Cultural continuity and discontinuity in a Russian-speaking migrant context: Cultural Dilemmas, National Habitus and Unbelonging

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THESIS DECLARATION

I, Raisa Akifeva, certify that:

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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to explore cultural continuity and discontinuity in small migrant communities within super-diverse environments (Vertovec, 2007), focusing on Russian-speaking migrants. I discuss what cultural (dis)continuity means to these migrants and the role migrant communities and leaders play in processes of cultural (re)production. The research draws on data collected from Russian-speaking communities in Perth, and Madrid, a characteristic of which is their smallness, which I argue is a significant feature. The empirical base of the research consists of interviews with migrants, observational data, analysis of social media, and other online data, secondary data, and documents.

Using a grounded theory approach, two significant themes related to cultural continuity and discontinuity were identified – a) cultural production in and of “community,” and b) negotiation of cultural habitus in individuals’ everyday lives. Cultural continuity within community occurs within the context of what I call “the official” (re)production of culture by community leaders. I argue that this is distinct from “unofficial” cultural experiences of migrants gained in everyday life. There are distinctive mechanisms behind these experiences, which I analyze from different theoretical perspectives. To explain them, I develop the concept of “cultural dilemma”, defined as the process of migrants’ reflection about what belongs to their culture and/or their interpretation of certain practices and beliefs as cultural, and deliberation about which cultural practices should be continued (and reproduced) or (dis)continued, and how.

I use Elias's concept of national habitus (1996) to describe cultural experiences in migrants’ everyday lives. The study argues that long-term socio-historical processes taking place within the post-Soviet space generate certain similarities among its inhabitants, which can be called “cultural habitus.” These include internalized dispositions and behavioural patterns reproduced and evident in everyday life, such as hygiene and health care practices, norms of conduct in public places, attitudes to children’s discipline, and parenting practices generally. Many migrants come to realize that they are bearers of these similarities only in the process of the migration experience. This process of recognition of their cultural habitus, realizing the cultural nature of certain standards of behaviour that were perceived as “civilized” and “rational” in the past, and deciding what is important to keep and what is not, I refer to as “cultural continuity dilemmas.” Participants solve these in different ways, and this is what generates cultural continuity and discontinuity.
The Russian-speaking migrant community, as a collective, as opposed to individuals’ personal experiences as part of everyday life, is conceptualised as a field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b), a space comprising agents and migrant institutions that are in competition for the right to speak on behalf of the community and to produce legitimate cultural products. The community leaders are analysed as cultural producers involved in power relationships. Contrary to the popular view in migration studies that representatives of migrant community organizations pursue goals related to the needs of migrants, and to the preservation of culture, this thesis argues that what the community’s leaders produce depends on their taste, cultural capital, and other resources they possess. They may transmit political ideology, such as Russian soft power, and focus on accumulating their own resources or different types of capital. In this process, community leaders experience their own dilemmas – “cultural production dilemmas,” i.e. what they need to produce and how, seeking to shore up their own version of Russian-speaking-ness and thus define what this community is.

These official and unofficial processes effect the fragmentation of the community. On the one hand, migrants actively trying to solve cultural continuity dilemmas often reproduce self-prejudices, endowing some (other) Russian-speaking people with negative traits (“backward,” “Soviet,” etc.). On the other hand, community leaders, challenging their right to represent and transmit Russian-speaking culture in a competitive struggle, draw boundaries between “proper” Russian-speakers and the Others. As a result, I argue that the Russian-speaking community is best described as a community of unbelonging.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: cultural continuity dilemmas and cultural production dilemmas

Interviewer: So, do you want to send her to kindergarten?
Respondent: I want to send her to kindergarten, and I don’t want to. She is a very active child who develops very quickly. In this sense, it is better for her to be in a kindergarten than with a wearied mother who tries to do something in the kitchen in any case, and she is in the room alone anyway. At the same time, of course, it’s scary, because kindergartens here are not so reliable as ours, in which there are still some Soviet standards of hygiene and everything. Here … there are no special hygiene standards, that is, they implement the principle of “exposing” as much as possible. Even in the best one. … Even from it, the mother [her friend] takes the children completely dirty. That is, he crawls on the ground, all this and so on. They don’t teach them how to wash their hands, as we were taught, do you remember? Each of us had a wardrobe, do you remember, right? With a personal towel, all these things.
Interviewer: So, you don’t trust this system, do you?
Respondent: I don’t trust, but partly I understand that I need to accept this, that I need to try to choose a better one, more or less.

– Alice¹, a respondent from Australia, interview data, 2019.

My firm conviction is that the goal of the [Russian Resurrection Film] festivals is to enhance the image of Russia, its culture, its traditions, and pride in our wonderful country. When I came to the opening of the festival [in Perth], I saw something completely different: the American hero, Batman, standing alone in the corner, oriental belly dance, but non-Russian one, the half-empty auditorium, and, of course, the choice of the movie – a comedy “Night Shift” … The opening of the festival became a get-together for its own people, a private, low turnout “family” party, in which someone’s personal interests were more appreciated than the interests of the community and the image of Russia.

– Natalia Ehrenfeld², a project coordinator of the Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia, a head of the Multicultural Talent Academy (Aurunews, 2019).

¹ All study participants were anonymized, which included the use of pseudonyms instead of real names (see Chapter 2 for details).
² Open access online data published by authors with their own names are not anonymized in this study (see details in Chapter 2).
The comedy, Night Shift, is one of the strongest comedies we’ve had in the past 15 years. The Soviet Union used to make great comedies, but in the period from the late ’90s to the present day, comedies are something Russia has struggled with, but this one really hits the mark.

– Nicholas Maksymow, a founder and director of the Russian Resurrection Film Festival (Kornits, 2018).

This thesis explores experiences of culture, cultural contestation and (dis)continuities among Russian-speaking migrants in Perth, Australia, and secondarily, Madrid, Spain. The main research question that it answers is: How is culture experienced and negotiated among Russian-speaking migrants and what role do small migrant communities play in these processes? Alice and Natalia, cited above, give examples that can be interpreted as their experience of culture and diversity, from two different contexts. While Alice talked about her experience in everyday life related to her understanding of the differences between some post-Soviet cultural practices, to which she is committed, and those shared in Australia, Natalia is concerned with different ways in which Russian culture is represented abroad by “official” representatives of the migrant community, criticizing the opening of the festival in Perth, the capital of WA, for the fact that it included some elements not only of “non-Russian” culture, such as the oriental belly dance, but also of some “inappropriate” Russian culture, citing as an example the Russian comedy “Night Shift,” chosen by the organizers. To describe these processes, I develop the concept of cultural dilemma, defined as the process of migrants’ reflection about what belongs to their culture and/or their interpretation of certain practices and beliefs as cultural, and deliberation about which cultural practices should be continued (and reproduced) or (dis)continued, and how.

In the given examples, both Alice and Natalia expressed a need for some kind of cultural reproduction and continuity in specific contexts, but as this study shows, some migrants challenge this perception by seeking to solve these cultural dilemmas in different ways. For example, for some Russian-speaking migrants, the “Soviet” hygiene standards which Alice mention are not understood as something positive, but as the embodiment of disciplinary practices that permeated all spheres of life in the Soviet Union and which were ultimately aimed at implementing social control. The other example is that of Natalia, who criticises the festival, which she believes has an essential function of representing Russian culture and justifies the festival program in the context of achieving these goals. However, in contrast to her, Nicholas Maksymow, the founder of the festival, describes the choice of the comedy “Night Shift” as entirely reasonable and well-grounded.
and expresses other ideas of how Russian culture should be transmitted and reproduced. I show that there are distinctive processes that underlie how cultural dilemmas arise and are resolved in these two contexts, which I describe within two different theoretical frameworks and by using different terms: 1) I use Mary Douglas’ (1966) and Norbert Elias’ (1991a, 1996, 1998, 2000b) theoretical ideas and Elias’ term “national habitus” to explain cultural (dis)continuity in migrant everyday life, as in the example of Alice, and I develop the concept of *cultural continuity dilemmas* to explore these processes; and 2) I use Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory (1985, 1993a, 1993b, 1996) and his term “field of cultural production” to analyse cultural (re)production in a migrant community by its leaders or cultural producers, as in the example of Natalia and Nicholas. I develop the concept of *cultural production dilemmas* to explain these processes.

Alice, a migrant from Russia, is afraid of the requirement to send her daughter to an Australian kindergarten. She perceives any kindergarten, even the best, as being unreliable because of the approach to hygiene, which seems to her to be generally poorly developed in Australia. Alice describes it as “there are no special hygiene standards” and contrasts it with the approach used in Soviet preschool educational institutions. Listing the features of a typical Soviet kindergarten, she asks me: “Do you remember?” because she does not doubt that I, a person of her generation, am well aware of what she talks about, although she was meeting me for the first time and knew nothing about my personal experience of Russian kindergartens.

Alice may be confident that we share the same experience because there was a unified system of hygiene standards implemented in kindergartens in different parts of the USSR, and many of them continue to be reproduced in the post-Soviet space today. A person who was socialized in this environment is perceived as someone who is familiar with them and who can easily understand why sending a child to an Australian kindergarten could be not only undesirable but even dangerous. Alice was right about my ability to understand the context. I remember well the personal wardrobes in kindergarten, where our “outerwear” was stored, and I also remember that I sometimes went to kindergarten alone when I was only five years old. In the USSR, people were very frightened by microbes, but they were more relaxed about the fact that children spent time outside without adult supervision.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) About the ability to spend time without adult supervision, see Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018, p. 6.
I argue that these ideas and norms shared by Russian-speaking migrants are a part of the Russian-speaking cultural habitus (Elias, 1991a, 1996, 2000b), the features of which were being formed during the construction and development of the Soviet state and which continued to change after the collapse of the USSR and throughout the migration experience. Nowadays, it seems incredible that my mother, who has always strived to be an exemplary parent, as I perceive her, and who showed a very high degree of care, sent me to kindergarten unaccompanied. And in those days, it would have seemed incredible to be at home or at kindergarten wearing outdoor shoes, eating on the floor and with unwashed hands, or come to kindergarten with uncombed hair, all of which are not uncommon in Australian kindergartens. Over the course of time, some norms undergo changes, while other norms, on the contrary, begin to be perceived as mandatory or essential, which must be adhered to in order for a child to be healthy and “civilized.”

Migrants realise that they are bearers of certain common cultural practices and beliefs, which come to be identified as cultural habits. In migrant and multicultural settings, like Australia, these cultural habits often lead migrants to face a choice of which standards to adhere to or which to challenge. This reflection on the peculiarities4 of their own beliefs and behaviour patterns, that is, the shared elements of their cultural habitus, and what migrants undertake when they realize that there are alternative cultural “systems of classification” (Douglas, 1966), I call solving cultural continuity dilemmas in an everyday life context. When, in the above quote, Alice says “but partly I understand that I need to accept this,” she demonstrates how the dilemma is being solved at the time of the interview. She continues to adhere to internalised hygiene standards but is ready to send her daughter to an Australian kindergarten, as she is an “active child.”

Processes for resolving cultural dilemmas by community leaders can be described differently and by using different terms. Natalia criticizes the organizers of the opening of the festival in Perth, in which the representatives of several other migrant institutions of the city participated, including the members of the Russian Australian Representative Council (RARC), which was created with the support of the Russian government. Natalia is a representative in Western Australia (WA) of another pro-Russian organization, the Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia (ACCR), which was established in opposition to the RARC. This example reflects one of the many

4 I use the word “peculiarities” to refer to the shared elements/features of the cultural habitus or society/state-formation process as it is used in Elias’s works: “To become aware of the peculiarities of the habitus of one’s own nation requires a specific effort of self-distancing” (p. 2, 1996); “The peculiarities of the code of behaviour and feeling which gradually became a dominant German national code” (pp. 63-44); “the structural peculiarities of the societies” (p. 149).
competitive relationships between the leaders of the Russian-speaking community in Perth and at the Australian national level, as well as the process of challenging how Russian-speaking culture should be reproduced, which is well described and explained by using the concept of field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b) in order to conceptualise migrant community.

Drawing on Bourdieu’s ideas, I describe the community as a space of positions of cultural producers (such as community leaders) and their institutions, who compete for the entitlement to speak on behalf of the community to produce legitimate cultural products. Natalia, her supporters, and opponents can be viewed as cultural producers – community members who conduct activities or engage in the creation of cultural products, oriented mainly towards their consumption by Russian-speaking migrants. The situation around the festival is an example of a power relationship between representatives of different organizations, as a result of which ideas about what Russian-speaking culture is and how it must be transmitted, maintained, and produced are established, reproduced, and revised: that is, cultural production dilemmas are resolved in a migrant community context.

These processes in daily life within the migrant community affect the community’s fragmentation at the symbolic level – how the community is imagined and how people perceive themselves to be attached to it. On the one hand, migrants, in solving cultural continuity dilemmas, reproduce and form self-prejudices – ideas about some Russian-speaking people with whom they do not want to associate. They endow them with negative cultural traits (“backward,” “Soviet,” etc.) that they believe they do not possess themselves. On the other hand, community leaders, challenging the right to represent and transmit Russian-speaking culture in a competitive struggle, draw boundaries between “proper” Russian-speakers and the Others. Therefore, whereas in many definitions of community the symbolic level comprises a sense of belonging as an essential component (Anderson, 1983; Cohen, 1985; Delanty, 2018), in contrast, the Russian-speaking community is best described as a community of unbelonging.

Although the concept of cultural dilemma is employed in a variety of studies within different disciplines, it is used unsystematically and with different meanings (Eshiett & Parry, 2003; Glover & Friedman, 2015; Kao & Hébert, 2006; Sanagavarapu, 2010; Thorp et al., 2017; Trompenaars & Hampden Turner, 1997). In the literature focusing on the practices of peoples working and interacting in an intercultural environment, a cultural dilemma refers to various tensions associated with cultural differences in practices and their interpretations, often being seen as difficult to solve.
(Alvarez, 2019; Anderstaf et al., 2021; Glover & Friedman, 2015; Thorp et al., 2017; Trompenaars & Hampden Turner, 1997). Such dilemmas can be used as case studies to help these people see the problem, understand it better and find solutions, for example, by developing intercultural competence. There is limited literature devoted to the development of this concept in such a way that it can be interpreted in the context of understanding the processes of cultural continuity and discontinuity, for example, in describing how parents adjust and adopt their parenting practices to a new environment or, alternatively, maintain them, demonstrating intergenerational tensions related to the fact that people grew up in different environments (Chan, 2018; Kao & Hébert, 2006; Sanagavarapu, 2010). The use of the concept of cultural continuity dilemma contributes to this line of discussion, placing it in a wider debate about what is meant by cultural practices, how they are formed and changed, while cultural production dilemma expands the use of this concept to study the processes of cultural production within migrants’ communities.

In summary, relying on Elias, Douglas, and Bourdieu’s theoretical ideas and developing the concept of cultural dilemmas, I suggest new optics for studying cultural continuity and discontinuity in small migrant groups and make the following contribution to the discussion. First, I adjust the theories of Elias and Douglas for migration research and the studies of parenting practices, in particular. This returns the focus to national characteristics in order to pay attention to super-diversity and diversification within one social group, at a time when the research of the similarities within the “nation” has lost not only popularity but is also heavily criticized. Using Elias’s methodological optics, I show that there were unique special conditions in the USSR in the context and in connection with which habitus was formed and changed and are being reproduced in Russia and some parts of the post-Soviet space, and this is what the migrants brought with them into a new cultural environment. Thus, one of my main contributions is to show how the use of Elias’s theory in migration research helps to understand what culture is and how it changes; that it is important to study “history,” and social structure processes in the country of origin of migrants, and not only be limited to research in the host country or transnational research of modern processes. Additionally, it shows that habitus is not a static phenomenon; it changes, including as a result of solving cultural dilemmas in a new environment. Second, one of the arguments I develop is that studies of community and migrant organizations overlook the important role of struggle and power relations in the community. It is in the process of these relations that the leaders of the community (re)produce the “official” culture. Moreover, this thesis argues that small communities develop differently compared to large ones.
I define Russian-speaking communities in Perth and Madrid as small, due to the small number of Russian-speaking migrants in these cities and their geographic dispersal (Australian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.; Department of Home Affairs, 2018; .id demographic resources, n.d.; National Statistics Institute, n.d.). According to the 2016 Census, 3,218 people living in WA speak Russian at home, which is 0.1% of the state’s population of around 2.5 million. There are 6,000 residents of the state who indicate Russian ancestry (0.2%) and 1,769 Russian-born people (0.1%). In the Community of Madrid in 2020, there were 7,680 inhabitants born in Russia, which is also approximately 0.1% of the total population of around 6.8 million. It is rather difficult to estimate the size based on the census results and other statistical resources, since the community includes people from different countries of the post-Soviet space (the former Soviet Republics, that replaced the USSR after its collapse), of different ethnicities, speaking different languages at home. In any case, it can be said that the communities of Russian-speaking migrants in Perth and Madrid are relatively small in comparison with other migrant groups that live in these cities, and large communities of Russian-speaking in other countries such as Germany, and US. There are 11 million people from Russia who live outside of it (United Nations, 2020).

As explained in this section, it can be concluded that in this thesis, when the focus is migrant everyday life, cultural continuity and discontinuity are explained through the concepts of cultural habitus and its transformation. I dwell on these processes in more detail in the next Section (1) of this introduction chapter. When I focus on the activities of community leaders in small migrant communities, I use the concepts of cultural production and field of cultural production. Understanding the community as a structured field of power relations allows me to explain how cultural production occurs in the process of struggle and helps answer the question about the role of the community in the process of cultural (dis)continuity. I describe these processes in Section 2 of the chapter. The peculiarities of cultural habitus, in particular self-prejudice, affect the fact that people do not form a sense of belonging to the community and, therefore, have an impact on how the community works and is being produced. The concept of a sense of unbelonging to the community in the context of cultural habitus is described in Section 3. Finally, I describe the structure of the thesis in Section 4.

1. Cultural continuity dilemmas and individuals’ everyday lives: negotiation of cultural habitus

Employing Elias’s (1996) concept of national habitus to describe cultural continuity dilemmas in migrants’ everyday life, the study argues that in the course of long-term socio-historical processes
taking place within the post-Soviet space, certain local similarities were developed and formed, not only at an institutional level, but also among its inhabitants. The latter comprises a wide range of internalized dispositions, feelings, behavioural patterns, and ways they perceive themselves, which can be called habitus. It includes the shared conscious cultural characteristics, such as identity and language and unconscious ones, those, for example, that are perceived as universal human civilized standards. *Cultural continuity dilemmas* are reflections on whether people should adhere to these cultural practices, beliefs, and norms in an environment in which they are not common.

Migrants solve cultural continuity dilemmas that relate to their behaviour and relationships with others in different circumstances – when thinking about whether it is dangerous for a child to crawl on the ground, as in the example of Alice, or whether it is worth changing outdoor shoes for indoor slippers at home, or when they decide how to celebrate certain holidays, when to speak Russian with their children, etc. The native language, the practices of celebrating certain holidays and wearing slippers at home can be considered as components of the national habitus (Elias, 1996), or *cultural habitus* – a term that I use when referring to the inhabitants of the post-Soviet space. In this work, within the study of everyday life, I focus only on those features that are recognized as common for and by people from the post-Soviet space in the context of the migration experience, since before this experience, they did not recognize these features as cultural. Among these are: 1) health care and hygiene practices, and attitudes to them, such as wearing slippers at home, 2) beliefs about acceptable behaviour in public space, practices related to this and other etiquette practices and beliefs such as ideas about the importance of being neat, 3) practices and beliefs related to the control of children’s behaviour and discipline such as ideas about when it is necessary to control a child or give him/her independence. These three sets of practices and beliefs or dispositions, all of which are examples of the peculiarities of the cultural/national habitus, do not have clear boundaries, as they can intersect with each other.

I show that these sets of practices and beliefs – these examples of the peculiarities of the habitus – were formed during the long-term processes of state development. In other words, I follow the task that Elias (1996, p. 19) poses for sociological research: to link the contemporary problems of a group and “the current social and national habitus of a nation to its so-called ‘history’.” For example, Alice talks about the differences between the “Soviet” norms of hygiene and childcare, which still exist in Russia, and Australian norms. The study demonstrates that these are not just shared stereotypical ideas about existing differences but that a system of standards was formed
and developed under certain socio-historical conditions in the USSR. I illustrate how they were institutionalized, disseminated and show how they have been internalized as habitus.

The application of Elias’s theory allows me also to contribute to the debate on the reasons for differences in child-rearing practices and approaches and their conceptualization. I show that some Russian-speaking parents’ habitus is best studied without using class and ethnic lenses, or rather, that habitus cuts across class and ethnicity. Researchers of migrant parents in different countries, including Russian-speaking ones, conclude that some features are associated with the experience of socialization in a specific country environment and show how norms and values can change in a new country of reception (Chao, 1994; Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Nesteruk & Marks, 2011; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013). I propose to describe these features using the concepts of cultural habitus and use the concept of cultural continuity dilemma to explain why and how features of habitus change after migration.

In addition, as I demonstrate, these certain everyday practices of habitus that are rarely studied and do not attract the attention of researchers in migration studies, and which at first glance seem to have nothing to do with access to a certain position and the accepted markers of the reproduction of inequality, can play an essential role in the life of migrants, act as important criteria and signals in the construction of the boundary (Barth, 1998) between “We” and “Others” and determine the choice of educational institutions. Elias’s concept of national habitus makes it possible to link these practices of habitus with the social structure that changes during the history of the state and experiences of migrancy and show their processuality and variability. In the next section, I introduce the concept of a cultural continuity dilemma that explains the transformation of habitus in a new environment.

1.1 Cultural continuity dilemmas and cultural habitus within everyday multiculturalism perspective

The notions of “cultural habitus” and “cultural dilemmas” offer a new focus in exploring the experience of (multi-)culture in the daily life of migrants. They can be seen as sub-themes of interest within the “everyday multiculturalism” perspective, which considers:

the everyday practice and lived experience of diversity in specific situations and spaces of encounter. It explores how social actors experience and negotiate cultural
difference on the ground and how their social relations and identities are shaped and re-shaped in the process (Wise & Velayutham, 2009b, p. 3).

The “everyday multiculturalism” perspective has proposed a new framework for the study of intercultural interaction, helping to move beyond an understanding of culture as a monolithic phenomenon and cultural transmission as a quantifiable process, defined by a set of discrete elements, such as language, national holidays, food and so on. Research in this vein shows that these interacting processes constantly change over time, forming mutable forms of cultural hybridity and mixedness, etc. (Boccagni & Baldasar, 2015; Collet, 2015; Meyer & Fozdar, 2020; Rubdy & Alsagoff, 2014). In my research, I not only focus on cultural variability as a result of everyday interaction, which is described by the term “cultural continuity dilemmas,” but I also show how certain dispositions and practices, formed during long-term socio-historical processes and called habitus, can play an important role in the “lived experience of diversity.”

One of Elias’s works’ most striking conclusions is that he was able to show that behind the dominant rational medical discourse, seemingly unrelated social mechanisms and reasons can underly the emergence of certain practices of etiquette, the development of manners, and norms of social behaviour. Douglas (1966), in a similar way to Elias (Elias, 2000b), debunks the logic of medical materialism by exploring contemporary ideas about dirt. She shows that these ideas are symbolic and cannot be reduced to scientific hygienic explanations. Douglas (1966) agrees that our knowledge of pathogenicity drives our understanding of dirt. When the influence of pathogenic organisms on the occurrence of various diseases was proven in medicine, it became rather difficult to comprehend dirt outside the context of this explanatory model. Meanwhile, she demonstrates that the concept of dirt existed before these discoveries in medicine, and that it had essential similarities with the way we understand it today: “If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place” (p. 36).

According to this definition, dirt exists if there is some sort of classifying system, and dirt is the rejected elements from a set of ordered relations. She gives examples of this:

shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table; food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom, or food bespattered on clothing; similarly, bathroom equipment in the drawing room; clothing lying on chairs; out-door things in-doors; upstairs things downstairs; under-clothing appearing where over-clothing should be, and so on (p. 37).
These examples demonstrate that objects perceived as dirty become anomalies in certain interiorized classifications. When people are faced with anomalies, they can apply negative and positive ways to treat them. The first involves ignoring the anomaly or condemning it. The second is the reinterpretation of existing classifications and the creation of new ones, in which the rejected elements become part of the unrejected elements of ordered systems. When individuals try to change the personal scheme of classifications, their options are limited since culture partially mediates these schemes, and cultural categories cannot be easily revised:

*But cultural categories are public matters. They cannot so easily be subject to revision.*

*… Any given culture cannot ignore the anomalies which its scheme produces, except at risk of forfeiting confidence. This is why, I suggest, we find in any culture worthy of the name various provisions for dealing with ambiguous or anomalous events (p. 40).*

Using Elias’ terminology, these schemes of classifications can be described as a part of the national (cultural) habitus. They include internalized ideas about what is dirty, dangerous, or acceptable. By combining Douglas’s ideas with Elias, it can be interpreted that Elias’s theory explains how and why these schemes were formed in Western Europe (Elias, 2000a, 2000b). It means that these ideas become part of what we call “second nature” [habitus] during socio-historical transformations, and following specific rules becomes accepted as ‘natural’ behaviour. The need to deal with anomalies in a way that is not common can trigger emotional reactions of fear and discomfort. Moreover, the perception of certain elements as deviations is further legitimized by the logic of medical materialism, supported by the dominance of the medical model.

Migrants represent a special case within this explanatory framework. Douglas writes that each culture has its own way of dealing with anomalies. However, migrants, being carriers of specific cultural schemes or cultural habitus, find themselves in a social space where ideas and norms are ordered differently, according to other schemes of classifications, other cultural habitus. Anomalies or ambiguities rejected in the scheme which migrants have internalized are particular cases of another classification, its legitimate elements. Migrants are surprised to find that, for example, crawling on the ground [which is perceived as dirty and/or cold], regularly eating sandwiches [which is perceived as harmful] and even placing shoes on the dining-table, as in Douglas’s example, is not considered a child health hazard under this new classification system. These two classification systems – old and new – offer different interpretations of relationships and actions. Awareness of this contradiction and choosing how to treat the element they always
perceived as dangerous and inappropriate, and which were not considered an element of culture in the past, is a cultural continuity dilemma in everyday life that migrants are actively trying to solve in different ways: either to accept the new norms, or reject them favour of the old, or try to find a compromise.

These alternative ways to solve dilemmas partially resemble the ways to treat anomalies described by Douglas (1966). For example, “by settling for one or other interpretation, ambiguity is often reduced” (p. 40). She gives an example of how the Nuer solve the problem of interpreting monstrous births and what to do with them. They categorize them as babies of hippopotamuses, and so after birth, they return them to where they belong, which is the water. Migrants can also interpret unusual behaviours and norms in a way that allows them to order the world around them. For example, they can conclude that people are not aware of the dangers of such behaviour or neglected rules. In their attempt to solve cultural dilemmas, migrants may either revise their scheme of classifications or retain them. While cultural schemes are formed and changed over a long period in the process of historical transformations, migrants usually find themselves in a situation where they themselves need to choose the way to treat anomalies and ambiguities, in other words, to solve dilemmas.

Therefore, faced with cultural continuity dilemmas, migrants solve them in various ways. There are several patterns in how the dilemmas are resolved: Some migrants retain their own interiorised system of classification. They interpret them in a familiar way, referring to medical reasons, norms of etiquette, etc. On the other hand, others begin to perceive them as a manifestation of the Soviet/backwards, in a negative sense. A third group tries to find a compromise and an opportunity to create something different from the old and new norms. For some people, finding the solution to such dilemmas is quite painful, since such behaviour is part of internalized norms, expediency, and the necessity of implementation of which has never been questioned. (Dis)trust in Western norms and (dis)trust of Russian/Soviet cultural norms, and vice versa, can influence which pattern is reproduced.

In the next section, I describe how the cultural production dilemmas of community leaders are addressed. To do this, I show why using Bourdieu’s theory helps to explain how the Russian-speaking migrant communities work, and what role its leaders play in cultural production and representation.
2. Cultural production dilemmas and migrant community

This research shows that the Russian-speaking migrants in Perth and Madrid are interrelated through a network of relationships and or membership in various migrant institutions, which reflects some kind of social entity which can be called a community of migrants. This ‘community’ entity has several specific features and important characteristics as identified during the research. Firstly, it has a rather pronounced institutionalization, comprising a number of Russian organisations, in comparison to the small number of Russian-speaking migrants. Secondly, the tensions and contestations that characterise migrant relations turned out to be a characteristic feature of the relationship between representatives of different organizations. Conflicts are associated with the processes of institutionalization, since new migrant institutions are often established as a result. For example, many organisations appeared as a result of a struggle between the members of the same organisation, because of which some of them left it and organized a new one. Thirdly, most people involved in existing migrant institutions knew about each other, have had contact with each other, or the activity of some of them influences the activity of others, even if there are no direct interactions between them. For example, conducting two different events targeted at the Russian-speaking audience on the same day is likely to affect their attendance. The size of the Russian-speaking community is small, and, thus, the number of potential visitors would be distributed between events. It appears that organisations and the events exist in the context of a relatively autonomous common social space.

This view of the migrant community as the field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993b) allows me to explain all of these empirically found characteristics. The field is one of the main concepts of Bourdieu’s sociology. It is a relatively autonomous structured social space constituted by social relations between individuals and institutions that are in a situation of permanent competition for specific stakes. The field can be understood as a space where a social game occurs, in which agents play and compete for a particular gain, both material and symbolic. The Russian-speaking community as a field of cultural production can be described as a space of forces, “in which what is at stake is the power to impose the dominant definition” (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 42) of Russian-speaking culture and how it should be reproduced and therefore to delimit the cultural producers entitled to take part in the struggle to define the culture. Agents and community institutions occupy certain positions that determine, on the one hand, their beliefs about what a community and Russian-speaking culture is, and, on the other hand, their practices aimed at transforming existing relationships that produce the field, or, conversely, at preserving them.
While, for example, in the “field” of literature, such agents and institutions include writers, publishers, literary agents, literary prizes, and in the “field” of art, they include theatres, theatre academies, art schools, and so on, in the Russian-speaking community as the field of cultural production they include existing migrant institutions (community schools, online groups, associations, shops, churches, etc.), and individuals who are producers of culture, which I call Russian-speaking culture (teachers of community schools, dancers, singers, etc.). Due to the small number of Russian-speaking migrants, the roles of producers and consumers regularly change. For example, recruiting new teachers for the community’s schools is often undertaken among parents who bring their children there. The dance and vocal groups also find new members from among the audience or other cultural consumers. Moreover, the spectators and producers can be connected in close relationships, and producers themselves regularly become consumers of products from other producers.

The notion of field can therefore explain the existing conflicts as a struggle for stakes specific to a field. The dynamic nature of the field structure, and consideration of the community as a hierarchized space of positions related to power relations between agents and institutions, is important for understanding the mechanisms of its functioning. It is in the struggle that the field is reproduced (Bourdieu, 1993b). On the contrary, in the literature, understanding the community as “networks of interpersonal ties” and by paying attention to its institutional density, these networks are described as horizontal, which provide people with social support, sociability, a sense of belonging, etc. (Hunter, 2018; Wellman, 2001, p. 228, 2005). However, as my research shows, Russian-speaking migrants form a community not through a horizontal network of relationships between people but through a system of power relations between people and institutions.

The community leaders are examined as cultural producers or agents who are involved in the power relationships. These ideas are at variance with the popular view in migration studies that leaders of migration organizations pursue goals related to some of the real needs of migrants, with the desire to preserve some of the “true” culture and heritage that they brought with them (Babis, 2016b). Rather, community leaders and their actions can be understood to involve those who represent the dominant agents, who try to maintain power and the existing order, and newcomers, who try to overcome existing barriers and, in the case of the field of cultural production, would like to control the monopoly of the legitimate mode of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993b). The state of power relations in the field and agents’ strategies are interrelated with the volume and
configuration of the various forms of capital they have accumulated. Agents with less capital specific to this field, such as newcomers, seek to undermine the power of the dominant agents who monopolize the capital (Bourdieu, 1993a) by producing heretical discourse and by developing subversion strategies. The dominant agents in response, form the defensive discourse of orthodoxy, through which they try to maintain the existing order. Criticism of some community leaders by others, and the latter’s reactions, are examples of offensive and defensive discourses, in which leaders defend their version of what Russian-language culture is and how it should be produced.

Additionally, I rely on Rogers Brubaker’s ideas regarding the answer to the question “What does it mean to speak ‘in the name of the nation’?” and his broader approach to ethnic groups (Brubaker, 2004a, 2004b, p. 116) to answer a question regarding the migrant community: what does it mean to speak “in the name of the migrant community?” Brubaker states that nationalists and other ethnic entrepreneurs aim to change people’s perceptions of their group affiliation and identity. He considers nationhood not as an ethnocultural phenomenon but as a political claim, which is used not to describe the existing reality, but to construct it, mobilize people, and form a sense of solidarity. This involves considering nationalism as a political language that nationalists use to induce people to a certain activity, in order to identify themselves with a particular nation. This language does not describe the existing order; it is intended to change the world. The same logic can be applied to the study of the language used by community leaders. In this sense, culture, heritage, and cultural values (Russian-ness) are not a reflection of a certain reality, but are rather a set of ideas and beliefs that community leaders (re)produce and construct, and they can vary greatly at different times.

Brubaker argues that ethnic and national groups cannot be identified with organizations that claim to speak and act on behalf of these supposedly homogeneous groups. While Brubaker primarily considers these processes in the context of the political goals that different ethnic and national leaders may pursue, I show that community leaders can transmit ideas of political groups pursuing the same goals and focus on the accumulation of various resources or different types of capital (Bourdieu, 2002). For my research, it is important to focus on how migrants understand the culture within the community, but the community leaders play the leading role in it. The events that are held, the symbols used, the organizations created, and the stated goals depend on the cultural producers in this field, who occupy a dominant position.
Migrant institutions play an essential role in the formation of communities and dynamic processes. It is these organizations that form social spaces, including the carried-out activities, that contribute to forming social ties between different small groups of migrants, who may perceive themselves to be rather isolated from the community they “imagine.” In the framework of studies of migrant organizations, there is a tradition of separating profit and non-profit organizations (Babis, 2016b; Halm & Sezgin, 2012; Jardim & Da Silva, 2019; Marzana et al., 2020; Moya, 2005; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). The latter are often considered to be establishments that are created to defend the interests of migrants and to maintain migrant culture and identity, thus they often consider the migrant culture as something that migrants bring with them from their home countries. Based on Bourdieu’s ideas, I show that what can be represented as the needs of migrants and migrant heritage depends on who plays the role of cultural producers in the community, which can be considered an ideology that is constantly disputed. Some pro-Russian organizations can be viewed as a type of diaspora institutions (Gamlen, 2014; McIntyre & Gamlen, 2019), created by governments to implement their political and ideological goals. Events supported by such pro-Kremlin organizations can be viewed as a tool of Russian soft power through which a certain set of official cultural symbols, performative rituals and narratives are transmitted.

Thus, when I describe cultural continuity and discontinuity in a community, I use the concept of cultural production. Defending their right to speak on behalf of the community and produce “proper” Russian-speaking culture, agents formulate and resolve cultural production dilemmas. For example, it is through this kind of competitive process that questions of proper culture are reviewed and substantiated, including such issues as which Russian films should be shown at the festival, which dances are considered to be native Russian, how to celebrate certain holidays and which ones, how to teach Russian language in community schools, what other subjects should be taught in Russian, and so on. The cultural continuity dilemmas in migrant everyday life, which was discussed in the previous section, arise from the awareness of the contradiction between migrants’ own internalized ideas and norms, and those with which they are confronted in a new environment. Working out these dilemmas is an attempt to understand what should be adhered to, and within which classification it is necessary to remain. In comparison, the cultural production dilemmas that community leaders resolve are defined differently: they are an attempt to both realise or substantiate what Russian-speaking culture is, and how to produce and represent it.
In conceptualizing migrant community in this thesis, I also focus on people’s perceptions of Russian-speaking migrants, the specifics of their identity, and how the way that community is imagined to affect the community’s fragmentation. In the next part, I describe these processes.

3. Identities, belonging and self-prejudices: “proper Russian vs. Western vs. backward Russian” culture

From the times of Peter the Great and during different periods of state development ever since, the construction of the image of Russia and Russian culture has been defined in opposition to, and in comparison to, the West and Western culture, so much so that this comparison has been central to the formation of Russian identity or a part of the habitus (Elias, 1991a) and the principal issues of Russian culture (Greenfeld, 1992; Kelly, 2001; Lotman, 2002; Malinova, 2014; Ryazanova-Clarke, 2011). Although attitudes towards the West as an important Other have changed in different periods, the key to understanding this confrontation or comparison lies not by way of an evolution of these ideas, feelings, and perceptions, such as perceiving it either as a role model or through the emergence of a feeling of inferiority and rising anti-Western sentiments (Dubin, 2000; Gudkov & Dubin, 2001), but rather in the “dilemma of Russia versus the West” (Greenfeld, 1992; Morgunova, 2006). To illustrate what formed its basis, Greenfeld (1992, p. 223) quotes the following question, posed by 18th-century Russian writer Denis Fonvizin:

*How can we remedy the two contradictory and most harmful prejudices: the first, that everything with us is awful, while in foreign lands everything is good; the second, that in foreign lands everything is awful, and with us everything is good?*

Even though many modern forms of soviet and post-soviet nationalism continue to use the image of the West as a model for comparison, they have an important difference from the idea underlying this quote – they do not try to build an image of the homogeneous Other who is either superior or inferior in everything. Even in the USSR, when the West was being formed as the main enemy and dangerous Other (Malinova, 2014), its image remained rather controversial (Yurchak, 2006, 2014). Criticism of some cultural forms as bourgeois manifestations could coexist with the formation of positive attitudes towards other Western cultural symbols and practices, the beliefs about which could change and be revised, or could differ within different contexts:
The Soviet state always in its history distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable forms of Western culture and constantly tried to draw a boundary between them (Yurchak, 2014, p. 320).

The opposition “Russia versus the West,” which is expressed in a very difficult attempt to delineate between acceptable/ global/ superior/ unacceptable/ dangerous forms of Western culture, remains an actual part of Russian ideology (Engström, 2020; Laine, 2021; Laruelle, 2016a; Malinova, 2012) and of how these boundaries are interpreted in everyday life (Pilkington et al., 2002; Seliverstova, 2017).

I argue that an actual feature of how Russian-speaking migrants comprehend their own and Western culture is found in the opposition of “Russian versus Western” culture, not as a dichotomy, but as part of the triad “a proper Russian(-speaking) vs. Western vs. backward Russian(-speaking) culture.” Moreover, the elements of Soviet culture are those which are constructed within this triad, either as a proper or as a backward culture, since Soviet culture is being just as painfully dissected into acceptable/ global/ superior/ unacceptable/ dangerous/ etc. forms as is Western culture. Elias’s theoretical framework allows me to explain the construction of these identity traits in the context of social development, especially the state-formation processes. For Elias, a self-image as a member of a particular group is closely connected with the group’s position in a system of power hierarchies and emotional and behavioural spheres, which are then transformed into interdependencies with social transformations. For example, the loss of the state’s former status can have a traumatic impact on its members, can trigger emotional responses, such as the desire to return to the former status, or lead to an experience of distance from the group if it has become stigmatized, such as happened for a generation of Germans participating in World War II (Elias, 1996).

Living through perestroika, a new direction of development of the USSR, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, the subsequent collapse of the USSR in 1991 and transition in the post-Soviet period was an excruciating stage associated not only with the loss of the status of great power but with the processes of acceptance of their own culture. It was a time of reflection on the negative aspects of the Soviet system, an understanding that the state had controlled almost all spheres of life and invented traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2012) that legitimized the existing political system and supported it, formed and constructed culture in such a way that it was ideologically “correct.” The whole habitual way of life, any everyday practices, holidays, customs, and tastes were rethought.
from the point of view of a critical appraisal of Soviet conditioning. The West was taken as a positive model for comparison, or rather its constructed idealized image. The subsequent period of rethinking the past and nostalgia for the USSR was an attempt to identify the positive features of life in the USSR, and to show that it was not so bad there (Abramov, 2013; Dubin, 2006). In the context of my research, I believe that this phenomenon of reflection on “Soviet” can be seen as an attempt to legitimize the migrants’ own norms and traditions, at least in part, which is often carried out in the light of comparing themselves with the West.

The solution to cultural continuity dilemmas by migrants is often a choice between what is constructed as elements of their own and foreign cultures: this choice is related to the attitudes towards and dis(trust) of them. For example, in the colonial world, these dilemmas could be solved in a simple way – the colonialists did not question their cultural superiority and tried to “civilize” the local inhabitants of the colonies. In the case of Russian-speaking migrants, when they interpret practices and norms as determined by culture, a painful question arises, which forms the basis for constructing the boundaries between their own and Western culture and which, paraphrasing the Fonvizin quote above, can be described as: what is good and awful with us and in foreign lands?

Andy Byford (2009, p. 105) describes a similar trend found in a study of migrants born in the USSR who moved to the UK in the 1990s and 2000s:

While I interviewed teachers who worked in several private Sunday schools for Russians ..., I noticed the tendency of my interlocutors to criticize some rival schools by emphasizing the “Soviet” nature of their curriculums or teaching staff. ... according to one of the respondents, the teachers were typical “Soviet schoolmarm.” ... Referring positively to their own education, they preferred to call it just “our education,” thereby ascribing a universal meaning to specific Soviet values.

Byford writes that the epithet “Soviet,” in the sense of a caricature of the USSR, was used in his study to delegitimize competitors while, describing their own values and practices, respondents had to suppress their Soviet origins. In my research, I explain this same duality in describing elements of Soviet/Russian culture, referring to the features of Russian identity associated with trust in one’s culture, which are reflected in the light of ubiquitous Soviet influence, and comparing and opposing it to the West. As a result, certain Soviet/Russian practices and standards are
perceived positively, while other Soviet practices are considered outdated, and their bearers may be stigmatized, for example, as “typical Soviet schoolmarm.”

This form of stigmatisation can be called self-prejudices, because they are unfavourable attitudes towards imagined Russian-speaking Others with some negative characteristics. It is essential to separate the notion of cultural habitus from the concept of “cultural intimacy” (Herzfeld, 2016), which refers to those aspects of national identity that relate to the ideas about their own characteristics, which members of the group are embarrassed about. Michael Herzfeld defines cultural intimacy as: “the recognition of those aspects of an officially shared identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality.” (2016, p. 7).

It is true that certain aspects of national habitus (Elias, 1996) can be viewed as “cultural intimacy:” different ideas about oneself that can be discussed humorously, as oddities, but at the same time as those cultural features that people perceive as those they possess, and which they embrace as part of their identity. However, cultural habitus is a broader category, which also includes those cultural features that have formed as cultural only in the process of migration. In the process of solving cultural dilemmas, they cause shame in some people, while in others, they can cause pride. Self-prejudices are another part of the cultural habitus, but these are attitudes that are formed not towards oneself but the insider Others and, unlike cultural intimacy, prevent the formation of a sense of sociality.

At the level of migrant communities, these features of identity are manifested in the fact that migrants do not form a sense of belonging to the community, even if they are cultural producers and active consumers. The imagined community (Anderson, 1983) of Russian-speakers is imagined as a community whose members do not like each other and do not want to communicate with each other. People participate in the reproduction of this structured field of social relations without forming a sense of belonging, but nonetheless identifying through unbelonging. Taking into consideration how people imagine the community and their perception of fragmentation of community, the Russian-speaking community can be described as a community of unbelonging. This is consistent with the results of a study of Russian migrants in other countries in the past (Kopnina, 2005; Markowitz, 1992): “we are confronted with the lack of ‘communal consciousness’ and widespread indifference or even antagonism towards fellow citizens among the Russians.”
(Kopnina, 2005, p. 95), but in my study, migrants in both Perth and Madrid form a common structured social space of networks, which can be called a community.

4. Thesis structure

The thesis structure consists of an introduction, conclusion, and three parts. Part 1 is the theoretical and methodological foundations of the study, comprising two chapters. Chapter 2 describes and justifies the study’s methods and design, how the data and what types of data were collected, and ethical issues related to the study. The theoretical foundations of the study are substantiated in Chapter 3, which is divided into two parts. In the first, I describe Elias’s theory (1991a, 1996, 1998, 2000b) and explain why the concept of cultural habitus is better suited to interpret the similarities of Russian-speaking migrants in everyday life than the notion of habitus as developed by Bourdieu, introduce the basic concepts relevant to my research, and discuss the applicability of Elias’s theory to the study of the Soviet and post-Soviet case. In the second part, I substantiate the applicability of Bourdiesian Field Theory (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b) to describe a community by placing it in existing debates around the definition of the concept of community, the relationship between migrant institutions and communities unfolding within migration and transnational studies. Thus, the two parts of this chapter provide a theoretical context for studying the cultural continuity dilemma in everyday life (Elias’s theory) and the cultural production dilemma in the community (Bourdieu’s theory).

Part 2 consists of four empirical chapters devoted to cultural habitus and cultural continuity dilemmas in everyday life. Chapter 4 focuses on the characteristics of Russian-speaking migrants and parenting styles and practices that can be viewed in the light of cultural habitus. I also provide a review of the literature that focuses on child-rearing practices, which allow me to show the contribution that Elias’s theory can make to this debate and subsequently to place some of the conclusions of my research into its context. Drawing on his ideas, this part analyzes the process of the formation of certain features of the cultural habitus in the USSR (Chapter 5) and in the post-Soviet period (Chapter 6). Based on existing literature, this research reveals how in the USSR, in order to achieve ideological and pragmatic goals, a transformation of everyday life took place, which affected various spheres of life, including the practices of taking care of health, hygiene, child-rearing, nutrition, education, and children’s pastime. I demonstrate how care for the health of Soviet citizens became a part of the internal policy of the state and how the imposed directive rules that served as a tool for disciplining the population were gradually transformed into cultural
norms and became part of shared and unconscious dispositions manifested in behavioural features that can be called cultural habitus. These chapters, firstly, substantiate why these features of migrants can be called cultural habitus, and secondly, they reveal the contradictions of some shared norms. *Chapter 7* is devoted to studying cultural continuity dilemmas in the context of the ideas of everyday multiculturalism. Empirical examples of dilemmas are given and discussed, ways to solve them and what they depend on are shown. I describe some patterns in how dilemmas are solved, for example, how the perception of norms as “Soviet” and “backward” leads to the abandonment of the desire to follow them, and show how the concept of cultural continuity dilemmas explains the process of cultural hybridization.

**Part 3** includes three empirical chapters, which deal with the Russian-speaking community and cultural production dilemmas (Chapters 8 & 9) and Identity, unbelonging, and self-prejudice (Chapter 10). Drawing on Bourdieu’s field theory, the migrant communities of Australia and Perth and cultural production dilemmas are analyzed. I describe migrant institutions, the role of Russian-speaking online groups in community building and cultural (re)/production and explain existing confrontation within the community. *Chapter 8* focuses on the Russian-speaking community in Australia. I begin this chapter by describing Russian foreign policy towards compatriots abroad since a struggle within the Russian-speaking communities took place in the context of this policy. This allows me to show why some agents and institutions can be viewed as those who champion Russian soft power and how some cultural production dilemmas arise and are resolved. In addition, I include a subsection on the history of Russian migration to Australia, as this enables me to understand who can act as community leaders at different times and explain some aspects of institutionalization of the community. *Chapter 9* is dedicated to the Russian-speaking community in Perth and the struggle for monopoly and Russian politics, in the context of which cultural dilemmas are resolved. In this chapter, the case of commemorations of Victory Day is analyzed as an example of a soft power strategy. It also explains the reasons for the active institutionalization of the community. *Chapter 10* illuminates the peculiarities of the national identity of Russian-speaking migrants and also explains why Russian-speaking migrants form prejudices towards other Russian-speaking migrants and how this affects the formation of networks of relationships. In this chapter, I examine why the community is fragmented at the symbolical level.

In *Chapter 11*, the conclusion, I discuss how the concept of cultural dilemma can be used to explore cultural continuation and cultural experience in two contexts — in everyday life and in migrant community. In the migration literature, there are views that migrants bring “baggage” with them
with their own culture, and community leaders and migration organizations allow this baggage to be preserved and transmitted. There are many questions raised in the context of these views – what culture is, what exactly they bring, how it is changing in the new environment, and to what extent organizations cope with the role of cultural representatives and gatekeepers. I propose an approach that answers these questions. Cultural habitus is a kind of “baggage” that migrants bring with them, and cultural continuity dilemmas reveal how elements of the national (cultural) habitus can be transformed and why. On the other hand, what the community leaders produce and transmit, I explain not through the concept of cultural habitus but through the concept of cultural production. Leaders produce an “official” culture, and its production process should be studied differently in the context of power relations. I use the concepts of identity, unbelonging, and self-prejudice to explain the fragmentation of the community, which also explain its existence.
PART 1
PART 1. METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Chapter 2. Methodology

Introduction
As part of the “Research Design” of my original PhD research proposal, I began with the following words: “The research is a comparative multiple-case study (Bryman, 2012), in which the communities of Russian-speaking migrants in Madrid and Perth are the compared cases. In both cities, I will use the same methods of data collection, sampling, and recruitment.” At that time, I perceived my two cases in Australia and Spain as being equivalent, and it was assumed that such cross-national research would provide an opportunity to focus on how different socio-cultural and political settings influence both the specificities of the communities and the parenting practices of Russian-speaking migrants, and other such processes related to cultural continuity. I wanted to focus mainly on the cultural transmission, and the role that the community plays in these processes. I started fieldwork in Perth in December 2018: this included participant observation, online data collection, and interviews, during which I attended a range of events held by Russian-speaking migrants (such as concerts, markets, and workshops), visited organizations, and met with respondents at their homes or in other places they suggested. In addition, since February 2019, I was a member of a Perth-based Russian dance group for about ten months, which I joined to facilitate access to this community. I travelled to Madrid in August 2019 and conducted one month of fieldwork there. In the course of my fieldwork, my research design and interpretation changed.

From the earliest stages of the research, I began to collect my field notes as well as informant descriptions of the numerous tensions and contestations that characterised both informal and formal relations between representatives of different migrant groups, organisations and their supporters, which then led to the creation of new institutions, the publication of official complaints in the press, and so on. This was a characteristic feature of the social entity that I was studying, in both Perth and Madrid, which can be perceived as very important since these tensions permeated people’s relationships within these social networks. These relations could both influence the desire of people to attend events held by the Russian-speaking community and shape the image of the community. The respondents themselves explained these conflicts, usually by the negative cultural characteristics of the people involved in them. Even the most active participants in the conflicts sadly told me how difficult it was for them to communicate with their opponents – all usually perceived themselves as victims. For example, one of the community leaders in Perth said to me
that there are two conflicting parties, and it would be great if I could help rid communities of opposition. In Madrid, one respondent complained to me that some of the organizers of one online group split off and organized another group, and that she is very upset with these conflicts in the community. I needed to describe these processes sociologically, but the cultural lenses preferred by the respondents did not seem appropriate for this case.

I expanded the research sample in both Perth and Madrid and interviewed more organizers, teachers, and other active community members than originally planned, in order to better understand this issue. The use of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1999) as a methodological strategy allowed me to assume that the community can be described as a field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993b). This view of the community helped explain not only the existing conflicts but also other discovered features. The data collected in Madrid made it possible to confirm that such an analytical model also described the community there.

In addition, in the course of my research, I began to pay attention not to the differences between the two cases, as I originally wanted, but the surprising similarities in the informants’ narratives from the two cities. For example, it was striking that many informants perceived both the Australians and Spanish to be more friendly and relaxed than themselves. Several everyday parenting practices were also similar. I needed to explain why parents in both countries show similar concerns about their child’s health, hygiene and “civilized” practices. At first, I wanted to describe them by using the concepts of Bourdieu’s habitus, but it seemed problematic to explain, within the framework of his theory, routine practices of everyday life such as specific practices of caring for a child’s health that are not related to the reproduction of inequality and access to social benefits. Elias’s theory, and his concepts of social habitus and civilizing processes, made it possible to explain these similar features within the context of social transformation taking place in the post-Soviet space in different historical periods. However, the choice of this theory also had a significant impact on the design of the study and the focus of my work.

As a result, I changed the idea of comparing the two cases (Perth and Madrid) as equivalent. Instead, I have focused on the Australian case and used the Spanish data to illustrate the main themes and findings. It is impossible to make an in-depth study of the two cases within this work, and it would be redundant to answer the questions posed. In this chapter, I elaborate on how the data is collected and analysed, describe in more detail how the research design was modified, and discuss important ethical issues related to the research.
1. Methods and data

The study involved taking an ethnographic approach to data collection, including digital ethnography (Bryman, 2012; Hjorth et al., 2016; Vogt et al., 2012) and, as part of it, observation was carried out on online forums and on groups for Russian-speaking migrants. Within-method triangulation was used, namely the combination of several methods of collecting qualitative data – semi-structured interviews, participant observations, social media and other online data collection, collection of documents, advice sources, secondary data – that were analysed independently of each other and were then compared (Kimchi et al., 1991). This diversity of data provides a range of different lenses through which the research questions what cultural experience and (dis)continuity mean to Russian-speaking migrants and the role played by migrant communities in these processes are viewed. This overcomes the limitations of one data collection method. For example, the publicity and the presence of other people may lead participants to reproduce a normative discourse in the public space, or the degree of participants’ acquaintance with each other or their status could limit the desire of some participants to share their experiences and opinions in face-to-face group discussion (Hollander, 2004; Smithson, 2000) but not limit them in this way in the online discussion. In addition to this, different methods allow researchers to collect data related to various phenomena. For example, the interview method is focused on the collection of biographical data, attitudes, beliefs, values, and motivations (May, 2010); observation can be used for the study of human activities, phenomena that a person does not talk about, that occur in the private sphere or during interaction (Corbetta, 2003); social media provides an opportunity to study not only factual information, but also how in the process of communication people discuss issues related to the continuity of culture, identities and parenting (Snelson, 2016).

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants from mixed and Russian-speaking families, the teachers, coordinators, and organizers of language and other community-based programs and group activities for Russian-speakers, and community leaders. All interviews were in Russian with Russian-speaking people and in English with one English-speaking partner. They were analyzed in the language in which they were taken, and then the quotes chosen to represent the data in this thesis were translated into English by me. They were conducted in face-to-face mode or via online calls using Skype, WhatsApp, and other Voice over Video Programs. In the course of the interview with parents, they described the social-demographic characteristic of their families, the time and reasons for migration, all programs the children were involved with, how and why the choice of cultural activities was made, the use of language in the family, involvement
in the Russian-speaking community, beliefs about Russian-speaking parents and culture, what parenting practices were considered appropriate in different situations, what they perceived as Russian-speaking culture and what efforts they make to transmit or maintain it, what it means to be non-Russian for them, what it means to be a good parent, and the educational and cultural institutions that their children attend. Interviews with teachers were conducted to determine the differences in the child-rearing practices of parents whose children attend the programs and how they explain them. Interviews with cultural producers allowed me to collect data that relates to their personal experience and biography, factual data about Russian-speaking communities, the history of organizations, and their ideas about how and why they work. I also interviewed an expert in commemorations of Russian Victory Day abroad to get his opinion on how this is carried out in Spain and Australia compared to other countries.

I conducted participant observation during visits to the Russian-speaking organizations and when visiting respondents, participating in meetings and other events organized for Russian-speakers, and while spending time outdoors with parents and their children. During these visits, I also sometimes interviewed people and took photographs that did not include the participants’ faces. I was also a member of one Russian-language dance group for eleven months. This allowed me to participate in various events, not only as a spectator but also as a performer. However, the observation data I recorded as its member I use only in a generalized form and without direct quotes. Additionally, I sampled and analyzed some of the most popular online groups for Russian-speaking migrants, in which participants ask questions, publish posts and discuss them, exchange news, advertise their services, etc. These groups, forums, and other platforms for online communication can be viewed as an environment in which identities are constructed, and communities are formed at least at the online level (Grasmuck et al., 2009; Morgunova, 2013). Thus, analyzing this data, I was able to study how identities have been negotiated, how participants self-present themselves and their opinions on various issues, which group dynamics have changed, and the way in which group boundaries have been constructed. They also contain factual information about the participants of these groups, the issues that they are interested in, the events that take place offline, the reasons for interaction, etc., which supplement the data collected by other methods.

In addition, the process of collecting and analyzing online data, in particular discussions under posts, can methodologically be considered as data similar to those that researchers collect during focus groups. Just as in discussions under posts, the focus group method allows researchers to
detect the diversity in participants’ views and positions (Smithson, 2000). To demonstrate the important differences between the interview method and the focus group, Agar and MacDonald (1995) use the category of folk models, defined as “frames of interpretation” (p. 83), shared by members of a group. Folk models can relate to general ideas about a phenomenon, similar positions, and opinions, familiar and shared interpretations of why something is happening, what reasons underlie some practices and other behaviour. During the interview, the participants in the study usually explain the folk model to the interviewer, describing in detail their own ideas and interpretations, whereas during a group interaction, the focus group makes it possible to identify a variety of folk models, namely, the different points of view of the participants and their opposing positions on any issue. In contrast to the interview, the focus group easily reveals both the contradictions between the participants and their similarities or differences in views and beliefs. I consider discussion of posts in online groups as such an interactive debate that allows me to highlight different and conflicting beliefs, opinions and views. These data were compared with interviews, in order to analyze whether other research participants share similar points of view, and were used to develop the notion of cultural continuity dilemma.

