

CICERO ON POETRY

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ERRATA

- p. 3, n. 9] after '1,12,18.' add: ' 10,2,22 *habet tamen omnis eloquentia aliquid commune*. Cf. also Tac. dial. 4,10 (& Peterson's note ad loc.); 10,13.'
- p. 67, l. 7 from top] for 'of Arch. 19', read 'of Arch. 18'
- p. 67, l. 7 from bottom] for 'saxa cantu flectuntur', read 'saxa et solitudines voci respondent, bestiae saepe immanes cantu flectuntur'
- p. 71, n. 14] add after '389.': 'Cf. also P. Venini: 'La distribuzione delle parole greche nell'epistolario di Cicerone.' *RIL* 85 (1952) 50-68, who shows that Gk. is not used in the serious letters (or in more formal letters addressed to persons of high rank) employing a *genus severum et grave*.'
- p. 75, l. 7 from bottom] for 'control and manipulate the emotion', read 'control and manipulate the emotions'
- p. 93, l. 2 from bottom] after 'accipio = to hear, be told...307,83' add: 'See also Peterson on Tac. dial. 1')
- p. 96, l. 3 from bottom] for 'the orator, like the poet, orator', read 'the orator, like the poet,'
- p. 192, l. 3 from top] for 'a such a list', read 'such a list'
- p. 233, n. 123] after 'Hor. epist. 2,1,56);' add 'Hor. carm. 2,1,11 (see also Nisbet-Hubbard ad loc.) grande munus, ars 80 grandesque coturni;'
- p. 260, n. 218] for 'Hermann', read 'Herrmann'
- p. 293, n. 47] after 'the dialogue's interlocutors.' add 'For another perspective, see Momigliano *CPh* 79 (1984) 206 who appears to argue that C. would never have countenanced so idealistic a wish as that to banish the poets from the state.'
- p. 300, l. 1] before 'scholarly', add 'Furthermore, in the investigation of these rhetorical as well as ethico-political influences on Cicero's literary ideas, the thesis drew upon the results of a large new body of secondary'
- p. 300, l. 18 from top] for 'in Ciceronian corpus', read 'in the Ciceronian corpus'
- p. 311, l. 17 from top] for 'lack of time the refer', read 'lack of time refer'
- p. 320, l. 11 from bottom] for 'since C. is no strict of observer', read 'since C. is no strict observer'

ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive study of Cicero's views on poetry, with particular emphasis on the major genres: epic, tragedy, comedy, and lyric. In general, incorporation of Ciceronian criticism of individual poets is eschewed, except in so far as such criticism contributes to the understanding of Cicero's views on poetry in general, or on the individual genres. The first chapters focus on how poetry in general might be defined in Ciceronian terms; on Cicero's views on the conditions of poetic composition, poetic inspiration and on the functions of the poet and poetry. The inescapable influence of rhetorical and ethico-political ideas on Cicero's literary criticism and theory is taken into consideration throughout all parts of the dissertation. The significance of the various dicta and testimonies from the Ciceronian corpus that appear to indicate something of Cicero's views on poetry are examined both in their individual contexts as well as in the larger context of Ciceronian literary and rhetorical theory. Conflicts between such Ciceronian texts are discussed and attempts are made to resolve these where it is possible so to do. Often Cicero's thought on poetic and literary questions is illuminated by reference to various traditions in ancient rhetorical and literary theory, including Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. Important writers after Cicero such as Quintilian are also drawn upon extensively as illustrating particular points of literary theory that survived long after Cicero. Discussion and assessment of works by other modern authors on some of the subjects undertaken in the dissertation also form a substantial part of the present work.

The study presents a conservative, conventional thinker on literary and poetic theory, much influenced by rhetorical, ethico-political and nationalistic ideas. The conservatism of his poetics, in contrast to his remarkably innovatory achievements in rhetorical theory, reflects both an adhesion to a rhetorical perspective from which all literature was approached, as well as an ethical and subsequently aesthetical reaction to the extreme neoterism that was developing among some of his younger contemporaries. Though poetry occupied much of Cicero's education and free time throughout his life, it remained very much a parergon, persistently subordinated to the discharging of subsidiary functions. Rarely does Cicero consider poetry on its own terms, and very few of the principles that he applies to its evaluation approach something resembling ideas current in modern aesthetic and literary theory. Notwithstanding, if one wishes fully to grasp the significance of Cicero as a literary thinker, one must take cognizance of his ideas on poetry, the composition, reading, citation and criticism of which occupied so great a part of his life.

Alexander Brilianus
Iustinae uxori suae s. p. d.

*ad quem alium me plus decet mittere hos libros quos de iudice artis poeticae
Cicerone conscripsi, fructum studiorum totiusque vitae meae, quam ad te,
mulier optima, sine qua facultas vel voluntas vivendi mihi deest? utinam
tantum hi libri quantum liberi nostri V, Xaverius Andreas, Anna
Magdalena, Elisabeth Clara, Ignatius Thomas & Helena Margarita,
coniunctionem studiorum amorisque nostri declarent! hoc ignosce mihi unum:
minore hos libros te honore affecturos quam deceat. meliora enim cum me
scripturum sperassem, scripsi deteriora. cura ut valeas. scribebam a.d. III Kal.
Mart. A. V. C. MMDCCCLV.*

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ABBREVIATIONS

AS	L. RADERMACHER (ed.): <i>Artium scriptores</i> . Vienna 1951
CHCL	P.E. EASTERLING – E.J. KENNEY – B.M.W. KNOX – W.V. CLAUSEN (edd.): <i>The Cambridge History of Classical Literature</i> . Cambridge 1982
CIL	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> . Berlin 1863–
CRF	O. RIBBECK (ed.): <i>Comicorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> . Leipzig 1897, 3rd ed.
DFA	Sir ARTHUR PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE: <i>The Dramatic Festivals of Athens</i> . Oxford 1968, 2nd ed. (rev. J. GOULD & D.M. LEWIS)
D-K	H. DIELS – W. KRANZ (edd.): <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> . Berlin 1951–2, 6th ed.
GL	H. KEIL (ed.): <i>Grammatici Latini</i> . Leipzig 1855–80
K-A	R. KASSEL – C. AUSTIN (edd.): <i>Poetae comici Graeci</i> . Berlin & New York 1983–
L-P	A.D. LEEMAN – H. PINKSTER et al.: <i>M. Tullius Cicero. De oratore Libri III. Kommentar</i> . Heidelberg 1981–1996 (up to 3,95): see bibliography for details on individual volumes.
LSJ	H.G. LIDDELL – R. SCOTT: <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> (rev. H.S. JONES). Oxford 1940, 9th ed. (E. A. BARBER: <i>Supplement</i> . Oxford 1968)
OCD	N.G. HAMMOND – H.H. SCULLARD (edd.): <i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> . Oxford 1970, 2nd ed.
OCT	<i>Oxford Classical Text</i>
OLD	P.G.W. GLARE (ed.): <i>The Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> . Oxford 1982
RE	A. PAULY – G. WISSOWA et al. (edd.): <i>Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> . Stuttgart-München 1893–1980
ROL	E.H. WARMINGTON: <i>Remains of Old Latin</i> . Cambridge, Mass. & London 1935–40
SH	H. LLOYD-JONES – P. PARSONS (edd.): <i>Supplementum Hellenisticum</i> . Berlin & New York 1983
TLL	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> . Leipzig 1900–
TRF	O. RIBBECK (ed.): <i>Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> . Teubner 1897, 3rd ed.
U-R	H. USENER–L. RADERMACHER (edd.): <i>Dionysii Halicarnasei opuscula</i> . Leipzig 1899–1929

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To the many others who have in various ways and at various times assisted me throughout my research, but who must remain nameless, not for want of gratitude, but for fear lest in naming some I should omit to name others whom I ought not to have omitted: to all these, thanks also.

1. INTRODUCTION

Overview:

- 1.1 previous work on Cicero's views of poetry
- 1.2 assumptions, aims and approach adopted in this work

1.1 previous work on Cicero's views on poetry

Interest in Ciceronian literary thought has always been primarily and naturally focussed on his handling of, and contribution to, the rhetorical tradition. However, in view of the facts that Cicero's educational, literary, social, legal and political activities involved him in various ways with poets, actors and poetry throughout his life and that he himself composed poetry¹ and translated the Greek poetry of others, the picture of the man does not seem complete². Hence there have been various attempts to rectify this situation: some critics in this connexion have concentrated on his poetry³; others have considered Cicero's critical views on poetry. The majority of the latter class have not been primarily concerned with the orator's views on poetry in general or with the genres as such, but rather have concentrated on discussing Cicero's views on specific poets and poetic works. In this connexion one may cite the older works of J. KUBIK: *De Ciceronis poetarum Latinorum studiis*. Diss. Phil. Vindob. I, 1887 and W. ZILLINGER: *Cicero und die altrömischen Dichter*. Würzburg 1911.

A broader approach was taken by E. MALCOVATI in her *Cicerone e la poesia*. Annali della facoltà di lettere e di filosofia, Pavia 1943, who does indeed devote the first chapter of this book to a discussion of Cicero's views on various general aspects of poetry, such as its inspiration, its ends, its genres. The second chapter deals with poetic criticism of both the

¹ In connection with C.'s youthful devotion to poetry, the testimony of Plut. Cic. 2,3 ff. is important: ἐγγύη πως προθυμότερον ἐπὶ ποιητικῇν etc.

² Cf. L-P II 235: 'Zu bedenken ist, daß Cicero selber neben den drein Prosagattungen (sc. Redekunst, Geschichtsschreibung, Philosophie) auch die Poesie als sein persönliches Arbeitsfeld betrachtete.'

³ Of the many works on C.'s poetry, one may cite the following: M. GÜNDEL: *De Ciceronis poetae arte capita tria*. Diss. Leipzig 1907; W.W. EWBANK: *The Poems of Cicero*. London 1933; E. CASTORINA: 'Le tre fasi poetiche di Cicerone.' *SicGymn* 6 (1953) 137-165; M. P. O. MORFORD: 'Ancient and modern in Cicero's poetry.' *CPh* 62 (1967) 112-16; W. CLAUSEN: 'Cicero and the New Poetry.' *Ciceroniana* 5 (1984) 91-100 = *HSPb* 90 (1986) 159-70; P. FERRARINO: 'Cicerone poeta e critico. La sua prima produzione poetica.' in *Scritti scelti*. Opusculi accad. XV Firenze Olschki 1986, 142-66; E. COURTNEY: *The Fragmentary Latin Poets*. Oxford 1993, 149 ff.

Greek and Latin poets; the third, with Cicero's own poetry. There have also been attempts by others to deal with particular aspects of Cicero's poetics, such as PENNACINI's discussion of Cicero's views on the inspiration of the poet and the poet's function in society⁴. Other examples of this specialised type of study include the investigations of GAGLIARDI and others⁵ into Cicero's literary debate with the neoterics – of which studies, some deny even the existence of the debate, the school or both! Another example of a specialised study is L. ALFONSI's article on Cicero and the lyric poets⁶. Throughout the thesis, these works are discussed and assessed, each in its appropriate place.

1.2 assumptions, aims and approach adopted in the present work

For now it will suffice to state the aims of and the approach adopted in the present work. GAGLIARDI once wrote, in the article just cited: '...Cicerone non fu proprio un teorico della poesia. Tutte le volte, infatti, che si è tentato di dare una sistemazione critica alla sua "poetica" ci si è trovati di fronte a più o meno precise reminiscenze democritee o platoniche e ad espressioni piuttosto vaghe ed indefinite che possono farlo apparire di volta in volta o strettamente ancorato alla tradizione ... o invece decisamente novatore sino a riecheggiare Filodemo nel precorrere incoscientemente posizioni tipiche dell'estetica idealistica ...' Bearing in mind his first point that Cicero was not a poetic theorist, I have not tried to attempt the kind of systematization of Ciceronian poetics to which GAGLIARDI objects. On the other hand, on the basis both of some scattered remarks on poetry in the Ciceronian corpus and of literary ideas of a more general nature, it is by all means possible to establish something more concrete about Cicero's views on poetry in general and on the poetic genres specifically than what GAGLIARDI suggests. In fact, Democritean-Platonic ideas of inspiration, as well as Philodemian aesthetics⁷ do not play, in my view, a significant rôle – if indeed any at all – in Cicero's thought on poetry.

⁴ A. PENNACINI: 'Posizione di Cicerone nella questione della applicabilità della retorica alla poesia.' *Quaderni del circolo filol. linguist. Padavano* 10 (1979) 63–75.

⁵ There are too many works on this subject to allow us to attempt an exhaustive list; the following, however, will suffice: D. GAGLIARDI: 'Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 (1968) 269–87; L. ALFONSI: 'Il termine NEOTEROI in Cicerone.' *Mnemosyne* 2 (1949) 217–23; 'Su Cicerone e i "poetae novi".' *Aevum* 36 (1945) 319; 'Ancora sui νεώτεροι.' *Sileno* 2 (1976) 83–4; W. ALLEN: 'Ovid's *cantare* and Cicero's *cantores Euphorionis*.' *TAPhA* 103 (1972) 1–14; H. BARDON: 'Réflexions sur les « poètes nouveaux »' *RBPb* 26 (1948) 947–60; C. BIONE: 'Cenacoli di poeti ed indirizzi culturali al tempo di Cicerone.' *MC* 11 (1941) 156–75; E. CASTORINA: *Questioni neoteriche*. Firenze 1968, 33 ff.; W.V. CLAUSEN: 'Cicero and the New Poetry.' *HSPb* 90 (1986) 159–70; M. GIGANTE: 'Catullo, Cicerone e Antimaco.' *RFIC* 32 (1954) 67–74; R.O. LYNE: 'The neoteric poets.' *CQ* 28 (1978) 167–87; D.F.S. THOMSON: 'Catullus and Cicero: poetry and the criticism of poetry.' *CW* 60 (1967) 225–30.

⁶ L. ALFONSI: 'Cicerone e i lirici.' *RFIC* 38 (1960) 170–77.

⁷ The notion that there are echoes of Philodemian aesthetics in C.'s rhetorica was advocated by A. ROSTAGNI: 'Risonanze dell'estetica di Filodemo in Cicerone.' *Atene e Roma* 3 (1922) 28–44. ROSTAGNI, who was followed by MALCOVATI 12 f., claims that 1) Crassus' reluctance to separate form and content in Bk. 3 of the *de orat.* (§ 19); and 2) C.'s use in the *orat.* (37 & 68) of the term *sophistae* to denote practitioners of the epideictic style reflect Philodemian influence. This notion of Philodemian influence on C.'s rhetorical ideas

The main aim of the thesis, then, is to provide the most comprehensive study yet of Cicero's views on poetry in general and on the poetic genres. Except in so far as his criticism of individual poets and their works helps to illuminate these views, I have as a general rule eschewed discussion of such Ciceronian judgements. In addition to the numerous, scattered utterances in the Ciceronian letters, speeches and philosophica, illustrative of his conservative tendencies in literary theory and criticism, I have sought above all, to illuminate Cicero's ideas on poetry by examining the influence of rhetorical theory on these ideas as suggested by his rhetorical works. I have also tried to set forth in so far as the evidence allows, the intellectual background to Cicero's views on poetry, paying particular attention to the traditions of ancient literary theory and criticism. I do not believe that either of these tasks has before been attempted, or at any rate, in as much depth as each is here undertaken. Several indications bear this out, especially the fact that the discussion of style is almost wholly absent from previous investigations of Cicero's views on poetry. The underlying assumption to my approach is of course that rhetorical ideas *can* and *should* in Cicero's case be transferred to his ideas on poetic theory. The notion of treating rhetoric and poetics as a unity is rejected both by modern literary theory, and perhaps also by the Hellenistic critics best represented by Neoptolemus⁸. On the other hand, the sort of separation of rhetoric and poetics that was advocated by such critics, is entirely out of the question when one is dealing with Cicero. The *logos* was to Cicero, whether in prose or poetry, but for its form, the same: *oratio* is, as Cicero said, quoting the poet Pacuvius, *flexanima atque omnium regina rerum*⁹. That he does not apply to poetry different principles of literary theory and criticism from those which he applies to oratory is

has generally not found favour with later critics (ROSTAGNI's work is not even cited by L-P), and was criticised somewhat by GRUBE (1965) 199 n. 2: 'There may be some echoes of Ph. in C., but they have little or no influence upon the course of the discussion or the opinions of the orator ... even if we admit that in all these cases Ph. is in the orator's mind, and he may have been, it is a poor harvest.' But cf. the recent article of S. OBERHELMAN-D. ARMSTRONG: 'Satire as poetry and the impossibility of metathesis in Horace's satires.' in D. OBBINK (ed.): *Philodemus & Poetry*. Oxford 1995, 249 with n. 62. On C.'s views on Philodemus' poetry and Epicureanism, see Appendix IV of NISBET's comm. on the speech in Pisonem.

⁸ That Hellenistic (hence Horatian) poetic theory was sharply distinguished from rhetorical theory, is a point upon which C.O. BRINK insists in his *Prolegomena* 16 ff. (cf. 187 ff.) and in the commentary on the *ars*: see for example, with special reference to C. as a possible source: pp. 79 f. on the doctrine of unity (where he makes the admission 'However well H. knew his Cicero - I am quite willing to believe that he knew him very well...') and pp. 372 f. on C.'s *perfectus orator* compared with vv. 366 ff. BRINK seems not to have satisfied himself that he had dispensed adequately in the *Prolegomena* and the commentary with the idea of C.'s *orat.* as a possible source of influence on the Horatian *ars*, for he returned to the subject afterwards in an article entitled 'Cicero's Orator and Horace's *Ars poetica*.' *Ciceroniana* 2 (1975) 97-106. Some, however, have not been entirely convinced by either BRINK's ubiquitous invocation of Neoptolemus, or his complete separation of poetics and rhetoric: see for example: G.W. WILLIAMS *CR* 24 (1974) 52-57; B. OTIS *Gnomon* 36 (1964) 265-272 (esp. 269 ff. very good on C.'s *orat.*); Z. PAVLOVSKIS *CPh* 69 (1974) 233-36 esp. 235; B. VICKERS: *In Defence of Rhetoric*. Oxford 1988, 49 f. (admittedly not a classicist); LUCIA CALBOLI MONTEFUSCO: 'Aristotle and Cicero on the *officia oratoris*' in FORTENBAUGH & MIRHADY (eds.) *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*. New Jersey 1994, 90.

⁹ *de orat.* 2,187; cf. Quint. 1,12,18.

obvious to anyone familiar with his many utterances on poets and poetry¹⁰. Not only does he apply rhetorical principles to the analysis of poetry¹¹, but conversely, he often illustrates various points of rhetorical theory, especially that on style, with quotations from the poets. Moreover, as the product of his rhetoric-dominated education, Cicero cannot have remained impervious to the tendency of the traditional, ancient criticism to think about all literature in rhetorical terms¹². In this connexion, it is worthwhile to cite D.A. RUSSELL in *Criticism in Antiquity* 2 ff. & 114 ff. who discusses the 'dominant rhetorical element' in ancient criticism and gives a refreshingly sympathetic account of the 'way in which rhetoric affected literary understanding and evaluation'¹³.

If then much can be learned about Cicero's ideas on poetry by studying his rhetorical thought and influences, a good deal may now be said on the subject in view of the advances made in Ciceronian rhetorical studies since MALCOVATI wrote her work on Cicero and poetry. In the intervening time, among other important contributions, BARWICK published his monograph on the Ciceronian rhetorical-education ideal (1963); DOUGLAS's commentary on the *Brutus* appeared (1966), as also did the massive commentary of LEEMAN, PINKSTER *et al.* on the *de oratore* (1981–96 up to 3,95), and WISSE's work on *ethos* and *pathos* (1989). Thus another aim of the present work is to bring the study of Cicero's views on poetry up to date with more recent research.

¹⁰ The fact too that entire attempts have been made to conform Horatian poetics to Ciceronian rhetorical ideas as contained in his rhetorical treatises— whether indeed such attempts with respect to Horace are valid or not need not concern us here — confirms to us at least the *prima facie* plausibility of transferring rhetorical ideas to poetics. See for example, MARY A. GRANT & G.C. FISKE: 'Cicero's *Orator* and Horace's *Ars poetica*.' *HSPb* 35 (1924) 1-74 and 'Cicero's *De Oratore* and Horace's *Ars poetica*.' *Univ. of Wisconsin Studies* 28 (1929).

¹¹ An outstanding example of this type of Ciceronian criticism is cited by NORDEN (1905) 484 f.: inv. 1,33 'wo er [sc. Cicero] eine längere Stelle der *Andria* des Terenz nach allen Regeln der Kunst als rhetorisches Musterstück zerlegt'. Likewise, the Limon fragment preserved in *Suet. vit. Ter.* 7, which apparently has Cicero competing with Caesar in an exercise of literary criticism on Terence, contains language that is strongly reminiscent of rhetorical stylistic characterisations (cf. QUADLBAUER 80 & SCHMID: *RhM* 95 (1952) 229–71). More examples of this kind of rhetorical criticism may be found at *de orat.* 2,326 f. & inv. 1,27 where C., illustrates the technique of *narratio* with *exempla* from Terence (cf. BLÄNSDORF 151 who argues that the final section of inv. 1,27 'erweitert sich zu der treffendsten Charakteristik des inneren Baus der Komödie, die wir aus dem Altertum besitzen'). The tradition is continued by Quint. in numerous places, esp. in the first chapter of the tenth book of his *inst.* A remarkable example here is 10,1,47 ff. on Homer: *nec poetica modo sed etiam oratoria virtute eminentissimus. nam ut de laudibus, exhortationibus, consolationibus taceam, nonne vel nonus liber, quo missa ad Achillem legatio continetur, vel in primo inter duces illa contentio vel dictae in secundo sententiae omnes litium ac consiliorum explicant artes? ... iam similitudines, amplificationes, exempla, digressus, signa rerum et argumenta ceteraque genera probandi ac refutandi sunt ita multa, ut etiam qui de artibus scripserunt plurimi harum rerum testimonium ab hoc poeta petant* (for the τόπος of Homer as ἐπηροικῆς εὐρετής, see RADERMACHER *AS* 9–10). Cf. PETERSON's introductory chapter on Quint.'s literary criticism, xxii ff.

¹² Cf. below § 4.3.1 in which it is shown how the study of poetry is totally integrated into the orator's education and *exercitatio*, thus emphasising a mechanistic, ultimately pragmatic type of analysis.

¹³ Numerous other authorities express a similar viewpoint, as for example, O. REGENBOGEN in his article on Theophrastus in *RE*, Supp. VII, col. 1522: 'Daß Rhetorik und Poetik systematisch bei T. zusammengehören, hat mit besonderem Nachdruck betont Immisch *Festschr. für Gomperz* (Wien 1902) 255 ff. Es besteht zwischen Poesie und Kunstprosa eine Syzygie derart, daß beide qualitativ zusammengehören, nur graduell in ihren Kunstmitteln sich unterscheiden ...'

Rhetorical ideas, however, are not the only influences on Cicero's ideas on poetry. Of particular relevance in this connexion, is Cicero's ethico-political and nationalistic outlook. Here too, advances have been made, for since MALCOVATI's time, BÜCHNER's commentary on the *de re publica* has appeared (1984), as has ZETZEL's commentary on selections of the same (1995). Another work of importance in a related field is N. WOOD's work on Cicero's social and political thought (1988). Here too the contributions of recent research will be recognised and assimilated.

I have also attempted to place the development of Ciceronian ideas on poetry in the context of the literary and cultural battles which Cicero fought with two movements, composed, as it seems, mostly of younger contemporaries: on the one hand, were the Atticists, advocates of the plain style in oratory; the other, more important group for the purposes of our study, was the Neoteric school of poets, consisting of Catullus and his circle of poet-friends. In the case of the former, as GAGLIARDI has argued, the stimulus to Cicero's antagonism was probably of an ethico-political nature; but I have disagreed with GAGLIARDI in that I do not see the difference of ethico-political outlook as the sole source of that antagonism; on the contrary, I have argued throughout that these ethico-political tendencies in Cicero ultimately shaped his aesthetic and literary ideas and turned him away from the incipient neoterism of his youth.

For obvious reasons, determining Cicero's personal views on any subject can be problematic when one is dealing with the dialogues. I have tried to show where possible why certain ideas the utterance of which is placed in the mouths of interlocutors other than in the mouth of Cicero should be attributed to him; conversely, why other ideas whose expression is represented as emanating from others' mouths should *not* be attributed to Cicero. Consideration of such factors as a given interlocutor's perspective and rôle in the dialogue, the purpose and context of a given utterance, and the affirmation or rejection of an identical or similar idea elsewhere in the Ciceronian corpus will help us here.

The division of the thesis is as follows. The second chapter deals with the question how poetry is or might be defined in Ciceronian terms; the third chapter deals with the Ciceronian views on the nature of the poet, and the conditions of the poet's composition, in other words, his inspiration; the fourth chapter examines Cicero's views on the functions of the poet and his poetry. In this chapter also are Cicero's views on epic discussed. Next follows a short chapter on Cicero and theatre that will serve to place in the socio-political perspective Cicero's views on the dramatic genres. Thereafter, each of the chapters is devoted to one or another of the major genres: tragedy, comedy (and briefly, the lesser

comic genres) and lyric. Dithyramb and choral lyric are excluded for obvious reasons, as having no relevance to Roman life, and as eliciting little comment from Cicero¹⁴.

I may here enlarge a little upon some of the topics broached in some of the chapters. In discussing how Cicero might have defined poetry in chapter two, I examine the vexed question of the relationship of rhythm to the definition of poetry, the status of poetry as an *ars levis* in Ciceronian thought, as well as other issues. The same chapter places the Ciceronian ideas about the definition of poetry into historical perspective by tracing briefly the development of ancient attempts to define poetry. In chapter six, I focus among other things, on the Ciceronian identification of the grand style with the tragic and on the significance for the reconstruction of the Ciceronian idea of the 'tragic' of the various uses of the trag- words in their transferred senses. The development of these transferred senses among the Greeks is also examined in order to show the historical context in which Cicero himself used the trag- words in their transferred senses.

Chapter seven represents perhaps the most significant contribution of the thesis. Here among other things, it is argued that Aristotelian or Aristotle-influenced ideas about rhetorical ethos affected Cicero's understanding of comedy, and that this kind of assimilation of rhetorical ideas about ethos very closely resembles an established tradition in ancient criticism of speaking about the concern of comedy, in particular, the New Comedy, with ethos.

A picture emerges from the thesis of Cicero as literary critic and theorist which will confirm to us many things which we already expected to find about him in these capacities; and which will also provide the occasional surprise. The Cicero who, though not given to indulge in the utterance or enjoyment of explicit comic obscenities himself, is yet not the prude that ZILLINGER would have us believe him to have been; the Cicero who in his positive evaluation of comedy shows an affinity with a sophisticated ancient critical tradition based on the consideration of comedy as being concerned with ethos; the Cicero who entirely rejects the Democritean-Platonic ideas of poetic inspiration; the Cicero who unlike the Cicero of the Seneca anti-lyric fragment (ep. 49,5) does *not* spurn the lyric poets entirely – these are not aspects of the man that we either expected to see or that indeed have been presented before. Other sides of Cicero are more familiar to us: the conservative critic enamoured of rhetorician-style analysis based on forms and technique, the conservative Roman, the advocate of the *mos maiorum*, the fervent nationalist, the pragmatist, the rhetorician and orator, the champion of the active life and of participation

¹⁴ de orat. 3,185 (on the richness and greater 'licence' of metre in dithyramb); opt.gen. 1.

in the *res publica*: all these personae find a voice in Cicero's utterances on poetry. In the Cicero who, on the one hand, remained for the length of his life much occupied with poetry, with reading, criticising, quoting and writing it; and who, on the other hand, never read poetry with an eye for the aesthetic, literary and musical qualities that today we look for in poetry, but on the contrary, read it entirely from a rhetorician's perspective and assigned to poetry socio- and ethico-political purposes often most probably contrary to the poet's own: in this Cicero we recognise a very different kind of appreciation of poetry, quite unlike anything we in our age know or should ordinarily approve.

2. DEFINITIONS OF AND GENERAL NOTIONS ABOUT POETRY

*sit fas vestra mihi vulgare arcana per orbem
Pierides, penitusque sacros recludere fontes*

VIDA *de arte poet.* 1,1–2

Overview:

Introduction

- 2.1 earlier, ancient discussions of the differences between poetry and prose
- 2.2 Cicero's rejection of the widespread, ancient virtual identification of poetry & prose
- 2.3 Cicero's rejection of the 'rhythm alone' principle; *orat.* 68: what is the most important characteristic of poetry?
- 2.4 the abandonment of the 'written' / 'unwritten' scheme in Roman rhetorical theory
- 2.5 the sources of Cicero's ideas on prose style: the triumph of 'Isocratean' & 'Aristotelian' ways of describing the poetic
- 2.6 distinguishing characteristics of poetry identified by Cicero
- 2.7 rhythm and metre as distinguishing characteristics of poetry
- 2.8 poetry as one of the *artes mediocres*
- 2.9 poetry as an esoteric art, beyond the critical appreciation of the masses
- 2.10 similarities between the poetry and prose
- 2.11 the *levitas* of poetry

Summary

Introduction

As a man of letters and as one who was deeply interested in both Greek and Latin literature, who in his youth had a poet for a teacher¹, and who himself tried his hand at poetic composition, Cicero must have devoted not a little thought to a consideration of the nature of poetry. This chapter aims to explore the fundamental ideas that Cicero held about poetry as well as the ancient critical background and the other sources of influence behind these ideas. As with most of the evidence in the Ciceronian corpus demonstrating the orator's thought on poetry, the scattered testimonies for these ideas are of an incidental nature: it is usual to find an utterance of Cicero on poetry introduced merely as part of a

¹ Arch. 1; M. L. CLARKE: 'Cic. at school.' *G & R* 15 (1968) 19 suggests that Archias may have been C.'s grammaticus.

larger discussion of something other than poetry. The utterance serves merely to place into relief the distinguishing characteristics of another pursuit, such as oratory, philosophy or historiography. The result of this circumstance is that often we find Cicero's ideas on poetry presented only in a fragmentary or incomplete state: ideas which are capable of fuller development, receive nothing more than a fleeting treatment. It is our business in such cases to attempt to extrapolate further information either from other Ciceronian passages or from a critical tradition from which he may have been drawing. With either of these alternatives, but especially of course with the latter, there is ever present the danger of wrongly attributing to Cicero ideas that he would never have entertained. To minimise this danger, one must always test a given a reconstruction against several criteria: that it is in itself a logical, coherent, and natural inference from the germ idea; that it does not disagree, and preferably where it is possible, that it does agree, with other fundamental Ciceronian ideas on literary questions; that there is good evidence that the tradition upon which the reconstruction is based was known to, and drawn upon by, Cicero.

2.1 earlier, ancient discussions of the differences between poetry and prose

It will be expedient first to give a brief, if somewhat crude, sketch of the development of the theory of the 'poetic' among the ancient Greeks, since it is in the light of this tradition that we may better appreciate Cicero's own views on the 'poetic' and may more precisely determine how original – if at all – were his own contributions to the subject².

Among the Greeks the distinction between poetry and prose appears for the first time only relatively late³. There are various reasons for this, but chief among them must be reckoned the late origin of the prose genres themselves – there are no extant prose texts from before the fifth century⁴. When the Greeks become conscious of the differences,

² For more extensive discussions of the Greek idea of the 'poetic' and of the development of Greek stylistic theory in general with which we shall soon be concerned the reader may be referred to the works cited in the notes on this section.

³ The earliest distinction appears to be Gorg. fr. 11.9 DIELS-KRANZ (cf. CAROL G. THOMAS & E. K. WEBB 'From orality to rhetoric: an intellectual transformation.' in I. WORTHINGTON (ed.): *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*. London 1994, [3-25] 7, 10); other discussions include Strab. 1,2,6 Demetrius 1 ff. Quint. 10.1.28; lastly, on the whole subject of the differentia of poetry, see RUSSELL (1981) 13 & 149 f.; NORDEN: *Kunstprosa* 30 f., 883 ff.

⁴ On the other hand, while it is known that Anaximander wrote a philosophical treatise in prose around the middle of sixth century B.C., Strab. 1,2,6 proposes Cadmus (sic), Pherecydes (fl. c. 550 B.C.) and Hecataeus (late 6th c.) as the first prose writers. Cf. also Varr. in Isid. orig. I 38,2: *tam apud Graecos quam apud Latinos longe antiquiorem curam fuisse carminum quam prosae; omnia enim prius versibus condebantur, prosae autem studium sero viguit. primus apud Graecos Pherecydes Syrius soluta oratione scripsit, apud Romanos autem Appius Caecus adversus Pyrrhum solutam orationem primus exercuit*. Cf. NORDEN 32 f.

their findings are for the most part concerned with external features – metre above all, but also stylistic devices and elements. On the other hand, exhaustive treatments of the stylistic distinction between prose and poetry are rare – if not altogether non-existent –, nor is any consensus reached on the distinguishing stylistic characteristics of poetry. The obvious ‘verse principle’ alone is the one point on which the majority of the Greeks agreed. In contrast to this generally superficial treatment of the differences between poetry and prose, Aristotle, unique in so many respects, again stands out, for, not only does he treat of the stylistic differences between prose and poetry in some depth as we shall see⁵, but more importantly, as is well known, in the first chapters of the poetics, he rejects the verse principle as the defining quality of poetry, and, seeking more profoundly for a universal principle, he settles on that of *mimesis*⁶. Measured against this criterion, even such prose works as the Socratic dialogues might be considered poetry (poet. 1447b11) since they too are concerned with *mimesis*, while, on the other hand, scientific treatises such as those of Empedocles written in verse and wholly lacking in *mimesis* ought not to be considered poetry⁷.

It is hardly surprising that, given the rhetorical bias of much of ancient criticism, attempts to define the differences between prose and poetry which were not based on the verse principle were concerned largely with stylistic features. Furthermore, when we look at that part of such attempts concerned with the defining of the ‘poetic’ we will find that often this consists of little more than amalgamating all that one thought prose or, to be precise, oratorical prose, should not contain. The curious result of this was that some prose theorists such as Aristotle⁸, Alcidas⁹ and Isocrates¹⁰ associate the ‘poetic’ with bad prose; to describe prose as ‘poetic’ was to use the term in a derogatory sense¹¹.

Already with Aristotle himself we find a sharp distinction between prose and poetic style: in the rhet. 3,1 (1404a19 ff., esp. 28¹²) and twice in 3,2 (1404b4–5 & 1405a3 ff.).

⁵ That a large amount of space is devoted in what follows to Arist.’s views on poetic style surely requires no explanation in view of his profound importance in ancient literary theory.

⁶ On the originality of Arist.’s contribution, see esp. RUSSELL 13, 149.

⁷ Despite Arist.’s outstanding accomplishment in developing the *mimesis* theory in the poet., his treatment of poetic style in the same work curiously leaves much to be desired; certainly the treatment of prose style in the rhet. is far more extensive, as has been pointed out by S. HALLIWELL: *The Poet. of Arist.* Chapel Hill 1987, 160: ‘...it is perhaps impossible altogether to suppress the suspicion that many questions of poetic style simply do not interest Ar. or strike him as important. The treatise, after all, locates the core of the poet’s art in the design of large-scale structure (plot) not in the fineness of verbal texture or detail...’

⁸ So, for example, Arist. rhet. 3,3 1406a32.

⁹ *περὶ σοφ.* 2, 12.

¹⁰ The passage Ev. 9 ff., in which poetry is distinguished from good prose style, is regarded as being polemically directed against Alcidas’s ‘poetic’ prose. Cf. N. O’SULLIVAN: *Alcidas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory*. Hermes Einzelschriften 60: Stuttgart 1992, 51 f.

¹¹ Cf. O’SULLIVAN 49 f. I do not however agree with his interpretation of Isoc.’s boast about his *λέξις ποιητικωτέρα* in 15,47. On which, see Appendix I.

¹² *ἑτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις.*

Although the focus of these passages is really prose style, through Aristotle's comparison of this prose style with the poetic we are able readily to determine his views on the latter (the same procedure is of course equally possible with other critics).

i) The first thing that we learn about the poetic style is that it involves some departure from ordinary words and usage (1404a31 ff.): the tragedians' abandonment of some of the excesses of this style¹³ points to one of the original features¹⁴ of the poetic style, that is, the selection of elements that are *παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον*. This departure from the ordinary usage is a theme that Aristotle elaborates on again later in the rhet. and earlier in the poetics.

ii) Related to this departure from ordinary usage is poetry's more adorned and more elevated style than that of prose. At the beginning of rhet. 3,2 Aristotle discusses the *ἀρετή* of lexis. From a comparison with poet. 22 1458a18 (where the formula given for this *ἀρετή* is almost identical to that in the passage just cited from the rhet.)¹⁵ it emerges that this lexis is both prosaic and poetic. The formula given in the two respective passages insists on two qualities in the lexis as being productive of the *ἀρετή* of lexis: that the style be a) clear (*σαφής*)¹⁶ and b) not low (*μὴ ταπεινή*). Now clarity is produced by the use of usual words¹⁷ (*σαφὴ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια*: rhet. 1404b6), but if one uses ordinary words only, the resulting style will be low and unadorned. Therefore, one must use the types of exotic words that are enumerated in poet. 22 (the citation is Aristotle's own), but we shall defer an examination of these categories to another section. The use of exotic words, *τὰ ξενικά*¹⁸, refers to that departure from ordinary usage and usual words that we have discussed above (i) – so too the verb *ἐξάλλάττω*¹⁹ used in connexion with the *τὰ ξενικά* and appearing in each of the

¹³ In a desire more closely to approach everyday conversation, they have abandoned the tetrameter for the iambic, and things which were *παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον* with which they used to adorn their works. Note that even here, the tragedians' abandonment of elements *παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον* already implies a descent from a 'higher' to a 'lower' style: so rightly DESPINA MORAITOU *Aristot. über Dichter u. Dichtung*. Stuttgart-Leipzig 1994, 19; her whole discussion of 'Dichterische Lexis' (18 ff.) is necessary reading for anyone interested in the subject.

¹⁴ So he writes: ὅσα...οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμου.

¹⁵ In fact, Arist. was clearly thinking of this section of the poet. when he wrote rhet. 3,2 as is evident from his citation of that very section in rhet. 3,2 1404b8

¹⁶ The reason Arist. gives for the necessity of clarity in lexis is characteristic of his philosophical approach to literary theory (and of his teleological philosophy!): the *logos* is a kind of indication, so that unless it indicates clearly it does not accomplish its task: 1404b2–3. S. HALLIWELL: *Poet. of Ar.* London 1987, 161, reads more into this insistence on clarity: '...this [sc. clarity] reflects not just a sense of the functional character of ordinary speech, but also, and perhaps even more so, the bias of Ar.'s own interest towards philosophical lucidity and precision.'

¹⁷ Cf. Anaximenes 30,7 where *σαφήνεια* is associated with *κοινὰ ὀνόματα*. In the rhet. 3,2 1404b5–6, Arist. speaks mainly about nouns and verbs, but it is clear from later in the rhet., as also from the poet. 22 that other categories are included too.

¹⁸ rhet. 1404b11 διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον. poet. 1458a22: ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη.

¹⁹ Cf. AUGUSTYNIAK 35 on *λέξις ἐξηλλαγμένη*, who sees in orat. 97 a reference to that aspect of the grand style which consists of being *maxime a consuetudine alienum*.

passages cited respectively from the poetics and the rhetoric. Aristotle next tells us (rhet. 1404b8; poet. 1458a21) that exotic words and the altering of the language make the style elevated: not only is it *μὴ ταπεινή*, it is *σεμνή* or *σεμνοτέρα*²⁰. We should strive for exotic words because men are admirers of what is remote (*θαυμασται γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν*), and what is admirable gives us pleasure (*ἡδύ*)²¹. But if lexis in general should strive for this elevation, much more so should the lexis of poetry, for the style of poetry should be more elevated in conformity with its higher themes and characters (this statement adumbrates his later invocation of the *τὸ πρέπον* principle²² much beloved of the Peripatetics and others):

ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖ τοῦτο (sc. making τὴν διάλεκτον... ξένην),
καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖ (πλέον γὰρ ἐξέστηκε περὶ ἃ καὶ περὶ οὓς ὁ λόγος...) (1404b12–14).

The opposite, on the other hand, is true of prose, that is, that fewer foreign elements are to be used, because the themes of prose (oratory) are 'lower', are closer to everyday life: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῶ ἐλάττωσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων*.

iii) greater obscurity in poetry than in prose: for although we are told in poet. 22 1458a18 (as in rhet. 3,2 1404b2) that the excellence of lexis subsists in clarity, yet poetry, even as it has greater room for exotic elements than prose, so it can afford to be more obscure than prose, since it is exotic elements or the avoidance of ordinary words that destroys clarity (see above²⁴). Metaphor also can contribute to this obscurity²⁵. In this

²⁰ Cf. Hermog. id. p.292,1 SP. = p.248,9 f. R. καὶ μὴν καὶ τροπικαὶ λέξεις σεμναὶ καὶ διωγκωμέναι.

²¹ Hence, it is to be noted, Arist. provides a carefully reasoned defence for the 'pleasure-principle' of poetry that will be discussed below.

²² Other references to *τὸ πρέπον* may be found in the same chapter: 1404b4–5 *πρέπουσα λέξεις*; b17 *πρέπον*; b15 *ἀπρεπέστερον* and in 3,7 1408a10 is found perhaps the best known of all references to *τὸ πρέπον* as a principle of style: Cf. BRINK, *Proleg.* 96 f.; 228 ff.

²³ Note also how *τὸ πρέπον* is appealed to earlier in 1404b4–5: the contrast between prose and poetry here again points implicitly to the higher elevation of the latter: prose style should be neither low, nor above the dignity (of the subject: *ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα*), but fitting (*πρέπουσα*); poetic style on the other hand, is not low, but neither is it fitting for < a > speech (*οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ*). By the absence of the *μῆτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα* in the description of the poetic style we are surely meant to infer that the poetic style is *above* the dignity of prose-subject matter. MORAITOU's paraphrase (20) of *ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα*, 'über die Maßen' is inaccurate: cf. LSJ s.v. *ἀξίωμα* 4 'worth, quality'; better still is COPE who prefers to render it as 'above the true valuation of the subject'.

²⁴ Cf. also 1410b12 *αἰ...γλῶτται ἀγνώτες*.

²⁵ And yet, Arist. states in rhet. 3,2 1405a8 f.: καὶ τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἢ μεταφορά. There is no contradiction here, for he is speaking in this passage of the use of metaphor in prose in which the demand for clarity is greater than that in poetry. The metaphors in prose, then, are to be *clearer* than those in poetry, that is, they are not to be inappropriate nor drawn too far afield (cf. the demand in 1405a10 f. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀρμοστούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπρεπὲς φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παρ' ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι; and 1410b32 εἰς ἔχρη μεταφορὰν, καὶ ταύτην μῆτ' ἄλλοτριαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν...; 1406b6 μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς). They should produce immediate or relatively swift recognition and understanding in the hearer (what is said about lexis and enthymemes in 1410b20 ff. applies equally, of course, to metaphors). COPE ad rhet. 3,2 1405a8, however, takes what is said about metaphor and *τὸ σαφές* in another way, believing the latter term to be used here in the sense of 'perspicuity', 'vividness' rather than clarity. He cites Demetr. eloc. 82 as example of this usage. Thus neither on this interpretation does Arist. contradict himself on the subject of metaphor.

connexion, poet. 22 1458a24 ff. is of the utmost importance. Aristotle here speaks about excesses in the use of foreign or exotic elements. The excessive use of metaphor we are told will produce *αἴνιγμα*: and this, although a fault, again points to the natural tendency of poetry towards obscurity.

Under one or more of the three heads listed above, each of the four frigid classes of 'poeticisms' condemned in rhet. 3,3 1405b34 ff. will fall. Let us look more closely at this chapter. The frigidity, τὰ ψυχρά, which is condemned in prose is said to arise from one of four causes: compound words (διπλᾶ ὀνόματα); exotic words which require explanation (γλῶτται); long, untimely and frequent epithets (ἐπίθετα μακρὰ ἢ ἄκαιρα ἢ πυκνά); and strong metaphors (μεταφοραί: cf. 1407b31 f. where he says that these last two categories can contribute to oratorical ὄγκος provided that one is careful to avoid their naturally inherent 'poeticism', τὸ ποιητικόν). In the next chapter 3,4 (1406b20 ff.) he adds the excessive use of similes to this list. Repeatedly does Aristotle associate these categories, or the excessive use of them, with poetry or a 'poetic' style: so, for example 1406a6 πάντα ταῦτα γὰρ ποιητικά...; 1406a12 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρόκειται...; 1406b10 ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν...; 1406b24 f. χρήσιμον δὲ ἢ εἰκὼν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις δὲ ποιητικὸν γάρ.²⁶

Under the second heading we saw that Aristotle mentions in rhet. 3,2 1404b6–9 a number of exotic words which render the style μὴ ταπεινὴ and κεκοσμημένη and he referred us to the poet. (21 1457b1 ff.) for the exact enumeration of these categories. In that last-mentioned passage, Aristotle lists eight categories of ὄνομα²⁷, although he says nothing in this passage of the quality or qualities which these impart to the style. These categories are: 1. κύριον 2. γλῶττα 3. μεταφορά 4. κόσμος 5. πεποιημένον 6. ἐπεκτεταμένον 7. ὑψηλόμενον 8. ἐξηλλαγμένον. If then, we may assume that all these are types of words which may legitimately be used in poetry, it is possible, from a comparison with the

The distinction between poetic and prose metaphors is insisted upon in several places. In 3,3 Arist. censures metaphors which are inappropriate on account of their being too solemn and 'tragic' (1406b7 διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν), and others which are unclear from being drawn too far afield (ἄσαφεῖς δὲ, ἂν πόρρωθεν' cf. de orat. 3,163 *videndum est ne longe simile sit ductum*, also Brut. 274 with DOUGLAS ad loc.): these he says are too poetic (ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν). In 3,4 1406b24 f., after describing simile as a species of metaphor, Arist. declares that simile should be used sparingly since it is poetic. Lastly, in 3,10 1410b36 he refers (cf. 1405a5 f.) to his division of metaphor into four types that is given in poet. 21 1457b6 ff. His statement that, of these, the type κατὰ ἀναλογίαν is the most highly esteemed, seems to imply that this is the type of metaphor best suited to prose, whereas the other three are less appropriate (the demand made in 1405a11 that metaphors should be ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον is probably not a reference to the type κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, but to being in *proportion* to the subject matter).

²⁶ Cf. 1407b31 f. καὶ μεταφορὰ δηλοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἐπιδέτοις, εὐλαβούμενον τὸ ποιητικόν.

²⁷ Why Arist. restricts himself here to a discussion principally of nouns, ὀνόματα (although some of the examples of metaphors in ch. 21 involve examples of verb metaphors) is not clear. Possibly the term ὄνομα is here used in the more general sense of 'words', *pace* HALLIWELL (1987) 159 who thinks it must mean 'noun', appealing to ch. 20 (1457a10). On the contrary, in the latter passage, ὄνομα is not merely 'noun', but also 'includes adjectives, pronouns, and probably adverbs' (LUCAS ad loc.). In any event, HALLIWELL abandons his earlier position in his Loeb ed. (1995) of the poet. where, to the translation of ὄνομα as 'noun' he adds this footnote: 'The term covers adjs. too: cf. 57a16'.

corresponding text in the rhet., further to determine which are those that Aristotle regards as more, or exclusively, poetic. In that passage from the rhet. just cited, we are admonished to use sparingly and in few places three types: 1. γλῶτται 2. διπλᾶ ὀνόματα 3. πεποιημένα. Now two of these are mentioned in the eight-fold division from the poetics, that is, the first and the third; διπλᾶ ὀνόματα however appears to lack a counterpart. Furthermore, we are told that three types are pre-eminently suited to prose: 1. τὸ κύριον 2. τὸ οἰκεῖον 3. μεταφορά²⁸. Again, one of these, οἰκεῖον has no corresponding type in the eight-fold division from the poetics, although, inasmuch as its meaning is opposed to that of metaphor (cf. LSJ s.v. III 3), we are probably justified in regarding the κύριον and the οἰκεῖον from this list in the rhet. as forming a group corresponding to the κύριον category in the list from the poetics. I think it equally safe to assume that the last three categories in the list of eight are largely or exclusively poetic: the explanations and examples given of these in 1457b35 ff. show that these are morphological aberrations from the common usage, and therefore, inasmuch as they are strictly παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον, they are inadmissible in prose. With regard to κόσμος about whose precise nature we are ignorant²⁹, Aristotle clearly excludes it in 1404b31 from among those types of words that are χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. Yet on the other hand, as Aristotle does not explicitly advise against its use (as he does against that of γλῶτται, διπλᾶ ὀνόματα and πεποιημένα), it may be inferred that it falls into an intermediate category, that is to say, it is neither as alien to prose as the first triad, nor as germane or as serviceable to prose as the second triad. This is confirmed by the earlier demand in 3,2 1404b7 that the lexis should be μὴ ταπεινὴ δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένη³⁰. Lastly, in 3,2 Aristotle singles out another type of word which is particularly

²⁸ τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόνα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν.

²⁹ This is the only category in poet. 21 which is not discussed apart from its inclusion in the list of eight categories in 1457b2, hence Arist.'s understanding of the term is uncertain. Apart from 3,2 1404b7, κόσμος is spoken of in connexion with prose in 3,14 1415b38, but here Arist. uses the term not in reference to individual words, but in an abstract sense, that is, 'ornamentation' rather than, 'ornament'. An instance of when κόσμος is out of place in prose is given in 3,7 (1408a14) ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν εἰάν...μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος. It is significant that in both these texts, it is implied that a lack of κόσμος (esp. when, as in 1408a12 the discussion requires it inasmuch as it is περὶ εὐλόγων) will lead to the appearance of careless, extempore composition (αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγεται 1408a12; αὐτοκάβδαλα φαίνεται 1415b38). κοσμεῖν is used in connexion with prose metaphors in 3,2 1405a14; it is contrasted with ψέγειν and therefore it is not, *pace* LUCAS ad poet. 1457b33, analogous with the other cited Aristotelian uses of κόσμος, but rather more like *ornare* in the sense *honorem, laudes alicui habere*. More significant is the association of κοσμεῖν and κόσμοι with the abnormal diction of the poets in 3,1 1404a34 and Isoc. 9,9. Now, 'πότνια συκῇ' at 1408a16 appears from the context to be an example of κόσμος applied to an εὐτελὲς ὄνομα, and therefore ornamental epithets of the kind the poetry commonly uses (cf. 3,3) must be at least one kind of κόσμος. LUCAS ad poet. 1457b33, thinks this only one type of epithet, and cites an alleged fr. of Theophrastus' περὶ λέξεως (Griech. Pap. der Hamburger Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek 1954, p. 36: pap.46-59) where compound and other types of epithets are mentioned. It seems to me likely that κόσμος is used of individual words in two senses: 1) in a general sense of all kinds of ornamental βοηθήματα (thus Isoc. 9,9; cf. rhet. 1405a7) 2) in the specific sense of epithets, of all types. On this interpretation, ὄνομα in poet. 1457b1 will mean not 'noun', but 'word'. See also n. 17 above.

³⁰ Arist. speaks of the prose stylist using κόσμος elsewhere: cf. rhet. 1404b7. 3,14 (1415b38), and it is associated with the poets in 3,1 (1404a34).

suited, (literally ‘useful’) to poets: *συνωνυμία*³¹, though this is, as is well known, a device much beloved of ancient oratory (cf. Quint. 9,3,45) and Aristotle perhaps only means to suggest here that poetry has a greater tendency to *variatio* than is ordinarily admissible in prose. The following table summarises our findings about poetic words in Aristotle:

Aristotle’s categories of poetic and prose words

poetic		prose
1. κύριον / οἰκειῖον]	most suitable for prose
2. μεταφορά / εἰκῶν		
3. κοσμός]	admissible in prose
4. συνωνυμῖαι		
5. πεποιημένον]	rare or disapproved of in prose
6. διπλᾶ ὀνόματα		
7. γλῶτται		
8. ἐπίθετα μακρὰ ἢ ἄκαιρα ἢ πυκνά		
9. ἐπεκτεταμένον]	inadmissible in prose
10. ὑφηρεημένον		
11. ἐξηλλαγμένον		

The table has its limitations; it neglects the distinction between ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’, that is to say, between prose and poetic, metaphors that has already been noticed.

* * *

In Ev. 9–11, Isocrates discusses the differences between poetry and prose³². While still insisting on metre and rhythm as defining qualities of poetry, he also recognises other distinguishing qualities of poetry related to style; indeed his list of poetic stylistic elements somewhat resembles Aristotle’s list of ‘frigid’ poeticisms in rhet. 3,3³³: Isocrates attributes

³¹ Arist. appears to have discussed synonyms in the poet. also, as we are informed by Simp. in cat. 36,13 KALBFLEISCH = fr. III KASSEL: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀρ. ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς συνώνυμα εἶπεν εἶναι ὧν πλείω μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα λόγος δὲ ὁ αὐτός...

³² We shall have occasion to discuss this passage again when we look at C.’s orat. 66–68.

³³ So O’SULLIVAN 51 & 127, though he insists on a much closer similarity than I would allow. In the first place, the category διπλᾶ ὀνόματα is perhaps neither the only type corresponding to Isoc.’s καινὰ ὀνόματα nor ‘the most obvious way of making a new word’; in fact, in the very passage cited by O’SULLIVAN 51 n. 157, namely, ‘Demetr.’ eloc. 98, this is not the first, but the third or fourth type of neologism mentioned. Likewise in Varr. ling. 5,7 the *confingere* type of neologism is not the first type of neologism mentioned (cf. also de orat. 3,154 where it is stated that there are two types of neologisms: one with *coniunctio* and the other without). On the other hand, not all διπλᾶ ὀνόματα are in fact new, and many may belong to ordinary usage even if the very fact

to the poets the use of a much greater range of stylistic devices and ornaments: not only the lexis of everyday usage, but also exotic, foreign and new words and metaphor are at their disposal³⁴. For the modern reader of poetry (at least of poetry before T. S. Eliot!³⁵) the stylistic elements identified by Isocrates and Aristotle are recognisable and familiar. If we are not surprised by them, it is perhaps because we forget that there were vastly different views of the 'poetic' in antiquity. For apart from a desire to meet the exigencies of the occasion, a polemical motivation, as in much of Isocrates' writings, is probably also involved in the passage. Alcidas, Isocrates' opponent, not only displayed in his own speeches (or at least in the *περὶ σοφιστῶν*)³⁶ such stylistic elements as Isocrates complains of, but conceived of the 'poetic' in a completely different way to the Isocratean /Aristotelian models. As one scholar has written, 'both Alcidas and Isocrates defined

of their *δίπλωσις* tends toward poeticism, and indeed to the 'sprachliche Übermäßige' of the dithyramb (cf. poet. 22 1459a8 f.). So rightly MORAITOU 23 f.; who also points (25) to the real Aristotelian parallel to the *καινά*, namely, the *πεποιημένα ὀνόματα* ('neugebildete Wörter') of rhet. 3,2 1404b28–30 and poet. 21 1457b33 f. (*πεποιημένον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής*). Interestingly, she equates the verb *ποιεῖν* (cf. 1458a7) with *fingeren* which recalls the *finxerit* of Varr.'s ling. 5,7 cited above.

Furthermore, Isoc.'s *ξένα* possibly refers more specifically to words truly foreign or peculiar to another dialect with which poets like to augment their diction (cf. LUCAS ad poet. 1458a22), whereas Arist.'s *γλῶτται* may refer to foreign and dialect words or archaic and obsolete words – hence *γλῶτται* are said in rhet. 1406b2 f. and poet. c.22 1459a9 f. to be best suited to epic, as MORAITOU 25 points out. (Dion. Hal. comp. verb. 25 p. 124,13 ff. U.-R., who in discussing *ὀνομασία ποιητική* also distinguishes between *γλωττηματικά* and *ξένα* and *τροπικά* and *πεποιημένα*). Admittedly, Arist. appears to use the terms *γλῶτται* and *ξένα* interchangeably (cf. 1406a7 and 1408b11), but this may only indicate Arist.'s wider application of the term *ξένα* (see again LUCAS ad poet. 1458a22). Again, I think that Arist.'s *ἐπίθετα* may be said to 'be covered in the [Isocratean] phrase *πᾶσιν τοῖς εἶδεσιν διαποικίλαι*' only in the most general way. Isoc.'s term, unlike Arist.'s, is somewhat vague, and could refer to *any* kind of ornamentation at all. The point of the phrase is to reinforce Isoc.'s general thesis that the poets are unrestricted in the range of stylistic devices at their disposal. The fact also that Arist. in the next chapter (3,4) adds similes (or at any rate, the excessive use of them) to his list of poeticisms again indicates that the correspondence between Arist.'s list and Isoc.'s is not perhaps not as close as O'SULLIVAN suggests.

But the most serious objection to a notion of close similarity between Ev. 9–11 & rhet. 3,3 is the profound discrepancy in the respective treatments of metaphor. For while Arist. in the latter passage condemns certain classes of metaphors only (*ἀπρεπεῖς αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον...αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν* etc.), Isoc. clearly claims that metaphor is wholly poetic. Whether or no he sincerely means this, is for our present purpose, irrelevant. In any event, O'SULLIVAN's claim that 'it is quite likely that Arist. took them [sc. the four 'poetic' points in Ev. 9] straight from Isoc.' appears in the light of the foregoing consideration highly implausible. Arist. developed his own distinctive theories of prose and poetic style, and at the core of each of these theories is metaphor. Cf. KENNEDY (1963) 104–6.

³⁴ The main difference between Isoc. & Arist. is the narrower boundaries within which Isoc. defines prose as falling, as against the broader scope of Arist.'s definition of prose. Isoc. states that none of these stylistic devices, nor rhythm and metre are part of the prose stylist's equipment. On the sincerity of Isoc.'s views as presented in Ev. 9 f., see Appendix I below.

³⁵ Yeats's notorious judgement of Eliot (*The Oxf. Book of Mod. Verse* xxi f.) is interesting in this connexion: '...his own art seems grey, cold, dry. He is an Alexander Pope, working without apparent imagination, producing his effects by a rejection of all rhythms and metaphors used by the more popular romantics rather than by the discovery of his own, this rejection giving his work an unexaggerated plainness that has the effect of novelty...he has the rhythmical flatness of *The Essay on Man*... in *The Wasteland*, amid much that is moving in symbol and imagery there is much monotony of accent... Nor can I put the Eliot of these poems among those that descend from Shakespeare and the translators of the Bible. I think of him as a satirist rather than a poet. Once only does that early work speak in the great manner...' [my italics]

³⁶ See J. VAHLEN: 'Der Rhetor Alkidamas.' *Sitzb. Wien. Akad.* 43 (1863) 491–528, esp. 509 f. where he provides examples of Arist.'s *δίπλᾳ ὀνόματα* & *γλῶτται* (e.g. *δυσανάληπτος* [19], *δυσεπικούρητος* [21], *ὁμοδραμεῖν* [7] etc.) and metaphor (cf. *οἰκονόμος ἡδονῆς* criticised by Arist. in 1406a27 and *βιοῦ κάτοπτρον* in

“poetic” prose by the other’s practice³⁷. For Alcidas, it is not any particular set of stylistic devices that defines the qualities of the ‘poetic’, but rather the elucubration and polish applied to a written speech, as opposed to the spontaneous, extempore oratory of which he was the champion³⁸. He declares in the *περὶ σοφιστῶν* that the writers of speeches are more worthy to be called poets than sophists (2) and that written speeches are more like poems than speeches (12). O’SULLIVAN 49 rightly locates the principal criterion of the Alcidas definition of the ‘poetic’ in the key term *ἀκριβεία*³⁹, ‘precision in the use of words’. In Isocratean rhetoric the term is associated, among other things, with *καθαρότης* (cf. Isocr. 5,4), ‘purity of diction’ – in other words, the avoidance of unusual words such as the *γλῶτται* and *διπλᾶ ὀνόματα* condemned by Aristotle in Rh. 3,3 and the *ξένα* and *καινὰ ὀνόματα* condemned by Isocrates in Ev. 9. This *ἀκριβεία* is coupled in sect. 16 of the *περὶ σοφιστῶν* with *ῥυθμός*, and accordingly it has also been suggested with some plausibility that for Alcidas the use of rhythm by speech writers such as Isocrates also contributed to the ‘poetic’ character of their oratory⁴⁰.

Greek theorists in the preceding generation – if Gorgias may be taken as representative of them – did not distinguish sharply between prose and poetic style⁴¹. The teacher of Alcidas and Isocrates, for example, states (Hel. 9) that all poetry is simply speech containing metre: *τὴν ποιήσιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον*⁴². NORDEN, *Kunstprosa* 883 ff., observed that this virtual identification of prose and poetic styles in fact plagued much of ancient theory even after the clarifications of Aristotle⁴³ and

1406b12 f. have, respectively, parallels in *ταμιεύεσθαι* [23] and *ὥσπερ ἐν κατοπτρῳ* [32]); and O’SULLIVAN 36 ff.

³⁷ O’SULLIVAN 51. Cf. also R. M. ROSEN’s review of the last mentioned work, *Bryn Mawr CR* 4.4.12, paragraph beginning with ‘Chapter II focuses in particular...’

³⁸ That Isoc. laboured much over his speeches he admits himself (4,14. 5,84). Quint. 10,4,4 informs us that he spent ten years in composing the Panegyricus! Isoc. also admits himself to being devoted (at least in his younger days) to *ἀκριβεία* and to being *φιλόπονος*: see 4,11. 5,4. 155. 12,3. 11. 15,11 & esp. 9,73. Cf. also O’SULLIVAN 44.

³⁹ Alcid. attributes this quality to written speeches in numerous places in the *περὶ σοφ.* 11, 13, 14, 16, 25, 33 & 34: cf. O’SULLIVAN 44. It is significant for the identification of Alcid.’s ‘written’ category with the *λέξεις γραφικῆς* of Arist. rhet. 1413b and the superior (epideictic) style of oratory praised by Isoc. in 4,11 that both Arist. and Isoc. attribute *ἀκριβεία* to their respective categories. Cf. QUADLBAUER 61, 64; KENNEDY: *HSPH* 62 (1957) 98; O’SULLIVAN 11.

⁴⁰ O’SULLIVAN 49.

⁴¹ THOMAS & WEBB 7.

⁴² Gorgias at any rate might have pleaded in own defence that this theory corresponded to his own practice, since he appears consciously to have cultivated a poetic prose (as may be seen from his Hel.); Arist. rhet. 1404a25–26 singles him out for being among those who developed a poetic prose style: *διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου*. For a similar ‘mechanische Auffassung der Poesie’ (KROLL ad Brut. 66), cf. also Marcellinus vit. Thuc. 41 who rejects the opinion of some that historiography is a species of poetry. The lack of metre is for Marcellinus the decisive factor: *καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι ποιητικῆς, δὴλον ἐξ ὧν οὐχ ὑποπίπτει μέτρῳ τινί*. Posidonius’ definition of *ποίημα* in his *περὶ λέξεως* (Diog. Laert. 7,60) *ποίημα δὲ ἐστὶν...λέξις ἑμμετρος ἢ ἔνρυθμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα* is not much of an improvement on Gorgias. On the meaning of *ποίημα*, see F. H. SANDBACH: ‘*Lucreti poemata* and the poet’s death.’ *CR* 54 (1940) 75 f.

⁴³ Arist. attacks this view in rhet. 3,1 1404a26 ff.

Isocrates. He cites among others an infamous passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, de comp. verb. 25 (= p. 122,14–16 U.-R.) in which it is shown that the best prose is poetic (or resembles poetry), and the best poetry rhetorical (πῶς γίνεται λέξις ἄμετρος ὁμοία κάλῳ ποίηματι ἢ μέλει, καὶ πῶς ποίημα ἢ μέλος πεζῇ λέξει καλῇ παραπλήσιον) – such a use of the concept of the ‘poetic’ is diametrically opposed to that of Aristotle and Alcidamas among whom, as we have already seen, ‘poetic’ is used in referring to prose, in a derogatory sense. One might also cite ‘Demetrius’ 215 who does not hesitate to call Ctesias a poet, since he is a ‘craftsman of vividness’, and also Strabo 1,2,6 who describes Homer as a master of rhetoric and denies that the φράσις of poetry differs fundamentally from that of rhetoric; for him artistic prose (ὁ πεζὸς λόγος, ὃ γε κατεσκευασμένος) is, as for Gorgias, merely poetry without metre, or an imitation of poetry (μίμημα τοῦ ποιητικοῦ).

We have already observed that the rhetorical bias of ancient literary theory inclined it to define the ‘poetic’ in purely formal and stylistic terms. The development of the concept of the ‘poetic’ is more closely tied to ancient Greek stylistic theory in two other, perhaps more important, ways. The first of these we have already alluded to, namely, the division of oratorical style into the ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ (or ‘spoken’ or ‘extemporaneous’) styles. The terminology for these styles is not fixed in Alcidamas⁴⁴, but his division ‘written’/‘extempore’ more or less corresponds to Aristotle’s in rhet. 3,12 (1413b4) according to which the one is called the λέξις γραφικὴ, the other, the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ⁴⁵. The second division, which is intimately related to the first, is the originally less explicit division into the ‘grand’ and ‘thin’ styles, a division which already appears – even before the rhetorical discussions – in poetic criticism⁴⁶, namely in the celebrated ἀγών between Aeschylus and

⁴⁴ He in fact prefers more concrete expressions such as ‘writing’ (τὸ γράφειν 3, 5) and ‘speaking’ (τὸ λέγειν 5), ‘the one who practises extempore speaking well’ (ὁ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παρὰντίκα καλῶς αὐτοῖς [sc. τοῖς λόγοις] χρώμενος) and ‘the one who devotes his efforts to writing’ (ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ γράφειν τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενος 8) etc. This is not to deny the unusually greater frequency of abstract expression in Alcid.’s style (cf. O’SULLIVAN 32 ff.), but it is obvious that such expressions as ‘writing’ and ‘speaking’ (verbal nouns in the Gk.) are more direct, more tangible than ‘written style’ and ‘unwritten’ or ‘extempore style’.

⁴⁵ This fundamental agreement between Arist. and Alcid. on this point is rightly insisted upon by O’SULLIVAN 46 with n. 138. Isoc. also to all intents and purposes follows this dichotomy between the ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ styles, even if he does not have specific terms for these: cf. again, O’SULLIVAN 11, 43, 48 f. and esp. 54 ff. & QUADLBAUER 61 who recognises a relationship between Alcid.’s λόγος γεγραμμένος / λόγος αὐτοσχεδιαστικός dichotomy and the two styles discussed by Isoc.

⁴⁶ In this connexion, one is reminded of KENNEDY (1957) 94 who takes the controversial view that the distinction of the three styles originates not in rhetorical theory, but in poetics. He bases this view chiefly on the assumption that the theory of the three styles ‘serves primarily an analytical purpose’ (the common perspective of poetic theory which is ‘most often concerned with evaluation of existing poetry’) whereas rhetoric always has ‘a primarily educational purpose’. While the chief texts elucidating the theory of the three styles such as rhet. Her. 4,8,11 and the orat. 102 do make use of analysis of existing oratory (often unsuccessfully applied, as HUBBELL (1966) argues), surely one might also equally view the citations from various types of oratory as mere *exempla*. The prescriptive character of these treatments of the theory of the three styles is always at the fore. Quint.’s dissatisfaction (12,10,66) with the tripartite system points to another problem with KENNEDY’s ‘analytical’ theory. Quint. seems to suggest that the tripartite system is not based on true experience of oratory, but rather is a false theory, arbitrarily divided into three categories.

Euripides in Aristophanes' *ranae* (830 ff.)⁴⁷. In later ancient literary theory the division is of course more explicitly enunciated and more or less established terminology⁴⁸ (with variants, of course) comes into use. Sometimes, furthermore, as is well known, the division is expanded into a tripartite (as in the system whose origin is sometimes attributed to Theophrastus⁴⁹) or into a fourfold division (as in 'Demetrius' 36⁵⁰). O'SULLIVAN rightly argues that whatever division is favoured by a given ancient critic, the bipartite system of 'grand' and 'thin' styles always survives, and often lies behind or co-exists with the other tripartite or fourfold schemes⁵¹. This stylistic dichotomy is indeed one of the fundamental principles of the ancient critics, and it is one of the many points on which ancient literary and rhetorical theory was remarkably – if not absolutely – united⁵². That the bipartite scheme was the fundamental and the most enduring of the stylistic divisions is proven even by the explicit testimony of the ancient critics themselves. Hence although 'Demetrius' 36 gives a fourfold division, he informs us that some critics believe that there are only two styles, the *χαρακτήρ μεγαλοπρεπής* and the *χαρακτήρ ἰσχνός*⁵³. 'Demetrius' further seems to imply that there is some truth in this because these two styles alone cannot be mixed, but on the contrary, *ὥσπερ ἀνθέστατον καὶ ἀντίκεισθον ἐναντιωτάτω*. Dionysius de comp. verb. 21 (p. 95,14 ff. U.-R.) is unsure in what the middle style consists and his difficulties in describing it reflect the fact that the middle style is, at least for him, the least developed part of the stylistic theory⁵⁴. Many have also pointed out that although Cicero increasingly favoured a tripartite scheme and ultimately abandoned in the composition of the orator the

⁴⁷ So RUSSELL 132 f.; GRUBE (1965) 26; also O'SULLIVAN 8 f. (with a detailed analysis of the Aristophanic language used to describe the 'grand' style of Aeschylus and the 'thin' style of 'Euripides'); 61. O'SULLIVAN 5 f., 16, 20 f. & 106 ff. furthermore correctly argues for the unity of Greek poetic and rhetorical criticism in the fifth century (and perhaps even later), especially in the case of Aristoph. (cf. the association posited even in antiquity between Gorg. & Aesch. on the one hand (= 'grand' style) and Eurip. & Prodicus on the other (= 'thin' style), on which, see again O'SULLIVAN 20 f.).

⁴⁸ *Pace* Dion. Hal. comp. 21 p. 95,14 f. U.-R. *ἐγὼ μέντοι κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν οὐκ ἔχων αὐτὰς προσαγορεύσαι ὡς ἀκατονομάστους...*

⁴⁹ Dion. Hal. Dem 3 [132,3–6 U.-R.]; cf. DOUGLAS (1966) xxxiv & *Eranos* 55 (1957) 19 ff.; RUSSELL (1981), 138; A. KÖRTE: 'ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ.' *Hermes* 64 (1929) 80; on the controversy over this attribution, see esp. QUADLBAUER (1958) 64 with n. 86. HENDRICKSON *AJPh* 26 (1905) 268 & 270 strangely awards the author of the rhet. Her. (4,8,11) the distinction of being 'the first writer to present the doctrine of the three styles'; in *AJPh* 25 (1904) 125–46 he attacks the Theophrastian attribution Cf. HUBBELL *YCS* 19 (1966) 184. A non-Theophrastian provenance of the doctrine is also favoured by SCHMID *RhM* 49 (1894) 157; J. STROUX: *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*. Diss. Strassburg 1912, 93 & 104; ATKINS I 156.

⁵⁰ Cf. RUSSELL (1981) 137 who gives references to a few other ancient testimonies for the fourfold scheme.

⁵¹ Cf. RUSSELL (1981) 135.

⁵² The relative unity of ancient lit. theory is indeed one of the principal themes of O'SULLIVAN's book. (cf. 6 f.).

⁵³ Even modern critics have felt the tripartite scheme to be problematic: cf. DOUGLAS (1957) 20: 'M. L. CLARKE and S.F. BONNER have drawn attention to the unsatisfactory features of the classification, and the difficulties caused by the doctrine of the Middle Style in particular... it looks more like an awkward survival which outlived its original purpose and usefulness...'

⁵⁴ *ἦν* [sc. *τὴν τρίτην*] *ὅπως ποτὲ γίνεσθαι φαίην ἂν, ἔγωγε ἀπορῶ καὶ 'δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέχειαν εἰπεῖν', εἴτε κατὰ στέρεσιν τῶν ἄκρων ἑκατέρας εἴτε κατὰ μίξιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον εἰκάσαι τὸ σαφές*. Cf. also Proclus in Photius Bibliotheca 239 & HUBBELL (1966) 185.

bipartite scheme, in the earlier⁵⁵ rhetorica he often favours the latter, as for example in Brut. 201–256. Lastly, Quintilian 12,10,66 seems sceptical about the usefulness of the tripartite division: for him, there are basically two poles (or three, if one prefers) with an infinite number of styles on either side of each.

Now the theoreticians' development of one end of this stylistic spectrum, the grand style, gave further, if not initial, impetus to the evolution of the concept of 'poetic prose' and subsequently of the 'poetic'. The affinity between the 'poetic' and the 'grand' style⁵⁷ with its tendency towards *pathos*, with its preference for rhythm, for strong metaphors, for the frequent use of exotic words, compound words, newly-coined words, and other forms of ornamental exuberance, seems obvious and natural to the modern student. Given the likelihood that among the Greeks primitive stylistic divisions arose before clear formulations of the distinction between prose and poetry, it is understandable that the affinity should have been recognised by them at a relatively late date. The former circumstance perhaps also partly explains why the later allusions to the 'poetic' in the formulations of the 'grand' style are at best, fleeting, abrupt and irregular⁵⁸.

In any event, the connexion between the 'grand' style and the 'poetic' is already implicit, or the very least, germinal, in Aristotle. We have already seen above that he insists that the lexis of poetry should be not only *μὴ ταπεινή*, but also, in conformity with its 'higher' themes and characters, even more elevated than that of prose. The connexion is also hinted at in other ways. For example, the *λέξις ἀγωνιστική* of rh. 3,12 which basically corresponds to the 'pathos' style or the 'grand' style of later rhetoric⁵⁹ is defined in terms similar to those used of Aristotle's 'poetic' style (associated with Gorgias⁶⁰ and Alcidamas) which is described earlier in book 3, especially chapters 1–3. The decisive point for the connexion

⁵⁵ The chronological development of C.'s rhetorical thought is neglected by QUADLBAUER 88 n. 244, hence O'SULLIVAN 13 n. 55 is somewhat misleading in appealing to the latter, since in the orator, with which O'SULLIVAN's argument is concerned on p. 13, the bipartite is altogether abandoned in favour of the tripartite division.

⁵⁶ See DOUGLAS (1966) xxxiv and ad 202; also article of the same: *Eranos* 55 (1957) 22 f. It is interesting to note that in connexion with C., HUBBELL (1966) argues that the Roman struggles in orat. 102 (despite his proposal of the speeches Caecin., Manil. and Rabir.perd. as examples of the three styles) to find true representatives among his speeches of three styles! While initially questioning the existence of the middle style, HUBBELL later concedes the three style theory to C., but denies that C. was capable of writing in three styles as C. himself claims. According to HUBBELL's intricate analysis based on C.'s own definitions of the three styles, while an attribution of the grand style to one of C.'s orations is not problematic, Caecin. and Manil. really belong to middle style: 'For all his trying ... C. could not be a plain or simple orator.' (186)

⁵⁷ On this connexion, see O'SULLIVAN 9 n. 46, citing AUGUSTYNIAC 42–4 on the *ποιητικὸν κάλλος*.

⁵⁸ The other part of the explanation is of course the desire in representing the grand style in a positive manner to eschew the stigma of 'poeticism' and 'frigidity'.

⁵⁹ So rightly O'SULLIVAN 12, 41.

⁶⁰ It is significant that Gorg. is associated by Arist. (and others! – cf. Philost. v. soph. I 9 *περιεβάλετο δὲ καὶ ποιητικὰ ὀνόματα ὑπὲρ κόσμου καὶ σεμνότητος*) with the 'poetic' style. For Gorg. himself claims as his own the psychagogic *logos* of the poets with its power to arouse the powerful emotions – fear, pity, grief (cf. Hel. 8,14 & QUADLBAUER 59) – and this again points to a germinal connexion between the 'grand style' and the 'poetic'.

between the λέξις ἀγωνιστική and the unnamed 'poetic' style is the common element of πάθος. For one of the two species of the λέξις ἀγωνιστική is said to require πάθος, while earlier in 3,7 (1408b12), the same elements which are attributed to the 'poetic' style, that is to say, the διπλᾶ ὀνόματα, ἐπίθετα and γλῶτται [= ξένα] of 3,3 (1405b35 ff.), are said to be best suited to the 'pathetical' style of speaking⁶¹ the purpose of which is to affect the audience with ἐνθουσιασμός. After giving some examples of this impassioned, 'enthusiastic' style, it is stated that the people speak in this style when they are ἐνθουσιάζοντες, and for this reason is the style also suited to poetry, since poetry is ἔνθεον. Another implicit connexion between the poetic and the grand style is also perhaps suggested by Theophrastus cited by Quint. 10,1,27. Theophrastus, Quintilian says, recommends the reading of poets, for from these come *in rebus spiritus et in verbis sublimitas et in adfectibus motus omnis...*

Later links between the poetic and the 'grand' style are more explicit. The clearest is perhaps 'Demetrius'. In his discussion of the *χαρακτήρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς* (38–127) he makes several, unambiguous references to poetic elements present in the style: in § 70 poetic forms of words and in §§ 112 f. poetic words⁶² are recommended for the *χαρακτήρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς*; in 78 we are told to use metaphors, but not too frequently, lest we write a dithyramb instead of prose⁶³. Dionysius Halicarnaseus in Dem. 5 discusses Plato's use of the two *χαρακτήρες*, the ὑψηλός and the ἰσχνός. While approving of Plato's use of the latter style, Dionysius is harshly critical of his use of the grand style. In this style, Plato's language is fat and deficient in *Hellenismos* (κάκιον ἐλληνίζουσα καὶ παχυτέρα⁶⁴); it lacks clarity (τὸ σαφές)⁶⁵; and abandoning everyday words and those in common usage, it prefers τὰ πεποιημένα ...καὶ ξένα καὶ ἀρχαιοπρεπῆ – the kind of words that, as we have seen, both Aristotle and Isocrates associate with poetry or poetic prose. Lastly, Dionysius accuses Plato of preening himself on his 'poetic figures...especially the Gorgianic ones' (σχήμασί τε ποιητικοῖς...καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Γοργιείοις...ἐναβρύνεται)⁶⁶. Let one last instance suffice in which a Greek author associates the grand style and the poetic. Marcellinus vit. Thuc. 41,

⁶¹ τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς.

⁶² Cf. § 77 where 'unusual' diction, λέξις ἀσυνήθης, is advised.

⁶³ The *χαρακτήρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς* is also said (66, 77) to have ὄγκος – the same quality associated by Arist. rhet. 1407b31 with poeticism.

⁶⁴ Cf. C. Arch. 27: *Cordubae natis poetis, pingue sonantibus atque peregrinum...*; 'fatness' (ἄδρως) is, of course, a characteristic commonly predicated of the 'grand' style. See for example, Phoebam. in Hermog. περὶ ἰδεῶν, rhet. Gr. 14, p. 384 RABE; Gell. 6,14; Philod. rhet. 1, p. 165 SUDH. cited by QUADLBAUER 65 with n. 90.

⁶⁵ So Arist. 1406a34–5 says that the poetic style produces 'un-clarity' (τὸ ἄσαφές) or destroys clarity (διαλύει τὸ σαφές).

⁶⁶ NORDEN 33 n. 3 also has a note on the characterisations common in antiquity 'der Poesie als der 'hochfahrenden' Rede, der gehobenen Prosa als der 'hochtrabenden' Rede, der niederen Prosa als des λόγος πέζος...' For further references he directs the reader to his own article in FLEICK. Jahrb. Suppl. 18 (1891) 274 f.

having declared that of the three *χαρακτήρες* Thucydides cultivated the *ὁ ὑψηλός*, states this: *διὰ γ' οὖν τὸ ὑψηλὸν ὁ Θουκυδίδης καὶ ποιητικαῖς πολλάκις ἐχρήσατο λέξεσι καὶ μεταφοραῖς τισίν*⁶⁷.

2.2 Cicero's rejection of the widespread, ancient virtual identification of poetry & prose

Let us now turn to Cicero. The kind of utterance found in passages such as Gorgias Hel. 9, Dionysius de comp. verb. 25 (= p. 122,14–16 U.-R.) and Tacitus dial. 10,4 in which a close relationship is postulated between prose and poetry is for Cicero, as for his epigone Quintilian⁶⁸, quite impossible. He recognises on the one hand the fact that the poets 'speak as it were in different language' (*quasi alia quadam lingua*) – a phenomenon that arouses the disapproval of Antonius (de orat. 2,61) who represents in the dialogue a position that is anti-intellectual, hostile to all forms of learning, especially of a literary, abstract or theoretical kind⁶⁹ (cf. 2,4: *Antonius autem probabiliorem hoc populo orationem fore censebat suam, si omnino didicisse numquam putaretur...*). Crassus himself in 3,153⁷⁰, on the other hand, also clearly distinguishes between the poetic and prose diction, although already here there is none of the disapproval expressed by Antonius, and one can detect a trace of the idea that the fact that differences exist between prose and poetic diction is as it should be. Other passages that express the idea that poets do and *should* use a different kind of language are not lacking: one may point to fin. 5,9. orat. 67⁷¹. 163 and Pis. 73 f.

⁶⁷ Marcell. also discusses the question whether historiography belongs to rhetoric or to poetry, noting that some hold that it is really a species of poetry (cf. above n. 42). See also NORDEN 91 who gathers and discusses more texts on the same subject.

⁶⁸ Cf. e.g. Quint. 10,1,28. 10,2,21.

⁶⁹ Cf. L-P II 235: 'Der Gesichtspunkt des Crassus ist prinzipiell und ideal, derjenige des Antonius ist praktisch und konkret.' L-P here also discuss the parallelism and differences between certain Crassus and Antonius discourses.

⁷⁰ *sed tamen raro habet etiam in oratione poeticum aliquod verbum dignitatem.*

⁷¹ Notice that here C. questions whether the style of the comic poets is to be regarded as poetry, since, but for the fact that their language is cast into versicles, is *nihil ... aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis*. The implication is clearly that the style of poetry *ought* to be different from the *cotidianus sermo*.

2.3 Cicero's rejection of the 'rhythm alone' principle; orat. 68: what is the most important characteristic of poetry?

Neither was Cicero entirely satisfied with the principle that by verse alone is poetry distinguished from prose: in the orator he expresses some doubt regarding this widely-held belief and here he was probably drawing on an Hellenistic or Alexandrian tradition, to which Horace sat. 1,4,45 ff.⁷² was also indebted. Paragraphs 62–68 of the orator form a sub-section of Cicero's treatment of *elocutio* in that work. The purpose of this sub-section is to set the parameters of oratorical style, that is to say, Cicero excludes certain literary styles from his consideration: that of the philosophers, that of the sophists, that of the historians and lastly, that of the poets⁷³. The following passage is an excerpt from 66 f.:

ab his [sc. qui scribunt historias] non multo secus quam a poetis haec eloquentia, quam quaerimus, sevocanda est; nam etiam poetae quaestionem attulerunt, quidnam esset illud, quo ipsi differrent ab oratoribus: numero maxime videbantur antea et versu, nunc apud oratores iam ipse numerus increbruit: quidquid est enim, quod sub aurium mensuram aliquam cadat, etiam si abest a versu – nam id quidem orationis est vitium – numerus vocatur, qui Graece ῥυθμὸς dicitur. itaque video visum esse non nullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen, quod incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum, apud quos nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis. nec tamen id est poetae maximum, etsi est eo laudabilior, quod virtutes oratoris persequitur, cum versu sit astrictior

Thus Cicero here agrees with those critics who questioned the value of insisting on verse, or at any rate, on rhythm as *the* distinguishing criterion of poetry: the reason given is that, even if there is no verse – which in prose in any case would be a fault (*vitium*) – rhythm is now common in oratory. This latter statement of which Cicero obviously approves, also serves, incidentally, to anticipate his later discussion of rhythmical prose (168 ff. cf. esp. 180 & 183). Now, some critics further developed this line of thinking according to which there is more to poetry than merely verse or rhythm. They argued not only that rhythm is not the distinguishing feature of poetry, but also that the works of some so-called prose writers such as Plato and Democritus, because their language is characterised by a vigorous

⁷² Cf. e.g. Hor. sat. 1,4,45 ff. *idcirco quidam comoedia necne poema / esset quaesivere, quod acer spiritus ac vis / nec verbis nec rebus inest, nisi quod pede certo / differt sermoni, sermo merus.*

⁷³ orat. 68: *seiuinctus igitur orator a philosophorum eloquentia, a sophistarum, ab historicorum, a poetarum explicandus est nobis qualis futurus sit.*

movement and rhythm (*incitatus feratur*⁷⁴) and by the use of brilliant figures of speech (*clarissimis verborum luminibus*⁷⁵), are more entitled to be called poetry than the works of the comic poets, whose works but for the fact that they are cast in a kind of verse, are no different from ordinary conversation. These critics, then, think that a particular kind of rhythm, characterised by a vigorous movement, and the use of brilliant figures of speech are essential features of true poetry and that mere verse is not. Cicero certainly agrees that the former two are important features, but he is not willing to concede that they are essential, hence he writes: *nec tamen id est poetae maximum*. For this interpretation of *id* as referring to the two features of the use of brilliant figures *and* metre / rhythm, compare SANDYS ad loc: 'A style marked by swift movement and brilliant figures of speech is not really...the most important characteristic of good poetry; on the contrary, such a style is equally characteristic of good oratory...'; and KROLL ad loc: 'Mit *id* kann sowohl das Metrum als auch die glänzende Sprache...als auch beides gemeint sein.'

The next section, § 68 is somewhat problematic. The section of the text that concerns us reads as follows in SANDYS's edition:

ego autem, etiam si quorundam grandis et ornata vox est poetarum, tamen in ea cum licentiam statuo maiorem esse quam in nobis faciendorum iungendorumque verborum, tum etiam nonnulli eorum voluptati vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt; nec vero, si quid est unum inter eos simile – id autem est iudicium electioque verborum – propterea ceterarum rerum dissimilitudo intellegi non potest; sed id nec dubium est et, si quid habet quaestionis, hoc tamen ipsum ad id, quod propositum est, non est necessarium

Up to and including the passage introduced by *nec tamen id...*, we are dealing, according to the commentators SANDYS and KROLL, with Cicero's criticisms of the opinion of others as to the most important characteristic of poetry. What, then, does § 68 contain? Again, according to SANDYS and KROLL, in this section Cicero states his own opinion. But only on this point do they agree, for according to SANDYS this opinion which Cicero states here refers to the implied question: 'What is the most important characteristic of poetry?' The answer, then, is what is affirmed in § 68, namely that there are two characteristics which above all distinguish poetry: first, a greater licence in the formation of new and compound words (*faciendorum iungendorumque verborum*⁷⁶); second, the fact that *some* of the poets are subservient to pleasure more with regard to words than with regard to sense (*nonnulli eorum*

⁷⁴ That this 'river' metaphor probably refers to rhythm, emerges from *orat.* 187 where the phrase is used again, but with clearer indication of the rhythm: *incitator numero ipso fertur*, cf. also *orat.* 39 *incitator fertur*.

⁷⁵ On the meaning of this term, v. *infra* n. 182.

⁷⁶ SANDYS, appealing to *orat.* 159 & *de orat.* 3,154. 170 interprets *iungendorum* as referring not to the collocation and arrangement of words, but to the formation of compound words.

*voluptati vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt*⁷⁷. KROLL, on the other hand, rejects the interpretation according to which Cicero in § 68 attempts to define what is the essential characteristic of poetry: 'Worin Cic. das eigentliche Wesen der Poesie sieht, sagt er nicht...⁷⁸'. He seems, rather, to refer Cicero's opinion stated in § 68 merely to *more* important differences between poetry and prose, and even of these, he understands Cicero as meaning to give only a selection, for later in *orat.* 201 f. Cicero stresses the poet's greater freedom in metaphors which is not mentioned here in § 68. That suggests that in *orat.* 68 the list of *more important* differences between poetry and prose was not intended to be exhaustive, but on the contrary, that Cicero only meant to give some examples. This interpretation of *orat.* 68 seems to me more plausible than that of SANDYS.

Of course, we are not surprised that Cicero should not have left us a general theory as to the nature of poetry, in which he should have indicated what indeed was the most important characteristic of poetry. Cicero's concern is primarily practical, that is to say, to define only individual aspects of poetry which the student of rhetoric is to avoid⁷⁹ – and which, in a few instances, the student is permitted and even obliged to imitate and approximate –, and as Cicero never intends to form a general theory as to the nature of poetry, it is then in vain to seek in Cicero's writings for a comprehensive definition of poetry – such as we find in Aristotle –, arising out of a philosophical inquiry into its nature. On the other hand, one seeks in vain for anything resembling such a theory in *any* ancient critic besides Aristotle. The *Hortensius*, the only work of his in which Cicero may have considered the nature of poetry from an aesthetic or philosophico-literary perspective, is all but lost to us. In the surviving works, and above all, in the rhetorical works, Cicero's concern in treating of poetry is primarily practical, setting before us the individual aspects of poetry that the orator is to avoid or to approximate.

2.4 the abandonment of the 'written' / 'unwritten' scheme in Roman rhetorical theory

When we say that Cicero stressed particular and individual aspects of poetry that the orator is to avoid or to approximate, we do not tell the whole story. For when Cicero did this, he was in fact following a tradition in prose theory which derives ultimately from

⁷⁷ Adopting MADVIG's emendation of this difficult passage. WILKINS's OCT adopts MADVIG's *non nulli eorum* but retains the odious MS reading *voluntati*, thus producing a hopelessly garbled passage. KROLL's retention of the MS reading *nonnullorum* together with the adoption of SAUPPE's emendation *voluntate* produces in my opinion the most attractive text. According to SAUPPE, *voluntate* here means 'nach der Forderung einzelner Kunstrichter'.

⁷⁸ KROLL's own suggestion is pure speculation: '....wahrscheinlich in der freien Erfindung (*ψευδος, μυθος*)...'

⁷⁹ So he will cite excessively poetic tendencies in orators such as Isoc. (*orat.* 190), in the same way that Arist. censures Gorgias at *rhet.* 1404a9.

Aristotle and Isocrates. Let us try to identify some of the factors which caused this tradition to enjoy so great favour with the Romans, and above all, with Cicero.

We saw above that one of the main stylistic divisions among the Greek theorists was between the 'written' and 'extempore' or 'unwritten' styles. This division gradually gave way to that other, namely, that which distinguished between 'grand' and 'thin' (together with its tripartite and fourfold variants) even among the Greeks themselves, not least of all because of the advent of speech-writers, who at least partially removed the necessity of extempore speech-making. The process of rendering the latter activity more or less superfluous was further carried out in Rome by the existence of the *patronus-clientis* relationship which existed between litigants and their advocates and which did not exist in fifth- and fourth-century Athens⁸⁰. Furthermore, the influence of Greek rhetoric and rhetoricians in Rome from the second century onwards⁸¹ aroused a desire among speakers for more sophisticated and polished types of oratory as is ordinarily produced only through written composition. There is evidence for written speeches among Roman orators as early as Cato the Elder⁸². Under the Roman Republic and especially in the Empire, extemporaneous speaking became increasingly associated with declamatory exhibitions and dissociated from actual oratorical practice⁸³. Exercises in extempore declamation even became fashionable for poets such as Archias and Antipater of Sidon (cf. Arch. 18. de orat. 3,194. Quint. 10,7,19). Even among rhetoricians such as Quintilian (10,7,1 ff.) who still insist on the practical importance of improvisation, it is clear that the emphasis is entirely altered from that of the Alcidasine position. For Quintilian (1,1,28. 10,3,2. 10,7,12) writing is all important, or rather, absolutely indispensable for success in speaking⁸⁴; whereas for Alcidas *ἡ μελέτη τοῦ γράφειν ἀπορίαν τοῦ λέγειν πλείστην παραδίδωσιν* (15). For Quintilian writing is arduous (10,3,1⁸⁵); for Alcidas, altogether easy (4 ff.)⁸⁶. On the other hand, the skill of extemporaneous speaking and by corollary the practice thereof, are of great value for Quintilian, but only in secondary capacities. The skill of extemporaneous speaking is for Quintilian an 'emergency' stopgap, to be called upon when time does not permit preparation or writing; or when the argument in a case has altered, and one's prepared answers have to be abandoned. Quintilian's attitude toward extemporary speaking as an

⁸⁰ Cf. KENNEDY (1972) 12 ff.

⁸¹ Cf. de orat. 1,14 with L-P ad loc.

⁸² E.g. Cato the Elder in Fronto 2 pp. 44–46 HAINES (ORF 8,173); on which, see KENNEDY (1972) 42 ff.; cf. also L-P ad 1,14.

⁸³ Cf. KENNEDY (1972) 311, 321.

⁸⁴ Writing always comes first for Quint.; thus he declares 10,7,29: *scribendum ergo, quotiens licebit, si id non dabitur, cogitandum: ab utroque exclusi debent tamen ita dicere, ut neque deprehensus orator neque litigator destitutus esse videatur*. [ita dicere FROTSCHER, WINTERBOTTOM: in id exercere RADERMACHER: inicere BHP]

⁸⁵ *laboris ... longe plurimum adfert stilus*.

⁸⁶ Cf. HAZEL L. BROWN: *Extemp. Speech in Antiq.* Diss. Univ. Chicago 1914, 37.

'emergency stopgap' is proven above all by the fact that, despite his declaration that extempore speech is the *maximus ... studiorum fructus...velut praemium quoddam amplissimum longi laboris* (10,7,1), he approves of the use of note-books (10,7,30 f.) and insists on the importance of the rôle of the memory (11,2,1 ff), concluding thus: *si memoria suffragatur, tempus non defuit, nulla me velim syllaba effugiat; alioqui etiam scribere sit supervacuum* (45). This completely contradicts the position of Alcidamas (18), who, it is interesting to note, condemns the speech-writers' memorisation of words and *syllables* (καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ συλλαβῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μνήμην).

Quintilian in many respects follows the teaching of Cicero on extempore speech in *de orat.* 1,150 ff, although it is clear that he places greater emphasis on the practice and acquisition of this skill than does Cicero⁸⁷. The latter also stresses the laboriousness of writing (*est enim magni laboris, quem plerique fugimus*); and his dictum that *<stilus est,> stilus optimus et praestantissimus dicendi effector et magister*⁸⁸ is well known and was famous even in antiquity⁸⁹. He also anticipates Quintilian's (10,7,29) three phases of composition (extempore, pre-meditated, written), likewise placing writing at the top of the hierarchy⁹⁰. By a strange reversal of positions, Cicero and Quintilian invert Alcidamas' view that extempore speaking and the written variety which imitates it surpass written speeches in effectiveness by virtue of their spontaneity and the appearance of spontaneity which lend an aura of truthfulness to the speech (12 f.). Cicero and Quintilian both insist that even while extemporising, the orator should appear to be speaking as if from a written speech⁹¹!

In its 'written' / 'spoken' form too, the original Greek stylistic dichotomy was no longer of great significance among the Romans. Even where it still persisted, the emphasis is again completely altered. For example, in Quintilian's discussion of the subject in 12,10,49 ff. we can at once discern a significant divergence in perspective from that of the Greek rhetoricians of the fourth century. Quintilian does not approach the subject as if to answer the question whether one should speak, or write; or which of the two modes is better; rather, he asks whether one's spoken version of a written speech should be the same as, or similar to, or different from, the written version. He records the (older) opinion of others that the written and the spoken speech differ (cf. *Isoc.* 5,25 ff. *ep.* 1,2), especially inasmuch as the former is composed according to the rules of art since it is to be judged by

⁸⁷ On the views entertained by each on the subject, see BROWN (1914) 54 ff.

⁸⁸ *<stilus est>* was rightly restored by STANGL: cf. L-P ad loc.; for similar Ciceronian utterances, cf. *fam.* 7,25,2. *Brut.* 92. *de orat.* 1,257.

⁸⁹ It is quoted by *Jul. Vict.* 444,2 H., *Quint.* 10,3,1 and alluded to by *Plin.* *ep.* 7,17,13

⁹⁰ *nam si subitam et fortuitam orationem commentatio et cogitatio facile vincit, hanc ipsam profecto adsidua ac diligens scriptura superabit.*

⁹¹ *de orat.* 1,152: *hanc adfert facultatem, ut etiam subito si dicat, tamen illa quae dicantur similia scriptorum esse videantur; atque etiam, si quando in dicendo scriptum attulerit aliquid, cum ab eo discesserit, reliqua similis oratio consequetur*; *orat.* 200. *Quint.* 10,7,7: *multo ac fideli stilo sic formetur oratio, ut scriptorum colorem etiam quae subito effusa sint, reddant...*

connoisseurs, whereas the other, demands greater pathos, vehemence and liberties in the use of devices in order to entertain the uneducated audience⁹². However, he rejects this opinion: there is no difference between writing and speaking, and if an orator's performance in delivery should differ from that in his written composition, this is to be reputed a fault. Thus in Quintilian's 'spoken' / 'written' discussion, the contest between the two modes, the dilemma between the one or the other disappears altogether; he is concerned rather with the relationship between the two modes in one and the same orator: the co-existence of the two is always presumed (*neque aliud esse oratio scripta quam monumentum actionis habitae*)⁹³.

Although he later concedes (12,10,52 ff.) that out of consideration for the intended audience (uneducated jurors *vs.* educated readers), some things will be found in the spoken version which are lacking in the written, and vice versa, there are numerous indications in the discussion that Quintilian is thinking just as much – if indeed not more⁹⁴ – about the other *officia oratoris* (e.g. *dispositio*, *inventio* [51–53, 55–6] and *actio* [cf. the many references to *agere*; also 57 on pronunciation] as he is about *elocutio*. Hence, when he begins in 12,10,58 with a new division (*altera est divisio, quae in tris partes et ipsa discedit, qua discerni posse etiam recte dicendi genera inter se videantur*) which is more specifically related to style, it is clear that this division does not cover exactly the same ground as the former and that therefore that the two divisions are not altogether in competition with one another.

Thus far we have seen how it came to be that the 'written' / 'unwritten' or 'extempore' stylistic dichotomy became largely irrelevant in the Roman context. It is clear that the type of extempore oratory advocated by Alcidas was not a viable option for Roman practitioners, who were impeded from adopting that approach both by circumstance (the presence of the *patronus-clientis* relationship), and by the school rhetoric they imbibed which, with its plethora of technical minutiae, inevitably promoted careful preparation and polish of the type opposed to the spontaneity favoured by Alcidas. Thus, as Alcidas' type of oratory no longer found favour, neither was it possible for his principles to survive – it was a case, so to speak of *cuius regio, eius religio*. But still we have not told the whole story.

⁹² *putaverunt... praeterea in agendo plus impetus plerumque et petitas vel paulo licentius voluptates, commovendos enim esse ducendosque animos imperitorum: at quod libris dedicatum in exemplum edatur, et tersum ac limatum et ad legem ac regulam compositum esse oportere, quia veniat in manus doctorum et iudices artis habeat artifices.*

⁹³ 'Written' and 'spoken' – or at any rate, 'writing' and 'speaking' – are contrasted or juxtaposed in a few passages in C., e.g. orat. 40. 150. 230, but in none of these passage does C. betray an awareness of the stylistic controversy that was at one time represented by these terms.

⁹⁴ In fact, nearly all the references to stylistic points (*lumina* [49], *plus impetus...paulo licentius voluptates, commovendos...ducendosque animos* [pathos 50] *tersum ac limatum et ad legem ac regulam compositum* [50], occur in the earlier part of Quint.'s discussion, i.e. when he is discussing the viewpoint of *others* who insisted on the difference between the written and the spoken; the only other possible reference to style *sermo ipse, qui facillime iudicem doceat, aptandus* [56] is vague.

2.5 the sources of Cicero's ideas on prose style: the triumph of 'Isocratean' & 'Aristotelian' ways of describing the poetic

How are we to account for the origin of specific stylistic principles by which Cicero distinguished poetry and prose? At this point, I should like to glance briefly at the sources behind Cicero's ideas on prose style. These sources fall chiefly under three types, all of which indicate clearly the extent to which the Alcidamantine programme had failed.

1) The traditional school rhetoric⁹⁵: the fact that the school rhetoric dealt with prose style at all, is indeed indirectly the legacy of early fourth century writers such as Aristotle, Theophrastus⁹⁶, and Isocrates. Some of the aspects of the school rhetoric's treatment of style, such as diction, received their impetus from this quarter; other aspects of the philosopher-rhetoricians' prose theories, such as the Aristotelian division into three genres (*συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν* rhet. 1358b7⁹⁷) and the (Theophrastian) virtues of style⁹⁸ were taken over more or less wholesale by the school rhetoric. This is not to deny that significant differences are to be found between the respective treatments of such aspects of prose style theory, but it should alert us to the fact that to distinguish between original and school rhetoric elements in Cicero's thought is at times extremely problematic. Lastly, other aspects of the school rhetoric, most notably the preoccupation with the figures, derive from the later Hellenistic rhetoricians.

2) the works themselves of the great fourth-century writers, whether in the original texts, or in digested forms such as may have been presented in collections of excerpts, résumés, doxographies and other intermediate sources constitute the second area of Greek influence on Ciceronian rhetorical and prose style theory⁹⁹. Cicero's general *disdain* for the

⁹⁵ C. gives enumerates some of the principal teachings (*ista omnium communia et contrita praecepta*) of the tradition in de orat. 1,138 ff. For discussions of this tradition, see KENNEDY (1972) 114 ff.; L-P I 38.

⁹⁶ KENNEDY (1963) 273 f. supposes on the basis of orat. 79 & de orat. 3,37 ff. where the four Theophrastian virtues of the style are discussed (as well as on the basis of a few other passages where Theophrastian influence is assumed) that C. 'made repeated use' of Theophr.'s *περὶ λέξεως*; cf. also the same (1972) 225; FORTENBAUGH (1989) 52, however, is more sceptical.

⁹⁷ Cf. de orat. 1,141; the division is of course only indirectly related to style.

⁹⁸ Which at times differed in number, schemes of three (rhet.Her. 4,12,17), four (as in the Theophrastian scheme: cf. orat. 79. de orat. 1,144), five (as among the Stoics, so Diog. Laert. 7,59) and six (Sulp. Vict. 320-1 H.) at various times existing.

⁹⁹ It will be seen from this that I have in general discounted the influence of second- and first-century Greek teachers of philosophy and rhetoric with whose teachings C. was acquainted or with whom he himself actually studied. The Academics such as Carneades, Philo of Larissa & Antiochus of Ascalon and other philosopher-rhetoricians were clearly less interested in questions of style than with other aspects of rhetoric (C.'s interest in them in Bk. 3 of the de orat. (62, esp. 67 f.) has more to do with the question of the relation of philosophy to rhetoric or with the subject of topics (110) and they are not discussed in his exposition of style). BARWICK (1963) 80 denies that C. studied rhetoric with Philo, and in general plays down the influence of Posidonius, Antiochus, Philo or of any other Academic on C.'s rhetorical-education ideas; for BARWICK

traditional school rhetoric – despite his widespread use of its teachings that we have already noticed – is well attested¹⁰⁰; for him, the body of these teachings was useful only in so far as it operated as a basic framework for the orator who should have recourse to it only that *quo quidquid referat et quo intendens ab eo quodcumque sibi proposuerit minus aberret* (de orat. 1,145). Partly from a true conviction that he was in the de oratore broadening the scope of rhetoric by introducing philosophical doctrines, and partly from the desire to re-inforce the impression that his approach in the de oratore was novel and departed from the theories of this traditional school rhetoric, does Cicero appeal on numerous occasions, directly and indirectly, to more ancient and philosophical sources for his rhetorical ideas. The fact that Hellenistic rhetoric was generally not interested in style also helps to explain why Cicero went back to earlier sources for many of his rhetorical ideas. Thus in the important letter to Lentulus (fam. 1,9,23) he writes of the de orat.: *scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quem ad modum quidem volui, tris libros in disputatione ac dialogo 'de oratore'... abhorrent enim a communibus praeceptis atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem oratoriam complectuntur*¹⁰¹; and in the de orat. 2,160, Cicero makes Antonius claim that he had read two works of Aristotle: the one in which the theories of his predecessors are expounded (the *συναγωγή τεχνῶν*) and the other on rhetoric¹⁰². It was, after all, the general claim of the de oratore to lift the study of rhetoric to a higher level than that of the school rhetoric by broadening the education of the orator, and above all by uniting the study of philosophy

the significance of the New Academy for rhetoric lay entirely with the doctrine of the theses. Of the rhetoricians, such as Apollonius Molon (Brut. 316 f.) who was outstanding in *notandis animadvertendisque vitiis* and corrected the excesses of the youthful C.'s style, there is no direct evidence of their teachings on style in the de orat. or the orat. In view of these considerations, one remains more impressed with the structure of the discussion on style in Bk. 3 of the de orat. based on the four Theophrastian virtues and with the testimony of C. himself in his fam. 1,9,23 that the de orat. was based on the teachings of the 'ancients both of Aristotle and of Isocrates'. Cf. KENNEDY (1963) 278 f.: 'C.'s de orat. and to a lesser extent orat. are anachronisms in rhetorical theory because they leap back over nearly three centuries to the broader and more philosophical concept of rhetoric found in Aristotle and his pupil... the third book of C.'s de orat. is heavily indebted to Theophr.'s On style...' also the same (1972) 215, 225. W. KROLL: 'Studien über Ciceros Schrift de oratore.' *RhM* 58 (1903) 552–597, esp. 576, on the other hand, sees the influence of the later Academy esp. of Antiochus (and to a lesser extent of Philo) throughout Bk. 3, even in some its parts concerned with style.

¹⁰⁰ de orat. 1,105. 137 2,75. 139. 3,54. 70. 75. 92. 121. 125. cf. orat. 43 & L-P I 38 & BARWICK (1963) 5 f., 8, 10, & esp. 71 ff. C.'s contempt for the rhetores Latini was even greater: cf. 3,93 f. with L-P IV 304 ff. ad loc. and KENNEDY (1972) 90 ff.

¹⁰¹ C. also seeks to add lustre to his dialogue with the prestige of ancient Greek philosophy by alluding to, and discussing the views of, other philosophers on various subjects, in particular, on rhetoric: so de orat. 1,45 ff. 75. 82 ff.

¹⁰² Arist.'s rhet. (so KENNEDY 1972, 221) or the top. (so L-P I 61)? In connexion with Antonius' claims of familiarity with these Aristotelian works, compare also inv. 2,4 ff. where C. claims to have drawn on a multitude of ancient Greek sources, esp. Arist.'s *συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, the Peripatetics, and the works of the Isocratean school. W.W. FORTENBAUGH: 'Cicero's knowledge of the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus.' in W.W. FORTENBAUGH & P. STEINMETZ (eds.): *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*. Rutgers Univ. New Brunswick N. J. 1989, 42 rejects the claims of familiarity with the authentic texts of these authors made in inv. 2,4 ff.; cf. also K. SCHÖPSDAU: 'Das Nachleben der *Technon synagoge* bei Cicero, Quintilian und in den griechischen Prolegomena zur Rhetorik.' in W.W. FORTENBAUGH – D.C. MIRHADY (eds.): *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*. Rutgers Univ. Studies in Classical Humanities VI. New Brunswick & London 1994, 193 ff. who argues that factual inaccuracies in the account (presumably from the *Technon synagoge*) given of Isoc.'s activities in the Brut. 48 could not have been present in Arist.'s original text.

and rhetoric¹⁰³. But elsewhere too, Cicero insists on the philosophical provenance of his rhetorical ideas. The most important testimony in this respect is the well known passage *orat. 12: et fateor me oratorem...non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiae spatiis exstitisse... et huius* [sc. Platonis] *et aliorum philosophorum disputationibus et exagitatus maxime orator est et adiutus*.

In the prologue to the *de orat.* (1,1–23) in which Cicero argues for the widest possible boundaries of the studies necessary for the formation of the *orator perfectus*, by which is implied, among other things, a familiarity with philosophy, Cicero alludes to the theory of style in 1,17 and 21. In the former passage, the reference, occurring as it does between such subjects as are not normally covered by the school rhetoric – the necessity of *scientia...rerum plurimarum* and the philosophico-psychological doctrine of pathos and humour – seems to point to the promise of a treatment of style on a higher level than was treated by the school rhetoric¹⁰⁴. That seems to be confirmed in 3,92, where Crassus in discussing *ornate* and *apte dicere* appears to express dissatisfaction with the usual rhetorical teaching on these aspects of style – he suggests derisively that on the subject of ἐκλογή and σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων the usual theory was all too easy, even irrelevant for practical purposes: *verborum eligendorum et collocandorum et concludendorum facilis est vel ratio vel sine ratione ipsa exercitatio*¹⁰⁵.

Nevertheless, in spite of Cicero's invocation of more prestigious and philosophical sources for the *de oratore*¹⁰⁶, it is exceedingly difficult at times to distinguish between Cicero's use of these sources in their original texts for the purposes of literary theory and his use of such texts as transmitted by 'secondhand' interpretations, a difficulty illustrated often by the *Quellenforschung* of the 19th and 20th centuries. More recent scholarship has tended to discount Cicero's own citations of original authorities and their works and to be sceptical about his familiarity with the original texts themselves. His direct knowledge of Aristotle's rhetoric remains one of the most controversial questions: again most modern scholars deny this knowledge, yet it is conceded as most probable that Cicero knew at any

¹⁰³ Apart from the more general aim of introducing philosophy as the most important contribution to the 'universal' culture necessary for the formation of the *orator perfectus* (in Bk. 1) – the *eruditio libero digna* of 1,17, philosophy is also necessary in C.'s rhetorical programme for the light it sheds on the doctrine of the *topoi* and the theses (in Bk. 2), and for the psychological insight that it provides with respect to the doctrine of *ethos*, *pathos* and *humour* (also in Bk. 2).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. L-P I 39: 'Von Ciceros Erweiterungen des traditionellen Lehrsystems...erschieden die meistens schon im Prolog...die Wichtigkeit der Philosophie ... für die Stillehre...'

¹⁰⁵ Other possible – though admittedly these are ambiguous and therefore far from decisive –, claims of philosophical influence on C.'s prose style theory are *orat. 12: philosophorum disputationibus et exagitatus maxime orator et adiutus; omnis enim ubertas...ducta ab illis*, *inv. 1,7: Aristoteles autem, qui huic arti plurima adiumenta atque ornamenta subministravit*.

¹⁰⁶ These invocations must be considered together with the choice of the dialogue format in which the argument follows a more desultory course than in the rhetorical handbooks and in which there is a general avoidance of established and precise technical language as part of C.'s desire to shun 'den Schein ein τεχνολογικός zu sein': cf. KROLL (1903) 572

rate indirectly some of the contents of the rhetoric from intermediate sources¹⁰⁷. The same conclusion perhaps applies equally in the case of other authentic works which may have influenced Cicero's ideas on prose style – works such as Theophrastus' *περὶ λέξεως* and the little known works of the Isocratean school alluded to at *inv.* 2,8.

