expected to arrive" (225^{28})

This is a unique, if oblique, reference by Pachymerēs to the Nikaian-Genoese Treaty of Nymphaion, made in 1261. By the terms of this treaty the Genoese were to have the right to trade throughout the empire without paying taxes, tolls and duties of any kind. They were also granted lavish quarters in many of the more important Byzantine coastal cities, as well as given permission to trade in the Black Sea, an area that had been off limits to westerners before 1204 (Manfroni 791-796).

The basileus, then, would have expected a great influx into Kōnstantinoupolis of Genoese traders and sailors and their families, all hurrying to take advantage of the treaty's provisions.

"He at first sent them to live at Thracian Hērakleia" (225^{32})

Pachymerēs gives here in one sentence the history of the Genoese establishment at Kōnstantinoupolis between 1261 and 1267.[150] As mentioned above (Pach. 219^{28}-221^{10} and commentary), Michaēl VIII awarded the Genoese an extended precinct in the city in 1261, but he expelled them in 1264 after the discovery of an anti-Byzantine plot ring-led by the Genoese podestà (*Annali genovesi* 4.65).

[150] Grēgoras, who was obviously drawing heavily upon Pachymerēs' work for this section of his own History, was confused by Pachymerēs' brevity and states that the Genoese were given Pera/Galata in 1261 (Greg. 97^{10-16}).

The choice of Hērakleia for the lodgement of the Genoese is an interesting one. Although it was the largest town on the northern shore of the Marmara Sea, and only a single day's voyage from Kōnstantinoupolis (Pryor 2002:45), it was not one of the centres in which the Genoese were given quarters through the Nymphaion treaty (Manfroni 793). It is likely, however, that Hērakleia was chosen out of a need for the Genoese to have a base close to the capital – since there was no indication that Michaēl VIII banned the Genoese from trading there, only from residing there[151] – and because Hērakleia had been awarded to Venice in the 1204 *Partitio Romanie* (Carile 1965/6:218-219) and therefore presumably possessed an old Venetian station well suited to the needs of the Genoese.

Unfortunately we know nothing at all about the size or the activities of the Genoese colony at Hērakleia (Geanakoplos 1959:170).

"but he later thought it wise" (227[1-2])

The Genoese emporium was located at Hērakleia for three years. This exile came to an end in 1267, when Michaēl VIII came to an agreement with the commune, allowing the Genoese to move from Hērakleia to Pera/Galata (*Annali genovesi* 4.107-108).

During this three year period the basileus had gone to great lengths to secure an alliance with Venice, hoping to replace the poorly performing and widely disliked Genoese. A draft treaty had been drawn up in 1265, but it was not ratified by the doge, Rainerio Zeno (Canale (Polidori ed.) 582-584; Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1934). In the end, in order to prevent a Venetian-Genoese rapprochement and an alliance of either or both with Charles d'Anjou, who was by now King of Naples, Michaēl VIII offered the Genoese a new quarter at Pera.

The choice of Pera shows the extent to which Michaēl was in the weaker bargaining position, since Pera/Galata had been desired by Genoa since at least 1154, when they had requested, and received, rights from Manouēl I to build a settlement there (Pears 1885:164, citing Sauli, *Storia della Colonia dei Genovesi*). Although Manouēl I did not actually end up giving Genoa the land on that occasion, Genoese interest in the site did not diminish. They had again suggested Pera/Galata in 1264 as an alternative to Hērakleia; a request that was swiftly rejected by basileus Michaēl at the time (*Annali genovesi* 4.66).

Pachymerēs states that the choice of Pera was made for security reasons – that too many Genoese within the city itself would be dangerous – but we could also suggest that the choice of Pera was made because the number of Genoese was too great for them all to reside in their old quarter under the second hill. In addition, considering the rocky relations between the commune and the empire, the Genoese may also have been thinking in terms

[151] And indeed it appears that despite the expulsion from the capital the basileus and Genoa remained on good terms (*Annali genovesi* 4.65).

of security in asking for Pera. It would certainly be harder for anti-Latin mobs, or organised attacks by either Venetian or imperial forces, to inflict damage on a colony across the harbour than on one in the city itself.

