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Alter-egos: Mediterranean agents negotiating identity at the dawn of the Franco-Ottoman alliance

Susan Broomhall, The University of Western Australia

This essay seeks to shed light on the role of a range of Mediterranean agents involved in fostering the nascent Franco-Ottoman relationship up to 1535, when the first French residential ambassador was sent to Constantinople, and in responding to these operatives' actions. It seeks to broaden our view of the Franco-Ottoman alliance in its early days, beyond its leaders to investigate the work of agents of differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds who acted as their alter-egos, in this case, focussing upon those for the French king. It thus investigates how individuals from diverse Mediterranean locales acted as diplomatic agents for François I to foster the alliance, and at the same time, negotiated their own status and identity through it. The unofficial nature of most of their work, and their identity as 'other' than French, was advantageous to the burgeoning relationship and also complicated the critique of this alliance that could be made by other polities, particularly those in the Habsburg network. The essay explores several dynamics of alterity, as multiple operatives and observers around the region sought to make sense of behaviours and actions that they read as 'other' and drawing upon a wide range of historical Mediterranean sources in order to broaden perspectives of agency, voice and resistance.

In 1541, Antonio Rincón, travelling as the envoy of the King of France to Sultan Süleymān I, was ambushed in Piedmont. Under orders of the governor of Milan, Alfonso III de Ávalos, Marques del Vasto, Habsburg agents murdered Rincón who was travelling in the company of Cesare Fregoso, a Genoese nobleman also in the military and diplomatic service of the French king. This gruesome event became one impetus for renewed conflict between the Valois and Habsburg monarchs in the following year, the ninth outbreak of fighting in the succession of conflicts known as the Italian Wars.

The murders of Rincón and Fregoso were the culmination of just over a decade of complex and mostly hostile Habsburg politics regarding diplomatic agents who were operating between the French king, François I, and Süleymān. Neither victim was a

native of the kingdom of France and indeed, they shared that alterity with most of François' key operatives who were responsible for fostering the emerging alliance until 1535, when Frenchman Jean de la Forêt was appointed first official French ambassador to the Porte; that is, to the government of the Ottoman Empire. This essay explores the complex politics of cultural, social and diplomatic alterity that informed these diplomatic endeavours. It analyses the differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and ambitions of the men who acted in these affairs as the alter-ego of François I, as well as how they were perceived in these roles by onlookers around the Mediterranean who held varying degrees of investment in their actions. How did these individuals come to act in such roles, and at the same time negotiate their own status and identity through them? How did multiple operatives and onlookers seek to make sense of behaviours and actions that were read as 'other'? This essay argues that religious, ethnic, cultural and emotional forms of alterities were in fact vital components to the development of Franco-Ottoman relations in these years.

Through its focus on a wide range of Mediterranean perspectives and sources on these events, revealing the voices and perspectives of little-known actors, this essay responds to the insights of postcolonial, subaltern, and anthropological alterity studies to broaden historical narratives of agency, voice and forms of resistance. The particular cultural politics of coexistence in the Mediterranean world has proved fertile ground for studies to date.¹ Cross-cultural mediators of various kinds, their activities, skills, status and identities, have gained increasing attention in recent years.² These studies have begun to develop, in the words of Eric Dursteler, 'a more nuanced and complex world of contention, but also one of commerce, connection and even coexistence' in the early modern Mediterranean.³ Such individuals are now regularly described in terms that emphasise flexible identities, 'cultural amphibians' for Noel Malcolm, or 'trans-imperial subjects' in E. Natalie Rothman's work.⁴ Although the Franco-Ottoman alliance and Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry have been thoroughly explored in Western literature, here attention is placed on the dynamic politics of exclusion and inclusion that pulled obscure individuals, often of uncertain social and political status within the wider Mediterranean, into unusually influential positions.⁵ Their identity, experiences and ambitions were governed by a range of identity markers, including their faith, gender, age, class, life experiences and particular skills. Almost every individual in this essay was referred to at the time by a range of variations of their name or perceived place of origin by those who commented upon them. I have indicated common variants that may be found in the sources and in the secondary literature, choices often reflective of nationalistic claims to, or disavowals of, their identity. Much harder to establish is how these individuals perceived themselves, when our source of evidence are primarily

letters addressed to those for whom they worked and must be read in terms of these (changeable) political alignments. The name that I have foregrounded is typically that of the language of the broad territory of each individual's origins. Moving beyond the usual name frames for these people (who are most commonly identified by French, Italian and Spanish language conventions), may help to emphasise the geographical diversity of actors who were engaged in these negotiations.

Additionally, in contemporary accounts by those around the Mediterranean, perceptions of the developing connections between the Ottoman world and France were articulated through particular sets of feeling behaviours and scripts operative within networks, which were designed to make sense of varied forms of otherness by which these authors clarified their own sense of self and shared identity. By drawing upon a wide range of sources from Ottoman, North African, Ragusan, Italian, French and Spanish linguistic and cultural traditions for its evidence, this essay considers how peoples and behaviours became identified as 'other' or as appropriate alter-egos by contemporaries in these negotiations. In doing so, it aims to respond to criticism such as that of bell hooks regarding studies in which the politics and rhetoric of alterity become 'a mask with which privileged subjects present themselves as critical thinkers, while failing to listen to the diverse voices of concrete others gathered under the rubric of 'the Other'.⁶

Ad hoc agents

Over the course of the 1520s and early 1530s, the relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire was forged principally by actors on behalf of the French kingdom in response to pressing circumstances that necessitated the Sultan's support. A significant impetus for the French to develop some kind of official relationship with Süleymān I was as a counterweight in their ongoing conflict with Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain (as King of Castile and Aragon respectively). The individuals at the heart of these negotiations were involved in *ad hoc*, extraordinary, unofficial missions that were part of a developing relationship, and mostly of a nature that could be disavowed if required.

In 1525, the shocking defeat of the French by Habsburg forces at the Battle of Pavia, which resulted in the detention of François I, had spurred French diplomatic forays to Süleymān I. The Sultan's ambitions in the eastern domains held by the Habsburg dynasty and his nearly unchallenged power in the Mediterranean offered a counterpoint that promised the potential to destabilise the power of Charles V. French overtures, led by the king's mother, Louise de Savoie, acting as regent while François was in captivity in

Madrid, were made directly as missives between leaders that were carried by envoys. The first of these men, unidentified, met an untimely death at the hands of the *sanjakkbey* of Bosnia, who thus acquired the elaborate gifts intended for the sultan.⁷

A second agent who did succeed in reaching Constantinople was a member of the powerful Frankopan dynasty (Hungarian: Frangepán; Italian: Frangipani) that dominated political life in the Kingdom of Croatia. This 'your faithful agent, Frankipan' as Süleymān termed him, was perhaps Zuan (Giovanni), a relative of Bernardin, Knez (Prince) of Krk, Senj and Modruš. Bernardin Frankopan was in the service of János Zápolya, Voivode of Transylvania, who had declared himself king of Hungary in late 1526, a claim soon to be challenged by the Habsburgs. This would certainly have made Zuan a logical candidate to assist French diplomatic relations that might weaken Habsburg dominance in the region.⁸ French documentation from the mid-1520s provides evidence of remuneration to a count 'Jehan-François Francapen' who carried letters for François as 'the ambassador of the Turk [Süleymān] to the king'.⁹ Interestingly, each protagonist named Frankopan as the envoy of the other in their texts, enabling each to distance himself from the actions undertaken. Frankopan had reportedly crossed Ferdinand's territory with the letters hidden under a false sole in his boots, as Ferdinand's envoys to the Sultan, Joseph von Lamberg and Nikolaus Jurischitsch, later reported that the Grand Vizier, Ibrāhīm Paşa, had revealed to them.¹⁰ As Frankopan made his way back across to Venice and onwards, the content of the sultan's letters and commitments to the French king began to be reported far and wide.¹¹ Charles V received a copy of Süleymān's letter via his ambassador in Genoa, Diego Lope de Soria.¹² After all, it served French interests for Süleymān's involvement in European affairs to be no secret.

Frankopan's work was followed soon after by that of Antonio Rincón, a former *Comunero* from Medina del Campo, who had been in service to the French crown since the early 1520s.¹³ Rincón had previously been engaged by François I on missions that would culminate in the monarch's support for János Zápolya's claims in Hungary.¹⁴ Rincón was in contact with Süleymān's ministers during 1529, perhaps at Belgrade, and was documented by French contemporaries in early 1530 returning to France with presents for the king that included 'three, very beautiful Turkish horses harnessed in the manner of their country'.¹⁵ In the spring of 1531, Zorzi (Giorgio/Gregorio) Gritti, an illegitimate son of Andrea Gritti, the doge of Venice, was on his way to Constantinople from France, ostensibly with reimbursement of a sum for Rincón's return voyage to France in 1529 advanced by Gritti's brother, the influential Ottoman advisor Alvise (Aloisio/Ludovico) Gritti.¹⁶ In Constantinople, the brothers' illegitimacy was no bar to political advancement, as it would have been in Venice.¹⁷ As an advisor to Ibrāhīm Paşa,

Alvise would prove to be an influential actor in the negotiations between France and the Ottomans at this period, as well as a source of information to the Habsburg network.