3) Cicero's grammatical studies of his youth, and the rhetorico-grammatical works of the Stoics. Although there is little explicit evidence of the influence of these two sources on Ciceronian prose style theory, and although Cicero makes Antonius criticise the views of the Stoics on style (*de orat.* 2,159), it is hard to believe that Cicero's wide exposure to the teachings of the grammatici and of the Stoics who themselves were greatly interested in grammatical studies, could have left no impression on him in this regard. The concerns of the grammarians with diction, choice of words, orthography and morphology, with identifying faults of language (*vitia orationis*¹⁰⁸), and classes of words (common, uncommon etc.) are not far removed from some of the aspects of the business of prose style theorists¹⁰⁹.

It is outside the scope of this chapter to investigate further the ultimate sources for Cicero's prose-style theory. And if perhaps even the preceding, all too cursory treatment of

¹⁰⁷ Denying knowledge: K. BARWICK: *Das rednerische Bildungsideal Cicero*. Abh.d.Sächs.Ak.d.Wiss. zu Leipzig, Phil.hist.Kl. Bd. 54 H. 3: Berlin 1963, 78; P. MORAUX: *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I*. Berlin-New York 1973, 41–3; KENNEDY (1972) 222 (qualified rejection); I. DÜRING: *Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens*. Heidelberg 1966, 137; FORTENBAUGH (1989) 39–60; O. GIGON 'Cicero und Aristoteles' *Hermes* 87 (1959) 143–62; L-P I 63 f. Affirming the possibility and probability of C.'s firsthand acquaintance with the rhet.: SOLMSEN (1938) 401–2; J. WISSE: *Ethos & Pathos*. Amsterdam 1989, 105 ff.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Diog. Laert. 7,44, & KROLL 1924, 89 n. 7.

¹⁰⁹ This remains true even if the texts studied by the grammatici were chiefly poetical, (cf. *orat.* 1,187 *in grammaticis poetarum pertractio*; see also KROLL 1924, 88). On the grammaticus' task of studying individual words and other separable components, cf Quint. 1,4,4 ff. esp. 1,8,13 ff.: *in praelegendo grammaticus et illa quidem minora praestare debet, ut partes orationis reddi sibi soluto versu desideret et pedum proprietates, quae adeo debent esse notae in carminibus, ut etiam in oratoria compositione desiderantur. deprendat quae barbara, quae impropria, quae contra legem loquendi sint posita, non ut ex his utique improbentur poetae (quibus, quia plerumque servire metro coguntur, adeo ignoscitur....) sed ut commoneat artificium et memoriam agitet... circa glossemata etiam, id est voces minus usitatas, non ultima eius professionis diligentia est.* On the business of the grammaticus in general, see also MARROU (1964) 369 ff.; BONNER (1977) 163 ff.; KENNEDY (1972) 63. Interesting also in this connexion, is the suggestion of CLARKE (1968) 19 that C.'s grammaticus might have been the poet Archias.

On the interests of the Stoics in the *ars grammatica*, see Diog. Laert. 7,44. 55 ff.; also OCD² s.v. 'grammar, grammarians' § 5; KENNEDY (1963) 295 ff. (1972) 62 ff.; KROLL (1924) 89; GRUBE (1965) 135 f.. The influence of the Stoics on Roman intellectual life and on C. is well attested. Crates of Mallos, the head of the Pergamene school visited Rome in 169 B.C. (Suet. *de gramm.* 3); Diog. of Babylon whose grammatical ideas are discussed by Diog. Laert. loc. cit. was part of the embassy of philosophers who visited Rome in 155; Panaetius, C.'s chief source for the off. (cf. 3,7), the disciple of both these, went to Rome in 144 and for the next few years was there and elsewhere included among Scipio's circle of friends; Posidonius visited Rome in 87, and his lectures were attended by C. in Rhodes in 78. Lastly, L. Aelius Stilo, one of C.'s teachers, was also a Stoic (*Brut.* 206 f.); cf. KENNEDY (1972) 62 f., 104. We have already noticed Posid.'s definition of *ποίημα* given in his *περὶ λέξεως* (preserved in Diog. Laert. 7,60): *ποίημα δέ ἐστι...λέξις ἑμμετρος ἢ ἔνρυσμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα...ποίησις δέ ἐστι σημαντικὸν ποίημα μίμησιν περιέχον θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπείων.*

a murky problem of *Quellenforschung* should be found to be wanting in respect of precision and accuracy, yet to go into the matter further is not germane to my purposes. I am only concerned with Cicero's prose-style theory here in so far as it has a bearing on his poetics. In what is to follow, some aspects of the former will be shown indeed to have had importance for the latter. In what preceded, what I wanted to hint at, and what I shall also develop further below, is merely that (1) in the sources for Cicero's ideas on prose style, we can detect a certain perspective common to numerous different ways of approaching style. According to this perspective, which perhaps might be called 'grammatical'¹¹⁰, style is considered on the basis of individual 'separable' constituents that can be studied in isolation (diction, ornament etc.). Furthermore I wanted to suggest (2), that, as with other areas of rhetorical theory, so with that concerned with prose style, Cicero perhaps drew on the teachings, whether through direct or intermediate sources, of authorities much older than the rhetorical school tradition, in particular from Aristotle and his successors and to a lesser extent from Isocrates.

If, however, it is at times difficult to distinguish between the use of material from ancient Greek authorities (whether in original texts or in the compendia of intermediaries) and that of school rhetoric elements¹¹¹, at least one area of Ciceronian prose-style theory seems to hold out more promise of disclosing its provenance. This is that very perspective which we have already seen in Aristotle and Isocrates whereby style is approached by way of a comparison between poetry and prose. Such a perspective seems to me to be indisputably alien to the nature (essentially practical – even if not based on practice!¹¹²) and purposes (prescriptive, not disquisitive) of the school rhetoric. There is also something primordial in the assumption that the differences between poetry and prose *ought* to be discussed – that too seems to point to the antiquity of the source upon which he is drawing. Another indication suggestive of the same inference is to be found in one of the principal texts in which Cicero treats this subject, *orat.* 66. In this passage, Cicero sets forth the necessity of distinguishing prose style from the poetic; yet the question is not as straightforward as it once was, for although the poets once seemed to differ from the orators chiefly in respect of rhythm and verse, yet *just now* the use of rhythm has itself become widespread among the orators (*nunc apud oratores iam ipse numerus increbuit*). The emphatic combination of adverbs *nunc ... iam* and the perfect tense *increbuit* are critical: why

¹¹⁰ By which I do not mean of course that this approach to the study of language was in all cases rudimentary (as in the case of the grammarians discussed above under heading (3)), but merely that it shares something with the task of the grammaticus who studies components of language in isolation. In any event, the point is that the study of stylistic minutiae is diametrically opposed to the 'impressionism' – if one may use the term in this connexion – of Alcidas.

¹¹¹ But cf. KROLL *R&M* 58 (1903) 569 who shows two instances in which the distinction is possible.

¹¹² Cf. *de orat.* 1,105 *non Graeci alicuius cotidianam loquacitatem sine usu...*

just now? Had not rhythm been a regular part of oratory for centuries, and does not Cicero himself acknowledge this in passages such as Brut. 32, de orat. 3,173 and (in the very work whence derives that passage with which we are now concerned) orat. 37 ff., 169¹¹³, 175¹¹⁴, 208¹¹⁵, 234? Even if the statement were made only with respect to the Roman oratory, it still rings strange – rhythm had been in use among Roman orators for decades before this passage in the orator was written – the first appearance of rhythm among the Roman orators is probably to be assigned to some date around the birth of Cicero, and possibly even earlier¹¹⁶. Furthermore, the fact that the Atticists consciously avoided rhythm¹¹⁷ surely indicates a reaction to an established fashion.

All these considerations suggest to me that Cicero was, in this section of the orat. on the differences between poetry and prose, drawing here on a much older, possibly philosophical, source than the school rhetoric. From this perspective, there is certainly strong support for the conclusion of O'SULLIVAN regarding the legacy of discussions such as those found in Aristotle's rhet. 3,3 on frigid 'poeticisms' and in Isocrates' Ev. 9 f. on the differences between poetry and prose. Having found these accounts to agree on several major points, O'SULLIVAN (51) writes: 'These principles had great influence on later theory concerning the difference between poetry and prose', and here, as evidence of that later theory, he cites orat. 68 & 202. There is further support for this view both in the 'grammatical' viewpoint assumed in defining the differences between prose and poetry to which we have already alluded, and again in the similarity of the types of differences

¹¹³ Speaking here of the rhythmical (cf. Brut. 33) conclusio, he says that although the ancients did not use it, because it was not yet invented, yet *qua* [sc. *conclusionem*] *inventam* omnis usus magnos oratores videmus.

¹¹⁴ Nor let us forget the Asiatics, who under the influence of the third-century Hegesias, were so utterly enslaved to rhythm (*maxime numero servientis*), that some of them actually produced what was tantamount to *versiculi*: see orat. 230.

¹¹⁵ In this passage it is stated that since the invention of the period (*circumscriptio* or *continuatio* or *comprehensio* or *ambitus*) rhythm has been universally employed in the epideictic genre after the fashion of Isocrates and Theopompus.

¹¹⁶ The account in the Brut. of the use of rhythm among the Romans is somewhat problematic. The first Roman orator to whom the use of rhythm is there explicitly attributed is M. Calidius (274). But clearly, rhythmic effects were sought after much earlier than that, for, DOUGLAS ad 274 points out, there are before this passage in the Brut., not a few references to periodic construction (e.g. 96. 140. 162). DOUGLAS thinks the 'conscious search for rhythms' did not occur at Rome before 100 B.C. Crassus in orat. 222 f. (an example of rhythmic oratio *non numero...sed compositione* is given in 219) appears to have used regularly a periodic construction consisting of short *κῶλα*, *membra* often with spondaic endings (*in spondeos cadit*), a *genus dicendi* of which C. remarks: *id...ipse...maximum probo*: cf. also Brut. 162 with DOUGLAS ad loc. & the fr. of a speech of Crassus preserved in de orat. 2,225 f. NORDEN 171 ff., on the other hand, detects attempts at rhythm and rhythmic effects much earlier: C. Gracchus, whose teacher was the Asiatic Menelaus of Marathus in Phoenicia, affords examples of *ἰσοκωλία* and *ὁμοιοτέλευτα* in some of the surviving fragments, and the rhythm and periodic structure of his oratory was studied and (at least initially) admired by Gell. 11,13. The latter passage – unless one is perversely to suppose that Gracchus' *Leistung* was entirely unintentional – really refutes DOUGLAS's belief in a later date for the first appearance of rhythm among the Roman orators, nor does his handling of the Gellius passage (ad Brut. 125: '...the developed mastery or complex and rhythmical periods was still to come. Gellius...reveals Gracchus' deficiencies in that respect') alleviate his difficulty.

¹¹⁷ C., however, claims in orat. 234 that this was merely because they were incapable of rhythmic composition. Whatever the case may have been, it remains true that the Atticists were conscious that they were not producing rhythmic oratory, a consciousness which was clearly in reaction to prevailing conditions.

proposed by Cicero to those found in Isocrates and Aristotle. To these we now turn our attention.

Let us first, however, summarise our findings on the Aristotelian-Isocratean concept of the poetic. There are, to be sure, some points of disagreement between Aristotle's and Isocrates' respective treatments of the differences between prose and poetry, largely concerned with the boundaries of prose – and here, the disagreement possibly has more to do with the polemical framework within which Isocrates was writing than with a sincere conviction on his part –, but over the concept of poetic style the consensus is clearer. The poetic style is that language which has a tendency to depart significantly from ordinary usage, clothing itself with bold ornaments and devices, metaphors (and similes), unusual diction and so forth – and all of this frequently, freely and audaciously. The purpose of this 'cloaked' and 'bedecked' language with its greater obscurity and frequent avoidance of direct expression¹¹⁸, of this language which is not at all the language of everyday¹¹⁹, is to achieve elevation of style.

Let us now examine the similarities that the two passages from the orator, 68 & 202, bear to the two passages from Isocrates and Aristotle just cited. Since the passage from Isocrates Ev. 9 f. is not at all straightforward, but on the contrary, poses some of its own problems, it may be well first to compare this with the passages from Cicero's orator.

The passage Ev. 9–11. is a brief manifesto of part of Isocrates' programme. He enumerates here, as we have already noticed above, distinguishing characteristics of poetry – mainly stylistic, but he also includes rhythm and metre under this head. He proposes an ideal of oratorical prose according to which the exponents of oratorical prose are to accomplish in prose and without the usual poetic devices the same effects upon the audience as the poets accomplish in their poems. At first glance, the similarities between the Ciceronian passages, especially 66–68, and the Isocratean¹²⁰ passage from the Ev. are rather striking. They are as follows:

¹¹⁸ Cf. Dion. Hal. Dem. 5 of Plato's grand, 'poetic' style: μελαίνει τε τὸ σαφές καὶ ζόφῳ ποιεῖ παραπλήσιον ἔλκει τε μακρὸν ἀποτείνασα τὸν νοῦν, συστρέψαι δέον ἐν ὀνόμασιν ὀλίγοις. ἐκχεῖται δ' εἰς ἀπειροκάλους περιφράσεις πλοῦτον ὀνομάτων ἐπιδεικνυμένη κενόν. Arist.'s remarks in rhet. 3,3 1406a11 ff. about the use of redundant epithets also seems to point to a similar notion of poetic language's avoidance of direct expression.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Antonius' complaint in de orat. 2,61 about the poets using *quasi alia quadam lingua*, also the dictum of Thomas Gray (Letter to Richard West, 1742): 'the language of the age is never the language of poetry' – indeed, he might well have said, 'the language of any age...'

¹²⁰ Isoc.'s influence on Ciceronian thought has been well documented by H.M. HUBBELL: *The Influence of Isoc. on Cic., Dionysius & Aristides*. New Haven 1913; for further works, cf. L-P I 64 f. Modern studies on C.'s debt to Isoc. have tended to concentrate, as L-P point out, on the impact of Isocratean thought on C.'s conception of the important social rôle of the orator and on the education of the 'philosophical orator'.

Even though C. admits in inv. 2,7 that he had not come across Isoc.'s τέχνη (cf. GRUBE (1965) 169; on this alleged work of Isoc., cf. also the important article of BARWICK: 'Das problem des isokrateischen Technē.' *Philologus* 107 (1963b) 43–60, esp. 50 who is sceptical about its existence; likewise RADERMACHER AS B XXIV 16; KROLL RE Suppl. VII 1940, 1049), he was, on his own testimony, familiar with other Isocratean works. He mentions specifically Isoc.'s Panath. and Panegy. in various places e.g. orat. 37. 38. 176. Cato 13. rep. 3,30 (?).

i) both texts allude to greater resources / poetic licence in the matter of ornaments and embellishments (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι / *grandis et ornata uox est poetarum, tamen in ea cum licentiam statuo maiorem esse quam in nobis*);

ii) both mention 'everyday language' (τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν i.e. 'standard', 'ordinary'¹²¹ / *sermonis cotidiani*);

iii) both allude to new and coined words (τὰ δὲ καινοῖς / *poetarum... licentiam... faciendorum iungendorumque uerborum*);

iv) in both, pleasure or sensual charm is mentioned as being one of the chief ends, if not the chief end of poetry (ἂ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ... ταῖς εὐρυθυμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγούσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας / *nonnulli eorum voluptati uocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt*.) This depends, however, on a questionable emendation of the MSS readings for orat. 68¹²².

v) both discuss rhythm and metre

The passage orat. 201 f. alludes to poetic licence (*liberiores poetae...*); the use of new words (*novum...novis*); and also includes a discussion of rhythm. As in Ev. 9, metaphor is also discussed.

Of course, upon closer inspection, the agreement between some of these points in the respective texts is not exact. Thus, for example, concerning the poetic licence in the use of embellishments, Isocrates says that these embellishments are granted to the poets (that is, to them *only*), whereas Cicero only gives the poets *greater* licence in their use. Concerning the use of everyday language, Isocrates makes it one of many styles at the disposal of the poets, whereas Cicero's claim that comedy is little different from *sermo cotidianus*, implies that the language of poetry ought to be of another kind. Isocrates grants to the poets alone the use of new and exotic words¹²³, whereas Cicero's poets again merely have greater

cf. Isoc. Panath. 10. Phil. 81). More importantly in that same passage from the inv., he freely admits to the influence of Isoc. on his rhet. thinking. C. appears to have regarded Isoc. chiefly as a teacher, for as L-P (I 64) point out, it is largely in this capacity that Isoc. appears in the *de oratore* and not in his capacity as an orator or as a composer of speeches (2,10. 94: cf. orat. 40. Brut. 32). There is at least one other passage in the orator where a connexion – even if only indirect – with the Isoc. Ev. 9–10 has been thought possible, namely, § 174. In the latter passage C. relates how Isoc.'s admirers heaped praise on him for being the first to introduce rhythm into prose. It is next described (from the account of the admirers?) how Isoc.'s noticed the displeasure with which orators were heard in contrast to the pleasure with which poets were heard, for which reason Isoc. sought to introduce, *causa incunditatis* (the phrase seems to recall Isoc.'s ἂ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν) rhythms into prose. So KROLL on orat. 174, wrote concerning Isoc. Ev. 9 f.: '...eine Stelle, die vielleicht Cic.'s Gewährsmann vorschwebte.' This hypothesis seems further to suggest implicitly that the Isocratean 'admirers' must have explained the origin of Isoc.'s programme to introduce prose rhythms by appealing to the passage from the Ev. Nevertheless, one cannot help feeling that if there is an echo of the latter passage in orat. 174 it is very faint and distorted.

H. WERSDÖRFER S.J.: *Die ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ des Isok. im Spiegel ihrer Terminologie*. Leipzig 1940, 124 thinks that much of Isoc.'s critical language is reflected closely by C. and he enumerates some (at times inexact) parallels.

¹²¹ Cf. LSJ s.v. *τάσσω* III 5 'received'

¹²² Cf. n. 77 above.

¹²³ Besides, C. does not really discuss the Isocratean category τὰ ξένα, unless, *faciendorum iungendorumque uerborum* in 68 & *nova et prisca* in orat. 202 be taken as classes of τὰ ξένα, but this is to understand the term more in the Aristotelian sense: cf. above. n. 18 & LUCAS ad poet. 1458a22.

licence in this department. On the other hand, the vastly different resources at the disposal of the Latin poets (poorer stock of archaisms and dialectal words, more limited capacity of the Latin language to form compound words etc.) in comparison with those that existed for the Greek poets will have partly contributed to Cicero's decision not to follow Isocrates exactly in this matter. Again, Isocrates describes the poets as using certain poetic devices and features to entrance and move their hearers, whereas in *orat.* 68, the text of which, as we have seen, is uncertain, perhaps the most one can say is that a concern for 'sound over sense' is for Cicero a feature of some, though not of all, poets' programme.

Again, the agreement over metaphor is really superficial. As we have pointed out earlier, Isocrates, grants the metaphor again to the poets only. Cicero's omission of metaphor in 68 is curious – the explanation for the omission is perhaps either, (1) as KROLL implicitly suggests (see the discussion above [2.3]), that the list of poetic features in the *orat.* 68 is not intended to be exhaustive; or (2) that here, C. is thinking of metaphor as belonging to prose and poetry, without distinguishing types of metaphor as Arist. does, and C. himself does later in 202.

Lastly, the respective treatments of rhythm and metre in Cicero in *orat.* 66–7 and Isocrates in *Ev.* 10–11 follow a similar pattern of disagreement; the former, insists on the rhythm in oratory; the latter allows both rhythm and metre to the poets alone. Thus, if one takes what Isocrates says in *Ev.* 9 f at face value¹²⁴, there are significant points in the respective Ciceronian and Isocratean accounts of the differences between prose and poetry which are indisputably at variance. I am more inclined to think, however, that Isocrates overstates his case, and in his desire to stress the arduousness involved in the composition of his type of prose (and thereby to gain greater glory for himself), he somewhat exaggerates the paucity of resources at the disposal of the orator¹²⁵. I argue this position in greater depth in Appendix I. If I am correct in the conclusion reached therein, Isocrates' and Cicero's respective positions will be somewhat closer.

The agreement between Aristotle and Cicero is far greater than between Isocrates and either of the other two. This is particularly true of the way in which both Aristotle and Cicero do not, as does Isocrates, deny wholesale poetic elements to prose, but on the contrary, allow them, either fully, or – and this is more usually the case – in a restricted manner (that is, with respect either to frequency of occurrence or to degree of 'boldness').

¹²⁴ So O'SULLIVAN 52: 'it is not necessary to rule out the possibility that Isocrates more or less meant what he said here...'

¹²⁵ This 'Einleitungstopos des *χαλεπόν*' (WERSDÖRFER 120) reminds us of the prologue to the *de orat.* 1,6 ff. where he asserts that great exponents of other arts (warfare, statesmanship, philosophy, mathematics etc.) are numerous, but those of oratory few. The paucity of resources at the disposal of the orator in comparison with those of the poet is touched upon by Arist. also, *rhet.* 3,2 1405a6 ff. *τασοῦτω δ' ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν* (sc. metaphors), *ὅσῳ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων*.

The following table will make these relationships clearer. Because the subject of Aristotle's discussion is narrower (frigid 'poeticisms') than either Isocrates' or Cicero's (the differences between poetry and prose), it seemed appropriate to supplement lacunae in the column representing his list from statements that he makes elsewhere¹²⁶; conversely, though I believe that Isocrates in Ev. 9ff. does not present fully his sincere views on the question at hand, nevertheless, for the sake of illustrating more clearly the differences between his *account* in that passage and the respective views of Aristotle and Cicero who are more consistent, at least on this subject, supposed lacunae have not been supplemented in the case of Isocrates.

¹²⁶ But these supplements are indicated by the outlined blocks.

**Poetic and Prose style elements according to
Isoc. Ev. 9 ff., Arist. rhet. 3,3 & Cic. orat. 66 ff. & 201 f.**

	ISOC. Ev. 9–11		ARIST. rh. 3,3		CIC. orat. 66–8		CIC. orat. 201–2	
	allowed		allowed		allowed		allowed	
	in poetry	in prose	in poetry	in prose	in poetry	in prose	in poetry	in prose
greater resources & licence <i>vis-à-vis</i> ornaments	■		□ ¹²⁷		■		■	
everyday / ordinary words	■	■	□ ¹²⁸	□ ¹²⁹	■ ¹³⁰	■	—	— ¹³¹
new and coined words	■		□ ¹³²	□ ¹³³	■	■	■	■
compound words	—	—	■	■	■	■		—
foreign words	■		□ =	□ =	—	—		
exotic words/ archaic	—	—	■	■	—	—	■	■ ¹³⁴
rhythm	■		□ ¹³⁵	□ ¹³⁶	■	■	■	■
metre /verse	■		□ ¹³⁷		■		■	
pleasure chief aim	■		—	—	[■]		—	—
epithets / all other ornaments ¹³⁸	■		■	■	—	—	■	■
metaphor	■		■	■	—	—	■	■

Key:

— not discussed *hoc loco*
 ■ allowed freely;
 ■ allowed with restrictions

 □ an empty space denotes 'not allowed'
 □ allowed freely, but not mentioned in rhet. 3,3
 □ allowed with restrictions, but not mentioned in rhet. 3,3

* * *

¹²⁷ rhet. 3,2 1405a6 τοσούτω δ' ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονείσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἐλλατόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων.

¹²⁸ poet. 22 1458a19

¹²⁹ rhet. 3,2 1404b6

¹³⁰ C.'s comment in 67 about the style of the comic poets seems to imply that the style of poetry is something different from *cotidianus sermo*, hence the smaller block here.

¹³¹ orat. 201: *nam de propriis nihil hoc loco dicimus*

¹³² poet. 21 1457b33 f.

¹³³ rhet. 3,2 1404b28–30

¹³⁴ Cf. de orat. 3,153 *inuitata sunt prisca fere ac vetustate ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa, quae sunt poetarum licentiae liberiora quam nostrae; sed tamen raro habet etiam in oratione poeticum aliquod verbum dignitatem*

¹³⁵ rhet. 3,8 1408b21 f. (cf. C. orat. 172: *versum in oratione vetat esse, numerum iubet...* 195 *nec numerosa esse, ut poema...*

¹³⁶ rhet. 3,8 1408b21 f.

¹³⁷ rhet. 3,8 1408b21 f.

¹³⁸ = Isoc.'s category *πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι*.

There are several other points in Ciceronian prose style theory which will have necessarily affected his ideas on the poetic and for which parallels can be found in Aristotle or in the Greek literary tradition of the poetic which derived much of its impetus from him. Thus, for example, there is evidence that although Cicero does not express himself in so explicit terms as the Greeks, he too probably agreed with that association between the grand style and the poetic style that we saw above to have been common among the Greeks. In the *orat.* 68, he describes the style of 'some' poets as being *grandis et ornata vox*. The qualification *quorundam ...poetarum* distinguishes the rest of the poets from the comic poets just discussed in § 67, whose language differs little from that of everyday speech, and accordingly excludes the poets from the company of those poets who are said in the following paragraph to employ that grand style. Also significant is the justification given in *orat.* 67 for the view that the style of Plato and Democritus has 'more right to be called poetry'. Of course this view is recorded as being that of others, but it is clear from the context that although Cicero may not accept the major (*nec tamen id est poetae maximum*), yet he accepts the minor premise with which we are now concerned: the style of Plato and Democritus is said to be more poetic than that of comedy because *incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur*. Now the first part of this justification, *incitatus feratur*¹³⁹, refers to a quality that is often predicated of the grand style, namely, that of speed (cf. *orat.* 97 on the grand style *cursu magno sonituque ferretur*)¹⁴⁰; it also employs an image that is also often applied to the grand style, namely, that of a river (so KROLL ad loc.: 'Bild vom Strom')¹⁴¹. Lastly, *incitatum* is also used at *orat.* 128 to describe one of the qualities of τὸ παθητικόν which belongs in the highest degree to the grand style. A little later, in the section on the grand style (97–99), Cicero distinguishes this style from the other two by insisting that the both the plain and the middle style can subsist entirely without the *variatio* afforded by the use of an admixture of the other two styles, whereas the reverse is true in the case of the *genus grande*. The orator who has the command of this style only and nothing else *vix satis sanus videri solet*. Furthermore, if such an orator fails utterly to prepare his audience before he begins *rem inflammare*, then he will appear *furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinulentus*. This description of the orator that commands the *genus grande* only seems to me unmistakably to be couched in terms which are intended to remind us of the inspired poet under the influence of the Democritean-Platonic *adflatus furoris* (cf. *de orat.*

¹³⁹ The closest parallel to this phrase is at *orat.* 187 *incitatio numero fertur*, where the expression, being qualified with *numero*, refers to the vigorous rhythmic movement of the periodic style.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. O'SULLIVAN 113 f. citing Eupol. Demes fr. 102 K-A on the style of Pericles as ταχύς; & other passages as well.

¹⁴¹ On the river image in connexion with the grand style, see O'SULLIVAN 115 f.

2,193. div. 1,80¹⁴²). The admixture of particulars referring to pathos and quasi-Democritean-Platonic ἐνθουσιασμός, resembles the association which Aristotle makes in the rhet. 3,7 (1408b11 ff.) between the impassioned style (with its natural proclivity towards διπλᾶ ὀνόματα, τὰ ἐπίθετα and τὰ ξένα) and poetry, even if in Cicero the association does not draw attention to poetry in so explicit terms as in Aristotle¹⁴³.

Again, the widespread axiom, originating perhaps with Aristotle, that clarity is achieved by ordinary words Cicero formulates in his own fashion in orat. 79¹⁴⁴ (speaking here of the *genus tenue*): *sermo purus erit et Latinus* (= καθαρός and ἐλληνίζειν cf. Arist. rhet. 3,5 1407a19 & 30–2 τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν... μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις) ... *dilucide planeque dicetur* (= σαφῶς¹⁴⁵). The same connexion between clarity and ordinary words is made in de orat. 3,49 *Latine scilicet dicendo, verbis usitatis* (= κοινά) *ac proprie demonstrantibus* (= propria, κύρια) *ea, quae significari ac declarari volemus, sine ambiguo verbo aut sermone, non nimis longa continuatione verborum, non valde productis iis, quae similitudinis causa ex aliis transferuntur, non discerptis sententiis, non praeposteris temporibus, non confusis personis, non perturbato ordine.* That ornamentation¹⁴⁶, which the orator of the *genus tenue* is thus said in orat. 79 to lack, is stated in de orat. 3,152 to consist – in the domain of *verba simplicia* – chiefly of *verba inusitata* (et *prisca* cf. 153), *novata* and *translata*. The list corresponds closely with *ornamenta orationis* enumerated in orat. 201 *translatum, novum, priscum* of which the more frequent and more audacious use is attributed to the poets. The same point about the greater licence afforded to the poets in the use of these types of words¹⁴⁷ is made in de orat. 3,153, but in addition a new point is made. For having admitted that with respect to the *inusitata* which are *ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa*, the poets have greater licence, Cicero next states, that nevertheless, here and there (*raro* cf. orat. 80 *nisi quod raro utimur*) a poetic word possesses dignity in prose too.

This dignity does not refer merely to the *antiquitas* of the diction¹⁴⁸; in fact it also implies the elevation of language (cf. orat. 68 *grandis et ornata vox est poetarum*) that derives from

¹⁴² See further, ch. 3 below.

¹⁴³ The link between the impassioned *genus grande* and the poetic is also seen in C.'s use of the term *tragicus* which is applied by him to exponents of this style and their oratory, so for example Brut. 203 (of Sulpicius) *grandis et ut ita dicam tragicus orator*, de orat. 2,225 & 227 (of Crassus against Brutus) *non minus refutatum esse Brutum tragoediis...sed haec tragica atque divina*.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Quint. 8,3,15 *perspicuitatem propriis...egere...*

¹⁴⁵ Cf. KROLL ad loc., citing Arist. rhet. 3,2 & poet. 22 on λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι.

¹⁴⁶ Quint. 8,3,1 & 8,3,3 implicitly connects an absence of ornament with clarity: *venio nunc ad ornatum in quo...sibi indulget orator. nam emendate quidem ac lucide dicentium tenue praemium est... < an > in causa C. Corneli Cicero consecutus esset docendo iudicem tantum et utiliter demum ac Latine perspicueque dicendo, ut populus Romanus admirationem suam non adclamatione tantum, sed etiam plausu confiteretur?*

¹⁴⁷ The point is strictly made with reference to the *inusitata* but the comparison with orat. 201 shows that his attitude towards the *novata* and the *translata* was the same.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Quint. 8,3,24 *propriis dignitatem dat antiquitas*.

being removed from the *usus cotidianus sermonis*¹⁴⁹, to which belongs in a special way that clarity which we have already noticed. It is precisely because this everyday language is allied with clarity and these ornaments are not, that Cicero emphasises clarity so emphatically in his subsequent treatment of metaphor *qua* ornament (de orat. 3,155 ff.): we are to use metaphor when the capacity to make our meaning clear is greater in a resemblance to other things than in the use of everyday language (owing to its *inopia*, i.e. its lack of a proper term for a thing): *inlustrat id quod intellegi volumus eius rei, quam alieno verbo posuimus, similitudo*; and we are to use only those metaphors which add clarity: *sed ea transferri oportet quae... clariorem faciunt rem*¹⁵⁰. A similar emphasis on clarity in the use of prose metaphor we have already seen in Aristotle's rhet. (3,2 1405a8 f. cf. supra n. 25). On the other hand, the fact that metaphor has to 'fetch' from afar something resembling the thing with which we are concerned is an indication that it involves some degree of obscurity (hence de orat. 3,167 *in quo obscuritas fugienda est*¹⁵¹); clarity must arise, as is implied by Aristotle, when the metaphor is not inappropriate (*ἀπρεπής* rhet. 1406b6, 1405a10 f.; so C. de orat. 3,159 *si sunt ratione translata*), that is, when it is not drawn too far afield (cf. 1405a10 f., 1406b7: so C. de orat. 3,163 *deinde videndum est, ne longe simile sit ductum*¹⁵²), and when it produces swift understanding in the audience (1410b20 ff., 1410b32 & cf. supra n. 25). Another indication of metaphor's natural departure from direct expression is introduced in Cicero's explanation of the pleasure that men take in metaphor at de orat. 3,160. The cause of this pleasure, he says, is that it is a kind of proof of cleverness (*specimen ingenii*) to jump over the obvious (*transilire ante pedes posita*) and to fetch something else from afar (*alia longe repetita sumere*)¹⁵³. Lastly, let us recall that in one section of Aristotle's handling of the distinctive qualities of poetic style in poet. 22 1458a24 ff. where he insists upon metaphor as belonging thereto, he warns that the exclusive use of it will produce *αἰνιγμα*. That too, indicates the natural tendency of metaphor to the obscure. Virtually the same point is made by Cicero at de orat. 3,167 (although here he is of course talking about prose style): *est hoc*

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Quint. 8,3,4 speaking of C.'s success in a richly ornamented speech: *nec tam insolita laus esset prosecuta dicentem si usitata et ceteris similis fuisset oratio*.

¹⁵⁰ In 3,156 states two kinds of metaphor are used in prose: those that are used because of the *inopia* of the language, and those *more audacious* ones (*audaciores*) by which we wish to add *splendor* to prose – and in the latter case *inopia* of the language is not the cause. It may be inferred that it is because this latter type is not employed to perform the function of ordinary language (i.e. to make our meaning clear), that the demand for clarity is not made here.

¹⁵¹ Quint.'s antithetical formula (8,3,15) is in this connexion significant: *rectissime traditum est, perspicuitatem propriis, ornatum (= opposed to perspicuitatem) tra(ns)latis verbis magis egere*.

¹⁵² Cf. opt.gen. 4 *in translatis ut similitudinem secuti verecunde utamur alienis*

¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the paradox remains, that although metaphor is in one sense *removed* from ordinary language, yet in another, it is germane to it, for 'all men speak in metaphors'. So also Arist. rhet. 1404b34; on the subject of Arist.'s views on metaphor, see J.T. KIRBY: 'Arist. on metaphor.' *AJPh* 118 (1997) 514–54.

magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obscuritas fugienda est; etenim hoc fere genere fiunt ea, quae dicuntur aenigmata.

2.6 distinguishing characteristics of poetry identified by Cicero

Let us now attempt to enumerate more comprehensively the things which Cicero remarks upon as distinguishing poetry from prose. It is not clear that these were the only things that Cicero would have thought of as particularly poetic – the nature and aims of the rhetorical works preclude such an assumption. Most of these distinguishing characteristics identified by Cicero are those that we either have already observed above or would naturally expect: poetic licence with regard to diction (archaisms, foreign words, new and coined words); elevation and greater ornamentation of style; freer and bolder use of metaphor; excessive concern for euphony, and so forth. Indeed, we may assume that many of these qualities were equally self-evident to the Romans themselves. In a revealing passage in the speech in Pisonem (72 f.) Cicero defends the notorious line *cedant arma togae* taken from his consulatus suus¹⁵⁴ and attacked by Piso. He ridicules Piso's ignorance and pretends he must teach him his elementary lessons in grammar since Piso apparently cannot distinguish the self-evident metaphorical *mos poetarum*¹⁵⁵.

This pervasive attitude of assuming that the fundamental differences between prose and poetry are widely known by those with a basic education will also explain why there are gaps in Cicero's enumerations and discussions of poetic characteristics. The tendency to neglect or to mention only *en passant* less important features such as certain ornaments and devices may be taken for granted. Important figures such as metaphor on the other hand may indeed be noticed, but comments to the effect that poetic metaphor differs from prose's in that it is more frequent and more daring are not expanded upon nor are examples given to illustrate what Cicero means by degrees of metaphoric daring. It is simply assumed that we all know how poetry excels prose in the boldness of its metaphors.

¹⁵⁴ On the title, often emended incorrectly to <de> consulatu suo, see COURTNEY (1993) 156.

¹⁵⁵ quid, nunc te, asine, litteras doceam? non opus est verbis sed fustibus. non dixi hanc togam qua sum amictus, nec arma scutum et gladium unius imperatoris, sed quia pacis est *insigne* et oti toga, contra autem arma tumultus atque belli, *poetarum more locutus* hoc intellegi volui, bellum ac tumultum paci atque otio concessurum. Cf. NISBET ad Pis. 73,13: '...C. is adopting the weary tones of a schoolmaster expounding the obvious to a stupid pupil.'

1. poetic licence:

tamen in ea cum licentiam statuo maiorem orat. 68. quae sunt poetarum licentiae liberiora quam nostrae de orat. 3,153; nos consuetudine prohibemur, poeta ius suum tenuit et dixit audacius Tusc. 3,20¹⁵⁶

A. words and diction not found in prose or ordinary speech:

cf. de orat. 1,128. 2,61. 3,153; *non ut poetae, sed sumpta de medio orat. 163*

i. archaic & obsolete:

inusitata sunt prisca fere ac vetustate ab usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa 3,153 audacius et priscis libentius utuntur orat. 201

ii. elevated:

quorundam grandis et ornata vox orat. 68. grandior de orat. 3,153

iii. new and coined¹⁵⁷:

licentiam statuo maiorem esse quam in nobis faciendorum iungendorumque orat. 68. sed ...poetae... tum etiam audacius et priscis libentius utuntur et liberiores novis 202. novantur autem verba, quae ab eo, qui dicit, ipso gignuntur ac fiunt, vel coniungendis verbis, ut haec: "tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat" "num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias" – videtis enim et "versutiloquas" et "expectorat" ex coniunctione facta esse verba, non nata; sed saepe vel sine coniunctione verba novantur, ut ille "senius desertus", ut "di genitales", ut "bacarum ubertate incurvescere" de orat. 3,154

iv. foreign:

orat. 163 f.¹⁵⁸; cf. Att. 7,2,1

B. use of figures of thought and transferred meanings

i. metaphor:

translatum / tralatum orat. 201 f. (cf. de orat. 3,152. 155 ff.)

ii. metonymy:

Pis. 72 f. on the well known verse from Cic.'s de consulatu suo cedant arma togae.

C. poetic stylistic aims:

i. greater freedom and more frequent occurrence of ornamentation:

ego autem, etiamsi quorundum grandis et ornata vox est poetarum orat. 68. id non debet esse fusum aequabiliter per omnem orationem, sed ita distinctum, ut sint quasi in ornatu disposita quaedam insignia et lumina. genus igitur dicendi est eligendum, quod maxime teneat eos, qui audiant, et quod non solum delectet... de orat. 3,96 ff. (cf. 1,69)

ii. excessive concern for euphony:

tum etiam nonnullorum voluntate vocibus magis rebus inserviunt [or tum etiam nonnulli eorum voluptati vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt]¹⁵⁹ orat. 68 potissimum bene sonantia, sed ea non, ut poetae, exquisita ad sonum orat. 163 (cf. 174 cum enim videret [sc. Isocrates] oratores cum severitate audiri, poetas autem cum voluptate...)

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Varr. ling. 9,5 *cum poeta transilire lineas impune possit*. Cf. KROLL (1924) 99 f.

¹⁵⁷ On Cicero's own prose contributions to the Latin vocabulary, see P. BRUNO: 'Verba vel novitate vel coniunctione facta apud Ciceronem.' *Latinitas* 2 (1954) 274–282; for the greater licence in this matter granted to poets, see esp. p. 277 of this same article.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. KROLL's comment on and paraphrase of 164: 'quare sollte auf *non ut poetae* zurückgreifen: weil wir keine Dichter sind, sondern Redner, so wollen wir lieber gute lateinische als schönklingende griechische Worte brauchen.'

¹⁵⁹ The first is the text in KROLL's, the latter, the text in SANDYS's ed. See above n. 77.

2. metre, verse & rhythm:

a. distinguishing characteristic is not rhythm:

nam etiam poetae quaestionem attulerunt, quidnam esset illud, quo ipsi different ab oratoribus: numero maxime videbantur antea et versu, nunc apud oratores iam ipse numerus increbuit. etiam si abest a versu – nam id quidem orationis est vitium – numerus vocatur, qui Graece ὁυδμὸς dicitur... est eo laudabilior, quod virtutes oratoris persequitur, cum versu sit astrictior orat. 67;

b. poetry is, unlike prose, strictly bound to (verse-)rhythm:

nec numerosa esse, ut poema, neque extra numerum, ut sermo vulgi, esse debet oratio – alterum nimis est vinctum ut de industria factum appareat... orat. 195; nec vero is cursus est numerorum – orationis dico; nam est longe aliter in versibus – nihil ut fiat extra modum; nam id quidem esset poema; sed omnis nec claudicans nec quasi fluctuans et aequaliter constanterque ingrediens numerosa habetur oratio, atque id in dicendo numerosum putatur, non quod totum constat e numeris, sed quod ad numeros proxime accedit; quo etiam difficilius est oratione uti quam versibus, quod in illis certa quaedam et definita lex est, quam sequi sit necesse... orat. 198; quod idem fit in numeris, in quibus quasi necessitati parere coguntur... orat. 202 est enim finitimus oratori poeta numeris astrictior paulo de orat. 1,70; neque vero haec tam acrem curam diligentiamque desiderant, quam est illa poetarum, quos necessitas cogit et ipsi numeri ac modi sic verba versu includere ut nihil sit ne spiritu quidem minimo brevius aut longius quam necesse est. liberior est oratio et plane, ut dicitur, sic est vere soluta, non ut fugiat tamen aut erret, sed ut sine vinculis sibi ipsa moderetur de orat. 3,184;

c. rhythm is produced in poetry solely by metrical feet; in prose, on the other hand, rhythm can also be produced by the arrangement of words (*constructio verborum* = *compositio*) and by symmetry (of clauses – *concinnitas*):

ita fit ut non item in oratione ut in versu numerus exstet idque quod numerosum in oratione dicitur non semper numero fiat, sed nonnumquam aut concinnitate aut constructione verborum orat. 202

d. iambus and dactyl natural, paean inimical, to verse:

iambus enim et dactylus in versum cadunt maxime; itaque ut versum fugimus in oratione, sic hi sunt evitandi continuati pedes; aliud enim quiddam est oratio nec quidquam inimicius quam illa versibus. paean autem minime est aptus ad versum: quo libentius eum recepit oratio. orat. 193 f.¹⁶⁰

e. in poetry, beginning, middle and end of verse equally important rhythmically; in prose, the clausula more so than the other parts:

clausulas autem diligentius etiam servandas esse arbitror quam superiora, quod in eis maxime perfectio atque absolutio indicatur. nam versus aequae prima et media et extrema pars attenditur, qui debilitatur, in quacumque est parte titubatum; in oratione autem pauci prima cernunt, postrema plerique... de orat. 3,192.

f. audiences are less forgiving of rhythmical errors and infelicities in poetry than in oratory:

de orat. 3,198: verum ut in versu volgas, si est peccatum, videt, sic si quid in nostra oratione, sentit. sed poetae non ignoscit, nobis concedit.

3. hiatus not allowed in Latin prose; though not favoured in poetry, hiatus is permitted for the sake of the verse:

sed Graeci viderint¹⁶¹; nobis ne si cupiamus quidem distrahere voces conceditur. indicant orationes illae ipsae horridulae Catonis, indicant omnes poetae praeter eos qui, ut versum facerent, saepe hiabant, ut Naevius, 'vos qui accollitis Histrum fluvium atque algidam', et

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Arist. rhet. 3,8 1408b33 ff.

¹⁶¹ He speaking here of the greater licence of the Greeks with regard to hiatus. See KROLL ad loc. for a discussion of the evidence for the practices of the Greeks.

ibidem: 'quam numquam vobis Graeci atque barbari'. at Ennius semel [/saep. A ¹⁶²] : 'Scipio invictus'; et [/semel ¹⁶³] quidem nos: 'hoc motu radiantis etesiae in vada ponti'. hoc idem nostri saepius non tulissent, quod Graeci laudare etiam solent orat. 152

2.7 rhythm and metre as distinguishing characteristics of poetry

Cicero's discussion of the differences between poetry and prose in orat. 67 ff. begins, as we have seen, with the assertion that it is not rhythm which is the chief distinguishing feature of poetry, since this is now common in prose too. The passages collected under 2 a in the list above (i.e. orat. 195. 198. 202. de orat. 1,70. 3,184), however, indicate that the opposing, traditional view called into question by Cicero in orat. 67 is not altogether abandoned by the author. In fact, the notion that the poet is more restricted than the orator with regard to verse is already broached at the end of orat. 67: *poetae...cum versu sit astrictior...* Later in the work, in orat. 195. 198. 202; as also earlier in de orat. 1,70 and 3,184, Cicero insists that with regard to rhythm also is the poet more restricted than the orator. These later remarks suggest that the unqualified dismissal at the beginning of orat. 67 of rhythm as a distinguishing feature of poetry does not accurately represent the whole of Cicero's position on the question. Placed into perspective by these later remarks, the initial claim of orat. 67 appears now to be something of an exaggeration made for the sake of emphasising the facts that rhythm is, and indeed should be, found in oratorical prose, and also that there are besides, other, perhaps more important, criteria of poetry.

It is interesting to see how Cicero views the verse/rhythm obligation imposed on the poet. In orat. 67, the task of poet is said to be all the more demanding (lit. 'praiseworthy') in that the poet, although restricted by the verse, strives after the same excellences of style achieved by the orator. In orat. 198, however, the verse-obligation imposed on the poet is regarded as making the poet's task with regard to rhythm easier than that of the orator, because 'in illis [sc. versibus] certa quaedam et definita lex est, quam sequi sit necesse...' In oratorical prose, on the other hand, 'nihil est propositum, nisi ut ne immoderata aut angusta aut dissoluta aut fluens sit oratio'. Granted that ancient oratorical prose composition is far more complex in respect of its periodic construction and rhythmic clausulae than the prose of modern European languages, nevertheless the claim that verse should be easier to compose (at any rate with regard to its rhythmic patterns) must strike many modern readers as extraordinary. And indeed to an extent it is: for in the first place it is obvious that the rhythmic patterns of a given verse, although they be restricted to a relatively small and finite number of permutations (and of course the several verses and genres of poetry differ as to the number of these permutations) and although a verse

¹⁶² Followed by HEERDEGEN, STANGL, SANDYS.

¹⁶³ *et quidem nos: FPO et A:* followed by ORELLI, KAYSER, KROLL; *et semel quidem nos:* scripsit HEERDEGEN, followed by SANDYS.

should have certain feet invariably or generally fixed, yet within these limitations the poet is afforded some freedom, not only in respect of the choice of feet in different positions, but also in respect of the placing and type of caesurae in a verse. Without this freedom the verse naturally becomes rigid and monotonous, and the rhythm contributes little if any meaning. In the second place, it has long been known the rhythmical clausulae themselves occur at predictable points in a Ciceronian period, that is at the ends of cola, and that these clausulae are of a finite type. Thus in this respect, oratorical prose of the type practised by Cicero, also labours under some restrictions, which if not as great as those to which the poets are subject, are at any rate far greater than those which are imposed on prose stylists in modern times. As NISBET in his commentary on the speech in *Pisonem* writes (xvii): ‘Cicero’s prose... is formal and rhetorical, and has the *intricacy and balance* which in modern languages is expected *only in poetry*’ [my italics]. Undoubtedly Cicero’s insistence on the greater difficulty involved in the mastery of rhythm in prose is related to his own preference for oratory.

2.8 poetry as one of the *artes mediocres*

Cicero pursues at *de orat.* 1,6 ff. (esp. 1,11 f.) a similar argument regarding the superlative difficulty of attaining excellence in oratory in comparison with the other arts – a theme, which as we have seen, somewhat recalls the Isocratean ‘*Einleitungstopos des χαλεπόν*’ in the *Ev.* 9 ff. There are also in the former passage some interesting comments made in relation to, or having some bearing on our understanding of, Cicero’s attitude to the status of poetry as an art. It should be noted that the text in 1,11 is somewhat problematic and certain editors allege a lacuna exists here, but we shall deal with *this* later. In the first place, at 1,6 we are introduced to two levels of *artes*, the *maximae* and the *mediocres*. The former is said in the following two paragraphs to include the art of war, that of statesmanship and that of oratory. The *artes* which belong to the lower level and which are called in 1,8 *reconditae*, include, according to 1,8 ff. philosophy (1,9), mathematics, music, the *ars grammatica* (1,10), poetry (1,11)¹⁶⁴. At the end of 1,8 Cicero acknowledges that some critics ranked oratory not with the *artes maximae* but with the *mediocres*¹⁶⁵, but he does not accept this. His argument in support of his claim that oratory is not to be associated with the *artes mediocres* is that outstanding exponents abound in these arts (*ne qui*

¹⁶⁴ Both the practice and the study of poetry which is part of the formative education of the Roman gentleman and orator: cf. L-P ad 1,8 & below § 2.11 with n. 193.

¹⁶⁵ *ac ne qui forte cum aliis studiis quae reconditis in artibus atque in quadam varietate litterarum versentur [=artes mediocres] magis hanc dicendi rationem quam cum imperatoris laude aut cum boni senatoris prudentia [=maximae] comparandam putet, convertat animum ad ipsa artium genera circumspectiatque qui in iis floruerint quamque multi...*

forte...putet...convertat animum ad ea ipsa genera circumspiciatque qui in iis floruerint quamque multi): we are told, on the other hand, that in oratory the case is the reverse (*sic facillime quanta oratorum sit et semper fuerit paucitas iudicabit*). In 1,9–10 it is stated that outstanding exponents abound in philosophy, mathematics, music and the *ars grammatica*. Thereupon, in 1,11 Cicero adds poets to this list, but the way he introduces them is significant: *vere mihi hoc videor esse dicturus, ex omnibus iis qui*¹⁶⁶ *in harum artium [=mediocrium] liberalissimis studiis sint doctrinisque versati* minimam copiam poetarum egregiorum exstitisse. Why does Cicero here talk about the paucity of poets? According to the ‘paucity of exponents’ argument employed in 1,8 to support the claim of oratory’s status as a greater-than-*ars mediocris*, one expects that Cicero should still be here insisting that poetry as an *ars mediocris* also has many exponents. The answer is of course given in the text: Cicero is talking only about the paucity of poets in relation to the exponents of the other *artes mediocres* (= *ex iis qui* etc.), and this is supported by the fact that at the end of 1,11 he claims that there are again far fewer good orators than good poets. Nevertheless, the point about the paucity of poets is still rather strange: according to the ‘paucity’ argument employed in 1,8, the paucity of poets – even if this paucity is to be understood only in relation to the other *artes mediocres* – should indicate that poetry of all the *artes mediocres* comes closest to being a greater-than-*ars mediocris*. This point is emphasised even more strongly by the emendations of 1,11 advocated by HENSE and STANGL. For Cicero, having stated that out of all the *artes mediocres* poetry has the fewest excellent exponents (*minimam copiam poetarum egregiorum*), continues in the next sentence thus:

atque *in hoc ipso numero* [which *prima facie* logically refers to the *minimam copiam poetarum egregiorum*] in quo perraro exoritur aliquis excellens, si diligenter et ex nostrorum et ex Graecorum copia comparare voles, multo tamen pauciores oratores quam poetae boni reperientur...

Hence, some editors have attempted to correct the illogicality of the passage by emending the preceding sentence so that there is an antecedent mentioning of orators to which *in hoc ipso numero* may refer. HENSE altered *egregiorum* to *et oratorum*; while STANGL (followed by PIDERIT-HARNECKER and WILKINS in his commentary ed. of 1892 & his OCT ed. of 1902) recognising that *egregiorum* was a necessary qualification, inserted <*et oratorum*> after the adjective. Each of these emendations, according to which either *oratorum* is substituted for *egregiorum* or <*et oratorum*> is inserted after *egregiorum*, places poets in a slightly different category to that in which the exponents of the other *artes mediocres* are found. The poets are associated more closely with the orators and the two arts appear to

¹⁶⁶ The reading of M rightly preferred by L-P to L’s *quique* printed in KUMANIECKI’s ed.

share something in common – the fact that, according to the argument of 1,11, good exponents in each of the two spheres (poetry and oratory) are rare is supposed to indicate that the two arts are more difficult than the rest. Of course, at the end of 1,11, it is stated that *far fewer* good orators are to be found than good poets, and here is the culmination of the *synkrisis* of the arts: oratory is the supreme art as shown by the fact that it has the fewest good exponents. On the other hand, one may say, poets are of all the exponents of the *artes mediocres* closest to the orators by reason of the fact that they are next in rank of paucity of good exponents.

It is for our purposes, however, immaterial which of these emendations¹⁶⁷ we accept: in fact, the point about the paucity of poets as differentiating their art from the rest of the *artes mediocres* still stands even without either of the emendations. This is not to suggest that Cicero ever entertained the idea of poetry as an *ars maxima*; on the contrary, because most genres of poetry¹⁶⁸ are not connected directly with the public life or the service of the state in the way that the art of war and statesmanship are, such a possibility is completely out of the question¹⁶⁹. And yet, we seem to have here something of a concession – even if, as we may well suppose, a concession begrudgingly given – that success in poetry is, like that in oratory, difficult of attainment, and therefore, in this sense, somewhat greater than that in other *artes mediocres* whose exponents are so numerous¹⁷⁰.

¹⁶⁷ For the record, I think the grounds for altering the MSS reading of M & L *poetarum egregiorum* are not compelling. I agree with CIMA, COURBAUD, KUMANIECKI & L-P who preserve the reading found in the MSS. The respective explanations that each of them offers for the decision to retain the original reading are not the same. COURBAUD ad loc. defends the MSS reading by arguing that the *atque in hoc...reperientur* sentence is somewhat anacoluthic: C. originally meant to write something like this: *numero [poetarum] plures egregii reperientur quam sunt oratores boni*; cf. also COURBAUD: *Mélanges Boissier*. Paris 1903, 139. CIMA: *Riv. di fil. cl.* 28 (1900) 456 ff. interprets *in...numero* as meaning ‘in relation to this number’. L-P ad loc., suggest that perhaps it is best to take the clause *in quo perraro exoritur aliquis excellens* not as a mere repetition of *minimam copiam poetarum egregiorum* but rather as ‘eine Verallgemeinerung des Gedankens zu etwas wie “die selten vertretenen artes”’ going closely with the following *si*-clause.

¹⁶⁸ This was of course more especially the case in Republican Roman than in Greek life.

¹⁶⁹ See § 2.11 below for a more detailed discussion of the idea of poetry’s failure to serve the state as a contributing factor to its *levitas*.

¹⁷⁰ Is our information about ancient mathematicians and musicians so terribly defective? Or is C.’s canon of ‘good poets’ inordinately restricted? To a modern reader who can enumerate probably as many, if not more ancient poets of merit than mathematicians or musicians, C.’s claim that there are far fewer good poets than good mathematicians or musicians is surprising to say the least, yet none of the commentators on *de orat.* has thought this utterance strange.

2.9 poetry as an esoteric art, beyond the critical appreciation of the masses

Later, in 1,12 Cicero does stress another important distinction between oratory and the *artes mediocres* (including poetry). Commenting on the paucity of good orators in comparison to the exponents of the *artes mediocres*, he says:

quod hoc etiam mirabilius debet videri, ceterarum artium studia fere reconditis atque abditis e fontibus¹⁷¹ hauriuntur, dicendi autem ratio in medio posita communi quodam in usu atque in hominum more et sermone versatur, ut ceteris id maxime excellat quod longissime sit ab imperitorum intelligentia sensuque diiunctum, in dicendo autem vitium vel maximum sit a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere.

Erudition and abstruseness of subject matter are already associated with the *artes mediocres* earlier in the *de oratore*¹⁷². The distinction drawn between oratory and the *artes mediocres* is that the language and subject matter of the former is within the comprehension and judgement capacity of the masses¹⁷³; the latter are 'technical'¹⁷⁴, specialist pursuits the comprehension and criticism of which are beyond the capacity of the masses¹⁷⁵. In the off. 3,15 Cicero speaks in a similar vein of the incapacity of the untrained masses to judge poetry correctly:

vulgus quid absit a perfecto non fere intellegit, quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum. quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in his aliquid probi quod capiat ignaros, qui

¹⁷¹ e fontibus is the reading of L; M has fontibus.

¹⁷² So: studiis quae reconditis in artibus atque quadam varietate litterarum (1,8); *difficile est numerare quot viri quanta scientia quantaque in suis studiis varietate et copia fuerint* (1,9); *quis ignorant ii qui mathematici vocantur quanta in obscuritate rerum quam recondita in arte et multiplici subtilique versentur?... quis huic studio litterarum quod profitentur ei qui grammatici vocantur penitus se dedit quin omnem illarum artium paene infinitam vim et materiam scientia et cognitione comprehenderit?* (1,10); *ex omnibus iis qui in harum artium liberalissimis studiis sint doctrinisque* (1,11).

¹⁷³ This is of course not a concession that the accessibility of oratory makes it easier of attainment; on the contrary, as C. explains in 1,16, this aspect of oratory is deceptive: *sed nimirum maius est hoc [= oratory] quiddam quam homines opinantur*. Oratory is in fact more difficult (*quid enim quis aliud...esse causae putet nisi rei quandam incredibilem magnitudinem ac difficultatem?*) than people suppose because while it does not have its own particular subject matter, its demands on the orator are far greater and more numerous (*pluribus ex artibus studiisque collectum*) than those imposed on those who pursue other arts. The orator has to master whatever subject matter is proposed by the case in hand; he must withal be master of many other disciplines (psychology, history, law, acting/delivery); he must have at his command a powerful memory, a cultured and refined wit, a well trained voice (cf. 1,17–18).

¹⁷⁴ In *de orat.* 1,187 C. speaks of different disciplines (including oratory!) as being reduced to theoretical and systematic treatments (*artes*).

¹⁷⁵ On the trained critic's superiority with respect to technical knowledge, see also *Brut.* 199 with DOUGLAS ad loc.; & *rhet.Her.* 4,2,3.

idem quid in una quaque re vitii sit nequeant iudicare; itaque cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia.¹⁷⁶

2.10 the similarity between the poetry and prose

Against Cicero's sharp distinction between poetry and prose must be weighed another perspective recurrent in his prose style theory according to which prose is regarded – paradoxically – as being closely related to poetry. Passages that indicate this close relationship include *de orat.* 1,70 *est enim finitimus oratori poeta*; 3,27 *poetis quibus est proxima coniunctio cum oratoribus*. In what does this close relationship consist? In the first place, in accordance with what we determined above regarding the association between the grand style and the poetic, it is clear that when Cicero is thinking of the close relationship between prose and poetry he is thinking chiefly of prose in the grand style. This is confirmed partially by the fact that in one of the passages in which Cicero alludes to the close relationship between prose writers and poets, we are to understand this close relationship as being spoken of in connexion with the use of rhythm and ornament: *nec in numeris magis quam in reliquis ornamentis*¹⁷⁷ *orationis, eadem cum faciamus quae poetae...* Yet we also have been informed that the *orator tenuis* is not to use at all, or to use only sparingly, both these features of language (ornament: *orat.* 29. 78–81.; rhythm: *orat.* 77). The most comprehensive exploitation of these properly belongs to the grand style (ornament: *orat.* 97 *tertius est ille...ornatus*; rhythm: *orat.* 97: *cursu magno sonituque ferretur*).

Of rhythm, Cicero says that those that are used in prose are the same as those found in verse, or at any rate, are not greatly different from those in verse (*orat.* 180. 188¹⁷⁸. 202). We have already seen some of the differences (see above § 2.6 2): at *orat.* 194 it is insisted that one is to avoid a continuous series of the poetical feet (which would produce verse) and that the paean, which is readily welcomed by prose, is not suitable for verse. At *orat.* 202 it is also pointed out that rhythm can be produced in prose by things other than metrical feet, as for example by *conciinnitas* and *constructio verborum*. On the other hand, another similarity exists: for as in poetry, so in prose, we must look to the end of the sentence, the line or the period; the ear awaits the end, and therefore the end should be not without rhythm (199, 201).

¹⁷⁶ That incapacity of the uneducated masses to judge poetry reminds us of Aristotle's censure in the *rhet.* 3,1 1404a26 f. of the uneducated masses' failure to evaluate the poetic style of prose writers such as Gorgias correctly: *καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα*.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. *de orat.* 1,70 *est enim finitimus oratori poeta... multis vero ornandi generibus socius ac paene par*.

¹⁷⁸ This passage, which also answers the second part of the inquiry at 180 (*si sit numerus in oratione, qualis sit aut quales, et e poeticis numeris an ex alio genere quodam*), states: *sed hi numeri poeticine sint an ex alio genere quodam deinceps est videndum. nullus est igitur numerus extra poeticos, propterea quod definita sunt genera numerorum*.

The use of rhythm and ornaments¹⁷⁹, then, are the first two common features of prose – above all in the grand style – and poetry¹⁸⁰, although, as we have seen, Cicero is careful to distinguish between the respective uses of even these in each genre. Rhythm and ornaments again seemed to be attributed equally to the grand-style prose (as typified by Plato and Democritus) and to poetry in *orat. 67 incitatus feratur*¹⁸¹ *et clarissimis verborum luminibus*¹⁸². Related to ornament is another shared feature, which is described in *orat. 68* thus: *si quid est unum inter eos* (sc. *poetas et oratores*) *simile – id autem est iudicium electioque verborum...* The exact meaning of the ‘judging and choosing of words’ is unclear. Why should the fact that each has to choose words be stressed as though it were the chief point of similarity between the orator and poet? That seems painfully obvious, even if one takes *electio verborum* in a technical, Theophrastian sense¹⁸³. Moreover, if *iudicium electioque verborum* is taken to refer to a technical procedure, there seems to be a somewhat anacoluthic shift in the focus of the argument which at *orat. 66* was not on a compositional procedure, but on style (cf. *66 ab his non multo secus quam a poetis haec eloquentia, quam quaerimus, sevocanda est*). Hence SANDYS ad loc., tried to get more sense out of the passage by citing *1,128 in oratore verba prope poetarum* and by referring *electio* to *elocutio*¹⁸⁴, but there seems to be some difficulty with this view too. For Cicero does not seem to be saying here that the diction of the two genres is similar – he had more or less denied just that at the beginning of the paragraph (*etiam si quorundam grandis et ornata vox est poetarum, tamen in ea cum licentiam statuo maiorem esse quam in nobis faciendorum iungendorumque verborum*)? The only way that SANDYS’s interpretation will work, then, is thus: Cicero means that the poets and orators are similar in respect of their selection of words (see the types enumerated in *orat. 80 & 135*), although he leaves it

¹⁷⁹ The demand imposed on the ideal orator in *de orat. 1,128* of *verba prope poetarum* must refer to that diction produced by the use of such ornaments (cf. *de orat. 1,70* quoted last footnote).

¹⁸⁰ So C. says in *orat. 201* that care is to be taken over both rhythm and ornament, *eadem cum faciamus quae poetae*.

¹⁸¹ Cf. the connexion with rhythm is brought out more clearly in *orat. 187 incitator numero fertur*.

¹⁸² The *lumina* here mentioned are used of ornaments in general; the term is used as in *orat. 134*, which refers to the discussion of *ornatus* in 80 (divided into 1. *simplicia*: a. *propria* b. *aliena*: *inuitata, facta, nova, translata, prisca etc.* 2. *collocata*) and itself alludes to metaphor and *collocata*. The more specific & technical sense applied to *lumina* in *orat. 135 & Brut. 275* (cf. DOUGLAS ad loc. & p. xxxii) *σχήματα* does not appear to be the one required here, although that possibility is not to be ruled out absolutely, especially in view of the following comment that the poet is to be commended for striving – in spite of the metrical restrictions placed on him – after the *virtutes oratoris*.

¹⁸³ The task of *electio verborum* was not, as it might be for us, a self-evident task to the ancient rhetoricians – on the contrary, so far is this from being the case that Dion. Hal. comp. 1 (p. 5,15 f. U.-R.) can promise to write for his young friend Rufus Metilius a whole book on the subject, since the impulses of the young mind are in need of much guidance therein (p. 4,21 ff. U.-R.). *ἡ ἐκλογή ὀνομάτων* was one of the three stylistic components into which Theophr. (Dion. Hal. Isoc. 3) divided ornament (*κατασκευή* the Stoic term for it – so Diog. Laet. 7,59; possibly also used by Theophr.; cf. KENNEDY 1963, 276): cf. KROLL ad *orat. 80*. The business of this component was apparently a technical process and governed, as in other areas of ancient rhetoric, by something approaching established principles and rules (cf., for example, the principles mentioned by C. in *de orat. 3,150. orat. 80. opt.gen. 4*). Hence when *ἐκλογή ὀνομάτων* is translated as ‘choice of words’ we miss something of the technical nature of the term, as well as something of its procedural aspect. In *de orat. 1,17* Cicero writes *et ipsa oratio conformanda non solum electione sed etiam constructione verborum*.

as understood that despite the similarities, even here there are differences such as quantity and degree of daring. According to this revised interpretation, SANDYS's invocation of *verba prope poetarum* is still irrelevant, inasmuch *ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων* includes *propria* too¹⁸⁵ and accordingly Cicero will not mean by *electio verborum* merely 'poetic' diction.

Another point of similarity that Cicero identifies between the poets and the orators is that to each of these classes of writers are the various styles available – even the *cotidianum genus* (orat. 109)¹⁸⁶ –, and indeed, the admixture of these style is incumbent upon both the poets and orators, lest they should weary and disgust their audience with excess of one style (orat. 109. de orat. 3,100)¹⁸⁷.

Lastly, leaving aside style now, we find that for Cicero one of the functions of the poets is identical to one of those of the orators, namely, the exposition of unlimited subjects, even technical subjects about which the poet or the orator may not possess exact knowledge: de orat. 1,70: *est enim finitimus oratori poeta ... in hoc quidem certe prope idem, nullis ut terminis circumscribat aut definiat ius suum quo minus ei liceat eadem illa facultate et copia vagari, qua velit*. Cicero's position is here of course the reverse of that taken by Plato in the *Ion* and the *Gorgias* in which the 'universalist' *epangelmata* are derided.

2.11 the *levitas* of poetry

Levitas which is 'triviality', 'frivolity', 'silliness', 'folly' is notoriously a Ciceronian predicate of poetry, for poetry is in general regarded as one of the *leviores artes*¹⁸⁸: de orat. 1,212. Brut. 3. fin. 1,25. 2,107. Cat. 50. Sest. 119¹⁸⁹. Together with the visual arts it is regularly assigned a lower status to that of oratory: cf. DOUGLAS ad Brut. 3. Cf. also Tac.

¹⁸⁴ His explanation of *iudicium* as *inventio* is somewhat bizarre.

¹⁸⁵ Thus C., by including *propria* (so de orat. 3,149 ff.; orat. 80. 201) under the head of *electio verborum* (=one of the three components of *ornatus*: cf. Dion. Hal. Isoc. 3; KROLL ad orat. 80), uses the term ornament in a wider sense than Arist. or modern usage in general would allow. Notice, however, that in C.'s scheme not all *usitata* or *propria* belong to *ornatus*, but only some of them, and only under certain conditions (cf. the principles governing *electio verborum propriorum* given in passages such as de orat. 3,150. opt.gen. 4; also KROLL on *nam de propriis nihil hoc loco dicimus* ad orat. 201: 'weil sie nur unter besonderen Voraussetzungen zum *ornatus* beitragen.') Thus SANDYS ad orat 201 errs when he excludes *propria* from *ornamenta orationis*; cf. DOUGLAS (1966) p. xxxii.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. also the hypothetical opinion posited by C. in orat. 36: *Ennio delector, ait quispiam, quod non discedit a communi more verborum*, though KROLL ad loc. understands Ennius' alleged proximity to the *communis mos verborum* to refer to the fact that Ennius does not depart from the *συνήθεια* as radically as Pacuvius.

¹⁸⁷ KROLL (1903) 569, 576 seems to attribute – unnecessarily, in my view – C.'s source for this rather self-evident doctrine to Antiochus.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. LANGE 248; if RUCH's and GRILLI's hypothesis of a *synkrisis des disciplines littéraires* at the beginning of the Hort. has any merit, it would seem that in this dialogue poetry is placed below history, oratory and philosophy. See esp. GRILLI's (63 f.) comments on this *σύγκρισις*; also BRINK's doubts about the same in JRS 51 (1961) 219. On the other hand, compare the discussion above in § 2.8 of poetry as one of the *artes mediocres*.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. fin. 1,7 where Lucilius' writings are described as *leviora, ut urbanitas appareat, doctrina mediocris*.

Dial. 10,5. Sometimes the *artes leviores* are referred to as *minora* cf. fin. 5,7 (*ad minora*) Tusc. 1,3. Brut. 70 f.¹⁹⁰. In the speech pro Archia a great portion of its beginning which is concerned with apologising for the *novum quoddam et inusitatum genus dicendi* (that is, the eulogy of poetry and literary culture in general in a forensic speech) is based on this fundamental Roman attitude toward poetry as one of the *leviores artes*¹⁹¹. On at least one occasion, however, poetry seems to fare a little better: in de orat 1,8 ff., as we have seen, he places poetry together with philosophy, mathematics, music and the *ars grammatica* among the *artes reconditae* or *mediocres*¹⁹². Elsewhere some of these *artes*, especially that of philosophy, enjoy a much more respectable rank as being necessary disciplines for the well-rounded, general education necessary for the Roman gentleman and orator. Hence collectively they are called in 1,9 the *laudandae artes*; in 1,11 *liberalissima studia*; in 1,72 the *artes quae sunt libero dignae* and in 1,73 *ingenuae artes*; in 3,21 Cicero speaks of the *ingenuearum et humanarum artium* and in 3,87 even of the *maximae artes*. It should be noted, however, that where Cicero speaks of poetry in connexion with one of these better classifications, he also has in mind not only the actual practice of poetry, but also the study of and familiarity with the great works of poetry¹⁹³. Whether this distinction is of any significance is unclear. L-P's comment ad 1,6 on the fluctuating status in Cicero's thought of these *ingenuae et humanae artes* is illuminating: 'Die wechselnden, vom jeweiligen Kontext bedingten Andeutungen sind typisch für die unsichere römische Wertung der kulturellen Erscheinungen.' At any rate, de orat. 1,6 ff., if it is to be interpreted as attributing to the practice of poetry a higher rank in the way just described, must be regarded a deviation from Cicero's usual position.

The belief that *levitas* is inherent in poetry is derived from several sources. In the first place, poetry was felt to be largely or wholly incompatible with those key ethical qualities¹⁹⁴ implied by the Roman *gravitas*¹⁹⁵ (at least as expounded by Cicero)¹⁹⁶: seriousness, dignity,

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Phil. 2,20, where, having alluded to his own poetry and writings, C. dismisses them briefly thus: *sed haec non huius temporis: maiora videamus*.

¹⁹¹ *Levitas* and its various degrees pertain to these *artes* according as the latter fail to serve the common good (cf. ORBAN 183), hence, it is C.'s aim in the pro Archia to show that poetry can and does perform this service. On the sincerity of the literary and cultural views expressed in the pro Archia, see below § 4.1.

¹⁹² The identification of the *artes mediocres* (see above § 2.8) of 1,6 with the *artes [reconditae]* of 1,8 was made by L-P ad 1,6: '...Cicero gibt 1,8 zu, daß andere die Redekunst mit den *artes mediocres*, dort *reconditae* genannt, wie Philosophie, Mathematik, Musik, Grammatik, Poesie auf eine Stufe stellen.'

¹⁹³ Cf. L-P ad 1,8: '*reconditis in artibus*...mit litterae ist die auf der Lektüre vieler Bücher beruhende Bildung gemeint.; and de orat. 1,187 *in grammaticis poetarum pertractatio*...

¹⁹⁴ *Gravitas* as an ethical concept is the first of the categories in K. GROSS: 'Gravitas.' *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum* Bd. XII. (1983) 752–779, esp. 753 ff.

¹⁹⁵ *Gravitas* as a characteristic of the Roman people and as a determining factor in the development of their literature and culture is a common theme in all the standard handbooks on Roman literature. See for example, SCHANZ-HOSIUS: *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* I 11; E. BICKEL: *Lehrbuch d. röm. Lit.* 1937, 51 ff.; W. KROLL: *Stud. z. Verständnis d. röm. Lit.* 1924, 1 ff.

¹⁹⁶ Although we undoubtedly find in the Romans of the historical age (but not perhaps in the earliest Romans – contrary to C.'s claim in the Tusc.) that *gravitas* as depicted and celebrated by their descendants (we think again of Cato the Elder), and although the term *gravitas* becomes widely accepted by the later Romans

loftiness, sobriety, even a curtness, a directness that is 'to the point'¹⁹⁷. We are familiar with the harsher¹⁹⁸ and – if one may use the term – 'Spartan'¹⁹⁹ aspects of Roman *gravitas* from Plutarch's life of Cato the Elder – his hostility to poetry and the theatre may be gathered from various sources²⁰⁰ – in which some of the central themes are the Roman's intransigence, austerity and stern morality²⁰¹. This moral code has been described by some scholars as a kind of puritanism, albeit a puritanism that developed from an originally lighter, less austere outlook²⁰². There is some validity in this comparison of the old conservative Roman *mores* with puritanism: the avoidance of all excess, luxury and

themselves as indicating a national trait, 'den ernsten u. pathetischen Zug des röm. Volkscharakters', the term in its abstract, ethico-political sense owes its development principally to Cicero. See K. GROSS: 'Gravitas' 753. For other accounts of *gravitas*, see H. WAGENVOORT. *Roman Dynamism. Studies in Ancient Roman Thought, Language and Custom*. Oxford 1947, 104 ff.; for a more political account of *gravitas* and *levitas*, see Z. YAVETZ: *Plebs and Princes*. Oxford 1969, 51 f., 98 ff. For Ciceronian texts see: Tusc. 1,2. rep. 1,5. Sest. 141. Phil. 9,10 (attributed to Servius Sulpicius Rufus as a paragon of Roman virtue), har.resp.43. As in many other cases, so here, the moral virtue was frequently transferred to the field of literary criticism: cf. Lael. 96. de orat. 3,28, and frequently *gravitas* is associated with the grand style Brut. 35 et passim (see DOUGLAS 1966, xliii for more references) & orat. 97. E. SEGAL: *Roman Laughter*. Harvard 1968, 12 ff. notices the conflict between the Roman *gravitas* and the abandon of the comic theatre as represented by Plautus. Unfortunately, his interpretation of comedy with its invocation of 'superego' and its misguided use of other psychological catchwords and concepts, leaves much to be desired. Cf. the criticism of his work by J. W. HALPORN CJ 65 (1970) 234–36.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Val. Max. 6,4 where among the examples of *graviter dicta et facta*, the *animi sermonisque abscisa gravitas* of C. Popilius Laenas stands out. Other qualities or virtues associated with *gravitas* are indicated in Tusc. 1,2: *quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda?* For its relation to, and union with, other virtues, see GROSS 756 f. For the Roman aversion to (especially Greek) *loquacitas*, talkativeness, cf. de orat. 1,47. 102. 105. 107. 2,17. 75 f. Lael. 17.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. GROSS 758: 'Die Verknüpfung [sc. *gravitas*] mit *severitas* (Mur. 6. 66. Cael. 29) auf die strenge Art des alten Römers, wobei aber *severitas* mehr die Strenge des Amtes, *gravitas* mehr die der Persönlichkeit meint.' Sall. Cat. 54, although he eschews the term *gravitas* 'um damit seine altertümliche Sprache u. seine Opposition gegen die Optimaten zu bekunden' (GROSS 753), describes aspects of the *gravitas* of Cato the Younger when he writes: *huic [sc. Catoni] severitas dignitatem addiderat...huius constantia laudabatur...Catoni studium modestiae, decoris, sed maxime severitatis erat...* For the generic association of oratory with *severitas*, and of poetry with *voluptas*, cf. orat. 174 *cum enim videret* [sc. Isocrates (9,10?)] *oratores cum severitate audiri, poetas autem cum voluptate...*

¹⁹⁹ Cf. E. BICKEL: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der röm. Lit.*² 1961, 59 f. who also compares the Roman and Spartan outlooks. Nepos Paus. 4,3 speaks of the *gravitas* of the Spartans.

²⁰⁰ Tusc. 1,3. Gell. 11,2,5. Cf. Plut. Cat. mai. 3. (cf. ibid. 23 where Plut. describes his contempt for all Greek learning and literature, without which of course Roman poetry does not exist).

²⁰¹ One cannot think of a more succinct testimony of Cato's austerity than the utterances preserved in Gell. 11,2,6 wherein he compares human life to iron and rates labour above leisure: *nam vita, inquit, humana prope uti ferrum est. si exerceas, conteritur; si non exerceas, robigo interficit. item homines exerceendo videmus conteri; si nihil exerceas, inertia atque torpedo plus detrimenti facit quam exercitio.*

²⁰² BICKEL 52–9. His gives four proofs for his thesis that the Romans were originally of a less austere, puritanical temperament, with an aptitude 'zu Phantasie, Spiel und Freiheit der Kunst': 1) the harvest festivals as described by Hor. ep. 2,1,139 ff.; 2) the yearly festival of the pipers' guild as described by Censorinus 12,2; 3) the Atellanae plays as described by Liv. 7,2,12; 4) the wedding songs of the *versus fescennini* (cf. Cat. 61,120. Hor. ep. 2,1,145 ff.). Cf. also GROSS 754. In a similar vein to BICKEL's theory of an originally less austere Roman outlook, is that advocated by MUTH 77, following an essay by E. ZINN: 'Die Dichter des alten Rom und die Anfänge des Weltgedichts.' *Antike und Abendland* 5 (1956) 7–26. These two authors argue less convincingly, as it seems to me, that the lower social status of the early Roman poets was 'nicht etwas eigentlich Römisches..., sondern griechisches Erbe das... schließlich, weil fremden Ursprungs, leichter überwunden werden konnte'. Thus the notorious hostility of the later-Republican Romans to poets was, according to them, not an indigenous attitude.

frivolity²⁰³; the denigration of the sensual, the hostility to poetry, or at the very least, to dramatic poetry²⁰⁴ – all these remind us of the English Puritans²⁰⁵.

Moreover, Cicero indicates at the beginning of the Tusc. and of the rep. that the qualities associated with *gravitas* are manifested in one's pursuits: these will be eminently practical²⁰⁶, utilitarian, 'weighty' in the senses of both 'important' and 'serious of purpose'; above all they will be directed toward the common good of the state²⁰⁷. Thus Cicero in Tusc. 1,2 gives examples of the kind of practical pursuits that are the objects of this *gravitas*: to strive for excellence in public morals, in family life, in law, in government, in the ordering of the state²⁰⁸, in warfare, and in practical or applied mathematics²⁰⁹. Likewise at the beginning of the rep. – where, although the reference to Roman *gravitas* is not as explicit, at 1,5 the concept is nevertheless perhaps present – the activity and excellence (*industriam virtutemque*) in public and military life of individuals *quorum singuli saluti huic civitati fuerunt* are extolled over the life of leisure and repose (*illa tranquillitate atque otio*) which had been abandoned in favour of service to the fatherland (*eam vitam, quae tamen esset reddenda naturae, pro patria potissimum reddere*). In fact the idea of service to the community, whether this be understood as the smaller unit of the family, or as the larger unit of the state, is a factor common to all these pursuits. It becomes apparent from this how the liberal arts and literature – above all poetry – not being directly aimed at service to the community should

²⁰³ Sall. Cat. 52 also appeals to the puritanism of the ancient Romans in comparison with the vicious life of his contemporaries: *domi industria, foris iustum imperium; animus in consulendo liber, neque delicto neque libidini obnoxius. pro his nos habemus luxuriam atque avaritiam; publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam; laudamus divitias, sequimur inertiam...*

²⁰⁴ William Prynne's *Histriomastix* (1632), an attack, as is suggested by its name, on stage players and the theatre in general, in which the author alleges that stage plays are the source of every crime, bears certain similarities – allowing of course for its Christian premises – to the conservative Roman outlook of the type exemplified by Cato.

²⁰⁵ BICKEL 59 compares the Roman puritanical hostility to the arts, and above all to the theatre, to that of the English Puritans, remarking that 'Kunst und Künstler kann nur da glücklich gedeihen, wo das Volksleben selber in dionysischem Zucken und Leuchten Spannungen auslöst'. Cf. GROSS 754; BEARE 172.

²⁰⁶ Thus, for example, even philosophy is regarded as vastly inferior to the Roman law, as C. makes Crassus declare in the de orat. 1,195: *bibliothecas me hercule omnium philosophorum unus mihi videtur XII tabularum libellus, si quis legum fontis et capita viderit, et auctoritatis pondere et utilitatis ubertate superare*. Cf. L-P ad loc.: 'Nach Crassus' Ansicht mangelte es der philosophischen Dialektik an sittlicher Autorität und praktischem Nutzen; das Studium der Gesetze sei deshalb viel empfehlenswerter.' Even though in de orat. 1,6 philosophy (together with mathematics, music, grammar and poetry) is placed among the *artes mediocres*, yet elsewhere, as L-P ad 1,6 point out, some of these *artes* – and philosophy must have been chief among these – are called *artes quae sunt libero dignae*. Yet by the time C. came to devote himself to the composition of philosophical works after the death of Tullia, we find a shift in his attitude. In fin. 1,12, for example, he describes the questions of ethical philosophy as being *uberiora* than legal discussions. See n. 228 below on the vacillating status of philosophy in C.'s writings.

²⁰⁷ Sall., who eschews the term *gravitas* for reasons mentioned above, in Cat. 52 also stresses the practicality, sobriety and integrity of the ancient Romans – qualities which Cic. identifies with *gravitas*: see text quoted above n. 203.

²⁰⁸ For C. the mixed constitution (*temperaverunt* cf. POHLENZ ad loc.: 'Das Wort für Mischung ist *temperatio* = *μεσότης*') was also evidence of the early Romans' practical foresight.

²⁰⁹ 1,5: *in summo apud illos [sc. Graecos] honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis inlustrius, at nos metiendi rationcinandi utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum*.

have been felt by the Romans in general to fail this test of *gravitas*²¹⁰. To the conservative Roman mind (as explained by Cicero and as exemplified by Cato: see Tusc. 1,3²¹¹), literature and poetry have introspective, self-serving tendencies²¹²; they are recreational pursuits²¹³ (*ludere, lusus, ludus*: cf. Tusc. 4,70 *sed poetas ludere sinamus*)²¹⁴ practised in *otium*²¹⁵

²¹⁰ So rightly ORBAN 183: 'Les préférences de l'orateur vont aux activités qui permettent d'exercer une action salutaire à communauté. Outre des témoignages formels que les textes fournissent, les épithètes *mediocres, leves, parvae*, appliquées aux arts théoriques, me paraissent explicites.'

²¹¹ Cf. Gell. 11,2,5. Plut. Cat. mai. 23.

²¹² It is to a large extent on these grounds that Cicero bases his notoriously adverse judgement on lyric. On which, see the chapter on lyric. Cf. the description inv. 1,1 of the orator who spends all his time in his exercises, neither considering what he may contribute to the state, nor putting into practice what he had learnt: *quare si quis omissis rectissimis atque honestissimis studiis rationis et officii consumit omnem operam in exercitatione dicendi, is inutilis sibi, perniciosus patriae civis alitur*.

²¹³ Cf. de orat. 3,58: *sed ut homines labore adsiduo et cotidiano adsuati, cum tempestatis causa opere [or perhaps better: tempestate ab opere. cf. L-P ad loc.] prohibentur, ad pilam se aut ad talos aut ad tesseras conferunt aut etiam novum sibi ipsi aliquem excogitant in otio ludum, sic illi a negotiis publicis, tamquam ab opere aut temporibus exclusi aut voluntate sua feriati totos se alii ad poetas, alii ad geometras, alii ad musicos contulerunt...*

²¹⁴ Significant in this connexion is the neoteric poets' programmatic uses of the verb *ludere* (synonymous with *nugari, nugae*) and its cognates (cf. Cat. 50,1–6; for *ludere* etc relating to the love-game, cf. c. 17,17. 61,210. 63,156; in the double-sense of the game of light, usually erotic, poetic composition and of the game of love-making, cf. c. 50. 61,232. 68,17; for examples in the later poets in the neoteric style who continued to use *ludere* etc not only as catchwords of their poetic composition but in order to associate themselves with their predecessors, cf. Verg. cul. 1. ecl. 6,1. georg. 4,565. Hor. carm. 1,32,2 ff. 4,9,8. Ov. fast. 2,3–6. 4,9 and further references in H. WAGENVORT: 'Ludus poeticus' in *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion*. Leiden 1956, 30–42 passim). Although these usages are directly influenced by the Greek and especially Hellenistic notions of *παίγνιον, παίξειν, παιδιὰ* (on which, see R. MUTH: 'Poeta ludens.' *Serta philologica Aenipontana* 2 (1972) 77 ff.; direct Hellenistic influence in this connexion may be detected in the Erotopaegnia of Laevius, a forerunner of the neoteric poets), it is nevertheless highly improbable that the *enfants terribles* and *bons viveurs* of Catullus' circle, with their generally scant regard for the traditional Roman morals and way of life, did not consciously choose the concept of 'playing' in describing their own lifestyle and light poetic compositions in order to offer a challenge as it were to their elders, those *severiores* mocked by Catullus. These latter would concur with C.'s dictum that *neque...ita generati sumus ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, ad severitatem potius et ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora* (off. 1,103; cf. rep. 1,67 concerning a state where anarchy and unlimited freedom prevail: *senes autem ad ludum adolescentium descendant, ne sint iis odiosi et graves*; for the combination *ludus/ludere & iocus*, cf. Cat.'s programmatic c. 50); or they would employ in speaking of poetry the terms *ludere, ludus* only in a denigrating sense, as in Tusc. 4,70. On the use of *ludere* in neoteric poetry, see MUTH, WAGENVORT 1956, NISBET-HUBBARD on Hor. carm. 1,32,2.

²¹⁵ Cf. C.'s rejection of *otium* as *inertia atque desidia* (Brut. 8), as an un-Roman evasion of activity in the political life (often opposed to Roman *negotia* or *occupatio*): rep. 1,2. 1,7–10 de orat. 1,56; as a characteristic of Greeks: de orat. 1,22. 102. 3,56 f. 131. orat. 108. Sest. 110 *Graeculum se atque otiosum putari voluit, studio litterarum se subito dedit*; (cf. p.red. in sen. 14 *cum vero etiam litteris studere incipit et belua immanis cum Graeculis philosophari...*); Verr. 2,2,7 *iam vero hominum ipsorum, iudices, ea patientia, virtus, frugalitasque est. ut proxime ad nostram disciplinam illam veterem, non ad hanc, quae nunc increbuit, videantur accedere. nihil ceterorum simile Graecorum, nulla desidia, nulla luxuries, contra summus labor in publicis privatisque rebus, summa diligentia*. (cf. KROLL 1924, 2). The Roman, and above all the Roman statesman, generally has little time for *doctrina, otium* and *studium* (de orat. 1,78–9. 3,82); excessive *otium* – even that devoted to study – is regarded as dangerous anyway since it can alienate a man from oratorical praxis. Of course, not all kinds of *otium* are condemned by C.; on the contrary, he allows that refined and cultured *otium* of the citizen active in the public life, which serves only to relax the mind when one's *negotium* is finished (off. 1,19. cf. 1,103. Att. 1,20,7. de orat. 3,58), to console deflated spirits, to equip one through study with fresh intellectual material for the discharging of one's *negotium*, and most importantly to give one the opportunity to reflect on important issues: cf. Arch. 12 ff. rep. 1,7. 14. de orat. 1,1. 2,20. Brut. 8. 10. Lael. 17. fam. 7,1,1. Planc. 66. The well known Ciceronian formula *cum dignitate otium* sometimes, as in de orat. 1,1. fam. 1,9,21, expresses this concept more precisely; in other places, such as at fam. 1,9,21. Sest. 98 it has a more political colouring, being roughly equivalent to 'civil harmony' or 'domestic peace'. In off. 1,69 ff. C.'s attitude toward *otium* is significantly altered, and one can detect the cause of this change in his own personal circumstances (cf. NARDUCCI 1997, 9 on C.'s growing inclination to accept the independence from involvement with the *res publica* of the literary *otium*, 'die Stille u. die beschauliche Versenkung in die Wissenschaften': ALBRECHT 422). Hence he defends those *qui...tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint*, these men *severi et graves...nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt* (cf. de orat.

and aim at, and offer their audience, nothing more than *delectatio*: cf. fin. 1,72: *in poetis evoluendis...in quibus nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio*²¹⁶ (cf. fin. 1,25. 2,107²¹⁷. leg. 1,5)²¹⁸. Hence Cicero's insistence in the pro Archia (12) that his abiding interest in literature and poetry is to be distinguished from the usual literary activities of others: *ego vero fateor me his studiis* [i.e. to literature and poetry] *esse deditum: ceteros pudeat, si qui se ita se litteris abdiderunt, ut nihil possint ex iis neque ad communem adferre fructum neque in aspectum lucemque proferre*²¹⁹.

Sometimes other terms, as for example the generic *virtus*, or *nostra disciplina illa vetus* (cf. Verr. 2,2,7), above all *prudentia*²²⁰, are used to express aspects of this practical, utilitarian outlook which is extolled at the beginning of the Tusc. and which receives its highest expression in a famous passage of Vergil's national epic (Aen. 6,847 ff.) in which the Romans' gifts for government and warfare are contrasted with the theoretical, abstract, and

3,58 & Sall. bell.Iug. 4,4). Furthermore, those who have dedicated themselves to study, and those whose health is weak are exempt from the duties of the active life. But those like the Epicureans who have no excuse (*quibus autem talis nulla sit causa*) are still to be condemned. The bibliography on this subject is extensive; let it suffice here to cite but a few of them: M. FUHRMANN: 'Cum dignitate otium.' *Gymnasium* 67 (1960) 481–500; C. WIRSZUBSKI: 'Cicero's *cum dignitate otium*: a reconsideration.' *JRS* 44 (1954) 1–13; N. WOOD: *Cicero's Social and Political Thought*. Berkeley & Los Angeles 1988, 193–205; L-P I 57 f. 'Römische occupatio und griechisches otium'. On *otium* as a neoteric life-principle and prerequisite for *ludus* and *nugae*, again see WAGENVOORT 1956, 36 & MUTH 75 ff.

²¹⁶ This is the reply of Torquatus the Epicurean to C.'s earlier challenge to him (Torquatus) and Triarius to defend as Epicureans their devotion to history, poetry and literature in general (1,25 f.). C. insists that they cannot say that these studies are a source of pleasure to them, because Epicurus, who despised learning never took that line. Torquatus' reply is as follows: i) the reason Epicurus rejected poetry and literature was that he defined education as consisting only of those studies which contribute to the science of happiness (*beatae vitae disciplina* 1,71); ii) T. admits that he and Triarius at C.'s instigation (*te hortatore*) are devoted to literature, and that the study of poetry and literature has nothing of 'solid utility' to offer, being nothing more than *puerilis delectatio* – that was why Epicurus rejected literature; but this does not contradict their Epicurean beliefs inasmuch as they pursue literature and poetry not as *education* (hence in line with Epicurus), but rather merely as *delectatio*. Cf. ELIZABETH ASMIS: 'Epicurean poetics.' in D.OBBINK: *Philodemus & Poetry*. Oxford 1995, 22 ff.

²¹⁷ But cf. fin. 2,115.

²¹⁸ Also orat. 68 according to MADVIG's emendation (followed by SANDYS) cf. above n. 77. SAUPE's correction of the MS. *nonnullorum voluntati* is, however, in my view better: *nonnullorum voluntate vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt*. Nevertheless, even here, the 'pleasure' principle is still implicit: cf. Dion. Hal. comp. 16 (p. 63,9 ff. U.-R.) ὥστε πολλή ἀνάγκη καλὴν μὲν εἶναι λέξιν ἐν ᾗ καλὰ ἐστὶν ὀνόματα, κάλλους δὲ ὀνομάτων συλλαβὰς τε καὶ γράμματα καλὰ αἴτια εἶναι, ἡδεῖαν δὲ διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἡδυνόντων τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον ὀνομάτων τε καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων... On the 'pleasure' principle in poetry, see also Eratosthenes ποιητὴν γὰρ ἔφη πάντα στοχάζεσθαι ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας (Strab. 115) and PFEIFFER *Hist. Cl. Sch.* I 166; Hermogenes Id. 1,6 τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ ἡδονῆς ἢ ποιήσεως οἶμαι στοχάζεται. (= SPENGEL p. 287,25 f. = RABE p.243,4 f.). See also below § 4.2 on *delectatio sola*.

²¹⁹ Cf. Phil. 2,20. fin. 3,7 (excusing Cato's 'book-gluttony'); ad Q.fr. 1,1,28 in which C. defends himself against a charge of *levitas* despite having devoted himself to Greek studies (again observe his appeal to his accomplishments in public life): *non enim me hoc iam dicere pudebit, praesertim in ea vita atque iis rebus gestis in quibus non potest residere inertiae aut levitatis ulla suspicio, nos ea quae consecuti sumus iis studiis et artibus esse adeptos quae sint nobis Graeciae monumentis disciplinisque tradita*. On the idea of exposure to light (= public judgement) as a test of reality, cf. de orat. 1,157: *illa commentatio inclusa in veritatis lucem proferenda est*. On the reliability of the speech pro Archia as a source of evidence for C.'s literary and cultural views, see below § 4.1.

²²⁰ For *prudentia* conjoined with *gravitas*, cf. ad Q. fr. 1,2,3; also GROSS 758, who notes the political overtones of this combination: '[*gravitas*] ist gepaart mit *prudentia*...mit *sapientia*...mit *consilium*, dem richtigen Urteil, das vor allem vom politischen Denken der Nobilität bestimmt ist...'

artistic pursuits of other nations (especially those of the Greeks)²²¹. *Prudentia* is most often used to express the Romans' 'practical wisdom' and 'sound thinking' based on experience²²² and manifested in action or in some sphere of professional activity²²³, in contrast to the abstract *sapientia* or *cognitio* of Greek intellectuals, who because they are so devoted to *otium* (de orat. 1,22. 3,56 f.), tarry excessively in theoretical speculations and eschew participation in the public life²²⁴ – hence Antonius is described in de orat. 2,4 as wishing to appear 'nostrorum hominum in omni genere *prudentiam* Graecis anteferre'. No less is *virtus* an active quality which is incompatible with the sedentary occupation of intellectuals: so rep. 1,2; *virtus actiosa* nat.deor. 1,110; above all off. 1,19: *alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias...cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est; virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit*²²⁵. Thus other terms employed by Cicero apart from *gravitas* to express essential Roman qualities, terms such as *prudentia* and *virtus*, inasmuch as they similarly imply a practical wisdom, an active life, are also inherently opposed to the contemplative activity of such arts as poetic composition.

Thus the first argument that Cicero uses both in the beginning of the Tusc. and elsewhere less explicitly in order to prove the *levitas* of poetry involves a comparison of the values of poetry with the qualities and pursuits of those whom one associates with *gravitas*.

²²¹ Cf. har.resp. 19 *nec artibus Graecos...superavimus*, Tusc. 1,3 *doctrina Graecia nos et omni litterarum genere superabat*, de orat. 1,13 *ut omittam Graeciam...atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas*. The Aen. passage 6,847 ff. is compared with that from the Tusc. by both DOUGLAS in his commentary on the Tusc.; and by NORDEN in his on Bk. 6 of the Aen.

²²² The lack of practical experience of many Greek intellectuals is the object of C.'s ridicule in the well known anecdote in which Phormio the Peripatetic discourses to Hannibal 'aliquot horas de imperatoris officio et de omni re militari': de orat. 2,75 f. (on which anecdote, see GÜTE 148). Cf. also 1,105 *Graeci alicuius...loquacitatem sine usu neque ex scholis cantilenam*, rep. 1,3: *eos...qui...urbibus...praesunt, iis qui omni negotii publici expertes sint, longe duco sapientia ipsa esse anteposendos*. In ad Q.fr.1,1,18 C. associates *prudentia* with *usus*: *quid enim ei praecipiam quem ego in hoc praesertim genere intellegam prudentia non esse inferiorem quam me, usu vero etiam superiorem?* However, on rare occasions *prudentia* is equivalent to *sapientia* or philosophy as at Tusc. 1,7. So DOUGLAS ad Tusc. 1,7: 'philosophy: for *prudentia* with this very rare meaning, usually represented by *sapientia*, while *prudentia* is practical foresight or skill esp. in law'; POHLLENZ on the same passage: '*prudentiam* sonst meist von der praktischen Einsicht oder den praktischen Wissenschaften...'

²²³ Important for C. is the etymology which derives *prudentia* from *providere* (cf. rep. 6,1. leg. 1,60. div. 1,111), a quality of the mind. And yet in all the various meanings of *prudentia* (cf. DOUGLAS ad Brut. 23), there is always some reference to a practical application to politics, to one's profession or discipline, to everyday life (thus the *scientia* attributed to *prudentia* in part. 76 is not something held merely in abstraction, as the defining sentence which follows this attribution makes clear: *atque illa prudentia in suis rebus domestica, in publicis civilis appellari solet*). Even when *providere* is invoked or when in using *prudentia* emphasis is given to the meaning of 'foresight', we are to understand these as the quality of a statesman who foresees trouble or possible difficulties for the state, and by his governing averts them (cf. rep. 1,45 and ZETZEL ad loc.; also 2,5. 12. 45. 6,1. div. 1,111)

²²⁴ Cf. Verr. 2,2,7 already cited above concerning the Sicilian Greeks: *nihil ceterorum simile Graecorum, nulla desidia, nulla luxuries, contra summus labor in publicis privatisque rebus, summa diligentia*, rep. 1,2 *usus autem eius (sc. virtutis) est maximus civitatis gubernatio, et earum ipsarum rerum quas isti [philosophi] in angulis personant reapse non oratione perfectio*; cf. de orat. 1,57. 3,56. In C.'s criticism of Greek intellectuals (and Romans affecting Greek manners) who eschew public life, often he has the Epicureans specifically in mind, as in rep. 1,1 *ut isti putant*; off. 1,70 f. fin. 5,57

²²⁵ The *virtus* praised in Tusc. 1,2 also refers to the quality of men active both in public and domestic life.

Two other variant arguments can be discerned in the beginning of the Tusc. In the first, which we meet often in Cicero, the Roman nation with its serious and sober outlook, with its practical, utilitarian pursuits that have been mentioned above, is contrasted with the Greeks whose outlook is represented as trivial, who prefer *otium* to *negotium*²²⁶, whose pursuits are abstract and artistic²²⁷: poetry, music, the plastic arts, mathematics, philosophy²²⁸. The principal reason for this divergence in tendencies which may roughly be reduced to the formula [*practical / utilitarian*] – [*impractical / abstract*] is the possession of *gravitas* or the lack thereof (= *levitas*); so K. GROSS: 753, adducing Tusc. 1,2: 'Er [sc. Cicero] nennt sie [Gravitas] als erste Eigenschaft, die die Römer von den Griechen unterscheidet.' Compare also POHLENZ ad Tusc. 1,2: '*gravitas, constantia animi magn.*, das sind die Tugenden, auf welche die Römer am meisten Wert legten, während sie den Griechen *levitas* und *inconstantia* vorwarfen.'²²⁹

²²⁶ Cf. de orat. 3,56 f. orat. 108; also KROLL (1924) 2.

²²⁷ Cf. Flacc. 9: *verum tamen hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam...*

²²⁸ For the abstract and philosophical pursuits of the Greeks, cf. fin. 2,68: *ab iis* [sc. Graecis] *philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas habemus*, de orat. 3,137: *ut virtutis a nostris sic doctrinae ab illis* [sc. Graecis] *exempla petenda sunt*. In de orat. 2,4 although the superiority of Greek learning is admitted, Antonius is said 'nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam Graecis anteferre'. Notice that C.'s position on philosophy appears to vacillate; in de orat. 1,195 cited above, it is held to be inferior to the law because it is not as useful. Naturally, often in the speeches the pursuit of philosophy and other forms of intellectual discourse are rejected as idleness, as Greek things (cf. de orat. 1,47. 2,17), as things devoid of value as not being based on practical experience: so p. red. in sen. 14. de orat. 2,75–77. Again, in rep. 1,3 the statesman (*ille civis qui...cogit omnes imperio legumque poena*) is held to be superior to the philosophers and men of learning (*ipsis est praeferendus doctoribus*), because he can compel all citizens to do what the philosophers with all their words can persuade – and that with great difficulty – only a few to do. But later in 1,26–29 Scipio appears to contradict the disparagement of philosophers in 1,2–3 with a long eulogy of the philosophy and learning (*doctrina*) (? cf. BÜCHNER 109) p. 17,22 [ZIEGLER], p. 19,23; *sapientia* p. 19,10; *humanitas* p. 19,14) which among other things bring one to understand eternity, man's place in the cosmos and to detach oneself from the world; there is similar eulogy of *sapientia* in leg. 1,58 ff. This is not quite a volte-face; rather, C. is here merely refining his position. In rep. 1,2–3, it is philosophy as a political inactive, self-serving pursuit or as a pursuit in which one is wholly absorbed (cf. rep. 1,30) that is rejected; in 1,26–29, it is already taken for granted that political activity is necessary (1,27 *imperia consulatusque nostros in necessariis...rebus*), but that political activity must be informed by *doctrina*. Thus rightly ZETZEL ad 1,26: 'The contradiction...is only apparent: Scipio views political activity as a necessary task...but one which is placed in its proper perspective by a sense of the value of learning'. The change in attitude becomes most marked in the philosophical books after the rep. in the 40's, as for example in fin. 5,7, philosophy is placed somewhat higher than the rest of the liberal arts and in numerous places its practitioners are even credited with *gravitas* (e.g. nat. deor. 1,1. Tusc. 5,104. fin. 1,4 *gravissimis rebus*, 4,23. leg. 2,14. off. 1,69. In fin. 1,1–2 he opposes those to whom *totum hoc displicet philosophari*, stating that he had answered them in his Hortensius and that therein philosophy was praised and defended (*a nobis philosophia defensa et collaudata est*). Cf. also the non-philosophical work orat. 10). This shift in attitude of course agrees with what Plut. tells us in his life of C. 40.: ἐκ τούτου (i.e. after the battle of Pharsalus) Κικέρων, εἰς μοναρχίαν τῆς πολιτείας μεθεστῶσης, ἀφόμενος τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν ἐσχόλαζε τοῖς βουλομένοις φιλοσοφεῖν τῶν νεῶν...αὐτῷ δ' ἔργον μὲν ἦν τὸ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις συντελεῖν διαλόγους καὶ μεταφράζειν, καὶ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν ἢ φυσικῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον εἰς Ῥωμαϊκὴν μεταβάλλειν διάλεκτον. Cf. DOUGLAS ad Tusc. 1,7 (on *in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari...de maximis quaestionibus...dicere*): '...that was not how C. saw the relative importance of oratory and philosophy before 46. The first passage hinting at a change of view is orat. 148...'.

²²⁹ On the *levitas Graecorum*, see Flacc. 36: *das enim mihi...nullam gravitatem...in Graecis hominibus esse*; 57: *levitas propria Graecorum*, ad Q. fr. 1,1,16. 1,2,4. *quae feci omnia, non quo me aut hi* [sc. Graeci] *homines aut tota natio delectaret: pertaesum est levitatis...*; Lig. 11. In rep. 1,5: *levitatis Athenienium...exempla...quae nata et frequentata apud illos etiam in gravissimam civitatem nostram dicunt redundasse*, and Sest. 141: *quodsi apud Athenienses, homines Graecos longe a nostrorum hominum gravitate diiunctos*, the Greek *levitas* is contrasted with the Roman *gravitas*. Cf. also TROUARD 22; WAGENVOORT (1947) 104, 119 who further cites on this subject W. KROLL: *Kultur d. Cicero. Zeit* (1933), 27 ff., which I have been unable to view.

A second variant argument runs thus: *gravitas* owes its origin to the founders of the Roman state²³⁰, or rather, there is no *gravitas* comparable to that of the Roman ancestors; these ancestors neither practised the art of poetry, nor awarded any honour to those who did (Tusc. 1,3)²³¹: therefore, poetry does not partake of *gravitas*. It is significant that for Cicero, the genius of the primitive Roman people lay in their eminently practical achievements, such as the law, the study of which is called at de orat. 1,193 the *antiquitatis effigies* that reflects the *maiorum consuetudinem vitamque*.

Cicero found philosophical confirmation for the Roman prejudice regarding the *levitas* of abstract studies and 'introspective' literature in the work of Dicaearchus who advocated the βίος πρακτικός against the βίος θεωρητικός of Theophrastus. This theme of the superiority of the active (and public) life over the contemplative, intellectual life is pursued in numerous passages in Cicero, above all in the rep. where it is stated in the first book (1,2): *nec vero habere virtutem satis est quasi artem aliquam nisi utare...virtus in usu sui tota posita est*²³².

Lastly, the fictitious content of certain types of poetry – perhaps even most poetry – often for Cicero contributes to poetry's status as an *ars levior*²³³. Thus in several passages Cicero hints that the subject matter of 'fictional' poetry, inasmuch as it is fictional and therefore not concerned with reality – on one level, at any rate – is trivial and unimportant²³⁴. There is also in Cicero's philosophical works a Platonic hostility to poets as liars and deceivers of men, especially with regard to the afterlife and to the gods: see for example Tusc. 1,10. 36 f. 3,2 f. nat.deor. 1,42. 77. 112. 2,63. 3,76 f. (*poetarum ista sunt, nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores non fabularum*) 91²³⁵. On occasion we find Cicero introducing this notion of poetry as being unreal, as not only dealing with unimportant

²³⁰ Cf. har.resp. 43. The *prisca gravitas* was not an idea of Cicero's invention, but on the contrary was a commonplace among the Romans; see for example: Vell. 2,49,3. 2,86,2. 2,116,3. Tac. hist. 1,83. Mart. 7,47,2. Val. Max. 2,6,1. Sall. Catil. 52, knows the concept, but, as it has already been indicated, avoids the term *gravitas*. Cf. also WAGENVOORT (1947) 106.

²³¹ This is the point of C.'s statements (Tusc. 1,3): *serius poeticam nos accepimus... sero igitur a nostris poetae vel cogniti vel recepti*. The idea of the lateness of Roman culture in comparison with that of the Greeks we meet elsewhere, as for example, in Brut. 39 (of eloquence); and in rep. 2,18.

²³² Cf. fin. 5,58: *ergo hoc quidem apparet nos ad agendum esse natos*, nat.deor. 1,110 *virtus actiuosa*, off. 1,19 *virtutis enim laus in actione consistit*; de orat. 1,78 (& L-P ad loc.). Cf. BÜCHNER Komm. zu rep. p. 55, 73, 80; also ZETZEL Comm. ad rep. p. 25 ff., and on 1,2,1. 1,12,3. NORDEN in his commentary on the Vergil passage which we have mentioned above (Aen. 6,847 ff.) remarks: 'Es folgt im Gegensatz zum βίος θεωρητικός der Hellenen der βίος πρακτικός der Römer.'

²³³ In orat. 67, C. dismisses the vigorousness of movement, metre and brilliance of figures as the most important characteristics of poetry (*nec tamen id est poetae maximum*) but he does not state what is the essential element. KROLL ad loc. conjectured it was 'free invention' (quoted above n. 78), citing Plut. quom. adul. 2. 16 c. *ὡς ποίησιν οὐκ οὔσαν ἢ ψεῦδος μὴ πρόσσεστι*. Schol. Dion. Thr. 449,4 *ποιητῆς δὲ κεκόσμηται τοῖς τέσσαρσι τούτοις, μέτρῳ μῦθῳ ἱστορίᾳ καὶ ποιῇ λέξει, καὶ πᾶν ποίημα μὴ μετέχον τούτων οὐκ ἔστι ποίημα, εἰ καὶ μέτρῳ κέχρηται*. [Long.] 15,8 in distinguishing poetical and rhetorical *phantasiai*, points to the fictitiousness of the former; he clearly holds the latter to be superior by virtue of their inherent reality and truth (*τὸ ἔμπρακτον καὶ ἐνάληδες*).

²³⁴ Cf. Mil. 8 *etiam fictis fabulis* where *etiam* possibly implies that one does not customarily devote much serious thought to tragic poetry, although admittedly this may be reading too much into the word.

²³⁵ Cf. also leg. 1,4 f. Manil. 25.

matters but as being itself unimportant, when he wishes to illustrate one of the differences between oratory and poetry (sometimes associated with acting), namely, that the one is concerned with reality and truth, its exponents being agents of real actions²³⁶, and the other with fictions, as if this were self-evident proof of the superiority and greater importance of oratory. Thus in *de orat.* 3,214, complaining of the virtual monopoly that the theatre has on the techniques of delivery, Cicero writes: *haec ideo dico pluribus, quod genus hoc totum oratores, qui sunt veritatis ipsius actores, reliquerunt; imitatores autem veritatis, histriones, occupaverunt. ac sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas*²³⁷. LAIDLAW 1960, 65 comments on this: ‘...in this antithesis one sees emerging again the Roman conviction that the world of art is less important than the world of action, here action in the courts.’

Summary

In this chapter we have seen how the notion of the poetic was developed by the Greeks mostly of the fourth century and that this was accomplished largely through their discussions of the differences between prose and ‘poetic’ style. We saw too that out of the different views of poetic style that were entertained among the Greeks, one type of view represented best by Aristotle, and to a lesser extent, by Isocrates, survived among the Romans, and that it was probably Cicero who was responsible for this survival. In particular, Cicero took over from Aristotle, Isocrates and those who followed in their tradition, notions of the poetic style as consisting of departures from the ordinary usage, and as exhibiting excessive and bold exploitation of several types of ornaments admissible even in prose. The types of ornaments that were identified by his predecessors were also in large part repeated by Cicero himself: in particular, metaphors, exotic words, archaisms, new and compound words. Again with Aristotle, Cicero abandons the insistence on rhythm and metre common among other theorists as the chief distinguishing characteristics of poetry. With regard to the *genera dicendi* theory we saw that Cicero, like Aristotle and other Greek theorists, identified the poetic style with the vehemently emotional, grand style. Lastly, we discussed Cicero’s notorious view of poetry as one of the *artes leviores*, in

²³⁶ Hence C. (*de orat.* 3,57) makes Crassus implicitly praise the ideal of Peleus for his son Achilles that he should become an *orator verborum actorque rerum* (= *Il.* 9,443). It is ironic that support for this ideal should be sought from a poet.

²³⁷ Cf. *de orat.* 2,193 *quid potest esse tam fictum quam versus, quam scaena, quam fabulae?* (L-P ad loc: ‘...die dichterische Form, die Bühne und die ersonnenen Geschichten sind die drei irrealen Aspekte des Dramas...’); cf also 2,34 *qui actor imitanda quam orator suscipienda veritate incundior?*

2. Definitions of Poetry

which we found, among other things, philosophical and nationalistic causes for his low estimation of the art.

3. THE NATURE OF THE POET: Conditions Necessary for Poetic Composition

'That talk of inspiration is sheer nonsense, I may tell you that flat. There is no such thing; it is a mere matter of craftsmanship.'