The main participants of my research are small groups of Russian-speaking migrants who are not amenable to statistical accounting, due to the fact that they came from different countries at different periods and identify themselves with different ethnic groups. In such cases, when the studied people are “rare or because they are hidden in some way or both,” the snowball method, where research participants recommend to the researcher potential participants who meet the criteria from among his/her acquaintances, is a better sampling method (Vogt et al., 2012, p. 152). Participants have also been recruited in several ways: the first one was through the writing of letters to gatekeepers such as teachers, leaders and organizers of Russian-language programs and groups, and to official representatives of the Russian Orthodox church, who were able to provide access to the field, invite me to meetings, lessons, events and other activities organized for Russian-speaking migrants, in order to undertake observation and recruit respondents for the study. The second way was through a formal letter of invitation to prospective participants, providing information about the research and asking for informed consent in oral or written form.

I also include in the project data from two previous studies conducted prior to the PhD research. They were focused on parenting practices of Russian-speaking migrants in Madrid with the same population. This data was collected in 2015 and 2017, under the auspices of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, where I worked as a senior lecturer. The projects were
funded through the Center for German and European Studies (sponsored by DAAD - the German Academic Exchange Service). I was allowed to use this data, relevant for this current research by the UWA Human Research Ethics Committee. The first research in Madrid was conducted in July 2015 (24 interviews) and included interviews with Russian-speaking parents, interviews with teachers or organizers of Russian-language structured programs for children (4 interviews), visits to these programs and visits with respondents, as well as meetings and spending time outdoors with parents. The second study comprises the second part of a longitudinal study extending from the first project. The fieldwork for this project was conducted in July–August 2017 in Madrid. I carried out the interviews with the same parents (17 interviews) and an additional five interviews with parents who were not interviewed in the previous research. The objectives of the previous projects included the collection of information that is required for the current project: the participants had already provided information about family composition, migration history, child-rearing practices, their perception of migration and cultural characteristics of the families, community involvements and some others. Of the 39 interviews I did in Madrid for my PhD research in 2019, 23 interviews were conducted with people I had interviewed in 2015 and 2017.

The main empirical data collected in Australia and Madrid are described in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Data</th>
<th>Components and Sampling</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Perth</th>
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</table>
| Interview data  | • Russian-speaking parents  
• Organizers and other cultural producers                                                 | 17/07 – 14/08/2015: 24 interviews 
21/07 – 18/08/2017: 22 interviews  
| Observation data| • Participant observation                                                              | 17/07 – 14/08/2015            | Dec/2018 – Dec/2019           |
|                |                                                                                         | 21/07 – 18/08/2017            |                               |
|                |                                                                                         | 12/08 – 12/09/2019            |                               |
| Secondary data | • Administrative/ government/ scientific reports  
• Online open Russian-language sites: Russian-language press, the sites of Russian organisations  
• Articles and books                                                                 | Jul – Sep/2019                | Apr/2019 – June/2021          |
| Social media data| • Messages, posts and comments in online groups, forums, and charts  
• Other open online resources                                                        | Jul – Sep/2019                | Jan/2019 – Dec/2020          |
Additional data concerning social habitus formation processes were also collected. To show that I study phenomena that are not specific only to the two cities selected for this study, and that the similarities that were found are common to migrants in different countries, I also asked a German respondent to answer questions that relate to hygiene practices, concerns about health and behaviour in public places. I also included examples from non-scientific sources: a book on parenting by Russian-speaking parents, written by an American journalist (Maier, 2017), a book of advice for Russian-speaking parents (Sigitova, 2020), various publications in newspapers and other media that are discussed by migrants on the forums, and the YouTube channel of a Spanish woman, Nuria (When you are Nuria, n.d.), who shares her ideas about the cultural differences between Russians and the Spanish. As explained in the next section, I also analyzed the National Standards for children’s health and safety for pre-school institutions in Russia and Australia, and included data from the standards of some other post-Soviet countries and programs that regulate the conceptions of management of upbringing and advice sources for educators.

My sample has a number of important features. Firstly, I mainly interviewed women. In Perth and Spain, ten interviews were conducted with men, five in each city. This is primarily because there are many more women than men among cultural producers and participants in the various activities aimed at children. There are organizations and groups that are composed only of, or mostly of, women. For example, both Madrid and Perth have online groups for Russian-speaking migrants, which only women can join, such as the most popular forum for Russian-speaking parents in Australia, which is for women only. One of the important reasons for this, most likely, is the characteristics of migration flows to these countries. In Australia, the proportion of men among those born in Russia is 37%, and 63% of women, respectively (Department of Home Affairs, 2018). In Spain, the picture is similar: 35% of men and 65% of women (National Statistics Institute, n.d.). In turn, this is related to the large proportion of female marriage migrants amongst the total number of Russian-speaking migrants in these countries, and to the way parenting responsibilities are distributed between parents in Russian-speaking families. For example, some of my female informants did not work or had casual work, thus spending much more time with their children than did their husbands, who worked full-time. Secondly, I interviewed migrants of different generations and from different waves of migration. It is important to note that the part of this study, in which the concept of cultural habitus is employed to describe cultural (dis)continuity process in migrant everyday life, is based only on the results of interviews with the first-generation migrants who moved from different countries of the post-Soviet space, but mainly from Russia. The rest of the interviews, with the second-generation migrants or migrants from other ways, were
analysed to study the processes in the community. In the next section, I will describe how these two themes of my research were highlighted, and how this influenced the modification of data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

2. Grounded theory as a main methodological framework

This study aims to examine the experience of culture and cultural continuity in the daily life of Russian-speaking migrants, focusing on their cultural practices and various beliefs related to the community’s perception of itself and what has or acquires cultural meanings. I examined both formalized cultural practices, which were performed as part of the activities of the various migrant organizations and the community leaders, (such as concerts, markets, and Russian-speaking educational programs for children), and everyday informal practices manifested in multiple situations, mainly with regard to the child-rearing practices used in different circumstances.

A number of studies argue that formal and informal cultural practices can be closely related, and that migrant institutions are created to represent the interests of community members, to form and maintain group identity, and to solve a certain range of community-relevant problems and issues (Babis, 2016b; Halm & Sezgin, 2012; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005; Zhou & Cho, 2010). However, in my research, in the process of collecting and analyzing data, two significant themes were identified – a) cultural production in and of “community”, and b) negotiation of cultural habitus in individuals’ everyday lives. This thematic division grew out of the grounded theory approach to qualitative data as a methodological strategy that determined the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data at all stages of the study.

The grounded theory is “the discovery of theory from data” (Glaser and Strauss, 1999, p. 1); it develops based on collected data, the subsequent collection and analysis of which also depends on the previous stages of research. It is fundamentally inductive. Charmaz (2006, pp. 5–6) summarized the main components that, according to Glaser and Strauss, include grounded theory practice and which were used in the practice of this study:

- **Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis**
- **Constructing analytic codes and categories from data, not from preconceived logically deduced hypotheses**
Using the constant comparative method, which involves making comparisons during each stage of the analysis

Advancing theory development during each step of data collection and analysis

Memo-writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties, define relationships between categories, and identify gaps

Sampling aimed toward theory construction, not for population representativeness

Conducting the literature review after developing an independent analysis.

Following this strategy, I started analysing data from the very first stages of fieldwork in Perth, which I conducted using participant observation, interviews, and online data collection method. Coding, which includes initial line-by-line coding and focused coding (Charmaz, 2006), was implemented for the first part of the data I collected at the beginning of the fieldwork. The interview, observation and social media text data were coded into groups and then into subgroups, based on the different topics related to the research aims. Based on the results of this analysis, the rest of the data subsequently collected was analysed using thematical analysis.

Therefore, the initial analysis made it possible to identify recurring ideas and patterns, then identify themes, and subsequently determine which additional types of data were required. This modification of data collection, based on the emerging theory, is called theoretical sampling, which is:

the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges (Glaser, Strauss, 1999, p. 45).

For example, since the commencement of data collection within the Perth case, conflict emerged as an important feature of the relationships between people, and was itself manifested in numerous confrontations, mainly between representatives of different organizations or the people who support them. In addition, the community was characterized by a large number of migrant institutions and by ongoing fractures, formations and reformations associated with previous conflicts. This led to the need to expand the study sample, to include more community leaders and other representatives of organizations as participants. As a result of the ongoing collection and analysis of data, Bourdieu’s field theory (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b, 1996) was chosen as the optimal framework; this allowed me to explain different community characteristics and processes. At the next stage of fieldwork in Madrid, data collection and analysis continued in the context of
these theoretical ideas, which made it possible to show that the chosen concept for the study of the community, the field of cultural production, is applicable to describe the processes in both cities, and, finally, to introduce the concept cultural production dilemmas.

An analytical description of the community processes taking place in Perth in the context of the chosen theoretical framework determined the next round of online and secondary data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Understanding the community as a field – a space of competition between agents and migrant institutions – led to the need to describe the main players in this field, their social characteristics, assess their resources (capitals) that determine their strategies and success in the struggle, and in the case of migrant institutions, to study when they were formed and under what circumstances. In the course of this analysis, it was revealed that many of the processes taking place in Perth were due to dynamic and structural changes in the Russian-speaking community at the national level. In particular, the organizations in Perth were merged into compatriot associations, which pro-Kremlin institutions coordinated at this Australian national level. Thus, this then led to the necessity to describe the important agents in the Russian-speaking community of Australia, and analyze their role in the implementation of Russian foreign policy towards compatriots abroad. In addition, an analysis of the discourse that agents produce during confrontations in order to maintain the existing order, or to justify the need for change, was carried out. Based on this data, I showed which arguments were used by competing representatives of various organizations in order to defend the legitimacy of their positions or to challenge the legitimacy of the positions of their competitors.

Thus, cultural production in and of “community” is the first key theme highlighted in the analysis and interpretation of data within which I develop the concept of cultural production dilemma. Concerts, holidays, educational programs, and other events produced by agents and institutions in this field are understood within the framework of this approach, not as ways of representing and reproducing certain aspects of Russian-speaking culture brought by migrants from their countries of origin, but as cultural products that are very strongly related to the power relations between agents and institutions, the resources of the agents producing them, and their beliefs about what should be produced and how, as in the case of the Australian community, some of these cultural products can be perceived as the production of Russian soft power.

Since the beginning of the analysis of interviews and online data, similarities have emerged in what are described by migrants as cultural norms and identified as markers of cultural affiliation
and differences. Cross-country comparison of informants’ narratives enabled me to identify a certain similarity in practices and interpretations, which are precisely related to the informants’ socialization contexts, during which these beliefs and patterns of behaviour could have been acquired. In the course of my analysis, I began to define these features through the concept of social habitus, drawing on Elias’s works (Elias, 1991a, 1996, 2000b), since some of them related to hygienic standards and practices of behaviour in public places; the transformation of which he describes in The Civilizing Process. Thus, I began to describe informal cultural practices in the daily life of migrants in the light of his theory.

In a methodological sense, the use of these optics posed new challenges for me. In Elias’s theory, important ideas relate not so much to the concept of social habitus and its changes but to its historical relationship with the transformation of social structures. He formulates the problem of 20th-century sociology as follow: “the investigation of long-term social process has as much as disappeared from its research activity” (Elias, 2000b, 2000a, p. 458), and the problem he solves in his book is described as:

\[
\text{the connection between individual psychological structures (so-called personality structures) and figurations formed by large numbers of independent individuals (social structures)} \quad \text{(p. 452).}
\]

According to his arguments, it is crucial to explain modern problems and processes interconnected to them by historical transformations. Therefore, his research approach is called historical-sociological, and his works are referred to as historical sociology (Connolly, 2016; Goody, 2002). The historical perspective for this part of this study is critical, since it allows me to demonstrate that the identified similarities are not constructed in the process of interaction after migration, but rather are associated with the reproduction of certain standards formed in the Soviet/post-Soviet space.

The use of Elias’s theoretical optics has prompted the need to expand the empirical database significantly, in order to convincingly show that the similarities found in this study can be described as habitus in Elias’ sense. To do this, I explore how these identified similarities – mainly hygiene and health care practices, behaviour in public places, and attitudes to discipline – were formed in the course of a long-term social process and then became second nature; that is, they were perceived as standards characteristic of a “civilized” modern people. I analyzed studies of the everyday life of the USSR, (its social, cultural, and educational policies), in order to show that
it is a unique historical case in which a specific system of standards concerning different aspects of life was formed, maintained, and spread.

The rich body of literature devoted to the studies of the USSR allowed me to describe these processes which were in place before the collapse of the USSR. Unfortunately, there is not enough research focused on these topics in the post-Soviet period to allow an analysis of their further transformations. In order to fill this gap, I have carried out an additional analysis of documents. I argue that a certain system of standards has been reproduced during the post-Soviet period which has affected the official standards, as well as the set of ideas broadcast through parental discourse. I base this argument on my analysis of the official documents that regulate the work of preschool educational institutions in Russia and on a comparison of these with Australian sources, including: 1) medical, sanitary and hygienic standards and 2) programs that regulate the model of upbringing and provide advice for educators. I show that Russian documents reproduce some of the ideas and standards developed in the USSR before its collapse.

These documents were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, in Elias’s theory, parenting practices play an important role, since it is in early childhood that the child learns certain norms and forms the self-constraint apparatus which allows him/her to observe and embody them as they grow up, without the need for external constraints. Secondly, as a source of empirical evidence, these documents reflect the ideas inherent in the methodological approach of Elias, who analyzed very similar data sources, including advice literature and various prescriptions regarding rules of conduct. Thirdly, these documents describe the norms shared by migrants in my research, and which they perceived and reported as demonstrating critical cultural differences between Russian-speaking and other groups. Comparing the discourses transmitted through these documents with the respondents’ narratives shows their similarities in reproduced ideas, and Elias’s theory is used to explain their relations. Thus, the grounded theory strategy in this case also determined the data collection strategy and the description of the results.

In the process of migration, these standards can change, and in order to describe these processes of transformation of habitus, I needed to introduce the concept of a social continuity dilemma. I develop this concept using the ideas of Mary Douglas (1966) within the framework of the approach of everyday multiculturalism (Wise & Velayutham, 2009b). For this task, I mainly analyzed online data from forums and groups for Russian-speaking migrants, as well as from interviews. In this way, the second key theme of my research emerged: negotiation of cultural habitus in individuals’
everyday lives, which I analyse using the concepts of national habitus and my notion of cultural continuity dilemma.

In addition, the sub-theme – identity, belonging and self-prejudice – related to both themes, (1) cultural production in and of “community” and (2) negotiation of cultural habitus in everyday life, emerged from my data analysis. This sub-theme was especially evident in the analysis of interviews and online data, which revealed similar trends evident in two themes, in relation to what is perceived as aspects of Russian culture and the carriers of that culture. Participants’ understandings of themselves and others were analysed in the context of a social constructivist approach (Edley, 2001; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). From this point of view, identity, perception of one’s own and others’ group memberships, and beliefs about one’s own experience and cultural patterns are constructed and modified in constant interaction with the social world (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Accordingly, in the process of collecting and analyzing data, I focus on how social categories are defined and used in social interaction, by comparing respondents themselves with meaningful “Others” and in opposition to them. In this way, the sub-theme of identity, belonging and self-prejudice links to the two previous themes at the symbolic or cognitive level. The migrant community on this level is conceptualized primarily by analyzing the practices of interaction and consumption which are perceived by participants as being specific to Russian-speaking migrants, as well as by focusing on the symbolic boundaries that imply shared beliefs about who is a member of these communities and groups (Barth, 1998). As a result of this analysis, I describe a community constructed at the symbolic level as a community of unbelonging. As a broader framework for this analysis, Elias’s theory makes it possible to link these features with the features of identity formation at different historical stages of the post-Soviet period.

3. Ethical issues and challenges

There were certain potential risks and harms associated with data collection methods, which I tried to avoid or minimize during all stages of the research. According to the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, harm is understood to mean a wide range of negative consequences for the participants: from physical, status, and other social and material deprivations to the suffering of any kind experienced by them (National Statement, 2015). The procedures for obtaining informed consent and informing the participants about the details of the research, their rights, and roles are important mechanisms in the management process. Therefore, participants were invited to sign a written consent form. In cases where they declined to sign a
written form, I read out the information and recorded oral consent on the digital voice recorder. The study meets all general requirements for consent (National Statement, 2015). Participation in the study was voluntary and participants were informed about all details of the study using the Participant Information Form. They could interrupt or delay participation in, and withdraw from, the study at any time without any personal consequences. In some cases, consent was not required (for example, with the collection of online data that is publicly available, described later, and in observations of public events). Online data from closed groups and forums is cited here with the consent of both the authors of the quotes and the administrators/moderators of the groups/forums.

The study is also based on the principles of a feminist “ethics of care,” which is reflected in problematizing the role of the power in the production of knowledge, potential exploitation of participants, their emotional dynamics, and reflections regarding the position of the researcher in relation to them (Millen, 1997; Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 2014).

I have constantly analysed my results and conclusion in terms of how much harm and benefit – another important category in the various ethical codes – they can do (Guidelines for Ethical Research, 2012; National Statement, 2015). For example, one of the conclusions I draw concerns the involvement of the leaders of migrant organizations in the struggle for resources provided by official Russian institutions, and I show how they turn out to be the “bearers” of ideas and scenarios developed within the framework of Russian policy towards compatriots abroad. During the first intensive phase of data collection in Perth, which lasted six months, none of these people mentioned their involvement in these processes, even during personal and seemingly quite sincere interviews and conversations. I participated in some such events and did not suspect that they were involved with the support of pro-Kremlin organizations, since this information was not mentioned anywhere. One of the reasons for this, as I see it, is that people are sometimes ashamed of such cooperation or do not perceive it as something that has a serious impact on what they do and they therefore prefer not to talk about it.

Research that addresses policy issues may have unique characteristics from an ethical perspective, such as the fact that research participants may not be “private individuals but be powerful social agents” (Langlois, 2011, p. 154). Thus, I analyzed the results and conclusions related to the Russian soft power policy implementation by community leaders and organizations, trying to take into account this specificity, and from the point of view of how much they can harm the participants who preferred not to talk about this topic or, on the contrary, can be beneficial. It is possible that they could have a positive effect on relationships within the community and help to overcome
some of the ethical problems associated with cooperation with Russian official structures, such as providing information to participants about the support of the Russian government and under which program/project such support is provided. In addition, it can help to voice some issues that many cultural producers are aware of and which they are greatly concerned about, but about which they prefer to remain silent. For example, when I discovered the role of Russian political institutions in dynamic processes within the Australian community, I met with one participant, a community leader, in an informal setting and shared the findings. She agreed with my interpretation and said that she was distraught to be included in these activities linked with Russian policy, but felt unable to withdraw her participation in these projects, since the resources she received enabled the organization to be competitive. This example illustrates how being included in this politically tinged field can be painful for some participants, and how they may be glad to have the opportunity to discuss it when it is made visible.

To reduce the risks associated with harm to participants, I have also used very few quotations from community leaders about the community processes, in order to ensure anonymity. Instead, I try to build my argument about community as a field by citing data mainly available in open sources – publications in newspapers, online sites, interviews in radio stations, and others. This removes the ethical issue of my participation in the local events and activities as an insider who gains access to information that is closed to outsiders, and about which people could be embarrassed, since I use data from interviews and participated observation for generalization without direct quotes, supported by data which is available publicly through online resources. This position relies on the framework of personal ethics of care, which focuses not only on not harming participants but also on interacting with participants equally, not from the researcher’s position, which carries more power (von Benzon, 2018). In the case of open-access online data, published by the author with his/her own name, this approach assumes that, firstly, these authors are considered “as agential actors rather than naive participants,” and secondly, ethics is considered “as ‘process’ rather than bureaucracy” (von Benzon, 2018, p. 2). This approach to the author of published materials means that his/her text can be cited in the same way as publication in an online newspaper and magazine, namely without obtaining informed consent.

In addition, I anonymized all interviewees. I do not even provide a description of all participants in this thesis, thus making identification impossible. The communities are small, and any detail

5 The gender of the respondent has been randomized for the purpose of anonymity.
such as the number of children, year of their migration to the city, or area of employment could help identify them. Therefore, I have sometimes changed information in the provided description, but in a way that does not affect the interpretation of the data. For example, I could change the city’s name, where the informant is from, and the number of children. In one case, I changed the respondent’s name twice since her combined quotes contain details that might allow someone to identify her. However, I provide such information in the text if it is crucial for interpreting the data and does not allow deanonymizing the respondent.

4. Conclusion

The grounded theory approach, chosen as a main methodological framework, allowed me to single out two main themes of my research: a) cultural production in and of “community” and b) negotiation of cultural habitus in individuals’ everyday lives. Underlying these two strands of my research are slightly separate theoretical discussions that have determined the method of data collection and analysis and the theoretical sampling. As a result, in comparison with what had been planned at the beginning of the study, the empirical base was significantly expanded. In addition to interview data, participant observation, and online data, I included official documents and advice literature in my analysis, and additional interviews and online data. Identifying these main themes determined the overall structure of this work, which includes two analytical parts: Part 2 combines chapters on the theme “negotiation of cultural habitus in individuals’ everyday lives,” in which I develop the concept of cultural continuity dilemma to explain the processes of cultural (dis)continuity in everyday life, and Part 3, which consists of chapters in which the concept of the cultural production dilemma is developed in order to explain cultural (dis)continuity associated with the migrant community. In addition, these two themes encompass a sub-theme – identity, belonging and self-prejudice. In Part 2, I show that (dis)trust in one’s own/Western culture, related to identity features, influences how cultural continuity dilemmas are resolved. In Part 3, I demonstrate that these same identity features, formulated as the triad “proper Russian vs. Western vs. backward Russian,” influence the formation of self-prejudices towards the insider Others and the way the Russian-speaking community is imagined.

In the next chapter of this Part 1, I provide a theoretical overview, which contains two distinct parts that provide the theoretical context for Part 1 and Part 2, respectively – 1) the applicability of Elias’s approach to migration research and 2) the rationale for using the Bourdieu theory to study communities. I study cultural habitus within Elias's socio-historical approach, which
required me to conduct additional analysis of literature and other sources in order to describe the mechanisms and processes of habitus shaping. This is how Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in Part 2 were developed, in which I argue that these shared features in practices and dispositions can be called cultural habitus, which has been formed in the context of structural transformations. In Chapter 7, I continue to develop the argument, using concepts of cultural continuity dilemmas to study cultural (dis)continuity in the everyday life of modern migrants. Chapters 8 and 9 of Part 3 are analytical chapters, in which I describe the Australian and Perth communities, and analyze the dynamic processes and cultural production dilemmas. In these two chapters, I use the Spanish case only to illustrate a number of cross-country similarities. The final analytical Chapter 10 of this Part focuses on the symbolic level (identity, imagined community, unbelonging, and self-prejudices) and is based mainly on interviews and online data analysis. Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 10 are based on data collected in and related to both Madrid and Perth.
Chapter 3. National habitus, communities: theoretical framework

Introduction

This chapter consists of two sections, which provide a theoretical context for the two main parts of my research, as follows: 1) This section is devoted to the study of cultural (dis)continuity in migrant everyday life, in which I use Elias’s term of national habitus to develop the concept of cultural continuity dilemmas (the results of the empirical analysis are discussed in Part 2 of this thesis) and 2) This section relates to the study of cultural (dis)continuity in the migrant community, in which I use Bourdieu’s term of field of cultural production in order to develop the concept of cultural production dilemmas (Part 3: Chapters 8 and 9). In addition, in this study, I use Elias’s concept of habitus to describe the identity and belonging characteristics of Russian-speaking migrants, particularly the sense of unbelonging to the community (Part 3: Chapter 10). Therefore, in this theoretical chapter, I substantiate the use of Elias’s theory to study migrants’ everyday life and their identity in the first part of the chapter, and the use of Bourdieu’s theory in order to conceptualize, and explain processes within, the community, in the second part of this chapter.

In the first part, Elias’s theory of Habitus: Identity, National Habitus, Civilizing Processes, I describe Elias’s theory to show how his ideas about national habitus as being a set of similarities shared by people from one national space, and his focus on the past in researching changes in daily practices, can describe the shared features of Russian-speaking migrants. I explain why I use his concept of habitus, instead of habitus proposed within the framework of Bourdieu's theory, and I then describe the central concept of Elias’s theory and arguments relevant to my research. In the second part, Community and Migrant Institutions: Theoretical debate, I explain the benefits of using Bourdieu’s theory to conceptualize the Russian-speaking community. It contains a critical review of the literature on community in the social sciences, and in migration studies in particular. I describe the current debate and major changes in societies and social sciences in order to, on the one hand, show how communities are defined and studied, and on the other hand, explain their limitations for the study of Russian-speaking communities. Then, highlighting various migration research studies about communities and institutions, I show that very few works focus on the leaders of organizations in the development of migrant organizations and processes in communities.
1. Elias’s theory of habitus: national habitus, identity, civilizing processes

1.1 Elias’s vs. Bourdieu’s theories in migration research

In migration studies, Bourdieu’s theory has become very popular as a way of explaining the various characteristics of migrants and their life trajectories. The concepts of cultural and social capital, as well as the concept of habitus, are used to explore various issues, which include, amongst others, the distinctive characteristics of migrants, the strategies of migrant parents aimed at raising their children, and ethnic discrimination (Cui, 2015; Wallace, 2017). At the same time, the focus of Bourdieu’s theory has always been on social inequality, and in his explanatory models the concepts of habitus and capital are closely related to the notion of field, which is defined as a structured space of social positions (Bourdieu, 1993a, 1996; Bourdieu & Nice, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Thus, various elements of Bourdieu’s theory are well suited to explain the differences between groups characterised by power relations and those issues connected with the possibilities and limitations of social mobility and the reproduction of social inequality. Cultural capital refers to the resources that people want to obtain or possess in order to gain positions held by dominant groups. However, cultural capital is relevant to a certain field, so if one considers the nation-state as an example of a field, then we can study how migrants in the receiving country try to accumulate new resources or attempt to adjust their cultural characteristics in such a way as to gain access to different positions in a new environment (Erel, 2010). For example, the concept of cultural capital allows us to understand Black Caribbean parents’ child-rearing strategies, which are aimed at ensuring success for their children in British schools (Wallace, 2017). They train children to interact with teachers by learning the practices of the local white middle class, even though these are different from their own practices.

Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural capital and habitus are about the similarities (in resources, practices, dispositions) that representatives of a social group share with each other, and which are recognized as features of their group, which distinguish them from members of other groups and the resources they do or do not possess. In the example above, white teachers at a London school perceived students to be more successful because their parents had trained them to reproduce certain middle-class practices which teachers unconsciously recognized as examples of successful student behaviour. Russian-speaking migrants also share some beliefs about the similarities they have with each other. On the one hand, these similarities can be explained by the notion of habitus, since they are manifested in a set of dispositions and specific behavioural patterns related to them. Russian-speaking migrants can also identify each other through recognizing these practices or just
by perceiving a kind of “Russianness” with respect to how a person looks and behaves. On the other hand, many of the beliefs and practices concerned with health care, hygiene, and some elements of child-rearing approaches that Russian-speaking parents reproduce in both Perth and Madrid appear not to have a class nature, and are not resources associated with access to dominant positions.

In this sense, Norbert Elias’s theory of national habitus (Elias, 1991a, 1996, 2000b), which overlaps with some ideas of Bourdieu’s theory (Paulle et al., 2012; Wilterdink, 2017), better describes the cultural characteristics of Russian-speaking migrants. National habitus also refers to the modes of thought, behaviour, and feeling which are acquired in the process of socialization. However, unlike Bourdieu’s conceptualization, it does not have to be related to the group’s position in the hierarchical social space or to the reproduction of social inequality. These are common features of members of a social group that are formed and change in the course of socio-historical processes. For instance, Annette Lareau (2003, 2011), drawing on the theory of Bourdieu, shows how the parenting approaches used by parents from different social classes reproduce social inequality. Elias (1996) describes the differences between Dutch and German parents differently, showing them to be interconnected with the history of the development of these countries, namely through the formation of various institutions and the role that different social groups play in making managerial decisions.

Such optics allow me to show how the development of cognitive, emotional, and behavioural characteristics of Russian migrants in Perth and Madrid is related to ongoing socio-historical processes, focusing on the features they consider cultural but that are not necessarily related to access to certain social positions. This research demonstrates that Elias’s theory can be applied to the study of migrants to interpret their characteristics manifested in practices, beliefs, and feelings, and their identity. The next section describes Elias’s basic concepts and theoretical ideas that are relevant to my research.

1.2 The main concepts: habitus and civilizing processes

1.2.1 Definition of habitus

The concept of habitus appeared in academic usage long before Pierre Bourdieu developed it as the main theme in his theories, thereby popularizing it in various fields of knowledge (Sapiro, 2015). It was widespread and regularly used in German sociology as early as the first half of the
20th century (Dunning & Mennell, 1996). Elias employed it in his earliest works, including in his famous book *The Civilizing Process*, first published in German in 1939. However, perhaps due to the general use of this term at that time, he did not give it an explicit definition. In addition, in the first English-language editions, habitus was translated overly simplistically as “personality makeup,” and therefore, English-speaking readers did not know for a long time that this term occupies a leading place in a number of his explanatory models (Dunning et al., 2000; Paulle et al., 2012).

In his latest book, *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Elias (1996) includes habitus in the title as one of the key concepts, although, once again, he does not explicitly define it. According to Dunning and Mennell, the authors of the *Preface* and translators of the book from German, he understands this concept as “embodied social learning” or “second nature” (Dunning & Mennell, 1996, p. ix). The latter definition indicates specific acquired characteristics common among members of a particular group, which they perceive as inherent and natural (Mennell, 1994, p.177).

In his earlier essay *Changes in the We-I Balance*, written in 1986, Elias (Elias, 1991a, p. 182) describes the concept of habitus, which he uses interchangeably with the term “make-up”, as follows:

> ... each individual person, different as he or she may be from all others, has a specific make-up that he or she shares with other members of his or her society. This make-up, the social habitus of individuals, forms, as it were, the soil from which grow the personal characteristics through which an individual differs from other members of his society.

Thus, by the social habitus or make-up, he understands the characteristics of individuals that members of one society share with each other or have in common, due to their belonging to this society, but at the same time also determines their individual characteristics to a certain extent.

This “something in common,” which makes habitus, includes a very wide range of shared characteristics and common peculiarities of members of one group or social community, which relate to its member’s personal and behavioural sphere. Whereas Bourdieu defines habitus as systems of acquired dispositions, which generates practices (Bourdieu, 1993a, 1996; Bourdieu & Nice, 1977), for Elias, habitus is both dispositions and practices, as well as affective experiences,
and much more. Examples of what has been considered as components of habitus are the common language (Elias, 1991a, p. 182, 1996, p. 18), a certain threshold of shame and repugnance, which had become visible and formed in Western people since the 16th century (Elias, 2000b, p. 414), and drinking customs common among German students in the 19th and 20th centuries, which allowed them to become heavy drinkers (Elias, 1996, p. 6).

Elias has even defined national identity as part of the habitus: “The traits of national group identity ... are a layer of the social habitus built very deeply and firmly into the personality structure of the individual” (Elias, 1991a, p. 209). This definition also contains another popular notion in his theory – “personality structure,” – which he uses at different times, drawing on Kardiner and Linton (Elias, 1991b, p. 148), or Freud (Elias, 1994, p. xliii), or as a synonym for habitus or that part of it that is related to the inner world of a person. Thus, identity is an “an integral part of the social habitus of a person” (Elias, 1991a, p. 183) and the personality structure.

Identity in Elias’s works is a complex concept that is intertwined with various other terms. It relates both to a collective awareness of oneself as a member of a particular group, to a shared perception of what is common to the group and what differentiates it from other groups and to a feeling of belonging to this group, which can be both positive and negative, depending on how satisfied the members are with the power position of their group relative to other groups and the characteristics that they think they possess. Members of a nation can either be proud of the nation or be ashamed, and these feelings can change over time and across generations. For example, the British post-second World War generation retained a sense of national pride in contrast to the corresponding generation of Germans. They not only believed that they were very different from residents of other countries, and were cognizant of a specific behavioural code that allowed them to recognize British people, despite internal ethnic, class, and other group differences, but also that they were superior, that it is better to be British than someone else (Elias, 1996). Explaining this example, Elias writes that:

This has to do with a national pattern of behaviour and a closely connected we-image, deeply anchored in the individual personality structure, which represents at the same time both an integral element of the identity of each person, a reliable symbol of a person’s belongingness to a group, and also the common identity of its members (p. 278).
We-image is also one of the central concepts that Elias uses and develops in various works (Elias, 1991a, 1994, 1996). As is evident from the above quote, it is an element of the group members’ common identity, a symbol of belongingness to it, rooted in the personality structure. Thus, Elias develops ideas about interconnected cognitive structures (we-images), affective states (feelings), and behaviours that reflect a certain similarity between group members, called habitus.

Mennell (Mennell, 1994), describing the peculiarities of the concepts of habitus and identity, writes that perhaps identity is more related to that which is consciously felt by the members of the group, while elements which refer to habitus are mostly unconscious. However, I prefer the definition given on the basis of the works cited above, namely, to understand habitus as a wide range of different shared characteristics, including identity, which may be both conscious and unconscious. In addition, I show further how Russian-speaking migrants can become aware of their own previously unrecognized characteristics, when they discover differences in the norms, values, and practices of residents of other countries. As can be concluded from Elias’s work, habitus is an umbrella term that can describe various personal characteristics associated with the feelings, thoughts, and behavioural patterns shared by a particular social group, including a nation. This broad understanding of the concept of habitus is beneficial for researchers working within practice theory, as it allows us to explore the similarities between members of a certain group, based not on a given definition, but on research results related to people’s behaviour and interpretations. Members of different groups may have various shared characteristics. Habitus, according to Elias, is not a static phenomenon as it can change interdependently with social developments in the long term (Elias, 1996, 2000b). I show that migration can also be considered a social transformation in which the social context changes rapidly.

1.2.2 Habitus formation

What is most significant in Elias’s theory is not so much the specific similarities of members of different social groups, but rather how these similarities are formed and developed in each particular case (Elias, 1996, 2000b, 2000a). His theory of “civilising processes” suggests that civilizing and decivilizing processes are associated with the formation and transformation of habitus. According to his ideas, in order to examine the problems of a social group or nation, including current problems, it is necessary to find their connection with socio-historical processes, for example, to establish relations between national habitus and the state-formation process. Drawing on these ideas, he explains in The Germans why Nazi ideas, leading to the Holocaust and
terrorism after World War II, became popular in Germany (Elias, 1996). He formulates the central question of this research as “how the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members” (p. 19). The formation and development of certain institutions is one of the ways in which national processes influence the formation of the common characteristics of certain social groups, manifested in shared norms and behaviour, since:

the fortunes of a nation become crystallized in institutions which are responsible for ensuring that the most different people of a society acquire the same characteristics, possess the same national habitus (p.18).

An example of such institutions in Germany was the duel, which, in contrast to other countries, spread outside aristocratic circles and made violence socially acceptable. I show that in Russia such educational organisations as kindergartens can be considered as institutions that have had habitus-shaping effects.

Amongst the important peculiarities of state-formation processes which influence changes in habitus is the awareness by the members of the nation that the country has lost its status, and that the country’s power-ration relative to other countries has been diminished. This realization can take a long time and may only take hold in the subsequent generation, but the consequences of this can be painful and traumatic and can affect self-esteem. In Germany, an example of such a loss in power status is the defeat in the 30-year war, the consequences of which were very difficult in an emotional sense. In particular, Elias considers the spread of heavy drinking practices, mentioned above, as the consequence of chagrin associated with the country’s loss of its former status. And in post-war Germany, the stigma of Nazism became a strong reason for the shame and dishonour felt by post-war generations, who tried to distance themselves from it and who perceived the previous generation with suspicion, with a desire to not be associated with it. These examples show that there is a certain amount of psychology implicit in Elias's theory, which reveals itself not only in the terms that he uses, but also in the theoretical ideas. The long-term fortunes of a nation are interconnected with the peculiarities of national habitus, which can be the causes of suffering, feelings of embarrassment and shame, even though people may not be aware of this. For example, the consequence of loss of position of a society within the power system of relations, as in the loss of its former greatness, can lead to the habitus of its members having signs of depression (Elias, 1996, p. 4). I argue that these processes related to the power position of states might be relevant for the Russian case.
This theoretical lens enables us to look from a new and interesting angle at the consequences of the loss of the USSR’s status as a great power, which was especially evident after its collapse. The resultant re-thinking of the achievements of the USSR, as well as all the consequences of changes from the Soviet system, which affected the area of everyday life, led to the formation of a feeling of embarrassment in relation to what is perceived as some elements of own culture, or to critical reflection and debate between Russian-speaking people.

According to the logic of Elias’s framework, in order to understand the characteristics of the national habitus of Russians and residents of the post-Soviet space, as well as those of migrants of different generations, it is also necessary to trace how these characteristics have formed in the context of socio-historical processes. These include the features of nation state development and the position of the state in the power hierarchy relative to other countries, and how these have impacted the origin of national similarities. The collapse of the USSR can also be viewed as the reason associated with a critical decrease in the position of the state within the general structure of power relations. This significant collapse and the subsequent repositioning of power also provided the starting point that influenced the perception of people as members of the nation, and the formation of a we-image that was “built deep into individuals’ sense of self-esteem and personality structure” (Elias, 1996, p. 278). In addition, during this period, a re-framing of many events of the past has taken place, the debate about which is ongoing. Such an example is seen in the dual role played by Stalin, who, on the one hand, led the country to victory in the war over fascism, which is still perceived by many Russians as a nation-forming symbol, and who, on the other hand, was responsible for the repression and purges of this period, which led to a huge number of victims. The lack of a transparent state rhetoric that is able to evaluate these historical events leads to a split in society, with regard to the perception and interpretation of such events and periods. In Australia, in contrast to Spain, there are more waves of Russian migrants who have perceived themselves differently in relation to their country of origin. Many migrants who arrived after the Second World War from Europe were anti-Soviet and did not want to return to the USSR, sometimes even putting themselves at risk as a result (“Russians,” 2001). Russian-speaking migrants who came from China include those who have never lived in the USSR; they perceive themselves as carriers of pre-revolutionary culture. According to Elias, all this should be reflected in the peculiarities of their identity, in how people perceive themselves and their nation, and, possibly, in Russian culture.
1.2.3 Civilizing processes

In *The Germans*, Elias (1996), focusing on national habitus, describes how inter-national changes in the standards of human behaviour and their feeling are interconnected with the history of the formation and development of the nation-state, as well as with the broader context of structural changes taking place in the world, mainly in Western Europe (p. 23). In his early book *The Civilizing Process*, he describes why the habitus of Western people across the West (Elias, 2000b, p. xi) transformed along with the changes in the structure of Western society. The long-term social transformations taking place in Western Europe are shown to be interconnected with the ongoing changes in behaviour and in the structure of human affects, as well as with how they are controlled. To show how standards of conduct have altered over time, he analyzes the ways in which etiquette books, literature, letters, various prescriptions regarding rules of conduct and manners, such as court regulations, education-related literature, and other historical sources, have changed.

While in *The Germans* he pays more attention to those changes that are relevant for understanding the inter-state processes taking place in Germany, and the formation of the peculiarities of the German national habitus, in *The Civilizing process* he describes similar transformations as taking place in very different spheres of everyday life and in the everyday relationships of people in all Western nations. He studies how several groups of practices have changed, such as table behaviour and eating practices, practices related to interaction in public space, which include standards of conversation, bodily standards, and practices of dividing space into what is perceived as either public or private. Certain behaviour patterns are constructed over time to signify a civilized person, who knows how to behave in different situations, and who can control his/her emotions and natural needs, including various bodily practices and drives.

For my research, several of the conclusions in the part of his work that relates to civilizing processes are important. First of all, a significant component of his theory is the description of the way in which external constraints are transformed into self-constraints during the process of historical change. The standards, which in the past were prescribed through external rules, adherence to which was also externally controlled, then become a part of the internalized norms and rules of the Western people, the reasonableness of which is no longer questioned. The modern adult begins to follow them without coercion or external control. Some behaviour practices that were considered perfectly acceptable in the past are now perceived as unacceptable. A person can unconsciously control certain bodily functions and their own conduct, feel ashamed, embarrassed
or afraid in certain situations, for example, if he/she violates generally accepted rules or if he/she becomes a witness to them. This self-constraint apparatus “is formed through external constraints in early childhood upbringing” (Elias, 1996, p. 33). This part of his conclusions directly concerns the practices of raising children in different societies. From an early age, children learn to behave in a certain way and subsequently to control their “drive impulses and affect inclinations” unconsciously (Elias, 2000b, p. 374). In the process of growing up, self-restraints begin to be realized automatically, becoming part of “second nature.” Thus, a certain “psychological habitus known as ‘civilization’” is formed, which is acquired by any “civilized” person of the Western world (ibid., p. 369). In my research, I show how the habitus can acquire special national characteristics. In the quote from Alice, which begins the introduction chapter, she talks about her fears related to the perception of the hygienic conditions of Australian kindergartens. This reveals the peculiarities of the shared national habitus to interpret certain situations as dangerous and unacceptable.

The next Elias conclusion which is important to my thesis is his illustration that different standards of behaviour, that people have perceived as being natural, have in fact developed historically under the influence of various rationales. There was no specific reason or plan to form a person with specific traits and forms of behaviour. Various social transformations “had direct significance for the change of the human habitus, the provisional result of which is our form of ‘civilized’ conduct and feelings” (Elias, 2000b, p. 366). Among these transformations, an advancing division of social functions is significant, which leads to the fact that people become more interdependent with each other, and their actions become stricter and more stable. Socially acceptable behaviour and the need to regulate one’s impulses become very important in the changing reality associated with the differentiation of social functions. At the same time, the centralization of power increases, and the means of physical violence is monopolized. These processes require the formation of a self-restraint apparatus that allows people to automatically control natural impulses, reducing the incidence of violence in society. The monopolization of physical violence leads to the fact that it will not be as spontaneous and widespread as it was in the past. People in societies with more stable monopolies of force are limited in their ability to spontaneously express their emotions and impulses, but at the same time they receive protection from external violence. Thus, the formation of stable monopoly institutions makes possible the formation of this automatic pattern of self-restraint. It can be concluded that one of Elias’s central concerns in both works is violence. In The Civilizing Process, he explains how the civilizing process leads to the fact that people learn to control their spontaneous emotions and restrain the manifestations of violence, and in The
Germans, he explains the reasons for the emergence of decivilizing processes in a “civilized” society that led to the Holocaust and subsequent acts of terrorism.

In the USSR, these processes develop somewhat differently, since, as I will show in Chapter 5, the Soviet government was consciously trying to form people with a certain psychological makeup and to civilize certain groups of the population, such as the peasants. Meanwhile, over time, the original goals have lost their importance, and the standards that were previously imposed from above remain in interiorized and institutionalized forms. I return to this discussion of Elias’s theory and its application to the study of the USSR and Russia in Section 1 of that chapter.

The next section of this chapter is devoted to a critical review of the literature on the study of communities and migrant institutions. The primary purpose of this section is to substantiate the applicability of Bourdieu’s theory for the study of migrant communities and processes associated with cultural production.

2. Community and migrant institutions: theoretical debate

2.1 “Community” as contested concept

The term “community” can rightfully be called one of the most controversial concepts in the social sciences. While in the past there was a more or less established opinion according to which a community was understood as being some kind of collectivity of people sharing a common culture, interests, and values, united on the basis of geographical proximity and face-to-face contacts, there is currently no generally accepted definition of community even within specific fields of research.

In order to understand the modern discussion that revolves around the concept of community, it is important to examine the basic changes in societies and social sciences, which led to a revision of its content. One of the crucial reasons for the change in the dominant view of the nature and essence of community is the so-called cultural turn in the social sciences (Delanty, 2018). An influential work reflecting these changes is The Symbolic Structure of Community by Anthony Cohen (Cohen, 1985), in which he describes the proposed theoretical and methodological shift as follows:

Moving away from the earlier emphasis our discipline placed on structure, we approach community as a phenomenon of culture: as one, therefore, which is meaningfully constructed by people through their symbolic prowess and resources (p. 38).
Thus, he proposes to understand the community not in the context of the ideas of structuralism but in the constructivist approach as a symbolic construct. In such a vision, the concept of symbolic boundary is important, formed in interaction with others, which means the differences that members of one community perceive between themselves and others. A community is what people consider to be a community, incorporating the meanings they construct when they think about how they themselves differ from representatives of other communities. Within this framework, social interaction is interesting only insofar as there is a symbolic construction of the boundary in its process. The concept of community is closely related to the concept of culture. It is in the community that people acquire culture and where they learn to be social through acquired shared symbols (Cohen, 1985, pp. 15-16).

Another meaningful work on communities that can be attributed to the constructivist approach is *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* by Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1983). This historical work offers an interpretation of the process of the formation of nations, defined as imagined communities, with the example of various nation-states. Anderson pays much attention to the various historical contexts that made such an imagination possible, and he also emphasizes the leading role of elites and the media in this process. In addition, the cognitive component, or the collectively shared understandings, is given vital importance in defining a nation as a community. “Imagined community” is contrasted with a community in which all the members have face-to-face contacts. The word “imagined” indicates that communities are being constructed and exist in people’s minds and that they may also include people beyond our face-to-face contacts. Anderson writes that “*all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contacts (and perhaps even these) are imagined*” (p. 49). Thus, he points to an important characteristic that allows modern communities to be considered as imagined, namely, the fact that community members “*will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion*” (p. 49). At one point in time, this definition became one of the leading interpretations used to describe different social groups and entities, not only limited to nations. However, Ghassan Hage (Hage, 2005) criticizes the widespread use of “imagined communities” in research. According to him, in such a conceptualization, there is little community but much imagination. In particular, he specifically emphasizes that the trans-national families he studied are not imagined, but “*concrete* familial communities with a definite analysable ensemble of social relations that constitutes them” (p. 468). This position illustrates the fact that social relations have again begun to play a leading role in explaining how communities are constituted in the social sciences.
The symbolic approach to understanding community is criticized for its reductionism (Delanty, 2018). The community cannot be considered isolated from people’s social experiences, which are an important way of forming ideas about the social world. Moreover, modern reality has transformed due to the development of information technology, globalization, migration, and postmodernism, which should be taken into account. Delanty (2018) writes that modern communities are a modernity product and are very different from traditional communities of the past. In the global age, they are very diverse – being either virtual, or face-to-face, traditional communities, and can include many other types – and they are also based on new forms of belonging related to ethnicity, gender, religion, etc. They are communicative, and communication also takes on various new forms. Like society as a whole, these new kinds of communities are fragmented, characterized by greater fluidity, openness, and less stable boundaries than they were in the past. Delanty (2018, p. 153) relies on Bourdieu and writes that:

"community is a set of practices that constitute belonging. What is distinctive about these practices – and this is to move beyond Bourdieu – is that they are essentially reproduced in communication in which new imaginaries are articulated."

In such a vision, understanding of the community is not limited to people’s mental constructs, which, in this case, is belonging: it is also important to take into consideration the process of constructing belonging through communication.

However, Somerville (Somerville, 2016) criticizes this approach, because it remains unclear how communication is interconnected with belonging. People, for example, can communicate without sharing ideas about belonging. This is exactly what I observe in the Russian-speaking community: there is regular communication and interaction between migrants who share the ideas of the existence of the “imagined” Russian-speaking community. However, many migrants perceive themselves to be outside this community, as not members, but rather as, for example, consumers of the community’s resources. As I wrote in Chapter 1, my research shows that individuals involved in relationships within a social space, a field of cultural production, which is a community, often do not share a sense of belonging to it, and so I have defined it as a community of unbelonging.

Somerville (2016) proposes his own definition of community, which is also based on Bourdieu’s theory. In his definition, the leading term is practices and not imagination or representation.
Conceptualizing the notion, he uses different terminology to Bourdieu, including the notions of habitus and fields. He writes that “communities are sets of practices within habitus in which the dispositions of the community members are determined specifically by their shared attachments” (p. 7). From the point of view of Somerville, community members have a similar habitus, which is formed since they are “attached to something or someone” (p. 4). Further, he shows how communities are ambiguously interconnected with fields:

*People are typically members of more than one community and their practices are also shaped by their positions in different fields. Although communities exist within habitus, therefore, habitus themselves exist in relation to fields of different kinds* (p. 7).

These examples demonstrate the frequent tendency among researchers who draw on Bourdieu’s theory in migration studies, as well as works focused on conceptualising community, to take no heed of his critical ideas about power relations between agents which permeate his work.

The power relations of individuals, the hierarchy of their social positions, and the struggle for resources in which they are included play an essential role in the theoretical models of Bourdieu. All of his key concepts – field, capital, habitus – are introduced precisely in the context of the description and explanation of the existing hierarchy of social relations that generate other types of inequality. The field functions since people, endowed with a certain habitus, recognize the laws by which the field exists, and are familiar with the rules of the game and its stakes (Bourdieu, 1993a). The structure of the relationship between the positions of agents and institutions that compete within the field is related to the habitus of the individuals occupying these positions. Understanding community as a field allows me not only not to consider that “communities exist within habitus” (Somerville, 2016, p. 7), but, on the contrary, to understand that community members are people with different habitus in the Bourdieusian sense of this term (not Eliasian), which can determine which cultural products they produce – high culture such as Russian ballet, popular culture such as fairs or something else entirely.

There are several essential exceptions in migration research, in which new concepts are elaborated, and which draw on Bourdieu’s theoretical insights. The first one builds on Bourdieu’s work to study cultural practices of Lebanese and their descendants in Australia (Tabar et al., 2010). Instead of an “ethnic community”, the authors use the concept of “ethnic field,” which is “a structured and a structuring reality which refers to a designated ensemble of relations” (p. 16). This study serves as an excellent example of how the migrant community can be studied as a field, in a
meaning based on Bourdieu’s field theory. My research has many intersections with this work, in the analytical part in which it remains within the framework of Bourdieu’s explanatory model. There it shows how an understanding of the community based on the concept of a field allows one to study power relations among community leaders, and how agents and migrant institutions form a network of a dynamic relationship that challenges how a migrant culture should be represented.

The second exception is a transnational social field approach to the study of migration, in which the field also refers to Bourdieu’s concept (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2006; Glick Schiller, 2005; Glick Schiller et al., 1992). The field is seen as a space in which the participants are included in the struggle for power, “which are composed of networks that link individuals to institutions in more than one state” (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2006, p. 26; Glick Schiller, 2012). Moreover, these networks are not just social relations but hierarchical transnational relations, from the perspective of power, because they are connected with various social and financial state institutions located in different countries but which are also included in power relations over national states’ borders. In the context of this perspective, migration research is criticized for deploying an “ethnic lens,” that is, when an ethnic group or a “transnational community” is considered as a unit of study or analysis (Glick Schiller, 2012). This is related to methodological nationalism in migration research, which manifests itself in the tendency to study what happens within a nation state, assuming that a migrant group differs from other state’s members in sharing a common history, identities, and other features (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2006). As part of this approach, Nina Glick Schiller also criticizes migration studies for the ethnic association fetish (Glick Schiller, 2012). She suggests that migration studies in some cases:

reduce the study of migrant identity and sociability to the study of so-called immigrant communities and reduce the topic further to a study of immigrant associations (p. 30).

This leads to the fact that a number of studies describe migrants as separate communities from local residents and who form predominantly ethnic ties. She argues that public policy based on these insights reproduces the ideas that migrants are culturally different, and that an effective way to work with them is through organization leaders who represent them. Meanwhile, organizations often represent not all migrants, but, for example, only those who have an orientation towards inclusion in ethnic networks.

For this transnational social field approach, the transnational dimension is significant, so the social field is a transnational social field, and instead of the ethnic lens, it is proposed to use a
transnational lens. Tabar (2020, p. 457) in another work, developing diaspora-specific field perspective for the study of diasporic groups, writes that:

whereas Glick Schiller et al. (1992) show the tendency of migration studies to suffer from the bias of methodological nationalism, we contend that another form of methodological bias afflicts the study of diasporic processes when viewed within a broad transnational framework – a bias that erroneously downplays, among other things, the role of the nation-state with which the diaspora builds its connections.

Other studies demonstrate that investigating the local level of the city and country, in order to explore migrants’ networks, identity and processes which relate to their everyday life, should not be underestimated. For example, a study of the Russian-speaking migrant market in Germany shows that the migrant services are state-related (Sommer, 2020). It is concluded that transnational social capital is irrelevant for most former Soviet Union migrant businesses, and business relationships outside the country-based community are minimal. The experience of Russian migrants in London and Amsterdam in the late 1990s – early 2000s demonstrates that their identity and community ideas are not considerably affected by “transnationalism” and “deterritorialization” (Kopnina, 2005, p. 207).

In my research, defining a community as a field of cultural production, I employ this concept closely to how Bourdieu conceptualised and used it. In his works, he did not limit the applicability of the field concept only to the national-state context. As Sapiro (2018, p. 161) writes about it:

The boundaries of fields are related to the process of differentiation and specialization of activities, as well as to geographic bodies, but these boundaries are not given, they evolve over time and are constantly reconsidered and challenged. Consequently, it is up to the scholar to define the relevant perimeters of a field.

In particular, my research shows that the local, not the transnational, dimension is crucial in understanding the Russian-speaking migrant community in Perth. Besides, I argue that, while describing communities through the concepts of field, it is essential, at the very least, to take into consideration how much their relationships are horizontal or vertical. When defining a community through communication, practice, or otherwise, using Bourdieu’s theory, it is necessary to consider how members’ social positions can affect relationships within the community. Studying the migrants of Madrid and Perth, I drew attention to the fact that community members are included
in the competition for the right to speak on behalf of the community and to produce a legitimate culture. This network of relationships includes, along with agents, various migrant institutions. Therefore, in the next section, I will provide a critical review of the literature, which highlights the relationships between communities and organizations.

2.2 Migration research: communities and institutions

In the framework of migration studies, the focus on migrant institutions and their role in various aspects of the life of migrants is a long-standing and traditional consideration. According to the classic definition of Robert Park (R. E. Park, 1925), “a community is not only a collection of people, but it is a collection of institutions” (p. 674). From his point of view, institutions are the key feature that distinguishes communities from other groups and entities of people. Park understands institutions quite widely: they are composed not only of educational, religious, and other formal organizations, but also constitute informal spaces for social interaction, such as playgrounds, as well as various kinds of enterprises, including businesses. Subsequent studies have shown that migrants can form a community without institutions (Breton, 1964; Markowitz, 1992). Communities can consist of informal networks of interpersonal relations, and the amount of formal community organizations and their complexity can vary significantly from community to community (Breton, 1964). In addition, the cultural turn, as shown above, leads to the fact that for many years the concept of the community as a socio-symbolic phenomenon dominated, which led to the loss of certain dimensions of community, including those associated with institutions but also with social relationships (Delanty, 2018).

At present, in the dominant approaches and trends, migrant institutions are not considered to be a structure-forming and integral component of migrant communities. One of the exceptions is the direction developed within the “civic community perspective” which is based on Putnam’s ideas that a civil community is built on voluntary cooperation, formed as a result of participation in secondary associations (Putnam et al., 1993; van Heelsum, 2002). Putnam et al. operationalize the concept of “civic-ness” of regional life or civic sociability as the incidence of mass media readership and the number of secondary associations including sport clubs, different types of cultural and leisure organizations, etc. In developing these ideas, a civic ethnic community is defined as “a set of interrelated ethic organizations” (Fennema, 2004; Fennema & Tillie, 2001), which are viewed as aiming to achieve common goals and interests of community representatives and which contribute to generate and maintain social trust. The latter is facilitated by horizontal
connections between organizations that allow information to circulate. More connections between organizations and their density contribute to the formation and maintenance of social cohesion. Thus, within this research perspective, the formation of the availability of a dense horizontal network of social organizations leads to various positive consequences for community members, such as social trust.

Using the example of Russian-speaking communities, I show that this perspective has a number of limitations. Firstly, it is debatable as to what can be considered as a horizontal network of organizations. I argue that a consideration of their interaction in the context of Bourdieu’s field theory (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b) allows us to see that the horizontal system of ties is the relations of competition and the struggle for access to various resources and for achieving legitimacy. Secondly, it seems to be uncritical that some goals and interests of community representatives are described and analyzed as common for most community members. I demonstrate that the way community goals and interests are formulated at a certain point in time reflects the views of those who take leading positions in this field and represent the community, but at another point in time, other leaders can take their place and reconsider what are common goals and interests of the community. In other words, the discourse focuses on the needs of migrants; the functions of organizations depend on those who construct them, but who construct them depends on who are the leaders of the community, considered as legitimate representatives of the community, and, using the ideas of Bourdieu, who wins in this social game. In addition to this, this system of interconnection between organizations can lead not to trust formation but to the exact opposite effect, which is distrust between community members. Community building can be based on distrust and conflicts, and these can then lead to the formation of new organizations.

Other significant research directions that raise the issue of the relationship between migrant communities and institutions include migrant organizations’ (MOs) and migrant entrepreneurship research. The first group, MOs research, comprises works focusing on the study of migrant organizations, including ones not referring to communities as a central point (Babis, 2016b; Halm & Sezgin, 2012; Moya, 2005; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). In a broad sense, the first group of works examines non-profit organizations such as voluntary associations or secondary organizations, “founded by immigrants at all stages of immigration, with the purpose of serving mainly the immigrant group itself” (Babis, 2016a, 2016b, p.359), whereas the latter, migrant entrepreneurship research is focused on commercial organizations. This division is partly related
to the shared beliefs that these organizations have significant differences in their goals, including the idea that the non-profit sector, unlike the commercial sector, is more related to the cultural, religious, and other social needs of migrants and towards assistance of their adaptation and other positive roles.