In June 1532, travelling via Zara Ragusa (today's Zadar and Dubrovnik), Rincón was received with honours by the Ragusan authorities.¹⁸ From there, the envoy continued on to Belgrade, in a visit memorialised by the Ottoman historian and private secretary to Ibrāhīm Pasha, Djalālzāde Muṣṭafā Čelebi, who recorded that Rincón carried presents for the Sultan from 'the most powerful king of France, renowned for his great treasures and who reigns over several lands'.¹⁹ Upon his return via Venice, Rincón conveyed to his hosts that had been received with 'great honour and a good welcome'.²⁰ Like Frankopan before him, not much was secret about his mission. Rincón himself hinted as to its import as he told his friend count Guido Rangone at Venice of his secret commissions for François for war plans, and left a trail of information across the regions through which he passed.²¹

In 1533, a new agent entered into the service of France, travelling via Messina to Constantinople; he was 'the Ragusan,' Serafin Gučetić (Sarro Gozze/Séraphin de Goze/Gozzo/Seraphim de Couche). Gučetić was the the youngest son of a wealthy mercantile family long involved in the civic life of Ragusa.²² That Christian city republic had been an Ottoman tributary state since 1458, a relationship that allowed free movement of Ragusans in Constantinople.²³ Elements of the city's elite held strong ties with the French, perhaps most notably the Archbishop of Ragusa, Filippo Trivulzio.²⁴ He came from a Milanese family who had received protection from the French and had fought alongside them. His brother, Teodoro, was governor of Milan, Genoa and later Lyon until his death in 1531. As Archbishop of Ragusa from 1521, Trivulzio maintained correspondence with the French and welcomed French travelers through the Republic.²⁵ He was described in hostile Spanish internal correspondence as 'as good as French and Turkish'.²⁶ In a 1537 letter, the then resident ambassador Jean de la Forêt wrote to Georges d'Armagnac, bishop of Rodez and French ambassador in Venice, of the rumours circulating about Trivulzio's prominent role in Franco-Ottoman affairs:

as to Monseigneur de Raguze, I am glad that he knows nothing of the accusation that has been made against him in Rome about the service he provides to the King and to the Great Lord [Süleymān], so much that if not in Rome, be assured that in many other places, due to our adversaries' envy, he, me and others are painted to be doing it.²⁷

In a 1539 letter, the archbishop was again openly acknowledged for his role in advancing Franco-Ottoman affairs, by Genoese-born Giovan Gioacchino da Passano, sieur de Vaulx, who had been *maître d'hôtel* to Louise de Savoie and undertaken several significant

diplomatic missions, including in Italy from 1527 to 1529. To Constable of France Anne de Montmorency, Passano promised:

I will make clear to the archbishop of Ragusa the contentment of the king and yourself, and the subvention that His Majesty has had sent to him, which really is very well employed, for he is a learned and capable person and very attached to His Majesty's service and who has depended and depends on his service.²⁸

It is probable that Gučetić was aligned with the French-leaning elite of the city. In any case, in 1533, Gučetić was sent to the French court to seek compensation for the loss of Ragusan goods that had been lost at sea to pirates off the French coast. It seems likely that, at the French court, he encountered the embassy sent by Khayr al-Dīn, the pasha of Algiers, soon to be better known in western Europe as Hayreddin 'Barbarossa', Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy, who had received a royal mandate, by way of a *firman* from Süleymān, to seek information about the sultan's potential ally.²⁹ When the embassy left France, with them, it seems, was the French agent Gučetić, who visited first Khayr al-Dīn and then the sultan. The Ragusan Council who had entrusted Gučetić with the mission to seek out compensation now discovered that he sailed to Constantinople, ostensibly with textiles that he purchased with their indemnities.³⁰ A report from Alvise Gritti to the sultan in April 1534 reported that he had news that another ambassador from the French king was leaving Ragusa on his way to Constantinople, noting that this envoy had already been there previously.³¹ Soon after, in May 1534, envoy of Ferdinand, Cornelius Schepper, was informed by Alvise Gritti in Constantinople that François' envoy had travelled by 'Africa' [likely Algiers] and Rhodes before meeting Ibrāhīm Pasha at Aleppo.³² By the summer, the Ragusan Council heard that Gučetić was returning from Constantinople. Passing through Ragusa in August, he continued on to the French court where he delivered gifts, three more Turkish horses, from Ibrāhīm Pasha to the king.³³

In mid-October 1534 another embassy, this time sent directly from Constantinople, arrived at Marseille, meeting the king at Chatellerault and then travelling up to Paris by December.³⁴ In February 1535, this delegation left France again from Marseille, this time carrying with them probably Gučetić. In that month, he had been provided 500 *écus* from the French king firstly, 'for his efforts' in bringing the horses from Constantinople, and then given another 500 'for the voyage that he is going on presently to Lord Abraham for the King and his return'.³⁵ The purpose of Gučetić's visit was soon circulated across the Habsburg network. In April, the Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Lope de Soria wrote to Charles' principal secretary, Francisco de los Cobos that

a man from Ragusa named Sarafin del Goso had passed through this city coming post haste from France, and that he said to a friend of his, who repeated it to me, that he was going to the Turk on a mission from king Francis to the Grand Turk, whom he was to inform of the great armament Your Majesty [Charles V] is preparing by sea, advising him to keep his eye on Constantinople and increase his fleet under Barbarossa, besides offering the ports of his kingdom as shelter in case of need. After leaving Venice the man went to a town of Sclavonia called Xavenigo [today's Šibenik], belonging to this Republic, and there spoke with the governor, to whom he imparted the very same information. The governor wrote to the Signory, and the Doge communicated the information to me as a piece of news of some importance under present circumstances. It appears that the man went thence to Constantinople.³⁶

From Constantinople, further letters announced the envoy's arrival: 'Seraphin de Gozo, the Ragusan, ambassador of the king of France, has arrived here, [...] gone on to see the Great Turk,' who was then encamped at Honar, on campaign to capture Baghdad from the Safavid dynasty.³⁷ However, a more important traveller from France in February 1535 was the newly appointed ambassador, Jean de La Forêt, the man was the first residential ambassador from France to the Porte. With his appointment, the visibility of the Franco-Ottoman alliance moved from covert to overt.

These agents from the Mediterranean world, men such as Frankopan, Rincón, Gučetić, and Giorgio Gritti, working in conjunction with colleagues at node points especially in Ragusa and Venice, were crucial to the establishment of relations between François and Süleymān. These men who most directly fostered the emergent relationship were by no means a homogenous group of individuals. Often appointed to their commission opportunistically, what they shared were conveniently ambiguous forms of access to, and representation of, authority figures, ideal to be eschewed by François and his official diplomats should the need arise during a period in which the possibility of firmer relationships and commitments were still being teased out.

Emotional inclusion and exclusion

These agents were men who were on the edge of the polities and cultural communities that they served. And they were so in a period in which contemporaries were drawing firmer boundaries, particularly of faith, around those whom they saw as like and those who were represented as firmly 'other'. Scholars have documented the many forms of othering between Christians and Muslims, and the complex rationales behind them, with a particular focus on the Christian world's fashioning of the Ottoman Empire.³⁸

Strategies of othering, in texts and acts, drew upon repertoires of emotions to fashion and perform 'right' feeling and practice towards peoples perceived to be outside and beyond their community, as well as those who were inside and like.³⁹

The increasing rapprochement between sultan and French king clearly threatened the political and military security of Habsburg interests, and provoked characterisation of the French king's action as 'other,' that is, as ill-fitting a Christian prince. Although Habsburg contemporaries noted the cross-faith alliance as shocking, it is worth noting that they were pursuing similar relationships at the same era, Charles sending the Genoese knight hospitaller Giovanni Balbi to the Shah of Persia in an attempt to negotiate a treaty.⁴⁰ Yet the details of what the emerging Franco-Ottoman relationship might entail were far from precise, leading to wild and fearful speculation among Habsburg correspondents, although, as Rhoads Murphey has argued, the Ottoman forces were substantially less organized and their plans more fluid and spontaneous than Europeans imagined at this period.⁴¹ Over the late 1520s, the Habsburg network was slowly gathering evidence to confirm the alliance via agents, spies, copied correspondence and occasional arrests of the leading protagonists of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy. The sultan's motivations for these arrangements were conceived in simple terms. The Franciscan Bernardino Pomazanić (Pomazanihi), originally from Istria, for example, sent Charles advice from Constantinople in March 1530, that Süleymān was boasting of his desire to challenge the leaders of western Europe:

'I want to go to Rome to find this Pope, and curse him as a thief. [...] the pope crowned him [Charles] emperor and said he is boss of all the world and especially over me. But I want to go see this man pope of Rome'. And this is said publicly all across Constantinople.⁴²

By May 1531, a note from the Archducal court in Vienna with information likely procured from Venetian reports, termed the French 'the allies and friends of the Turks' and cautioned that 'what we know for sure is that we must hold the French for veritable Turks.'⁴³ The governor of Marano (probably the town in Friuli), wrote to the emperor in November 1533 with what appeared to be very precise details passed through a number of claimed spies for Alvise Gritti, one of whom was a resident of Marano:

They have confessed that the said Gritti, in the name and as a representative of the Turkish Emperor, has made an alliance with the kings of England and France, and with several other princes, against His Imperial and Royal Majesties and the rest of Christendom, in consequence of which the armies of the Turk, consisting of about 1,500 light horse and 22,000 hackbutiers (the whole force to be paid by the king of France), are about to invade Christendom.⁴⁴

In March 1534, a letter was sent from the Governor of Hone (present-day Honaine), on the North African coast, D. Iñigo de Vallejo Pacheco, to the emperor, in which he reported that two Christian slaves recently arrived in the Tlemcen province from Algiers in the train of the sultan of Tlemcen, attested that

two French commercial boats were moored in the said port [of Algiers], but the bulk of the cargo of these two vessels was in powder and metal to make cannons. Two slaves of the same nation were tasked with melting the metal and they have already made 12 or 14 excellent pieces of artillery.⁴⁵

Charles V assured the Count of Nassau that his information on the growing alliance came from a widespread range of reliable sources in Naples, Venice and even ‘from the most trusted servants of the Turk himself and people attached to Barbarossa’.⁴⁶ For their part, the French suspected that Habsburg correspondents were spreading false rumours about the belligerent intentions of the Ottomans in order to inspire fundraising of their own, as François’s ambassador to Venice, Lazare de Baif, opined to the Bishop of Auxerre, François de Dinteville, then ambassador in Rome.⁴⁷

Some among the Habsburg network of correspondents in the Mediterranean made forceful affective expression central to their epistolary communication.⁴⁸ Over the course of the late 1520s and early 1530s, they were following leads of agents whom they suspected were working for the Franco-Ottoman relationship. In 1534–35, several were stopped and searched. A monk, Ludovico de Martinengo, from Brescia, who had been at Ferdinand’s court was stopped by Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, Habsburg ambassador in Genoa, his letters searched but no new information discovered.⁴⁹ Lope de Soria, then ambassador to Venice, was similarly worried about the knowledge of another suspected agent, Giovanni Mida, an engineer and reputed friend of Ibrāhīm Pasha and Alvise Gritti. Lope de Soria recommended to Charles violent measures in order to extract information, insisting that ‘if they ordered him to give some treatment with the rope, he might say something of importance’.⁵⁰ ‘[I]f I had it in my power,’ Lope de Soria opined, ‘I would not hesitate to stretch out his arms a little to make him tell the truth and for that I do not think I would be condemning my soul’.⁵¹ Mida was later arrested on the orders of Charles’ principal secretary, Los Cobos. Lope de Soria’s correspondence fused obsession and bravado in his dedication to uncover Franco-Ottoman networks in his midst. In 1535, he was tracking Marco de Nicolo who had been in Constantinople but had sworn to the authorities in Venice that he was headed not for France but to Verona for ‘a change of air’.⁵² Nicolo was likely one of the Venetian jewelers whom Lorenzo Gritti, brother of Alvise and Giorgio, had taken to Constantinople in 1534. In order to pass by Venice, Ibrāhīm Pasha had asked the

Serenissima to provide him with a safe-conduct. While in Venice, Nicolo called upon Lope de Soria, offering to disclose information about the Ottomans but his detailed questions about the Habsburg navy raised suspicions.⁵³ Lope de Soria wrote to Antonio de Leyva, Governor of Milan, asking him to watch if Nicolo headed to France, adding in another letter to the emperor, 'I would cut a finger from my hand to take him out of this State and give him to Your Majesty'.⁵⁴ Lope de Soria's strongly emotive letters to Charles appear designed to signal his passion and dedication to the emperor's service.

Expression of emotion about 'the other', whether that meant Christians, Habsburgs or spies, helped to shape what it meant to belong to Ottoman, French or Habsburg networks. These were particular emotional scripts and behaviours for how to express feeling operative within exclusive networks that were given meaning through the alterity of others.

Alter-egos: Ambition and identity

If expressions of shared feelings between French and Ottoman agents dominated their diplomatic practice, other communications reveal fractures and concerns about those who were driving the sensitive engagements. Alter-egos of the king and sultan held far less levels of power and recognition within these negotiations than the men they represented, but they nonetheless harboured their own ambitions and agendas.

Envoys for François were charged with high responsibilities but less evident prospects of securing positions of power in the long-term from the ruler whom they served. It was thus in their interests to craft a range of alternative positions and identities for themselves, which could create opportunities in the future. Serafin Gučetić, for example, may have seized upon the chance in 1532 to represent the city's government in France as a way to distinguish himself.⁵⁵ The Ragusan authorities' administrative files recorded that he left, with 'heart and mind willing,' travelling via Ferrara and Lyon, carrying dyed goatskins and ermine furs from Constantinople first to Lyon to sell for fine textiles there, with additional funds to purchase further goods.⁵⁶ However, Gučetić's subsequent actions struck the counsellors with surprise. Towards the end of 1533, they heard that Gučetić was in Messina, heading towards Constantinople. The Council in Ragusa ordered their consul in Messina to seize up to 2000 ducats' worth of the goods (the equivalent of the indemnity they had sought from France), 'in case he does not want to obey'.⁵⁷ Gučetić had evidently become someone quite other to their expectations. In August 1534, he re-appeared in Ragusa, promising to appease a series of creditors and pay back the amount he had received in France minus his costs. But by October, he was no longer there to fulfil his commitments to creditors and his two guarantors were forced to pay

his debts.⁵⁸ Only one of these guarantors was later compensated after Gučetić received payment from François I in February 1535.⁵⁹ His brother, Marin, spent several more years developing complicated legal manoeuvres with family members using Serafin's property investments near Ragusa to secure the return of his own funds spent as Serafin's guarantor. Gučetić's wife, Anica Bobaljević, continued to appear in the city's courts through the 1540s, as she attempted to manage the debts that her husband had left behind in the city.⁶⁰

Agents such as Gučetić were also rivals for the attention of rulers alongside more entrenched diplomatic and political actors who shared professional, cultural, ethnic and historical ties to each other and their leaders. It could thus be in the latter's interests to emphasise the otherness of their competitors. Certainly members of the French diplomatic network voiced concerns that Gučetić could not reliably be expected to fulfil the king's commands, as they themselves claimed to do. They perceived Gučetić to operate with different rules of courtesy, with the French ambassador to Venice, Georges de Selve, complaining that Gučetić had not even called upon him as he passed through Venice.⁶¹ For Selve, Gučetić's 'otherness' appeared to reside in his lack of awareness or perhaps interest in adopting the conventional codes of conduct practised by the diplomatic elite. He lamented Gučetić's pride and his apparent boasting of his important mission. 'My Lord,' Selve wrote to Jean Du Bellay, 'I have known that the Ragusan was going to the Turk for a long time because he was so imprudent that, when he passed through here, he let it be understood to anyone who wanted to know that the King was sending him to the Turk.'⁶² Selve reported that 'the Emperor's own ambassador, soon after he had passed through, had sent spies after him and knew the commission that he had for the Turk'.⁶³ He contrasted Gučetić's imprudence with his own good conduct: 'I wrote to La Forêt suggesting he warn the Ragusan to watch his route as closely as he could for he would be watched'.⁶⁴ Gučetić had not only upset Selve but also the Venetians, as Du Bellay reported: 'the Signoria complained to me that in passing through Constantinople, he had said several bad words against them.'⁶⁵

If Gučetić apparently did meet the diplomatic standards expected by Du Bellay and Selve, there were others still who could not convince Europe's leaders of the value of their ongoing service at all. Among these was Camilo Orsino (Cammeille Ursin/Camilo Pardo Orsino), Conte di Manoppello, Marchese di Valle Siciliana e Guardia Grele, whose estates had earlier been confiscated by Charles V, and who had served as a mediator between François and Janos Zápolya in Hungary, as had Rincón.⁶⁶ In 1532, Charles' ambassador in London, Savoyard Eustace Chapuys, was able to report to the emperor Orsino's appearance in the city, seeking Henry VIII's backing for an undisclosed mission between the French king, the Sultan and the German princes:

Camille spoke to the King for a while, and exhibited a number of papers and letters he had with him. He intends, he says, going straight to Hungary or wherever the Turk [Solyman] may be, and states that he is only waiting for the King's answer, which he expects to receive to-day or to-morrow. He has brought from France two vessels laden with heavy ordnance.⁶⁷

Chapuys rushed news of these affairs to Charles's sister, Mary of Hungary, governor of the Low Countries. By the following week, Chapuys had learned that not all Orsino's claims could be taken at face-value:

he has certainly been to Court several times, but I fancy more for the purpose of visiting it, and exhibiting certain fantastic plans and designs of his own respecting fortifications to he erected here and there than for any other purpose. ... Camillo, however, has been light-headed enough to speak in public about his plans and intentions, ... having spread rumours here, as if he were the Turk's confidential agent, that before next Michaelmas that Infidel would lay siege to Rome, and propagate several other pieces of news equally absurd. He has likewise announced in public that his journey to those distant regions is undertaken at the express desire of the king of France, who had also sent thither a gallant captain, named Nicolas Rusticq, a native of Antwerp, very clever in the art of recruiting soldiers.⁶⁸

Chapuys had sized up and dismissed this agent but Orsino continued to engage the French for some time to come. In 1535, Du Bellay wrote to François I of his conversation with 'Cammeille Ursin', who, he wrote, 'wants very much that you hear his news of matters in Constantinople. And it seems to me, Sire, that he speaks most pertinently and that nothing has diminished in his good will since you last saw him'.⁶⁹ However, by the following year, alarmed by his public claims, François had him arrested, writing to Cardinal de Tournon and the Chancellor Antoine du Bourg: 'the proposals that Lord Camille par de [Pardo] Ursins has held with you monsieur cardinal openly, make me think he has very bad will. For this reason, I wish that you would have him taken to

Pierre-Assise [Château de Pierre-Encise, the prison fortress in Lyon] where you will have him well and securely guarded'.⁷⁰ Orsino would later go on to join the service of Venice.⁷¹ Not all would-be actors found a role in this particular set of negotiations. Orsino was considered simply too 'other,' as he displayed behaviours that did not align with the expectations of diplomatic officials or the king.

Such agents were never simply the alter-egos of the leaders they represented in these negotiations, but also had their own status and future in view. Their payment came not only in money but also, it seems, in the glory and recognition that they could extract from their activities, acclaim that they likely hoped to translate into more concrete and sustainable rewards. These behaviours could be surprising and unsettling alternatives to those expected by their paymasters, and by the more usual community of men who held formal diplomatic positions.

'Foreign' diplomacy

While Gučetić pursued his ambitions around the Mediterranean, others in the region saw his movement as an opportunity to express their own political allegiance and secure credit among the leaders of Europe. In particular, one Italian prince awaited his arrival in order to secure a potential alliance with the Emperor and open up possible participation in the Habsburg political network. Gučetić, like his fellow agents, had long been under surveillance and in late August 1535 he was captured on his return to France from Constantinople by Francesco Maria della Rovere, the Duke of Urbino.

This was not the first time that the Habsburg network had sought to disrupt relations between the French and Ottomans. In March 1531, Giorgio Gritti, who was returning from the French court to the Porte, had been arrested by a Habsburg captain, De Scalengues (Escalenga), appointed governor of Asti in Piedmont.⁷² However, Gritti's arrest was deeply controversial, as Miguel Mai, the Aragonese ambassador to the Pope, reported to Charles: 'The Pope at first objected that this would be a cause of war with France because the Most Christian King would certainly take it as an insult'.⁷³ Accordingly, Charles expressed indignation, whether feigned or real, at these events. In a letter to his ambassador to Savoy-Piedmont, Gutierre López de Padilla, he indicated that he was 'much vexed' about Gritti's arrest, particularly as it had taken place in the recently acquired territory that he had included as part of the dowry of his sister-in-law, Infanta Beatrice of Portugal, Duchess of Savoy, 'who has been much affronted in consequence'. However, the Emperor nuanced his complaint about Gritti: 'His orders then were that by no means was the arrest to be public, or take place in the lands of the Infanta.' He demanded De Scalengues 'set him at liberty immediately, give him back all

his papers, and excuse himself to the Duchess by saying that it was altogether a mistake.' Yet Charles also evidently weighed up other concerns in his reflections to López de Padilla, namely that, as 'Giorgio Gritti is the son of the doge of Genoa [sic], his ally, and was coming straight from the king of France, his brother [in law], he (the Emperor) wishes to see him well treated'.⁷⁴ The Emperor's lack of clarity about his justifications for interference continued to vex his agents across the region as, throughout 1532, French correspondents reported varied attempts to prevent Rincón from making passage to Constantinople. As Charles V explained to his brother Ferdinand, he had ordered Gritti's release when none of his letters appeared suspect and 'so as not to give the French king, to whom he was returning, nor the Venetians and Italians cause for feeling, and even more so the Turk [...] that this was against the previous truce'.⁷⁵

In 1534, Lope de Soria, Charles' ambassador in Venice, reported news of Giovan Gioacchino da Passano, who had recently arrived in Venice, claiming he was a trader but was suspected by the Habsburg network of being a liaison to the Ottomans for the French. Lope de Soria wrote to the emperor of his suspicions: 'Jean Jocquin, who served the king of France in several important missions, is now here. He pretends that he comes on leave of absence from his master, to marry and rest. The report is that he has already married a Genoese lady, the sister of Domenico Sauli, of the Council of the duke of Milan, and taken a house here to live privately, as he says.'⁷⁶ At a relatively late age, Passano had indeed married the young Caterina Sauli in 1533.⁷⁷ As a couple on private business and no official commission from the French king, they could more easily network through banquets and dinners. With regret, the ambassador noted that, 'all those of this town fear to treat with us publicly and even in secret. With him, they will have no scruples because he is not here as a public person and acts in the office of a merchant.'⁷⁸ Yet, he wrote, 'I strongly suspect that he has come for no other purpose than to discuss with George Gritti the affairs which his master, the king of France, may have with the Turk. I am the more convinced of this that about the same time the said George Gritti, and Camillo Paolo Orsino, both of whom come from Constantinople, arrived in Venice.'⁷⁹

Giorgio Gritti was also connected to Serafin Gučetić, as the Habsburg network discovered. When the latter was captured, letters from Gritti were found among his possessions, linking the missions of the men across the Mediterranean.⁸⁰ Gučetić's capture under the direction of the Duke of Urbino was not, however, the first attempt to disrupt his diplomatic project, and he had long been under surveillance. Lope de Soria was well aware of his passage through the region in late April 1535 and wrote to Cobos in code, that he had been informed from the hour of Gučetić's arrival and planned to

steal his letters. Furthermore, he told Cobos, 'I ordered two of my servants to give him some cuts of the knife at night, they waited to give them to him but as he had gone back to his own lodging, it was not possible.' He nonetheless tasked a Domenico Piniello Guastacini to trail and capture him.⁸¹ However, Habsburg justifications for attacks on the agents of other European rulers were fraught and Lope de Soria was well aware that such actions would be construed as contrary to diplomatic norms among Christian princes. He thus assured the emperor that he would only use 'the same means as the Most Christian King uses at present'.⁸² Likewise, Spanish agents complained that the Archbishop of Ragusa acted almost as a 'hotelier given how many Turks come and go.' Don Pedro de Toledo, Viceroy of Naples, opined, that 'if it were not for the name that I have, I would have already given him fifty stabs as punishment and as an example to others'.⁸³

The hostile attacks on another ruler's agents was in a way another expression of alterity, precisely the argument raised by French diplomats. Georges de Selve complained that 'the Duke of Urbino's act to have him arrested was one of a very bad nature and I know not what honest excuse he can allege for it.'⁸⁴ Selve insisted that Du Bellay represent the king's interests in the matter before the duke, 'feeling for yourself the insult that he has done to the King'.⁸⁵ Du Bellay and the Bishop of Mâcon, ambassador in Rome, Charles Hémard de Denonville, wrote admonishing the duke bluntly to release Gučetić: 'You know, my Lord, that to do otherwise would be in direct contravention not only with the honest offers that you have freshly made to the Lord [François I] and the service that you claim to have always carried for him, but it would be to do something that is unaccustomed to princes and violate the rights of men.'⁸⁶ The sheer audacity of the insult to François left them to conclude equally forcefully: 'since we do not want to think this of you, we will not give you a longer remonstrance'.⁸⁷