MACKAIL'S *Life of William Morris*

Overview:

Introduction: brief survey of history of divine inspiration theory

- 3.1 Chief discussions of Ciceronian theory about the nature of the poet: PENNACINI & MALCOVATI
- 3.2 Ciceronian texts: 3 elements identified in divine-inspiration theory
- 3.3 the letters:
 - a) Att. 2,3,4
 - b) ad Q. fr. 2,9,1
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- 3.4 'furore' texts: de orat. 2,193 f.
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- 3.7 Arch. 18 and *poetic doctrina*
- 3.8 *natura/ingenium* and *ars*
- 3.9 *ars/doctrina* and the *mos maiorum*
- 3.10 the judgement on Lucretius

One of the tendencies of literary theory and criticism in antiquity made familiar to readers not only from texts of Homer, Hesiod, Plato, and Pindar, but also from the modern commentators is that which attempts to explain the poet, the nature of his profession and the process of his composition in terms of his relations with external influences, over which he exercises little, or no control. In the earliest sources, the poets themselves declare this special relationship with such external powers, whether in sincere belief, or in accordance with the convention, when they invoke the aid of the Muses¹, or one of the gods, and proclaim their specific mandate to be, like the prophets, the mediators between the heavens and mortal men. In later sources, beginning with Democritus and Plato, the poet is regarded as somehow 'possessed' (the Platonic *κατοκωχή* describes this

¹ In this connexion, it is interesting to note that the neoterics, being poets *ex arte* as I shall argue below, invoke no aid from any Muse (cf. KROLL ad Catull. c. 1,9 ff.: 'C. schließt mit dem Gebet an die Muse, seinem Buche ein langes Leben zu verleihen – ein Ersatz für die sonst übliche Bitte um Inspiration'); on the contrary, instead of receiving accounts from the Muses, the neoterics relate their stories to them (cf. Catull. 68,41 ff. (cf. FORDYCE ad loc.)). In the next generation Gallus (fr. 2 COURTNEY = Pap. Qasr Ibrim inv. 78–3–11/1 [LI/2]) reverts to a more traditional formula: *tandem fecerunt [ar]mina Musae quae possem domina deicere digna mea.*

action), that is to say, inspired, by some divine agent, or moved by a kind of madness that resembles divine possession². Ideas of both kinds, are of course, not exclusive either to antiquity or to Greece and Rome alone; they are, as has been observed often enough, relatively common in many cultures. For the poetic talent is rare and hence naturally at all times and in many places has a mystic aura enveloped its inner workings, leading inevitably to speculation about its origins. It is, nevertheless, true that such ideas enjoy a remarkable prominence in antiquity and no account of ancient poetics can be complete which fails to take account of them. We find them in one form or another, alluded to, or discussed, by the major ancient critics of poetry. It is outside the scope of this chapter to review the development and multiplicity of forms which these ideas took in antiquity, except insofar as they have direct relevance to Cicero's thought.

3.1 Chief discussions of Ciceronian theory about the nature of the poet: MALCOVATI & PENNACINI

The two principal discussions of Cicero's ideas regarding the inspiration of the poet and his position in the ancient critical tradition are to be found in MALCOVATI (1 ff.) and PENNACINI (69 ff.)³. Despite the fact that Cicero in no place, except in the speech *pro Archia* where other considerations related to the exigencies of the case are involved, intends to discuss the poet and the process of composition *per se*, MALCOVATI and PENNACINI endeavour to find in a series of unrelated statements in Cicero's writings these ideas not only represented more or less substantially, but also constituting the basis of his own views on the subject. First and foremost among these writings is accordingly the *pro Archia* which MALCOVATI and PENNACINI treat as though it were a systematic Ciceronian manifesto on poetics. MALCOVATI takes Cicero's statements on the divine 'adflatus' and 'furor', to all intents and purposes, at face value; for her Cicero, according to his eclectic manner, has combined aspects of Democritean and Platonic teachings⁴. She, notices (3) that 'questa teoria della forza divina...affiora in altri luoghi ciceroniani, temperata spesso da espressioni attenuative come *aliquis quidam quasi...*', but this does not cause her to hesitate in attributing to Cicero (even though, she admits (9), he neglects to expound this explicitly) a Democritean, atomistic and kinetic understanding of the divine influence on the soul in its

² For a good general account, see E. DODDS: *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley-Los Angeles 1951, 80 ff.; also R. VELARDI: *Enthousiasmos*. Roma 1989.

³ Cf. P. FERRARINO: 'Cicerone poeta e critico.' *Scritti Scelti*, opuscoli accad. XV Firenze Olschki 1986, 143: 'Per Cicerone il poeta è bensì, come per Ennio, « santo » – « il sacro vate » ...'

⁴ Likewise JOCELYN (1973) 68, citing, of the texts to be discussed below in § 3.2, the following: 1,2, 4 & 6: 'His [sc. C's] view of the nature of the poet's inspiration was one traditionally associated with Plato as well as with Democritus'.

artistic operations (5 ff.)! Plato was responsible for stressing the truth of the poet's perceptions (which were comparable in every respect to the hallucinations of the Bacchantes or Corybantes) despite his insanity in the poetic composition⁵. The poet is out of his mind, when he composes, and in fact, it is not really he, but the divinity (of whom he is merely the interpreter) who composes. These aspects of the doctrine of the divinely inspired poet are approved and adopted by Cicero. PENNACINI, on the other hand, treats the attenuating phrases more seriously: of Arch. 19 ('quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari'), he writes (69 f.): 'peraltro quasi e quodam assegnano a divino spirito funzione di metafora; sicché *spiritus divinus* sarà da intendersi, per analogia, come ispirazione proveniente dalla natura e dalle *vires mentis*'. Thus, while he does not take the texts of Cicero which allude to a Democritean-Platonic understanding of divine inspiration as indications of sincere belief in such notions, still it is evident that he takes this model as the basis for Cicero's developed views on poetic compositions. In what follows, I shall argue, on the contrary, that Cicero does neither what MALCOVATI nor what PENNACINI alleges; that their errors are due to a misunderstanding of the contexts of the several passages which they adduce in support of their contentions, and to selective readings of the relevant texts. I shall also argue that the doctrine of the divine poet, is not – not even in a mitigated form – adopted by Cicero, and that the allusions to the same are either only conventional symbols, or are employed only for the occasion to support a larger argument. First, it will be expedient to list here all the texts which may be adduced as referring to this doctrine:

3.2 Ciceronian texts that seem to support a (divine) inspiration theory⁶

1). Arch. 18

ceterarum rerum studia et doctrina et arte constare, *poetam natura ipsa valere et mentis viribus excitari et quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari. qua re suo iure noster ille Ennius sanctos appellat poetas*, quod quasi deorum aliquo dono atque munere commendati nobis esse videantur. sit igitur, iudices, sanctum apud vos, humanissimos homines, hoc poetae nomen, quod nulla umquam barbaria violavit. saxa cantu flectuntur atque consistunt: nos instituti rebus optimis non poetarum voce moveamur?

2). de orat. 2,193 f.

[Antonius]: sed ut dixi, ne hoc in nobis mirum esse videatur, quid potest esse tam fictum quam versus, quam scaena, quam fabulae? tamen in hoc genere saepe ipse vidi, ut ex persona mihi ardere oculi hominis histrionis viderentur... quae si ille histrio, cotidie cum ageret, tamen recte agere sine dolore non

⁵ She cites (8) in this connexion C. div. 1,114, which of course is concerned not with poets, but diviners.

⁶ Chronologically arranged but for the passages from the epistles.

poterat, quid Pacuvium putatis in scribendo *leni animo ac remisso* fuisse? fieri nullo modo potuit. saepe enim audiavi poetam bonum neminem – id quod a Democrito, et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt – sine *inflammatione animorum* existere posse, et sine quodam *adflatu quasi furoris*

3). orat. 109

[Homerus, Ennius, reliqui poetae et maxime tragici] sed quid poetas *divino ingenio* profero?

4). Tusc. 1,64

mihi vero ne haec quidem notiora et illustriora carere vi divina videntur, ut ego aut poetam grave plenumque carmen sine *caelesti aliquo mentis instinctu* putem fundere, aut eloquentiam sine maiore quadam vi fluere abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibusque sententiis.

5). div. 1,34

quorum omnium [sc. *oraculorum* or *signorum*] interpretes, ut grammatici poetarum, proxime ad eorum quos interpretantur, divinitatem videntur accedere

divinitatem *HOTTINGER* : divinationem *A V B*

6). ibid. 1,80

fit etiam saepe specie quadam saepe vocum gravitate et cantibus ut pellantur animi vehementius, saepe etiam cura et timore, qualis est illa [sc. Hesione] atque etiam illa concitatio declarat vim in animis esse divinam. negat enim sine *furore* Democritus quemquam poetam magnum esse posse, quod idem dicit Plato. quem, si placet, appellet *furem*, dum modo is *furor* ita laudetur, ut in Phaedro Platonis laudatus est. quid, vestra oratio in causis, quid ipsa actio potest esse vehemens et gravis et copiosa, nisi est animus ipse commotior? equidem etiam in te saepe vidi et, ut ad leviora veniamus, in Aesopo familiari tuo tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quaedam abstraxisse a sensu mentis videretur:

7). Att. 2,3,4

sed me *κατακλείς* mea illa commovet quae est in libro tertio:

interea cursus, quos prima a parte iuventae
quosque adeo consul virtute animoque petisti,
hos retine atque auge famam laudesque bonorum.

haec mihi cum in eo libro in quo multa sunt scripta *ἀριστοκρατικῶς* Calliope ipsa praescripserit...

8). ad Q. fr. 2,9,1

non mehercule quisquam *μουσοπάτακτος* libentius sua recentia poemata legit quam ego te audio quacumque de re, publica, privata, rustica urbana.

9). ibid. 3,4,4

de versibus quos tibi a me *scribi* vis, deest mihi quidem opera, quae non modo tempus sed etiam animum vacuum ab omni cura desiderat; sed abest etiam *ἐνδουσιασμός*, non enim sumus omnino sine cura venientis *anni*, etsi sumus sine timore.

quae Ω : qui scripsit SHACKLETON BAILEY sed abest etiam ἐνθουσιασμός Ω : post opera posuit SHACKLETON BAILEY

10). ibid. 3,5,4

quod me de versibus faciendis rogas, incredibile est, mi frater, quam egeam tempore, nec sane satis *commoveor animo* ad ea quae uis canenda. ἀμπώτεις uero et ea quae ipse ego ne cogitando quidem consequor tu, qui omnis isto eloquendi et exprimendi genere superasti, a me petis? facerem tamen ut possem, sed, quod te minime fugit, opus est ad poema *quadam animi alacritate*, quam plane mihi tempora eripiunt.

Three elements might roughly be identified as proof of a belief in some form of the divine-inspiration theory:

- I. *furor* or madness
- II. possession by divinity, or by divinely originated phenomenon etc.
- III. all other operations in the poet's mind or soul produced by an external or quasi-external source (e.g. by some force/*adflatus/inflammatiō/incitatio* etc.)

For the time being we will allow the widest possible interpretation in the attribution of the second element, so that any mention of the divinity in connexion with the poets or their poetry might be placed in this class. The third element covers all other out-of-the-ordinary or preternatural or quasi-preternatural conditions – excluding the (divine) *furor* – under which a poet might compose. The following table will serve to illustrate which elements might be alleged to be present in each of the above cited passages.

**Presence of divine-inspiration theory elements
in selected Cic. passages**

	I	II	III
Arch.18	—	•	•
de orat. 2,193 f.	•	—	•
orat. 109	—	•	—
Tusc. 1,64	—	•	•
div. 1,34	—	•	—
—1,80	•	•	•
Att. 2,3,4		•	
ad Q. fr. 2,9,1	• (?)	•	—
—3,4,4	—	•	•
—3,5,4	—	—	•

3.3 the letters: a) Att. 2,3,4 b) ad Q. fr. 2,9,1 c) ad Q. fr. 3,4,4. 3,5,4⁷

Let us start with those passages which may be disposed of relatively easily. It may be stated with confidence from the outset, that as a general rule the letters are not a good source from which to draw proofs for an alleged Ciceronian belief in the divine inspiration theory. Their casual form; their author's capricious changing of opinions as he submitted to the changing times and circumstances; likewise their author's evident preoccupation with practical affairs and politics as against his general indifference to the discussion of ideas of a theoretical nature; their abundant irony and humour (not infrequently joined with touches of sarcasm and cynicism): – all these factors not only demand that any remarks found in the letters which may resemble theoretical formulations should be treated with extreme caution, but also strongly suggest that probably in all cases, these remarks cannot *per se* be cited safely as indications of positive belief.

a) Att. 2,3,4⁸

In Cicero's poem *Suus Consulatus*, not only does the council of the gods make an appearance, but also several of the Muses directly address the consul; of the fragments that survive, we know that Urania in the second, and Calliope in the third, communicate with Cicero. We have in this letter to Atticus, nothing more than a description of that mannerism that Cicero had adopted in a poetic work of fiction after the fashion of old epic in which the gods take an active part in the affairs of men, and the Muses directly address their charges. He states no more than that Calliope herself in the third book instructed his persona. The poem's introduction of the direct and active agency of celestial beings was attacked even in Cicero's own time (possibly by Clodius⁹), and by others in later generations such as Quintilian 11,1,23 who remarks on the verses in which Jupiter summons Cicero to the council of the gods, and in which Minerva is said to have taught him the *artes*: 'quae sibi ille secutus quaedam Graecorum exempla permiserat'; and [Sall.] in *Ciceronem* 3 & 7.

b) ad Q. fr. 2,9,1¹⁰

The passage from Marcus' letter to Quintus 2,9,1, our first alleged '*furor*' text, seems to reveal a lack of sincere belief in the doctrine of the divinely inspired poet, a doctrine which

⁷ = 7–10 respectively at § 3.2 above

⁸ = 7 at § 3.2 above. Dated Dec. 60 or shortly thereafter.

⁹ Cf. COURTNEY 158.

¹⁰ = 8 at § 3.2 above. Dated 55 B.C.

perhaps Quintus held – at any rate, in some form¹¹. Marcus jocularly says of himself that he is more eager to hear his brother's reports and views on recent events than a poet 'struck out of his wits by the Muse' (μουσοπάτακτος) who is to give readings of his latest poems. The playful hapax legomenon hardly suggests a reverent attitude toward the divine possession, but the derisive cynicism of the sophisticated sceptic. 'Inspiration' or possession by the Muse here has nothing to do with composition, but with the zeal to have one's own works recited¹²!

c) ad Q. fr. 3,4,4 & 3,5,4¹³

In a series of three letters, 3,4,4; 3,5,4; & 3,6,3, written within the space of a few weeks of each other, Marcus refuses requests from his brother for some original verses. In each of the letters, Marcus offers an explanation why he is unable to compose poetry at the time of writing, and only in the first, is explicit reference made to the divine inspiration theory. He writes in 3,4,4 that ἐνθουσιασμός is absent. That this claim is not meant to be taken at face value as MALCOVATI takes it, but is rather to be understood as a clever *recusatio* with a learned allusion to the Democritean doctrine of poetic ἐνθουσιασμός, is suggested already by the fact that Cicero does not persist in the following two letters to appeal to the absence of the divine possession. (SHACKLETON BAILEY in his commentary on ad Q. fr. 3,4,4 line 2 is decidedly misleading when he implies that poetic inspiration is referred to in ad Q. fr. 3,5,4: neither *poema* nor *satis commoveor* can be taken as corresponding to the preternatural phenomenon of ἐνθουσιασμός.) Hence this, taken together with the fact that, as will be shown below, there is no other passage in the Ciceronian corpus that provides firm evidence of a belief in the poetic ἐνθουσιασμός, suggests to us that to mistake this passage from ad Q. fr. 3,4,4 for a statement of sincere belief is to rob the passage of its light, erudite humour which derives part of its force from the author's scepticism. The use of Greek phrases in Cicero's epistles for polite banter has been documented¹⁴, and may be compared to a modern English critic jocularly employing a technical term from the French critics, such as DERRIDA's *archi-écriture*. Indeed there are few other passages in any Roman author in which it is more abundantly evident that the literary convention of the poetic

¹¹ Apart from the evidence of div. 1,80, the fact that Q. placed so much emphasis on *natura* over technique and learning (de orat. 1,5) suggests that he had a similar outlook with regard to poetics.

¹² Juvenal at the beginning of his first satire complains about the excessive number of would-be poets, who make the plane trees and marble buildings of Fronto shake and reverberate with endless recitations; cf. Hor. ep. 2,1,110. 2,2,90 ff.

¹³ = 9 & 10 at § 3.2 above. Dated Oct. 54 & Oct./Nov. of the same year, respectively.

¹⁴ R. B. STEELE: 'The Greek in Cicero's epistles.' *AJPh* 21 (1900) 389.

ἐνθουσιασμός had come in Hellenistic and Roman times to outweigh the belief¹⁵. Therefore, this text does not support a hypothesis regarding a Ciceronian belief in the doctrine of 'divine poetic inspiration'.

The text of ad Q. fr. 3,4,4 as it stands in WATT's OCT edition with the *sed abest...* ἐνθουσιασμός placed after the main explanation (*deest mihi quidem opera, quae non modo tempus sed etiam animum vacuum ab omni cura desiderat*) suggests that the appeal to the absence of ἐνθουσιασμός was a humorous after-thought¹⁶. Such an interpretation is hardly plausible in SHACKLETON BAILEY's Cambridge and Teubner editions, where the text is significantly altered. Reasons are given for these emendations in SHACKLETON BAILEY's commentary and in *PCPhS* 7 (1961) 4. An examination of the disputed points (the placing of the clause '*sed abest ... ἐνθουσιασμός*' and the gender of the relative pronoun introducing the clause *non modo...desiderat*) is outside the scope of this chapter, and accordingly I shall not dwell upon them here¹⁷.

In our two passages, then, we have nothing more than explanations of the natural order offered for Cicero's inability to compose verse at the time of writing the letters to which those passages respectively belong. In the first he says that he is lacking the energy or determination (*opera*) for the task of poetic composition, since that energy requires time and a mind free from every anxiety; moreover the divine possession (*enthousiasmos*) is also absent, since he is consumed with anxiety about the coming year *etc.* In the second, he again says that he lacks time, and is not excited or in the right mood for the themes which Quintus has requested (*non sane satis commoveor animo*); to compose poetry, one needs to be in possession of a certain sprightliness (EWBANK) or *élan*, of which he has been entirely robbed by the troubles of the day. The theme of the poet unable to write by reason of the anxieties burdening him is found elsewhere in Roman literature: Lucr. 1,41 f.; Catull. 65,1–2; Ovid Trist. 1,1,39; Juv. 7,57. Incidentally, one might legitimately ask how this demand for the carefree mind is to be reconciled with that passage from the *de orat.* (2,193) which we shall examine below and in which Cicero declares that the artistic creation cannot be accomplished without the genuinely felt grief of real experience¹⁸. There also appears in that same passage, as in the *orat.* 132 – a similar demand for *ipse ardere* is likewise found

¹⁵ RUSSELL 79.

¹⁶ On the mood and temper of the letters of this period, see SHACKLETON BAILEY: *Cicero*. 88: 'In spite of such passages [Q. fr. 3,5,4 of 54 B.C. which, in its complaint about the times, is of course very similar to our letter and passage Q. fr. 3,4,5 of the same year and month] C.'s early fifties ought not to be regarded as one of the blacker periods in his life...[t]he tone of his letters is prevailingly cheerful, even gay...'

¹⁷ See Appendix II on this passage, in which I defend WATT's Oxford text.

¹⁸ I suppose it might be replied to this that *animus vacuus ab omni cura* is merely a *prerequisite* to *enthousiasmos*, but there is no warrant for this kind of hierarchical, theoretical systematization except for the order of the phrases in the passage ad Q.fr. 3,4,4, and there *enthousiasmos* is not placed after *animus vacuus ab omni cura* as though in a systematic sequence, but is only added as an after-thought as is shown by the introductory phrases to the clauses *non modo ... sed etiam ... sed abest etiam*.

there –, the metaphor of raging fires which again hardly seems consistent with that carefree *otium* required in the letters.

3.4 ‘*furor*’ texts: de orat. 2,193 f.¹⁹

Let us now proceed to examine those passages in which insanity or some out-of-mind, irrational experience (*furor* etc.) is alleged to be part of Cicero’s thought about the inspiration of the poet: de orat. 2,193 f., and div. 1,80. The passage de orat. 2,193 f. comes from Cicero’s well-known discussion (2,189–196) of the necessity for the orator to experience the emotions which he himself wishes to arouse in the judges and the audience. WISSE, seizing upon some of the words of Antonius addressed in this passage to Crassus (‘tantum est flumen gravissimorum...verborum...ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere videaris’), called this section of his book on ethos and pathos, ‘Ipse ardere’. The idea of the orator wishing to arouse emotions which he must himself first experience, is familiar to us from Aristotle’s rhet. 1408a11 ff. and Quintilian 6,2,25–36; while Horace ars 102–3 gives utterance to a poetic version: *si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi*²⁰ (cf. also Aristotle poet. 1455a27 ff)²¹. Cicero in fact returned to the concept nearly ten years later in the orat. 132, and in the de divinatione 1,80, written the year after; also in a problematic passage in the Tusc. 4,55. KROLL declared the idea ‘daß man Psychagogia erziele, indem man den Zuschauer den eigenen Affekten zu folgen zwingt’ typically Peripatetic²², and the Peripatetics are explicitly linked in Tusc. 4,43 with this doctrine of the usefulness of the passions (here represented by *ira/iracundia*). In Cicero’s discussion in the de orat., after establishing the necessity of experiencing oneself the emotions which one wishes to arouse in others, attention is drawn to the question of the practical possibility of experiencing the emotions oneself on a regular basis, and it is this aspect of the question (not considered by Aristotle or those influenced by him) that leads him to introduce the subject of dramatic actors and the poets who compose their parts. The contention that this demand for emotional ‘naturalism’ or ‘realism’ is in oratory practically possible Antonius

¹⁹ = 2 at § 3.2 above.

²⁰ WISSE (1989) 265 is mistaken when he writes: ‘The passage from Horace only concerns the need, for the actor, to show emotions...[t]he reference to the poet is at most indirect’. As BRINK (1971) 187 states in the commentary which WISSE himself quotes without understanding it: Horace ‘dramatizes the *poet’s failure*. He involves him only at a remove’...the ‘playwright is ultimately responsible for “assigning ill-fitting speeches” *male mandat*’. In fact, for BRINK, the direct addressee is not the actor, but the *dramatis persona*, and, indirectly and ultimately, the poet. Cf. L-P ad 2,189!

²¹ The problem of the genuineness of the emotion displayed, however, did not concern Arist. in the Rh., nor the school rhetoricians: see WISSE (1989) 264.

²² ‘Die historische Stellung von Horazens Ars Poetica.’ *Sokrates, Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* 6 (1918) [81–98] 88, 93: cited by BRINK (1971) 182 and WISSE (1989) 265 n. 78.

supports by means of the analogies with the poet and with the actor: since the arousal of genuine emotion is regularly accomplished for the actor and the poet even in so artificial and unreal (*quid tam fictum*) a field as the theatre (L-P ad loc.: 'die dichterische Form, die Bühne und die ersonnenen Geschichten sind die drei irrealen Aspekte des Dramas'), so *a fortiori* is that same arousal possible in the field of the orator who deals, not with fiction, but with reality (cf. de orat. 3,214: *oratores, qui sunt veritatis ipsius actores...imitatores autem veritatis histriones*).

First, a word about the sources. The Peripatetic provenance of this discussion of the usefulness of emotion, it will be observed, immediately undermines any attempt to link the passage from the second book of the de oratore with any theory of poetic composition under divine inspiration, whether derived from Democritus, Plato or from any other source. For if Cicero's Antonius in likening the poet to the orator is here advocating a Peripatetic doctrine, he cannot at the same time be invoking a Platonic and Democritean model of poetic inspiration, (therefore, another explanation must be sought for that invocation). The Peripatetics, following Aristotle, have no interest in such theories, being concerned, on the contrary to defend the talented and intelligent control of the poet (*εὐφροῦς, εὐπλαστοί*: Arist. poet. 1455a32 f.²³) as against the possessed and divinely manipulated poet described in Plato's dialogues²⁴. Poetry in the Democritean and Platonic accounts is conceived of as an 'abnormal inner experience', a 'revelation apart from reason and above reason'²⁵: a view utterly alien to the Aristotelian, and presumably Peripatetic, conception.

Again, irrespective of whether or not a rhetorical source lies behind Antonius' discussion in the de orat. as some suggest²⁶, the fact that this notion of the necessity of experiencing the emotional arousal is applied in a *rhetorical* fashion²⁷ to the poet (and his 'representative', the actor), indicates that on this point, at the very least, Cicero conceived of the poet and orator as working under the same conditions – otherwise the comparison is bereft of its force. The whole discussion of the necessity of experiencing the emotions is seen wholly from the perspective of the orator and directed towards his needs. Any

²³ I accept the insertion of *μᾶλλον* before *ἢ μανικῶς*: see LUCAS & ELSE ad loc.; also RUSSELL 77 f.

²⁴ Cf. RUSSELL 76 ff.

²⁵ DODDS 82.

²⁶ So RUSSELL 77; but WISSE (1989) 264 f. & 267 rejects a rhetorical source, and prefers to see a philosophical controversy (reaction to Stoicism?) and the conflict with the younger generation of orators (Atticists?) behind Antonius' discussion. If WISSE's attempt to identify the origin of the discussion in the dispute of C. against the younger generation of orators (Atticists?) has validity (cf. NARDUCCI 1995, sect. 1: 'l'insistenza sul coinvolgimento emotivo dell'oratore cela probabilmente uno spunto polemico nei confronti di una forma embrionale di atticismo'), it would again confirm the argument that the Democritean-Platonic claims regarding the poets are not understood by Antonius according to the postulates of poetic theory, but on the contrary the perspective is, if not that of the rhetorical handbooks, wholly that of an orator's.

²⁷ By *rhetorical*, I mean 'with reference primarily to the concerns of rhetoric'.

comparison drawn with exponents in other fields can only be relevant if those exponents are regarded as working under the same conditions and, to a limited extent, towards the same ends. That again tends to weaken any interpretation of Antonius' discourse as positing a theory of divine inspiration through *furor*, since notions of external influence such as the Muses are alleged to have on the subjects of their benevolence have no place in rhetorical theory.

There are two significant factors drawn from internal evidence against any understanding of Antonius' discourse as containing a belief in the divine inspiration of the poet through *furor*: viz., 1) the absence of the divine element 2) the context which shows that the subject of the discourse is emotion, *pathos*, not inspiration. On account of these departures from the 'Platonic-Democritean' models, even the *furor* which Antonius invokes becomes problematic for those trying to reconstruct an inspiration theory for Cicero, since in the Platonic-Democritean accounts, these elements are not independent of each other. There cannot be a poetic *furor* in the traditional accounts without some external influence driving it; in Cicero on the other hand, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, there is no outside influence – let alone divine intervention. In the light of these considerations, one is forced to interpret the invocation of the Platonic-Democritean poetic inspiration as being merely a support for Antonius' argument vis-à-vis the use of emotion (in this case *furor*) in order to be effective with one's audience. Still, one might argue that simply because Cicero has ignored the divine element, he did not thereby mean to reject the claim of the poets to be aided by celestial powers, but simply that in invoking the *furor* the divine aspect of the theory was not relevant to the orator as being an altogether terrestrial figure who has nothing but his own devices upon which to rely. That seems at first a plausible interpretation, but nevertheless, even if it is valid, we are compelled to acknowledge that the passage from the *de orat.* lacks positive proof of a belief in the divine inspiration of the poet through *furor*. Actually, this interpretation will not sustain closer examination even if one concedes that Antonius does not mention the divine element because it does not concern the conditions of the orator's 'performance'. For, as we shall soon see more clearly, in Cicero's discussions of the orator's use of *pathos*, the poet and actor are regarded as the orator's allies in respect of their similar capacity to control and manipulate the emotion.

There are good grounds for taking the invocation of *furor* at *de orat.* 2,194 in another way, that is to say, that the *furor* is invoked not merely in an incidental way in order to draw attention to the similarity of another kind of emotional experience, but rather we are to understand Antonius as wishing to associate in a more positive way the kind of *furor* the poets experience with that *pathos* which he urges for the orator. For not only is the obvious

fact of the emotional experience common to orator, actor and poet stressed, but also the 'triggering' mechanism and management of this experience are regarded as being to a certain extent subject to the control of the orator and likewise to that of the actor and the poet²⁸. Plato's poetic theory implies 'la negazione di qualsiasi competenza tecnica specifica ai poeti'²⁹ – in other words, the very opposite of what Cicero wants to prove here, and not just in the case of the orator, but also with regard to the actor and the poet. Now, this interpretation, if it is correct, must needs exclude – at least, in the instance of this passage from the *de orat.* – an attribution of *any* kind of inspiration theory to Cicero, for his *inflammatio animorum*, and *quidam adflatus quasi furoris* now appear to be not the unexpected, and irresistible possessions such as that described by Plato's *κατοκωχή* (*Phaedr.* 245a) – for that would be contrary to what Cicero wants to prove here – but frenzies controlled *ad libitum*. As against the extraordinary, superhuman quality of the Democritean-Platonic model of poetic inspiration, Cicero is concerned to demonstrate the ordinary and very human capacity to summon the emotions at will, and not just for poets, but likewise for actors and orators. Thus, while Cicero in citing Democritus' and Plato's theories is interested in the irrationality of the possessed experience, yet, for Cicero, this experience is not driven by a divine agent, nor by any external force, but the possessed is, paradoxically, very much the 'captain of his soul' (if one may borrow a phrase from Henley); furthermore this possessed experience appears to be concerned, for Cicero, not with the whole of poetic composition, but apparently only with a specific portion thereof (namely, with aiding the process of making genuinely emotional expression), and is directed, so it would seem, really only at stylistic considerations (as Horace's discussion in the *ars poetica* indicates)³⁰.

At least two other passages in Cicero's works tend to confirm this notion that for Cicero, the poet like the orator and the actor is not subject to an irresistible, uncontrolled passion such as an uncritical reading of Antonius' discourse in the second book of the *de orat.* might suggest. The first passage, or rather the first set of remarks consists of some utterances of Crassus' in the third book of the same work, by means of which Antonius' ideas on *pathos* are significantly modified, or to be more precise, refined; the second is the problematic passage from the fourth book of the *Tusculanae disputationes* to which I have already alluded (at the beginning of this section § 3.4), in which Antonius' main points are

²⁸ E. NARDUCCI: *Electr. Antiq.*, vol. 2, iss. 5 - March 1995, sect. 2 [[ftp://ftp.utas.edu.au/departments/classics/antiquity/](http://ftp.utas.edu.au/departments/classics/antiquity/)] speaks of 'nell'uno [i.e. nell'oratore] e nell'altro [i.e. nell'attore]...la continua capacità di adirarsi, di provare dolore, di essere squassati dai più diversi moti dell'animo.'

²⁹ VELLARDI 9.

³⁰ BRINK (1971) 182 seems to underestimate the import and general direction of the Ciceronian passage, which if it does not explicitly link the necessity of genuine emotion with decorum in style, at any rate, hints thereat.

contradicted. Also there are scattered passages in the orator (e.g. 55 ff. & 128 ff.) dealing with delivery and emotion in which careful study and mastery of technique are urged in order to bring about variation and modulation in *actio*.

I should like to look at the problematic and notorious passage from the *Tusculanae disputationes* first, since – if I may anticipate the thesis of the section following –, the solution to the problem posed by it will be found in Crassus' reply in the third book of the *de orat.* In the *Tusc.* 4,43 the Peripatetic view about the usefulness of the emotions for the orator is brought forth:

quid, quod Peripatetici idem perturbationes istas quas nos exstirpandas putamus, non modo naturalis esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datas?...haec nullam habent vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio.

It has long been recognised that Cicero's confutation (regarded by many as being influenced by a Stoic source³¹) of this view in 4,55 f. in which the usefulness or appropriateness of emotion for the orator is discussed, contradicts everything Cicero had said in Antonius' discourse in the *de orat.*: the two passages are almost exact parallels. As NARDUCCI (1995 § 1) has recently stated: 'd'altra parte, è difficile sfuggire all'impressione che in quest'ultima opera [sc. *Tusc.*] l'autore intenda svolgere una sorta di "palinodia" nei confronti delle opinioni di Antonio; orienta in questo senso già la scelta degli identici paragoni: il poeta e l'attore stanno in ambedue i casi a significare i due distinti versanti dell'attività oratoria'. The problem of the contradiction between the two passages, has elicited a multiplicity of thoroughly intricate, almost baffling, solutions. Thus any attempt to attribute to Cicero on the basis of *de orat.* 2,193 f. a theory of irrational, quasi-possessed inspiration and composition must come to grips with this passage from the *Tusculanae disputationes*. Even if one has recourse to a non-divine, rationalist interpretation of the *furor* as being one of the pre-conditions for composition or *actio*, one must explain why in the *Tusculanae disputationes* Cicero rejects genuine emotion, for orator, actor and poet³². WISSE 266, treating the passage from the *Tusculanae disputationes* as the apparent

³¹ L-P Komm. III 145; WISSE (1989) 267; Cf. NARDUCCI § 4 & f.n. 15.

³² He writes: *oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non dedecet...num aut egisse umquam iratum Aesopum aut scripsisse existimas iratum Accium*: the triad orator-actor-poet is thus preserved in the same order. NARDUCCI saw this 'scelta degli identici paragoni' as partial proof of a connexion between Antonius' discourse and the passage from the *Tusc.*

aberration, tries to make it agree with the de orat. passage by means of the following, relatively simple solution: at the close of the passage from the Tusculanae disputationes, that is, at end of 4,55, Cicero absolves himself from his earlier commitment made at the beginning of 4,55 to the Stoic ideal which eschews all emotion whether real or feigned: he is, he states, only discussing in this place the wise man of the Stoic model: others may feel the emotions, especially the orator, inasmuch as he 'is definitely not a wise man...but a man of practical life'. That explanation seems inadequate, since while it may still permit the use of emotion, yet according to the first remarks of 4,55, that is feigned emotion only – which is of course contrary to what Antonius advocated. Thus no real agreement is effected between the two passages. It is obvious, at any rate, that if the poets and the actors are among those permitted (according to this Peripatetic modification of the quasi-Stoic position) to simulate the emotions, then the notion of a genuine, emotional *inflammatio animorum* in the case of the poets and the actors is out of the question and likewise the notion of composition, whether poetical or otherwise, as an unartificial, unpremeditated experience.

NARDUCCI gave a more satisfactory solution to the disagreement between the Antonius passage and that from the fourth book of the Tusculanae disputationes. He too regarded the latter as being 'sostanzialmente isolato all'interno del pensiero ciceroniano' on account of the radical Stoicism underlying it, and argued that Cicero tried to effect a compromise between quasi-Stoic and Peripatetic positions on *pathos*³³: the quasi-Stoic being the absence of genuine emotion; the Peripatetic being the necessity of simulating the passions. But how is the question of the advocating of feigned emotions in the Tusculanae disputationes – a thing condemned in Antonius' discourse – to be answered? NARDUCCI rightly found the answer in the reply that Crassus gives in the third book to Antonius. Crassus does not reject the validity of the thesis that genuine emotion is convincing and therefore recognises the potency of nature, but at the same time he recognises that there are technical and artistic demands to which the successful orator, actor and poet must attend, if he is to give vent to his genuine emotion in an effective manner. The evidence for this notion in Cicero of the so-called 'actor's paradox' (a term that begins with Denis Diderot's *Paradoxe sur le comédien*), that is to say, the paradox of controlled emotional disturbance, has been gathered and examined by NARDUCCI. He rightly observes (sect. 2) that in his reply in 3,212 ff. to Antonius' discourse on the genuineness of the emotions, Crassus stresses as against Antonius the rôle that *ars* plays in the orator's employment of the emotions: 'Replicando ad Antonio, Crasso si mostrerà...molto più consapevole delle esigenze dell' *ars*': that is to say,

³³ Sect. 4: 'un tentativo di compromesso...tra la soluzione peripatetica e quella stoica'

the process is not one of *natura* alone. The integration of the two into a coherent theory reflects the higher complexity and sophistication of Crassus' 'raffinata cultura' as opposed to the simple practicality of Antonius. Although the following important remarks of Crassus (3,212) pertain directly to the discussion which had preceded them regarding the choice of oratorical style to be adopted for each occasion and circumstance and regarding in particular the ornaments attending the several styles, they also apply to the discussion which follows regarding the use of the emotions and delivery:

ornamentis isdem uti fere licebit, alias contentius, alias summissius; omnique in re posse quod deceat facere *artis* et *naturae* est, scire quid quandoque deceat prudentiae.

The general principle established here is important for determining the attitude of Cicero towards composition, whether poetical or oratorical, in a word, to qualify the remarks of Antonius in the second book by placing them in their true perspective *vis-à-vis* Ciceronian critical thought as presented by the totality and sum of the rhetorical works. Here a considerable degree of artistic control is restored to the actor, poet and orator, and it is in the light of this that Cicero's claim in the *orat.* 132 to be so incensed in his delivery *ut me ipse non teneam*, is to be assessed.

In Crassus' reply, the rôle of *ars* in the use of the emotions is not only vindicated, but lucidly described (3,215 ff.). Crassus does not reject the proposition that *in omni re vincit imitationem veritas*, but on the contrary, concedes it freely to Antonius, albeit in a qualified manner. If reality (*veritas* = *natura*) were sufficient and all that were required in delivery, Crassus states, there would be no need of art (*arte profecto non egeremus*). But in fact, emotion is often so confused that its natural appearance becomes obscured and clouded. It is the business of *ars* and *prudentia* to remove this obscurity and to bring into prominence the essence of the emotions felt, each of which has its own expression assigned to it by nature: *nullum est enim horum generum quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur*³⁴. Crassus then proceeds to give practical examples of how this art and technique is to be applied in the execution of various emotions as described by the verses of some poets. The chief point to be observed here is the entirely voluntary, and controlled nature of these emotions, even if they should be genuine: 'le passioni dell'oratore si presentano come qualcosa di ben diverso da banali perturbazioni dell'animo; si tratta piuttosto di passioni suscitali a piacimento' (NARDUCCI). The same concern to urge the study of the techniques of mastering emotional delivery is apparent in the two passages from the orator (55 ff. & 129 ff.): at *orat.* 132 Cicero states that there is no technique of *pathos* which he has not tried. In *de orat.* 3,102 f.,

³⁴ NARDUCCI sect. 2: 'Ars e prudentia insegnano all'oratore a isolare i confusi elementi di un miscuglio emotivo, a scegliere di volta in volta a quale passione concedere briglia...'

where Crassus is discussing stylistic variation and relief, the comparison with the actor and the poet is introduced yet again, which results in the subject being brought naturally into some connection with delivery (moreover, the technique of *variatio* whereby the style or tone *summittitur...deinde augetur, extenuatur, inflatur, variatur, distinguitur* is especially centred around parts of a poem or a speech that are high in emotive content, hence the connection with delivery is inevitable), and in causing us to think of Antonius' discourse in the second book. Crassus implies that the principles of, and the technique concerned with, *variatio* were understood by actors before orators, and then goes on to remark that poets and musical composers understood this art even before the actors. That is not the statement of one who believes in some form of inspiration. Furthermore, the critical formulation of Crassus whereby *natura* and *ars* stand in a harmonious relation to one another, a fundamental concept in Cicero's thinking, may be projected, by virtue of the close parallels whether explicit (actor) or implicit (poet) drawn between the orator and his literary cousins in the theatre, back to Antonius' discussion of the actors' and the poets' work, and of their allegedly irrational inspiration. Now we can see that Antonius' demand for genuine emotion, whether in orator, actor or poet must be interpreted in the light of Crassus' remarks whereby this demand is qualified: genuine emotion subject to the controls of art³⁵.

³⁵ Because in Crassus' reply to Antonius on the use of genuine emotion there is a shift in emphasis from *inventio* to delivery (observe also that Crassus like Antonius draws the parallel between the orator and the actor: 3,214), most of the commentators – e.g. L-P III 146; WISSE (1989) 265; NARDUCCI despite his declaration of agreement with SCHRYVERS regarding *inventio* [n. 12] and despite the fact that he begins his paper by remarking that the actor and the poet in Antonius' exposition represent 'i due diversi versanti dell'attività oratoria', has nothing more to say about the poet and his composition in the rest of his study – have viewed Antonius' discussion as principally pertaining to delivery. P. H. SCHRYVERS ('Invention, imagination et theorie des emotions chez Cicéron et Quintilien.' in B.VICKERS (ed): *Rhetoric Revalued*. New York 1982, 47), on the other hand, has placed the argument in its true context of *inventio*. According to his interpretation of Antonius' discourse, the orator depends on his mastery of *inventio* for his knowledge and technique of arousing in himself, and thereby, in others, the emotions that he desires and needs to arouse. The poets themselves have shown this mastery of *inventio*, their compositions involve this 'programming' of the probable and believable emotions and this process of composition is to all intents and purposes the same as that of the orators. Antonius in a particularly lucid passage (2,191) explains how the presence of appropriate 'thought' and arguments (*inventio*) in the speech is a pre-condition of any successful and effective delivery:

magna vis est earum sententiarum atque eorum locorum, quae agas tractesque dicendo, *nihil* ut opus sit simulatione et fallaciis. ipsa enim natura orationis eius, quae suscipitur ad aliorum animos permovendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam, quam quemquam eorum, qui audiunt, permovet.

Antonius thus paradoxically denies the use of *ars* in *actio* (*nihil ut opus sit simulatione et fallaciis*), yet *implies* the use of technique in the selection of *sententiae* and *loci*. The process of composition is in a sense divorced from that of delivery: the speech has a certain emotional content 'programmed' into it which is entirely independent from any colouring given to it by delivery. C. returns to the idea of the speech as an emotional entity independent of the delivery in *orat.* 132 *nec umquam is qui audiret incenderetur, nisi ardens ad eum perveniret oratio*. (Admittedly, he earlier (130) grants delivery superiority over composition in commanding the audience: *quae quaecumque in me sunt – me [enim] ipsum paenitet quanta sint –, sed apparent in orationibus, etsi carent libri spiritu illo, propter quem maiora eadem cum agantur quam cum leguntur videri solent*. SANDYS cites some fine parallels, esp. Isoc. 5,26.) As LEEMAN, PINKSTER and RABBIE comment on the passage from the *de orat.* 2,191: 'ein bemerkenswerter Gedanke: wir sind die nächsten Zuhörer und "Opfer" einer Rede, die wir selber vortragen, die sich aber gewissermaßen verselbständigt'. If then it is true, as NARDUCCI writes, that in his reply 'non a caso Crasso trae dal teatro gli esempi di cui si serve per illustrare come le voci possa variamente atteggiarsi

3.5 'furore' texts: div. 1,80³⁶

In the *de divinatione* 1,80 Cicero was to return to the idea of the poet's frenzy (*furore*) which he first took up ten years earlier in the *de oratore*. It is the second of our 'furore' passages, and unlike the first, seems to contain in addition to, and connected with, the *furore* of poetic composition, the divine element. Again, Cicero cites as his sources Plato and Democritus. On this occasion, however, he specifically names one of the works upon which he relied (or at any rate, claims to have relied): Plato's *Phaedrus* (presumably meaning 244a & 245a)³⁷. The context is as follows. Quintus who in the first book defends divination, divides the practice into two classes (1,34): artificial (1,72: they use reason, observation and interpretation of phenomena: haruspication, augury, lots, exposition of signs; cp. 1,12) and natural (oracles, dreams, frenzied prophesying etc.). In order to prove the possibility of divination, and in particular divination by natural means, Quintus appeals to the Stoic doctrine of the relationship between the human soul and the divine soul (from which the former is derived: 1,70 cf. 1,64 *animus....quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur*). According to this doctrine, the human soul must needs be incited by its contact with the

nelle tonalità della *iracundia*, della *miseratio*, della *metus*, della *voluptas*, e così via (*de orat.* 3,214 ff.)', it is also no accident that he likewise here includes the verses of the (dramatic) poets – it is obvious that the stylistic delivery could have been illustrated with examples from the theatre without having to cite the verses 'accompanying' the delivery. The significance of the verses that are quoted is that the appropriate emotions are 'programmed' into them, and that they contain stylistic devices (for example the *dilemma*: 'quo nunc me vertam'. Cf. GRATWICK: CHCL II 133, who points to the highly poetic and dramatic elements borrowed from tragedy in Gracchus' speech cited in *de orat.* 3,214.) peculiar to poetry which indicate emotional content. These poetic compositions thus have a certain programmatic value already inherent in them, and it is the task of delivery to bring this programmed emotional content to light and through *imitatio* or *veritas* to endow it with credibility. To affirm this similarity between, or even identity of, the respective processes of 'emotional' composition employed by the poets and the orators is not to deny the substantial difference of motive highlighted by both Antonius and Crassus. NARDUCCI reminds us that, the actor, though Antonius does not deny the reality of his emotions, 'per quanto...si muova in mondo di *ficta*'; the orator in deference to his own reputation and his duties to that of his client is personally and in a real sense involved in the events of which he is one of the principal agents: 'neque ego actor sum alienae personae sed actor meae' (*de orat.* 2,191).

³⁶ = 6 at § 3.2 above.

³⁷ One may note in passing here a connexion of a very different nature between the *Phaedrus* and the *de orat.* which sheds further light on the question of C.'s views on the use of genuine emotion by the actors, poets, and orators. In an interesting, recent paper E. SCHÜTRUMPF ('Non-logical means of persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *de orat.*' in W. W. FORTENBAUGH & D. C. MIRHADY (eds.): *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*. Rutgers Univ. Stud. VI 1993, 95–110) argued against the prevailing consensus of scholars (SOLMSEN, KROLL, LEEMAN & PINSKTER who 'see Aristotelian influence throughout *De oratore*' [SCHÜTRUMPF 106], WISSE (1989) etc.) which traces C.'s thinking on the *pathe* back to Aristotle. He admitted that Aristotle's three *ἐντεχνον πιστεῖς* (Aristotle's innovation whereby 'hatte... *ἡδὸς* und *πάθος* als *πίστεῖς* auf Linie mit den Argumenten gestellt' L-P III 123; cf. SOLMSEN 1938 & 1941) do appear in C.'s *de orat.*, but denied they operate in the same structural system. In Aristotle, they appear as part of the *officia* of style and disposition: in C., they are firmly placed in the realm of *inventio*. More radically, Schütrumpf denied that Aristotle was in any substantial way a source for C.'s views on *pathos*. Instead, for Schütrumpf, C.'s true source was Plato, and in particular his *Phaedrus*. He points out that C.'s demand for philosophical study of human nature (and emotions: *de orat.* 1,17. 53. 60. 69), is nowhere to be found in Aristotle; but on the contrary in Plato's *Phaedrus* there is a remarkable correspondence (269d ff.): indeed, for Plato, the whole concept of *ψυχαιγωγία* depends on an exact, almost scientific knowledge of the human soul, even as the doctor understands the body and knows which medicines to apply for each ailment (270b: cf. *de orat.* 1,84f). The notion of adapting the speech and the way of talking 'to the psychological condition of the audience' (271d ff.) is also present in C.'s *de orat.* (1,54: cf. 2,159).

divine soul or force which pervades everything, and this must especially be so when the soul is not 'fettered with the chains of human flesh': *vinclis corporis impediti* (1,110). The human soul has two parts: that which is connected with 'animal' bodily appetites, and that which operates the use of reason and intelligence. This higher part of the soul is most active when the soul is divorced from the body, as for example in sleep, dreams, frenzies (1,70 f.): it is in this phase that the soul is no longer sundered from communion with the divine mind (*diungunt... se a societate divina* 1,110) and the natural capacity of the soul to predict future events is unleashed:

haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat...et Dicaearchi et... Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraculum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. (2,100)

It should be observed that the section 1,34–71, in which the *furor* of *naturalis divinatio* is discussed, is separated both thematically and structurally³⁸ from the passage with which we are concerned. The latter (1,80) belongs to a larger context (1,79–81) which is concerned with giving proofs for this *vis divina in animis* not in its capacity as a divinatory faculty, but rather as the impersonal force of nature which can instigate powerful motions of the soul, manifesting itself in particular in the creative and emotive impulses of the artist. In 1,79 Quintus had enumerated manifestations of the *vis divina* diffused *longe lateque* throughout nature: the disturbance endured by the Pythia at Delphi or the Sibyl, and even the differences in soil are all due to the action of the divine force manifesting itself in the climate and the exhalations from the earth. Then he moves to other kinds of disturbance – also proofs of the *vis divina* –, this time in the human soul: a profound stirring of the psyche brought on by some spectacle, some solemn voices and singing, even by some fear or concern. Then the *furor* of the poet and the pathos of the orator and actor are invoked as further proofs of the divine force.

The examples of the manifestation of the divine force in 1,80 preceding that of the poet's *furor* are somewhat obscure³⁹, but to attempt to get some sense out of them may help us to understand something about the poet's *furor*, seeing that it seems to be connected with what precedes. What is the nature of the manifestation of the divine force in those preceding examples? Is it simply that by virtue of the *vis divina* in soul, quite ordinary phenomena – such as some spectacle or voice or song – can cause the soul to be profoundly and in a unique way stirred? That seems to be the most natural interpretation,

³⁸ There is an intervening section (1,72–79) in which Q. returns to artificial divination.

³⁹ M. SCHOFIELD: 'Cicero for and against divination.' *JRS* 76 (1986) 52 rightly commented on the 'chaotic disorder of Quintus' examples... switching erratically from one sort of divination to another, and from anecdotes to arguments and theory back to anecdotes again'.

and the one most in agreement with the statement which follows the quotation of Pacuvius' verses⁴⁰, and yet, if it is true, then even for Quintus who represents contrary positions to those taken by his brother in the dialogue, the proximate cause of the inspiration does not seem to be the divine force, but rather some relatively common, pathetic occurrence. Already then, the model of inspiration proposed to us here is significantly different to Plato's. In the Phaedrus 245a, it is sufficiently clear that the madness takes hold of the soul in an undisturbed, unmolested state: ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον⁴¹. On this reading of the passage from the de divinatione, the *furor* of the poets is nothing but another kind of *concitatio*, to which all men are subject, and likewise the *animus commotior* and *ardor vultuum atque motuum* of the orator and the actor – that is hardly the formulation for an inspiration theory exclusively concerned with the poets. But the notion of some everyday occurrence causing some profound emotional stirring is, as a proof of the divine force in souls, somewhat banal and rather subjective, and this, together with the fact that the *enim* in the sentence following (*nec enim sine furore...*) has, on this reading, only a tenuous connection with what precedes, suggests another interpretation which is this. Since a profound stirring of the soul at ordinary, pathetic occurrences is a rather subjective criterion for determining whether the divine force has operated in the soul, it might be argued that Quintus has in mind another, more objective and certain measure, namely, to discover whether under the influence of a particular commotion some out-of-the-ordinary accomplishment, such as an artistic production has resulted, as for example, great poetry (*poetam magnum esse posse*), or sublime oratory or acting. On this reading the sentence *fit etiam saepe specie quadam, saepe vocum gravitate et cantibus ut pellantur animi vehementius, saepe etiam cura et timore* refers to the audience of a tragedy; *qualis est illa* refers to one of the characters in the tragedy, Hesione (the transition from audience to one of the characters is admittedly somewhat abrupt and one might say, anacoluthic): each of the parties (audience and character/actor) like the rings in the magnetized chain in the Ion, receives a portion of the *concitatio* from the poet. Now the sentences which follow this description of Hesione give better sense: *atque etiam illa concitatio* (sc. of the audience and character, then of the poet) *declarat vim in animis esse divinam. negat enim sine furore.... etc.* Notice, however, that it is not, as it is in the Phaedrus, the divine force which is immediately and directly responsible for the poetic creation, but

⁴⁰ Confusingly, Pacuvius' verses quoted by Quintus refer to the possession experienced by Bacchantes (*flexamina tamquam lymphata aut Bacchi sacris / commota*) which *prima facie* appears to be linked with the kind of *commotio* experienced by the poets as mentioned in the passage following the quotation. But Pacuvius was only comparing (*tamquam*) Hesione's commotion to that of the Bacchantes; more importantly, in the text which follows the quotation, Quintus does not explicitly link the *commotio* of the poets with that of the Bacchantes.

⁴¹ DE VRIES comm. ad loc. 'the soul has to be "tender" and "virgin", in order to be impressionable...earlier impressions would enfeeble the grip of the *μανία*'. Cf. Pl. Ion 534b4 ff.: καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν αὖ ἐνδεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ.

rather it is that particular, out-of-mind abstraction (brought about by the divine force) which enables the poet to make his compositions. By the analogy with the rings in the Ion I do not mean to imply that the divine inspiration is handed down from one recipient to the next. What is passed on is merely a portion of the *concitatio* or *furor* which the poet requires (together presumably with his talent and art) in order to be a great poet. You must feel the emotions first which you wish to excite in others. The inclusion of the orator (and the actor) in the description of the conditions necessary for composition, again will be found to be decisive against a Platonic, divine-inspiration interpretation of this passage.

One observes also that the description of the poetic *furor* is confusing and misleading because it uses the same or similar language as that found in the passages describing divination by *furor*: *concitatio quadam animi ...vaticinantibus per furorem* 1,34; *mentem Pythiae divino afflatu concitabat* 1,38; *ea si exarsit acrius, furor appellatur, cum a corpore animus abstractus divino instinctu concitatur* 1,66. There is, however, no suggestion in our passage that we are meant to regard the poetic *furor* as akin to divinatory *furor*⁴², or that the former is a direct communication with the gods or the divine force. The *praesagatio* of 1,66 is not mentioned in connection with our poetic *furor*; on the contrary, in 2,9–10⁴³ divination as a thing which, being devoid of principles, cannot be regarded as a science or art, is declared to be of no use for the cultivation of literature (here one would have expected Cicero to exclude poetry from the generic *litterae* if he had intended to associate it with divination⁴⁴); Marcus declares (2,12): ‘divination has no place in the those things which come within the domain of the senses or are contained in the arts...there is no field or subject-matter which we can make subject to divination’. However the greatest hindrance to an interpretation according to which Cicero both believes in divination, and intends that the divinatory *furor* should be identified with our poetic *furor*, is the fact that in the second book divination is attacked and, if not altogether denied, at any rate, questioned by Marcus himself⁴⁵ – the alleged enunciation of the belief in the divine inspiration of the poet, is after all placed in the

⁴² Pace TLL s.v. *furor* 1630,16 f.

⁴³ Cf. 2,12.

⁴⁴ For poetry as one of the *artes* cf.: de orat. 1,9–12. 3,58; cf. 3,127

⁴⁵ Older commentators and writers (PEASE, MOMIGLIANO, SÜSS, HUNT) tend to interpret the second book of the div. as representing Marcus’ personal statement of unbelief. This approach has more recently been attacked above all by MARY BEARD *JRS* 76 (1986) 33–46 and in a more qualified way by M. SCHOFIELD *JRS* 76 (1986) 47–65. They argue that such an approach is too simplistic, and that it fails to take into account both the literary and Socratic form of the dialogue which allows for argument *in utramque partem* without requiring committal to one side or the other; similarly such an approach is thought to ignore C.’s characteristic suspension of judgement. SCHOFIELD, however, does not go so far as BEARD who avers not only that C.’s voice cannot be recognised in the div., but also that it is futile even to make the attempt to discover it. SCHOFIELD agrees that C. does indeed identify himself with the sceptical case as set forth in the second book, but he denies that C. believes that divination has nothing to be said for it. R. J. GOAR: *Cicero and the State Religion*. Amsterdam 1972, 96 ff., esp. 101 ff., defends the traditional view of the div.; according to him C. ‘...has in view a cherished aim...the undermining of superstition, at all costs’.

mouth of Quintus⁴⁶. Let it be observed above all that Marcus, in response to Quintus' request in 2,100, specifically refutes divination by *furor* in 2,110 (or at any rate, thinks he does). Obviously then, if for Cicero there is no such thing as divination, there cannot be a poetic 'version' of it, or at the very least, doubts concerning the possibility of it must remain. Furthermore, it seems difficult to reconcile these doubts in the second book regarding divination with any belief in communication with, or revelation from, the gods through a human intermediary such as the theory of divine inspiration claims. Marcus attacks not only the assumption that it is beneficial for us to receive communications from the gods (2,20 ff.), but also the syllogisms of Chrysippus, Cratippus and other Stoics by which they attempt to prove the possibility and existence of communications from the gods (2,101 ff.)⁴⁷. Of course, in both these instances, these communications concern future events, and it might be argued therefore that it is not necessary to have our poet, who is after all not a diviner, receiving communications about the future. But in the *de divinatione* it is accepted by both defender and attacker of divination that the only possible kind of communication – or rather, the only possible kind of beneficial communication – that the gods could impart to men by which they might manifest their love for men, is one the purpose of which is to signify future events (cf. e.g. 2,101 ff.). The notion of a human intermediary conveying divinely revealed teachings not about the future is not even considered as a means by which the gods may exhibit their love for men; certainly, if there are other forms of divine revelation to man, Marcus does not press the possibility.

* * *

We have seen that, notwithstanding the appeal to identical authorities, the presentation of the poetic *furor* in the *de divinatione* differs significantly from that found in the *de oratore* of some ten years before. In the former, the *furor* is treated as the manifestation of the *vis divina* in the human soul; in the latter, it was simply an irrational, indomitable emotional experience, and there is no hint of an external, divine force behind it. In no way can it be said, as NARDUCCI says, that in the *de divinatione* Cicero returns to the *furor* of the *de oratore*. A few other observations on the way in which Cicero handles the *furor* element might be made.

⁴⁶ The distinction is overlooked by NARDUCCI: 'Nel *de divinatione* (I 80) – composto dopo le *Tusculanae* – Cicerone tornerà a insistere sul *furor* della propria oratoria....'

⁴⁷ The force of this argument is of course in no way impaired by N. DENYER's brilliant paper 'The case against divination.' *PCPhS* 31 (1985) 1–10 in which the author demonstrates that Bk. 2 of *div.* is largely philosophically feeble.

The first is that even if either or both of the passages from the *de oratore* or the *de divinatione* should be accepted as proof of a so-called Platonic-Democritean theory in divine inspiration, there is a false emphasis on madness which is perhaps lacking from Democritean theory. There are only two fragments regarding the divine inspiration in DIELS-KRANZ which possibly derive from first-hand acquaintance with Democritus' works: fr. 18 (= Clem. Alex. Strom. 6,186) and fr. 21 (= Dio Chr. 36,1). In neither of these texts is reference made to madness, but rather we read *ἐνθουσιασμός* in the first, and *φύσεως θεαζούσης* in the second. The possession implied by these terms (whose precise meanings in these instances is not at all certain) does not necessarily entail madness or frenzy as has been commonly asserted in modern commentators⁴⁸. In fact, it seems that the two Ciceronian notices with which we have been concerned, *de orat.* 2,194 & *div.* 1,80, are largely responsible for this typical modern interpretation. The problem is compounded by the fact that the two Ciceronian texts (together with Hor. *ars* 295) are presented together in DIELS-KRANZ as fr. 17, with the intrusive note 'vielleicht identisch mit:' (i.e. with fr.18 = Clem. Strom. 6,168). Horace's testimony about Democritus excluding sane poets from Mt Helicon⁴⁹ might have been influenced by Cicero himself, or at any rate, by a common second-hand source. In any event, it is manifest that the Romans chose to view insanity as the essential point of the doctrine of divine inspiration, and Democritus' and Plato's theories as identical. VELLARDI (*Enthousiasmòs* 102), on a different point, rightly commented: '...le testimonianze di Cicerone e di Orazio sono molto più utili come informazioni sul dibattito teorico sulla poesia nel periodo intorno alla metà del primo secolo a.C., che non per la ricostruzione del pensiero di Democrito su questo tema'. An excellent alternative to the traditional interpretation of Democritus' divine inspiration theory was provided by RUSSELL (*Criticism* 72), who wrote: '*Enthousiasmòs*, "possession", will have had a more positive meaning for him [sc. Democritus] than mere loss of sanity; he will have regarded it, no doubt, as susceptible of explanation in terms of his atomic physics. Moreover, as Democritus' ethical ideal was one of tranquillity, it is unlikely that it should have associated something he greatly admired with the most extreme kind of mental disturbance'. In the light of this, we see that MALCOVATI's [6] interpretation of Cicero's *furor* involves a circular argument: 'Il delirio, il *furor* – come dice Cicerone –, che accompagna l'ispirazione così poetica come divinatoria, non è dunque una *alienatio mentis*, ma una alterazione: Democrito... non usa infatti le voci *μαίνεσθαι* o *παράφρονεῖν*, bensì *ἀλλοφρονεῖν* e *μεταλλάττειν*.' Cicero's *furor*, according to her, is not the *alienatio mentis*,

⁴⁸ Cf. for example GUTHRIE: *Gr. Phil.* 2, 477; DODDS 82; BRINK ad Hor. *ars* 295–8: 'Something like *enthousiasmòs* and *hieron pneuma* (fr. 18) is the Greek behind the wording of Cicero and H.'[sic].

⁴⁹ *ars* 295 ff: *ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte/ credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas/ Democritus...*

which *furor* ordinarily would suggest (Cicero makes Quintus define *furor* div. 1,66 thus: ‘*furor appellatur, cum a corpore animus abstractus divino instinctu concitatur*’ cp. 1,33) because Democritus (in whose footsteps Cicero follows) does not use terms indicating these concepts! It seems likely that the overemphasis on the aspect of insanity, as against divine possession, is caused by Cicero’s greater reliance on Plato, in particular, Phaedrus 245a. This leads to a curious development whereby Democritus’ *enthousiasmos* becomes identified solely with madness, and the divine element is ignored as at de orat. 2,194. In the beginning of the de divinatione, Cicero had discussed the etymology of the word for the prophet’s art, and had remarked how superior the Roman word (*divinatio*) was to the Greek (*μαντική*) because it did not obscure the concept of the divine origin by overemphasising the element of madness (*μανία* = *furor*)⁵⁰ – in fact, the very thing that he had been guilty of doing in expressing the concept of *enthousiasmos*!

A second observation on Cicero’s handling of the *furor* element, is that, as against the two passages which are adduced in support of the thesis that Cicero held the divine inspiration theory through frenzy and with which we have been primarily concerned up to now (de orat. 2,194 and div. 1,80), there are at least two other Ciceronian passages in which it is denied that madness is capable of producing good or complex poetry. The first is div. 2,111. In this passage, Marcus is at pains to show that the Sibyl, or whoever composed the verses of the Sibyl, could not have composed these under the influence of madness:

non esse autem illud carmen furentis cum ipsum poema declarat (est enim magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationis et motus), tum vero ea quae ἀκροστιχίς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versus litteris aliquid conectitur, ut in quibusdam Ennianis ‘Q. Ennius fecit’. id certe magis attentī animi quam furentis. atque in Sibyllinis ex primo versu cuiusque sententiae primis litteris illius sententiae carmen omne praetexitur. hoc est scriptoris est, non furentis, adhibentis diligentiam, non insani.

The implication of the reference to Ennius’ poetry is, of course, that neither could he have composed such cleverly wrought verses while in a fit of madness. The second passage, Cato 22, contains the anecdote about Sophocles’ trial, in which the poet’s sons attempted to remove him from the management of the estate on the grounds of insanity or senility:

...sic illum quasi desipientem⁵¹ a re familiari removerent iudices. tum senex dicitur eam fabulam quam in manibus habebat et proxime scripserat, Oedipum

⁵⁰ Cf. Plato’s derivation of *μαντική* Phaedr. 244b–c.

⁵¹ TLL s.v. 730,18: ‘male sapere, insanire’; as equivalent for *furere/furentem* cf. Ulp. dig. 23,2,9: *si pater furit, avus sapiat*.

Coloneum, recitasse iudicibus quaesisseque num illud carmen desipientis videretur.

The fact that here old age is presumed to be the main contributing factor to the kind of insanity attributed to Sophocles does not detract from the argument: Cicero's point in reproducing the anecdote was to show that old age does not always result in insanity and loss of reason. Sophocles is outstanding proof of that seeing that he composed some of his best poetry in old age, and the composition of poetry requires full possession of the senses.

3.6 texts citing chiefly the divine element: div. 1,34; Tusc. 1,64; orat. 109⁵²

In de divinatione 1,34 the interpreters of signs in presaging the future are stated by Quintus – even as the grammarians who interpret the poets – to approach the *divinitatem* of those (that is to say, of the gods) whom they are interpreting. The passage at once reminds us again of the Ion, where Socrates explains the ability of the rhapsode who is the interpreter of the poet's thought (τὸν γὰρ ῥαψωδὸν ἐρμηνεῖα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι: Ion 530c) as being a θεία δύναμις (533d) / θεία μοῖρα (534c), which is in turn connected by the chain originating with the Muse to the divine power operating in the poet. The reading *divinitatem* in W. AX's Teubner text is J. J. HOTTINGER's conjecture substituted for the reading of the MSS, *divinationem*. The latter reading is admittedly difficult: HOTTINGER insisted that men are either completely prophetic or not at all so, and so his conjecture appears at first to be good, especially when one compares this passage with div. 1,1 *proxime ad deorum vim...possit accedere* (1,34 has *proxime ad eorum ...divin[?] videntur accedere*). To HOTTINGER's objection, however, PEASE ad loc. answered thus: '... the argument of HOTTINGER that men are either completely prophetic or not at all so is refuted by such a passage as 1,63: *adpropinquante morte multo est divinius* (sc. *animus*)...' ⁵³. If, then, we side with PEASE and retain the MSS reading, the passage presents no problem regarding divine power in the poets: for on the MSS reading, Quintus is not making an analogy between the interpreters of the signs approaching the divinity of the gods, and the grammarians approaching that of the poets, but between the diviners *qua* interpreters of signs and grammarians *qua* interpreters of poets. The respective objects of each group (heaven-sent signs and poetry) are alike in that they are both communications⁵⁴. On the other hand, if we side with HOTTINGER, then indeed, Quintus would appear to be saying

⁵² = 5, 4 & 3 respectively at § 3.2 above.

⁵³ So likewise does TLL s.v. *divinatio* 1613,84 keep the MSS reading.

⁵⁴ Cf. DENYER *PCPhS* 31 (1985) 6; also PEASE ad loc.: '...the approach of the professional diviners is less to the *deity* of the gods than to that knowledge of the future as a result of which they send signs to men.'

that both interpreters of divine signs and the grammarians approach the divinity of their subjects, but again, this would be the view of Quintus only, Marcus' foil in the dialogue.

Much of the argument in the first book of the *Tusculanae disputationes* is concerned with proving the immortality of the soul, in order to refute the proposition with which the book began: 'malum...videtur esse mors'. Among the philosophical proofs offered (auto-mobility of the soul, indivisibility etc.), Cicero seeks to prove the soul's immortality by showing that there exists in the soul evidence of divine power, or at least, that there are faculties in the soul which must necessarily be of divine creation.

quid? illa tandem num leviora censes, quae declarant inesse in animis hominum
divina quaedam? (1,56; cf. 1,60)

Since it is impossible to account for the origin of these faculties, as it is possible to account for the composition of organic and biological parts of the body (blood, bile, phlegm, bones, muscles, veins etc.), it is impossible to account for their end. Among these powers he enumerates, memory, creative invention and intellectual deliberation (*cogitatio*) which enable us to investigate obscure and hidden things. It is in this context that our passage 1,64 appears. In introducing into the discussion the advances made in music, the scientific discoveries of Archimedes and others, the ability of the poet to compose *grave plenumque carmen*, of the orator to produce elevated eloquence, or of the philosopher to philosophise, it was, of course, Cicero's intention to argue the case for the divine origin of the faculties in the soul which made these human accomplishments possible. There is admittedly some difficulty, however, with the remark on the poet, for to him alone⁵⁵ seems to be attributed immediate and direct divine operation in the soul (*poetam grave plenumque carmen sine caelesti aliquo mentis instinctu...fundere*). Thus, despite the softening effect of *aliquo*, the words *caelesti instinctu*⁵⁶ and *fundere* (used frequently in connexion with poetry and poetic outbursts⁵⁷ to suggest a flow of words, if not uncontrolled, at any rate remarkable for its volume and quality) *prima facie* appear to reflect a belief in divine power working in the poet as he composes. In fact, what Cicero has done here is to mix different kinds of arguments⁵⁸. Starting from Plato's proof in the *Phaedo* of the immortality of the soul, according to which the faculty of learning is viewed as the recalling of knowledge already possessed by the soul, Cicero had only to prove the divine origin of the soul by means of its various

⁵⁵ In the case of the orators, if *sine maiore quadam vi* is supposed to refer to an external, higher force acting directly upon the orator (as the *caelestis aliquis mentis instinctus*), then that would detract from the uniqueness of the poet's claim to be alone inspired by the godhead. Probably, however, it refers merely to the orator's prowess.

⁵⁶ For *instinctus* used of divinity operating directly in the soul, Cf. div. 1,66.

⁵⁷ Cf. C. de orat. 3,194; id. Arat. Prog. 185 MUELLER; Lucr. 4,585; Catull. 64,321.

⁵⁸ He is guilty of a similar lapse in his confused treatment of Plato's *ἀνάμνησις* and *μνήμη* in sections 57–61; cf. HUNT 106.

intellectual faculties; but when he comes to the poetic faculty he rather clumsily mixes in an argument of another kind, the direct, divine action on the poet in composing: that is, divine inspiration. Thus he has moved from general and common qualities of the human soul (possessed, of course, in varying degrees) which was all that was required for the argument, to specific favours bestowed by the gods on specific individuals; the argument does more to evince the divinity of the inspiring agent, than to show forth the intellectual activity of the human soul, and is therefore, to a certain extent, contrary to his larger argument about the immortality of all human souls. This argument, therefore, if it proves anything at all, proves the immortality of the poet's soul only! The literary pedigree and traditional authority of the appeal to the divine inspiration of the poets will have caused him to contaminate his first argument in this way. *Grave plenumque carmen* again points to the kinds of poetry (again, epic and tragedy) that are worthy to be regarded as the products of divine inspiration: comedy and minor comic genres, lyric and satire are excluded.

Divino ingenio used of the epic poets Homer, Ennius, *reliquis poetis et maxime tragicis* at orat. 109 can hardly be adduced as sufficient evidence for belief on Cicero's part in the divine inspiration of the poet. The transferred meaning of *divinus* – 'godlike', 'outstanding', 'excellent', 'wonderful' – is amply paralleled elsewhere, and the epithet is used in this sense of many other kinds of men, things, activities and so forth which are unrelated to poets or poetry (e.g. Arch. 15(l): of eminent men in the state; Tusc. 1,63: of Archimedes; fin. 1,76: of Plato and Aristotle; cf. de orat. 3,68: of Carneades). Cf. TLL s.v. *divinus* 1624,11 ff.; cf. *divinitus* 1618,10 ff. *divine* 1626, 26 ff.; OLD s.v. *divinus* 3⁵⁹.

3.7 Arch. 18⁶⁰ and poetic *doctrina*

The last and most important passage in the series adduced as possibly indicating a belief in divine inspiration of the poet, takes us back to the speech pro Archia (18). In the following paragraphs, I shall attempt to distinguish first of all several claims made in this passage from the pro Archia about the nature of poetic composition; I shall attempt to refute the interpretations alluded to at the beginning of this chapter that PENNACINI and MALCOVATI impose on this passage; lastly, in the light of what we have concluded about this passage, we shall return to the discussion of *natura* and *ars vis-à-vis* poetic composition, and review the notorious judgement of Cicero on Lucretius.

⁵⁹ Cf. Gk *θεῖος* 'admirable' 'marvellous': LSJ s.v. 3 b; GUTHRIE: *Gr. Phil.* II, 477 n. 2.

⁶⁰ = 1 at § 3.2 above.

In the speech *pro Archia*, after Cicero has extolled the ability of Archias to extemporise in verse and has enumerated reasons for admiring the work of the poets, and of this poet in particular, he now attempts to justify their claim to special reverence, and in this attempt he has recourse to the traditional notion of the holy poet, inspired and protected by the gods. There are basically six arguments which Cicero employs throughout the *pro Archia* in defence of poetry. They appear (roughly in order) as follows:

- 1). worth of poetry as material for enriching oratory (12–14)
- 2). worth of poetry *per se* as refined (*humanissimam ac liberalissimam*) pleasure (13, 16–17)
- 3). worth of poetry as maker of great men
 - a. by inciting others by means of moral and philosophical examples (14)
 - b. by improving *natura* with *doctrina* (15–16)
- 4). superior claim of poetry to popular esteem over fine acting which is justly admired by all the public (all were moved by the death of Roscius) [natural argument] (17–18):
 - a. poetry especially in its bizarre manifestations: e.g. extempore composition merits public esteem more than acting: *animorum incredibiles motus celeritasque ingeniorum* as against mere *motus corporis*.
 - b. *accurate cogitateque* written compositions on par with the ‘classical’ works’ (*ad veterum auctorum laudem*)⁶¹ standard also merit public esteem.
- 5). worth of poetry as the work inspired by the gods: the poets are holy and deserve reverence and protection [supernatural argument] (18–19; 27)
- 6). worth of poetry as means by which the Roman state is glorified (19 to end)

The order of the arguments also roughly coincides with the ascending importance he attaches to each (although the third argument is conspicuously out of place, and might have been placed – if one were to consider only the strict order of thought – more appropriately before the sixth). In only three of the arguments are poetry and poets considered on their own terms, or rather, without reference to ‘incidental’ benefits accrued from them: in the second, the fourth and the fifth. Yet these arguments, even though parts of them are exceptionally elevated in style, are clearly the most weakly developed of the six. The second is patently apologetic in tone. The fourth (also apologetic: *utar enim vestra benignitate, quoniam me in hoc novo genere dicendi tam diligenter attenditis*), while at first appearing to exalt the intellectual talent required for poetry in order to vindicate its claim to greater public esteem than that of fine acting (which requires merely physical and corporal talents), in fact is not a universal claim about poetry, but one pertaining chiefly to a particular and exceptional aspect of poetic composition, namely extempore composition. The second part

⁶¹ Cf. PENNACINI 67 f. for the idea of the ‘classical’ standard in this speech.

of the fourth argument concerning written composition (*quae vero accurate cogitateque scripsisset*) and contrasted the extempore composition (*cum litteram scripsisset nullam*) whose *animorum incredibiles motus celeritasque ingeniorum* are clearly in antithesis to the keywords *accurate cogitateque*, an antithesis between spontaneity and careful elaboration, in fact does not partake of the parallel set up between the actor and the extemporising poet, but was added merely to show the two sides of the poet's compositional activity. Thus the immediate purpose for drawing the parallel between the actor and the extemporising poet is obvious: namely, to appropriate for the poet some portion of that public estimation which the actor has acquired through his achievements: the poet has *a fortiori* a greater claim to the public's admiration and affection which Roscius possessed, by virtue of the greater talents involved in the poetic activity. But on what basis is the parallel drawn? Precisely on the grounds of the similarity of the value of each of the practising 'artists' as objects of public fascination: in this case, fascination with the ability of each to 'perform': the one, by means of bodily actions, the other, by means of operations of the (swift) intellect. This factor of performance is the reason why the compositions written *accurate cogitateque* are excluded from the comparison⁶². The use of *ingenia* and *animorum incredibiles motus*⁶³ is specifically ascribed to the process of extempore composition; the use of *cura* and *cogitatio* to the written compositions. Thus, the higher compositions which meet the standards set by the ancient writers (*ad veterum auctorum laudem perveniret*) are the polished, written products of elaboration, and not the spontaneous products of *ingenia* and *animorum incredibiles motus*⁶⁴. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the *de orat.* 1,150, speeches written and delivered *sumpto spatio ad cogitandum, paratius atque accurate* are likewise declared to be superior to extempore productions. The language used in this passage is strongly reminiscent of that from the *pro Archia*. Cicero was led to the fifth argument, by which he intended to explain the origin of the powers of the poet and thereby to expand their importance and claim to public admiration, by the remembrance of the *natura-ars* dichotomy suggested to him by the discussion of the *animorum incredibiles motus celeritasque ingeniorum*. But the introduction of the belief in the divine inspiration of the poet is little more than a paying of lip service to the tradition with its positive acknowledgement of the poet's exceptional abilities and of the inexplicable processes of his activity.

⁶² GOTOFF's *ad loc.* choice of words 'written performance' in this connexion is unfortunate.

⁶³ A similar phrase is used with regard to the talent of the orator in *de orat.* 1,113.

⁶⁴ Recall the letters to Quintus examined above in which C. insists that poetic composition demands *time* and a mind free from all care. C. regarded writing as one of the most important exercises for the orator, not only in his formation and education, but even throughout his career: cf. *de orat.* 1,152. 257. 3,190. (*stilo qui et alia et hoc maxime ornat ac limat*); *orat.* 150. 200; *Brut.* 92. 96. 272. *Quint.* 10,3–5 inculcates and discusses the importance of the *stilus*. Cf. also § 2.4 on the 'written' / 'spoken (unwritten)' dichotomy in ancient rhetoric.

There are several indications that the argument is not fully, if indeed at all, advocated by Cicero in the *pro Archia*. Our first doubts regarding Cicero's genuine belief in the fifth argument are aroused by the sheer lack of prominence and importance attributed to it, despite the sublime and grand nature of what is being claimed. Immediately remarkable is the limited space devoted to it – the argument about the glorification of the state and military accomplishments occupies more than ten times the space afforded the *topos* of the divine inspiration. There is little development of the fifth argument, or little drawing out of the implications of the notion of the divine inspiration. Only three developments of the argument may be discerned:

1. *sit igitur indices sanctum vos...hoc poetae nomen quod nulla umquam barbaria violavit*
2. *saxa ac solitudines voci respondent, bestiae saepe immanes flectuntur atque consistunt, nos instituti rebus optimis non poetarum voce moveamur?*
3. battle of cities to claim Homer as her own...Smyrnaeans even dedicated a shrine to him⁶⁵.

(The last of the three variations on theme of the holy poet is not explicit in its reference to his holiness, and may equally apply to the sixth argument of the poet to be revered as a glory to the nation.) In addition to this lack of development and variation, the argument's lack of importance for, and prominence in, the speech, may be seen in the fact that its absence would little impair that section of the speech concerned with the 'defence of poetry'. It is a 'decorative' argument, the success of which depends as much on traditional associations and the conjuring up of familiar images from pseudo-pious legends as from the figurative and elevated language by which it is given expression⁶⁶.

The second indication is to be found in the wording with which the argument is introduced: *ac sic a summis hominibus eruditissimisque accepimus*. In the first place, *ac sic* suggests an addition to the previous assertion 'and what is more' (TLL *s.v.* *atque* III A 'atque ducit enuntiatum indicativum sensum tantum, accedere possunt quidem aliaeve particulae; cp. OLD *s.v.* *atque* 2): obviously the context alone will decide the degree of relationship with what precedes, and whether what is proposed in the addition is greater than, less than, or equal to that which precedes. In our case, we expect from the argument following *ac* to be directly related to what precedes and to be of higher import; as it is, there is at once something of a debasement of the argument in the speaker's refusal to accept responsibility for the doctrine adduced: *ac sic...accepimus* (*accipio* = 'to hear, be told': see OLD *s.v.* 18; TLL *s.v.* I 4 p. 307,83) ; and later: *quare suo iure noster Ennius 'sanctos' appellat poetas* (compare TLL

⁶⁵ It is rather ironic that Plato is claimed as one of C.'s models for the doctrine of the 'divine' and holy poet, when C. cites Homer as proof of the reverence due and paid to this 'divine' poet. In the *Republic* 599 d–e & 600 c–d, Plato uses the *lack* of honour shown to Homer as an argument against his worth to society!

⁶⁶ Cf. GOTOFF 174 ff.

s.v. *atque* III F: *saepe atque adnectit auctoris sententia; accedit hic quoque* quidem and the example from *Sest. 3: atque ego sic statuo*). On the other hand, the *natura–ars* dichotomy and the explanation of the divine inspiration of the poet which follows are inherently connected (and grammatically indicated thus by the *ac*) with the argument preceding. Accordingly, *ac* in the light of what follows takes on the colouring of a conjunction introducing not a new point as the culmination of a series of arguments, but rather, a new point which is rather incidental, and which may or may not be the climax in the development of the argument (it is largely irrelevant to the speaker's case). The tone is perhaps something similar to this: 'And to come to that, one might add what we have on the highest and most learned authority...' This refusal on Cicero's part to commit himself to the content of the fifth argument (cf. again the use of *atque* to allow the author to add his *own* opinion to an argument TLL s.v. *atque* III F), does not, of course, forbid Cicero from exploiting it for what it is worth, that is to say, as I have already indicated, from using it as a 'decorative' argument. GOTOFF's analysis of the passage (174 ff.) shows how the passage marks something of an epideictic high-point in the speech; the language is very elevated, figurative – almost poetic. But this very exuberance of language, style and image also serves further to diminish the credibility of the speaker as regards his own personal belief in the doctrine: to believe that poets are blown upon with some kind of divine breath, and that they are commended to us in the manner of a gift of the gods, is one thing; but Cicero does not expect us to think of him as advocating the truth of the Orpheus and Amphion myths, that rocks, and deserts, and wild beasts are moved and respond to the poet's voice. That is a pretty conceit whereby the sensitivity of non-human (uncivilised) creation to the divine power of poetry is introduced in order to give greater insistence to the demand that human civilisation should *a fortiori* (because *nos instituti rebus optimis*) be equally, if not more, sensitive and responsive to the divine powers of poetry.

The next and more important indication of the lack of personal belief in the doctrine of the divine inspiration is that the introduction of this doctrine into the speech is clearly prompted by the exigencies of – or rather, I should say the opportunities presented by – the case and by nothing else; unlike the arguments about the functions of the poet in the *pro Archia* which can be verified by other statements in Cicero's writings⁶⁷, the claim about the divine impetus of the poet is not supported elsewhere as we have already seen.

Furthermore, in the passage under examination (18–19), one can find if not direct contradictions, at any rate, a certain carelessness or looseness of argument: a carelessness which, because it reveals an indifference on Cicero's part to present the theory in its best

⁶⁷ See next chapter, § 4.1.

light, will in turn suggest the degree of credence lent to the theory of the *poeta sanctus*. For example, we have already seen how the use of *ingenia* was applied *especially* to the extempore poetic composition, and how *cura* and *cogitatio* (which must surely approximate, if not be equivalent to, *ars*) were applied to the written compositions. Yet, if in the doctrine of the divine inspiration, the object of the divine inspiration is natural gifts (*ingenia*) only and not *doctrina*, *praecepta* and *ars*, then on this reading the divine power affects only, or at any rate, *especially*, extempore poetic composition. But this is surely not the thesis which Cicero wished to be understood here since that would diminish and limit the claim he has been making about Archias' written compositions, and the possibility of this injurious thesis must be set down to the carelessness of the orator. Another example of the carelessness and somewhat contradictory nature of this section concerns the *natura-ars* dichotomy (the triad *natura-ars-exercitatio* had already appeared in the beginning of the speech⁶⁸) which introduces the discussion of the doctrine of the divine inspiration. All the rest of the arts depend on *doctrina et praeceptis et arte*; the poet alone depends on *natura*⁶⁹: *natura* bestowed on him by the gods who seem to commend him to us as if a gift to be protected and revered. Elsewhere, Cicero will forbid such a separation of the *artes* or *studia*: in the third book of the *de oratore*, where Crassus undertakes to argue the unity of *res* and *verba* (3,19–24)⁷⁰, of the three arguments employed⁷¹, one of them is [Ps.]-Plato's assertion that *omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri* (the original is from epin. 992a: δεσμὸς γὰρ πεφυκὼς πάντων τούτων εἰς ἀναφανήσεται διανοουμένοις⁷²). There the argument is also necessary to reinforce Crassus' fundamental thesis of the 'universal orator' (L-P IV 132), and more particularly, to suggest one of the central themes of the book, the connexion between oratory and philosophy. But the thought of the interconnexion of all the arts was fundamental to Cicero too, and perhaps explains the confidence with which he applied himself to so many pursuits in his career. In fact this [Ps.]Platonic *vox* is mentioned in the speech pro Archia itself, at the very beginning (2), where Cicero is justifying not only the extensive studies in all the liberal arts, but also his earlier statement that a poet could have contributed so much to his own formation: *etenim omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent habent quoddam commune vinclum et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur* (cp. L-P IV 134). It was on the basis of this doctrine of the

⁶⁸ Cf. L-P I 211.

⁶⁹ GOTOFF 175, entirely misses the point of the dichotomy when he writes: '...while other arts demand a high level of technical competence, poetry requires *in addition to mastery of the skills*, inspiration as well' [my italics]: the distinction is made clearly in Arch. 18.

⁷⁰ The theme is pursued throughout much of Bk. 3 (56–95: esp. 60. 76. 92); and of course also throughout much of book I: cf. L-P I 41–2. Cf. also Brut. 23; orat. 14. 16 ff., 118.

⁷¹ Cf. L-P IV 131 ff.

⁷² Cf. L-P IV 134 for similar passages in Plato.

interconnexion of the arts that Cicero accepted as axiomatic for the formation of the orator the so called *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*⁷³. So while Cicero (de orat. 3,56–73) can deplore the loss of that ancient, original unity between thought and speech, between philosophy and oratory, through the over-specialisation of professions, yet he can approve of those specialists who *in iis artibus, quae repertae sunt, ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem, omne tempus atque aetates suas consumpserunt*. The description of these specialists who sought to bring all the *artes* which developed *humanitas*⁷⁴ into some kind of systematic, comprehensive education resembles the description of Archias's own education (Arch. 4: *ab eis artibus aetas puerilis ad humanitatem informari solet*) which in turn must have been the basis for the education that according to the speech (Arch. 1), Cicero received from him⁷⁵.

The importance of the doctrine of the unity of the arts for Cicero may be gathered from the fact that it is used as one of the main arguments in support of his thesis not only of the indivisibility of form and content (de orat. 3,19 ff. cf. 1,48. 50: & L-P I, 41 f.; IV 131), but also of the unity of speech and thought, of oratory and philosophy, upon which, in turn, is based the whole conception of the 'universal' orator. The superiority of the 'generalist', that is the one who through wide education in the *artes liberales* and his comprehensive knowledge is able to apply himself successfully to endeavours in various fields, the superiority of this 'generalist' over the specialist is for Cicero precisely what distinguishes his ideal orator from his lesser rivals, and, indeed, from the exponents of other arts. That versatility and demand for wide learning are two of the main themes of the de orat. and in particular of Crassus' discourse in the the first book. In a notable illustration of the kind of versatility and wide learning he desires in his *orator perfectus*, he makes an analogy with the 'learned' poets such as Aratus and Nicander of Colophon who combined *poetica quaedam facultas* and *natura* with *doctrina* and *ars* (de orat. 1,69). In this passage from the de orat., Cicero compares the poet to the orator, and makes them identical in respect of their capacity and freedom to write and discuss competently subjects belonging to other arts⁷⁶: *in hoc quidem certe prope idem [sc. ac orator], nullis ut terminis circumscribat aut definiat ius suum, quo minus ei liceat eadem facultate et copia vagari qua velit*. L-P comment *ad loc.*: 'auch Dichter haben sich öfters Stoffe aus anderen Fachgebieten zu eigen gemacht'. The orator, like the poet, orator, may be ignorant of a specialised field such as astronomy, but since like the poet, he can be enlightened by a specialist on that subject and indeed speak better about it than the

⁷³ K. BARWICK: *Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros*. Berlin 1963, 13 ff.

⁷⁴ WEHRLI (1978), 79 & n. 15: 'Humanitas im Gegensatz zum Adjektiv nicht als natürliche Veranlagung, sondern als Ergebnis von Erziehung verstanden wurde' quoted by L-P ad 3,58.

⁷⁵ But NARDUCCI (1997) 4 n. 3 is sceptical about C.'s claims that Archias had a profound influence on his youth and education.

⁷⁶ On the theme of the orator's skill and capacity to speak on any subject: cf. de orat. 1,21. 3,77.

specialist himself, there is no reason why he should or cannot talk about any subject that he has taken the trouble to be instructed in (*tamen iis de rebus ipsis si ei dicendum, cum cognorit ab iis qui tenent, quae sint in quaque re, multo oratorem quam ipsos illos quorum eae sunt artes esse dicturum* [1,65 cf. 1,69]⁷⁷). The demand, therefore, for the mastery of content applies equally to the orator and the poet: and the law of the indivisibility of form and content likewise is valid for both. The view of RONCONI (89) that Cicero by this example of Aratus and Nicander wished to separate form and content is erroneous: the whole context of the illustration tells against it, since Cicero is striving to prove not that a poet can be a mere decorator of content, of which his entirely ignorant, but on the contrary, that, like the orator, he must have a certain mastery of that subject (even if it is outside of his expertise) in order to expound his material properly. The illustration also emphasises the *possibility* of gaining such a mastery even when the subject is quite alien. In fact, in the speech pro Archia, as elsewhere⁷⁸, the manifest admiration for the 'learned poet' betrays the insincerity of the belief in the divinely inspired, frenzied poet. In de orat. 1,51 on the same theme of the necessity of mastering one's subject, he writes: *quid est enim tam furiosum quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia nec scientia?* In another place, in the Tusc. 3,3, while warning against the misleading and seductive influence of the poets, Cicero does not hesitate to credit them with *magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque* in a way that suggests that the learnedness (whether beneficial or harmful to others is another matter) of the poets was axiomatic, at the very least, for Cicero⁷⁹. One thinks of the 'learned poet' as being learned by virtue of his studies not only in the sciences (= content), but also in his technique (= form). Thus, the interpretation of PENNACINI 68 ff. which makes the poet by virtue of his divine inspiration (or at any rate, his *natura*), some kind of autonomous entity, exempt from the common laws that govern the other arts, or which makes the poet free from the bonds which join those arts and which make some of them accessible to all the others, is irreconcilable with Ciceronian thinking for which the unity of the arts is fundamental. Just as the other arts are not dependent on preternatural forces for their impetus, so for Cicero is poetry in every respect, like the rest, an entirely human craft, and moreover, like oratory, poetry enjoys much commerce with the other arts, as may be seen in the illustration of the *poeta doctus*. As a last point with regard to the interconnexion of poetry and the other arts, it may be noted what L-P have commented on this passage about Aratus and Nicander. They point out that Cicero connects poetry with the other arts,

⁷⁷ Cf. de orat. 2,36–38.

⁷⁸ Cf. Cato 22. 47 (Sophocles); 50 (Naevius, Plautus, Livius): *...studiis flagrant senes vidimus...atque haec studia doctrinae*, 54 *doctus Hesiodus*.

⁷⁹ ORBAN 178 f. (citing Tusc. 3,3): '[doctrina] désigne...forme nettement supérieure du savoir: savoir universel des poètes.'

in particular with the other literary, ‘verbal’ arts in a double way: first by the analogy with oratory, whereby it is shown like oratory to possess a similarity capacity for absorbing alien content which it is able to expound in a more lucid and eloquent fashion than the experts themselves; second, by the similarity, – even identity –, of stylistic means: ‘Aber Cicero beschränkt sich nicht auf diese Analogie; er gibt zugleich eine allgemeine Charakteristik der Poesie im Verhältnis zur oratorischen Prosa... [er] benutzt die Gelegenheit, sein literarisches Blickfeld zu erweitern *und die verbalen Künste als ein zusammenhängendes Ganzes darzustellen*’ [emphasis mine].

3.8 *natura/ingenium* and *ars*

Having dismissed divine inspiration as a factor in the Ciceronian conception of poetic composition we must now consider another theory closely related it, which is formulated using the *natura/ingenium*–*ars* dichotomy that we have already mentioned. PENNACINI 68 ff. wanted to salvage the Democritean-Platonic theory of divine inspiration in Ciceronian thinking, by claiming for the latter ‘una versione attenuata della credenza nell’origine divina della poesia’. He argues that Cicero merely uses the theory in a metaphorical sense: ‘in luogo della divinità, matrice della poesia è qui la natura: cioè la facoltà poetica’. Later he makes the exclusion of *ars* and *doctrina* more explicit (70): ‘Non contano a produrre le caratteristiche specifiche della poesia né *ars dicendi* né *doctrina*: la poeticità è qualcosa che *doctrina tradi non potest*...La *natura*...in generale garantisce al poeta il suo specifico carattere di poeta e il suo valore...’ He goes further; in order to reinforce the exclusion of *ars* and *doctrina* from the process of poetic composition, he introduces (71) the teaching found in several places in the Cicero’s rhetorical works (part. 18 [& 72!], orat. 177 f.; 183) about the ear being the discoverer and judge of verse, metre and rhythm. In these places, Cicero was concerned to show that it is the natural sense of hearing which is the first to detect these rhythmical qualities, and that art and theory are not at all essential to this process, but are merely subsequent operations to explain what man discovered and continues to recognise without art – thus that art and theory were born of the observation and study of nature (orat. 183: *quem [versum] dimensa ratio docuit quid accideret: ita notatio naturae et animadversio peperit artem*). But this teaching cannot be adduced to advance PENNACINI’s thesis about Cicero’s belief in the poet’s dependence on nature, because clearly this faculty for recognising verse or rhythm is attributed not solely to poets, but to orators, and indeed, so it would seem, to all men. Furthermore, in Brut. 33 f. in the account of Isocrates, although the same doctrine is enunciated about the ear, nevertheless, there is a marked preference for management of

rhythm by theory and observation, and a certain degree of disdain shown for dependence on natural instinct in these matters:

quaedam ad numerum conclusio nulla erat aut, si quando erat, non apparebat
eam dedita opera esse quaesitam – quae forsitan laus sit, verum tamen natura
magis tum casuque, non umquam aut ratione aliqua aut ulla observatione
fiebat.

Not satisfied with having thus posited the formal side of poetry in Ciceronian thought firmly outside the realm of art and theory, and on the contrary, entirely within the boundaries of the natural gifts of the poet, PENNACINI then proceeded to search for an explanation for the poet's cognitive process in the same realm. So instead of the Muse or the god being responsible for the poet's peculiar knowledge and wisdom⁸⁰, that is, the content of his poem, PENNACINI makes Cicero's poet a recipient and interpreter of the Platonic Forms, to which *natura* is responsible for making the poet more susceptible. PENNACINI invokes in order to support his thesis about 'la teoria del poeta per *natura*, cui *l'ingenium* suggerisce, attraverso le idee, materia per il canto' that notorious passage from the orator 7–10 in which the sculptor is said to have modelled his figures of Jupiter or Minerva not on any one person, but on the Form of beauty that he contemplated in his mind. It is obvious here that again in this thesis, even if it were granted that this passage could be applied to the poet (of whom there is no mention!), his dependence on nature with regard to the acquisition of content is not unique to him: in the passage from the orator alone we are given to understand that the Forms are accessible to the sculptor, and also to the rhetorician – and presumably also to the orator, for eloquence is there enumerated as one of the Forms (10: *sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaerimus*). This interpretation is clearly in opposition to PENNACINI's later insistence on the fundamental difference between the modes of knowledge and content acquisition employed by the poet on the one hand (the Forms innate in him, and his natural abilities to grasp them) and the orator on the other (technique, *inventio*, *ars*).

In fact, the truth is that the Forms are introduced in the orator not chiefly with the intention of explaining the cognitive process of the *artifex* or the orator, but in a more general way to serve the programmatic assimilation of his own oratorical ideal of the unification of philosophy and rhetoric with the Platonism. As has been recently argued by A.A. LONG⁸¹, Cicero sets up the un-Platonic Form of Eloquence, in order to show that this ideal of the unification of philosophy and rhetoric is 'true to the spirit, though not the letter

⁸⁰ As is the case with the Homeric bards Demodocus (Od. 8,477 ff.) and Phemius (Od. 22,342 ff.). Cf. RUSSELL: *Criticism*. 70 f.

⁸¹ 'Cicero's Plato and Aristotle.' in J. G. F. POWELL (ed.): *Cicero the Philosopher*. Oxford 1995, 50.

of the Plato's discourses'. LONG (49) also points out, with devastating results for PENNACINI's thesis about the nature of the poet's capacity to receive the Forms, that the clause *sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam* (orat. 9) need not, and indeed ought not to be taken as it has customarily been taken to mean, that 'Cicero took Plato's Forms to be mind-dependent entities'. For PENNACINI (72) claims that *natura* is responsible for 'una capacità innata di contemplare le forme innate da principio dimoranti nello spirito nell' individuo' [my emphasis]. Also, that '[p]oeti si nasce, con le idee dentro e la capacità di percepirle creandone delle immagini'. LONG, on the contrary, argues that in the phrase *in mente insidebat*, the only point being made is – and admittedly it is fairly obvious – that 'a Form must be present or accessible to the mind that perceives it, without implying in addition that its existence depends on its being thought'. He also argues that the case for the expression being taken in this way is strengthened when the remarks about Phidias are compared with what is later said of Plato and his Forms (*easque* [sc. *ιδεα*] *gigni negat et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intellegentia contineri; cetera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu*).

But let us now return to PENNACINI's larger claim about the general dependence of the poet on his natural gifts, as opposed to those aids provided by art and technique. I have already argued against the dissolution of the bonds which in Ciceronian thought unite all the arts, and which make transition from the one to other, or at least, from oratory and poetry to all the others possible; if that is correct, then the same judgement regarding the *natura*–*ars* dichotomy will apply to poetry as that which is applied by Cicero to other arts. In fact, his attitude toward this dichotomy may fairly well be established in the case of oratory, although there is considerable disagreement among scholars as to the relative degree of participation each of the members of the dichotomy has in the final analysis. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly examine Cicero's views on the respective rôles that *natura* / *ingenium* and *ars* play in the creative business of various fields, but especially that of oratory. Most of the information on this subject is contained in the theoretical works, and much of it naturally is concerned solely with rhetoric and oratory. On the other hand, some of it is of a more general nature, and by virtue of the fact that Cicero adheres both to the doctrine of the unity of the arts, and to the doctrine of the applicability of rhetoric to poetics (as I argued in the first chapter), these views can tell us something, if indeed not a great deal, about Cicero's views on the respective rôles of *natura* / *ingenium* and *ars* in the composition of poetry⁸².

⁸² Cf. GRUBE (1962) 241: 'We shall...more recognise that many of the rhetorical formulae which he employs can be applied beyond the field of rhetoric'.

In Cicero's writings, instead of *natura* / *ingenium-ars*, we usually find the triad made familiar from Protagoras and Greek rhetoric and literary formulations⁸³: *natura-ars-exercitatio*. The fact that the discussion of these three conditions is frequently reduced to the mere dichotomy *natura* / *ingenium-ars*, not only in Cicero (as in Arch. 15 & 18), but also in other writers (for example Quint. 2,19,1), indicates that these are the two critical elements in the controversy. The introduction of *exercitatio*, while conceivable in fields other than oratory, belongs in a special way to the latter. It forms an essential part of the established oratorical curriculum, and likewise of extended programmes such as that delineated by Cicero in the *de orat.* 1,147-159⁸⁴. In Hellenistic / Horatian poetic theory, on the contrary, while it seems to play a rôle (cf. Hor. ars 409 *studium*⁸⁵), it does not appear to be either as systematized as it was in rhetorical theory and education, or as important as the other two elements⁸⁶. We shall not accordingly concern ourselves greatly with this member of the triad in general and specifically in relation to poetic theory.

DOUGLAS (1966) xxviii writes of Cicero's recurring fascination with the triad: 'It cannot be proved that Cicero never referred to, for example, *ingenium* without consciously alluding to the triad, but it was certainly never far from his thoughts'. We find it already in the *de inventione* 1,2: *huius rei, quae vocatur eloquentia sive artis sive studii sive exercitationis cuiusdam sive facultatis ab natura profectae*, and recurs several times in the *Brutus* (1,22. 25 etc.: see DOUGLAS for more references and discussions). L-P I 211 point out that in Cicero's time the triad was so familiar that he could introduce it into his speech for Archias (1 & 15). In the philosophical *de oratore* the triad assumes enormous significance as one of the fundamental problems that rhetoric must first deal with⁸⁷, and it provides the basis for an important structural division in the first book, and for three concomitant discussions within that division of the three members of the triad (*natura/ingenium* 113-33; *ars* 134-46; *exercitatio* 147-59). In fact the triad is apparently introduced very early in the prologue to the first book, where Cicero is explaining to his brother Quintus the reason why he undertook to write the work: it was in response to a frequently made request by Quintus to

⁸³ P. SHOREY, 'Φύσις, Μελέτη, 'Επιστήμη.' *TAPhA* 40 (1909) 185-201.

⁸⁴ Cf. L-P I 245 ff.

⁸⁵ Cf. BRINK ad loc.: '*studium*, like μελέτη, ἄσκησις, is a technical term in these discussions'; likewise FISKE-GRANT (1929) 77: '...it [sc. *studium*] connotes *exercitatio*'; ROSTAGNI ad loc., on the other hand, interprets *studium* as the synonym of *ars*: 'Sinonimi di *natura* e di *ars* sono, da una parte *ingenium*...dall'altra *studium*'. A most interesting fragment of a certain iambic poet Simulus (not the 4th-C comic poet of the same name), fr. 727 SH = MEINECKE I p. xiii, is preserved in Stobaeus 60,4 in which the poet is said to need not only φύσις and τέχνη, but also μελέτη. Later ἐπιμέλεια and other attributes are said to make the poets σοφοὺς ... καγαθοὺς.

⁸⁶ Thus rightly BRINK in the comm., 394 on *ars* and *natura*: 'This duality underlies the whole poem'; also 38: '*ars* involves its logical opposite *natura*'; at 75, B. seems to include practice under *ars*: '...that amalgam of rationality and skill, theory and practice, called τέχνη or *ars* by the ancients'.

⁸⁷ Cf. L-P I 209: 'Die Frage nach der diesbezüglichen Rolle von *natura*, *ars* und *exercitatio* gehört noch zu den einleitenden Fragen des rhetorischen Systems'.

improve upon the rather rough and unsophisticated rhetorical works – *commentarioli* – (that is, the two books of the *de Inventione*) that he had produced in his youth (c. 91–88 B.C. according to KENNEDY (1972) 107), which were now not worthy of his age and experience. Cicero wished also to produce something which would allow him to expand upon, clarify and defend the position that he had taken in rhetorical discussions against Quintus:

solesque non numquam hac de re a me in disputationibus nostris dissentire quod ego eruditissimorum hominum *artibus* eloquentiam contineri statuam, tu autem illam ab *elegantia doctrinae* segregandam putes et in quodam *ingenii* atque *exercitationis* genere ponendam.

It has been pointed out (L-P I 23) that *artibus* is here used, and not *arte*; that consequently what must be meant is not the *ars rhetorica*, but the general education provided by the *artes* ‘in ihrer Gesamtheit’; the so-called *scientia omnium artium* which is so predominant a theme in the *de oratore*. Furthermore, it has been shown that the value of *ars* as manifested in the rhetors’ systematic education is not problematic for Crassus’ opponents. Still, it cannot be doubted that we are supposed to be reminded of the triad by the mere similarity of terminology and the number of opposing prerequisites set up in the formula. Later occurrences and traces of the triad do refer to the *ars*, not *artes*: at 1,14 in discussing the primitive development of oratory at Rome Cicero explicitly uses precise terminology associated with the triad:

ac primo quidem totius rationis ignari, qui neque *exercitationis* ullam vim neque aliquod praeceptum *artis* esse arbitrarentur, tantum quantum *ingenio* et cogitatione poterant consequebantur.

After this follows an exposition of the introduction of the *ars* into Roman society and of its subsequent progress by means of Greek teachers and books. To this may be added Sulpicius’ request (1,96) to Crassus for a thorough discussion of *totius huius vel studii, vel artificii, vel facultatis* (= *exercitatio, ars, natura*) (cp. also 2,162. 232). The triad is again discussed in the second book by Antonius (*ars* 74–84; *ingenium* 85–88; *exercitatio* 89–98: cf. L-P II 281 ff.). Sometimes, however, the triad is reduced to a mere contest between *natura* and *ars* (1,113. 214), as we have already observed above. In the *Brutus* there are over twenty references to the triad (either in its full tri-partite or various truncated bi-partite forms⁸⁸); in the orator one can find over ten references to the triad, or to the *natura–ars* pair, or to one of the three members mentioned in such a way as to recall the triad⁸⁹.

⁸⁸ DOUGLAS xxviii cites the following passages from the *Brut.*: 22. 25. 98. 110. 111. 125. 233. 236–7. 240. 243. 245. 247. 249. 267–8. 272. 276. 280. 282. 302–3. 327. 331.

⁸⁹ *orat.* 4. 33–4. 48. 51. 90. 99. 114. 116. 140–43. 146–7. 162. 200. 229. Cf. 130–32.

It is clear then, from the rhetorical works and even from the speeches (cf. also pro Caelio 45) that the triad played a fundamental rôle in Cicero's critical thinking. How then did Cicero deal with the question of the respective rôles of *natura*, *ars* and *exercitatio*? His attitude to the three members of the triad may be characterised in this way: he always allows supremacy to *natura*; yet at the same time he is unwilling to deny the usefulness and advantages of *ars* or *doctrina* (understood and recognised if not in the traditional senses, at any rate, certainly as a kind of *ars* or *doctrina*): *exercitatio* is not problematic, and is accepted by all, whether defenders of *natura* or of *ars*. If Cicero seems to vacillate somewhat in his estimation of the precise value of *ars*, some of that uncertainty may be attributed to the fact that when he refers to this component, he is in fact referring to different things. Sometimes he means the *ars* in the traditional sense of the rhetoricians' theory or of one of their handbooks (e.g. de orat. 1,91. 113. 114); at other times, something not so narrow is meant, but rather a systemization based on practical observation (e.g. 1,102. 109. 2,5); and at other times again, the terms *doctrina*, *artes*, or *disciplina*⁹⁰ acquire a more broadened sense of the wide and general education, with a thorough grounding in philosophy, law, history and the liberal arts (1,5)⁹¹.

It was in reaction to the education provided by the rhetorical schools and the handbooks which stressed a mechanistic, theoretical and rule-bound approach to oratory⁹² (L-P I 23 also suggest that: '[v]ielleicht beschränkten auch die von Crassus angefochtenen "rhetores Latini" ihren Unterricht größtenteils auf Redeübungen"⁹³) that Cicero characterised this kind of *ars* as ineffectual inasmuch as it was not proven in practice and that he sought to redress the imbalance by stressing that *ingenium* and *natura* are absolutely necessary prerequisites for the orator. Passages in which the *ars rhetorica* is thus denigrated include: de orat. 1, 86 ff. 102 ff. 113. 214; 2,10. 217. 3,75. orat. 122⁹⁴. 140. 146. 147. 161 f. The attack on the *ars* is particularly an important theme in the first book of the de orat., and for obvious reasons, since in that book he wishes to elevate the study of oratory to a higher level than was the norm in the handbooks, and to endow it with a more philosophical character⁹⁵, liberated from the petty *praecepta* of the rhetoricians (cf. de orat. 1,5)⁹⁶. The state of poetics before and at that time was certainly not similarly shackled by

⁹⁰ For the different nuances of meaning possessed by the terms *ars*, *doctrina*, *disciplina* in C., see ORBAN LEC 25 (1957) 174 ff.

⁹¹ On C.'s criticisms of the handbooks of the school rhetoricians, see BARWICK (1963) 10 ff.

⁹² Cf. BARWICK (1963) 71 ff.

⁹³ Cf. BARWICK (1963) 43.

⁹⁴ KROLL ad loc. points out that 'C. hat eine gewisse Neigung, den Umfang dieser *ἐντεχνα* zu beschränken...und manches, was sonst dazu gerechnet wird, als natürlich und selbstverständlich zu bezeichnen'.

⁹⁵ Cf. GRUBE (1962) 244.

⁹⁶ Cf. D'ALTON: *Rom. Lit. Theory & Criticism*, 149.

such books stuffed with *nugae* (de orat. 1,86), nor with teachers and schools promoting these books; and this circumstance is what I suggest Cicero is thinking of principally when he states in Arch. 18 *ceterarum rerum studia* [i.e. excluding poetry] *et doctrina et arte constare*. (It goes without saying that Cicero, by implying at, for example, de orat. 1,89 f. 108. 113 f. 146, that the *ars* of the rhetoricians can be dispensed with, is of course contradicting what he had alleged in the speech for Archias where he says that apart from poetry, all the rest of the disciplines depend on *doctrina* and *ars* [18].) In the public speech, contrary to his expositions in the theoretical treatises destined for more erudite readers, Cicero takes advantage of the common conception of the *artes*, especially that of the orators, and places it in contrast to the poets, who go to no school for poets (even the use of sound and rhythm is governed by a natural instinct common to all: orat. 162. 178. 183. de orat. 3,195), and who in traditional legend are furnished with a divine gift.

GRUBE and L-P rightly notice a conflict in Cicero's rhetorical works which on the one hand, as we have just seen, seem to protest 'against the elaborate technicalities of the professional technicians', and on the other hand, are, in many parts, largely filled up with technicalities of a very similar kind⁹⁷. Cicero himself appears to be conscious that he might be accused of being yet another technician in de oratore 2,10 (cf. orat. 43: *nulla praecepta ponemus – neque enim id suscepimus*. 140 ff). The argument of maturity used to explain this contradiction which holds that as Cicero grew older he developed an ever growing aversion towards the rhetorician's technicalities, is not supported by the evidence. *Partitiones oratoriae* and *topica* written over ten years after the de oratore deal with many of very same concerns which the rhetoricians themselves covered: 'kinds of cases, issues, and arguments...sources of arguments or *loci*, that is, *inventio*' (GRUBE 1962, 237 f.). And of course, the second and third books of the de oratore itself are often highly technical, despite the protests of the first book. Cicero owns as much in a letter to Atticus of 54 B.C. in which he explains why he removed Scaevola from the last two books of the dialogue: *et erat primi libri sermo non alienus a Scaevolae studiis; reliqui libri τεχνολογίαν habent, ut scis*. Furthermore, as L-P comment: 'Auch in De or. ist ein rhetorisches Stratum fast überall sichtbar (cf. 1,17–8; 64)⁹⁸. How is the conflict to be explained? GRUBE over-simplifies the matter when he argues that on the more legalistic, precept-bound side of rhetoric (*inventio*,

⁹⁷ GRUBE (1965) 172 ff.= *Phoenix* 16 (1962) 237 ff; L-P I 38.

⁹⁸ The underlying structure of the de orat. provided by the *ars rhetorica* has frequently been remarked upon: for many have perceived that after the preliminary discussion of fundamental questions concerning rhetoric and oratory in Bk. 1, the rest of the work is based loosely on the five *officia oratoris* (Cf. BARWICK 1963, 10; L-P I 231. II 184. IV 92; WISSE 1989, 14; BRINK 1975, 98.), each of which constitutes an *ars* in itself (Brut. 25); Bk. 2 covers *inventio*, *dispositio*, *memoria*; Bk. 3 *elocutio* and *actio*. Even those parts of instruction (the division of these is 3,107 ff.; 'Ciceronian' *topica* 2,132–151; the doctrine of ethos and pathos 2,178–216; the doctrine of wit and humour 2,216b–290; the doctrine of prose-rhythm 3,178–198) with which Cicero supplies the deficiencies of the school handbooks are largely of a technical nature. Cf. BARWICK (1963) 73 ff.

loci etc.) Cicero was not averse to the technicalities of the rhetoricians, but it was merely for the technicalities of style in the rhetoricians' teaching that he had little patience. There is, it must be admitted, some truth in this interpretation; the pure study of style takes up very little space in Cicero's theoretical works, even when he states that he is going to discuss style⁹⁹. On the other hand, in addition to the third book of the *de oratore*, Cicero also discusses stylistic matters at the end of the orator – in particular, composition: collocation of words, rhythm, period etc. – and it is in this latter work that, although he is admittedly embarrassed somewhat by being caught out like a technician and school teacher (140), he nevertheless defends such teaching eloquently in 141 f. Nor in other places where he denigrates the rhetorician's teachings does he make the distinction between stylistic matters and others of greater concern to lawyers such as *inventio*, *loci* etc. Rather, the contradiction between Cicero's repeated denigration of the *ars* in some places and his implied advocacy of it throughout large portions of the theoretical works, is to be resolved not so much by distinguishing – as GRUBE does – between these two parts of the *ars rhetorica*, as by distinguishing between the excessive formulations of, and slavish adherence to, ineffectual rules on the one hand, and the limited, and practical advantages afforded by parts of the *ars*¹⁰⁰. Cicero does recognise that in a qualified manner rhetoric may be regarded as a kind of *ars* (*de orat.* 1,109: *sed sive est ars sive artis quaedam similitudo, non est quidem neglegenda*)¹⁰¹, and having carefully delineated the boundaries of its usefulness and worth in the first book, he frequently gives credit to it not only as that which can supplement the deficiencies of nature¹⁰², but also – in the case of those for whom no such deficiencies exist – as a useful guide (eine Richtlinie). Take for example the following passage from *de orat.* 1,138:

in his enim fere rebus omnis istorum artificum doctrina versatur, quam ego si nihil dicam adiuvere, mentiar; habet enim quaedam quasi ad commonendum oratorem, quo quidque referat et quo intuens ab eo, quodcumque sibi proposuerit, minus aberret¹⁰³.