"to settle them at Pera" (227^{1})

Pachymerēs shortly defines the new Genoese quarter more clearly. It was "the western part of Pera, near Galata" (Pach. 227^{7}) and a "large area". Thus the initial Genoese settlement at Pera was a strip along the shore of the Golden Horn, running on a NW-SE axis from the modern Atatürk Bridge (Balard 1978:182-186). Vessels coming to dock here were visible from the Blachernai palace, and this may explain the otherwise confusing fact that Genoese ships sailing "past" that palace were required to salute the basileus (Pach. 537^{11-13}; PK 235^{14}-236^{14}). Interestingly enough, the new Genoese quarter was directly opposite that of their arch-rivals the Venetians. Michaēl VIII may have intended the Golden Horn to act as a moat separating the citizens of the two feuding cities.

Before the Fourth Crusade this area had been the Jewish quarter of the city (Villehardouin 88), but the Jews abandoned it during the Latin Empire. After the Byzantine restoration the Palaiologoi awarded them a new district in the Blanga quarter, beside the harbour of Eleutherios on the Marmara Sea (Jacoby 1995:228; Janin 1950:260).

"the sole exception being the fortress of Galata" (227^{2})

That the basileus refused to allow the Genoese control of this fort strongly indicates that between 1261 and 1267 the great harbour chain of the Golden Horn had been replaced by the Byzantines. Such a vital element of the city's defence could be allowed out of imperial control.

"But as for the Venetians and Pisans" (227^{2})

The Venetian quarter at Kōnstantinoupolis was much larger in extent in the period of the Latin Empire than it had been prior to 1204, extending westward to at least the monastery of Christ Pantokratōr, which the Venetians occupied, and southward to an unspecified distance. This area had been walled off from the rest of the city by 1207 (TT 13 no. 179). Michaēl VIII returned the quarter to its earlier size, though he did not otherwise restrict the Venetian trading privileges granted by earlier basileis.

The Pisans, too, were granted continued occupation of their quarter, which was located between the Venetian and Genoese emporia. The Pisan quarter had been largely destroyed by fire during the Fourth Crusade, and it had never regained its earlier prosperity in the following decades due to the Genoese dominance of the commerce of the western

Mediterranean and the ongoing conflict between Pisa and the inland city of Florence, which desired to conquer Pisa for its port.

"he ordered the demolition of two fortresses" (227[4])

The first of these fortresses was presumably part of the fortifications of the Venetian quarter, built during the Latin Empire. The fortress beside the marketplace should probably be identified with the '*palacium latum et amplum ad formam castri'* that the Genoese demolished and had sent back to Genoa (*Annali genovesi* 4.45). This *castrum* is usually said to be the monastery of Christ Pantokratōr, which the Venetians occupied (Geanakoplos 1959:149 n.49; Balard 1978:113; Nicol 1988:178). Two points argue against this identification. First, there is no archaeological evidence to suggest that the monastery was demolished completely or in part between its construction in the twelfth century and today, nor any indication that it was somehow fortified and then de-fortified in the thirteenth century (Megaw 1963:335-364).

Second, Pachymerēs explicitly states that the fortress stood beside the marketplace, and what evidence we have places the Venetian marketplace (*embolo*) at the eastern end of the Venetian quarter, at what is today known as the Egyptian bazaar at the southern end of the Galata Bridge[152] (Brown 1970:74-79). There is nothing to suggest that the Pantokratōr monastery was located beside a marketplace of any kind, and indeed its location, at the crest of the hill, cannot really be said to be near the sea. The Venetian *embolo*, right next to the shore, fits Pachymerēs' description much better. Therefore this passage of Pachymerēs indicates that there existed a Venetian-built fortification located near the shore at the eastern end of the Venetian quarter.

The second of the two fortresses destroyed by order of the basileus is more problematic. Pachymerēs says that it was the fort of Galata, but this statement stands in direct contradiction to his earlier statement that the fort of Galata was kept out of Genoese hands (Pach. 227[1-2]). Since we know that the chain-tower at Galata was maintained as an imperial possession in later times, most notably during the siege of 1453, then the most logical solution to the problem posed by Pachymerēs current passage would be that a second fort existed on the northern shore of the Golden Horn, located in the area given to the Genoese, and that Michaēl VIII ordered the destruction of this fort to prevent the Genoese having a fortified centre to their quarter. Pachymerēs simply became confused between the two places.