Du Bellay and Hémard de Denonville sent an agent directly to della Rovere to remind him in person of his long-standing service to François. He was to tell the duke that the king 'would find it strange that he [the duke] should come to retain his letters and those that were sent to be given to him, a thing that is not done, not only between friends but hardly even between enemies'.⁸⁸ These actions, they insisted, were outside the norms of the diplomatic conventions between princes:

make him very clearly understand that he has to consider the importance of this matter and how the tail of it could be long in consequence of it, and that it gives a real opening to princes to stop each other's servants, which would be a wound so great and the beginning of such discords in all of Christendom that he who made it would not be able to heal it when he wanted to, and would remain greatly blamed

and reproached by all good and honorable people, those who wish for shared peace, as a result that he would be in danger of afterwards being condemned for it from/by one side and the other [...] For that reason, he would do well to pause and consider this fact before committing further and to make it possible that no one would have anything to lament about.⁸⁹

Maintaining the French position that a sovereign prince was entitled to his own diplomatic endeavours unobstructed, Du Bellay and Hémard de Denonville encouraged their agent to assert François' rights:

There can be no credible proposal or appearance, given the good treatment that the King has made in his lands and realm for all those coming and going to the emperor without retaining a single one of them, and having them accommodated in all things, that the said Emperor would retain those who come and go to the King from anywhere they could come from, even if they come there from the Turks, Jews or any infidels that they could be, for one knows well that he can send to them and receive from them whenever he wants as a thing accustomed at all times by those who recognize no lord and superior.⁹⁰

Meanwhile, the French ambassadors were also writing to François, providing him with evidence from others that reinforced the French view that della Rovere's actions were entirely unacceptable. They assured François that the Pope 'found the whole thing filthy and dirty, with very bad consequences, telling us among other things that these ways of doing things diminish the hope that he had conceived of being able to have some good effect with the Emperor'.⁹¹ Du Bellay and Hémard de Denonville were certainly aware that Pope was also entertaining representations from Habsburg ambassadors, not least of whom was the Count of Cifuentes, who signalled the Emperor's complaints and celebrating the duke's action to capture infidels and those who were travelling to meet with them.⁹² The pontiff had responded 'prudently,' in the French view, 'that even if the King was receiving news about the Turk and people from him, he was not to be reprimanded, and that it should be assumed that, such a prince as he was, he would do it for the wellbeing and not for the detriment of Christianity.'⁹³ Du Bellay and Hémard de Denonville understood della Rovere's actions as embedded in a Habsburg plan to disrupt the Franco-Ottoman alliance. Gučetić, they argued, was 'a gentleman whom the Turk was sending to you with letters and presents for you,' and insisted that the main objection was not Gučetić himself but that, 'when all is said and done, the principal resentment, and that which they have more to fear, will be that of the Turk'.⁹⁴

These accusations of foul play appeared to pique Charles V to act. In a letter to Cardinal de Granvelle, his ambassador in France, in October 1535, he announced that he had demanded Gučetić's release. Yet he concluded the missive with a hint of bitterness,

'however much we hear that the Ragusan was very offensive to us, so too have been other agents of the King, with no punishment whatsoever.'⁹⁵ In a further letter in December of that year, the emperor continued to express a sense of the unfairness of superior Habsburg etiquette in the face of perceived French perfidy. He wrote later that month of how he had reacted as soon as he had heard that the Ragusan was a servant of the King's, 'regardless of his charge and what he practised were a bad thing'.⁹⁶ For the emperor, Gučetić's activities on behalf of France denoted an offensive manoeuvre unworthy of a sovereign prince who acknowledged the equal status of his rival. For Charles, it was François' control of his agents and muted response to infractions against Habsburg interests that was 'other' to the diplomatic practice of Christian princes.

Antonio Rincón too had long been watched, causing similar degrees of trepidation and fascination among onlookers, with Habsburg correspondents documenting his travels between the French court and the Porte. Mai, Charles' ambassador to the Pope, wrote in June 1531, in cipher, of Rincón's plans, reassuring the emperor that both he and Andrea del Burgo, Ferdinand's ambassador to Rome, knew 'what sort of personage he is'. Mai explained that he had written to Ferdinand to have Rincón arrested should he pass through Austrian Habsburg dominions. He speculated, perhaps with a degree of bravado intended to impress his reader, that

Rincon's person might be secured as though highwaymen had stopped him, and then be put to the torture to find out whether he brings any message [from Turkey]. This done, Rincon ought to be secretly sent to some castle or prison, perhaps, too, sentenced to be garrotted, because, besides its being convenient that the affair be kept secret, he will thus atone for his many previous misdeeds.⁹⁷

But Mai concluded his report by explaining that he was telling the emperor of his plans so that if he did not approve, the orders could be countermanded.

It would in fact be another ten years before the Habsburg network had their chance to act.⁹⁸ In July 1541, Rincón was ambushed and murdered in Piedmont by order of the governor of Milan. To Habsburg eyes, his murder might have been cast as a legitimate act against one who had committed treason, even if he was not technically on Habsburg soil at the time. Rincón, after all, was born a Castilian and thereby owed his allegiance to Charles as King of Castile, and moreover he numbered among the rebels of the *Comunero* Revolt of 1520-1.⁹⁹ His were the actions of a traitor, as Ferdinand opined: 'Antonio Rincon, who has become a fugitive and given up his loyalty to us ... recruits and assembles troops, and having done so, he leads them ... against us and our dominions'.¹⁰⁰ In the end, Rincón's convenient inclusion under the Habsburg authority

of his place of birth justified his murder, a community to which he could not as an individual in theory decline allegiance. He was not an other; he was one of them, but had *acted* as other, both as a rebel *Comunero* and as an agent of France, and thus had to be punished.

Charles was well aware that murder of the French king's agent would constitute a breach of international diplomacy and of their previous agreements. He specifically warned del Vasto

even if you could detain him, it would be contrary to the truce of Nice ... and if you have already done so you must release him and set him free immediately, making it clear that he was detained without any orders from me (which is the truth) and that as soon as we heard about it we gave orders to release him.¹⁰¹

However, del Vasto chose to ignore Charles' advice, calculating (correctly) that the Emperor would not be displeased with the act. Del Vasto was not punished, Charles' ministers having advised: 'the dexterity he has shown should be praised — although to avoid any risks, this must be done in the utmost secrecy.'¹⁰² Del Vasto and the Emperor continued to insist to external inquirers that there had been no murder and worked together to concoct a fabricated tale that they had escaped, but not before confessing to their crimes. Charles' correspondence reveals his complicity in these acts, instructing del Vasto, 'If you decide to let the assassins escape and one of the writes you the confession as we have discussed,' he was to ensure that he could display 'certain documents found on them, which detail the wicked and perverse plots that they were hatching.'¹⁰³ These would demonstrate 'the harm to Christianity and ours from the enemies of the faith and show that for this reason the truce between us and the king of France cannot be considered broken.'¹⁰⁴ Reinforcing his commitment to del Vasto, soon after Charles visited Milan and stood as godfather to the marques's son.

Despite Charles' repeated claims to know nothing of the whereabouts of François's agents, no one was fooled for long. The deaths of Rincón and Fregoso fed into a new chain of events that shifted François and Charles back onto war footing. With the knowledge that he had Süleymān's backing, François declared war on Charles in 1542, framing the emperor's role in the murder of Rincón as 'so great, so detestable and so foreign an offence to those who carry the title and quality of prince that it can in no way be pardoned, tolerated or supported.'¹⁰⁵

Conclusions

In this intense period of diplomatic activities between the French and the Ottomans, watched at close quarters by the Habsburg network, in which the behaviour of Christian

princes and the formation of new inter-faith collaborations were themselves widely perceived as 'other', a wide range of alter-egos for the French king played a vital role. These men were 'foreign' in many ways, rarely sharing the cultural and ethnic identity of the ruler they served or the professional status of his more usual diplomatic operatives. They do not easily fit the criteria of transnational subjects as scholars have described in other contexts. In order for them to do the work that was requested of them, they had to be explicitly 'other', and disavowable should the need arise. As spies, secret agents and unofficial envoys, these men were required to take on a powerful alternative personality, that of the king they represented, even providing in this role a context for war between Christian princes. However, fulfilling these expectations whilst forging a sustainable future for their own ambitions as individuals was less easy to juggle. Framed explicitly as outsiders to the politics they served was useful to conduct the business of François and Süleymân, but it left these agents highly vulnerable to a ruler's changing ideas and political stances. On the other hand, their alterity also demanded of leaders and the more formalised diplomatic community an unusual degree of trust, with little direct oversight over men who might change allegiance or act beyond their instructions, and evade control through the mechanisms employed by official diplomatic and political networks.