Brut. 111 is even more positive about *ars* in its function as a guide:

⁹⁹ GRUBE (1962) 238: 'In the third book of the *De oratore*, for example, Crassus is supposed to deal with style exclusively but he deals at great length with the relation of oratory to philosophy; even when he is dealing with style itself, he prefers to discuss general principles...'

¹⁰⁰ Cf. BARWICK (1963) 71: 'C. ist zwar überzeugt, daß die Theorie der zünftigen Rhetoren für die Ausbildung eines Redners von Wichtigkeit ist.'

¹⁰¹ One observes that in questioning the status of rhetoric as an *ars* C. diverged fundamentally from Aristotle who at the very beginning of the rhet. gives the subject of his study the status of a τέχνη. The motivating factor for Cicero in this divergence was firmly in the Isocratean tradition, namely, a desire for a return to the ancient unity of *sapientia* and *eloquentia*, to which the very idea of an *ars rhetorica*, the study of speaking divorced from thought – like a mind severed from its body, to use Crassus' analogy (3,24) – , was an obstacle (cf. L-P I 42; GRUBE 1962, 236).

¹⁰² *de orat.* 1,115. *Tusc.* 3,2: cf. *orat.* 183 & ORBAN 174 ff.

¹⁰³ L-P on *quo quidque referat*: 'Beziehungssystem'; on *quo intuens*: 'Das Bild deutet auf den Steuermann, der bei der Fahrt gewisse feste Punkte im Auge behält um den richtigen Kurs wahren'.

quid dicam opus esse doctrina? sine qua etiam si quid bene dicitur adiuvante natura, tamen id, quia fortuito fit, semper paratum esse non potest¹⁰⁴.

Passages in which the *ars* – the scope of its applications having thus been extensively curtailed – is similarly received well (to varying degrees) include: *de orat.* 1,109–10. 115. 145–46. 2,32. 3,212¹⁰⁵.

In addition to the points of doctrine which he wished to add to the orator's education and which were lacking in the handbooks¹⁰⁶, it was also a desideratum of Cicero's programme, not only that his ideal orator should exercise himself in the widest possible range of fields (*de orat.* 1,21. 59. 3,76)¹⁰⁷, but also that he should have a truly universal knowledge acquired from an *eruditio libero digna* (*de orat.* 1,17. 213), the general education with its curriculum of subjects outside rhetoric, in particular history, law (1,16–20) and philosophy (3,56–73. *orat.* 11–19. 113–20. *Brut.* 161. 322)¹⁰⁸; the study of literature (including the *evolutio poetarum*) was of course not excluded (*de orat.* 1,44. 128. 158. 2,72. 3,37. 48. *Brut.* 322.), but is often not mentioned explicitly, inasmuch as it tends to be subsumed into the rhetorical and grammatical studies (even if in more narrow terms than was to Cicero's taste)¹⁰⁹. We have already noticed above with L-P (I 23) that at 1,5 something resembling the rhetorical formula *natura-ars-exercitatio* appears, with this difference, however, that instead of *arte* we find *artibus*. It is reasonable to suppose therefore that Cicero was modifying the traditional triad by substituting the syncrisis of the *artes* (cf. L-P I 36) for the *ars* of the rhetoricians¹¹⁰. By means of this 'maximalist' demand he was able both to maintain his criticism of the hackneyed and ineffectual rhetorical handbooks, and yet at the same time, to respond vigorously to the challenge posed by those orators who believed that τέχνη could be entirely dispensed with, that talent alone was sufficient¹¹¹. Cicero went even further still, teaching that although talent is absolutely essential, only the orator who possessed *omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam* (*de orat.* 1,20) could be an *orator perfectus*¹¹².

¹⁰⁴ Cf. GRUBE (1962) 245 ('One can be an orator without this knowledge (sc. theoretical), but one cannot be consistently good...') fails to notice this passage from *Brut.*

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *de inv.* 1,5: *non natura modo neque exercitatione conficitur, verum etiam artificio quodam comparatur*, *Brut.* 22. 111. 125. 233. 236. 237. 240. 243. 245. 247. 267. 272. 276. 282; *orat.* 48. 90. 114. 116. 122. 141. 142. 144. 146. 147. 167. 229.

¹⁰⁶ Discussed by BARWICK (1963) 73 ff.

¹⁰⁷ L-P I 58 ff.; HUBBELL (1913) 19 ff.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. L-P I 36 ff., III 210 ff.; HUBBELL (1913) 24; BARWICK (1963) 35 ff.; DOUGLAS (1966) xli.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Brut.* 322; GRUBE (1962) 241 f.

¹¹⁰ KROLL ad *orat.* 4 notices the substitution. There seems to be an allusion to the substitution in *de orat.* 2,14.

¹¹¹ The controversy is attested by Dion. Hal., *de comp. verb.*, 131–35 U.–R.; and Quint. 2,11–2; cf. L-P 23.

¹¹² On the *orator perfectus* and his universal knowledge, see L-P I 42; BARWICK (1963) 7, 10 ff.

Quintilian's discussion (2,19,1 f.) of the question *naturae plus ad eloquentiam conferat an doctrina* leads to the pragmatic solution that, although *natura* can achieve success without *doctrina* (here rhetorical instruction, but obviously of a much broader scope than is found characteristically in the rhetorician's handbooks) and while *doctrina* can accomplish nothing without *natura*, yet, when each is in equal measure, the *orator mediocris* owes more to *natura*, but the *orator consummatus* owes more to *doctrina* (cf. L-P I 210). In Cicero we find a similar teaching implied in the *de orat.* and enunciated more directly in the speech *pro Archia*; however, there is this difference: for Cicero *doctrina* is taken in its widest acceptance, so that it signifies that universal knowledge and wide culture of which we have just been speaking and upon which the *orator perfectus* ultimately depends for his superiority. The *alia quaedam* that are mentioned in 1,19 and 1,109 as being necessary for the achieving of eloquence refer to this same 'Universalkenntnis' (L-P I 37), this *eruditio libero digna* (1,17). In the *pro Archia* 15, Cicero states in terms that remind us of Quintilian's discussion:

etiam illud adiungo, saepius ad laudem atque virtutem naturam sine doctrina quam sine natura valuisse doctrinam. atque idem ego hoc contendo, cum ad naturam eximiam et inlustrem accesserit ratio quaedam conformatioque doctrinae, tum illud nescio quid praeclarum ac singulare solere exsistere.

* * *

We have thus seen in this section of the chapter that in terms of rhetorical theory, Cicero is wholeheartedly committed to the triad *ars/doctrina-natura-exercitatio*. While exalting the supremacy of *natura*, he is not indifferent to the claims of *ars/doctrina*. I have also argued here and in the first chapter, that the wholesale transference of rhetorical theory to poetics in Cicero is most probable, and in certain aspects, absolutely demonstrable. Accordingly, I am inclined to believe that Cicero, who believed in a version of the doctrine of the universal bond uniting all arts, would also have applied the triad, or at any rate, the pair *ars-natura* to the nature of the outstanding poet. The passage *Arch.* 18 does not imply, on the contrary, a Ciceronian belief in the poet's dependence on *natura* alone; the suggestion there of *natura* alone is coupled with the Platonic-Democritean motif of divine inspiration, and is introduced not only on the authority of others – that is to say, Cicero does not acknowledge the belief as his own –, but also in response to the exigencies of the case in which the orator at this point in the speech wished to stress the sacrality of the poet, hence his right to be protected and venerated (*sit igitur, iudices, sanctum apud vos, humanissimos homines, hoc poetae nomen, quod nulla umquam barbaria violavit*).

3.9 *ars/doctrina* and the *mos maiorum*

There is another, more important controversy in Cicero's age concerned partially with the *natura-ars* dichotomy, and this controversy likewise elicited from Cicero a response of insistence on the supremacy of *ingenium*, but in this case, there are also nationalistic and cultural factors brought into play which must be considered in assessing the rôle of *ars* in Cicero's critical thinking. Against the isolated and individual orators endowed with talent (*Naturredner*) and critics (such as Quintus) who deemed talent alone to be sufficient, there arose among the younger generation a tendency to emphasise art and technique over talent. This tendency was especially manifested in the Atticist movement to which Cicero was notoriously opposed, and it was paralleled in the field of poetry where it manifested itself in the Neoteric movement, to which Cicero was also opposed – a circumstance which is hardly surprising, given that fact that the adherents to those respective 'movements' were in some instances identical.

In Cicero's mind, the Atticists were a new breed of technicians, who posed a greater threat than the traditional rhetoricians because their programme made grander claims, and because they made direct and personal attacks on Cicero. When I say that they were technicians I mean that while they may not have gone so far as to occupy themselves with a body of complicated and over-precise rules and formulas that were not based on practice¹¹³ (and therefore ineffectual for oratorical success), they were like the traditional rhetoricians in that they were characterised by a similar rigidity, inflexibility, fastidiousness and narrowness of vision regarding the nature and range of the orator's art (*orat. 22 ff. de opt. gen. 11. 12 intellegentiam ponunt in audiendi fastidio; Brut. 285 sed quia sunt in Atticis alia aliis meliora, videat ne ignoret et gradus et dissimilitudines et vim et varietatem*) with the result that they stripped oratory of its flesh and blood and reduced it to a mere skeletal frame (*Brut. 68; cf. de opt. gen. 8*). In their case, fastidiousness and technicality were manifested in their excessive concern with hard and fast stylistic rules concerning purity, clarity, correctness of language and expression, concerning models to be followed to the exclusion of all others (*Lysias, or Thucydides or Xenophon: Brut. 283 ff. de opt. gen. 9 f.*). The interest they shared with the Analogists with grammar and word formation smacked of pedantry – another proof of their obsession with rules and theoretical formulae (*de orat. 3,38. 48 f. 52. Brut. 253*)¹¹⁴. Their oratory was too studied (*dum modo sit polita, dum urbana, dum elegans Brut.*

¹¹³ Cf. Quint. 12,10,14: *haec manus [sc. Atticorum] quasi quibusdam sacris initiata [sc. Ciceronem] ut alienigenam et parum superstitiosum devinctumque illis legibus insequatur.*

¹¹⁴ The exact relationship of Caesar and his work *de analogia* with the Atticist movement is uncertain. NORDEN: *Kunstprosa*. 184 ff. emphasised the connexion between Analogy and Atticism; but against him HENDRICKSON (1900) 101 n. 2 (even though he recognised that Caesar's work was 'one of the important contributions to the movement'; KROLL (1913) 12 n. 1; DOUGLAS (1955) 245 & GRUBE (1962) 248 deny any necessary connexion between Caesar and the Atticists; between a fascination with grammar, with purity and

285), too erudite (Brut. 283), with the result that they appealed only to the learned and were thus utterly incapable of popular success (Brut. 283. Tusc. 2,3. de opt. gen. 11). Like the rhetoricians they measured the art not by what it was capable of, but by their own limited ability; they made rules to compensate for their lack of talent, and declared that one must follow certain models, and that these models alone were Attic, whereas the truth was that they only adopted those models because they were incapable of imitating anything else¹¹⁵. Their most grievous error was their insistence that there was only one style, the *genus tenue*, and that this one style alone was the true Attic (orat. 20 ff. esp. 28; de opt. gen. 9–12). In all of these *praecepta* and quasi-cansons the Atticists must have seemed to Cicero little different from the rhetoricians of the schools against whom the ambitious ideal of the orator's education as set forth in the de oratore is a reaction. Talent in that work is given superiority over the *ars* of the technicians, who may very well have included – if only in their premature manifestations – the Atticists¹¹⁶.

Now if in oratory the Atticists were a new breed of technicians, the New Poets represented a parallel movement in poetry which exalted recondite learning and technique over talent¹¹⁷. These literary heirs of the whole Callimachean and Alexandrian tradition

accuracy of language (*Latinitas*) and the concerns of the Atticist programme. KENNEDY (1972) 240 f. on the other hand links Stoic fondness of the plain style with the *Latinitas* movement, Caesar's de analogia, and ultimately the Atticists. Varro's view on Analogy (discussed in ling. 8–10) that it inevitably leads to ludicrous and insane (cf. 8,33) formations and therefore to aberrations from good Latinity, must have been shared by C. who constantly insists on the practice of the old Roman aristocracy as the true criterion of good Latinity (cf. de orat. 3,44. Brut. 210).

¹¹⁵ On the rhetoricians' abundance of theory as against their lack of talent, see de orat. 1,113; on the Atticists' lack of talent, see orat. 23 f.: *quid enim sit Atticum discant eloquentiamque ipsius viribus, non imbecillitate sua metiantur. nunc enim tantum quisque laudat quantum se posse sperat imitari*; 234 f.: *hoc modo dicere nemo umquam noluit nemoque potuit quin dixerit; qui autem aliter dixerunt, hoc adsequi non potuerunt. ita facti sunt repente Attici...*; de opt. gen. 10.

¹¹⁶ Recently there have been attempts to date the controversy much earlier than critics have traditionally been willing to concede (WILAMOWITZ 1900, KENNEDY 1972, DIHLE 1977, etc. date it after the de orat.); in fact these new attempts would have the controversy going as far back as to circa 60 B.C., and would place the origins of the controversy firmly in the grounds of, not Hellenistic or Greek, but rather Roman literary criticism. Notable proponents of such a revised view have been those of the new Dutch school associated with the de orat. commentary project presently in progress at the Klassiek Seminarium in Amsterdam (see in the commentary II 146: (ad 2,190 ff.) on the feigned and genuine emotions; IV 149 f.: ad 3,25–27 on the rejection of rigid stylistic divisions; IV 189: ad 3,42 on Attic pronunciation. Also WISSE: *Ethos & Pathos*. (1989) 268 n. 91; 'Greeks, Romans & the rise of Atticism.' in J. G. J. ABBENES, S. R. SLINGS, I. SLUITER (eds.): *Gr. Lit. Theory after Arist.* Amsterdam 1995, 65–82). One should also notice the earlier attempt of G. HENDRICKSON *CPh* 1 (1900) 97–120, to find traces of the beginnings of the controversy in the Cicero's remarks in the third book of the de orat. regarding the importance and means of achieving pure Latinity

¹¹⁷ For several attempts to refute the thesis that the Ciceronian terms *poetae novi* (orat. 161), οἱ νεώτεροι (Att. 7,2,1) and *cantores Euphorionis* (Tusc. 3,45) each refers to a single, identifiable group of poets, and whether if they all do, they refer to the same 'school' or group: see N. B. CROWTHER's article 'οἱ νεώτεροι, poetae novi, & cantores Euphorionis.' *CQ* 20 (1970) 322–327; and C. BIONE: 'Cenacoli di poeti e indirizzi culturali al tempo di Cicerone.' *MC* (1941) 156–175, esp. 170; H. BARDON 'Réflexions sur les « poètes nouveaux ».' *RBPh* 26 (1948) 947 ff., & *La Littérature latine inconnue*. Paris 1952, I 358 ff. advocates caution in using the term 'school', but recognises a sort of vague, ill-defined concept of neoterism. Against whom, see the more positive approaches of WHEELER (1934) 77 ff.; LYNE (1978) 167 f.; E. PARATORE: *Catullo 'poeta doctus'*. Catania 1942, 9 ff.

were truly poets *ex arte*, *Kunstdichter* (L-P I 210)¹¹⁸ who like their models held that the poet is 'to be judged solely according to the canons of art and delight'¹¹⁹. They resembled the Atticists not only in their excessively technical approach, but also in their grandiose claims of exclusive possession of certain literary virtues, and of being the first to possess those virtues. The first characteristic, that of painstaking craftsmanship is seen above all in their assimilation of Hellenistic techniques¹²⁰ – one thinks especially of Hellenistic narrative technique in Catullus¹²¹, and of the intricate and architectonic structural patterns that were so much a feature of his poems (e.g. 46. 62. 63. 64. 68)¹²² –; in their predilection for conspicuous metrical peculiarities and devices such as *σπονδειαίων* (cf. Att. 7,2,1– again Hellenistic)¹²³ and for five or fewer word-hexameters (Catull. 64,15, 77, 115, 319)¹²⁴; in their condemnation of ecthipsis of *s* in words ending in *-us* (orat. 161)¹²⁵. The use of polymetric verses (at that time still relatively new to Rome, and distinctively Hellenistic)¹²⁶ and the discussion of this use (Catull. c. 50; Ov. Trist. 2,431 f.)¹²⁷ also indicate a heightened awareness of technical detail; and the epigram, a favourite genre of the New Poets, naturally demands and exhibits more obvious use of highly polished technique in antithesis

¹¹⁸ On Catullus' and the New Poets' indebtedness to Callimachus: see W. CLAUSEN, 'Callimachus & Latin poetry.' *GRBS* 5 (1964) 181–96; K. QUINN: *The Catullan Revolution*. Melbourne 1968, 44–69 cf. R. O. LYNE *CQ* 28 (1978) 170 f., 183; ELDER *HSPb* 71 (1966) 145 ff.; on Alexandrianism and the New Poets: see CLAUSEN (1964) 187 f.; FORDYCE's comm. xviii.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Callim.'s (Aet. prol. 18) *αἰδοῖ δὲ τέχνη / κρίνετε μὴ σχοίνῳ Περσίδι τὴν σοφίαν*. Cf. also LYNE (1978) 171; idem: *Catullus, Handbook*. Cambridge 1975, 1–5; J. V. CODY: *Horace & Callimachean Aesthetics*. Collection Latomus Vol. 147, Bruxelles 1976, 15 ff. esp. 18 f.

¹²⁰ J. P. ELDER: 'Notes on some conspicuous and unconscious elements in Catullus' poetry.' *HSPb* 60 (1951) 105 citing the following studies: O. WEINREICH: *Die Distichen des Catull*. Tübingen, Mohr, 1926; O. FREISS: *Beobachtungen über die Darstellungskunst Catulls*. Diss. Würzburg, Memminger, 1929; O. HEZEL: *Catull und das griechische Epigramm*. Diss. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1932; I. SCHNELLE: *Catullinterpretationen*. Diss. Gräfenheinen, Schulze, 1933; A. RAMMINGER: *Motivegeschichtliche Studien zu Catulls Basiagedichten*. Diss. Würzburg, Triltsch, 1937; cf. R. C. G. LEVENS: 'Catullus.' in *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, Oxford 1968, 365.

¹²¹ LYNE (1978) 181 ff.; FORDYCE xx.

¹²² Cf. ELDER (1951) 102 ff.; FORDYCE xxi.

¹²³ Highly favoured by the Alexandrians: cf. WEST: *Gr. Metre*. Oxford 1982, 154; Catull.'s c. 64 abounds in them (23 in 408 verses = 5.6 per cent) cf. CROWTHER (1970) 322 f.; CLAUSEN (1986) 159; LYNE (1978) 180; G. B. TOWNEND: 'The poems.' in T. A. DOREY: *Cicero*. London 1965, 126. For another view about C.'s quip to Atticus on the *σπονδειαίων*, see C. BIONE: 'Cenacoli di poeti e indirizzi culturali al tempo di Cicerone.' *MC* (1941) 162 & D. GAGLIARDI: 'Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 (1968) 281 who see no hostility in the passage. The hendecasyllable is also of course Hellenistic, alternatively named Phalaecian, after the epigrammatist of that age, Phalaecus: cf. FORDYCE xxii; LESKY: *Hist. of Gr. Lit.* (Eng. tr. by WILLIS & DE HEER) London 1976, 739.

¹²⁴ Cf. CROWTHER (1970) 323

¹²⁵ Cf. CROWTHER (1970) 324; for C.'s own use of this outmoded feature of old Latin verse, see M. GUENDEL: *De Ciceronis poetae arte capita tria*. Diss. Lipsiae 1907, 30 f.; TOWNEND (1965) 127.

¹²⁶ Cf. McDERMOTT *WS* 14 (1980) 81.

¹²⁷ Cf. LYNE (1978) 170, 172, 176, 180; ELDER (1951) 110 ff. LYNE argues that the polymetric versicles were not unique to the neoteric poets, but that others before them had used them. Both those same poets whom he lists: Porcius Licinus, Valerius Aedituus, Lutatius Catulus, and above all Laevius, are rightly held by others to be precursors of the Neoterici for this and other reasons: cf. L. ALFONSI: *Poetae Novi*. Como 1945, 9ff. esp. 19 ff. Besides, the use of the lyric and polymetric rhythms was not as authentically Greek in the hands of the early poets (cf. Porph. ad Hor. c. 3,1,2 on Laevius: *lyrica non Graecorum lege ad lyricum*).

and structure¹²⁸. The New Poets also betray in their poetry the use of sophisticated techniques to introduce and weave into poems learned allusions (again in Alexandrian fashion) intended as a kind of coded language for those initiated into the New Poets' coterie¹²⁹. Frequently long and little known place-names¹³⁰, epithets, and obliqueness of expression and antonomasia; frequent use of *γλῶσσαι, ἅπαξ λεγόμενα*, rare or innovative grammatical forms and structures, and idiosyncrasies of metre have been detected in a comparative study of Euphorion and Cinna, all of which point to highly polished and artificial styles¹³¹.

In their programme also¹³², the New Poets insisted on *ars*, or on canons which in Cicero's thinking were equivalent to the inflexible *praecepta* of the technicians in rhetoric. One of the principal causes of Cicero's hostility to this new school of poets – the same hostility exemplified by the three famous references at *orat.* 161, *Tusc.* 3,45 and *Att.* 7,2,1 – was undoubtedly the fact that they promoted, and claimed to be the sole possessors of, certain literary virtues; and that, in perfect conformity with their rigid canons, they anathematized all who either did not agree with their ideas or who did not belong to their set (*Catull.* 14. 22. 26. 36. 95)¹³³. In order to be a New Poet, one had to possess *doctrina*¹³⁴ – not merely learning in Hellenistic technique and form indicated above¹³⁵, but also a *recherché* and esoteric kind of learning, the full significance of which could only be appreciated by one's fellow neoteric poets: in fine, it amounted virtually to a certain,

¹²⁸ Cf. ELDER (1951) 104 f.

¹²⁹ Cf. ELDER (1951) 107 ff.

¹³⁰ Cf. KROLL ad *orat.* 163; LESKY 112.

¹³¹ L. C. WATSON 'Cinna & Euphorion.' *JIFC* 4 (1982) 93–110. Against this view of the artificiality of style and 'composite expression' of the neoterics must be balanced the obvious fact that they also made striking use of the current and everyday living language of their time, especially, of course, in the epigrams and *nugae*. N. SCIVOLETTO: 'Lingua composita ellenistica e lingua neoterica' *GIF* 11 (1958) 30 ff. demonstrates this indebtedness to the *Umgangssprache*, with many illustrations. But he errs, in denying the stylistic artificiality and metrical novelty that we have just noticed. The use of the everyday speech in poetry does not always mean 'lingua fatta per essere intesa da tutti'; one only has to look at the development of English poetry in the twentieth century, with the advent of modernists like T. S. Eliot, whose abandonment of the literary idiom of his predecessors and his extensive use of everyday language had precisely the opposite effect to that of the enormously popular poetry of Tennyson with its high literary style.

¹³² In *Catull.* programmatic utterances can be found above all in the following poems: 1, 12, 14, 14a, 16, 22, 35, 36, 42, 50, 53, 68, 95. Cf. E. CASTORINA: *Questioni neoteriche*. 'I carmi programmatici.' Firenze 1968, 79 ff.

¹³³ The verses on Valerius Cato teacher and mentor of many of the *poetae novi* (cf. *Catull.* 36; COURTNEY 189 ff.) perhaps by M. Furius Bibaculus (fr. 6 COURTNEY = fr. 17 MOREL) *Cato grammaticus, Latina Siren / qui solus legit ac facit poetas*, indicates a similar attitude of exclusive possession of literary virtues and status to that which the Atticists held. Against the view of Valerius Cato as leader and teacher of the neoterics, cf. N. B. CROWTHER: 'Valerius Cato, Furius Bibaculus, & Tigidas' *CPb* 66 (1971) 108–9.

¹³⁴ Particularly revealing is *Catull.* 68,33 where the poet, while staying at Verona, excuses himself to his friend for his failure to compose a poem, alleging as his reason the fact that he does not have his whole library with him! Cf. FORDYCE ad loc.: 'The excuse is revealing evidence of the methods and ideals of the *poeta doctus*, what is expected of him is Alexandrian poetry, translated, or modelled on, Greek, and for that he needs his library.' Cf. also KROLL (1924) 37 f. with references to the later neoterics in a similar vein.

¹³⁵ Cf. WHEELER (1934) 84 f.; ELDER (1951) 101 ff.; KROLL (1924) 36 f.

exclusive brand of taste, and in this sense *doctrina* was a shibboleth of the Neoterics¹³⁶. In respect of this *recherché* kind of *doctrina* the neoteric ideal of the *poeta doctus* differed profoundly from that of the Ciceronian ideal, whose learned litterateur is to be condemned unless his learning is accessible to all and benefits the common welfare (Arch. 12). Neoteric *doctrina* and the *poeta doctus* are continually invoked in the programmatic poems (e.g. Catull. 1,7. 35,17. 65,2), and in the ancient tradition of later generations Catullus, Calvus and the New Poets are associated with that particular kind of learned poet which they exalted in their programme (cf. Lygdamus 6,41; Tib. 1,4,61; Mart. 1,61,1. 7,99,7. 8,73,11. 14,152. Gell. 19,13,5. Prop. 3,34,89. Ov. am. 3,9,62). We have a famous advertisement of that *recherché*, neoteric *doctrina* in Catull. c. 95 where the most extravagant praise is lavished upon Cinna's *Zmyrna*, a small but highly polished poem of nine years' labour, whose obscure mythological subject matter, called by one critic 'erotic, morbid, grotesque' was of the kind that typically fascinated the neoterics¹³⁷ (cf. Catull.'s *Attis*). So learned, obscure and recondite was Cinna's *Zmyrna* that within a generation it required a commentary – as did his *Propempticon*¹³⁸. Like the Atticists they insist on certain models to the exclusion of all others. In the case of the neoterics, the models are of course Alexandrians and Greek lyric: Callimachus above all¹³⁹, Euphorion¹⁴⁰, Sappho, Simonides. That is not deny that Alexandrian influence was not felt in the earlier Roman literature – on the contrary, it is a commonplace that from its very beginnings Roman literature draws continually from Hellenistic sources, as was consistent with its age¹⁴¹ –, but whereas earlier Roman writers tended to assimilate the Alexandrian influence to the Roman character with a certain naïveté and artlessness, to mingle Roman elements with Greek, with the neoterics we find a wholly new approach. With them there is, first of all, a rejection of the Roman tradition; next a striving for a more authentic and pure Alexandrinism through imitation that is more

¹³⁶ FORDYCE xix translates *doctrina* as 'taste'; one thinks of the use of 'style' in the modern idiom 'to have style', but of course there is something more than that in *doctus*, *doctrina*, something anti-populist and something which suggests certain rare qualities of high culture esteemed by the cognoscenti.

¹³⁷ W. CLAUSEN: 'Callimachus and Latin poetry.' *GRBS* 5 (1964) 190.

¹³⁸ The author of the commentary on the *Zmyrna* was L. Crassicius (Suet. de gramm. 18; Philargyrius [Filagrius?] on Verg. Buc. 9,35); of that on the *Propempticon*, Iulius Hyginus (Charis. GL I 134 K). L.C. WATSON: 'Cinna and Euphorion.' *SIFC* 4 (1982) 93–110 argues convincingly that *cantores Euphorionis* at Tusc. 3,45 refers above all to Cinna.

¹³⁹ On Callimachus and the Roman neoterics, cf. CLAUSEN's art. just cited.

¹⁴⁰ On Euphorion, cf. WATSON (1982) 93–110, who compares the poetic fragments of the two poets and establishes the following points of similarity: a) *γλῶσσαι* including *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα* and foreign or dialect-loan words; words used in an unusual or innovative sense; b) heteroclite forms and changes of gender; c) rare or localised epithets and place-names d) idiosyncrasies of metre.

¹⁴¹ Cf. for example D. GAGLIARDI: 'Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 (1968) 269, 272: 'Ma questa stessa contrapposizione appare piuttosto semplicistica, giacché tende a differenziare in maniera radicale due momenti della letteratura latina: il periodo archaico e quello ciceroniano, che sono in realtà parte integrante dello stesso processo storico della cultura ellenistica. Oggi questa tesi non è controversa. E la constatazione vale soprattutto per Ennio, che della letteratura latina archaica è il massimo esponente. "Sempre più evidente ci risulta la formazione ellenistica di Ennio" – ha ben osservato il Mariotti...'

studied, more conscious. GAGLIARDI 272 describes this distinction well: 'Sì che in sostanza la differenza tra la letteratura arcaica e quella del periodo ciceroniano non è in motivi culturali antitetici, ma piuttosto nell'accettazione più consapevole da parte dei νεώτεροι dei modelli greci, e nella ricerca di un più terso e prezioso dettato – un ideale *leptotes*, insomma – di contro all'indiscriminato alessandrinismo dei primi autori latini.' We can learn something of the neoterics' adherence to their models and the *doctrina* involved in their imitation from Catull. 68,33 (cf. 68,40) where a request for some poetry is refused on the grounds that the poet being away from home does not have his library with him from which he might select his model¹⁴². The young poets who think nothing of the *rumores senum severiorum*¹⁴³, who do write not for the wide public audience, but only for their circle (c. 14a. 95,7 ff. esp. 95b,2¹⁴⁴), the pleasure-seeking 'undiluted Thyonians' (c. Catull. 27,7), are, despite their *doctrina*, paradoxically, committed to a Callimachean, anti-didactic, 'autotelic' aesthetic¹⁴⁵. When one calls to mind others features of the neoteric programme: the notion of *lusus* and *nugae* (another proof of their anti-didactic tendency) – neoteric terms for their kinds of poetry in contrast to the 'serious' poetry of epic and tragedy which they eschewed¹⁴⁶; their insistence on *labor limae*¹⁴⁷, their catalogue of key stylistic terms such as *delicatus*, *lepidus*, *venustus*, *elegans*, *facetus*, *urbanus*, *salsus*¹⁴⁸; their claims of *novitas* and of priority in literary innovation¹⁴⁹; and lastly and most importantly, their Callimachean

¹⁴² This is the interpretation of FORDYCE ('The excuse is revealing evidence of the methods and ideals of the *doctus poeta*, what is expected of him is Alexandrian poetry, translated, or modelled on, Greek, and for this he needs his library') and KROLL ('C. braucht, um dichten oder im antiken Sinne übersetzen zu können, eine kleine Bibliothek, in der namentlich die als vorbildlich geltenden *auctores* vertreten sein müssen'). QUINN proposes a radically different interpretation, making *scriptorum* derive from *scripta*, Catull. on this reading states that he does not have a large stock of his writings with him; but one may ask why in that case couldn't he have sent some of what little he did have with him? QUINN's interpretation requires us to suppose that a poet, and in our case a neoteric poet who expends prodigious labours and time on little pieces, does not carry about with him in his memory his own poems – a preposterous proposition as anyone who has attempted to compose little poems can attest from his own experience.

¹⁴³ How different was the scene in Horace's time may be gathered from his complaint that now even the *patres severi* have become Grecizing poetasters (ep. 2,1,109; cf. 2,2,90 ff. where the kind of poetry with which Hor.'s generation is preoccupied is characterised as being Greek lyric and elegiac represented by Callimachus, Alcaeus & Mimnermus).

¹⁴⁴ Cf. CROWTHER *CPh* 66 (1971) 247 & n. 13; T. P. WISEMAN: *Catullus & his World*. Cambridge 1985, 124 ff. esp. 126.

¹⁴⁵ CODY (1976) 16 ff.

¹⁴⁶ On *ludus* and its aesthetic and ethical connotations in the programme of the *poetae novi*, see L. LANDOLFI: 'I *lusus* simposiali di Catullo e Calvo o dell'improvvisazione conviviale neoterica.' *QUCC* 53 (1986) 77-89; also H. WAGENVORST: 'Ludus poeticus.' in *Studies in Rom. Lit., Culture & Religion*. Leiden Brill 1956, 30 ff. ELDER (1966) 147 suggests hesitantly that Catull. may even have called his longer poems *nugae*. On *ludere*, its cognates and *nugae*, see above § 2.11, n. 214.

¹⁴⁷ Catull. 1,2 (cf. CAIRNS *Mnemosyne* 22 (1969) 154; ELDER (1966) 147); Cinna fr. 11 (cf. *Ciris* 46); cf. QUADLBAUER (1958) 81.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. FORDYCE ad 10,4. 43,8; for a more recent, socio-linguistic analysis of such words employed by Catullus and his circle 'for describing stylish behaviour', see B. KROSTENKO: *Cicero, Catullus and the Language of Social Performance*. Chicago-London 2001.

¹⁴⁹ Catull. 1,1 (*novum*) & 5 (*unus Italorum*): are proclamations of these neoteric virtues: cf. ELDER (1966) 147: 'As for *novum*, it must mean what Cicero...meant by *poetae novi*...'; also W. CLAUSEN: 'Cicero & the New Poetry' *HSPH* 90 (1986) 160: '...[C.] writes [sc. orat. 161] with perceptible emotion and seems to be thinking of the

insistence on the small poem¹⁵⁰ and rejection of the long-winded poem, especially of the Roman epic and annalistic tradition¹⁵¹: when one recalls to mind these features of the neoteric programme, one cannot fail to recognise the causes of Cicero's hostility. That aggressiveness, exclusiveness, and rigidity inherent in their programme all again bespoke the narrowness of vision afflicting the technicians in rhetoric. All the features of the programme were reducible to an excessive emphasis on the claims of *ars*.

The distinction made above between the old Roman poetry, especially with its Annalistic tradition, and the Alexandrinism of the New Poetry ought to be qualified. We have already acknowledged that Hellenistic influences can be traced as far back as Ennius¹⁵², and even though there are grounds for regarding Ennius as anti-Callimachean¹⁵³, it is accepted today, as GAGLIARDI quoted above states, as uncontroversial that the history of Hellenism in Roman literature is more complex than was once supposed, and that the polarization of sympathies between old and new was never so rigid. Lucretius also has been shown convincingly not to have been the arch-conservative, Ennian poet he was once thought to have been; on the contrary, he shared some of the Alexandrian and in particular Callimachean tastes of his age¹⁵⁴. Conversely, Catullus was not entirely free from debt to the old Roman poets, however much he may have despised them¹⁵⁵. But the thesis

contrast, which the New Poets were concerned to emphasize, between their new poetry and the old – the old poetry which C. so admired and respected'. Such claims of innovation were of course taken up again and expressed more explicitly by the immediate successors of the neoterics: cf. Verg. Buc. 3,86. 6,1. 3. Georg. 2,174–6; Hor. C. 3,30,12–14; Prop. 3,1,3–4. On the *Erstheitsmotiv* in the later neoterics, see WIMMEL (1960) 133 ff. This is not to deny that similar claims were not made earlier in Latin literature (cf. Enn. Ann. 7; Lucr. 1,926–30), but taken together with the rest of their programme, the neoteric claims made along these lines cannot but have been yet another source of irritation to C. with his ardent love of the archaic Roman literature (e.g. Tusc. 3,45): cf. below § 4.10.

¹⁵⁰ Catull. 1,1 *libellum* (cf. Filagrius on Buc. 9,35 on Cinna's *Zmyrna quem libellum decem annis elimavit*); 1,4 *nugas*. 95b,1 *parva*, 95b,2 against poetry that is *tumidus* (cf. Callim.'s Lyde fr. 398 PF. *παχὺ γράμμα*). Cf. QUADLBAUER (1958) 81.

¹⁵¹ Catull. 36,1. 95,3. 7. 95b,2; cf. 14 and FORDYCE ad loc. Cf. M. GIGANTE: 'Catullo, Cicerone e Antimaco' *RFIC* 32 (1954) 72 ff.: 'Il *tumidus* richiama il *παχὺ* dell'epigramma callimacheo; *populus* è il volgo profano che indulge al raggio dell'asino, all'espressione gonfia ed adiposa. Antimaco, nel carne catulliano, dopo Ortensio e Volusio autori di voluminosi *Annales*, è il grandioso e famoso "idolo" la cui menzione segna il culmine dell'adesione del Veronese, piena ed incondizionata, alla poetica callimachea...'

¹⁵² Cf. also O. SKUTSCH: *The Annals of Q. Ennius*. Oxford 1985, 148 f., 330, 371, 609; 'Enniana, I.' *CQ* 38 (1944) 85–86. Not only Ennius, but also Lucilius seems to have Callimachean echoes: see N. B. CROWTHER: 'Catullus & the traditions of Latin poetry.' *CPh* 66 (1971) 246 f.;

¹⁵³ Cf. W. V. CLAUSEN: 'Callimachus & Latin poetry.' *GRBS* 5 (1964) 185–7, esp. 186: '...why should Ennius allude to Callimachus' dream at the beginning of the *Annales*, τὰ 'Ρωμαϊκά, a long discursive epic about the vicissitudes of a people, about kings and battles? Was this not precisely the sort of poetry Callimachus had condemned? Ennius' purpose, I believe, was polemical and anti-Callimachean: he designed to confute Callimachus...'

¹⁵⁴ R. D. BROWN: 'Lucretius & Callimachus' *Illinois Class. Stud.* VII.1 (1982) 77–97; but note his qualified conclusion: 'L. was not Callimachean in the sense of being an aggressively modernistic poet, but he was sensitive to the invigorating winds of change which were effecting a transformation of the contemporary literary climate.' Brown (78) also acknowledges the differences that separated L.'s use of Alexandrianism from that of the New Poets: above all, his archaisms, and his attachment to the old Roman tradition of the long poem.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. I. FROBEL: *Ennio quid debuerit Catullus*. Diss. Iena 1910; WHEELER (1934) 61 ff.; H. BARDON: 'Catulle et ses modèles poétiques de langue latine.' *Latomus* 16 (1957) 614–27.

maintained above is not controverted by these facts, nor by the fact that Cicero the poet himself, as has been noticed many times, was, if not throughout his life, at any rate, in his youth, heavily indebted to Hellenistic poetry, as is proven by his *Aratea* as also by other poems of apparently Hellenistic character¹⁵⁶. To draw from the Hellenistic sources as all pre-neoteric poetry did from Ennius to Lucretius, is not the same thing as to strive consciously¹⁵⁷ to be and (what is more significant) to proclaim oneself to be Callimachean and of authentic Alexandrian stamp and to have inaugurated a new kind of poetry, truly and exclusively worthy of attention. To do that effectively requires a certain and firm rejection of the native tradition – a thing completely unacceptable to Cicero¹⁵⁸. Even if when he was younger he had been more Greek and Hellenistic (and thought of as such) than he should ever have wished to be¹⁵⁹, in theory, especially in the developed literary theory of his maturity, he was a nationalist. He writes in the orator 22: *esset egregium non quaerere externa, domesticis esse contentos*. Again, conversely, simply because there are traces of the old Roman poetry in the neoterics, that does not controvert the commonly held view that the latter made a conscious effort to reject the old native tradition and the modern archaizing Roman poetry. None of the old Roman poets is mentioned in Catullus; he clearly condemns modern Roman poets of Ennian stamp: Volusius, Hortensius, Suffenus, Aquinus (c. 14, 22, 95); Ennius is explicitly said to have been despised by the *cantores Euphorionis* in the notorious passage from Tusc. 3,45. WHEELER's (62) remarks in this connexion are worth quoting:

There is no evidence that he [sc. Catullus] took the slightest friendly interest in their [sc. his Roman predecessors'] work. When he sought aid from the past, he turned directly to the Greeks. And yet no poet by mere assumption of such an attitude can free himself entirely from connection with those who have helped to develop the poetry of his native land. If he thinks himself to be an absolutely free lance, an ultra-modern, he is self-deceived.

¹⁵⁶ Glaucus Pontius (treated by the Hellenistic poets Hedylus, Hedyle, Alexander Aetolus & Nicander: cf. Athen. 296e; and Callimachus!: cf. Suidas in the life of Callim.; references quoted from MALCOVATI & WATSON cited below), Alcyones (perhaps a metamorphosis story like that used by Ovid Met. 11,410–748), Nilus, Thalia maesta. Cf. MALCOVATI (1943) 234 ff.; E. CASTORINA: 'Le tre fasi poetiche di Cicerone.' *SicGym* 6 (1953) 137–65; D. GAGLIARDI: 'Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 (1968) 269–287, esp. 274 ff.; P. FERRARINO (1986) 145 ff. L. C. WATSON (1982) 94 even goes so far as to speak of 'the Callimachean orientation of C.'s early poetry'!

¹⁵⁷ Cf. CLAUSEN (1964) 187 f.: '...Callimachus had little or no influence on Latin poetry until the generation of the New Poets ... The poetry of Catullus, Valerius Aedituus, Porcius Licinus, and Laevius might be called Hellenistic; but it had little to do with the New Poetry, which is Callimachean in its inspiration ... I do not mean necessarily that no Latin poet had heard of Callimachus ... I mean rather that Parthenius made Callimachus important to some Latin poets...'

¹⁵⁸ Fin. 1,4 ff., Brut. 65 ff., de opt. gen. 11. 18.

¹⁵⁹ Plut. C. 5: καὶ τὸν γε πρῶτον ἐν Ῥώμῃ χρόνον εὐλαβῶς διήγε ... Γραικὸς καὶ σχολαστικὸς ἀκούων.

At this point, I should also like to mention a highly controversial thesis which links the Atticists and the New Poets. We have already noticed above the controversy regarding the existence of a school or movement commonly called today the New Poets. Yet, despite the dangers of adding speculation to an already disputed point, some have attempted to make such a link¹⁶⁰. I do not wish to press the thesis any more than to point out some similarities and points of contact between the two movements. I have argued above that they held similar outlooks with regard to *ars*. Now let us turn to some other considerations. In addition to the fact that they shared some members in common – Calvus is the only one of whom we have certainty on this point, but there were probably others¹⁶¹ – if we accept the recent attempts of the Dutch school¹⁶² to date the Atticist crisis back to the time of the de oratore, then Atticism is brought more into line chronologically with the neoterism¹⁶³. Furthermore Stoic stylistic precedents have been detected in the origins of both movements. GEORGE KENNEDY (1972) 240 has written that ‘Stoic study of language helped make exactness of diction the fundamental virtue of style (an Atticist virtue also!) and this in turn produced an elegant sensitivity in the choice of words and made possible in poetry, in Catullus for example, a personal expression which is intensely emotional’¹⁶⁴. Lastly, brevity, both of composition length and of expression itself, seems to have been a common feature of the programmes of both movements: that is a fact generally agreed upon in the case of the poets (cf. above)¹⁶⁵; as to the school of oratory the claim of brevity, perhaps less well established, may be extrapolated from the evidence regarding the movement found in the rhetorical works from the 40’s. The evidence is discussed in Appendix III.

¹⁶⁰ HENDRICKSON *CPh* 1(1906) 103; T. FRANK: ‘Cicero & the poetae novi’ *AJPh* 40(1919) 396–415.; L. ALFONSI: *Poetae novi*. Como 1945, 14; BARDON (1948) 949 f.; J. H. COLLINS: ‘Cicero & Catullus’ *CJ* 48(1952) 11–17, 36–41; LEEMAN (1963) 166 f.; E. CASTORINA (1968) 41 ff. Also less explicitly, E. GRUEN: ‘Cicero & Licinius Calvus’ *HSPb* 71 (1966) 225 f.

¹⁶¹ E.g. Cornificius, the poet friend of Catullus (c. 38)? Some identify him with the Cornificius with whom Cicero corresponded: in 12,18,1 Cicero places him among the *magni oratores* (perhaps a sarcastic reference to the Atticists?) and in 12,17,2 he acknowledges that the orat. espouses views which are at variance with those of Cornificius. For the identification of Catullus’ Cornificius with C.’s correspondent, cf. TEUFFEL-SCHWABE § 209 & 209,2; COURTNEY 225

¹⁶² Cf. n. 116 above.

¹⁶³ Catull. was dead by the middle of the 50’s. The complaint that C.’s three criticisms of the *poetae novi* are all too late to be references to Catull. and his friends, has some validity; on the other hand it is entirely possible that C. was retrogressive in his criticisms, especially as the effects of the ‘Catullan revolution’ (to use QUINN’S phrase) were still being felt, and were indeed to influence later Roman poetry irrevocably.

¹⁶⁴ Other scholars have described the shared, general stylistic outlook of the Atticists and the New Poets in bolder, though rather vaguer terms: cf. ALFONSI (1945) 14: they shared a ‘culto dell’urbanità, nitida precisa scarna essenzialità, temperato equilibrio della parola...’; CASTORINA (1968) 41 ff. in response to the query whether Atticism with its classicizing nature (that is, with its constant appeals to antiquity) could be reconciled with neoterism (that is, the *new* direction in poetry): replied that neoterism ‘obbedisce pur sempre alle leggi classiche dell’eleganza: è, anzi, l’eleganza più raffinata’.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. above on their programme. For brevity as one of the shibboleths of Catullus (and his school), see J.P. ELDER ‘Catullus I, His poetic creed, & Nepos’ *HSPb* 71 (1966) 145 f.

* * *

I wish now to turn to a subject which is inextricably linked with Cicero's reaction to the Atticists and the New Poets, and which ultimately coloured his judgement regarding *ars*. I am speaking here about the *mos maiorum*. It will be advantageous in understanding this problem to view Cicero's attacks on those two movements, not as separate actions, but as a general reaction to the younger generation of *litterati*. In what follows I shall argue that Cicero regarded himself as the defender of Roman tradition in life as in literature, in fine, as the upholder of the *mos maiorum* against the younger anti-Roman, pro-Hellenistic generation. Thus, an essentially nationalistic, ethical and cultural outlook forced him to modify – or at any rate, to confirm – his literary position, whereby he denigrated that Greek and Hellenistic *ars* to which he was so much indebted. There are three points to be considered here. The first, the rejection of national writers in preference for Greek or Hellenistic models (a feature common to both the Neoterics and the Atticists) we have already touched upon, and therefore we shall say no more of it here. The second is historical, ethical and personal: not only did *poetae novi*¹⁶⁶ and the Atticists attack him¹⁶⁷, but they moved in a different world to his, ethically alien to the *mos maiorum*. This is especially true of the *poetae novi*. In the first place, they abandoned the ideal of the *mos maiorum* in their poetry not only by rejecting the traditional heroes of Roman history as their subject matter, but also by adopting the Callimachean attitude of poet-critic whereby their poetry became self-conscious, introspective, frequently becoming poetry about poetry¹⁶⁸ – a thing which

¹⁶⁶ Catull. 49. The contributions on this poem apart from the commentaries have been vast. It may be safely said that the majority of modern scholars have reached a consensus in interpreting the poem as ironic and satiric, if not also bitter and hostile: so D. E. W. WORMELL: 'Catullus 49.' *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 59-60; J. FERGUSON: 'Catullus and Cicero.' *Latomus* 25 (1966) 871-72; D. GAGLIARDI: 'Sul carme 49 di Catullo.' *P & I* 9 (1967) 227-232; R. E. H. WESTENDORP-BOERMA: 'Once more on Catullus 49 and Cicero.' *GIF* 21 (1969) 433-36; E. LAUGHTON: 'Dissertissime Romuli nepotum.' *CPh* 65 (1970) 1-7 & 'Catullus 49. An acknowledgement.' *CPh* 66 (1971) 35-36; M. MONBRUN: 'Encore sur Cicéron et Catulle. Raisons et date d'une rupture.' *Pallas* 19 (1972) 29-39; W. P. BASSON: 'The riddle of Catullus 49.' *AClass* 23 (1980) 45-52; W. C. MCDERMOTT: 'Cicero and Catullus.' *WS* 14 (1980) 75-82; W. J. TATUM: 'Catullus' criticism of Cicero in poem 49.' *TAPhA* 118 (1988) 179-84; T. ADAMIK: 'Catullo e Cicerone: il carme 49.' *ACD* 25 (1989) 67-72 (probably the best work done on the poem with an exhaustive bibliography: cf. also E. A. FREDERICKSMEYER: 'Catullus 49, Cicero & Caesar.' *CPh* 68 (1973) 268-278). A small minority of dissenters interpret the poem as sincere praise: T. FRANK: *Catullus & Horace*. Oxford 1928, 39-40; W. ALLEN: 'Catullus 49 and Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*.' *CJ* 32 (1936) 298; D. F. S. THOMSON: 'Catullus and Cicero.' *CW* 60 (1967) 115 ff.; FORDYCE ad loc. I have not had the opportunity of reading A. SETAIOLI: 'Il carme di Catullo a Cicerone. Una messa a punto.' *Sileno* 11 (1985) 211-27 (*Studi in onore di Adelmo Barigazzi*: II). On C.'s familiarity with the New Poetry, LAUGHTON (1970) 5 writes: '...it seems perverse to imagine that one of the best-read Romans of his age should not have been among the first to become acquainted with new literary movements in Rome. He would have read the poetry of Catull. and Calvus in any case...'; cf. MCDERMOTT (1980) 77 f.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Quint. 12,10,14 quoted above n. 113.

¹⁶⁸ Admittedly, there are traces of this even in Ennius, but this kind of restricted introspection must be weighed against his more important *munus rei publicae* as exemplified by the *Annales*. Also, C. will have disregarded any shortcomings in his favourite poet according as it suited his purposes. On Callimacheanism in Ennius and the relationship of Callimachus to Ennius, see above nn. 152 & 153.

for Cicero with his notoriously utilitarian view of poetry as one of the *leviores artes* must have been a veritable vanity of vanities¹⁶⁹. Next there is the moral laxity and turpitude exhibited in the personal lives *and* in the poetry of neoterics¹⁷⁰. We shall see below that Cicero often characterises the ‘lifestyles’ of the younger set as not being merely hedonistic, but hedonistic in a specifically Greek (that is degenerate) mode. The literary intellectual influences of Greece and specifically Alexandria are intimately connected with this degeneration, if not the ultimate cause. The third point we shall consider reinforces this prejudice: for it is a common Ciceronian theme that the Romans relied on *ingenium*, the Greeks on *ars* and *doctrina*. The former is ennobling, in agreement with the *mos maiorum*; the latter degenerative and un-Roman.

In the beginning of the *de finibus* where he attacks the extreme philhellenists who wholeheartedly embrace the Greek culture (*fin.* 1,1: *ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere*), Cicero castigates them for their unbecoming lack of patriotism, for their rejection of Rome’s dramatic poets such as Pacuvius, Terence and Caecilius, in favour of the original authors Euripides, Sophocles, Menander. Even a native work such as the *Electra* of Atilius who, it was agreed, was a stiff and insensitive writer (*ferreus scriptor*) was worth reading simply because it was part of the national literature (*fin.* 1,5). The reason given is that to be ignorant of the poets of one’s own nation is to be either supremely lazy, or excessively affected and effeminately fastidious: *rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poetis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi*. It is significant to observe that *delicatus* and *deliciae* (whether of the same origin is immaterial) are key words in the neoteric programme (cp. Catull. 17,15. 50,3)¹⁷¹; likewise Cicero uses it frequently in a derogatory fashion of faddish and affected young men of the neoteric set. In a letter to Atticus (1,19,8) he speaks of the *libidinosa et delicata iuventus*. There is more: in the prosecution case against Caelius whom Cicero defended and who was one of Catullus’ circle, much is made of the dissipated morals and decadence in which he and his modern set indulged (*Cael.* 27: *deliciarum obiurgatio*); the line of defence taken by Cicero was to play down and make light of the excesses of youth with a rather cheerful and avuncular attitude understanding (‘for many people in their youth have had a sip and taste of life in the fast lane, and have been utterly addicted to debauchery – then, one day they turn over a new leaf and become important and eminent citizens. And besides, everyone generally lets the young get away with a bit, since their hormones rather over-excite their

¹⁶⁹ As BROWN (1982) 79 f. points out, the poet-critic type of Callimacheanism is best exemplified for us for the first time in Catullus’s oeuvre, but traces of it may be found in Lucret.

¹⁷⁰ As WILLIAMS (1968) 33 (quoted below, ch. 4 n. 89) rightly points out, in Catullus at any rate, there are no paradigms of right conduct – quite the contrary in fact – and no pride in or laudation of Roman history.

¹⁷¹ Cf. below ch. 7 n. 102.

passions and sexual appetites' – 28). Later in the speech (43–4), following a similar line of defence (*adulescentiae... excusatione* – 43), Cicero is concerned to deflect further insinuations of this sort of life-style, but of course no one doubts that even if the charges that he denies are now untrue, yet there is truth in them as far as Caelius' youth is concerned:

at vero in M. Caelio...nulla luxuries reperietur, nulli sumptus, nullum aes alienum, nulla conviviorum ac lustrorum libido...amores autem et *deliciae* quae vocantur...numquam hunc occupatum impeditumve tenuerunt.

Clodia's friends whom she had enlisted to trap in the baths P. Licinius who according to the prosecution had entered into a conspiracy with Caelius to poison Clodia, are described much in the same terms as Caelius' youth albeit with an additional note of contempt and mockery (67: *in conviviiis faceti, dicaces, non numquam etiam ad vinum deserti sunt...quam ob rem excutiemus omnis istorum delicias*). Little wonder, since Caelius' and Clodia's circles must have at some time overlapped, if indeed they were not identical. In a letter to Atticus (2,14,1) written in 59, three years before Caelius' trial, Cicero couples her (Βοῶπις, ox-eyes = Clodia) with a *convivium delicatum*. Another interesting connection in this labyrinth of references and cross-references to the neoteric set, these perfumed, Hellenized *delicati* is Caelius' admitted earlier association with Catiline. In that notorious description of one of the groups that constituted his revolutionary forces, the sixth, and Catiline's own (*proprium Catilinae*) which briefly relates their effeminacy, delicacy and self-indulgent excesses, Cicero calls them *hi pueri tam lepidi ac delicati* (Catil. 2,23). For a fairly balanced appraisal of relations between Caelius and Catullus the reader may be referred to Appendix III of AUSTIN's commentary on the speech. FORDYCE in commenting on Catullus 50, a poem written to his neoteric colleague Calvus, in which the poet celebrates a private 'composition' session that they enjoyed the day before (*ut convenerat esse delicatos*) had occasion to refer to the Cicero's use of the words (*deliciae* and *delicatus*) as exemplified in the passage just cited: 'Cicero uses the words as a moralist castigating the moral irresponsibility of the bohemian society of his day...; Catullus and Calvus speak the language of the society he [Cicero] is castigating'. Other instances of Cicero's derogatory use of the words invariably point back, if not directly to Catullus and Calvus' neoteric clique, at any rate to that Hellenizing portion of the younger generation who were distinguished by their affected refinements and risqué manners.

Let us return to the third point. RONCONI (83 f., 87) has noticed that Cicero saw himself as standing in the tradition of the Scipionic Circle (whether or not anything so formal ever existed, at any rate the ideal existed before Cicero's time and may be found exemplified in the lives of Scipio and his friends) with their ideal of a synthesis of the Hellenistic bookish culture (*doctrina*) and the traditions of the Roman ancients, the *mos maiorum*.

quid enim potest esse praeclarius, quam cum rerum magnarum tractatio atque usus cum illarum artium studiis et cognitione coniungitur? aut quid P. Scipione, quid C. Laelio, quid L. Philo perfectius cogitari potest? qui, ne quid praetermitterent quod ad summam laudem clarorum virorum pertineret, ad domesticum maiorumque morem etiam hanc a Socrate adventiciam doctrinam adhibuerunt¹⁷².

In the next chapter we will have occasion to look at the function of poetry and literary learning in general in helping to produce for the benefit of the State, a unique class of men who successfully combine *doctrina* with *ingenium* and training; men who in accordance with the *mos maiorum* 'ethicized' and directed to moral and political ends their bookish learning. As early as the writing of the *de inventione*, when the young Cicero was presumably still heavily under Greek influences, and was therefore, not as able (or perhaps as willing) to distinguish Greek contributions to learning and literary culture as he was in maturity, he already shows this Roman ethicizing attitude toward *doctrina* (albeit not identified specifically as Greek for the reason stated above):

nam quo indignius rem honestissimam et rectissimam violabat stultorum et improborum temeritas et audacia summo cum rei publicae detrimento, eo studiosius et illis resistendum fuit et rei publicae consulendum. *quod* nostrum illum *non fugit* Catonem neque Laelium neque Africanum...quibus in hominibus erat summa virtus et summa virtute amplificata auctoritas et, quae et his rebus ornamento et rei publicae praesidio esset, eloquentia (here = also literary learning as shown by the homologous passage in the *pro Archia*)¹⁷³

The examples Cicero gives in the speech *pro Archia* (16) of such men are basically the same as those cited above:

ex hoc esse hunc numero quem patres nostri viderunt, divinum hominem, Africanum, ex hoc C. Laelium, L. Furium, moderatissimos homines et continentissimos, ex hoc fortissimum virum et illis temporibus doctissimum Catonem illum senem. qui profecto si nihil ad percipiendam colendamque virtutem litteris adiuvarentur, numquam se ad earum studium contulissent.

That these claims are made in the speech for *Archias*, a Greek and a poet, is of the utmost significance since it is manifest that Cicero is attempting to justify and make his client appear more acceptable to the hearers in court and to assuage the ill-effects of their general distrust of and ingrained prejudice towards Greeks by associating the culture and literature of his client's nation with Romans who were by common consent Romans of the first rank,

¹⁷² rep. 3,5.

¹⁷³ inv. 1,5.

exemplars of virtue and probity, fathers of their nation. And yet it is true that the tension between Greek learning and Roman tradition is one that is never fully resolved in Cicero's works and the two elements appear frequently in Cicero's works, presented sometimes as capable of agreement and of complementarity, at other times, as irreconcilably polarized into antinomies. Caesar recalls to us in the second book of the *de orat.* (2,265) an utterance of Cicero's grandfather to the effect that the better a Roman knew Greek, the more worthless he was; and yet it is known that his children valued and made use of Greek education and culture¹⁷⁴; likewise it has been observed that, 'the role of Antonius throughout the dialogue is to depreciate the rhetorical value of the Greek learning to which he continually shows himself both devoted and indebted' (cf. 2,1. 4. 28. 59). He represents a class of Romans whose relationship with Greek culture and learning is uncertain, unresolved. For we notice three main classes of Romans with respect to their attitude toward Greece: first there are the Romans of the old school of Cato, who utterly reject Greek learning and customs (or at least say they do!); next are those who would have a synthesis between the Greek and Roman cultures, like the Scipionic Circle, men such as Publius Africanus, C. Laelius, L. Furius: these men professed their devotion to Greek culture openly (*palam*: *de orat.* 2,154). Between these two main classes stands Antonius. In 2,150 he had discussed how superior talent is to art (2,150), and how little room there is left for art between talent and industry; in 2,153 he shows that the nature of the Roman people is such that the orator who shows the least art, the least technique, and no Greek learning whatsoever is more likely to enjoy success with the people. Thus art and technique are linked with the Greek learning: *semper ego existimavi iucundiores et probabiliores huic populo oratores fore, qui primum quam minimam artificii alicuius, deinde nullam Graecarum rerum significationem daret*; on the other hand, Cicero always wants to link natural disposition and talent, virtue and prudence with the Roman approach to the various fields of endeavour: this is one of the chief themes of the beginning of the *Tusculanae disputationes*; to this we may also add *orat.* 143: *plerique nostrorum oratorum...ingenio plus valuerint quam doctrina*, and *de orat.* 1,95. And yet, despite the unfavourable associations with Greek learning, at the same time Cicero makes Antonius recognise, albeit reluctantly, its value, and to regard as uncouth those wholly lacking it: therefore, he urges that this kind of learning be received in secret. The third class consists of the extreme philhellenists whom we have just discussed, to whom Cicero was vehemently opposed and who in their literary tastes as in their personal lives abandoned the *mos maiorum*. This *mos maiorum*, which many modern writers have been reluctant to define except in the vaguest of terms¹⁷⁵, often has a specifically

¹⁷⁴ Cf. GUTE 142.

¹⁷⁵ This is certainly a subject that would reward further study.

ethical flavour when used in contrast to Greeks. Thus the concept often refers to that ethical superiority of the Romans by virtue of their innate wisdom (compare Cicero's description of Crassus' attitude toward Greek learning 2,4: *Crassus non tam existimari vellet non didicisse quam illa [= Greek learning] despicere et nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam Graecis anteferre*). It is, above all, this *prudentia*, this practicality and ethical superiority of the Romans that is exalted over Greek learning at the beginning of the Tusculanae disputationes where he attempts to excuse the inferiority of the Romans to the Greeks in all the genres of literature. The problem of Greek superiority in all the departments of literature evidently vexed him much because he took cognizance of the disparity of accomplishment in the arts in several places: apart from the opening of the Tusculanae disputationes, we find this national deficiency acknowledged at Brut. 39, at the beginning of the de orat. (1,13), and in these places he is at pains to emphasise that Rome was considerably younger than Greece (cp. rep. 1,58)¹⁷⁶ and that for this reason 'Greek superiority is an historical accident caused by the lack of contemporary Roman competition'¹⁷⁷: *doctrina Graecia nos et omni litterarum genere superabat, in quo erat facile vincere non repugnantes* (Tusc. 1,1). Here also in the opening of the Tusculanae disputationes we have a further clue as to what Cicero means when he talks about the *mos maiorum*; for that not only refers in a concrete and neutral way to the customs of the ancients, but the term is also used in what may be called a more Romanticizing way of what were *customarily* the pursuits of the ancients, what *customarily* contributed to their greatness. That means, not theory and abstract learning, not literature and poetry, but right moral behaviour, sound management of family and household matters, polity, the framing of polity; empire and military excellence; and the moral virtues, gravity, constancy, magnanimity, honesty, loyalty and so forth:

nam mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiares nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius, rem vero publicam nostri maiores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplina. iam illa, quae natura, non litteris adsecuti sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente sunt conferenda. quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda?

Thus in the literary context, *mos maiorum* will also reflect these values, will be, in Cicero's mature and developed outlook, concerned with ideas of national greatness, will exude the

¹⁷⁶ Cf. TROUARD 43 f.

¹⁷⁷ GUITE 154 f.

same practicality. The idea of the *βίος πρακτικός* being superior to the *βίος θεωρητικός* (perhaps borrowed from Dicaearchus against Theophrastus' contrary notion¹⁷⁸) is one of the principal themes of the *de re publica*, and finds its way in the work early in the first book (1,2)¹⁷⁹. Here it is formulated by placing *virtus* 'als höchster römischer Wert' in opposition to *ars* 'im Sinne der τέχνη' (BÜCHNER). An *ars* can be kept in one's possession as a knowledge without exercising it, but the essence of *virtus* subsists in its operation. Cicero leads to the characteristically Roman conclusion: the statesman who enforces by laws and penalties the principles which have been enunciated in the doctrines of the (Greek!) philosophers must be regarded as superior to the teachers of such principles (1,3). Part of the veneration of the *mos maiorum* also involves the recognition of the intellectual superiority of the Roman people over other peoples, including the Greeks. So *Tusc.* 1,1:

hoc (sc. studium sapientiae) mihi Latinis litteris inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent (cf. *rep.* 2,30).

This brings us back to our third point about the Romans' reliance on *ingenium* as against that of the Greeks on *ars* and *doctrina*. The whole ethos of the New Poets and of the Atticists with their respective emphases on theory and *doctrina* is diametrically opposed to the traditional belief of the Romans (or at any rate of Cicero) in their intellectual superiority and talent.

It is essentially this difference of attitude between Cicero and the younger literary generation towards the *mos maiorum* and towards the achievements of early Roman antiquity, especially in the field of literary endeavour, that was fundamental in forming Cicero's attitude towards them. The difference of outlook *vis-à-vis* the *mos maiorum* as the chief cause of Cicero's hostility to the neoterics is essentially the thesis of D. GAGLIARDI's article 'Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 (1968) 269–287, but he goes too far, I believe, when he asserts that this was the only cause, and that in all matters of literary taste, in choice of models, genres, style, and content, he was in total agreement with the New Poets. The view that he did not regard Ennius the epic poet as the supreme poet – at any rate, of the Romans – is utterly mistaken, and will be examined in § 4.12 below.

We have nearly come to the end of our discussion on Cicero's views on the nature of the poetic composition and on *ars* and *ingenium*. We have seen that Cicero did not hold any

¹⁷⁸ Cf. BÜCHNER: *Komm. de re pub.* 55 f., 73, & ad 1,2.

¹⁷⁹ Some leaves are missing before this section (two quaternions and the first leaf of the third). Cf. *rep.* 3, 5–6.

form of the Platonic-Democritean divine inspiration theory. We have seen that he gave pre-eminence to *ingenium* over *ars*, and that he did so partly for sound theoretical reasons, but partly also for ethical and nationalistic reasons. Nevertheless, he was more indebted to Greek and Hellenistic influences than he should ever have liked to admit, and his knowledge of Greek literary theory is exhibited abundantly, even if somewhat apologetically, in his theoretical works. His attitude to *ars* and *ingenium* in rhetoric and oratory, especially as seen in his reactions to the traditional rhetoricians and to the Atticists, likewise his assumptions regarding the applicability of rhetoric to poetics strongly encouraged him to adopt a similar, if not exactly identical, position with regard to the New Poets.

3.10 the judgement on Lucretius

It would not be fitting to conclude our study of Cicero's views on the *ars* – *ingenium* pair and its relationship in poetic composition without sparing a word for the famous judgement on Lucretius in ad Q. fr. 2,10(9),3, in which that portion of literary theory appears to be mingled with the criticism of the poet:

Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis.
sed cum veneris.

That tantalising, but brief comment has excited academic curiosity for generations, and so many, intricate and subtle have the various interpretations offered for it been¹⁸⁰, that it is little wonder that today some scholars have seen fit to ignore the lengthy bibliography devoted to it¹⁸¹. I share with some a certain trepidation about adding to a catalogue already too long; and therefore, for fear of flogging a dead horse, I shall attempt to keep this discussion to a minimum, restricting myself to a brief survey of those two interpretations (LITCHFIELD counts at least eleven) which I hold to be the most worthy of attention¹⁸².

¹⁸⁰ We may, at any rate, rejoice in the fact that the days of reckless emendations are long past! Cf. SCHANZ-HOSIUS I Teil, 274.

¹⁸¹ SHACKLETON BAILEY in his comm. on the letter cites only a few of the writers on the subject, praising TYRELL and PURSER's complaint of scholars who have so liberally handled this criticism and 'will not let C. say what he thought'; L-P I 23 cite none!

¹⁸² Below is a representative list of contributions (SCHANZ-HOSIUS give some other references, but nothing published after 1915):

C. BAILEY: CR 28 (1914) 100–103

G. HENDRICKSON: *AJPh* 22 (1901) 438 f.

J. KUBIK: *De M. Tullii Ciceronis poetarum Latinorum studiis*. Diss. phil. Vindobonenses: Lipsiae 1887, 341 f.

H. W. LITCHFIELD: *HSPb* 24 (1913) 145–59

H. A. J. MUNRO: *Lucr. de rer. nat. libri sex*. London 1886 (4th ed.), 313 ff.

H. NETTLESHIP: *Journ. of Philol.* 13 (1885) 85

E. NORDEN: *Die antike Kunstprosa*. (1915) 182, n. 1

LITCHFIELD's 150 comment deserves to be repeated: 'The text as it stands...admits of more than one perfectly reasonable explanation...several interpretations...any one of them entirely adequate'. He performed an admirable service in describing and classifying many of the more significant interpretations. On the other hand, if we can reach agreement over two features of the comment in the epistle to Quintus – two features which in the light of the foregoing study seem to me self-evident – then it will be possible to dispense with many of those interpretations and to limit ourselves to two. The first feature is Marcus' obvious invocation of the *ars–ingenium* antithesis: any interpretation which fails to recognise that that element of literary theory plays a crucial rôle in this judgement, utterly misses the mark. Therefore we reject all interpretations which make *artis* here refer to technical content¹⁸³. Within a few months of this letter, Cicero wrote another to Atticus in which he used the Greek term *τεχνολογία* of Bks 2 and 3 of the *de oratore*, and it seems implausible to me that he would not have used this or a similar term had he wished to make this point about technical content in order to avoid inevitable confusion with the literary theory *ars – ingenium*. BAILEY 101¹⁸⁴ and L-P I 23 are correct in recognising the presence of the literary theory; SHACKLETON BAILEY also rightly supports the view that the antithesis in ad Q. fr. 2,10(9),3 is to all intents and purposes the same as that found in Ov. trist. 2,424: *Ennius ingenio maximus, arte rudis* and Am. 1,15,14 (of Callimachus): *quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet*¹⁸⁵. Therefore with BAILEY 102 I give my support to that interpretation designated by LITCHFIELD 154 as III 5 a, with this one modification: that it was not Cicero who thought of *ars* and *ingenium* as 'mutually independent not to say incompatible' but many of the literary theorists both before him and in his time. We have seen above in section § 3.8 that indeed there were such theorists.

The second feature of the passage is that it contains a reference to a controversy between Quintus and Marcus over the respective rights of *ars* and *ingenium*, for the

P. NUMMINEN: *Quo modo Cicero de Lucretio (et quodam Sallustio) indicaverit*. Annales Univ. Turkuensis ser. B. XLIV i. Turku: The University 1953

F. POLLE: *Philologus* 25 (1867) 501 f.

R. REITZENSTEIN: *Drei Vermutungen zur Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* Marburg 1894, 55

SCHANZ-HOSIUS: *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* München 1927, I Teil, 274

D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY: *Comm. on ad Q. fr. 2,10(9),3*. Cambridge 1980

H. A. STRONG: *CR* 28 (1914) 142

A. F. WELLS: *JRS* 45 (1955) 226–7

¹⁸³ E.g. REITZENSTEIN (1894), NUMMINEN (1953). Furthermore, when unqualified *ars* is used of technical content as in a technical handbook, it seems always to refer to technical content as contained in a *prescriptive* treatise produced for professional purposes, hence most often of rhetoric and grammar (cf. rhet.Her. 1,3 *ars est praeceptio, quae dat certam viam rationemque dicendi*). That is not the kind of technical content found in Lucretius.

¹⁸⁴ '...C. could not have made this criticism without a perfectly clear consciousness of the universal commonplace of literary criticism, the contrast between φύσις and τέχνη...'; cf. DOUGLAS's comm. xxviii quoted above: 'It cannot be proved that C. never referred to...*ingenium* without consciously alluding to the triad [in our case, i.e. in poetry, the pair], but it was certainly never far from his thoughts.'

¹⁸⁵ Cf. MUNRO (1886) 314, but he falls into other errors.

historicity of which we have another testimony in *de oratore* 1,5: so rightly L-P I 22 f.¹⁸⁶ This allow us to circumvent the objection to the interpretation of SCHANZ-HOSIUS and HENDRICKSON (= LITCHFIELD's I) – which I favour above all – that this theory 'presupposes a condition with regard to Quintus' opinion which we have no right to assume'. On the contrary, *de oratore* 1,5, completed not long before our letter, and still fresh in his mind as the letter to Atticus 4,16,3 shows, entitles us to make that very assumption! The passage therefore, interpreted after HENDRICKSON's approach with *ita sunt* placed in contrast to *tamen*, has Marcus agreeing with Quintus about the many *lumina ingeni* in Lucretius' poem (or passage(s) of his poem¹⁸⁷), and then correcting him about, or at any rate, pointing out to him, the richness of the poem with regard to *ars*.

¹⁸⁶ Die Meinungsverschiedenheit der Brüder M. und Q. (1,5)...betrifft die Rolle der *artes* (doctrina)...neben den von Q. ausschließlich anerkannten Elementen *ingenium* und *exercitatio*. Für die Historizität der Stellungnahme des Q. können wir vielleicht auf den Brief [ad. Q. fr. 2,10,3] verweisen...Man kann diesen Satz so auslegen, daß Q. besonders Lukrezens *ingenium* habe hervorheben wollen, woraufhin M. den Bruder hinsichtlich der *ars* korrigiert.' SHACKLETON BAILEY is therefore decidedly mistaken when he supposes that 'it makes no odds to the supposed difficulty of *tamen* whether *multae tamen artis* was part of Q.'s verdict or ... an additional comment'; the whole thrust of the passage is partly of agreement, partly of correction. HENDRICKSON (1901) 439 felt there were two other indications of a disagreement between the brothers: 1) in the characteristically Ciceronian aposiopesis *sed cum veneris*: 'but we'll discuss the matter more fully when you come'; 2) in the otherwise strangeness of the utterance: 'Apart from the objection to *tamen* which others have felt, it would seem to me unnatural that C. should repeat verbatim or essentially the judgement of Quintus unless it were to express partial dissent from it, to which...the succeeding words [i.e. *sed cum veneris*] point.'

¹⁸⁷ On the meaning of *poemata*, see F. H. SANDBACH: 'Lucreti poemata and the poet's death.' CR 54 (1940) 75 f.

4. EPIC AND THE FUNCTIONS OF POETRY

'Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And, departing leave behind us
Footprints in the sands of time,'

LONGFELLOW

Overview:

- 4.1 the cultural and literary programme of the pro Archia: a case of ulterior motives?
- 4.2 the first two functions: 1) mental and spiritual refreshment 2) *delectatio sola*
- 4.3 the third function: education, general and oratorical
 - 4.3.1 applications of poetical reading in rhetorical study and oratorical practice
- 4.4 the fourth function: contribution to the intellectual and moral excellence of great men
- 4.5 the fifth function: *exempla* and the praise of great men
- 4.6 the sixth function: the national poet, dispenser of immortality and contributor to the glory of individuals and of the state
- 4.7 epic as the ideal genre best able to fulfil the functions
- 4.8 the rhetorical factor: interest in epic as corresponding to epideictic oratory
- 4.9 the epic poet as being closest to the ancient ideal of poet according to the *mos maiorum*
- 4.10 polemical motives arising from Cicero's literary and cultural battle with the neoterics
- 4.11 epic and historiography
- 4.12 Ennius epicus as the greatest poet in Cicero's judgement

4.1 the cultural and literary programme of the pro Archia: a case of ulterior motives?

The speech pro Archia is justly famous for its unparalleled encomium of poetry and literary culture in general. The orator's defence of his client in the speech includes a spirited justification of the poet's profession, especially on sociological grounds. Because this *apologia* of poetry and the poet occurs within the context of a legal defence, we must consider first the question to what extent – if at all – Cicero's utterances on poetry and literature in the speech may be regarded as genuinely his own, and not merely the disingenuous representations of one influenced by the exigencies of a case which he is to defend. The question is not difficult to answer: by all means are we justified – even after we make allowances for the contingent demands of Archias' defence – in accepting the bulk of what Cicero says in the pro Archia, whether on poetry and poets specifically, or on literature and culture in general, as representing closely Cicero's own personal views¹. It is

¹ So rightly M. ORBAN: 'Le "pro Archia" et le concept cicéronien de la formation intellectuelle.' *LEC* 25 (1957) 173–91, esp. 173 f.: 'Car dans ce discours se sont donné rendez-vous les idées les plus chères à Cicéron, celles qu'il a défendues toute sa vie, avec ardeur. [...] le *Pro Archia* n'est pas le produit d'une flambée d'enthousiasme, mais qu'il traduit une conviction sincère et tenace...' ORBAN, arguing that the most significant passages of the speech 'présentent une profusion de termes qui couvrent des notions voisines, peu saisissables',

significant in this connexion that although critics are divided over the questions (i) whether the sections of the speech touching upon *humanitas* and the liberal arts (1–3²) and the remarkably long excursus on the importance of poetry and on the intellectual formation through literature and culture (the so-called *argumentatio extra causam* (12–30)) were essential to the case, and (ii) whether in fact these sections occupied so large a part of the speech that was actually delivered in court as they occupy in the written version that has been handed down to us, nevertheless no critic seriously calls into doubt the sincerity of the views expressed on these subjects³. Most of the ideas on literary, rhetorical and cultural themes are attested elsewhere in the Ciceronian corpus: for example, Cicero's devotion to literature and studies (12 ff.), his high ideal of the necessity of the widest possible education, of an education that eschews all specialisation⁴ and his concept of *humanitas*⁵ (3 & 14)⁶; his insistence that *doctrina* is not to be sequestered from the active life (12 f.)⁷ and

bases his approach on the explanation of these terms: '*Humanitas, ars, doctrina, disciplina, litterae*, autant de concepts qu'il faut expliquer, éclairer, distinguer, si l'on ne veut pas sombrer dans un infructueux à peu près ... Notre rôle à nous est de redécouvrir au travers des pages inertes une personnalité vivante. Vues dans cette perspective, les quelques lignes vraiment exaltantes du Pro Archia ... nous attachent à leur auteur, révélant ce qu'il a pensé, ce qu'il a senti...'

² At § 3 *hoc concursu hominum litteratissimorum, hac vestra humanitate* C. appeals to his listener's pride in their education and culture in order to excuse his discourse *de studiis humanitatis ac litterarum*. Cf. M. VON ALBRECHT: 'Das Prooemium von Ciceros Rede pro Archia und das Problem der Zweckmäßigkeit der *argumentatio extra causam*.' *Gymnasium* 76 (1969) 419–29, esp. 422 ('...dem Prätor, den Richtern und den Zuhörern, deren Bildungsstolz C. schmeichelt...') & 424 ('... [C.] appelliert mit Erfolg auch an das Bildungsbewußtsein seiner Zuhörer...')

³ The two opposing views are represented by W. STERNKOPF: 'Die Oekonomie der Rede Ciceros für den Dichter Archias.' *Hermes* 42 (1907) 340–73 & VON ALBRECHT. The former argues (344 ff.) that the legal case of Archias was sound and easily settled (cf. H. C. GOTOFF: *Cicero's Elegant Style*. Univ. Illin. Pr. 1979, 81: 'On the safe assumption that Cicero was acting as a serious, professional advocate, we may be sure that he would deviate from accepted practice only if he were confident that he would not damage his case by so doing'; 212 f. on the strangely jocular allusion to the praetor (his brother) 'the best way to understand the reference.... is to assume that the orator had reason to be confident from the start in the outcome of the trial'); and that this being the case, C. took the opportunity afforded by this trial of making a public confession of belief in the importance of literature and culture. The latter, on the contrary, argues that the excursus was absolutely essential to the argument of the case, for the very reason that Archias' legal pretensions were exceedingly weak.

⁴ On C.'s ideal of a broad education, see *de orat.* 1,5. 16 ff. esp. 20. 69 ff. 2,68. 3,121. 141. *Brut.* 161. 322. *orat.* 11 ff. 120 (cf. also GRUBE (1962) 236 ff. & BARWICK (1963) 10 ff.); for his hostility to specialisation and excessive abstraction, see esp. *rep.* 1,30 f.; see also ORBAN 187: 'C. condamne, à de rares exceptions près, le spécialiste qu'un égoïste désir de savoir a détourné d'une activité supérieure, le service de la communauté...' and 188 on the broader intellectual formation conceived of by C.: 'Sans appeler formellement *doctrina* la formation supérieure que C. a conçue pour l'orateur, c'est elle qu'il défend ici.'

⁵ On the Ciceronian association of *humanitas* with *doctrina* and the distinction between the two, see ORBAN 177 f. (with numerous passages cited): 'Alors que le mot *humanitas* désigne toujours l'ensemble des branches d'étude, l'extension de *doctrina* dans certains textes ne débordent pas les limites de quelques disciplines déterminées.' On Ciceronian *humanitas* considered alone, see ORBAN 182 f. (with extensive bibliography): '... le terme embrasse, sans la dépasser, la notion de culture générale fondée sur l'étude des *artes liberales*. Il désigne soit l'ensemble des ces matières [n. 55: cf. *Arch.* 2, 3 (associé à *litterae*)], soit la formation qui en résulte... [n. 56: La distinction apparaît nettement dans *Arch.* 3, où le terme, deux fois employé, reçoit successivement l'une et l'autre valeur.]'

⁶ Cf. NARDUCCI (1997) 8: '...nell'accenno al fatto che una vasta *doctrina* è resa necessaria proprio dall'immensa varietà degli argomenti che si è chiamati ad affrontare nei tribunali, si vede l'uomo che sta già meditando le principali tematiche del *de oratore*.'

⁷ On the Ciceronian idea of the relationship between culture and civil obligation, see NARDUCCI (1997) 9; also above § 2.11. With *neque ad communem adferre fructum neque in aspectum lucemque proferre ... me autem quid pudeat*,

that one should strive not only to have one's writings published but also to have them reach the widest possible audience (12⁸); his concept of the cultured *otium* which is not to be wasted in idle games (12 f. 16⁹); his belief in the universal bond of the arts (2¹⁰); his belief in the capacity of literature to preserve one's name in posterity, and thereby to bestow immortality, so to speak (19 ff.¹¹); his belief that literary portraits convey more meaning and that in a more lasting way than do the monuments of the plastic arts (30¹²); his beliefs that the ancients possessed superior natural gifts, or received their *virtus* from nature (15¹³) and that natural gifts, even if they be capable of much without *doctrina*, yet when polished with a liberal education and cultural formation invariably achieve something even greater (15 f.¹⁴); his insistence that cultural and intellectual formation through literature is necessary for the perfection of *virtus* and for the attainment of right living (14 f.¹⁵): these and other key ideas in the pro Archia are attested elsewhere in Cicero's writings and this guarantees for us the sincerity of the literary and cultural views expressed in the former¹⁶. Equally significant is the fact, that, as VON ALBRECHT repeatedly stresses (421 ff.),

qui tot annos ita vivo ... ut a nullius umquam me tempore aut commodo aut otium meum abstraxerit aut voluptas avocarit ... numquam amicorum periculis defuit, cf. Phil. 2,20: me nec rei publicae nec amicis umquam defuisse, et tamen omni genere monumentorum meorum perfecisse operis subsicivis ut meae vigiliae meaeque litterae et inventuti utilitatis et nomini Romano laudis aliquid adferrent; & off. 1,155.

⁸ Cf. Tusc. 1,6. ac. 1,2.

⁹ Cf. above § 2.11 n. 212. Cf. de orat. 1,1–2. fin. 1,10. off. 1,155. The prejudice against the frivolous use of one's *otium*, and in favour of that which is employed to improve oneself culturally and intellectually is also implicit at de orat. 3,58; also in the recurring motif in C.'s dialogues whereby the interlocutors are said to have convened for the purpose of intellectual discussion and in order to pursue their common literary interests (cf. rep. 1,14), having at the same time abandoned the city during the games or some public festival (so de orat. 1,24. nat.deor. 1,15. fin. 3,8; cf. also fam. 7,1,1 & below § 7.5.2). On the type of *otium* attacked by C., see BÜCHNER Komm. 70 ff.

C., of course, generally favours the Dicaearchean βίος πρακτικός (cf. rep. 1,1–2 & BÜCHNER Komm. 73 f.; ZETZEL ad 1,2): cf. fin. 5,58 *ergo hoc quidem apparet nos ad agendum esse natos*, nat.deor. 1,110 *virtus autem actiosa*, off. 1,19 *virtutis enim laus in actione consistit*. On the other hand, he is not averse to the Theophrastian βίος θεωρητικός: provided it be balanced with the former cf. Att. 2,12,4. 2,16,3. 7,3,1.

¹⁰ Cf. de orat. 3,21 & L-P IV 134; also ORBAN 189.

¹¹ Cf. Brut. 60. ac. 2,4. fam. 5,12,1. Tusc. 1,34 (quoting Ennius' *hic vestrum panxit maxuma facta patrum*). Cf. NARDUCCI (1997) 14 ff.; also SHANNON N. BYRNE: 'Horace carm. 2.12, Maecenas, and prose history.' *Antichthon* 34 (2000) 22: in the pro Archia, the expression of the belief in literature's capacity to bestow immortality is perhaps the most decisive indicator of the sincerity of the cultural and literary views espoused in the speech. Notice also that both the speech and the letter fam. 5,12,7 recount the anecdote about Alexander's utterance at Achilles' tomb in Sigeum, in which the former lamented with envy that in the poet Homer, Achilles had a *praeconium virtutis*.

¹² Cf. fam. 5,12,7. rep. 6,8; also NARDUCCI (1997) 17 n. 48 on Arch. 30: 'Che Cicerone esprima qui una propria radicata convinzione è testimoniato dal fatto che anche nella famosa lettera in cui chiede a Luceio una monografia storica sul suo consolato, egli ricorre a un'analoga contrapposizione [between portraits of the body and portraits of the intellect and genius] ...' Cf. also Tac. Agr. 46.

¹³ Cf. fin. 3,11. Tusc. 1,1 ff. 4,1.

¹⁴ orat. 48: *nihil enim est feracius ingeniis, iis praesertim quae disciplinis exculta sunt*, Brut. 111.

¹⁵ Cf. Tusc. 1,1, off. 1,4. fin. 1,2 ff. esp. 1,10 (probably also implied at 1,25). ORBAN 190: 'C. souligne des lors ([Arch.]14–16) les effets moralisateurs de l'étude... [i]ndéniable ... est la contribution de l'étude au développement des vertus qui ont assuré à Rome sa grandeur ... La pratique des lettres prend place parmi les éléments de l'éducation civique et y est assujettie.'

¹⁶ Cf. ORBAN 191: '...les chapitres du Pro Archia qui s'étendent du n°12 au n° 18 énoncent les principes que Cicéron défendra tout au long de sa carrière: supériorité de la vie active (12), dédain de la spécialisation (12), intérêt et agrément de l'étude cultivée sans dessein préconçu (16–17), contribution précieuse de la culture

Cicero from the beginning¹⁷ and elsewhere in the speech associates his own *auctoritas* with the cause of the literary *humanitas* and *otium* of his client¹⁸. Nor is it correct to regard the speech as mere declamation; on the contrary, the speech with its enunciation of so many, long-held programmatic ideas is carefully and deliberately planned¹⁹.

On the other hand, although we are compelled to acknowledge in general the sincerity of the literary and cultural views expressed in the pro Archia, we should not at the same time ignore the fact that there are limits beyond which we may not continue with this same confidence. This is one of the chief shortcomings of A. PENNACINI's article in which the author discusses the function of the poet in Ciceronian poetic theory²⁰. Not only is the article little more than a paraphrase of the speech, but worse still, the author without reservation accepts everything the orator says therein. We have already seen in the preceding chapter that on at least one of the points urged in the pro Archia (18), namely, the divine inspiration of the poet, we are not to accept the view expressed there as Cicero's own²¹.

4.2 the first two functions: 1) mental and spiritual refreshment 2) *delectatio sola*

In the first place, the poet has the duty of publishing his works and of thereby profiting the state. Cicero makes this point at Arch. 12 when he defends his own devotion to literature and attacks others *qui ita se litteris abdiderunt, ut nihil possint ex iis neque ad communem*

générale à l'exercice de la parole (17-18), nécessité de l'instruction supérieure pour l'orateur (12-13).' Cf. also STERNKOPF 345 'Denn war ihn lockte, was ihm seine Aufgabe reizvoll machte, das was eben die Gelegenheit, die sie ihm bot, in seinem und seiner Gesinnungsgenossen Namen bezüglich ihrer Stellung zu Kunst und Wissenschaft eine Erklärung abzugeben, eine Bekenntnis abzulegen und zu begründen. Diese Rede sollte etwas ganz Eigenartiges, etwas noch nicht Dagewesenes werden.'

¹⁷ See esp. the opening lines: *si quid est in me ingenii, iudices, quod sentio quam sit exiguum, aut si qua exercitatio dicendi, in qua me non infiteor mediocriter esse versatum, aut si huiusce rei ratio aliqua ab optimarum artium studiis ac disciplina profecta, a qua ego nullum confiteor aetatis meae tempus abhoruisse etc.*

¹⁸ 422: 'Einmal tritt die Person des Archias als eines Mannes von hoher Bildung hervor ..., zum andern aber gilt Ähnliches auch von dem Prätor, den Richtern und den Zuhörern, deren Bildungsstolz C. schmeichelt ... Damit gewinnt er das Wohlwollen seines Auditoriums... Nachher wird C. geradezu das *otium* und die darin möglichen geistigen Betätigungen noch mit seiner eigenen *auctoritas* umgeben (12-14) ...' By pointing out the fact that C. defends by means of his *auctoritas* the *humanitas* and *otium* of his client, VON ALBRECHT implicitly acknowledges the sincerity in general of the orator's views on literary and cultural subjects presented in the speech. Cf. also NARDUCCI (1997) 12.

¹⁹ So STERNKOPF 340: 'Ich für meine Person glaube nicht an die flüchtige Skizze, halte die Behauptung von dem stark declamatorischen Charakter der Rede für übertrieben und finde, daß sich C. weder wirklich noch gleichsam gehen läßt, sondern eine sehr sorgfältige Disposition befolgt und überall wohl überlegt und zum Zwecke spricht.'

²⁰ A. PENNACINI: 'Posizione di Cicerone nella questione della applicabilità della retorica alla poesia.' *Quad. del circ. filol. linguist. padovano* 10 (1979) 63-75.

²¹ And yet, it is to be noted that, as was urged in the preceding chapter, C. here does not rely on his own *auctoritas* but on that of *summi homines eruditissimique*. He thus distances himself somewhat from what is advanced at section § 18 of the speech regarding the poet's divine inspiration.

adferre fructum neque in aspectum lucemque proferre. This *fructus communis* takes various forms, and it is the object of each of the functions – with the exception of one – assigned by Cicero to the poet and his work to procure for the state one or other of these forms. As all of the functions are more or less alluded to in the pro Archia, we shall take this speech as the starting point for our study, supplementing the discussion, where necessary, with testimonies from other Ciceronian texts.

The first function of the poet and poetry, then, is described at § 12 and it is a function that is of deep personal significance to Cicero: the poet and his work are said to furnish the reader with mental refreshment and relief from the hectic and turbulent business of the forum: *quia suppeditat nobis, ubi et animus ex hoc forensi strepitu reficiatur et aures convicio defessae conquiescant*. Literature and poetry are viewed as ‘strumenti idonei a ristabilire un equilibrio morale e psichico’²². Quintilian (10,1,27) paraphrases this section of pro Archia thus: *velut attrita cotidiano actu forensi ingenia optime rerum talium blanditia [=lectio poetarum] reparantur. ideoque in hac lectione Cicero requiescendum putat...* Apparently we are to understand Cicero here to mean something different from the entertainment and *delectatio* which poetry provides²³, since Cicero discusses the subject of *delectatio* later (16²⁴) and in that place he stresses the lack of resulting *fructus* associated with that *delectatio* and in this way the latter is distinguished from the *animi refectio* of § 12. The learned and cultured *delectatio* of § 16, although praised moderately as the *animi remissio humanissima ac liberalissima*²⁵, is described in terms of its lack of contribution to the active political life of a man; it does not, ultimately, benefit the state – this is the meaning of *quod si non hic tantus fructus*²⁶ *ostenderetur*, the *animi refectio* of § 12, on the other hand, is in strong contrast to this, described in terms of its contribution to the public life of the political man²⁷: it provides relief *ex hoc forensi strepitu*, by which it is implied that this kind of study restores to the political man the mental powers and energy necessary for the performance of his tasks in public life; it enables his mind to endure tremendous strain by allowing it, as Cicero says somewhat oxymoronically, to ‘relax

²² PENNACINI 65.

²³ Pace RONCONI 94 f. ‘dilettare...è detto appunto che la poesia allenta la tensione dello spirito col diletto.’

²⁴ *quod si non hic tantus fructus ostenderetur, et si ex his studiis delectatio sola peteretur, tamen, ut opinor, hanc animi remissionem humanissimam ac liberalissimam iudicaretis.*

²⁵ One cannot fail to see in the beautiful justification of the description of *animi remissio* as *humanissima ac liberalissima* (‘una elaborata serie di brevi *κῶλα* manierati’ – NARDUCCI 1997,12) something of a personal confession on the part of C.; he insists that even if one excludes from consideration the contribution of literature to the greatness of the political man, one must acknowledge the refined pleasure it provides. Literature is *animi remissio humanissima ac liberalissima* because it is enduring, it belongs to all seasons and because *haec studia adulescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.*

²⁶ On *fructus* as referring to a benefit contributed to the community, cf. § 12 *neque ad communem adferre fructum...*

²⁷ So rightly NARDUCCI (1997) 8: ‘...l’oratore sta ... ben attento a non presentare questa « ricreazione » esclusivamente come un *lusus* disinteressato, che porta lontano dall’impegno in favore dei concittadini ...’

with learning'. Hence the *animi refectio* is depicted as a kind of psychical or psychological therapy, as it were, and Archias correspondingly represents the guru and high priest, so to speak, of humanism for a clique of the educated class (*quaeres a nobis, Grati, cur tanto opere hoc homine delectemur*)²⁸. The idea, though expressed here in modern terms, would have been familiar to many of the court who would have had their own Greek-speaking (or less likely, Roman) priest-like figure for their own clique²⁹.

Delectatio sola, the refined entertainment of the free man described at § 16, is represented tentatively, then, as another function, although it is clear that Cicero regards this as the least important of the functions. This somewhat hesitant acknowledgement of a function of poetry removed from the realm of civil obligation is related to the gradual development in Ciceronian thought whereby intellectual activity is granted increasingly greater independence from service to the state. In the pro Archia, inasmuch as it is a speech and thus intended for a wider public, complete independence of this kind is rejected (cf. § 12, where those intellectuals are criticised *qui ita se litteris abdiderunt, ut nihil possint ex iis neque communem adferre fructum neque in aspectum lucemque proferre*); but there is evidence that in the philosophical discourses Cicero adopts a less 'timid' position³⁰. See also above § 2.11, esp. n. 216 (on fin. 1,72) & n. 218.

²⁸ A similar idea of the arts, and of poetry in particular, providing spiritual relaxation was possibly also discussed in a section of the Hort. represented by the frs. 6 ff. GRILLI (fr. 6 reads: *quaero enim non quibus intendam rebus animum, sed quibus relaxem ac remittam*). Cf. GRILLI's (62 f.) discussion of these frs.: 'Ed è Catullo che come "ars" capace di questa distensione spirituale pone la poesia al di sopra delle arti figurative etc....'

²⁹ Such an open admission of devotion to Greek teachers and learning would in a Roman court of course have been risqué – hence the apologetic tone that pervades much of the speech, especially at its beginning (§ 3: *sed ne cui vestrum mirum esse videatur*...). This is not to deny that, as GOTOFF 105 f. points out, this apologetic tone refers chiefly to the style, but the request for pardon at § 3 regarding the style of the speech is, as ALBRECHT 421 f. shows, intimately connected to one of the main themes of speech: 'Vordergründig ist ... die Entschuldigung für diese ungewohnte Art der Rede das zweite Hauptthema der Einleitung. Hintergründig wirken jedoch auch hier starke psychologische Momente mit: Einmal tritt die Person des Archias als eines Mannes von hoher Bildung hervor, dem nur eine solche Redeweise gerecht werde, zum andern aber gilt Ähnliches auch von dem Prätor, den Richter und den Zuhörern, deren Bildungsstolz Cicero schmeichelt, indem er sie nicht nur direkt daraufhin anspricht, sondern sie eben durch die Wahl der Redegattung für sie unbewußt über Alltag hinaushebt. Damit gewinnt er das Wohlwollen seines Auditoriums...'

Compare also Sest. 119 where C. apologises for digressing *de poetis, de bistrionibus, de ludis in iudicio*. For these kinds of apology, see M. L. CLARKE: *Rhetoric at Rome*. London 1953, 74; see also ZILLINGER 64 and 70 where he cites examples of feigned ignorance of poetry.

³⁰ See the prologues to fin., Tusc., fam. 9,8,2. A trace of this development is also evident, though in a mitigated form inasmuch as some service to the state is still felt indirectly, at rep. 1,12 *etiamsi qui ipsi rem publicam non gesserint, tamen quoniam de re publica multa quaesierint et scripserint, functos esse aliquo rei publicae munere*. Cf. NARDUCCI (1997) 9: 'Spingendosi solo di rado ad attribuire alla contemplazione intellettuale un valore superiore alla dedizione alla *res publica*, le opere filosofiche registreranno comunque l'affacciarsi di una più ardita concezione dell'attività culturale.' He further cites his own discussion of this evidence in *Le « Tusculanae »: un percorso di lettura*, critical essay to Cicerone, *Le Tuscolane*. Milano 1996, 5 ff.

4.3 the third function: education, general and oratorical

The study of poetry forms not only part of the general education of the Roman³¹ – it belongs to *iis artibus, quae repertae sunt, ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem* (de orat. 3,58³²) –, but also specifically part of the orator's education (de orat. 1,128. 158 etc.)³³. Cicero alludes to this function in the speech at Arch. 1 *si huiusce rei ratio aliqua ab optimarum artium studiis ac disciplina profecta* and again at 13 *quod ex his studiis haec quoque crescit oratio et facultas*. Furthermore, poetry and literature in general continue to provide the orator throughout his professional career with intellectual material (Arch. 12: *an tu existimas aut suppetere nobis posse quod cotidie dicamus in tanta varietate rerum, nisi animos doctrina excolamus, aut ferre animos tantam posse contentionem nisi eos doctrina eadem relaxemus?*). The doctrine of the necessity of the reading of the poets for the orator's education and continuing professional development is perhaps incipient already in the sophists' interest in grammatical and literary questions (such as that attributed to Hippias and Prodicus), but it is with Theophrastus that the doctrine is in the ancient tradition most strongly associated. His recognition of the poets' service to the orators is related by Quintilian (10,1,27)³⁴:

plurimum dicit oratori conferre Theophrastus lectionem, *multique eius iudicium sequuntur*, neque inmerito. namque ab his in rebus spiritus et in verbis sublimitas et in adfectibus motus omnis et in personis decor petitur...

In the rhetorical works of Cicero similar sentiments can be found, as in de orat. 1,158, 3,39. 48. To the Romans present in court and hearing Cicero's defence of Archias, this service requires clarification; the relationship between rhetoric /oratory, and the literature (in particular, poetry) is not, as one critic has pointed out, immediately obvious to the layman³⁵.

³¹ Arch. 16 *haec studia adolescentiam alunt*; cf. Phil. 2,20. fin. 1,72; also Quint. 1,8,1 ff. esp. 1,8,8. On the subject of the study of poets in Roman education, see S.F. BONNER: *Education in Ancient Rome*. London 1977, 212 ff.; MARROU (1964) 336 f. emphasises the fact that the stimulus and early development of the native poetry at Rome was intimately 'bound up with the need to give some sort of body to the secondary-school syllabus'.

³² Cf. de orat. 1,23 *puerilis doctrina*, 2,1 as ORBAN 182 points out, C. always wishes the 'acquisitions de l'école', 'un minimum strictement indispensable à la qualité d'homme libre', to be augmented by personal studies in these areas: 'Il fallait que l'étude personnelle grossît ce maigre bagage, dont le Romain des classes dirigeantes ne pouvait se contenter (Brut. 331–2: *quas cum domo haurire non posses*).' ORBAN 183 f. with numerous references to the appropriate Ciceronian texts also discusses C.'s belief that studies in the *artes liberales* exercise a polishing effect (cf. Brut. 236 *arte limaverat*) on the faculties of the mind. ORBAN, on the other hand, should have acknowledged that most of these texts are concerned with philosophical or rhetorical studies; the idea of a wider, more general education in the liberal arts can be inferred only by an abuse of the imagination.

³³ Cf. BARWICK (1963) 13 f.; KUBIK 240; GRUBE (1962) 241.

³⁴ While many of C.'s ideas on the *lectio poetarum* are reflected in the tenth book of Quint.'s *institutiones* – a debt acknowledged by Quint. himself – Quint.'s treatment of the study of poetry in the orator's formation is more systematic, cohesive, exhaustive, and, in the final analysis, more sophisticated than C.'s scattered utterances on the subject.

³⁵ GOTOFF 105 f.

The idea of poetry providing the orator with material, arguments, themes, ornaments and so forth, in order to aid the composition of speeches *in tanta varietate rerum*, and the idea of its contributing to the orator's professional development by refining his mind with learning (*doctrina*) are thus well established in the critical theory of antiquity. The study of poetry becomes in the ancient system of liberal-arts education one of the *comites ac ministratrices oratoris* (de orat. 1,75). Nevertheless, one cannot fail to observe that Cicero subordinates this study to an even more radically subsidiary rôle than do some of his predecessors. He is, of course, indebted for his view that the orator should be well and extensively grounded in the liberal arts to Isocrates³⁶, who possibly also advocated the study of the poets³⁷, although the texts such as (Dem.)³⁸ 1,51; (ad Nic.) 2,13 commonly adduced in support of this notion have more to do with stressing the moral guidance afforded by the poets, than with the benefits conferred on a rhetorical education from the study of the poets. In any event, there is nothing in Isocrates that approaches the thorough integration of the study of the poets into the rhetorical education syllabus of the kind that we see in Cicero (cf. especially de orat. 1,158, on which see discussion below). Thus Cicero's position with regard to the poets differs significantly from that of Isocrates: Cicero totally subjects the poets to the service of the orator, whereas for Isocrates 'the orator was the successor of the poet'³⁹, and took over the latter's rôle as educator. There is in the orator, in Isocratean thought, a true inheritance from his spiritual ancestor the poet, and hence although Isocrates clearly takes the view that oratory is superior to poetry, his attitude to poetry is more akin to that of an academic who thinks his discipline superior to or more difficult than that of a colleague in another field; Cicero's attitude, on the other hand, may be likened to that of academic who, although confident that his discipline is superior to and vastly more difficult than a secondary-school subject, yet recognises that the mastery of the latter is a prerequisite for the approach to the former. Poetry is for Cicero merely one of the *artes leviores* which are *comites ac ministratrices oratoris* (cf. Sest. 119).

³⁶ Cf. H. M. HUBBELL: *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides*. Thesis (Yale) Oxford 1913, 18 ff; HUBBELL has many interesting points, but restricts Isoc.'s influence on C.'s ideas of education and training of the orator for the most part to the study of philosophy, thereby omitting the other branches of the liberal arts the study of which Isoc. also advocated; GRUBE (1962) 236. R. JOHNSON: 'Isocrates' method of teaching.' *AJP* (1959) 25-36 illustrates some of Isoc.'s other concerns, and offers some imaginative explanations as to how these were covered in his curriculum.

³⁷ So MARROU (1956) 83; GRUBE (1965) 42; JOHNSON *AJP* (1959) 25-36. But the whole idea of Isocrates teaching appreciation of poetry has been questioned by O'SULLIVAN 72 with n. 59. On Isoc.'s idea (cf. 1,51. 2,13) that study of the poets will repay the reader with much moral guidance and philosophical principles, cf. C. Arch. 13. Tusc. 2,26. Plut. mor. 14e-37b wrote a whole treatise on the theme, but in it he promises (15c) also to point out poetry's evils, and how best to deal with them.

³⁸ Although rejected by common consent as spurious, the speech is regarded as exhibiting Isocratic features: cf. LESKY (1957) 540 f.

³⁹ R. JOHNSON: 'The poet and the orator.' *CPh* 54 (1959) 173.

Notice also that Isocrates at Ev. 9,8 ff states explicitly that the aims of poetry and of the kind of prose that he wishes to be attempted are the same; the means only differ. He thus implicitly here acknowledges a kind of equality between the two arts, or rather near equality, since he thinks of his kind of prose as being more difficult than poetry. Thereby he legitimises the activity of the poet as an autonomous business, or rather thereby he does not require of the poetic activity some kind of justification outside the serving of its own immediate and self-determined ends. The *encomia* of great men here are not viewed as a service to the state. Nothing could be further from Ciceronian thought, for the numerous passages in Cicero in which the reading of the poets is either urged or presumed, are united by a common pragmatism according to which the end is invariably, firmly and strictly placed outside the appreciation of the poetry itself as an valid artistic entity, and is, rather, subordinated to the pursuit of other activities, principally rhetoric and oratory, sometimes to philosophy, sometimes to the duties of political and civic life. The reading of poetry has no *raison d'être* if it does not serve these ends: 'aveva bisogno, nel pensiero di Cicero, di una giustificazione sociale e pubblica'⁴⁰.

The following list in § 4.3.1 will illustrate how the principal Ciceronian passages on this subject always involve some subjugation of poetry reading to a pragmatic end, for the most part, entirely alien and accidental to its nature. The list of passages is restricted to those in which the reading of poetry is related to the orator's training. Accordingly, passages are omitted such as Arch. 16 where *delectatio sola* is referred to as a purpose for reading poetry, and fin. 1,25, where the reading of poetry is implicitly approved⁴¹ but for a purpose other than *delectatio sola*⁴². Furthermore, in at least one passage, de orat. 1,69–70, a culture of poetry reading is presumed in the interlocutors (and implicitly in the readers of the dialogue) if the the analogy between the poet and the orator is to be fully appreciated⁴³: this passage also is omitted as not indicating, even implicitly, the purpose of such poetry reading. To those passages outside the pro Archia in which an exhortation to *Dichterlektüre* (marked by an asterisk) is directly made I add some of those in which reading and knowledge of poetry are assumed in, or implicitly recommended to, the reader and are prerequisites not only to the full understanding of the discussion in hand, but also – if the

⁴⁰ PENNACINI 66.

⁴¹ Cf. fin. 1,72 *in poetis evolvendis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore facimus...*

⁴² This passage presumably directs the reading of poetry to moral and educational ends. At 1,72 the Epicurean Torquatus represents the study of poetry and other *artes* as being a necessary part of the education of the young, which, however, is, certainly not to be pursued in later life, *except* as *delectatio*: cf. above ch. 2 n. 216.

⁴³ Crassus here insists on the similarity between the poet and orator with respect to their capacity to treat – in a manner more eloquent and impressive than the experts themselves – of subjects in which neither has expertise. It is further urged that for this purpose both poet and orator require wide education and learning.

passage is pedagogical –, to the mastery of any concepts, skills and techniques that are under discussion.

4.3.1 applications of poetical reading in rhetorical study and oratorical practice

1) poetry as source of information, arguments, themes, to be exploited and as necessary part of the orator's *eruditio*: de orat. 1,158* (it is placed here at the beginning of a list of sciences to be studied, hence CLARKE 57 underestimates the importance of other genres of literature in Cicero's educational programme when he limits the 'main constituents of the orator's learning' to philosophy, law and history. I presume CLARKE based this on an indifferent, though rather careless reading of passages such as de orat. 1,256 (but *omnia legant, omni recto studio atque humanitate* of course refers to general literary and poetic studies) and Brut. 322 (again *studuisse litteris* refers to general literary studies – the fact that the specific branches thereof are not explicitly mentioned, as are philosophy, law and history is irrelevant; *perfecta eloquentia* is obtained partly through a wide reading: poetry is naturally included in that, as also in a more indirect way in the reference to the ability of the orator who is able *delectandi gratia digredi*)

2) diction

- i) pursuit and mastery of diction almost-poetic in order to enrich style with ornament and general *facultas*: de orat. 1,128
- ii) avoidance of poetic diction / euphony through study of poetry: rare words orat. 66-68

3) Latinity

- i) good Latinity to be learned from the old poets: de orat. 3,39*. 48*. orat. 155
- ii) bad Latinity of some poets to be avoided orat. 155 f. Brut. 256; Att. 7,3,10

4) ability to differentiate between styles to be developed from study of poets: de orat. 3,27; Brut. 167; (fin. 2,10).

5) necessity of stylistic variation observed by poets to be imitated: de orat. 3,100 ff. orat. 108; (fin. 2,10).

6) processes of choice and (judgement?) of words and collocation the same in poet and orator *iudicium electioque verborum*: orat. 68 (*iudicium electioque verborum*)⁴⁴, 201

7) understanding of rhythm, metre and other technical aspects of prosody and versification conned from the study of the poets is generally assumed both in the third book of the de oratore and throughout the whole of the orator; observe in particular:

⁴⁴ Cf. RUSSELL: *Criticism* 3.

de orat. 3,184. orat. 152 (on hiatus and synaloepha) and 161 (on ecthipsis of terminal s).

8) mastery of τὸ πρέπον in the poets to be studied and imitated: orat. (70 ff.). 74; (off. 1,97)

9) reading of poetry as means of exercising and improving *memoria*, *imitatio*: de orat. 1,257 (= 1,158 see below)

The section of de oratore 1,147–159 is concerned with the *exercitatio* of the orator⁴⁵, under which is included not only the education of the young orator, but also the lifelong *consuetudo* of his professional career (L-P I 247). In this section we see the final degradation of the reading of poetry⁴⁶. Here it becomes merely one of several compulsory subjects, though admittedly it stands out from the usual types of school exercises that are denigrated at 1,19⁴⁷. The process of criticism, entirely rhetorical and designed for a rhetorical end⁴⁸, is described at 1,158 which I cited in the table set forth above:

legendi etiam poetae, cognoscendae historiae, omnium bonarum artium
doctores atque scriptores et legendi et pervolutandi et *exercitationis causa*
laudandi, interpretandi, corrigendi, vituperandi, refellendi...⁴⁹

There is, then, a mechanical and pragmatic form of criticism involved in this kind of exercise, even though there is obviously demanded a greater degree of engagement with the texts than was required in the traditional teaching of the *grammatici*⁵⁰. The task (reading stage) set before the student and practising orator is to explain, praise, correct, criticize and refute the text (*laudandi, interpretandi, corrigendi, vituperandi, refellendi*); *exercitationis causa* implies that this part of the task will be principally concerned with the partitions of rhetoric, above all, *inventio* and *elocutio*, but also probably *dispositio (ordo)*⁵¹. The special emphasis given to the first three partitions in the description of the exercise, typifies the rhetorical bias affecting much of ancient criticism. RUSSELL (*Criticism* 115 f.) succinctly illuminates the theoretical bases which gave rise to this development. He wrote:

⁴⁵ Cf. L-P I 247 ff. for primary and secondary sources on the subject, and a general discussion of the same. Through the mouth of Crassus, as L-P point out, C. does not distinguish 'zwischen den eigentlichen rhetorischen Übungen und den außer-rhetorischen Übungen von 1,158–9.'

⁴⁶ Thus rightly LANGE 240: 'Ciceronem adolescentem carminibus legendis operam dedisse statuendum est, magis ut inserviret studiis oratoriis, quam quod vera imbueretur poesis admiratione'.