[152] Surely it is no coincidence that the modern marketplace stands on the site proposed for an ancient marketplace?

"each nation would not be hindered by taxes" (227[9])

Michaēl VIII, in allowing the Italians to trade duty-free, was merely fulfilling the obligations laid down by earlier treaties between the empire and the cities. The Venetians had been granted freedom from the ten percent *kommerkion* harbour tax as far back as 1082 (TT 1 no. 23), and this had been reconfirmed as recently as 1219 (TT 2 no. 252; Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1703). The Genoese had, of course, been awarded the same privilege by the Nymphaion treaty of 1261 (Manfroni 792), and the Pisans had been granted it in 1111.

2.36 What Happened to the Ambassadors of the basileus to the Pope and the Italians

"despatched speedily" (227[12])

In a letter written sent the basileus in 1263, Pope Urban IV refers to an earlier letter from Michaēl sent *statim capta Constantinopoli urbe alias nobis* (Guiraud no. 295). Since the papal throne was vacant at the time of the city's capture, following the death of Alexander IV on 27 May 1261, it is generally accepted (Loenertz 1962:172; Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1901a) that Michaēl VIII sent his embassy when news of Urban's election reached Kōnstantinoupolis, probably no earlier than the end of September. While this remains the most likely scenario, it is nevertheless possible that Michaēl sent his gift-laden envoys to Rome even before Urban's elevation to the papacy. It would certainly have done him no harm to have ambassadors in Rome to counteract the presence of Baudouin II or his supporters, and the words *tacheōn* and *statim* both have a sense of urgency absent if there was a delay of two months between Michaēl's entry into the city and the sending of the embassy. That the men he sent, Nikēphoritzēs and Aloubardēs, were of minor rank also suggests a quickly organised embassy despatched to Italy very soon after the occupation of the city. It must be noted that the embassy to the Pope in 1262 was headed by Michaēl Abalantēs, a sebastos (Dölger, *Regesten*, no.1911; *PLP* no. 15).

"Nikēphoritzēs" (227[13])

Nothing is known of this man except what Pachymerēs tells us of his former employment by Baudouin II and his grisly end in Italy.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 20300.

"Aloubardēs" (227[14])

Aloubardēs is also little known. Apart from this reference to him by Pachymerēs, he is known only from a reference to his presence on another embassy to Rome from Michaēl VIII, sent in 1262, where he is referred to as a monk named "Maximus Alufardes" (Guiraud no.295). Geanakoplos (1959:132 n.65) suggests that the name Aloubardēs is Italian, and that he may have been a gasmule, an individual of mixed Greek and Latin parentage. If so then his Frankish blood and (probable) knowledge of some Italian vernacular or Latin may have suggested him to Michaēl VIII for the embassy.

His entry in the *PLP* is no. 689.

"served. . . as secretaries" (227[14])

Baudouin II, despite his protestations to the contrary regarding the purity of his Latin-French regime (Wolff 1947:224), employed many Greeks at many levels of his government, from ambassadors (Pach. 149[24-25]) to humble scribes and secretaries, some of whom at least wrote official documents in Greek. As an example, a letter from the Latin emperor to a Mongol captain in 1253, asking that Friar Willem van Ruysbroeck be given safe passage, was written in Greek, and the Mongol had to have it sent to the Crimea to be translated, as none of his court could read it (Willem van Ruysbroeck 109).

There must have been, however, many individuals who had knowledge of Latin, French or Italian to ensure smooth running for the Latin government of a Greek city. Nikēphoritzēs and Aloubardēs may have been chosen for this embassy precisely because of their familiarity with the westerners and their ways.

"accused of treason" (227[15])

As Loenertz remarks (1962:171), Pachymerēs' account of the embassy *n'est pas excessivement clair*. Pachymerēs seems to be saying that the two ambassadors were seen as traitors, after transferring their allegiance from Baudouin II to Michaēl VIII. While this reaction may be regarded as extreme, given the lowly ranks the two men held in the Latin regime, the fall of Kōnstantinoupolis to the Byzantines aroused strong anti-Greek emotions throughout western Europe, and Byzantine stocks were very low for some time.

"the ruler" (227[18])

Loenertz (1962:172) incorrectly identifies this individual as Manfred of Sicily. Pachymerēs, however, is consistent in reserving use of the word *kratōn* for the reigning basileus and, as Failler (1984:227 n.4) points out, he always uses the word *rex* when referring to Manfred.