A popular focus of research on MOs is on their positive functions and the role they play in the lives of migrants, for migrant communities, their countries of residence, and of origin (Halm & Sezgin, 2012; Jardim & Da Silva, 2019; Marzana et al., 2020). Organizations are often described as structures that migrants set up to fulfill their own needs, solve specific problems, represent their and their community interests, and create and maintain collective identity (Babis, 2016b; Halm & Sezgin, 2012; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). Simultaneously, the studies analyzing the conditions under which new MOs are founded, maintained, and evolve over time show that the numbers of existing organizations, developmental features, and the purpose, character, effectiveness of them can be different at different periods, and this depends on many factors (Babis, 2016b; Pirkkalainen et al., 2013; Vermeulen, 2005). Among the most important are the local opportunity structure, different migrant group characteristics, and home country characteristics (Babis, 2016b; Vermeulen, 2005). Babis also highlights the “gaps vis-à-vis the host society” factor as related to differences in language, culture, religion, and customs between migrants and residents of the host country. For example, these gaps can lead to the emergence of new religious institutions of migrants. Thus, within this MOs research direction, the organization’s activities are again described as reflecting the “real” needs of migrants, and the studies tend not to focus on the important question of what actually comprises the migrants’ culture, and on what kind of organizations appear in heterogeneous communities from the perspective of the main language used at home, religion, etc.

Although in many studies the leaders of organizations are interviewed as participants, very few works focus on their roles in developing migrant organizations, and what these are. Nevertheless, a number of studies have shown that leaders can play an essential role in these processes (Pirkkalainen et al., 2013; Vermeulen, 2005; Wijers, 2013). For example, the Afro-Surinamese organizational pattern at a certain point in time in the past was largely determined by informal leaders who held these positions due to their ability to find funding for organizations and members (Vermeulen, 2005). The development path of the Somali associations in Italy and Finland was influenced not only by the political opportunity structures of the country but also by the
characteristics of the leaders of organizations, their ability to interact productively with migrant communities, and the institutions of their country of residence (Pirkkalainen et al., 2013).

Migrant entrepreneurship research deals with people’s entrepreneurial activities and, therefore, considers business organizations and other institutions related to entrepreneurship as special ones that play a particular role in the life of migrants (Barberis & Solano, 2018; Dheer, 2018; Ram et al., 2017). Despite the fact that this research area is very developed, very few works analyse the relationship between migrant businesses and migrant communities (Gao, 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Schuch & Wang, 2015; Zhou & Cho, 2010). One of the critical studies, in which the model of the relationship of ethnic entrepreneurship with community building was proposed, was carried out within the framework of studies of enclave economy, which is a type of ethnic economy bounded by ethnic neighbourhood and coethnic relationship (Zhou & Cho, 2010). According to this conceptual framework, ethnic local businesses contribute to the development of local ethnic social structures, which in turn leads to the formation of social spaces in which people interact and form social networks. Local social structures are referred to:

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\text{all observable establishments that are located in a spatially bounded neighborhood, ranging from social service and human service organizations, civic organizations, and religious organizations to ethnic organizations (family, kin, clan, or hometown associations and mutual aid societies; professional associations; and homeland high school or college alumni associations) (p. 90).}
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Thus, it was shown that community-based business institutions’ development has non-economic effects, since it contributes to the formation of socio-cultural organizations, participation in which leads to strengthening social ties and ethnic closure.

This research perspective on the relationship between institutions and communities has several special features that allow us to better understand what the distinctive features of cases of Russian-speaking migrants are, and why they require a different framework for analysis. Firstly, the difference between business and non-profit organizations is important for this framework. It is entrepreneurship that entails the formation of the various institutions and ethnic businesses which contribute to the development of ethnic social structures. In the case of Russian-speaking migrants, the organization’s status may be associated with national structural capabilities. For example, community language schools in Australia are registered as non-profit organizations and as cultural centers that receive support from the government. There is no such possibility in Madrid, and
educational centers there that perform the same functions are registered as commercial organizations, although they may exist without making any profit. In addition, a methodological framework based on Bourdieu’s theory makes it possible to de-emphasize the differences between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. Institutions and agents are involved in the social game in which stakes may not be economical but symbolic. While within the ethnic entrepreneurship framework, business leads to a high degree of institutional completeness of sociocultural organization, in Russian-speaking communities high institutional completeness is associated with entirely different processes. Institutionalization is mainly a result of a power relationship. The small size of communities leads to a lack of opportunity for the development of ethnic business, but at the same time, there may be many organizations that can bring symbolic profits. In addition, I show that organizations should be considered not in isolation from, but as part of, the community. In the case of small dispersed groups of migrants, the formation of social interactions occurs when based on organizations, but without organizations, migrants generally form only small networks of friends.

Despite these differences, the definition of “organization” that Zhou and Cho (2010) provide is the one I use in my research:

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\text{We use ‘institution’ and ‘organization’ interchangeably to refer to registered (formal) and nonregistered (informal) establishments. For example, we view community centers, churches, and nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs) as local institutions the same way we do restaurants, doctors’ offices, travel agencies, banks, and tutoring centers (p. 95).}
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3. Conclusion
In migration research, Bourdieu’s theory has become very popular for explaining various phenomena and processes. His concepts began to be used outside the context of his explanatory model, in which power relations and inequality are one of the key focuses. On the one hand, in the first part of the chapter, I show how Elias’s theory makes it possible to study the characteristics of migrants manifested in everyday life, which are formed as a result of long-term social processes and which are difficult to explain in the context of power relations. On the other hand, in the second part, I demonstrate that Bourdieu’s theory is well suited for studying the processes in some migrant communities, precisely because it allows one to take into account the power relations in which the
leaders of the communities and community institutions are included. The two parts of this chapter form theoretical contexts for the study of cultural (dis)continuity processes, firstly in the everyday life of migrants and secondly, in the migrant community.

The concept of national habitus as an umbrella term allows one to focus on dynamic shared national characteristics, to study their emergence and transformation mechanisms, and to focus on everyday life, paying attention to routine practices that often fall outside the scope of research interest. Elias’s work *The Civilizing Process* gained more popularity than *The Germans*, in which he uses his study of Germany to show how socio-historical processes can explain problems experienced by the modern group. I show how this theoretical framework can be used to study the USSR and the post-Soviet space, as well as the characteristics of its inhabitants. In the next section, Part 2, I will dwell on these processes in more detail and show how cultural habitus is negotiated in the daily life of migrants in a new environment. In addition, in the last analytical Chapter 10, I will again use Elias’s ideas to describe the migrants’ characteristics of identity and unbelonging to community.

I propose a conceptual framework of the study of a small dispersed community of migrants based on the Bourdieusian field theory (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b). I draw on the concept of field of cultural production to conceptualise “community,” which can be defined as a structured social space constituted by social relations between migrants and migrant institutions that are in a situation of permanent competition for specific stakes. “Community” is a contested concept and there are many different definitions of it. However, the studies of community and migrant organizations overlook the important role of struggle and power relations in community, and even when they use the Bourdieusian ideas they mostly miss Bourdieu’s points on this.

In the framework of studies of migrant organizations, there is a tradition of separating profit and non-profit organizations. The latter are often considered as establishments that are created to defend the interests of migrants and to maintain migrant culture and identity, thus they consider the migrant culture as something that migrants have brought with them from their home countries. Based on Bourdieu’s ideas, I show that what can be represented as needs of migrants and migrant heritage depends on who plays the role of cultural producers in the community, which can be considered as ideology that is constantly disputed. There are some similarities with Rogers Brubaker’s (2004b) reflection on nationalism, as described in Chapter 1. I try to use the same logic to explain how we can study migrant culture, focusing on community leaders and migrant
institutions. In Part 3, I will use the concept of cultural production dilemmas, which is developed within the framework of these Bourdieusian ideas, to describe the processes of cultural production within the community.

The following Part 2 includes four analytical chapters devoted to studying national or cultural habitus and cultural continuity dilemmas through the framework of Elias’s theory and within everyday multiculturalism perspective.
PART 2
PART 2. CULTURAL CONTINUITY DILEMMAS: NEGOTIATION OF CULTURAL HABITUS

Part Two of this thesis comprises four chapters that deal with cultural continuity and discontinuity in migrant everyday life through the examples of the reproduction and transformation of child-rearing practices. Many studies on migrant parenting first describe their characteristics and then explain how they change in the process of migration experience (Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Nesteruk & Marks, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2014). My narrative has the same logic, but for describing cultural characteristics and their formation, I use the theory of Elias and his concept of habitus, and for explaining the changes in the habitual characteristics as a result of living in diversity, I develop the concept of cultural continuity dilemma. The conceptualization of the notion of cultural continuity dilemma within the perspective of everyday multiculturalism (Wise & Velayutham, 2009b) was described in the Introduction, and allows me to explain how certain dispositions and practices formed during long-term socio-historical processes, and called habitus, play an important role in how “social actors experience and negotiate cultural difference” (p. 3).

This part begins with Chapter 4, in which I present a literary debate on parenting practices and then show how, in a new cultural environment, certain practices and beliefs begin to be understood by migrants as cultural characteristics when they are faced with the realization that non-Russian-speaking parents in certain situations behave differently. I also show how these child-rearing practices and beliefs relate to parenting style and are a part of the cultural habitus, which I explore in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In these two chapters, I illustrate how some of the attitudes and practices of modern migrants were constructed during the formation of the Soviet and Post-Soviet states, and describe the broad socio-political context in which this happened. Using the example of the formation of hygiene, child-care and other standards and the role of educational organizations as habitus-shaping institutions, I argue that these are the standards and practices that modern Russian-speaking migrants try to (dis)/continue and or transmit to their children, or to at least attempt to create conditions for them that would meet these standards. Chapter 5 is devoted to the description of civilizing and habitus-shaping processes in the USSR. Chapter 6 explores why and how conceptions of upbringing and management of children have been developed, focusing more on the present, including a discussion of how modern migrants reproduce some of the ideas of these concepts and practices that meet existing standards and norms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I apply the concept of cultural continuity dilemmas to show how practices change, that is, I describe the processes of cultural continuity and discontinuity in everyday life.
Chapter 4. Child-rearing styles, practices, and beliefs of Russian-speaking migrants

Introduction

Interviewer: In your opinion, is there a difference between Russian-speaking parents and Australians?

Nina: In some aspects of upbringing.

Interviewer: Well, in which ones?

Arina: We are more controlling.

Nina: No, we are more, how to say ... Yes, it is probably control. But it is expressed not in the fact that we want to control our children, but in the fact that we worry more about them, we care.

... Tanya: “Dress warmly” – we [Russian-speakers] have it.

Nina: Hats. Well, the children’s hats, of course, we already ... I already let many of them go, but still not all. That is, slippers, for example, to dress her at home, this is every five minutes: “Katya, put on your slippers. Katya, put on your slippers.” ... Yesterday we, for example, before going to school; not, the day before yesterday, on Friday. [The daughter said:] “I won’t wear tights, and that’s it.” She wears socks in such a coldness! [She said:] “Everyone is wearing socks [in the school]; I won’t wear tights.” I say: “You’re going to get sick” (respondents in Australia).

In this chapter, the notion of cultural habitus applies precisely to the example of parenting practices and beliefs, which makes it possible to place this concept in the context of the discussion regarding the nature of parenting and its adjustment to a new context. In this study, I use the concept of “child-rearing practices” or “parenting practices” in the sense suggested by Darling and Steinberg’s (1993) defining practices. They distinguish between the concepts of “values and goals,” “parenting practices,” and “parenting styles.” The parents’ values and goals of socializing their children are important determinants of parental behaviour. They wrote that:

socialization goals include both the child’s acquisition of specific skills and behaviors (e.g., appropriate manners, social skills ...) and the child’s development of more global qualities (e.g., ... critical thinking, independence)” (p. 492).

Parenting practices are described as “behaviours defined by specific content and socialization goals” (Darling, Steinberg, 1993, p. 492). Examples of parenting practices include both the
management and punishment of children’s behaviour, dress, and comportment. The authors define parenting style as:

*a constellation of attitudes toward the child that are communicated to the child and create an emotional climate in which the parent’s behaviours* [encompassing both parenting practices and aspects of the behaviours which are not goal directed or goal defined such as tone of voice] *are expressed* (Darling & Steinberg, 1993, p. 493).

Thus, parenting style provides the emotional climate in which the child grows, and moderates the efficacy of parenting practices to reach the goals. Parenting styles do not depend on the content of parental behaviour and of child-rearing context. For example, authoritative parents (Baumrind, 1967, 1971, 2005) can use different practices to achieve effective implementation of home tasks: some parents may believe that children should perform them before children’s rest, but others – after. For another example, authoritative and authoritarian parents can use the same practices, but the climate in which they are used can be different. The style or climate difference lies, for example, in how parents are demanding and controlling, how they are responsive, “warm,” and supportive of children’s autonomy.

In this work, when I write about the migrants’ reflections in relation to parenting style, I have in mind their perception of such stylistic features as manifested in parental behaviour towards a child, such as strictness, relaxation, excessive control, caring, friendliness, and other features that can emotionally tinge the same practices in different ways. In the conversation with Nina, Arina and Tanya, quoted above, describing the differences between Australian and Russian-speaking parents, Arina and Nina start with cultural styles’ features: “*we are more controlling; we worry more.*” To explain when these stylistic features occur, they then cite typical examples of parenting styles and practices, one of which concerns taking care of health. Nina moved to Australia from Armenia with her husband and one-year-old daughter fourteen years before the time of this interview. And for fourteen years, she has continued her attempts to teach her daughter to follow specific standards. She uses directives to influence her daughter’s behaviour: “*Put on your slippers.*” From the perspective of parenting style characteristics, this directive can represent controlling attitudes and limited autonomy support. However, such a directive expresses not only the parent’s demanding style of achieving goals but also internalized norms, standards, and the emotions felt by parents when observing their children violate these. The demanding response is associated with
fears for the child’s health, which the parents report as not being shared by other parents who come from a social environment with different norms (namely, “Australian” parents).

I use the concept of child-rearing or parenting approach in describing and explaining my data when discussing a set of socialization goals, and/or practices, and/or stylistic features, and also when considering those shared cultural norms and standards (beliefs) that can influence both the content and perception of the three previous ones. For example, parents in different countries may have similar goals of socialization, such as appropriate manners and health care skills, but the difference will be in their beliefs about which manners are considered appropriate and what behaviours of the child are considered to be dangerous to the child’s health (for example, not wearing slippers in winter). I also use Elias’s (Elias, 1996, 2000b) concepts to refer to practices and beliefs: the standard of conduct of behaviour, behaviour patterns, codes of conduct, and habits. One of the objectives of this chapter is to show how the perception of cultural difference, forming after migration, influences the self-reflection about one’s parenting style and how it relates to certain parenting practices and beliefs, which, as I argue, can be considered part of the cultural habitus in Elias’s sense.

This chapter is divided into three sections. It begins with a literature review on child-rearing practices, styles, and approaches. In the second section, I show how, due to the migration experience, migrants develop an awareness of how their parenting practices and beliefs reflect cultural characteristics or habitus, which they had once considered global and universal. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the perception of parenting styles is usually associated with the reproduction of specific codes of conduct, revealing how cultural habits are transmitted and continued.

1. Child-rearing styles and practices: literature debate

Child-rearing practices have been studied from different theoretical positions and perspectives. On the one hand, there is a discussion on the conceptualization and operationalization of parenting practices, styles, approaches and on the consequences on a child’s development and life chances (Baumrind, 1967, 1971; Darling & Steinberg, 1993; Lareau, 2003, 2011; Spera, 2005). On the other hand, the researchers discuss the reasons for the existing variety of child-rearing practices, styles, and approaches in terms of class (Lareau, 2002, 2003, 2011; Weininger & Lareau, 2009).
ethnic and national characteristics (Kremer-Sadlik et al., 2010; Kremer-Sadlik & Fatigante, 2015; Lee & Kao, 2009), structural constraints (Bennett et al., 2012; Chin & Phillips, 2004) and more.

A considerable contribution to this debate on the variety and determinants of the child-rearing practices has been made by Annette Lareau, who distinguishes two child-rearing approaches: “concerted cultivation,” which is more common among middle class parents, and “accomplishment of natural growth,” which is more common for parents from poor and working-class families (Lareau, 2003, 2011). She describes how certain class-specific features of child-rearing, such as the organization of children’s daily lives, language use, and the ways parents interact with institutions, contribute to the formation of certain cognitive characteristics in children, as well as the acquisition of skills, which lead to successful life trajectories. Implementation of the concerted cultivation approach suggests that parents consider the development of a child through organized activities as an important component of child-rearing. In contrast, children from families that implement the accomplishment of the natural growth approach are mostly engaged in unstructured leisure activities (watching TV, inventing themselves what to do), initiated by the children, and carried out without adults’ participation. Poor and working-class parents care about their children’s safety but pay less attention to the quality of the content of their children’s leisure than do middle-class parents. Differences are observed not only in the number of structured activities attended by children from different classes but also in parental beliefs about the benefits and consequences of such organized activities and in the desired outcomes for the children (Lareau, 2002; Weininger & Lareau, 2009). Lareau considers that middle-class parents encourage various talents and skills in their children and share beliefs about the benefits of structured activities for their overall development. Methodologically she relies on the works of Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1996; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990), and one of the crucial conclusions she makes is that parents, through these class-specific features of child-rearing, contribute to the formation of habitus, understood within Bourdieu’s theory as a set of interiorized dispositions (Lareau 2003, p. 276). Thus, on the one hand, children from different classes socialize in various conditions and acquire different experiences, and, on the other hand, these conditions contribute to the formation of certain cognitive features and the acquisition of skills that determine the success of life trajectories.

Other studies have analysed various parenting practices in conjunction with other theoretical positions and take into account other factors. For example, Pamela Bennett and colleagues explain differences in children’s organized activities with regard to the structural constraints faced by
working-class parents (Bennett et al., 2012). They argue that the fact that working-class children attend fewer classes than middle-class children in their study can be explained by the number of extra-curricular and after-school activities provided by schools and which are available in their area, rather than the cultural logics of parents. Comparative research of middle-class parents’ practices and attitudes in the United States and Italy indicated differences in the parental approaches (Kremer-Sadlik et al., 2010; Kremer-Sadlik & Fatigante, 2015). In particular, researchers have identified two types of childhood ideologies that are related to parents’ views of child development as described by Halldén (1991): the child as a “project” and the child as a “being.” US parents share the ideas of the first type and consider childhood as a period of preparation for adult life, whereas Italian parents consider it as a period of freedom (Kremer-Sadlik & Fatigante, 2015). Researchers believe that the identified differences are rooted in a local and socio-cultural context. For example, in Italy, a child’s success in life may depend more on the family’s social status than on his/her educational achievements. Therefore, Italian parents may consider their role in the child’s homework activities as not being so crucial for his/her future trajectory, in comparison with parents from the US, who practice “concerted cultivation” parenting.

In addition to these discussions, psychological studies of parental practices have been developed (Chen et al., 2012; Fibbi & Truong, 2015; J.-H. Park & Kwon, 2009) in which the research of Diana Baumrind has played a crucial role (Baumrind, 1967, 1971). She studied American middle-class families and identified three parenting styles based on two dimensions: responsiveness and demandingness (Baumrind, 2005). Demandingness reflects the desire of the parents to integrate the children into society, to socialize them, whereas responsiveness refers to the promotion by the parents of the children’s individuality and their desires. Demandingness becomes apparent in the control of the child’s behaviour, in the supervision of his/ her activities, while responsiveness consists of the parents yielding to the children’s requests, supporting them, and making them adaptable. She identified three child-rearing styles. A high level of demandingness and a high level of responsiveness characterizes an authoritative parenting style, an authoritarian style signals a high level of demandingness and a low level of responsiveness, and a permissive style denotes a low level of demandingness and a moderately high level of responsiveness. Subsequently an indulgent style has been added, and this is characterized by a low level of both dimensions (Spera, 2005). An important result of studies using this theoretical framework has been to reveal the positive impact of an authoritative parenting style on various aspects of children’s lives possibly
leading to academic success, well-being, and other outcomes (Driscoll et al., 2008; Steinberg et al., 1992).

In migration studies, researchers point to the presence of specific features in the child-rearing practices of migrant parents and the role of the community in the child-rearing processes. The concept of social capital as proposed by James Coleman helps to highlight how the social resources of families and communities can compensate for a lack of education, professional skills, and material resources: such resources include a set of shared norms and values, attitudes, ties (friends, relatives) between people (Coleman, 2001). Min Zhou and Carl L. Bankston III (1994) revealed that Vietnamese students, who adhered to traditional family values and who were integrated into their migrant communities, studied better than local peers from the same school and, in contrast to those, were focused on achieving high educational qualifications. However, these studies do not explain how these traditional family values and practices were formed.

This issue of the cultural uniqueness of “Asian” parenting has caused a heated separate debate (Chao, 1994, 2000; Chen et al., 2012; Juang et al., 2013; Watkins et al., 2017). The research devoted to the analysis of the relationship between child-rearing styles and practices and the academic success of Asian children, applying the Baumrind theory, plays a central role in this debate. These studies have revealed that this framework cannot explain the patterns found in Asian families. Asian students from families with parenting styles described as controlling and authoritarian received high grades in school compared to their peers (Dornbusch et al., 1987; Steinberg et al., 1992). This paradox shows the limitations of this framework in explaining child-rearing in immigrant families, which may have their own cultural characteristics that are not considered by Baumrind’s concepts. Chao (1994) proposes the notion of “training,” which characterizes an alternative parenting style used by Chinese mothers and explained by Confucian tradition. In contrast to the authoritarian style, the standards of behaviour and dispositions determined by this style, both existing in society and enforced by parents, are associated with a particular culture of love and care, and the formation of harmonious relationships with others.

Another popular term used to describe the cultural characteristics of parenting in Asian families is “Tiger mother” or “Tiger parenting,” which is described as harsh, demanding, controlling, and emotionally unsupportive. Parents who exhibit this parenting style have high demands on school performance, are highly restrictive of their children’s extra-curricular activities, and provide the child with less emotional support (Lui, 2020). Training parenting style and Tiger parenting have
many points of commonality, but the important differences are that, unlike training which “represents an ideology that typically is applied to all Chinese parents,” Tiger parenting describes a subtype of style of a specific group, whose behaviour has negative features, such as hostility (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 1119). This reductionist view of the peculiarities of upbringing in Asian families is criticized for its monolithic and essentialist character, which tends to overlook the fact that in Asian-heritage families, parents also show love and care for their children and try to find compromises, in order to facilitate adherence to the rules (Juang et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014; Watkins et al., 2017). The Tiger parenting associated with “negative” Asian parenting practices is contrasted with the notion of “helicopter parenting” as a distinct form of control, which has come to be used to describe the parenting style of those middle-class parents in Western culture who are over-involved in the lives of their offspring (Kwon et al., 2017; Padilla-Walker & Nelson, 2012). In contrast to Tiger parenting, helicopter parenting is related to such positive aspects of parent-child relationships as, for example, providing the child with high emotional support.

It is not easy to make generalizations about the studies that concern the parenting practices of Russian-speaking migrants since they have a different research focus and are aimed at studying different groups, both ethnic and social. For example, in Israel, Russian-Jewish middle-class parents who emigrated from the USSR and the post-Soviet space have been studied. The practices of the former USSR immigrants in Israel are often analyzed through lenses that take into account their ethnic identity or class (Golden et al., 2018; Rapoport & Lomsky-Feder, 2002). Meanwhile, an analysis of the literature on Russian-speaking parents in different countries reveals some interesting patterns. Many researchers argue that their parenting style is characterized by increased control, and in the case of Russian – Israeli parents, it is described as demanding and generally authoritarian (Golden et al., 2018; Jurcik et al., 2013; Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013). The parents themselves also describe the parental style of people from the post-Soviet space as stricter, authoritarian, and emphasizing the importance of control (Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Nesteruk & Marks, 2011). Russian-speaking migrants perceive the parenting style of native-born parents in America and Israel as “too relaxed,” but at the same time, the parents themselves try to adopt a less strict parenting style after the migration (Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Nesteruk & Marks, 2011; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013). Russian-speaking migrants’ parenting practices in different countries have been identified as characterised by teaching their children good manners, and by ensuring that children fulfill various domestic duties and obligations (Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Remennick, 2009; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013). In many studies, these features in parenting dispositions or practices are often explained with
reference to the Soviet past, both by researchers and parents (Golden et al., 2018; Jurcik et al., 2013; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013).

The different types of parenting raise the question of how culture matters in children’s upbringing, and how the development of different types of child-rearing practices and styles can be explained. Elias’s theory (1996, 1996, 1998) can be used as a theoretical framework to analyze the child-rearing practice of modern migrants. Parent-child relationships play an important role in his works. He writes that parenting styles and practices change during the historical development of specific countries and acquire their own specific national features. For example, by describing the peculiarities of the German habitus, he gives the following example:

*It is widely said – and observation confirms this – that the Dutch allow their children more freedom than do the Germans. As Germans would put it, Dutch children are naughtier*” (Elias, 1996, p. 12).

In a very similar way, Russian-speaking migrants describe the behaviour of Spanish and Australian parents, who, in their opinion, allow their children more freedom than they do. Elias explains the differences in practices, values, attitudes, and feelings by the fact that in different countries various models of behaviour and obedience are internalized and spread in the course of historical processes. For example, in Germany norms of the military nobility became widespread, in contrast to Holland, where norms of urban merchant patricians dominated. This, argues Elias, helps to explain the stricter German parenting styles to the Dutch.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I will show that in the USSR, the formation and transformation of standards of behaviour occurred in the process of building the Soviet State, during which a certain set of values and norms were standardized, distributed, and regulated, and which also formed a certain cultural habitus. Furthermore, parent-child relationships are described in the works of Elias within the context of understanding civilizing processes, during which they have taken different forms in many respects from relationships of previous periods (Elias, 1998, 2000b). Certain standards of conduct, which in the past were introduced from above, through external coercion, began to be transmitted by parents to their children through their habits and behaviour patterns and parenting practices, which can manifest themselves unconsciously and automatically. The period of early socialization is precisely the stage when children learn many of the rules and norms characteristic of a particular society. Studying how adults rear their children enables one to understand the system of norms and rules that people internalize, and which may have national specificities. Elias
(2000b) believes that “differences in the kind and stage of a civilizing process” may explain the fact that members of certain social groups may be perceived as “younger” or “older” (p. xi). Russian-speaking migrants are an illustrative example who find themselves to be carriers of a particular “civilized” standard of behaviour in societies that they are used to considering more “civilized.”

Literature concerning differences in parenting practices between various social groups often focuses on those that relate to life chances, to opportunities or limitations for upward social mobility, or to children’s physical well-being. Lareau’s theory (2003, 2011), which is based on the ideas of Bourdieu, describes the formation of two approaches of parenting that contribute to the reproduction of a specific habitus in the children of the middle and working classes, which are associated with the reproduction of social inequality. Parenting styles introduced by Baumrind (Baumrind, 1967, 1971) are also often described in the context of their consequences with regard to life chances and the child’s well-being. One of the debates unfolding around the cultural uniqueness of “Asian” parenting is also related to its social mobility consequences for the child (Chao, 1994, 2000; Chen et al., 2012; Juang et al., 2013; Watkins et al., 2017). The hygiene and health-related practices and norms of behaviour in public space are characteristics of Russian migrant parents which do not directly relate to the achievement of certain social positions, but they can act as critical cultural characteristics that construct and maintain social boundaries between groups. Moreover, they can determine other diverse forms of behaviour and even underlie important life decisions, such as the choice of an educational institution for a child. While Lareau’s theory (2003, 2011) explains differences formed in families of different classes, Elias’s framework makes it possible to reveal the peculiarities which have formed in distinct cultural contexts. Previously perceived as universal norms and standards, in the new host society environment they become overtly visible and begin to be constructed as cultural features, as will be shown in the next section.

2. Awareness of cultural differences

Migrants were unaware of cultural variability in certain practices, feelings and dispositions before the migration experience, since they were experienced as “second nature.” Many of the examples I focus on in this and the next chapters relate to behaviours that evoke emotional reactions, such as embarrassment, unpleasantness, anxiety, etc. Through familiarity with situations loaded with such feelings, people have learned what arouses them from early childhood (Elias, 1996, 2000b).
In adulthood, such an emotional reaction occurs automatically in similar circumstances, when behaviour does not correspond to internalized social prohibitions. These processes go hand in hand with the rational explanation why people need to comply with these standards.

In a different social environment, as in the context of migration, in which other norms are prevalent, many previously unconscious features become overtly visible and comprehended as culturally distinctive. It can be quite difficult to rationally explain why people in another country do not follow the usual standards of what the migrants considers to be civilized and safe behaviour. Migrants describe their first experience with someone’s behaviour which broke their acquired norms as being a shock. For instance, one respondent was struck when, immediately after arriving at the airport, she saw a child crawling on the “dirty” floor next to carefree parents who seemed to see no danger in this. Another respondent describes how she was shocked by certain practices to warming children in Australia: “Mothers are in boots and hats, but their child is barefoot. We have seen this a lot of times. It was a shock. Now we are already used to this.”

This first experience is often gained in public places or in the family in the case of mixed marriages. Unusual conditions and standards maintained in kindergartens and schools in the host country can be perceived as very frightening when they directly relate to their own children. Another example of such a situation is from a dialogue with a respondent and her mother who came to Australia to live with her daughter’s family for several months. The mother tells me about her experience of spending time with her two grandchildren and daughter’s German husband in a public place in Perth:

**Mother:** Well, there are drinking fountains, such water ones. They [grandchildren] come up and turn on the fountain and start splashing. But people are calmly going by. But if it had happened in our place, they would have got a scolding for it. It is not allowed to do this in our place, right?

**Respondent:** And even strangers would have scolded them.

**Mother:** He could splash up. He was wet himself from head to foot, it has been going on for fifteen, twenty minutes in this way. They would have immediately received a scolding for this in our place, but here – I did nothing and controlled myself. And the father said: “It’s okay, but what is there, what’s the big deal?” Well, since the father said that this is normal, I naturally tried not to reprove them.
For the grandmother who first encountered such a calm reaction to children’s noisy behaviour, this experience was an illustration of cultural differences that she had not previously suspected. “I did nothing and controlled myself” demonstrates how difficult it was for her to restrain herself and not react to the behaviour of her grandchildren. The first encounter with such examples causes shock and misunderstanding, but also internal discomfort associated with fear of sanctions for violation of generally accepted norms, as well as anxiety for the child’s health in the case of, for example, violation of hygiene standards. Fear of admonition or condemnation from bystanders is often mentioned to explain the reasons for the feelings. I dwell on these mechanisms of public control in more detail in Chapter 7 (2.2). In the next section, I will show how the perception of difference influences self-reflection about one’s parenting style and how it relates to cultural practices and beliefs.

3. Child-rearing styles and practices

Through their migration experience, the majority of respondents in both countries came to perceive their child-rearing styles and practices as having been conditioned by culture from the post-Soviet space and as being distinct from those employed in Spain and Australia. Prior to migration, they perceived these same styles and practices as normal and generalized. Post migration, they perceived important features of child-rearing styles of Russian-speaking women as including the careful supervision of children’s behaviour, covering different areas of life, and a high level of parental control over the observance of rules and norms, accompanied by disciplinary instructions:

*We have a lot of restrictions. We have a very restrained upbringing; we restrain the child to a high degree in order that he or she does not exceed the limits. In Spain, there are not things like that. A child is a king and a god. If he or she wants to poop in the middle of a table, so this is the right thing to do. They have different attitudes to children; they allow them everything, everything is permitted* (Inna in Spain).

The migrant women perceive parents in Australia to share similar, contrasting, ideas about strictness in upbringing and the desire to follow the specific rules:

*Julia:* We love the rules very much. Or we need them maybe more than others need them.

*Interviewer:* Well, what kind of rules?
**Julia:** Of behaviour, how everything must happen. Some rules. That is, it is very, very difficult for us to really adjust to a different norm. We perceive it as wrong ... We are outraged very much by the moment when children do not listen to us, while Australians allow children many things and it’s not even difficult for them: “I don’t care, as much as you like.”

According to Baumrind’s (2005) terminology, the respondents perceive the behaviour of Russian-speaking parents as highly demanding, in other words, as being consistent with the high demandingness dimension of parenting styles. The styles of the Australians and the Spanish are often described as being characterized by “freedom,” “relaxation,” benevolence, emotional calmness, and easy attitudes towards children’s behaviour, as opposed to those implemented by Russian-speaking parents who express concern and nervousness and often control their children’s behaviour and reprove them. For example, Tamara, a Russian migrant from Australia, supposes that Russians more often reproach their children compared with Australian parents, who respond more easily in the same situations:

**Interviewer:** Is it possible to distinguish a Russian-speaking family if they don’t even speak Russian? Are there any signs?

**Tamara:** It seems to me that the Russians sometimes are more... the Russians scold their children more. While the Australians behave more with some kind of freedom, they have more easy attitudes to children and upbringing process, to the situations when the children do something wrong.

Luda from Spain describes the difference between the parenting approaches in a very similar way. Spanish parents are perceived to be calmer, steadier, and more benevolent, while Russian-speaking parents are more anxious and worried:

**Luda:** I think Spanish women are calmer, steadier, more benevolent with children, to our regret...

**Interviewer:** So are the Russians more what? What is opposite to the word “calm”?

**Luda:** More anxious ... More, more uneasy. Spanish women have more couldn’t-careless attitudes. This has both pros and cons. This can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it is good that they seem to have such easy attitudes and convey these easy attitudes towards everything and children. On the other hand, I believe there are some fundamental issues that, however, should not be ignored, which are ignored here,
for example, regarding childcare. So, that is, in my opinion, it is better to be concerned and do everything in the way it should be done.

Such a critical perception of Russian-speakers’ child-rearing approach as “too strict” and local parents as “too relaxed” is also found in the study of Eastern European immigrants in America (Nesteruk & Marks, 2011). In my research, this opposition is often accompanied by the description of specific practices or norms in which such strictness or relaxation becomes apparent. In the quotes above, Inna and Julia believe that Spanish/Australian parents allow their children to act in ways that they personally would consider to be inappropriate. Tamara, explaining the difference between Australian and Russian-speaking parents, identifies Australians’ easy attitudes to children when “the children do something wrong.” Luda describes the same features at the end of the quote. She also believes that Spanish parents may allow children not to do what ought to be done. Thus, Tamara and Luda share the opinion that Australian and Spanish parents may allow their children not to follow specific rules. They observe the differences and suggest that these reflect a relaxed attitude towards the fact that their children are breaking the rules. However, such a conclusion could only be drawn if Australian and Spanish parents share the same beliefs about what behaviour is within the norms and what is not, in other words, if they are guided by the same scheme of classification (Douglas, 1966). Meanwhile, they may share different interiorized standards related to the same patterns of behaviours of children of the same age.

While, according to Darling & Steinberg (1993), parenting styles may not depend on parenting practices but rather determine the emotional climate in which parents can exhibit similar practices, Russian-speaking migrants in both countries often associate the manifestation of style characteristics of parenting with certain practices that they and their children perform. They often accompany descriptions of stylistic peculiarities in parenting with examples of the different common types of parental control over children’s behaviour in those situations requiring adherence to specific standards and practices associated with maintaining the standards: “Do not sit on the floor; do not look at that way; do not say this; sit with me decently; I am eating – do not disgrace the mother in a restaurant” (responder in Spain). The migrants believe that they have too many rules, or believe that they are stricter about the need to follow the rules than Spanish or Australian parents, but they often talk about rules in relation to the same behavioural patterns of children, many of which are perceived as dangerous for the child’s health or as being “uncivilized.”
It seems that this tendency to relate the features of the emotional climate or style with certain practices appears in other studies of Russian-speaking migrants (Golden et al., 2018; Jurcik et al., 2013; Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013). For example, Komolova and Lipnitsky (2018) show that Russian-speaking parents in the United States often use the words “must” and “necessary” when children do not follow their directions. However, it is interesting that the examples given to illustrate this concern are commonly about hygiene and nutrition practices: for instance, a mother tells her daughter that she “don’t need this [food]” (p. 9). This does not exclude the possibility that the child-rearing style of Russian-speaking migrants may be generally more demanding. However, it does show that violations of those norms related to cultural beliefs (for example, not going without shoes and not sleeping on the floor as it is dangerous to health), and certain practices intended to transmit these norms and teach children to follow them are associated with the style characteristics such as strictness, nervousness, worriedness, etc. Thus, a focus on parenting style can overlook important shared characteristics of parenting concerning specific practices and beliefs, which are a part of cultural habitus. Parents from other countries may be more relaxed about such practices since, for them, children’s behaviour is not so much associated with health risks or with the parent’s responsibility to ensure a child grows up as a normal “civilized” member of society whose behaviour is not perceived as an anomaly by others.

I subscribed to the YouTube channel hosted by the Spanish woman, Nuria, in Russian (When you are Nuria, n.d.). She is from Barcelona but studied in Moscow for some time. She speaks excellent Russian and, in her videos, she talks a lot about her life in Russia, what surprised her in the cultural sense, and about the differences she sees between Russian and Spanish everyday life. Nuria names some of the features that the Spanish respondents in my study bring to the fore: she describes how important it is to wear slippers at home in Russia, how Russians celebrate the holidays, and mentions many other curious observations that are very insightful. However, in one video, she indicates the differences in parenting styles that confused me initially. She believes that Russian parents do not take care of children as much as the Spanish (When you are Nuria, 2018). To prove this, she notes an example from her observations of children and parents’ behaviour outside the city in Russia. She says she was surprised that children were allowed to walk everywhere, although there was a river, cars were driving, and pieces of metal were sticking out of the ground. In her opinion, Spanish parents would constantly say to children in similar situations: “Don’t go there, don’t climb here.” She supposes that Russian parents pay less attention to what the children are doing compared with the Spanish, while walking with children and friends, for example, in a park. Therefore, she concludes that Russian children are more independent than Spanish ones.
I was amazed by this example because it seemed like a mirror image of how many Russian-speaking informants in Spain describe Spanish parents. In the opinion of many, as shown above, they are perceived as relaxed, and in some cases, even as carefree in relation to the child. There is no doubt that this atavistic example is easy to dismiss based on sociological reasoning. For example, it can be assumed that these parenting features are not cultural differences but social ones. The parents from Nuria’s example and the respondent in Spain may come from different social groups. Nuria’s friends may be much younger and represent a different generation of parents who grew up after the collapse of the USSR and were socialized under different conditions. Married and skilled migrants can be a unique group of people who differ from other Russians. By and large, we know little about Nuria and her environment, so there may be many other reasons behind her opinions, and even without using scientific methods to collect and analyze data, she could simply be drawing conclusions that do not reflect the general trend.

However, I tried to reconcile these observations with my research, and it was this attempt that enabled me to take into consideration the fact that when informants and Nuria talk about style features (guardianship, control, strictness, relaxation), certain typical children’s behaviour and circumstances are cited as examples in which they occur. Everyone tries to describe the child’s practices and the parents’ reaction to them in order to explain the differences in the style approaches. Russian-speaking mothers in Spain consider themselves stricter because, unlike Spanish mothers, they control how the child sits at the table, whether he or she wears a hat or adheres to the daily routine, and by not allowing the child to eat some types of foods. Nuria believes that Spanish mothers do not allow children to walk without their supervision in certain situations, whereas Russian mothers do, and that the Spanish pay more attention to children’s behaviour in a park. In all these examples, the manifestation of style features is linked to the child’s specific behaviour in specific circumstances.

This can be explained by the fact that according to different classifications (Douglas, 1966), different child behaviour patterns could be considered dangerous, incorrect, or anomalous. For example, when a child is warmly dressed, wearing shoes, in clean clothes, trained not to sit on the ground, not get into a puddle or eat something that has fallen to the ground, Russian-speaking parents have no cause for concern. At the same time, what Russian-speaking people perceive as both dangerous and an anomaly is not an anomaly within a Spanish scheme of classifications. As one Russian-speaking migrant in Spain said:
I regularly face children who are lying on the floor or sitting on the ground, but the parents don’t care, and then, of course, they put something dirty in the mouth.

“Something dirty in the mouth” is something that can be very dangerous to health, and life threatening, from the point of view of a Russian-speaking mother, and it seems that it does not cause such anxiety among Spanish parents. At the same time, Russian-speaking mothers do not consider that the behaviours that worried Nuria have harmful outcomes. In the USSR, children could spend time outside and move around the city without their parents’ supervision. Migrants from the former USSR in the United States mark this feature as a cultural difference comparing the contexts of children’s autonomy in these countries (Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018). Perhaps Australian and Spanish parents in Russia would also consider Russian parents more relaxed because they do not pay attention to the dangers that they would consider most relevant.

This study demonstrates that it can be significant in migration research to pay attention to the various contexts in which the parenting style differences that migrants talk about are manifested, and to the specific practices that they accompany. In the case of Russian-speaking migrants, they concern a particular set of internalized standards of conduct that Australian and Spanish parents do not follow and which this study argues are part of their cultural habitus. These standards are associated with behaviour in public places and other rules of etiquette, instances of control for the observance of hygiene rules, and intensified care for the child’s health. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will illustrate why they can be called habitus and in Chapter 7 – how and why they change during the migration experience.

4. Conclusion

The perception of the stylistic features of one’s approach to child-rearing is closely related to parenting practices, and moreover to those that have their own national specificities, which can be identified only by studying this group of migrants and the history of their formation. This suggests that we need to rethink features of parenting style of Russian-speaking migrants, which are often described in Western contexts as authoritarian (Jurcik et al., 2013; Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018; Zbenovich & Lerner, 2013). Instead, it is important to link the manifestation of approach not only with the stylistic features of communication with the child but also with the specific practices which it expresses, and with shared cultural beliefs about what behaviours are dangerous, embarrassing, “civilized,” and so on. In Russia and other countries of the post-Soviet space, parents are supported by institutions in which everyone observes and shares the same norms, and
they may not perceive themselves as strict and anxious parents. In addition, children may be more willing to follow these norms in an environment where they are commonplace.

This research confirms the findings of previous studies about the limitations of the applicability of a standardized view of parenting approaches and styles to the study of the experience of migrants (Chao, 1994; Nguyen et al., 2014; Watkins et al., 2017). In the case of Russian-speaking migrants, the perception of their own styles is closely interconnected with child-rearing practices, through which these styles as an emotional climate is expressed. Specifically, certain child-rearing practices, for example, related to taking care of the child’s health in the way which is customary in some countries of the post-Soviet space, are associated among migrants with manifestations of their greater severity than is demonstrated by local parents. Baumrind’s theory (1967, 1971, 2005) assumes that an authoritarian parent demands that children follow strict rules and takes their desires into account less compared to parents who adopt an authoritative style. However, for Russian-speaking migrants, adherence to certain rules is not a matter of personal choice, since not following them is considered hazardous to children’s health or a sign of uncivilized behaviour according to internalized norms. There are a number of situations in which Russian migrants perceive Australian and Spanish parents as giving their children too much autonomy, but the Russian-speaking parents are unable to do this because they perceive the situation as being dangerous and unacceptable. Cultural habitus determines a different threshold of shame and fear associated with certain behaviours, such as sitting on the floor and wearing slippers.

Adapting Norbert Elias’s and Mary Douglas’s ideas for the study of contemporary migrant groups (Douglas, 1966; Elias, 1996, 1998, 2000b), in Chapter 7 I focus on how the daily routines of migrants, such as observing etiquette, hygiene and health care practices, and including healthy nutritional practices, can change during migration experience. These shared features, which represent a specific set of interiorized dispositions and behavioural patterns, unrecognized as culturally specific before migration, are a part of the cultural habitus. I prove this in the next two Chapters 5 and 6 by demonstrating that Russian-speaking migrants reproduce ideas and norms that have been formed in the process of state development and became part of the standards reproduced and institutionalized in the post-Soviet space.
Chapter 5. Civilizing and habitus-shaping processes in the Soviet Union

Introduction

Proper hygiene was something of a Bolshevik obsession; everywhere schools and preschools strove to impress upon children the importance of clean clothes and hands and to get children to transform their parents’ (presumptively slovenly) habits.

(Chatterjee et al., 2016, p. 81)

Russia is an interesting empirical example for the study of the formation of a national or cultural habitus since two crucial historical events took place during the 20th century, which significantly influenced both the processes of ongoing structural transformations and people’s everyday lives. These landmark events and concurrent processes are the Russian Revolution of 1917, including both the “February Revolution” and the “October (Bolshevik) Revolution,” and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 (Fitzpatrick, 1999b). During the revolutionary events of 1917, the monarchical form of government was overthrown, and the Bolsheviks established Soviet power. Tsarist Russia was transformed into a completely new state in a very short time period. The process of constructing society along communist lines that began at this time ended in 1991 due to the collapse of the USSR, and this was again associated with dramatic changes in the political agenda, which affected all areas of life and identity.

In this and the following Chapters, I use the main ideas and concepts of Elias’s theory to analyze the formation of some of the standards of behaviour relevant to my research on Russian-speaking migrants, such as hygienic and health care practices and practices related to “civilized” behaviour. The purpose of this analysis is to show that certain national similarities were initially formed under external constraints at different stages of Soviet and Russian state development, and amongst various social groups. However, as a result, they became a part of an internalized set of dispositions, feeling, and practices, which are perceived as essential and necessary and become part of what people experience as “second nature” – cultural habitus. As part of the cultural habitus, the reasonableness of such behaviours is not questioned and is perceived to be an integral part of a “civilized” person or of caring parents. Thus, in this chapter, I analyze the formation of these standards and beliefs during the Soviet period, from 1917 to 1991, and then, in chapter 6, I will

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6 I use the Bolsheviks to refer to a political group that supported Marxism and was committed to the proletarian revolution that came to power under the leadership of V. Lenin in 1917 (Chatterjee et al., 2016) as well as the communists, their political successors.
demonstrate how some of these are reproduced in official standards and manuals in the post-Soviet period, from 1991 to the present time, as well as how they are being maintained by Russian-speaking migrants.

This chapter focuses on processes that took place mainly during the Soviet period. I show why certain institutions and processes can be considered habitus-forming, and also explain why certain standards disseminated as universal, and related to health, hygiene, and etiquette, acquired features specific to the USSR. The quote from the book above describes one example of this uniqueness – certain standards of hygiene practices, the scope of their application, and methods of dissemination take on such extreme forms that they are described as an “obsession” (Chatterjee et al., 2016). At the same time, focusing on the distinctiveness of the Soviet case, I explain the processes of habitus-formation, drawing on Elias. To begin, specific codes of conduct were enforced through external coercion and control, but then, as these standards began to be reproduced by people themselves without external prescription, some of them disappeared from manuals and official standards.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first, I describe how Elias’s theory can be applied to study the USSR and the post-Soviet space, and which of his ideas are relevant to my work. Secondly, I explain why the development of some of the modern norms and practices shared by migrants can be understood in relation to the state’s history of changing social structures and the formation of cultural habitus. Finally, based on a review of the literature, I briefly describe the important milestones in the development of parenting discourses in the USSR and Australia. The cross-country differences specified in this section will further clarify some of the peculiarities of the parenting practices of Russian-speaking migrants.

1. Soviet Union and Russia in the context of Elias’s theory

Some studies analyze the processes that took place in Russia or the USSR by applying Elias’s thesis of the civilizing process perspective and/or by highlighting the limitations of such an analysis (Kelly, 2001; Kelly & Volkov, 1998; Volkov, 2000). For example, Catriona Kelly (2001), in her book on the study of advice literature, published in Russia from the 18th century to 2000, describes why the application of this approach to the Russian case is debatable. She argues that despite the fact that some of his hypotheses can be used to describe certain trends in the Russian case, such as the homogenization of specific practices under the influence of elites in certain
historical periods, there are important distinctive features that limit the usefulness of Elias’ framework.

The first significant difference, in her opinion, is that the behaviour values that were spreading in Russia during the “civilizing process” were perceived in those periods as foreign, even if they were not. This narrative was influenced by the fact that both the West and Russia itself perceived Russia as being “barbaric” and “backward.” Thus, their own customs simultaneously “became a matter for pride on the one side and shame on the other” (p. xxviii). Therefore, the norms spread in the course of the civilizing process were considered Western, and these were supposed to replace their own “barbaric” habits and norms. Secondly, according to Kelly, there was not a single unitary “civilizing process” in Russia, but many different “civilizing and anti-civilizing processes” that could coincide with as well as contradict each other. Thirdly, while Elias focuses on those prescriptions represented in advice literature which were aimed at “encouraging the repression of the body,” Russian literature covers a much wider range of areas within which readers can be “civilized” (p. xxxii): it deals with relationships with family and friends, encourages them to attend theatres, museums, concerts, libraries, and read books, describes how to set up their home better, advises hygiene, and much more. Thus, Kelly concludes that Elias’s definition of civilization is much narrower than the civilization narrative constructed through Russian books, manuals, and other literature that she analyses.

I assume that much of this criticism can be explained by the fact that Kelly focuses on The Civilizing Process, and does not examine The Germans, in which Elias develops and explains his earlier ideas (Elias, 1996, 2000b). While in the former volume Elias uses the term “the civilizing process”, in the latter he writes about plural civilizing and decivilizing processes that can occur simultaneously, contradict each other, and relate to different social groups of people and representatives of different generations. Moreover, identity plays one of the leading roles in his theoretical ideas. The West has been defined as an important Other in the process of constructing Russian identity. The feeling of shame associated with the image of Russia as a state with barbaric features, which Kelly writes about, corresponds well with the idea that it is traumatic for members of the nation to become aware of the low international rank of the state. These processes, as I show in this research, resonate with the way in which Russian-speaking migrants see themselves nowadays and how, on the one hand, they try to distance themselves from the stigmatized image of a Soviet person and, on the other hand, they may perceive the contested image of the West with
distrust. These dilemmas affect the perception of their own behaviour and child-rearing practices, which are suddenly and unexpectedly understood by migrants to be culturally conditioned.

I agree with Kelly that Elias’s understanding of “civilized behaviour” is narrow to some extent, but not because it is limited to “the repression of the body,” but because its central defining argument is around engagement with, and control over, violence. Processes are described as civilizing and decivilizing, depending on how much they are associated with the ability to control the use of violence, or foster it. He writes of this ability as one of the keys to defining such behaviour: “the necessity to abstain from violence within states is one of the fundamental elements of what we call "civilized behaviour"” (Elias, 1996, p. 279). Some processes in the USSR related to disciplining the population were directly associated with the formation of a strong state, with the centralization of power, including the monopolization of the means of physical violence. However, other processes, such as encouraging the practices of visiting museums and being involved in other cultural activities, are rather difficult to associate with mechanisms of pacification. Meanwhile, even if they are not civilizing processes in this strictly Eliasian sense, they can be analyzed within the framework of his theory as processes that can have habitus-shaping influence, by adhering to his broader description of a civilizing process as a “transformation of individual structures” (Elias, 2000a, p. 483) or habitus.

Another significant difference between the Russian case and the cases described by Elias is that in the USSR, “civilizing” the population was intentional and strictly regulated from above, whereas Elias describes these processes as unplanned. The Bolsheviks set themselves the task of creating a specific Soviet personality that would permeate personal characteristics and way of life, as I will show in the next section. Some features of lifestyle, which in other societies were reproduced within particular social niches and resources, access to which was limited by class in the Bourdiesian sense, were supposed to be extended to different groups or the entire population. However, it would be an oversimplification to consider the processes taking place in the USSR only as a manifestation of totalitarian politics. The civilizing aims that the Bolsheviks tried to achieve were often set within the framework of broader political goals which related to ideological tasks, the implementation of the ideas of Marxism, and they aimed at solving the problems of the past that they had inherited. They can also be considered processes with habitus-shaping influence.
In this sense, Kelly provides and then analyses an interesting example. She describes an article in the Russian magazine “Ogoniok” about Russian tourists abroad, published in 1997. It makes fun of the usual behaviour of Russians, from the authors’ point of view, during their holidays abroad, such as, for example, consuming large amounts of alcohol, sunbathing topless, using obscene words. At the same time, the taking of various cultural tours (of, for example, museums and art galleries) by Russian tourists is also described as their usual practice. Kelly writes that this mode of conduct (taking cultural tours) is unlikely to be expected from British tourists in similar circumstances from the same social groups, while for Russians, this behaviour is more typical for the majority. She believes that this desire for self-improvement represented by participation in cultural excursions and self-education is an example of “some aspects of the Soviet behaviour ethos” (Kelly, 2001, p. 392). In the late 1990s, this “nodding acquaintance with high culture was still considered requisite for all” (p. 393) and is an indirect consequence of the propaganda of kul’turnost’ (culturedness, civilisation) carried out in the USSR. This conclusion is made precisely as a response to the challenge posed by one of the tasks that, as claimed by Elias, sociology must solve, namely, to consider the national habitus of representatives of a social group or nation as it relates to its history of development (Elias, 1996). Therefore, the conclusion can be reformulated within the framework of Elias’s theory by using different terminology, so that the drive for self-improvement can be considered a part of the national habitus. Unlike Bourdieu's argument that consumption of high culture is strongly connected with class, the ideas of national habitus are a lens through which the consumption of certain high culture elements can be viewed as aspects of the national ethos.

In this study, I use Elias’s theory to show the connection between long-term historical processes and the habitual characteristics of Russian-speaking migrants, which include identity and child-rearing practices. The national processes and similarities do not have to be described in civilizing terms, which are understood in a narrow sense. For example, cycling in the Netherlands is described as part of the national habitus (Kuipers, 2013), and the feelings and attitudes influencing the development of bureaucratization in an Irish Association are described as part of its employees’ habitus (Connolly, 2016). Moreover, habitus refers to any shared characteristics of group members influenced by the fortunes of that group. Thus, in my research, the primary term is national or cultural habitus, its formation, and its transformation, which are interdependent from the fortunes of a nation.
In the following section, I show the applicability of Elias’s approach, as formulated above, to the Russian case. I illustrate how some of the attitudes and practices reproduced by modern migrants were constructed during the formation of the Soviet state, in the form of external directions and standards for the population. I describe the broad socio-political context in which this happened and why these specific cultural characteristics took shape.

2. The development of habitus in the Soviet Union

The Bolsheviks who came to power undertook enormous tasks of reorganizing the state and society, such as accomplishing:

“transition from capitalism to communism” and becoming “the leader of all the working and exploited people in organizing their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie” (Lenin, 1917/2014, pp. 62, 71).

Their implementation and concomitant processes led to significant, multifaceted changes. Geographic mobility accompanied high social mobility (Fitzpatrick, 1999a). The new ideas of the system of social stratification were grounded upon a very different foundation: the ideology of the new regime was based on Marxist ideas, in which class is central. It is undoubtable that these ideas were reflected in the political agenda pursued in relation to different social groups. Some had the opportunity of rapid social mobility carried out in defiance of the previous logic of social hierarchy (Fitzpatrick, 1999a; P. V. Romanov & Yarskaya-Smirnova, 2007), whereas others were deprived of their rights, property, positions, and state protection caused by different reasons, including their social origin. In the new state, in which the lifestyle of different groups of the population was strictly regulated, it was also necessary to resolve the contradiction between the origin of the new elite and their social position (Volkov, 2000).

The formation of a new socialist state required politics and ideology to rapidly change people’s beliefs and behaviour (Lebina et al., 2007). The creation of a new order included the reorganization of the entire social life of citizens, and the construction of new everyday lives, encompassing all the relevant spheres – religion, family relations, raising children, spending leisure time, living conditions, appearances, etc. One of the essential tasks that had to be solved was the formation of a New Soviet Person and, most importantly, the formation of his or her political consciousness (Chatterjee et al., 2016). The Bolsheviks were challenged to “civilize,” “modernize,” “liberate” the oppressed and “backward” masses such as workers, peasants, women, children, and national
minorities (Chatterjee et al., 2016, p. 69; Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 2003). Aleksandra Kollontai, People’s Commissar of Social Welfare in the first Soviet government, a Bolshevik feminist theorist, wrote in 1920: “In Soviet Russia the working woman should be surrounded by the same ease and light, hygiene and beauty that previously only the very rich could afford” (Kollontai, 1920, as cited in Chatterjee et al., 2016, p. 87).

In addition to the current new tasks, it was necessary to solve a large number of problems inherited from Tsarist Russia, such as the illiteracy of the population, the lack of social institutions (schools, kindergartens, medical institutions, etc.), and many other social issues (Kelly, 2007; Lebina et al., 2007). One of Russia’s descriptions at that time is as a “country where almost ninety percent of the population consisted of illiterate peasants” (McLeish, 1972). Real social problems, closely related to ideological content and political reforms, were rooted in the past or were the result of political or social changes. In the next sections, I demonstrate this by using the example of Soviet health care and cultural policy development, focusing on hygiene and health care rules. I also touch on the reform of preschool and school education and its consequences.