⁴⁷ Cf. L-P I 246: 'Auf die exercitatio nimmt er dort 1,19 Bezug: hortemurque potius liberos nostros ... ut animo rei magnitudinem complectantur, neque eis aut praeceptis aut magistris aut exercitationibus quibus utuntur omnes, sed aliis quibusdam usw. Es ist klar, daß diese alia quaedam in 1,158–9 aufgezählt werden.'

⁴⁸ RUSSELL: *Criticism* 2, 4 ff., 114 ff. discusses how criticism and theory became rhetoricised.

⁴⁹ The whole passage provides the basis for the famous first chapter of Bk. 10 of Quint.'s inst. in which he enjoins and expounds the advantages of a wide reading of the various literary genres.

⁵⁰ So rightly L-P ad loc.: 'Die hier in fünf – immer negativeren, kritischeren – Gerundungen aufgezählten Aktivitäten gehören nicht alle zum Unterrichtsbereich des Grammatikers und stellen insgesamt eine bedeutend höhere Stufe der Beschäftigung mit den Texten dar.'

⁵¹ On *elocutio*, *inventio* and *dispositio (ordo)* as part of *exercitatio*, cf. L-P I 248, 250 f.

‘...it is an inescapable presupposition of rhetoric that the speaker knows what he wants and has formulated to himself the message he wishes to convey; he has now to be shown what to say and how to say it in order to attain his end ... The content and form of the speech depend on a preliminary assessment of the situation and of the character and attitudes of the persons who have to be convinced. Any analysis of literature undertaken as part of rhetorical instruction has therefore to expose the workings of the writer’s mind on these lines.’

In an earlier passage (1,154) of the same section, Cicero makes Crassus describe one of his youthful *exercitationes* in which, having committed to memory a passage of the most impressive poetry⁵², just as he would do with the famous oration of some first-rate orator, he would attempt to recast and recite the content of the poem or speech in different words, chosen with the utmost care. The exercise is not one only of style, but – what is always a *sine qua non* in Ciceronian thought on style – of mastery of the subject matter and content (hence he should choose a ‘weighty’ piece of poetry which will stand translation into another form). He subsequently abandoned the task of exercising himself in this fashion, when he discovered it to be impossible to find better words than those which Ennius or Gracchus had chosen – a circumstance which rendered the exercise futile if he used those same words, or a hindrance if he used others which must by exclusion be less suitable for the piece⁵³. In passing, one may naturally ask whether, when Cicero makes Crassus say that he tried to recast the poetry in different words, we are to understand Crassus to mean that he attempted the re-fashioning in verse and poetic diction with all the poetic ornaments denied the prose writer and speaker. In the very next paragraph (1,155), he says that his translations from the best Greek orators resulted in the best style possible (his aim), ‘and yet this did not entail resorting to exotic words’, and he only introduced new words when they were appropriate and formed *imitando* (by analogy?)⁵⁴. This may indicate that in order to achieve the best style in recasting the poem, he would be compelled to use at the very least, a poetic diction (for the inculcation of which, see § 2 i in the list above

⁵² He means some portion of epic and tragedy, as L-P rightly comment on *versibus...quam maxime gravibus* – but NORCIO’s translation ‘versi, i più densi di pensiero’ may very well be closer to the true sense, given the context; cf. Quint. 10,5,3 who, in writing on the value of the modified version of this very exercise, mentions that the Greek models ‘rerum copia ... abundant’.

⁵³ Coleridge’s (*Table Talk*) definition ‘prose, – words in their best order; poetry, – the best words in the best order’ in effect represents a partisan objection to one of the rhetorical assumptions on which C.’s exercises are based, namely, that poetry and prose may stylistically be of the same order and quality (cf. *orat.* 66 ff.); likewise to the assumption made in *Arch.* 18 that a poem may admit of several permutations of form with regard to diction, combinations and collocations of words. Cf. Quint.’s 10,5,5 dissension from Cicero.

⁵⁴ RECLAM: ‘durch Analogie’; WILKINS ‘coined by imitation’; NORCIO ‘nell’atto di imitare’; whatever the exact sense, WILKINS is surely right when he takes C. to mean words consistent with Latin formation (*qualitas, perceptio*), and not Greek words in Roman letters.

'Applications of poetical reading') – if not verse and all the other elements and qualities of poetry too –, since at 1,154 we learned that the *optima verba* were also the *maxime cuiusque rei propria*⁵⁵. In any event, the exercise was abandoned, but the principle underlying it Cicero makes Crassus salvage by modifying the exercise to that of translation of the Greek orators. Quintilian (10,5,2 ff.) discussed this passage and, in opposition to Cicero, judged the exercise to be invaluable in as much as it promoted a command of a wealth of content and the skilful devising of ornaments and figures. Even the form of the exercise involving the recasting of the Latin orators, which Cicero makes Crassus reject because the best words were no longer available, Quintilian approved of. In his opinion, it is always possible to find a better way of expressing oneself (*neque adeo ieiunam ac pauperem natura eloquentiam fecit, ut una de re bene dici nisi semel non possit*), and even if it were granted that no better or equal manner of expressing oneself can be found, very near to the best may certainly be found. The whole section of Quintilian 10,5 indeed sheds much light on the importance of *variatio* for developing *copia dicendi* and *facilitas* (ἑξίς)⁵⁶. Quintilian also discusses the exercise of paraphrasing of the poets, which he includes under writing exercises – thus closely following Cicero who insists on writing as an indispensable aid to developing eloquence (1,150: for more references see L-P ad loc.) and places under this head translation and paraphrase. (Quintilian, incidentally, informs us that this type of exercise involving the paraphrasing of poetry was the sole kind used by Sulpicius.) However, with apparently greater sensitivity than Cicero, Quintilian assessed the worth of the exercise, recognising that in making prose out of poetry, the orator elevates his style with the sublimity of the poetry, while at the same time he is compelled in the process to exchange the poetic words for those natural to prose. It is not a little surprising that Cicero failed to recognise this virtue of the exercise and thus seems to forget the fundamental differences between prose and poetry on which he insists elsewhere. Perhaps this apparent oversight may be explained by my suggestion above that Cicero conceived of the exercise differently, requiring the student or orator to recast the poem in other poetic diction – perhaps, also with other poetic elements – and not in prose. Again, it is perhaps not too optimistic to

⁵⁵ I do not understand how L-P ad 1,155 can claim that 'Aus 1,154 ergibt sich, daß die *optima* nicht immer *cuiusque rei propria* zu sein brauchten'; surely the very point of the passage is the opposite of what they allege, and it is this point to which Quint. 10,5,5 (indirectly alluding this passage: cf. 10,5,2) objects: his argument is that no theme or subject matter has only one style germane to it which is to be regarded as the best.

⁵⁶ *Copia* and *varietas* are often joined together (e.g. at de orat. 3,67) and are outstanding characteristics of the grand style: orat. 20, 29, 97; cf. DOUGLAS's comm. p. xliii for more references. With the revival of rhetoric in the Renaissance came a renewed interest in *copia dicendi*, but this was followed by an unhealthy development whereby this quality alone was identified as the essential characteristic of the abundant style. It is typified by such works as Erasmus' de copia, the first book of which (*copia verborum*) 'involves synonymns, heterosis or enallage, metaphor, variation in word form, equivalence, and other similar methods of diversifying diction'. See C. THOMPSON: *Collected Works of Erasmus*. XXIV 301: 17-19.

suppose that Cicero really was consistent here about the unity of style and content, and that is why he makes Crassus give up the poetic form of this exercise, not only because Ennius had appropriated the best words already (the argument which Quintilian rejects), but because a prose form *per se* could not be given to a poetic content: the one cannot be divorced from the other. Quintilian, in addition to the 'prose naturalisation' of diction, finds these further virtues in the exercise: in the first place it allows the student to see how 'oratorical robustness' may be added to the ideas expressed by the poetry, and in the second place it requires him to supply the omissions inherent in the poetry, and to tuck in the exuberance (*omissa supplere, effusa substringere*). The importance and high value, then, attributed to the practice of rendering the same content in different words in the rhetors' systematic programme of training for the orator, partly explain Cicero's interest in Archias' 'performance' compositions in this fashion described in the speech at § 18 as follows: *quotiens revocatum eandem rem dicere commutatis verbis atque sententiis*⁵⁷! (That interest is also explained by the fact that Archias' 'performance' compositions were extemporaneous, and improvisation was held in high esteem by Cicero, as indeed by others too in antiquity⁵⁸). One should also observe that the sort of exercises on the poets that Cicero ascribes to Crassus and that we have been examining here, although departing vastly from the objectives and means that we today usually associate with pure literary criticism, at any rate, goes beyond anything that was done in the schools at the time. KUBIK (240), on the basis of Tusc. 2,26 thought that Cicero had received the practice from the Greeks, but on the contrary, KUBIK has in fact wrongly confounded the kind of exercises described here in our passage from the *de oratore* with the type of study done on the poets in Tusc. 2,26 (*declamatio*) in which the aim was to embellish (*ornamento*) the set speech with appropriate and fitting (*delectu, elegantia*) pieces of poetry, as in the example given at 2,23 ff., and in delivery to give the verse its *proprium numerum*. But that even this type of *declamatio* exercise was something of an advance on the study customarily prescribed by the schools is made clear by BARWICK's (13) exposition of the exercises on the poets prescribed by the pedagogues mentioned by Cicero (*de orat.* 3,58) who *in iis artibus quae repertae sunt, ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem, omne tempus atque aetates suas consumpserunt* as being basically '[die] Dichtererklärung, m.a.W. [die] Grammatik'.

⁵⁷ The distinction between *res* and *sententiae* as opposed to the usual equivalence of the two terms, may be explained as that between subject matter (*μῦθος*) and arguments, opinions regarding that subject matter (*quidquid erit in quaque re, eliciendum atque dicendum*) which can be altered according as it is *disputandum ... in contrarias partis*. On C.'s interest as a rhetorician and orator in extempore verse composition, see Appendix IV.

⁵⁸ Cf. *de orat.* 1,150. 3,194 (concerning Antipater of Sidon); Quint. 10,7,1. On the other hand, Crassus is made to speak with the some derision about the virtuoso improvisations of Gorgias at *de orat.* 1,103 f. (on the difference between the Gorgianic Epangelma and ability of the orator perfectus to speak *omni de re quaecumque sit proposita ornate ... copioseque*, see L-P I 58).

4.4 the fourth function: contribution to the moral and intellectual excellence of great men

At section § 14 of the pro Archia, Cicero begins to emphasise the moral effect of poetry. In the next section he enunciates the fourth function of the study of literature and poetry: it contributes to the perfection of *virtus*, to the moral and intellectual excellence of great men⁵⁹. Having insisted at § 14 that such study serves as a moral stimulus to great deeds, he poses in the following section the question whether the great men praised in literature were themselves imbued with this learning. He concedes that it is difficult to confirm this in all cases, and that great men have attained to *virtus* and greatness without the aid of this learning; and lastly, that talent without learning has attained to glory and *virtus* more often than has learning without talent. Nevertheless, he avers, when talent is combined with systematic learning in these abstract arts and with the perfect shaping of human nature brought about by study⁶⁰, the result is usually something truly unique and outstanding: *atque idem ego hoc contendo, cum ad naturam eximiam et inlustrem accesserit ratio quaedam conformatioque doctrinae, tum illud nescio quid praeclarum ac singulare solere exsistere*⁶¹. He thereupon enumerates examples of great statesmen who were devoted to letters: Scipio Aemilianus, Laelius, Furius and Cato⁶². These would not have given themselves up to study, if literature could not help them attain and cultivate *virtus*.

⁵⁹ On the contribution of *doctrina* in general to the formation of great men, cf also C.'s description of the *rector rei publicae* at rep. 5,2 = Grillius rhet. 1,4 p. 28,14 MARTIN: *in politia sua dicit Tullius rectorem rei publicae summum virum et doctissimum esse debere ita, ut sapiens sit et iustus et temperans et eloquens ... scire etiam debet ius, Graecas nosse litteras, quod Catonis facto probatur, qui in summa senectute Graecis litteris operam dans indicavit, quantum utilitatis haberent*; (cf. also HECK 231 comparing orat. 113–20 and other passages in the de orat); & off. 1,155 *nosque ipsi, quidquid ad rempublicam attulimus ... a doctoribus atque doctrina instructi ad eam et ornati accessimus*..

⁶⁰ The expression *conformatio doctrinae* at § 15 refers to the perfect 'shaping' of man's nature (i.e. his humanity) brought about by study; it is comparable to the expressions such as *ad humanitatem fingeretur* (de orat. 3,58) and *ad humanitatem informari* (Arch. 4) that C. uses elsewhere: cf. ORBAN 184 n. 68: '... désigne le façonnement parfait de notre nature d'homme, que l'étude a opéré en nous...' OLD s.v. 'conformatio' 5, citing this passage (alone), vaguely and, in my opinion, inexactly renders it as 'training (imparted by instruction)'

⁶¹ Cf. STERNKOPF 354; NARDUCCI (1997) 10 suggests this idea 'che il culmine della perfezione umana fosse rappresentato dall'arricchimento che la cultura poteva apportare a una natura già di per sé ben conformata' was Greek in origin, derived perhaps from Posidonius or from Antiochus of Ascalon.

⁶² It is significant that, as NARDUCCI (1997) 11 points out, these personages are to return as the principal interlocutors in some of C.'s philosophical dialogues. There, as here in the pro Archia, they represent this ideal of *natura* conjoined with *doctrina*. The fact that the historical reality of these statesmen imbued with literary and philosophical studies is highly dubious, is beside the point; these romanticised portraits allow Cicero to represent his cultural programme as based firmly in the tradition of the *maiores*: see again NARDUCCI (1997) 11.

4.5 the fifth function: moral *exempla* and the praise of great men

We have just now touched upon the fifth function of poetry: it is the moral function described at section § 14 of the pro Archia, according to which the poet may either inculcate moral lessons such as that *nihil esse in vita magno opere expetendum nisi laudem atque honestatem*⁶³, or induce the reader to draw such lessons for himself from the *exempla* of greatness and from the praises of great men that are contained in poetry and literature⁶⁴: *pleni omnes sunt libri, plenae sapientium voces, plena exemplorum vetustas: quae iacerent in tenebris omnia, nisi litterarum lumen accederet.*

4.6 the sixth function: the national poet, dispenser of immortality and contributor to the glory of individuals and of the state

The traditional theme of immortality bestowed by the poet and his work⁶⁵ which Cicero begins to pursue in the pro Archia from section § 19 onward is closely related to this function of praising great men. The distinction subsists in this, that whereas at Arch. 14 Cicero stresses the contribution of literature's *exempla* to the individual's ethico-political formation, from Arch. 19 onward, it is the contribution to the glory of the individual and of the state that is stressed. On the other hand, it is obvious that the two functions are intimately connected since the one can hardly be discharged without the other. With respect to the glorification of individuals, Cicero recounts how his client served some of Rome's great generals by composing laudatory works, as for example, on Marius' successful Cimbrian campaign (19) and on Lucullus' exploits in the East (21). Ennius too, performed a similar service for the elder Africanus, Q. Fabius Maximus, M. Claudius Marcellus and Fulvius Nobilior⁶⁶ (22). Cicero also relates anecdotes from history illustrating the common human desire for glory and immortality⁶⁷: here we have Themistocles' reported utterance

⁶³ Cf. Planc. 55, where C., having quoted some moralistic and aphoristic verses of Accius in which King Atreus had given grave counsel to his sons, dryly and with much liberty from the forensic custom, remarks: *nostis cetera. nonne, quae scripsit gravis ille et ingeniosus poeta, scripsit non ut illos regios pueros, qui nusquam erant, sed ut nos et nostros liberos ad laborem et laudem excitaret...*

⁶⁴ On the Ciceronian idea of poetry and literature as a depository of *exempla* proposed for the imitation of the reader, see NARDUCCI (1997) 9, who stresses the quasi-philosophical vocabulary used at Arch. 14 ('un lessico carico di valenze filosofiche').

⁶⁵ MALCOVATI 14 f. summarises some of the more important precedents for the theme. C. pursues the theme himself elsewhere at leg. 1,1. Tusc. 1,33 f. 117. Cato 73.

⁶⁶ GRATWICK CHCL II 128, however, thinks that Ennius' Ambracia celebrating Nobilior's capture of that city was a *praetexta* rather than a narrative poem.

⁶⁷ At Tusc. 1,33 ff. he represents the poets themselves as being desirous of this immortal glory! Although their works serve as incentives for citizens to noble action, to the enduring of toil, danger and even death – citizens who would otherwise not be moved thereto *sine magna spe immortalitatis* –, the poets themselves justly demand a share of this glory:

that his preference in the matter of recitals was for that which best published his own excellence (20); likewise Alexander's lament at the tomb of Achilles at Sigeum: *o fortunate adulescens, qui tuae virtutis Homerum praeconem inveneris!* One should also not overlook a particularly Roman feature of Cicero's insistence on the function of the poet as glorifier of men and dispenser of immortality: Cicero equates the glorification of the individual with that of the state: *praesertim cum omne olim studium atque omne ingenium contulerit Archias ad populi Romani gloriam laudemque celebrandam* (19); *qui libri non modo L. Lucullum ... verum etiam populi Romani nomen inlustrant ... nostra sunt tropaea, nostra monumenta, nostri triumphbi; quae quorum ingeniis efferuntur, ab iis populi Romani fama celebratur* (21); *cuius laudibus certe non solum ipse, qui laudatur, sed etiam populi Romani nomen ornat. in caelum ... Cato tollitur: magnus honos populi Romani rebus adiungitur. omnes denique ille Maximi, Marcelli, Fulvii non sine communi omnium nostrum laude decorantur*⁶⁸.

4.7 epic as the ideal genre best able to fulfil the functions

We have now examined the various functions assigned by Cicero to the poet as set forth principally in the speech pro Archia. We have seen that all but one of them (the provision of *delectatio sola*) is either directly or indirectly aimed at the discharging of a service to the state. Thus it is obvious that the sixth function, inasmuch as it is the most direct and the highest of these services to the state, will represent for Cicero the most important function. More importantly, it is obvious that of all the genres, the ideal genre will be for Cicero the epic, especially that which is nationalistic and that which contains encomia of outstanding men important in the national history. This kind of poetry is best able to fulfil the functions, especially the last three with their ethico-political and nationalistic concerns.

poetae nonne post mortem nobilitari volunt? unde ergo illud:
 'aspicite, o cives, senis Enni imaginis formam:
 hic vestrum panxit maxima facta patrum?'
 mercedem gloriae flagitat ab is quorum patres adfecerat gloria, idemque:
 'nemo me lacrimis...
 cur? voluto vivos per ora virum'

⁶⁸ MARROU (1964) 317 rightly points out that the Roman heroism was distinguished from the Greek and especially Homeric ideal of individual heroism, precisely by virtue of the fact that 'its heroism never had any particular individual character; it was always strictly subordinated to the public good and the public safety, as though this was its one aim'. Cf. leg. 3,8 *salus populi suprema lex esto*. In a similar fashion, the *exempla* of *virtus* that are selected for particular recommendation by C. as models of *natura* conjoined with *doctrina* are not, as in the Hellenistic philosophy, models drawn from the umbratile domain of the schools, but are outstanding figures in the nation's history: hence in Ciceronian thought no individual attains to glory without ultimately transferring that glory to the nation. Cf. NARDUCCI (1997) 11.

There are, however, other considerations apart from the functions that will lead us to the same conclusion that this nationalistic, panegyric, historical epic⁶⁹ is for Cicero the ideal. To these we may now turn our attention.

4.8 the 'rhetorical' factor: interest in epic as corresponding to epideictic oratory

Although Cicero never explicitly compares the nationalistic, panegyric epic to epideictic oratory⁷⁰, he does at any rate acknowledge a certain stylistic affinity between the genus demonstrativum and poetry in general⁷¹ and one may reasonably conjecture that the similarity of the encomiastic epic to epideictic oratory especially with respect to subject matter, aims, style levels⁷² and manipulation of pathos⁷³, will not have escaped his attention. In *partitiones oratoriae* 69 ff. where one finds a more substantial discussion of

⁶⁹ The chief representatives will be, of course, Homer, Ennius (cf. Arch. 22), Naevius (*bellum Punicum*) and Accius (he also wrote an *Annales* – as also did a certain A. Furius: see Brut. 132. Macr. 6,1,31. Gell. 18,11). The fashion for panegyric poetry, especially in the epic genre, was widespread in C.'s generation and in that preceding his. In the pro Archia, we are told that Sulla rewarded some second-rate poet for an epigram on him on condition that he should give up writing altogether (25). Q. Metellus Pius gave an audition to some native poets of Corduba when he wanted to have his feats committed to verse (26). Archias ingratiated himself with Marius by writing a poem on the Cimbrian victory; another on the Mithridatic campaigns in honour of Lucullus (19. 21). From C. himself we have the Marius; and in praise of himself, we have the notorious *consulatus suus* and *de temporibus suis*. He also attempted to write a panegyric epic in honour of Caesar, and another in collaboration with Quintus on Caesar's expedition to Britain (on the former, see ad Q.fr. 2,15,2. 3,8,3. 9,6; on the latter: 2,16,4. 3,4,4). Caesar himself and Brutus composed verses too, and from the fact that Tac. dial. 21 makes Aper joke about these works in connexion with those of C. (*fecerunt ... et carmina ... non melius quam Cicero, sed felicius, quia illos fecisse pauciores sciunt*) suggests that they were possibly also self-eulogies and epics. It is significant that all of the subjects of these poems were, with the sole exception of C., soldiers.

⁷⁰ Interesting in this connexion is Isoc. Ev. 9,11, where the author clearly conceives of panegyric oratory as being analogous to laudatory poetry, only differing with respect to its means: ἀποπειρατέον τῶν λόγων ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δυνήσονται, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας εὐλογεῖν μὴδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις ἐγκωμιαζόντων. While C. himself never explicitly links panegyric and (epic) poetry, it is interesting that the pro Archia, one of whose objects of praise is epic poetry, contains many features of the epideictic oration (hence the apology for the *novum et inusitatum genus dicendi* at § 3): cf. NARDUCCI (1997) 6; ALBRECHT 421 with n. 6; P.R. MURPHY: 'Cicero's pro Archia and the Periclean Epitaphios.' *TAPhA* 89 (1958) 99–111.

⁷¹ At orat. 65–68, the respective styles of epideictic, history and poetry are presented as having some relation to each other, or at the very least, as having in common the characteristic of being different from that of forensic oratory. Cf. also L-P II 240.

⁷² The elevated style of epideictic oratory is implied at orat. 37 f. 65 & Brut. 287 with reference to Thucydides whose work in Ciceronian thought is analogous to epideictic oratory: *rerum gestarum pronuntiator sincerus et grandis...*; cf. part. 69 *genus ... nullum ... uberius ad dicendum*; also 72 f. where the 'poetic' style (i.e. designed to delight, directed *ad explendum aurium sensum* [cf. orat. 68 *vocibus magis quam rebus inserviunt*], and abounding in archaisms, new words, metaphors, ornaments, figures and rhythms) of the epideictic oratory is discussed.

For the elevation of style in epic, cf. esp. Quint. 10,1,46 on Homer: *hunc nemo in magnis rebus sublimitate...superaverit* and he is a master of all emotions, mild and vehement alike (48); Ps.-Long. de subl. 9,2 ff. on the ὕψος and μεγαλοφροσύνη of Homer & AUGUSTYNIAC 36 f.

An intriguing and tantalising criticism of poetry in the grand style occurs at Arch. 26 where C. refers disparagingly to the crude efforts of certain Corduban poets at encomiastic poetry as *pingue* which reminds us of the Callimachean fat / thin distinction. It is, however, admittedly unclear whether by *pingue* C. refers to the over-rich foreignness or provincialism of the poets' Latinity, or to the excessive grandness of their style in their encomia.

⁷³ Cf. part. 71 *ad animi motus leniter tractandos magis quam ad fidem faciendam aut confirmandam accommodatur*.

laudationes or 'Roman' epideictic oratory than elsewhere in the Ciceronian corpus, we are told that this type of oratory is aimed at pleasure (69 *delectationem sectatur*, 72 *ad voluptatem auditoris et ad delectationem refertur*, cf. *de orat.* 2,341 *magis legendi et delectationis ... causa*) and is directed *ad laudandos claros viros*; that there is no genre *uberius ad dicendum* nor any *utilius civitatibus*, dwelling as it does on the contemplation of virtues and vices (*in cognitione virtutum vitiorumque*). Like epic, it revels in portents, prodigies, oracles and occurrences apparently ordained by divine will or fate (73). The object of *laudatio* is *honestas* (part. 71) which reminds us of Arch. 14 where Cicero implies that the moral lesson of all literature is that *nihil esse in vita magno opere expetendum nisi laudem atque honestatem*. These descriptions of epideictic strongly recall the type of poetry that is praised in the pro Archia, that is to say, the nationalistic, panegyric kind of epic. Thus the similarity of this type of poetry to one of the oratorical genres – even if this genre was not widely practised at Rome – must have further contributed to Cicero's fascination with the former.

In the second place, these very circumstances, namely that epideictic was not a traditional genre among Roman speakers, and that it was not widely practised even in Cicero's age are themselves significant⁷⁴. The only exception to the rule was the funeral orations delivered over outstanding men (or sometimes, but rarely, over women: *de orat.* 2,44)⁷⁵. It is reasonable to suppose that, in view of the rarity of the practice of epideictic at Rome, Cicero felt the Romans, unlike the Greeks, lacked adequate opportunities⁷⁶ and means to fulfil that function of the epideictic towards the state which he so highly valued (cf. part. 69 *utilius civitatibus*), namely the praise of illustrious national figures and the glorification of the state. This nationalistic, encomiastic kind of epic thus comes to represent for Cicero one of the vehicles capable of supplementing this hiatus in the Roman literary repertory⁷⁷.

⁷⁴ Cf. *de orat.* 2,341 *nos laudationibus non ita multum uti solemus*. Cf. NARDUCCI (1997) 6; KENNEDY (1972) 21 f. The rarity of the custom of *laudatio* at the Rome and the fact that the genre had few *praecepta* governing it (so *de orat.* 2,44; cf. 2,341 *de quibus nemo fere praeciperet*) explain why C. in the *rhethorica* says very little about the genre (observe the omission at *de orat.* 1,22). Cf. DOUGLAS Comm. on Brut. xxix. Other references to *laudationes* and epideictic oratory include Brut. 61. *orat.* 37–42. part. 69 ff. Observe that Quint. 3,7,1–2 distinguishes the Roman *laudatio* and *vituperatio* from the Greek epideictic oratory, inasmuch as the latter is entirely divorced *a parte negotiali*, that is, it is non-practical, whereas the former types are always involved with some *publicum officium*.

⁷⁵ On the *laudatio funebris*, see DOUGLAS ad Brut. 61; W. KIERDORF: *Laudatio funebris. Interpretationen u. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der römischen Leichenrede*. Meisenheim am Glan 1980.

⁷⁶ Note also C.'s anxiety expressed at Arch. 23 that the Romans have less opportunity to divulge their glories throughout the world by means of their literature than have the Greeks inasmuch as *Graeca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus, Latina suis finibus exiguis sane continentur*.

⁷⁷ The other vehicle will be historiography, which will be discussed below.

4.9 the epic poet as being closest to the ancient ideal of the poet according to the *mos maiorum*

In the famous prologue to the *Tusculanae disputationes* in which Cicero was concerned to show how the various arts had come to the Romans at different times, and to indicate that now it was the turn of philosophy to find a place in Latin literature, the author testifies to the ancient conception of the poet as one subjugated to the service of the whole community. Although Cicero wishes here to stress the early hostility of the Romans to the poets and their works, it is implied that the poets, though despised, were accepted on the condition of this service (1,3):

sero igitur a nostris poëtae vel cogniti vel recepti. quamquam est in Originibus solitos esse in epulis canere convivas ad tibicinem de clarorum hominum virtutibus (cf. *Tusc.* 4,3)...

The history of these primitive banquet songs is presented in a slightly different light at *Brut.* 75, where there is no mention of resistance on the part of any Romans to poetry, nor of poetry's late introduction into Rome, but on the contrary, the poet as the proclaimer of Roman virtue and excellence seems to be regarded as a thing entirely consistent with the *mos maiorum*:

atque utinam exstarent illa carmina, quae multis saeculis ante suam aetatem in epulis esse cantitata a singulis convivis de clarorum virorum laudibus in Originibus scriptum reliquit Cato! ⁷⁸

Cicero, the conservative and staunch defender of the *mos maiorum*, is again moved to prefer the epic, especially the nationalistic, encomiastic kind, as corresponding most closely to the primitive tradition⁷⁹ of assigning poetry the function of glorifying the illustrious figures in the nation's history.

4.10 polemical motives arising from Cicero's literary and cultural battle with the neoteric school

This moralistic and utilitarian view of poetry was to the new literary culture that was emerging in the years of Cicero's political decline a dying creed; it was utterly incompatible with the new generation's renewed embrace of those Hellenistic and Alexandrine influences, which despite their having been imported many generations before, were only

⁷⁸ Cf. *de orat.* 3,197. *Tusc.* 4,3; Varro ap. Non. s.v. *assa voce. in conviviis pueri modesti ut cantarent carmina antiqua, in quibus laudes erant maiorum et assa voce et cum tibicine.*

⁷⁹ Cf. *Lucr.* 5,1445 f. *carminibus cum res gestas coepere poetae / tradere ...*

now for the first time coming into their own, now for the first time being absorbed with an exuberant enthusiasm for, and a finer critical adherence to, the true spirit and ideals of the accepted models⁸⁰. In contrast to the old fashion, the Ennian archaism, the 'Ennian-Annals' tradition defended more vigorously by Cicero with advancing age⁸¹, the high and serious Alexandrine taste predominating the literary and artistic scene is for the esoteric⁸², for bizarre and cultish (occult?) mythology, for the amatory (risqué *ἔρωτικὸν πάθημα*, as KROLL calls it); otherwise the late Republican predilection in poetry is for technical matter suitable for didactic versification. In the *Tusculanae disputationes* 3,45 and the *div.* 2,132 Cicero draws the battle-ground between the old fashion and the new⁸³: Euphorion's excessive obscurity (representing the fashion of the new poets) is pitted against the simple grandeur of Homer and Ennius⁸⁴: to the question 'which is better?', the answer in favour of the latter is implicitly suggested. Again in the *Brutus* 191 he writes⁸⁵: *poema enim reconditum paucorum adprobationem, oratio popularis adsensum vulgi debet movere*. The neoteric dwells in the

⁸⁰ Cf. CLAUSEN (1964) 187 f. on the development of Callimacheanism in Latin poetry.

⁸¹ C. himself was of course not immune to Hellenistic and Alexandrian influences in his own poetic compositions, but it is clear that with advancing age his preference was for the nationalistic and historical epic: cf. CASTORINA: 'Il neoterismo nella poesia latina.' *Convivium* 33 (1965) 135 & 'Le tre fasi poetiche di Cicerone.' *SicGym* 6 (1953) 137–65. On C.'s early adhesion to neoterism, see also CLAUSEN (1986) 161: 'There is a certain irony in the reflection that Cicero himself had once been, in effect, a New Poet: the very young man who translated the *Pontus Glaucus*, the *Alcyones*, was a student of Hellenistic elegance ... and the older man, therefore, an expert if unfriendly critic of such poetry: *cantores Euphorionis*.'; cf. also CASTORINA (1968) 33 ff.; D. GAGLIARDI: 'Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 [1968] 270, on the other hand, calls into doubt whether such a development in C.'s poetic tastes really occurred.

In speaking of the 'Ennian-Annals' tradition, we do not mean to imply that Ennius himself was untouched by Hellenistic and Alexandrian influences (cf. GAGLIARDI 272); but it cannot be doubted either that the Ennius of the big book, of the *Annals*, is clearly less indebted to such influences than the Ennius of the other works; or that the Ennius of the *Annals* belongs to the same tradition as that to which the *Volusian Annals* belong, however superior the former may have been to the latter. That Catullus and his friends despised such a tradition is clear from c. 36 (on *Furius Bibaculus*, who was only 'on the fringes of the "new poets"', see COURTNEY 198 ff.). Cf. GAGLIARDI 285; on the other hand, GAGLIARDI 272 f. rejects the notion that there was fundamental difference of aesthetic aims between the archaic Roman literature represented by Ennius, and the neoterism of C.'s generation; for GAGLIARDI the main difference lay in the more conscious, more refined Alexandrinism of C.'s generation as opposed to the cruder, more indiscriminate type prevailing in the earlier writers: 'Sì che in sostanza la differenza tra la letteratura arcaica e quella del periodo ciceroniano non è in motivi culturali antitetici, ma piuttosto nell'accettazione più consapevole da parte dei νεώτεροι dei modelli greci, e nella ricerca di un più terso e prezioso dettato – un ideale di *leptotes*, insomma – di contro all'indiscriminato alessandrinismo dei primi autori latini.' Nevertheless, even if this view be accepted in whole, or in part, it remains absolutely beyond question that there was a cultural conflict between C. and the neoteric poets. The latter rejected the epic of the Ennian-Annals tradition; hence C. would have found even greater reason to cherish that tradition.

⁸² Cf. the clever lampoon on L. Crassicius who wrote a commentary on Cinna's *Zmyrna*: *Suet. gramm.* 18,2.

⁸³ For a contrary view, see GAGLIARDI 270 ff. He rejects the common opinion that C. was opposed to neoterism on aesthetic grounds, believing rather that his hostility was 'il prodotto di un consenso di natura etico-politica' (272).

⁸⁴ On C.'s insistence on the obscurity of Euphorion and the clarity of Homer, cf. CASTORINA (1953) 160.

⁸⁵ Of Antimachus of Colophon c. 400 B.C., see DOUGLAS' note *ad loc.*: '... he anticipated the Alexandrians in learned obscurity' and is thus in one sense to be reckoned among the forerunners of the neoteric movement in Latin poetry; Catullus, Cinna and the *novi poetae*, however, denied any spiritual lineage from him but on the contrary condemned him for his excessive wordiness: see Catull. 95,10 / 95b 2. In this they were doubtless influenced by Callimachus whose anti-Antimachus position is attested by fr. 398 PF.

small and miniature poem (short lyrics and epyllia) and revolts against the Ennian spirit (as typified by the *Annales*) of the big book⁸⁶.

There were other factors influencing Cicero's mature rejection of neoterism; among these, the most important must be considered the following: the new school's abandonment of Roman-ness and the *mos maiorum*; its rejection of the traditions of the archaic national poetry⁸⁷ and of the nationalistic ideal in poetry; and its inherent introspection and ethico-political outlook, hostile to that 'active life' that Cicero consistently advocates (e.g. off. 1,19 etc.)⁸⁸. The kinds of functions assigned by Cicero to poetry, that is to say, the inculcation of morals and Roman virtues, the glorification of national heroes etc. (see above §§ 4.4–6) are, as has rightly been pointed out, not the concerns of the poems of a neoteric such as Catullus⁸⁹. When Lucilius, the eulogist of Scipio Africanus⁹⁰, defines *virtus* to be the following: *hos (homines moresque bonos) magni facere, his bene velle, his vivere amicum, commoda praeterea patriae prima putare, deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra* (fr. inc. 1351–54 KRENKEL), we acknowledge that the voice of the poet has nothing in common with neoterism: the values of the older Roman poetry and the new school are worlds apart. Thus even if, as GAGLIARDI argues, Cicero's hostility⁹¹ towards

⁸⁶ Cf. EWBANK 1 ff.; CASTORINA (1968) 43.

⁸⁷ Literary polemic was clearly a part of their programme, as Catull. 95 & 95b show. Cf. CLAUSEN (1964) 189: 'a polemical poem in the Callimachean style was not meant to be merely a confutation; it was meant to be simultaneously a demonstration of how poetry ought to be written.' On the neoteric rejection of the praise of famous men as the highest task of poetry, cf. G.W. WILLIAMS (1968) 31 ff.

⁸⁸ Cf. GAGLIARDI 285: 'Chi sono dunque i *cantores Euphorionis*? Certamente degli epigoni del neoterismo, che avevano radicalizzato i postulati della scuola, tendendo ad un alessandrinismo esclusivistico, entro una concezione dell'arte vista come mero *lusus*, fuori da ogni impegno anche sul piano artistico ... L'imitazione dei modelli ellenistici dovette diventare cioè solo una mania grecizzante in questi giovani che, per sottolineare con estrema spregiudicatezza il loro totale distacco dall'antica tradizione nazionale, presero ad irridere Ennio...'

⁸⁹ WILLIAMS (1968) 33: 'A man would need to be deeply immoral to find paradigms of conduct in such poetry [sc. as Catullus], and he could read from cover to cover without finding many salubrious references to Roman history. Instead, he would find pleasure taken in depravity of every sort, mockery made of Roman officials, stories of mythical Greek heroines, and – perhaps worst of all – the portrait ... of the author totally immersed in a painful and illegitimate relationship with a Roman matron.'

⁹⁰ Cf. Hor. sat. 2,1,17.

⁹¹ One should also not underestimate the animosity that must have been generated in C. towards the younger generation who undoubtedly would have been among those who laughed at his attempts in the epic genre. Cf. Pis. 72 ff.; Tac. dial. 21. GAGLIARDI's (273) thesis that epic was not necessarily opposed to the programme of the neoterics of C.'s generation is perverse. His claim that the cultivation of epic poetry was not a distinguishing mark of the older Roman literary tradition is untenable. He based this claim on the fact that 'supposed' precursors of neoterism such as Sueius and Matius, as well as alleged neoterics such as Furius Bibaculus (*Annales belli Gallici*) and Varro Atacinus (*Argonautae* and *bellum Sequanicum*), as well as others supposedly representing neoteric values such as Archias and Alexander of Ephesus, all tried their hand at epic. These attempts to attribute epic composition to neoterism as if it were almost a regular feature are not difficult to answer. In the first place, the argument from the precursors is largely irrelevant: whatever the precursors may or may not have done, the whole point of the neoterism of Catullus' generation was the desire for a more refined, more authentic Alexandrinism, which of course, entailed a rejection of the big book. With regard to Archias: he plied his trade in a more or less client-patron relationship; of Alexander of Ephesus, too little is known: in any event, there is no evidence at all linking either him or Archias with the Roman, neoteric movement to which C. was opposed. Of Varro Atacinus, COURTNEY 237 states: 'V. writes only in hexameters, did not compose a miniature epic and has no known connection with any of the "neoteric" poets'; while of Furius Bibaculus, he writes (199 f.): 'Frs. 1–6 show a poet of *nugae*, but it may come as a surprise to find such a one writing a μέγα βιβλίον, an epic in Homeric and Ennian fashion ... We should think

the neoterism that developed in the younger generation was not based entirely on aesthetic or literary concerns – an hypothesis which I do not favour–, he will at any rate have naturally found ethico-political motives for his mature preference for the nationalistic, Ennian-style epic⁹².

4.11 epic and historiography

In a recent article⁹³, SHANNON N. BYRNE reminded us that not only was prose history an ‘acceptable leisure-time activity and adjunct to an active political career for prominent Romans since Fabius Pictor’, but also, that it was highly desirable to distinguished Roman statesmen and soldiers to be included in such histories (especially those composed by their peers). To have one’s deeds recorded in this way would guarantee the eulogized subject not only prestige in his own lifetime, but the preservation of his name in posterity. Cicero shows himself to be imbued with the same ideas about historiography in the notorious letter he wrote to Lucius Luceius in 55 B.C., in which he duns the senator to write an historical monograph on his consulship, exile and recall (fam. 5,12):

ardeo cupiditate incredibili neque, ut ego arbitror, reprehendenda nomen ut nostrum scriptis illustretur et celebretur tuis ... neque enim me solum commemoratio posteritatis ac spes quaedam immortalitatis rapit sed etiam illa cupiditas ut vel auctoritate testimoni tui vel indicio benevolentiae vel suavitate ingeni vivi perfruamur (1) ... illa nos cupiditas incendit ... ut et ceteri viventibus nobis ex libris tuis nos cognoscant et nosmet ipsi vivi gloriola nostra perfruamur (9)

Later, in the same letter, he compares the sort of commendation that he might receive from Luceius not only with that which Timaeus bestowed on Timoleon and Herodotus on Themistocles, but also with that which Homer bestowed on Achilles (fam. 5,12,7). Thus he explicitly here equates the function of historiography with that of epic⁹⁴, and this identity of functions together with some very powerful motives to attain glory for himself⁹⁵

of Bibaculus as one on the fringes of the “new poets”; his *œuvre* does not include that mark of the thorough Callimachean, a miniature epic, and Horace calls him *pingui tentus omaso*, which means that he was *παχύς*, in the Callimachean code the opposite of *λεπτός*.’

⁹² Cf. CASTORINA (1953) 150; this is not to deny that C. admired the Ennius of tragedy (cf. Tusc. 3,45; also CASTORINA 1953, 161); but, one can hardly doubt that Ennius the epic poet, the glorifier of national heroes who is celebrated in the pro Archia, was vastly more important to C. than the Ennius of tragedy.

⁹³ ‘Horace *Carm.* 2.12, Maecenas and prose history.’ *Antichthon* 34 (2000) 18–29.

⁹⁴ On the tradition of associating history with poetry (Quint. 10,1,31 *historia ... est ... proxima poetis et quodam modo carmen solutum*), see NORDEN *Kunstprosa* 91 with numerous references. At orat. 30, C.’s description of Thuc. (*res gestas et bella narrat et proelia, graviter sane et probe*) invites a comparison with epic: cf. C.’s characterisation of Ennius epicus at Brut. 75 as *omnia bella persequens*.

⁹⁵ It is well known that C. also requested Archias himself to write an epic celebrating his consulship: see Att. 1,16,15.

further explains his interest in epic. On the other hand, one should be aware that on purely socio-political grounds Cicero prefers histories composed by other eminent Romans such as Lucceius to the poetic encomia such as epics that Cicero desired to be composed on him by lesser men. Thus rightly BYRNE 21 writes: 'A poet's panegyrics could achieve nearly the same effect, but poetry celebrating the deeds of noble Romans was typically the work of social inferiors and did not carry the same weight as a historical work in prose composed by a distinguished Roman.' In the letter to Lucceius, Cicero illustrates the greater prestige of such prose history in this respect when he writes (5,12,7):

atque hoc praestantius mihi fuerit et ad laetitiam animi et ad memoriae dignitatem, si in tua scripta pervenero, *quam si in ceterorum*, quod non ingenium mihi solum suppeditatum fuerit tuum ... sed etiam *auctoritas clarissimi et spectatissimi viri, et in rei publicae maximis gravissimisque causis cogniti atque in primis probati*, ut mihi non solum praeconium quod, cum in Sigaeum venisset, Alexander ab Homero Achilli tributum esse dixit, sed etiam *grave testimonium impertitum clari hominis magnique* videatur. placet enim Hector ille mihi Naevianus, qui non tantum 'laudari' se laetatur sed addit etiam 'a laudato viro'.

4.12 Ennius epicus as the greatest poet in Cicero's judgement

D. GAGLIARDI ('Cicerone e il neoterismo.' *RFIC* 96 (1968) 269–287) argues not only that it is not permissible to speak, as has been done, of an 'antineoterismo cieco ed assoluto'⁹⁶ in Cicero, but also that Cicero remained throughout his life committed to a neoteric poetic. He thus rejects (270) the widely held view that with the passing of years Cicero turned from the neoteric Alexandrianism of his youth to a more conservative taste for Ennian archaicism. GAGLIARDI makes some good points, especially in correcting the traditional account of the development of Roman literature as a strict polarization of attitudes between old and new, between the Ennian Annalistic tradition and neoteric Alexandrianism. But he errs when he denies that Cicero regarded Ennius' epic favourably, and indeed, as the greatest poetic works if not in the world's, at any rate, in all of Rome's literature. According to GAGLIARDI, Cicero was not, as is commonly held, deeply enamoured of Ennius the archaicizing epic poet, but only favoured his tragedies; also Cicero's taste, like a true Callimachean, was not for epic; and that the nature of the dispute

⁹⁶ M. GIGANTE 'Catullo, Cicerone ed Antimaco.' *RFIC* 32 (1954) 73.

with the younger neoterics was based not on aesthetic and stylistic, but on other considerations of an 'ethico-political nature':

Vero è che l'Arpinate, fatto pensoso del *mos maiorum* dalle vicende politiche di cui si era trovato ad essere protagonista, sebbene cominciasse ad avvertire una punta di diffidenza verso questi poeti che non solo manifestavano l'insofferenza della loro generazione verso i grandi della politica contemporanea, ma cantavano con insolita audacia miti scabrosi...pure non ripudiò gli ideali neoterici per l'epica enniana (277)...La simpatia dell'oratore per gli arcaici fu soprattutto di natura politico-morale, non estetica: ha radici nella suggestione della loro forte tempra italica, della loro «gravità sentenziosa», non nell'ammirazione dei loro moduli d'arte. (278)

GAGLIARDI then resorts to a highly questionable interpretation of a passage commonly regarded as favourable to Ennius *qua* epic poet. The testimony of opt. gen. 2: *itaque licet dicere et Ennium summum epicum poetam* is dismissed (277) as being merely a hypothetical statement, since it is qualified by the limiting clause that follows: *si cui ita videtur* ('if anyone thinks that'). Reservations about Ennius *qua* epic poet are detected by GAGLIARDI in Brut. 75–76 (the only thing being questioned here is Ennius' claim to being wholly original!) and orat. 36 (surely the same sort of hypothetical statement GAGLIARDI dismissed in opt. gen. 2!). The fact that Cicero praises Ennius (*O poetam egregium!*) in the well known passage from Tusc. 3,45 after having just quoted verses from one of his tragedies, the *Andromacha*, is adduced as proof of Cicero's high regard for Ennius being restricted to Ennius *qua* tragic poet only; likewise that fact that Ennius is juxtaposed with Pacuvius and Accius over against the triad of the great Greek tragedians in passages such as de orat. 3,27⁹⁷. To prove that Cicero had no preference or special liking for epic, the specious arguments are adduced that there is no explicit declaration in all of Cicero's work to that effect (that proves nothing since in no place does Cicero speak in general terms of any of the genres, with the exception of comedy, and possibly of lyric as well⁹⁸); that Cicero's own epic production, namely, the *works consulatus suus* and *de temporibus suis* cannot be regarded as proof either that Cicero showed a preference for the epic genre or that there was a shift in his aesthetic tastes away from an Alexandrinist type literature towards more traditional forms inasmuch as these were works occasioned by particular circumstances: they are, he asserts, in substance 'solo un omaggio alla tradizione scaturito da circostanze particolari,

⁹⁷ This passage is not specifically cited by GAGLIARDI.

⁹⁸ For a discussion of the vexed interpretation of the notorious judgement on the lyric poets, see below § 8.2.

non già l'espressione di una *προτίμησις* di cui Marco Tullio fosse criticamente consapevole' (277).

This is all very unconvincing. In the first place, it is not proved that the occasion of a poem, or the occasional impulse suggesting it, is inextricably linked with a predetermined genre. In the second place, when we consider that in Ciceronian critical thought subject matter and genre must necessarily suggest one another (cf. the beginning of *opt. gen.*), then it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a taste for epic subject matter implies a taste for the epic genre! Furthermore Cicero's *Marius* with its Homeric echoes⁹⁹ – probably published in the 50's¹⁰⁰, that is to say, around the same time as the other epic works – was not occasioned by any notable circumstances in Cicero's life, and this provides another argument against GAGLIARDI's thesis.

The statistics concerning the frequency and type of poets and their poetry cited in Cicero's works can help us here. No poet even remotely challenges Ennius for the frequency of references or quotations of verses; from ZILLINGER's 'Zusammenstellung der Zitate bei Cicero' (89–169) one can see that the number of references to Ennius or quotations of his verse is in excess of 150 (not including repeated quotations). Of these citations, the *Annales* account for around 40, while of the identified fourteen tragedies some 70 or so citations are made. That alone should give one cause to doubt GAGLIARDI's thesis that Cicero was not really interested in epic per se. But what really shows that the interest in epic is not motivated merely by 'ethico-political' concerns, is the fact the poet who is referred to or quoted with the greatest frequency after Ennius, is not a Roman, not a tragedian, not an Alexandrinist or an Alexandrine or Hellenistic poet: it is in fact, Homer, who has around 70 citations; Accius, Pacuvius, Terence, Lucilius have each less than half that number of citations. And in fact the passage from the *de orat.* (3,27) where Ennius is linked with the other two major Roman tragedians who form, as it were, a triad corresponding to the three great Attic tragedians, demonstrates with respect to Ennius, not so much, as GAGLIARDI insists, a preference for the tragic *oeuvre* of Ennius, as Cicero's constant tendency to search for Roman parallels to phenomena in Greek literary and cultural history, a tendency manifested again in the respective openings to the *Tusculanae disputationes* and the *de finibus*. Indeed, it is clear that this same tendency leads him to crown Ennius as the Roman Homer. In the speech *pro Archia* where Cicero introduces the argument for the honour due to poets from their fellow citizens on the grounds of their service to the state, the first concrete example he gives is of Homer (19). He then attempts to apply this proof to the case of Archias, and enumerates his literary works as instances of

⁹⁹ EWBank 124 ff.

¹⁰⁰ COURTNEY 175; EWBank 14 ff.

his services to the Roman people (19–21); thereupon he proceeds to demonstrate, lest there be concern that such honours as were given to poets among the Greeks were either unknown among the Romans, or inconsistent with the *mos maiorum*, that in fact this kind of recognition was afforded to Ennius. The parallel with Homer is implicit in ‘noster’ *Ennius*: Homer was honoured in such a way by his fellow citizens; our Ennius (=our own Homer) likewise. Of all the Greeks, it is Homer to whom Ennius is chiefly indebted (de fin. 1,7); Homer and Ennius are linked in orat. 109; and Homer appears to Ennius in his dreams (ac. 2,51. 88; rep. 6,10), and occupies his thoughts in his waking hours (rep. 6,10). Accius who is cited with the next greatest frequency after Homer, exhibits concerns alien to the Alexandrinising poets in his nationalist works, his *Annales*, his *fabulae praetextae* the *Decius* (or *Aeneadae*) and the *Brutus*. Both Ennius and Accius are depicted in the speech pro Archia (22 & 27) as representing Cicero’s ideal of the poet in that they applied their art to the glorification of illustrious Romans, and ultimately thereby to that of the Roman people. And in the nat.deor. 2,93, when Cicero’s Stoic Balbus derides the materialist view of the order of the world, he insists that the haphazard collision of atoms and particles of matter is no more capable of producing the complex and ordered parts of the world, than are innumerable copies of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet thrown at random on the ground capable of producing even Ennius’ *Annales*, let alone even one verse of it (thus representing an accepted, established ideal of poetic perfection)¹⁰¹.

If Ennius is Hellenistic in formation, and shows Hellenistic influences in his work, still, as we have seen above, that was largely incidental: the author of the *Annals* is un-Hellenistic, precisely because of his nationalistic outlook; furthermore because of his extreme, ethical view of the purpose of poetry. Ennius is anti-Callimachean¹⁰² precisely because his poetry is not *κατὰ λεπτόν*, but the big, continuous narrative which told of a nation, of kings and wars: *omnia bella persequens* so Cicero described him in the Brut. 75; and Ovid’s (trist. 2,423 f.) summary description of Ennius makes him sound like one of Callimachus’ Telchines:

utque suo Martem cecinit gravis Ennius ore –

Ennius ingenio maximo, arte rudis –

It will be noticed here too in this passage (2,427 ff.) how Ovid separates the poets of the grand and lofty kind (Ennius and Lucretius) concerned with wars and philosophy, from the

¹⁰¹ This was apparently a Stoic (from Posidonius, one of C.’s great influences) attack on a Democritean / Epicurean analogy whereby the atoms of the *kosmos* were compared to the letters / words of a poem. Allusions to this analogy occur in Lucr., most famously at 2,1013–21. Cf. D. ARMSTRONG: ‘The impossibility of metathesis.’ in D. OBBINK: *Philodemus & Poetry*. Oxford 1995, 224 ff. The Posidonian source of the attack at nat.deor. 2,93–94 on the Democritean metaphor was first detected by H. DIELS: *Elementum*. Leipzig 1899, 1–14.

¹⁰² Cf. CLAUSEN (1964) 186 quoted above § 3.9 n. 153.

frivolous, erotic little poems (*exigui*) of the younger Roman poets who either belonged to or were connected in some way with the νεώτεροι: Catullus, Calvus, Tigidas, Memmius, Cinna, Cornificius and Cato. Callimachus, the chief model of the New Poets is characterised by Ovid (trist. 2,424) in almost exactly the opposite terms: [*Battiades*] *quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet*. Furthermore, if Ennius is not concerned with amatory themes, he is certainly concerned that his poems should contain a good deal of ethical and philosophical content – that is hardly an Alexandrinist view of literature. Cicero notes in the *de orat.* 2,156 that Ennius wants his Neoptolemus to philosophise (*philosophari*), and his established preference for Euripides again bears out his moral concerns in literature. Above all, he is the nationalist poet *par excellence*, and this is why Cicero does not hesitate to call him the *summus poeta* (prov. 21). The presentation of him as the pre-eminent national and nationalist poet is enunciated by Cicero in numerous works: above all in the speech *pro Archia* in various places; at *Tusc.* 1,34, Cicero, upon quoting one of his epigrams, depicts him as the chief glorifier of the Roman nation:

‘aspicite, o cives, senis Enni imaginis formam:

hic vestrum panxit maxima facta patrum’

mercedem gloriae flagitat ab is quorum patres adfecerat gloria.

Lastly in the beginning of the fifth book of the *de re publica*, Cicero extols to the skies a verse of the *Annals* which for him sums up the virtue and excellence of the Roman state, and explains succinctly whence that commonwealth was ever able to derive its strength provided that it remained true to its progenitors’ conception of the nation:

moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque¹⁰³

His praise for this verse is really quite extraordinary, manifesting an enthusiasm unequalled anywhere else in the Ciceronian corpus: the closest thing to it would be the well known description of Ennius (*o poetam egregium!*) which appears in the *Tusculanae disputationes* (3,45) after a citation from one of the tragedies. But in our present passage, Cicero is so taken with the verse, that he is led to introduce the divine inspiration theory again, attributing quasi-religious sanctity to the poet as to a seer, even though the reference to the divine operation is merely a comparison and not intended to be taken as an actual description of the process of Ennius’ composition. St Augustine *civ.* 2,21 preserves Cicero’s own words on the verse:

quem quidem ille versum, vel brevitate vel veritate tamquam ex oraculo
quodam mihi esse effatus videtur.

¹⁰³ On the importance of the *mos maiorum* for C. as summed up in the preface to Bk. 5 of the *rep.*, cf. ZETZEL 24 f.

The verse is so highly esteemed not only because it explains the political foundations upon which the Roman nation was established, but is, as it were, a creed of the Roman moral, social, aesthetic outlook. Cicero identifies his own conservatism in these matters with Ennius'. GAGLIARDI errs greatly when he separates Cicero's ethico-political outlook from his aesthetic and literary tastes, and the proof of the intimate nature between these two is shown by an examination of the functions that Cicero assigns the poet, for it is from these that we shall learn that the poet's profession is not justified unless it be fully integrated into society. For Cicero, such a poet was Ennius *summus epicus poeta* (opt.gen.2) and it was this Ennius who in his mind discharged these functions more admirably than any other.

5. CICERO AND THE THEATRE:

The educational, cultural and socio-political background

If we wish fully to understand Cicero's theoretical conceptions of the dramatic genres, it is necessary for us first to grasp the educational, cultural and socio-political contexts in which these conceptions were developed and with which they were to an extent and in certain respects inextricably linked. As the subject of Cicero's relationship to the theatre has been well covered by others, I wish to treat of this subject in a cursory fashion only¹.

The theatre was an integral part of Roman civic and religious life. The religious festivals during some of which the dramatic shows were staged² occupied a considerable portion of the Roman calendar and constituted an important facet of Roman society. Theatrical shows were also attached to lavish games put on for specific occasions by individuals such as those established by Caesar in 46 for the dedication of the Temple of Venus Genetrix, and those of Pompey in 55 for the opening of his theatre and temple. Isolated celebrations such as these were also significant events in the Roman calendar. Furthermore, the popularity of the games ensured their political importance: considerable expenditure on them was a requisite for any candidate (principally for the aediles³) wishing to advance through the *cursus honorum*, and political failure threatened any aspiring magistrate such as Mamercus (off. 2,58) who disregarded the people's appetite for lavish games (cf. off. 2,57 ff. Mur. 38–40)⁴. On the other hand, Cicero approved (*bonis viris si non desiderantibus at tamen approbantibus*) the aedile largesses only reluctantly because he recognised that they were a long-standing custom of the Roman political system (off. 2,57 f.: *inveterasse*); on ethical grounds he found the practice repugnant. We shall have cause to discuss the aedile largesses again in the chapter on comedy.

The theatre was also politically important for other reasons. In the first place, as a central, public meeting place where prominent figures came to see and to be seen, the theatre gave the people the opportunity to express their political reactions to those same figures. For when such prominent men entered the theatre the people would applaud or

¹ W.A. LAIDLAW: 'Cicero and the stage.' *Hermathena* 94 (1960) 56–66; F.W. WRIGHT: *Cicero and the Theatre*. Smith College Class. Stud. 11, Northampton 1931. I have been able to view only portions of E. BERTRAND: *Cicéron au théâtre*. Ann. de l'Univ. de Grenoble 9 (1897). I have not had access to: L. WINNICZUK: 'Quid Cicero de spectaculis et histrionum arte senserit.' *Meander* 14 (1959) 337–43 & 'Cicero on actors and the stage.' *Atti del I Congresso di Stud. Ciceroniani Roma 1959 I* (1961) 213–22.

² The following *ludi* were scenic: the *ludi Romani* (4–19 Sept.), the *ludi Florales* (28 April–3 May), the *ludi plebei* (4–17 Nov.), the *ludi Apollinares* (6–13 July), the *ludi Megalenses* (4–10 April).

³ Cf. Att. 9,12,3: *praetores ius dicunt, aediles ludos parant, viri boni usuras perscribunt*.

⁴ Cf. Auct. de vir. illustr. 72,4.

hiss or give other such vociferous displays of feeling⁵. Thus Sest. 106: *etenim tribus locis significari maxime de re publica populi Romani iudicium ac voluntas potest, contione, comitiis, ludorum gladiatorumque consessu*. In the second place, the plays themselves could be the stimulus to such political demonstrations on the part of the people. Lines written many years before an event and without any political motivation whatsoever, could many generations later in a given political climate and under the impulse of the people's reaction to a particular recent event, take on a new interpretation of political significance. A good example of verses being taken out of their context in order to be applied to recent political developments is to be found in a performance of an unknown tragedy (TRF inc. 115–117 RIBBECK-KLOTZ) reported by Cicero in Att. 2,19,3. He informs us that when these hostile verses were recited by the actor Diphilus the audience with loudest approbation understood them to refer to Pompey. In the case of the first verse (*nostra miseria tu es magnus*), Diphilus was called upon to give innumerable encores. Cicero's comment on the verses and on the crowd's reaction thereto illustrates well how significant socially and politically the performance of verses intended for another purpose could be when given such an interpretation⁶: *nam et eius modi sunt ii versus ut in tempus ab inimico Pompei scripti esse videantur*.

The theatre extended its sphere of influence to other areas of Roman life as well. School-boys were made to read the poets from an early age (leg. 1,47), even to commit passages of their works to memory (Tusc. 2,26 f.). In the higher education, lecturers in philosophy interspersed their discourses with quotations from the poets, and Cicero tells us of exercises where the student was required to translate from the Greek poets for the purposes of improving his command of ornamentation in Latin (Tusc. 2,26). In the case of Cicero, the influence of the theatre on his education in less formal ways is well attested by both himself and by Plutarch. For Plutarch Cic. 5 informs us that at the beginning of his career as an orator Cicero paid close attention to the acting styles of Roscius and Aesopus⁷ in order to improve his delivery. Cicero's own numerous utterances in which he explicitly or implicitly compares the orator and the actor highlight the intrinsic fascination that the theatre held for Cicero purely from a rhetorical standpoint (cf. div. 1,80. Tusc. 4,55. de orat. 1,118. 128–30. 251. 258 f. 2,193. 3,83. 214. 221)⁸. A particularly striking example of Cicero's interest in the theatre from the rhetorical perspective may be found in Macrobius'

⁵ Cf. Sest. 105. Phil. 1,30. 6,11. fam. 8,2,1. Att. 10,12a,3. 14,2,1. For numerous other references and on this whole subject of the games as a 'barometer of public opinion', see WRIGHT 4 ff.; BLÄNSDORF 146. JOCELYN 63 f.

⁶ C. seems to indicate in Att. 2,19,3 that the interpretation was also suggested by the way in which the verses were performed: *Diphilus tragoedus in nostrum Pompeium petulanter invecus est*. Cf. Sest. 118, where a verse from a togata by Afranius during a vigorous performance takes on a political significance.

⁷ λέγεται ... νοσήσας ... πρὸς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, τοῦτο μὲν Ῥωσίου τῷ κωμωδῷ, τοῦτο δ' Αἰσώπῳ τῷ τραγῳδῷ προσέχειν ἐπιμελῶς.

⁸ Cf. LAIDLAW 57 f., 64 f.; WRIGHT 26 f.

account (Sat. 3,14,12 f.) of Cicero and Roscius' amicable contests in which each attempted by means of his own art to outdo the other in copiousness of expression on a given theme. Roscius' confidence in the supremacy of his art led him to write a book in which he compared the art of oratory and acting⁹. The friendships that he later developed severally with each of the two actors just mentioned¹⁰, and the legal defence that he undertook on behalf of Roscius further increased – even if only indirectly – Cicero's involvement with the theatre.

The verses of the poets provide the orator with another form of embellishment and supplementary argumentation: the aspiring orator should imitate the practice of the greatest orators who interspersed quotations from the poets in their speeches, in the first place, to show off their learning; in the second place, to add charm to the speech and to give the audience relief from the severity of forensic language and matters; and lastly to give additional authority to their statements by appealing to similar sentiments in the poets (Quint. 1,8,11). In this connexion, significant is the observation of JOCELYN (1973) 63 that the quotations of Latin poetry in the Ciceronian speeches 'are dominated by the dramatic scripts performed at the public festivals'¹¹. This was no accident, for the orator was here accomodating his speech to the tastes and education of the wider audience. So rightly JOCELYN (1973) 63: 'It is unlikely that the peasant and city working-classes had any advanced literary education, but attendance at the public festivals would have acquainted them with the plots and the songs of the classic plays.' Cicero also quotes the poets (both Greek and Latin) extensively in the rest of his works, especially in the philosophical works and letters¹². Here a verse quotation might be used to give a thought a witty turn; or to confirm some point of mythology; or it might be used as an example of human nature; or to illustrate a point of grammar or language; or to support some moral doctrine being alleged – or, on the contrary, to refute some widely held, but mistaken moral notion. The use of poetic quotation, although to a certain extent natural and to be expected from an

⁹ *et certe satis constat contendere eum cum ipso histrione [sc. Roscio] solitum, utrum ille saepius eandem sententiam variis gestibus efficeret an ipse per eloquentiae copiam sermone diverso pronuntiaret. quae res ad hanc artis suae fiduciam Roscium abstraxit, ut librum conscriberet quo eloquentiam cum histrionia compararet.*

¹⁰ For C.'s intimacy with Aesopus, see div. 1,80. ad Q.fr. 1,2,14. fam. 7,1,2; for that with Rosc., Quint. 77. div. 1,79. leg. 1,11 etc. Cf. also Macr. Sat. 3,14,11 *ceterum histriones non inter turpes habitos Cicero testimonio est, quem nullus ignorat Roscio et Aesopo histrionibus tam familiariter usum ut res rationesque eorum sua sollertia tueretur...* Lastly, cf. also L-P ad 1,124. Rosc. was of course no stranger to familiarity with statesmen even before his association with C.; his friendship with Sulla is well attested: cf. Macr. Sat. 3,14,13. Plut. Sull. 36. Val. Max. 8,7,7 *principum familiaritates amplexus est*. Cf. also C. GARTON: 'Sulla and the theatre.' *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 148 ff.

¹¹ Cf. Quint. 1,8,11 where he refers to the practice that one may observe in Asinius, Cicero and others, of inserting poetic quotations into one's speeches. In such orators, he says, one may find quotations of Ennius, Accius, Pacuvius, Lucilius, Terentius, Caecilius and others: thus all dramatists except Lucilius. Note, however, that, as M. RADIN: 'Literary references in Cicero's orations.' *CJ* 6 (1911) 193–217 has shown, C. generally exercised restraint in his use of literary quotations in the speeches in order to avoid giving offence by ostentatious displays of learning.

¹² Cf. RADIN (1911); ZILLINGER 50 ff.; 68 ff.; BERTRAND 84.

educated and well-read writer, yet in another way again demonstrates a high level of participation in the theatre. The verses of the dramatic works, often valued for their apophthegmatic value, are in a sense an intellectual currency by means of which one could trade ideas with different levels of a society which, if they had little in common, at any rate shared in the practice of frequenting the theatre.

Cicero's practical involvement with the theatre can thus be demonstrated from at least five different perspectives:

- 1) *as a Roman citizen*: the theatre was part of the religious festivals which the citizens celebrated regularly and frequently throughout the year
- 2) *as a politician and political observer*: the theatre was inextricably linked through its connexion with the aediles to the *cursus honorum*; the theatre was studied as a gauge to popular sentiment on political issues
- 3) *as a well-to-do Roman*: the works of the theatre formed part of the education curriculum
- 4) *as an orator / rhetorician*: the theatre provided models for delivery; the dramatic works provided additional ornamentation and supplementary argumentation and illustrative material for orations
 - 4a) likewise as a writer of non-oratorical works, C. drew quotations to prove or refute a point and as ornamentation from dramatic works
- 5) *as a friend to famous actors*: through his relationships with Roscius and Aesopus C. was inevitably, albeit indirectly, brought into contact with the theatre

All these factors must be borne in mind when we come to consider the positive aspects of Cicero's theoretical assessments of the dramatic genres. Sometimes it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish approbation given to an aspect of a dramatic genre as the result of an purely intellectual and theorizing activity, from approbation arising out of his conditioning as a Roman citizen, as a politician, as a friend to famous actors etc. Nor should such a distinction be necessarily desirable. As an eminently practical man, as a Roman, as one who sought for the most important part of his life to be active in the affairs of the city, it is inevitable that the theoretical formulations and the practical tendencies in him should often have crossed paths and even if at times they are at variance, yet at other times, they will be found to coincide.

6. TRAGEDY

‘...when orators
Touch strong men’s hearts with glory till they weep...’

BLUNT

Overview:

Introduction: exchanges between ancient oratory and tragedy

6.1 the development of the transferred uses of the trag- words among the Greeks

6.2 the uses of the transferred trag- words in Cicero

6.2.1 *transferred trag- words employed to denote emotional displays or (emotion-driven) exaggerations*

- a) Mil. 18
- b) Tusc. 4,73
- c) de orat. 1,219
- d) de orat. 1,228
- e) de orat. 2,205
- f) de orat. 2,225

6.2.2 *transferred trag- words employed to denote solemnity (of style, theme etc.) and elevation of style*

- a) de orat. 2,227
- b) de orat. 3,30
- c) Brut. 43
- d) Brut. 203

6.3 Cicero’s criticism of tragedy

6.4 Cicero’s positive view of tragedy; the purpose of tragic composition

6.4.1 Cicero’s preferences among the tragedians

6.5 Cicero’s depiction of tragedy:

- 6.5.1 predominant themes in tragedy
- 6.5.2 tragic conventions

Introduction

That tragedy and oratory were related in a special way and that one may discern (especially in the Roman period and in late antiquity) in their respective histories a continual interaction and exchange of influences, and a struggle between opposing interests, are common enough themes among the ancient and modern commentators¹. We know the names of not a few men who practised or who were involved with both arts – among the Greeks², Aeschines³, Theodectes⁴, one of the two poets who shared the name

¹ Plat. Gorg. 502 d. For a general discussion of Greek rhetoric and tragedy see V. BERS: ‘Tragedy and rhetoric’ in WORTHINGTON: *Persuasion* 176-95.; cf. also ELSE 565 f. and NORDEN: *Kunstprosa* 883. On Roman tragedy’s fascination with rhetoric, see W. BEARE: *The Roman Stage* 71, 76 ff, 82, 120 f.; & GRATWICK’s article in CHCL II esp. 132 f.; and for the influence of rhetoric on Latin tragic style, see NORDEN 839 ff. 889; JOCELYN (1967) 42.

² Cf. OCD² s.v. ‘tragedy’ on the development of tragedy after the death of Euripides: ‘There may have been experiments in form, such as the *Centaur* of Chaeremon... and Chaeremon and others either wrote to be read, not acted, or at least are regarded by Aristotle as better fitted for reading (*ἀναγνωστικοί*), being characterised by a vivid descriptive style (*γλαφυρά* *λέξις*, as opposed to *ἀγωνιστική*) (Arist. Rh. 3,2 (1413b13)). The fact that several poets of the century were rhetoricians as well as (or more than) poets may be connected with this...’

Astydamas⁵; among the Romans even before Seneca and the age of declamation, we know of C. Titius⁶ and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo⁷. In fifth-century Athens we find the beginning of a certain exchange of vocabulary and stylistic devices between tragedy and rhetoric⁸, an exchange which is marked on each side by a desire to conceal the influences of the other, even if such efforts to accomplish this are unequal to the task. From the point of view of rhetoric the immediate attraction is easily understood, for although it is '[t]rue, [that] the ability to induce affect in spectators was not confined to tragedy: Plato's *Ion* (535b-d) describes the intense fear suffered by audiences of Homeric rhapsodes...', yet 'because tragedy was enacted by actors, not narrated, used a language that was at least *less* alien from everyday speech than epic or choral lyric, and was subject to a popular vote, it must have been seen as a more natural source of rhetorical ploys than epic'.⁹

At Rome the circumstances of the tragic performances were of course different, and the poetry itself was judged from a different perspective, hence the reasons for the relationship between tragedy and oratory could not be entirely the same. The point about tragedy's being enacted by actors, not narrated, is at any rate obviously true even for the Romans¹⁰. In other ways too, the Romans regarded tragedy and oratory as being intimately related. A particularly important testimony in this regard is Quintilian 5,13,42 f. where declaimers are warned not to propose weak counter-arguments that may easily be answered:

ut non sit ille inutilis versus:

'non male respondit, male enim prior ille rogarat'

fallet haec nos in foro consuetudo, ubi adversario, non ipsi nobis respondebimus. aiunt Accium interrogatum, cur causas non ageret, cum apud eum in tragoediis tanta vis esset [optime respondendi], hanc reddidisse rationem, quod illic ea dicerentur quae ipse vellet, in foro dicturi adversarii essent quae minime vellet.

adversario MSS; adversarii (scil nobis respondebunt) RADERMACHER | esset B: esset optime respondi (respondendi) B

A

³ Cf. rep. 4,13. Dem. 18,13. 242 with WANKEL ad loc. Cf. also RE 1,1893, 1051.

⁴ He was a pupil of Isoc.: cf. orat. 172. On his tragedies and victories, cf. the entry on him in the Suda.

⁵ One of the two was also a pupil of Isoc.; both were poets: cf. Suda s.v.

⁶ fl. c. 130 B.C.; cf. Brut. 167 & DOUGLAS ad loc.

⁷ Cf. Brut. 177. Val. Max. 3,7,11 records an anecdote about his rivalry with Accius. He was the aedile of 90 and one of the interlocutors of C.'s de orat. Cf. L-P II 205 f.

⁸ Examples of rhetorical influence on tragedy and of tragic influence on oratory given by BERS 178 ff.

⁹ BERS 189.

¹⁰ C. himself acknowledges the similarity between oratorical *actio* and the *actio* of the tragic stage in numerous passages such as de orat. 1,128 where Crassus recommends the *vox tragoedorum*. Cf. 1,251 where Antonius, in response to the demands that Crassus places upon the orator, denies that special study of *actio* is required of the orator, especially of the kind undertaken by Greek tragic actors *qui et annos compluris sedentes declamitant et cotidie* (L-P ad loc. regard the *et* in *Graecorum more et tragoedorum* as best taken as dittography).

The poet's¹¹ answer betrays not only familiarity with the courts, but implicitly acknowledges *ex silentio* an affinity with, or at any rate, a similarity to, the argument / counter-argument technique of the forensic speech writers and orators. His plays are thus especially indebted to rhetoric in this 'situation of the dramatic character when he [the dramatic character] is actually arguing a case: Medea fighting her verbal duel with Jason, or Hecuba accusing Helen before Menelaus. Now the character is a public speaker; he is in the same position vis-à-vis another character or characters as the orator in an assembly. He has to muster his arguments, prove and disprove, augment or depreciate, with conscious art: διδασκαλία' (ELSE 565 f.)¹². One of Cicero's favourite quotations (de orat. 2,187; cf. also Tusc. 2,47) from the Roman tragedians which illustrates another aspect of their fascination with rhetoric, namely its persuasive power over men (particularly through the manipulation of their emotions) is taken from Pacuvius' Hermione TRF 177 R = ROL II 232 (Quintilian 1,2,18 also cites it):

sed tantam vim habet illa, quae recte a bono poeta dicta est: „flexamina atque omnium regina rerum oratio“ ut non modo inclinantem excipere aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem, ut imperator fortis ac bonus, capere possit¹³.

Thus in these texts we see not only that the Roman tragedians perceived themselves as being concerned with rhetorical persuasion, but also that Roman rhetoric felt reciprocally, as it were, a strong affinity with tragedy.

We shall for the time being postpone a discussion of what the exact nature of this affinity was felt – at any rate by Cicero – to be. The questions which will occupy us now are what was Cicero's conception of tragedy as a literary genre and what the concept of the

¹¹ C. informs us also at Brut. 107 that L. Accius had an interest in oratory.

¹² A. DALE: *Euripides. Alcestis*. Oxford 1954, xxviii speaks in a similar vein: 'The aim of rhetoric is Persuasion, Πειθώ, and the poet is as it were a kind of λογογράφος who promises to do his best for each of his clients in turn as the situations change and succeed one another. This does not by any means exclude an interest in character; the skilful λογογράφος takes that into account in its proper place. But the dominating consideration is: What *points* could be made here?'

¹³ W. & L-P cite Eur. Hec. 816 Πειθῶ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνην as the verse Pac. is alleged to have imitated. ZILLINGER's (77) view that the parallel in Tusc. 2,47 where *ratio* is substituted for *oratio*, is due not to 'ein frostiges Wortspiel ratio – oratio' but to the fact 'daß dem Cicero bei der Stelle Tusc. 2,47 der Vers des Pacuvius nur undeutlich gegenwärtig war' is hardly tenable. We are not justified, merely in order to avoid imputing to C. a weak word play, in assuming that he could not remember accurately a quote so easily remembered, and so favourable to his own prejudices. Tusc. 2,47 is not intended to contain an exact quotation; the verse was used (without acknowledgement), but the sentiment altered so as to suit the requirements of the work in hand. A.E. DOUGLAS: 'Form and content in the *Tusculan Disputations*.' in J.G.F. POWELL (ed.): *Cicero the Philosopher*. Oxford 1995, 207 calls the change 'a neat play on the favourite Latin use of *ratio* / *oratio* to represent two aspects of the Greek *logos*'. For this attempt to express different sides of *logos*, DOUGLAS could have cited inv. 1,2 where C. has *rationem atque orationem*. MALCOVATI 131 is more cautious about making the Tusc. passage a direct allusion to the Pacuvian verse. On the context of the Euripidean passage and its significance in literary history, see BERS 182.

'tragic' denoted for him. Since Cicero does not in any passage specifically discuss tragedy as a literary genre, it will be expedient to deal with the second question first. One way of approaching this is to examine the ways in which Cicero uses the trag- words, especially in their transferred senses, for it is in these latter uses that, by virtue of the fact that direct reference to tragedy is lacking, the conception of the tragic may readily be apprehended¹⁴. The limits to this approach, on the other hand, are fairly obvious: since Cicero is himself in time far removed from the original developments away from the literary senses of the trag- words, a doubt must always remain in the handling of a given Ciceronian transferred usage of a trag- word to what extent (if indeed at all) Cicero is conscious of the transference. For even if Cicero uses a trag- word in a transferred sense, he may be using it in a merely proverbial or colloquial way, with little or no consciousness of the transference, and then the transference cannot be trusted greatly to tell us much about Cicero's notion of the tragic in that instance. Caution must therefore be exercised here so as not to overstate the implications of the evidence. Nevertheless, provided that one remains sensitive to the danger just mentioned, there is no reason why one may not in proceeding along these lines learn something about Cicero's views on tragedy and the tragic.

6.1 the development of the transferred uses of the trag- words among the Greeks

Before discussing Cicero's use of the trag- words, it will be expedient to examine briefly the historical background and the tradition of these transferred senses among the Greeks themselves, among whom the original transferences arose.

Despite that reciprocal interest in each other's art that we have just noticed to have developed between the orator and the tragedian, the first transferred uses of the trag- words, *τραγικός*, *τραγωδικός*, *τραγωδεῖν* etc.¹⁵ originate not among the orators or, for that matter, the rhetoricians¹⁶, but among the comic poets and the philosophers Plato and

¹⁴ This is basically the same principle that J. DALFEN adopts in his important article 'Übertragener Gebrauch von ΤΡΑΓΙΚΟΣ und ΤΡΑΓΩΔΕΙΝ bei Platon und anderen Autoren des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts' *Philologus* 116 (1972) 76-92, esp. 78, in discussing the concept of the 'tragic' among 4th- and 5th- century writers.

¹⁵ For the investigation of this subject the following works are of particular interest: J. DALFEN's important article; also to the first chap. of LESKY's *Die griechische Tragödie*. Stuttgart 1964 (3. Aufl.); H. ZILLIACUS 'ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΑ und ΔΡΑΜΑ in metaphorischer Bedeutung.' *Arctos* 2 (1958) 217-20 and R. S. BLUCK: 'On ΤΡΑΓΙΚΗ: Plato, *Meno* 76e.' *Mnemosyne* 14 (1961) 289-95 and also the commentary of the same on Pl. *Men.* 76e3.

¹⁶ In fact there is little evidence that, with the exception of Gorgias, any of the early rhetoricians were interested in tragedy; rather, Homer was viewed as a more important model and source of oratorical inspiration: cf. the first four chapters of RADERMACHER AS and below, on the association between Homeric epic and tragedy. With regard to Gorgias, it may be observed that not only was the style of his new artistic

Aristotle. Indeed, the first formulations of tragic style (the earliest occurrence of the word *πάθος*, so essential to criticism and theory of the ancient critics writing on tragedy and the grand style to which it came to be inextricably linked, does not precede the great tragedians¹⁷) also belong to traditions that were hostile to tragedy¹⁸. This circumstance was to have lasting and far-reaching impact on the development of tragic theory and criticism.

Excluding the philosophers for the time being, we find that the main uses of the trag- words among other Greek writers, especially the comic poets, are largely stylistic. Just as it does not surprise us to find the early Greek comedy occupying itself with the task of [τὸ] *κωμωδεῖν τοὺς τραγωδοὺς* (Arist. poet. 1458b31 ff.)¹⁹ especially with regard to the tragic poets' perversely abnormal language, so it is entirely consistent with this fact that the development of the transferred senses of the trag- words among the comic poets should be centred around stylistic elements. Aristophanes, reflecting similar uses – as one might suppose – among other comic poets, is our most important witness here. In his plays the trag- words are used in such a way that the direct, intellectual connexion with tragedy is beginning to be relaxed²⁰. We find in Aristophanes, for example, the first attested instances of the trag- words used to indicate 'pomp'²¹, 'elevation of style', 'magnificence' (of style)²². This nuance which among later writers is often used in a derogatory or jocular way²³, is first hinted at in the ranae 1004 f²⁴. In these two verses, Dionysus attributes to Aeschylus the honour of being the first of the Greeks to surpass the tragic 'bosh' (*τραγικὸν λῆρος*) of his predecessors with heaped-up, 'towering', solemn, and ornamented words: *ἀλλ' ὦ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνὰ / καὶ κοσμήσας τραγικὸν λῆρος...*²⁵ One may also

prose directly influenced by the tragedians, but 'he seems to have had a quite new and personal interest in the tragic drama' (PFEIFFER 46).

¹⁷ Cf. T. GOULD: *The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy*. Princeton 1991, ix. For the linking of *πάθος* with *τραγωδεῖν*, cf. Men. Asp. 329 & [Longin.] de subl. 15,3.

¹⁸ With regard to comedy, at any rate, it is surely no matter for surprise given the competitive nature of the Greeks and of their drama, that the trag- words should come to be used by the comic poets to lampoon the dramatists of the more prestigious genre, to complain enviously about the easier task of writing tragedies (cf. KOCK's remark ad Crates 28 K-A), and to make one of their chief activities the [τὸ] *κωμωδεῖν τοὺς τραγωδοὺς* (Arist. poet. 1458b31 ff.).

¹⁹ It is disputed whether the Arphrades mentioned here was a comic poet, and the same one mentioned by Aristoph. eq. 1281. vesp. 1280; and also whether *τραγωδοὺς* here can mean 'tragic poets'. Cf. LUCAS ad loc.

²⁰ So DALFEN 78.

²¹ Cf. Plat. rep. 577b *τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς* (of the tyrant's external pomp: cf. 577a *μὴ καδάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὀρῶν ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως*); Polyb. 5,26,9 *τῆς εἰσόδου τραγικῆς*. Plut. 2,330a *τὰ...ἔξαλλα καὶ τραγικὰ τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ κόσμου*. Luc. gall. 24 *ἡ ἄλλη τῆς ἀρχῆς τραγωδία πᾶσα ἐς ὑπερβολὴν ἐξωγκωμένη*. imag. 21.

²² Such a conception of the tragic underlies [Longin.] de sublim. 3,1 *ἐν τραγωδίᾳ, πράγματι ὀγκηρῶ φύσει καὶ ἐπιδεχομένῳ στόμφον...*

²³ Cf. Dem. 18,242 *αὐτοτραγικὸς πῖσηκος*: the Schol. explains the apparently proverbial expression *τραγικὸς πῖσηκος* thus: *τάττεται τῶν παρ' Ἀξίαν σεμνυνομένων* p. 82,34–35 SAUPPE (cf. Hsch. s.v.); for overly pompous style, cf. Luc. hist. conscr. 16

²⁴ Cf. DALFEN 79.

²⁵ The author of the life of Aeschylus cites these verses in support of his claim that Aeschylus in numerous respects, but especially in respect of the *τὴν...τοῦ χοροῦ σεμνότητα*, surpassed those who preceded him. Cf. QUADLBAUER (1958) 59: 'Der Chor preist Aischylos als den ersten, der ῥήματα σεμνὰ "auftürmte" und den

compare the earlier verses 833 f. where Euripides ridicules the solemn airs that Aeschylus puts on (*ἀποσεμνυνεῖται*²⁶).

Aristophanes is also the first witness of another nuance of the trag- words which is less concerned with style than with content. This occurs when a trag- word is used to indicate the pitiable or wretched quality of some event or circumstance which, being capable of exciting pity in observers, is comparable to, or might even become, the subject matter of a tragedy (cf. the pax 146–48)²⁷. DALFEN 79 detects a second nuance in the *ἐτρατεύετο* of ranae 834 which is used in connexion with *τραγωδία* (but note that the two testimonies cited in 79 n. 9 are obviously much later than Aristophanes). According to this interpretation, Aristophanes' Euripides attributes to Aeschylean tragedy elements which are monstrous, fantastic, out-of-the ordinary, improbable.

Nevertheless, as we have already hinted, in all of the instances in Aristophanes where the trag- words are used, some connexion with tragedy, however tenuous, may still be detected²⁸. In Plato, the direct connexion is loosened still further. However, determining all the nuances bestowed by Plato on the trag- words is a less straightforward matter owing to the controversial interpretation of several significant passages containing these words. It will suffice here to notice only some of the various attempts to interpret Plato's metaphorical uses of the trag- words.

In the rep. there occur several instances of transferred trag- words. At 413a–b, when Socrates fails to make himself understood while speaking metaphorically, he concedes that he was speaking 'tragically', *τραγικῶς λέγειν*. The only satisfactory interpretation of this passage is that by *τραγικῶς λέγειν* Socrates means speech in a high-flown or grandiose style. Attempts to derive from the Platonic trag- words the senses 'ainigmatodes', 'ambiguous' (WILAMOWITZ: *Platon*. Berlin 1930, II 146); 'obscure', 'mental befuddlement', always with 'the suspicion of downright deceit' (ROSENMEYER *AJPh* 76 (1955) 226 f.); or 'mythical' (GRIMAL *REG* 55 (1942) 1–13²⁹), or 'ein Hindernis der Wahrheitsfindung'

tragischen λόγος "ausschmückte": typische Merkmale des Erhabene: das Feierliche, das Gehobene und der Schmuck.'

²⁶ Aristotle uses this word to describe tragedy's development away from satyr plays, from slight plots and ridiculous language (1449a20). According to DALFEN 79, there is another sneer in ran. 834, namely in the verb *ἐτρατεύετο*: this is supposed to mean that Euripides accuses Aeschylus of filling his tragedies with the strange, the monstrous, the fantastic, the out-of-the ordinary, the improbable.

²⁷ Yet another nuance is attested in Acham. 9 ff., where *τραγωδικόν* is used to describe a violent pain and grief, a 'shaking of the heart' cf. DALFEN 78; ZILLIACUS 218 associates this less satisfactorily with 'tragischer Darstellungsart'. Note that even here, the 'tragoedic' pain that Dikaiopolis suffers is still connected with tragedy: it arises as he impatiently awaits the performance of Aeschylus' works.

²⁸ So rightly DALFEN 78; cf. also ZILLIACUS 218.

²⁹ Both ROSENMEYER and GRIMAL were principally concerned with interpreting the passage Meno 76 e in which the definition of colour by Socrates is said to be *τραγική*. GRIMAL's interpretation is rather complicated. He argues that the definition was held to be tragic because like a tragedy (which is 'un mythe mis en action') it was mythical. The definition was mythical because it was mechanistic, referring solely to the *monde visible et tangible*, and failing to express 'les rapports intellectuels éternels qui unissent réellement deux

(DALFEN 81) have been convincingly refuted by BLUCK in his commentary on Meno 76 e and in his article 'On ΤΡΑΓΙΚΗ: Plato, Meno 76 e.' *Mnemosyne* 14 (1961) 289–95. As BLUCK 293 points out, at rep. 545e not only is τραγικῶς associated with ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν and with the invocation of the Muses, but also later in 547a, it is conceded that what the Muses say is correct (ὀρθῶς). Hence the other interpretations which would have τραγικῶς involved with 'ambiguity', or 'mental befuddlement' or 'downright deceit', or any other aberration from the truth obviously do not fit with this latter passage. 'It looks as though,' writes BLUCK 294, 'τραγικῶς must mean simply "in their grandiose way" – implying, probably, a certain amount of *difficulty*, but no uncertainty or muddleheadedness, and certainly no "suspicion of downright deceit"³⁰. In this way are answered attempts by scholars such as GRIMAL, ROSENMEYER and DALFEN³¹ to locate the meanings of the Platonic transferred trag- words in the Platonic epistemology or in the Platonic treatment of other philosophical theories.

'High-flown' or grandiose style seems to be the point of τραγωδεῖν in Cratylus 414c when Socrates in discussing the etymology of words with Hermogenes says that the original forms of words have been buried ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγωδεῖν αὐτά – note that with this process is associated εὐστομία and καλλωπισμός. AST citing this passage renders τραγωδεῖν thus: *grandius aliquid reddo*; LSJ s.v. τραγωδέω II 2 also citing this passage, renders it as 'dress up words'. Surely neither is anything more meant by τετραγωδημένον in the later passage 418cd³²: here τραγωδεῖν is connected with the desire to attain μεγαλοπρεπέστερα (418c)³³. Plato's use of the transferred trag- words may thus be viewed as an organic development of the nuances already found in Aristophanes: that is to say, they serve chiefly as stylistic terms, although there is also often an implication of 'elevated' or difficult subject matter such as in the definition of colour in Meno 76e.

Stylistically, of course, the definition of colour in this last passage has nothing in it that is particularly reminiscent of the 'archaic diction of the poetical drama', although, as has

concepts'. DALFEN 83 n. 16 and throughout his treatment of Platonic trag- words is very noticeably indebted to GRIMAL's ideas.

³⁰ The statement that the Muses speak correctly, and that they must needs speak correctly inasmuch as they are Muses 547a is overlooked by DALFEN 82: 'Worin das "Tragische" besteht, ist hier ausdrücklich gesagt: hohe Worte, wie im Ernst gesprochen, aber doch scherzhaft, also nicht ernst zu nehmen. Gesprochen werden sie aber zu Kindern... die ...nicht bis ins Innere hindurchsehen...'

³¹ Cf. DALFEN 90: '„Tragik“ und „tragisch“ hat bei ihm etwas mit der Erkenntnis zu tun, und zwar als ihr Gegenpol. Das „Tragische“ in der äußeren Erscheinung... oder im Wort und in der Rede verstellt den Blick auf Wesenerkenntnis einer Sache und verdunkelt den Sinn des Gesagten.'

³² DALFEN 84 f. sees in τραγωδεῖν more than is warranted by the texts: for him, τρ. is a conscious effort to prevent the true nature of thing being seen: 'Das Ergebnis ist dann auch, daß die aus solchen Motiven in „tragischer“ Weise verformten und gesprochenen Wörter nicht mehr zur Erkenntnis der Dinge beitragen können, die sie bezeichnen.'

³³ The interpretation of περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον in 408c is problematic. For two different approaches, see DALFEN 87 & BLUCK (1961a) 294.

been shown by others, it may be regarded as 'poetic' in several respects³⁴. However, the crucial stylistic points are in fact more general: these include the facts that the definition employs unusual features and is fashioned in an elevated style. With Aristotle the association between the trag- words and poetry in general is strengthened; at the same time the association between the tragic and the solemn or the elevated is continued. We see both these tendencies in the passage rhet. 1406b6 ff. where Aristotle censures inappropriate metaphors in prose. He says there that these metaphors are inappropriate, ἀπρεπεῖς, because they are σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν. Thereupon he elaborates on this point by citing the metaphors of Gorgias as being ἀσαφεῖς inasmuch as they are drawn too far afield (πύρρωθεν). Aristotle concludes by stating what exactly is wrong with such metaphors: they are too poetic: ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. Thus in this context, 'tragic' and 'poetic' appear to be used almost interchangeably. Solemnity and the tragic are also found linked together in meteor. 353b1 ff.³⁵ The fabulous theorizing of the ancients (who occupied themselves with θεολογίαι) regarding the sources of the sea is attributed to a desire to sound more impressive: τραγικώτερον καὶ σεμνότερον³⁶. Hence, although Aristotle when using the trag- words in transferred senses applies them to those who are guilty of a certain excess, a certain indecorum, strictly speaking he does not use them as terms of invective, for what is 'tragic', though it be inappropriate in a prose or scientific context, may be appropriate elsewhere.

The invective application of the transferred trag- words is more fully developed by the orators, especially those of the fourth century³⁷ and other post-Aristotelian writers; at the same time, the connexion with tragedy is further relaxed. A typical usage of the transferred trag- words in this category is when these words are used to disparage excessively pathetic demonstrations or speeches. This leads naturally to the development whereby the 'tragic' is associated with acting or speaking emotionally out of proportion to circumstances, hence

³⁴ DALFEN 83 notices the following unusual features about the definition: 1) unusual diction: χροῖα instead of the more usual χρώμα; 2) likewise is ἀπορροή extremely rare in Attic prose; 3) 'Zwei seltene Wörter folgen also auf einen betonten Einsatz, der durch das an die Spitze gestellte orthotonierte ἔστιν und das nachdrückliche γὰρ gebildet wird. Cf. BLUCK (1961a) 295 n.1.

³⁵ So rightly MORAITOU 43 n. 260.

³⁶ DALFEN is mistaken in claiming that Arist. uses τραγικός to describe a false doctrine, and that therefore Arist.'s concept of the tragic here relates to the 'theological' or the 'mythical' ('Sie entspringt „theologischem“, d.h. mythischem Denken und gehört somit einer überwundenen Denkform an.'). Surely τραγ. here is used to characterise the lofty ideals and aims of the ancients viewed from their *own* perspective (ὑπέλαβον). It would be absurd to suppose that Arist. is attributing to the ancients the aim of presenting *falsehoods*. Rather, he is saying that they wished to sound more grandiose, more impressive. Hence DALFEN's interpretation of the Aristotelian τραγικός in this instance as derogatory (cf. his claim 92 n. 20: 'Keiner der zitierten Autoren verbindet mit τραγικός, τραγωδεῖν einen positiven Sinn...') is incorrect. Nor is τραγωδεῖσθαι in Arist. ph. 239b25 used in a derogatory sense: cf. LSJ s.v. τραγωδέω 3: 'metaph., *make famous or well known*'; again, it has nothing to do with a criticism of a false theory as DALFEN 91f. seems to imply.

³⁷ As WANKEL ad Demosth. 18,13 complains, DALFEN's article on the transferred use of τραγικός and τραγωδεῖν among 5th and 4th C authors but for a single footnote (n. 20) ignores the orators!

with exaggeration. The trag- words are especially used with these nuances when describing exaggerations of accusations, crimes, deaths and horrors³⁸. Such nuances appear to underlie Demosthenes' use of τραγωδεῖν at 18,13³⁹, although even here, as elsewhere in this speech (cf. also 19,189), an allusion to tragedy, or rather to the former acting profession of his adversary, Aeschines, cannot be ruled out altogether⁴⁰. In any event, WANKEL cites other texts to show that this invective use of the transferred trag- words had become naturalised by the fourth century⁴¹.

We have already noticed a tendency to use the trag- words synonymously with those denoting 'poetic', 'poetically' and so forth. The development was already incipient with Plato in the controversial description of the definition of colour as 'tragic'; and with Aristotle the 'tragic' and 'poetic' are used virtually interchangeably in his discussion at rhet. 3,3 of inappropriate metaphors. Another, similar development occurred whereby the language and style of Homeric epic are described as 'tragic'. Plato of course had called Homer the first teacher and leader of the tragic poets (rep. 595b–c. 598d. 607a)⁴², and Aristotle in chps. 3–5 of the poetics had similarly treated Homer as the predecessor of the tragedians in many respects. With both these authors the prevailing idea here is that the mimetic qualities of epic rendered it assimilable to tragedy⁴³, although Aristotle adds the further point that the *mimesis* of epic and that of tragedy are similar inasmuch as each is concerned with serious characters and subject matter⁴⁴. Later, when rhetoricians and others took over from Plato this idea of Homer as the forerunner of the tragedians and when they

³⁸ So rightly LSJ s.v. τραγωδία II 2 'hence of descriptions of horrors...'

³⁹ So rightly DALFEN 92 n. 20; also WANKEL ad loc. LSJ s.v. τραγωδέω II citing this passage render simply as to 'tell in tragic style, declaim', but the contexts of this passage and 19,189 strongly suggest that this 'tragic style' involves exaggeration; later LSJ acknowledge for τραγωδεῖν the sense 'to exaggerate' (cf. also s.v. τραγωδία II 2 'an exaggerated speech') but can only cite for this the late text of Gal. de usu partium 16,4 τραγωδεῖν ἂν δόξειε μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθεύειν 'would seem to be romancing'. For another example of τραγωδεῖν used in the sense 'to exaggerate', 'to magnify' esp. of horrors, cf. Polyb. 6,56,8 (cf. 6,56,11 τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγωδίᾳ). Diod. Sic. 19,8 (ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν περιαιρετέον ἐστὶ τὴν ἐπίθετον καὶ συνήθη τοῖς συγγραφεύσι τραγωδίαν) and ZILLIACUS 218.

⁴⁰ Cf. WANKEL ad 18,13: 'Das Scholion zu unserer Stelle (p. 269,26–28 Dd.) läßt offen, ob D. die Metapher wegen der pathetischen Übertreibung gebraucht oder mit Anspielung auf den ehemaligen Schauspieler.' Cf. his comments ad 18,313. ZILLIACUS 218 states that Plato uses τραγωδεῖν in the sense "übertreiben", "vergrössern", but does not substantiate this controversial claim.

⁴¹ Cf. e.g. Hyp. 2,12 ἵνα...ἐξ[ῆ] σοι τραγ[ω]δίας γε[γράφαι] εἰς τὴν εἰσαγγελ[ίαν] οἴασ[θε] περὶ νῦν γέγρα[φ]ας (the restorations are widely accepted) & 3,26 εἰς δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γεγεννημένου ἔωμεν, τὰς τραγωδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγωρίας ἀφηρηκότες ἐσόμεθα; Men. Sic. 262 & Asp. 329 (in this last passage δεῖ τραγωδῆσαι πάθος might arguably be understood as a jocular reference to the tragic stage). Cf. also Men. fr. 740 KOERTE.

⁴² Cf. Theaet. 152d where Homer is referred to as the leading composer of tragedy.

⁴³ Cf. A. LESKY: *Die griechische Tragödie*. Stuttgart 1964 (3. Aufl.), 14: 'Wenn antike Kritiker Homer den Vater der Tragödie nannten oder seine Dichtung einfach dieser zurechneten, so haben sie vornehmlich an die mimetischen Elemente des Epos, den Dialog vor allem anderen gedacht. Aber wie wir sahen, hat es noch tieferen Sinn, wenn auf dem Relief der Apotheose Homers auch Tragodia [sic] huldigend vor dem Dichter der Ilias steht.'

⁴⁴ Arist. poet. 1448a25 ὥστε ... μὲν ὁ αὐτός ἂν εἴη μιμητῆς Ὀμήρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μιμοῦνται γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους. Cf. also 1448b34 τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὀμηρος ἦν... ; & 1449b9 f. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μετὰ μέτρου λόγῳ μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἡκολούθησεν.

spoke of Homeric epic as 'tragic', the mimetic aspect does not appear to have been a major consideration, but rather it is played down or overlooked altogether, and the tragic quality becomes vaguer, harder to define⁴⁵. In the case of some authors, it seems now to be a rhetorical virtue, a 'poetic' or 'elevated' style which at the same time preserves decorum, eschewing excess and amplifying where necessity arises⁴⁶. An example of this type of rhetorical development is Hermogenes de meth. pp. 450–1 RABE where the author discusses the subject *περὶ τοῦ τραγικῶς λέγειν*. According to this remarkable passage in Hermogenes, if one wants to learn *τὸ τραγικῶς λέγειν*, one ought to study Homer, for he taught this very thing and because he himself was *τραγωδὸς καὶ πατὴρ τραγωδίας*. Thus *τὸ τραγικῶς λέγειν* is here not even associated with the works of the tragic dramatists!

In summarising this section on the development of the transferred uses of the trag- words among the Greeks, the following observations may be made. In the first place, it will be noticed that the earliest transferred uses of the trag- words occurred largely for the purposes of stylistic description. Furthermore, I disagree with DALFEN 92 n. 20 who holds that a positive sense is, as a rule, not attached to the the transferred uses of *τραγικός*, *τραγωδεῖν*. It is true that Aristophanes pillories the tragic poets and their respective tragic styles, but we do not yet detect in his transferred use of the trag- words the invective element that later writers add to it. Again, it is true that many, if not most, of the instances of the transferred trag- words in Plato and Aristotle occur in situations where another position is being criticised; but with these philosophers the tragic element is, if criticised at all, criticised not *per se*, but on the contrary, merely as being out of place, inappropriate, obfuscating, excessive. The truly invective use of the metaphorical trag- words developed elsewhere – apparently at first with the orators such as Hyperides and Demosthenes. Lastly, it may be added in passing that nowhere in Classical or Hellenistic literature are the trag- words used in the way modern languages use 'tragic' and 'tragedy' to denote without reference to tragedy a sad, pitiable or unfortunate situation. How and when this development occurred has been discussed by ZILLIACUS⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ Cf. Aeschin. ep. 10,9; possibly also Alexis fr. 245 MEINEKE (?) = Athen. 4,164 c; Schol. in Hom. Il. 1; cf. also Diog. Laert. 4,20. 26.

⁴⁶ The idea of Homer as the inventor of all rhetorical virtues is also taken over by Quint. 10,1,46 (cf. RADERMACHER AS 9–10). Quint. calls our attention to Homer's handling of big and little things (*hunc nemo in magnis rebus sublimitate, in parvis proprietate superaverit*), a theme similarly pursued by Hermog. p. 450 RABE (*τὰ μεγάλα τῇ βραχύτητι τῆς ἐρμηνείας φυλάττει μέγιστα, τῆς συντομίας τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῖς διασφραδίζει, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα τῇ περιβολῇ τῶν λόγων μέγεθος προσλαμβάνει*). It is in this judicious handling of big and little things that Hermog. sees the essential quality of *τὸ τραγικῶς λέγειν*.

⁴⁷ The earliest occurrence of this usage appears to be found in a fragmentary letter from the Byzantine era (6th C.) WESELY Wien. Stud. 12 (1890) 2, p. 93 = SB 5314, ll. 14 ff.; cf. ZILLIACUS 217.

6.2 the uses of the transferred trag- words in Cicero

Instances in Cicero of transferred *tragicus*, *tragice* and *tragoedia* can be divided broadly into two classes: 1) *transferred trag- words employed to denote emotional displays or (emotion-driven) exaggerations* and 2) *transferred trag- words employed to denote solemnity (of style, subject matter etc.) and elevation of style*. One should not, however, insist on this division too strictly, for it is difficult with some of these instances to determine into which of these two classes they fall and in such cases it may well be that the nuances of both classes are operative. The following classification of Ciceronian passages is the one which seems most natural to me. A passage marked with the following sign [*] probably also belongs to the other class under which it is not here included. I have for reasons of expediency reversed the order in which the two corresponding classes of nuances developed among the Greeks.

6.2.1 *transferred trag- words employed to denote emotional displays or (emotion-driven) exaggerations:*

This class basically corresponds to the type of which we saw some examples in Demosthenes, Hyperides, Polybius and others. Under its positive aspect, this class denotes mastery of oratorical pathos and hence persuasive power. Under its negative aspect, it suggests not only excessive emotional exhibitions deemed to be out of proportion to the circumstances or subject matter, but also exaggerations. This two-sidedness was correctly identified by L-P ad 2,205: 'An sich braucht tragoediae nicht eine negative Bewertung zu enthalten...nur in nugis (cf. 1,86) sind sie lächerlich'.

a) Mil. 18:

Cicero thus derides the sympathy-seeking and excessively emotional displays with which the prosecution and supporters of Clodius invoke the name of the road given to it by its builder, Clodius' ancestor:

nunc eiusdem Appiae nomen quantas tragoedias excitat!⁴⁸

⁴⁸ OLD s.v. (a) strangely includes this passage among those bearing the literal meaning. Yet, even without consideration of the context, the plural number as well as the form of expression (*tragoedias excitare*) clearly point to a transferred signification. For *tragicus* (q.v.) no transferred meaning is recognised!

b) Tusc. 4,73*

A young man in a comedy by Turpilius afflicted with the love-passion is described as indulging in a tragic exhibition of emotion:

hic insanus videtur etiam suis. at quas tragoedias efficit!

The excerpt from his soliloquy which follows with its invocation of the sea-god and the deified winds indicates that *tragoediae* is here probably also used in the second way, indicating solemnity of style. (Cf. the comments on the rhetorical association between solemnity and divinity in Hermogenes to be discussed in the section on *haec tragica atque divina*.)

‘Te, Apollo sancte, fer opem, teque amnipotens⁴⁹

Neptune, invoco

Vosque adeo, Ventili!’

c) de orat. 1,219

neque vero istis tragoediis tuis, quibus uti philosophi maxime solent, Crasse, perturbor, quod ita dixisti, neminem posse eorum mentes qui audirent aut inflammare dicendo aut inflammatas restinguere, cum eo maxime vis oratoris magnitudoque cernatur, nisi qui rerum omnium naturam, mores hominum atque rationes penitus perspexerit, in quo philosophia sit oratori necessario percipienda

In this passage, the practical, anti-intellectual Antonius rejects the wide claims placed on the orator by Crassus with regard to the acquisition of psychological and philosophical learning. As L-P rightly comment, the *quod*-clause explains *istis tragoediis*. Hence *tragoediae* are here ‘pathetische Behauptungen, Großrednerei’: the emphasis is on the making of grandiose statements, on the making of too much out of little or nothing at all. The remark that *tragoediae* of this type are commonly found in the philosophers’ discourses harks back to Antonius’ account of Charmadas’ debate with Menedemus (1,85 ff.) in which the former insisted on the necessity of philosophy in the orator’s education.

⁴⁹ *amnipotens* is the emendation of WÖLFFLIN ap. RIBBECK, accepted by POHLENZ in his ed., as against the more commonly accepted *omnipotens*.

The following passages attach either a neutral or a positive connotation to the transferred trag- word. As has already been indicated, the trag- words under this head denote for Cicero effective and persuasive use of pathos in oratory.

d) de orat. 1,228

In this passage, Antonius continues his rejection of Crassus' definition of the orator as one who must acquire philosophical knowledge of ethics and psychology (see above on de orat. 1,219). At 1,225 he proceeds to furnish examples to substantiate his claim that such knowledge is not only unnecessary for an orator, but even at odds with his task as a persuader of men. Hence it is implied that oratory is unphilosophical because it appeals to the emotions and sometimes even resorts to sensationalist means to arouse these. The first example (1,225 f.) is taken from a speech of Crassus himself. The second, (1,227 f.) describes how P. Rutilius Rufus, a devotee of the Stoic philosophy, criticised not only Crassus but also the performance of Servius Sulpicius Galba. The latter was, according to Cicero (Brut. 82), the first Roman orator to put into practice some of the most important tasks peculiar to the orator, especially those concerned with arousing the emotions⁵⁰. According to our passage, Galba had, when he was being prosecuted, employed in his own defence several manifestly emotion-arousing devices: he had introduced and lifted up in his arms his juvenile ward, the memory of whose illustrious father was intended to elicit tears from the people; and he ceremoniously committed his own two sons to the guardianship of the state⁵¹. By these means, Rutilius contended, Galba procured his acquittal:

reprehendebat igitur Galbam Rutilius, quod is C. Sulpici Gali propinqui sui Q. pupillum filium ipse paene in umeros suos extulisset, qui patris clarissimi recordatione et memoria fletum populo moveret, et duos filios suos parvos tutelae populi commendasset ac se tamquam in procinctu testamentum faceret sine libra atque tabulis, populum R(omanum) tutorem instituere dixisset illorum orbitati. itaque, cum et invidia et odio populi tum Galba premeretur, *hisce eum tragoediis liberatum ferebat*, quod item apud Catonem scriptum esse video: nisi pueris et lacrimis usus esset, poenas eum daturum fuisse. haec Rutilius

⁵⁰ *nimirum is princeps ex Latinis illa oratorum propria et quasi legitima delectaret animos aut permoveret, ut auget rem, ut miserationibus, ut communibus locis uteretur.* I do not understand how L-P ad 1,40 can refer this description of Galba in the Brut. to 'leidenschaftliche[r] actio'. For the use of *miseratio* in connexion with the pathetic style, cf. orat. 130 f. & QUADLBAUER 90.

⁵¹ Both devices were common in ancient oratorical practice, and even recommended by rhetorical theorists. For the practice of introducing children into the court, cf. Quint. 6,1,24. 30. 41. 47 (he deals with the subject specifically in connexion with moving the audience to tears: *faciendo quaedam lacrimas movemus, unde et producere... et liberos...*) cf. also Aristoph. vesp. 568 ff. 976 ff.; of commending children to the audience, cf. C. inv. 1,106. 109 (*conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans... undecimus [sc. locus misericordiae], per quem liberorum ... commendatio fit*). Cato's comment (de orat. 1,228) on Galba's performance also indicates its heavy reliance on emotional means: *nisi pueris et lacrimis usus esset, poenas eum daturum fuisse.*

valde vituperabat et huic humilitati dicebat vel exilium fuisse vel mortem anteponendam.

Note that *tragoediae* refers not just to the *actio* (hence WILKINS's 'histrionics' is imprecise: see below), but also, and in fact primarily, to the emotionalism of Galba's appeals. Thus it is questionable whether this use of *tragoediae* is entirely pejorative. Antonius is trying to show that the means and ends of philosophy and oratory are different and accordingly whatever one may think of the *humilitas*⁵² of Galba's *tragoediae* is largely irrelevant: the fact remains that by their means Galba was successful in achieving the desired end, that is, persuasion. From this consideration, it becomes apparent that it cannot have been Antonius' primary intention to ridicule Galba's *tragoediae*. WILKINS's 'histrionics' is perhaps a little too derogatory; and besides, it misses the main point of the extreme emotionalism of the *tragoediae*; in fact, it would be exceedingly difficult to find in English a concise rendering that would adequately cover the various nuances implied by the Latin.

e) de orat. 2,205

In this passage, although Antonius is still the speaker, it is Cicero's views that are represented⁵³. The discussion concerns the discretion and restraint to be applied in the use of emotional oratory.

equidem primum considerare soleo, postuletne causa; nam neque parvis in rebus adhibendae sunt hae dicendi faces neque ita animatis hominibus, ut nihil ad eorum mentis oratione flectendas proficere possimus, ne aut inrisione aut odio digni putemur, si aut tragoedias agamus in nugis...

The passage implies that a negative connotation need not necessarily be attached to *tragoediae*, as L-P ad loc. correctly interpreted it (quoted above). Only *in nugis* are *tragoediae* laughable. We may infer that there are, therefore, *tragoediae* which are not laughable, but impressive and effective *dicendi faces*. Where *tragoediae* are permissible or even advisable, the

⁵² Cf. Rutilius' reproach de orat. 1,228: R. *valde vituperabat et huic humilitati dicebat vel exilium vel mortem anteponendam...*

⁵³ Crassus' and Antonius' respective views are basically the same with regard to the irrational means of persuasion, especially pathos; the main difference lies in Crassus' insistence that the powerful effects on the minds of the audience of pathos and wit lend support to his thesis that an orator should possess philosophical and psychological knowledge (1,53. 60. 165), as against Antonius' claim that such mastery of the irrational means depends on general, practical knowledge of men, not on theoretical knowledge (1,219–24). Moreover, as our passage 2,205 belongs to a section (204–211) in which Antonius gives systematic rules for the application of pathos in practical oratory (e.g. consideration of the exigencies of the case: *postuletne causa* cf. 2,17 *tempus quid postulet*) – based on practical experience –, we have further reason to accept what he says here as representing C.'s views on pathos. For Antonius' practical and concrete perspective in the de orat. often represents the complement, not merely the foil, to Crassus' theoretical and idealistic perspective. Cf. L-P II 235.

effect is comparable to *ψυχαγωγεῖν*: cf *mentis...flectendas* (2,205) & *animi hominum moverentur* (2,204).

f) de orat. 2,225*

In this passage it is described how Crassus by the use of the effective combination of 'Witz und Pathos' (L-P III 210 f.) soundly defeated Brutus:

quis est igitur qui non fateatur hoc lepore atque his facetiis non minus refutatum esse Brutum quam illis tragoediis, quas egit idem, cum casu in eadem causa funere efferretur anus Iunia. Pro di immortales, quae fuit illa, quanta vis! quam inexpectata! quam repentina! cum coniectis oculis, gestu omni [ei] imminenti, summa gravitate et celeritate verborum...

efferretur ELL., L-P, ed pl.; cum funere ferretur L; ferretur M; funere efferretur PEARCE, KUM.; gestu omni imminenti L, L-P; gestu omni ei imminenti PID., W., KUM.