"a dishonest embassage from the city" (227^{18})

Without giving any details, Failler (1984:227 n.7) connects this reference by Pachymerēs to a "dishonest" embassy with that embassy narrated earlier in the text (Pach. 149^{22}-151^{3}). In the earlier passage Pachymerēs clearly treats the embassy from Kōnstantinoupolis to Michaēl VIII as a legitimate one, and gives no indication that it had a "taint of treason". Nor does Akropolitēs when he discusses the same embassy (Akrop. 161^{25}-163^{17}). If Pachymerēs is, as Failler claims, referring here to that earlier embassy as "dishonest", he may perhaps be intending to contrast Michaēl VIII's acceptance of Greek "traitors" - serving the Latins rather than their rightful rulers – with the Italian disgust and rage at the so-called "treason" of former servants of Baudouin II now willingly serving his successor, Michaēl VIII.

"those people" (227^{19})

Loenertz (1962:172) claims that the embassy was caught and mishandled by *"les hommes des Baudouin II"*, but it is impossible, given the evidence we have, to be as specific as this. Certainly Baudouin II and his followers would have had more to be enraged about the most people, but their involvement cannot be proven. The best we can say is that Nikēphoritzēs was seized by some people living somewhere in Italy south of Rome. In fact, by "those people", Pachymerēs is probably making a slur upon westerners as a whole.

"he ran away as fast as he could" (227^{24})

If Pachymerēs' account is correct, the attack upon the envoys bears the hallmark of an impromptu mob lynching of travellers. It certainly appears, given that Aloubardēs managed to escape, that the attack was neither well-planned nor well-executed, and the gruesome punishment meted out to Nikēphoritzēs appears too senseless and brutal to have been ordered by someone in authority as a matter of policy. One could draw numerous modern parallels for mobs raised to a fever pitch of aggressive and hatred against a particular individual or nation over a perceived injustice. Many westerners saw the capture of Kōnstantinoupolis as such an affront (for example, the poet Rutebeuf, in his "La complainte de Constantinople").

It is clear that Aloubardēs continued on his mission and delivered his master's letter to the pope (Guiraud no.295). That he could do so is another indication that there was no organised plan by the authorities to hunt down the ambassadors, but that Nikēphoritzēs' killing was unauthorised, if not unsanctioned.

Appendix A

Chronological Framework

The following is a summary of the chronology of the events covered by Books I and II of Pachymerēs' *Historia*, as used in the Commentary of this thesis. Pachymerēs usually follows the order of events as they happened, but occasionally digresses to past or future events, or changes the narrative order for special purposes.

Summer 1243: Battle of Köse Dagh between Selçuks and Mongols; Iōannēs III makes defensive preparations in case of Mongol attack (2.25)

1253: Michaēl Palaiologos is arrested under charges of treason (1.7)

1254: Michaēl Palaiologos is released after swearing oaths of loyalty to the Laskarid dynasty (1.7)

3 November 1254: Death of basileus Iōannēs III Batatzēs

Spring 1256: Michaēl Palaiologos flees to Selçuk court at Konya (1.09)

Autumn 1256: Battle of Akseray between Selçuks and Mongols; Sultān 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II flees to Nikaia (1.9)

November 1256: Nikaian forces occupy Dyrrachion (1.10)

Spring 1257: Michaēl II of Epiros revolts against Nikaian dominion (1.10)

May 1257: Theodōros II returns 'Izz al-Dīn Kayka'us II to his throne in Konya; Michaēl Palaiologos restored to the favour of Theodōros II (1.9)

Summer (?) 1257: Michaēl Palaiologos is sent to Makedonia with a small force (1.10); Mongol embassy received by Theodōros II (2.25)

Autumn 1257: Michaēl Palaiologos defeats force under Theodōros, son of Michaēl II (1.10)

Early 1258: Theodōros II tortures Maria Tarchaneiōtissa Palaiologina after accusations of witchcraft (1.12); Michaēl Palaiologos arrested in Thessalonikē, and imprisoned (1.11)

20 February 1258: Baghdad falls to the Mongol army of Hülegü (2.24)

Summer 1258: Marriage of Guillaume of Achaia and Anna of Epiros (1.30); Michaēl Palaiologos released from prison (1.12)