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¹ Birnbaum and Sebök, *Practices of Coexistence*. See also a study of coexistence in the Ottoman Empire at an earlier period by Levy-Rubin, *Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire*, and for a later period, Greene, *Shared World: Christians and Muslims* and Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants, Dursteler, *Venice in Constantinople* and his *Renegade Women*.

² In addition to the titles in n. 1, see Dursteler, "Speaking in Tongues"; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*; Garcia-Arenal and Wieger, *A Man of Three Worlds*; and Malcolm, *Agents of Empire*.

³ Dursteler, "On Renaissance Bazaars and Battlefields," 434.

⁴ Malcolm, *Agents of Empire*, 34; Rothman's helpful terminology in *Brokering Empire*, 13. See also Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, who emphasises the flux and fluidities of identities in the Ottoman world.

⁵ Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, considers this in relation to the Franco-Ottoman alliance for a slightly later period. For the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, a recent summary of the historiography can be found in Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean," 21–23.

⁶ hooks, *Yearning*, 151, cited in Guenther, “The Ethics and Politics of Otherness: Negotiating Alterity and Racial Difference,” 195.

⁷ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 245.

⁸ ‘votre fidèle agent Frankipan,’ Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 117. See also the Latin letter from François I to Süleymān (which may or may not have been sent), mentioning ‘Joanni Frangiapano’, on 119. This agent was identified by Ferdinand, then Archduke of Austria, King of Bohemia, and disputed King of Hungary and Croatia, as Krsto, son of Bernadin, in his letters to his brother, Charles V. See his letter from Innsbruck, 14 March 1525: ‘icelluy roy de France pratique avec le conte Christofle de Frangebambz, que tant avec quelque nombre de ses gens comme a l’aide des Turcz de Bosna, qu’est pres de Croacie, il deust entrer en mes pays de Carniole et Stiria et me faire la guerre,’ Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V*, 155.

⁹ Tausserat-Radel, *Inventaire analytique des archives*, x, n. 3; ‘Au seigneur Jehan-François Francapen ambassadeur du Turc devers le Roy 200 livres tournois par lettres a Chastellerault du 18 juillet 1526 pour luy aider a supporter les frais puis son arivée et en attendant que ledict seigneur ait fait reponse sur certaines lettres que ledit come Jean Francapen luy a presenté de la part du dit Turc,’ Bibliothèque nationale de France [BNF], MS Clairambault, 1213, fol. 65.

¹⁰ ‘Und hat weiter angefangen dy ursachen warum sein kaiser das khunigreich hungern zw bekriegen und untersich zw pringen unterstanden nemblich also als der khunig von frankreich in der khay M^t fankhaus gewest hat er seinem Kaiser und lme aus der fankhaus sendlich geschribn welichen brief ein pot durch E. M^t Lande in schueechen zwischen den solln pracht habe,’ February 1531, Gévay, *Urkunden und Actenstücke*, 43–44.

¹¹ See reports to the Senate of Venice, 5 February and 29 March 1526, reported by Sanuto, *Diarii*, 96 and 119.

¹² 15 July 1526, “Spain: July 1526, 11–25,” in Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 1, 1525-1526*, 797–811, n. 489.

¹³ On Rincón’s activities, see Bourrilly, “Les Diplomates de François,” 64–83 and 268–308. See also Setton’s coverage of his activities, *The Papacy and the Levant*, in the wider context of political events of this era.

¹⁴ See Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 312.

¹⁵ ‘troys beaux chevaulx turcz harnachez à la mode de leur pays,’ Bourrilly, “Les Diplomates de François Ier,” 271.

¹⁶ Bourrilly, “Les Diplomates de François Ier,” 276. On Alvise Gritti’s later career, see Decei, “Aloisio Gritti au service de Soliman le Magnifique.”

¹⁷ Turan, “The Sultan’s Favorite,” 282, and details of his relationship to Ibrahim, 280–316. On Ludovico, see Nemeth Papo and Papo, *Ludovico Gritti*.

¹⁸ Ragusa, 2 July 1532, Sanuto, *Diarii*, 743.

¹⁹ ‘Azutéan Dobrovnik bégjeitol futár érkezett s azt hozta hírül, hogy Francseország padisajhéjtol, Frengisztztán királyainak egyikétől, Francsiskótól – a k mint trónon ülő és hatalmasan országoló király roppant gazdag kincstáráról hires, a Messiással kérkedő keresztyén hadseregének nagyságáról ismeretes és a kinek kormányzása alatt levő

városoknak, falvaknak, váraknak s tartományoknak nincsen száma, mert több országon uralkodik – mondom: ettől követ jön a tenger és szárazföld urának, az igazágos padisahnak udvarába,' Thury, *Török – történet írók*, 196. On Ibrahim Pasha, see Turan, "The Sultan's Favorite."

²⁰ 'luy fut faict gros honneur et bon recueil,' Venice, 5 August 1532, Charrière, *Négociations*, 207–8.

²¹ Venice, 10 April 1532, Rodrigo Niño to Charles V, "Spain: April 1532, 1–20," in Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, 418–31.

²² On Gučetić, see Tadić, *Dubrovanin Serafin Gučetić* and Broomhall, "Portal of Hopes and Dreams."

²³ Indeed, until 1806, see Kunčević, "Janus-faced Sovereignty," and for the wider context, Goffman, "Negotiating with the Renaissance State."

²⁴ On intellectual links between Ragusa and France in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Deanović, *Anciens Contacts*; Franolić, *L'Influence de la langue française*; and Birnbaum, *Humanists in a Shattered World*.

²⁵ Bašić, "Shipping in Dubrovnik," 122–23.

²⁶ 'Es tan francés y turco como V.M. habrá entendido otras muchas veces, y ahora de pocos días a esta parte ha dado en ser hostelero de cuantos Turcos van y vienen. Por lo del servicio de Francia y lo de ser turco siendo prelado no es cosa que Su Santidad ni V. M. deben consentir, y si no fuese por el nombre que tiene yo ya habría hecho darle cincuenta puñaladas por su castigo y en exemplo de otros,' Villafranca, Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1028, fol. 23, cited in Moral Pérez de Zayas, *El virrey de Nápoles*, 87, n. 5.

²⁷ 'touchant Mons. de Raguze, je suys bien ayse qu'il ne scait riens de l'accusation qu'on disoit avoir esté faicte contre luy à Rome pour le service qu'il faict au Roy et au grant Seigneur, combien que, si ce n'est à Rome, soyez certain que en assez d'autres lieux par envye de noz adversaires luy, moy et d'autres sommes assez blasonnez,' Avlona, 13 July 1537, cited in Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest," 316. See also for the later period, Biegman, "Ragusan Spying for the Ottoman Empire."

²⁸ 'Je feray entendre à monsr l'archevesque de Ragyuse, le contentement que le Roy et vous avez de luy, et de la subvention que Sa Majesté luy faict depescher, laquelle pour verité est très bein employée, car il est personnage sçavant et suffisant et très affectionné au service de Sa Majesté et qui pour son service a despendu et despend...' March 1539, cited in Bourrilly, "Les Diplomates de François Ier," 292, n 1.

²⁹ Relation of Mario Giustiniano, in Tommaso, *Relations des ambassadeurs venetians*, 54 and 64.

³⁰ 3 December 1533, Historijski Arhiv Dubrovnik [HAD], *Diversa Notariae*, vol. 102, fols. 96v–97r.

³¹ Archives de Topkapi, E.5187, cited in Feneşan and Bacqué-Grammont, "Notes et autres documents sur Aloisio Gritti," 95. The authors suggest, by contrast, that this may be Camillo Orsino on 91–92.

³² 'Nudius tertius huc [Constantinople] venisse quemdam Sawss ex Imbrahimo Bassa qui ipsius literas attulit ad magnam Cesarem. In quibus haud dubie continetur quid cum ipso tactaverit orator regis Francorum. Qui primo traiecit in Aphricam, postmodum venit

Rhodum, et ex Rhodo venit in Syriam ad Imbrahimum Bassam Cum quo absolutis negociis per eamdem viam maris recessit, et nunc est in reditu ad regem suum,' 9 May 1534, Gévay, *Urkunden und Actenstücke*, 34–35.

³³ 'pour ses peines et vaccaons davoit amene aud. Seigneur de la part de Abrahin Baschis troys chevaulx turques', 'pour une voyage quil va presentement faire pour lesd Seigneur devers led. Seigneur abrahin et pour son retours devers led Seigneur,' 24 February 1535, BNF, MS Fr. 15632, n. 15, fol. 4v.

³⁴ Bourrilly, *Histoire journalière d'Honorat de Valbelle*, 264; Bourrilly, "Un Ambassadeur Turc à Marseille," 464–69.

³⁵ See n. 34 above.

³⁶ April [1538] [sic: 1535], "Spain: April 1538," Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 5 Part 2, 1536-1538*, 462–73, n. 199.