2.1 Hygiene, health care and Soviet culture

There are two widely disseminated cultural symbols that illustrate the relationship between ideology and hygiene in the early stages of Soviet power. The first is the famous statement of Lenin: “Either the lice will defeat socialism or socialism will defeat the lice,” addressing the seventh congress of Soviets in 1919, the second is the propaganda poster “Comrade Lenin cleans the Earth from scum,” created in 1920. In the centre of the poster is a globe, on which Lenin is standing and sweeping away four figures with a broomstick, which symbolize the clergy, kings, and capitalists. It is no coincidence that the introduction to the book by Tricia Starks (2008) “The body Soviet: propaganda, hygiene, and the revolutionary state” begins with this quotation, and the review of this book starts with a description of the poster (Morrissey, 2010). They demonstrate two important aspects of Soviet propaganda related to the concepts of hygiene and health: on the one hand, its real focus on solving social and health problems of the population, as in the case of the above quote, and, on the other hand, its use for ideological purposes, to form the image of a Soviet person or, conversely, his or her enemy, in a metaphorical sense, as in the example of the poster.
In addition to political transformations that had ideological underpinnings, the Bolsheviks faced the need to solve social problems that they had inherited from the pre-revolutionary period and which also arose during the construction of a new state (Bernstein, 1998; Fitzpatrick, 1999a; Kelly, 2007; P. V. Romanov & Yarskaya-Smirnova, 2007; Volkov, 2000). The First World War, the revolution, the ensuing civil war, political reforms, as well as related problems all combined to become the causes of various epidemics, diseases, and famines, which seriously affected the health of the population and the number of people who had died and were dying (Bernstein, 1998; Kelly, 2007; Starks, 2008). Lenin’s quote above reflects the typhus epidemic crisis that raged in those years (Bernstein, 1998). High mortality rates and the spreading of various diseases made the issue of the nation’s health acute and urgent.

Various processes had an impact on the emerging social order and produced new problems that required solutions. As a result of the policy of collectivization and industrialization, large numbers of people were moving from one settlement to another. Since the late 1920s, the urban population’s composition changed significantly, due to a rapid influx of peasants into the cities (Attwood & Kelly, 1998; Volkov, 2000). There were so many of them, and they had such a visible impact on the social transformation of cities that this process was called the “ruralization” (окрест’IANIVANIE) of cities. For the workers who arrived in the cities, barracks were being built, characterized by poor living conditions. The peasants did not just change their place of residence; they found themselves in an urban environment, in which different mechanisms of control and maintenance of order were in force, compared to the communal ones, which had regulated public order in the villages. The consequence of this was an increased number of crimes of various kinds, drunkenness, lack of labour discipline, and appalling hygienic conditions in the places of residence. The transition to the new state was accompanied by many other visible and severe difficulties that needed to be urgently addressed. For example, in the 1920s, there were about 7 million homeless children (“besprizorniki”) registered officially in the country (Chatterjee et al., 2016; Medison, 2007). The enormous number of children who begged and who engaged in criminal activities became a massive and noticeable problem of the new state. It was necessary to take urgent measures to stop the spread of infections, reduce mortality and crime.

However, concern for the population’s health was considered and addressed not only due to medical and demographic reasons. It was part of the official rhetoric symbolizing significant political transformations. According to this rhetoric, in capitalist societies, the living conditions and health of workers were poor. The Bolsheviks proclaimed the construction of a distinct state,
in which the good health of citizens, their whole working and living conditions were one of the important priorities (Starks, 2008). The concept of hygiene used in these discourses also referred not only to body standards, environmental conditions, and disease prevention but was also included in the language of ideology aimed at creating specific political order and stability of the political system.

The change in the population’s health condition was supposed to illustrate the revolution’s victory in solving the known painful problems of the past. For example, in pre-revolutionary Russia, the West served as a model against which existing childcare practices were compared, and “it went without saying that the West was assumed as being more developed than Russia” (Kelly, 2003). High rates of infant mortality were among those visible signs that illustrated the fact that Russia did not meet the “civilized world” standards. For example, in 1901, the proportion of children who died under one year old was 40.5%, and in 1910 it was 38%, which was visibly higher than these indicators in developed countries (Kvasha, 2003). Social activists in the pre-revolutionary period viewed the sphere of social protection of the population as deeply inconsistent with these standards and as a threat to Russia’s future. One of the consequences of this was a great interest in identifying the particular methods and ideas which underpinned child-rearing, upbringing and caregiving practices in the West: what theories were developed, which practices were used, and which political changes took place? Thus, improvement in these areas would allow the new society to be opposed to the Western countries and the pre-revolutionary state; one of the symbols of the new order and consequent success in overcoming these problems was having a healthy and clean body (Kelly, 2003; Starks, 2008).

The medical and hygienic vocabulary began to be actively used outside the medical discourse (Bogdanov, 2009; Starks, 2008; Vays, 2008). The construction of the Soviet identity and the image of an ideal Soviet society was carried out using concepts related to health, hygiene, and purity in both the direct and metaphorical sense. They formed the basis of the symbolic boundaries that were built between their members and ideological outsiders. Western society was described as unhealthy, sick, rotting, decomposing, and as infecting others. It was contrasted to the Soviet clean

Simultaneously with recognizing its “civilized” superiority in various spheres, the attitudes towards the West remained contradictory, as I wrote in Chapter 1. See, for example, the role of ressentiment (the rejection of the West, existential envy of it, a reaction to a feeling of inferiority, aversion to humiliating reality) in the construction of Russian identity vis-a-vis “the West” (Greenfeld, 1992; Malinova, 2014). Idealized Russia, defined as an anti-West, has been the essence of various Russian nationalisms at different subsequent historical stages. These ideas also fuelled the ideology of the Revolution of 1917, which was conceived on the scale of rescuing the whole world.
and healthy society, which, in turn, needed to be cleansed of the remaining diseases. Unhealthy behaviour included both a different spectrum of deviant social behaviour and delinquency and anything that was associated and perceived as ideologically alien and hostile. The poster of Lenin cleansing the world from scum, described above, is an example of this metaphorical use of language and symbols associated with cleanliness and hygiene. It can be interpreted that representatives of different social groups, which Lenin sweeps away, are carriers of ideological infection. Cleanliness, health, and hygienic order were related to political order, so bodily disciplinary practices relating to, and control of, the body were placed in the broader context of control and discipline.

An active campaign was launched to achieve these different goals. New institutions were being created, new rules and regulations were being introduced, and public education was being carried out in all possible ways. Various campaign materials were printed, and activities aimed at education in the field of health, hygiene, and prevention of diseases were conducted (Bernstein, 1998). The standards were especially effectively deployed in disciplinary spaces, such as schools, pioneer camps, the army, and factories (Orlova, 2007). Orphanages, foster homes, and labour camps for homeless children were being created, in which they were taught the rules of hygiene and discipline. Special health inspectors and volunteers checked on schools, workplaces, buildings, and dwellings (Starks, 2008). They distributed campaign material, instructed how and what rules had to be followed, and controlled adherence to these rules. The entire Russian culture of the 1920s and early 1930s was characterized by “the obsession with hygiene” (Kelly, 2007, p. 505). The propaganda reached such proportions that it affected almost the entire population to one degree or another (Bernstein, 1998). People were not only taught how to adhere to a healthy lifestyle but also inculcated with new norms of behaviour: they were shown how to eat, wash, behave at home, in the workplace, and in other private and public places.

There were attempts to educate certain social groups in etiquette and manners, to civilize them in the early stages of building a new state. British writer H. G. Wells, who visited Russia in 1920, described the Home of Rest for Workmen, organized in order to conduct educational work with workers:

To this place workers are sent to live a life of refined ease for two or three weeks. It is a very beautiful country house with fine gardens, an orangery, and subordinate buildings. The meals are served on white cloths with flowers upon the table and so

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forth. And the worker has to live up to these elegant surroundings. It is a part of his education. If in a forgetful moment he clears his throat in the good old resonant peasant manner and spits upon the floor, an attendant, I was told, chalks a circle about his defilement and obliges him to clean the offended parquetry (Wells, 1920).

Thus, attempts to teach ‘civilized’ manners to certain groups within the population existed in the early stages of creating a new Soviet society.

The cultural policy pursued for this purpose was aimed at constructing a new “cultured” (kul’turnyi) Soviet person who observed specific rules of behaviour. However, the notion of culturedness (kul’turnost’) was not strictly defined in the policy context (Volkov, 2000). While culture (kul’tura) is one of the central concepts of Soviet politics, “culturedness” refers to the everyday life of a Soviet person and in the ’30s became the antonym of the concept “lack of culture” (beskul’tur’e) (Fitzpatrick, 1992). The description of what “being cultured” was contrasted with the attributes “being uncultured,” “dark,” and “‘backward’ like a peasant” (Fitzpatrick, 1992, p. 218) and overlapped with the ideas that were contained in various advice manuals issued after Erasmus’s famous book (Kelly & Volkov, 1998), which, according to Elias, influenced the civilizing processes in Europe (Elias, 2000b).

The processes that took place in the 1930s related to disciplining the population, mainly former peasants, and to teaching them to lead an urban lifestyle, what Vadim Volkov (2000), relying on N. Elias, calls “the Stalinist civilizing process.” The model of the cultured person (kul’turnyi chelovek) included a set of internal and external qualities that could be formed by improving oneself. For example, a cultured person had to take care of personal hygiene, read books, and look after his or her appearance. Mastering hygienic practices were associated with the qualities that a person needed to work effectively. A good employee was described as not only well-disciplined but also as a person who embodied neatness and culturedness, and who prioritised cleanliness at home and the workplace. In some factories, workers were even required to shave and comb their hair. Here, the practices related to personal hygiene and good manners go together with positive personal qualities. I will demonstrate later that cleanliness, neatness/tidiness, and other manners and qualities of personality, including morals, continue to be closely related to each other in modern Russian pedagogical approaches to interacting with children in kindergartens and the practices of migrant parents.
Another population group that was taught new cultural norms during this period was the new elite, 65% of whom, by 1932, consisted of representatives of the working class (Hoffmann, 2003). The pamphlet *How to Become Cultured*, published in 1929, also emphasised the importance of taking care of health and observing the rules of hygiene: “a cultured person is first of all a healthy person,” and adherence to the rules of hygiene was described as a means of achieving good health (Hoffman, 2003, p. 66).

Fitzpatrick (1999a) argues that the different standards of behaviour that citizens of the USSR had to master during the era of Stalinism belonged to three levels of culture. The first level was characterised by basic hygiene and elementary literacy. The second level included a code of particular manners, for example, relating to rules of conduct in public places, at the table, and in bed. All town-dwellers, including the working class, had to learn how to use a knife and fork, sleep on sheets, read newspapers regularly, etc. The third level contained elements of high culture: good manners, correct speech, a certain awareness of some literature, music, and ballet. Unlike the second level of culture, the third included standards of behaviour and norms that were more oriented towards the new party elite. Meanwhile, a cultured Soviet person, regardless of his or her position in the social hierarchy, had to address themselves to self-improvement. Fitzpatrick writes that those who visited the USSR in the 1930s noticed the expressed love of the Soviet people for reading and their desire to acquire knowledge in various fields.

Over time, the conception of culturedness was transformed. Although some cultural attributes began to be associated with negative characteristics, for example, fashionable clothes and “gallant” manners, the perception of cleanliness and other aspects of hygiene and health care as signs of an exemplary Soviet person persisted in later Soviet periods (Kelly, 2001; Volkov, 2000). I have already given an example from Kelly, above, about the peculiarity of post-Soviet tourists, as manifested in the desire to enjoy high culture (Kelly, 2001). The Soviet case is unique and interesting in that certain standards of behaviour, like an interest in visiting museums, which may have a class nature in other societies, spread to all groups of the population.

This section has discussed how hygiene and health care and teaching good manners become part of public health, cultural policies, and broader ideological goals. In the next section, I propose to dwell on the trends in Soviet pedagogy and the processes of the accompanying development of education.
2.2 Upbringing and socialization contexts

Researchers of nationalism describe the enormous importance of general education and publishing materials in national languages in the dissemination of ideas of national ideology at the symbolic level (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 2009). Similarly, this process of developing nationalism can be described as the spread of other beliefs, norms, and standards of behaviour. The education system, the media, family, and other social institutions played a significant role in this process from the first stages of Soviet power. Before the revolution, most people had been uneducated and even illiterate, and education had generally been reserved for representatives of certain elite social groups, many of whom then lost their former social positions and power. Thus, some norms, values, standards, practices, etc., which the Bolsheviks adopted and adapted from pre-revolutionary times, were still new for many population groups.

I argue that in the USSR, the formation of certain institutions, the standardization of ideas about what constitutes a cultured and healthy Soviet person, and the dissemination of these ideas through various channels made it possible to form a number of features of the national or cultural habitus. In education and child-rearing, such habitus-forming institutions were comprised of medical institutions that created medical and hygiene standards for educational and other institutions, Soviet pedagogy, various didactic literature for children and parents, and educational institutions with their own rules of behaviour, some of which I explore in this section and in the next chapter. The Soviet government’s politics, aimed at spreading ideological ideas and civilizing the population, made it possible to unify some norms and practices across social classes. Institutionalized multifaceted child-care, which began at preschool age, allowed a high degree of government intervention in children’s socialization. In the next chapter I will demonstrate how some of the standards of conduct instilled in children and parents in the USSR by various processes are reproduced in institutionalized and embodied forms in the post-Soviet space, including in the diaspora.

With the coming to power, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the elimination of illiteracy and the formation of a new school education system as one of their primary tasks. Accordingly, all previously existing educational institutions were abolished, and a united school system was legalized – free, secular, and providing a single educational path from kindergarten to university for everyone, regardless of social status, gender, and other characteristics (Kelly, 2007; State Commission on Education, 1918). Thus, the unification of education and its centralization took place.
The educational system was subsequently reformed many times, but specific ideas were developed and became an integral part of emerging shared norms. The importance of a clean and safe environment for children was already scientifically substantiated at an early stage of building the new state (Kelly, 2007; Saddington, 2019), and hygiene issues received enormous attention. On the one hand, scientific, pedagogical, regulatory organizations and departments were being created to form standards and then implement them. For instance, in 1924-26, special sub-departments of school hygiene were formed at the medical faculties of a number of universities (Fadeev, 2012). On the other hand, child-care institutions were built to emulate the standards that these structures produced. For example, kindergartens had to follow strict guidelines for creating a safe and healthy space for a child, and various professionals, including health care workers, were involved in ensuring that this process was carried out effectively (Saddington, 2019).

Since the mid-1920s, preschool educational institutions began to pay attention to various sanitary procedures, and a system of recommendations for hygiene practices was being developed (Kelly, 2007). This involved implementation of:

> [an] *insistent hygienic regime with regular hand-washing sessions punctuating sessions of eating, handicraft, nature study, and play and supervisors told to check that children wiped their bottoms thoroughly when they had finished using the lavatory (before, of course, making them wash their hands yet again)* (p. 397).

In 1932, sanitary standards were also introduced for the premises in which preschool institutions are located, including, for example, daily cleaning of floors with hot water and soap. Similar standards were established in schools.

Questions concerning hygiene, child-care and other standards of behaviour in relation to children were raised not only within the framework of medical discourse. They were an essential part of Soviet pedagogy, and included the ideas of Anton Makarenko, a classic Soviet pedagogue who developed the theory and methods of working with children, which gained immense popularity. His figure as a great pedagogue was canonized, and his various ideas greatly influenced Soviet pedagogy and were used in different fields outside of it (Bronfenbrenner, 1962; Kharkhordin, 1999; Wernecke, 1967). In 1920 he began to manage a children’s labour colony for juvenile delinquents and homeless children (“*besprizorniki*”), in which he applied his pedagogical approach. He described the pedagogical methods and principles that led him to success in working
with children in this colony, in which an important role was assigned to manners and hygiene. For example, in one of his 1938 lectures on the issues of “vospitanie” (upbringing or character formation) in the Soviet schools, he cited the following example of his positive experience in organizing the life of a children’s collective:

These flowers, suits, cleanliness of rooms, cleanliness of shoes – this is what a children’s ‘kollektiv8’ (collective) should have. Shoes must always be cleaned, without this, what kind of ‘vospitanie’ (upbringing) can there be? Not only teeth but [also] shoes. There should be no dust on a suit. And hairstyle requirement. You can wear any hairstyle you want, but a hairstyle must really be a hairstyle.” (Makarenko, 2012, pp. 215-216).

Requirements for compliance with hygiene rules (cleanliness of premises and shoes) were interspersed with requirements for appearance (neat clothes, hairstyle) and aesthetic aspects of the environment (flowers planted in the yard). They were all directly related to the discipline of children and their upbringing. The existence of this set of rules and norms was not rationalized by medical reasons, but by the goal of raising children to be “civilized”: “a boy who does not spit, who does not clean his nose with two fingers is already a ‘vospitannyi’ (well-bred) boy” (Makarenko, 2012, p. 217). This again illustrates that the civilization of Soviet people in different discourses involves interweaving the ideas of hygiene with the formation of moral or aesthetic qualities.

Upbringing (vospitanie) is one of the most important terms in Soviet pedagogy. It has been closely related to the concept of culturedness, which included a “proper upbringing” (Rivkin-Fish, 1999). In the context of education, this concept was close to “character education” (Bogachenko & Perry, 2015) since it reflected the crucial goal of the Soviet educational system, which was to form a personality of a specific type. This included the area of morality and personal characteristics and standards of conduct, including those related to both hygiene and etiquette. At the same time, “upbringing” is also discussed in the family context, which was expected to pursue similar goals in the formation of certain personality types (Field, 2007). Therefore, I use the term “upbringing” to refer to the similar approaches to the treatment and instruction that children faced both in the family and in educational institutions. Both institutions (family and educational) were supposed to unite in achieving the mutual tasks of training children in a specific way. As will be shown later,

8 For the meaning of the concept of “kollektiv” in the USSR and in the definition of Makarenko, see Kharkhordin (1999).
today’s migrant parents continue to expect educational institutions to perform some of the same “upbringing” functions, such as ensuring that children follow the rules of hygiene, and they also expect the spaces and places that educate children to meet several specific hygiene related requirements.

In this period of Soviet history, in addition to the preschool and school education system, various institutions for children’s socialization were being created. There were many opportunities for after-school, extra-curriculum, and leisure activities, for example, low-cost holiday camps, and “circles” (kruzhki), which offered various pastimes: dance, chess, maths, etc. (Attwood & Kelly, 1998). Similar norms for children’s nutrition, space arrangement, and sanitary and hygienic standards were applied within these institutions. Visiting different structured forms of activities such as circles were popularised and propagandized.

The Soviet government used a wide variety of channels and methods to form certain habits and regulate children’s and parents’ behaviour. These were not only rules from the top that had to be obeyed. Various state institutions worked with a child’s family to educate parents on upbringing practices. For this purpose, special events for parents were organized and educational and recommendation books were printed (Kelly, 2007; Medison, 2007). Russian literature historically acted as a means of enlightenment, which was supposed to shape certain moral and social behaviour, and, in the USSR, it explained to people how to live a correct communist life (Chatterjee et al., 2016; Fisher, 2019). Parents were instructed to develop children’s cleanliness, neatness, adherence to a daily routine and teach them manners that include rules of conduct in public places, such as not speaking loudly from an early age (Field, 2007; Kelly, 2007, p. 372). In addition, new methods of influencing parents were introduced. Various volunteer groups were created to guide parents, including using methods such as propaganda and public shaming. Party members were condemned for neglectful parenting; cases of “unproper upbringing,” for example as represented by a child’s poor performance in school, could be publicly examined and judged. Thus, society shared the responsibility for raising children and would actively intervene in this process.

Children’s literature also reflected the tasks of didacticism and had to meet specific requirements, namely, to be propagandist, influence children’s character, shape their tastes, and teach them to behave in certain ways in different circumstances (Miller et al., 1976). In the early stages of Soviet power, it was expected that children would also influence their parents, who may have remained
carriers of outdated habits and beliefs. They were taught to maintain cleanliness at home, help their parents do housework, keep the dishes clean, wash their hands regularly, change slovenly parents’ habits, etc. (Chatterjee et al., 2016; Salnikova & Kornyushkina, 2017). Some publications created in the USSR for this purpose have become widely known both among parents and among educators as a pedagogical means of socializing and raising children. For example, the fairy tale “Wash ‘em White” by Kornei Chukovskii, published in 1923, about a boy who does not want to wash, has become a classic (Attwood & Kelly, 1998). Chukovskii himself wrote about this tale as a work that provides didactic tasks and overlaps with those raised by the People’s Commissariat of Health (Kruchkov, 2018). This work has been used in various educational programs and games aimed at teaching children hygiene skills and it remains popular today as a didactic tool aimed at developing these skills (see, for example, Melkonyan, 2019; Gordeeva, 2009).

The evolution of different rules and standards of childhood upbringing illustrates how these tendencies can be interpreted in the context of Elias’s ideas, with regard to formation of the apparatus of self-constraint. It can be concluded that hygiene and health care standards and practices are part of two different discourses and control practices. Medical institutions and healthcare professionals have developed medical standards. Parallel to them, pedagogical and educational institutions and significant agents have produced psychological and pedagogical norms and upbringing approaches. The changes that have occurred in these rules and standards can be interpreted as a reflection of the fact that some of the norms are internalized and begin to be reproduced without strict external prescriptions.

The school rules of 1943 contained a list of 20 directions that described specific actions and situations. For example, a child had to “come to school clean, combed and neatly dressed,” “keep the rooms clean, keep their clothes, shoes, bed in order” (Rules for students, 1954, as cited in Maslinsky, 2015a, p. 62). Nevertheless, over time, descriptions of situations and actions disappeared from the rules, and abstract moral directions remained (Maslinsky, 2015a). For example, out of the ten school rules of 1972, three relate to cleanliness and tidiness but are already formulated in a general way: “keep clean, ... observe the rules of personal hygiene, ... be ... neatly dressed” (Model rules for students, 1983, as cited in Maslinsky, 2015a, p. 65). In parallel with this, since the 1950s, the requirements governing behaviour in individual schools began to spread. While the school rules were from the authorities, schools had a choice in the case of the requirements, and they could vary from school to school. These requirements concerned three areas of disciplinary control: discipline, hygiene, and etiquette. They did not replace the mandatory
school rules but concretized them, and could contain much more detail than even the school rules from the past. For example, according to the rules of one of the schools in 1978, students were forbidden to “run, shout, mess, whistle” (Unitary requirements for students, 1978, as cited in Maslinsky, 2015b, p. 53).

Elias (2000) explains that specific directions disappeared from the advice literature in the course of the historical civilizing process because they became part of the psychological habitus inherent in any “civilized” person. Once people have internalized civilized practices as the norm and follow them themselves, they no longer need to be directed to follow these practices. Changes in the Soviet school rules may reflect a similar trend. The state began to offer schools a set of general moral and behavioural guidelines, rather than specific detailed rules, since schools, without external instructions, reproduced the rules in their school-level requirements which they considered to be mandatory and important. These requirements contained a large number of details and could be distinguished by rigor and meticulousness, which no one formally demanded from schools (Maslinsky, 2015a).

Moreover, the directions related to disciplinary body practices, on the contrary, disappeared from the school requirements over time, although in the 1930s, some of them contained rather detailed descriptions on what the child should do at home, such as: “In the morning wash face, hands, ears, neck, brush your teeth. Wash hands before eating” (Student Code of Conduct, as cited in Maslinsky, 2015b, p. 49). It can be explained not by the fact that school was losing the function of influencing family life, but rather that parents had mastered these norms and were able to regulate children’s behaviour by themselves, in contrast to the early Soviet period when it was expected that sometimes children would have transmitted rules, which they acquired in school, to “backward” parents. Furthermore, other forms of influence appear in society, which are not in the form of a list of strict requirements, but which encompass other soft methods of influence and socialization.

Sanitary standards regulated by authorities in the sphere of medicine and health contain requirements for children’s living conditions in schools, and a slightly different trend is observed there. The 1962 sanitary rules for general education and boarding schools are much more detailed than the previous ones and even describe the colour of the walls and desks (Kelly, 2007, p. 502). Nevertheless, some hygienic regulations governing behaviour also disappear from these documents over time (Serikov, 2018). For example, basic hygiene rules are no longer included in
mandatory sanitary rules for orphan homes. Serikov concludes, based on the theory of the classic of cross-cultural psychology Hofstede, that these elementary norms of personal hygiene (washing hands, brushing teeth, taking a shower, etc.) ceased to be regulated externally in time because they moved to a deep cultural level, and thus became deep-seated cultural values. This explanation, using different terminology, bears similarities to Elias’s framework.

Elias’s theory (1996, 2000b) and the concept of national habitus make it possible to explain how and why these norms are internalized, and to focus on the characteristics and variability of these processes and results in a particular group or nation. For example, norms concerning etiquette, safety, and health, etc., similar to those in Russia, can be found in educational institutions’ everyday lives in other countries (Thornberg, 2009). However, they may have particular national distinctions that people are not aware of, since they have become second nature and seem generally accepted. The national specificity of some norms and rules can be consciously perceived only when interacting with people and institutions that do not adhere to them. For example, hygiene norms in relation to children, which Russian-speaking migrants internalized, are stricter and more detailed than those they face after migration. Thus I show, drawing on Elias’s theory, that certain civilizing processes have led to the formation of habitual characteristics shared by the inhabitants of some countries of the post-Soviet space. Among these characteristics are the features of their parenting practices, which I began to describe in the previous chapter.

In the next section, I compare the ideology of raising children and managing them in Russia and Australia, which enables me to understand the features that are actualized in the interviews described in Chapters 6 and 7.

3. Parenting discourses in the Soviet Union and Australia

I cite two quotes that illustrate different parenting discourses in the Soviet Union and Australia at different periods of time. The first quote is from a Soviet book for parents published in 1950, which Natalia Chernyaeva (2010) uses in her article on the analysis of changes in the concept of good-parenting in the USSR, reconstructed through the Soviet Parenting Manuals since the early 50s, from the post-Stalinism period to the 1980s. The child was to:

**eat, sleep, wash his face, play outside at certain times and without delay, to wash his hands before dinner time and whenever they get dirty. He should begin his meal and get up from the table only upon his mother’s permission; he should say ‘thank you’ to**
Chernyaeva uses this quote to demonstrate the thesis that in the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s, the image of a disciplined child trained in specific rules of etiquette was constructed through manuals for parents. During this period, “discipline” was a widespread word in the literature for parents, but it is used not only to mean following certain rules and norms but also to describe children’s attitudes toward these rules, namely the internalized desire to follow them.

The second quote is from Rachael Kitchens’ article (2007), also devoted to parenting discourses, but which were reproduced and constructed in Australian parenting literature in the inter-war years:

Modern family life is often criticised by those who hold as their ideal the somewhat rigid discipline and complete agreement to parents’ wishes that characterised the family life of earlier days. But it is generally recognised that family life to-day, with its greater freedom and its greater comradeship[,] is finer than it has ever been before (Gutteridge, 1937, as cited in Kitchens, 2007, p. 459).

This quote is taken from a series of lectures given by the principal of the Kindergarten Training College of Victoria and published in 1937, and it illustrates attitudes that are very different from those presented in Soviet literature written in the next decade. Kitchens considers that the ideas in this quote are in line with a general trend in parent-child relationships, in which values of freedom and family companionship replaced discipline as an essential part of parenting.

She explains the changes that have taken place in Australia, drawing on Elias’s theory and his concept of “informalization.” Elias connects changes in behaviour and feelings in Europe in the 20th century with the structural changes in societies occurring at that time (Elias, 1996). He writes that the power differential between parents and children, men and women, former metropolises and colonies, and other groups had decreased. This trend in a change from the previous strict formal behaviour to more informal behaviour in the same situations of interaction is called “informalization,” and is associated with civilizing processes. To explain these changes, Elias again uses the idea that, in the course of the development of states, the external constraint that regulates people’s behaviour is increasingly replaced by self-constraints, when people follow certain standards automatically since they have adopted them in early childhood upbringing (Elias,
1996, 2000b). Kitchens (2007) shows that changes in parental discourse in Australia, sometimes called the liberalization of the family, can be explained in the context of this model. She argues that “liberalizing” or “informalization” is a long-term process, as a result of which individuals do not lose the ability to obey, but rather form “more exacting patterns of self-control” (p. 460).

Interestingly, Chernyaeva describes similar trends in changes in parenting approaches that took place in the 1960s and 1970s in the USSR. In the post-Stalinist era, the disciplinary model of upbringing, which taught parents how to raise a “cultured” child, has been replaced by the “child-guided” model, according to which the needs and interests of children are more important than some ready-made scheme and rules of discipline that must be followed. In Soviet childrearing manuals, ideas of free and spontaneous children with unique personality traits and interests that parents should take into account were beginning to dominate. These trends in different countries can be described as a shift towards a high level of responsiveness, using Baumrind’s terminology, discussed in Chapter 4. However, this shift took place later in the USSR than in Australia.

My research shows important features of the Russian case, making it difficult to consider this trend in changes in childrearing approaches as being linear and the same as in the West, but instead happening with a time-lag. Apparently, in the USSR, due to its own political processes, which I briefly described earlier in this chapter, within and outside the parental or psychology-pedagogical discourse, a separate medicalized discourse was formed that concerns children’s health and hygiene practices. While the general approach to upbringing changed, and the child’s autonomy and freedom also began to be appreciated, the requirements for sanitary and hygienic standards were outside these trends and changed much more slowly or even differently. In addition, within the framework of official pedagogy, a normative childrearing model continues to be constructed, which tries to coexist with the ideas of an independent child. The medicalized discourse that concerns hygiene and health begins to exist independently of the parental discourse, also including hygiene and health care ideas as was evident in Makarenko’s approach. Thus, I argue that the new ideas of the free and spontaneous child, which develop within the framework of the psychological-pedagogical approach, begin to exist with some old ideas of a “cultured,” “healthy” and “disciplined” child but do not replace them.

At the official level, these two discourses are institutionalized as two groups of standards for educational institutions – pedagogical and medical. Sanitary and hygienic norms have been institutionalized in the form of mandatory standards developed by medical institutions for
educational institutions and for other organizations working with children. Parallel to this, in Soviet and Post-Soviet pedagogy, one of the prioritized directions in the upbringing of children continues to be the formation of hygiene and health care practices, which coexist with ideas regarding the rules of etiquette that a child must learn, as well as the autonomy of a child, which are, for example, reflected in the new Russian educational standard for preschool institutions (FSES, 2013). While norms in the context of medical discourse are liberalizing slowly, the informalization of disciplinary norms is more pronounced, as I will show in the next chapter.

4. Conclusion

Researchers of cultural norms and everyday life in Russia and the USSR usually single out different historical periods in order to show their specificity (Field, 2007; Fitzpatrick, 1992, 1999a, 2000; Hoffmann, 2003; Kelly, 2001, 2007; Kelly & Shepherd, 1998; Shlapentokh, 1989). All these periods undoubtedly created special socio-historical conditions that led to radical shifts in various aspects of people’s lives. At the same time, some ideas that became part of multiple policies and ideologies pursued in the USSR were adopted from the pre-revolutionary period and from the West (Kelly, 2001; Kharkhordin, 1999; Tomiak, 1996). Soviet society is also not homogeneous in the class sense, and research shows that essential differences existed in lifestyle among people from different social groups (Fitzpatrick, 1999a; Starks, 2008). The lifestyle of privileged and non-privileged groups, residents of cities and rural areas, and various republics could be significantly diverse. I do not focus on these distinctions because, in my research, I am interested in the similarities that became common for representatives of different groups in the course of all these transformations. I show that there is a certain set of standards of conduct, which in the USSR in various ways under intense external control extended to the entire population, covering different groups.

Despite the similarity to the civilizational standards common in Western countries, the Soviet standards have acquired special features. Fitzpatrick (1999a), describing the first level of culture, which includes the rules of personal hygiene and elementary literacy, argues that in this sense, the Soviet state set the same civilizing goals in relation to its own groups, such as peasants, as Western countries pursued in relation to the inhabitants of the colonies, whom they considered backward. My research demonstrates that these superficial similarities between Western colonial and Soviet norms can hide differences, such as in personal hygiene standards and how and under what circumstances they are perceived to be maintained. They are relatively insignificant at first glance,
but I argue that they can play a visible role in the cultural self-identification of migrants, their daily and child-rearing practices, and their daily routine in general. For example, neatness/tidiness has become an important concept in Russian pedagogy, and differences in caring for a child’s appearance are those features that migrants begin to consider cultural, as I show in the next chapters.

In the USSR, there were enough significant inconsistencies between the official system of standards and their implementation, that many of the aspired goals were not achieved. Kelly writes about this as follows:

*That self-education, albeit in diluted form, was still the ambition of most Russian citizens at the end of the twentieth century, and ... was a belated and unexpected tribute to the success of the Soviet system in constructing symbolic reality, whatever its failures in achieving practical goals* (Kelly, 2001, p. 393).

In Part 2, I show that the Soviet state also succeeded in disseminating a specific system of beliefs and related practices that were being formed as part of the cultural habitus.

Elias (1996, 1998) explains how the peculiarities of habitus are shaped in the process of structural transformations in nation-states. In the past, specific rules of conduct were determined by external compulsions (enforced by other people and institutions), which have since been transformed into individual self-restraint apparatuses built into the habitus of every civilized Western person. For example, he shows how certain customs and taboos at the table had nothing to do with hygiene in the past and was justified by the fact that “noble” people behave that way, that it is “courtly” and, later, “civil”⁹. Rationalization through hygienic reasons comes later when these standards have spread outside the court society. Simultaneously, the threshold of repugnance related to behavioural disturbances that cause a spontaneous emotional response was changed. However, in different countries, the boundaries of acceptable behaviour differ, due to the features of the socio-historical conditions of their formation. I try to show what processes encouraged the adoption of more stringent standards regarding hygiene and health care which became widespread in the USSR.

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⁹ Considering such processes in the pre-Soviet period is beyond the scope of this thesis since my argument is based on an explanation of spreading some standards to different groups of the population, starting from the Soviet era. On the specifics of the formation, for example, of etiquette in Russia at the beginning of the 18th century and later, see Kapkan & Lihacheva, 2018; Kelly, 2001.
In the USSR, the change in political power was accompanied by serious social changes that permeated all structures of society, changing the social order and displacing the population not only geographically but also within the structure of social stratification. The country’s leadership faced very different tasks related to the spread of ideology and the need to solve many interconnected social problems. The implementation of the standards discussed in this chapter took place through different institutions, and took on standardized forms that allowed a very similar environment to be created and a very similar system of ideas to be disseminated across different parts of the country. Gellner and Anderson show the critical role that the development of various institutions such as the education system and the media played in spreading the ideas of nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 2009). In a sense, it can be concluded that the spread of ideas related to health care, hygiene, and “cultured” behaviour occurred in a similar way.

A considerable number of different channels of influence were created – institutions that formed standards, regulatory bodies that monitored their observance were developed, and various ways of instilling these standards and educating the population were formed. Thus, the concepts of health, hygiene, and “cultured” behaviour were constructed in the context of different ideas – medical, civilizational, pedagogical, and ideological discourses. In the next chapter, I describe the consequences of this division.

In substantiating my argument in this chapter, I mainly rely on the literature on the Soviet period. This chapter has shown how the historical processes, by which ideas about civilised ways of being move from being externally directed through government institutions such as education and health, become second nature and part of habitus over time. In the next chapter, I will continue to develop these ideas about the transformation of external constraints into self-constraints in the process of historical changes and during early childhood upbringing, by considering the processes taking place in the post-Soviet era. However, due to the lack of a rich literary base that would cover these processes, I analyze modern standards and recommendations for preschool educational institutions. This allows me to study the official system of views on the upbringing of children and its conditions, and to explore which norms are beginning to be reproduced without external directions. In addition, the analysis of these documents will demonstrate the trend described in this chapter, according to which the number of mandatory rules and regulations are gradually decreasing or becoming less detailed. This trend can be interpreted in the sense that these norms begin to spread and reproduce without external constraint, which will be demonstrated in the last
part of the next chapter, in which I show how migrants reproduce these habitus-forming notions of being in the world.
Chapter 6. Official upbringing discourses and reproduction by Russian-speaking migrants

Introduction

In this chapter, I continue to develop the ideas introduced in the previous chapter to show how certain standards, through the development of habitus-forming institutions, are formed and disseminated and then become part of internalized norms that people perceive as rational and universal. I also show that they acquire unique cultural traits. Therefore, I compare Russian standards and approaches for preschools with those found in Australia. I began the introduction of this thesis with a quote from Alice, a migrant in Australia, who describes the advantages of “Soviet” hygiene requirements for kindergartens over Australian ones. Among these advantages, she notes that in Russia educators teach children to wash their hands, that children have the use of a personal towel, and that their outerwear is stored in a wardrobe. As can be concluded, these reproduce the standards and ideas that have evolved within two relatively independent discourses – medical and educational. Medical requirements expect educational institutions to have wardrobes in which children and adults leave outdoor clothing, and they also rule that shoes are to be left in a particular changing room before entering the main premises; pedagogical guidelines require that educators teach children to perform a large number of actions aimed at observing the rules of hygiene and etiquette, which include the use of a towel and regular hand washing. Below are examples of these hygiene and educational standards as set out in two contemporary sources written for preschool workers in Russia.

From the sanitary standard:

1. VI. The requirements for the placement of equipment in the premises of preschool educational organizations
   6.2. Change-rooms are equipped with wardrobes for the outerwear of children and staff. Wardrobes for clothes and shoes are equipped with individual shelves for hats and hooks for outerwear (SanitaryRegulations, 2013).

From the educational program:

2. The teacher must ... improve cultural and hygienic skills, begin to mould the skills of cultured behaviour:
   - to reinforce the skills of cultured behaviour at the table;
- to reinforce the skill of appropriately using personal hygiene items (towel, hairbrush, handkerchief, clothing);
- to reinforce the ability to perform the basic cultured and hygienic rituals correctly: preparation for having a meal, preparation for sleep;
- to draw children’s attention to the cleanliness of what is being eaten; the cleanliness of rooms, objects, clothes. …

3. It is inadmissible to dictate to children how and what they should play and impose on them the game’s plots. The developmental potential of a game is determined by the fact that it is an activity organized by children themselves without assistance (For 4-5 years old children, Yakobson et al., 2016, p. 31, p. 110).

The first quote (1) is from the sanitary standard, the Sanitary Regulations and Norms for preschool educational institutions, that are mandatory. The second and third ones (2, 3) are from the pedagogical program, which is compiled by taking into account the Educational Standard for Russian Preschool Education and was officially recommended for use by preschool educators. The sanitary standard is approved by the chief state sanitary doctor of Russia, of the Russian Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) – it is part of the medical requirements that are derived from a medical justification, that is, they are formed and developed within the framework of the official medical discourse. The second document, the educational program “Rainbow,” reflects the pedagogical approach, which also has a scientific basis but is also within the framework of the psychologist-pedagogical discourse. As can be seen from the second quote (2), it too contains information about hygienic and health care standards, and includes a description of what should be inculcated in a child, while the first document deals with the sanitary and hygienic conditions for working with children, which are considered to be necessary in order to ensure a safe environment. In addition to ideas related to the upbringing of a civilized and healthy child, the pedagogical approach contains the “liberal” ideas about the need to support the child’s initiative, as reflected in the last quote (3).

After the collapse of the USSR, many things were revised, but the sanitary standards, which were formed in the context of medical and scientific approaches, proved to be constant. For example, some hygienic standards instituted in the USSR have been in force until recently, without having been revised (List, 2020a; List, 2020b). This formed the familiar context in which some of these unique standards had then begun to be perceived as universal and reproduced. Although practices
and ideology were changing during the Soviet period, and the actual implementation could be far
from what was proposed in the standards, certain ideas proved to be enduring and became part of
the cultural habitus, as I demonstrate. The approach to hygiene and health care, which included
the formation of certain nutritional practices, was being developed and reproduced through the
various institutions in which the socialization of children and the internalization of specific rules
took place. Even if a person does not adhere to certain norms, he or she can share these ideas about
what is dangerous, harmful and uncivilized. Parallel to, and connected with this, certain ideas about
the autonomous child began to develop, which were also internalized; they then began to be
reproduced through institutions and by migrants.

This chapter has three main aims. The first is to continue developing the argument about the ideas
and standards that have been internalized and that become part of cultural habitus in the process
of historical changes and during early childhood upbringing. Whereas in the previous chapter, I
described these processes in the USSR, in this chapter I analyze them in the post-Soviet period.
The second aim is to show the characteristics of the prevailing norms and beliefs around child
raising, which are reproduced by migrants. In particular, I demonstrate that the two groups of ideas
transmitted within the pedagogical approach turn out to be incompatible and contradictory in
practice. The first group of “liberal” ideas is illustrated above by the last quote (3) about the
importance of encouraging autonomy and independence in children. However, the second quote
(2) related to the ideas from medical discourse reflects the values of raising a child from an early
age to be civilized and to follow the rules of hygiene and etiquette independently. The sheer
number of rules that a child must learn under the supervision of an adult do not correlate easily
with the encouragement of spontaneity and individual initiative. While this contradiction is
masked in Russia by the taken for granted nature of these beliefs, in their new social environment,
characterised by different practices, migrants reproducing the ideas from these two contradicted
discourses begin to perceive this contradiction as a hard-to-solve “parenting paradox”, which I
explore in more detail in Chapter 7 (2.3).

The chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 1, I describe the models of childrearing in
Russian kindergartens to show which ideas are transmitted through Russian documents compared
to Australian ones, which of these reproduce the standards of the USSR, and what is reproduced
in documents without the directions from above. I analyze the two groups of modern standards
and manuals for preschool institutions represented by the quotes above: medical sanitary and
hygienic standards, which exist outside of pedagogical methods and ideas (subsection 1.1) and
pedagogical programs that regulate the model of upbringing and are developed on the basis of a psychological and pedagogical framework (subsection 1.2). Section 2 will show how Russian-speaking migrants reproduce many of these ideas and practices in their host settings that had first been spread and institutionalized in the USSR.

1. Preschool education: official discourse and practices

1.1 National Standards of child health and safety in Russia and Australia

Important Russian legislative documents regulating the activities of preschool educational institutions in the area of children health and safety are Sanitary Regulations and Norms (SanRaN) (SanitaryRegulations, 2013; SanitaryRegulations, 2020a; SanitaryRegulations, 2020b; SanitaryRegulations, 2020c). They provide directions that establish sanitary and hygienic requirements for premises of institutions, provision of food and drink, daily routine, etc., and contain a number of recommendations for creating the conditions that ensure children’s safety and health. SanRaN 2013 (SanitaryRegulations, 2013), approved in 2013, was in force until very recently and was superseded by new policies after the enactment of the new acts on 01.01.2021 – SanRaN 2021 (SanitaryRegulations, 2020a; SanitaryRegulations, 2020c).

The closest equivalent in Australia is the National Quality Standard, which “sets a high national benchmark for early childhood education and care and outside school hours care services” (NQS, n.d.). It includes seven quality assurance areas, which provide a brief description of what is regulated by the standard, and also briefly lists how this is achieved, and includes “Children’s health and safety” and “Physical environment.” It describes what should be provided, and in what areas, but it does not contain information on methods and specific actions. Based on this standard, a large number of resources have been developed that show in great detail how each area of the standard can be interpreted, offering examples of the ways in which the standards can be implemented. They are developed for staff and parents, cover different areas, and some information overlaps in them. For example, among those related to the field of health and hygiene, there are collections of guidelines, tips, recommendations, and methods of working with children in the organizations: Healthy eating in the National Quality Standard: A guide for early childhood education and care services (HealthyEating, 2019), Staying Healthy: Preventing infectious diseases in early childhood education and care services (StayingHealthy, 2013).
These Russian and Australian documents are conceptually very similar because they claim to disseminate ideas related to healthy lifestyles and child health protection that are of scientific and medical relevance. In general, they seem to reflect similar medical and scientific ideas about hygiene and health care, relevant in the modern world. Therefore, these documents have much in common. For example, they proclaim the need to regularly wash hands and floors in the rooms, and indicate where it is best to sleep and what to eat. At the same time, some differences can be found, which indicate that there are distinctly national features in these approaches.

A significant difference is that a substantial list of requirements, which are mandatory in Russia, are only advisory in Australia. For example, the Russian document specifies in detail the requirements for the lighting of the premises, the admission of children to the organization, the organization of the daily routine, and much more, which all preschool institutions are required to follow. Australian guidelines contain similar requirements, but they merely have the status of recommendations. In addition, different countries have slightly different medical and hygiene standards, and it can be concluded that Russian requirements are generally more stringent.

1.1.1 Hygiene and safety standards

Many Russian hygiene standards are often very detailed compared to Australian instructions. In Australian preschools, it is suggested to wash floors and tables once a day and when they are visibly dirty (StayingHealthy, 2013). In the Russian requirements of SanRaN 2013, it is said that floors have to be cleaned:

at least two times a day with open transoms or windows, with obligatory cleaning of floors near plinths and under furniture, windowsills, radiators, etc., where dust accumulates” (17.1), “wet cleaning in rooms for children is carried out after each meal”, and “children’s dinner tables are washed with hot water and soap before and after each meal with special rags, which are washed, dried and stored dry in a special labelled container with a lid (17.2).

Thus, given that children can be in kindergarten for 8 hours, and eat 3-4 times there (15.11), the rooms for children must be washed at least 3-4 times per day, and the tables at least 6-8 times per day. This requirement specifies not only the frequency of cleaning but even the methods of washing and storing rags in great detail. Tables should be washed with soap; rags should be kept in a special container, dried after each use.
Many modern norms and their implementation in Russia were developed in the USSR. The requirements described above are also contained in the Sanitary Requirements for Preschool Institutions adopted in the USSR in 1985, some of which have even more details. For example, according to these rules, floors also had to be washed at least twice a day, but once with furniture moved aside (SanitaryRequirements, 1985). The new standard of 2021, SanRaN 2021, simplifies some of the rules, but they are still stricter than the Australian guidelines. For example, tables can be washed with a detergent, not only with soap, but still before and after every meal (2.11.2).

Official ideas about children’s safe sleep and rest also differ. The National Quality Standard website provides detailed guidelines for using a cot (SafeSleep, n.d.). Another official Australian resource says that when children stop using a cot, they can sleep on a bed or on a mattress that is placed on a clean floor (SafeSleeping, 2020). The Russian standard contains many more requirements related to beds and their location, and these are mandatory. For example, in newly built preschool buildings, it is mandatory to allocate separate bedrooms with beds. Children should only sleep on beds with a hard base (6.12), and mattresses are not allowed. Bedroom floors must be cleaned every time after the children’s sleeptime (17.1). These requirements are also found in the Sanitary Requirements of the USSR, which contain even more details about the requirements for the beds (SanitaryRequirements, 1985).

**Figure 1: Kindergarten nap time**

[Images of children sleeping in a kindergarten setting, showing different countries: Spain (Jaen, 2020), Russia (Danilova, 2020), and Australia (Shipilova, 2017).]
The images above reflect some of the differences in existing official standards between Russian, Spanish, and Australian institutions that affect children’s practices. Although diversity in practices can exist within one country, there are differences in international standards: for example, in Russian kindergartens, children do not sleep in their clothes and on mattresses, and in many kindergartens, they also sleep in separate rooms intended only for this purpose. I will show later how Russian-speaking parents recognize these differences in the standards in educational institutions, which can then lead to anxiety about their children’s health.

1.1.2 Standards regarding illness

There are also several substantive features that relate to the conceptual differences in the Australian and Russian approaches to illness. The Australian guidelines state that fevers are common in children whose normal temperature is up to 38°C (StayingHealthy, 2013, p. 32). Treatment is required only if a child seems unwell and unhappy. A common cold is also considered an illness in which exclusion is not required, although parents are encouraged to keep their child at home until they feel better.

Different rules apply in the Russian case. According to official Russian requirements, an educator or medical professional must interview parents on a daily basis about the health of each child brought to a preschool organization. According to the inquiry results, “sick children, as well as children where there is the suspicion of the presence of an infectious disease, are not allowed to attend” (SanRan 2013, 11.2). What is meant by “sick children” is not explained but such an interpretation “with suspicion of the presence of an infectious disease” allows, apparently, staff members to consider many symptoms, including colds, as a reason for obligatory exclusion.

This can be evidenced by an interview of a paediatrician for a popular Russian-language electronic resource, which was published under the title “Can children with a runny nose attend kindergarten?” (Sadovnikova, 2016). She says that in the beginning, the disease can take hold without symptoms. Therefore, she advises that the child should stay at home with supervision if he or she has a runny nose or temperature, as well as if he or she was more tired than usual the day before and had gone to bed early. In the interview, she talks about the responsibility of parents to other children who could get infected from their child, and she recommends that the child should stay at home for two to three days more until a full recovery is assured. A daily morning examination of children in preschool educational institutions was prescribed by the Soviet
Requirements of 1985, and they remain in the 2021 standard (*SanitaryRegulations*, 2020c; *SanitaryRequirements*, 1985). Apparently, there is a clearer boundary between health and illness in the Russian official medical discourse and the approach to treatment rooted in the USSR standards, as compared to Australian standards, and this ascribes a wider range of symptoms to diseases that are considered dangerous for the child and others.

### 1.1.3 Nutritional standards

Another example of conceptual differences in the directions adopted by the two countries is found in the nutritional standards of preschool institutions. On the one hand, they reflect a similar approach to nutrition from a medical point of view. The Australian guidelines list foods that one can eat every day without harm to health, including fruits, vegetables, grain (cereal) foods, as well as foods that should never be provided to children, such as deep-fried foods or sugary drinks (*HealthyEating*, 2019). SanRaN 2013 reflects similar ideas about which products are useful or hazardous to a child’s health. For example, soda drinks, cream cakes, ice cream, chips, and other foods fried in fat must not be ever given to children. On the other hand, unlike the Australian guidelines, the Russian requirements reproduce an approach to child nutrition that is regimented and detailed. There is an extensive list of requirements for the food parameters, preparation and storage of food, as well as regular monitoring of its quality.

In addition to the list of recommended products, SanRaN 2013 contains a mandatory list of dishes that should be included in the daily menu:

*Breakfast must consist of a hot dish (porridge [*kasha*], casserole [*zapekanka*], cottage cheese [*tvorozhnyi*] dishes and egg dishes, etc.), a sandwich and a hot drink. Lunch must include an appetizer (salad or serving vegetables, herring with onions), the first course (soup), the second course (a garnish and a dish made of meat, fish, or poultry), a drink (compote or kissel [a classic sweet drink]). An afternoon snack includes a drink (milk, fermented milk drinks, juices, tea) with bakery or pastry without cream, it is acceptable to serve cottage cheese and cereal casseroles and dishes. Dinner can include fish, meat, vegetable and cottage cheese dishes, salads, vinaigrette salads and hot drinks. For supper, it is recommended to serve fermented milk drinks* (15.6).

This standardized menu, developed for all preschool educational institutions in Russia, lists many traditional dishes and was made following certain national specific ideas about what to eat for
which meals. Lunch consists of three courses and includes soup and compote or kissel as an obligatory component. Traditional vinaigrette salad, herring with onions, casserole, porridge, cottage cheese dishes, and fermented milk drinks are listed as recommended dishes. Thus, the official conception of good nutrition, disseminated through this document, includes particular dishes and their combinations. Breakfast without a hot dish, or lunch without soup, does not correspond to official norms.

In SanRaN 2021 there are fewer details: “the menu can be corrected taking into account the climatic-geographical, national, religious and territorial characteristics of the population’s nutrition,” but it still includes many other nutritional requirements, as well as a reference to the Federal Law “On the quality and safety of food,” which obliges educational institutions to include hot nutrition and the first course (usually understood as soup in Russia) in certain meals of children (FL, 2020, Article 1, 4; Article 25.2., 1). Additionally, SanRaN 2021 lists certain dishes that are acceptable in children’s nutrition, for example, bitochki [a traditional type of meatballs], syrniki [cottage cheese pancake], and oladyi [thick pancake] (SanitaryRegulations, 2020a, p. 23). Thus, the official approach continues to propagate ideas about the benefits of hot food, including the first course, and about the safety for children of specific dishes which are common in cuisines of some post-Soviet countries. It can be concluded that, despite the liberalization of nutritional requirements, the general idea of distributing food throughout the day and the itemization of what the children should eat at each meal remains.

The many differences between the Russian menu and the examples of menus compiled under the Australian National Quality Standard (MenuPlanning, n.d.) can be called cultural. In examples of Australian menus, soup is a relatively rare dish, only one main course is usually served, and the morning meal does not often contain a hot dish. In the “Menu planning checklist for family day care – full day” developed according to the standard, there is a special option, “Sandwich days”, for cases when sandwiches are provided as a main meal (MenuPlanning, 2019, p.2). Below are examples of random menus in two preschools in two countries, compiled to different standards. Australian lunch does not comply with the 2013 Russian standard, as it does not include appetizer, soup, and drink and may also contain a sandwich as a main course.
Behind this difference in standards, as I try to show, there are different cultural norms, which in the post-Soviet space were institutionalized and also internalized by parents as ideas about good nutrition, which I explore in section 2.3 of this Chapter.

These elements of the Russian conception of nutrition, including the ideas of optimal nutrition, examples of menus for children of different ages, procedures for cooking, food storage, and quality control, are all contained in Soviet documents (Guidelines, 1984). These ideas are also reproduced in modern sanitary regulations for preschool institutions, adopted in other countries of the post-Soviet space. For example, according to the national hygienic requirements of the Republic of Uzbekistan:

> breakfast must consist of a hot dish (porridge ['kasha'], casserole ['zapekanka'], cottage cheese ['tvorozhnyi'] dishes and egg dishes, etc.), a sandwich and a hot drink.

Lunch should include an appetizer (salad or serving vegetables, etc.), the first course (soup), the second course (a garnish and a dish made of meat, fish, or poultry), a drink (compote or kissel) (HygienicRequirements, 2016).

The sanitary requirements of the Republic of Kazakhstan contain information that:

> breakfast consists of a hot dish (first or second courses) and a hot drink, eggs, a bread with butter or with cheese. Lunch includes salad, first course, second course (the main hot dish made from meat, fish or poultry) and the third course (compote, tea, juices and kissel)” (Sanitary and Hygienic Regulations, 2017).

There are also many other similarities in the current instructions of different countries of the post-Soviet space that relate to methods of maintaining cleanliness, ensuring the safety of the child, and
monitoring the implementation of these methods etc (Sanitary and Hygienic Regulations, 2018; Sanitary and Hygienic Regulations, 2017; Sanitary Requirements, 2016). For example, children are examined daily for diseases and the room must be intensively cleaned. The rules seem to be composed based on similar templates and contain identical ideas, which are sometimes completely duplicated. There was a single unified scientific school of thought developed by institutes and specialists from different republics. For example, the guidelines Control over the arrangement of children’s nutrition in preschool institutions, approved in 1987, to which all preschool institutions of the USSR had to adhere, were prepared by the institutions, including those in Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Guidelines, 1987). Thus, organizations from different republics of the USSR participated in the development of these regulations, were co-authors of them, and trained new specialists in the republics within the framework of these areas. The high internal mobility of some population groups, the result of the Soviet practices of obligatory employment of graduates (the raspredelenie or “distribution” system) (White, 2007), who had to work for three years in organizations located in different parts of the USSR, also contributed to the unification of knowledge and approaches.

In this section, I looked at the standards that have become part of medical discourse and have been accorded mandatory status; in the next section I will consider the standards and recommendations that develop in the context of the educational, pedagogical, and psychological approach to upbringing. They also contain ideas about health care practices, but mainly within the context of the description of how they should be taught and transmitted to the child.

1.2 Conceptions of management of children and upbringing: independent and free vs civilized and healthy

A crucial critical point in preschool education development was the adopted Federal Law “On Education in the Russian Federation” in 2012, according to which preschool education was recognized as a stage of education and became the first level of general education (Abankina et al., 2019). As a consequence of these changes, in 2014, the Federal State Educational Standard for Preschool Education (FSES) was introduced for the first time in Russia, which reflected the main new principles and approaches to preschool education and contained a set of mandatory requirements for preschool institutions.
Each preschool educational institution develops its own basic general educational program of preschool education (BP) in accordance with the FSES and taking into account all or some of the provisions of the Exemplary Program (EP) approved in 2015 (EP, 2015; FSES, 2013; Guidelines, 2016). Thus, an educational institution developing its own program (BP) can be guided only by these documents (FSES and EP), considering EP as a framework for its activity. In addition, instead of EP, they can use the author’s educational programs (AP), which are compiled taking into account the official documents and are then available for download on a special website (RANEPA & Ministry of Education of Russia, 2019) after passing the program appraisal. Some of these author’s programs (AP) were developed before the FSES, but were then revised in accordance with it. Their number is limited, and some programs are more popular than others. For example, a study in one of the regions of the Russian Federation showed that at the beginning of 2014, 82% of educational institutions used three author’s programs (AP) “Rainbow” (44%), “From Birth to School” (30%) and “Childhood” (8%) to develop their own programs (BP), which is why I have mainly analyzed these programs in this study (Babaeva et al., 2019; Veraksa et al., 2019; Yakobson et al., 2016; yankel1955, 2016).

The developed programs (BPs and APs) have a mandatory section regulated by the FSES and EP and a variable section developed by the authors’ BPs or APs. Therefore, this second variable part can contain different content and may also vary from program to program. This variable part, which the authors of the programs have created depending on their preferences and capabilities, may reflect the usual habitual practices and norms of working with children in educational institutions, and also reflect internalized beliefs. The next subsection 1.2.1 will look at the mandatory requirements outlined in the FSES and EP relevant to my research, and then, in subsection 1.2.2, I will analyse the variable part of the programs. In both sections, I focus on the content of the programs concerning hygiene practices and, more broadly, some norms of etiquette and a healthy lifestyle, since this is an area that migrants from both countries have to deal with when they talk about cultural differences. In addition, in subsection 1.2.1, I will show how, since the adoption of the FSES, the approach to children’s autonomy and independence has been changed.