The emotionalism described by *tragoediis* seems to be associated equally with style (*vis* [= *vis dicendi*, so rightly L-P], *summa gravitate* and possibly also *celeritate verborum*⁵⁴) and delivery (*cum coniectis oculis, gestu omni imminenti, celeritate verborum*)⁵⁵. L-P ad loc. (on *tragoediis*) associate the *tragoediis* of this passage more with style (= Class II below) and more specifically with the *genus grande*. On the other hand, the fact that the pathos and dramatic impact of Crassus' delivery are hinted at as being heightened by the funeral procession of Brutus' kinswoman which was passing by the Forum while Crassus was yet speaking, seems to indicate a greater emphasis on the external aspects (= *actio*) of the *tragoediis*.

6.2.2 transferred trag- words employed to denote solemnity (of style, subject matter etc.) and elevation of style

The class corresponds to the earliest type of transferred trag- words which we observed to have developed among the Greeks and for which Aristophanes was the earliest extant witness. Some of the texts under this head imply a Ciceronian association of tragedy with the grand style⁵⁶. Elsewhere, Cicero refers to the association more explicitly, as for example at Tusc. 1,37 where, in introducing an excerpt from some unknown Roman tragedy, he says *frequens ... consessus theatri ... movetur audiens tam grande carmen*.

⁵⁴ L-P ad loc., on the other hand, think *celeritate verborum* has more to do with *actio* than style.

⁵⁵ On the influence of the stage on C.'s thought about delivery, cf. FISKE-GRANT (1929) 41: 'An examination of the index of Wilkins' edition of Cicero's *De Oratore* under the headings *histrio, tragoedia, comoedia, Roscius, tibicen, tibia* shows how frequently Cicero draws upon analogies from the stage for his delineation of the orator's art'. Cf. also LAIDLAW (1960) 56 ff.; L-P ad 2,193. Arist. before him had noticed the power of *ὑπόκρισις* in oratory: rh. 1403b21 ff., 1404a12 ff.

⁵⁶ On this traditional association, see below § 7.5.2 esp. n. 123.

a) de orat. 2,227

After a substantial quotation of Crassus' speech, we read the verdict:

sed haec tragica atque divina

Tragica is here, in contrast to the ambivalent *tragoediis* of 2,225, most decidedly a stylistic description. The precious fragment of Crassus' speech preserved in the preceding passage 2,225 f. (=DOUGLAS [1966] Append. A 27) furnishes important internal evidence which can help us to form some idea as to Cicero's meaning when he describes the speech as *tragica atque divina* (cf. *tragoediae* in 2,225, on which see below). In addition to this, we have Cicero's own qualifying remarks: *quanta vis! quam inexpectata! quam repentina! cum coniectis oculis, gestu omni [ei] imminenti, summa gravitate et celeritate verborum...*' As has just been stated, some parts of this description refer to the extremely emotional display and pathetic technique of Crassus' *actio*⁵⁷; other parts (*summa gravitate* and *celeritate verborum*), on the other hand, apparently look forward to the stylistic characterisation of the speech at 2,227 as *tragica atque divina*.

The meaning of the phrase is of course that the speech was in the sublime, impassioned, grand style. This is confirmed not only by the terminology itself, to which we shall return later, but also by the following considerations.

1. **Context:** Caesar's purpose in quoting the excerpt was to show Crassus' mastery of pathos, just as earlier his complementary mastery of wit was also described and substantiated (cf. 2,225 *his facetiis non minus refutatum esse Brutum quam illis tragoediis*). Hence we expect to find the excerpt from Crassus' speech to be in the highly emotional style. This is indeed what emerges from a study of the internal evidence.

2. **Internal evidence:** the excerpt from Crassus' speech itself, as has already been indicated, furnishes internal evidence as to the meaning of *tragica atque divina*.

Rhythm: The excerpt was subjected to rhythmical analysis by NORDEN (1915³), I 174–5, according to which there was revealed a great number of cola⁵⁸ and clausulae. The high

⁵⁷ And yet even here we must not rule out the possibility that the first three exclamations (*quanta vis! quam inexpectata! quam repentina!*) refer at the same time to *elocutio*: cf. Quint.'s (12,10,65) attribution of *vis* and *celeritas* to Pericles' *Blitzrede*, as an example of the grand style. On which, cf. also QUADLBAUER 104.

⁵⁸ Crassus is stated by C. in various places to have had a predilection for a style based chiefly on cola and commata: cf. Brut. 162. de orat. 3,190. orat. 223 where C. gives his approval for this kind of style.

incidence of the cretic-trochee and ditrochee type clausulae – well known to be among Cicero's favourites⁵⁹ – is significant, as is also the conspicuous tendency towards agreement between accent and ictus. The strongly-impressed rhythmical character of the excerpt thus confers upon it a level of ornamentation which is to be eschewed by the speaker of the plain style (orat. 77⁶⁰. 79⁶¹), and to be attained only in moderation by the speaker of the middle style (orat. 91). Furthermore the use of the shorter units of the cola instead of the longer and fuller period will undoubtedly contribute to the swift and rushing quality of the speech⁶² – traits typical of the grand style, as is indicated clearly by Cicero at orat. 97 where he states of this style that it *cursu magno sonituque ferretur*, and at Brut. 325 f. where the Asiatic version of the grand style is said to be *volucres atque incitatum*⁶³ and *oratio... incitata et vibrans*⁶⁴.

Style: the most conspicuous feature of the style is the abundance of figures⁶⁵, which are a kind of ornamentation (Brut. 69⁶⁶). As we have already seen, ornamentation is generally regarded as being alien to the plain style (orat. 79 quoted above⁶⁷); on the other hand, the speaker of the plain style is permitted to use, if not all (orat. 38. 65. 84), at any rate most of the figures, although even with these he is to be sparing (*verecundus; parcius* cf. orat. 79. 83 f. also KROLL ad 84), or is to be indifferent to the attaining of polish (orat. 86 *ornamentis utetur horridius*). With regard to the middle style, it is stated that it is to be more restrained (*summissius*) than the ornamented, grand style (orat. 91). Thus the presence of figures is not to be taken alone as evidence of the grand style. The decisive factors are the frequency and quality of these figures. We have already observed that our small excerpt from the Crassus speech is suffused with figures: we may infer from the description of Crassus' speech (*tragica atque divina*) that Cicero would have regarded this abundance of figures as contributing to the grand style of the speech. Furthermore, when we examine the types of

⁵⁹ Cf. NISBET (1961) xvii.

⁶⁰ *primum igitur eum tamquam e vinculis numerorum excimamus...*

⁶¹ *tum removebitur omnis insignis ornatus quasi margaritarum, ne calamistri quidem adhibetur... unum aberit, quod quantum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus, ornatum illud suave et affluens...*

⁶² Perhaps already implicitly recognised in the remarks of Cicero's Caesar: *quam repentina! ... cum ... celeritate verborum...*

⁶³ On *incitatum* as a quality of the grand style, cf. the judgement at Brut. 203 on Sulpicius, the *vel maxime... grandis et tragicus orator. incitata et volubilis ... oratio*.

⁶⁴ On *vibrans*, cf. DOUGLAS ad loc.: 'vibrans: 'swift-flying', a metaphor from javelins...' he compares orat. 234 where the verb is used of Demosthenes' *fulmina*. Cf. also O'SULLIVAN 113.

⁶⁵ The assigning of these either to the class of thought or to that of speech is controversial, since our sources are notoriously in disagreement on the subject.

⁶⁶ The term which rhet. Her. (4,18,13) uses for the figures is *exornatio*.

⁶⁷ C.'s denying of ornament to the plain style at orat. 79, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition. Ornament consists of 1) choice of words 2) arrangement of words (including rhythm) 3) figures & tropes (cf. Dion. Hal. Isoc. 3; [= p. 58,4–7 U.-R.]; KROLL ad orat. 80; WILKINS ad de orat. 3,148; KENNEDY (1963) 276), but in the following sections, it is clear that C. permits to the plain style the use of at least some of the figures, but these are, as is to be expected, to be used only parsimoniously.

figures employed, we shall see that at least some of these are of the kind that are especially recommended for a highly emotional style. These figures include:

- *commoratio*: the dwelling on the same point, i.e. the contrasting of Brutus' disgrace with the honour of his ancestors (orat. 137. de orat. 3,201. Quint. 9,1,27. 2,4)
- *percontatio*: the asking of questions (de orat. 3,203. Quint. 9,2,6 ff.). Quintilian 9,2,8 points out that questions have more emotional impact than mere positive statements (*quanto enim magis ardet quam si diceretur...*) and that questions are often used to arouse different emotions: ill-will or pity 9,2,9; indignation (as in our passage) 9,2,10.
- *aversio*: the passage is a kind of apostrophe (orat. 138 *ut ab eo quod agitur avertat animos*; Quint. 9,2,38 ff. who states that this figure *mire movet*). Compare the not-too-dissimilar figure of *exclamatio* (Quint. 9,2,26 ff. & rhet.Her. 4,15,22⁶⁸), which both rhet.Her. and Quintilian state is particularly useful for arousing indignation. On the other hand, the figure *προσωποποιία* (Quint. 9,2,29 f.), which somewhat resembles that of *exclamatio* and characteristics of which our passage also shares, is prohibited by Cicero to the speaker of the plain style (orat. 85)⁶⁹.
- *dilemma*: the excerpt also presents to us a variant of the figure later called *dilemma*⁷⁰ ('What am I to do? A? No, because...; B? No, because...')⁷¹.
- *geminatio verborum* (epanaphora): the repetition of words (orat. 135, de orat. 3,207. rhet.Her. 4,13,19): in our passage, observe the six-fold anaphora of *quid*, the triple anaphora of *cui* and the five-fold anaphora of *tu*⁷². Rightly do L-P ad loc. point out the pathos of the figure⁷³: 'Das sechsfache quid ist Ausdruck des Pathos' and the climax involved in the catenation of expressions *hos – in foro – in urbe – in civium conspectu*. The solemnity and vigour

⁶⁸ Note that the rhet.Her.'s *exclamatio* has a wider scope than that of Quint.; according to rhet.Her.'s definition (*exclamatio est quae conficit significationem doloris aut indignationis alicuius per hominis aut urbis aut loci aut rei cuiuspiam compellationem*) the *exclamatio* of 4,15,22 would also cover Quint.'s *aversio* (= apostrophe) of 9,2,38.

⁶⁹ Clearly our text employs a figure which partakes something of the character of *προσωποποιία*: for although a dead person is not represented as speaking (orat. 85: *non faciet rem publicam loquentem nec ab inferis mortuos excitabit* cf. top. 45), it is with a dead person that Brutus is invited to communicate; also according to Quint.'s definition of *προσωποποιία*, it is a feature of this figure to display the inner thoughts of the adversary, and to depict (even imaginary: 9,2,31) conversations between other people. At 12,10,61 Quint. explicitly links the *προσωποποιία* with the grand style.

⁷⁰ It appears to be related to the figure which rhet.Her. 4,40,52 calls *divisio*: *est quae rem semovens ab re utramque absolvit ratione subiecta... haec se statim explicat, et brevi duabus aut pluribus partibus subiciens rationes exornat orationem*. To this, both KROLL and SANDYS tentatively refer orat. 137 *ut dividat in partes*. KAYSER, cited by SANDYS ad orat. 137) compares C. inv. 1,45: *complexio est in qua, utrum concesseris, reprehenditur...* Typically, of course, the figure requires only alternative questions and solutions: cf. Hermog. inv. 4,6 p.192 RABE (περί διλημμάτων). For an example in C., cf. Mur. 88 f.

⁷¹ On the presumed popularity of this rhetorical figure in Roman tragedy and oratory, cf. GRATWICK CHCL II 133. He cites a classic example from a fragment of a speech of C. Gracchus fr. 58 MALCOVATI = de orat. 3,214.

⁷² Note also the alliteration in the passage; on the importance of which in early Roman poetry, cf. NORDEN 890 and JOCELYN (1967) 42 on alliteration in Roman tragedy.

⁷³ Cf. HOFMANN (1951) 63: 'Darum begegnet Anapher am häufigsten bei den reinen Affektwörtern, den Frage- und Ausrufpartikeln...'

of the figure is emphasised by rhet.Her, 4,13,19 *haec exornatio ... habet ... gravitatis et acrimoniae plurimum*⁷⁴. Compare Cicero's prohibition at orat. 85 of the emotional type of this figure to the plain style.

Thus the figures employed in the Crassus excerpt indisputably point to an elevated, emotional style.

3. Caesar's comments on Crassus' speech: When we examine more closely Caesar's comments on Crassus' speech, what emerges is the implicit association of tragedy with the grand style. Hence 'tragic' has come to be used merely metaphorically for 'in the grand style'.

Caesar's description of Crassus' delivery. We have already noticed that Caesar (2,225) described Crassus' delivery as being impassioned, dramatic and, in a word, 'tragic' (*illis tragoediis*). Naturally, delivery must in some way correspond to the style of the speech, or rather, the two must in some respect agree⁷⁵. Now at orat. 86 we are warned that the delivery of the plain speaker is not to be 'tragic'. Hence, from this we may infer that the style of the 'tragic' delivery is either the middle or the grand. The forcefulness (*quanta vis*), solemnity (*gravitate*)⁷⁶, and extreme emotionalism of Crassus' 'tragic' delivery points, at least in this case, to the latter.

Caesar's description of the style of Crassus (2,227): the juxtaposition of *tragica* and *divina* is significant. *Divinus* does not merely suggest the metaphor of divine inspiration⁷⁷, but

⁷⁴ For the juxtaposition of these two qualities in connexion with the grand style, cf. orat. 99.

⁷⁵ Cf. de orat. 3,222: *oculi sunt, quorum tum intentione, tum remissione, tum coniectu, tum hilaritate motus animorum significemus apte cum genere ipso orationis. est enim actio quasi sermo corporis, quo magis menti congruens esse debet.* The relationship between text/style and delivery is brought out elsewhere too. Thus for example when C. (de orat. 1,128) places on the perfect orator the demand of possessing the *vox tragoedorum*, he is of course speaking of delivery. Later, however, Cicero will illustrate what he means by the *vox tragoedorum* at 3,217 ff. by means of examples taken from the tragedies of Accius, Pacuvius and Ennius. Thus whilst the emphasis is chiefly here on the acting part of tragedy, we see that the *actio* still has a certain, necessary relationship with the text. Compare also de orat. 3,102, where Cicero is discussing the necessity of stylistic and tonal variation, and of tension and relief: he not only quotes some tragic verses to illustrate this idea but also describes Roscius' and Aesopus' respective deliveries of these verses (the first two verses derive from an unknown tragedy: ZILLINGER 141 = 30-1 RIBBECK; the second pair from Ennius' *Andromacha*: ZILLINGER 111 = VAHLEN 88 ff.; JOCELYN XXVII (b) p. 83 f. & frs. 81 & 87): *neque id actores prius viderunt quam ipsi poetae, quam denique illi etiam, qui fecerunt modos, a quibus utrisque summittitur aliquid, deinde augetur, extenuatur, inflatur, variatur, distinguitur.*

[In passing I should like to suggest that the coupling of *poetae* and musicians at 3,174 is meant to recall the coupling at 3,102. If this is true, then *poetae* here will mean chiefly, if not exclusively, tragic poets, as it did at 3,102. The reference to the shared artistic sensibility of the tragic poets and the musicians (*qui fecerunt modos*) is made here in order to allow Cicero to show how tragedy and oratory are in another way related: *namque haec duo musici, qui erant quondam idem poetae, machinati ad voluptatem sunt, versum atque cantum, ut et verborum numero et vocum modo delectatione vincerent aurium satietatem. haec igitur duo, vocis dico moderationem et verborum conclusionem, quoad orationis severitas pati posset, a poetica ad eloquentiam traducenda duxerunt.*]

⁷⁶ Cf. Brut. 143: *Crasso nihil statuo fieri potuisse perfectius. erat summa gravitas...*

⁷⁷ Cf. de orat. 1,28 (with L-P ad loc.). 202. 2,7. 127. 188. 3,15. 3,228.

sometimes it also implies more loosely the sublime elevation and solemnity associated with the grand style. To speak of gods and divine things was commonly thought to impart solemnity to the style: cf. Hermogenes *περὶ ἰδ.* p. 242 ff. RABE (*περὶ σεμνότητος*). Hence *divina* is here used metaphorically of a style that is solemn, even sublime, as would be one that was used in connexion with truly divine things. The solemnity of style implicit in *divina* is brought out more clearly in the sentence following *tragica atque divina: nec apud populum gravior oratio*. Note also that *contentio* refers to the highly emotional style ('de gravitate dicendi, fervida oratio, πάθος') and not, as TLL s.v. *contentio* 676,39 would have it, to *actio*⁷⁸. In another passage, *de orat.* 1,40, *divinus* is used in connexion with an outstanding, albeit untutored, exponent of the grand style, Servius Galba (see above on *de orat.* 1,228) the consul of 144: he is called there *divinum hominem in dicendo*⁷⁹. Compare the characteristics of his style described at *Brut.* 86⁸⁰ *ardentior / atrocior / asperior / incitatio*⁸¹ *acriorque esset, gravior et vehementius*: all traits commonly associated with the grand style: (for *ardentior* cf. *de orat.* 2,190. *orat.* 99 *Brut.* 276; *atrocior* *de orat.* 2,200; *asperior* *orat.* 20; *incitatio*⁸² 35. 93. 203.; *gravis* and *vehemens* *Brut.* 35. 38. *orat.* 20. 97. 99 etc.).

Hence *tragica* and *divina* seem to me to suggest two sides of the grand style: on the one hand, extreme pathos; on the other, solemnity and perhaps other qualities indicated at *Brut.* 86 (just quoted).

b) *de orat.* 3,30

quid, noster hic Caesar nonne novam quandam rationem attulit orationis et dicendi genus induxit prope singulare? quis umquam res, praeter hunc, tragicas paene comice, tristis remisse, severas hilare, forenses scaenica prope venustate tractavit atque ita, ut neque iocus magnitudine rerum excluderetur nec gravitas facietis minueretur?

⁷⁸ So rightly L-P ad loc.

⁷⁹ A similar description of Crassus is given at *de orat.* 3,4 ff. in connexion with his last speech delivered in the grand style in the senate against the consul Philippus: *multa a Crasso divinitus dicta esse ferebantur... illa tamquam cycnea fuit divini hominis vox et oratio*. Notice the language used to describe the speech: *hic cum...quasi quasdam verborum faces admovisset* (3,4: cf. 2,205 also of the grand, pathetic style: *nam neque parvis in rebus adhibendae sunt hae dicendi faces*); *permulta tum vehementissima contentione animi, ingenii, virium ab eo dicta esse constabat, sententiamque eam ... ornatissimis et gravissimis verbis ... ab eo dictam* (3,5). This association of *divinitus*, *divinus* with the grand style is not to deny the primary associations of the words *divinitus*, *divinus* with quasi-divine inspiration, with prophecy or with Crassus' quasi apotheosis – correctly identified by L-P I 87, IV 103, and their commentary ad 1,26 & 3,4 –, but that seems to me an incomplete reading of certain texts containing these words which fails entirely to take cognizance of the stylistic implications also borne by them.

⁸⁰ Also *Brut.* 93 *quem fortasse vis non ingeni solum sed etiam animi et naturalis quidam dolor dicentem incendebat efficiebatque ut et incitata et gravis et vehemens esset oratio*.

⁸¹ For the MS (L) reading *adhortor*, various emendations have been proposed: *ardentior* CORRADUS; *asperior* MARTHA; *ardentior* FRILLER; *incitatio* BUSCHE, REIS.

⁸² Note that *incitatus* is associated with *παθητικόν* at *orat.* 128.

This is Crassus' description of Caesar's unique and novel oratorical style. Among the mingling of other, normally opposed stylistic elements, Caesar is said to have dealt with 'tragic matters in a manner almost suited to comedy'. The literal sense of *tragicus*, 'belonging to, concerning tragedy', and even the weaker sense of 'characteristic of tragedy' (so L-P ad loc.) are barely felt. Surely little more is meant here than that 'serious' matters – that is, things that would normally require to be treated with solemnity of style – are dealt with in a light-hearted way. On the other hand, there is probably also an underlying allusion to Caesar's activity as a tragedian (cf. L-P ad loc. on *forenses scaenica prope venustate*) – one might say, a recognition of the influence of Caesar's tragic compositions on his oratory.

Thus the discussion of the merits of the poet-orator Caesar is significant for another reason. There is an implicit admission that the two genres, oratory and tragedy, are not incompatible; that, on the contrary, the influence of the latter on the former may be beneficial⁸³. This implicit admission also underlies the passage Brut. 177 where again Caesar's literary style is discussed:

festivitate igitur et facetiis, inquam, C. Iulius L. f. et superioribus et aequalibus suis omnibus praestitit oratorque fuit minime ille quidem vehemens, sed nemo unquam urbanitate, nemo lepore, nemo suavitate conditor. sunt eius aliquot orationes, ex quibus sicut ex eiusdem tragoediis lenitas eius sine nervis perspicitur potest.

Observe that his tragic compositions are not felt to detract from his oratory – or to put it less boldly: no such feeling at any rate is expressed. The criticism of Caesar (*minime ille quidem vehemens...lenitas eius*⁸⁴ *sine nervis perspicitur potest*) is entirely personal; in no way does it affect the general underlying assumption that tragic composition is not incompatible with oratory: one is permitted to attempt in oratory *res tragicas* and to deal with *res forenses* with a *scaenica prope venustate*. On the contrary, the personal criticism seems to be this, that Caesar could never rise above the plain or the middle style (cf. Cicero's earlier comment in Brut. 177: *festivitate...et facetiis ...praestitit...nemo unquam urbanitate, nemo lepore, nemo suavitate*)⁸⁵. Both in oratory and in his tragedies, he lacked the forceful emotionalism required for the grand style (*lenitas eius...perspicitur potest*): one can see this deficiency even in Caesar's own tragedies. Here again, then, Cicero links the grand style with tragedy.

⁸³ Compare the related, though more general idea, common in C., that there is a certain affinity between the poets and the orators: de orat. 1,70 *poetis quibus est proxima coniunctio cum oratoribus*, 3,27. 100 (implied). 174. orat. 68. 201.

⁸⁴ FRIEDRICH's insertion of *non* at this point is generally not accepted, and rightly so.

⁸⁵ For *suavis* and *lepos* used in connexion with the middle style, cf. orat. 91 & 96. For *urbanitas* as a synonym of the *come* of the ἡδύκων at orat. 128, and of the *comitas* of Terence (whom Varr. ap. Gell. 6,14,6 assigns to the middle style), cf. SCHMID 245 f.

c) Brut. 43*

Here Atticus is discussing how rhetoricians (and ‘rhetorical historians’?) distort history to suit their purposes and to give their writings greater impact (*concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis, ut aliquid dicere possint argutius*):

hanc enim mortem rhetorice et tragice ornare potuerunt, illa mors vulgaris nullam praebebat materiam ad ornatum.

DOUGLAS ad loc.: ‘rhetorice et tragice: two Greek words, conveying disparagement of Greek ways.’ But it will be remembered that it is Atticus talking here, and Cicero allows the charge. Thus by a curious development two terms referring to two unrelated genres have been so juxtaposed as to represent almost synonymous stylistic values – and these, by Cicero’s tacit admission of Atticus’ accusation are implicitly approved! The claim that the ‘ordinary’ and ‘mundane’ (*vulgaris*) theme is insufficient for the pathos required by the orator is revealing. Since such types of themes provide insufficient material for ornamentation (*nullam praebebat materiam ad ornatum*), some lying (*ementiri*) is required. This ornamentation (*ornare*), the principal common factor of the terms *tragice* and *rhetorice*, at once points to the higher, more elevated style. Furthermore, the fact that an unnatural, gruesome, perhaps even ‘romantic’ death is thought to be richer in opportunities for ornamentation suggests that this ornamentation is concerned primarily with pathos.

On the other hand, another shared characteristic of the *tragice ornare* and the *rhetorice ornare* is the predisposition to lying⁸⁶. The theme of poets as liars is common enough – no less in Cicero⁸⁷: why then does not Cicero have Atticus say here simply *poetice* rather than *tragice*? One could of course have recourse to the easy explanation that *tragice* here stands for *poetice* – we have seen above that already with Aristotle the terms ‘tragic’ and ‘poetic’ are used virtually interchangeably (rhet. 1406b6 ff.). Certainly, one cannot rule out the more general sense of ‘poetic’ absolutely, but more probably the passage has more point than merely this. For although the main point of the passage is the embellishing and distorting of history, it is, as has already been suggested, specifically the gruesome death, the unnatural and bizarre nature of the scene depicted that has attracted the description *tragice ornare*.

⁸⁶ In this connexion, one should note the precedent of Hellenistic polemic against ‘tragic history’. See Polyb. 2,55–63 with WALBANK’s notes ad loc. and ad 6,56,8: ‘P. here uses the terminology applicable to “tragic history” ... he is prepared to adopt the ‘tragic’ approach (despite his many criticisms of it)...’

⁸⁷ See for example: Manil. 25. leg. 1,4 f. Tusc. 1,10. 36 f. 3,2. nat.deor. 1,42. 77. 112. 2,63. 3,76. 91.

d) Brut. 203

The following excerpt contains Cicero's verdict on P. Sulpicius Rufus, one of the two younger interlocutors in the *de orat.*:

fuit enim Sulpicius vel maxime omnium, quos quidem ego audiverim, grandis et, ut ita dicam, tragicus orator. vox cum magna tum suavis et splendida; gestus et motus corporis ita venustus ut tamen ad forum, non ad scaenam institutus videretur.

Again we have the juxtaposition of the tragic and the rhetorical: a type of oratory is called 'tragic'. Of greater significance, however, is the more explicit association of the tragic with the grand style (*grandis et ... tragicus*) which we have already noticed above in our discussion of *de orat.* 2,227⁸⁸. The formulation is bolder than any used before (hence the apologetic *ut ita dicam*): it is applied directly to the orator – thus only indirectly to his manner or style. The emphasis here seems at first glance to be on the theatricality of the performance⁸⁹ – especially in view of what follows: *vox cum magna tum suavis et splendida; gestus et motus corporis ita venustus ut tamen ad forum, non ad scaenam institutus videretur*. Moreover, elsewhere when Cicero speaks about delivery there is a presumption that a 'tragic' form also exists: so for example at *orat.* 86: *actio non tragica nec scaenae*⁹⁰. However, I am inclined to take *tragicus* as referring at the same time to both delivery and style. This interpretation is suggested by the fact that the *grandis*, with which *tragicus* in our passage is juxtaposed, is used in the *Brutus* to refer to style only (*pace* DOUGLAS ad Brut. 29)⁹¹. Thus the juxtaposition seems to be concerned primarily with style, although delivery will come into it also. This accords with the discussion of Cotta's oratory in the section (Brut. 202) immediately preceding our passage: for here the discussion is chiefly concerned with style, although there is an allusion to invention (*inveniebat*) and delivery (*infirmetas laterum*). Moreover, in our passage, *tragicus* in its capacity to bear another sense of 'tragic theatricality' will naturally serve as a bridge to the further discussion of Sulpicius' delivery.

⁸⁸ The attribution of the grand style to Sulpicius is made implicitly elsewhere too: so at the end of Brut. 203 *incitata et volubilis ... oratio ... Crassum hic volebat imitari ...*; *de orat.* 2,88 *verbis effervescentibus et paulo nimium redundantibus ...*; 2,89 *omnino in illud genus eum Crassi magnificum atque praeclarum natura ipsa ducebat*; 3,31 *Sulpicius autem fortissimo quodam animi impetu, plenissima et maxima voce, summa contentione corporis et dignitate motus, verborum quoque ea gravitate et copia est, ut unus ad dicendum instructissimus a natura esse videatur*. On the association between the tragic and the grand style, see also below § 7.5.2.

⁸⁹ So DOUGLAS ad loc.: 'tragicus: so in a complimentary sense (despite objections to theatricality; cf. on *scaenam* below)...'; HENDRICKSON translates: 'S. indeed was the most elevated in style and... the most theatrical'.

⁹⁰ Cf. *de orat.* 1,129: *in oratore autem ... vox tragoedorum, gestus paene summorum actorum est requirendus*.

⁹¹ Cf. 29. 35. 121. 126. 203. 287. 289.

These then are the texts in which the transferred uses of the trag- words appear. We have observed that most of them are found in the technical, rhetorical works. Furthermore, on my reading of these texts, only a few of them bear an unequivocally negative or derogatory connotation (note also that two of these, namely, *Mil.* 18 and *Tusc.* 4,73, are not concerned with literary theory). On the contrary, the tragic usually represents positive values in Ciceronian literary theory.

6.3 Cicero's criticism of tragedy

We shall now look at what Cicero has to say in a more direct manner on tragedy. In treating of the individual texts directly touching upon tragedy we are faced with similar difficulties to those which we shall encounter in dealing with the texts dealing with the comic genres. First, the lack of general reflexion on tragedy⁹² will force us to examine scattered and isolated texts the statements of which on tragedy are of necessity incidental and frequently directed not at tragedy in general, but at specific tragedies or tragic poets. Hence, one should be aware of, and resist, the temptation – inherent in this approach – to overgeneralise. Second, the nature of the texts is such that often nothing positive is affirmed, and only a descriptive account is given of, say, a tragic situation; thus it is not directly indicated what is ideal in Cicero's opinion, but only what is in existence, although of course, it may be possible to learn something from his choice of texts that he quotes, refers to, or discusses. It is often hard to distinguish between a mere descriptive passage, and another in which there is a positive affirmation that truly represents Cicero's views on some aspect of tragedy. In such instances, the utmost caution must be exercised: one cannot hope to do much more than merely to report what is said as being an indication of Cicero's familiarity with the tragic art: to extrapolate beyond this would be rash. Third, the different genres in which Cicero worked present the reader with different, often contradictory views and perspectives, owing to the different audiences for whom he was writing, and the different traditions within which he was working. The most conspicuous, indeed, the fundamental disagreement arising out of the difference of genre is the disapproval on the one hand of tragedy observed in the genres comprising the orations and the philosophical treatises, and the more neutral and approving attitude, on the other hand, observed in the rest of the corpus. That is the kind of eclecticism with which all students of Cicero are familiar, especially readers of the philosophical works. With each of the respective genres he seems to adopt a different persona, and consequently has a different

⁹² BLÄNSDORF 143 n. 8; BERTRAND 94; WINNICZUK 213.

perspective dependent chiefly on the sources and traditions of the genre. Viewed in this light, the inconsistencies with which Cicero's thinking on tragedy as a whole is troubled seem less significant, and more importantly, there will be found a certain consistency *within* the respective genres.

In the speeches the hostility that we encounter toward tragedy and the theatre in general is a manifestation of deep-rooted socio-cultural prejudices held by the Romans. The texts we are referring to are those like Phil. 11,13: the chief objection is to the social status of the acting profession, and the general disrepute of all activities connected with the stage. Hence here the hostility toward tragedy is incidental, and so we shall not concern ourselves with it any further⁹³.

With regard to the hostility toward poetry expressed in the philosophical writings, it might appear to a certain extent legitimate to treat the views in the philosophical treatises as though they were secondary in respect of their claim to authenticity, inasmuch they are borrowed from the philosophical sources (whether primary or secondary) and from the philosophical traditions within which Cicero was writing. Thus E. LANGE wrote: 'Denique sunt sane etiam pauci alii loci, quibus poetarum gloriam nimis detrectare videtur. At facile, opinor, est ad intellegendum hos quoque minoris esse momenti. Cicero enim persaepe non tam ut artium iudex sententiam dixit, quam ex philosophorum consuetudine...'⁹⁴. This would not be to deny either that Cicero agreed with the hostile views of poetry expressed in the philosophical works, or that Cicero drew on other sources for his rhetorical works, but as a literary theorist and rhetorician, Cicero was a more original thinker than in the philosophica; he draws on the wealth of his own oratorical experience and on many years' meditation on literary and rhetorical theory and practice⁹⁵. In a sense, then, one may say with justice that the ideas of the rhetorical works meant more to him personally, were more his own, and accordingly they must take precedence in any deliberation on his literary ideas. On the other hand, I do not think the *prima facie* dichotomy between the Ciceronian 'literary' and Ciceronian 'philosophical' perspectives, at least with regard to tragedy, is so great that one must have recourse to a 'grading' of authentic views. Really, the Ciceronian criticism of poetry, especially of tragic poetry is quite restricted and is thus far removed from the all-encompassing rejection in Plato's republic of the imitative genres of poetry. It is absolutely possible to make Cicero's criticism of certain aspects of tragedy, as for

⁹³ See WRIGHT c. II for a discussion.

⁹⁴ E. LANGE: *Quid cum de ingenio et litteris tum de poetis Graecorum Cicero senserit*. Diss. Halle 1880, 248 (& 250).

⁹⁵ In contrast to this, it is salutary to recall that at the end of his life and in the space of three years (46–44), C. managed to throw off over 15 – the number varies but a little in catalogues according as some of the books are dated – books of philosophy! On C.'s own admission, he only returned to the study of philosophy when he was retired from his legal and senatorial duties, having nothing else to do (*praesertim nihil agens*): see the prologues to the first two books of the Tusc.

example in the *Tusculanae disputationes*, conform with his acceptance of the genre implicitly expressed elsewhere.

Let us now, then, consider the ‘ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy’ as we find it occurring in the philosophical treatises. Two of the offences with which tragedy is charged are the same as those with which the other poetic genres are charged in the philosophical treatises: first, the moral depravity (*flagitia, turpe*) and triviality (*levitas*) of its subject matter (and in particular the exaltation of sensual love *amor stupri*⁹⁶ as opposed to *amor amicitiae*; Tusc. 4,69 *de comoedia loquor...quid ait ex tragoedia ...ille*)⁹⁷; second, we find a Platonic-style (rep. 379b ff.) condemnation of the poets’ falsehoods and deceptions, especially with regard to the nature of the gods: cf. nat.deor. 1,42 f. 2,63. 3,76 f. 91.⁹⁸ Tusc. 1,36 f. 3,2 f.⁹⁹.

The third offence with which tragedy is charged belongs chiefly to tragedy. In the second book of the *Tusculanae disputationes* which is concerned with the enduring of pain, three of the tragic heroes Philoctetes, Hercules and Prometheus are introduced into the discussion to show as against the Epicureans that even great men find pain to be a *tristis... res...aspera, amara, inimica naturae, ad patiendum tolerandumque difficilis*. After some passages of substantial length have been quoted from the respective tragedies in which those characters appear suffering, it is established that pain is indeed an evil. Thereupon, the reading of poetry and the interweaving of quotations into philosophical discourses are praised and recommended as useful exercises. But now another stern criticism – again its impulse is strongly Platonic – of the poets is introduced (2,27):

sed videsne, poetae quid mali adferant? lamentantis inducunt fortissimos viros, molliunt animos nostros, ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non legantur modo sed etiam ediscantur. sic ad malam domesticam disciplinam vitamque umbratilem et delicatam cum accesserunt etiam poetae, nervos omnis virtutis elidunt. recte igitur a Platone eiciuntur ex ea civitate, quam finxit ille, cum optimos mores et optimum rei p. statum exquireret. at vero nos, docti scilicet a Graecia, haec [et] a pueritia legimus ediscimus, hanc eruditionem liberalem et doctrinam putamus¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁶ Note that C. gives this part of the criticism of tragedy a particularly Roman turn: the homosexual love of beautiful young men which is promoted by the tragedies, derives from the custom of the Greeks’ *gymnasia in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores* (Tusc. 4,70: cf. also 71)!

⁹⁷ For more extensive discussions of these subjects, see below in the chapter on comedy, § 7.5.1–2.

⁹⁸ Observe, however, the different perspectives from which these utterances in nat.deor. emanate: Velleius (Epicurean) 1,42 f.; Balbus (Stoic) 2,63; Cotta (Academic) 3,76 f. 91.

⁹⁹ On poetry’s being removed from truth and reality as a cause of its levity, see above § 2.11.

¹⁰⁰ There are, in addition to the explicit allusion to the Platonic expulsion of the poets from his commonwealth (rep. 398a; cf. 605b. 607a), several other Platonic reminiscences in the passage: for *sed videsne*,

Thus Cicero accuses the *poetae*, even as Plato accuses the imitative poets in the third book of the republic, of rendering men weak, effeminate and cowardly. The citing of the three tragic examples before this passage, together with the use of the technical word, *inducere* (cf. WRIGHT 100: although admittedly this term is also used quite loosely for ‘bringing a character onto the scene’) leads one to suppose that Cicero is here thinking chiefly, if not solely, of the *poetae* of tragedy¹⁰¹. Furthermore, at 1,36 Cicero uses *poetae* of the tragedians (*frequens enim consessus theatri, in quo sunt mulierculae et pueri, movetur audiens tam grande carmen*), and likewise elsewhere, as we shall see, the depiction of pain is for Cicero closely and in a special way identified with tragedy. Furthermore, the elevated and ennobling purpose that Cicero assigned to epic, as again we shall see later, really forbids us from placing Homer and Ennius *qua* writer of epics in the same degraded status as the corrupting tragic poets. It is interesting to observe also, that Proclus, Plato’s commentator¹⁰², in the face of the overwhelming evidence, was desirous of exempting Homer from Plato’s general condemnation of the poets as imitators. He claims that Plato did not mean to include Homer in his assessment of the ‘tragic’ poets as mere imitators of phantoms with no regard for truth (I 196,18 ff. KROLL): the other poets strive to excite pathos (I 197,30–198,11; 199,12–14), but Homer is not an imitator (I 198,11 ff.). This ‘brave attempt to save Homer’ while flawed, shows an interesting reaction to the Platonic hostility to imitative poetry in general, which, I should like to suggest, was also a reaction with which Cicero sympathised¹⁰³. The sheer scale of epic, the greatness of the deeds that it celebrates, the element of nationalism which characterises it (at any rate, in its Roman manifestations), the gravity of its subject matter: all these speak in epic’s favour with Cicero as against tragedy, – at any rate, in its Greek and *crepidata* forms – which with its tales of lust, incest, greed and untrammelled, psychopathic violence, must have seemed to him by comparison, sordid and trivial in scope.

poetae quid mali adferant? lamentantis inducunt fortissimos viros, cf. rep. 605c–d: ἀκούων σκόπει. οἱ γὰρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι ‘Ομήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ... also 387c–e μὴ ἐκ τῆς φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι ... καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμούς ἄρα ἐξαιρήσομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν ... ὅρθως ἄρ’ ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν ... etc. For *vitamque umbratilem et delicatam ... nervos omnis virtutis elidunt*, cf. rep. 411b ἕως ἂν ἐκτῆξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ “μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν”.

¹⁰¹ So too his model Plato rep. 605c10 f.: ἀκροώμενοι ‘Ομήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν...

¹⁰² Cf. N. GULLEY ‘Plato on poetry.’ *G & R* 24 (1977) 159 f.

¹⁰³ Significant in this connexion is the grammatically incomplete fr. rep. 4,5 = Non. p. 308,38 *ego vero eodem quo ille Homerum redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe quam sibi ipse fingit*. To be sure, the fr. is assigned to Laelius (*pace* BÜCHNER), and does not derive from the section of Bk. 4 *de poetis* (again *pace* BÜCHNER). Nevertheless, it is clear that the speaker does not wish to expel either Homer or the epic poets here (for a longer discussion, see chapter on lyric): so HECK 188 (who makes Plato the object of the banishment); BÜCHNER 371: ‘Scipio hat prononciert seinen Standpunkt ausgedrückt – *ego vero* –, daß er dasselbe wie Plato hätte tun können, gern tun würde, nun aber nicht mit Homer oder dem römischen Homer...’

Other differences between Cicero's notion of the pernicious influence of the (tragic) poets on the audience and that of his Platonic model are also to be observed. In the extensive Platonic account (rep. 604–607 ff.) the background to the discussion is a consideration of the poet as a suitable moral teacher, as a conveyer of truth, as a reliable imitator of reality. Having established that the poet does not aim to please by imitation the right thinking part of the hearer's soul (λόγος, λογισμός 604a, d) but the weaker character (τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον 605b) in the soul which is swayed by πάθος (604b), he then passes on to consider what effect the πάθος has on the audience. The effect is that it gives the audience pleasure: they surrender themselves and follow the poet, and share in the πάθος, and they praise the poet earnestly (saying) that he is a good poet whoever can affect them in this way (605d). The evil of this experience is that we unwittingly feed the lamenting thing in us (τοῦ θρηνώδους 606b: cf. τὸ ἐλαινόν) by sharing in another's grief, and it becomes difficult to control ourselves. In Cicero's account, on the other hand, the mechanics of the corrupting influence on the hearer's souls are not explored with the subtlety of the Platonic account. More importantly, the Platonic notion of poetry being a mimesis at a third remove is not a concern, either in the Tusculanae disputationes, or apparently, in the republic¹⁰⁴. Lastly, Cicero's interlocutor¹⁰⁵ in the rep. 4,5 = Non. 308,38 does not appear, as has been stated, to have wanted with Plato to banish the imitative poets or the tragedians – on the contrary, if one may conjecture from Aug. civ. 2,8 (*et haec sunt scaenicorum tolerabiliora ludorum, comoediae scilicet et tragoediae... quas etiam inter studia, quae honesta ac liberalia vocantur, pueri legere et discere coguntur a senibus*), tragedy together with comedy are an established and accepted part of the education in the Ciceronian commonwealth¹⁰⁶.

Thus although the Ciceronian criticism of poetry and of tragedy in particular, especially as dealt with in the Tusculanae disputationes and presumably also in the republic, receives much of its impulse from Plato, it lacks the subtlety of its model, nor does it share some of the latter's more profound concerns (e.g. about poetry being a mimesis at a third remove). Finally, and most importantly, Plato's ultimate rejection of the imitative poetry is abandoned by the Ciceronian pragmatism which manages to find a place for the dramatic poetry in the Roman state.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. BÜCHNER 370.

¹⁰⁵ For a discussion of who the interlocutor is, and who is banished, see the chapter on lyric.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. BÜCHNER 379 'Es war ein Abschnitt über die Dichter, *de poetis*... Die Epiker können nicht gefehlt haben. Das Ende von Kap. 8 macht es wahrscheinlich, daß nicht nur Epos ... sondern auch Tragödie und Komödie in der Jugendbildung eine Rolle gespielt haben...'

6.4 Cicero's positive view of tragedy; the purpose of tragic composition

Against this qualified and restricted philosophical hostility to tragedy, Cicero is elsewhere better disposed to tragedy. We remember first the general law of composition that he gives the tragic and comic poets¹⁰⁷: *itaque et in tragoedia comicum uitiosum est et in comoedia turpe tragicum* (opt.gen. 1). This is a law that Cicero could hardly have laid down had he been truly hostile to comedy and tragedy and had he wanted to banish their poets from the state. In the Brutus he speaks about two Roman orators who composed tragedies, and the fact that they pursued this activity elicits no judgement from Cicero. He criticises the first, C. Titius (167) not for having transferred some of his oratorical charms over to his tragic compositions, but because he failed to do so *tragice*! The comment implies a recognition of tragic merit. The second, C. Iulius (178: the same who gave the discourse on wit and humour in the second book of the *de oratore*), is also criticised with regard to his tragic compositions; this time the offence is a lack of πᾶσις: *ex eiusdem tragoediis lenitas eius sine nervis perspicitur potest*. But these are personal criticisms; no complaint at all is made about the fact that they composed tragedies in the first place.

Another circumstance will have further contributed to Cicero's acceptance of the genre. In his generation and even in that preceding his, it was not regarded as extraordinary, but on the contrary it was socially acceptable, for gentlemen to pursue poetry as a leisure activity, and amateur tragedians naturally are numbered among these dilettante poets¹⁰⁸. After C. Iulius Strabo the number of politician-orators who dabbled in tragedy is not inconsiderable: his nephew Julius Caesar wrote an Oedipus tragedy (Suet. Caes. 56) (Augustus himself reworked the Ajax myth – so Suet. Aug. 85); Asinius Pollio (fam. 10,32,3) informs Cicero in a letter of the literary efforts in tragedy of the Caesarian L. Cornelius Balbus¹⁰⁹. Quintus Tullius Cicero, we learn in a letter (ad Q. fr. 3,5,7) once finished four tragedies in sixteen days; he was fond of Sophocles and rendered some of his works into Latin. This largely Roman phenomenon of amateur tragic composition is a vastly different affair from professional composition¹¹⁰. Moreover, tragedies are read as often as, if not more often than, they are performed. Hence the suggestion that the phenomenon of the Roman orator-politician dabbling in tragedy may be explained as 'an extension of political activity and expression' (BEACHAM 126) ignores its passive, bookish aspect. In a passage of the *Tusculanae disputationes* preceding that in which Cicero praises

¹⁰⁷ MALCOVATI 19 f.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. BEACHAM 127: '...dramatic composition appears to have devolved to scholars and dilettantes...'

¹⁰⁹ For all these amateur poets and more see BEACHAM 125 ff.

¹¹⁰ Cf. GRATWICK CHCL II 129 f.

Plato for banishing the poets from his republic (2,27), one of the interlocutors, speaking about the kind of exercises in philosophical declamation mentioned at 1,7, confesses:

itaque postquam adamavi hanc quasi senilem declamationem, studiose equidem
utor nostris poetis...

The mentioning of the poets here refers to the custom of interspersing the philosophical discourse with poetic quotations. The context, in which Dionysius the Stoic was criticised for employing this practice of inserting poetic quotations *quasi dictata, nullo dilectu, nulla elegantia*¹¹¹, and Philo of the New Academy on the contrary is praised because he *et proprio numero*¹¹² *et lecta poemata et loco adiungebat*, suggests that *studiose* is to be taken to mean the kind of sympathetic reading and recital of the poets' verses which conforms to the model of Philo. And in the reply, it is stated that one of the reasons the poets are so dangerous is because

ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non modo legantur modo, sed etiam ediscantur .

Later, at 5,63 where the efforts of Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse as a tragic poet are being discussed, the following, thoroughly Roman remarks about the enthusiasm of poets for their own works are to be found:

poetam etiam tragicum – quam bonum, nihil ad rem; in hoc enim genere
nescio quo pacto magis quam in aliis suum cuique pulchrum est; adhuc
neminem cognovi poetam (et mihi fuit cum Aquinio¹¹³ amicitia), qui sibi non
optumus videretur; sic se res habet: te tua, me delectant mea...

Adhuc neminem cognovi poetam together with the reference to Aquinius suggests the speaker has contemporaries very much in mind. Cicero thus appears to describe obliquely and through the interlocutor of his dialogue a craze for poetastery among some of his own generation (cf. also from a later age Hor. ep. 2,1,108–10). The comment *te tua, me delectant mea* is not to be taken absolutely in a generalizing way, but rather we should also understand a gentle self reproach on Cicero's part. But therein also lies a resigned acceptance of the poetasting custom and of the vanity with which men practise it.

This new bookish, reading culture associated with poetry and with tragedy in particular, a culture which is pursued in private leisure (although sometimes shared among friends), must certainly have appealed to the scholar in Cicero. One is reminded in this connexion of Cato 22, in which Cicero relates the story of Sophocles when he was haled into court by

¹¹¹ Cf. POHLENZ ad loc. on *quasi dictata*: 'Dabei kann an das gedankenlose Nachsprechen von Lehrsätzen gedacht werden... ebensogut aber an das mechanische Aufsagen ohne sinngemäße Betonung und Rhythmus.'

¹¹² The emendation of SEYFFERT for the corrupt reading *et proprium nrt*, POHLENZ also suggests *et pro<nuntiabat> numero* on the model of div. 2,117 *ut ea non modo cernat multo ante sed etiam numero versuque pronuntiet*.

¹¹³ Apparently the notoriously bad poet whose poems Catullus in jest threatens to send to his friend Calvus as a punishment (c. 14,18): so POHLENZ ad Tusc. 5,63.

his sons on charges of neglecting the family estate. When it was his turn to speak, the great poet read one of his last compositions to the jury to prove that his was not a mind afflicted with senility. Cicero clearly likes the fact that Sophocles was able to pursue his passion in extreme old age¹¹⁴, and in his description of the poet, he relishes the scholarly, bookish aspects of the man (cf. div. 1,54: *doctissimum hominem*), and tacitly gives his approval to his calling¹¹⁵.

Furthermore, something might also be said about Cicero's attitude to the reading of the tragic poets. His own personal interest in tragedy both Greek and Roman is well documented by the commentators¹¹⁶. The innumerable passages in which he praises individual tragedians, or quotes them with approval; the translations of the selected passages of the Greek tragedians that he made with great care (though not always with great accuracy: see JOCELYN 98 ff.) *prima facie* suggest that, as MALCOVATI wrote, '[d]ell'arte drammatica ...Cicerone è conoscitore e ammiratore entusiastico: specialmente della tragedia'.

As an orator and rhetorician Cicero advocates the Theophrastian doctrine that the reading of the poets is essential for the orator's education: cf. de orat. 1,158. 3,39. 48¹¹⁷. That reading is intended of course to enrich one's style and vocabulary (cf. de orat. 1,128 *verba prope poetarum*). With regard specifically to the tragedians, the orator may anticipate from his readings to attain *in verbis sublimitas et in adfectibus motus omnis* (Quint. 10,1,27): tragedy will provide for him innumerable models for the grand style with which, as we have seen, tragedy is often associated.

A fragment of the Hortensius preserved in Nonius 396 M (=fr. 48 MUELLER = 8 GRILLI) proposes to us a dramatic situation in which one of the interlocutors of the dialogue expresses an interest in reading the tragic poets. It is unclear whether the primary motive in the request is purely literary or philosophical. The fragment reads:

quare velim dari mihi, Luculle, iubeas indicem tragicorum, ut sumam qui forte
mihi desunt

¹¹⁴ Cf. rep. 5,2 = Grilius rhet. 1,4 p. 28,14 MARTIN quoted above, ch. 4 n. 59.

¹¹⁵ For learned Latin tragedians, see Brut. 107 on Lucius Accius: *erat cum litteris Latinis tum etiam Graecis ut temporibus illis eruditus*; & Quint. 10,1,97 who says that those who lay claim to be learned regard Pacuvius as more learned than Accius; Hor. epist. 2,1,55 f.

¹¹⁶ See articles by STEELE, RADIN, MALCOVATI 21 f., ZILLINGER & WRIGHT on the tragedians. More recently, however, it has been argued that C.'s first-hand knowledge of, at any rate, the Greek poets was not as extensive as was formerly supposed. See H.D. JOCELYN: 'Greek poetry in Cicero's prose writing.' *YCS* 23 (1973) 61–111.

¹¹⁷ Cf. also Quint. 10,1,27.

This may very well be no more than a request for a reading list, a 'catalogue of tragic poets'¹¹⁸: this is how the OLD s.v. 'index' 5 takes it (cf. Quint. 10,1,57). But one wonders for what purpose a such a list would be required; perhaps rather it is better to take the phrase to mean a 'catalogue of all their works' (sc. the tragic poets'). This is how BRINK *JRS* 51 (1961) 219 understood the fragment, who turned it into a request from one of the guests to Lucullus (the host in the Hortensius) for 'a list of tragedies in...[his] library in order to select the works that are not in his own collection'; GRILLI in his commentary on the Hortensius (1962) 63 took it in a similar way 'farsi prestare dall'amico quei testi che dall'*index* gli risultano mancargli'. This explanation is certainly the most plausible, but to explain the fragment so that it agrees with specific circumstantial details in the dialogue, is perhaps to rob it unnecessarily of a possibly greater significance as far as the whole work is concerned¹¹⁹. As an alternative, I should like to suggest that what is being requested here is a 'summary, digest' (OLD s.v. 4) either of the individual plays, or, more likely, in my opinion, a 'pointer' or 'indicator' of memorable lines and passages from the tragedians. For this notion I should cite for comparison Isocrates Ad Nic. 44 ἔτι δ' εἴ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας, ἐφ' αἷς ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστ' ἐσπούδασαν... Obviously, it is not clear why the tragic poets alone are wanted, but it is fairly obvious why a collection of gnomic utterances might be regarded as useful, especially in the context of the beginning of a philosophical dialogue. The one who is addressing Lucullus in the fragment – perhaps Catulus, as GRILLI supposes – is, on this reading, desirous of having at his disposal a greater store of tragic verses than those currently in his possession (*ut sumam qui forte mihi desunt*) with which to intersperse his philosophical discourses. We have already seen that Cicero at Tusc. 2,26 f. approved of this custom of poetic quotation in philosophical expositions.

On the evidence of Cicero's transferred uses of the trag- words, and in view of his occupation as orator and rhetorician, we may infer that for Cicero the chief purposes of

¹¹⁸ The word 'tragicorum' must surely refer here to poets, not, as WRIGHT 78 n. 123 thought, to actors.

¹¹⁹ Earlier commentators on the Hortensius (USENER, PLASBERG, RUCH) wanted to find a literary discussion connected with the introductory conversation of the dialogue. BRINK *JRS* 51 (1961) 219 allowed the literary discussion but thought this had more to do with the custom established and observed in other of the philosophical treatises according to which a discussion of some literary matters precedes the 'business of the day'. This tends to make the literary concerns as reflected in the fragment relatively extrinsic to the main themes of the dialogue, a view countered by ALFONSI (1960) 170 f. who has suggested that the literary problems discussed in the Hortensius were more integrated than this into the main argument of the dialogue. He quotes several fragments in support of this hypothesis, the most apposite of which is fr. 23 M (=57 R/=92 GRILLI):

ut ii qui combibi purpuram volunt, sufficiunt prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam, sic litteris talibusque doctrinis ante excoli animos et ad sapientiam concipiendam imbui et praeparari decet.

ALFONSI comments: 'si discute sul posto che agli studi compete nell'*itinerarium mentis* verso la filosofia'.

tragedy are connected with language, style and the manipulation of the emotions: or to be more precise: tragedy will be for him a vehicle of the grand style and accordingly it will be very much concerned with the presentation and arousing of pathos: *frequens... consessus theatri ... movetur audiens tam grande carmen* (Tusc. 1,37). As a Roman statesman he will also have admired the inculcation of Roman aristocratic ideals and values conveyed by the Greek myths dramatized from a Roman perspective in the *crepidatae* and by the Roman themes of the *praetextae*¹²⁰. But the two aspects just mentioned, namely, the employment of the grand style and the manipulation of pathos (which are of course related) will have especially aroused and sustained Cicero's interest in tragedy, for it is in these that Cicero sees the natural affinity between the tragic genre and his own discipline of oratory, especially as practised by the *perfectus orator* delineated in the *de oratore* and the orator¹²¹. Thus one need not look in Cicero for any aesthetico-philosophical purpose such as Aristotle posits about the tragic mimesis and its *katharsis* of the emotions (po. 1449b24 ff.); Cicero does not concern himself with the contemplation of the genre's nature along such lines. Nevertheless, despite his Platonic-style strictures that we encounter in the philosophical works about tragedy's occasionally dubious morality, about its tendency to disseminate theological falsehoods, and above all, about tragedy's emasculating effects on its audience through its misuse of pathos¹²², Cicero acknowledges in at least two other places, that tragedy is not entirely devoid of a higher, moral purpose. We learn in one passage that the audience is meant to look beyond the superficial exterior of the action and dialogue of the play and that the poet can and does speak to us indirectly through one of his characters, exhorting us to better things. At *Planc.* 59 Cicero quotes some lines from Accius' tragedy *Atreus* in which the king addresses the princes. He leaves off in the middle of the quotation and hastily apologises thus:

nostis cetera. nonne, quae scripsit gravis ille et ingeniosus poeta, scripsit non ut illos regios pueros, qui nusquam erant, sed ut nos et nostros liberos ad laborem et laudem excitaret.

In another passage, *leg.* 2,41, he seems to understand that tragedy is concerned with questions of justice when he mentions with approval the fact that tragedies abound with examples of criminals who suffered penalties for their crimes of *violata religio*.

¹²⁰ Particularly significant in this connexion, is C.'s discussion of Pacuvius' *Niptra* at *Tusc.* 2,48 f.: *non nimis in Niptris ille sapientissimus Graeciae saucius lamentatur vel modice potius: 'pedetemptim,' inquit, 'ite et sedato nisu / ne succussu adripiat / dolor' (Pacuvius hoc melius quam Sophocles; apud illum enim perquam flebiliter Ulixes lamentatur in vulnere)...* Cf. also, 1,105. 3,44 f. 4,19. *fin.* 4,62. *Sest.* 120; and *Planc.* 59 quoted in the main text below. On the celebration of aristocratic ideals in Roman tragedy; cf. GRATWICK CHCL II 130

¹²¹ Cf. *orat.* 70 *vehemens in flectendo, in quo uno vis omnis oratoris est ...*

¹²² Cf. *Pis.* 43 *Thyestea est ista execratio, poetae volgi animos non sapientium moventis....*

6.4.1 Cicero's preferences among the tragedians

We might adjoin here a few words on Cicero's personal preferences among the tragic poets. That he was perhaps a careless and indifferent reader of the Greek tragic poets JOCELYN has shown in his article on Greek poetry in Cicero's prose writing (esp. 79 ff.), in which it is shown that Cicero in translating or citing the Greek tragedians frequently ignores the contexts from which his extracts were taken, a procedure which often results in errors or slight mistranslations. This might in some cases be excused on the ground that Cicero was adapting a given extract in question to the exigencies of the subject with which he was concerned in his own composition, but in other cases, this is demonstrably not to be excused in the same way. A more serious objection to the advocate of Cicero's familiarity with the Greek tragedians is JOCELYN's hypothesis that many of the Greek verses or quotations found in Cicero's prose writings, in particular, the philosophica, are not taken from Cicero's own personal readings of the poets who composed these works, but from the Greek philosophical models that lay behind Cicero's own philosophical writings (cf. JOCELYN 75 f.)¹²³. Cicero, JOCELYN argues, merely replaced Greek verses in the original treatises, either with the Latin versions of the same, or where Latin versions did not exist, he translated the Greek verses himself into Latin. Sometimes, however, it is admitted, Cicero adds poetical quotations of his own choosing, sometimes even from his own poetical works.

In any event, greater familiarity with the Roman tragedians may be assumed. In this connection, the circumstances of his education and Roman upbringing, his personal contacts with men of the Roman theatre, and profound patriotic impulses contribute to his love of and enthusiasm for the poets of the Roman tragedies (as one of the interlocutors of the Tusc. says 2,26, *studiose equidem utor nostris poetis*). And if the innumerable quotations of these poets in Cicero's writings do not, in the light of what JOCELYN alleges regarding the replacement of Greek verses with the Latin versions of the same, signify as much as they were once thought so to do, yet in other places, Cicero himself unambiguously attests to his admiration of the Roman tragedians. One might include under this head, the following passages: 1) de orat. 3,27 in which Cicero, in insisting upon the close relationship of the orators with the poets, compares the illustrious Greek triad of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides with that of the Roman poets, Ennius, Pacuvius and Accius. They all differ in style, but each has his own merit *quamquam omnibus par paene laus in dissimili scribendi genere*

¹²³ As JOCELYN 64 points out, it is only in his letters to Atticus that C. produces literal Greek quotations from the poets. However 'the seventy or so quotations in C.'s letters need not ... imply the deep knowledge of the original poems which enthusiasts often claim for him. Some are clearly requested from Atticus' own letters while most are of a gnomic character, as likely to come from the cultural ambience as from the poems themselves.'

tribuat. 2) orat. 36: in answer to the question which is the best *forma* or *χαράκτηρ* in oratory, he diverts the discussion to the contemplation of the Roman tragedians. He imagines that some will say Ennius takes the palm because *non discedit a communi more verborum*; others will give it to Pacuvius (cf. opt.gen. 2¹²⁴), because *omnes apud hunc ornati elaboratique sunt versus, multa apud alterum* (sc. Ennium) *neglegentius*; and others still to Accius. It is implied that these are the three outstanding exponents of tragedy and deciding among them is merely a matter of opinion (*varia ...sunt iudicia*). 3) ac. 1,10: here Cicero rejects Varro's view that those interested in Greek philosophy would rather read the Greek works than works on this subject in Latin. Why should not Latin readers similarly delight in Latin philosophy who delight in reading the Roman tragedians Ennius, Pacuvius and Accius and many others *qui non verba sed vim Graecorum expresserunt poetarum*? Therefore, Cicero attributes to the Roman tragedians the distinction of having performed a significant service for their country by transferring the Greek poetic genius to Rome, as he himself had done with the geniuses of Plato and Aristotle (cf. fin. 1,7). 4) fin. 1,4: Cicero here condemns those Romans who in preferring the Greeks profess an aversion to Latin literature. It is unpatriotic to spurn the Medea of Ennius and the Antiope of Pacuvius on the ground that one prefers to read Euripides' corresponding works. Even with regard to inferior tragic poets such as Atilius, whom Lucilius (?) called a *ferreus scriptor*, if one were to reject his version of Sophocles' Electra, that would be a sign of *inertissimae segnitiae* or excessively refined fastidiousness (*fastidii delicatissimi*). The disdain for the old Roman poets as well as the phraseology used to indicate this fastidiousness with regard to them reminds us of the kind of over-refined excesses and 'un-Romanness' to which Cicero objected in the New Poets¹²⁵.

While he undoubtedly admired the national tragedies, the *praetextae*, with their Roman themes, and (one may suppose) their inculcation of Roman values, *pietas* and martial *virtus*, it is highly significant that ZILLINGER's index shows that Cicero's quotations from and references to the Roman tragedians, are almost exclusively taken from, or directed at, the *crepidatae* versions of the Greek myths (see above § 6.4 on how these *crepidatae* versions of Greek myths were made to do service for Roman aristocratic ideals). Accius' Brutus alone is mentioned and quoted by Cicero (Sest. 123. Att. 5,1). ZILLINGER 36 comments: 'Wenn wir Ciceros Interesse an der römischen Geschichte bedenken, das vielleicht in erster Linie der Grund seiner Begeisterung für die Annalen des Ennius ist, so muß diese Tatsache (i.e.

¹²⁴ Cf. WRIGHT 31: '...in another [sc. connection] (opt.gen. 2) ... [he] concedes that Pacuvius may be the best, he follows that almost immediately (opt.gen. 3) with a reference to Accius, as if he were the typical tragic poet ...'

¹²⁵ For further and more extensive discussions of C.'s familiarity with and admiration for the Roman tragedians, see the studies by ZILLINGER, KUBIK, MALCOVATI 21 f., 102 ff.; WRIGHT 31 ff. On neoterics' fastidiousness and general rejection of the national literary traditions, cf. above § 3.9.

the absence of *praetextae* quotations) zunächst wundernehmen.' Whether or not, as ZILLINGER supposes, Cicero felt the *praetextae* were, despite all their patriotic and aristocratic values, dramatically static in comparison with works based on Greek mythology, is of course a matter of conjecture.

6.5 Cicero's depiction of tragedy

In closing this chapter, it may be useful to consider what Cicero represents as predominant themes of tragedy and what conventions he knows to be maintained in the genre. Whether he approved or disapproved of these features is, in some cases, easy enough to determine; in others, one can only conjecture. Our purpose here, however, is to attempt not to establish the Ciceronian ideal, but merely to describe Cicero's knowledge of the genre. We will, on the other hand, notice some Ciceronian interpretations of certain features of the genre which exhibit a tendency towards allegorism¹²⁶.

6.5.1 predominant themes

1) Physical pain. At har.resp. 39 he discusses which of the penalties meted out by divine retribution is the worst, and asks what can be worse than madness: *nisi forte in tragoediis quos vulnere ac dolore corporis cruciari et consumi uides, graviores deorum immortalium iras subire quam illos, qui furentes inducuntur, putas*. Philoctetes' agony is cited as the locus classicus. Also at Tusc. 2,20 ff. the pains of three heroes (Philoctetes in Accius' *Philocteta*; Hercules in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*; and Prometheus in Aeschylus' *Προμηθεὺς λυόμενος*), are related and passages touching upon their agony quoted.

2) Divine Vengeance (*δίκη* = *poena*, *supplicium*), often pursued by the Furies. So the passage from the har.resp. (39) just quoted: *a dis immortalibus quae potest homini maior esse poena...*? In an animated passage in the speech in Pisonem (46) Cicero relates how the gods have visited Piso with every penalty that he could have prayed for, and yet he did not pray for them:

atqui fuit optandum. me tamen fugerat deorum immortalium has esse in impios et consceleratos poenas certissimas. nolite enim ita putare, patres conscripti, ut in scaena videtis, homines consceleratos impulsu deorum terreri furialibus taedis ardentibus.

¹²⁶ Cf. Lucr. 3,978 ff. for other examples of Roman allegorical interpretation.

From this passage we gather also that Cicero regarded the dramatic representations of the divine vengeance as symbolic of the reality. Here is a sophisticated allegorical understanding of the tragic action which is at once imaginative and at the same acutely perceptive:

sua quemque fraus, suum facinus suum scelus, sua audacia de sanitate ac mente deturbat; hae sunt impiorum furiae, hae flammae, hae faces.

3) Madness (ἄνθη). There are several passages: de orat. 2,193 *Telamo iratus furere luctu filii videretur*, or again, we may look at har.resp. 39: *quae potest homini maior esse poena furore atque dementia ? ...illos qui furentes inducuntur...*; likewise Pis. 46 f.:

mihi enim numquam veniret in mentem furorem et insaniam optare vobis in quam incidistis... sua audacia de sanitate ac mente deturbat...ego te non vaecordem, non furiosum, non mente captum, non tragico illo Oreste aut Athamante dementiorem putem...

This aspect of tragedy was apparently a source of fascination for the rhetorical schools, at least, as far as it concerned Orestes, who was proverbially a madman. Athamas is also mentioned in the har.resp. passage (39). See NISBET's note ad Pis. 47; MAYOR's and COURTNEY's commentaries (1980) on Juv. 8,215.

BEARE noticed the frequent appearance of *furor* and *dementia* in Roman tragedy from its very beginning with Livius Andronicus to writers beyond the classical period such as Seneca¹²⁷. A closer study of the prominence of these themes in Roman tragedy may be found in an article by FLORENCE DUPONT¹²⁸, one of the theses of which is that 'le FUROR caractérise les héros tragiques dans toutes les tragédies latines'. From the same article we may discover a clue to the fascination of the rhetorical schools with tragic *furor*. According to DUPONT, the Roman tragedians developed the tragic concept of *furor* ('der tragische *furor*') out of the early Roman juridical concept of *furor* ('der juristische *furor*'). It is, she further argues, owing to this concept peculiar to the Romans ('im Grunde unübersetzbare römische Begriff') that Roman tragedy is clearly distinguished from its Greek models. The Greek poets answered the philosophical problems posed by tragedies in 'extraordinarily different' ways; the Romans simplified the question of tragedy regarding the terrible and inhuman guilt of the tragic heroes: 'gab die gesamte römische Tragödie nur eine Antwort: die Schuld der Helden liegt darin, daß sie *furiosi* sind' (141).

¹²⁷ BEARE 29 f.

¹²⁸ 'Der juristische und der tragische *furor*' in J. BLÄNSDORF (Hrsg.): *Theater und Gesellschaft im Imperium Romanum / Théâtre et société dans l'empire romain*. Tübingen 1990, 141-47; her application of quasi-anthropological speculation to questions of *Quellenforschung* is at times, however, excessively dogmatic.

4) Mental pain (*aegritudo* etc.). In a well-known passage from the *Tusculanae disputationes* Cicero discusses the alleviation of grief and distress (3,44 f.) citing examples of these afflictions from two tragedies by Ennius: the *Thyestes* and the *Andromacha*.

5) Questions of justice: heinous crimes (murders, matricide, patricide etc.) and the fate of those who commit them: leg. 2,41 *poena vero violatae religionis iustam recusationem non habet. quid ego hic sceleratorum utar exemplis, quorum plenae tragoediae?* Mil. 8;

6.5.2 tragic conventions

1) Wailing, cries. Tusc. 2,27: *lamentantis inducunt [poetae] fortissimos viros*. From the *Thyestes* again (Tusc. 3,44); at 2,49 there is an interesting Roman perspective on this matter of men crying. Cicero says the Greek version (Sophocles) of the *Niptra* (Νίπτρα ἢ Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀκανθοπλήξ) is inferior to the Roman version made by Pacuvius, because *apud illum [sc. Sophoclea]... perquam flebiliter Ulixes lamentatur in vulnere*. Also de orat. 2,193 *flens ac lugens dicere videbatur* (of an actor reciting tragic verses and experiencing himself the emotions of the character whom he is representing).

2) *Deus ex machina*. At nat.deor. 1,53 Velleius is expounding Epicurean theology and cosmology as against that of the Stoics. He criticises the latter's lack of imaginative thinking:

quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poetae cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis confugitis ad deum.

It is of course not clear whether the use of the *deus ex machina* is objected to in all instances, but we may be sure that, in some cases at any rate, the poets were felt to have recourse to it too readily in order to explicate themselves from difficult plot developments. Moreover, the comment looks remarkably like a philosopher's stock joke¹²⁹, so that the objection is really bereft of any critical value.

3) The poet must feel the emotions he wishes to excite (ὁμοπαθεῖν / *ipse ardere*)¹³⁰. This idea and its variants of course have a long history. In Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*

¹²⁹ A joke about this tragic convention is found already in the 4th C. comic poet Antiphanes: fr. 189 K-A.

¹³⁰ The following works may be consulted on the subject: BRINK & RUDD ad Hor. ars 99-113. For the adaptation of the theory to rhetoric, see also FISKE-GRANT (1924) & (1929); H. J. LEON: 'The technique of emotional appeal in Cicero's judicial speeches.' *CW* 29 (1935) 33-37; E. NARDUCCI 'Mysteria rhetorum. Cicerone e le passioni dell'oratore.' *Electronic Antiquity* vol. II issue 5 (March 1995) P. TOOHEY & I. WORTHINGTON (eds.) <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/EIAnt/> (I have indicated in the citations of this article the section numbers given by the author himself); E. SCHÜTRUMPF: 'Non-logical means of persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *De Oratore*.' in W. W. FORTENBAUGH & D. C. MIRHADY (edd.) *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities Vol. 6 New Brunswick NJ 1994, 95-110; F.

(148-50) Agathon has the notion of 'getting inside his character' by dressing in women's clothing:

ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆδ' ἅμα γνώμη φορῶ.
 χρὴ γὰρ ποιητὴν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ δράματα
 ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς τρόπους ἔχειν.

The idea here is, of course, not quite the same: the poet employs the external paraphernalia to aid the conception of the 'inner' character. Still, we can see in this passage the notion of the poet departing from his true self, whether in respect of his costume, or of his mental state, as being a requisite for realistic (that is to say, believable) poetic composition. Something closer to our idea is to be found in Euripides' *Supplices* where Adrastus delivers a speech part of which (176-83) some commentators have found problematic (it corresponds neither to anything else in the speech, nor to anything in Theseus' answer), and it has been suggested that the lines are a defence of the poet himself. Lines 180-83 repeat this theme that the poet must feel the emotions that he wishes to excite:

τόν θ' ὕμνοποιὸν αὐτὸς ἂν τίκτῃ μέλη
 χαίροντα τίκτειν. ἦν δὲ μὴ πάσχει τόδε,
 οὔτοι δύναιτ' ἂν οἰκοθὲν γ' ἀτῶμενος
 τέρπειν ἂν ἄλλους.

In a well-known passage of Plato's *Ion*, although the subjects are not tragedians and tragedy, we find the same notion applied to the epic rhapsode who relives in an ecstasy the episodes he is reciting (535b ff.). Ion relates that when he is reciting something piteous, his 'eyes well with tears'; when something frightening and terrible, his 'hairs stand upright' and his 'heart leaps'.

The Ciceronian passage which chiefly concerns us here is *de orat.* 2,189–196¹³¹. Earlier (190), Cicero establishes the necessity for the orator to feel the emotions that he wishes his audience to experience. In the following excerpt (193 f.) he argues for the possibility of this:

...sed, ut dixi, ne hoc in nobis mirum esse videatur, quid potest esse tam fictum quam versus, quam scaena, quam fabulae? tamen in hoc genere saepe ipse vidi, ex persona mihi ardere oculi hominis histrionis viderentur † spondalli illa † dicentis:

SOLMSEN: 'Aristotle and Cicero on the orator's playing upon the feelings.' *CPh* 33 (1938) 390-404; J. WISSE: *Ethos & Pathos* 250 ff.

¹³¹ It is will be expedient here to reproduce WISSE's (258) division of the passage:

2,189 Introduction: necessity (A) and possibility (B) of *ipse ardere*
 190 Development of (A) necessity
 191-94a Development of (B) possibility
 194b-96 Illustration of (A)

segregare abs te ausus aut sine illo Salamina ingredi ?
neque paternum aspectum es veritus ?
numquam illum „aspectum“ dicebat, quin mihi Telamo iratus furere luctu fili
videretur; ut idem inflexa ad miserabilem sonum voce,
quom aetate exacta indigem
liberum lacerasti, orbasti, extinxti; neque fratris necis,
neque eius gnati parvi, qui tibi in tutelam est traditus –
flens ac lugens dicere videbatur; quae si ille histrio, cotidie cum ageret, tamen
recte agere sine dolore non poterat, quid Pacuvium putatis in scribendo leni
animo ac remisso fuisse? fieri nullo modo potuit. [194] saepe enim audiui
poetam bonum neminem – id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum
esse dicunt – sine inflammatione animorum existere posse et sine quodam
adflatu quasi furoris...
[196] quam ob rem hoc vos doceo ... ut in dicendo irasci, ut dolere, ut flere
possitis ...

The passage of course is dealing with the use of pathos in oratory. The principal example which is used to illustrate the possibility of the orator experiencing *ad libitum* the emotions which he wishes to arouse in his audience, however, is taken from the tragic stage and from the poet composing for it. Thus tragedy best represents for the speaker in the dialogue the genre in which the emotions are most effectively manipulated.

7. COMIC POETRY

Cas.: *Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?*
Brut.: *No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself,
But by reflection, by some other things.*

SH. Jul. Caes. Act. I, Sc. 2

Overview:

7.1 Introduction

7.2 the discourse on wit, de orat. 2,216–290: background and context

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7.5.1 flagitia

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7.6 positive evaluation of comedy in Cicero

7.6.1 the rhetorical background and the ethos tradition in ancient literary formulations of comedy

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7.6.5 a Ciceronian theory of a 'comedy of errors'?

7.6.6 the Scipionic tradition and the Ciceronian ideal of comedy

7.1 Introduction

That Cicero possessed a keen sense of humour and a natural facility for making witticisms (even if today these might seem somewhat frigid and weak to us who do not value verbal humour as highly as did the ancients) is abundantly clear from his speeches and letters. That he likewise greatly esteemed the use of witticisms emerges from the discourse which he assigned to Caesar Strabo in the second book of the *de oratore*. It is significant that this discourse, an innovation in many respects in the ancient systems of rhetoric, occupies so great a portion of the work. Cicero was indeed proud of his own facility in making witticisms, as may be seen from passages such as *Planc.* 35 and *fam.* 7,32,1–2. Lastly, his reputation as a wit in antiquity is well attested, not only from the passages just cited, but also elsewhere. Some of his enemies used his humorous talent against him; Quintilian 6,3,2 ff. has to defend him against the charge that he exhibited no moderation in his use of humour (*nimius risus adfectator*)¹; others called him the *consularis scurra* (cf. *Macr. Sat.* 2,1,12) and Cicero's defence of Murena occasioned the caustic remark

¹ Cf. 12,10,12 *suorum homines temporum incessere audebant ut...in salibus frigidum ...*

of Cato: 'What a wit we have, gentlemen, for a consul!' (ὡς γελοῖον, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔχομεν ὑπατον Plut. comp. Dem. et Cic. 1,5)². In the light of his predisposition towards humour and witticism, Cicero's interest in comedy and the other comic genres (mime, Atellan farce etc.)³ was natural, even if perhaps, as we shall see, there were other things that he esteemed more highly in these dramatic spectacles than the verbal witticisms and jokes designed merely to evoke 'belly laughter'.

There is more information in the Ciceronian corpus on the comic genres, than on any other field of poetics. Though still scattered and relatively meagre, this evidence seems at once to afford us an opportunity to assess more accurately Cicero's attitude towards the comic genres collectively and individually than is possible in the case of the rest of the literary genres. The most notable pieces of this evidence are the following: the general, philosophical judgement on comedy (without parallel in his collected utterances on the other genres) preserved in Aelius Donatus' excerptum de comoedia 5,1, p. 22,19 WESSNER; a celebrated comment, again of a universal nature, on comedy in the speech pro Sexto Roscio Amerino (47); scattered remarks illustrative of his aversion to vulgarity, outrages and slander in the comic genres; several judgements of theoretical significance on individual comic poets; and lastly, the well known discourse on humour in the second book of the *de oratore*.

The focus of the chapter will primarily be on comedy (i.e. *palliata* and *togata*), although some observations on Cicero's attitudes to the other genres, in particular to mime, cannot be avoided for the purpose of comparison. For a more exhaustive discussion of Cicero's relationship to the minor comic genres, the reader may consult with advantage D. FERRIN SUTTON: 'Cicero on minor dramatic forms.' *Symbolae Osloenses* 59 (1984) 29–36⁴.

7.2 Caesar's discourse on humour, *de orat.* 2,216–290:

At first glance, this justly celebrated discourse does not appear to hold out great promise of yielding much and important information on Cicero's views on comedy, and indeed on the other comic genres⁵. For it is obvious that we are dealing here with a treatment of

² For a discussion of the use of wit in Roman oratory in general, see L-P III 172.

³ SUTTON 33 lists other minor Italian comic genres which C. mentions or with which he was perhaps familiar such as *ludus talaris* (Att. 1,16,3. off. 1,150); the *embolium* (ad Q. fr. 3,1,24) and the Greek satyr plays and the Greek-Italian phlyakes (Att. 1,20,3 ?).

⁴ Cf. also WRIGHT *Cic. & the Theater*. Wisconsin 1931; MALCOVATI (1943) 188 ff.

⁵ That the discourse represents C.'s views, and not merely those of Caesar Strabo, has been convincingly demonstrated by L-P III 174, who point not only to the function of the discourse (the unorthodox presentation of the style-figures which would otherwise have had to be dealt with in Bk. 3) but also to the fact

humour that is drawn wholly within a rhetorical framework, adapted chiefly to the needs of a dialogue on oratory⁶. On the other hand, because many of the remarks on humour are couched in more universal terms, because the classifications are occasionally illustrated with examples from comic works⁷, and lastly because the more theoretical aspects of the discourse bear striking resemblances to some of the more important ancient treatises on poetics and on comedy in particular, it may be possible to detect in this discourse clues as to Cicero's views on comedy and the other comic genres. Furthermore, even in those parts of the discourse that are entirely centred around rhetorical concerns it is still likely that we may continue along similar lines. The justification for this lies in the Ciceronian transference of rhetorical theory to poetic and literary criticism for which I argued in the chapter one. A possible objection, however, to this approach in the case of comedy will be that it is pointless to try to determine Cicero's views on comic humour on the basis of a rhetorical discussion on oratorical humour, inasmuch as what Cicero may or may not have approved of in oratory with regard to humour, will not necessarily be the same in the case of comedy. To this I reply, in the first place, that the limited evidence suggests that Cicero approached all of literature from a rhetorician's perspective. One simply cannot conceive of him sitting in the theatre viewing some comic piece and *not* judging the spectacle and the jokes by the rhetorical standards and principles which he advocates in the *rhētorica*. In the

that C. mistakenly attributes the discourse to Antonius in a letter written barely five years after the *de oratore* to P. Volumnius Eutrapelus (fam. 7,32,2). The selection of Caesar as the spokesman for these views *de ridiculis* is thus almost entirely without significance: 'Dieser galt zwar als witziger Redner par excellence (cf. etwa Brut. 177), aber Cic. scheint dieser Wahl dennoch keine allzu große Bedeutung beigemessen zu haben ... Dieser Gedächtnisfehler (sc. the misattribution to Antonius) macht uns darauf aufmerksam, daß im Grunde genommen jeder der anwesenden Hauptunterredner die Lehre *de ridiculis* hätte vortragen können: für Caesar ist das klar, für Antonius geht das aus dem angeführten Brief hervor: für Crassus aus 2,227 f.; für Catulus etwa aus 2,244.'

⁶ The purpose of the discourse is not teach orators how to make witticisms and jokes, and in that sense it is not a piece of rhetorical instruction. On the other hand, it is still firmly rooted in the rhetorical context in other ways. L-P III 172 ff. identify at least three reasons for the introduction of the discourse on humour into the dialogue: 1) humour was more important in Roman oratory than in Greek (which explains why nothing comparable is found in the Greek rhet. handbooks); 2) for a compositional reason: to bring some relief after the difficult discourse on *inventio* given by Antonius; 3) to allow him to discuss the stylistic figures in a schematic way as had been traditionally done, without, however, attracting the stigma of the tediousness associated with the usual handbooks.

⁷ But probably only two or three of the examples by which the categories of witticisms are illustrated are taken from comedies despite the fact that Cic. recommends in 2,257 the introducing of verses either as they are or slightly altered into a speech, and despite the fact also that a cursory glance at the surviving comedies of Plaut. & Ter. proves the ease with which Cic. might have illustrated most, if not all, of the categories by means of their comic verses. In fact, mimes, Atellanae and satire represent a greater contribution to the discourse than does comedy. Novius, the author of Atellanae is cited thrice (255, 279, 285); an anonymous mime in 274; three iambic verses of different, unidentified mimes in 274; Caecilius Statius' *Synephebi* in 242(? cf. L-P ad loc.), 257; another verse of an unknown comedy in 257; Lucilius' *Satires* in 253, 263(? cf. L-P ad loc.), 277(?). These 'comic' verses taken together represent less than 20% and those strictly from comedy less than 4% of around 70 jokes cited. Remarkably we have nothing from Plautus or Terence (PLEBE's attribution of 2,257 to the *Phormio* is mistaken); L-P III 202 comment: 'das wirkt um so erstaunlicher, wenn man die Beispiele, durch welche im 3. Buch die *elocutio* und *actio* erläutert werden, betrachtet: dort stammt die übergroße Mehrheit davon aus römischen Tragödien...'; A. PLEBE: *La teoria del comico*. Torino 1952, 69 f. is thus misleading when he claims that Cicero in the Caesar discourse was greatly dependent on the Roman comic theatre.

second place, the objection is answered by the ideal of integrity, especially in public life, that Cicero advocates⁸. Even if in his own life Cicero often, and especially at times of crises, fell short of the philosophical principles that he espouses in the *philosophica*, we cannot again conceive of Cicero, who espouses in the *de oratore* and the *de officiis* an ideal of the Roman orator and gentleman with his refined, witty and chaste humour, slapping his thigh in unrestrained mirth at some obscene jest in a mime. Here in the theatre, amid the throng, the statesman faces no danger, no challenge to his ideals; simply to preserve his public persona of *gravitas* and *dignitas*, is no great task. The Cicero who depicts the interlocutors of his dialogues as quitting the city during the season of the games, is the same who in public or in his writings will exhibit an aloofness from the tastes and pleasures of the *volgus*. As a practical man, as a politician⁹, Cicero will have tolerated, or rather, not been offended by, the baser forms of humour in the comic theatre, but as one deeply imbued with rhetorical principles he will probably not have relished such humour, and in his posture as Roman gentleman with refined taste in humour, he will certainly never have admitted to liking anything so coarse¹⁰.

The passage in question occurs as a lengthy appendage to the discourse on *ethos* and *pathos* (2,178–216) and concludes the section of *inventio*: thus, it would seem, humour is viewed by the rhetorician as a component of the invention of emotional proofs or of the ‘non-rational’ proofs (*pisteis*): *ipsa hilaritas*, he says, *benevolentiam conciliat ei, per quem excitata est*.¹¹ But here I shall defer a more detailed examination of the relationship of humour to *ethos* and *pathos* to a later section. The importance given to humour (shown by the length of the discussion – nearly a tenth of the work) is a significant development in the history of rhetoric, and Cicero is credited with having been the first to attempt an exhaustive treatment of humour within the rhetorical context¹². Greek rhetorical handbooks in general contained little or none of this type of study, and the Greek quasi-philosophical writings of a specific nature *de ridiculis* contributed little to the theory *de ridiculo* and appear to have been mainly concerned with giving examples (*de orat.* 2,216; cf. L-P III 173)¹³.

⁸ Cf. off. 1,111 *omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae, tum singularum actionum... in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus*.

⁹ Cf. on C.’s relation to the theatre from this perspective, see above, ch. 5.

¹⁰ Cf. Quint. 6,3,4 on jokes attributed to C.: *ut quo sunt magis vulgaria, eo sit credibilis, illa non ab oratore ficta, sed passim esse iactata*. And yet, Quint. 6,3,48 thinks that on occasion C.’s humour was excessive and descended almost to the level of the *scurile*, cf. Plut. comp. Dem. & Cic. 4.

¹¹ 2,236 : remarkably A. HAURY: *L’ironie et l’humour chez Cicéron*. Leiden 1955 neither quotes nor refers to this important passage anywhere in his book.

¹² On the other surviving ancient treatments of wit and humour (Quint. 6,3; rhet. Her. 1,10; Demetr. de elocut. (128–78) and Plut. quaest. conv. 2,1; praec. ger. reip. 7): see L-P III 190.

¹³ Demetr.’ de eloc. 128 ff. is not a discussion of the laughable, although traces of Peripatetic work *περὶ χάριτος* (by Theophrastus?: cf. Diog. Laert. 5,48) can be found which conveyed doctrine of laughable. Furthermore, the date of the work is of course still controversial. There is no proof that Cic. knew either. Demetr. of Phalerum, Theophrastus’ pupil also wrote a *περὶ χάριτος* (Diog. Laert. 5,81), but as is clear from

Granted then, that Cicero's exposition of humour is an innovation in the rhetorical context, and that he did not draw on – at any rate Greek – rhetorical sources, is there a possibility that he relied on other theoretical works, and more specifically, as we have suggested above, on treatises on comedy? That was a view widely held at one time, and even till quite recently. There are at least two points in Caesar's discourse which seem either to have been derived from the field of poetics, and specifically from comic poetics. One is the 'ugliness' theory of laughter given at 2,236 ff. (cf. 2,248. 289 'similitudine turpioris'): commentators have long drawn attention to the resemblance this bears to Aristotle's definition in the poetics 1449a32 ff. and many have been of the opinion there is some connexion, whether immediate or indirect between the two passages¹⁴. For us today who no longer accept that Cicero had first-hand knowledge of the poetics, a direct connexion is out of the question, and yet it is undeniable that there are Aristotelian elements here (so L-P III 192, 206). On the other hand, one might add that as this definition of the *locus...et regio quasi ridiculi* is an 'ethical' part of the discourse, it could equally have originated not from a work of poetics, but from a Peripatetic work such as Theophrastus' *περὶ γελοίου*, or more likely (since it seems clear that Theophrastus could not have been used, given the rejection in 2,217 of Greek theoretical works *de ridiculis* as containing nothing but *insulsitas* – hardly a description one imagines Cicero could have used of Theophrastus¹⁵) from a work of a similar type containing some ethical formulations of Peripatetic stamp.

The second is at 239 ff. where Cicero divides the first of the two kinds of wit (*duo genera...facetiarum, quorum alterum re tractatur, alterum dicto*) into two further sub-categories which seem to resemble those found in two of the Greek excerpts on comedy that are found attached to the Aristophanic manuscripts. The two sub-categories making up this *ridiculum in re* are 1) *narratio* or *fabella* (240) and *imitatio depravata* (242)¹⁶. Now in the

the respective lists in Diog. Laert., both Theophr.'s and Demetr.'s (of Phalerum) works were ethical, not rhetorical. On other ancient, pre-Ciceronian works on the laughable (Arist.'s lost second book of the poetics, Theophr.'s *περὶ γελοίου*, Neoptolemus' (of Parium) *περὶ ἀστεϊσμῶν*), of which there is no proof that Cic. had any knowledge, see L-P II 190 f.

¹⁴ Cf. VOLKMANN: *Rhet.* Leipzig 1885², 289; WILKINS ad loc.; E. ARNDT: *De ridiculi doctrina rhetorica*. Diss. Kirchain 1904, 27 f.; M. A. GRANT: *The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable*. Madison 1924, 19, 24 f., 71, 79; L. COOPER: *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*. Oxford 1924, 89; R. A. PACK: 'Errors as subjects of comic mirth.' *CPh* 33 (1938) 406; PLEBE 72; L-P III 206.

¹⁵ ARNDT 26 recognised the difficulty ('sed num verisimile est eum [sc. Cic.] viros doctissimos et clarissimos [sc. Theophrastum et Demetrium Phalereum] appellare insulsos?') but got around it by ingeniously suggesting that this complaint about the absurdity of the theoretical parts of the Greek works was perhaps copied from the Greek source, that is, from either Theophr. or Demetr. The general argument of ARNDT's discussion (26 ff.) of the Caesar discourse is that Cicero has many points in common with the Peripatetics which indicate a Peripatetic source, probably Theophrastus or Demetrius Phalereus. On the impossibility of Demetr. Phaler. as a source for the Caesar discourse (there is no evidence for a work by him *περὶ γελοίου*), see L-P III 191.

¹⁶ This interpretation which the L-P commentary follows, has recently been rejected by H. PINKSTER, one of the authors of that commentary in 'The structure of Cicero's passage on the laughable in *de oratore* II.' in

Tractatus Coislinianus¹⁷, and in the two prolegomena VI KOSTER and XIb KOSTER¹⁸, laughter is said similarly to arise from two categories, ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως, and ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων. Nine sub-categories of γέλως ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων are given by the Tract. Cois.¹⁹, but the two prolegomena give for the category ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων only the first two, with the comment: ἐκ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τρόπους δύο. Bernays thought the omission in Proleg. VI KOSTER of the rest of the sub-categories was due to a lazy excerptor²⁰. This opinion prevailed until ARNDT (13; cf. 28 f.) first discovered the striking similarity between the isolating of these two sub-categories ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων in the Proleg. VI KOSTER²¹ and Cicero's *Sonderstellung* of two types of *ridiculum in re*. What is more, Cicero adds a comment at the end of his discussion of his types of *ridiculum in re* which seems to correspond to the Prolegomenon's κατὰ τρόπους δύο: *ergo haec duo genera sunt eius ridiculi, quod in re positum est* (2,243). At first glance one should think that by this comment Cicero means these two are the only kinds of *ridiculi quod in re positum est*, but from 2,264 ff.

D. Longrée (ed.) *De usu. Études de syntaxe latine offertes en hommage à Marius Lavency*. Bibliothèque des cahiers de l'institut de linguistique de Louvain. Peeters Louvain-la-neuve 1995. According to this revised interpretation, the two kinds of wit introduced at the end of section 239 (*duo genera...facetiarius, quorum alterum re tractatur, alterum dicto*) do not constitute 'the first and basic classification' in the response to the fifth question posited in 235 (*quintum quae sint genera ridiculi*), but are, on the contrary only two of a possibly longer series of examples that might be adduced in response to the fourth question in 235 (*quartum quatenus*). The two further sub-categories of humour in *re* (cf. 2,243: *ergo haec duo genera sunt eius ridiculi quod in re positum est*, paraphrased by L-P thus: 'dies sind die beiden (my italics) Arten des auf einer Handlung beruhenden Witzes') are likewise, according to PINKSTER'S revised interpretation, not significant. Cf. PINKSTER (1995) 251 f.: 'There is...no indication in the text that there are only two...there may be more...I find no support for the interpretation of *duo genera* as "die beiden Arten".'

¹⁷ To this treatise, the sole MS of which (Parisinus Coislinianus 120) belongs to the tenth century, various dates have been attributed. JANKO 8 thinks its originated in late antiquity, most probably in the sixth century. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that the material of the tractate derives ultimately from Peripatetic sources (cf. KOSTER iii & COOPER 13). Some critics, most notably JANKO 42 ff., have argued that the tractate betrays a close affinity with Aristotelian thought.

¹⁸ These two prolegomena, which indisputably bear some relation to the tractate, are preserved in Aristophanic MSS dating from the 11th or 12th (Venetus Marcianus 474) to the 14th centuries.

¹⁹ Of which only three or four are possibly paralleled in C.'s *ridicula in re*: (ἐκ τῆς ἀπάτης, ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιώσεως = narratio/fabella & imitatio depravata (240,242) (on ἀπάτη, cf. Arndt 13: 'generum Ciceronianorum prius (fabella vel narratio ficta) mihi cognatum visum est ἀπάτη illi catalogi; nam quamquam non ignoro haec verba diversa esse, tamen etiam fabella genus quoddam fallaciae est, ac quoniam factis orator audientes decipere non potest, fabellam appellavi ἀπάτην oratoriam'); ἐκ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀνακολούθου, ἐκ τῶν παρὰ προσδοκίαν = discrepantia (281) & praeter expectationem (284). W.L. GRANT: 'Cicero and the Tractatus Coislinianus.' *AJPh* 69 (1948) 80–86 who totally rejected a connexion between the Tractatus Coislinianus and Cicero, accepted (84 f.) only one possible point of concordance for the respective lists ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων and *in re*, the last, that is, ἐκ τῶν παρὰ προσδοκίαν = discrepantia (281) & praeter expectationem (284). Apart from this, GRANT accepted only two other possible points of concordance between the Tract. Cois. & de orat. II: the 'common division into content and expression' (*in verbo* & *in re*) and of the categories *in verbo*, *ambiguum*–*ὁμωνυμία*. All three points however are dismissed as inconsequential, given their frequency in rhetorical theory. His interpretation is thus utterly at variance with that of ARNDT (1904) 32 who, while admitting the deficiency of concordances between the lists ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων and *in re*, held that the respective lists ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως and *in verbo* in the Tract. Cois. & C. were virtually identical (cf. 35: 'ita igitur congruunt catalogus Coislinianus et Ciceronis disputatio, ut dubitari omnino nequeat, quin ex eodem fonte scriptores hauserint.')! It should be observed that R. JANKO'S list (*Aristotle on Comedy. Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II*. London 1984, 165) of C.'s categories *in re* is grievously incomplete: he identifies only 11 categories; L-P III 195 have 23 (Grant 1948,81 counts 26)! For comic humour as being derived from τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν, cf. also Hermog. meth. 34 = p. 451,11 RABE.

²⁰ J. BERNAYS: *Zwei Abhandlungen über die aristotelische Theorie des Drama*. Berlin 1880, 180.

he returns to *ridicula in re*²², and now he says that they are many, although again we meet *narratio*, and *similitudine quae aut conlationem habet aut tamquam imaginem* (266) which has been supposed by various interpreters to be the same as the *imitatio depravata* of 242²³. On the basis of these similarities, ARNDT suggested with some hesitation that Cicero's catalogue reflected something of the structure of an unknown *fons communis* used by the excerpts. In this structure, the first two categories *in re* are at first marked off from the rest (for what reason is unclear) but later joined with them: 'itaque statuendum esse putavi iam in excerptorum communi fonte ut apud Ciceronem genera brevis spatii separata fuisse ab iis quae latius paterent.'

Although this hypothesis was advanced with the utmost caution by ARNDT (so much so that at the end of his discussion he allows his reader, if unconvinced by his hypothesis, to return to the laziness of the excerptor: 'haec si cui minus probabiliter exposita esse videntur, refugiat ad ignaviam excerptoris!'), it was enthusiastically revived by JANKO in his attempt to reconstruct the second book of Aristotle's poetics. He accepted that there is a connexion between Cicero's source and the Tractatus Coislinianus and the excerpts on comedy²⁴. He goes further still, for having accepted a comedy-poetics source for Cicero's discussion of humour in the second book of *de oratore*, he finds fault with Cicero's terminology on the grounds that he has inappropriately applied comedy terms to rhetoric! He writes (192): 'Thus these two items [sc. ἀπάτη and ὁμοίωσις] are Aristotelian, but applied to the *stage-actions* of comedy, as they could not in the rhetoric. This conclusion

²¹ Wrongly ascribed by him to John Tzetzes.

²² PINKSTER (1995) 250 saw a difficulty in the L-P interpretation which first divides humour into the two categories *in re* and *in dicto* (based upon 2,239) and then further divides the category *in dicto* in two further sub-categories *in verbo* and *in re*. 'Things are even worse, because in the supposed subclass *res* there is an explicit reference back to the superclass *res* (2,264 *quod ante posui*).'

²³ GRANT (1924) 109 f.; H. HERTER: (Discussion of previous work) *Gnomon* 3 (1927) 726. This identification is rightly rejected by L-P: on which, see their discussion III 180. Much of the confusion over the classification of wit in the Caesar discourse, especially with regard to the categories *in re* (2,264 ff.) is due to the fact that many scholars (e.g. GRANT 1924, 109-11; JANKO 1984, 188 f.) have erroneously thought the *prima partitio* of 248 & 252 into the two classes of witticisms one *in re* and the other *in verbo* (thus the categories *in re* 264 ff. are covered by this *partitio*) is equivalent to the division in 239 f. *duo enim sunt genera facietiarum, quorum alterum re tractatur, alterum dicto*. This confusion has been lucidly cleared up in the L-P commentary (III 177 ff., 188 ff.) where it is convincingly shown that there are two divisions in the Caesar discourse, one in 218 which is the same as that in 239 f. (*cavillatio-in re* & *dicacitas-in dicto*), and a second which is utterly different, in 248 & 252 *in re* and *in verbo*. The first division *cavillatio-dicacitas* (sustained humour of longer passages as against the short, pointed utterance = our 'witticism') or *in re-in dicto* is of Roman origin, and not to be confused with the well known rhetorical contrast *in re-in verbo* which we meet in 248 & 252. Thus the categories *in re* in 264 ff. are not a continuation of 239-42; the *facietiae in re* there consist of two categories only: *narratio* & *imitatio depravata*.

²⁴ JANKO (1984) 35 n. 2: 'The number "two" is paralleled in Cic. de orat. II 243... It appears that his source reflected a structural feature of the Treatise'; 73 '...it seems best to assume that Cic.'s source was in some way related to our treatise on comedy; 104; 188 ff. JANKO'S terminology is somewhat confusing: by 'treatise' or 'Treatise on Comedy', he means now the Tractatus Coislinianus, now the Tractatus Coislinianus and the other obviously related excerpts taken as a whole and used together in his reconstruction. Cf. JANKO (1984) 4.

explains why both Demetrius and Cicero having headings under *πράγματα*, an unsatisfactory term especially for rhetoric...' (sic)²⁵.

On the other hand, even if JANKO's amplified version of ARNDT's hypothesis were correct, it may be questioned whether this justifies the attempt to examine the Caesar discourse for theoretical formulations on comic humour and comedy, on the grounds that this discourse, although placed wholly in a rhetorical context, relies ultimately on sources concerned with the poetics of comedy. Clearly, it does not follow that simply because Cicero drew on poetics sources, therefore he would have applied to comedy the theoretical principles he found in those sources in the same way as he applies them to oratory. Rather, the attempt to extrapolate Ciceronian views on comic humour from a rhetorical discourse is justified, because, as I have argued, Cicero *did* apply rhetorical theory to literary and poetic criticism. In any event, another, exhaustive study, appearing in the L-P commentary (III 193 ff.) a few years after JANKO's reconstruction, has shown that such a notion of a connexion between Cicero's source and the Aristotelian or Peripatetic doctrine of comedy must be treated with the utmost caution, and that in the case of the minute details of the respective classifications of wit, such a notion is impossible. L-P argued that the (up to then) almost universal practice²⁶ of relating Cicero's classification of witticisms to the alleged Aristotelian theory of comedy (based on the excerpts and the Tractate) was misguided, since there is clear evidence that Cicero used at least one, specific Greek and – it may be demonstrated – rhetorical, source in this classification²⁷; the alleged connexion between Cicero's source and the excerpts of comedy *vis-à-vis* the categories of the laughable is thus untenable. In 2,288 Cicero clearly alludes to at least one Greek source which has three categories of 'thing-witticisms' (*exsecrationes*, *admirationes*, *minationes*). These three categories are unknown to the comedy excerpts and to the texts adduced for the

²⁵ JANKO without warrant presupposes that Demetr. & C. are each trying in different ways to apply the comic-poetics concepts of the first two kinds (story/ tales /deception & imitation/making alike/ comparison) of humour which involve *πράγματα* ('stage-actions') to their respective subjects (in Demetr. the source of charm, in C. the source of humour). In fact, there is no proof that either Demetr. or C. was trying to transfer these comedy concepts to rhetoric, but on the contrary, there is evidence – at any rate in C.'s Caesar discourse and above all in the analysis of the humour categories therein – that demonstrates that C.'s source and perspective are here entirely rhetorical. JANKO seems to be unaware that the distinction between thing-figures & word-figures was a feature of rhetoric perhaps from the second century, that is to say, well after Arist. & Theophr. (the origin of the definition of the distinction has been sought in Apollodorus of Pergamon or in his predecessors). Thus C. in transferring this post-Aristotelian distinction of figures to the classification of witticisms (252: 'it's a joke *in re* when the humour remains whatever words you use; it's a joke *in verbo*, when it loses its wit when the words are changed'), has used his terminology appropriately, and entirely in harmony with the discipline of his age. On the distinction between the figures, see G. BALLAIRA: 'La dottrina delle figure retoriche in Apollodoro di Pergamo.' *QUCC* 5 (1968) 37-91.

²⁶ There have been exceptions: G. AMMON: 'Bericht über die Literatur zu Ciceros rhet. Schriften 1903–04(05).' *JAW* 126 (1905) 170-71; GRANT (1948) 80–86; G. M. A. GRUBE: *The Greek and Roman Critics*. London 1965, 187.

²⁷ As AMMON (1905) 170 f. observed, most of the *genera ridicula* in the Antonius discourse are style figures. See further L-P III 194 ff. for parallels of the Ciceronian *genera ridicula* with other rhetorical treatises on the figures, which all point to a rhetorical source for the Antonius discourse.

reconstruction of the Peripatetic theory, but they do appear in rhetorical works as style-figures (*exsecrationes* de orat. 3,205; *admiration*: cf. orat. 135, Quint. 9,2,26; *minationes*: cf. Quint. 9,2,103; orat. 138²⁸). A still more significant piece of evidence adduced by L-P (III 194) is Quint. 6,3,70, where we are informed that some authors classified the categories of wit according to the style figures: *figuras quoque mentis, quae σχήματα διανοίας dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnis* [not *omnia* as in L-P!], *in quas nonnulli diviserunt species dictorum*. This hypothesis of a rhetorical source is also confirmed by the two facts that the only concordances between Cicero's catalogue and that of the Tractatus Coislinianus are style-figures²⁹, while the concordances between Cicero's catalogue and that of the rhet.Her. 1,10 are more significant than those between Cicero and the Greek writings³⁰.

On the other hand, L-P III 197 & 200 do also recognise for the Caesar discourse a source which is probably related to a work on comedy, but this is not for the classification of wit according to the style figures. Here we are dealing with a source which makes a broader division into 'theatrical' humour or wit, and speech or verbal-humour. That contrast, which we also meet in the Tractatus Coislinianus, is undoubtedly derived from the Peripatetic theory of comedy. L-P conjecture that the source here was a Latin tradition, whether oral or written, which tried to adapt the Peripatetic theory of comedy to the needs of rhetoric. In Cicero's treatment, we have as 'theatrical' forms those comprised under *cavillatio*: *narratio*³¹ and *imitatio depravata*³²: these are given prominence precisely because they alone of the categories of wit are 'theatrical', that is, they call upon the orator's mastery of *actio*; the rest of the categories (2,253 ff.) are classes of humour which are clearly based on speech, and can be classified according to the style-figures which are divided in word- and thing-figures³³. But again, there is no possibility of direct Ciceronian acquaintance with the writings of either Aristotle or Theophrastus on comedy. L-P III 200 write: 'Man darf da unseretwegen von "peripatetischem Einfluß" reden, wenn man nur hinlänglich berücksichtigt, welch ein ärmliches Relikt der aristotelisch-theophrastischen Tradition uns

²⁸ For more references, see L-P III 194.

²⁹ *ambiguum* (253–56) – ὁμωνυμία *verbi immutatio* (paronomasia: 256) – παρωνυμία; *translatio* (metaphor: 262) – ἑξαλλαγή *similitudo*, *collatio*, *imago* (265–6: as a figure cf. 3,205 & 207) – ὁμοίωσις; *praeter expectationem* (284 f.: as a figure cf. Tiberius περὶ σχημάτων 16 Spengel III p. 66,22) – παρὰ προσδοκίαν.

³⁰ Cf. L-P III 199.

³¹ Shown to be 'theatrical' from 2,241: *est...huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores eius de quo narres, ut sermo, ut voluit omnes exprimantur, ut iis qui audiunt tum geri illa fierique videantur*.

³² Cf. 2,242: *quid aliud fuit, in quo contio rideret, nisi illa voltus et vocis imitatio...vero cum dixit et extento brachio paulum etiam de gestu addidit... ex hoc genere est illa Rosciana imitatio senis...*

³³ Thus it is clear that the alleged 'separation' of *narratio* and *imitatio depravata* does not reflect a supposed structural feature found in the excerpts (in particular Proleg. VI KOSTER), but exists for two reasons not related to comedy: 1) the two sub-categories of *cavillatio* belong to a different division from that to which belong the categories *in re* which are identified 264 ff. (*in re-in dicto* as against *in re-in verbo*); 2) the two sub-categories of *cavillatio* refer to 'theatrical' aspect of the orator's art, that is his *actio*, whereas those categories *in re* mentioned 264 ff. are all speech-based jokes: thus C. is emphasising two kinds of humour which are of use to the orator in his *actio*.

darin vorliegt, und wie weit diese Art von Lehren von der wirklichen peripatetischen Komödietheorie entfernt ist’.

The evidence of the Caesar discourse contributing to the reconstruction of Cicero’s views on comedy, the comic genres and comic humour may now be divided into four classes according to the putative source or object of the piece of evidence in question.

1. *The classification of witticisms derived from a rhetorical source on the figures: de orat. 2,253 ff.*

Under this head, all that needs to be said for now is that Cicero clearly admired these classes of word- and thing-jokes, and would doubtless have sought examples of them in the comedies³⁴.

2. *A section of the Caesar discourse derived from a rhetorical source influenced by Aristotelian poetics.*

Here we are talking about the ‘ethical’ parts (235 ff.) of the theory of the laughable, especially the definition of the *locus...et regio quasi locus ridiculi* (the ‘ugliness’ theory) in 236. The section has some connexion with Aristotle’s definition of comedy in poet. 1449a34 where we read the sentence τὸ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν³⁵. It may therefore be inferred that Cicero would have thought about the humour of comedy in universal, Aristotelian terms³⁶.

3. *The sections of the Caesar discourse possibly derived from comedy-poetics sources*

Under this head we have the broader division into ‘theatrical’ categories of humour, and humour based on speech (239 f.; 248 ff.). Cicero would have viewed comedy with these categories in mind.

4. *Various condemnations against low or vulgar humour, including that of several comic genres (see below)*

5. *A favourable quotation of an unidentified comedy in which Roscius acted (242).*

³⁴ See below § 7.6.3 II b for more on this subject.

³⁵ Cf. GRANT (1924) 78 f. ARNDT 27 f. PACK’s attempt to find Arist. influence in the section 2,237–39, is refuted by L-P III 206.

³⁶ Cf. BLÄNSDORF 146: ‘In den Anschauungen über Wesen und Wirkung der Komödie zeigt sich Cicero noch am ehesten von der Kunsttheorie aristotelischer Prägung abhängig.’

7.3 types of humour condemned in the Caesar discourse

I wish now to discuss the aspects of comic literature of which Cicero disapproved and for the purposes of this I shall draw upon and discuss the evidence in the Caesar discourse mentioned above under the fourth head. Again, it must be acknowledged that all this evidence occurs in a strictly rhetorical context, and concerns the kind of humour that does not befit an orator. But, as I have constantly argued, it is mistaken to think that Cicero would not have applied these same principles to his assessment of comic humour. The kind of refined humour that he admired and advocated for the orator and Roman gentleman is the same that he would have relished above all in the comic theatre. Obviously, not all the characters of comedy are of high station, but even the 'low' characters of the Roman comedies are capable of coarse humour on the one hand, and refined wit, clever repartee, and other forms of innocuous jests. Moreover, it is significant that in the Caesar discourse the types of humour that are deprecated are either directly related to the comic theatre or could conceivably be applied to it. The following passages may illustrate this:

239 sed quaerimus idem, quod in ceteris rebus maxime quaerendum est, quatenus; in quo non modo illud praecipitur, ne quid insulse, sed etiam, si quid perridicule possis, vitandum est oratori utrumque, ne aut scurrilis iocus sit aut mimicus.

242 atque ita est totum hoc ipso genere ridiculum, ut cautissime tractandum sit; mimorum est enim et ethologorum, si nimia est imitatio, sicut obscenitas. orator surripiat oportet imitationem, ut is, qui audiet, cogitet plura quam videat; praestet idem ingenuitatem et ruborem suum verborum turpitudine et rerum obscenitate vitanda.

244 in dicto autem ridiculum est id, quod verbi aut sententiae quodam acumine movetur; sed ut in illo superiore genere vel narrationis vel imitationis vitanda est mimorum et ethologorum similitudo, sic in hoc scurrilis oratori dicacitas magno opere fugienda est.

245 f. ergo haec quae cadere possunt in quos nolis, quamvis sint bella, sunt tamen ipso genere scurrilia; ut iste, qui se vult dicacem et me hercule est, Appius, sed non numquam in hoc vitium scurrile delabitur.

247 temporis igitur ratio et ipsius dicacitatis moderatio et temperantia et raritas dictorum distinguunt oratorem a scurra, et quod nos cum causa dicimus, non ut ridiculi videamur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid, illi totum diem et sine causa.

251 f. atque hoc etiam animadvertendum est, non esse omnia ridicula faceta. quid enim potest esse tam ridiculum quam sannio est? sed ore, vultu, imitandis motibus³⁷, voce, denique corpore ridetur ipso; salsum hunc possum dicere atque ita, non ut eius modi oratorem esse velim, sed ut mimum. qua re primum genus hoc, quod risum vel maxime movet, non est nostrum: morosum, superstitiosum, suspiciosum, gloriosum, stultum³⁸: naturae ridentur ipsae, quas personas agitare solemus, non sustinere. alterum genus est in imitatione admodum ridiculum, sed nobis furtim tantum uti licet, si quando, et cursim; aliter enim minime est liberale; tertium, oris depravatio, non digna nobis; quartum, obscenitas, non solum non foro digna, sed vix convivio liberorum.

To these may be added from the following passage from the orator :

88 illud admonemus tamen ridiculo sic usurum oratorem ut nec nimis frequenti ne scurrile sit, nec subobsceno ne mimicum, nec petulanti ne improbum, nec in calamitatem ne inhumanum, nec in facinus ne odii locum risus occupet, neque aut sua persona aut iudicium aut tempore alienum.

Notes on the above passages.

Cicero's³⁹ *scurra* mentioned in de orat. 2,239. 244. 245. 246 and also alluded to in orat. 88 refers to the *scurra* of mime, but in fact the name is both a general term for an obnoxious figure in society⁴⁰, a city idler, often well-to-do; and also a specific term for an entertainer, the professional mime, a *saltator* and *ioculator*, who plays the rôle of a malicious, interfering, witty gossip⁴¹. The *scurra* is mentioned in Plautus⁴², but he is not a Plautine character nor a stock character of the *palliatae*⁴³. Thus the *scurra* has theatrical associations, strictly speaking, only with the mime.