16 August 1258: Death of basileus Theodōros II Laskaris(1.13)

17(?) August 1258: Senate assembles at Magnesia; Speeches by Geōrgios Mouzalōn and Michaēl Palaiologos (1.15-1.17)

25 August 1258: Funeral of Theodōros II; Assassination of Mouzalōn brothers (1.18-19)

September 1258: First Assembly at Magnesia, attended by nobles only. Appointment of Michaēl Palaiologos as interim regent and his promotion to megas doux; Patriarch Arsenios arrives at Magnesia at the end of the month. (1.21-1.26)

October 1258: Second Assembly at Magnesia, called by Patriarch Arsenios and attended by both secular and ecclesiastic dignitaries. Michaēl Palaiologos distributes largesse and lobbies for higher honours (1.26-28)

13 November 1258: Michaēl Palaiologos promoted to despotēs and receives title of basileōpatōr (1.28-1.29)

December 1258: Decision made to make Michaēl Palaiologos basileus; he is relieved of oaths binding him to the Laskarid house (1.29, 2.1-2.3)

1 January 1259: Michaēl Palaiologos acclaimed as basileus; oaths sworn by people to uphold dual-monarchy (2.4)

January-February 1259: Michaēl VIII's excursion to Philadelpheia (2.6)

February 1259: Iōannēs Palaiologos attacks Epiros, routing Michaēl II (1.30)

Spring 1259: Nikaian forces occupy western Makedonia (2.11); Epirote and Achaian armies levied and join forces (1.30)

March 1259: Coronation of Michaēl VIII at Nikaia (2.7-2.9)

April-May 1259: Embassies to Michaēl VIII from Selçuk Turks of Konya and Latin Empire of Constantinople. (2.10)

2 June 1259: Manfred of Sicily marries Helenē of Epiros; Sicily allies with Epiros and Achaia against Nikaia (1.30)

Summer 1259: Battle of Pelagonia; Capture of Prince Guillaume de Villehardouin (1.31)

Summer-Autumn 1259: Epiros is occupied by Nikaian forces; Michaēl II flees Arta (1.32, 2.11); Iōannēs Palaiologos and Iōannēs Doukas sack Thebes (1.30)

Autumn 1259: Iōannēs Palaiologos brings most of the Nikaian army back east from Epiros (1.31); Capture of Selybria by Nikaian troops (2.14)

Nov-Dec 1259: Resignation of Patriarch Arsenios; elevation of Patriarch Nikēphoros II (2.15-2.17).

January 1260: The returning army from west is honoured at Lampsakos (2.13), Michaēl VIII crosses the Hellespont; Andronikos of Sardeis takes monastic habit at Selybria (2.18). Nikēphoros II fires Manouēl of Thessalonikē, replacing him with abbot of Sōsandra (2.22)

February-April 1260: "Siege of Galata" (2.20-2.21); Nikēphoros II joins army at Kōnstantinoupolis; Battle of Trikoryphos and capture of Stratēgopoulos (1.32).

April-August 1260: Signing of one-year truce with Latin Empire (2.21); Michaēl VIII quells Epiros in person (2.21); Nikēphoros II makes several personnel changes to bishoprics (2.22).

September(?) 1260: Michaēl II gives his son Iōannēs to Michaēl VIII as a hostage or ward, and returns Stratēgopoulos (2.12)

October(?) 1260: Michaēl VIII makes a treaty with Hülegü il-khan (2.24)

End 1260: Death of Nikēphoros II (2.22).

Spring 1261: Synod assembles to discuss return of Arsenios to the patriarchate (2.34)

13 March 1261: Treaty of Nymphaion signed between Nikaia and Genoa.

June 1261: Iōannēs Palaiologos sent as commander to Makedonia; Alexios Stratēgopoulos sent on reconnaisance to Kōnstantinoupolis (2.26)

Early July 1261: Venetian fleet leaves Kōnstantinoupolis for the Black Sea (2.26)

25 July 1261: Capture of Kōnstantinoupolis by Stratēgopoulos and local patriots (2.27)

27 July 1261: News of the fall of the city reaches Nikomēdeia (2.28)

Early August 1261: News reaches Michaēl VIII (2.29); agents of the nobility are sent to Kōnstantinoupolis (2.30)

14 August 1261: Michaēl VIII reaches Kōnstantinoupolis

15 August 1261: Michaēl VIII makes ceremonial entrance into Kōnstantinoupolis (2.31).

16 August 1261: Negotiations begin between Michaēl VIII and the Italian colonies of Kōnstantinoupolis (2.32)

September 1261: Stratēgopoulos sent to Epiros with reinforcements for Iōannēs Palaiologos (1.32).