1.2.1 Mandatory part of the educational programs

In a conceptual sense, one of the significant changes in the new approach after the adoption of the FSES in 2014, is the revision of the attitudes towards the child, previously considered as an object
of upbringing, but now, according to the new principles of preschool education, recognized as a full-fledged individual participating in relations with an adult. Consequently, the child's initiative must be supported, and he or she takes part in the choice of the educational program. In order for specialists to become acquainted with the changes that are expected of them during the transition to the new standard, various training activities are carried out to explain which common practices of working with children have become obsolete. For example, in the webinar “On the implementation of the principles of the FSES of preschool education” conducted in 2015, the author, O. A. Skorolupova, who is an expert in this area and a member of the working group of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia on the development of the FSES of preschool education, gives the following example (Obruch Zhurnal, 2015). She shows a photograph that illustrates one of the ways a teacher plays with children with dolls, and explains why it requires modification and how it can be done:

*Figure 3: A photograph from the webinar*

The table – it is standing precisely in the same position in which a teacher put it; the dishes on this table are located in the same way she placed them, the dolls are sitting on the chairs or the sofa in the same way she sat them. Children will not play in this game. Firstly, because the teacher tells them: “Put everything in the same place as it was before the game, please do not forget to do it.” So the child will no longer go here next time. It would be much more appropriate if the child put this table here by him/herself, take [a toy] he or she needed from the cabinet, put not a doll there but a bear with an elephant or a dog, whom he or she wants to invite here now. This is what is also very important to understand now, dear colleagues. Reshape these your clearly defined zones; try to avoid them. Give more opportunities for children to exercise initiative and creativity. Rely on them more. Let them show this initiative and
creativity, including creating some kind of subject-developing environment for their own game. It is their game, after all! Therefore, they themselves, in fact, create the environment.

This example shows how much the norms of working with children were previously more regulated. The author cites this fact as being well understood by all participants in the webinar and believes that it is relevant for the audience, and that it illustrates the usual way of playing in kindergarten. According to this example, the teacher is not only the author of the game and creates its details, but also asks that the toys are returned to their previous position after the game, apparently in order to play it again. The change in the approach to the teacher-child interaction within a game indicates that such practices of playing within the rules created by the educator have begun to be re-evaluated at the official level. However, although the new standard focuses on giving children more initiative in certain situations, there are still many traditional practices of interaction with children in the approach, which imply that a child’s actions must be guided by following a particular model developed by an adult (Abankina et al., 2019). For example, the requirements regarding the daily routine, which must be prescribed in the organization program, have been retained.

In the FSES, some norms of etiquette and a healthy lifestyle are highlighted in the context of the educational process goals that preschool educational institutions are obliged to accomplish and in the descriptions of the results of achieving educational objectives. They are formulated in the form of general guidelines. For example, they include:

>moulding a general culture of children’s personality, including the values of a healthy lifestyle, the development of their social, moral, aesthetic, intellectual, physical qualities” (FSES, 2013).

Additionally, the EP contains information on methods and ways of achieving the assigned goals, such as by working with children from 1 to 3 years old in order to strengthen their health and develop the values of a healthy lifestyle. Thus adults “teach them to observe the rules of personal hygiene” (EP, 2015, p. 30-31), and, for their social and emotional development, they “teach them to be tidy, familiar with the rules of etiquette” (ibid., p. 28). Thus, in the main documents on which the educational and upbringing activities of institutions are based, information is contained about the need to form practices that observe the rules of personal hygiene and etiquette, but the details
of what is meant by these practices are not provided, and the methods by which they can be formed and developed are prescribed more in outline.

By the absence of details and listing of significant outcomes for children, formulated as benchmarks, these Russian documents are similar to the Australian documents: *National Quality Standard* and the nationally approved learning framework for early childhood educators. However, even at the level of these documents, it is assumed in the Russian standards, as shown above, that adults still expect to teach a child to be tidy. The notion of the importance of tidiness is one of the cultural markers contested by Russian-speaking migrants, as shown in the section 2.1 of this chapter. More details can be found in the author’s educational programs (APs), which, as shown above, can be seen as reproducing the acquired norms of working with children, and which go beyond those prescribed in the mandatory documents discussed in this section. The next section 1.2.2 is devoted to the analysis of the APs in order to show which standards, practices and other elements of the conception of upbringing in educational institutions are reproduced in these programs, without the directions from above.

1.2.2 The variable part of the educational programs: “Civilised” behaviour and good manners

APs specify specific practices and attitudes of children which are to be formed, and they contain the methods to achieve these aims. Detailed descriptions are given of what needs to be formed, how and at what age. For example, in the program “Rainbow” it is written that the teacher, working with children, must “patiently and gradually teach them to wash and dry their hands correctly; teach children to have a tidy appearance” (Yakobson et al., 2016, p. 108, 110). Special attention is paid to children’s table manners, and how they handle their things and objects in kindergarten. For example, children learn without assistance to:

“carefully arrange bread plates, cups and saucers, plates, napkin holders, put the cutlery on the tables (spoons, forks, knives), take care of shoes (wash, wipe, clean)” (Veraksa et al., 2019, p. 195, 266), to “participate in maintaining order in the room and the area of the kindergarten” (Babaeva et al., 2019, p. 112), and learn to “neatly put down clothes on the chair before going to bed” (Buneev, 2019, p. 173).

These objectives reproduce the ideas of the Soviet approach to raising children in a preschool institution. For example, the “Program of Upbringing and Training in Kindergarten” of the Minister of Education of the Uzbek SSR, which was drawn up on the “Model Program of
Upbringing and Training” of the Ministry of Education of the USSR, contains almost literally similar educational tasks (Vinogradova, 1988).

The transmission of these norms requires daily monitoring of the child’s behaviour, teaching him or her many rules of behaviour, and it involves a large number of routine practices of control and discipline. Many of these may indicate that various different experiences are perceived as dangerous and related to health. During the preschool period, the child must master many generally accepted etiquette norms. According to the programs, it is desirable that children self-sufficiently (samostoyatel’no) observe the rules and be able to monitor their implementation by the end of their education in preschool institutions. Self-sufficiency (samostoyatel’nost’) is one of the central concepts of the approach, but has a specific meaning, indicating the formed desire and need of the child to follow certain rules and norms due to his or her internalized desires, rather than due to external constraints and control. For example, the task facing a teacher working with children 5-8 years old is “to develop self-control while following the rules and norms of personal hygiene” (Yakobson et al., 2016). Discipline in this conception, paradoxically, is an auxiliary means for the formation of self-sufficiency, which, in this sense, is very close to the self-constraint apparatus, which developed in the course of civilizing processes (Elias, 1996, 2000b).

Examples from the Soviet program for kindergartens also illustrate that the development of self-sufficiency goes together with mastering different skills and abilities under an adult’s supervision (Vinogradova, 1988):

“to teach children to keep their clothes neat, to strive to be self-sufficient while changing clothes” (p. 84), “to cultivate [vospityvat’] children's ... self-sufficiency, self-discipline, the desire to be always neat, tidy” (p. 97).

Self-sufficiency reveals itself in the interiorization of certain norms and rules and is a quality formed with other “moral” qualities: the Soviet kindergarten was supposed to “cultivate industry and other moral qualities: responsibility, thrift, self-sufficiency” (p. 189). Notably, the mastering of the skills of self-care is represented within the formation of the desire to labour (p. 97). Thus, it is implied that training children to follow specific rules and norms independently is directly related to the formation of certain moral qualities.

Nowadays, some of these ideas continue to be reproduced. A survey of parents and educators, conducted in 2016, showed that, in general, they generally share the beliefs of what qualities are
important to cultivate in children. The first three most popular qualities that both parents and educators chose are: industry (67% of parents and 72% of educators), a sense of responsibility (59% and 62%), and good manners (59% and 55%) (Abankina et al., 2019, p. 119). It was concluded (Abankina et al., 2019, p. 118) that this consensus results from the public dialogue that has taken place in recent years. However, the choice of these qualities also corresponds with those moral qualities considered essential to transmit to a child, according to Soviet manuals, and can represent the continuity of some values and beliefs as a part of cultural habitus. Perhaps these beliefs about their connection with valuable moral qualities is also the reason why these structured upbringing practices remain so stable, although they contradict the spreading of ideas of the formation of self-sufficiency in a different sense, in other words, in the meaning of emotional and psychological independence.

Another study conducted in 2001 was focused on the changes that took place in Moscow childcare centres from the Soviet period to the post-Soviet period, over a ten year time span (Ispa, 2002). It shows that some childrearing goals and values were maintained from 1991, but at the same time, new ones have developed. The former goals relate to children’s physical well-being, kindness, good manners, and aesthetic appreciation, while the latter incorporate values such as respect for individual differences and independence, happiness, self-confidence, and self-esteem. Most employees of these organizations notice, as a positive development, that children are:

more relaxed, less inhibited, more spontaneous – in a word, more “free” than Soviet-era children. Several times directors pointed to something children were doing and commented on how open and nonanxious the children were compared to Soviet-era children (Ispa, 2002; p. 405).

The goals related to children’s health are operationalized through high standards of cleanliness and nutrition of children, and the presence of a nurse is mandatory in the childcare centres. Aesthetic appreciation is taken into account, along with particular ways to study music, poetry and the decoration of rooms, plus clothing and appearance requirements, such as combing hair and being neat are recognised as important. Thus, according to this study, the values of child independence are new and have spread in childcare institutions since the collapse of the USSR but even before the FSES; however, practices related to taking care of health and to learning certain manners are still considered to be important goals in the upbringing of children.
These two groups of ideas about the importance of mastering of the norms related to civilized and health protective behaviour do not fit comfortably with ideas associated with the child-centred approach, according to which children should be allowed to initiate games for themselves and where their spontaneity and autonomy is encouraged. In order for children's behaviour to comply with a vast number of standards that permeate various aspects of life, regular monitoring is required, carried out not only by parents but also by educational institutions. The child’s day is tightly regulated in the preschool institutions. He or she eats at the same time every day, placing the dishes neatly on the tables before meals, and during meals must follow the rules of “cultured behaviour”, go to bed with the whole group at the same time, and must carefully put clothes on a chair in a particular sequence before going to bed. Compliance with such rules is associated with the safety measures necessary to preserve children’s health and to bring them up as “civilized”. The child's autonomy, subject to these standards, is not permissible because it implies a certain deviation from behaviour deemed to be safe for health. It is always dangerous to sit on the ground, eat with unwashed hands, sleep on a mattress on an unclean floor, and be without a hat in cool weather. Even a one-time deviation from the rules is understood to risk the onset of health problems.

The contradiction between, on the one hand, the desire for the child to be self-sufficient (samostoyatel’niy) and independent, and, on the other hand, ideas about the importance of controlling the child’s behaviour, is also found in the research of Russian-speaking migrants (Jurcik et al., 2013; Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018). I indicate that this parenting paradox can be explained by the interweaving of ideas from two different contradictory discourses – 1) “liberal” and 2) medical and/or “civilizing.” The former, manifested in the revision of the attitudes towards a child as an autonomous participant in interaction with an adult, reflects liberalization in the ideas of upbringing, which become apparent in the FSES’s conception. The latter, related to the desire to raise a “cultured” and healthy child, reproduces Soviet pedagogical and medical ideas and coexists with the first discourse’s ideas, thus leading to a paradox. Migrant parents in my research reproduce the ideas from two discourses, including the parenting paradox. In the next section (2.1), I will show how they reproduce some of the ideas of the medical and or “civilizing” discourse, and in Chapter 7 (1.3), I will demonstrate how the paradox makes it challenging to resolve cultural continuity dilemmas.
2. Migrant parenting practices as a part of cultural habitus

2.1 “Civilised” behaviour and good manners

In this section, I want to show why certain practices and norms regarding the rules of etiquette and manners shared by migrants can be considered a part of the cultural habitus. This group of norms is analyzed in isolation from the others for purposes of clarity and because it is impossible to cover the full extent of the peculiarities that can be constructed as cultural in this thesis. In practice, when talking about differences, respondents often list many other norms and standards along with these, such as in the following example, in which Svetlana describes her daughter’s experience in a school with many migrant children from different countries.

**Interviewer:** Tell me, please, how does your daughter compare to her classmates, is she different or not? Not personally, but specifically because of the culture?

**Respondent:** I think so.

**Interviewer:** How is this expressed?

**Respondent:** The school which she attended, the class was multicultural. ... They were all diverse kids in this class, and there I noticed the difference, which is not so much in their behaviour as the children are all the same: someone does not want to share something, someone wants to share in this previous school. The difference was only in the motivation of this kind of academic performance: Chinese mothers, Asians, and we, who are Russians. I am not sure about other nationalities because it was what caught my attention. For some reason, it was Asians. In this class, there was a Japanese mother whose child also had a very fixed schedule. [The similarities were] in a certain strictness, and a cleanliness in clothes, tidiness, and extra-curricular activities immediately after lunch.

**Interviewer:** And are you as well?

**Respondent:** And I am too: “What’s on the floor? What are you doing with your hands?”. This is such a particular type of strictness. ... I tell you, there was a very diverse class, someone arrived six months ago, someone a year ago. Someone was from Iran, someone from Sri Lanka, someone from Italy. That is, there was a very diverse class of these children. In that class, I noticed that the only [distinction] was based on this certain strictness of the standards [‘kul’tury’] of behaviour. That is, we have a workload to complete. Towards also the issue of being clean, tidy, combed. Because some kids say: “I don’t want to comb myself.” And foreign moms: “That’s ok, don’t comb your hair.” But I am: “How’s that? You’re a girl, aren’t you?”
Interviewer: Is it Russian or Mari\textsuperscript{10}?
Interviewer: That is, is this strictness towards appearance?
Respondent: We say: “Do not do it!” This is Soviet. Socks with a hole are shameful, as well sitting on the floor and with legs apart. All of this is Russian, all of this. You must have good handwriting! It is a shame to write like chicken scratches, another person won’t be able to read it. All of this, all: “Stop sniffling, stop snapping, don’t chew noisily.” All of these are ethics, some rules, and so on. This is what I feel among us and among the Japanese, Asians.

Answering the question about the differences between her daughter and classmates, which she considers cultural, Svetlana speaks firstly about academic motivation but then switches to enumerate the features in the parenting styles and practices. She believes that Russian-speaking and Asian parents have many similarities, and this distinguishes them from other parents from other countries, whose children also studied with her daughter in a multicultural school. The stylistic similarity consists in strictness, but the description of the style features is intertwined with specifying parenting practices (as it was shown in Chapter 4) in which this strictness is manifested: the child has a fixed schedule and carries an additional load in addition to school work which includes attending extra-curricular and after-school activities, must write in a beautiful hand, have clean and tidy clothes, have combed hair, must sit in a particular position and in the correct places, and must also observe other rules of etiquette, such as eating in a certain way, without chewing noisily or snivelling. Here, there are many common examples of cultural differences mentioned in other interviews and data sources that relate to etiquette rules and the structuring of leisure activities.

This spectrum of repeated examples is associated with shared ideas about how to rear children in Russian preschool institutions, as described in the previous section. According to APs, children learn not only to take care of the cleanliness of their bodies, but also to look after their appearance. They learn to be tidy, neat, and to pay attention to the appearance of their clothes and hairstyle. For instance, an educator should:

*form in children the habit of keeping a clean body, tidiness of clothes, hairstyles; brush their teeth without assistance, wash their face, wash their hands as necessary, keep*

\textsuperscript{10} The respondent is a Mari, which is an ethnic group in Russia.
their nails clean; cover their mouth and nose with a handkerchief when coughing and sneezing; consolidate the skills to notice and remove disorder in their appearance without assistance; improve the table standards: the skills to use the cutlery correctly (fork, knife); eat neatly, silently, maintaining the correct posture while sitting at the table; make a request correctly, give thanks (Veraksa et al., 2019, p. 255).

Five and six year old children are expected to learn table manners, which include a fairly wide range of practices such as eating silently, and even sitting in a certain position. This quote corresponds with Svetlana’s description of what she perceives to be the customary expectations of Russian-speaking parents. These standards of social conduct, which have been formed and changed since the times of the USSR through external control and assigned rules, are now reproduced as part of the internalized norms of “civilized behaviour”, which were unquestioned before people migrated to another country.

In a new country with different codes of conduct and manners, migrants encounter other parents’ and teachers’ behaviour in similar circumstances and then they begin to perceive distinctions between these behaviour patterns. The standards of their own society, not shared by foreign parents, begin to be interpreted as a manifestation of their culture’s peculiarities and no longer simply as a part of the modern world’s universal human norms; in other words, these standards are now seen as being uniquely associated with those reproduced in some countries of the post-Soviet space. For example, Svetlana calls them Russian and Soviet. As I described in Chapter 4 with regard to the relationship between perceptions of parenting styles, practices, and beliefs, they came to consider them as markers of their excessive demands (Baumrind, 2005) or as a sign of holding many rules in high regard. However, in the context of Elias’s civilization theory (2000), when Russian-speaking parents like Svetlana make demands on the appearance of children, who insists on combing her daughter’s hair, they “civilize” them.

Tidiness is one of the traits that a “civilized” and healthy child should have from the point of view of the post-Soviet societies’ codes. The child is taught to use the comb from early childhood. Teachers play with children in special didactic games aimed at developing hygiene skills and manners. For example, in one program, it is proposed to play with two and three year old children in a game: “You need to be tidy,” which is described as follows: “Why are the toys frightened?” (Comb all the dolls, let them look in the mirror) (Buneev, 2019, p. 156). The game belongs to the section “Formation of a healthy lifestyle,” since tidiness is rationalized not only by aesthetic
reasons, but is also a sign of a healthy person. Through these games, many different norms are supposed to be inculcated in children. Children are taught not only to take care of themselves with a comb, but also how to recognize untidiness in others. The fact that dolls are uncombed is presented as an anomaly, something that frightens. Svetlana also says that by following these rules, she considers others’ opinions: “Socks with a hole are shameful,” apparently because in the eyes of others, these would then characterize the child as sloppy or the mother as an insufficiently responsible parent. This is an example of the fear of other people’s opinions, which can be interpreted in terms of “mutual horizontal surveillance among peers,” (Kharkhordin, 1999) and which is described in the next chapter (Chapter 7, 1.2). Thus, one behavioural standard can be associated with several social norms. Keeping tidy is part of a healthy lifestyle, but at the same time, it is something expected by other people, and if this particular rule is not followed it can cause anxiety. Children are taught to adhere to this norm without assistance and to pay attention to how others adhere to it, and they learn to be surprised and frightened if others do not demonstrate appropriate compliance. By the end of preschool age, it is assumed that a child can observe these norms on their own, such as health care and hygiene norms (FSES, 2013). These will be discussed in detail as a part of cultural habitus in the next two sections.

2.2 Health care and hygiene practices

Speaking about the cultural peculiarities, the respondents give similar examples of cultural differences, not only in etiquette standards of behaviour, but also in hygiene practices and the practices of taking care of the child’s health. Daily practices such as sitting on the floor, not wearing outdoor shoes at home or changing them to slippers, eating a “proper meal” at a table, being clean, staying protected from the cold and the sun, and many other practices are features that suddenly become apparent in a new environment, along with style characteristics of the parents’ behaviours, and are constructed as important markers and symbols of cultural differences. A considerable number of actions, circumstances, and objects can be perceived as hazardous to health, some of which Julia cites when she talks about the differences she sees between Australians and Russian-speaking parents:

*Because we have a norm not to walk barefoot or wear shoes in the house. It is a norm not to put shoes on the table, it is what sometimes happens here as well. Yes. And so on and so on. ... They eat outdoors on the ground!*
In both countries, it is noted that Russian-speaking parents dress their children more warmly than do Spanish and Australian parents in the same weather and season: “In the winter we have hats, in the fall we have hats. Jackets, warm socks.” The respondent in this quote mentions the differences in Spanish and Russian mothers’ health care practices, which is often expressed in the fact that Russian mothers pay greater attention to the protection from the cold and other weather conditions which are perceived as unfavourable or dangerous for the health of the child. A respondent from Australia who had experience of living in England listed the main cultural differences between parents, including the ways in which children wear a hat in temperatures when non-Russian-speaking residents do not consider a hat to be necessary: “In England, children wear hats (difference in the perception of the same temperature).” This quote also reflects the shared opinion of many respondents from both countries about particular physiological sensations – they believe that they feel colder at temperatures at which the locals do not feel it.

The analysis of the programs makes it again possible to show the connection between the norms reproduced by the Russian preschool education programs and migrants. Children in preschool institutions learn specific rules in the selection of clothes, depending on the seasons. For this purpose, it is proposed to play the game of “Dress the doll for a walk,” with children of three and four years old, during which the child selects suitable clothes for the doll (Babaeva et al., 2019). The purpose of this game is to familiarize children with:

- items of outerwear, the purpose of items of clothing, dressing rules, careful and neat use of them, drying them after a walk; the variability of some items (different types of hat, jacket or coat); using the guidelines for dressing (p. 262).

The beliefs that a child needs to be taught to follow certain clearly prescribed rules about what clothes are appropriate for what weather, including different types of hats, are also combined with rules to do with the care of clothing. Clothes need to be protected and dried if they get wet while out walking, and they must be neat. The connections between certain practices, objects, and health, which are taught to children from an early age in Russia and apparently, in some post-Soviet countries, are acquired by many adult migrants, at least in part. Unsurprisingly, people who believe that these rules are medically sound will consider Australian norms with surprise and horror, especially when the child begins to follow them instead of adhering to Russian norms.

There are many other examples in the programs to illustrate these differences in the systems of classification (Douglas, 1966). For teaching a child to connect his or her behaviour and well-being,
use of the phrase “I got my feet wet outside, so I got a runny nose” (Veraksa et al., 2019, p. 218) is suggested, which demonstrates the dangerous effects of having wet feet outdoor. Thus, from early childhood, a causal connection is formed between the state of clothing, the body and subsequent diseases. Russian-speaking migrants share these norms and give examples in which they are shocked that other parents do not consider it to be dangerous that a child gets wet playing in a puddle or is poorly dressed in the rain. For instance, a woman shares her impressions of what surprised her in Australia: “I was shocked that children could get wet in the rain and kept spending time in wet clothes. Then children certainly get sick, but their parents are surprised why.”

Other popular cultural distinguishing features noted by Russian-speaking migrants include attitudes towards a sick child and treatment approaches. They may consider that a child needs to be treated even when physicians do not see a good reason for this. A respondent from Spain considers that the Spanish, including practitioners, ignore the weak symptom of colds and do not give them such importance, as is customary in some part of the post-soviet space, and she describes how it is emotionally difficult for her to accept the doctor’s refusal to treat her daughter with a runny nose:

They [the Spanish] are like this. Snot is flowing from my child’s nose in streams, well, let it flow. No, I certainly cannot do this. I’m rushing along to the doctor. My doctor scolds me: ‘Why are you visiting me? Snot has just begun. It is not anything yet.’ Sometimes I am afraid to go to the doctor, but I want to so much.

It seems that one reason for the lack of confidence in treatment is related to the different institutionalized treatment and the diagnostic standards and views of specialists from different countries with regard to patients with the same symptoms, as partly described in the section 1.1.2. A Russian-speaking general practitioner, who worked for a long time with the migrants in Australia, told me that excessive diagnostics are adopted as a common practice of physicians in the post-Soviet space. She made this conclusion based on the medical history of Russian-speaking migrants, who had been prescribed examinations that are not customary in Australia under similar circumstances.

Migrants face two legitimate positions regarding health care and treatment for children, which can be viewed as being derived from two different classification systems (Douglas, 1966), which are culturally mediated, as explained in Chapter 1. They need to choose between them, which in some cases is very difficult to do, not least because the norms of the first approach have been
internalized. Any refusal to follow these causes intense emotional anxiety about the child’s health. As a recognized symptom of disease in the Russian-speaking schema, a runny nose is a sign of danger, causing a feeling of emotional discomfort. As shown in the respondent’s quote, she anticipates the Spanish physician’s reaction and is afraid to visit him; however, despite this fear she does still visit him occasionally. Fear about health proves to be stronger than fear about any possible criticism from the doctor, which may be directed at her worries which he considers to be unnecessary.

Migrants in different countries complain that children with a runny nose still attend a kindergarten or a school, while in Russia it is not allowed. These institutionalized norms are inculcated by the migrants themselves and can be reproduced even in an environment with different standards, both at the official level and at the level of everyday practices and everyday fears:

*German parents are never afraid that a child will get infected by other children or someone else. Children are taken to a kindergarten up to a temperature of 37.5 °C. They are not excluded when they are snotty, coughing. This is the accepted norm. “Russian” parents are in a dead faint due to this as well. In a playground: “Katya, let’s get out of here, you see, the boy is coughing!!!” 😂😂😂 ... Russian parents are terrified that their children will be infected with something from other children and, in general, are much more anxious about their children’s health. All the time, they want a doctor to prescribe a blood test. German paediatricians are shocked by Russian parents because they always seem to know better than doctors what to do and how to treat their children, but this is another story 😂 (respondent in Germany).*

The last quote reflects a formal difference in the admission of children to educational institutions in Germany and Russia (Kotliar & Smirnova, 2016) and it also reflects another feature of Russian-speaking parents which is the desire to double-check the doctors’ treatment methods and make sure that they are correct. They develop strategies which enable them to follow their own beliefs about what to do when their children have certain symptoms. Veronica, from Ukraine, and who has a medical degree from Australia, describes how Russian-speaking parents act in some cases:

*I notice this, both in Ukraine and even here [in Australia] Russian parents treat, treat, treat everything, everything is not enough for them and they want to treat everything ... They specifically ask on a forum:*
— I saw the GP, my child is coughing, has running nose. This is a bad GP, who prescribed nothing. To whom should I go to be prescribed antibiotics?

These specific health treatment practices, such discussion in online forums about disease symptoms and ways of treating them, mistrust of the doctor’s prescriptions and conclusions, and delving into the issue of treating a child, can be partially correlated with findings from other studies. It has been shown that residents of the post-Soviet space are suspicious of unfamiliar institutions, that they distrust healthcare providers in host and receiving countries, use informal networks to obtain practical information, and that they demonstrate a desire for self-improvement (Chentsova-Dutton & Vaughn, 2012; Jurcik et al., 2013; Kelly, 2001; Kostareva et al., 2020). However, based on this study, it cannot be said that Russian-speaking migrants do not trust all physicians. They do trust those physicians who, in their opinion, treat correctly, that is, firstly in accordance with certain norms that they have internalized, and, secondly, if migrants do not know themselves how to treat certain diseases, then in accordance with information that they have acquired through self-education and social networks from sources which they trust.

At one Australian Russian-speaking forum, a participant posted a book of advice for parents. The book is written in Russian by a Doctor of Medical Sciences, who describes herself as representative of a generation that grew up in the USSR and in the 1990s (Sigitova, 2020). She argues that in a new era of parenting, there is a necessity to look for new ways of rearing children which differ from those of the past. Her book teaches parents how to talk to children about different topics. In the chapter “How to Talk to Children about Health and Illness” there is a section called “What should be avoided?” According to the author, it lists three well-known typical phrases about diseases that should be avoided when addressing address a child: “Button up your jacket, or you’ll catch a cold!; Put on a hat, you do feel cold!; Do not get in there, you will fall!” She describes these phrases as enduring cultural constructs that need revision. Notably, two of them correspond to those fears that are not only shared by migrants in different countries but also begin to be perceived as cultural characteristics. A hat is not just a piece of clothing that protects from heat and cold, it is negotiated by migrants as a cultural marker, which in some circumstances indicates that the person in the hat is a Russian-speaker.

This book of advice also illustrates how some norms are being revised in the post-Soviet space. Lareau explains the differences in parenting practices between middle-class and working-class parents: the former are quicker to familiarize themselves with the best and most modern advice
and recommendations for parents, and then they try to follow this advice (Lareau, 2003, 2011). The fact that this book was recommended on one of the Russian-language forums suggests that it has already found readers who find it interesting and valuable, which perhaps means that they recognize these constructs and are ready to change, armed with new medical evidence. Reconsideration of such perceptions can occur at the institutional level, when, for example, a new concept of education disseminates new views on the role of the child in interactions with the adult, as shown in the previous sections, namely, by inviting him or her to demonstrate more initiative. Perhaps the next generation will ultimately lose any knowledge of the existence of some of the norms that I write about in this work. According to Elias (1996, 1998), habitus is not a static phenomenon. It changes under the influence of various factors, including the processes taking place both in the country of origin and in the new environment.

2.3 Nutritional practices

Pechurina (2017), in a study on the food practices of Russian-speaking migrants in the UK, describes how they construct cultural meanings of Russian food in contrast to British food. She shows that in making this distinction there is a similarity with the results of another study in which Polish migrants in London used the word “normal” when talking about Polish food, considering it to be healthier and better (smells, looks, tastes better) than non-Polish “abnormal” food (Rabikowska, 2010). Rabikowska, referring to Bourdieu, explains these dispositions and tastes for food as conditioned by habitus. This also explains that such global food as hamburgers and chips can also be constructed as Polish proper food – because eating them was a repeated practice in Poland in the past.

In my research, this dichotomy of “own” normal, healthy food and “their” unhealthy food is also an important characteristic that is manifested when parents describe cultural differences in children’s nutritional practices. However, there is an important difference from the examples from the studies above – this distinction does not apply to any products and dishes construed as national or cultural, but to those that Russian-speaking parents consider healthy or, conversely, harmful for children. In my research, parents often talk not about cultural exclusivity and superiority in relation to their children’s nutrition, but about their commitment to healthy eating practices that are medically validated. For example, many Russian-speaking migrants consider certain traditional soups and hot homemade food to be healthy and they believe that children must consume them regularly. Simultaneously, many other dishes considered traditional for the post-Soviet space, such
as *pelmeni* (Russian dumplings) or some salads (e.g. *Olivier* salad), may not be perceived as healthy or as important for children’s diets. The essential difference between these two examples is that the consumption of the first food group is viewed to be in line with the healthy dietary standards generally accepted in different countries and which is medically justified. As with other health care practices described in the previous section, they only begin to acquire cultural significance in a new environment in which these norms are not so generally accepted and are obviously different.

The same logic is as applicable here as in the description of other health, hygiene, and civilized standards. In the USSR, standards for proper nutrition were developed and disseminated, and given a special role in determining children’s nutrition. Modern research shows that Russians continue to reproduce distinct traditional eating patterns and beliefs about the benefits and harms of some foods and dishes (Ganskau & Minina, 2015; Minkova, 2013). Soup is considered an essential part of a proper meal and “lack of soup makes lunch ‘defective’” (Ganskau & Minina, 2015, p. 90; Honkanen & Voldnes, 2006). Young people who studied at the technical school also reproduced similar ideas and practices (Minkova, 2013): a proper meal pattern that they described in interviews included the idea that it is necessary to eat porridge [‘*kasha*’] for breakfast and hot soup for lunch and that meals prepared at home are healthy. Forty-seven percent of patients suffering from diseases of the digestive system, residents of cities and rural areas in Russia who differed in educational levels and ethnicity, believed that their illness was caused by the absence of hot and liquid food (Serdjukova et al., 2012). Thus, there is a certain set of products and cooking methods associated with healthy and proper food by people from different social groups, and a lack of hot and liquid food is part of the Russians’ beliefs about unhealthy eating habits.

An American journalist, Tanja Maier (2017), wrote a book about characteristics inherent in the upbringing of Russian-speaking children based on her long-term participation in an online forum for Russian-speaking mothers living both in Russia and other countries. She describes how Russians feed their children as follows:

*The usual diet of a Russian child of any age: soups, black [rye] bread, kefir [fermented milk drink] and cottage cheese [‘*tvorog*’], fruits and vegetables, porridge, compote, pancakes [‘*blinchiki*’], eggs – all of these gives a completely balanced diet. … One Russian mother recalled how she was shocked by the Dutch nursery, where 8-9-month-old children are given apple sauce and toast with Nutella”* (pp. 182-183).
In my study, migrants reproduce these attitudes and approaches to child nutrition and responses to their encounters with violations of internalized norms, such as toast with Nutella, which are prohibited in the Russian nursery.

In the narratives of migrants, sandwiches, chips, and sweets are considered to be the opposite of proper food, which primarily means hot meals and soup. The sandwich is constructed as one of the most visible cultural symbols of “abnormal” eating when it acts as a full dinner or lunch since it is neither liquid or hot. A respondent from a mixed Spanish-Russian family answers the question about what is prohibited for her son:

*What else in the sense of prohibitions? Basically, perhaps, it may be the diet practices. Their [the Spanish’s] love of sandwiches is immense when for dinner they can easily eat a sandwich and be happy and consider it a proper dinner. Additionally, there is also my prohibition not to feed the child supper after 8 o’clock.*

This narrative also conveys other beliefs regarding dinner times, which is atypically late for Russian-speaking migrants in Spain. It illustrates how various internalized norms and dispositions manifest themselves in different cultural contexts. Russian-speaking parents generally rate positively the quality of food practices implemented in educational institutions in Spain but may criticize the widespread late dinners. In Australia, dinner time is not actualized as a cultural marker, but nutrition practices at school are among the most frequently discussed and painful issues. At the same time, in both countries, sandwiches that are served as the main course of a meal are constructed as a sign of a foreign approach to nutrition. These ideas and practices had been perceived as scientifically based, far from ideology and culture. In a social environment with new standards, unconscious features begin to acquire cultural meanings, and their rationality can be questioned.

This is illustrated by the following quote from my conversation with two women, in which they answer my question whether there is a difference between Russian-speaking parents and Australians:

*Nina:* Well, the issue of nutrition. Our kids don’t eat the same as Australian kids, do they?

*Inna:* By the way, about soups: The fact that soup is a must. Many Australians would argue with you. They would say why boil vegetables when you can wrap it in a fresh
sandwich with vegetables? Many would argue about this. All these Olivier salads. We are proud of them, but when you look, there is not a single vitamin left. Maybe a little has remained in the green peas, but even in them. ... Well, the girls who just come from Russia are sure that soup is a must. ... I agree that soups are needed. But there are those who are only soup and precisely in this way. [However,] it should be in this way and in another way – it is necessary to broaden [one’s views].

When Nina brings up the topic of nutrition, Inna immediately starts talking about the differences in terms of the healthiness and harmfulness of dishes that she perceived as cultural. Obviously, she believes that everyone present understands very well why she talks about these particular dishes as being typical for two cultures, and that the fact that Russian-speakers consider soup as a healthy dish, and a sandwich as harmful, is widely known. From her point of view, Australians who take an alternative approach to eating have different, well-founded ideas about what a proper meal is. This is an example of how the rationality of their own nutritional standards is being rethought. The sandwich is no longer perceived as a dangerous dish, although the attitudes towards the soup as a proper meal remain. Interestingly, Inna distinguishes a group of Russians, different from those present – these are “girls who just come from Russia.” They are different since they do not yet have the experience of acquaintance with other standards, and have not yet begun the process of reflection which could reveal the fact that those standards that they brought from Russia may not be the only correct ones.

Douglas (1966), proving the fallacy of the applicability of the logic of medical materialism to explain ancient religious precepts, cites the prohibition of eating pork in Judaism as an example. The fear of Russian-speakers about feeding their children a sandwich for dinner is of a similar irrational nature – this practice is an anomaly in the cultural classification system. Learned from childhood and reinforced in different contexts, it becomes part of the “second nature.” When children do not adhere to this practice, parents can experience emotional discomfort and concerns about their health. It is striking how much Soviet authorities have succeeded in extending the practices beyond advice literature, official standards, and food-service organizations, towards making them an intrinsic part of people’s daily lives. In Australia, the eating patterns are perhaps more stratified in the Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu, 1993a, 1996). This does not exclude the fact that Russian-speakers’ nutritional practices are also very strongly associated with the consumption patterns of different social groups and continue to change (Caldwell, 2009; Echevskaia, 2011). However, very different people share some common ideas about proper nutrition and a positive
attitude towards certain foods, which they come to perceive as cultural in host society contexts and can be regarded as a part of cultural habitus.

3. Conclusion and discussion

Based on the works of A. Lareau, Margaret Nelson and Rebecca Schutz conducted ethnographic research in two day-care centers for children of preschool and school age, serving different social segments of the population (Nelson & Schutz, 2007). Both centres corresponded to the requirements for children’s organizations of this type, and had a reputation as institutions that met the highest quality standards in their local communities. However, they displayed significant differences in their approaches to the care of children, due to differences in such characteristics as the typical ways of interaction between children and adults, the number of organized activities offered, styles of conflict resolution, in their responses to children’s questions and so on. According to this study, childcare institutions do not compensate for class inequalities, but reproduce them in spite of meeting the highest quality standards. They set different contexts of socialization for children from working-class and poor families, and middle-class children.

In my research, I develop Elias’s (1996, 1998, 2000b) ideas, which show that different country contexts can also be viewed as different socialization environments in which certain similarities are formed. The concept of cultural habitus allows for a focusing on similarities that are not necessarily interrelated with the group’s class positions, as in the studies of Bourdieu and Lareau. In addition, habitus is an umbrella term, so its features are not a set of previously known characteristics and peculiarities: the interpretation of what characteristics constitute habitus is the result of research. In particular, this study shows that in the USSR, the formation of certain moral qualities and character traits was perceived as directly connected with the discipline and development of the child’s self-sufficient qualities. According to these ideas, children, while mastering the skills of hygiene, self-care, etiquette, also form certain moral qualities, such as industry and a sense of responsibility that are considered essential. Therefore, when studying the parenting approaches of Russian-speaking parents, it is necessary to take these features into account.

In this chapter, in studying the formal approaches to hygiene and upbringing in preschool institutions, I demonstrate the differences and characteristics of these environments. I show that they have their own country characteristics, the emergence of which can be explained not by
medical and scientific determinism but by the history of the development of countries and institutions with which they are interdependent. I reconstruct the parenting approaches used in Russian preschool organizations and some post-Soviet countries, but in the context of comparison with equivalent Australian examples. I also show how these differences were constructed within a historical perspective, and how these features, on the one hand, were institutionalized differently in these two countries, and, on the other hand, how they became part of a pedagogical and medical discourse that reproduces ideas formed in the USSR. Elias’s (1996, 2000) theoretical approach enables me to analyze how the set of norms and practices that migrants reproduce were being formed and how it relates to social transformations in particular countries. I describe the controversy of its ideas, as it combines ideas that are part of a medicalized discourse that require constant adherence to a considerable number of rules and which, on the other hand, has incorporated the values of a spontaneous and free child. Thus, the “liberalization” of the pedagogical approach takes place against more or less stable ideas related to the importance of following rules associated with health care and etiquette, and to structured ways designed to encourage adherence to these rules.

In the second part of the chapter I focused on parenting practices that are a part of the cultural habitus (Elias, 1996), which acquire cultural meanings in the process of migration. These are everyday routines and habits that often remain outside the scope of researchers’ interest within migration studies, such as dressing children according to the weather or observing table manners. Elias’s theory allows me to pay attention to those similarities shared by inhabitants of the post-Soviet space. The view on the cultural characteristics of migrants as a manifestation of habitual features shows that these are not characteristics that migrants can easily abandon or, on the contrary, try to maintain. Differences appear unexpectedly in situations of everyday interaction, in spheres that have previously been perceived as having rational causes. Following them further is not an issue of choice for first-generation migrants. Nevertheless, this is not something that they can pass on to their children, even if they would like to. Cultural habitus is formed in a broader context that goes beyond the family. The child interiorizes these norms in the family, in kindergarten, at school, etc. From early childhood, interacting with adults in the family and in different institutions, children master certain norms and learn to reproduce behavioural patterns (Elias, 1996). They are trained to look after themselves and follow specific rules automatically, with the help of self-control. Parents reproduce these standards, which they themselves learned from early childhood and became their “second nature,” but they then collide with other common norms after migration.
Elias’s theory also contributes to the studies of parenting practices of migrants by explaining what underlies some shared practices, and the notion of cultural continuity dilemma allows me to describe what happens to common characteristics in a new environment in which different norms are adopted. The norms and practices that were once imposed from above and which were intended to achieve very different goals become an integral part of everyday life, and this is perceived as a sign of a civilized society. How do migrants behave and react when they realize that other people do not share similar norms and practices in other social environments? I show this in the next chapter in which I focus on contemporary migrants: in the process of migration experience, how can those different norms and practices which began to be perceived as cultural norms and standards be challenged or not followed?
Chapter 7. Cultural continuity dilemmas: Russian-speaking migrants and the experiences of everyday multiculturalism

Introduction

The last few days in the morning, it has been 8 °C. It’s good that it has not been below zero. But... I come to school, and there everyone, well, almost everyone, is in shorts. And for some reason, just in the last few days, my son decided that he didn’t need a jacket. A chest cough has appeared.

I wonder how people dress in other countries?
Is it something wrong with us, or rather with Aussies?
(Irina in Australia)

My aim in this chapter is to provide a new perspective on exploring the experience of culture and cultural continuity in migrants’ daily life, by applying the notion of cultural continuity dilemma. In order to explain this concept, I provide many examples related to parenting practices, with an emphasis on describing processes of cultural variation, continuation, and hybridisation. This discussion helps to explain the process by which interiorised practices, feelings, and dispositions as a part of cultural habitus (Elias, 1991a, 1996, 2000b) begin to be perceived as cultural. It involves the realisation that certain cultural practices exist as internalised standards, which can be explained by rational reasons related to socialisation that took place in the past in the home country; subsequently, by losing the implicit ‘naturalness’, inherent in these practices, through the process of acquiring ‘cultural’ meaning, their rationality begins to be questioned by migrants.

These processes of realising the cultural nature of certain previously taken for granted internalised “civilised” and “rational” standards of behaviour, revising and negotiating their reasonableness, I call cultural continuity dilemma. A “cultural dilemma” can refer to any situation perceived as a cultural tension or even as a cultural clash that migrants try to resolve. In the above quote, Irina is reflecting on her own development of awareness about different cultural practices and standards. It reveals how her experience of being confronted with different cultural practices leads her to question practices she used to think were “normal” and “natural.” Her quote articulates one of the cultural dilemmas that concerns health care practices: “Is it something wrong with us, or rather with Aussies?” As shown in the previous chapter, Russian-speaking migrants in both Australia and Spain often pay attention to the fact that they dress their children and themselves more warmly...
at the same temperature than the Australians and the Spanish do. In her question, she contrasts “us” and “Aussies” because she has begun to interpret these practices to be culturally conditioned.

I describe these processes by drawing on the theoretical ideas of Douglas (1966) about the similarity of different cultures in what are perceived as cultural anomalies and ambiguities. Irina reproduces the shared idea of how children should dress at 8 °C. According to her interiorised classification system, wearing shorts in this kind of weather is an anomaly, but this practice is the norm in the Australian context. This discrepancy in classification systems raises a dilemma that is difficult to resolve since the child’s health is at stake. There is medically based rationality behind wearing a jacket at this temperature. According to Irina, not following these standards led to the child’s chest cough. Internalized schemes are not easy to abandon since they are part of the cultural habitus or “second nature.” Failure to follow the usual rules and norms causes fear, shame, and other emotions. Meanwhile, shared standards of behaviour normal to the host country, which migrants must confront, challenge rationality and cause them to think about how, for example, to dress a child.

Depending on how the dilemma is resolved, migrants rationalize the existing differences that have been discovered, in one way or another, by either continuing to follow them, or by modifying them. Cultural dilemma solutions are complex cultural dynamic processes which are not linear and they depend on many factors. Habitual features are negotiated through everyday interactions with Russian-speaking migrants and other residents of the country of origin and reception. During these processes, some behaviour standards are perceived as “Soviet” or “backward” in a negative sense, while others, on the contrary, do not lose their civilizing function and medical validity in the eyes of migrants, thus adherence to these latter standards remains strong.

I describe the main ways of solving dilemmas: these are to be seen where people either continue to act according to their classification schemes (Douglas, 1966), begin to follow the norms that they believe exist in a new environment, or try to modify internalized schemes. The different ways chosen to solve a dilemma with regard to these types are relative since, very often, the solution of dilemmas is an ongoing process of experience of cultural diversity, and this does not always involve a conscious choice. For example, migrants may only discover that their beliefs and practices have been modified when they return to their country of origin and recognize the new characteristics they have acquired.
I develop the notion of cultural continuity dilemmas within the everyday multiculturalism approach that “explores how cultural diversity is experienced and negotiated on the ground in everyday situations” (Wise & Velayutham, 2009b, p. 2); this offers a perspective on the experience of diversity that takes into account continuity and fluidity of processes of social interaction and construction of identity. This approach allows one to explore the experience of diversity with regard to daily interaction in different environments, both positive and that which is accompanied by tension and conflict. The challenges of living with diversity exhibit specific features depending on different contexts – playgrounds, schools, local areas, and other spaces of encounter (Ho, 2011; Lisiak, 2018; Wilson, 2013; Wise & Velayutham, 2014). One of the objectives of this chapter is to show how cultural habitus can underlie the differences of beliefs and interpretations among people in various cross-cultural encounters, and how the concept of cultural continuity dilemma explains how migrants change their opinions, beliefs, feelings, and practices.

This chapter has three main sections. In the first section, I provide examples of cultural dilemmas and a variety of solutions to these dilemmas. I provide several examples of how the clash between different cultural norms and practices can lead to tensions in relationships within a culturally diverse environment. In the second section I describe some of the trends in the resolution of such dilemmas. I show how cultural boundaries are constructed and deconstructed in the process of solving cultural dilemmas, and clarify the role that trust in one’s own culture and the foreign culture play in this process. If migrants perceive the world within their learned classification schemes, they not only classify anomalies in a certain internalized way, but they also reproduce their usual way of confronting them. I show that migrants, when faced with anomalies and ambiguities, can themselves try to return their familiar and accustomed order to the world around them, or, alternatively, they may expect sanctions or interference from other people. I also show how two conflicting internalized groups of values, composed of freedom and civilized and healthy behaviour, form an insoluble paradox. And in the final section, the concept of the cultural dilemma is applied to describe the processes of hybridity and to show the complexity of cultural dilemmas in which different norms can be intertwined.

1. Cultural continuity dilemmas and ways to solve them

The next discussion about one post in a Russian-speaking online group, and some examples taken from the interviews and observation notes, illustrate the differences in how the dilemmas are
solved. The author accompanied her post with a photo taken in a cafe, in which three adults are eating at a table, at the centre of which a small child sits wearing shoes:

_Tell me, am I behind the times? Today in Coles\(^{11}\), a cafe, there is a child in shoes on the table. As long as we were there, as long as he sat there. On my question to the manager of Coles, whether it is possible that the parents will be reproved, I was told that this is ‘personal people’s choice’. Do I alone think that it is unhygienic? But, please, do not mention the ethnicity of the parents. I was more surprised by the management’ attitudes to the situation._

This incident is interesting in that it coincides with Mary Douglas’s example (1966) given in the introduction chapter: “shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table,” because, at the symbolic level, it is rejecting an inappropriate element of cherished classifications (p. 37). However, apparently, there are minor deviations in ordered systems in different countries: shoes on the dining-table are acceptable in Australia in certain contexts and are an appropriate element of the system. There are several other similar examples from the comments and interviews, which, additionally, illustrate this (see below the photo from an Australian play centre taken by one of the commentators of this post). In the post-Soviet space, such parents’ behaviour in the same contexts is classed as anomalous or “polluting.” The author of the post tries to return order to the surrounding world by asking the cafe manager to reprove the child’s parents. The manager’s refusal confuses her. Douglas writes that if any given culture does not produce rules that explain what to do with anomalies, the culture has a “risk of forfeiting confidence” (p. 40). In the case of the manager’s response, the woman has no adopted way to deal with anomalies and ambiguities. She is like many others who, in the face of a violation of accepted norms, wants to interpret the fact that the actions take place outside the interiorized classification scheme and who tries to solve the dilemma that has arisen by appealing to people on the online group.

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\(^{11}\) Coles is a well-known Australian supermarket.
Figure 4: A photo from an Australian play centre posted by one of the commentators

She requests that attention is not directed at the parents’ ethnicity since, as far as I could understand, there is an Asian family in the photo. Indeed, quite a few comments interpret what happened without using a cultural lens. For example, some participants write that they themselves may do the same or suggest that the child’s mother could be exhausted. Nevertheless, many participants in the discussion share the opinion that this example illustrates the cultural differences between Russian-speaking people and Australians. At first glance, people’s reactions reflect a wide range of opinions and the absence of general trends. Some participants believe that the child in shoes on the dining-table is a sign of cultural differences and that such behaviour is unacceptable. Others agree that this situation indicates the peculiarities of Australian culture, but, on the contrary, consider that it is a positive manifestation whereas some describe the situation without using cultural explanation arguments at all. However, as in many other examples related to discussion of issues perceived as having cultural differences, this one has some characteristic features.

Firstly, it evokes a lively response from members of the on-line group. This post is accompanied by more than 500 comments, which demonstrates the very great interest in the topic under discussion. Many of the online posts that deal with cultural differences generate a vigorous discussion in which people express controversial and opposing views. For example, one post on the conditions in which children eat lunch in Australian schools received 1,100 comments in an online group of about 6,000 people. Such discussions in different Russian-speaking forums and groups often contain critical and judgmental statements about the authors or other participants, and several threads can end in conflicts. All this may indicate that the topics raised in them arouse interest and are very sensitive and painful.
Secondly, such lively reactions and controversies are often triggered by topics related to health, hygiene, as well as by discussions of those standards of behaviour that are considered as “civilized.” This is a certain set of repeated examples that includes issues related to the norms and practices from the previous chapter. Discussing the popularity and emotional intensity of this post, some participants recall other posts with a lot of comments sparking a similar debate such as wearing slippers at home (for example: “like the one with slippers =))),” lack of special places to eat at school, and sitting on the ground and other very popular examples that arise in interviews and forums in the context of discussing cultural differences in parenting and environments of child-rearing.

These cultural reflections are examples of “cultural continuity dilemmas,” solved by people, like the author of the post, who question whether their perception and judgment of the observed behaviour is correct. They try to find support in the Russian-speaking community, but they can only find it partially because these differences are interpreted in various ways. Douglas (1966) describes that the ways of treating anomalies can be both negative and positive. The former presupposes ignoring or condemning them, and the latter requires the formation of a new scheme of classifications in which anomalies have a place (p. 39). Migrants are a special case as they deal with at least two legitimate alternative classifications. They may prefer one of these schemes or they may try to reconcile them by modifying, which constitutes three main ways of dealing with dilemmas.

When migrants remain within their own classification system, they interpret these events in a familiar way, such as considering them from the viewpoint of their own compliance with civilising or medical standards, which they perceive as universal, based on rational reasons. For example, some people believe that parents’ bad manners cause their behaviour in the café. Others rationalise it in the context of medical discourse. Such an explanation of what happened then allows them to consider the violation of norms as a manifestation of insufficient awareness of the negative consequences of this behaviour:

People put their shoes on the table because they don’t know what’s on the soles. My husband, with two university degrees, always wore his outdoor shoes in the house and said that I was exaggerating until I brought the facts from the lessons that we have 96% of faeces on the soles. So, in a panic, the poor husband has immediately begun to
change his shoes from then till now. But if people do not know these facts, of course, they shove their shoes everywhere.

Staying within their own schemas of classification, migrants not only interpret the situation in the usual way, but they also act following the internalised rules of how they should behave in such situations. The woman above tried to inculcate these norms in her husband by explaining why his habit is dangerous from the medical point of view; others, such as the author of the post, try to admonish people who are perceived to be breaking the rules. A negative attempt to treat anomalies, where people either condemn them or try to return the order by encouraging behaviour that is consistent with their rules, is a practice that respondents regularly mention.

Parents can find it very hard to compromise or accept other standards because of their strong concerns about their children’s health. Internalised beliefs about what is dangerous and frightening lead to different interpretations of the same situations by different participants in the interaction, and can cause regular worry and tensions. A clash of different perceptions occurs within varying situations encountered in everyday life. However, the relationships between members of a mixed family or between parents and children, and the reproduction of norms in educational institutions, appear to be contexts in which such tensions can be difficult to avoid, because they have become part of daily experience. The attempts to influence peoples’ behaviour by encouraging them to follow rules that do not share can lead to conflicts. It can be difficult for parents to explain the reasons for their requests and demands to follow their standards, due to the fact that people who have socialised in different environments are unable to understand the depth of fears experienced by these parents, who believe that breaking the rules is a threat to their children’s health. The following example illustrates such a cultural clash associated with different ideas about hygiene standards between the respondent and her husband’s Australian mother:

“At first, [my husband’s] mother began to visit us once a week so that we could go shopping, to a cafe because she could sit with her [granddaughter] for three hours. But one day, she came from a medical institution, where she had visited a friend’s husband. It is like a nursing home, something like this. Generally speaking, I knew that she had come from there, and I asked her to wash her hands. That is, I knew that she did not come from home. And the mother grew hysterical. Until that time, she had changed her shoes: I had given slippers to her, there had been no problems. But then I asked her to wash her hands and change her shoes as usual. She immediately locked herself
in the bedroom, and declared that she had new footwear, new shoes ... She shouted. Despite the fact that I was holding the child in my arms. She yelled at me. She said that it was idiocy, that she was never asked to wash her hands anywhere, that she was not dirty, that she will never cross the threshold of our house, that: ‘I do not want to sit with your child,’ and she left. ... Though I very politely asked her: ‘Pleeease!’ in an ingratiating voice. That is, I didn’t demand. Well, it was not an adequate response ... Generally speaking, after this incident, we began to visit her. That is, at first, I was very angry and did not want to, but then I understood that she needs someone, at least some kind of social circle, some kind of family. ... That is, she no longer wants to visit us. She came here once more time; she just didn’t come down there; she was here wearing shoes. I didn’t say anything to her. Now we either go out somewhere together or to her place.”

Concerns about the child’s health can be so strong that parents are not able to ignore the violation of their norms in certain encounters, and thus they try to provide children with the conditions that they consider necessary to ensure their safety. In Australia, Russian-speaking parents regularly complain about the organisation of meals in schools and preschool institutions which, according to them, contains many different problems from the perspective of safety and a healthy lifestyle, such as the lack of opportunity to eat hot, “healthy” food, not having a school refectory, and sitting on the ground during lunch breaks. While in the country of origin the educational institutions act as bearers and disseminators of the same norms that parents share, in the host country the equivalent institutions are seen as being unsupportive of parents and as hindering the implementation of their parenting strategies. These perceptions then justify daily worries about the child’s health, and as a result, parents may try to encourage children to follow their rules on their own, for example, by suggesting that they sit on their own arm or leg during school lunch break or that they take homemade food at least a few times a week, or by choosing an institution that matches their beliefs on quality. They may even try to change the foreign standards, as in the following example.

A Russian-speaking migrant, Karina Bright, took on an activist role to change Australian schools’ food system and gave an interview about this to the SBS Russian radio, which was published with the following description:
The way school lunch organised in Australia is often a point of heated debates in Russian-speaking forums especially between the newly arrived parents for who eating while sitting on the ground is a foreign and wild concept. Meanwhile Australians don’t see anything wrong with it. We speak with Karina Bright who is on a mission to change the system of school food services (Elgina, 2018).

Notably, this description reproduces the popular point of view that the newcomers react more emotionally to some examples of cultural differences and that their perceptions may change over time.

Another way to solve a cultural dilemma is to begin to perceive foreign standards as having an advantage. For example, some migrants believe that they reflect the set of cultural differences that make this country an excellent place to live in. When I asked one Russian-speaking woman why, in her opinion, people sometimes put their shoes on the table, she said that it is for such examples why she loves Australia: people do what they like, and no one pays attention to it unlike in Russia; Australia is free country (from observation notes). The fear of dirt on shoes ranks with taking notice of it or with the practices of reproving. All of them are perceived as negative cultural traits that are not common in Australia, the absence of which endows the country with advantages, a manifestation of the fact that it is a “free” country.

By resolving cultural continuity dilemmas in this way, parents try to change the parenting practices that are interconnected with them. Anna, talking about Russian-speaking parents’ specific characteristics, describes how she has reconsidered her views on the child’s tidiness and change behaviour:

This is an image of a boy and a girl, when a girl should always be well-dressed and combed, ironed, and so on. Poor Valya [a daughter], how I tortured her in childhood ... That is, one used to treat things with care and wear things for years. With Fedya [the youngest son], of course, everything is already different, that is, he is there, you know, in the sand and in the water: I wash, throw out, and go and buy a new one, that is, it’s no problem. But towards her, I had very strong attitudes, that is, all the Australian girls were running around, you know, stained with sand, and so on. Me: ‘Valya, don’t... ’ (depicts a gesture used to reprimand a child). ... I ironed Valya’s clothes. For example, I stopped ironing children’s clothes probably a year ago. ... We are very much dependent on public opinion. That is, in the West, they haven’t cared
for a long time... How can I say it? They are: ‘In the way in which I feel comfortable, I am at my ease.’ ... That is, they absolutely feel comfortable, as if they are in their own shoes. We have a lot in this regard: ‘yeah, what will others think, and what will they say?’

The interview took place when Anna had resolved the dilemma she had faced while observing some Australian parents’ behaviour and attitudes towards this. It can be concluded that she began to accept a new classification system, according to which some practices of raising Russian-speaking parents are anomalies. She now believes that negative cultural features underlie the concern about the child’s appearance. Russian-speaking people became seen as being dependent on others’ opinions, and what previously seemed an anomaly is now considered as the norm and a sign of independence from external opinion. Previous parenting practices have lost their rationality, and the child-rearing style that accompanied these practices now seem overly strict, demanding, and unjustified.

Many migrants problematize these differences and try to find a compromise. This is another way of solving the cultural dilemma, where migrants try to modify their habitual practices by taking into account the new standards. In an effort to modify their behaviour according to the new norms, parents reduce the level of control over the child’s behaviour at home and in public places and to change the types of instructions from a directive form to a softer one. They also reduce the degree of control over health, which had been demonstrated through frequent visits to the doctor, using clothing to protect against the weather, etc. A respondent from Spain describes how her attitudes and behaviour towards a child have changed under the influence of Spanish norms:

And I now have adapted to some degree and also have begun to have a more relaxed attitude to the child. Of course, I explain to her that it is not permissible to scream if you are in some place. It is ugly to scream. But I don’t do this with her: ‘Sit down, I say, keep your back straight.’ Yes, I still correct her, but I say: ‘Let your back be straight’, but not in a fanatical way.