³⁷ *imitandis motibus*: supported by Nonius cod. G & L-P's preferred reading; *imitandis moribus*: HL, and the reading in KUM.'S ed.; cf. L-P ad loc.

³⁸ This list L-P ad loc. regard as containing 'verschiedene Typen mimischen Benehmens'.

³⁹ C.'s attack on the *scurrae* may also have had personal motivations behind it: Macr. Sat. 2,1,12 informs us that his enemies frequently called him a *scurra*. As a Ciceronian term of political abuse, see P. CORBETT: *The Scurra*. Scottish Classical Studies 2, Edinburgh 1986, 59 ff.

⁴⁰ CORBETT 27 ff., esp. 32, 38, 60 f. etc.; GRANT (1924) 91 ff.

⁴¹ CORBETT 27, 38, 44.

⁴² CORBETT 27 ff.

⁴³ CORBETT 26, 44 f.

The *sannio* of 251 whose name is of uncertain origin⁴⁴ seems to be a buffoon who moves laughter especially by means of bodily actions and facial contortions. Cf. Non. p. 61, 3 ff. *sanniones...qui sunt in dictis fatui et in motibus et in schemis*. Some derive the word from a Latin comic entertainer mentioned by Diodorus (37,12,2) called Σαννίων (?) who οὐ...μόνον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐκίνει γέλωτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν σιωπὴν καὶ καθ' ὁποῖαν σώματος ἐπιστροφὴν ἅπαντας ἐποίει τοὺς θεωμένους μειδιᾶν... Terence has it as a proper name in the *Adelphoe*. SUTTON 34 thinks the *sannio* of our passage is the buffoon not in the mime, but rather in the Atellan farce.

References to the *scurra* and the *sannio* are respectively juxtaposed with comments about the *mimus*, and are thereby brought into closer connexion with the theatre.

Thus the following vices are identified by Cicero in the use of humour:

1. lack of *moderatio* and *temperantia*: 239, 244, 246, 247 (the last three refer to the use of *dicacitas*); this vice is that of the *scurrae*: cf. orat. 88⁴⁵). There are also sub-categories of this kind:
 - a. caricature taken too far, *nimia imitatio*: 242, 244 (a vice of the *mimi* & *ethologi*)
 - b. *narratio* of the *mimi* and the *ethologi*: 244
2. foul language and obscenity of subject-matter: 242 (the vice of the *mimi* cf. orat. 88), 252
From the four types of humour condemned in 251 f.⁴⁶ (two of which are already mentioned, caricature – *imitatio*⁴⁷ and obscenity) we may add the following two:
3. the clownish appearance and acting (e.g. of the *sannio*): *sed ore, vultu, imitandis motibus*⁴⁸, *voce, denique corpore ridetur ipso*: 251
4. facial contortion: 252 (*oris depravatio*)

A conclusion may easily be drawn from these findings: the censure in the Caesar discourse of the uses of humour in the comic theatre all concern excesses found not in comedy, but in the other comic genres⁴⁹, chiefly the mime⁵⁰. The censure of these types of humour

⁴⁴ Cf. WILKINS & L-P ad loc.

⁴⁵ *illud admonemus tamen, ridiculo sic usurum ut nec nimis frequenti, ne scurrile sit, nec subobsceno, ne mimicum...* Note, however, Quint.'s 6,3,48 judgement that on occasion C.'s humour was *paene... scurrile*.

⁴⁶ Cf. GRANT (1924) 89 f.

⁴⁷ On the assumption that the *imitatione* of 252 is the same as the *nimia imitatio* of 242.

⁴⁸ The *imitando* here is not of the same character as in *nimia imitatio* above. So rightly L-P ad loc. explaining why they rejected *imitandis moribus* in 251: 'moribus kann unmöglich richtig sein: erstens imitiert ein sannio keine Charaktere'. COOPER 89 is mistaken when he compares the list following (*morosum, superstitiosum etc.*) to the Theophrastean sketches and the characters of New Comedy.

⁴⁹ Obscenity, if the emendation of Quint. 6,3,47 (from *obscura* to *obscena*) is correct, seems to have been a feature of the Atellana. BEARE CR 44 (1930) 167 & CR 51 (1937) 213 ff., however, defends the reading of the MSS (*obscura* = 'riddles'). Quint. 10,1,100 complains of the theme of 'disgusting' pederasty in Afranius' togatae

indicates that in general Cicero felt the mime was not worthy of his attention as a Roman of good breeding: *...tertium oris depravatio, non digna nobis; quartum, obscenitas, non solum non foro digna, sed vix convivio liberorum* (252). The *vix convivio liberorum* means that such obscene humour is unacceptable *even* in a private setting⁵¹, in gentlemen's leisure and entertainments – thus, by extension, it might be taken to mean the kind of theatre to be eschewed, or at any rate, disdained by the Roman man of good breeding. On the other hand, even in the mime certain types of jokes are praised, the taking of words literally rather than according to the sense (259), and the class of jokes called *subabsurda* (274).

7.4 reaction to obscenity in comedy

Despite what we might regard as the obscenity and indecency of many elements in Roman comedy⁵², there is no evidence to suggest that Cicero was particularly offended by these elements. Doubtless, there were popular, vulgar types of humour in the *palliatae* and *togatae* which were not exactly to his taste, but ZILLINGER's 24 f.⁵³ and GRANT's (1924) 98 f. attempts to extend the Ciceronian condemnation of obscenity or indecency of language and subject matter in the mimes and the farces to comedy are without foundation.

In fact there is no passage in any work of Cicero in which obscenity and comedy are ever explicitly connected in a condemnatory fashion⁵⁴. There are, apart from those in the *de orat.* just examined, three passages which are usually adduced in support of the contention that Cicero condemns obscenity in comedy. These are:

which, Quint. alleges, merely revealed Afranius' own character: *utinam non inquinasset argumenta puerorum foedis amoribus, mores suos fassus* – but even here it is unclear whether this would have constituted obscenity, especially since one cannot tell from Quint.'s testimony whether sodomite or pederastic activity was represented on the stage, or merely alluded to.

⁵⁰ On C.'s dislike of mime, see GRANT (1924) 50 f., 88 ff.; J. BLÄNSDORF: 'Das Bild der Komödie in der späten Republik.' in U. REINHARDT u. K. SALLMANN (Hrsg.): *Musa Iocosa*. Hildesheim - New York, 1974, 145 f.; D. FERRIN SUTTON: 'Cicero on minor dramatic forms.' *Symbolae Osloenses* 59 (1984) 29 f. The study of C.'s relationship to the mime in H. REICH: *Der Mimus. Ein literar-entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Versuch*. Berlin 1903, 61 ff. is perverse. Rightly therefore does GRANT (1924) 89 complain: 'REICH ... is too ardent a partisan of the mime to do Caesar's attitude toward it exact justice'. SUTTON (1984) 35 n. 2 mistakenly includes REICH among those to whom 'C.'s disdain of mime is well known'.

⁵¹ So rightly ARNDT 31 'hoc convivium liberorum in quo paulo plus licentiae quam in foro...'

⁵² See DUCKWORTH 1952, 291 ff.; J.N. HOUGH: 'Miscellanea Plautina: vulgarity, extra-dramatic speeches, Roman allusions.' *TAPhA* 71 (1940) 186–198; C.B. GURLITT: *Erotica Plautina. Eine Auswahl erotischer Szenen aus Plautus*. München 1921.

⁵³ He makes the condemnation of mime obscenity refer also to Plautine comedy: 'Wenn er die starken, oft obszönen Spässe der zeitgemäßen Posse, vor deren Nachahmung er den Redner warnt, an verschiedenen Stellen (z. B. *de or.* 2,239. 242. *or.* 88) tadelt, so geht dieser Tadel stillschweigend auch auf Plautus... Plautus war gewiß auch dem Cicero eher der Vertreter des derben, obszönen Witzes, den Cicero selbst ängstlich vermied.'

⁵⁴ The distinction between the obscenity and indecency in mime and the relative lack thereof in comedy is pronounced in Diomedes' *ars grammatica* III. In his description of comedy in GL I 489 KEIL there is nothing to parallel what he later says of mime (I, 491): *mimus est sermonis cuius libet < imitatio et > motus sine reverentia, vel factorum et < dictorum > turpium cum lascivia imitatio*.

1) orat. 88, already quoted;

2) rep. 4,11 (= Aug. civ. 2,9)

numquam comoediae, nisi consuetudo vitae pateretur, probare sua theatri
flagitia potuissent.

3) Tusc. 4,69

o praeclaram emendatricem vitae poeticam, quae amorem flagitii et levitatis
auctorem in concilio deorum conlocandum putet! de comoedia loquor, quae, si
haec flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino...

As what was said of the passages from the Caesar discourse applies equally to orat. 88, nothing more need be said about the latter. Of the other two, the following observations can be made: each uses the term *flagitia* not *obscena* or *obscenitas* (nor are the two synonyms here: cf. TLL s.v. 'flagitium' III 1: 841,13 – hence not III 2; and yet in another context the two terms might be conjoined⁵⁵); the sentiment in each is roughly the same: if society did not tolerate or approve these *flagitia*, either comedy would not exist, or these *flagitia* could not be exalted on the stage⁵⁶. What these *flagitia* are we shall try to determine more precisely below; for now, I infer on the grounds of the difference of terminology that in neither of the two passages with which we are concerned does Cicero explicitly condemn in comedy obscenity either of language or of subject-matter.

In a notorious letter to Papirius Paetus (fam. 9,22) where Cicero responds in a light-hearted vein to an obscene word (*mentula*) appearing in a letter sent to him by his correspondent, we find a very different Cicero from the Cicero with whom we are often presented in works such as ZILLINGER'S who fantasizes that Cicero entertained a puritanical horror of obscenity⁵⁷. For here he shows himself able to appreciate, and indeed, to defend with elegant wit the enlightened view of the Stoics on obscenity (or rather, on the non-existence of obscenity both in words and subject-matter). The Stoic doctrine is that we ought to call a spade a spade. So be it, says Cicero, and he likes it when Paetus talks

⁵⁵ So in the fam. 9,22 C. writes: *nam si quod sit in obscenitate flagitium...*; cf. off. 1,104 *unum (sc. iocandi genus) ...inliberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum*.

⁵⁶ Cf. Aug.'s civ. 2,14 adaptation of C.: *di tales, qui etiam seminanda et augenda flagitia curaverunt, talia vel sua vel quasi sua facta per theatrales celebritates populis innotescere cupientes.. frustra hoc exclamante Cicerone, qui cum de poetis ageret....*

⁵⁷ Those who attempt to argue that *even* this letter is proof of Cicero's inherent abhorrence of obscenity are answered by SHACKLETON-BAILEY *ad loc.*: '[T]hat Cicero controverts or refutes the doctrine [sc. of the Stoics] is a hallucination of certain annotators...the whole thing is a *jeu d'esprit*'. This is obviously the most natural reading of the letter, and is confirmed as such at the very end of the letter, where in stating ('not very solemnly') a preference for 'Plato's modesty' he implies that he rejects not the Stoic doctrine, but simply the practice advocated by it, and this, not on moral grounds, but because it is his custom to do otherwise. GRANT (1924) 81 ff., is one of those who interpret fam. 9,22 as a refutation of the Stoic paradox.

in an uninhibited fashion with him; for his part, he merely uses the chaste language of Plato because that's what he is used to (see text quoted below)⁵⁸. This agrees with the picture we have painted above of a Cicero who was not overly offended by obscenity even though it was not particularly to his taste. The relevant parts of the letter are as follows:

amo verecundiam! – vel potius libertatem loquendi. atqui hoc Zenoni placuit, homini mehercule acuto, etsi Academiae nostrae cum eo magna rixa est. sed, ut dico, placet Stoicis suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim disserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu; nam, si quod sit in obscenitate flagitium, id aut in re esse aut in verbo; nihil esse tertium. in re non est. itaque non modo in comoediis res ipsa narratur (ut ille in 'Demiurgo'

'modo forte –'

nosti canticum. meministi Roscium: 'ita me destituit nudum.'

totus est sermo verbis tectus, re impudentior) sed etiam in tragoediis. quid est enim illud

'quae mulier una'

... (1) vides igitur cum eadem res sit, quia verba non sint, nihil videri turpe. ergo in re non est. multo minus in verbis. si enim quod verbo significatur id turpe non est, verbum, quod significat, turpe esse non potest ... (2) igitur in verbis honestis obscena ponimus (4)

And here is the end of the letter:

habes scholam Stoicam: ὁ σοφὸς εὐδυσσεύμονήσει. quam multa ex uno verbo tuo! te adversus me omnia audere gratum est; ego servo et servabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te scripsi quae apertissimis agunt Stoici. sed illi etiam crepitus aiunt aequae liberos ac ructus esse oportere...

It is significant above all, that fam. 9,22,1 is the only passage in Cicero in which there are grounds for arguing that Cicero acknowledges a connexion between comedy and obscenity; yet the following circumstances are significant:

1) He says there is no obscenity in the language (*totus est sermo verbis tectis, re impudentior*): 'totus...sermo verbis tectus' seems to imply that comedy (at any rate of the type written by Turpilius) uses concealed, euphemistic, not improper language. In this connexion it is again

⁵⁸ This preference for modest language does not prevent him from employing veiled obscene humour by means of suggestion and innuendo in his own letters and speeches. Cf. Quint. 6,3,25 on the *pyxis Caeliana* of Cael. 69; also Quint. 6,3,76. See further KATHERINE A. GEFFCKEN: 'Comedy in the Pro Caelio.' Leiden 1973, 28 ff. esp. 42. For oral-sex innuendo in C. (cf. Cael. 34 – the alternative interpretation to that of *drinking* water after fellatio, namely, that of douching the vagina after intercourse is scarcely less obscene) cf. ADAMS 213 & n.1; also 222 f. & n. 3. C. confesses that the veiled, but obscene joke to Clodius which he reports in Att. 2,1,5 was a *non consulare...dictum*. On his preference for Platonic *verecundia* of language, cf. BÜCHNER (1974) 167.

significant that St Augustine (civ. 2,8), who depends greatly in the second book of the *de civitate dei* on the fourth bk. of Cicero's *rep.*, found comedy (and tragedy) to be less objectionable than the other dramatic forms by reason of their relative lack of obscenity (at least of language); he states that comedies and tragedies are the two forms of *ludi* that are tolerable, and that even school boys are made to learn them, because, although they may contain shameful subject-matter, nevertheless they do not contain obscene language: *multa rerum turpitudine, sed nulla saltem, sicut alia multa, verborum obscenitate compositae*.

2) The subject matter is called *impudentior* ('rather more immodest'), not *obscenum*.

3) Although Cicero writes *in comoediis*, the example taken from these is not Plautus or Terence, but rather from Turpilius: this example may represent for Cicero, not all of comedy, but merely one particular style of comedy such as Turpilius wrote which was *re impudentior* (or rather, which contained *turpitudinem in re*: cf. 9,22,3). Even with regard to Plautus, who is generally agreed to be more bawdy than Terence, it is known that his so-called obscenities are far fewer and milder than those of other comic poets both before (with the exception possibly of Menander) and after him: see DUCKWORTH 291 ff. For the general avoidance of lexical obscenities by both Ter. & Plaut., see J. N. ADAMS: *Lat. Sexual Vocab.* London 1982, 218 f.

5) Cicero attributes to tragedy instances of the same kind of subject-matter obscenity or immodesty. Thus there is no suggestion in Cicero of a specifically 'comic' obscenity such as one might have expected to find.

Lastly, one might add that the fact that Cicero here cites a performance of Roscius, tends to undermine a theory which holds on the basis of the letter fam. 9,22 that Cicero found obscenity in comedy morally repugnant. Cicero's profound admiration for his friend's consummate art as an actor and for his moral qualities as a gentleman would seem to preclude the actor's involvement – at any rate, in Cicero's mind – with any disgraceful activity arising out of the use of obscenities such as the performers of 'lower' dramatic genres such as mime are associated with (*de orat.* 2,242. 251. *orat.* 88)⁵⁹. For Cicero, whatever Roscius performed on stage was worthy of witnessing and of study (*de orat.* 1,130); the orator should strive in his delivery to attain the gestures and gracefulness of Roscius (*de orat.* 1,251: *Roscii gestum et venustatem*). In Q.Rosc. 18 Cicero asks: *estne quisquam, qui tibi purior, pudentior, humanior, officiosior, liberaliorque videatur?* At the very least, even if we accept that the subject matter of the works performed by Roscius was at times *impudentior*, yet this was conveyed in guarded language, and nothing was so exhibited on the stage as to

⁵⁹ On his friendship with Roscius, see above ch. 5; on his admiration of the actor's art, cf.: *de orat.* 1,30. 251. 2,233. For R.'s moral qualities: cf. Quinct. 78. Q.Rosc. 18. 23.

detract from Roscius' personal *venustas* and *pudor*, otherwise Cicero's comments on these qualities of Roscius would be pointless.⁶⁰

If it is cause for surprise to find the conservative defender of the *mos maiorum* espousing the enlightened attitude to obscenity that we have inferred from *fam.* 9,22 – albeit an enlightened outlook that still prefers modesty in language –, perhaps even more surprising is the passage *de officiis* 1,103 f. At the beginning of this passage, Cicero's argument is that the Roman gentleman or freeman is not born to spend his time in jesting and facetious play. Nevertheless, some humour and sport are permissible, but only as relaxation or recreation, just as we use sleep and rest to recover from our *severitas* and *studia graviora atque maiora*. Thereupon Cicero divides humour into two kinds: that kind which abounds in excess, immodesty, sordidness, lewdness, outrageousness, and *obscenity*, and the other which is discerning, urbane, clever, witty. Not into the former class, but into the latter does he next place Plautus and the 'Atticorum antiqua comoedia'⁶¹. Having thus declared Plautus and this 'ancient comedy of the Attics' as belonging to that class of humour worthy of the gentleman, he next adds the remarkable comment that the humour unworthy of a gentleman can be easily discerned (*facilis...distinctio*) by the fact that it contains *rerum turpitudine...aut verborum obscenitas*. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: for Cicero, Plautus and the 'ancient comedy of the Attics' were either not obscene, or (but this is not what the text says) only mildly so in comparison with other scenic entertainments such as mime (cf. *orat.* 88. *de orat.* 2,242)⁶². Thus on the basis of this passage, the thesis is untenable that Cicero regarded as obscene the humour of Roman comedy – or at any rate the humour of Plautus, who indisputably surpasses Terence both in the quantity and explicitness of his sexual humour.

The argument for a Ciceronian objection to obscenity in comedy based upon an alleged, general moral objection to obscenity is weak. Despite his preference for modest language (*verecundiam Platonis*), Cicero has been shown to resort on occasion to obscene humour in his speeches and letters, even if in a veiled and allusive way. The speech *pro Caelio* is particularly rich in this kind of humour⁶³, and it is significant that this speech abounds in

⁶⁰ Against these observations must be weighed the testimony of *Quinct.* 78 where C. states that Roscius, although so brilliant an artist that he alone seems worthy of watching on the stage, is a man of such a calibre that he alone (among actors) seems unfit for the stage! Again, however, it should be observed that in the censure of the stage here there is no explicit link with obscenity, and the remark about the unworthiness of the stage for so great a man as Roscius as a kind of gentleman may refer merely to the traditional (class!) prejudice of the aristocratic Romans towards those involved with the theatre. For more on this prejudice, see § 7.5.2 below. Cf. also LAIDLAW (1960) 61.

⁶¹ On the meaning of this expression, see Appendix V.

⁶² On the obscenity of mime, see REICH 170 ff.; on C.'s reaction to obscenity in mime, see REICH 65, 67; GRANT (1924) 82, 90 f.; SUTTON (1984) 29.

⁶³ See n. 58 above.

elements (often intentionally) reminiscent of comedy and the comic theatre⁶⁴. Thus ADAMS rightly comments that although the 'orator had to be euphemistic', and although 'lexical obscenities and mildly risqué words are absent from the speeches of Cicero', yet '[t]he modest silence of the orator was to some extent a disingenuous pose. The speeches of Cicero are full of references to sexual practices, unnatural and otherwise, and of sexual invective'⁶⁵.

7.5 aspects of comedy condemned

Obscenity then may be discounted as an objectionable feature of comedy. Of the four following aspects of comedy to be discussed below, three certainly did earn Cicero's censure; in the case of the fourth (pathos), however, his attitude appears to have been somewhat ambivalent.

7.5.1 *flagitia*

1) *flagitia*⁶⁶: 'outrages', 'enormities', 'scandals', conduct that is shocking and involves one in disgrace. This word, as was stated above, is not in passages such as rep. 4,11 (*numquam comoediae, nisi consuetudo vitae pateretur, probare sua theatri flagitia potuissent*) and Tusc. 4,69 (*o praeclaram emendatricem vitae poeticam, quae amorem flagitii et levitatis auctorem in concilio deorum conlocandum putet! de comoedia loquor, quae, si haec flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino*) a synonym of *obscena* or *obscenitas*. Even if *flagitia* refers solely to sexual misdemeanours (OLD s.v. 4 c), obscenity need not be present. The distinction is clear from fam. 9,22,1 *si quod sit in obscenitate flagitium...*; nor is obscenity present in passages such as rep. 4,12 (*flagitium facere*)⁶⁷ and nat.deor. 3,91 (*portenta enim ab utrisque [sc. Stoicis et poetis] et flagitia dicuntur*) where *flagitia* or *flagitium* is used in reference to the poets and their works. The context of each passage shows what is meant by *flagitia* in any particular instance. The two passages Tusc.

⁶⁴ Cf. GEFFCKEN, esp. 17; AUSTIN ad C. pro Cael. 35 '*inducere* is the t.t. for 'to bring on the stage'.

⁶⁵ ADAMS 222.

⁶⁶ *flagitia* rep. 4,11. (cf. nat.deor. 3,91) Tusc. 4,69. *flagitiosi* Tusc. 4,68. *flagitium facere* rep. 4,12. *flagiti* Tusc. 4,69. *flagitio* Tusc. 4,70.

⁶⁷ Although this passage looks like a quotation from the Twelve Tables, the fact that the corresponding text in Tusc. 4,4 is worded differently (in fact without *flagitium*) and likewise the fact that one does not expect to find this type of relative clause with the final sense (LEUMANN-HOFMANN-SZANTYR 558, 708) suggest that this passage is C.'s interpretation of this section from the Twelve Tables. See BÜCHNER, Komm. de re publica, 384 f., who comments further on the use of *flagitium* here: '*flagitium* – mit *facere* verbunden heißt es seit Plautus eine Schandtät begehen...'

4,69 and rep. 4,11 in which the *flagitia* of comedy are discussed convey similar or identical judgements on the nature and origin of these *flagitia*. In the Tusc. passage, we are dealing with misdemeanours motivated by love as *insania* (4,72) or *furor* (4,75): *stupra...et corruptelas et adulteria, incesta* (4,75). In the rep. passage, we are meant to understand not only such shameful deeds as are wont to be committed under the influence of, or in aid of, the love-passion (cf. 4,9 *quas inflammant cupiditates*), but also other kinds of outrages commonly found in the New Comedy. The list of misdemeanours found in the Policraticus 7,9 of John of Salisbury, even if this latter text does not contain a genuine fragment of rep. 4,9⁶⁸, perhaps well gives a general idea of what Cicero means by the *flagitia* of comedy: *hi supra adulteriaque conciliant, varias doli reparam artes, furta, rapinas, incendia docent...* Cf. BÜCHNER'S comment ad rep. 4,11: '*flagitia*, Schandtaten wie Vergewaltigungen, Betrug, Untaten aus Geiz, die Themen der Komödien...'⁶⁹ The term, then, has a wider application in the rep. passage than merely 'sexual misconduct or instances of it' (*pace* OLD s.v. 4 c), although there is no doubt that misdemeanours of a sexual kind are included in the term.

Observe that the *flagitia* decried in the rep. 4,11 are ascribed apparently only to comedy⁷⁰ – thus reversing the position adopted by Plato in his 'analogous' condemnations in the Republic where the scandalous behaviour and outrages cited mostly concern those of the gods and the heroes of epic and tragedy⁷¹. In the passage from the Tusc. 4,68 ff., however, although Cicero writes *de comoedia loquor* when illustrating the *flagitia* that he is speaking of, he then goes on to give examples from tragedy, after which he repeats the charge of *flagitia*: *sed poetas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem*. Thus in the Tusc. passage at any rate, the condemnation of the poetic *flagitia* is not restricted to comedy only, but extends also to tragedy.

⁶⁸ This text is printed in KRARUP'S ed. of the rep. as constituting part of 4,9; ZIEGLER in his ed. only alludes to it in a notice appended to 4,9; BÜCHNER in his comm. 372 rejects this section of Policr. 7,9 as an interpolation; as does HECK 252. SOLMSEN Mus.Helv. 13 (1956) 48 ff. alone 'mit recht problematischen stilistischen Argumenten' accepts this text as Ciceronian.

⁶⁹ The flexibility in the use of the word *flagitia* may be seen from a comparison of this text rep. 4,11 *numquam comoediae, nisi consuetudo vitae pateretur, probare sua theatri flagitia potuissent* with Tusc. 4,69 *de comoedia loquor, quae, si haec flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino*. In this comparison we see two closely related texts, the latter of which clearly harks back to the former, and yet we find a difference in the use of the term *flagitia*: in the first passage it bears the wide range of meanings as suggested by BÜCHNER; in the latter, its range of meanings is restricted to cover only those misdemeanours prompted by the amorous passions (cf. HEINE'S note ad loc.).

⁷⁰ So rightly BÜCHNER Komm. 381; cf. SOLMSEN (1956) 50 on the Policraticus of John of Salisbury 7,9. As BÜCHNER also points out, we are dealing here with the 'Neue Komödie und ihren Abkömmling, die römische'.

⁷¹ E.g. 378 ff.; the condemnation of comedy in 606c concerns not the *flagitia* of comedy but its gratification of base emotions in the audience (*γελωτοποιεῖν*), analogous to tragedy's gratification of πάθος. It is, of course, possible – perhaps even likely, given his Platonic model – that C. also condemned the *flagitia* of tragedy and epic in the Bk. 4 of the rep., but there is no surviving evidence to support this, unless perhaps Aug. civ. 2,14 (one may justifiably accept that civ. 2,8–14 in general is indebted to the Bk. 4 of the rep.) – a chapter concerned with the Platonic expulsion of the poets: see above n. 56.

If it is not unlikely, given the Platonic model, that Cicero's condemnation of the *flagitia* represented on the stage extended to tragedy also and perhaps even to epic, we must nevertheless acknowledge that in Cicero there is an emphasis on comedy which is wholly lacking in Plato. There is another aspect of Cicero's critique in the rep. of the *flagitia* on stage which departs radically from Plato's 'analogous' (if one may use that term at all) condemnations in his Republic. Plato repeatedly attacks the untruthfulness of the poets' representations on the stage and in epic and recommends that the laws for his state require that poetry be truthful (376e ff. 382a)⁷² – truthful at any rate in so far as this 'truth' conforms to his canons of poetic composition laid down in 379a ff.⁷³ Cicero's complaint, on the other hand, is that the *flagitia* of the comic stage are all too true! I do not mean they are true in the way that Plato demands that an event depicted in a poem must have happened and in exactly the way that it is said to have happened (see for example, 378c⁷⁴) – nor does Cicero mean this, that is to say, for example, that there was a young man who was really called Chaerea who did the things that Terence relates him to have done in the *Eunuchus*; but true in the ethical sense with which Hellenistic philosophy was greatly concerned⁷⁵; Plato of course disallowed such 'deeper sense' truth (*ὑπόνοια*) in poetry (378d). Thus we have here in Cicero's condemnation of the *flagitia* of comedy an example of what SOLMSEN (1956) 64 calls the 'juxtaposition and occasional blending of Platonic and Hellenistic motifs'. The view maintained in Bk. IV of Cicero's rep. regarding the ethical concern of comedy is noticed by BÜCHNER (Komm. 381) who compares it with Rosc. Am. 47: (*in comoedia*) *effictos nostros mores in alienis personis expressamque imaginem nostrae vitae quotidianae videmus*. Whether the notion of an ethical concern of comedy in Bk. IV of the rep. is supported by the famous 'comedy as a mirror of life' utterance preserved in Aelius

⁷² So Aug. civ. 2,14: *An forte Graeco Platoni potius palma danda est, qui cum ratione formaret qualis esse civitas debeat, tamquam adversarios veritatis poetas censuit urbe pellendos?*

⁷³ On Plato's distinctive attitude toward truth in poetry, see N. GULLY: 'Plato on poetry.' *G & R* 24 (1977) 154–169, esp. 163 ff.: 'He proclaims the truth of certain general principles which are to serve as the state's guide-lines for literature... Literary statements exemplifying the principles are approved and may be propagated as literally true; literary statements incompatible with the principles are condemned as false and disallowed...' cf. 166: 'The overriding criterion is the moral effect of particular fictions on audience or reader.'

⁷⁴ Here he forbids the telling of stories about the gods warring against each other because such stories are not true: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ.

⁷⁵ Although SOLMSEN'S (1956) 50 remarks on C.'s attitude toward comedy in the rep. were based on a disputed attribution of a greater portion of the Policr. 7,9 of John of Salisbury than is generally allowed by many commentators, he seems to have hit rightly upon the Ciceronian fusion of Hellenistic and Platonic ideas in Bk. 4: 'Using the – presumably Hellenistic – definition of comedy as *speculum consuetudinis*, C. repudiates comedy because it "mirrors" the bad habits of life; further grounds for condemnation are that it stirs the emotions and that it gives undignified accounts of the gods. These are Platonic arguments; C. has transferred and adapted to comedy what in Plato had been a criticism of tragedy...the juxtaposition and occasional blending of Platonic and Hellenistic motifs is perhaps the most remarkable feature in C.'s critical approach to literature.' Cf. FRAENKEL 1960, 368 n. 2. The metaphor of literature as a mirror of life, however, goes even further back than the Hellenistic period, for Alcidas called the *Odyssey* a καλὸν ἀνδρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, an utterance that earned Arist.'s censure (rhet. 1406b12). Cf. PFEIFFER 50 f. For another example in C., cf. Pis. 71 with NISBET's note ad loc.

Donatus excerpt. de com. 5,1 p. 22,19 WESSNER = rep. 4,13 ZIEGLER, or on the contrary, as BÜCHNER thought, merely makes the attribution of that fragment to the rep. probable, is a difficult question to determine. I defer a discussion of this problem and related questions concerning the fragment to a later section of this chapter.

Furthermore, Cicero's critique of poetry in Bk. IV of the rep. differs from Plato in another significant way. With regard to the *flagitia*, not only is there a shift in emphasis from tragedy and epic to comedy, as well as a different approach to the nature and rôle of truth in the representation of these *flagitia*, but there is also a more practical view of the impact on the audience of the representation of the *flagitia* in the theatre. Of Plato's sophisticated and more abstract concerns about poetry's being at a third remove from reality, about its falsehoods and inducement to effeminacy through the sympathetic reaction of the audience, through its weakening of the rational element in the soul and feeding of the baser elements⁷⁶, we find no trace in the fragments of Cicero's rep. Thus a simplification of Plato's objections seems to have occurred in Cicero's work. The latter's two main concerns here, *flagitia* or the proposing of bad examples to the public and the slandering of prominent citizens are practical and typically Roman⁷⁷ – or rather, were felt by the Romans to be peculiar to themselves⁷⁸. John of Salisbury in the Policraticus 7,9 writes: *malorum exempla proponunt* (sc. *poetae*) *oculis multitudinis imperitae*. To illustrate this, he cites the example of young man from the Eunuchus of Terence, who, upon seeing a painting where *inerat pictura haec, Iovem quo pacto Danae misisse aiunt quondam in gremium imbrem aureum*, he feels justified in committing a similar misdemeanour⁷⁹. PÖSCHL (1936) 136 f. and SOLMSEN (1956) 42 ff. attributed the *adulescens Terentianus* of John's Policrat. 7,9 and the

⁷⁶ A Platonically inspired version of this notion is found in Tusc. 2,27 where the context of enduring pain through various means, but above all through the use of reason (2,42) is more amenable to the Platonic notion than is that of Bk. 4 of the rep.

⁷⁷ The term *flagitium* often, if not always, bears an undertone of distinctly Roman flavour and reminds us of the process of Italian popular justice, *flagitatio* (though admittedly, despite their etymological kinship, they are not connected): cf. Don. on Ter. Eun. 382: *flagitium more militari dicitur res flagitatione hoc est increpatione digna* (cf. Serv. Aen. 2,124). On *flagitatio*, see FORDYCE on Catull. 42 & comm. 412 f. with references to others: H. USENER: 'Italische Volksjustiz.' *RhM* 56 (1901) 1 ff.; E. FRAENKEL on Catull. 42, *JRS* 51 (1961) 46 ff.

⁷⁸ Notice Aug.'s (civ. 2,9) comments on rep. 4,11: *et Graeci quidem antiquiores vitiosae suae opinionis quandam convenientiam servarunt, apud quos fuit etiam lege concessum, ut quod vellet comoedia de quo vellet nominatim diceret*; and the critique of Old Comedy in comparison with the *verecundia* (cf. BÜCHNER 376 fin., 377 & 379 fin.) of the Roman law at 4,11–12: *quem illa non adtigit, vel potius quem non vexavit? cui pepercit? esto, populares homines improbos, in re publica seditiosos, Cleonem, Cleophontem, Hyperbolum laesit. patiamur, inquit, etsi eiusmodi cives a censore melius est quam a poeta notari; sed Periclem, cum iam suae civitati maxima auctoritate plurimos annos domi et belli praefuisset, violari versibus et eos agi in scaena non plus decuit, quam si Plautus noster voluisset aut Naevius Publio et Gnaeus Scipioni aut Caecilius Marco Catoni maledicere. dein paulo post: nostrae, inquit, contra duodecim tabulae cum perpaucas res capite sancissent, in his hanc quoque sancendam putaverunt, si quis occentavisset sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri: praeclare; iudiciis enim magistratuum, disceptationibus legitimis propositam vitam, non poetarum ingeniis, habere debemus, nec probum audire nisi ea lege ut respondere liceat et iudicio defendere*. The issue of freedom of speech and Attic comedy was, however, not as straightforward as C. implies. Evidence of some hostility to unbridled freedom of speech is provided by the law that prevailed between 439 to 436 *μη κωμωδεῖν*: on which, see below, n. 145.

⁷⁹ Aug. civ. 2,7 & conf. 1,16,26 likewise condemns this Terentian passage for its corrupting influence on schoolboys.

accompanying criticisms of poetry all to Cicero's rep. HECK 253 on the contrary, rejected such an attribution, arguing that Augustine's epist. 91,4 provided the model for John's combining of Cicero's critique of the dramatic poets with the example from Terence's *Eunuchus* 585 ff.⁸⁰ Whatever the case may be, it can hardly be doubted that the argument of the corrupting influence of bad examples (of the gods?) as given in the comedies as opposed to the good examples of heroic personalities of historic figures such as Cato, was present in Bk. IV.

7.5.2 *levitas*

Levitas ('triviality', 'frivolity', 'silliness', 'folly'): on poetry as an *ars levior*, see the section devoted to this subject in the chapter on the definitions of poetry (§ 2.11). I add here to that section only considerations as to the factors contributing to the *levitas* of dramatic poetry in general and more specifically to that of comic poetry.

We have already observed that Cicero, following the tradition of the Romans, attributed *levitas* to poetry and to all those involved with it. To that may be added the assertion that comedy and the other comic genres, for reasons that we shall examine here, were regarded by Cicero as the poetic genres most profoundly stamped with *levitas*. The Romans of the later Republic believed that it was their own ancestors' contempt for the dramatic arts – one might say, their attribution of *levitas* to these arts – which caused those associated with the theatre to be relegated to their low social and political status⁸¹. This much Cicero argues implicitly in the rep. 4,10: *cum artem ludicram scaenamque totam in probro ducerent, genus id hominum non modo honore civium reliquorum carere, sed etiam tribu moveri notatione censoria voluerunt*⁸². One is not to suppose then that the low esteem in which the actors and the composers of

⁸⁰ HECK'S similar rejection of the thesis that this critique of the dramatic poets combined with the Terence quotation in Aug. epist. 91,4 derives from Bk. 4 of Cicero's rep. is less convincing. The fact that the Terence quotation in Aug. epist. 91,4 is 'sandwiched' closely between two explicit references to the rep. make the grounds for the attribution to that work very strong indeed. May we also detect a reference to the Terence-Eunuchus episode depicting Jupiter's *flagitium* in the Danae myth in Tusc. 4,70: *sed poetas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem?* If we may, then, given that this Tusc. passage bears some relation to Bk. 4 of the rep., it is all the more plausible that the Eunuchus quotation was found in the latter. I agree with BÜCHNER in his commentary on the rep. 374 f. who attacks HECK'S 'categoric handling' of the passage from the Pollicraticus and approves (while acknowledging some interpolations) the earlier attempts of SOLMSEN and PÖSCHL to place this passage among the fragments of the rep. More on this below.

⁸¹ On the status of actors at Rome, see WRIGHT 23 ff.; T. FRANK: 'The status of actors at Rome.' *CPh* 26 (1931) 11–20; W.A. LAIDLAW: 'Cicero and the stage.' *Hermathena* 94 (1960) 56–66, esp. 61; SUTTON (1984) 30; PEASE ad de div. 1,80 'ut ad leviora veniamus'. C. himself indicates the long-standing prejudice towards actors among other places in Catil. 2,59: *nemo in scaena levior aut nequior qui se non eiusdem prope sodalem fuisse commemoret*.

⁸² According to BÜCHNER (Komm. ad loc) we are to understand the first wish of the Romans *honore civium reliquorum carere* as referring to slaves (and freedmen); the second, *tribu moveri notatione censoria* as referring to those Roman citizens who appeared on the stage (or to use St Augustine's words: *quisquis civium Romanorum esse scaenicus elegisset*).

the plays were held both on the social and political levels originally contributed to the belief in the *levitas* of drama: that would be to put the horse before the cart, so to speak. Yet it is certainly likely that we are here dealing with a self-perpetuating prejudice, that is to say, a prejudice one of whose effects in a later age becomes a cause: the low status of actors and the composers – even if that condition was initially enforced by law and custom – later confirms the belief in the *levitas* of the dramatic arts.

Observe that the status of the actors at Rome again provides Cicero with another opportunity for emphasising the *gravitas* of the early Romans as compared with the lack thereof among the Greeks. With the Athenians the acting profession was not only not disreputable, but on the contrary, so esteemed that those who were attached to it were often entrusted with public offices of the highest honour⁸³. Cicero informs us (presumably with indignation) in the rep. 4,13⁸⁴ that Aeschines, though as a youth he had acted in tragedies, engaged in politics (*rem publicam capessivit*); likewise that Aristodemus the tragic actor was sent as ambassador to Philip to negotiate matters of the highest importance for the state. Cicero, on the contrary, plays on the traditional prejudices of the Romans towards the theatrical and acting professions when in Phil. 11,13 he tells us that two of Antony's satellites, Nucula and Lento, were involved with the theatre, *quorum alter commentatus est mimos, alter egit tragoediam*. 'These references by Cicero,' comments WRIGHT 15, 'are clearly intended to be derogatory.' In the speech pro Archia 10 Cicero also declares that the Greek states often conferred citizenship on actors even though, in Roman eyes, such men were endowed *aut nulla aut humili aliqua arte*⁸⁵.

It is a tendency or posture of the upper classes in most stratified societies to disdain the vulgar tastes and so it was among the Roman aristocracy – hence Cicero represents the interlocutors of some of his dialogues as having temporarily abandoned the city in order to escape the games and other public festivals: so de orat. 1,24. nat.deor. 1,15. rep. 1,14. fin. 3,8⁸⁶. Thus for Cicero the very vulgar appeal of the theatre and of the games was itself a contributing factor to the *levitas* of those entertainments (off. 2,56 f.⁸⁷ Mur. 38⁸⁸). On the

⁸³ On the social status of Greek actors, see PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE DFA 279 f.

⁸⁴ This passage is preserved in Aug. civ. 2,11 where St Augustine is trying to prove the consistency of the Greeks as against the Romans. The former, argues St Augustine, were consistent because they honoured and thought worthy of honour those who were involved in the *ludi scaenici* which were approved by the gods.

⁸⁵ Aristocratic Roman contempt for the acting profession is also found in back-handed compliments such as Rosc. 17. Quinct. 78. On which passages, cf. LAIDLAW 1960, 61.

⁸⁶ Cf. also fam. 7,1,1: *si te dolor aliqui corporis aut infirmitas valetudinis tuae tenuit quo minus ad ludos venires, fortunae magis tribuo quam sapientiae tuae; sin haec quae ceteri mirantur contemnenda duxisti et, cum per valetudinem posses, venire nolueris, utrumque laetor, et sine dolore corporis te fuisse et animo valuisse, cum ea quae sine causa mirantur alii neglexeris...* On traditional Roman, aristocratic contempt for the theatre, cf. Varr. rust. 2, pr.3. ant.rer. div. fr. 1,55 = Aug. civ. 4,31. Liv. 7,2,13.

⁸⁷ *ipsaque illa delectatio multitudinis ad breve exiguumque tempus <quaeratur>, eaque a levissimo quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria quoque moriatur voluptatis. bene etiam conligit haec pueris et mulieris et servis et servorum simillimis*

other hand, it is not unbecoming for one from the ruling classes on occasion to admit to interest in the games: see for example Mur. 39: *si nosmet ipsi qui et ab delectatione communi negotiis impedimur et in ipsa occupatione delectationes alias multas habere possumus, ludis tamen oblectamur et ducimur...* (cf. Att. 2,8,2), and 40: *qua re delectant homines, mihi crede, ludi etiam illos qui dissimulant, non solum eos qui fatentur; quod ego in mea petitione sensi*. But if the tastes of the people are contemptible, hardly less so are the aediles and others who, in order to curry favour with the masses, spend lavishly on staging the games (off. 2,55 ff.), though Cicero concedes on this point that, if a candidate hopes to advance through the *cursus honorum*, he must according to custom and within reasonable limits surrender to the popular tastes and give the public the amusements it demands (off. 2,58)⁸⁹. One should take care to note that the *levitas* decried here is not only the ethical and intellectual *levitas*, but also partly that political *levitas popularis*, the *levitas* of demagogy⁹⁰. Indeed, those who pandered to the masses (*qui ea, quae faciebant quaeque dicebant, multitudini iucunda volebant esse*: Sest. 96) especially by means of distributing *largitiones* are invariably associated in Cicero's writings with the *levitas* of the *populares*⁹¹.

The preoccupation of much of Menandrian New Comedy and of its Roman derivatives with love⁹² is for Cicero another contributing factor to comedy's *levitas*. That Roman criticism associated love themes especially with comedy seems to be evinced by Servius' commentary on the Aen. 4,1 p. 458 THILO-HAGEN, where Servius calls the style 'almost comic' (*paene comicus stilus*) and states this is little to be wondered at, given that the subject-matter is love. The last section of the fourth book of the Tusc. deals with the healing of the passions and disorders of the mind (*perturbationes mentis* 4,58 ff.). One of these disorders is described as an 'irrational exaltation of the spirit' (4,13), and it is associated with the excess

liberis esse grata, gravi vero homini...probari posse nullo modo. It should be remarked, however, that the emphasis in off. 2,55–58 appears to be on the gladiatorial and non-scenic entertainments of the games.

⁸⁸ *nam quid ego dicam populum ac vulgus imperitorum ludis magno opere delectari?* On the vulgarity of the games and of the theatre in general, cf. Att. 7,1. fin. 5,63. Tusc. 1,36–37.

⁸⁹ This concession justifies his own actions as aedile in 69 when he put on games in honour of Ceres, of Liber and Libera, and of Flora (Verr. 5,36 – of these, however, those in honour of Flora only were scenic games; cf. also Mur. 40), especially in view of the fact that he was not extravagant in his expenditure (off. 2,58). On the loss of popularity suffered by aediles who disregarded the people's taste for the games, cf. auct. de vir. illustr. 72,4.

⁹⁰ Cf. Phil. 5,49: *omnem vim ingenii, quae summa fuit in illo, in levitate populari consumpsit*, Phil. 7,4: *qui propter levitatem populares habebantur*. Brut. 103; possibly also rep. 4,7 = Non. p. 194, 26: *in cive excelso atque homine nobili blanditiam ostentationem ambitionem † meam †* [codd. *notam* IUNIUS CAST. *nimiam* SIGONIUS *merae* L. MÜLLER *rear* BÜCHNER] *esse levitatis*.

⁹¹ Cf. Sest. 139. off. 2,55 f. The *popularis* is compared (by means of a quotation from Ter.'s Eun.) with the comic *assentator* Lael. 93–95; he is a fawner, a flatterer, a 'yes-man'. Cf. YAVETZ 51 f., 97 ff. See below for more on this subject.

⁹² Cf. Plut. fr. 134 SANDBACH ap. Stobaeum IV 20,34 *περί ἔρωτος*; cf. Ov. tr. 2,370 *fabula iucundi nulla est sine amore Menandri*. Diom. ars GL I 488,14 ff. KEIL: *comoedia a tragoedia differt, quod...introducuntur...in illa luctus exilia caedes, in hac amores, virgines raptus*.

of delight⁹³ that one commonly observes in the lovers depicted in comedy. Thus in 4,67 Cicero contrasts legitimate gladness (illustrated by Naevius' Hector who expresses joy at his father's praise) with the illegitimate *animi elatio*, the excess of delight in which a young lover, ecstatic in the anticipation of love-making, indulges in a scene from a comedy by Trabea. This young lover, like many others in Roman comedy towards whom the poets wish the audience to be sympathetic, is guilty of that elation (here, in their love-affairs) typical of trivial men, or men characterised by *levitas*: *ut nimis afflicti molestia, sic nimis elati laetitia iure iudicantur leves* (4,66).

The citation of the scene from Trabea's comedy is followed by a somewhat digressionary⁹⁴ diatribe against love⁹⁵ (69–76) furnished with examples taken from Roman drama – mostly from comedy, though two are from tragedy⁹⁶ – and concluded with prescriptive remedies. Love is declared to be a kind of insanity (*insania* 4,72; *insanus* 4,73; *furor* 4,76), hence it is diametrically opposed to the intellectual *gravitas*, as GROSS 758 observed: 'sie [sc. *gravitas*] ist gepaart mit prudentia (ad Q. fr. 1,2,3. Balb. 50), mit sapientia (Tusc. 4,57. nat. deor. 1,1), mit consilium (Pis. 19. 23), dem richtigen Urteil... [*gravitas*] steht in dieser Verbindung dem ratlosen furor... gegenüber, auch der humilitas, der bedenkenlosen Meinungsäußerung (Cic. fam. 1,9 [8], 3. inv. 1,109)'. Otherwise, if no loss of reason ensues, love causes the perversion of reason for an evil purpose, as is alleged in nat.deor. 3,72. Here the main argument is that reason is not a gift from the gods because often it is abused and applied to a wicked end. Of the proofs offered for this argument, Cotta first adduces examples of reason abused by mythical characters in tragedy (3,66 ff.); after these, he introduces comedy:

Medea modo et Atreus commemorabantur a nobis, heroicae personae inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes. quid levitates comicae parumne semper in ratione versantur?

All the examples from comedy which follow involve the justification of some misdemeanour connected with the cause of love. Again, apart from the symptoms of the love-passion just mentioned, another mental quality attaches itself to those afflicted with

⁹³ Observe C.'s distinction between *gaudium* and *laetitia* in 4,13: *nam cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur... cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exsultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt, sine ratione animi elationem*. Cf. also fin. 3,35.

⁹⁴ The digressionary nature of the passage is suggested not only by the numerous and extensive quotations from the poets (note esp. C.'s parenthetical comments: *de comoedia loquor...quid ait ex tragoedia princeps ille Argonautarum... sed poetas ludere sinamus...*), but also by the structure of the final section of Bk 4. From section 63 onward C. deals with the individual disorders of the mind; each disorder occupies only one or two sections (grief 63; fear 64; unrestrained delight 66–67; desire 66 [?]), except for anger and love: the former fills three (77–79), the latter nine sections (68–76).

⁹⁵ For another diatribe against love and the disturbances of mind and loss of reason that it causes, cf. Lucret. 4,1037 ff.

⁹⁶ Another quotation – attacking the custom of nudity – elicits not indignation but praise from C., and this is of Ennius and probably is not from a dramatic work.

the same malady, namely, inconstancy, or a failure to adhere to a set of principles. This quality is seen often in amatory poetry, especially in the young men of comedy (4,76), and it has been remarked that virtues opposed to this quality are characteristic of those associated with *gravitas*. Thus GROSS 755: '*Standhaftigkeit*. Neben der Bedeutung «Würde» verbindet sich mit G. auch die von Festigkeit des Charakters, Prinzipientreue...es ist nicht immer leicht, diese Bedeutungen klar voneinander zu scheiden...'97

We also learn in the diatribe against love in the Tusc. that the mental disorder occasioned by love is a thing disgusting in itself: *perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore foeda per se est* (4,75). That vulgar, lustful love is altogether of such exceeding triviality (*tantae levitatis...*) that Cicero can think of nothing with which to compare it (4,68); comedy proves its utter lack of morality by the fact that it so exalts Love, that *flagitii et levitatis auctor*, as to think it worthy to be placed in the council of the gods (4,69). The remedy for one afflicted with the kind of love-madness depicted in the theatre is to show him the triviality of his passion (*illud quod cupiat ostendatur quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihili sit omnino...4,74*)98. Elsewhere, irrationality is attributed not merely to the love-passion but specifically to amatory poetry – especially comedy – as a stimulant to the love-passion. Thus in rep. 4,9 = Aug. civ. 2,14, Cicero denounces the deleterious effect on public morality of the *pathos* connected with love and depicted in comedy: *ad quos cum accessit...clamor et adprobatio populi quasi cuiusdam magni et sapientis magistri, quas illi obducunt tenebras, quos invehunt metus, quas inflammant cupiditates!* BÜCHNER 372 comments: 'Es geht um Komödien und Tragödien zusammen...Das unheimliche der Massenpsychose steht im Vordergrund... *Inflammant cupiditates* ...läßt sich nur auf die Komödie beziehen. Schauspiele haben also einen negative Wirkung auf die Moral und zwar eine umso schlimmere als ihre Ansichten von einer Öffentlichkeit gebilligt erscheinen.' Now although the dramatic arts are not the main subject of the passage from the Tusc. 4,66 ff. (its chief purpose is to attack the popular erotic love, the passions it arouses, the general loss of reason attending its presence, and the outrages that it occasions), it is evident that comedy and drama in general, as media by which this kind of love is advertised and represented *sympathetically* are similarly subject to some of the criticisms that Cicero levels against those who surrender themselves to this mental disorder. This applies particularly to 4,68 and the beginning of 4,69. Cicero does not here take, as he does elsewhere, the view that comedy allows us to see ourselves as in a mirror and invites us, as does satire, to laugh at the follies of men. Having here quoted a comic passage that

97 For the combination of *gravitas* / *gravis* with *constantia* / *constans*, see for example, Flacc. 89. Phil. 7,5,14. Tusc. 4,61. ad Q.fr. 1,1,20.

98 Cf. 4,76: *nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, haec ipsa per sese quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria...* Another passage from Roman comedy, this time from Terence' Eunuchus, is quoted to illustrate this triviality.

praises love, Cicero exclaims ironically that poetry is an excellent reformer of life (*praeclara emendatrix vitae*); and thereupon declares explicitly that comedy is the advocate of the kind immorality and triviality (*o praeclaram emendatricem vitae poeticam! quae amorem, flagitii et levitatis auctorem ...*) against which he has been inveighing. It is significant too, that in introducing the quotation, Cicero does not attribute the encomium of love to one of the characters in the comedy, but to the poet himself, Caecilius. Hence the poet is represented not as merely 'reporting' or 'commenting on' the modes of thought that he has encountered in real life, but as the very author and advocate of those ideas. There is, however, a slight diminution of hostility to the immorality of comedy in the second part of 4,69. For Cicero next implicitly admits that comedy is not to be blamed entirely for its preoccupation with *flagitia*: the stuff of comedy is the vices and immorality of its audience; comedy is a mere, admittedly sympathetic, reflexion of existing social conditions: *de comoedia loquor, quae si haec flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino*⁹⁹. But Cicero is still here somewhat removed from the position that he adopts in other passages where he affirms the ethical concern of comedy¹⁰⁰. He is even further removed therefrom in what follows. For in the next section of the Tusc., namely 4,70, he even allows the (comic) poets to continue in their own way (4,70 *sed poetas ludere sinamus...*); it is implied that we are not to expect much moral instruction from the theatre, because dramatic poetry, being fettered to the conditions of the age¹⁰¹ cannot be a teacher of *virtus*; if we want to learn that, we have to go to the philosophers (*ad magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus*). That is somewhat at variance with what he says at S.Rosc. 47 and in the famous mirror metaphor of rep. 4,13 (on both of which, see below § 7.6.3 IVa). We may conclude that Cicero's admiration for comedy's universal, and ethical concerns and for its reflections of social conditions, was tempered by his distaste for comedy's preoccupation with, and sympathetic representation of, amatory themes¹⁰².

Thus far we have considered reasons why *levitas* was attributed to comedy that apply equally to other species of poetry. We have considered the low status of the actors, the

⁹⁹ Cf. BLÄNSDORF 146 f.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. below § 7.6.3 IVa.

¹⁰¹ Cf. BÜCHNER 381 on rep. 4,11: 'eine Korrelation zwischen Zeit und Stück, zwischen Kunstwerk und Umständen'; & BLÄNSDORF on 4,13 'Im doppelten Sinne einer Widerspiegelung der Lebenswirklichkeit und einer Bedingtheit durch öffentlichen Verhältnisse ist ... seine Äußerung 4,13 zu verstehen.'

¹⁰² The supposed Ciceronian erotic epigram to Tiro (!) mentioned by Plin. epist. 7,4 was undoubtedly counterfeit. On the other hand, C. does speak favourably at Pis. 70 about the poetry (*poema*) of Philodemus (*poema porro facit ita festivum, ita concinnum, ita elegans, nihil ut fieri possit argutius*) some of which was evidently on erotic themes, but this portion of his oeuvre is spoken of disparagingly by C. (*de isto quoque scripsit ut omnis hominis libidines, omnia stupra ... adulteria denique eius delicatissimis versibus expresserit*). The description of Philodemus' erotic verses as *delicatissimi* is significant: *delicatus* seems to have been something of a key-word of the neoterics: cf. Catull. 50,3 (cf. QUINN ad loc); and C. (Att. 2,14,1) uses it of a dinner party attended by Clodia's (i.e. Catull.'s) set. Cf. also above § 3.9, pp. 118 f. On Philodemus' poetry and other literary activities, see also Appendix III to NISBET's comm. on Pis.

high esteem in which the dramatic arts were held among the people; the demagogic tendencies of many who put the games on – these contributed equally in Cicero's eyes to the *levitas* of all genres of dramatic poetry. Similarly, amatory themes – despite what Servius states in his commentary on Aen. 4,1 – typically are found not only in comedy but also in tragedy and lyric (4,71¹⁰³). We now turn our attention to factors relating specifically to comedy.

It is a self-evident fact that the humorous in the traditional Roman thought may be, and is indeed often, identified with *leve* in comparison with seriousness, which may of course be represented in Latin by *gravis*, *grave*¹⁰⁴: 'this whole business,' writes Cicero, 'of raising laughter is light' (*leve enim est totum hoc risum movere*. de orat. 2,219)¹⁰⁵. It is a natural development in thought and in the languages of many nations to connect the serious with heaviness, and the trivial or the frivolous with lightness and it is a development which one finds in most of the European languages. This is not to imply that there is a necessary connexion between the trivial or the frivolous with the humorous, only that, as the humorous is opposed to the serious¹⁰⁶, it naturally finds itself placed together with those less dignified qualities. The Romans were greatly fond of wit¹⁰⁷ – especially of the type exemplified by the elder Cato's ἀποφθέγματα (off. 1,104¹⁰⁸) –, and its cultivation is greatly esteemed in oratory¹⁰⁹ (cf. L-P III 172 f.). It is characteristic of the aristocratic temperament, however, to frown upon buffoonery, the low humour of the *scurra*, laughter merely for laughter's sake (de orat. 2,239. 244. 247), uninterrupted, immoderate, smutty jesting (cf. orat. 88. de orat. 2,242), or gesticulatory, 'slap-stick' humour (de orat. 2,251). On the contrary, there has to be a point to the humour; there must be some economy in its use and the humour must have some effect other than merely laughter: *temporis igitur ratio et ipsius dicacitatis moderatio et temperantia et raritas dictorum distinguet oratorem a scurra, et quod nos cum causa dicimus non ut ridiculi videamur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid, illi totum diem et sine causa* (de orat. 2,247). Thus the conservative Roman tradition that regards itself as characterised above all

¹⁰³ ...quae de iuvenum amore scribit Alcaeus! nam Anacreontis quidem tota poesis est amatoria; maxime vero omnium flagrasse amore Rheginum Ibycum apparet ex scriptis.

¹⁰⁴ Hence GROSS 753: 'Zwei Bedeutungen lassen sich seitdem erkennen: 1) Würde, Ernst...'

¹⁰⁵ For the formula *gravitas* = seriousness / *levitas* = humour, cf. de orat. 2,248. 3,29. 30 where *gravitas* is opposed to humour (*iocus*, *lepos*, *facetia*), which by implication is equivalent to *levitas*. The latter term is however explicitly linked with the comic humour in nat.deor. 3,72 *levitates comicae* (cf. de orat. 2,274 concerning a particular type of joke associated mime). Cf. L-P ad 3,31: 'Ebenso comicus "typisch für die Komödie", es deutet vor allem auf einen leichten Ton [my italics], cf. De nat. d. 3,72.'

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Isoc. 10,11: σεμνύνεσθαι τοῦ σκώπτειν καὶ τὸ σπουδάζειν τοῦ παίζειν ἐπιπονώτερόν ἐστιν.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. L-P III 172 f.

¹⁰⁸ Examples of these are cited throughout the account of wit in Bk II of the de orat.; for references, see L-P III 200 ff.

¹⁰⁹ C. attributes it to orators as a virtue: cf. Brut. 105, 128, 143, 158, 164, 173, 177, 186, 198, 216, 224, 228, 236. Also L-P III 172 ff., and regarded himself 'als größter Exponenten dieser Fertigkeit in seiner Zeit': cf. Planc. 35. fam. 7,32,1–2. 9,16,3.

by *gravitas*, seriousness, cultivates an image of the Roman aristocracy as a class that, despite its fondness for wit, seldom laughs, or is seldom given, to use the colloquial expression, to 'belly-laughs' (*cachinnatio*): cf. Tusc. 4,66¹¹⁰; ad Her.[?] 3,25¹¹¹. Cato the Younger is described by Plutarch Cat. min. 1 as πρὸς γέλωτα κομιδῇ δυσκίνητος, ἄχρι μειδιάματος σπανίως τῷ προσώπῳ διαχεόμενος, though it is uncertain to what extent this restraint with regard to laughter was due to the old Roman *gravitas* in him, and to what extent to his Stoic creed. To be sure, in a notorious passage in the pro Murena (60–66) where Cato's seriousness and severity (*gravitati severitatieque*: 66) are ridiculed, Cicero attributes these qualities principally to his Stoicism (60–61; *te ipsum...vi naturae atque ingeni elatum et recentibus praeceptorum studiis flagrantem*: 65)¹¹². Nevertheless, even if there is an element of Stoicism in this newer kind of Roman *gravitas*, an element that caused the boundaries of moral duties to be extended beyond the design of nature (60. 65), we must acknowledge that it is only an element, and that, as *gravitas* was an indigenous trait in the Roman character, there is accordingly in that character something that is responsive to Stoic ethics with its emphasis on impassivity and its rejection of pleasure¹¹³. Cicero seems to imply this by the fact that in the same speech he describes Cato as being full of the old Roman principles, and he accordingly applies to Cato terms very similar to those that he uses at the beginning of the Tusc. to describe the outstanding qualities of the Roman forefathers¹¹⁴.

If for the conservative Roman, then, the humorous is by nature inherently connected with *levitas*, let us now examine whether Cicero further attributes *levitas* specifically to any sources of the comic humour, under which we may include: plot, character, setting and language. Concerning plot we have only the moral strictures of rep. 4,11 concerning the vulgar approval in the theatres of the *flagitia* depicted therein. We are on more fruitful ground when we approach Cicero's views on comic character. For he sees in the treatment of comic character which is, according to the Aristotelian formula, baser than the average

¹¹⁰ *si ridere concessum sit, vituperetur tamen cachinnatio.*

¹¹¹ *sin erit sermo in iocatione, leviter tremebunda voce, cum parva significatione risus, sine ulla suspitione nimiae cachinnationis leniter oportebit ab sermone serio torquere verba ad liberalem iocum.*

¹¹² It is likewise uncertain whether C. in Mur. 38 & 40 means to attribute Cato's hostility to the games to the latter's native *gravitas* and *severitas* or to his Stoicism.

¹¹³ The whole concept of Roman *urbanitas* and *liberalitas* as developed by the Scipionic circle and by Cicero in Bk I of the off. owes much to the Stoicism of Panaetius (who moved among Scipio's circle) with his theory of τὸ πρέπον, *decorum*. Cf. E. S. RAMAGE: *Urbanitas. Ancient Sophistication and Refinement*. Oklahoma 1973, 35 f.; also FISKE (1920) 83: 'It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of P., not merely on Roman Stoicism, of which he is the real founder, but also on Roman law, social and political theory, and through his grammatical and rhetorical interests upon Roman literary theory and composition'.

¹¹⁴ Compare the numerous descriptions of Cato throughout the speech (*gravissimo atque integerrimo viro* 3; *homini omni virtute excellenti* 54; *totius vitae [sc. Catonis] splendor et gravitas* 58; *finxit enim te ipsa natura ad honestatem, gravitatem, temperantiam, magnitudinem animi, iustitiam, ad omnis denique virtutes magnum hominem et excelsum* 60) with that of the Roman forefathers in Tusc. 1,3: *in qua ...virtute nostri multum valuerunt... quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda?* Also Antonius' description (de orat. 2,228) of Crassus as *omnium gravissimum et severissimum*.

man, or – which to use his own formula – consists of some *turpitude et deformitas* (de orat. 2,236), a large contribution to the *levitas* of comedy. We will observe later that in another mood Cicero takes a more enlightened, more philosophical view of the presentation of base character in comedy. For the present we are concerned only with his expressions of disapproval of comic character as a contributing factor to comic *levitas*. There is always an implication in these expressions that comedy does not merely present these characters as an impartial observer might describe a new acquaintance; but on the contrary, comedy is actively involved with these characters, and if it is not indeed positively sympathetic to them, it at any rate partly shares in the *levitas* of these characters inasmuch as it strives to win itself laughter through them. In fact, Cicero states in Lael. 98, some of these characters would not be humorous if it were not for their counterparts who act as their foils. We have already seen comedy's young lover ecstatic at the prospect of love-making whose kind is judged *leves* (Tusc. 4,66). Two other, well known comic types are subject to Cicero's hostility. The first is the *miles gloriosus*. His *levitas* is implicitly linked with his ridiculousness in off. 1,137 where he is contrasted with the ideal Roman gentleman whose *gravitas* is noted twice (*gravitate tamen adiuncta... retinere gravitatem*). Cicero writes: *deforme* (cf. the *deformitas* of de orat. 2,236) *etiam est de se ipsum praedicare, falsa praesertim, et cum inrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum*. The second is the parasite and fawner (often the companion of the braggart soldier), the *assentator*, whose type elicits this sardonic remark from Cicero (Lael. 98): *nec parasitorum in comoediis faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi*. Here is what Cicero says in an earlier passage (Lael. 93) about this type of character:

quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

'negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi omnia adsentari.'

ut ait Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona. quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. multi autem Gnathonum similes, cum sint loco fortuna fama superiores, horum est adsentatio est molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. contio quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet quid intersit inter popularem, id est adsentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum et gravem.

Cicero thus compares a comic type with a political type, the *popularis* whom we have already observed in connexion with the flattering of the people with games and other

forms of *largitiones*. The *populares* like the comic figure of the *assentator* or *parasitus* are distinguished chiefly by their *levitas* (Phil. 7,4. Brut. 103) which manifests itself in its eagerness to flatter at any cost, its inconstancy, its lack of principles, its fickleness¹¹⁵ (cf. GROSS 756)¹¹⁶. The Optimates on the contrary are for Cicero conspicuous for virtues contrary to these, as we learn in the 'canon' of Optimate virtues enumerated in Sest. 139: *qui auctoritate, qui fide, qui constantia, qui magnitudine animi consiliis audacium restiterunt, hi graves, hi principes, hi dignitatis atque imperii semper habiti sunt*. *Gravitas* indeed was a catchword for the Optimates as GROSS (755 f.) has shown, just as *levitas* was for them the standard term of abuse that they hurled at the *populares*¹¹⁷.

Levitas was also for Cicero undoubtedly inherent in comedy by virtue of the lower *socio-political* class of its characters, and also by virtue of the relative unimportance of the settings and events it depicts. It is reasonable to suppose that Cicero agreed with the widely-held view in antiquity that, compared with tragedy or epic, comedy deals with people of lower rank, that its setting is domestic, and the events depicted concern private, rather than, public men¹¹⁸. Comedy is thus devoid of *auctoritate personarum* (Quint. 10,1,97); Cicero, on the other hand, held in highest esteem the participation in the *res publica* and the application for the common welfare of one's *auctoritas* in that participation. Thus the relative triviality of comedy in this respect in comparison with other genres such as epic and tragedy in which *introducuntur heroes duces reges* cannot have failed to impress itself upon him¹¹⁹.

Gravitas is often associated with the grand style (rhet. ad Her. 4,11. orat. 20. 53. 97. 99–101. de orat. 3,177)¹²⁰, or – if used not in contrast to the other two style-types (*genus mediocre*, *genus tenue*) – merely with weightiness or dignified grandeur of language that lends it persuasiveness. This latter kind of *gravitas* is sometimes attributed even to comic writers

¹¹⁵ But cf. DOUGLAS (1966) on Brut. 103. Against DOUGLAS is the testimony of Lael. 93 ff.

¹¹⁶ Note that some of these qualities are shared by the type of young men already discussed who are depicted on the stage as being afflicted with the love-passion (cf. Tusc. 4,76).

¹¹⁷ Sometimes C. compares political opponents with comic characters as for example in Phil. 2,15. Q.Rosc. 20.

¹¹⁸ Perhaps implicit in S.Rosc. 47. More explicit texts are: Hor. ars 90. Diom. ars gr. III GL I 488,3–5 & 14 ff. KEIL *comoedia est privatae civilisque fortunae...κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἰδιωτικῶν πραγμάτων ἀκίνδυνος περιοχὴ... comoedia a tragoedia differt, quod in tragoedia introducuntur heroes duces reges, in comoedia humiles atque privatae personae...* <Evanth. de fab.> p. 21,9 ff. WESSNER *inter tragoediam autem et comoediam cum multa tum imprimis hoc distat, quod in comoedia mediocres fortunae hominum, parvi impetus pericula...at in tragoedia omnia contra: ingentes personae...* gloss. Ansil. s.v. *comoedia* gloss. Lat. I p. 128,351–353 LINDSAY-MOUNTFORD *comoedia: est, quae res privatorum et humilium personarum comprehendit* (cf. Placid. gloss. S 21 *scaena* p. 34 PIRIE-LINDSAY). Isid. etym. sive orig. lib. VII 7,6 LINDSAY *sed comici privatorum hominum praedicant acta; tragici vero res publicas et regum historias*.

¹¹⁹ C.'s high regard for *auctoritas* is attested in innumerable passages (e.g. de orat. 1,107. 214. 253. 2,153. 156. 230. 333. 339. 3,211 Sest. 139); cf. esp. rep. 1,3 *equidem quem ad modum 'urbes magnas atque inperiosas', ut appellat Ennius, viculis et castellis praeferendas puto, sic eos qui his urbibus consilio atque auctoritate praesunt, iis qui omnis negotii publici expertes sint, longe duco sapientia ipsa esse anteponendas*. For his insistence on participation in public affairs, cf. 1,7 ff.

¹²⁰ Cf. also Brut. 35. 38. 86. 88. 89. 93. 126. 143. 221. 265. 291.

such as Caecilius (Hor. epist. 2,1,59) and comic productions such as the satyr-plays (Hor. ars 222)¹²¹. Horace also hints at this *gravitas* in the *ars poetica* when he says that comedy on occasion lifts its voice (93)¹²². Typically, however, *gravitas* is associated with the elevated style of tragedy¹²³, especially with that of Aeschylus¹²⁴, as for example by Quintilian 10,1,66 *tragoedias primus in lucem Aeschylus protulit, sublimis et gravis et grandilocus [= grandiloquus] saepe usque ad vitium* (cf. Hor. ars 279 f.)¹²⁵. The virtues of the grand style of tragic poetry are often attributed to effective, moving oratory, as in *de orat.* 2,225. 227. *Brut.* 43. 203; sometimes, when the style is elevated and sublime, but the subject matter trivial (as in comedy), Cicero sarcastically calls it 'tragic' as for example in *Tusc.* 4,73. *de orat.* 2,205. Now although it is necessary for the orator to master all three styles and he would be deficient if he possessed only one of the styles, since each of the styles has its own province (*orat.* 69 f.¹²⁶, 99), nevertheless, for Cicero the grand style which enables one to sway and incite one's listeners is that in which the orator is most powerful and effective (*orat.* 69 *nam id unum ex omnibus ad obtinendas causas potest plurimum... in quo uno vis omnis oratoris est*; cf. *de orat.* 1,60. 2,215. 3,105. *Brut.* 276) and the master of the grand style is called the *princeps* of orators (*orat.* 99). Accordingly it is to the grand style that Cicero attaches the greatest importance. Since the language of comedy is generally deficient in the *gravitas* associated with the grand style, so it is incapable of winning the highest admiration which belongs solely to the grand style (*orat.* 97). We should add some qualifications to these remarks. Strictly speaking, we are not trying to establish here a kind of *levitas* of language, which is – unlike *gravitas* – not a term used by the critics in relation to style. We are concerned rather with a lack of *gravitas* of language. Furthermore, it is obvious that even if a style does not compel our highest admiration, yet it may still merit some measure of admiration. We shall see later that Cicero and other critics indeed do attribute some virtues to the 'lower' styles

¹²¹ Cf. also ad Q.fr. 3,1,19 *epistulam Aristophaneo modo, valde mehercule gravem et suavem*, & QUADLBAUER (1960) 56.

¹²² On *gravitas* in comedy, see GROSS 764; on the *gravitas* of the satyr-plays, see STEIDLE 115 f.

¹²³ Cf. Quint. 1,8,8 *in tragoediis gravitas*. 10,1,97 *Accius atque Pacuvius clarissimi gravitate sententiarum, verborum pondere, auctoritate personarum* (cf. Hor. epist. 2,1,56); Ov. am. 3,1,70 *grandius urget opus*, rem. 375 *grande sonant tragici*; trist. 2,381 *omne genus scripti gravitate tragoedia vincit*; gloss. Ansil. s.v. *comœdia* gloss. Lat. I p.128,351 LINDSAY-MOUNTFORD *non tam alto ut tragoedia stilo...* On the association between tragedy & the grand style (cf. *Tusc.* 1,37 *frequens consessus theatri ... movetur audiens tam grande carmen*), see also AUGUSTYNIAK 43; QUADLBAUER (1958) 59, 61 et passim; KELLY 7 ff.; also in my chapter on tragedy, § 6.2.2.

¹²⁴ But of others too, as for example, Accius in *Planc.* 59.

¹²⁵ Quint.'s description of Aesch.'s style (note esp. his claim *primus...protulit*) reminds us of Aristophanes' caricature of the same in the *Ran.*, esp. of vv. 1004 f. where Diony. says to the tragedian: ὦ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων περγώσας ῥήματα σεμνὰ. For Aristoph.'s treatment of the grand style of Aesch., see O'SULLIVAN (1992) 8 f., 109 f.; see also, however, 126 where it is pointed out that Aristoph. presents the comic poet Cratinus as an exponent of the grand style.

¹²⁶ Cf. A. E. DOUGLAS: 'A Ciceronian contribution to rhetorical theory.' *Eranos* 55 (1957) 18–26 (on C.'s connecting of the three styles with the three *officia oratoris*); also M. WINTERBOTTOM: 'Cic. & the middle style.' in J. DIGGLE, J. B. HALL & H. D. JOCELYN: *Studies in Lat. Lit. & its Tradition*. In Honour of C. O. BRINK. *Cambr. Philol. Soc. Suppl.* Vol. 15 (1989), 125–31.

(that is, the plain and the middle) as they are found in comedy. However, not all comic poets achieve those virtues, and indeed, it would seem that for Cicero most of them did not, as two passages from the *orat.* seem to indicate. First, *orat.* 67: *itaque video visum esse non nullis, Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen, quod incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum, apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis...*; second, *orat.* 184: *at comicorum senarii propter similitudinem sermonis sic saepe sunt abiecti, ut non numquam vix in eis numerus et versus intellegi possit.* In both these passages the lack of *gravitas* that is manifested in the lack of vigorous movement (*incitatus feratur*) and brilliance of figures (*clarissimis verborum luminibus*), and in the general *similarity* to everyday speech¹²⁷, is implicitly counted as a defect. More explicit criticism is to be detected in the *abiecti* of the second passage. Compare the derogatory uses of this word in *orat.* 192. 230. 235 (applied to the style of the neo-Atticists).

7.5.3 pathos

There appears to be a certain ambivalence in Cicero's attitude to pathos in comedy. In the first place, the Ciceronian observations on pathos in comedy are to an extent linked with the criticism of *levitas*, and thus it will be observed that we have already touched upon this subject above in connexion with love poetry¹²⁸. To the extent, then, that Cicero felt amatory themes to be presented in a sympathetic light by comic poets, and to the extent that the pathos depicted on the comic stage is occasionally – if not most often – connected with these amatory themes¹²⁹, there can be no doubt that Cicero from the philosophical perspective of the *Tusculanae disputationes* disapproved of pathos in comedy. Notice this distinction, however, that whereas above we examined Cicero's hostility to all excessive passions as being in themselves mental disturbances which are evidence of *levitas*, here we are more concerned with the disproportionateness of the emotions presented and aroused (especially in the audience¹³⁰) in relation to the humorous and trivial subject matter of comedy. Let it suffice here to recall the text just cited from *Tusc.* 4,73 in which Cicero sarcastically says of a young lover's speech from Turpilius' *Leucadia* delivered in an

¹²⁷ JOCELYN (1967) 38 ff. argues that originally the language of the Roman tragedians and composers of comedies was the same ('in place of the three very distinct vocabularies of the Attic stage they offered one, based on that regularly used in the house of the great Roman families...'); only as the second century progressed, did a more marked distinction develop, the tragedians' tending toward more 'elaborate and artificial' language; the comic poets, toward the common language.

¹²⁸ Cf. *Tusc.* 4,68: *inflammato animo concupiscunt*, 71: *maxime vero omnium flagrasse amore Rheginum Ibycum apparet ex scriptis*, 4,72: *sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio*; 73: *at quas tragoedias efficit!* *rep.* 4,9 = *Aug. civ.* 2,14: *frustra hoc exclamante Cicerone, qui cum de poetis ageret: 'ad quos cum accessit,' inquit, 'clamor et adprobatio populi quasi cuiusdam magni et sapientis magistri, quas illi obducunt tenebras, quos invehunt metus, quas inflammant cupiditates!* Cf. also *Quint.* 6,2,12: *ut amor πάθος, caritas ὄρεος*.

¹²⁹ Cf. P. FLURY: *Liebe und Liebessprache bei Menander, Plautus und Terenz*. Heidelberg 1968, 70 ff.

¹³⁰ Cf. BÜCHNER 372.

elevated and grand style: *at quas tragoedias efficit!* The complaint made here regarding the impropriety of the style given what Cicero regards as trivial subject matter agrees with the rule that is laid down (albeit in a rhetorical context) in *de orat.* 2,205: *nam neque parvis in rebus adhibendae sunt hae dicendi faces...ne aut inrisione aut odio digni putemur, si aut tragoedias agamus in nugis...*

On the other hand, from the aesthetic perspective it is obvious that inappropriateness of language can also be a source of comic humour. The same source of irritation to Cicero regarding *tragoediae in nugis*, that is inappropriateness of language in a serious (oratorical) context, was probably felt to be in a humorous context – thus especially in comedy – a legitimate source of humour¹³¹. Furthermore, pathos is not always accounted among Roman critics a fault in comic writers. But more of this later; for now it is sufficient to note that Cicero's whole attitude to tragic pathos in comedy cannot be determined on the basis of this passage from the *Tusc.* alone¹³².

7.5.4 slander and invective

Probably for Cicero there is no element in comedy more objectionable than its licence to attack individuals from the stage, that is to say, in public. As this licence – particularly when extended to attacks *nominatim* in the Attic fashion – was not a prominent, if at all existent, feature of Roman comedy, it is clear that Roman comedy will be exempt from Cicero's criticism of comedy on this ground. There are four texts with which we are here concerned, three from the *rep.*, and one from the *Tusc.* Inasmuch as the last passage contains an alleged quotation from the XII Tables, it obviously cannot be concerned with comedy; but as the passage deals with poetic slander and invective, it is clear that it has some bearing on our present discussion.

1) *rep.* 4,11 = *Aug. civ.* 2,9 (*Aug.*'s words in italics):

¹³¹ In fact, there seems to be evidence that even the rhetoricians regarded *tragoedias agere in nugis* as not alien to the aims of the orator who wishes to employ humour, provided that his humorous intentions are clear to his audience. See below, § 7.6.4.

¹³² So rightly BLÄNSDORF 153 on the same passage: '...er mokiert sich über das tragische Pathos in der Klage eine unglücklich Verliebten und trifft damit ein häufiges Stilmittel der Komödie' & n. 42: 'Ob C. diese tragischen Stellen ästhetisch mißbilligt hat, geht aus opt.gen. or. 1 nicht mit Bestimmtheit hervor...'

et Graeci quidem antiquiores vitiosae suae opinionis quandam convenientiam servarunt, apud quos fuit etiam lege concessum, ut quod vellet comoedia de quo vellet nominatim diceret. itaque, sicut in eisdem libris loquitur Africanus,

quem illa non adtigit, vel potius quem non vexavit? cui pepercit? esto, populares homines improbos, in re publica seditiosos, Cleonem, Cleophonem, Hyperbolum laesit. patiamur, *inquit*, etsi eiusmodi cives a censore melius est quam a poeta notari; sed Periclen, cum iam suae civitati maxima auctoritate plurimos annos domi et belli praefuisset, violari versibus et eos agi in scaena non plus decuit, quam si Plautus, *inquit*, noster voluisset aut Naevius Publio et Gnaeo Scipioni aut Caecilius Marco Catoni maledicere.

2) rep. 4,12 = Aug. civ. 2,9

dein paulo post: nostrae, inquit, contra duodecim tabulae cum perpaucae res capite sanxissent, in his hanc quoque sancendam putaverunt, si quis occentavisset, sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri: praeclare; iudiciis enim magistratum, disceptionibus legitimis propositam vitam, non poetarum ingeniis, habere debemus, nec probrum audire nisi ea lege ut respondere liceat et iudicio defendere.

3) rep. 4,12 = Aug. civ. 2,9

*dicit deinde alia et sic concludit hunc locum ut ostendat, veteribus displicuisse Romanis vel laudari quemquam in scaena vivum hominem vel vituperari*¹³³.

4) Tusc. 4,4

quamquam id quidem [that is, that there must have been carmina & song in the early epoch of Roman history] etiam XII tabulae declarant, condi iam tum solitum esse carmen: quod ne liceret fieri ad alterius iniuriam lege sanxerunt

Regarding the context of the rep. passages, it will be expedient to make some prefatory remarks. First, it is clear from certain remarks in Aug. civ. 2,9 (*dein paulo post* after the first; and before the third: *dicit deinde alia et sic concludit hunc locum ut ostendat*) that the three passages belong to the same discussion in the rep. and that between the first and the second and between the second and the third there was other material which has not

¹³³ Both ZIEGLER & KRARUP fail to print this text in italics, as they should have done, given the fact that it is clearly not meant to be a direct quotation: cf. BÜCHNER ad loc.

survived¹³⁴. The first quotation follows another from the rep. (4,11) which speaks about the *flagitia* of comedy and the approval of the audience for the same, the theme being the 'Korrelation zwischen Zeit und Stück, zwischen Kunstwerk und Umständen' (BÜCHNER 381). This ethical conception of comedy as a mirror of everyday life is clearly aimed at the New Comedy and its derivative, the Roman. Hence this quotation and our first regarding the defamation of politicians in comedy indicate that in Cicero's discussion of comedy in the rep. there is a transition from the New to the Old Comedy. The association of the Old Comedy with invective and the licence to make personal attacks is a common-place in Roman criticism: cf. Brut. 224. de orat. 3,138. Hor. ars 280. sat. 1,4,2 ff. Porph. ad Hor. epist. 2,1,148. ad Hor. ars 281. Val. Max. 8,9,2. Plin. iun. ep. 6,21. Quint. 10,1,65. 12,2,22. Euanth. II 14 WESSNER. Diom. ars gr. III 488,23 KEIL. That this feature distinguished the Old from the New Comedy (and its derivative the Roman) is enunciated by Porph. ad Hor. ars 281: '*successit vetus his comoedia, quae appellatur <ἀρχαία>. Est autem genus maledicacissimum et multum distans ab hac nova*'¹³⁵.

In Cicero's discussion in the rep. of the licence to make personal attacks *nominatim* we can discern three parts represented by the three surviving fragments preserved to us by St Augustine. In the first section, Cicero describes indignantly how things stood at Athens; we are to understand that no limits were placed on this licence and therefore comedy spared none. This may have been acceptable – *esto* of course indicates a concession – in the case of demagogues, malfeasants and seditionists, although it would have been better if such men had been branded with the *nota* of the censor¹³⁶, but in the case of the leaders such as Pericles who were endowed with the greatest *auctoritas* and who had merited well of their country in time of war and peace, it was not right that such abuse should be set to verse and performed on the stage. It would have been just as wrong if at Rome Plautus and Naevius had wished to attack the Scipios, and Caecilius, Marcus Cato (thus Roman comedy is exempt from Scipio's / Cicero's indignation).

¹³⁴ Cf. BÜCHNER 376.

¹³⁵ HENDRICKSON (1894) 22 n. 2 rightly interprets *hac* as referring to Roman reproductions of the *véa κωμῳδία*.

¹³⁶ For this transferred use of *notare* applied to Old Comedy, cf. Brut. 224. Hor. sat. 1,10,16. Donat. de com. V 6. Old Comedy's invective against vice and other ills of contemporary society is elsewhere and among other Roman authors not always regarded badly; cf. Brut. 224. leg. 2,37. Hor. sat. 1,4,2 ff. Plin. iun. ep. 6,21. Quint. 10,1,65. Donat. de com. V 6. C. speaks of the censor in several places in Bk. 4 of the rep., cf. 4,6 (twice, possibly thrice) & 4,10; the office represents a principle of sound constitutional government and social stability based on a carefully monitored public morality characterised by *verecundia*. Hence, BÜCHNER Komm. 382: 'Zu beachten, daß das Motiv des Zensors leitmotivisch bei den verschiedensten Gegenständen auftaucht.' For BÜCHNER, *notari* in our passage is not a zeugma, but alludes to earlier references in Bk. 4 on the office of the poet *notare, non docere*, with which idea BÜCHNER compares Hor. sat. 1,4,106. According to BÜCHNER'S hypothesis, traces of C.'s description of the poet's office are preserved in the Policr. of John of Salisbury 7,9 who writes *notant enim [sc. poetae vel comici] non docent vitia et aut utilitatis causa grata sunt aut voluptatis*. See his commentary 372 ff.

In the second section, our attention is directed to the Roman attitude. Here, the legal restraints, the public morality carefully regulated by the magistrates, the protection of individual's status and the severe penalties against slanderers are contrasted with the unrestricted liberty at Athens. The passage may be paraphrased thus: the Roman forefathers who established the Twelve Tables made few crimes capital offences, but among these were the crimes of singing songs or composing defamatory poems against another. They did well in so doing, for the lives of Roman citizens ought to be subject, not to the wits of the poets, but to the judgement of the magistrates appointed by the state for that responsibility; and to their investigations made according to law. Nor ought a Roman citizen to be the subject to any shameful reproach¹³⁷, unless he can respond and defend himself in a court of law. The fourth of the passages listed above which is taken from the Tusc. and which also reports the law from the Twelve Tables (but clearly the passage does not claim to quote the text *verbatim*) agrees with our passage from rep. 4,12 on two points: 1) it depicts the law as forbidding a particular kind of *carmen*; 2) it depicts the law as being concerned to protect the individual citizen (*alterius*) from character-assassination. It is outside the scope of our study to discuss the questions: 1) whether Cicero in our passage from the rep. reported the text of the Twelve Tables faithfully; 2) if he did, up to which point in the passage Cicero is quoting, and at which point he begins to interpret (that is, whether the clause *sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam...alteri* or merely *quod infamiam...alteri* is supposed to be part of the text from the Twelve Tables); 3) what was the original meaning of the passage from the Twelve Tables. For discussions of these questions there is an extensive bibliography representing a range of widely disparate views¹³⁸.

The third section with which Cicero concludes the discourse in Bk. 4 of the rep. on the question whether a citizen ought to have the right to make personal attacks on his fellow citizen, recapitulates what was said earlier by denying that one should have this right; and Cicero supports this with an appeal to the authority of the Roman forefathers to whom

¹³⁷ *Probrum* is the t.t. for the grounds of the censor's *nota*.

¹³⁸ For a selection of the more important works, the reader may be directed to the following: T. MOMMSEN: *Strafrecht*. Leipzig 1899, 565; 794 ff., 800 f.; P. HUVELIN: 'La notion de l'iniuria dans le très ancien droit Romain', in *Mélanges Appleton, Annales Univ. Lyon*. 1903, 18–22; R. MASCHKE: *Die Persönlichkeitsrechte des röm. Iniuriensystems*. Breslau 1903, 11 ff.; F. BECKMANN: *Zauberei und Recht in Roms Frühzeit. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Interpretation des Zwölftafelrechtes*. Diss. Münster 1923, 26 ff.; E. FRAENKEL: review of the last cited work: *Gnomon* 1 (1925) 185–200; ; T. FRANK: 'Naevius and free speech.' *AJP* 48 (1927) 105–10; C. BRECHT: *R-E* 34 (1937) col. 1752–63, s.v. 'Occentatio'; L. ROBINSON: *Freedom of Speech in the Roman Republic*. Diss. Johns Hopkins Univ. Baltimore 1940; A. MOMIGLIANO: review of the last cited work: *JRS* 32 (1942) 120–24; L. ROBINSON: 'Censorship in Republican Drama.' *CJ* 42 (1946) 147–50; R.E. SMITH: 'The law of libel at Rome.' *CQ* 2 (1951) 169–79; BÜCHNER *Komm.* 383 ff. Of those who are sceptical about C.'s faithfulness in reproducing the Twelve Tables, some regard the *occenavisset* of the first clause as referring not to libel, but to incantations; the second clause (*sive carmen...alteri*) on this hypothesis is regarded as having been added by C. or by some author quoted by him in order to explain as referring to libel the first clause which was no longer understood in the later republic.

such freedom was displeasing – indeed the latter condemned not only the right to attack, but even the right to praise another in public¹³⁹.

Thus of all the objectionable features of comedy, it was this licence to attack others from the stage which elicited Cicero's most vehement opposition. The reasons are all to be found in Cicero's ethical and political philosophy¹⁴⁰. With regard to ethics, the right granted to Old Comedy *ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν* offends against Cicero's concepts of justice (off. 1,20 ff.) and temperance (off. 1,93 ff.¹⁴¹). Moving away from questions of ethics, we find that at the obvious, practical level, this comic element has the most grievous, and most immediately tangible, effect on the public life. Probing deeper, Cicero finds that it disturbs the traditional structures of authority of the constitutional state; by subjecting the *auctoritas*¹⁴² and *dignitas* of the state's *principes* to ridicule; by failing to observe sound legal procedure through the legitimately appointed officers of state, by endangering the social stability with its demagogic appeals to the people, by its utter disregard of the sanctioned principles of the *mos maiorum* that demanded that society be governed by a respect for the individual's reputation and status. Cicero is proud of the protection that the Roman state affords the individual in this respect; proud also of the legal principle by which this protection is administered: *debemus...nec probrum audire nisi ea lege ut respondere liceat et iudicio defendere*. Above all, the moral principle of *verecundia* upon which the political and social stability of the old Roman republic was based allows no place for the kind of licence implied by the Attic *ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν*. *Verecundia* which is mentioned at rep. 4,6 and which was possibly an important, if not the central, argument for the Roman position in the discussion of this licence¹⁴³, is that 'modesty' or 'attitude of restraint (arising from the respect for others)' (OLD s.v.) which, independently of the punitive force of the law,

¹³⁹ The additional prohibition here that no living man should be praised on the stage is curious. The whole preceding discussion would seem to require only that there should be a requirement not to vilify (*vituperare*) another; for which reason, BÜCHNER ad loc. conjectures that we must be lacking in the surviving fragments a good portion of the dialogue in which was contained a discussion of other dramatic genres, or of the theatre as a whole. It is, on the contrary, also possible that C. was not at all thinking of other dramatic genres specifically or of the theatre as a whole, but rather that, being seized with the desire to cast the prohibition in a more universal form, was thus induced to balance the *vituperari* clause with that of the *laudari*.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. F. QUADLBAUER: 'Die Dichter der griechischen Komödie im literarischen Urteil der Antike.' *WS* 73 (1960) 56.

¹⁴¹ off. 1,93: *sequitur ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua verecundia et quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur*. Temperance is connected with *decorum*, τὸ πρέπον.

¹⁴² For the necessity of the *auctoritas* of the *principes* for the well-ordered state, and for the good life of those *principes*, see Brut. 7. 9.

¹⁴³ BÜCHNER 376 f. conjectures that there is to be detected in Aug.'s (civ. 2,9) *inverecundius* an allusion to C.'s appeal to *verecundia*. 'Da wir beobachtet haben, daß die Sitten der Gemeinschaft auf dem Begriff der *verecundia* aufgebaut werden, dürfte es wahrscheinlich sein, daß das Zugeständnis Augustins, daß die Griechen zwar *inverecundius* "mit Respekt vor der Persönlichkeit" gehandelt hätten, einen Ausdruck Ciceros aufgreift, zumal es nicht in seinen Beweisgang, der hier fortgesetzt wird, paßt.' Cf. also HECK 113 f. on C.'s hostility to comedy on account of its violation of Roman *verecundia*.

establishes the public morality by deterring the individual from disgraceful actions, as we read in rep. 5,6:

<civi>tatibus, in quibus expetunt laudem optumi et decus, ignominiam fugiunt ac dedecus. nec vero tam metu poenae terrentur, quae est constituta legibus, quam verecundia, quam natura homini dedit quasi quendam vituperationis non iniustae timorem.

With this, one may also consider off. 1,99:

adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. nam neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat non solum adrogantis est sed etiam omnino dissoluti. est autem quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere, in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.

Thus for Cicero such advantages as are commonly attributed by modern societies to 'freedom of speech' were non-existent. ('[L]iberty,' one scholar has written, 'is nowhere explicitly associated with freedom of speech in Republican Rome, although, of course, many institutions of which the Romans were consciously proud, depended on liberty of speech. The Romans never had a proper translation of *παρρησία*.¹⁴⁴' Thus this licence of Attic comedy *ὀνομαστί κωμωδεῖν* was absolutely incompatible with Ciceronian political thought¹⁴⁵.

One question remains. Cicero's statement that had Plautus and Naevius wished to calumniate important men of the state, they would have acted as unjustly as did the Greek comic poets in the case of Pericles, reflects his belief in the superiority of Roman *mores* to those of the Greeks, and agrees with his opposition to slander and invective from the stage. On the other hand, how is one to reconcile what Cicero says in this connexion about Naevius with the testimonies from antiquity¹⁴⁶ and the common opinion which obtains to

¹⁴⁴ A. MOMIGLIANO: review of LAURA ROBINSON (1940). *JRS* 32 (1942) 124.

¹⁴⁵ On C.'s social & political ideas, see N. WOOD: *Cicero's Social and Political Thought*. Berkeley & Los Angeles 1988, esp. 90 ff.; F. CAUER: *Cicero's politisches Denken*. Berlin 1903. The licence of the Attic comedians did not go altogether unchecked, for between 439 to 436 there was a law *μὴ κωμωδεῖν*: see *Σ*Ach. 67; cf. I.C.STOREY: *Antichthon* 26 (1992) 6; SOMMERSTEIN *CQ* 36 (1986) 101–8; Addenda to PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE *DF4*² 364. S. HALLIWELL: 'Comic satire and freedom of speech in classical Athens.' *JHS* 111 (1991) 48–70, however, has argued (64) that this law, and possibly also another mentioned at *Σ*Av. 1297, were passed in connexion with 'special and limited circumstances' and that they 'point beyond matters of strictly personal satire to a much broader question of political sensitivities'. He concludes (69) that 'there existed in classical Athens a climate of attitudes which accepted, permitted, and even encouraged the liberty of comedy to indulge in forms of personal ridicule, denigration, and *αἰσχρολογία*...'

¹⁴⁶ For the testimonies associating him with personal attacks in verse on the *principes civitatis*, see Aul. Gell. 7,8,5–6. Caes. Bass. GL VI 266. Pseud. Ascon. ad Cic. Verr. 1,29 for his punishment, see Aul. Gell. 3,3,15. Hier. Chron. 135 G. For a discussion of these texts and some others where Naevius is not explicitly mentioned, see H. D. JOCELYN: 'The poet Cn. Naevius, P. Cornelius Scipio and Q. Caecilius Metellus.' *Antichthon* 3 (1969) 32–47.

this day¹⁴⁷ that Naevius in fact did calumniate some of his enemies – probably from the stage – and was probably punished for this offence? There are again not a few works devoted to this problem and to the related problem of the interpretation of the well known Naevian verse *fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules* preserved in the commentary of Pseudo-Asconius on the first Verrine¹⁴⁸. We are of course concerned with the interpretation of this Naevian verse only in so far as it can help us to understand the former problem. I cannot resist the feeling that of these works that deal with both of these problems, although some are conspicuous for the ingenuity with which their authors have interpreted the Naevian verse, yet none of them gives an adequate explanation for the discrepancy between the various traditions of antiquity regarding Naevius' poetic attacks on the *principes civitatis* and Cicero's declaration in the rep. that such an attack by Naevius would have been just as wrong as Greek comedy's attack on Pericles. The ancient evidence regarding Naevius is too scant and vague to admit of such clarification and accordingly we must expect not definitive solutions, but rather we shall content ourselves merely with the plausible.

First, let us observe that many of the interpreters of the verse are not concerned with the problem of reconciling Cicero's statement in the rep. with the ancient testimonies regarding Naevius. Thus LEO (1905) 32 and the vast majority of commentators¹⁴⁹ up till recently who followed him make the verse a senarius, supposing it to have come from a comedy. This seems to be supported *prima facie* by the statement of Aulus Gellius 3,3,15 'de Naevio quoque accepimus fabulas eum in carcere duas scripsisse, cum ob *assiduam maledicentiam et probra in principes civitatis de Graecorum poetarum more* dicta in vincula...coniectus esset...', where *Graecorum poetarum more* is clearly an allusion to the Old Comedy. On the other hand, to accept that the verse comes from a comedy, is flatly to contradict Cicero's statement in the rep. that had Plautus or Naevius wished to attack Publius and Gnaeus Scipio (i.e. *principes civitatis*) from the stage it would have been as wrong as the attacks of Greek comedy on Pericles. More plausible, then, are the solutions offered by those writers who acknowledge that Cicero's evidence in this matter is of critical importance in determining the origin of the Naevian verse. Here, then, are several of the various solutions

¹⁴⁷ Cf. for example, the OCD² s.v. 'Naevius'.

¹⁴⁸ The following works represent only a selection: F. LEO: *Die saturnische Vers.* Abh. d. kön. Ges. d. Wiss. z. Göttingen 1905, 32; G. WISSOWA: 'Naevius und die Meteller.' *Genethliakon für C. Robert.* Berlin 1910, 51–63; F. MARX: 'Naevius.' *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königl. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.* Leipzig. Philologisch-historische Klasse 63. Band. (1911) 39–82 = *Aufsätze zur frühlateinischen Dichtung* [ed. Hans Herter] Hildesheim 1969, 1–44; T. FRANK: 'Naevius and free speech.' *AJPh* 48 (1927) 105–110; MOMIGLIANO (1942) 122; E.V. MARMORALE: *Naevius poeta.* Catania 1945, esp. 39 ff.; ROBINSON (1946) 147 f.; SMITH (1951) 170 f.; JOCELYN (1969) 42 ff.; BÜCHNER Komm. 376, 383.

¹⁴⁹ So, for example, FRAENKEL R-E Supptbd. 6 s.v. 'Naevius', col. 623; MARX (1911) 59: 'Es ist ein iambischer Senar, der nur entnommen sein kann jenem Lustspiel...und es widerspricht jeder gesunden Beweisführung, diesen Senar zu einem Saturnier umzugestalten...'; FRANK (1927) 105; ROBINSON (1946) 147; G.W. WILLIAMS in OLD² s.v. 'Naevius'.

offered to explain the apparent discrepancy between the ancient accounts of Naevius' poetic invective(s) against leading men of the state and Cicero's dismissal in the rep. of such an idea¹⁵⁰.

1) MARMORALE 63 ff. makes the verse a Saturnian, belonging to Naevius' *bellum Poenicum* published before or in 207 and originally being laudatory in intention (toward L. Caecilius Metellus, consul of 251 – the plural either is 'emphatic', 'rhetorical', or is possibly used because this Metellus was consul twice). Later the verse was turned against Lucius' son Quintus Caecilius Metellus, probably not by Naevius himself, but by someone else. Aulus Gellius' statement (3,3,15) regarding Naevius' attacks on leading men of the state *de Graecorum poetarum more* is to be explained as follows¹⁵¹. Naevius certainly did make personal attacks on leading men and these attacks were indeed vitriolic. Accordingly Aulus Gellius is justified in comparing Naevius to the poets of Old Comedy in this way. However, Naevius used discretion by never naming his victims, and preferred innuendo and indirect criticism to the more direct manner of comic invective that attacked *nominatim*.

2) JOCELYN (1969) 38, 42 ff. holds that the verse was from neither a Roman comedy (which would not have tolerated such a licence, as Cicero points out) nor from the *Bellum Poenicum*¹⁵². He conjectures that the Naevian verse was either an 'oral' verse or one written and circulated privately. So too, Metellus' witty reply, with which the Naevian verse was 'handed down in the family of the Metelli'. Such a practice of preserving the *facete dicta* of one's ancestors was common among Roman aristocrats¹⁵³. Verses composed either orally or in writing and circulated privately in which names are explicitly mentioned are invariably distinguished in imperial accounts from stage insults which tend to avoid the use of names and rather to rely more on innuendo¹⁵⁴.

3) BÜCHNER Komm. 376, 383 offers three mutually exclusive explanations. Firstly, he suggests with MARMORALE and JOCELYN, that the verse was not from a comedy. Secondly, he conjectures that Cicero was not in possession of all the facts of Roman literary history and therefore erred when he included Naevius among the Roman comic poets who could not have made such personal attacks on leading men of the state. Thirdly, he suggests that Cicero disregarded the fact of Naevius' slanderous works from the stage as being

¹⁵⁰ Little need be said about SCHOELL'S reckless emendation of rep. 4,11 whereby he would have the *aut* in *si Plautus...noster...aut Naevius* replaced with *ut*. That would obviously make a simple task of reconciling C.'s utterance on comic slander with the known tradition about Naevius; but it loses its attractiveness at once both by having interfered with the MS, and by the fact that it destroys the whole point of the passage, which is that at Rome personal attacks from the stage were inconceivable. So rightly BÜCHNER Komm. 383.

¹⁵¹ MARMORALE 49 ff.

¹⁵² JOCELYN'S asserts (47) that the 'Naevian verse...does not fit...the tone of the *Bellum Poenicum*', but he does not attempt to substantiate this claim. Why should an epic not have a complimentary reference to a decorated war hero, such as L. Caecilius Metellus?

¹⁵³ JOCELYN 38, 47.

¹⁵⁴ JOCELYN 43, with references in n. 109.

‘unerheblich’. Neither of the last two explanations is particularly attractive. In reply to them one may state the following: since Cicero is speaking at rep. 4,11 strictly about comic attacks on prominent men and since it is not only possible but in fact most likely that he means here comic attacks of the *ὀνομαστὶ χωμωδεῖν* type (so Aug. civ. 2,9 *nominatim*), there is no discrepancy between his statement at rep. 4,11 and the historical facts – at least as far as we know them. For, as JOCELYN has argued most convincingly (38 & 43 f.), there is no evidence to show that Naevius’ attacks on Q. Caecilius Metellus (consul of 206) or P. Cornelius Scipio (consul of 205) issued from a comedy in *nominatim* fashion: on the contrary, all the evidence there is points in exactly the opposite direction, that is to say, that if Naevius attacked anyone from the stage, it was in the veiled manner of the comic verses quoted by Gell. 7,8,5.

BÜCHNER’s first attempt to account for the *prima facie* discrepancy between Cicero’s statement at rep. 4,11 and the well-known tradition associating Naevius with some attacks on certain prominent men of the state offers no positive solution regarding the origin of the Naevius verse. On the other hand, MARMORALE’s solution depends more on speculation than evidence and flies in the face of the general tradition that Naevius did attack some prominent men. The witness for the Naevius verse, Pseud. Asconius ad Cic. Verr. 1,29, indicates that the verse was intended as an insult: likewise Caesius Bassus GL VI 266 KEIL who, though he does not quote the verse, most certainly refers to it. As an insult, the verse does not fit the context of the bellum Poenicum; and it can be made to belong to that poem in a laudatory capacity only by denying the testimonies just cited which indicate the verse’s hostile intent, and by the most convoluted speculation. JOCELYN’s solution alone appears to me complete (in so far as the circumstances of the fragmentary evidence permit) and plausible.

7.6 positive evaluation of comedy in Cicero

Having now concluded our discussion of the aspects of comedy that Cicero found objectionable, let us now direct our attention to the more positive side of Cicero’s assessment of comedy. We have already considered in more general terms Cicero’s approval of drama implicit in his practical involvement with the theatre in chapter five. Bearing all that was said there in mind, let us now focus more specifically on the theoretical conceptions and formulations that developed in Cicero’s thinking with regard to comedy. I have already discussed in chapter one the relationship between rhetorical and literary theory in Cicero’s thought and the question of applying the former to the latter. The reader

may consult that chapter for an explanation of the assumptions upon which the present investigation is based.

In what follows, I am going to argue on the basis of various remarks of Cicero, taken together with some remarks of other rhetoricians and literary critics writing in a similar tradition that comedy's main interest lay for Cicero *qua* literary critic in the fact that it may be explained to a large extent in terms of the ethos component of the rhetorical ethos / pathos distinction. This rhetorical interest in, or rather, the rhetorical way of looking at, comedy as a genre principally oriented towards ethos or as being 'ethical' is particularly marked and is well attested in ancient literary theory. There are traces also of this tradition in Cicero's writings.

7.6.1 the rhetorical background and ethos tradition in ancient literary formulations of comedy

Let us, then, now examine the application of Ciceronian ethos to the interpretation of comedy. First, it will be expedient to give a brief description of Cicero's concept of ethos. In Cicero's rhetorical theory, ethos¹⁵⁵, one of the three means of persuasion included under *inventio*¹⁵⁶, is the advocate's character-drawing, or character-presentation the aim of which is to win the good-will of the audience towards both the speaker and the client (*conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam*¹⁵⁷ *cum erga oratorem tum erga illum, pro quo dicet orator*). This character-drawing is produced by presenting certain qualities of the speaker and client favourably and in such a way as to win for them (the speaker and client) the sympathy of the audience. These qualities may include a man's character, his habits, his (way of) life (*mores et instituta et vitam*), his prestige, his achievements, how he has been judged to have spent his life (*dignitate hominis, rebus gestis, existimatione vitae*) and so forth. Ethos likewise includes portraying in negative terms the same qualities (or lack thereof) of the opponents (*et item improbari adversariorum*). The emotional mode of ethos with regard to content, style

¹⁵⁵ C. of course never uses this term or indeed pathos, but as he most certainly does describe in the *de orat.* & *orat.* concepts that correspond to these two means of persuasion (and also indeed another which corresponds to rational arguments) these usages are justified. As WISSE (1989) 223 wisely pointed out, the use of these technical terms further recommends itself by averting the danger of implying that any of the other designations found in the *de orat.* is a t.t. Cf. L-P Bd. III 123. All quotations are from *de orat.* 2,182–184, unless stated otherwise.

¹⁵⁶ *de orat.* 2,115 *ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa...*

¹⁵⁷ For ethos and (*benevolentiam*) *conciliare*, cf also *de orat.* 2,212. 3,104. *orat.* 128. On the erroneous interpretation of *de orat.* 2,200 by E. FANTHAM: 'Ciceronian conciliare and Aristotelian ethos.' *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 266 f.; likewise by W.W. FORTENBAUGH: '*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*. Some remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178–216.' *Rhetorica* 6 (1988) 267 according to which C. is understood to be so confused as to attribute *conciliare benevolentiam* equally to the violent emotions (pathos), see WISSE (1989) 238, 276.

and delivery is gentleness (*lenitas vocis...non enim semper fortis oratio quaeritur, sed saepe placida, summissa, lenis... actione leni*¹⁵⁸) and mildness (*mansuetudo*¹⁵⁹); on the other hand, Ciceronian ethos is no longer to be identified with ‘a lesser degree of πάθος’¹⁶⁰, that is, with the *leniores affectus* or the *affectus...mites atque compositos* of which Quintilian speaks in defining his version of ethos (6,2,9)¹⁶¹. With regard to the three-fold style division, ethos is apparently compatible with either the middle or the plain style. The middle style as being compatible with ethos may be inferred from the stylistic terms *placida* (2,183) and *suaviter* (2,184)¹⁶²: these terms (or rather, terms with the same stems as these) are used by Cicero in describing the middle style (*placide*: orat. 92; *suavitas*: orat. 69. 91. 92. Brut. 276); the *summissa* of de orat. 2,183 and 2,11 however, denotes a quality that belongs to the plain style (orat. 72. 76. 82. 90. 99. 101)¹⁶³.

At first sight, this description of ethos would not seem to yield much material for a theory of comedy. The practical bias of the rhetorical theory of ethos does not at first sight seem applicable to comedy since it aims at persuasion, winning the case, defeating the opponent – hence its emphasis on the effect on the jurors and audience, that is to say, the arousal of sympathy in them –; but none of these considerations seems particularly relevant to the literary genre or to our understanding of it. Again, it might be alleged, and rightly so, that in ethos there is no consideration of plot, of comic humour, of aesthetics, of other fundamental literary questions connected with the genre. On the other hand, ethos, considered from its portrayal of character – whether positive and negative¹⁶⁴ – conceivably could provide the basis of an interpretation of comedy; and even the practical focus in

¹⁵⁸ For the association of *lenitas* with ethos, cf. also de orat. 2,200 *genus illud alterum...lenitatis et mansuetudinis, 2,212: sed est quaedam in his duobus generibus, quorum alterum lene...nam et ex lenitate, qua conciliamur eis qui audiunt...remissio autem lenitatis.*

¹⁵⁹ For *mansuetudo* and ethos, cf. also de orat. 2,200.

¹⁶⁰ SOLMSEN (1941) 179.

¹⁶¹ For criticism of this widespread error, whereby C.’s ethos is confused with Quint.’s ethos which is merely an alternative emotional mode to pathos, see WISSE (1989) 240 f.

¹⁶² QUADLBAUER 80 thinks that because *come* is associated at orat. 128 with ethos, and because *come* is in the 4th line of Limon fragment associated with Terence who is the ‘Meister der Charakterdarstellung, des πάθος’ and whom Varro (ap. Gell. 6,14) assigns to the middle style, therefore, *come* must also be a characteristic of the middle style. SCHMID 248 likewise thinks C. attributed the middle style to Terence: for this, SCHMID also relies on Gell.’s notice as well as on some exceedingly complicated (and at times unconvincing) interpretations of various terms in the Limon fragment.

¹⁶³ For this theory of C.’s attribution of the plain and middle styles to ethos, as well as for bulk of the interpretation here of Ciceronian ethos, I am indebted greatly to WISSE’s *Ethos and Pathos*, esp. ch. 6 & 7; L-P Bd. III 126 f. is based on WISSE); previous expositions of ethos before WISSE are generally not reliable, or are deficient on various points. WISSE (1989) 215 n. 95 shows that the *lenitas* of de orat. 2,182.212 (cf. *lenis* 2,183. 184. 211. 212) and the *comitas* of de orat. 2,182 (cf. *come* orat. 128) are not style-specific terms.

¹⁶⁴ In comedy, the portrayal of character obviously can take more forms than in Roman oratory, where it consists entirely of description or self-description; of character expression through a lighter emotional mode, through an unimpassioned style, through gentleness in delivery etc. Most significantly, in comedy, the character portrayal may also be executed through the dramatic action of the plot. Cf. DUCKWORTH (1952) 268.

ethos on the effect on the audience (*conciliare & benevolentiam conciliare*¹⁶⁵) could contribute to a theory of comedy in its own peculiar way, even if in a way not immediately apparent, or agreeable to modern literary criticism¹⁶⁶. Furthermore, ancient critics certainly did apply the concept of ethos – in particular as contrasted in the rhetorical ethos/pathos distinction – to their interpretation of one type of literature, and they contrasted this type of literature with another which they felt to be particularly concerned with pathos. Later this application of the ethos/pathos distinction to the classification of literature came to be taken for granted and would solidify into something more ‘genre-specific’: tragedy came to be seen as being particularly ‘pathetic’, comedy as being particularly ‘ethical’; at first, however, discussing literature in terms of the ethos /pathos was done in a rather tentative fashion, and no attempt was made to extend the distinction to the genres. On the subject of the application of the rhetorical distinction ethos /pathos to ancient literary criticism, the seminal work is a paper of C. GILL¹⁶⁷, and we must refer the reader to that paper for a wider discussion of the texts here cited¹⁶⁸. The following texts, then, are adduced by GILL as instances of the application of the ethos part of the ethos /pathos distinction to comedy or to certain types of literature which bear some resemblance to comedy.

1) Arist. poet. 1459b13–16:

καὶ γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ
παθητικόν, ἢ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἡθική.

Aristotle declares the Iliad is more concerned with the pathos: the arousal of particular emotions (pity and fear?: 1449b27) through the portrayal of violent actions (Achilles’ killing Hector etc.); the Odyssey on the other hand is more concerned with ethos: it is ἡθική, ‘expressive of character’. This is not to suggest that character is not expressed in the Iliad, only that in the Odyssey the concern with character is more in line with the Aristotle’s ideal

¹⁶⁵ E.g. de orat. 2,182: *conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam...*; 2,115: *ut conciliemus eos nobis qui audiunt*.