³⁷ 'Es arribado alli Seraphin de Gozo, Raguseo, embiado por el rey de Francia, [...] son idos al Gran-Turco,' Archivo General de Simancas, Estado [AGSE], Legajo 462, cited in Tauxier, "Un expédition des Turcs," 352.

³⁸ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*; Meserve, *Empires of Islam*; Dursteler, "Describing or Distorting the 'Turk'?"; Dursteler, "Bad Bread"; and Dursteler, "Fearing the 'Turk'." For the experiences and perception of Christians and Jews participating and assimilating in Ottoman worlds, see Graf, *The Sultan's Renegades* and studies in Firges et al., *Well-Connected Domains*.

³⁹ On the idea of communities defined through emotional practice, see the foundational Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

⁴⁰ See Sicking and Servantie, "L'origine de la diplomatie imperiale," 219.

⁴¹ Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, and Murphey, "A Comparative Look." See also Necipoğlu, "Süleymân the Magnificent" and Bunes Ibarra, "Kanuni Sultan Süleyman."

⁴² A French language version of advice sent to Charles by Bernardino Pomazanić from Constantinople in March 1530, can be found in Belgian Royal Archives that Allain Servantie suggests may have been translated from Spanish: 'Qu'il est tout certain que ledt Turc veult aller la volte de Rome et dit ces parolles: 'Je veulx aller jusques à Rome trouver ce pape, et l'estourbir quel ung larron. Et n'y vois pas pour laisser l'empereur patron d'Espagne / le pape l'a coronné Empereur et dit qu'il est patron sur tout le monde et encoires sur moy. Mais je veulx aller veoir cest home pape de Rome.' / Et que acy soy se dit tout publiquement par led. Constantinoble,' cited in Servantie, "Information on Ottoman Shipbuilding," 20. On Pomazanić, see Žontar, *Obveščevalna služba*, 205–8.

⁴³ AGSE, Legajo 22, fol. 36, cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 72, and as fol. 56 in Bérenger, "Les Vicissitudes de l'alliance militaire Franco-Turque," 9.

⁴⁴ 19 November 1533, "Spain: November 1533, 16–30," Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, 858–68, n. 1152.

⁴⁵ 'en el puerto de Argel, quedavan dos naos francesas, que avian ido allí à contractar, y la mayor parte de la mercaderia que llevaban era poivo y metal para hazer artelleria, y que dos cautivos franceses que estan allí la hunden y an hecho hasta doze o catorce

piezas muy buenas,' in letter of D. Iñigo de Vallejo Pacheco, Governor of Hone, to Charles V, 13 March 1534 in *Documents inédits sur l'histoire*, 73. On rumours of Ottoman shipbuilding, see Servantie, "Information on Ottoman Shipbuilding," 20–21.

⁴⁶ 'par les propres serviteurs plus confidentz dudit Turcq et gens dudit Barberossa,' Charles V to Count of Nassau, 29 August 1534 in Weiss, *Papiers d'Etat du cardinal de Granvelle*, 170–71.

⁴⁷ Venice, 24 and 27 April 1532, Charrière, *Négociations*, 198–99.

⁴⁸ On these networks generally at this period, see Perez, *Ambassadeurs, Apprentis Espions et Maîtres Comploteurs*.

⁴⁹ Gürkan, "Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean," 372.

⁵⁰ 'Vos Majestés sont très pieuses et si elles ordonnaient de luy donner quelque traitement de corde il se pourrait qu'il dise des choses d'importance,' Venice, 7 April 1535, AGSE, Legajo 1311, fol. 64, cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 75.

⁵¹ 'et si je l'avais en mon pouvoir, je ne laisserais pas de lui étirer un peu des bras pour qu'il dise la vérité et pour cela je ne crois pas condamner mon âme'. Venice, 13 March 1535, AGSE, Legajo 1311, fol. 79, cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 75.

⁵² 'changer d'air,' Venice, 1535, AGSE, Legajo 1311, fol. 47, cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 77.

⁵³ Turan, "The Sultan's Favorite," 371.

⁵⁴ 'et moi je me ferais couper un doigt de la main pour le prendre en dehors de cet État et pour le remettre à V.M,' Venice, 1535, AGSE, Legajo 1311, fol. 47, cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 77.

⁵⁵ Tadić, *Dubrovanin Serafin Gučetić*, 13.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 20; HAD, *Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, vol. 41, fol. 20r; 'sponte et ammo voluntario,' meeting of 8 January, HAD, *Diversa Cancellariae*, vol. 120, fol. 43v.

⁵⁷ 'et caso non volesse obedi— alli comandam^h di v. tr— qualla procurata di farli sequestrare,' 3 December 1533, HAD, *Diversa Notariae*, vol. 102, fols. 96v–97r.

⁵⁸ Tadić, *Dubrovanin Serafin Gučetić*, 24; HAD, *Cons. Minu.*, vol 37, fol. 121r.

⁵⁹ Tadić, *Dubrovanin Serafin Gučetić*, 25.

⁶⁰ For details of these events, see Tadić, *Dubrovanin Serafin Gučetić*, and Broomhall, "Portal of Hopes and Dreams."

⁶¹ 'Or, en effect, Monsr, combien que je ne le cognoisse, et qu'en passant il ne soit venu a moy,' Venice, 13 September 1535, Scheurer, *Correspondance du Bellay*, 92.

⁶² 'Monseigneur, il y a long temps que je sceu l'allée dud. Ragusee vers le Turcq, qui fut si imprudent que, passant par icy, il laisse entendre a qui le voulut sçavoir que le Roy l'envoyoit vers le Turcq,' Venice, 13 September 1535, *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶³ 'Et me dit l'ambassadeur propre de l'Empereur, bientost après qu'il fut passé, qu'il luy avoit tenu les espies après et qu'il avoit sceu la comimision qu'il avoit d'aller vers le Turcq,' Venice, 13 September 1535, *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶⁴ ‘Dèz l’heure que la Seigneurie m’en eust parlé, j’escrivis a La Forest qu’il admonestat led. Ragusee qu’il se gardat le plus qu’il pourroit a son passage car il seroit guetté,’ Venice, 13 September 1535, *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶⁵ ‘et la Seigneurie me fit plaincte aussi qu’en passant par Constantinople il avoit dit quelques mauvaises paroles contre eulx,’ Venice, 13 September 1535, *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶⁶ For his earlier missions with Zápolya, see Ursu, *La Politique orientale*, 75.

⁶⁷ 13 May 1532, Eustace Chapuys to Charles V, “Spain: May 1532, 1-31,” Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, 438–51.

⁶⁸ 22 May 1532, Eustace Chapuys to Charles V, “Spain: May 1532, 1-31,” *ibid.*

⁶⁹ ‘desire fort qu’il vous plaise l’ouyr parler des affaires de Constantinoble. Et me semble, Sire, qu’il en parle bien pertinement et qu’il n’a riens diminué de sa bonne volonté depuis le temps que ne le vistes,’ Scheurer, *Correspondance du Bellay*, 18.

⁷⁰ ‘Les propoz que le sr Camille par de Ursin a tenuz q vous monsr le cardinal en plaine table, qui me fait juger qu’il a très mauvaise volenté. A ceste cause je veulx et entends que vous le faciez prandre et le mectre a Pierre-Assise ou vous le ferez bien et seurement garder,’ François to Cardinal de Tournon and to the Chancellor, 15 [sic 26] Sept 1536, Archives nationales de France, J 965, 26, n. 5, cited in Scheurer, *Correspondance du Bellay*, 18, n. 1.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁷² For the identity of Escalenga, N. 385, “Spain: July 1530, 25-31,” Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 1, Henry VIII, 1529-1530*, 659–69, n. 2.

⁷³ 24 June 1531, “Spain: June 1531, 16-30,” Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, 189–203, n. 749. On Mai, Levin, *Agents of Empire*, 45.

⁷⁴ 24 June 1531, “Spain: June 1531, 16-30,” Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, 189–203, n. 752.

⁷⁵ ‘pour non delasser occasion ny au roy de France, de deuers le quel jl retournoit, ne aux Veneciens et Italiens de soy ressentir, et encoires que le Turc [...] que ce fust este contre la tresue passee,’ July 1531, Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V*, 494.

⁷⁶ “Spain: March 1534, 21-31,” Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 5 Part 1, 1534-1535*, 84–100.

⁷⁷ Alonge, “Au service du roi.”

⁷⁸ ‘tous ceux de cette ville craignent de traiter avec nous publiquement et même en secret. Avec celui-là ils n’auront pas ces scrupules parce qu’il n’est pas ici personne publique et fait office de marchand,’ Venice, n.d., AGSE, Legajo 1310, fol. 198 cited in Quatrefages, “La Perception gouvernementale espagnole,” 74. On Venice’s role as an intermediary, see Hassiotis, “Venezia e i domini veneziani.”