This example shows how difficult it can be not to follow internalized norms. The mother cannot completely relinquish control over the child, requiring adherence to the following of specific rules, and instead tries to do it less strictly. These two schemas are not easy to combine since they are not only about the parenting style, as I show in the previous chapters, but are also about different
beliefs of what is permissible behaviour on the part of the child. Perhaps, in other countries, these certain civilized standards are being acquired in a slightly different form, in a different way, or at a later age than in Russia and some other post-Soviet countries. Thus, migrants can try to change, taking into account the standards as they were understood. These may be “imaginary” standards, different from the ways in which local people perceive and follow them.

Importantly, resolving dilemmas is a long-term process that does not necessarily involve final solutions and conscious choices. This is a cultural (dis-)/continuity experience, which may depend on the conscious preferences of migrants or may be related to the experience of living in another country. Some respondents say they only really recognize how they have changed when they return to their country of origin, and it turns out that they and their children are already behaving differently. In the next Section 2, I will highlight some important trends in how cultural dilemmas are dealt with.

2. Resolving cultural dilemmas: some trends

2.1 A "proper Russian vs. Western vs. backward Russian" culture

In order to resolve cultural continuity dilemmas, migrants choose between different groups of standards and accepted behaviours and then try to interpret the nature of cultural differences. This choice and interpretation depend on the general trust and attitude towards one’s own and other people’s culture. These processes are influenced by the features of identity and Othering, which I describe with the triad “proper Russian vs. Western vs. backward Russian” (see Introduction Chapter 1). These features manifest themselves in two ways. Firstly, since the transition into post-Soviet societies, different cultural forms and symbols, lifestyles, and generally accepted practices have been constructed as saturated with Soviet influence. The migrants, solving dilemmas, also answer the difficult questions of which of these peculiarities perceived as cultural are important to transmit and maintain, and which of them are examples of negative “Soviet” or “backward Russian” features. Secondly, the West has traditionally been an important Other for the construction of identity, with which not only a comparison was made, but which was also perceived in different periods as the bearer of certain important norms and rules. As Kelly writes: “there has been a long Russian tradition of assuming civilized values to be of universal significance, yet embodied in their most perfect form by Western European societies” (Kelly, 2001, p. xvi).
The discrepancy between the “Imaginary West” (Yurchak, 2006), or rather the ideas about the globality and universality of some of their own cultural norms, with real practices, often form the basis of new dilemmas, such as:

*How does, in one of the most economically developed and wealthiest countries in the world, the education system deny the need for hygiene (eating on the floor, without washing hands), the importance of healthy and fresh food for growing organisms, a culture [standards] of proper nutrition?*

In this quote, expressed by a parent worried about the lack of a refectory in Australian schools, she is surprised that her ideas about civilized behaviour and norms adopted in civilized countries do not correlate well with what actually happens in Australia, which she has perceived as being a civilized country.

Russian-speaking migrants, faced with yet another dilemma, try to classify the observed discrepancies within this triad. It is not easy to do this, but it is even more challenging to find agreement – in discussions with other migrants, there is often someone who criticizes the discussed Russian practices and standards as being manifestations of something negative or Soviet. The threads of comments about the experience of one of the participants as a nanny and educator in an Australian kindergarten, and some other examples related to this topic illustrate this:

*Educator:* I am in kindergarten all the time. My first day in kindergarten was not just a shock but a nightmare. I still can’t get used to it. Although my teacher tells me that there are very, very good kindergartens, but many of them seem just horrible. Every day I see how children play in the kindergarten, and every day is a new shock for me.

...  

*Mother:* what’s going on there that shocks you? I am interested in it since the children have been going to a kindergarten for several years now. Maybe I don’t understand something. Thank you

*Educator:* well, when I see that children sleep on the floor, on thin mattresses. When they come in from outside and go to bed in the same clothes and shoes, when an educator calmly can walk in shoes over the sheets that are on these mattresses. When they all run barefoot outside in the morning, and their feet, hands, and feet, their noses are icy when the snot flows in a stream and no one wipes them off. When babies who are 10-14 months old are given food to eat unassisted, and this is not bad, but it is
outside, dangerous and their shoes. Our kindergarten is the right area, it is clean. Moreover, I would not want my child to be in such a kindergarten, and secondly, I cannot just see other babies in such a state. Of course, I wipe them off, I don’t give sand to eat if I see, I also try to wipe off their hands, but I can’t do everything for everyone! Maybe for someone, this is normal, but I cannot accept this, I can live with it, yes, but not accept it!

But perhaps this is not the case in all kindergartens, because we do not live in the most luxurious area, perhaps this fact is the point!

Mother: I understand you. Yes, it’s the same situation in our kindergarten. Just precisely like you wrote. I do not worry about this anymore.

Educator: You have nerves of steel. But, as an educator, I just cannot. They are children, afterward, it hurts their eyes, they sneeze, cough and the head crawls off the mattress right on the floor, the children’s clean face, where they just walked with shoes. Ugh!

Mother: It’s not about nerves. I know that they are happy to go to kindergarten and that everything is well with them. All the above points do not scare me. I recall a kindergarten in Russia with horror and how they beat us there and forced us to eat our own vomit. These are horrors. But I do not consider that happy children running barefoot are a problem. BUT as a mother, of course, I’m glad that there are educators like you in kindergarten.

This thread of discussion, dedicated to Australian kindergartens, demonstrates how migrants’ ideas about the proper standards of preschool institutions reproduce the official rules from the regulating Soviet and Russian documents, as well as the norms transmitted through the pedagogical manuals and programs described in Chapter 6: children need to sleep on beds with a solid base, change their shoes when they come in and change their clothes when they go to bed or get dirty, eat neatly, and be clean. Moreover, any violation of many Soviet and post-Soviet standards is perceived as dangerous due to the consequences for children’s health: it is dangerous for them to run barefoot outside, be in wet clothes, sleep on a thin mattress and unwashed floor, and not wash their hands.
However, even in the discussion of such issues, some opinions reflect a different way of interpreting them. For example, Kristina explains this ambiguity as a manifestation of Australian culture’s positive aspects, and says that the cleanliness of children and premises in Soviet kindergartens was maintained by implementing a rigorous approach to upbringing, in accordance with which children were not allowed to play with toys and get dirty:

*In a wholesome kindergarten, it cannot be as clean as in the kindergartens of the USSR. Such purity is achieved by terrible rules and terrible treatment of children. In my kindergarten, we were not allowed to play with toys and were regular yelled at if we got dirty.*

She used the example of the USSR in a negative critical sense to describe those practices that other Russian-speaking migrants may well describe as “Soviet” in a positive sense or “proper Russian”.

Many migrants problematize these differences and try to find a compromise. The woman who is responding to the kindergarten teacher, demonstrates such an attempt to solve the cultural dilemma differently. She supports the educator’s approach to treating children in kindergarten but believes that in Australian kindergartens, children are happy, in contrast to her Russian experience: “*I do not worry about this anymore. ... I do not consider that happy children running barefoot are a problem.*” She used to be anxious in the past, but her attitude has changed as the children feel happy. As a result, she said, she redefined her views about the dangers posed by these behaviours and by the local environment.

These examples do not mean that a person considers everything that he or she perceives as Soviet or Russian as categorically negative or positive. For example, in one narrative, the epithet “Soviet” can emerge in a positive sense and then appear in a negative sense to describe other features. The following example shows the attitude of Masha, a migrant from Ukraine, to her son’s Catholic school in Madrid. Describing the school, she emphasizes its strictness and discipline as positive characteristics:

*There they have discipline, they have a uniform, there is strictness and quality. It is the best school in my point of view.*

Then, listing the advantages of this Catholic school with partial payment of the fee compared to other private and free public schools, she again speaks of the strictness and exactingness, which is expressed, including the fact that underperforming children repeat a year:
Therefore, it is better in this semi-private one, where they demand, as they demanded in our Soviet school. And very often, if a child lags behind, many pupils are held back. I like the program, I like the demands, I like the approach of the teachers, how they approach the learning process here.

In another part of the interview, Masha returns to describing the positive aspects of her son’s school and says that the school was able to overcome the bullying in the class in relation to him. This is how she describes the problems he faced:

Look, Raya, what else I like in my school. He had moments last year, three or four people pestered him. There is no such coercion as excessive physical violence here, as we had in the Soviet one. Here is the psycho-emotional.

Significantly, Masha twice uses a reference to the Soviet school to describe the features of the approach of the Spanish school, but, in the first case, she speaks of a positive aspect, of exactingness towards students, and in the second case, of a negative aspect, in that amongst the children there was the possibility of resorting to physical violence. This is an example of an ambivalent attitude towards “Soviet” practices and norms, which migrants can comprehend and reconsider as being acceptable or, conversely, undemocratic and outdated.

Thus, migrants can resolve cultural dilemmas in various ways. Trust in Western norms and distrust of Russian/Soviet cultural norms, especially when reinforced by one’s personal experience, can influence which pattern is reproduced. Certain practices and norms may begin to be recognized as Soviet in a negative sense, as being outdated or as having been inherent in a totalitarian system, whereas foreign practices are assumed to be a sign of a free society, not constrained by a framework of endless norms and rules. Therefore, even the shoes on the table can be constructed as a symbol of the freedom of Western society, while the Russian attitudes to them as a product of the Soviet disciplinary system. However, the problem is that there is no precise logic that would make it possible to determine which indications of post-Soviet culture are “Soviet” heritage in a negative sense, since the state tried to control all spheres of life in the USSR, and culture can be adapted to meet ideological and disciplined goals. A respondent from Germany describes the ambiguous attitude towards the “Soviet” legacy as follows:
And it often even happens like this: a person criticizes severely something Soviet, the past; someone assents to him and criticizes even more, and then he suddenly begins to praise it and be proud of it himself. Such a shift that he almost contradicts himself.

Nevertheless, there are some practices, norms, and approaches that are considered cultural and are often described positively, for example, the efforts of Russian parents to give their children a good education, and there are others that are described negatively. The latter include the shared practices of mutual control and unsolicited advice, which will be discussed in the next section.

2.2 Mutual control and unsolicited advice

According to the opinion of Russian-speaking migrants, mechanisms of horizontal social control, which make it possible to influence and regulate social relations, exist in post-Soviet societies. It seems that the ordinary members of these societies are vested with disciplinary functions: they have the right not only to condemn those who do not follow certain rules but also the right to exert direct influence, such as admonishing a mother who demonstrates neglectful behaviour towards a child. It is possible that a person’s attempts to reprove parents who put a child wearing shoes on a table, or passengers in the subway who put their feet on the seats, are being implemented in the context of this method of maintaining public order, and with regard to a set of sanctions for violating established norms that are permissible under acquired standards of behaviour. On the one hand, people themselves perform this function of public control when they try to influence people’s behaviour, when the behaviour is perceived as unacceptable. However, on the other hand, they are also afraid of being sanctioned and being themselves subjected to admonitions from strangers. An example of the latter is an excerpt from an interview given in the Chapter 4: the respondent believed that random passers-by could scold children or their parents for playing noisily with a water fountain in Russia.

Public methods of admonition and control were an important component of the concepts that underpinned Soviet disciplinary methods. This was one of the key guiding principle of Makarenko’s pedagogical approach, and then of the entire Soviet approach to socialization, implemented in all educational institutions in the USSR (Bronfenbrenner, 1962; Kharkhordin, 1999):
Each member of the collective is encouraged to observe deviant behaviour by his fellows and is given opportunity to report his observations to the group. Reporting on one’s peers is esteemed and rewarded as a civic duty (Bronfenbrenner, 1962, p 51).

Such “practices of mutual horizontal surveillance among peers,” which included admonitions to right behaviour, became an integral part of the system of disciplining citizens during the Khrushchev period and applied to all spheres of life (Kharkhordin, 1999, p. 355). It was during these years that collective surveillance and disciplining parents took on many forms (Field, 2007). Various structures appeared, such as house and factory committees and volunteer groups that advised parents, exercised control over children’s upbringing and which were supposed to influence those parents accused of neglect or indulgence. Perhaps the practices of monitoring, advising, and attempting to influence behaviour that migrants talk about are habitualized practices of mutual disciplining, that have become a ritualized part of everyday life.

In addition, a comparative study of Russians living in Russia and European Americans showed that Russians were more likely to give unsolicited advice and advice to strangers (Chentsova-Dutton & Vaughn, 2012). This is illustrated by a quote from BBC correspondent James Rodgers, who:

\[
\text{time and time again found himself being lectured by passersby on personal matters,}
\text{soon realizing that in Russia his behaviour appeared to be ‘everyone’s business’; ‘You can’t really say ‘Mind your own business!’ in Russian. You can translate the phrase literally, but the concept is not well understood’} (Chentsova-Dutton & Vaughn, 2012, p. 687).
\]

As an example of the prevalence of advice-giving in an informal context in Russia, Kelly describes an incident from her own experience:

\[
\text{‘I wouldn’t advise it’, said the man behind me in a queue at the Lenin Library in 1991, as I stretched out my hand for a plate of egg mayonnaise} (Kelly, 2001, p. xxi).
\]

Such practices are a consequence of a special model of social support fostered in Russian (Chentsova-Dutton & Vaughn, 2012).
The line between admonishing practices and advice is sometimes blurred, as the advice can be given in the form of an admonition. Tanya, an Australian respondent, describes how she and her family visited her hometown in Russia:

*Here we are already accustomed to the fact that children sit easily on the floor, well, they are small, and there is nothing wrong with this for us. Well, it is usually quite normal to do this here. We visited a health resort in Chelyabinsk. And my Marina sat on the floor there, on the stairs. And with some girl she just sat there, doing something. The old women came up to me: 'What are you doing? She will gain nephritis of the kidney. She will be childless.'*

In this story, several tendencies are woven together, as already described above. Firstly, a shared cultural belief, according to which sitting on the cold surface is dangerous, is mentioned. Secondly, Tanya herself is no longer the bearer of these attitudes. Living in another country has changed her attitude towards these practices. Thirdly, it can be seen here that the respondents’ fears about possible interference when in the company of strangers, when certain generally accepted norms are violated, are valid. The parents and daughter’s behaviour were not a breach of the peace, so the interference by the women is instead an example of admonition-advice, whereby passers-by expect and want to both help and teach parents, apparently acting within the framework of this permissible model of social support.

On the other hand, in similar situations, the Australians and Spanish may not respond to violations of the rules, not because they do not want to intervene, but because they do not perceive such behaviour as violations or do not consider the consequences to be dangerous. The reaction of the post-Soviet space inhabitants may be related to a different threshold of repugnance and the frontier of shame (Elias, 1996) in certain situations. In other cases, on the contrary, migrants may strike local residents by their behaviour, which is no longer perceived as being dangerous in the post-Soviet space. An example from the study of former USSR mothers in the United States illustrates a situation where an American neighbour admonishes a former USSR woman for leaving her child to play unattended, and warns that other neighbours would consider telling the police about it (Komolova & Lipnitsky, 2018). The woman is shocked by such a reaction since she does not share the idea that it is dangerous to leave the child unattended and therefore does not consider such a reaction to be consistent with the situation:
For example, when we just arrived [to the US], Alexandra [pseudonym] was 3 years old, and she went to play in the building. . . . and all of a sudden my neighbour rang my doorbell and said, ‘Oh, what are you doing, the neighbours are going to call the cops, and they will take your child away!’ I grabbed my child and told my husband, ‘I am going home. I won’t stay here another 5 min. What kind of country is this that your child can be taken away to another family because she ran around in the building?’ (p. 6-7).

This is an opposite situation, when the behaviour of migrants is viewed as an anomaly and neighbours try to intervene and change this behaviour by resorting to the help of superiors, in this case the police. In examples of Russian-speaking migrants from my research, such control and influence over behaviour usually remains at the level of horizontal relationships between people of equal status and powers.

However, it is crucial for my research that migrants imagine such practices as real and of a cultural nature. These features appear in interviews and are mentioned on forums in order to explain the causes of conflicts in Russian-speaking communities, their distrust of Russian-speaking people, the reasons they left their country of origin, and also what shocks them repeatedly when they return. For example, several times in an interview, responders use a well-known joke based on a play on words. To show that the practice of giving advice is a harmful cultural trait originally from the USSR, they say that Russian-speaking people are from “strana sovetov” (the Land of the Soviets, a well-known synonym for the USSR). The Russian word sovet (pl. Sovetov) can be translated as either advice or Soviet. Therefore, “strana Sovetov” as a synonym for the USSR may have a different meaning: the Land of Advice. Here is an example of a comment on a post whose author complains about receiving unsolicited advice from Russian-speaking migrants:

Sorry, but it’s a strange post from someone who grow up in the post-Soviet space, where personal boundaries did not exist, and the Motherland was called “strana Sovetov” for a reason 😊 This is a really distinguishing feature of our mothers and grandmothers and almost a cultural norm :)) from Au mothers, Englishwomen, etc., you never hear this, and in their [online] groups either

Here is a similar opinion from another discussion, but already regarding the practice of reproving:
Look, you are so afraid of Russians, that it sounds as if you have never lived in Russia. We went home to Moscow twice, and sometimes we also found ourselves in different situations. In my experience, people there are gloomy and tough, ready always to repulse just because of the quality of life, the need to stand up for themselves every day, they prepare for trouble in this way. ... They often reprove the child, not because of their malicious nature, but because it is so customary in Russia in society, helping a mother to raise a child 😅.

One of the participants in the discussion replies to her: “It’s not about fear. You just get out of the habit of utterly disrespectful communication and collective upbringing.”

The term collective is not applied to a small community in the last quote, such as a neighbourhood or organization-based community. The collective, in this sense, is an imagined community of Russian-speaking people, but it exists not only in the imagination but also as a collection or association of strangers who may demand that certain cultural norms are followed, which migrants themselves have either heard about or have previously encountered. Such beliefs about some Russian-speakers also contributes to the formation of distrust towards unfamiliar Russian-speaking people. I expand on this in more detail in Chapter 10 on identity.

In the next section, I will show how the “parenting paradox,” which is the internalization of various groups of values and norms, is reproduced in a new environment and affect how cultural dilemmas can be solved.

2.3 Independent and free vs civilized and healthy: parenting paradox

In Chapters 5 and 6 I show that various institutions, which have a habitus-forming effect, have formed over time in Russia. In particular, national standards for children’s health and safety are developed and approved by medical organizations. This process creates a perception of these norms that they are scientifically and medically justified. At the same time, good manners and “cultured” behaviour remain an important goal of socialization. The pedagogical literature and manuals for preschool educational institutions’ employees contain much information that concerns the need to develop these skills and to follow the rules related to hygiene, health care, and etiquette. According to this approach, the role of the adult in the transmission of these norms to children in early childhood is significant, and discipline acts as an essential tool that allows children to form independence with regard to the meaning of the self-control apparatus (Elias, 1996, 2000b), and
the internal needs to obey these rules on their own. At the same time, in the late Soviet and post-Soviet period, beliefs around the importance of developing independence, freedom, and spontaneity in a child have spread. As a result, in the modern Russian approach to parenting, which is transmitted through medical and pedagogical standards, as well as in literature for parents and educators, two conflicting ideas are intertwined: firstly, the values of raising a child to be relaxed, spontaneous, and “free” (Ispa, 2002) and secondly, ideas about creating clean and safe settings and about the importance of internalizing a multitude of norms that relate to hygiene and civilized behaviour.

These two groups of values construct the optics through which parents look at and evaluate cultural norms in new countries. On the one hand, they are afraid of not following specific rules; on the other hand, they observe the manifestation of other forms of behaviour that they also value and which, in their opinion, Russian-speaking migrants exhibit to a lesser extent than other parents. For migrants, the attempt to combine these ideas forms an insoluble paradox. Following a large number of interiorized rules does not fit well with providing children with autonomy, which Russian-speaking migrants also value. Here is how this contradiction is formulated in one dialogue with a woman attending a Russian-speaking playgroup in Australia:

**Interviewer:** Then, do you think Australian upbringing is any different from that of Russian-speakers?

**Respondent:** Our people [nashi\(^{12}\)] are more cultured, more cultured. Because I work, I have worked a lot, for five years, I worked for four years before maternity leave: Oh, what things have I not seen! I was just shocked by this whole country. What things have I not seen, really!

**Interviewer:** For example?

**Respondent:** It seems that a person has a higher education, yes, but he can eat and then burp, and the louder, the...

**Interviewer:** Do you mean a colleague, for example?

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\(^{12}\) It is difficult to translate this term since it is a specific construction to the Russian language, indicating a particular “our group” that is discussed. Hosking (2001) writes about this: “Russians have always been actively conscious of the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders,’ an attitude which they readily transfer to the international plane. The contrast between my (we) and oni (they) is very marked (…) The phrase \(u \) nas (in our village, at our workplace, in our country) is very evocative and frequently used; Russians are always surprised that English has no precise equivalent” (p. 17). It is clear from the context of the interview that she uses it when talking about Russian-speaking migrants.
Respondent: Yes, he can do it that the whole office hears, and this is still the most harmless thing that I have seen. Therefore, our people, of course, are more cultured. But maybe with others [with strangers]. When they are between themselves, maybe... I don’t know, I have no explanation.

...

Interviewer: And how do parents interact with their children, are there any differences?

Respondent: Probably, the Australians give more freedom, but our people restrict their children a lot, unfortunately, I can say.

Interviewer: Everywhere or in only public spaces?

Respondent: Probably, our people say a lot everywhere that: “it’s not allowed, it’s not allowed.” On the one hand, [Australians] give children a lot of freedom, and teach them not to be aggressive.

Interviewer: But at the same time, some grow up less cultured?

Respondent: And they grow up less cultured, a paradox.

The word “cultured” is used to describe manners, and is opposite to unacceptable and bad. The word is closely related to the concept of kul’turnost’ (culturedness), which is widely spread in the USSR due to the Soviet kul’turnost’ campaign, and which has a civilizing mission (Kelly, 2001; Volkov, 2000). “Our people, of course, are more cultured” can be understood as meaning “more civilized,” namely, through following specific rules of etiquette. Apparently, in some contexts, in Australia, behaviour that is anomalous in Russia is permissible, at least for people from certain social groups or in some contexts. Australians’ behaviour, which goes beyond the habitualized norms of etiquette which the respondent has previously perceived as universal, puzzles her. She tries to find some explanation for this but cannot, because such “uncivilized” behaviour, which she witnessed, is not easy to be rationalized when it contradicts interiorized beliefs about what constitutes acceptable behaviour. At the same time, the fact that Australian parents restrict their children less in certain circumstances is perceived positively as a manifestation of freedom and pacification. A large number of restrictions on the part of Russian-speaking parents are described as a negative feature in their habitual interactions with a child.

According to these views, civilized behaviour includes the moderation of behaviour and a restraint of drives, similar to the way in which Elias (2000b) considers the consequences of a civilizing process as consisting of both the repression of the drives, but also, at the same time, as a means of
providing children with autonomy and independence in order to ensure their emotional well-being and freedom, and an ability to communicate well. The absence of “civilized” behaviour when related to caring for the child’s health and safety in some contexts, and the manifestation of significant civilizational features (such as freedom) in others form the paradox.

The following example from Wilson’s (2013, p. 633) study is a quote from the British mother, Deb, who talks about her experience with an Asian parent on the playground. It illustrates how the ideas of raising an independent and spontaneous child do not correlate well with the ideas of ensuring their safety in certain situations:

*And I heard this Asian lady telling her five-year-old that she wasn’t allowed to balance on the curb because it was too dangerous, and she nearly had kittens when she saw Lee jumping off the dragons tail outside the centre... And I don’t know about you, but I was brought up with the key thing; that my parents had to teach me to be independent. That is not... it doesn’t seem to be a part of their upbringing, it seems to be ‘we will look after you, we will make sure that you are protected from the outside world’,..., nobody values independence...*

Deb criticizes the child-rearing approach of Asian parents for lacking the intrinsic value of independence, manifested by the fact that an Asian mother is concerned about the health of her and Deb’s children in situations that Deb considers safe. Deb’s views are consistent with the idea that raising free and independent children requires less discipline and more independence (Chernyaeva, 2010; Kitchens, 2007). However, in order to allow the child to balance on the curb, parents need to get rid of the fear that such behaviour can lead to damaging and irreversible consequences for health. This example makes it possible to better understand why it is difficult for Russian-speaking parents to reconcile two groups of values that constitute a paradox. They, like this Asian mother, perceive some situations as dangerous and unacceptable, and which require their intervention, but at the same time, they do not want to restrict their children and would perhaps prefer to react the way Australian and Spanish parents do in some similar situations, in other words, to be relaxed, as I showed in the Chapter 4.

Relaxedness, which is usually used to describe a set of foreign parenting attitudes and practices, can have both a positive and negative connotation for Russian-speakers. For them, there is a slight contradiction in this relaxedness or “couldn’t-care-lessness.” This is a sign of freedom, composure, and a pleasant, benevolent atmosphere. It can be perceived as a manifestation of favourable
personal qualities. However, at the same time, it can be an indication that parents are not worried about the possibility that the child may grow up uncivilized, having acquired bad habits, or about the child’s health. Russian-speaking migrants can believe or worry that this can be a sign of a lower level of responsiveness. This influences the solution of cultural dilemmas.

The respondent from Germany, describing cultural differences in Germany, explains how people change in a new environment:

The Germans don’t care about what the kids are wearing. ... Children often have matted hair, girls’ hair is combed haphazardly, nobody really cares about it. ... ‘Russian’ mothers, on average, take much more care of both their appearance and the appearance of their children and their tidiness. But even in this sphere, there are some Russian mothers who have found the German couldn’t-care-less attitudes pleasant and they themselves have been relaxed a little bit. It seems to me that I myself began to relax a little under the influence of German couldn’t-care-less attitudes toward clothes and relaxedness towards hygiene.

This phrase “relaxed a little bit” reflects finding some kind of compromise in these two different classification systems (Douglas, 1966). They continue to follow their cultural norms but in a slightly different way. However, it is difficult to find a compromise in this, since in the two systems there are different ideas about what is dangerous for a child. Parents can only relax when they see no danger in such situations as is described by British Deb in the example given above, in which it seems that she does not understand the concern of an Asian mother.

It is essential to take these features into account when placing Russian parents’ parenting approach in the context of European/Western explanatory lenses. For example, it is argued that the approach taken by German childcare teachers, who set goals for promoting autonomy, is at variance with the approach taken by Russian-speaking migrant parents both more and less educated, for whom maintenance of physical-well-being, personal hygiene, and health is more important (Bossong & Keller, 2018). Two examples are given to prove this in the article. The first is a quote from a German teacher:

I looked away, when the child tried to put on their shoes in a wrong way ... for me it was important that he did it independently. It is my duty to support the child to become
independent. In that moment it was less important that the shoelaces were still open (p. 79).

The second is Russian a mother’s quote:

In any case, I would not wait until the child gets dressed by him/herself. As soon as I would see that there is a problem in getting dressed independently, I would help immediately ... They have to care better for the children (p. 79).

However, as shown in the Russian parental discourse, the ability to dress independently is also a crucial skill, but at the same time, it is necessary to form the child’s desire to be tidy, to button clothes and shoes properly so that the child does not end up barefoot and catch a cold and get sick. Russian-speaking parents want their child to internalize specific norms related to a healthy lifestyle and social behaviour by the time they reach school age, and this desire does not correspond well with the idea of spontaneous children who are allowed to freely choose activities in which to be involved. An analysis of posts on Russian-language online forums in Germany made by migrant parents showed that one of the main complaints of parents about German kindergartens is:

Educators do not monitor how the child dresses for taking a walk. The child dresses without supervision, so he or she often finds himself or herself without a hat, mittens, and a jacket is badly buttoned (Kotliar & Smirnova, 2016, p. 42).

The cultural habitus features become apparent in the way in which migrants face similar dilemmas in different parts of the world. It can be clearly seen here how the ideas of children’s autonomy, implemented in some foreign kindergartens in other contexts, do not correspond well with the acquired values of safety practices when related to their health. And most importantly, these parents’ ideas about safety cannot be considered as prevailing over the values of children’s development, the formation of their different abilities, and freedom. In a Russian kindergarten, an environment that is perceived as safe exists by default. The safe environment, in which the educator is obliged to ensure the safety of a child using very specific methods, is governed by rules approved by the medical authorities. From the point of view of this approach, dressing a child safely is not part of an implemented pedagogical approach, it is a medical norm. In Russian pedagogical discourse, these values coexist with the values of child development. It can be argued that, in terms of realization of the child-rearing approach, Russian-speaking parents prefer supervised and instructed playing and learning. However, the structure of goals regarding which
skills children should develop in kindergarten has its own unique features, including the combining of ideas about the formation of moral qualities by adopting certain norms of behaviour under the guidance of an adult, as shown in Chapter 6.

This contradiction becomes especially acute in a different cultural environment, when migrants begin to be aware of the need to solve various underlying cultural dilemmas. I argue that such attributes of Russian-speaking migrants are best viewed not as a manifestation of common characteristics among migrants from different non-Western countries or among migrants from different classes, formed within a common parenting approach shared by specific groups of people all over the world, but rather as a part of cultural habitus, and having their own unique particularities. Additionally, these features change during social interactions. This process of experiencing acculturation, hybridity, or adherence to one’s “classification system” is solving cultural dilemmas.

3. Hybridization of parenting practices and intercultural negotiations

The assimilation perspective in migration studies, which views cultural change as a one-way process, has for a long time now been critiqued as inadequate. Other explanatory models have grown in influence, models that view cultural change as a process of transmutation over time, characterised by a diversity of variability, intercultural negotiations in everyday life, hybridization of parenting practices, and bi-cultural identity process in migrant and mixed families (Meissner & Vertovec, 2007, 2015; Meyer & Fozdar, 2020; Nguyen et al., 2014; Sanagavarapu, 2010; Wise & Velayutham, 2009a). Using the notion of cultural continuity dilemmas contributes to this debate by uncovering certain patterns in hybridization processes and intercultural negotiations. The concept of national habitus returns a focus on national similarities to the field of migration research, whereas cultural continuity dilemma is applied to capture their diversification and to discuss the hybridisation model. Solving various dilemmas creates a unique combination of practices: for example, someone can adhere to certain nutrition practices but change their attitude towards the child’s appearance, but another person may resolve these issues quite differently. Some dilemmas remain completely insoluble for a long time. Therefore, people can solve dilemmas one way or another or, alternatively, they will have to experience dilemmas as part of their daily routine.
The following example demonstrates a hybridisation approach to resolving cultural dilemmas: Julia shows her mixed attitudes towards teaching practices, atmosphere, and conditions in Russian-speaking and Australian educational institutions, which influence the child’s choice of preschool activity and, at the same time, the practice of raising children in a mixed family. In this part of the interview, Julia speaks of a particular atmosphere of educational organizations for children of Russian-speaking migrants, which is created not only through the strict teachers’ treatment with children, but is also affected by peculiarities of the interaction of parents, which are competitive:

**Interviewer:** But about the Russian-speakers here. Have you known mothers who are not worried that their child does not speak Russian?

**Julia:** I have not known anybody who is not worried at all, but I have known those whose whole family has decided that this is not a priority. This happens. I even know that, for example, a mother is very active in communicating in Russian herself, but she does not send children to any Russian courses at all, on principle, because she does not like the atmosphere at these courses.

**Interviewer:** What kind of atmosphere?

**Julia:** For example, well, some people move to Australia because they want to leave what they don’t like at home, but in these Russian schools, they just see what they don’t like, what they left.

**Interviewer:** Do you agree with that?

**Julia:** Yes.

**Interviewer:** Is there anything in particular? ...

**Julia:** Competition, to a considerable degree.

**Interviewer:** What is this?

**Julia:** Well, whose children speak better, dance better, and so on. ...

**Interviewer:** What about teaching approach?

**Julia:** Some people really don’t like it ... I heard that there are those who don’t like it. And, by the way, I do not send my children to the lessons there, because I myself noticed this, the so-called Soviet approach, when children are very scolded.

**Interviewer:** Where is this?

**Julia:** This happens in some courses.

**Interviewer:** That is, strictness?

**Julia:** Very strict, stricter than usual in Australian schools, yes.
However, in another part of the interview, when we discuss Australian schools’ features, the comparison with Russian practices and norms is based on different criteria. They mention that Australian schools do not comply with specific standards of hygiene and other sanitary requirements, allowing children not to follow hygiene rules, such as sitting on the floor, which, on the contrary, according to Julia, characterizes the Australian approach as having disadvantages compared to the Russian one. She finishes:

_Julia:_ These are all our beliefs that are not observed here, and as a result, they have a problem with certain things.

_Interviewer:_ But you don’t allow it, do you?

_Julia:_ I have to allow, since we are in a mixed family, to allow many things, but if I were the sole boss, most likely I would have continued the Russian approach.

_Interviewer:_ In everything? Or in something that you think would be good to change?

_Julia:_ Not fanatically, but... I see that maybe something needs to be changed [in the Russian approach], because in the end, everything seems to be satisfactory [in Australia].

Julia’s example illustrates how responses to dilemmas can be versatile. On the one hand, she believes that there are certain features of the approach adopted in Russian education, which is described unequivocally negatively, which reproduce the negative Soviet ways of interaction between a teacher and a child. On the other hand, the school hygiene standards, in her opinion, lead to health problems and other negative consequences. She is forced to compromise with her foreign husband and thus feels that she has to allow her children to do what goes against her own beliefs. Nevertheless, she concludes that the Russian approach in relation to hygiene is not ideal and could be changed, since the consequences of the Australian standards do not seem to be particularly dangerous. This illustrates ambivalent attitudes towards certain practices and norms and how they are being reinterpreted.

Dilemmas are tackled in a variety of ways, and this forms a common cultural mixedness. Nevertheless, this does not always happen randomly and chaotically in the process of interaction, and it may be possible to discern certain tendencies in the course of this process. The dilemmas that arise when two legitimate discourses collide are the most difficult to solve. For example, children with the same cold symptoms may be treated differently in different countries. Dilemmas
are easier to resolve when one’s approach is supported outside of the community. For example, certain nutritional practices at school are adopted not only in Russia but also in some Western countries; therefore, continuing to follow their own Russian standards can provide additional grounds for legitimation. The solution to many dilemmas is complicated because they affect situations in which several norms and values are interwoven, some of which are perceived positively and others negatively.

4. Conclusion and discussion

In this chapter, I focused on parenting practices to show how Elias and Douglas’s ideas provide a new perspective on what can be understood as cultural (dis-)continuity and the experience of diversity (Douglas, 1966; Elias, 1996, 1998, 2000b). The concept of “cultural continuity dilemmas” helps to describe the transformation of cultural habitus in daily interaction and to bring some order to studying these processes. For example, one can demonstrate that cultural dilemmas arise when migrants are confronted with norms and practices that contradict those which have previously been internalized. Additionally, the notions of cultural continuity dilemmas and cultural habitus make it possible to contribute to the debate concerning acculturation processes, cultural changes, cultural negotiation, cultural hybridization and concerning the connection between the emotional life of migrants and social and ethnic boundaries (Boccagni & Baldassar, 2015; Kuran & Sandholm, 2008; Meyer & Fozdar, 2020; Rubdy & Alsagoff, 2014; Sanagavarapu, 2010). Dilemmas can arise in relation to very different issues, but each dilemma may be solved in a unique way, as a result of which the practices of migrants are hybridized. Thus, by the process of hybridization in this work, I mean transforming cultural habitus, which is an interacting process that constantly changes over time (Elias, 1996).

The examples given in this chapter relate to those practices that can be attributed to the peculiarities of the cultural habitus, since they are shared by Russian-speaking migrants and, most likely, were formed and changed in the course of socio-historical processes taking place on the territory of the post-Soviet space. These are the cultural features affecting the sphere of everyday life and are perceived as cultural only in the process of migration; before that, they were perceived as a characteristic of a modern civilized person. The cultural habitus changes in the process of social development. For Elias (1996, 1998), changes in everyday behaviour and affect controls are interconnected with the processes of development of society in the countries he studies. In particular, external norms and rules are internalized, and a person follows them automatically.
without external control and coercion. In the case of migrants, which Elias did not study, there is an interesting reverse process. Internalized norms become recognized in an environment where other people do not follow them, at times quite rapidly, since external norms turn out to be different. This leads to the need to reflect on their appropriateness and on the necessity to stick to them, and whether or not they should be reproduced: that is, a need to solve cultural continuity dilemmas becomes apparent. These practices, which were not recognized as cultural, are not easy to change and abandon in an emotional sense, since not following them can cause a feeling of fear for the child’s health or his or her future, and an awkwardness on behalf of their own or child’s behaviour.

This task is challenging for those people who have a high degree of distrust in the culture of their country of origin, since, on the one hand, they are ready to adopt Western cultural norms, and, on the other hand, their norms that are associated with these practices were perceived as essential and appropriate before migration. Colonialists could perceive another culture as less civilized and thus follow their own norms without questioning their importance, moreover, they would also try to “civilize” others. Russian-speaking migrants present an interesting case since some of their own norms and practices are perceived by them as more civilized, while others, on the contrary, are seen as Soviet and “barbaric,” and very different from the norms of civilized Western society.

Russian-speaking mothers want to raise their child to be self-sufficient, free and happy. This is one of the important values that they share. But at the same time, they want him or her to grow up as a healthy and civilized person. And they transmit these beliefs with certainty as they are and have been generally accepted. What is transmitted includes a huge arsenal of standards which are intended to inculcate civilized behaviour. This is inconsistent with other ideas about civilized upbringing which are concerned with giving the child more freedom and an opportunity to take the initiative. These two conflicting ideas do not appear to be contradictory in countries of origin because the need to pass on this vast set of cultural norms from early childhood is undeniable. Under the post-Soviet scheme of classifications, these rules are not considered excessive, and the need to follow them is perceived as the norm for the modern parent. However, in the new environment, their rationality is being questioned.

One of the messages of modern trends in the study of migration processes, such as those carried out in the context of superdiversity and transnational perspective, is to show that national lenses as optics for the study of migrants have lost their relevance. The various migrants’ attributes such
as, for example, specific migration channels, legal status, transnationalism practices, age, gender, both individually and in different configurations, may have more significance for explaining the diversity of migrants’ trajectories, their experiences, cultural changes and repertoires than their ethnicity and the country of origin (Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Vertovec, 2007). Cultural exchange is a process that takes place at all sorts of levels on a daily basis: in families, in neighbourhoods, nationally and globally. Additionally, the transnational turn shifted attention from studying what happens at the level of the national states to transnational processes extending across their borders (Glick Schiller, 2005, 2012; Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2006). Although these perspectives are crucial, in this study, I show the relevance of studying local processes of negotiations of cultural difference, paying attention to the national similarities of migrants, called national habitus or more broad cultural habitus. The daily routine of migrants can be permeated with routinized practices that are cultural in origin. It can be said that within the framework of migration research, there is practically no interest shown in the practices of taking care of cleanliness, health, and compliance with certain rules of etiquette. By examining the experiences of Russian-speaking migrants it can be shown that that it is in this area that differences can be actualized, which acquire cultural meaning.

The change in the main theoretical directions in migration research has led to the fact that studies that try to focus on national specifics run the risk of being criticized for essentialism, the use of cultural lenses, and an inability to take into account diversification within social groups, and also transnational processes. In the meantime, one can reverse this argument and argue that the exclusive focus on transnationalism and super-diversity does not allow the researchers to see the similarity that Elias calls national habitus. This similarity can manifest itself in minor points related to everyday practices, but can also determine many important life decisions, such as the choice of an educational institution for a child. In addition, following Elias, I show that the study of historical processes can explain the contemporary problems of a social group.

In the Part 3, comprising two chapters, I examine cultural continuity within the Russian-speaking communities by developing the concept of cultural production dilemmas.
PART 3
PART 3. CULTURAL PRODUCTION DILEMMA AND MIGRANT COMMUNITY AS A FIELD AND COMMUNITY OF UNBELONGING

This is some kind of power, isn’t this? The dominance of one kind of grouping over another, let’s say. They claim to be ... I do not know what. Well, but what is there to share here? We have such a little knot of people here, in fact, living here. And there is some kind of an incomprehensible tug of war, instead of uniting and making a common cause. For example, doing these concerts, but together. Yes? Well, in general, there is some kind of struggle for the audience, some struggle for some heads. It is impossible to understand what [it is].

(respondent in Perth, Australia)

In this thesis, I argue that cultural (dis)continuities in everyday life and in the community proceed differently from each other, and I propose studying these processes within different theoretical frameworks. In Part 2, I explained cultural continuities in migrant everyday life using the concept of cultural continuity dilemma based on Elias’s and Douglas’s theories. Part 3 consists of three chapters (8, 9 and 10): in Chapters 8 and 9, I develop the concept of cultural production dilemmas, based on Bourdieu’s theory, to explore the processes of cultural (dis)continuity associated with the processes of cultural production within the Russian-speaking community in WA. In addition, in order to do this, I conceptualize the community as a field of cultural production, namely, the space of forces within which agents and migrant institutions occupy certain positions that determine their beliefs about what Russian-speaking culture is, and their practices aimed at transforming existing relationships that produce the field, or, conversely, at preserving them.

Thus, the community is conceptualised as a competitive social space in which the agents (leaders and other cultural producers) and institutions are involved in a struggle for power and domination; this struggle is viewed as the central principle underlying the dynamic processes in this field or community. The above quote is from an interview with one of the cultural producers in Perth and reflects the fact that, in the eyes of agents in this field, the struggle is an important feature that characterizes the different relationships between them. It is in the struggle that some cultural production dilemmas arise regarding what Russian-language culture is, how to produce it, and how the revision of what is produced takes place. At the same time, the characteristics of agents also affect the cultural products they generate.
In the literature, migrant organizations are often viewed positively as allowing migrants to meet their various needs and to form networks of support and trust (Halm & Sezgin, 2012; Jardim & Da Silva, 2019; Marzana et al., 2020; Schrover & Vermeulen, 2005). However, in my research, I demonstrate that migrant institutions are also involved in a struggle for power, which can be experienced as a painful and difficult process. In addition, I describe the influence of Russian policies towards compatriots abroad on cultural production processes. The emergence of diaspora institutions in different countries is associated with different instrumental origin-state purposes (Gamlen, 2014; McIntyre & Gamlen, 2019). Russia is attempting to instrumentalize the diaspora and thus contributes to the formation of diaspora institutions to extend its political and cultural sphere of influence beyond its political borders (Laruelle, 2018; Molodikova, 2016; Suslov, 2018). This Russian involvement, at some point, turns out to be central in the struggle between some producers.

In many definitions of a community, the important component is belonging to the community. In Chapter 10, my research shows that although the community can be described as a field of cultural production, people often do not share the feeling of belonging to it, even if they are active members.
Chapter 8. Russian-speaking community in Australia and Russia’s “compatriots project”

Introduction

Moscow has neither the financial nor infrastructural resources, nor the ideological or “soft power” attractiveness to successfully manipulate “global Russians” who have voluntarily emigrated to Western Europe and North America ...

In fact, attempts to instrumentalize the diaspora in the “far abroad” have created a cleavage among Russians abroad, some of whom have become “professional compatriots” whereas others distance themselves from Russia and express skepticism of any initiatives originating in Russia (Suslov, 2017, p. 3, p. 10).

Suslov, in his article on Russian policies in relation to the Russian diaspora, writes that the so-called “global Russians” have divided into two groups. The first, known as “professional compatriots” are a minority, loyal to the Kremlin. The second is composed of the majority of migrants in the diaspora, who do not want to play according to these rules. As follows from the quote above, in describing the situation and making a forecast for the future, he believes that Moscow does not have enough resources to instrumentalize Russian migrants in the West. One would expect this would also apply to Russian-speaking cultural producers in Australia who are involved in the struggle for a monopoly on legitimate cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993b). It would seem reasonable for the community to be represented not only by people who are ready to participate in the Kremlin-funded “game,” but also by agents who are not connected with pro-Russian networks or who are perhaps opponents of the “professional compatriots.” However, my research demonstrates that in WA, many of the community leaders in the Russian-speaking community are competing for the right to act as “professional compatriots.” In fact, the central split dividing official representatives of the community is not between those loyal to the Kremlin and others, but between those who reprimand other cultural producers that they are not doing it successfully enough.

Cultural producers can solve cultural production dilemmas in different ways, but in WA, several important and active community groups choose a strategy of loyalty to Russian politics, and are involved in the implementation of its various initiatives and programs with the inclusion of other community members. As a result, certain cultural products, created with the support of these organizations and which are then made available to cultural consumers, such as activities for
children and various public events, reproduce some official symbols and rhetoric. In this and the following chapters, I explain how and why in Australia, a country with a small number of Russian migrants, “the compatriots project” (Byford, 2012) is able to be successfully implemented. This includes various official political discourses and practices which are aimed at Russian-speaking people living outside of Russia. I also analyze how this is determined by the resources of producers, such as cultural, social, and economic capitals, and what impact this has on cultural production and reproduction.

This chapter presents the results of an analysis of the context of the processes taking place in WA, which I focus on in Chapter 9: I identify key agents and institutions in the history of Russian-speaking migration to Australia, and in Russia’s approach to diaspora, and their competitive relationship. Section 1 provides an overview of the history of the Russian-speaking migration to Australia, and gives details of some key agents and institutions from the past, whose contribution was of great importance in the dynamics and further institutionalization of the community. Then, in Section 2, I describe Russia’s “compatriots project” and identify the key agents in Russia and Russia’s approach to diaspora. Finally, in section 3, drawing on Section 1 and 2 and using field theory (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b), I examine the history of creating two pro-Russian organizations in Australia, the Russian Australian Representative Council and the Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia, the representatives of which play a visible role in the WA Russian-speaking community, and analyze the discourses produced in the struggle for dominance.

1. Russian-speaking migration to Australia

Australia has never been among those countries accepting a large number of migrants from Russia and the USSR, and this fact is reflected in the small proportion of these migrants in the total population of Australia, and the number of migrants who have come in different periods (Australian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.; “Russians,” 2001). Despite this, the first migrant institutions and active community leaders appeared here quite early on, compared to their appearance in Spain. This can be explained by the history of migration, namely by the characteristics of those groups of Russian-speaking migrants who moved here from different countries during the Soviet period. This section will give an explanation for the history of the emergence and development of some migrant institutions and illustrate that competitiveness and tensions have always been part of the relationship between the community’s representatives and leaders, and between its fragmented groups. The frame and objectives of this thesis do not allow me to describe the history of migration
in detail, so I focus only on those points that are important for understanding the processes regarding the development of the community in WA

There are several standard chronological periods of migration, characterized by a pronounced growth in the number of Russian-speaking migrants and a change in the composition of the migration flow. The first wave of migration, from the Russian Empire, took place during the pre-revolutionary period, when a small number of representatives of religious denominations, political migrants, Jews, and labour migrants ended up in Australia (Kanevskaya, 1998; Kravtsov, 2011; Polyan, 2005; “Russians,” 2001). The second wave of Russian migration to Australia, from 1920 to 1940, was related to the migration of White Russians (monarchists and anti-communists), named after the “White movement” (these are people who participated in the civil war against the Bolsheviks), resulting in 4,711 arrivals. (“Russians,” 2001; Ryazantsev, 2013). The migrants from this wave have formed various institutions and organizations, including schools, Russian clubs, churches, and political structures. For example, the first group of the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS) was launched in Australia in 1937, and the Australia-wide Russian-language newspaper “Unification”, its origins based on the NTS, began publication in 1950 (Unification, n.d.; Zezin, 1996). Unification was anti-communist at that time, and was also the only Russian-language newspaper in Australia for many years.

The creation of institutions that promoted anti-Soviet beliefs, which were shared by many migrants, did not assist in the consolidation of the community. On the contrary, immigrants divided into different groups that were in opposition to each other (Kanevskaya, 2008a). Political activists were amongst some of the warring agents in those years. Here is how one of the members of NTS describes the development of this organization in the late 1940s to the early 1950s:

There was a Russian club in Brisbane, it was pro-monarchy. But for most members of this club, its political direction did not matter. They met in the club to chat, debate, sing Russian songs and recall the past. After a while, the club was in our hands (Zezin, 1996).

Thus, the place for meeting Russian-speaking migrants acted as a space of competition but between the representatives of different political groups. The institutions created at that time have now changed their focus and goals, such as the newspaper “Unification,” which still exists and which still actively participates in the existing system of relations between agents and institutions, as will be shown later.
In the period from 1939 to 1947, 0.5-0.7 million people were displaced abroad due to the Second World War, and subsequently avoided repatriation to the USSR (Polyan, 2005). Initially, most displaced persons in this period were to be found in European countries, and then some of them emigrated to the New World. This group formed the third wave of Russian emigrants to Australia (1947–1952). The number of migrants born in Russia increased from 1947 to 1954 by 8,000, reaching 13,000 by the end of this period (“Russians,” 2001).

Many migrants of this group tried to hide their origins because of their fear of being repatriated to the USSR, and because of widespread negative attitudes towards the communists in Australia during the time of the Menzies government. Through the media, the Australian government set out to encourage a negative attitude towards communism as being a very dangerous threat (Ison, 2008). My respondents from Perth, who are the children of displaced persons, also reported this, reflected in the well-known expression of that time – “reds under the bed,” indicating that the communist threat was not only external but also internal. As a result, a number of families came to Australia with new surnames or changed them after migration, hiding their Russian origins to avoid repatriation to the USSR or to avoid encountering negative attitudes towards themselves and their children. In some respondents’ families, parents asked them to introduce themselves as Poles. In Perth, the number of Russian-speaking migrants was very small, and in addition to this, not all of them were inclined towards consolidation because of these reasons.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Russians coming from China migrated to Australia, and this composed the fourth wave of migration (“Russians,” 2001; Ryazantsev, 2013). It is the educated groups of migrants from China who have played an important role in the process of the autonomization of the field of Russian cultural production. The high status of migrants from this group is associated with the history of the Russian-speaking community in the Chinese region of Manchuria, which began with the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), built by the Tsarist Empire under an agreement with China after 1898 (Moustafine, 2010).

Tens of thousands of professionals, workers, and other specialists came to the region from different parts of the Russian Empire, and Manchuria became a Russian colony with Harbin as its centre. The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the ensuing civil war led to the emergence of new Russian-speaking migrants who had quickly relocated to Manchuria: among the refugees there were members of the nobility, representatives of the military, intellectual and artistic elite, opponents of
the Soviet government, and those who had left or fled the country for political, ideological, and heritage reasons. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Harbin became one of the main centres of Russian emigration and culture in the world (Bakich, 2000). Many educational institutions of a very high-quality were established, various periodicals and books in Russian were published, and there was a rich opera and theatre program. They were isolated from the USSR, where in fact most of them had never lived because they had emigrated either before or during the process of political transformations, or they had actually been born abroad. Political events of different years influenced the size, composition, and resettlement of Russian-speaking residents of China in Manchuria and beyond. These Russian-speaking migrants formed an idea of themselves as the custodians of old Russian culture, and representatives of the educated elite played an important role in maintaining Russian culture abroad and in forming beliefs about what the meaning and composition of this culture should include.

In the 1950s, due to political influences and other reasons, Russian-speaking residents started to leave China in large numbers, and some migrated to Australia. Migrants coming from various regions of China formed into different groups and also retained their own particular Russian identity, which was closely related to where they had lived previously. Thus, migrants from different regions maintained their own identity: for example, migrants from Harbin call themselves Harbinians (Harbintsy) (Kanevskaya, 2008b). They often acted as community leaders or founders of various new Russian organizations, they contributed to the mass media and activities in Australia and also joined existing groups and institutions. For instance, the editors and journalistic staff of the newspaper “Unification” were replenished with Russian-speakers from this group. The founder of the Department of Russian Language and Literature at the University of Melbourne and of the Australian Slavists’ Association, and the general editor of the monograph series “Russians in Australia,” was Nina Christesen, who was a migrant from Harbin (Christesen, Nina, n.d.).

Many migrants from Shanghai and Harbin were well educated, spoke several languages, had diverse cultural interests, and differed in their social status and education from the groups of Russian migrants from other parts of China, to whom they “have disdainful attitudes” (Kanevskaya, 2008b, p. 111). Yet, at the same time, they were not ready to unite but rather competed among themselves:

_In China, there were no close contacts between the Russian Harbinians and the Russians from Shanghai, and they often competed with each other in the cultural_
sphere. This competition was carried over to life in Australia. The Harbinians were the most numerous group and considered themselves the most Russians of all Russians (p. 111).

The described competition between groups and their beliefs that it is possible to be more Russian than Others is consistent with the view of the migrant community as being a space of competition between agents for the right to fulfill a legitimate mode of cultural production.

These beliefs about the migrants from China with high specific cultural capital have been shared by different players in the field of the Russian language and culture. For example, the former ambassador of the Russian Federation, Grigory Logvinov, speaking at a meeting with the journalists of the Russian-language media in Australia in 2017, said about migrants from China:

First of all, I wish to acknowledge what the older generation of Australian Russians did, those who came mainly from China, as I understand they make up 30% of the Russian community. These are those people who arrived in the country penniless, built schools, churches and so on. All honour to them for the material, spiritual, moral basis of the Russian diaspora in Australia (Kouzmin, 2017).

In this passage, he describes them as the founders of the first Russian educational, religious and other institutions in Australia, and names them as those who laid the moral and spiritual foundations of the community. In addition, notably, he estimates this group as being quite large, which “makes up 30% of the Russian community.” However, there have been practically no representatives of this group in WA, due to the specific way in which the Russian migrant population has been distributed across the country as a whole.

The positions of the first active community members and leaders in Perth were taken by people who mainly came to Australia as displaced persons after the Second World War. One of the first communities of Russian-speaking residents in the city was formed around the Orthodox Church, or rather alongside the development of the parish. Father Sergij, who established the church in Perth, arrived in 1951 as a displaced person who had been sent to a refugee camp located in Northam (Protopopov, 1995). In the same year, he held the first service in Perth, which 60 people attended, and in 1954 the church, built with money from donations, was opened (Protopopov, 1995; Russian orthodox church in Perth, n.d.). For many years it acted as an important institution around which Russian-speaking migrants consolidated, and not merely those who professed
Orthodoxy or identified as religious. There was a small Russian-language library and a space where people met, united by ideas about a shared common culture, which did not always include a religious component. People from this community, who were subsequently not limited by religious interests, created the first folk dance group, a choir, and other groups. The second generation of migrants conducted Russian-language meetings and balls. There were also other Russian-speaking groups in Perth, such as the community at the Baptist church, but they were even smaller. For a long time, these small groups which had gathered around institutions or networks of friends were isolated from each other and did not form part of a common social space.

Father Sergej moved to Melbourne in 1969, and then moved to Sydney in 1970, where he received the rank of Archbishop in 1971. In his published sermons, there is information that helps to understand better the characteristics of the community of people visiting the church in different cities. For example, in one of them, composed after he departed from Perth for the Eastern states, he reprimanded the parishioners for leaving the church before the end of the service:

_I have often heard that Harbin is the remnant of primordial Russia [kondovaya Rus’]. Maybe, maybe! But in primordial Russia there was no such phenomenon, as we observe here, but in fact that in our church the majority are the Harbinians. So, I am starting to doubt whether Harbin preserves the primordial traditions, the tradition of primordial Russia. Or maybe it has only adopted the customs of metropolitan Orthodoxy? In the parish where I was before I came to the east, there was 75 percent of people from the USSR, but no one left the church before the end of the service there, but the Harbinians left. Nevertheless, I hope that the Harbinians will show that they really represent themselves, not only in Harbin but also in Australia, the remnant of primordial Holy Russia_ (Protopopov, 1995).

From his point of view, the parishioners of the Perth church were different from the participants of the service mentioned here. The logic he used to evoke Harbinians’ guilt reproduces views about them as bearers of a primordial Russian identity, retaining old customs and foundations of Russian culture (“Kondovyj,” n.d.). He explained that appropriate behaviour was expected of Harbinians, as they were the bearers of primordial Russian traditions, in contrast to the participants at the Perth church from the USSR (and who were displaced people, as shown above). It can be said that he appealed to them as the Russian-speaking cultural elite, from whom the reproduction of culture in its “original” form was expected.
This group can be considered the legitimate bearers and producers (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993b) of Russian culture within the Russian-speaking community in Australia. This is related to the fact that they had a high volume of capital which is specific for this field, namely, cultural capital. This was associated with the authentic Russian culture, the high culture of the educated classes and the elite, and “genuine” pre-revolutionary culture, which was devoid of controversial “Sovietness,” about which I wrote in the previous chapters. Therefore, they have been perceived as the bearers of legitimate traditions, who managed not only to retain them while in “exile” and then to transmit them through the generations, but also to save them from the transformation associated with the ideology and politics of the USSR and other countries at different periods.

The fifth wave of Russian migration in the 1990s was prompted by the reforms during the Gorbachev era, the collapse of the USSR, and the adoption in 1993 of the law permitting free entry into and exit from the country (Polyan, 2005; Zayonchkovskaya, 2003). The three main countries receiving migrants from Russia during this period included Germany, Israel, and the United States. Australia was an attractive migration destination, and the number of applicants exceeded those who received permission to enter it. Among these people, a significant number had higher education qualifications (“Russians,” 2001). One of the migrant groups that came to Australia in this period was composed of women who were migrating due to marriage, including the so-called “mail-order brides.” In the 2000s, there was a decrease in the number of migrants, and a change in the reasons given for leaving Russia (Savoskul, 2016). Currently, the main categories of migrants coming to Australia continue to be professionals and their family members, and women migrating as a result of marriage. In Australia and Spain, many women from this group form an integral part of the Russian-speaking community. According to the census, there are significantly more Russian-born women than Russian-born men in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). It appears that this difference is mainly caused by the fact that a large number of these women were marriage migrants13.