October 1261: Michaēl VIII sends embassy to Pope Urban IV (2.36)

Winter 1261: Guillaume de Villehardouin is released by Michaēl VIII; cession of south-east Morea to the empire (1.31); Stratēgopoulos captured by Epiros for second time (1.32)

December 1261: Constanza-Anna signs her dowry rights in the empire over to Michaēl VIII (1.32)

Mid-1262: Guillaume de Villehardouin returns to the Morea (1.31); Stratēgopoulos exchanged with Constanza of Sicily (1.32); Chadenos makes cadastral survey of mountain borderlands (1.5-1.6)

1263: Tzakōnes moved from Morea to Kōnstantinoupolis (2.33)

1264: Genoese of Kōnstantinoupolis exiled to Hērakleia (2.35)

27 May 1267: Treaty of Viterbo signed between Baudouin II of Kōnstantinoupolis and Charles d'Anjou of Naples (2.32)

1267: Genoese recalled from Hērakleia to Kōnstantinoupolis; they settle at Galata (2.35)

Appendix B

The Official Hierarchy of Late Byzantium

The fourteenth century handbook of ceremonial by Pseudo-Kodinos gives the hierarchy of the late Byzantine court, its officers and their relative rankings (PK 300-302). As Pachymerēs refers many times to these titles, the individuals who held them and their promotion from one to another, the list is repeated here.

Titles that are mentioned in Book One or Book Two of Pachymerēs' *Historia* are given in bold, along with the page and line references where they are first encountered. Titles that Pachymerēs does not mention are unembellished.

1. **Despotēs** (37^{13})
2. **Sebastokratōr** (125^{19})
3. **Kaisar** (125^{16})
4. Panhypersebastos
5. **Prōtobestiarios** (41^{8})
6. **Megas doux** (97^{15})
7. **Megas domestikos** (41^{12})
8. **Prōtostratōr** (155^{16})
9. Megas logothetēs
10. **Megas stratopedarchēs** (155^{9})
11. **Megas primmikērios** (91^{25})
12. **Megas konostaulos** (37^{5})
13. Epi tou kanikleiou
14. **Prōtosebastos** (155^{19})
15. Pinkernēs
16. Parakoimōmenos tēs sphendonēs
17. **Parakoimōmenos tou koitōnos** (183^{12})
18. Megas baioulos
19. Kouropalatēs
20. **Prōtobestiaritēs** (89^{29})
21. Domestikos tēs trapezēs
22. Epi tēs trapezēs
23. Logothetēs tou genikou
24. Megas papias
25. **Eparchos** (31^{29})
26. Megas droungarios tēs basilikēs biglēs
27. **Megas hetaireiarchēs** (183^{13})
28. Logothetēs tou dromou
29. Hypatos tōn philosophōn
30. **Megas chartoularios** (43^{15})
31. **Mystikos** (155^{20})
32. **Prōtasēkrētis** (131^{14})
33. Epi tou stratou
34. Megas droungarios tou stolou
35. Domestikos tōn scholōn
36. Primmikērios tēs aulēs
37. Prōtospatharios
38. Megas archōn
39. Tatas tēs aulēs
40. Megas tzaousios
41. Praitōr tou dēmou

42. **Logothetēs tōn oikeiakōn** (155[22])
43. Megas logariastēs
44. Epi tōn deēseōn
45. **Archidiakonos** (165[22])
46. Skouterios
47. Prōtokynēgos
48. Amēralēs
49. Aktouarios
50. Megas adnoumiastēs
51. Koiaistōr
52. Logothetēs tou stratiōtikou
53. **Prōtoierakarios** (41[14])
54. Kritēs tou bēlou
55. Megas diermēneutēs
56. **Logothetēs tōn agelōn** (77[31])
57. **Dikaiophylax** (23[8])
58. Akolouthos
59. Orphanotrophos
60. Prōtonotarios

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