⁷⁹ Venice, 29 March 1534, Lope de Soria to the Emperor, 30 March, “Spain: March 1534, 21-31,” Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 5 Part 1, 1534-1535*, 84–100.

⁸⁰ AGSE, Legajo 1311, fols. 140–43 (5 October 1535), 144 (8 October 1535) and 194–96 (11 October 1535), cited in Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean,” 374.

⁸¹ ‘j’ai ordonné à deux de mes serviteurs de lui donner des coups de couteau de nuit, ils l’attendirent pour les lui donner mais comme il s’embarqua de son propre lodgement

cela n'a pas été possible,' Venice, n.d., AGSE, Legajo 1311, fol. 14, and Legajo 1312, fol. 115, cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 76.

⁸² 'oeuvres dont use à present le Très Chrétien,' Venice, n.d., AGSE, Legajo 1311, fol. 33 cited in Quatrefages, "La Perception gouvernementale espagnole," 76.

⁸³ 'Es tan francés y turco como V.M. habrá entendido otras muchas veces, y ahora de pocos días a esta parte ha dado en ser hostelero de cuantos Turcos van y vienen. Por lo del servicio de Francia y lo de ser turco siendo prelado no es cosa que Su Santidad ni V. M. deben consentir, y si no fuese por el nombre que tiene yo ya habría hecho darle cincuenta puñaladas por su castigo y en exemplo de otros,' Villafranca, AGSE, Legajo 1028, fol. 23, in Moral Pérez de Zayas, *El virrey de Nápoles*, 87, n. 5.

⁸⁴ 'toutesfois je tiens qu'il soit envoyé du Roy, et me semble un acte de très mauvaise nature celui du duc d'Urbin de l'avoir arrêté, et ne sçay quelle honneste excuse il sçaurait alleguer,' Venice, 13 September 1535, Scheurer, *Correspondance du Bellay*, 92.

⁸⁵ 'vous ressentant de l'injure qu'il a faicte au Roy,' Venice, 13 September 1535, *ibid.*, 92.

⁸⁶ 'Vous sçavez, Monseigneur, que la ou vous feriez aultrement se seroit directement contrevenir non seulement aux tant honestes offres que freschement avez faictes faire aud. seigneur et la servitu que dictes luy avoir tousjours portee, mais ce seroit faire non accoustumee entre princes et violé le droict des gens,' Venice, 17 September 1535, *ibid.*, 95.

⁸⁷ 'Et pour ce que nous ne voulons penser cela de vous, nous ne vous en ferons par ceste lectre plus longue remonstrance, joint que nous avons donné charge aud. de Murette vous en communiquer plus au long,' Venice, 17 September 1535, *ibid.*, 95–96.

⁸⁸ 'led. seigneur debvera trouver fort estrange qu'il vienne a luy retenir ses lettres et ceulx qui sont envoyez vers luy pour les luy bailer; chose qui ne se faict non seulement d'amy a amy mais a grand peine se faict-elle entre ennemis,' Venice, 17 September 1535, *ibid.*, 96.

⁸⁹ 'luy fera bien vivement entendre qu'il ayt a considerer l'importance de cest affaire et combien la queue en pourra estre longue pour la consequence dont il est, et que c'est donner une vraye ouverture aux princes de arrester les serviteurs les ungs des aultre, qui seroit une playe si grande et commencement de tells discordz en toute la Chrestienté que luy qui l'auroit faicte ne la pourroit gairir quant il voudroit, dont il demoureroit grandement blasmé et reprins de tous gens de bien et d'honneur de de ceulx qui desirent le repoz commung, de sorte qu'il seroit en dangier que puis après on s'en print a luy d'une part et d'aultre ... Et pour ce, qu'il ayt bien a poiser et considerer ce faict avant que y entrer plus avant et de y pourveoir de sorte que personne n'ayt matiere de s'en lamenter,' Venice, 17 September 1535, *ibid.*, 96–97.

⁹⁰ 'il n'y a propoz ne apparence, n'estant pas croyable que —veu le bon traictement que led. s' Roy faict faire par ses pays et royaulme a tous allans et venans vers ledict Empereur sans en retenir ung seul, et les faisant acommoder de toutes choses —led. Empereur voulust retenir ceulx qui vont et viennent devers led. s' Roy de quelque part qu'ilz puissant venir, quant bien ilz y viendront de la part des Turcs, Juifs ou aultres infidelles quelz qu'ilz peussent ester, car on sçait bien qu'il peut envoyer vers eulx et recevoir d'eulx toutesfoys et quants que bon luy semblera pour ester chose

accoustumee de tout temps par ceulx qui ne reconnoissent point de seigneur et superieur,' Perugia, 17 September 1535, *ibid.*, 99.

⁹¹ 'qui a trouvé la chose orde et sale et de très mauvaïse consequence, nous disant, entre aultres paroles, que tells façons de faire luy diminuoient l'esperance qu'il avoit cenceue de pouvoir moyenner quelque bon effect avec led. Empereur,' Perugia, 23 September 1535, *ibid.*, 108.

⁹² *ibid.*, 111–12.

⁹³ 'prudement', 'que quant bien le Roy auroit Nouvelles du Turc et gens de par luy, il n'en seroit a reprendre; et qu'il failloit presuppose et estimer d'ung tel prince que tout ce qu'il faisoit, il le faisoit pour le bien et non pour le dommage de la Chrestienté,' Perugia, 23 September 1535, *ibid.*, 112.

⁹⁴ 'ung gentilhomme que le Turc envoyoit devers vous avec lettres et presans a vous adressans'; 'ou l'on dict y avoir une turquoise d'inusitee grandeur,' Perugia, 23 September 1535, *ibid.*, 106. 'quant tout est dict, le principal ressentement, et que plus ilz auroient a craindre, sera celuy du Turc,' Perugia, 23 September 1535, *ibid.*, 107.

⁹⁵ 'combien que entendons que ledit Ragousois a faict très-mauvais office à l'encontre de nous, comme ont faict aultres faict dudit S' roy, sans chastoy quelconque,' Messina, 23 October 1535, Weiss, *Papiers d'état*, 392.

⁹⁶ 'jà çoit que sa charge et ce qu'il praticquoit fût chose mauvaïse,' Naples, 22 December 1535, Weiss, *Papiers d'état*, 419.

⁹⁷ 24 June 1531, "Spain: June 1531, 16-30," Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 2, 1531-1533*, 189–203, n. 749.

⁹⁸ Parker treats at some length this affair that led to renewed warfare, from the perspective of Charles V, *Emperor*, 278-84

⁹⁹ See the detailed article on this topic: Escamilla, with Bertomeu Masiá, "Antonio Rincón;" Parker, *Emperor*, 141, citing the description of the Spanish ambassador in Venice, Rodrigo Niño, 18 June 1530 (AGS E 1308/58-9).

¹⁰⁰ *Acta Tomaciana*, X no. 164, 170-1 cited in Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 317.

¹⁰¹ 'pero la detencion, aunque se pudiesse hazer, seria contra la tregua y en ninguna manera se deve hazer, y si se huuiese hecho, soltarlo y ponerle luengo en libertad haziendo entender que se hauia hecho sin orden nuestra, como seria verdad y que luego como lo entendimos lo mandamos soltar.' 23 June 1541, Alba, 'Correspondencia,' 85; Translation from Parker, *Emperor*, 278.

¹⁰² Parker, *Emperor*, 279 citing *consulta* prepared for Charles by Secretary Idiáquez, AGS E 52/359.

¹⁰³ 'sy en caso que os resoluais que se absenten los susodichos y os scriuan alguno dellos la dicha carta, seria bien que donde se narra como passo el caso y dize que por causa des secreto fue quemada la ropa que se les tomo, se añadiesse "excepto çiertas scripturas que se les hallaron, por las quales consta las malas y peruersas platicas que tractauan".' 8 August 1541, Alba, 'Correspondencia,' 95; translation from Parker, *Emperor*, 279.

¹⁰⁴ 'porque se considera que aunque para justificar lo que toca a Rincon ay muchas causas que se podran alegar que el tractaua en daño de la christiandad y nuestro con los

enemigos de la fee y mostrar que por esto no se puede tener por rompida la tregua entre nos y el rey de Francia'. *ibid* 95; my translation.

¹⁰⁵ 'une offense si grande, si détestable et si étrangère à ceux qui portent le titre et la qualité de prince qu'elle ne peut en aucun cas être pardonnée, tolérée ou supportée,' François to the Estates of the Empire assembled at Nuremberg, 9 January 1543, cited in Bacon, *The Life and Times of Francis the First, King of France*, 450.