Thus, Russian-speaking migrants in Australia are people of different ethnicities, ages, and generations who emigrated for various reasons and in different historical periods. A small percentage of them knew each other before migration, for example, as was the case with some of

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13 There is no room to explore this migration in any detail, except to explain that the motivation of marriage migrants to emigrate can be a very diverse. In particular, it was shown that women in some European countries themselves emphasize the importance of romantic reasons for their migration and contrast themselves to those whose behaviour contributes to the stigmatized image of a pragmatic Russian-speaking marriage migrant (Akifyeva & Erashova, 2015; Heyse, 2010; Säävälä, 2010).
the migrants from China. However, in most cases, Russian-speaking migrants came quite autonomously through professional migration programs or because of marriage and as family members of these groups. Throughout the history of migration, Russian-speakers in Australia have actively created various institutions that have acted as important social spaces in which migrant networks have been formed. An important role in this process was played by new “independent” migrant institutions created within the Russian compatriots project relatively recently, and this will be discussed in the following sections.

2. Russia’s “compatriots project:” political discourses and practices

In this section, I describe Russia’s approach to the diaspora, mainly in relation to its strategies to mobilize and use it as an instrument of political influence, and I focus on the periods since Vladimir Putin’s first term as Russian president. I use Byford’s concept of Russia’s “compatriots project” (2012) to describe the official variety of political practices, discourses and strategies, including Russian soft power politics. I show how and for what purposes a number of organizations were formed that impact the implementation of this project in WA.

Issues that concerned “Russian compatriots” (sootechestvenniki) abroad have been the subject of active political debate in Russia since the collapse of the USSR and are ongoing (Suslov, 2018). In different years, there has been discussion and revision as to which groups ought to be assigned to this category and what policies should be pursued regarding these groups. In 1999, a law “On the State Policy of the Russian Federation regarding Compatriots Abroad” was passed according to which compatriots abroad were considered to be composed of the following groups of people: 1) citizens of Russia who lived permanently abroad, 2) people who were born in the USSR, living in a country of the post-Soviet territory with the exception of Russia, and who are citizens of these countries, stateless persons, or who have a residence permit, 3) former citizens of the Russian Empire, the USSR or Russia, who have acquired the citizenship of other countries, a residence permit or who are stateless persons in these countries, and 4) the descendants of all these groups (On the State Policy, 1999). In 2010 the law was amended, and the concept of compatriots was revised, narrowing categories (On Amending, 2010). While in the previous version it covered all former citizens of the USSR, the new one covers only those who are related to ethnic groups who have lived historically on the territory of Russia and who choose to have cultural, spiritual and legal ties with Russia. Thus, there is a transition from a more imperial understanding of the category associated with the positioning of Russia as a historical and cultural successor of the
USSR to all its former citizens and their descendants, to an ethnocultural view in which succession only applies to certain categories of people with some cultural and ethnic connection with Russia (Suslov, 2017). This wording does not, in fact, give a clear definition of those who can be included in the group of compatriots: it is assumed that there is a specific “spiritual” relationship between people and lands.

An important ideological concept which is part of Russia’s foreign policy that is aimed at working with compatriots abroad, and disseminating and popularizing the Russian language and culture, is the concept of the “Russian World.” It has been used as a synonym for the Russian diaspora living abroad (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008; Main Directions, 2010), for designating Russians living abroad, and also for networks of non-territorial, global Russian-speaking communities. Thus it is seen as a social entity having some common Soviet heritage, for indicating the distribution and influence of the Russian language and culture outside the Russian Federation (Laruelle, 2015, 2016b; Suslov, 2018). For the first time, the concept was officially used in a speech by Putin in 2001 at the First World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad, which was created as one of the important projects aimed at building the Russian-speaking diaspora (Tkach, 2017). At the VI congress in 2018, Putin again used the concepts of the Russian world and compatriots, addressing the participants and broadcasting the official content of these concepts:

This forum has brought together more than seven hundred citizens from different countries. However, at the same time, you – all together – represent a huge community of Russian compatriots, represent one big, huge Russian world that has never been built exclusively and only on ethnic, national, or religious grounds. It has put together and united all those who are spiritually related to Russia, who feel a spiritual connection with our Motherland, who consider themselves to be bearers of the Russian language, culture, Russian history (Kremlin.ru, 2018).

In this appeal, compatriots were defined in accordance with the existing law on compatriots through a spiritual connection with Russia. However, it was also said that the community of compatriots represents the Russian world, which extends over and beyond state, ethnic, and religious borders.

These processes occur in the context and under the influence of the search for a national idea, which concludes with the construction of an image of a nation as a community with a common Russian culture. In this instance, “Russian” is constructed in a civilizational sense, according to
which the boundaries of the community extend over state borders (Kalinin, 2015). Russian culture as a national idea makes it possible to justify Russia’s intervention in the political life of other countries and explains any political and economic conflicts and disagreements through cultural differences (Kalinin, 2014). For example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has been ideologically justified through the common cultural and linguistic community of residents and their shared past. Thus, the “Russian world” acts as one of the significant topics of the discourse of national identity (Kalinin, 2017) and, together with the concept of compatriots, with which it is closely interconnected, reflects the main ideas of geopolitical ideology. According to this, Russia is designed as a civilization, which includes culture bearers and representatives from different countries and various groups.

Another key concept of Russian politics relating to compatriots abroad is soft power. It was proposed by Joseph S. Nye, an American political scientist, to describe the ability of a state to attract others to want to do what is in the state’s interest, “the power that comes from attraction:” it is “attractive power” as opposed to hard power, which involves the use of force and coercion to achieve one’s goals (Nye 2004, p. 6). The concept began to be used in Russian political rhetoric from the mid-2000s, and in 2013 it was officially defined in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015). However, the Russian elite’s and political actors’ interpretation of soft power politics, despite being based on an academic understanding of the concept, has significant differences in practice. Nye considers Russia’s beliefs that government is the main source of soft power erroneous. According to him, civil society institutions can be much more effective in producing soft power than can state propaganda, which does not inspire confidence in people (Nye, 2013). In Russian politics, by contrast, priority is given to achieving pragmatic goals by using methods of control of soft power sources (Rotaru, 2018; Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015).

The diaspora began to be seen as a means of “soft power” in Russia’s compatriots’ policies, aimed at enhancing the international influence of Russia (Suslov, 2017). The tasks associated with exercising soft power and mobilizing a global network of “compatriots” are formed and implemented in the context of a wide variety of political and legal discourses, initiatives, and practices. For example, in 2010, “The main directions of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of international cultural and humanitarian cooperation” were approved by Putin, within which cultural diplomacy is described as a tool of soft power, with the intention of influencing public opinion in order to increase Russia’s authority (Main Directions, 2010). The Russian language is seen as a tool contributing to the formation of identification with Russian-speaking
communities, and to the construction of identities related to both Russian language and to Russian culture (Klyueva & Mikhailova, 2017). In 2014, “the Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy” were approved (Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy, 2014), in which a significant role is assigned to those tasks aimed at implementing policies abroad, such as supporting various organizations of Russian-speaking residents in other countries, and supporting institutions related to the dissemination and popularization of the Russian language and culture.

An important step in the implementation of these ideas was the creation of new institutions and divisions, such as the Department of Work with Compatriots at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005 (Laruelle, 2018), the Russian World Fund (Russkiy Mir Foundation, n.d.) in 2007, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo, n.d.) in 2008. Coordinating Councils of Russian Compatriots (CCRC) are a crucial connecting link between the official Russian representative offices and institutions and the Russian-speaking population (“compatriots”) and their organizations abroad that are created at a national level. CCRCs “are umbrella structures, under the auspices of which” various organizations of compatriots existing in a country, such as community schools, Russian-language media, song, dance groups, etc., are voluntarily united in the countries of residence of compatriots (WCCRC, n.d.-a). The CCRCs are in turn coordinated by the World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad (WCCRC), the executive body of the World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad discussed above (WCCRC, n.d.), which was officially recognized as “a representative body ensuring the interaction of compatriots with state authorities of the Russian Federation” and its entities (On Amending, 2010). In addition, intermediate structures – Regional Coordinating Councils of Russian Compatriots (RCCRC) – were created, which coordinate the activities of CCRCs in several countries of the same region (WCCRC, n.d.-c).

Thus, a complex system of interconnected institutions was created, some of which are in direct hierarchical relations. For example, the CCRC in Australia, which is called the Russian Australia Representative Council (RARC), has representative offices in five Australian states – the Territorial Coordinating Councils – which unite 116 Russian-speaking organizations in Australia (according to the data provided by the organization in 2021) (WCCRC, 2021). RARC is coordinated by the WCCRC and the Regional Coordinating Council of Compatriots of America, New Zealand, and Australia (RCCCANZA, n.d.). According to one of its former heads, RARC
was created with the support of the Russian Government (through the Russian Embassy) as a connecting, independent, and official coordinating structure between Russia, Russian compatriots, and Australians of Russian origin living in Australia” (RARC, 2014).

A representative from one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs structures of the Russian Federation told me that she perceived the CCRC in a certain sense as an analogue of the Komsomol, the youth organization of the Communist Party of the USSR. However, the Councils are not formal political organizations and are not targeted exclusively at youth. Perhaps the parallel with the Komsomol arose because of the volunteer nature of participation and the ideological orientation of the organizations. In addition, even though CCRCs have been created in different countries as part of the implementation of the Russian project regarding compatriots abroad, at the same time they have no formal relationship to the Russian state; they are registered as organizations in the countries where they are located, or can exist without even registering as a legal entity (WCCRC, n.d.-c). Therefore, their inclusion in this transnational network of ideological relations may not be obvious, and in the case of Australia, at the State level, it can be almost invisible since it is represented by the state’s organizations and their leaders who may already have been active members of the community before the development of these ideological structures. In addition, many of them have Australian residency or citizenship and represent a wide range of organizations in the city – from schools and musical groups to the parish council of the Russian Orthodox Church (RARC, n.d.).

These structures, at the level of specific localities abroad, coordinate and organize the implementation of the various requirements implicit in the compatriots project. This involves carrying out specific activities and the need to obtain visible results. For example, the plans to implement the State Cultural Policy Strategy include information about the planned activities for “strengthening and expanding the influence of Russian culture in foreign countries,” and they also include particulars about those who are responsible for implementation, as well as indicators that allow regulatory authorities to monitor the execution of these activities (Action Plan, 2019b). In particular, the Russian World Fund and the Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo are among those who are responsible for “conducting ... abroad large-scale complex actions and events aimed at supporting the Russian language, promoting Russian education and popularizing Russian

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culture”. Similarly, the Russian Orthodox Church was responsible for “conducting the Days of Russia in foreign countries” (Action Plan, 2016). The plan for the implementation of the state policy of the Russian Federation toward compatriots living abroad for 2021–2023 includes “a set of coordinated events of compatriots in the framework of the Victory Day celebration,” as well as New Year’s matinées for the children of compatriots. Monitoring indicators are typically quantitative: for example, the number of activities carried out, the number of schools supported, and the number of foreign countries in which the activities were carried out are all counted (Action Plan, 2020).

In Australia, this approach, focused on quantitative indicators, is reflected in a large number of events and in participation with coordinated international actions. In her application to participate in the elections to the new WCCRC composition in 2021, the current head of the Australian RARC describes RARC’s many achievements, including managing a large number of events in different cities in Australia: the Days of Russia, National Unity Days, Victory Day events, festivals, youth forums, camps, competitions, seminars, round tables and many more (Belkina, 2021a). In WA, these events are organized by the institutions of the territorial council15.

Apparently, the value of quantitative indicators and coverage of these discourses, policy practices, and of the tools for assessing productivity and implementing control (that is, the numbers of events, of organizations, of projects, and of cities in which events took place,) is one of the reasons leading to the declared existence of such a large number of Russian-speaking organizations, and also to the practice of conducting a large number of events when there is only a small number of cultural consumers in Australia and, in particular, in Perth. By comparison, the CCRC in Spain claims 53 organizations (CCRC in Spain, n.d.), almost half the number of organizations in RARC Australia (116). There are 7 organizations in Madrid and Castilla–La Mancha; most organizations are found in the regions of Catalonia, Cantabria, and Andorra where there is a large percentage of the total Russian-speaking population: in these regions there are 12 organizations, but in Catalonia alone there are more than 30 thousand people who were born in Russia (National Statistics Institute, n.d.), which is more than all the Russian-born migrants throughout the whole of Australia. In contrast, in Perth, with just around 1800 Russian-born people (Department of Home Affairs, 2018), the council claims 19 organizations. Additionally, the main opponent of RARC, another pro-Kremlin organization, the Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia (ACCR), was

15 See, for example, RARC, 2019b.
estimated by its leader to include 43 Russian-speaking organizations in 2018 (International Affairs, 2018).

As is evident in the number of organisations and events, the community is a field of struggle between agents, whose characteristics and resources determine which cultural production dilemmas are formulated and how they are solved. In Australia, this is greatly influenced by the inclusion of agents in the transnational ideological networks of institutions created within the Russian compatriots project. I will explain further why the implementation of this project takes on such scale in Australia, at least quantitatively, and what impact this has on the cultural production process in general.

3. Russian-speaking community and Russia’s “compatriots project” in Australia

In this section, I describe the history of the emergence of two organizations, RARC and its opponent ACCR, and their confrontation in the field of cultural production. Both groups participate in the competition for power and the representation of Russian-speakers in this field, through gaining access to material and symbolic resources provided by the Russian government. As shown above, the main agents included in the competition for leadership in the Russian-speaking community in WA have mostly been representatives of these two groups, or are in a coalition or partnership with them. I will show that the set of resources formed within the compatriots project allows them to accumulate symbolic capital and endows them and their institutions with legitimacy in this field.

3.1 Agents and Institutions in the process of struggle

The Russian Australian Representative Council (RARC) was created in 2007 (Nikolaev, 2014; WCCRC, n.d.-b). The council consisted of a head with two representatives in each of the states. Its first head was Igor Savitsky, a migrant from China, a nobleman, and a successful entrepreneur. He has played a leading role in the Russian-speaking community at different times and has filled a number of positions, such as a president of the Russian Business Council of Australia and chairman of the Harbin-China Historical Society (Savitsky I. K., n.d.).

The editorial staff of the oldest Russian-speaking newspaper “Unification” describes the main functions of the emerging RARC in the following way:
At first, the embassy employees determined themselves whom to allocate money, which organizations retain the Russian language and culture abroad, but when the Council was established, they decided that it would be better able to fulfil these tasks. In addition, the Councils decided which of the children and young people involved in community work should be recommended to travel to Russia under various programs. Another important part of the work was awarding the most excellent compatriots with medals and diplomas of the Council. This moral reward remained particularly important, due to people perceiving it as gratitude from Russia, which many people, even those who were born in other countries, passionately love and consider their own historical Motherland (Editors of “Unification,” 2016).

Thus the RARC, in fact, began to act as a legitimizing institution (Bourdieu, 1985), the creation and functioning of which was supported, at the time of its development, by the agents and institutions of the community, who had already occupied dominant positions before the emergence of the organization. The process of autonomization of the field of cultural production is related to the appearance of the producers who have the power to make aesthetic judgments about products and their values. It also relates to the institutions that began to fulfill the function of recognition, creating a market for symbolic goods that are not necessarily in accord with economic logic, since the value of some products is not measured in economic terms. In the Russian-speaking community, the council has become an institution that has the function of developing its own criteria for evaluating a cultural product and of providing an opportunity for other agents in the field to receive cultural recognition within the peer group of competitors. For example, they may decide which of those participants involved in community work can be recommended for participation in projects, and award the most excellent compatriots. In addition, the organization gives people the opportunity to obtain official positions, and to organize competitions, conferences and other events. As will be shown in the next chapter, these features have proven particularly in demand for the community’s leaders in WA.

In 2013, Archpriest Mikhail Protopopov, a representative of another group of the “old” wave of migration (before the collapse of the USSR) who had come to Australia from Europe to a camp for displaced persons after the Second World War (“Michael Protopopov,” 2008), was elected the chairman of the RARC; a year after his resignation, the council secretary, Irina Simonyan, who had moved to Australia from Russia in 2001 (Russkie.org, n.d.), began to carry out his duties. Then, in 2014, on the recommendation of the World Coordinating Council, the structure of the
councils of compatriots around the world was changed, which led to the reorganization and re-election of the RARC and governing body (RARC, 2014). These processes, apparently, were connected with the evolution of the compatriots projects, and were associated with the annexation of Crimea which took place in 2014, and which was followed by military conflicts in the Ukrainian territories. As a result of this, subsequent global changes affected Russia’s relations with different countries, as well as internal political processes (Suslov, 2017). In particular, in the period after 2014, the Russian world became a key concept in Russian political ideology.

These changes affected the structure of the RARC, which became more institutionalized and centralized. Before the reorganization, the council could include public representatives, and after the reorganization it could include only representatives of organizations registered in Australia. In addition, the Territorial Coordination Councils (TCC) were created in each state, which consist of representatives of the state’s organizations (RARC, 2014). These changes are important in understanding the institutionalization processes in the Perth community, as I will show in the next chapter.

There was a confrontation in the elections to the new council in 2014, related to the fact that some people were not allowed to be present in the election process. Since then, the confrontation between these groups has become a visible component of the ongoing processes at both the national and state levels. As a consequence, some new organizations have been established in opposition to the RARC and the TCCs, that have had the same function. For example, in New South Wales, in 2017, the Association of Social Activists and Groups was created as an alternative to the state’s TCC. The Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia (ACCR) was established at the national level in 2018. Vladimir Ejov, a director of the Flinders Mathematical Sciences Laboratory of Flinders University, South Australia, who moved to Australia in 1995, was elected the President of the Council. The first head of the RARC, Savitsky, and two representatives of WA, both of whom took an active part in the TCC of the state in the past, were included in the governing body (ACCR, n.d.).

According to Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1993a), the agents involved in the struggle for specific power in the field, and if they gain authority and monopolize what can be considered the basis of power, can implement maintenance strategies to protect orthodox discourse. On the contrary, those agents who do not have sufficient authority have less specific capital and adhere to heresy strategies in an attempt to destroy the existing order and to transform the distribution structure of specific
capital. In this sense, it is important to realize the basis for the main criticisms as expressed by these opposed agents in the Russian-speaking community in Australia.

The group that criticized the new governing body of the RARC accused the head of self-interest, the inefficiency of the created structure, the expulsion of representatives of the old migration groups from the council, centralization, and control over the activities of organizations in the states, and also for not representing the interests of Russia well enough. For example, Ejov published the Petition “Stop the anti-embassy activities of the Russian Australian Representative Council!” in 2017, in which he called for the dismissal of the head of the council and an audit of her work, accusing her of pursuing selfish ends and of activities directed against the Russian Embassy (Ejov, 2017). The former head, Savitsky, in an interview on SBS radio, said that the TCC’s “should work independently, but are actually under the diktat of the RARC” (Tsyzkin, 2017). He talked about the diktat understanding it as the instructions issued to the organizations from the council as to what activities need to be carried out and how. Representatives of “old” community organizations, such as “Unification,” also criticized the new governing body of the RARC:

The new leadership of the Council could not rely on the support of a large part of the experienced and honoured leaders of Russian organizations who stopped being in the Council.

Building defensive arguments, the head of the RARC interprets the conflict differently – as a generational conflict. For example, in response to a critical publication by “Unification”, the head and board members of the RARC wrote in their defence:

For a long time, the council was headed by I. K. Savitsky and in the organization the representatives of the so-called old emigration dominated, who made a colossal contribution to the development and support of the Russian world in Australia. However, the composition of the Russian community in recent years has been greatly renewed. I want to remark that the rejuvenation process of any organization is natural, and it is always an extremely important necessity ... It is hoped that all parties will show a high degree of wisdom, responsibility and honesty and will not allow a generational conflict to happen, and, on the contrary, will apply every effort in order that the old emigrants will transmit the experience to young people (President and Board Members of RARC, 2016).
The tensions between the groups are explained by their generational differences, which are understood as differences related to age and to the time when migration took place. Thus, on the one hand, the accompanying problems are explained by a lack of experience associated with being younger and the fact that these migrants had arrived in Australia later, but on the other hand, the process of rejuvenation of the organization is described as inevitable and necessary. It appears that the immutable authority of some migrants from previous waves of migration, possessing a high volume of capital specific to the Russian-speaking community and who for many years acted as ones of the dominant agents in the field of Russian cultural production in Australia, is here being questioned.

This is consistent with how the confrontation of agents in the field of cultural production is described (Bourdieu, 1993a, 1993b). Differentiation of the various institutions of production and distribution of cultural goods is related to their differences in products, producers, genres, public, and so on. The avant-garde tries to discredit existing norms, arguing that what was produced is outdated or no longer ranks as valuable. The opposition between recognized art (orthodoxy) and avant-garde (heresy) is interconnected with differences in the social characteristics of producers (authors and actors), the public and readers, and differences in the cultural institutions. In the Russian-speaking community, representatives of the old migration and those people who identify with them, and certain other community leaders, can be regarded as recognized authorities, who are opposed by others at some point in time; these opponents attempt to show that the previous norms are outdated and irrelevant to the current situation. Representatives of orthodoxy resort to a typical argument in such confrontations: they emphasize the fact that they are not motivated by economic gain, in contrast to opponents who are accused of self-interest.

At the same time, in the proclaimed ideas and goals of some of the main participants in the struggle for leadership in the Russian-speaking community, a lot of common, and shared, pro-Russian views can be found. This is an important point because it concerns ideas about what Russian culture is and how it should be produced – that is, the issue of resolving cultural production dilemmas and discerning who the bearers of this culture are.

3.2 The process of cultural production and discourses
Since the RARC is an organization that was created and exists with the support of the Russian government, one would expect that opposition to it will produce subversive discourse, positioning
and defining itself as a group that does not want to be included in this network of ideological relationships associated with the implementation of Russia’s compatriots project or with another group that adheres to other ideological views (Suslov, 2017). Heretical rhetoric can be based on various ideas related to the modes of transmission and maintaining culture, and the understanding of what culture is. However, both groups compete for leadership in the reproduction of the ideas and practices of the compatriots project, with regard to representing the community in the transnational network created to implement the project and related to the Russian government. They write appeals and complaints in Russian and direct them to Russian officials or to the members of this network. For example, the petition against the RARC activities is addressed to six official representatives of various Russian pro-government structures, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo, and the WCCRC (Ejov, 2017).

In addition, the leaders of both organizations demonstrate a commitment to views consistent with official Russian rhetoric, and they are also actively involved in the reproduction of cultural products which have been invented and constructed in Russia in recent years as part of the compatriots project. Here is an excerpt from a publication by Simonyan, the former head of the RARC, published on the website of the WCCRC in 2018:

For sympathy with Russia, even if you do not become the target of bullying, you can easily get into the ‘toxic’ lists in the West. In such a new reality, we will have to live and work. ... In 2014-2015, when anti-Russian hysteria went beyond the limit, the most troubles we received ... [were] from some of our compatriots who literally writhed in convulsions at the sight of any of our support to Russia. At the same time, some of them itched to get to the local council with a desire to push out everyone who sympathized with Russia, and claimed hysterically that Russians should not have any pro-Russian organization at all. Well, in order to keep the councils in a healthy form and be able to work effectively, there should not be any loyalty to such an audience. All those who will deal with the issues of Russians in foreign countries over the next three years should carefully check ‘who is who.’ Otherwise, the result may be sad.

... Both adolescents and older generations have an interest in Russia. This is proved by the millions of tourists who came to the FIFA World Cup in Russia ... Therefore, while maintaining and developing the traditional Russian culture, a well-known one and
probably even stereotyped one (in ‘Kalinka’ – balalaika style), it is important to pay attention to the export of modern Russian culture, focusing on the mass consumer” (Simonyan, 2018).

Several points are noteworthy in this extract. Firstly, it contains political rhetoric. She calls the reaction to Russian-Ukrainian relations in 2014–2015 and the inclusion of Crimea in Russia “anti-Russian hysteria” and bullying. According to this rhetoric, the West is opposed to Russia as a political opponent, and sympathy for Russia thus means support for its political stance. Secondly, she divides compatriots into those who support these political views and those who do not want the representation of compatriots abroad to embrace such support. She considers the latter as threatening the work of the Council. She says that it is necessary to “reject the illusions of unity of the Russian world according to the formula ‘everyone with everyone.’” This idea is consistent with the argument that within the new Russian policy, the compatriots are seen as heterogeneous groups, which include “traitors” (Suslov, 2018) and illustrates how leaders, while solving cultural production dilemmas, may fragment the community into proper Russians and Other Russians. Thirdly, she talks about the process of cultural production – about what is included in Russian culture and how and for whom it can be produced. Interestingly, the traditional Russian culture is supposed not only to be maintained but also developed, including its stereotypical aspects, which, although not being “proper” Russian culture, may attract consumers. In addition, she argues that modern Russian culture should be produced for export. This illustrates how cultural producers can solve cultural production dilemmas.

An excerpt from an interview with Ejov in the Russian journal “The International Affairs” (IA) in 2018 also refers to anti-Russian rhetoric, but it is understood more broadly than political criticism of Russia, such as Russophobia:

**IA:** Australia supports anti-Russian rhetoric. How does this affect our compatriots and attitudes towards them at the everyday level? ...

**Ejov:** Feeling ourselves as citizens and an integral part of the Russian world is very exciting and pleasant, but also brings responsibility. There is always Russophobia. It is a sense of envy, the basis of Russophobia is envy. ... But Russia lives its own life. We will still fly into space and save the American cosmonaut there (International Affairs, 2018).
The group “we,” on behalf of which Ejov speaks, is a community of the Russian world connected with Russia. According to him, Russia is superior to other nations in a number of ways; this causes a sense of envy and gives rise to criticism of Russia. He reproduces ideas about the status of Russia as a superpower competing with the United States, which Russia will heroically surpass, for example by showing its superiority in space exploration.

Both leaders of these organisations use such recognizable tropes of geopolitical discourse of the Russian word, invented and borrowed symbols: they compete for the right to produce official activities, replicated in different countries, for example, by arranging various events dedicated to Russian holidays. Official support is provided to both groups, and thus one of the main visible struggles in the field unfolds as a fight between pro-Russian groups for the status of representing the interests of the Kremlin.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I continue to explore how the community of Russian-speaking migrants and its role in cultural continuity can be described. Conceptualizing the community as a field of cultural production, I focus on migrant institutions and community leaders who produce culture and their involvement in power relationships. I investigate some of the key agents and institutions of the Russian-speaking community of Australia concerned with the confrontation and the struggle, and look at how changes in the structure of this field are interconnected with the dynamic processes taking place in the field of Russian foreign policies, and also at how the arguments of the agents involved in the struggle are developed. The struggle for the monopoly of legitimate cultural production can take the form of confrontation of various points of view on the field (Bourdieu, 1993b). Each agent imposes on others the boundaries of the field, conditions to belong to the field, and points of view that should be accepted as legitimate. I explore the confrontation between agents in the Russian-speaking community in a similar way, analyzing subversion and defensive strategies and the corresponding discourses within which what is construed as Russian culture is produced and reproduced.

Russian-speaking communities can thus be considered, and attempt to be employed as, champions of Russian soft power. The chapter analyzes why the compatriots project is quite successful in Australia, in terms of the impact on cultural production and the formation and inclusion of migrant institutions for its implementation. One of the reasons for this is that the new organisation begins
to act as a legitimizing institution (Bourdieu, 1985). Another reason is that the project has been supported by a group of migrants with a high volume of symbolic capital, who are perceived as legitimate leaders of the community by various players and by a number of well-known community institutions which were created in the past. Building positive relationships with them has allowed the Russian officials to form new organizations, inviting existing community leaders to take on leadership positions. In the struggle between old and new agents in the field, the Russian position was to choose the role of peacemaker, as a result of which two groups were formed, opposing each other but nevertheless competing for the right to reproduce “official” Russian ideas, symbols, and practices.

The processes described in this chapter had a significant impact on the Russian-speaking community in WA, whose agents and institutions were the visible players in this confrontation. As I will show in the next chapter, inclusion in these networks contributes to the institutionalization and fragmentation of the community, increasing the confrontation within it, the creation of coalitions, and influencing what activities are conducted: that is, how dilemmas are resolved. The Perth community is more institutionalized than the Madrid community and is more interconnected with pro-government organizations. Within the framework of this thesis, I do not have the opportunity to compare these processes in the two countries and cities in detail. However, it can be concluded that one reason relates to the history of migration and the formation of migrant institutions. The migration of Russian-speakers to Madrid is a relatively new phenomenon, and the first migrant institutions appeared later than they did in Australia. In addition, there are no representatives of the cultural elite who would be considered as being legitimate as was the case in Australia. Every field has a history that determines its specific stakes and interests, and may not be relevant for other fields (Bourdieu, 1993a, 1993b; Sapiro, 2003).
Chapter 9. Russian-speaking community in Perth

Introduction

I attended the meeting of a Russian-speaking organization in Perth to meet Nina, a migrant from Armenia and a member of this organization. Anna, another respondent who had worked with Nina’s husband in the past in Russia, told me about the organization and introduced me to Nina. Anna is a volunteer in two other Russian-speaking organizations in WA. In addition, she was a co-organizer of the celebration of a national holiday that is celebrated in some of the former republics of the USSR, which was mainly aimed at Russian-speaking migrants from these countries.

Later, I met Nina and some other active members of her organization at a picnic in honour of the Russian holiday and at a concert held with the pro-Russian organization’s support. At these events, there were a variety of people that I had met before at other events or through organizations for Russian-speaking migrants, including, for example, parishioners of two Russian-speaking Churches (Orthodox and Baptist), Anna, and also a member of a performing group, in which I danced for about a year.

After the meeting with Nina, I was also introduced to one of the oldest members, Dina, and her husband. They invited me in the evening to have dinner with their son, Mark, a second-generation migrant who does not speak Russian, and his wife, Olya, a first-generation migrant from Kazakhstan. It seemed that Olya had been personally close to an active member of another pro-Russian organization, which also supports many different events in the city, held for Russian-speakers, including an alternative celebration of the Russian holiday at which my dance group performed. This pro-Russian organization was created in opposition to the first one, which I mentioned above.

This description, taken from my fieldnotes and related memories, contains many references to different people and institutions for Russian-speaking migrants and the events they organize. Based only on the information described above, I have depicted their system of relationships in a chart below. Attendance at an event or its organization, membership in an organization, and personal acquaintance is shown in the chart as connections. For example, Nina is a member of organization number one (“Org 1” in the chart) and attended the celebration of holiday 1, which was supported by the pro-Russian organization 1. Nina knows Dina well, whose daughter-in-law was friendly in the past with the organizer of the pro-Russian organization 2, which convened an
alternative celebration of the same holiday 1, due to the fact that the two pro-Russian organizations are in confrontation with each other. In this example, the pro-Russian organizations 1 and 2 are the Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia (ACCR) and the Russian Australian Representative Council (RARC). ACCR and RARC are institutions that include leaders and representatives from a variety of organizations in the city and that are connected with different organisations. This is reflected to a certain extent even in this chart: for example, a representative of pro-Russian organization 1 is a member of organization 2.

This example is a sketch of what constitutes a fragment of the Russian-speaking community of Perth, and allows me to illustrate a number of characteristic features identified during the study in both Perth and Madrid. Russian-speaking migrants differ from each other by various social characteristics. They belong to different generations of migrants, who have either come from different countries of the post-Soviet space or who have been born in Australia. They are religious to varying degrees or are members of different denominations, and come from Russian-speaking and mixed families, as well as from families in which the native language of the members is from one of the countries of the post-Soviet space. They speak English with varying degrees of proficiency and occupy different social positions with regard to education and professional employment. They also differ among themselves in the degree of their inclusion in the network of
these relationships and participation in the various Russian-language events. Some of them, like Anna, play a visible and active role, holding various positions in several organizations and maintaining relationships with the various Russian-speaking migrants of Perth. Others have a very limited circle of Russian-speaking acquaintances, as well as a low level of consumption of Russian-speaking resources and participation in events. Despite these differences, Russian-speaking migrants are still interconnected through a network of relationships, possible membership in various organizations and their consumption of various Russian resources: this can be called a community or the field of cultural production.

The main objective of this chapter, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, is to propose a model of analysis of cultural production in migrant community by focusing on Perth as an example. The first claim is that by using his concept of field of cultural production, the Russian-speaking migrant community in Perth can be understood as a structured social space in which agents and institutions compete for the right to represent the community and to produce legitimate cultural products. Therefore, this network of connections represents a power relationship between individuals (agents) and institutions, not a horizontal relationship between individuals. The second claim concerns the process of cultural production: that is, what is produced by the leaders of the community (including activities, lessons provided by organizations, concerts, meetings, competitions that they hold, holidays, mass media resources and other cultural products) depends on two elements: firstly, their characteristics, such as dispositions, tastes, and the resources they possess, including economic, cultural, and social capital; and secondly, the process is developed during the struggle and relationships with other agents and institutions. Thus, as a result of competent relationships, it is in this space that cultural production dilemmas arise and are being resolved. In the first section of this chapter, I describe some of the characteristics of community leaders and organisations and, correspondingly, the products generated.

The chosen optics also allow me to answer the question as to why several active community groups in Perth are involved in the transnational ideological networks, created within the Russian soft power project, and how their involvement affects the process of cultural (re)production. In the second section, I focus on the struggling relationship between two large groups of cultural producers and explain how this relates to the implementation of the compatriots project. I described the context that largely determined the dynamics of these processes in the previous Chapter 8. Finally, in the third section, I use the example of the practices of commemoration of Victory Day to show how participation in this project affects cultural production in Perth. By solving cultural
dilemmas, agents try discursively to draw boundaries between what they and their opponents produce, as I showed in previous chapter; however, the repertoire of what is produced may be very similar and limited.

1. Agents and institutions

There is an analogy between the Russian-speaking community and the literary, artistic and other fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993a, 1993b; Sapiro, 2003). Although being vague and rather unclear, such career paths attract very different agents in the sense of their ambitions, dispositions, and other characteristics. In the literary field, in order to take risks and to engage in an activity that may not generate any profit, agents should be able to manage without significant material rewards: for example, they would need to combine this activity with another job or have a different source of income. In the Russian-speaking community in Perth, most cultural producers are not usually materially dependent on this particular cultural production activity. They have a job, often in a different field, or they do not work, having an employed family member. In the latter case, these are often women from Russian-speaking or mixed unions.

In this field, opportunities for acquiring economic benefits or stable income are notably limited, due to limited product demand related to the size of the community and product quality. In Perth there are not a lot of commercial Russian-speaking community-based enterprises. The only grocery which existed at the time of fieldwork was only opened by prior arrangement (a customer had to book a visit), and the only cafe set up by Russian-speaking owners, in spite of having Russian dishes on the menu and being known by some members of the Russian-speaking community as Russian, targeted a much broader customer segment: it had an ethnically neutral name and interior, an English-language menu, and looked more like a globalized coffee house. Nevertheless, some people have built professional careers within the community and earn a stable income by selling services and products only or primarily to Russian-speaking consumers. However, there are very few of them, including, for example, hairdressers or manicure specialists working with Russian-speaking clients, people cooking dishes of ethnic or Russian cuisine on individual orders, and private teachers. The information about their products and services can be found through advertisements published in Russian-speaking online groups, or participants may recommend them in response to requests made in the groups. It seems that most cultural producers either make a small profit, which cannot be considered commercially successful, they enter the Australian market or, alternatively, they do not make commercially viable profits and even conduct some activities and events by self-financing them.
Research on the enclave economy shows how the development of local business contributes to the formation of non-commercial local ethnic social structures and thus to the creation of social spaces, in which people form social ties and which, in general, has a positive effect on the functioning of the local communities (Zhou & Cho, 2010). In the Russian-speaking community, business development is more possible when entrepreneurs or small business owners are involved in the life of the community as active non-profit participants. There are some cultural producers who hold volunteer or non-profit positions in various organizations and who also have businesses or conduct commercial events. Clients are often recruited through these non-profit networks of relationships. However, in many cases, it cannot be concluded that business development by itself determines the growth of social structures or vice versa: it appears that entrepreneurial activity is usually most effective when it is simultaneously linked together with non-commercial activity; thus these two modes of activity encourage each other and contribute to the formation of a space called a community. For example, one entrepreneur is the organizer and administrator of one of the primary and most popular online groups, and is also a participant and co-organizer of many community events. However, many cultural producers do not participate in enterprise activities and can play the same visible role in developing social structure. The numbers of players who are pursuing material rewards in this field are insignificant.

In the case of literary and other culturally related production, these activities can have their own symbolic benefits, and cultural producers may be interested in accumulating symbolic resources and obtaining symbolic profit such as recognition, status, and prestige. For example, producers can sufficiently increase their social capital and receive recognition and other symbolic dividends. This is particularly relevant for people whose migration path has been accompanied by downward social mobility. Such a social trajectory is typical for many female marriage migrants, who have higher education qualifications and held professional positions before migration. In Australia, due to their lack of English proficiency or to the time it takes to have their overseas qualification assessed, they can be out of work for some time. For example, a representative of one community language school describes who is employed by the school and why they work there as teachers:

*Basically, it is based on enthusiasm. Teachers who have no children, they are the ones who have recently arrived. They don’t have any Australian experience; they really need to take the first steps. Basically, our teachers are those whose children attend [these activities], they are interested in teaching their own children.*
Gaining such a teaching position enables some of the migrants to take “the first steps” in Australia with regard to building social capital, and allows them to accumulate resources which can subsequently be converted into economic ones. Participation in the community can also be converted into improving some of their children’s skills. Parents can organize activities themselves or work in organizations such as the school where their children study, as shown in the quote above. However, among the cultural producers a variety of people with different backgrounds, migration experience, English level proficiency, and work status can be discerned.

The rewards from such non-material profit can vary greatly. The community members may obtain formal positions: administrative positions in organizations, membership in various councils, organizers of different competitions, domestic and international trips funded by the Russian government, and so on. The community also acts as a space where people can professionalize their own hobbies. People engaged in any activity, even at the amateur level, have a unique opportunity to convert these skills into increased status. It allows inexperienced artists, teachers, and organizers to occupy positions that would often require a higher level of competence and skills in other fields. Non-professional artists perform on stage at public events, and organizers of various events may not have had any previous experience of event management. It can be also considered a benefit for parents that their children have the opportunity to perform publicly at concerts and other community events. The quality requirements may be lower if a performance is in Russian (or possibly any non-English language). Groups can perform with an international repertoire, for example, either oriental or ballroom dancing, or it can be stylized in a naive or inexperienced way as a performance related to the Russian-speaking culture. There are almost no teachers of the Russian language with special education qualifications in Russian language community schools, and the participants in dance groups, singers, and other musicians and performers do not need to have any special training or experience to start performing at public community events or to represent the community at multicultural events. For example, I was invited to teach Russian in one school, and to participate in public performances. Thus, the cultural products are limited by the resources and different characteristics of cultural producers: if, for example, there is an artist in the community, art classes can be offered, and if a producer also has sufficient material resources, he or she will pay for special equipment.

In this field, it is difficult to discern those who could be considered recognized or “old” professionals (unlike the situation in some other states), for example, as in the case of migrants who had come from China who own specific capital, relevant to this field, related to their origin,
education and other features of the carriers of “authentic” Russian culture, as described in the previous chapter. This leads to the fact that participation in this process does not require significant expenses and investments. According to Bourdieu, during the struggle in the field, there is a change of authorities, but the rules of the “game” themselves remain unchanged because the amount of investment to get into the game and acquire the necessary knowledge in order to participate in it is too high (Bourdieu, 1993a). For example, in the field of science, agents must spend a lot of time getting an education. In contrast to this, there are vacant positions in the field of production of Russian-speaking culture in WA. Although new organizations are constantly being created, the size of the community is growing relatively slowly which means that it is not always easy to find people who are willing and able to be involved in some activities as cultural producers, such as language teaching. Moreover, the stakes in the game are quite specific and are of interest only to a certain circle of people and sometimes only within a certain period of time – for example, until the producer finds a job or the child stops attending a community language school.

Despite the fact that attracting a new audience is an important but fraught task for some producers, caused by the small size of the community and increasing competition between producers, the community is relatively closed to people from outside (non-Russian-speakers). Many events are held only in Russian, and even if a translation is provided, it is often the bare minimum. Several respondents complained to me that nobody wants to communicate with their English-speaking husbands in English at such events and organizations. The husband of one of the respondents also told me that he felt himself to be excluded at such events. One reason may relate to the fact that the influx of new participants could raise the question of their Russianness. At the moment, the exclusivity of some producers is not in the type of product they produce (as I already wrote, it can be international or made at an amateur level), but more that they can produce it in Russian. The field of production creates the value of the cultural products, and it is the field that constructs faith in the creative competence and strength of the producers (Bourdieu, 1993b). The product must be recognized as having value by those who have the specific competences and dispositions required to recognize the product as valuable. The influx of a new audience, composed both of non-Russian-speakers and migrants from different waves, could lead to a revision of what is of symbolic value, casting doubt on the value of a particular product and how it represents the Russian-speaking culture. In addition, it would exclude Russian-speaking consumers and producers with a limited knowledge of English.
The confrontations and tensions characterize the relationship between institutions and cultural producers. The selected theoretical lenses suggest considering them as a struggle for the monopoly of cultural legitimacy between agents and institutions. The community dynamics are closely related to these processes – many institutions arose as a result of a confrontation and conflict between the members within one organization. In the process of competition, discourses are produced which define Russian-language culture, how it should be produced, and how the product of one organization or collective differs from another. In the process of these competitive struggles to impose legitimate cultural practices, cultural production dilemmas are formulated and resolved. In the next section I will explore this in more detail.

2. The struggle for the monopoly of legitimate cultural production

The Russian-speaking community, like any field, creates struggles and competitions. Many new organizations and collectives arose as a result of separation from another organization or team, which was accompanied by confrontations. They have occurred at different levels, both within the same organization, between individuals and at the level of opposing coalitions, the composition of which can shift and change. However, acting in the role of a cultural producer, it can be quite difficult to avoid being included in these processes – organizations can be associated with coalitions, even if only one of its members is an active participant in this confrontation. For example, one of the cultural producers, an active participant in various activities, describes how she tries to avoid conflicts, but is faced with the fact that other members of the community are trying to win her over to their side.

Some people would like me to be involved in this just to win any of the battles. And I don’t like this. I don’t want to be a part of this. Because I know that any battle in the community will just divide the community, it doesn’t matter who wins the battle; the community won’t be the same after this; the community will be all separated. And this is what is happening.

Many cultural producers said that they felt these conflicts keenly, attended a psychologist, and stopped communicating with the Russian-speaking community for a while.

As described in the previous chapter, two main opposing groups can be identified in WA. The first group is represented by the members of the Russian Australian Representative Council (RARC) or the Territorial Coordination Council (TCC), as its state representative body, and includes
nineteen organisations under its umbrella (RARC, n.d.). The second consists of a group of people who have united in opposition to the RARC and who do not perceive the current composition or leadership of the TCC as legitimate. This group includes representatives of the second all-Australian pro-Kremlin organization – the Australian Council of Compatriots of Russia (ACCR), which holds membership in some institutions and cooperates with other organizations. Both organizations, RARC and ACCR, as shown in the previous chapter, are included in the Russian compatriots project network. The members of these groups are in confrontation with each other and they contest the right of their opponents to act as community leaders. The vast majority of organizations and some of their members in Perth are directly or indirectly involved in this confrontation or form partnerships with representatives of these pro-Russian organizations. By indirect participation, I mean that some co-organizers or participants in the events supported by those organizations involved in implementing the compatriots project are not aware of this, or perceive their own role differently. For example, the representatives of RARC and ACCR can invite members of other organizations with whom they have collegial relations outside of these pro-Russian networks to participate in an event. It seems that many of those who implement events with the support of the Russian government do not perceive this as being significant with regard to what is produced and how it is generated, or they prefer to keep silent about how this may can affect their activities.

The community leaders often occupy several key positions at once and lead several institutions or projects. For instance, there are two main online groups for Russian-speakers in WA, the administrators of which represent two opposed groups. Both groups are highly active, and both present slight differences in their published materials. Most of the posts in both groups are published in Russian and relate to events in Perth, held by Russian-speaking individuals and organizations. Participants ask questions that are linked with their migration experience and things that concern life in Perth. In both groups, participants can place advertisements. These are mostly published by Russian-speaking individual entrepreneurs or small business owners who want to advertise their services, such as private lessons, hairdressing and beauty services, goods and custom-made products, etc. Much of the information and advertising in these groups is therefore duplicated. The groups are so similar in both names and goals that some respondents have not noticed the differences between the groups, or have randomly joined one group, not knowing that the second one existed. Nevertheless, they differ as to which Russian-speaking events they cover and what information they publish about their preferred Russian-speaking organizations. Each group can publish information about the activities of organizations with which they are in a
coalition and omit the activities and news of their opponents and those who have formed a coalition with them. The leaders of both groups and some of their friends are not followers of the groups of opponents. Thus, I argue that the online groups can be considered as the institutions involved in the struggle, along with other migrant institutions and agents, and the leaders of these groups as cultural producers who articulate discourses in the process of competition for stakes in this social game.

The struggle for the monopoly on the legitimate mode of cultural production can take the form of confrontation of various points of view on the field. For example, I began my introduction to these theses with a quote from a representative of one of the groups who criticized the Russian film festival’s opening, conducted by another group, for displaying inappropriate elements of Russian culture. Each agent imposes on others the boundaries of the field, conditions of belonging to the field, and points of view that should be considered legitimate. The declaration of the desire to return to roots is seen as an effective tool against dominant agents (Bourdieu, 1993b). In this case, representatives of one group accuse others of self-interest, by conducting cultural events for money, narrowly understanding culture as a “fair” culture, represented through dancing in the kokoshniks [Russian folk headdresses for women] and specific ethnic dishes put up for sale or in another “incorrect” way. They claim that it is necessary to understand the culture differently, from the standpoint of spirituality and a specific Russian soul. The opposite side may indicate the lack of professionalism of opponents or comment on their specific personal characteristics.

Although both groups are in confrontation, both also actively interact with the Russian officials. The online groups provide information about various events supported by the pro-Russian organizations, which the organizers or their partners often carry out. Official representatives of the embassy and consulate have participated in a variety of events held by different groups. For example, a children’s performance unexpectedly culminated in the introduction of the appointed Honorary Consul of the Russian Federation in WA, who presented an award for contribution to the development of culture to one of the community activists who was present at the occasion but who had not been involved in the production of that particular performance. Participation in the implementation of the compatriots project has an impact on the process of cultural production, and in particular on the symbols and rituals that begin to be reproduced. For example, some children who attend activities for Russian-speaking children can get involved in the celebrations of some Russian holidays, be dressed in wartime uniforms, and participate in other rituals and practices typical for pro-Kremlin programs.
The reorganization of the RARC in 2014, according to which the council should not include representatives of the public, but only registered organizations, and the creation of the TCC at the state level, which should be composed of member organizations, has influenced the processes of institutionalization of the community. The previous chapter indicated that success in the implementation of different aspects of the compatriots projects is often measured by using quantitative indicators. Apparently, this has led to new organizations being established, or some informal structures being nominated organizations by the same collectives and people. According to some of the opponents of both organizations, there are several strategies intended to increase the number of organizations included in the councils and to produce an impression that they are related to a large number of the community initiatives. For example, based on community schools or groups, there were classes or activities specified as separate organizations. There are also cases when an organizer has listed several organizations which perform one function as separate organizations. Some informal groups have been presented as formal organizations, such as online Facebook groups being listed as organizations of compatriots in different sites, including the Russian Embassy in Australia. In addition, the independent community activists became members of several organizations in order to relate to formally registered structures. Thus, the number of organizations has increased, although the number of participants can remain more or less the same.

Australian multiculturalism policy, which involves supporting various community organizations, also contributes to the process of institutionalizing the community (Moran, 2016). According to the representatives of various schools, without the support of the Australian government they could not exist. As a result, they can function with very low classroom attendance. The head of one of the community schools said that they receive much more support from the Australian government than from the Russian government. In Madrid, schools are not able to receive government support, and therefore, for the most part, they are registered as commercial organizations, which can only exist if there is a demand for their services.

Agents and institutions are included in the struggle for a monopoly on cultural production, but there are few differences between producers in the sense of the volume of different capital that they possess: social, educational, cultural, symbolic, as well as the quality, content, and criteria for the value of produced products. This is one of the reasons why agents are trying to accumulate a capital of institutional recognition and why they are interested in cooperating with the Russian officials who support them. The RARC creates five types of different awards for “compatriots:”
Orders, Medals, Certificates of Honour, Letters of Commendation, and Diplomas of the RARC. There are also various government awards and certificates that are awarded to cultural producers at various events. This considerable number of medals and certificates, which are regularly awarded at various events by both officials and the RARC and which perform the function of an internal legitimizing institution, are a symbol of gaining recognition as a legitimate cultural producer. This proves to be very important in light of the absence of other legitimizing markers.

Moreover, the community leaders regularly attend social and official events and meetings conducted by representatives of the Russian authorities and which are covered in the Russian-language media. For example, representatives of WA organizations attended a diplomatic reception in Canberra (Kouzmin, 2015), a reception at the residence of the Ambassador of the Russian Federation, and met with diplomatic representatives during their visit to Perth. Being included in these pro-Russian networks also gives them the opportunity to obtain membership in various organizations and leadership positions, and to gain access to the distribution of various resources, such as in the organization of various Russian competitions. For example, a member of the ACCR held a competition Aleksander “Pushkin in the Crimea,” the winners of which were enrolled in the Russian children’s camp Artek, located in Crimea. From the parents’ point of view, this was a good opportunity for children who are learning or preserving the Russian language abroad. From the point of view of Russian soft policy, such competitions allow the participants to rethink and reflect on the role of Crimea in the history of Russia. For the organizer, the responsibility for conducting such a competition is a marker of possessing specific symbolic resources in the community. However, this kind of institutional recognition is not considered by all community members as legitimate, and can increase community conflict, as it is already a field of struggle by nature.

In the process of the struggle, agents form the boundaries between what they and their opponents produce; that is, they solve cultural dilemmas. The cultural production dilemma is thus not only a reflection on how to create a cultural product, in accordance with their limited set of knowledge, skills, and other resources, but also defends this in the process of competition, reaction to criticism, or by taking into account the alignment of forces in the field. In the struggle for legitimacy, they have a limited arsenal of strategies to achieve it. The cooperation with pro-Russian institutions and official Russian structures has allowed them to acquire additional resources in this competitive struggle, such as institutional recognition. However, such cooperation then requires the solving of new cultural production dilemmas and modification of the cultural products generated. I will show
this further with the example of the celebration of Victory Day in Perth. This example will show that, from one angle, the commemorative practices can have rituals and symbols associated with the official modern celebration in Russia. And from another angle, the chosen celebration programs are sometimes poorly correlated with the realities caused by community characteristics.

3. The process of cultural production: the case of commemorations of Victory Day

Victory Day, 9th May, is one of Russia’s most important public holidays, and has its origin in the Soviet past. On this day, the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany in 1945 is celebrated. After the collapse of the USSR, the official approach to understanding the victory in the war and the rituals of its commemoration changed dramatically (Arslanova (Mikhailenko), 2011). During the Yeltsin era, new guidelines appeared; for example, the Orthodox Church began to act as a symbol of unity for people, and, for representing victory, Soviet symbols were rejected in favor of current symbols.

During Putin’s presidency, the Great Victory again becomes one of the main ideological guidelines. The participation in the war is seen as an important component of the heroic past, the historical heritage on which the national idea is built (Dubin, 2005). The Soviet symbols have been returned to the rituals of its commemoration, such as, in 2008, military equipment in the parade on Red Square, and modern realities have additionally required the search for new, more relevant ideas (Kurilla, 2020). As a result, officials adopted some bottom-up initiatives, which have become enormously popular. One such successful initiative involved participants of the commemoration pinning St. George ribbons on their clothes. This action soon became associated with state propaganda, and after actions by the opposition whereby participants began to use white ribbons as a symbol of protest against the government, the St. George ribbon began to be perceived by some people as a state patriotic symbol, in contrast to the symbol of the protest movement (Kolstø, 2016; Kurilla, 2020). The second important initiative which the state has adopted is the “Immortal Regiment” action, which is a procession with portraits of the war veterans – relatives of the family of the participants (Fedor, 2017; Kurilla, 2020; Patalakh, 2020). The memory action gained immense popularity and has begun to be held in different countries around the world. When the states began to integrate it into the official commemoration ceremony, it also became a part of the pro-Russian agenda for working with compatriots abroad.
Commemorations of Victory Day at the Russian schools are also an essential part of nationwide events (Linchenko, 2019). The commemorative rituals and practices include concerts, consisting of theatrical performances, dances, and both military and other songs performed by children in front of the school administration and teachers. Other activities involving children include the so-called open field kitchens held in parks, which include cuisine of the war years served to the accompaniment of music from the time, and dressing children in military uniforms or military-style clothing (Linchenko, 2019; Veinmeister & Grigorieva, 2020).

People began to ascribe different meanings to these actions and to the symbols and rituals (Arkhipova et al., 2017; Veinmeister & Grigorieva, 2020). They have been created as the most painful points of confrontation in collective ways of celebrating Victory Day. On the one hand, some of them began as civic initiatives that have gained immense popularity and which continue to be perceived by many people as sincere and non-political ways of remembering the war. On the other hand, they have received subsequent active support from the Russian state. This has had the result that one part of society views them negatively as elements of state propaganda and activities conducted within the framework of patriotic pro-Kremlin programs. They are criticized as politically motivated practices carried out within the politics of memory of the ruling elite.

All these main ideological rituals, narratives and symbols are officially intended to be reproduced through the compatriot project. However, the division in people’s attitudes towards them is reflected in other countries at the level of community leaders, particularly with regard to how the Immortal Regiment (see above) is conducted and who would like to act as its coordinators. Nowadays, there are two organizations that conduct this action: the Immortal Regiment (IR), who
first implemented the procession, and who continue it as a civil, non-state, non-political initiative, and the Immortal Regiment of Russia (IRR), which is coordinated by the Kremlin and which, according to Sergey Lapenkov, one of the founders of the Immortal Regiment, is pseudo-public (59.ru, 2021). The procession tries to be embedded as a part of a government program aimed at disseminating the official version of the narrative of the war with the help of the Russian diaspora. It is used even more generally as a tool of Russian soft power abroad, intended to teach people a way of understanding the war from a particular, official, standpoint (Fedor, 2017). Here is how Lapenkov describes some of these processes in an interview with the Australian radio station SBS Russian (Naumova, 2018):

This year, especially in a number of countries, there were conflicts between these people, who have again appeared there as representatives of the IRR through the CCRCs [Coordinating Councils of Russian Compatriots], through [the Federal Agency] Rossotrudnichestvo, somewhere they have been supported by the embassy. There is a direct struggle for the Immortal Regiment there. The coordinators who started in Seattle, for example, in Toronto, they left. That is, they have lost the opportunity for influence because all of this is mixed with some kind of pseudo-patriotic enthusiasm, with some strange great-power manifestations.

Thus, in some countries, pro-Kremlin organizations began to carry out this action by supplanting the previous organizers or to implement it in parallel with them in the same locality. In Australia, at least in some cases, the situation is different – the pro-Kremlin organizations, ASSR and RARC, try to integrate this action into their programs of commemoration. The head of the RARC, in her application addressed to Russian officials and activists within the Russian compatriots project network (Belkina, 2021a), mentions the merits of her organization conducting various Immortal Regiments, organized both by the non-governmental organization IR and implemented within the compatriots project (Consulate General of Russia, n.d.). In Perth in 2021, the organizer of the procession, who was an ACCR counsellor on consular issues, conducted it as a part of a series of different events dedicated to Victory Day; the conference was called “The Historical Memory of Victory: Dialogue of Generations”, and was held with the support of ACCR and the Embassy of the Russian Federation. According to the publication of an ACCR member, the main argument and premise of the conference was formulated in a video-message from the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Australia, who opened this series of commemorative events, stating that a number of world politicians are trying to misrepresent the history of World War II and the role of
the USSR in it (Morozova, 2021). The Consul General of the Russian Federation in Sydney, who was present at the opening, explained why such events are important:

This topic is relevant, no doubt, because nowadays everywhere, all over the world there is a misinformation campaign to slander the history of Russia, including its role in the Great Patriotic War (Russian News Agency TASS, 2021).

Thus, the organizers politicize these community events and use them to broadcast the official Russian version of the commemorative rituals and war narrative, and take the opportunity to convert this experience into the accumulation of their symbolic resources.

According to Simonyan, a former RARC head, Victory Day was barely celebrated in Australia in the past, and many considered it “bad form” as it was perceived as a Soviet practice (Skabarnya, 2016). Obviously, today everything has significantly changed. The 9 May celebration in Australia includes a series of centralized events across the country (Belkina, 2020; RARC, 2018), many of which are coordinated or supported by pro-Russian organizations. The scale of the celebration is striking with regard to the number of different events taking place in many cities, as well as the number of organizations that take part in them. In these celebrations, global actions that take place around the world as part of the implementation of various Russian policies towards compatriots are combined with initiatives and events organized by various creative community organizations that arose from the grassroots, as well as the actions of such well-known pro-Kremlin patriotic organizations as the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club, providing soft propaganda (Harris, 2021).

For example, in 2021, the Night Wolves Club and the Immortal Regiment in Melbourne were among Melbourne’s co-organizers of commemorative events (IR in Melbourne & RERC, 2021). The club held a motorcycle race that included “flower-laying at two memorials and moving along with the column of the Immortal Regiment” (Belkina, 2021b). In Sydney in 2016, as part of a celebration organized by the RARC, the motorcycle race was led by Semyon Boykov, the leader of one of the Cossacks organization, known for his expressed support for Putin and his politicized actions and statements.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{16}\) See, for example, Printcev, 2021.
Notably, various established Australian organizations join the celebration, which contains Russian contemporary formal rituals. For example, a celebration at the Russian House in Melbourne, one of the oldest organizations founded in the 1960s by Russian-speaking migrants who came from post-war Europe as displaced persons and from China, included watching the Victory Parade from Red Square (Kalashnikova, 2018). At this event, RARC representatives from the state also awarded a Certificate of Merit to the organizer of the Immortal Regiment in Melbourne.

*Figure 6: Victory Day Celebration in Sydney, 2016. From left to right: S. Boykov and I. Simonyan, RARC, Sergey Shipilov, Consul General of Russia (RARC, 2016)*

*Figure 7: Invitation to celebrate Victory Day at the Russian House in Melbourne in 2018 (Russian House, 2018)*
In Perth, the militaristic-patriotic base of events is less pronounced, since there are no nationalist organizations like the Night Wolves among the co-organizers. The community is not large, but by competing for the right to represent it and to be included in pro-Russian networks, the agents are involved in the struggle for a monopoly on cultural production, and the products reproduce some practices and rituals which are typical for the modern official Russian events related to Victory Day. I will show how this happens describing the commemoration of Victory Day in Perth in 2019, which were supported by pro-Russian organizations, ACCR and RARC.

The ACCR took responsibility for conducting five events: an open lesson in a Russian community school (May 5), (this included a concert program about the war), a picnic (May 5), a “meeting for a cuppa” in the Orthodox Welfare Association (May 10), the commemoration of Victory Day, including the Immortal Regiment (May 9), and the “Memorial Evening,” which was comprised of a concert program, a Soviet movie about the war and greetings to veterans (May 11) (Lunkova, 2019). In addition, the representatives of the opposition RARC organized an alternative celebration in Hyde Park on 12nd May in the form of a picnic with a concert program, the Immortal Regiment, an open field kitchen, and other activities (RARC, 2019a). Thus, six events were held, which was an unprecedentedly large number for such a short period of time, given the average distribution of what usually happened in the community and its size.

The different organizations had a similar set of key, easily recognizable, symbols and rituals such as the distribution of St. George ribbons, a concert program with songs or dances of the war years or about the war, children, and participants in military uniform. Even the Immortal Regiment, which was created to be held in the form of a single mass procession of people whose family members had participated in the war, was announced and conducted by both organizations, despite the absence of a large number of people in Perth who could participate in it. As a result, this action was very much affected by the local reality related to the size of the community: very few people brought portraits of their relatives. In another event, it was supposed to give flowers to war veterans, or at least to those who were children in wartime. However, there were only very few people from this group in Perth, only one of whom came to this event. It seems that the prepared scenario does not necessarily match well with those people who live in Perth and are ready to participate in the events, but the organizers still include these rituals in the program of events and report them in the press (Lunkova, 2019).
For organizations of the Russian-speaking community, cooperation with each other in arranging events is usual. This allows them, on one hand, to make the program more diverse and, on the other, to attract more members of the public, since a significant amount of participants is composed of members of the organizer’s families and other partner organizations and their friends. Due to the number of events and the diversity of the program, most of the Russian-speaking organizations that exist in the city, and their representatives or members, were involved in the celebration: dance groups, singers, community schools’ representatives, the priest of the Orthodox church, and others.

The fact that these events are being implemented as part of the projects of pro-Russian organizations is usually not announced. They can be easily perceived as volunteer and bottom-up initiatives or as the initiatives of organizations which are simply part of their regular activities. For example, the picnic, which took place on 5th May, was announced not as an event associated with the celebration of Victory Day but as an outdoor catching up “with old and new friends.” At the same time, although this fact is not announced, it is not concealed either, as the organizer herself subsequently posted a link to the press publication about ACCR-supported events, and included it in an online group, whence I was surprised to know that it was associated with the celebration of Victory Day.

As previous studies have shown, using the same symbols and rituals in celebrating Victory Day can acquire different meanings in different countries and with different participants (Gabowitsch, 2015). I suggest looking at them from a different angle. Within the Perth community, participants and organizers can differ significantly in their motives for participation, with regard to their values and ideas about the preferred ways of commemoration, but they are structurally limited by the
repertoire of collective practices that they are invited to share. The products generated by community leaders satisfy the interests of a limited circle of consumers, but in the absence of an alternative, they can also attract other consumers as well. This is illustrated by an excerpt from an interview with a woman from Perth, in which she describes how she came with her children to the celebration before the official start, in order to avoid participation in the rituals that she does not like, but at the same time she wished to provide an opportunity to tell the children about the war with involvement from some community members:

**Interviewer:** You said you don’t really like public events – is that about all of them?

**Respondent:** No, Victory Day – I do not like this euphoria when everyone is happy, and they put on military uniforms on children – it’s absolutely dreadful for me. ... I don’t like the way it is represented. And I don’t know even... If you noticed, we were on May 9th. We arrived there half an hour earlier. ... We stood there, looked, talked with the children, and left before the beginning of the event. ...

**Interviewer:** And where is, I wonder, this military uniform from, how does it get here, to Australia?

**Respondent:** It seems to me, yes, it was not three years ago [in Perth]. ... This is new militaristic rhetoric. ... I don’t know how it appeared [here]. Last year ... we came on time ... And when I saw these kids walking ... And then they smile ... in these field caps ... This is a uniform from the battlefront. This is the form, in fact, of those going to death. Why are we dressing it for children?

Migrants solve cultural continuity dilemmas in different ways: they have different attitudes to holidays and symbols, have different ideas about what is part of the collective memory and cultural tradition and how it should be transmitted and continued. However, cultural producers, solving cultural production dilemmas during the struggle in the field, generate a limited repertoire of products that involves the reproduction of certain official symbols and narratives in the case of Victory Day and other celebrations.

It seems that in Australia events sponsored by pro-Russian organizations can be seen as an instrument of Russian soft power policy. These events are mostly not acknowledged by anybody, including the organizers, as being part of coordinated activities within the compatriot project. Organizers and consumers participate in these events for various reasons. For some, these are projects which implement the tasks of their organization in a series of various activities that other
sponsors or the Australian government can support. For others, this is more akin to entertainment, or a space for finding friends, and meeting with Russian-speakers; and for still others, the day is associated with a very important national story that they want to pass on to their children. In the Russian context, all these symbols and rituals can be recognized as official and directed at people who do not want to participate in the official policy implementation events. However, when carried out abroad, the ideological framework of the event is not perceived as an instrument of influence. The events involve a lot of active agents and institutions of the community, and these are people with different backgrounds, migration history, political views, social status, and so on. The voluntary nature of their participation in the reproduction of practices and meanings gives the impression that everything that happens is a civic initiative, and that all symbols and performative rituals are chosen voluntarily as the most preferred. This fact, in my opinion, can increase the political loyalty of those who, for various reasons, become involved in these events. One of the organizers told me in private that “we are all becoming more pro-Russian” in emigration. For a long time, I personally was convinced that all these symbols, which in the Russian context cause serious regular discussions and act to split opinion within Russian society, are perceived differently and as non-political by immigrants. During the six months of fieldwork, I did not see any official Russian influence on how the community is performed, and I myself became less critical about practices and symbols that are much more contested in Russia, that is, until I examined this connection.

The Russian government successfully cooperates with many organizations of Perth, which compete with each other for the right to participate in the implementation of activities under the soft power policy. It also provides them with information and support and this collaboration affects cultural production in the community.

4. Conclusion

In the field of symbolic production of the Russian-speaking culture, the main struggle is about contesting what Russian-speaking culture is, how it should be represented and reproduced, and what makes up its main elements and symbols. In other words, in the process of the struggle, the participants dispute how the cultural production dilemmas should be resolved – how to celebrate national holidays and which ones, what should be taught in the Russian-language schools of the community, in what forms and with what symbols the collective memory should be expressed.
Various groups of producers within the field compete for the conquest of cultural legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 19):

\[
\text{[T]he more the field is capable of functioning as a field of competition for cultural legitimacy, the more individual production must be orientated toward the search for culturally pertinent features endowed with value in the field’s own economy. This confers properly cultural value on the producers by endowing them with marks of distinction (a speciality, a manner, a style) liable to be recognized as such within the historically available cultural taxonomies.}
\]

As shown in the previous chapter, cultural producers such as Russian migrants from China who have perceived and positioned themselves as the keepers of proper and authentic Russian culture can be considered agents endowed with marks of distinction related to their membership of this group, their social origin, and others. Their position-taking, i.e., “the manifestations of the social agents involved in the field” (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 30), have included magazines, books, and many other cultural products, referring to high culture. Their products achieved cultural recognition not only from consumers but also from some competitors.

Although legitimacy criteria are always contested in the field, they are less contested in relation to them than agents in the Perth community, where many people who are ready to act as producers do not have a high volume of specific capital in the described sense. They can be well educated and occupy high social positions, but often in areas remote from the sphere of art, language, and those spheres which are related to the high culture associated with the important part of the Russian heritage, such as opera, theater, ballet, and literature, and most importantly they do not possess recognized marks of distinction compared to their competitors. Cultural products that can be created are also related to agents’ recourses or capitals. The cultural products are limited by the agents’ characteristics, dispositions, taste, skills, and social origin. As a result, agents generate a wide range of products, but are often inexperienced. Therefore, their positions are unstable and always disputed: representatives of different groups accuse opponents of unprofessionalism, poor taste, and misinterpretation of the essence of Russian culture.

The Russian-speaking community of Perth is characterized by active institutionalization, fragmentation, and confrontation. This intensive institutionalization is due not only to the real fragmentation of institutions as a result of this struggle but is also due to the institutional diversity
of organizations included in the compatriot project network. From the point of view of Bourdieu’s theory, the transformation of people into institutions and obtaining of formal positions can be considered a process of institutional legitimacy (Sapiro, 2003). The Russian policies which focus on working with compatriots abroad affects these processes. The implementation of the Russian compatriots project led to the creation of pro-Russian organizations and the emergence of community members who claim to be agents and institutions of consecration, members of which

*are authorized (or rather compete for the authority) to endow works with certain properties and thus to rank them on a scale of legitimacy* (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 13).

They help the work that cultural producers produce “achieve cultural recognition” (ibid), and their inclusion in the transnational network of institutions associated with the implementation of the project gives them the opportunity to accumulate the symbolic capital necessary to maintain their positions during the struggle in this field at the state level. This leads to the fact that certain performative rituals, symbols, and narratives constructed within the Russian compatriots project are reproduced in the community of WA and acquire the status of legitimized symbolic goods.

Thus, in the Russian-speaking community, the variability of cultural products is low, and the choice of events is limited. There are Russian-speakers who are interested in consuming cultural products, who nevertheless are unable to choose events in accordance with their specific tastes and their own ideas of what Russian-language culture is and how it should be reproduced. If we understand the institutions of the community and their leaders as the cultural representation of Russian-speaking migrants, then we can conclude that only a limited segment of Russian-speaking migrants is represented.
Chapter 10. “Community of disunited”: identity, unbelonging and self-prejudices

Introduction

When I stopped communicating with Russians, I still realized that we all have something in common, and I certainly also have these traits. I have even been recognized many times as Russian, I am a typical Russian, and I have resigned myself to it.

(Russian speaker from Australia, male)

This chapter mainly focuses on the level of symbolic interpretations and representations, and is concerned with issues related to the construction of identity, ideas about the Russian-speaking community, and symbolic boundaries between We and Others. One of the important tasks of this chapter is to summarize and connect the two main lines of research devoted to the conceptualization and functioning of the Russian-speaking community, and to the cultural habitus and raising and solving of cultural dilemmas. Russian-speaking migrants do not simply participate in the formation and reproduction of a community through the practices of production and consumption of culture and in direct or indirect participation in power relations of agents and institutions. Through their attitudes to the community and an understanding of what it means to be Russian-speaking migrants, they form the community’s image at a symbolic level as a community of unbelonging. I consider these processes in the context of Elias’s theory, according to which identity is a layer of the social habitus (Elias, 1991a, p. 209). As in solving cultural dilemmas, migrants reproduce the idea that some Russian-speaking migrants are carriers of a backward, “Soviet” or “improper” Russian culture that I call self-prejudices. The community is constructed as an entity with which these traits can be associated. Cultural habitus classifies practices and products, and marks a person as being a member of a cultural group. In the epigraph to this chapter, there is a quote from a conversation with a Russian-speaker who forms an idea of himself as a typical Russian through being identified as such by other people in Australia. These unrecognized cultural characteristics acquire cultural significance, sometimes against the individual’s wishes.

Elias’s theory allows me to describe these features and to explain how they are formed and change historically. For Elias, an important point in forming self-perception of oneself as a member of the group, with an emotional component, is the group’s loss of its status in the hierarchy of power relations. In the Introduction, I showed how historical processes are interconnected with the formation of identity features of the inhabitants of the post-Soviet space, and how these are
constructed around the triad “proper Russian vs. Western vs. backward Russian.” These characteristics have an impact on the way in which Russian-speaking migrants deal with cultural dilemmas, as illustrated in Chapter 7. In this chapter, I focus on the migrants’ perceptions of themselves and Others. There are a number of features that are customarily considered Soviet in a negative sense or as being rooted in “backward” traditions. For example, people may share the opinion that scandals and rudeness are a manifestation of earlier Soviet practices of communication between people, which were considered acceptable during the Soviet era. Non-professionalism can also be perceived as part of the professional practices which were widespread in Soviet times and which were acceptable attitudes towards work and other activities. Therefore, conflicts in the Russian-speaking community, and the lack of professionalism of some migrant organisations and groups producing Russian culture, are perceived as a manifestation of backward Russian culture. Such duality in perception, which is indicated by the fact that, on the one hand, people perceive themselves and their friends positively, and, on the other hand, some “Other” Russians are considered as bearers of “bad” cultural features, also allows me to find an answer to the questions: why do many people constantly talk about some Russian-speaking migrants who do not want to communicate with any Russian-speakers, whereas they rarely perceive themselves in this way? And why do some Russian-speaking migrants not want to communicate with other Russians?

1. Identity and recognition

In Part 2, I focused on those aspects of the cultural habitus that were unconscious in the past, but through the process of everyday experience in a new social environment become not only perceived, but also culturally marked. These signs begin to act as important elements of group belonging, forming symbolic boundaries (Barth, 1998) between cultural “We” and “Others,” and the latter includes not only external Others but also internal “Russian-speakers,” with whom migrants do not associate themselves if their cultural characteristics are considered to be “negative” or “Soviet.” Chapter 7 gave an example of how a sandwich, served as the main course of a meal, is constructed as a cultural trait that symbolizes different parenting approaches. Other practices and norms that cause cultural dilemmas can also acquire the function of assisting recognition of members of one’s own group in distinction from those “out-of-group,” as well as being markers that indicate a person’s group affiliation.

Migrants describe that they are recognized as Russian-speakers by their appearance and behaviour:

**Interviewer: Are you identified as Russian?**
Respondent: Yes, yes, yes, yes. ... Firstly, they immediately figure it out by my appearance. Secondly, by my behaviour: “Timur [her son], stop, this is not allowed, don’t do this.”

In Spain, in contrast to Australia, phenotypic traits are classifying, especially if migrants have blond hair, like Arina, quoted above. Also, many female informants from Spain often said that they are much younger than the Spanish mothers of similarly-aged children who they encounter in schools, kindergarten, playgrounds, etc., and this is also a marking feature. There are several other country differences which may serve as external identification group characteristics. According to some Spanish respondents, Russian-speaking children are easily recognized on the beaches due to their Panama hats, worn for protection from the sun. However, in Australia, wearing a hat in the summer is a shared norm, and therefore it does not serve as a classifying sign in the same way.

There are many other examples shared by respondents in both countries. The child-rearing style of Russian-speakers, described as strict, and characterized by increased control, is often mentioned by respondents as the way in which they can identify Russian-speaking parents and their children, and can also identify themselves, as shown in the example given by Arina about her interaction with her son Timur. This process of identification often happens in public places, for instance, on playgrounds or in educational institutions, because it is in such environments that differences appear for the first time, and thus it becomes possible to compare the behaviour of parents and their different reactions to a child’s behaviour when this is perceived as violating the rules, as I described in Chapter 4.

The signs of cultural habitus first acquire cultural meaning, and then they can form the basis of the we-image (Elias, 1991a, 1996) and become an essential element of self-identification. An interview with Australian respondent Julia illustrates this. When she said that Russian-speaking migrants showed more control in interacting with a child in public places and in making decisions, I asked her whether she herself possesses these qualities:

Respondent: Yes. Therefore, I say: “I am Russian.” Until now, yes.
Interviewer: Well, do you like it, or are you trying to do something with it?
Respondent: Most likely, as long as I hold on to this in our country... How to say? It helped me to survive and continues to help me. So I stay... No, I haven’t changed. I
think it hampers me. But in order to change this, it is necessary, as if the entire system in my head would be completely rebooted.

This quote clearly demonstrates the formed connection between national identity and the perceived parenting style as a part of the cultural habitus that anchored it. Julia describes these stylistic features as something that is not within her power to change, and her feelings related to it are not positive – this is what helps her survive, but, on the other hand, it also hinders her. This quote contains analogies with the respondent’s beliefs in this chapter’s epigraph: he gradually forms an idea of himself as a person with typical cultural traits and “have resigned himself to it.” This is not something that a person chooses in certain situations, but rather as something that needs, somehow, to be accepted. And often, such a pessimistic perception by migrants of their acknowledged traits and practices is associated with the fear that they may be manifesting something Soviet or backward, as in the case of Julia, although she also believes that these qualities help Russians to survive.

Other respondents identify the same signs for marking the image of the “inner Others,” often negative ones:

If on the playground, you see mummy, who always calls to order her child: “Shshsh.”
And “sit here and don’t run.” This is the Russian parent. Well, in my opinion, Asians also train children in such a way that they have to be meek and mild, meek as a lamb. The child should not make noise, his or her voice should not be raised” (respondent from Australia).

Unlike previous examples, this respondent appraises this behaviour negatively as being a manifestation of negative cultural traits that she herself does not possess, as follows from her interview.

Adherence to specific practices and norms, which are part of internalized dispositions, forms the image of a person as culturally different, and not always in a negative sense. Anna describes the differences between her children and cites the example of the youngest child, who, in her opinion, grows up Australian:

Respondent: But this one is running around, this is a joey, he is my Aussie-Aussie. In general, I say, he is barefoot everywhere. He took off his shoes, ran, yeah ... Aussie-
Anna and her husband are both migrants in Australia, but come from different countries, and they moved to Australia when they already had their first child. In this example, cultural identity is again understood by her as having been shaped by a certain set of everyday practices, but unlike Julia, in this instance this is in order to describe another person’s identity and not her own. To confirm his Australian identity, she asks her son about his own self-identification and develops the argument by describing his behaviour which, as she believes, confirms this identity. The son grows up as an Australian, not only because he considers himself Australian but also because he loves to walk without shoes and wear loose clothes.

Bourdieu writes that two capacities determine the habitus: the capacity to generate practices and products and the capacity to differentiate them (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 170). The cultural habitus (Elias, 1991a, 1996, 1996) has similar capacities in a certain sense. Russian-speaking migrants reproduce a system of practices and norms, but they also recognize them as cultural ones, or they learn to do this after migration. While for Bourdieu this is generally associated with the lifestyle of social groups, in the case of cultural habitus this may be a limited repertoire of practices, which amongst migrants can be reduced via the process of solving cultural dilemmas and the adoption of other cultural norms and habits. Recognition does not always occur by interpreting a certain classifying behaviour or cultural representation of a person. Apparently, there are some internalized mechanisms for recognizing the signs of the cultural habitus incorporated in the body. According to Bourdieu, habitus can be manifested in certain postures, gait, gestures, as well as style of clothing, hairstyles, and other external features. Similar mechanisms are relevant to the cultural habitus.

Russian-speaking migrants, in some cases, can even recognize those who do not perform any culturally specific actions, simply by their appearance. I give as an example something that happened to me. I attended a class of my Russian-speaking dance group after a two-month break. I had left Australia for two months, and during this period, I had not communicated with anyone from the group, even on social networks. I arrived ahead of time and waited for the lesson in the
hall. The class of the “Australian” group, which rented the hall before my group, had just finished, and its members were still in the same room as me. During my absence, a new dancer had joined the team, with whom I was not familiar. She entered the hall, confidently approached me, and asked a question in Russian. I was in my usual sports uniform, was silent, just looking at my phone and it seemed to me that I could have passed for someone from the “Australian” group. I asked her how she guessed that I was Russian. “We Russian girls easily recognize each other,” she replied. In other situations, I myself have been able to recognize Russian-speaking people. The respondents also tell me about similar occurrences. This is what the respondent means in the epigraph of the chapter when he says that “I have even been recognized many times as Russian.” He told me how he found himself several times in situations in Australia when people began to speak Russian with him, determining his nationality only from his appearance. Thus, cultural habitus also includes internalized classified and classifying schemes of perceptions and practices.

Michael Herzfeld (2016) uses the notion of cultural intimacy to describe the recognition of that part of a cultural identity that insiders do not want discovered by external observers. On the one hand, these self-stereotypes cause a feeling of embarrassment in front of outsiders, but on the other hand, they provide the certainty of common sociality. According to his theory, members of any nation will share ideas about some of their own contrary features that act as an important part of identity. Some aspects of cultural habitus can be described using the term cultural intimacy: for example, with regard to the peculiarities of upbringing, which in the case of Russian-speaking migrants are described as manifestations of their excessive nervousness and other characteristics that they recognize in, or ascribe to, themselves, and of which they are critical. However, in this study, I prefer to use the term cultural habitus, which is broader than cultural intimacy and includes many other shared similarities that constitute identity. As I have shown, what makes some respondents feel sad and embarrassed, can, on the contrary, cause feelings of pride in others. Besides, in the migrant environment, not only does the recognition of some unconscious cultural practices and norms take place, but migrants, in the process of solving dilemmas, can abandon these in favour of others. Moreover, they do not always form a sense of solidarity but can, on the contrary, act as a sign marking other Russian-speakers as people with whom the respondents do not want to be associated. The cultural habitus also includes those ideas about the Russian-speaking friend, which I called self-prejudices. It is a negative attitude towards some constructed inner Others who are imagined as having different negative traits. These perceptions underlie the formation of a sense of distrust towards outsiders, national disunity at both a global and the local level of migrant communities, as I will further show.
2. “People really don’t like each other:” how an “imagined Russian-speaking community” is imagined

“Community of disunited” is the title of an interview with a Russian-speaking migrant from Australia, Vitaliy Agron, which was released in audio format on the Australian SBS Russian radio website in 2015 (Vassiliev, 2015) and was referenced in a post on one of the Russian-speaking forums in Australia in 2016. Vitaliy is a geologist who lived in Australia for twenty years, and before that for five years in Israel and two years in China. Due to his varied and long-term migration experience, he was invited to share his ideas about the Russian-speaking community and people.

“‘What the devil did you come here for?’ Alla Bogolepova on the peculiarities of contemporary emigration in the Russian way” is an article written by a Russian-speaking journalist from Lisbon, Portugal, for the Russian online news site “Gazeta.Ru” (Bogolepova, 2020), a link to which was also published in a post in one Russian-speaking online forum in 2020. This publication, issued almost five years after the SBS interview referred to above, written by a person who lives in another country and who has a different migration experience, reproduces many similar ideas regarding the disunity of Russian-speaking communities in different countries of the world and the reasons for these. These views reflect the opinions of many participants in my research, and which are essential for understanding the characteristics of the Russian-speaking community at a symbolic level. I will dwell on these points, analyzing in more detail the 2015 interview with Vitaliy Agron.

Tina: You call yourself a “professional immigrant.” There is the same picture in all the countries where you have been or is this our Australian misfortune?

Vitaliy: ... I once discussed this with a geologist from Bangladesh, and he said that they basically have the same feature: when they see each other, they cross to the other side of the street. I cannot say that about Israel. When Israelis meet each others overseas, they usually hug rather than cross the street. ...

It seems to me that all these associations are artificial in themselves. Of course, language is a very important part of culture, communication and everything else. And it would be logical to unite on the basis of a single language. But all the same it turns out that people who are strangers to each other are trying to do something together.
Recently, a very controversial and extraordinary comrade Nevzorov on Echo of Moscow\textsuperscript{17} coined a phrase, which, of course, sounded quite cruel. There was a discussion of the Stalinist regime and why it all happened. And he said that the Russian people simply cannot stop humiliating each other. They enjoy it. I kind of don’t completely agree with this, because I don’t want to be categorical, but even in my life, in fact, there were quite a few cases when I experienced it myself. This can concern anything. Russians have a slightly different approach to new people and to the acceptance of a person into their environment. That is, it usually always starts with a negative. Do you agree?

There is a very unfunny joke about forums: You visit an American forum, ask a question and get an answer. You visit an Israeli forum, ask questions and you are asked a counter question. You visit a Russian forum and for two days they explain to you what a schmuck you are and that you never had to come here at all. Unfortunately, this is the case. Fights, showdowns happen on any forums, but in Russian ones it acquires some kind of gratifying characteristic, this hobby is absolutely adored by everyone. A community of disunited. ...

Vitaliy: Yes, I like to speak Russian ...

Tina: Continuing your thought – but I love to speak it with friends.

Vitaliy: I love to speak it with friends, that’s right.

One of the popular views discussed or shared by the respondents is that Russian-speaking people do not want to interact with each other abroad. It is with the discussion of this issue that the interview with Vitaliy begins. The disunity of the Russian-speaking community is stated as a well-known fact, without requiring any introduction or explanation. The journalist Tina Vassiliev describes the situation with passion as an “Australian misfortune,” but does not explain what it is about. Apparently, it is assumed that the title of the interview, “community of disunited,” which already reflects the notion of disunity of Russian-speaking migrants and the background knowledge of the context, is sufficient for the listeners to understand the question.

Vitaliy interprets it in the sense that at least one of the signs of “misfortune” about which Tina asks is about the fact that Russian-speaking people do not want to communicate with each other abroad.

\textsuperscript{17} Echo of Moscow is a Russian-language Russian radio station, and Nevzorov is a journalist.
and that when they meet each other, they “cross to the other side of the street.” Alla Bogolepova, describing the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Lisbon, shares the same beliefs:

_I don’t know why we have such a pathological dislike for each other. Where does the desire to cross to the other side of the street at the sound of Russian speech come from?_

She also writes about this passionately, and considers it a negative cultural trait that deprives migrants abroad of the opportunity to be included in the support networks of compatriots.

The respondents often recall meeting those who avoid communication with Russian-speaking people. In their opinion, one of the signs of such behaviour is complete avoidance of contact, for example, switching from Russian to a foreign language when they meet a Russian-speaking person, or trying to stop talking and then leave. In other instances, in the case of a casual acquaintance, some may themselves declare their unwillingness to communicate with Russian-speakers. A respondent from Madrid, describing her experience of chance encounters with such people, gives examples of both scenarios. In Spain, she came across those who, in her opinion, tried to leave when they heard that she spoke Russian, for example, on the coast:

_When, there on the coast, when you see Russian-speakers and when they hear the same speech, it starts like ... or they fall silent. Then they start to leave. The main thing is not to communicate._

Additionally, she spoke about a woman who told her that she did not want to communicate with Russian-speaking migrants:

_Once, when I talked to one woman, she is an adult, she has been here for about 30 years, she moved here a very long time ago. And when I said that one friend of mine lives there, there, I have many Russian-speaking friends here, Russians. And when she said: “Oh, I don’t communicate with anyone.” – “And why?” And she is from Moscow. She says: “Oh, you know, if I wanted to communicate with our people, why would I have left there?!_”

One of my respondents from Perth answered in approximately the same way. When I asked her why she and her Russian-speaking husband chose Perth for migration to Australia, she replied that one of their reasons was that there are few Russians living in Perth, and that they emigrated in order to leave them behind in Russia, and not for on-going communication.
The idea that Russian people abroad do not care about each other may also apply to Russians in general. Migrants can encounter this opinion in the Russian-language press, in on-line forums, and in conversations with each other. For example, an excerpt from an interview with the famous Russian artist Chulpan Khamatova was posted in a Russian-language online forum, in which, when speaking about Russia, she concludes: “we do not love each other in this country. It is unpleasant for us to do something nice to another person.” It was suggested that this conclusion of hers could be a topic of discussion in the forum, with a link provided to the interview, and many commentators supported her opinion. In the 2015 interview referred to above, Vitaliy quotes the words of the well-known journalist Nevzorov from Russian radio, saying “Russian people simply cannot stop humiliating each other,” with which he partially agrees, and he believes that this helps explain the situation in migrant communities.

In Chapter 5, describing the application of Elias’s theory to the study of Russian-speaking migrants, I cite as an example Ogoniok’s article about Russians abroad, published in 1997. In it, written many years before these more recent publications, the same ideas are reproduced:

*The Russian, when he or she is abroad, has another wonderful feature. As soon as he or she catches the eye of the last Russian border guard, he or she immediately tries to separate from them [Russians] .... We don’t love each other.*

This quote too refers not only to the dislike of Russian-speaking tourists for each other but also to their lack of desire to interact. Speaking about Russian-speaking migrants, Alla Bogolepova opines:

*We do not help each other, we do not form any of our own cultural spaces and do not want to be considered an ethnic group at all.*

Thus, the reluctance to communicate with each other abroad, as well as the disunity of the migrant community, are explained by the lack of love for each other and is considered an exclusive national trait.

In the opinion of Russian-speakers, this is what distinguishes them from people from other countries of the world. For example, according to Alla, “it is customary for the Russians to stay away from each other,” in contrast to the Chinese, Nepalese, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, French, and Indians. “I have lived in different countries and have seen that the Chinese, Romanians and others help each other, unlike the Russians,” one of the respondents from Australia complained to
me. Vitaliy Agron also considers this a national trait, but he reassures listeners that there are other nationalities who do not want to communicate with each other when they meet abroad, such as people from Bangladesh. A respondent from Spain told me that people from India often gather by the river to socialize, and he regrets that Russian-speakers do not want to spend time together in a similar way. He described this tendency to keep a distance from other Russians with regret and sadness, and as a disadvantageous trait.

Usually, in the comments on such critical posts, there are always people who share or, conversely, dispute such a point of view. When people describe their personal experience, or discuss their friends and acquaintances and the support they have received from Russian-speaking people, it can differ significantly from such ideas. However, when thinking about Russian-speaking people globally, they often imagine (Anderson, 1983) themselves as disunited individuals who avoid compatriots-strangers. Here again, it is important to highlight the differences by using the concept of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 2016), which can describe the self-image shared by group members and which may possibly embarrass them. The most crucial difference, in my opinion, is that these ideas do not form sociality but separation. The community at both the global and local levels is imagined to be disunited, and the consequences of this are distrust of others and the desire to limit communication to narrow networks of those friends whom people trust. Vitaliy Agron talks about this when he repeats after Tina Vassiliev that he likes to speak Russian only with friends. Alla Bogolepova writes about the same:

*No, we are certainly not some kind of ghouls, we know how to make friends and help our friends, but these are isolated connections that arise as the result of personal affection.*

In addition, it is internal “others” who are endowed with these “shameful” features, as these are characteristics that people do not recognize in themselves. People distance themselves from other Russian-speakers since, in their opinion, they are simply reacting to the negative attributes of their compatriots, which they themselves do not possess.

The unwillingness of Russian-speaking migrants to consolidate and maintain relations with each other has been found in some other studies. The reluctance to live close to each other, and the choice of residential area, based on the socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhood, rather than on the presence of Russian neighbours, and the lack of social organizations that would provide assistance and support to migrants, are the specific characteristics of some Russians abroad.
(Ryazantsev, 2013). Kopnina (2005, 2006) uses the concept of antagonism to describe the distinguishing feature of Russian migrants residing in London and Amsterdam in the late 90s and early 2000s, which was displayed by a reluctance to have close contact with each other. In those years, the migrants living in these cities “compose a socially heterogeneous group, where animosities and mistrust between the migrants enhance social distance” (Kopnina, 2005, p. 99). She concluded that the term “community” was not applicable to them and uses the concept of subcommunities to describe interest groups, social circles, and other fractured groups into which Russian migrants from these cities are divided.

A study of Soviet Jewish emigres who came to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates some similar trends, as seen in this excerpt from the migrant interview cited in the article:

*No one really helps anyone else in this community, except maybe family. There is no feeling of community; each person is running so fast to accumulate wealth for himself—to buy more jewellery and sausages—that no one else matters. I hate this so much I cannot even express this to you. I told you from my job that I have mostly American and Oriental friends. I love the Korean people—they are such hard workers and they know how to help each other* (Markowitz, 1992, p.148).

This narrative is very similar to those quoted above, and illustrates a pessimistic view of Russian-speaking migrants as disunited people who do not form a sense of community and who do not want to help each other, unlike other migrant groups. However, Markowitz disagrees with the prevailing view of her respondents that they do not form communities. She calls the article “Community without Organizations” and says that migrants build friendly and kinship informal networks of support that are based on trust in each other. This formation of fragmented migrant networks is similar to the findings of Kopnina’s study, although in her study, members of subcommunities could also form relationships through migrant institutions.

The difference between the results of my research is that all these disparate migrant groups exist in one social space, which I call the field of cultural production or community. A feature of this community is that migrants often do not form a sense of belonging to it and do not perceive themselves as part of it, but at the same time, all these groups are part of existing relationships and affect their dynamics and the products that are generated. In the next section, I will show how the
Russian-speaking migrant community exists without a sense of community, equivalent to a “community of unbelonging.”

3. Community of unbelonging: perception of Russian-speaking community by migrants

In the previous section, I mainly focused on how a community is imagined at the global level. This part is devoted to the perceptions of the local migrant community. During the research, I was regularly told about Russian-speaking migrants in Perth and Madrid who do not want to communicate with other Russian-speaking migrants, or who do not interact with them for varying reasons. Several times I was given contacts of people who were associated with this group and during the interview it usually turned out that they have Russian-speaking friends or have used, to some extent, the resources of the Russian-speaking community. I have already given one example above, citing a Russian-speaking couple who chose to migrate to Perth because there were few Russian-speaking people living there, yet at the same time, their child had attended classes in a Russian-language community school.

Another woman, who was also introduced to me as a person who does not communicate with Russian-speaking people, was concerned that my discussions with her would not be useful for my research, because she was not involved in the Russian-speaking community. However, during the interview, she talked about several Russian-speaking friends with whom she maintains relationships and how she tried to send her children to Russian-speaking language schools. Subsequently, I also met her at a Russian-speaking event, to which she came with her Russian-speaking friends.

I witnessed another example illustrating a similar pattern by chance. In a shopping mall next to my house, I met a man, Ivan, whom I had met once previously at a Russian-language concert. We greeted each other and had a very short conversation, from which I learned that he lives in the same area. After that, we met by chance a few more times and sometimes stopped to talk. During one of our conversations, I asked if he attends Russian-language events, and he replied that he never attends them and does not want to. I was surprised because I first met him at such an event. To this, he said that he had made an exception on that occasion, since he generally tries not to communicate with Russian-speaking migrants because there is a high probability of meeting an unpleasant person. For example, he speculated that they might like to express anti-Putin
sentiments: and as he moved to Australia a very long time ago, for a completely different reason, such conversations are unpleasant to him, he avoids them. I clarified whether this implied that he does not communicate at all with the Russian-speaking residents of Perth. He objected to my clarification, saying that he had a circle of friends here of about eleven people with whom he had been close for many years.

In all these cases, similar trends can be traced. Apparently, having Russian-speaking migrant friends or irregularly attending Russian-speaking events is not considered as inclusion in the Russian-speaking community. It seems that people tend to see themselves as very dissimilar to those who, in their opinion, are more heavily involved in various activities or networks of Russian-speaking migrants and who consume more Russian-speaking services or are the producers of such services. It is important to note that the migrants themselves consider this network of cultural producers as being a community; this is in contrast to the studies of Markowitz and Kopnina, in which Russian-speaking migrants not only did not form a sense of community, but also did not agree that a community of Russian-speaking migrants existed at all.

For other people, the intensity of the participation of a friend or acquaintance in various Russian-speaking events, or the regularity of consumption of services and information, can also be a measure of a person’s inclusion in the Russian-speaking community. One of my respondents, who herself is a producer of Russian-speaking culture, works in a field in which she encounters a large number of Russian-speaking migrants. She believes that most of these people are not included in the Russian-speaking community and that they try to stay away from it. Here is how she describes it:

Interviewer: But are the people who work with you ... Are they included in these Russian-speaking networks?

Respondent: Only two out of all, and while one is directly involved, the second is simply, for example, her son [attends Russian-speaking activity]. There are several guys, one whose wife worked in a Russian-language school, but he himself was not included. There are several girls and boys who do not associate with Russian society at all, and by the way, there are a lot of them [in this professional sphere]. I know a lot of other Russians from other companies, they have never been seen in the Russian community.

Interviewer: Are they not in the online groups, do they not communicate?
**Respondent:** They do not go to the events ... No, they are fluent in Russian and we meet with them, we speak Russian perfectly, but they in no way come close to the Russian society, they stew in their own juice and do not want to get into any quarrels, because many hear about internal conflicts and simply do not want to be associated with this crowd. They have some friends of their own, some of their own interests, and they do not get involved with the Russian society in any way.

Here, again, inclusion in Russian-language networks is directly associated with participation in some public events, and with the consumption of products created by cultural producers. A person can have Russian-speaking friends, his or her family members can play an active role in the community or be regular consumers of some Russian-speaking services, but they themselves may not be perceived as a member of these networks. Moreover, even participation in the production of culture may not be considered as signifying full membership of the community. For example, the same respondent told me about a woman who is a member of one Russian-speaking organisation:

*She never participated in the life of the Russian-speaking society, never at all. ... She was forcibly dragged along and is only there due to her friend because she has a great relationship with her, and she is not friends with anyone else.*

Having a Russian-speaking friend, and membership and an active role in one of the Russian-speaking organizations, is not sufficient to consider her as a person who actively participates in the life of the community.

Another important reason why these people are not considered fully-fledged members of the community, or do not consider themselves as such, is not only due to their active participation or otherwise in the production and consumption of culture, but also to the attitudes they hold towards the Russian-speaking community. In the above examples, people do not want to communicate with Russian-speaking community members themselves or do not want to identify with them. Ivan, mentioned above, is afraid of unpleasant conversations about Putin, whereas others, in contrast, do not like certain products associated with the symbols and narratives which result from the production and consumption of culture. Also, some colleagues and acquaintances of the respondent do not wish to participate in conflicts and to be seen as part of this conflicted community. The woman from the last example, according to the respondent, also does not want to
participate in other events both because of the conflicts in the community, but also because of the “low level of the product that is provided.”

Thus, these reasons, related to the characteristics of the product, which is limited not only by variety but also by its quality, are combined with other reasons which relate to the perception that community members are people with whom they do not want to communicate, and of the emotional atmosphere as being uncomfortable. An important reason as to why people do not want to be part of this community is their belief that the community reproduces various negative cultural traits and or politics. As well as these reasons, there may also be prejudices against certain Russian-speaking Others who are the bearers of these negative traits.

4. Self-prejudices to Russians and mistrust: various imagined inner Others

One of the most stigmatized groups in the narratives of informants and discussions in online groups is often Russian-speaking people, a kind of “inner others” with whom Russian-speaking migrants and their friends do not usually associate. As stated above, self-prejudices are distinct from cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 2016). The latter are self-stereotypes whereby the group representatives are embarrassed, but which are associated with the reproduction of group identity. Migrants from both cities share the ideas that Russians are “closed,” that their sympathy and friendliness must be deserved, while the Spanish and Australians are “open”, affable and friendly. This is an example of cultural intimacy, as respondents often see it as a common group trait.

Self-prejudice is negative perceptions of Russian-speaking “inner Others” with whom Russian-speakers do not want to associate, and who they consequently endow with negative traits that they believe they themselves do not possess. For each respondent, this group of “backward,” “Soviet,” and other Russian-speakers may be different. Some migrants say that they avoid contacts with members of the Russian-speaking community, because they do not want to communicate with Russian patriots who criticize the West. In contrast, the aforementioned Ivan does not go to Russian-language events because he seeks to avoid conversations containing criticism of Putin. The mistrust of their own culture, which I wrote about in the previous chapters, and the lack of agreement about what is acceptable and unacceptable lead to the fact that any problems associated with communicating with Russian-speaking people can then be perceived as demonstrating aspects of their negative cultural traits. Therefore, conflicts in a community are most often perceived as a
manifestation of the negative cultural characteristics of its members. One respondent, talking about the conflicts in the Russian-speaking online communities in Spain, concludes:

Therefore, this is simply not just something that I do not like, it is unpleasant for me. Because I, for example, know that the Spanish themselves are not like that.

It is not merely the community as a whole which can be perceived as an entity personifying everything bad that exists in Russian-speaking culture, but people whose communication is limited only by the community are described as people with disparate flaws:

They are included only in Russian-speaking networks, if they have limited knowledge of the English language and due to this tightness and limited everyday life, it causes a certain discontent, as I said, discontent or some kind of mild depression, and it always results in the fact that you just get angry with other people.

It is interesting that this excerpt is from an interview with one of the active cultural producers of the Russian-speaking community, a person who participated in a variety of events either as a co-organizer or as a main contributor.

Russian-speaking migrants who moved here many years ago may have a negative attitude towards the newcomers:

It is very difficult for me to contact the Russians who have arrived, for example, 5 years ago from Russia.

Those who arrived recently may speak negatively about those migrants who had arrived a long time ago:

It seems to me that those who have lived here for a long time, how to say, somehow it seems that the person has been living here for such a long time that he or she has achieved [something] and somehow tries to show it off to you every time, so I didn’t really communicate with someone who is Russian.

It is interesting that one of these women was a visitor to the various Russian-speaking events, and the second was a cultural producer, that is, they were both actively involved in the Russian-speaking activities of the community.

Someone singles out Russian-speaking men as a particular “problem” group:
Russian men, they are so constrained in themselves. Very much all about just themselves. I can’t even communicate with them at this level because I keep away from them.

For other migrants, the group identified as having shortcomings may be Russian-speaking women, but different respondents can name different negative traits. In some cases, they talk about envy or the selfish goals that migrants pursue, and about the desire to gossip. This respondent complained about the tendency to brag or, on the contrary, to complain about life, in contrast to Spanish women: “Russian girls very often like to talk either about the very bad things, yes, that everything is bad, or to boast.”

Often this group of Russian-speaking people is described as possessing qualities that characterize them as backward and uncivilized:

*As for the mentality, Russians are rude, pushy, ill-mannered (in Russia, I say sorry and smile through a word, and then I stop after three days), and retreat into private life.*

Some migrants, like this woman, speak negatively about Russian-speaking people in general; others share the idea of a certain group of “less pleasant” Russians. For example, this is how one respondent described her impression of a Russian-speaking community leader speaking at an Australian multiculturalism event:

*Thanks to such well-mannered and educated people with good attitudes like her, we are considered Europeans. But among the Russians there are many much less pleasant people.*

The latter is contrasted with well-mannered, educated Russians with good attitudes, thanks to whom they are considered Europeans. She is talking about some imagined external observer, whose opinion is important. “Europeanness” here is synonymous with civilization. Some Russian-speaking migrants in Amsterdam and London also described the behaviour of their compatriots with a similar social background as “embarrassing, backwards or irritating” (Kopnina, 1995, p. 92).

Thus, the internal other can be very extensive and may include a diverse range of Russian-speaking migrants, regardless of their social status, age, gender, and other characteristics. People tend more
often to try and attempt to define the Russian-speaking group to which they consider themselves as belonging, and to clarify who is perceived as belonging to the negative other.

There is one quote from an interview that illustrates some of my key ideas about prejudices towards Russian culture and about the perception of oneself as a bearer of Russian culture. It shows how this contradiction is built into the narrative between the positive perception of oneself and one’s own Russian environment, the desire to transmit some aspects of Russian culture to one’s child, and, on the other hand, the idea of some Russians as being bearers of “backward” Soviet culture. In this example, a number of patterns can be traced that are typical for Russian-speaking migrants. The respondent considers that some aspects of Russian culture are very important. For example, she believes that her primary task as a parent is to transmit the Russian language to her two children. Here is how she describes it:

*I can say that, it was a very important, primary task for me, because, firstly, I am Russian, well. I understand that I will never know English enough to discuss with my children everything and to say everything that I really think on some topic. Especially if there is some personal topic, it is not so simple like: “What will you eat for breakfast?” Something important, I will never be able to explain it in English as good as in Russian. Plus we have grandmothers, grandfathers, uncles, aunts, great-grandmothers, who also do not speak English. And all of this turns out as a broken connection. Then, too, our culture is important to me, our books, literature, poems are important to me and they cannot be translated into English, they must be understood only in Russian.*

The first goal is formulated in an instrumental way. The respondent wants to speak her native language with her children, which she knows better than English, and also to give them the opportunity to communicate with relatives who do not speak English. The second goal cannot be interpreted as pragmatic. She wants her children to read Russian-language books in the original. For these purposes, she said, she limited her communication to Russian-speaking people and created a Russian-speaking environment for her children:

*Respondent: I have no Australian friends. We are all very much determined to preserve the language, we are all very kind of fenced off, let’s say, in such a Russian community here. I think, looking at their [children’s] friends at some parties, no, they*
are not very different from the Australians. They are more different from the Russians than from the Australians.

**Interviewer:** How do they differ from the Russians?

**Respondent:** They are calmer, more free, more confident in themselves, more relaxed, probably.

In another part of the interview, she talks about other aspects of Russian culture, in this case, about negative ones:

**Interviewer:** Please tell me how Russian-speaking parents differ from Australian parents?

**Respondent:** Oh, these are generally psychotic people, hysterical, psychotic people [laughs].

**Interviewer:** Do you mean Russian-speakers?

**Respondent:** Yes. The less time they have lived here, the more psychotic and hysterical they are. The longer the time, the more Australian they are. If it is a Russian couple, the wife is more nervous. If it’s a mixed family, then the husband still somehow has influence, apparently, and the process goes faster. Russians are very obsessed with grades and control. And for them it is very important to study well at school, it is super important, but the Australians in general, in my opinion, do not pay any attention at all to this. Study well, and what? Learning somehow. The only people who probably bother with this are the Chinese and the Russians.

**Interviewer:** So you think that Russians very much want to educate a child right?

**Respondent:** They do not want to educate him, they want to ... train him like a monkey, so that later they can say to everyone: “Look, mine has a red, a gold medal there.” At the same time, they do not understand absolutely, at the same time, they do not understand absolutely in the market situation that this is not a guarantee at all that the child will live comfortably or something else. And why this is done, I do not understand. ... But, in my opinion, statistics of recent years completely refute this ... Normally, [freelancers] earn a lot more than people sitting in offices. Prestige – yes, probably, some of this Soviet backwardness, that you need a portfolio, a diploma or something else.
Interestingly, this example is about parenting practices that many migrants perceive as positive aspects of culture and describe as advantageous. She speaks negatively about Russian-speaking parents, who enroll the child in various extracurricular activities and who devote a lot of attention and effort in order to ensure the child’s academic success. She does not interpret this approach as the desire of the parents to give their child a good education or to ensure a successful future. She believes that they need the child’s success to confer prestige in the eyes of others, that the child’s happiness and health is secondary, and also that such aspirations are due to “Soviet backwardness.” That is, these parenting practices are perceived as a negative cultural trait that has roots in the USSR, and parents who behave in this manner are carriers of these traits.

5. Conclusion

Kelly (2001, p. 396), in the afterword of her book Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin, concludes in favour of the “neo-traditionalist ‘interpretation of Russian history.’” She further writes:

[I]t is perhaps less the persistence in Russia of ‘neo-traditional’ features that is remarkable than the pervasiveness of anxiety about the aberrancy of these. The survival of patronage networks into the late twentieth century was evident also in Italy or Spain: what was more peculiar was the agonized assumption on the part of many Russians themselves that this survival pointed to national backwardness (though this could be matched in Ireland, another country filled with uncertainty about its relationship to ‘European civilization’).

The migrants in my study are not only concerned about elements that are perceived as traditional, but are also at times interpret any characteristics that they attribute to manifestations of their culture as signs of backwardness. A distrustful attitude towards culture is reflected in the perception that the Russian-speaking community possesses these properties and that their compatriots are possible carriers of these cultural traits. The migrants can take an active part in the life of the community without perceiving themselves as members, in particular, because they do not want to associate with people who are perceived by the insider Others. Having experiences wherein one’s own peculiarities were recognized as cultural, or recognition of one’s own difference, serves as one of the mechanisms for the formation of national identity. Some features may begin to be perceived as something inevitable to which, in some cases, it is necessary to resign oneself.
Community, understood as a field of cultural production, is a field of struggle, not a field of solidarity. Cultural producers, solving cultural production dilemmas, also construct differences between proper Russian-speaking migrants and between appropriate and inappropriate elements of culture, as shown in the previous chapters. This also contributes to the fact that people may not develop a feeling of belonging. However, the general atmosphere is also influenced by the peculiarities of the cultural habitus. Cultural habitus is an umbrella term that includes various national similarities, including cultural intimacy. In contrast to this term, habitus covers different self-images, both awkward and proud, and characteristics that can change as a result of solving cultural dilemmas.
Chapter 11. Conclusion

The study explored the question of how culture is experienced and negotiated by Russian-speaking migrants and what role communities – particularly small communities – play in this process. This raised many related questions relevant to studies of cultural (dis)continuities and experiences in migrant communities, such as what culture means to migrants, how it can be studied, and what community means for these migrants. Drawing on Elias’, Douglas’, and Bourdieu’s theoretical ideas and developing the concept of cultural dilemmas, I propose new theoretical optics that allow me to interrogate these questions. I argue that the processes of cultural experience and (dis)continuities proceed differently in two contexts – in everyday life and in the migrant communities - and explain them within two different theoretical frameworks, using different terminology. I employ Mary Douglas’s theory of purity and danger (1966) and Norbert Elias’s theory of habitus (1982, 1996, 2002) and develop the concept of cultural continuity dilemma within the everyday multiculturalism approach (Wise & Velayutham, 2009) to describe and explain these processes in migrants’ everyday lives. I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory (1985, 1993a, 1993b, 1996) and the concept of cultural production dilemma to explain processes in migrant communities as fields of cultural production, focusing on “official” cultural products (re)produced by community leaders or cultural producers. Thus, one of the significant results of my research is to demonstrate how and why cultural (dis)continuities in everyday life are distinct from the processes of “official” (re)production of culture by community leaders.

Norbert Elias, in his book The German (1996), summarizes one of its purposes:

*In reality, though, the contemporary problems of a group are crucially influenced by their earlier fortunes, by their beginningless development. This points to one of the tasks sociology has not yet coped with – and at the same time to a method which can help a nation in coming to terms with its past. One of the functions of this book is to pave the way intellectually and practically in handling such problems* (p. 19).

Elias formulates the function of the book very broadly, not as tied to a specific empirical case and problems but as a theoretical perspective within which other sociological research can be carried out. In the form in which it has been finally conducted, the part of this research related to the study of migrant everyday life and identity is largely inspired by this very premise of explaining the formation and development of peculiarities of cultural habitus as being interconnected with state-formation and other socio-historical processes. Thus, one of my contributions to the literature is to
adjust Elias’s theory of habitus for migration studies, and studies of migrants’ parenting practices, in particular. Employment of his concept of habitus firstly allows me to show that the experience of culture and diversity in migrant everyday life can be interconnected with migrant groups’ historical or “earlier fortunes”, and to demonstrate that it is important to study the processes of social development in the country of origin of migrants, and not be limited to focus on modern processes in the host country or at a transnational level.

In addition, Elias’s theory makes it possible to return the focus in migration research from the study of diversification and heterogeneity within migrant groups (Crul, 2016; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Vertovec, 2007), which has gained dominance, to the study of national or cultural similarities. Such similarities are formed in the process of historical developments and transformations and are not necessarily interrelated, for example, with the group’s class positions, as in the studies of Bourdieu and, for example, Lareau in studies of child-rearing practices. I show that in the Soviet Union, unique conditions were formed, within which certain standards and norms were institutionalized and disseminated. As a result, during these “civilizing” and habitus-shaping processes, certain national similarities were formed and developed between the inhabitants of the post-Soviet space, which are associated with ways in which they perceive themselves, particular practices, and interiorized beliefs related to health care and hygiene, “civilized” behaviours, and ideas related to the control of children’s behaviour and discipline. The conflict between two internalized groups of ideas from contradictory discourses (medical and “liberal”) forms an insoluble parenting paradox that migrants reproduce.

I combine Elias’ and Douglas’ ideas about the mediated role of culture in the perception of ambiguous or anomalous events to develop the concept of cultural continuity dilemmas to describe the transformation and contestation of cultural habitus. Douglas and Elias focus more on norms and practices common to people within the social environment where they are socialized. People learn not only the rules to be followed but also the interpretative patterns and how to respond to certain anomalies, explain them, and act. Facing contexts that does not fit the “normal scheme of classifications” (Douglas, 1966) leads to anxiety, shame, and other emotions. Migrants, finding themselves in a society where the taken for granted scheme of classifications are not the norm, can be extremely confronting. For example, Russian-speaking migrants in Australia and Spain experience “pollution” behaviour to be the norm, and are consequently forced to interpret these anomalies, given the fact that their explanatory schemes are not shared by others. In some cases, these situations lead to reflection when people try to understand why these standards are infringed
and how they should act in order to resolve cultural continuity dilemmas. Resolving cultural dilemmas is dependent on renegotiating one's own norms. Some migrants start to perceive them as a manifestation of backwardness or other negative interpretations.

In her book about Soviet childhood, Catriona Kelly (2007, p. 510) does not describe the history of the totalitarian state but shows different dimensions of the Soviet system. She writes, for example, that “school life was not meant simply to deprive and repress. It was meant to provide pupils with a positive sense of their own identity as pupils, a feeling of corporate solidarity”. This duality of the Soviet system and its outcomes is what many post-Soviet residents face when reflecting on their heritage in a cultural sense. They must deal with cultural continuity dilemmas, trying to realize which of their characteristics are Soviet or Russian (-speaking) and whether they are characteristics of “proper” or “backward” Russian (-speaking) culture. Certain practices and norms begin to be recognized as Soviet in a negative sense, as outdated or inherent in a totalitarian system, and foreign practices are assumed to be a sign of a free society, not constrained by the framework of endless restrictive norms and rules. This critical view of one’s culture as a legacy of the Soviet system, which can be assessed as somewhat inferior to the “civilized” West, makes it challenging to resolve cultural continuity dilemmas. The attitudes to post-Soviet culture and the solution to these dilemmas, as a result of which certain practices and standards begin to be perceived as outdated or inappropriate, leads to the formation of self-prejudices, prejudices towards Russian-speaking Others as bearers of these cultural norms and other negative traits.

One of my main arguments is that previous studies of community and migrant organizations have paid insufficient attention to the struggle and power relations in the community and the role of leaders and institutions in cultural (re)production. Bourdieu’s field theory makes it possible to look at a community not as horizontal networks forming trusting relationships between its members, whose leaders represent migrants’ real needs, but as a space of competition, in which, as a result of the struggle, it is contested and negotiated how Russian-speaking culture should be reproduced, transmitted, and maintained, that is, how cultural production dilemmas are resolved by community leaders. Thus, I consider the representatives of organizations as the main cultural producers, on whom, how and through what means of production Russian “official” culture is constructed and represented depend in many respects. Pro-Russian organizations, created as part of the implementation of the compatriots project, allow cultural producers to accumulate the symbolic capital necessary to maintain their positions during the struggle and help cultural products that they produce “achieve cultural recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985). This, in particular, explains why
some performative rituals, symbols, and narratives constructed within the Russian compatriots project are reproduced in the Russian-speaking community.

Meanwhile, the integration of Elias’s ideas about identity enables me to examine the specific features of a community related to a shared sense of unbelonging. In many studies, a sense of belonging to a community, the formation of attachments at a symbolic level, and trust in each other, is its fundamental basis. This study shows how a community can exist as a structured social space of relationships, actively develop and institutionalize itself, at the same time as being perceived as disunited and/or consisting of members with whom migrants do not want to identify themselves. However, to some degree or another, they can hear about each other, have virtual or face-to-face contacts, meet at various Russian-speaking events, send a child to community activities, read Russian-speaking online forums or post there, and also achieve other goals through Russian-language networks. Thus, the community of Russian-speaking migrants is not well described by the imagined community (Anderson, 1983) metaphor, primarily because people cannot share ideas about their communion and even emphasize their difference from other members or groups, despite the fact that they can interact with each other regularly, and consume or produce resources of Russian-speaking migrant institutions. People often share a vision that there is a Russian-speaking community in Western Australia, to which they do not belong. Community leaders, drawing boundaries between “proper” Russian-speakers and Others in a competitive struggle, contribute to the process of community fragmentation and the formation of a sense of unbelonging.

Thus, the research has demonstrated that the interconnection between agents and organizations can lead not to trust formation but to distrust and conflicts between community members, and may not provide a sense of belonging but rather function as a community of unbelonging. However, field is always a field of struggle; and it is in the process of struggle that the Russian-speaking community is formed, institutionalized and developed as a common social space.
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