¹⁶⁶ Already, as C. GILL (‘The ethos/pathos distinction in rhetorical and literary criticism.’ *CQ* 34 (1984) [149–166] 151–155) has shown, the influence of Arist.’s rhetorical ideas on his poetical theory is evident in his application in the poet. of the ethos /pathos distinction to mimetic poetry. The significant points raised by GILL are: 1) that Arist. in the poet. discusses the character of the poetic figures (ethos) and the emotions of the audience (pathos) separately; he does not consider the ‘interplay between character and emotions [sc. of the poetic figures]...’ 2) that when Arist. treats the process of dramatic composition (ch. 17), he presents it in quasi-rhetorical terms as a relationship between the author/ speaker/ poet and the audience: ‘...he seems to imagine the playwright himself, like an orator, standing before the audience himself, and playing on their emotions...’

¹⁶⁷ See previous footnote.

¹⁶⁸ GILL’s interpretation of Ciceronian ethos is in many respects erroneous (he was following FANTHAM whose regrettably influential work in this area is altogether unreliable: see WISSE (1989) 223, 225, 232, 235 ff.); not all of his treatment, however, of Cicero is mistaken, and his paper remains a stimulating and thought-provoking work.

(in the poetics¹⁶⁹) of ethos revealing men as either good or bad, dividing them clearly into two camps. Perhaps also the *Odyssey* is more ethical in the sense that the characters thus divided into good and bad are assigned respectively the ends which they deserve¹⁷⁰. This type of plot which appeals to our sense of justice (τὸ...φιλόανθρωπον) Aristotle says in poet. 1453a1–7 arouses neither pity nor fear, and therefore lacks pathos and is more appropriate to comedy than to tragedy¹⁷¹. The *Odyssey*'s closer affinity to comedy is brought out more clearly in 1453a30–36: δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστὶν σύστασις, ἡ διπλὴν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσεια καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν· ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμωδίας οἰκεία· Of course when Aristotle speaks of comedy, he can mean only the Old or the Middle Comedy¹⁷².

2) Quint. 6,2,20

diversum est huic, quod πάθος dicitur, quodque nos adfectum proprie
vocamus, et, ut proxime utriusque differentiam signem, illud (sc. ἡθός)
comoediae, hoc tragoediae magis simile.

Pathos is assimilated to tragedy, because like tragedy, it 'is almost wholly concerned with anger, hatred, fear, envy, pity' (*circa iram, odium, metum, invidiam, miserationem fere tota versatur*). The basis of Quintilian's distinction between tragedy and comedy we may gather from the context of 6,2 is three-fold: 1) the emotional mode appropriate to each; 2) the style appropriate to each; and possibly also 3) the 'type of human situation they present' (GILL), although the last is a mere inference from the sentence *haec pars circa iram, odium* etc. and is not explicit either in our text, or in the surrounding context¹⁷³. Possibly Quintilian also associates ethos with comedy – for him, the Menandrian New Comedy in its various Roman guises, both of which were of course unknown to Aristotle – because this Menandrian New Comedy was interested in stock ethical types and realism in characterisation, both of which features were related to his concept of ethos. Thus realism

¹⁶⁹ 1448a1–5: ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἡθῆ σχεδὸν αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ τὰ ἡθῆ διαφέρουσι πάντες). Cf. 1448a11–12. 25–29. 1448b24 ff.

¹⁷⁰ ELSE on 1456a1 & 1459b15 also interpreted ἡθική as referring to the 'ethical' ending whereby the good are rewarded, the bad punished. On Arist.'s view of this 'ethic' plot with the double structure (poet. ch. 13), see L.A. POST: 'Aristotle and Menander.' *TAPhA* 69 (1938) 8 f. For a different interpretation of ἡθική, cf. LUCAS ad 1456a1.

¹⁷¹ Cf. POST (1938) 20.

¹⁷² So GILL (1984) 151 n. 16: '...he knows only the old and middle comedy, and not the Menandrian comedy later critics associated with *ethos*.'

¹⁷³ Similarly, GILL's (160) idea that Quint.'s association of ethos with the New Comedy was based among other things on the fact that we find in New Comedy the 'exploration of moral themes' is not supported by any passage in Quint., although the idea is found in Roman criticism; cf. Donat. de com. 5,1: *comoedia est fabula diversa instituta continens affectuum civilium ac privatorum, quibus discitur, quid sit in vita utile, quid contra evitandum*.

of characterisation appears to be connected with *ethos* in 6,2,13: *ἥθος... in quo exprimendo summa virtus ea est ut fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur utque mores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodam modo agnoscantur*. Again, in 6,2,17 Quintilian states that the rhetorical exercises of the *ἥθη*, character sketches which perhaps first originated under Theophrastian influence¹⁷⁴, are rightly termed *ἥθη* for they are directly related to *ἥθος*: *non parum significanter etiam illa in scholis ἥθη dixerimus, quibus plerumque rusticos, superstitiosos, avaros, timidos secundum condicionem positionum effingimus; nam si ἥθη mores sunt, cum hos imitatur, ex his ducimus orationem*. And when Quintilian lists Menander's merits in 10,1,69 f., we read this praise of the comic poet's ethic realism: *ita omnem vitae imaginem expressit...ita est omnibus rebus, personis, adfectibus accommodatus*¹⁷⁵. He gives examples of ethical stock types when he states Menander's usefulness as a model for declaimers for whom it is necessary *secundum condicionem controversiarum plures subire personas, patrum filiorum, < caelibum > maritorum, militum rusticorum, divitum pauperum, irascentium deprecantium, mitium asperorum. in quibus omnibus mire custoditur ab hoc poeta decor*¹⁷⁶. 'Character (*ethos*),' writes RUSSELL (1981) 10 on this passage, 'important in all oratory, is of special importance in this scholastic form' – a scholastic form, that is, for which Quintilian recommends the study of Menander.

3) [Longinus] 9,15:

δευτέρου δὲ εἵνεκα προσιστορήσω τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσειαν, ὅπως ἡ σοι γνώριμον ὡς ἡ ἀπακμὴ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ποιηταῖς εἰς ἥθος ἐκλύεται. τοιαῦτα γάρ που τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος ἡθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα οἰκίαν, οἶονεὶ κωμωδία τις ἐστὶν ἡθολογουμένη.

There is perhaps some debt to Aristotle's poetics in Longinus' application of the *ethos* / *pathos* distinction to the Iliad and Odyssey, even if Longinus applies it in a different way and for different reasons. According to Longinus, when the *pathos* of great writers and poets declines (that is, when the emotional content and the capacity to arouse emotion in the audience diminishes), there is a tendency to give way (lit. to be 'relaxed' or 'dissolved') to *ethos*, character (portrayal). He supports this by appealing to the character portraits

¹⁷⁴ R.G. USSHER: *The Characters of Theophrastus*. London 1960, 9 f., sees Th.'s influence on this type of rhetorical exercise indicated by Quint. 6,2,17. This was probably not, however, as USSHER states, the original purpose of Th.'s *Characters*. On the other hand, W.W. FORTENBAUGH: 'Theophrastus, the *Characters* and rhetoric.' in in FORTENBAUGH-MIRHADY (eds.): *Peripatetic Rhet. after Arist.* New Brunswick 1994, 15 ff., esp. 16 n.10 & 32 ff. suggests that Th.'s *Characters* may reflect 'a larger development within the Peripatos – one that concerns not only rhetoric, but also ethics and poetics'.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Gell. 2,23,13 where Caecilius is criticised for failing to reproduce Menander's decorum in character-depiction: *Caecilius vero hoc in loco ridiculus magis quam personae isti quam tractabat aptus atque conveniens videri maluit*.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Plut. Mor. 853 d-e (Comp. Arist. et Men.), where Aristophanes is censured because his λέξεις οὐδὲ τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω καὶ οἰκείον ἀποδίδωσιν... Menander in contrast is praised because he οὕτως ἔμιξε τὴν λέξιν, ὥστε πάσῃ καὶ φύσει καὶ διαθέσει καὶ ἡλικίᾳ σύμμετρον εἶναι...

drawn from the domestic scenes of everyday life in Odysseus' house. Such domestic scenes and character portraits set within a context of 'everyday life' (ἡθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα) we are to infer are absent from the *Iliad*. It is above all the realism of these character portraits (perhaps also *within* a domestic setting, as different from a scene of high pathos such as a court or a battlefield) to which Longinus attributes the *Odyssey*'s affinity to ethos. RUSSELL's note ad 9,15 is instructive: 'Aristotle and L[ong.] mean that the *Odyssey* is more realistic¹⁷⁷, nearer to everyday life, milder in emotional tone¹⁷⁸. The antithesis between ἥθος and πάθος...is really a formulation of a common preconception in antiquity...that there is a positive correlation between realism and lack of seriousness and tension¹⁷⁹'. Again, RUSSELL's paraphrase of τοιαῦτα...ἡθολογουμένη makes a similar point: 'his *realistic* description of Odysseus' house, with its depiction of character, is of this kind. It is a sort of comedy of manners¹⁸⁰.' GILL 163 likewise insists that it is the *Odyssey*'s 'more comfortable domestic realism, both in situation and in personal behaviour' which 'we associate with a Menandrian comedy of manners' that accounts (at any rate, partially) for Longinus' identification of the *Odyssey* as a kind of comedy with ethos.

Dionysius Thrax *ars gramm.* § 2 p.6,9 UHLIG seems to refer to a common theory of comedy as involving domestic realism, that is character-portraits drawn from everyday life (cf. the scholiasts on this passage), when he insists on reading τὴν κωμωδίαν βιωτικῶς.

7.6.2 New Comedy and domestic realism

There is also of course a tradition in ancient criticism in which the ethos element is perhaps not explicit but the writers nevertheless stress that faithfulness in depicting everyday life is a characteristic, perhaps the chief characteristic of comedy – above all of

¹⁷⁷ One is reminded of Alcidas' metaphor that the *Odyssey* was a καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, a metaphor which Arist. – strangely to us – condemned in *rhet.* 1406b12.

¹⁷⁸ LUCAS on poet. 1456a1, however, objects to RUSSELL's attribution of this 'relaxed' or 'tranquil' sense to Arist.'s ἡθική, asserting, on the contrary, that such a usage is not found in Greek until the first century B.C.

¹⁷⁹ Schol. Dionys. p. 172,28 HILGARD commenting on Dionys. Thr.'s τὴν δὲ κωμωδίαν βιωτικῶς and failing to understand the tendency of ancient literary theory to associate comedy's ethical realism with a lack of seriousness, produced this fanciful explanation: καὶ <<βιωτικῶς>> λέγεται, τουτέστι ἱλαρῶς, ὡς ἂν εὖξαιτό τις βιώναι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ γέλῳ. The alternative explanation which the Schol. Dionys. 172,31 f. gives according to which βιωτικῶς is related to the theory of comedy as μίμησιν τοῦ βίου is closer to the mark.

¹⁸⁰ His 'comedy of manners' for κωμωδία...ἡθολογουμένη, is however, unfortunate. This misleading term which not only in general tends to be too vague to be of much use, but also falsely associates Longinus' hypothesized comedy with the highly stylized Restoration comedy which exhibits an emphasis on wit over plot, a highly sophisticated society, a lack of realism and sincerity – features alien to Menandrian comedy. POST (1934) 13 ff. rightly rejects absolutely the use of the term in connexion with Menander. RUSSELL preserves the term in his translation of Long. 9,15 in RUSSELL-WINTERBOTTOM (eds.): *Anc. Lit. Criticism*. Oxford 1972, but in his revision of F. HAMILTON FYFE's translation for the Loeb series (1995) he gives the more precise rendering 'comedy of character'.

the New Comedy of the type composed by Menander and assimilated by the Roman comic poets¹⁸¹. That 'domestic realism' of which GILL speaks is implicit in such formulations of comedy and it is not impossible that their authors, even as the ancient writers discussed above, were likewise thinking of comedy as having some relationship to ethos¹⁸² – this is demonstrably true, at any rate, in the case of Quintilian, as we have just seen above. The kind of formulations which we are thinking of in which the faithfulness of New Comedy to everyday life is stressed, and in which there is no explicit reference to ethos, are represented by the following:

- 1) Aristophanes of Byzantium apud Syrian. comment. in Hermog. II 23.6 RABE = Men. 32 KÖRTE: ὦ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἂν ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;
- 2) Schol. A Heph. p. 115,13 CONSB. παρὰ τοῖς κωμικοῖς...τὸν γὰρ βίον οὗτοι μιμούμενοι.
- 3) Manil. 5,475 f.: *Menander, / qui vitae ostendit vitam*
- 4) Quint. 10,1,70: [Menander] *ita omnem vitae imaginem expressit*
- 5) Aul. Gell. 2,23,12: *illud Menandri de vita hominum media sumptum, simplex et verum et delectabile* (on the phraseology *de vita hominum media*, cf. Hor. epist. 2,1,168 f. *creditur, ex medio quia res arcessit, habere sudoris minimum...comoedia*)
- 6) Donat. exc. de com. V 2 WESSNER 23,5 commenting on the origin of the word κωμῳδία: ἀπὸ τῆς κώμης, *hoc est ab actu vitae hominum, qui in vicis habitant ob mediocritatem fortunarum, non in aulis regiis, ut sunt personae tragicæ*. Cf. V 3: *comoedia autem, quia poema sub imitatione vitae atque morum similitudine compositum est...* also V 5 (commenting on Cic.'s famous dictum on comedy to be discussed below): *aitque esse comoediam cotidianæ vitae speculum, nec iniuria. nam ...lectione comoediæ imitationem vitae consuetudinisque non aegerime animadvertimus*.

One might also cite the Schol. Dionys. p.172,31 HILGARD which, in commenting on Dionysius' insistence on reading comedy βιωτικῶς, seems to refer to the theory that comedy is an imitation of life: τὴν δὲ κωμῳδίαν βιωτικῶς].... Ἡ << βιωτικῶς >> κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ βίου, ἵνα εἰ μὲν ὑπόκειται γέρων, μιμησώμεθα τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ γέροντος, εἰ δὲ γυνή, μιμησώμεθα τὴν φωνὴν τῆς γυναικός. Cf. Schol. Dionys. p. 306,35 HILGARD ὁ κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ βίου, τουτέστιν ὁ μιμούμενος τὸ παρειαγόμενον πρόσωπον καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀποματτόμενος σχέσιν, ἵνα ἂν μὲν ὑπόκειται γέρων, μιμησώμεθα τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ γέροντος, εἰ δὲ γυνή, μιμησώμεθα τὴν φωνὴν τῆς γυναικός.

¹⁸¹ Compare RUSSELL's comments on Longinus' βιολογούμενα in 9,15: '[it] implies portrayal of ordinary life, and comedy is *par excellence* the realistic genre'.

¹⁸² Cf. GILL (1984) 163 n. 79; and again RUSSELL on Long. 9,15 quoted above. It has been conjectured that the definition of comedy as an 'imitation of life' owes its origin to Peripatetic theory (R. PFEIFFER: *Hist. of Class. Scholarship*. Oxford 1968, 190 f.); if this is correct, then our conjecture here that writers who associate the (New) comedy with everyday life are also thinking of some relationship between comedy and ethos is made the more plausible, given the Peripatetic and especially Theophrastian interest in character.

In another class is the testimony of Evanthius II 6 WESSNER 17,12 ff. who in addition to emphasis on the closeness of (New) comedy to everyday life, appears to allude to the ethos element of New Comedy. His familiarity with an established tradition of associating comedy with ethos and tragedy with pathos was perhaps already earlier indicated in I 5, where, in a manner similar to that of Aristotle and Longinus, he states that Homer composed the Iliad like a tragedy, and the Odyssey in the image of a comedy¹⁸³. Unfortunately, he does not state the reason for this double comparison, and accordingly the attribution of the ethos / pathos distinction to comedy and tragedy must remain – in this passage at any rate – conjectural. But let us return to II 6 WESSNER 17,12 ff.: he alludes here to the greater realism of (New) comedy – which we have seen was implicitly insisted upon by Longinus 9,15 – as being inherent in its well-ordered plots which are closer to our everyday experience, in its characters who represent the people one meets in the street¹⁸⁴, and in its generally greater approximation to ordinary life: *aliud genus carminis νέαν κωμωδίαν, hoc est novam comoediam, repperere poetae, quae argumento communi magis et generaliter ad omnes homines, qui mediocribus fortunis agunt, pertineret ...et eadem opera multum delectationis afferet, concinna argumento, consuetudini congrua, utilis sententiis, grata salibus, apta metro*. At III 5 WESSNER 19,16 ff. in enumerating the virtues of Terence as a comic poet (who in a manner of speaking here represents the ideal of New Comedy), Evanthius seems to allude to the ethos of New Comedy in contrast to the pathos of tragedy: *haec cum artificiosissima Terentius fecerit, tum illud est admirandum, quod et morem [= ethos] retinuit, ut comoediam scriberet, et temperavit affectum, ne in tragoediam transiliret*¹⁸⁵.

It is well known that Aristotle in the poetics insists on dramatic probability: in numerous passages in that work that demand is applied to tragedy, epic and comedy¹⁸⁶. After Aristotle, one finds that among ancient critics this probability is especially attributed to New Comedy: one thus finds conjoined with an emphasis on realistic character portrayal in the lighter emotional modes a demand for plots with probable arguments – that too is naturally to be expected of plays of ‘domestic realism’. So Evanthius II 6, p. 17,12 ff. WESSNER just quoted (note especially *concinna argumento*). Similarly, the Schol. Dionys. p.

¹⁸³ *Homerus... qui Iliadem ad instar tragoediae, Odysseam ad imaginem comoediae fecisse monstratur.*

¹⁸⁴ Cf. IV 2: *inter tragoediam autem et comoediam cum multa tum inprimis hoc distat, quod in comoedia mediocres fortunae hominum, parvi impetus periculorum laetique sunt exitus actionum...*

¹⁸⁵ Cf. POST (1938) 10 f., 23: ‘Now *pathos* and *ethos* in rhetoric refer to two ways of appealing to a jury, one by a strong emotional assault, the other by an apparently uncolored picture of frank and natural individuality that would attract without rousing strong emotion. It is in this sense that Evanthius praises Terence for avoiding *affectus* and keeping to *mos*.’ Cf. also BRINK on Hor. ars 89.

¹⁸⁶ On this subject, see N. O’SULLIVAN, ‘Aristotle on dramatic probability.’ *CJ* 91 (1995) 47–66.

449,13 HILGARD commenting on πλάσμα, the type of plot which according to the other scholiasts on Dionysius Thrax distinguishes comedy from tragedy¹⁸⁷, writes: πλάσμα <δὲ> τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν γενέσθαι, μὴ γενόμενον δέ¹⁸⁸. That clearly cannot refer to the Old Comedy with its heroes who fly to heaven on gigantic dung-beetles. But not only should the characters be of such a kind as one might meet in the street (*in comoedia humiles atque privatae personae*¹⁸⁹), but the events of the story should not involve so great dangers, or possess so great potential to frighten, or so great misery and pathos – all these elements, however effective they might be in moving the audience when skilfully employed, are felt to be out of place in comedy¹⁹⁰, among other reasons, perhaps, because they were felt to detract from the credibility of the plot, or rather to detract from the capacity of the plot to appeal to our ordinary experiences of life¹⁹¹.

7.6.3 the Ciceronian conception of comedy and ethos

Now I wish to attempt to show that in Cicero there are several ways in which ethos may be associated with the interpretation of comedy, less convincing perhaps when taken separately, more so, however when considered together. I shall discuss them under the following heads:

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Schol. Dionys. p. 173,22: πλάσματα; also Schol. Dionys. p. 306,25 διάπλασμα & p. 307,3 διαπλάσματα. On the insistence in the Schol. to Dionys. on fictional πλάσμα in comic plot, cf. JANKO 49.

¹⁸⁸ On this passage, cf. ROSTAGNI (1921) 119 ff.

¹⁸⁹ Diom. ars gr. III GL I 488,15 f. KEIL

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Evanth. III 5, p. 19,16 ff. WESSNER just quoted; also p.20,1–3 *illud quoque inter Terentianas virtutes mirabile, quod eius fabulae eo sunt temperamento, ut neque extumescant ad tragicam celsitudinem...*; Diom. ars gr. III GL I 488,20 KEIL *tristitia namque tragoediae proprium*.

¹⁹¹ The presentation of violence on the Shakespearian stage is of course remarkably undisguised in comparison with the conventions of the Greek and – presumably – of the Republican Roman tragic theatres. Nevertheless, the inherent violence in the plots of the Greek and Roman tragedies admits of some comparison with the Shakespearian. In this connexion, E.M. WAITH's discussion in his Oxford ed. (1984) 56 f. of Tit. Andr. on violence and its attendant loss of realism in that play are illuminating (cf. also 65 ff.). The experience of certain directors in staging so extremely violent a play as Tit. Andr., lead them to eschew attempts at modern, realistic settings (Nazi-style uniforms etc.) and 'to avoid a kind of realism which might limit, rather than widen, the appeal of the play, and in seeking to shock in the manner of the Grand Guignol might, paradoxically, "appear ludicrous or stagey"'.

- I) the presentation of character in (New) comedy is compatible with rhetorical ethos
- IIa) oratorical humour bears some relation to ethos: this may be seen in its functions and the terms used to describe it. Comic humour which is sometimes described in the same or similar terms as oratorical humour is equally susceptible of rhetorical treatment from the perspective of ethos
- IIb) oratorical humour, having some relation to ethos, also has in its division into types of humour (de orat. 2,240 ff.) many parallels in comedy
- III) the main Ciceronian passage on ethos outside of the de orat. (orat. 128), in addition to its demand for character-portrayal, also contains:
 - i) a reference to 'all the usual experiences of everyday life' which could be applied to comedy
 - ii) two general, descriptive terms which also could be applied to comedy
- IV) Cicero's famous dictum on comedy as a 'mirror of life' can be related to the theory of ethos by means of the formulation that occurs in ancient literary criticism whereby 'closeness to everyday life' is associated with ethos.

I) *the presentation of character in (New) comedy is compatible with rhetorical ethos*

This is not to deny that character-portrayal of course has more forms in comedy than in Roman oratory where it consists entirely of description, or self-description¹⁹². Character is also of course depicted in tragedy, but as tragedy is a *miseriarum comprehensio*¹⁹³ and consists of violence and extreme emotion (such as pity and fear) as well as destruction of life¹⁹⁴, and as *lenitas*, the gentler emotional mode associated with Ciceronian ethos, is lacking in tragedy, its depiction of character seems less real, less tangible to our everyday experience – hence it is not of the kind that may be compared with the depiction of character (positive and negative) with which Ciceronian ethos is concerned. The Peripatetic (?) identification that we saw above of comedy with the depiction of character perhaps derives ultimately

¹⁹² Cf. above n. 164.

¹⁹³ Diomed. ars gr. p. 488,23 KEIL

¹⁹⁴ The destruction of life in tragedy and the embracing of it in comedy form a common antithesis in the ancient formulations of comedy and tragedy. So Schol. Dionys. XVIIIb4 KOSTER = Theod. Alex. gramm. p.58,31 GOETTLING (not in HILGARD) says that comedy (unlike tragedy which involves what Theophr. ap. Diom. ars gr. GL I 487,11 f. KEIL called a *τύχης περίστασις*) is *συστατική τοῦ βίου...καὶ ἡ μὲν κωμῳδία τὸν βίον συνίστησιν, ἡ δὲ τραγωδία διαλύει*. Cf. Schol. Dionys. p. 306,26 f. HILGARD who says that tragedy destroys, comedy (re-)composes life: *ἡ μὲν τραγωδία διαλύει τὸν βίον, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία συνίστησι*. Evanth. IV 2 p. 21,15 f. WESSNER: *in tragoedia fugienda vita, in comoedia capessenda exprimitur*. Arist. poet. 1449a34–36 on comedy: *ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχυρὸς ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν*. Arist. defines tragic pathos thus in poet. 1452b11–13: *πάθος δὲ ἐστὶ πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά*. Cf. also Diomed. ars gr. GL I 488,16 ff. KEIL. Cf. also A. ROSTAGNI: 'Aristotele e aristotelismo nella storia dell'estetica antica.' *SFIC* 2 (1921) 131.

from the Aristotelian assertion in poet. 1450a15 ff. that tragedy is concerned primarily not with character but action¹⁹⁵. Cf. poet. 1450a24 f.: ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἡθῶν γένοιτ' ἂν.

This line of thought, whereby Menandrian comedy's character-portrayal is assimilated to rhetorical ethos, is enunciated more distinctly in Quintilian, Cicero's ardent admirer, as we have seen above. However, the germs of this kind of thought already appear in Cicero. The most striking evidence here is a passage from S.Rosc. 47, in which Cicero comments on a situation in a comedy which he suggests represents one which we are likely to encounter in everyday life:

haec conficta [sc. in comoediis /comoedia] arbitror esse a poetis ut effictos
nostros mores in alienis personis expressamque imaginem vitae quotidianae
videremus

One might also compare Cat. 65, where the comic stage with its irascible old fathers is apparently at the back of Cicero's mind – at least initially; later, it is brought to the fore. Notice how Cicero especially delights in the latter part of this passage with the (Terentian) depiction of character here:

at sunt morosi et anxii et iracundi et difficiles senes. si quaerimus, etiam avari;
sed haec morum vitia sunt, non senectutis...quae tamen omnia dulciora fiunt et
moribus bonis et artibus idque cum in vita tum in scaena intellegi potest ex iis
fratribus qui in Adelphis sunt. quanta in altero diritas, in altero comitas¹⁹⁶!

IIa) *oratorical humour bears some relation to ethos: this may be seen in its functions and the terms used to describe it. Comic humour which is sometimes described in the same or similar terms as oratorical humour is equally susceptible of rhetorical treatment from the perspective of ethos*¹⁹⁷

There are several indications in the second book of the de orat. of a connexion between humour and ethos (and of a connexion between humour and ethos/pathos regarded together¹⁹⁸). This is not to deny that there are also indications in the same book of a

¹⁹⁵ Cf. ROSTAGNI (1921) 49.

¹⁹⁶ On C.'s fascination with true-to-life character-types in comedy (esp. that of Ter. & Caecilius), see BLÄNSDORF 147 ff., who has collected all the relevant Ciceronian passages.

¹⁹⁷ The relationship between humour and ethos/pathos (2,178–216) is discussed by GRANT (1924) 73–76; L-P III 210–213; WISSE (1989) 305–312.

¹⁹⁸ Of the indications of a connexion between ethos/pathos (taken together) and humour, the most significant is the position of the discussion of humour in the de orat. It occupies sections 2,216–290 and follows directly on from the discussion of ethos and pathos (2,178–216). That the discussion on humour belongs in some way to the discussion of *inventio* and more specifically to the two *pisteis* of *inventio*, ethos and pathos, is indicated further by the fact that Antonius rounds off the discussion of *inventio* (291–306) before that of *dispositio* is taken up. Thus the section on humour is clearly sandwiched between two sections on *inventio*, the one concerns specifically ethos and pathos, and the other, Antonius' general practice with regard to *inventio*. Cf. L-P III 210; WISSE (1989) 306 f. found two further indications based on considerations of

connexion between humour and pathos, as WISSE (1989) 308 f., 310 f.¹⁹⁹ has shown, but the connexion between humour and ethos is manifestly more important²⁰⁰ and indeed it is more clearly enunciated (as in 2,236).

The first indication, then, of a link between humour and ethos occurs at 2,216: the use of humour is here described as *suavis*: *suavis autem est et vehementer saepe utilis iocus et facetiae...* Now *suavitas*, as L-P III 211 point out, is connected specifically with ethos at 2,184²⁰¹. We must acknowledge, however, with WISSE (1989) 307 n. 23, that the connexion here is weak, since the allusion to *suavitas* is made only once in the discussion of ethos (2,184), and there not very conspicuously.

More convincing is the second indication contained in 2,236 where to the question *sitne oratoris velle risum movere* (235) the reply is given:

est plane oratoris movere risum, vel quod ipsa hilaritas benevolentiam conciliat ei, per quem excitata est, vel quod admirantur omnes acumen, uno saepe in verbo positum, maxime respondentis, non numquam etiam lacescentis, vel quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat, vel quod ipsum oratorem politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, quod urbanum, maximeque quod tristitiam ac severitatem mitigat et relaxat odiosasque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit.

First of all, we find here the exact phrase *benevolentiam conciliare* which we find elsewhere specifically used of ethos, as for example in 2,182 and in *orat.* 128 (cf. *de orat.* 2,115. 121. 128. 212. 216. 291. 292. 310. 3,104²⁰²). This very similarity of phraseology (even if we are not dealing with technical terms) makes it highly improbable that Cicero should have written this passage about the use of humour without thinking back to what he had written

form: 1) the transition between pathos and humour (2,216) is not very pronounced; there is no definite break such as occurs in other divisions of subject matter in the *de orat.*; 2) Antonius in *de orat.* 2,181 promises to discuss disposition *after* he has discussed the last two elements invention, ethos and pathos.

¹⁹⁹ I am not inclined, however, to accept WISSE's conjecture – based on a single passage in [Long.] *de sublim.* 38,5, together with some vaguely supporting texts from *Brut.* (188. 198) – that C. regarded laughter as emotion.

²⁰⁰ Whereas oratorical humour may be compared to a type of ethos as we shall see below, it appears from 2,216. 236. 340 to be connected with pathos only as a way of *removing* the extreme emotions of the audience; and here too ethos comes into play again, for the effect of the humour is the same as that not only of pathos, but also of ethos. See *de orat.* 2,216 *illa autem, quae conciliationis causa leniter aut permotionis vehementer aguntur, contrariis commotionibus auferenda sunt, ut odio benevolentia [=the aim of ethos], ut misericordia invidia tollatur.* Cf. WISSE 237 (also with n. 63): '[t]he wording *contrariis commotionibus*...must...be taken loosely, as also including the gentle emotions that are the effect of ethos...'

²⁰¹ And with ethos and pathos in part. 22.

²⁰² And yet *conciliare* is not always connected with ethos, as in 1,143. 2,200. 206. 207 etc. Cf. WISSE (1989) 234 n. 49 for more references. In *de orat.* 2,200, although the phrase *benevolentiam conciliare* occurs without reference to ethos, the fact that C. states that the sympathetic reaction (*benevolentiam*) belonged not to the jury (*iudicium*) but to the people (*populi*), indicates that the use of the phrase *benevolentiam conciliare* is here not analogous to that in which it is connected with the jury as happens in ethos and oratorical humour. Cf. WISSE (1989) 276.

some paragraphs earlier on *ethos*²⁰³. Again, *benevolentiam conciliare* in this passage, together with *admirantur omnes acumen*, and *ipsum oratorem politum...urbanum* indicates that humour can contribute to *ethos*, indeed can be a form of *ethos*, since it too portrays the orator's character in a positive way²⁰⁴. If then humour can be a kind of *ethos*²⁰⁵, and this kind of *ethos* leads to a characterisation whereby the orator is made out to be *politus*, *eruditus*, *urbanus* (de orat. 2,236), it is surely not insignificant that in the description in off. 1,103 f. of the type of humour worthy of a Roman gentleman, the characteristics of this type of humour, which includes the humour of New Comedy as represented by Plautus²⁰⁶, resemble the characteristics of the oratorical humour which, as we have just stated, may be a form of *ethos*:

de orat. 2,236:

the orator as portrayed by humour

est plane oratoris movere risum, vel quod ipsa hilaritas benevolentiam conciliat...vel quod admirantur omnes acumen...vel quod ipsum oratorem *politus* esse hominem significat, quod *eruditus*²⁰⁷, quod *urbanus*, maximeque quod tristitiam ac severitatem mitigat et relaxat odiosasque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit.

off. 1,103 f.:

the kind of humour fit for a Roman gentleman

ipsum genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed *ingenuum* et *facetum* esse debet...duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum inliberale petulans flagitiosum obscenum, alterum *elegans*²⁰⁸ *urbanus ingeniosus facetus*, quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt

To recapitulate: the type of man depicted by oratorical humour exhibits similar qualities to the characteristics of the humour declared in off. 1,104 to be worthy of the Roman gentleman, of which Plautus and the Attic comedy are representative. We may be permitted to represent this more clearly, if somewhat more crudely, by means of the following diagram:

²⁰³ Cf. GRANT (1924) 75: '...it is clear that Cicero had the *ἦθος* of the speech in mind when he wrote the section on the uses of wit to the orator.'


²⁰⁴ So GRANT (1924) 75; L-P III 211; WISSE (1989) 308.

²⁰⁵ The identification of oratorical humour with *ethos* is, however, not absolute; essential differences in the nature of their aims (the function of oratorical humour is only subordinate to the wider aim of the *pistis* *ethos*), the occasion and limits of their respective employment (*ethos* should flow throughout the whole speech like blood in a body, so de orat. 2,310, whereas the use of humour is restricted: so de orat. 2,221. 247) and their forms: *ethos* in general is developed through passages fashioned in a defined style or through the continuous fabric of the whole speech, whereas humour has two types, one of which, *dicacitas* consists of short and pithy barbs. Cf. WISSE (1989) 309; E. NARDUCCI: *Cic. e l'eloquenza romana*. Roma-Bari 1997, 63.

²⁰⁶ On the meaning of the phrase *Atticorum antiqua comoedia*, see below, Appendix V.

²⁰⁷ Learning and literature are frequently associated with *urbanitas*, in the passage from the off., the literature element is self-evident (Plautus etc.); learning is hinted at by *elegans* (cf. de orat. 2,28), *ingeniosus* and the reference to the Socratic books. On literature, learning and *urbanitas* in C. (associated in de orat. 1,17. 2,25; distinguished in fin. 1,7) see E.S. RAMAGE: *Urbanitas*. Oklahoma 1973, 51, 56 et passim. Plin. ep. 1,16,6 describes an acquaintance whose wife's letter sounded to Plin. like Plaut. or Ter.; he describes such a woman as *tam doctam politamque*.

²⁰⁸ Terence, understandably not singled out for his humour, nevertheless stands out on account of his *elegantia* of language: Att. 7,3,10 *Terentium, cuius fabellae propter elegantiam sermonis putabantur a C. Laelio scribi*; Quint. 10,1,99 *licet Terenti scripta ad Scipionem Africanum referantur (quae tamen sunt in hoc genere elegantissima...)*. For C.'s admiration of *elegantia*, cf. rep. 4,8 = Non. 430,29 *admiror nec rerum solum, sed verborum etiam elegantiam*.



Another indication of the connexion between ethos and oratorical humour is indicated again in 2,236 where it is written: *quod frangit adversarium...quod refutat*. Thus humour can be a form of negative-ethos (cf. de orat. 2,182 *et item improbari adversariorum* [sc. *mores et instituta et facta et vitam*]), and humour resembling, or at times identical to, this kind of derisive, blackening, destructive humour may of course be found in comedy. One type of oratorical humour *in re* described by Cicero in de orat. 2,240 f. (the *narratio* / *fabella*) especially resembles this derisive function: *est autem huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores eius, de quo narres, ut sermo, ut voltus omnes exprimantur, ut iis qui audiunt tum geri illa fierique videantur*.

IIb) *oratorical humour, having some relation to ethos, also has in its division into types of humour (de orat. 2,240 ff.) many parallels in comedy*

We can approach the question of the relationship between comedy and ethos in another way. We have just considered oratorical humour *as a kind of* ethos; we argued that comedy, as a humorous genre could similarly be interpreted in the light of rhetorical ethos. We also pointed to two passages where in fact there seemed to be some correlation between the type of humour represented by Plautus (and Attic comedy) and the character-portrayal resulting from the use of oratorical humour (which can be a *kind of* ethos): again, we found here an indirect link between ethos and comedy. One can now go further: for if one considers particular details of Cicero's classification of categories of humour, one cannot fail to recognise many striking similarities to types of humour found in Roman comedy. In this connexion, it is significant that Aristotle was content to allow one analysis and enumeration of the types of humour to suffice for both the rhetoric and for the poetics. He writes in rhet. 1419b5: *εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς*²⁰⁹. In the case of Cicero, for most, if not for all, of the categories of humour *in re* and *in verbo* of the

²⁰⁹ Cf. rhet. 1371b35

dicacitas type (2,253 ff. cf. L-P III 194), as well as for the two categories of the *cavillatio* type (*fabella* or *narratio & imitatio depravata* 2,240–42), it is not difficult to find parallels in Roman comedy, and indeed DUCKWORTH 351 ff. has collected some of these. Thus, perhaps if we recall the rhetorical focus of Caesar's discussion of humour, we will not be particularly surprised by the almost total lack of examples taken from Roman comedy²¹⁰, but it is certainly is surprising when one considers, as L-P III 202 f. point out, that the overwhelming majority of examples illustrating *elocutio* and *actio* in Bk. 3 are taken from Roman tragedy! Typically in the Caesar discourse the examples are taken from speeches; from collections of dicta such as those of Cato; and from other comic genres such as from Lucilius or mime²¹¹.

This claim requires qualification. We are not suggesting that the humour of the orator is identical with that of comedy; it goes without saying that there exist in comedy some important types of humour, especially those dependent on gesture, action, dramatic irony, plot, continuous repartee and so forth, which are entirely absent in oratory. All we wish to establish here, is that, from the rhetorician's perspective, there are sufficient parallels between the various types of humour found in comedy and oratorical humour to allow for the rhetorical treatment of humour in comedy. Again, as oratorical humour is, in our opinion, more closely connected in Cicero's system with *ethos* than with any other part of rhetoric, so there can be another indirect link between *ethos* and comedy.

III) *the main Ciceronian passage on ethos outside of the de orat. (orat. 128), in addition to its demand for character-portrayal, also contains:*

- i) a reference to 'all the usual experiences of everyday life' which could be applied to comedy*
- ii) two general, descriptive terms which also could be applied to comedy*

²¹⁰ There are at least three quotations from comedy in the treatment of humour in *de orat.*: 2,242 (from Caecilius' *Synephebi*); 2,257 one quotation perhaps again from Caecilius (= *Stat*), and one from an unknown comedy whose author is not named. None of these quotations, however, is an illustration of the one of the categories of humour; in each of these instances it is the use of the quotation (e.g. Roscius, Scaurus, Antonius) that constitutes the witticism.

²¹¹ Cf. L-P III 202: 'Besonders auffallend ist das fast gänzliche Fehlen von Beispielen aus der Komödie (Plautus und Terenz!); das wirkt um so erstaunlicher, wenn man die Beispiele, durch welche im 3. Buch die *elocutio* und *actio* erläutert werden, betrachtet: dort stammt die übergroße Mehrheit davon aus römischen Tragödien (Accius, Pacuvius und besonders Ennius)'. L-P suggest the reason for this absence of comedy quotations in the humour-discourse lies in the fact that C. used for his exempla in the humour-discourse a collection of witticisms, while in Bk. 3 he quoted from memory. The theory of REICH (1903), 64, 68 that C.'s choice of so many examples from mime was determined by a conscious effort to gratify (?) Julius Caesar, a lover of the mime, whose older relative C. Iulius Caesar Strabo is assigned by C. the discourse on wit and humour in the second bk. of the *de orat.*, is highly improbable, if not altogether perverse. REICH, as GRANT (1924) 89 points out, overlooks in the Strabo discourse the numerous adverse judgements on mime, and the sharp distinctions made between oratorical humour and mime.

Here is Cicero's definition of ethos and pathos in *orat.* 128:

duae res sunt²¹² enim, quae bene tractatae ab oratore admirabilem eloquentiam faciant. quorum alterum est quod Graeci ἡθικὸν vocant, ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum; alterum, quod idem παθητικὸν nominant, quo perturbantur animi et concitantur, in quo uno regnat oratio. illud superius come, iucundum, *ad benevolentiam conciliandam* paratum, hoc vehemens incensum incitatum, quo causae eripiuntur; quod cum rapide fertur, sustineri nullo pacto potest.

i) In the excerpt *ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum* we seem to have a description completely compatible with a theory of comedy. Certainly it seems to agree with the ideas of those ancient critics examined above, who stress that the province of comedy (and especially of New Comedy) is the realm of 'everyday experience', of 'ordinary life', of the whole range of circumstances that one ordinarily encounters in one's life. Cf. SANDYS rendering of *orat.* 128 thus: 'that which bears upon men's different natural dispositions and characters, and all the associations of life'. One might also compare Quintilian's description of Menander in 10,1,69: *ita est omnibus rebus, personis, affectibus, accommodatus*.

ii) *iucundum*: suggests agreeableness, pleasantness, the absence of all vehement emotion and aggression: that too reminds us of the 'comfortable domestic realism' of (New) comedy: the laughter is generally good-natured (especially in New Comedy); there is no violence, no danger that might cause unease in the audience; nor misfortune such as to cause pity; nor any difficulties that cannot and are not resolved. Hence a Greek definition of comedy preserved in Donat. exc. de com. V 1 p. 22,14 WESSNER: *κωμῳδία ἐστὶν [...] περιοχὴ ἀκίνδυνος*²¹³; and Evanthius IV 5 writes of the endings of comedy: *catastrophe conversio rerum ad iucundos exitus patefacta cunctis cognitione gestorum*. On the potential for persuasiveness in things that partake of *iucunditas*, cf. *de orat.* 2,326.

come: like *comitas verborum* in *de orat.* 2,182 (cf. *orat.* 132), this is used (albeit somewhat vaguely) both in a stylistic and ethical sense: it is not, as WISSE rightly insists, in either of its senses a technical term²¹⁴. On the ethical level, *comitas* is related to *humanitas, facilitas* (cf. *facilitatis* in *de orat.* 2,182) & *iucunditas* (see above) and belongs, together with them, to an

²¹² *duae res sunt*: this is the reading of *A* followed by KROLL; SCHUETZ's *duo restant* which WILKINS prints in the OCT, and SANDYS' *duo sunt* seem pedantic and unjustified emendations.

²¹³ Likewise Diomed. *ars gr.* GL I 488,4 KEIL: *κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἰδιωτικῶν πραγμάτων ἀκίνδυνος περιοχὴ*. JANKO 48 f. thinks the definition was of Theophrastian origin (cf. *ars gr.* GL I 487,11 f. KEIL: *a Theophrasto ita definita est* [sc. *tragoedia*]).

²¹⁴ WISSE's (1989) 215 n. 95 suggestion, however, that *comitas* in *de orat.* 2,182 refers to pronunciation is surely mistaken, as *orat.* 128 indicates.

aristocratic social and cultural ideal, an 'aristokratischen Lebensideal'. According to L-P ad 1,35²¹⁵ it suggests 'die offene, liebenswürdige Haltung besonders den Niedrigeren oder Jüngeren gegenüber...' Stylistically, *come* and *comitas* are more vague terms and their traits are somewhat harder to define. Probably we should be not far from the mark, if we say that the *comis* style is refined, polished, light, affable, cheerful, courteous, temperate, graceful²¹⁶, charming, urbane²¹⁷, having a tendency to wittiness: in a word, it is, truly, an 'aristocratic' style, betraying social superiority, education, culture. These traits of *comitas*, then, indicate the lines along which Cicero wishes in orat. 128 the character-portrayal (ethos) of the orator to proceed. Now this *comitas* of orat. 128 we find mentioned by Cicero in the fourth verse of the well known Limon fragment²¹⁸ and here it is used explicitly in connexion with the New Comedy as represented by Terence²¹⁹. Because of this parallel, the *comitas* of the Limon fragment has been thought to be a reference to the ἡδυσκόν in Terence²²⁰. SCHMID 246 was of the opinion that the *come* in v. 4 referred not only to *urbanitas*²²¹, but also to the ἡδυσκόν, appealing to the Greek equivalent ἀστεῖον, whose work can be performed in Latin

²¹⁵ They cite K.H. HEUER: *Comitas, facilitas, liberalitas. Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit*. Diss. Münster 1941, 24–25.

²¹⁶ Cf. DE LORENZI 3 'ogni cosa dicendo con grazia'.

²¹⁷ Cf. TLL s.v. *comis* 1785,74 citing the GLOSS. Also COURTNEY *Frag. Lat. Poets* 154 on the Limon fr.: '*come* = *urbanum*'; W. SCHMID: 'Terenz als Menander Latinus.' *RhM* 95 (1952) 245 f.: 'Dem in V. 1 [sc. of the Limon fr.] hervorgehobenen Bemühen des Terenz um latinitas gestellt sich nun in V. 4 ein Hinweis auf seine *urbanitas*, denn auf sie wird man das mit 'urbanum' fast gleichbedeutende *come* deuten (*quidquid come loquens* gut zu einem dem Scipionenkreis verpflichteten Geist)'.

²¹⁸ The text of the fragment together with Caesar's reply (?) as printed in COURTNEY *FLP* 153 reads as follows (for a different text, see SCHMID 271):

Cicero in Limone hactenus laudat:

tu quoque qui solus lecto sermone, Terenti,
conversum expressumque Latine voce Menandrum
in medium nobis sedatis † vocibus † effers,
quiddam come loquens atque omnia dulcia dicens.

item C. Caesar:

tu quoquem tu in summis, o dimidiate Menander,
poneris, et merito, puri sermonis amator.
lenibus atque utinam scriptis adiuncta foret vis
comica, ut aequato virtus polleret honore
cum Graecis neve hac despecte ex parte iaceres.
unum hoc maceror ac doleo tibi desse, Terenti.

Cic. 3 motibus BARTH: fort. uersibus 4 quiddam A: quid quod Z: quidquid LEO | dicens / loquens codd.: colens BAEHRENS: reddens SCHMID

item C. Caesar del. L. HERMANN: *Musée Belge* 34, 243 ff. *aliisque assentientibus*

Caes. 5 neve corr. ROTH: neque codd. | despecte BAEHRENS et LEO: despecta codd. | iaceres codd.: iaceret FERRARINO

²¹⁹ Cf. Cat. 65, where C. in reference to the two brothers of Ter.'s Ad. exclaims: *quanta in altero diritas, in altero comitas!*

²²⁰ So SCHMID 234 n.12; ROSTAGNI (1944) 43 thought there was also a reference to ethos in the *sedatis motibus* (the conjecture of BARTH for the controversial reading *sedatis vocibus*; A. DE LORENZI's *sedatis moribus* in *Dimidiatus Menander*. Napoli 1949, 2 & 44 ff. is preposterous; cf. SCHMID 237 n. 22 citing BÜCHNER who also advocates *sedatis moribus*), appealing to Quint.'s definition (6,2,9) of ethos as *affectus mites atque compositi*. Cf. QUADLBAUER (1960) 57. SCHMID 234 f. rightly rejected this appeal as involving an anachronism, insisting on the contrary that Quint. may not be adduced here to explain C.'s concept of ethos.

²²¹ Cf. QUADLBAUER (1960) 57.

by *comitas*, as stated in the Gloss. II 248,31 (cf. TLL s.v. *comis* 1785,76)²²². In support of his claim regarding *come* in v. 4 that ‘es ist eine Forderung des ἀστεῖος λόγος, daß man das Ethos der Reden den Redenden anpasse’, he cites a passage from Anaximenes’ rhet. (22 p. 59, 18 A.): ἀν δὲ ἀστεῖον γράφειν θέλῃς λόγον, παραφύλαττε ὡς μάλιστα ὅπως τὰ ἥδη τῶν λόγων ὁμοιοῦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυνήσῃ. One is reminded of Quintilian’s statement regarding Menander’s excellence in his depiction of ἥδη²²³: *in quibus omnibus mire custoditur ab hoc poeta decor*. A similar thought is found in Plut. Compar. Arist. et Men. 853 ὥστε πάσῃ καὶ φύσει καὶ διαθέσει καὶ ἡλικίᾳ σύμμετρον εἶναι.

It is the business of ethos (and oratorical humour) to exhibit these qualities of *comitas* and *urbanitas* in order that the orator may be thought of as possessing a refined, well-tempered, urbane, aristocratic character. *Comitas* in both its aspects – of refinement and urbanity on the one hand, of aristocratic outlook, on the other – are attributed to Terence. *Comitas* may be exhibited by some of the characters in the play themselves, but chiefly, I think, we must think of Cicero attributing the *comitas* to Terence: his aristocratic urbanity is manifested in the way he treats the characters of his comic figures (even low figures) with the utmost decorum and propriety, fitting the characters of the dialogues to the figures in the comedy. One might compare the urbanity and noblesse that Fielding exhibits through his mastery of the widely disparate colours of his ‘character palette’, from milk-maids and stable boys to pedantic parsons and landed gentry like Sir Thomas Booby²²⁴. It is this urbane, aristocratic stamp of the author that is indicated by *comis*: hence there is no conflict with comedy’s ethical concern with the ‘everyday’ experiences or with comedy’s presentation of men *qui mediocribus fortunis agunt* (Evanth. II 6, p. 17,14 f. WESSNER). One recalls Crassus’ discussion of urban Latin²²⁵ at de orat. 3,45 where he says the speech of his (aristocratic) mother-in-law Laelia makes him think he is hearing Plautus or Naevius: her ancestors spoke *non aspere... non vaste, non rustice, non hiulce, sed presse et aequabiliter et leviter*²²⁶.

²²² Cf. the association of ἀστεϊότης with comedy in Schol. Dionys. p. 306,19 & 34 HILGARD. On the use of *comitas* as a rendering of the Gr. ἀστεϊότης, EVA FRANK: De vocis *urbanitas* apud Ciceronem vi atque usu. Diss. Essen 1932, 56 ff. (Exkurs über den rhetorischen Gebrauch von ἀστεῖος).

²²³ Cf. FRAENKEL 1960, 360 f.

²²⁴ It is, of course, again in vain that modern critics such as L.A. POST: ‘The art of Terence.’ *CW* 23 (1930) 123 complain about Terence’s lack of differentiation among his various characters. R.C. FLICKINGER: ‘Terence and Menander.’ *CJ* 26 (1930) 682 f., while accepting a certain, refined and elevated uniformity of characterisation in Ter., refuses to view this as a defect, but on the contrary, regards it as positive development of the programme of the Scipionic Circle.

²²⁵ Although the discussion at this point is principally concerned with purity of urban Latin pronunciation, that concern is of course intimately connected with that regarding purity of the Latin language: so rightly L-P IV 181.

²²⁶ Yet, it must be admitted that at Brut. 258 f. it is initially suggested that at the time of Laelius and Scipio *everyone* who lived in the city spoke pure Latin; but this is significantly corrected later when it is conceded that this is not quite true: *nec omnium tamen; nam illorum aequales Caecilium et Pacuvium male locutos videmus*. Furthermore, there was an ancient tradition regarding the excellence of Plautus’ language: cf. Varro Men. 399 *Plautus in*

IVa) Cicero's famous dictum on comedy as a 'mirror of life' can be related to the theory of ethos by means of the preconception that occurs in ancient literary criticism whereby 'closeness to everyday life' is associated with ethos.

Here is the text of the fragment, which is generally attributed to Bk. IV of the rep.²²⁷, Donat. exc. de com. V 1 p. 22,19 WESSNER = XXVI KOSTER:

comoediam esse Cicero ait imitationem vitae, speculum consuetudinis, imaginem veritatis

It is likely that we are dealing in this fragment, which many regard as derived from a Peripatetic source²²⁸, with New Comedy and its Roman derivatives²²⁹: if further proof for this apart from the fragment's emphasis on the truthful representation of everyday life were required, one could point to the passage S.Rosc. 47, already cited above, in which the reference to New Comedy (at any rate its Roman guise) is more explicit²³⁰. Of all the formulations that we examined above that treated of (New) Comedy's faithfulness in reproducing an 'image of everyday life', Cicero's is for us perhaps the most impressive with its tricolon climax, and celebrated mirror metaphor²³¹.

Some have objected, however, that this definition is not particularly apropos in the case of Roman comedy – at any rate, in the case of the kind of comedy that Plautus and Terence wrote. There are three possible solutions here, the judgement on which is rendered more difficult by our ignorance of the fragment's context:

1) the fragment refers, not to Roman, but to Greek comedy: but in the light of S.Rosc. 47 where a similar sentiment is expressed in connexion with a Roman palliata; in the light also of Scipio's defence of *Plautus noster* at rep. 4,11, it is difficult to see – if the fragment does indeed belong to the rep. – why the one who uttered it should have excluded Roman comedy from his discourse.

sermonibus poscit palmam, Aelius Stilo ap. Quint. 10,1,99 *Musas ... Plantino sermone locuturas fuisse, si Latine loqui vellent*; cf. also BLÄNSDORF 152. On the purity of Terence's language, cf. Caesar's reply (?) to the Limon fr., l. 2: *puri sermonis amator*.

²²⁷ Cf. BÜCHNER Komm. 381; E. HECK: *Die Bezeugung von Ciceros Schrift de republica*. Hildesheim-New York 1966, 213 preferred to assign it to the Hortensius.

²²⁸ So for example: PFEIFFER (1968) 190; WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORF: *Einleitung in d. gr. Trag.*, 1895: repr. Darmstadt 1959, 56 n. 13; cf. ROSTAGNI: *Scritti minori* I (1955) 230, 339 n. 5; also (1921) 92, 140 f.

²²⁹ So QUADLBAUER (1960) 56; WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORF (1895: repr. 1959), 56.

²³⁰ So FRAENKEL ad Aesch. Ag. 838–40, vol. II 386 n. 1.

²³¹ This metaphor by which literature is compared to a mirror of life seems natural, perhaps even somewhat trite to our modern sensibilities, and yet it was once thought too bold. Arist. Rhet. 1406b12 notoriously condemned its use by Alcidas in reference to the Odyssey: τὴν Ὀδυσσεϊαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον. Another instance of the mirror metaphor applied to literature in the Ciceronian corpus is to be found in Pis. 71, where C. says that Piso's life is reflected *tamquam in speculo* in the poems composed for him by Philodemus.

2) Cicero has uncritically and carelessly copied some Greek source, the sentiment of which lies behind our fragment.

3) Cicero does mean to include Roman comedy within the definition of comedy as a mirror of life. It is to a discussion of this possibility that I wish now to turn my attention.

The *palliata*, it is alleged, does not represent Roman domestic life, but Athenian and Greek domestic life²³². But how far is such criticism really justified? Undoubtedly, to a limited extent it is: but to think of the Roman comedy in the form of the *palliata* as the representation merely of Greeks (and foreigners)²³³, in Greek dress²³⁴, living in Greek towns, talking like Greeks, observing (or transgressing) Greek laws and customs is to lose sight of significant, and perhaps, the most significant features of the Roman comedy. The Roman writers of the *palliata* themselves of course contributed to this deception: despite some inevitable and natural 'Romanisation' evident in their plays, the poets regularly give indications of foreign elements throughout their dramas (one thinks in particular of such colourful coinages as *graecissare* and *pergraecari*).

On the other hand, the *palliata* does not represent the whole of Roman comedy. The *togata*, which purported to represent Roman life, was not, it is true, based on the New Comedy, and yet it apparently drew heavily from it. Cicero in *fin.* 1,7 informs us that Afranius often used passages from Menander; Horace *epist.* 2,1,57 likewise states that Afranius' toga would have suited Menander, and Afranius himself in the prologue (?) to the *Compitalia* (*Macr. Sat.* 6,1,4 = CRF p. 198 RIBBECK³) defended himself against detractors' accusations that he had stolen many things from Menander. Cicero gives a hint as to his judgement on the *togata* in a passage (*Tusc.* 4,45) – if it may be so taken as representative of the whole genre – in which he comments on a scene from one of Afranius' comedies: he declared it to be *e vita ductum*, whence it may be inferred, that, at least in this comedy, the *togata* possessed for him a similar veracity in the depiction of everyday life.

In the second place, one should observe that in Menander's comedies most of the principal themes concern universal conditions of human society on the ordinary plane. This was already recognised with great insight by Evanthius II 6, p.17,12 ff. WESSNER: *νέαν*

²³² So, for example, E. SEGAL: *Roman Laughter* Harv. Univ. Press Cambridge 1968, 31 : '[Plautus] plays are *palliatae*, that is, Greek stories in Greek dress, bearing no relation whatever to Roman practice. Hence those who believe that the purpose of drama (especially comedy) is "to hold up the mirror up to nature" (a misguided notion whether argued by Cicero, Quintilian, or Hamlet) therefore consider Plautus to be reflecting the nature of Hellenistic Greece.' On the Greek and foreign elements in Terence, see R.C. FLICKINGER: 'Terence and Menander.' *CJ* 26 (1930) 682–94. Suet. *vit. Ter.* 5 states that Ter. after producing his six comedies, left Rome possibly *causa...percipiendi Graecorum instituta moresque, quos non perinde exprimeret in scriptis*

²³³ Cf. Diom. *ars gr.* GL I 490,15 KEIL.

²³⁴ Cf. Donat. *exc. de com.* VI 5 p.26,15 f. WESSNER; Diom. *ars* GL I 489,18 KEIL. cf. DUCKWORTH 88 ff.

κωμῳδίαν, hoc est novam comoediam, repperere poetae, quae argumento communi magis et generaliter ad omnes homines, qui mediocribus fortunis agunt, pertineret²³⁵. Similarly SANDBACH writes in the introduction to GOMME's and his commentary on Menander (24): 'Some [of the plays] have a strongly marked general theme: *Adelphoe* B, Terence's *Adelphoe*, is about the right way to bring up a son, *Dyskolos* is about co-operation and isolation, *Samia* a study in relations between father and son. In *Epitrontes*, although it has a serious theme of loyalty between husband and wife, the plot is forwarded to a great extent by scenes between 'minor' characters, who are depicted for their own sakes etc.' WEBSTER in an essay on Menander's social criticism²³⁶, while acknowledging that many of the situations in Menander's plays represent particular problems of the Greek society of his time, also shows that often it is the characters themselves and how such characters react in such situations that are of primary interest²³⁷. Both individual character and the general character of human nature are central concerns of the New Comedy; in many ways the plays transcend the simpler issues of the specific society for which they were written, and it is chiefly by reason of this relevance of their to a larger humanity that the plays of this genre were able to undergo translation, adaptation, transformation all the while retaining their capacity to fascinate and entertain later generations and foreign audiences. So WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF wrote: '...das Menandrische Lustspiel. Das erst ist wirklich mit dem modernen Drama vergleichbar, weil es lediglich künstlerische Zwecke hat, weder für einen bestimmten Tag noch auf ein bestimmtes Publikum berechnet ist, und weil seine Stoffe rein menschlich und wirklich dem Tagesleben entnommen sind: sie ist μίμησις βίος [sic], κάτοπτρον ὁμιλίας, ὁμοίωμα ἀληθείας²³⁸.

But let us consider again the capacity of the palliata to mirror life. Now it is true that there are found at the basis of the plots of New Comedy certain circumstances reflective of conditions in fourth-century Greek society which are utterly alien to the Roman scene²³⁹. We are thinking, for example, of Greek conventions such as the restrictions placed on Greek free-born women, especially the unmarried, which prohibited them from appearing alone – if at all – in public, from mingling freely with others outside their family, especially with those of the other sex²⁴⁰. Such restrictions do not at all apply to Roman women²⁴¹,

²³⁵ Cf. ROSTAGNI (1921) 139: '...finché nella Nuova adottò i soggetti generali...'

²³⁶ *Studies in Menander*. Manchester 1950, 59 ff.

²³⁷ Cf. also L.A. POST: 'The "Vis" of Menander.' *TAPA* 62 (1931) 208, who emphasises the Menander's 'detailed study and expression of human psychology as shown in the lives of ordinary people'.

²³⁸ *Einleitung in d. gr. Trag.*, 1895: repr. Darmstadt 1959, 56.

²³⁹ Cf., for example, the account of Athenian society in SANDBACH-GOMME, *Men. Comm.* 28 ff.

²⁴⁰ Hence, as SANDBACH rightly points out in the Intr. to the Menander commentary (24), eros cannot be the predominant subject in the plays of such a society where the freedom of association is restricted, or indeed, non-existent. In the *Curculio* 37 f. Palinurus remarks that one can have a love-affair with anyone, except, 'a wife, a widow, a virgin, a youth or free-born boys', i.e. with foreigners and hetairai.

hence again, it might be alleged that in this respect the Roman adaptations of the New Comedy are not a *speculum consuetudinis* and do not at all reflect everyday life as it was experienced in Rome. On the other hand, however, it might be replied that even if such restrictions were not in place in Rome, yet both restriction to move freely as one wishes in public, and prevention from associating with those whom one chooses to associate with are common enough experiences in all, and particularly in ancient, societies (that is, such circumstances frequently arise through forces other than those of law or custom); or, even if in rare cases, such experiences are entirely unknown, we are perfectly able to imagine them to ourselves, and we are perfectly able likewise to ponder how we might react when faced with such circumstances. In this sense, the Roman adaptations might still be regarded, as Cicero says, an *imago veritatis*. The same kind of ready appeal to our common experiences and shared humanity cannot be alleged in the case of the togata. For apparently the composers of this genre were, by a kind of *lex operis*, prohibited from presenting on the stage any character or action that might assail the dignity of the Roman name or offend the national pride. Thus, for example, Donatus on Ter. Eun. 57²⁴² informs us that as a rule slaves were not allowed to be presented in the togata as being cleverer or wiser than their masters, as was the case in the palliata. In strong contrast to the togata, Terence as a composer of palliata enjoyed far greater freedom from such artistic constraints. Evanthius III 4 p. 19, 12 ff. WESSNER informs us that he *solus ausus est...etiam contra praescripta comica meretrices interdum non malas introducere*. In this sense the palliata must be regarded as truer to life²⁴³ and less artificial: for courtesans, whatever one may think of their profession, are not always wicked or vicious, and members of the lower orders are sometimes cleverer and wiser than their masters – the reverse is the rule only in a perfectly eugenic society which has never yet been on the face of the earth. Again, it is not outside the common experience of humanity that slaves and servants should plot against and deceive their masters.

I suppose, however, that ultimately it is to a certain extent irrelevant whether or not we judge the Roman derivatives of the New Comedy to have been successful in ‘mirroring life’; what matters is that Cicero and the Romans, whatever they might have thought of the several styles and humorous merits of the Roman comic poets, did judge these comic poets, and above all Terence, as heirs of the New Comedy, especially in the capacity of these latter as imitators and true representers of everyday life: so S.Rosc. 47. Cat. 65. Lael. 93. 97–98 etc.

²⁴¹ Cf. BEARE (1964) 133.

²⁴² *concessum est in palliata poetis comicis servos dominis sapientiores fingere, quod item in togata non fere licet.*

²⁴³ So Evanth. III 4 p.19,12 f. WESSNER comments: *cum in fictis argumentis fidem veritatis assequeretur.*

Let us then return to the theory of the relationship between comic realism and ethos. We recall that in Longinus' comparison of the Odyssey to a kind of 'comedy of character', the elements of realism, especially domestic realism, characterisation, and lack of pathos were all bound up with his concept of comedy. We saw also that there are traces of these associations elsewhere, as in Dionysius Thrax, *ars gramm.* § 2 p.6,9 UHLIG and similarly in the scholiasts on this passage²⁴⁴. In the light of these texts which appear to contain implicit references to a tradition of associating comedy with βίος, and of associating everyday life with ethos, the probability that Cicero in the fragment with which we are now concerned in a similar fashion connected comedy with everyday realism and sought this everyday realism in the portrayal of character, is all the greater.

PFEIFFER in his *History of Classical Scholarship* (1968) 190 n. 9, commenting on the source of Cicero's famous dictum on comedy, suggested that for the determining of this question help may be at hand in a 'literal testimony', namely Schol. A Heph. p.115,12 ff.: *παρὰ τοῖς κωμικοῖς...τὸν γὰρ βίον οὗτοι μιμούμενοι θέλουσι δοκεῖν διαλελυμένως διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐμμέτρως, ὁ δὲ ἀνάπαιστος διαλελυμένην ποιεῖ τὴν φράσιν διὰ τὸ † τρῖσημον*. The emphasis here is so clearly on the comic poets' use of 'colloquial' metre and their desire to make their dialogues resemble everyday speech, that one is rather inclined to think that PFEIFFER over-estimated the value of this text as a source testimony for Cicero's dictum. Cicero expresses a similar idea about the similarity of the comic poets' language to everyday speech in *orat.* 184: *at comicorum senarii propter similitudinem sermonis sic saepe sunt abiecti, ut non numquam vix in eis numerus et versus intellegi possit*²⁴⁵. KROLL ad loc. thought that Cicero in alluding to the difficulty involved in discerning verse and rhythm in the comic poets had in mind the frequent agreement of verse accent and word accent in the senarii of the Roman comic poets²⁴⁶. Earlier, in *orat.* 67, Cicero argues that owing to the utter lack of elevation in the

²⁴⁴ The latter, in explaining the term βιωτικῶς, also make an interesting distinction between tragedy and comedy, whereby tragedy is defined as containing 'history and narration of past events' (but cf. Arist.'s view of tragedy and historicity at poet. 1451a36 ff.) whereas comedy comprises fictions based on things drawn from life. So Schol. Dionys. p. 173,3–4 HILGARD *ἡ μὲν τραγωδία ἱστορίαν ἔχει καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν πράξεων γενομένων, ἡ δὲ κωμωδία πλάσματα περιέχει βιωτικῶν πραγμάτων*. Cf. Schol. Dionys. p. 306,24–26 & p. 307,2–3 HILGARD. For the possibly Peripatetic distinction of plots into μῦθος (impossible stories as of parts of epic (?) and tragedy); ἱστορία (the narration of events that have happened as of tragedy) and πλάσμα (fictitious stories which are possible), cf. Schol. Dionys. § 1 p. 449,11–13 HILGARD, on which, see ROSTAGNI (1921) 119 f. & 130 f., who held that this distinction was known to the Roman critics who used for these terms *fabula* (=μῦθος), *historia*, & *argumentum* (=πλάσμα): *rhet.Her.* 1,8,13: *fabulam, historiam, argumentum. fabula est quae neque veras neque veri similes continet res, ut eae sunt quae tragoediis traditae sunt. historia est res gesta...argumentum est ficta res quae tamen fieri potuit, velut argumenta comoediarum*. C. inv. 1,19,27: *fabulam, historiam, argumentum. fabula est in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur...historia est gesta res...argumentum est ficta res quae tamen fieri potuit. huiusmodi apud Terentium*... Cf. also Quint. 2,4,2: *fabulam, quae versatur in tragoediis atque carminibus non a veritate modo, sed etiam a forma veritatis remota; argumentum, quod falsum, sed vero simile comoediae fingunt; historiam, in qua est gestae rei expositio*; & Evanth. IV 2 p. 21,15 f. WESSNER: *omnis comoedia de fictis est argumentis, tragoedia saepe de historia [historica?] fide petitur*.

²⁴⁵ Note Quint.'s 10,1,99 criticism of Ter.'s (lack of?) rhythm: *licet Terenti scripta ad Scipionem Africanum referantur (quae tamen sunt in hoc genere elegantissima et plus adhuc habitura gratiae, si intra versus trimetros stetissent)*...

²⁴⁶ Cf. DUCKWORTH (1952) 364 f.

style the works of the comic poets have less right to be called poetry than the language of Plato and Democritus which abounds in vehemence of expression and rhetorical figures (*incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur*). The language of the comic poets, but for its being framed in some kind of verse, is nothing other than everyday speech²⁴⁷: *comicorum poetarum; apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis*. KROLL compared with this passage not only the Schol. A Heph. cited above but also Strabo 1,2,6: *καθάπερ ἂν τις καὶ τὴν κωμωδίαν φαίη λαβεῖν τὴν σύστασιν ἀπὸ τῆς τραγωδίας καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν ὕψους καταβιβασθεῖσαν εἰς τὸ λογοειδὲς νυνὶ καλούμενον*. Elsewhere, in *orat.* 189 Cicero states that *senarii* are almost impossible to avoid in everyday speech since the Latin language consists to a large extent of *iambi*, and in *orat.* 191 we read: *sunt enim qui iambicum putent, quod sit orationis simillimus*²⁴⁸; *qua de causa fieri, ut is potissimum propter similitudinem veritatis adhibeatur in fabulis*. These texts put into perspective the comments of *orat.* 67 and 184 which appear *prima facie* to constitute criticism: we are reminded of the artistic aims of the poets with regard to language and metre. The conclusion that one may deduce from the considerations of all the texts discussed here is that for Cicero all the aspects of the comic poets' work – content, character-presentation, themes, language and metre – were subject to the all-pervasive artistic demand of veracity in the depiction of everyday life. On the other hand, there do not seem to be reasonable grounds for limiting our Cicero fragment preserved by Donatus to the consideration of metre and language as in the Schol. A Heph. or in Strabo; on the contrary, the fragment's philosophising generalisations and its Peripatetic flavour as well as its probable attribution to one of the philosophical works (probably the *rep.*) all clearly point to a more universal formulation on the essence of comedy.

The fragment corresponds in its ethico-philosophical outlook not only to *S.Rosc.* 47, but also to *rep.* 4,11 (= *Aug. civ.* 2,9) *numquam comoediae, nisi consuetudo vitae pateretur, probare sua theatri flagitia potuissent*²⁴⁹. BÜCHNER *Komm.* 381 points out that at the basis of all these

²⁴⁷ Cf. Hor. sat. 1,4,45: *idcirco quidam comoedia necne poema | esset quaesivere, quod acer spiritus ac vis | nec verbis nec rebus inest; nisi quod pede certo | differt sermoni, sermo merus*. The similarity of thought in this passage to that in *orat.* 67 and the correspondence of phraseology (*idcirco quidam...quaesivere* and *itaque video visum esse non nullis*) are conspicuous and point to a common source. The doctrine that there is more to poetry than merely metre and that comedy on account of its colloquial speech has less right to be called poetry than even certain elevated styles of prose was thought by BRINK *Prolegomena* 163 n. 1 to suit the Lyceum. He notes the conjecture of WILAMOWITZ that the doctrine's author was Theophrastus. PLESSIS & LEJAY remark on Hor.'s *quidam*: 'des critiques connus, les grammairiens d'Alexandrie' – a suggestion not altogether unattractive in view of C.'s somewhat obscure reference to the poets themselves being the first to inquire into the essence of poetry (cf. NORDEN: *Kunstpr.* 884 'von den Dichtern selbst...'). KROLL, on the other hand, ad *orat.* 66 interprets *quaestionem attulerunt* to mean not that the poets themselves raised the question, but that they 'gave rise to it'; this interpretation is based on the dubious argument that it is the business not of poets, but of grammarians *quaestiones solvere* (Suet. *gramm.* 11) – as if the scholarly Alexandrian poets could not have been interested in this kind of grammatical inquiry!

²⁴⁸ Cf. Arist. *poet.* 1459a12: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι...*

²⁴⁹ Cf. *Tusc.* 4,69 *de comoedia loquor, quae, si haec flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino*.

utterances lies the idea that there is ‘eine Korrelation zwischen Zeit und Stück, zwischen Kunstwerk und Umständen’²⁵⁰. BÜCHNER further points out that the speech mode of Scipio, to whom this utterance in the rep. is assigned, is called by Augustine ‘disputans’: this is interpreted by BÜCHNER to mean that Scipio, as the friend of Terence, was defending the comic poet – presumably against charges of immorality in his works.

7.6.4 pathos as a positive contributing factor in comedy?

Whether Cicero would have regarded pathos as playing a significant rôle in comedy, is unclear, but one is inclined to take the view that he would not have. We have already seen in § 7.5.3 that Cicero in his philosophical mode disapproved on ethical grounds of comedy’s partisan presentation of tragic pathos used in connexion with trivial, amatory themes. From that it does not, of course, necessarily follow that Cicero must have rejected pathos in comedy on aesthetic grounds. Opt.gen. 1 indicates only his attitude to the genres as a whole, from which it may be inferred only that he felt that pathos *in general* did not play a significant rôle in comedy²⁵¹. On the other hand, the doctrine of *tragoedias agere in nugis* 2,205, states that the use of excessive emotion in trivial matters incurs *inrisio* (or *odium*); but we are to understand the context here to be serious, even if the matter is not of the highest importance. Hence one is not to declaim in epic or tragic style in cases concerned with issues such as *stillicidium* or *alluvio*. But clearly, in a humorous context, one would expect *tragoedias agere in nugis* to be a perfectly legitimate source of humour. The rhetorical writers are not explicit about this, but there are hints that they would have admitted this kind of humour, or at any rate, one akin to it. Thus Caesar at de orat. 2,242 describes a form of humour *in re* which depends on *depravata imitatio*; he gives as an example of this, Crassus’ caricature in solemn style (L-P ad loc. ‘parodiert eine Eidesformel’) of Domitius Ahenobarbus²⁵²: *per tuam nobilitatem, per vestram familiam! ... per tuas statuas!* Quintilian 6,3,25 f. mentions jokes which we *aut facimus aut dicimus*: each class can occur, and with increased

²⁵⁰ Likewise BLÄNSDORF (1974) 147 n. 21: ‘Cic. de re p. 4,11 *numquam comoediae* etc. ... Im doppelten Sinne einer Widerspiegelung der Lebenswirklichkeit und einer Bedingtheit durch die öffentlichen Verhältnisse ist auch seine bereits erwähnte Äußerung 4,13 zu verstehen.’

²⁵¹ So rightly BLÄNSDORF 153 n. 42: ‘Ob Cicero diese tragischen Stellen ästhetisch mißbilligt, geht aus opt. gen. or. 1 nicht mit Bestimmtheit hervor, da dort die Genusdifferenzen von Tragödie und Komödie insgesamt betrachtet werden.’

²⁵² Note the *gravitas* attributed to him at 2,230.

charm, if we add seriousness (*gravitas* or *severitas*) to it²⁵³. More important evidence is provided by Cicero's own practice, especially with regard to the *προσωποποιία* which Quintilian 12,10,61 says belongs especially to the grand style, and which Cicero himself often uses to great comic effect, as in the famous *προσωποποιία* of Cael. 33 f.²⁵⁴. Of course, the pathos used in humorous, oratorical contexts must always presume some kind of pretence and self-awareness on the part of the orator: hence Quintilian says 6,3,70 *ridiculum est autem omne, quod aperte fingitur*²⁵⁵. Therein does the pathos depicted by comedy differ; for sometimes the pathos will be genuine (as far as the comic situation is concerned), as in the case of the love-sick youths, whereas in other instances, the characters ostensibly themselves simulate 'mock' tragic pathos.

Moreover, it is well known that on occasion we find ancient writers associating pathos in a positive way with comedy²⁵⁶ or at any rate with certain comic writers. Thus Varro ap. Charis. GL I 241 KEIL *πάσῃ vero Trabea... Atilius Caecilius facile moverunt*; Quintilian says of Menander in 10,1,69: *ita est omnibus rebus, personis, adfectibus, accommodatus*. Horace, also, in ars 93 ff. speaks of a stylistic, tragic pathos that occasionally occurs in comedy: *interdum tamen et vocem comoedia tollit / iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore...* (cf. sat. 1,4,48 f. *at pater ardens / saevit*; and ep. 2,1,59 *dicitur...vincere Caecilius gravitate*). Cicero too himself in several passages of the Tusc. speaks of comic characters affected with anger and other 'extreme' passions, as for example in Tusc. 4,45. 55 (a togata); 67–68. 72–73. 76 (and yet it is significant that he does not speak approvingly of these scenes); Cael. 36 f. That comedy must, and indeed does, on occasion depict more agitated emotions requires no demonstration²⁵⁷: Quintilian, as we have seen above, remarks on Menander's facility and range in this area of character depiction²⁵⁸; likewise Aulus Gellius 2,23,19 applauds Menander's fine and subtle portrayal of emotion: *timet, irascitur, suspicatur, miseretur, dolet. hi*

²⁵³ Other categories of oratorical humour as discussed in the rhetorical treatises lend themselves to pathos or to *tragoedias agere in nugis*: thus C. de orat. 2,288 & Quint. 6,3,70 mention certain figures (*σχήματα διανοίας*) such as *exsecrationes, admirationes, minationes* and others whereby we *interrogamus* (note Quint. 9,2,8 on the greater emotionalism of questions than mere positive statements) *et dubitamus et adfirmamus et minamur et optamus; quaedam ut miserantes, quaedam ut irascentes dicimus*. Also the quotation of verses (de orat. 2,257; Quint. 9,3,96–98): cf. Cael. 18 where quotations of Ennius' tragedy *Medea exsul* are given, again, for comic effect; and 37 where some comic verses of impassioned fathers remonstrating with their wayward sons must have been recited with great emotional intensity.

²⁵⁴ Cf. AUSTIN's comments ad loc.: 'C.'s tactics are here masterly; even by the end of § 38 he must have known that he had won his case, with Clodia laughed out of court.'

²⁵⁵ Cf. 6,3,99 *subabsurda illa constant stulti simulatione: quae nisi fingantur, stulta sunt...*

²⁵⁶ In a slightly different connexion, one might cite the theory of comic katharsis of the emotions alluded to in the Tract. Cois. (§ IV in JANKO) *κωμωδία ἐστὶ μίμησις πράξεως γελοίας ... δι' ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλωτος περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν*. See also JANKO's 143 ff. reconstruction of the theory.

²⁵⁷ On the tragic style in Plautus, cf. F. LEO: *Plautinische Forschungen*. Berlin 1912, 132 ff.; E. FRAENKEL: *Plautinisches im Plautus*. Berlin 1922, 88 f. Firenze 1960, 338 ff.; on pathos in comedy: DUCKWORTH 370 (citing Plaut. Amph. 633 ff. & capt. 781 ff.) & 371 where the metre of Plaut.'s rud. 664 f. (a cry of despair) is compared with that of Ennius' *Andromacha* frs. 81–3 JOCELYN.

²⁵⁸ Cf. also 1,8,7: (*comoedia*), *cum per omnis et personas et adfectus eat*.

omnes motus eius affectionesque animi in Graeca quidem comoedia [sc. Menandri] *mirabiliter acres et illustres*. To allow in comedy, however, the depiction of certain, more agitated emotions is not in any way to contradict what we have alleged already regarding the primacy of ethos in comedy for Cicero. In the first place, it seems to have been a principle of Hellenistic aesthetic theory that comedy had an *οἰκεῖον*²⁵⁹ from which (stylistic) pathos was an occasionally legitimate aberration. This is brought out by Plutarch comp. Arist. et Men. 853e where Menander is compared to a flautist. Plutarch in praising him says that if occasion should require more impassioned, elevated style, Menander is able to open all stops of the flute, but as soon as possible he returns to the normal tone: *ἐὰν δέ τινος ἄρα τερατείας εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ψόφου δεήσῃ, καθάπερ αὐλοῦ πάντρητον ἀνασπάσας ταχὺ πάλιν καὶ πιθανῶς ἐπέβαλε καὶ κατέστησε τὴν φωνὴν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον*. The occasional occurrences of pathos, then, in comedy are merely exceptions which prove the rule²⁶⁰. Another consideration brings to light the relative insignificance of pathos in comedy in comparison with ethos: comedy is defined by the ancient critics as ‘not being involved with danger’²⁶¹; there is neither pain nor destruction of life in it, as there is in tragedy²⁶². Accordingly, any emotions either that a comedy depicts or that it arouses cannot by necessity be as agitated as those depicted in or excited by a tragedy; in any event, those more vehement emotions which are depicted in comedy are intended to affect the audience in quite different ways from the ways in which the audience of a tragedy witnessing the same emotions are expected to be affected. Emotions such as anger and grief in a comedy are never taken seriously, but are, on the contrary, to be laughed at, because the characters expressing those emotions are absurd; or because the causes of those passions are mere trifles and disproportionate to the reactions they arouse; or because the audience understands from the nature of the genre, that no injury or harm will befall any of the favoured characters, and therefore that such outbursts are again felt to be ridiculous and disproportionate.

²⁵⁹ In connexion with the *οἰκεῖον* of comedy, cf. C. opt.gen. 1 *itaque et in tragoedia comicum vitiosum est et in comoedia turpe tragicum*, which, as I have stated, hints at the relative unimportance of pathos in comedy in Ciceronian literary theory. With this axiom from the opt.gen., cf. Quint. 10,2,22 *nam nec comoedia in cothurnos adsurgit, nec contra tragoedia socco ingreditur* Hor. ars 89 *versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult*. BRINK ad loc., who does not cite the Ciceronian passage, derives the Horatian dictum ultimately from Arist. rhet. 1408a13: *τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἢ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾗ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν, ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγεται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς...* The Horatian commentator also notes that the distinction between the two genres was more problematic in the Roman drama than in the Greek for in the former the composition of both genres might be pursued by the same author. Cf. also BRINK Prol. 97 f.

²⁶⁰ Cf. SCHMID 239.

²⁶¹ So Diom. ars gr. GL I 488,3 KEIL *comoedia est...sine periculo vitae comprehensio...κωμωδία ἐστὶν ἰδιωτικῶν πραγμάτων ἀκίνδυνος περιοχή*.

²⁶² So Arist. Poet 1449a34–36 says of comedy that it contains *ἀμαρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχυρὸς ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φαρμακικόν*, and in like manner defines tragic pathos thus: *πάθος δὲ ἐστὶ πρᾶξις φαρμακικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά* (1452b11–13).

Furthermore, when one considers how ethos and pathos are used by the ancient critics in relation to comedy, it is clear that ethos is more significant for the elucidation of the genre than is pathos. For, if what RUSSELL ad Long. 9,15 writes is true that there is 'a common preconception in antiquity...that there is a positive correlation between realism and lack of seriousness and tension' (= absence of pathos), then ethos would appear to be – at any rate, from the type of literary criticism based on rhetorical principles and practised by Cicero – most germane to the description of the function of comedy in a way that pathos is not. Likewise, it is ethos and not pathos that is, from the rhetorical perspective, necessary to Cicero's two formulations regarding the function of comedy, the one found in S.Rosc. 47 and the other preserved in Donat. exc. de com. V 1 p. 22,19 WESSNER. Lastly, orat. 128 on ethos contains a description of a literary function that is more readily transferrable to a description of comedy; the comments in the same passage on pathos, are in an obvious way better suited to tragedy.

It is my view, then, that for Cicero, pathos did not play as important a rôle in comedy as ethos played. Even if Cicero did agree with other ancient writers in allowing 'comic pathos' – and yet, as we have seen, he did this at times reluctantly and with distaste –, this would have been a dispensable component, unlike ethos which, as we have urged throughout, was fundamental to his conception of comedy.

7.6.5 a Ciceronian theory of a 'comedy of errors'?

Something should be said about the possibility that Cicero might have made 'mental error the basis of an interpretation of the structure of comedy'. This allegedly Hellenistic comic theory was traced back to Aristotle in a paper by R.A. PACK²⁶³. One of the two passages which PACK adduced in support of his thesis was de orat. 2,237–39, which, he held together with GRANT (1924) 71, to be derived ultimately from Aristotle. The possibility, however, that this Ciceronian passage was based on an Aristotelian theory of comedy was seriously called into doubt by L-P III 206 f. The Dutch commentators there pointed out that parallels drawn between Arist. rhet. 1374b and the passage from the de orat. are flawed. PACK's interpretation of the Ciceronian text was fundamentally misguided in that Cicero was not answering here the question *quae sit ridiculi materies?*, but rather, the ethical question *quatenus...sint ridicula tractanda oratori?* Furthermore, Cicero's term *vitia* in 2,238, while conceivably applicable to mental errors and mistakes, is also applied to bodily

²⁶³ 'Errors as subjects of comic mirth.' *CPh* 33 (1938) 405–410.

defects (cf. 2,239 & 266) – a sense never attributed by Aristotle to his allegedly analogous terms *ἁμαρτήματα* and *ἁμαρτία*. Cf. Tract. Coisl. VIII ὁ σκώπτων ἐλέγχειν θέλει ἁμαρτήματα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος²⁶⁴.

7.6.6 the Scipionic tradition and the Ciceronian ideal of comedy

We have tried to demonstrate above that comedy, especially in the form of the New Comedy and of the Roman adaptations of the same, was susceptible of, and indeed was subjected – at least partially – to, treatment according to Cicero's rhetorical principles. We saw also that Cicero's definition of comedy which betrayed Peripatetic influences, had a philosophico-literary outlook, and was framed in universal terms. It is now possible to proceed further; in brief, to determine, according to what we have just attempted to demonstrate, Cicero's ideal form of comedy and comic poet. It should be noted, however, as we have already noted in the introduction, that we are not concerned with Ciceronian criticism of individual poets, except insofar as this criticism can help us to illuminate Cicero's poetic theory.

From all that has been discussed above, together with some new points to be considered below, it is possible now to describe Cicero's ideal form of comedy. Described negatively, it will eschew mimic elements, obscenity, slander and invective in public against other citizens (especially those holding prominent positions in the state); and in general pathos will be absent. Describing it positively, one may enumerate the following attributes. The most important types will be the New Comedy, especially that of Menander, and Roman (*palliata*) comedy which most closely approximates the New Comedy. The poet's principal concern will be to reflect human society in the relations between its members and the behaviour of the same, one to another: it will do this a) by adopting universal themes that deal with ordinary human experience, b) by means of *ethos* – that is, by the depiction of character, and by the adoption of the milder emotional modes congenial to the presentation of domestic reality. From what will be discussed below, one may add the following: the plot will be coherent and probable; plot-structure and narrative technique will contribute to the charm of the play; the humour will be refined, aristocratic, gentlemanly; the language will reflect everyday speech, yet at the same time will be pure, elegant, exhibiting all the hallmarks of exemplary Latin.

²⁶⁴ L-P III 207, however, insist, without substantiation, that this passage refers not to bodily defects, but rather to, slapstick type accidents such as stumbling, bumping the head etc.

Thus the New Comedy and its Roman adaptations represent for Cicero the ideal form of comedy, and furthermore Terence as a Roman poet in this genre, most closely approaches for Cicero the ideal comic poet. I append here some additional remarks on some of the criteria intended further to support this view.

mimic elements: Evanth. III 5 p. 20,3 f. WESSNER, in a passage which stresses Terence's superior virtues over other comic poets (*et a Plauto et ab Afranio...et multis fere magnis comicis*), mentions Terence's avoidance of mimic elements: *illud quoque inter Terentianas virtutes mirabile, quod eius fabulae eo sunt temperamento ut...neque abiciantur ad mimicam vilitatem*. Caecilius, on the other hand, is criticised by Gell. 2,23,12 for debasing a scene of Menander's Plokion with mimic elements.

obscenity: see § 7.4 above. Although Terence is not mentioned explicitly, passages such as off. 1,104 and Aug. civ. 2,8 (book 2 of the civ. is greatly dependent on Bk. 4 of Cic.'s rep.) show that obscenity was felt largely to be absent from the New Comedy²⁶⁵. On the greater and more numerous vulgarities and obscenities found in Plautus than in Terence, see DUCKWORTH 291ff.; on the general avoidance of lexical obscenities in Plaut. & Ter., see ADAMS (1982) 218 f.;

slander & invective: the development of New Comedy away from the invective and slander of Old Comedy is a commonplace in Roman criticism, see for example: Evanth. II 3 ff.; Porph. on Hor. epist. 2,1,148 & on ars 281; Diom. ars gr. III p. 489,4–5 KEIL etc. Aristotle eth. Nich. 1128a20 ff. in illustrating the difference between educated and illiberal humour, compares it to the difference between the humour of the old comedy and that of the recent (not 'New'): ἴδοι δ' ἂν [sc. this difference between educated and illiberal humour]. τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν. The humour of the old comedy is said to consist of αἰσχρολογία and to be deficient in comparison with the newer comedy in respect of εὐσχημοσύνη. Aristotle's aversion to αἰσχρολογία and λοιδορία is attested elsewhere, namely in pol. 1336b3–23 (cf. Plat. leg. 935–36). Some therefore understand Tract. Coisl. VII on the distinction between comedy and abuse²⁶⁶ as referring to the development of comedy away from the abusive tendencies of its earliest stage, and this section of the Tract. is thought to be derived ultimately from Aristotelian thought²⁶⁷. JANKO 205 writes: 'A.'s vision of comedy's teleological development towards its essence, combined with the observed evolution of comedy in his own time, enable [sic] him to

²⁶⁵ On obscenity in Aristophanes and Old Comedy, see Plut. moral. 711 f & 853 a.

²⁶⁶ διαφέρει ἡ κωμωδία τῆς λοιδορίας, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν λοιδορία ἀπαρακαλύπτως τὰ προσόντα κακὰ διέξεισιν, ἡ δὲ δεῖται τῆς καλουμένης ἐμφάσεως.

²⁶⁷ So JANKO 203 ff. following J. BERNAYS: *Zwei Abhand. über die arist. Theorie des Drama*. Berlin 1880, repr. Darmstadt 1968, 148 ff.

dissociate it from the personal abuse in which it originated... Such dissociation is intimately connected with the classification of comedy as a mimetic art, for mimetic art in A.'s theory is quite different from the direct representation of historically existent persons or events... Thus the definition of comedy as essentially exclusive of abuse is integral to Aristotelian theory...²⁶⁸ Based on what we have discussed above in the section on slander and invective in comedy (§ 7.5.4), a good case may be made that Cicero either was or would have been sympathetic to this Aristotelian idea on the evolutionary development of comedy away from abuse. For one recalls Cicero's condemnation (rep. 4,11) of the Greek comic poets' right *ὀνόμαστί κωμῳδεῖν* prominent men of the state which is contrasted with his mentioning of Roman poets (two of whom are in the New Comedy tradition) who, had they wished to attack prominent Romans, would have acted as unjustly as the Greek comic poets did in the case of Pericles.

pathos: that Ter. eschewed tragic pathos Evanthius III 5 p. 19,18 & p. 20,1–2 WESSNER observed with much approval: *et temperavit* [sc. Terentius] *affectum, ne in tragoediam transiliret...illud quoque inter Terentianas virtutes mirabile, quod eius fabulae eo sunt temperamento, ut neque extumescant ad tragicam celsitudinem*. Evanthius implies in these two passages that other comic poets (*multis fere magnis comicis*) were guilty of this lapse into excessive emotion. Cicero's attribution of *sedatio* to Terence in the Limon fragment preserved by Suetonius likewise is an acknowledgement of Terence's merit in not transgressing the emotional and stylistic levels appropriate to comedy, that is to say, in preserving its *οἰκείον*. RIBBECK was of the opinion that Cicero's remark here on the Terentian *sedatio* was made by way of comparison with Plautus and Caecilius: 'Mit feinem Stilgefühl hält der Dichter die Linie zwischen tragischem Pathos und gemeiner Redeweise: nur selten, in leidenschaftlichem Affekt machen seine Personen einen kurzen Ansatz zum Kothurn...'²⁶⁹

humour: the humour of the New Comedy is more restrained, less buffoonish, crude and boisterous: so Plut. comp. Ar. et Men. 853 a ff.²⁷⁰ & quaest. conv. 711 f condemns the crudity, buffoonishness and immoderateness of Aristophanes' humour. The Tract. Coisl.

²⁶⁸ Cf. ELSE 188.

²⁶⁹ Gesch. der röm. Dichtung I 155 f.; cf. SCHMID 237 ff esp. 238–239: 'sollte deutlich sein, daß die in *sedatis vocibus* liegende Charakteristik dem terenzischen Stil eine Wohltemperiertheit des Ausdrucks zuschreibt... Man sollte... *sedatis vocibus* auf das Fernhalten solcher Sprach- und Stilelemente deuten, die das *οἰκείον* der Komödie gefährden könnten: ich denke an das *altum, tragicum, tumidum, turgidum*...'. Caecilius' use of tragic pathos seems also to be indicated by Hor. epist. 2,1,59 *vincere Caecilius gravitate*.

²⁷⁰ One may note in passing the hypothesis of GRILLI 64 ff. according to which, fr. 10 of his ed. of the Hortensius = Non. 240,31 M. (*quod alterius ingenium sic < acre > ut acetum Aegyptium, alterius sic acre ut mel Hymettium dicimus*) represents not merely a comparison between two comic poets (so already USENER 121), but in fact a comparison between Arist. and Men., in which the wit of the one is compared to the pungent Egyptian vinegar, and that of the other to the 'bitter-sweet' honey of Hymettus.

XVIII says of the Old Comedy: παλαιά, ἡ πλεονάζουσα τῷ γελοίῳ. The New Comedy, on the other hand, abandons this and in fact has a tendency towards the serious: νέα, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν προϊεμένη, πρὸς δὲ τὸ σεμνὸν ῥέπουσα²⁷¹. The admixture of the serious and of the mirthful which Plut. in quaest. conv. 712 b²⁷² praises in the comedies of Menander reminds one of Cicero's comment on the sources of humour in de orat. 2,250: *nullum genus est ioci, quo non ex eodem severa et gravia sumantur*. The implication of Gell. 2,23,12 is that Menander, unlike his inferior Roman imitator Caecilius, does not seek to rouse laughter at every opportunity, but on the contrary, observes diligently decorum and the exigencies of the character-portrayal: *Caecilius vero hoc in loco [sc. Menandri] ridiculus magis quam personae isti quam tractabat aptus atque conveniens videri maluit*²⁷³. Similarly, the temperateness of the humour and the avoidance of buffoonish elements in the New Comedy agree well with Cicero's ethical description of the boundaries of humour in the de orat. 2,235 ff. (*adhibenda est primum in iocando moderatio* [238] ... *vitandum est oratori utrumque, ne aut scurrilis iocus sit aut mimicus* [239]); cf. also 2,248. Cicero's own preference in comic humour is described in off. 1,104 as being *elegans urbanum ingeniosum facetum*; its opposite is *inliberale petulans flagitiosum obscenum*. The first example given of the former is *Plautus noster*: that seems to point again to New Comedy, or at rate to Roman derivatives thereof. It is perhaps not surprising that Plautus is here selected in preference to Terence: it is generally agreed that Plautus' humour is greater than Terence's (cf. Macr. Sat. 2,1,10–11)²⁷⁴. What is surprising, however, is the inclusion of *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* in this class of gentlemanly humour. The possibility that this phrase refers largely, if not exclusively, to the comedy of Old Comedy's most famous exponent, Aristophanes, who claimed to be more refined and witty and less vulgar and obscene than his rivals, is discussed in Appendix V on off. 1,104.

New Comedy and Menander: Cicero's address to Terence 'tu...solus' in the Limon fragment indicate that for him, Terence is *the* Menander Latinus. Similarly SCHMID 244: 'in der Frage der Menander-Mimesis des Terenz besteht das *solus* zu Recht...' ²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ Cf. COOPER 285. JANKO 242 ff., however, does not accept that παλαιά and νέα here refer respectively to what we term Old and New Comedy.

²⁷² ἡ τε τῆς σπουδῆς πρὸς τὴν παιδίαν ἀνάγκη...

²⁷³ Cf. de orat. 2,247: *temporis igitur ratio et ipsius dicacitatis moderatio et temperantia et raritas dictorum distinguunt oratorem a scurra; et quod nos cum causa dicimus, non ut ridiculi videamur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid, illi totum diem et sine causa*.

²⁷⁴ And yet it is a curious, perhaps significant, circumstance that C. rarely quotes Plaut.! So LAIDLAW (1959) 22.

²⁷⁵ Possibly Terence's closeness to his models is indicated also by Afranius in his Compitalia ap. Suet. vita Ter. 7 p. 8,17 WESSNER *Terenti num similem dicetis quempiam?* [or *Terentio non similem dicens quempiam* codd. plerique]. Cf. H. MARTI: 'Zeugnisse zur Nachwirkung des Dichters Terenz im Altertum.' in U. REINHARDT u. K.SALLMANN (eds.): *Musa Iocosa*. Hildesheim - New York 1974, 159.

ethos and character depiction: we have already noticed how Cicero in passages such as Cat. 65 delights in Terentian character portrayal. Compare also inv. 1,27²⁷⁶; Caecin. 27. Cael. 38. Phil. 2,15. We also saw how the *comitas* attributed by Cicero to Terence in the Limon fragment probably refers not only to *urbanitas*, but also to the ἡδυκόων. Ausonius protr. 58, p. 76 PRETE who reworked Cicero's Limon fragment, coupled Cicero's *comis* with a reminiscence of Hor. epist. 2,1,174, inverting the criticism of Plautus there into praise of Terence: *adstricto percurris pulpita socco* instead of *non adstricto percurrat* etc. Observe that Horace at ep. 2,1,170 ff. is complaining about Plautus' carelessness in his character depictions (*aspice Plautus / quo pacto partis tutetur amantis ephebi, / ut patris attenti, lenonis ut insidiosi* etc.): whence he says that Plautus runs all over the stage in ill-fitting comic slippers!

ROSTAGNI, Comm. Suet. de poetis, 43, was misguided when he adduced Quint.'s rendering of ἡδυμία (*affectus mites atque compositi*) as support for his interpretation of *sedatis motibus* in the Limon fragment, thus referring *sedatio* wholly to τὸ ἡδυκόων²⁷⁷, but his comparison of Terence to Menander as ἡδυκόος par excellence is perhaps not far off the mark. Hence Varro sat. Menipp. 399 BUECHLER writes: *...poscit palmam in ethesin Terentius*; and de Latino serm. II 16 SEMI = Charisius p. 241,27 KEIL: ἡδυμία...nullis aliis servare convenit...quam Titinio Terentio Attae. ZILLINGER 38 in defending his theory that Cicero esteemed Terence more highly than Caecilius writes: 'Die Charakterzeichnung, in der Terentius stark war, ergötzte ihn eben in der Komödie mehr als das, was ihr Hauptvorzug sein muß, die komische Wirkung.'

coherence and probability of plots: see § 7.6.2 above on coherence and probability of plots in the New Comedy. Cicero's preference²⁷⁸ for this more sophisticated type of plot may be adduced from passages such as Cael. 64 *veluti haec tota fabella veteris plurimarum fabularum poetriae* quam est sine argumento, quam nullum invenire exitum potest – note that *veteris* is decisive here, being used derisively²⁷⁹; Cael. 65 *mimi ergo iam exitus, non fabulae; in quo cum clausula non inuenitur, fugit aliquis e manibus, dein scabilla concrepant, aulaeum tollitur*; Phil. 2,65 (note again in these last two passages the disparagement of the mime); Cat. 5 *a qua [i.e. Natura] non veri simile est cum ceterae partes aetatis bene discriptae sint, extremum actum tamquam ab inerti poeta esse neglectum*; and nat.deor. 1,53 in which the tragic poets are indirectly criticised for the preternatural dénouements to which they have recourse upon

²⁷⁶ *illa autem narratio quae versatur in personis, eiusmodi est, ut in ea simul cum rebus ipsis personarum sermones et animi perspicui possint, hoc modo: venit ad me saepe clamitans: quid agis, Micio? etc.* (from Ter. Ad. 60–64).

²⁷⁷ For criticism of ROSTAGNI, see SCHMID 234 f.

²⁷⁸ Thus also (implicitly) BLÄNSDORF 151 f.

²⁷⁹ Cf. AUSTIN ad loc., who cites LANDGRAF's note ad S.Rosc. 17. Thus C. at Cael. 64 is comparing Clodia's allegedly fictitious account of the infamous Licinius-at-the-baths episode to a 'little skit (*fabella*)' of a 'hackneyed old' poetess with many such works to her credit.

involving themselves in seemingly inextricable difficulties of plot...*quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poetae cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis confugitis ad deum...*²⁸⁰ Varro ap. Non. 374 (= sat. Men. fr. 399 BUECHLER) thought Caecilius surpassed all with respect to plots (*in argumentis Caecilius poscit palmam*), but Terence's excellence with regard to coherence and probability of plots was remarked by others, among whom Evanth. III 4, 5 & 7 is especially eloquent: *adde quod argumenti ac stili ita attente memor est, ut nusquam non aut caverit aut curaverit quae obesse potuerunt, quodque media primis atque postremis ita nexuit, ut nihil additum alteri, sed aptum ex se totum et uno corpore videatur esse compositum*²⁸¹.

plot-structure and narrative technique: in two passages, de orat. 2,326 f. & inv. 1,27 Cicero uses quotations from Ter., Andr. 51 ff. & Ad. 60 ff. (this latter passage is not discussed in de orat. 2,326) to illustrate the technique of *narratio*, stating that when this is used effectively, it can enhance the *incunditas* and *festivitas* which are so efficacious in securing persuasion. In both Ciceronian passages, emphasis is placed on the fact that successful *narratio* contributes greatly to character-portrayal. BLÄNSDORF, while admitting that the passage from the inv. begins with the oratorical technique of *narratio*, argues that the final section of the passage could be applied also as a general description of comic plot structure: *hoc in genere narrationis multa debet inesse festivitas, confecta ex rerum varietate...dissimulatione, errore...fortunae commutatione, insperato incommodo, subita laetitia, incundo exitu rerum*²⁸².

purity of language & stylistic elegance: Cicero regarded Terence as an authority, as it were, on questions of Latinity. This emerges from a letter to Atticus 7,3,10 in which Cicero quotes a verse of Terence in support of his claim that the correct usage of *Piraeum* when describing direction towards which, demands the preposition *in*. The appeal to Terence's authority is justified on the grounds that his *fabellae propter elegantiam*²⁸³ *sermonis putabantur a C. Laelio scribi*. Caecilius, on the contrary, is rejected as a *malus...auctor Latinitatis*. Cf. Brut. 258 *mitto C. Laelium P. Scipionem: aetatis illius ista fuit laus tamquam innocentiae sic Latine loquendi – nec omnium*

²⁸⁰ For a similar idea, cf. Antiphanes fr. 189 K-A: <ἐπει>δ' ὅταν μηδὲν δύνωντ' εἰπεῖν ἔτι, / κομιδῇ δ' ἀπειπήκωσιν ἐν τοῖς δράμασιν, αἰρουσιν ὥσπερ δάκτυλον τὴν μηχανήν, / καὶ τοῖς θεωμένοισιν ἀποχρώντως ἔχει.

²⁸¹ Terence's concern for plausibility in areas other than plot is remarked upon also by Don. Ter. Hec. 138,3: *argumenta in coniecturam necessario posita, quibus Terentius ex utraque parte disputans τὸ ἀπίθανον purgat, ne quis illum stulte posuisse hoc indicaret...hinc est quod ait Horatius vincere...arte.*

²⁸² BLÄNSDORF 151: 'Die Beschreibung geht zwar aus von der Technik der Erzählung, aber der letzte Abschnitt erweitert sich zu der treffendsten Charakteristik des inneren Baus der Komödie, die wir aus dem Altertum besitzen.'! MARTI 160 also discusses the passage as a testimony to Ter.'s importance in the school rhetoric; cf. also NORDEN: *Kunstprosa* 884 n. 3.

²⁸³ For the association of *elegantia* with comedy, cf. also Quint. 1,8,8 *in comoediis elegantia*.

*tamen, nam illorum aequalis Caecilius et Pacuvius male locutos videmus*²⁸⁴. Now correct and pure Latinity is, according to Cicero, not in itself a virtue, but an absolutely fundamental prerequisite for good style: it is the *solum ...et quasi fundamentum oratoris* (Brut. 258); in de orat. 3,38 it is written: *neque conamur docere eum dicere, qui loqui nesciat; nec sperare, qui Latine non possit, hunc ornate esse dicturum; neque vero, qui non dicat quod intellegamus, hunc posse quod admiremur dicere*. There can be little doubt that Cicero would have the same standards imposed upon the poets, as one may infer not only from the texts already cited, but also from de orat. 3,39 where it is written *sed omnis loquendi elegantia, quamquam expolitur scientia litterarum, tamen augetur legendis oratoribus et poetis*. (3,45 on pronunciation: *cum audio socrum Laelium...eam sic audio, ut Plautum mihi aut Naevium videar audire*). Purity of Latinity was also a principal concern of Cicero for cultural and nationalistic reasons, as emerges from Brut. 258–9. Here there is an implicit lament over the loss of linguistic purity that existed in the Scipionic age due to the introduction into Roman life of foreign influences²⁸⁵. Lastly, correct *Latinitas* is in Cicero's thought, as well as in that of other Roman writers, a touchstone of that all-important socio-cultural and literary value of *urbanitas*, as Brut. 170–1²⁸⁶ & 258–61 indicate – that *urbanitas* which implies courteousness, civilisation, wittiness and cultural superiority²⁸⁷. In this connexion, RAMAGE's (49) remarks on Terence are illuminating '...Terence was not simply copying [sc. the Greek models], for the vehicle he used to bring his material before his audience was the *sermo purus* of Rome and the language of his plays is a reflection of the *urbanus sermo* that marked the gentleman and his urbanity²⁸⁸'.

Terence's interest in stylistic questions is indicated by passages such as Andr. prol. 12, Phorm. prol. 5, and perhaps also Haut. prol. 46. Cicero's own high regard for Terence's style is summed up not only in Att. 7,3,10 *Terentium, cuius fabellae propter sermonis elegantiam*, but also in the *lectus sermo* and *comitas*²⁸⁹ which he attributes to him in the Limon fragment, as well as in the closing statement of this same fragment according to which all of Terence's poetry is suffused with loveliness (*omnia dulcia dicens*²⁹⁰). There is implicit in the attribution of *comitas* among other things, the refinement of style that appeals to the sophisticated, cultural elite. This high praise²⁹¹ may be compared favourably with Plutarch's

²⁸⁴ Cf. MARTI 160.

²⁸⁵ Cf. L-P IV 180 f.

²⁸⁶ *Tum Brutus: quid tu igitur, inquit, tribuis istis externis quasi oratoribus? quid censes, inquam, nisi idem quod urbanis? praeter unum, quod non est eorum urbanitate quadam quasi colorata oratio.*

²⁸⁷ Cf. L-P IV 181; RAMAGE 47 ff. & 59 ff. (the latter section is concerned more with pronunciation).

²⁸⁸ Ter.'s claim of *pura oratio* in Haut. prol. 46 was once widely understood to refer to his Latinity; R.C. FLICKINGER: 'A study of Terence's prologues.' *Phil. Quart.* 6 (1927) 255 f. interprets it differently as meaning that 'in the prologue there was nothing but rhetorical delivery, entirely divorced from histrionic action'.

²⁸⁹ On which, see above § 7.7.3 (III).

²⁹⁰ SCHMID 247, 271 f. would expunge *dicens* in favour of *reddens* 'alle Lieblichkeit suchest...'

²⁹¹ SCHMID 233 does not hesitate to regard it as 'uneingeschränkte Lob'.

unsurpassed admiration of Menander in the comp. Arist. et Men. 854a–b: ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος μετὰ χαρίτων... δεικνὺς ὅ τι δὴ καὶ ὁποῖον ἦν ἄρα δεξιότης λόγου...τίνος γὰρ ἄξιον ἀληθῶς εἰς θέατρον ἐλθεῖν ἄνδρα πεπαιδευμένον ἢ Μενάνδρου ἕνεκα; πότε δὲ θέατρα πίμπλαται ἀνδρῶν φιλολόγων [ἢ] κωμικοῦ προσώπου δειχθέντος;²⁹² Hor.'s epist. 2,1,59 *vincere...Terentius arte* possibly also refers among other things to Terence's cultivation of *Kunstsprache*; Quint. 10,1,99 is more explicit: *Terentii scripta...quae tamen sunt in hoc genere elegantissima...*

Lastly, one should not in determining Cicero's ideal form of comedy and the comic poet who most closely approaches this ideal, underestimate the influence of Cicero's own profound admiration, or rather idealisation, of the Scipionic Circle²⁹³. Whether, of course, such a group really existed, and actively promoted a common literary and cultural programme is in one sense irrelevant for our purposes. What matters is that Cicero presented the group as existing, as pursuing common literary and cultural ends. Part of his presentation of the Scipionic Circle comprises the wholesale acceptance of the traditional accounts connecting Terence and the composition of his plays with Scipio and his friend Laelius²⁹⁴, as emerges from Att. 7,3,10. That is not to allege that he believes the *non obscura fama* about Scipio and Laelius' contributions to Terence's works; he chooses to record the rumour merely because the association between the comic poet and the Scipionic Circle agrees with his own preconceived notions about the poet as an aristocratic poet, inspired with the same Hellenistic aesthetics that informed the thought of Scipio and his friends. Terence becomes by means of this rumour inextricably linked in Cicero's thought with the Scipionic Circle, a group which he idealises as the embodiment of Roman political, literary and cultural excellence, of the perfect fusion of the *mos maiorum* and the new Hellenistic learning²⁹⁵. It is therefore inevitable that Terence's claims to Cicero's allegiance as the best of Roman comic poets should be confirmed and consummated by Terence's association with Scipio and his circle of friends. It is significant that when Augustine quotes a passage

²⁹² On Ter.'s appeal to sophisticated, refined minority who esteemed urbanity, see RAMAGE 38, 49; also, FLICKINGER (1930), 683, 693 f.

²⁹³ I say idealisation, for it is now of course generally accepted that no such group existed in the formal sense; and even if we accept that Scipio and his friends shared certain political ideas and intellectual interests based on the new Hellenistic learning, it is unclear how far this entitles us to speak of a Scipionic Circle committed to a systematic programme of political, cultural and literary ideals. Certainly no one doubts that Cicero's idealisation of the group has made some – perhaps the greatest – contribution to the making of this 'historical' notion. On the other hand, BÜCHNER, Komm. zu rep., 28 f., while rejecting much of the earlier scholarship on the Scipionic Circle, still finds certain grounds for accepting the existence of the group and their unity based on common political aims and intellectual interests; A.E. ASTIN: *Scipio Aemilianus*. Oxford 1967, 294–306 & J.E. ZETZEL: 'Cicero and the Scipionic circle.' *HSPb* 76 (1972) 173–9 & *Cicero. de re publica*. *Selections* Cambridge 1995, 12 f. are more sceptical.

²⁹⁴ Possibly all derived from Ter. Ad. prol. 15 f.; Suet. vita Terenti 2. (quoting Porc. Lic.) 4; Quint. 10,1,99.

²⁹⁵ On Ter.'s appeal to an aristocratic, sophisticated, and Hellenizing minority, see RAMAGE 38, 49; cf. also FLICKINGER (1930) 683, 693 f.

of Cicero's rep. that *prima facie* appears to be a criticism of comedy's immorality (really, the Roman adaptations of the New Comedy), he remarks that this was the utterance of Scipio *disputans*. BÜCHNER, Komm. zu rep., 381 was surely correct in interpreting this *disputans* as meaning that Scipio, 'der Freund des Terenz, der er war..., wenigstens diesen verteidigt hat...' Terence and the New Comedy, he means, cannot be censured merely for presenting on stage the immorality which they see in everyday life.

Something, finally, should be said about opt.gen. 2 (*itaque licet dicere et Ennium summum epicum poetam, si cui ita videtur, et Pacuvium tragicum et Caecilium fortasse comicum*) which according to some²⁹⁶, should be interpreted as meaning that Cicero held Caecilius to be the best comic poet. Such an interpretation must be emphatically rejected for numerous reasons. We have already seen how Terence came closest of all to answering Cicero's theoretical conceptions of the ideal comic poet; and one may also point out that Terence is quoted more often than Caecilius (the comparison is more significant when one considers from how few of Caecilius' many comedies Cicero quotes in contrast to his comprehensive testimony²⁹⁷ of the relatively meagre Terentian corpus). Most significantly of all, the text of opt.gen. 2 *Caecilium fortasse comicum* [sc. *summum*] is clearly framed as an hypothetical statement, designed merely to suggest the opinion of others: therefore does Cicero add the clause *si cui ita videtur*. ZILLINGER 32 n. 1 correctly observes: 'Es liegt im Tone der Stelle, daß Cicero hier auf die Meinung eines anderen anspielt. Mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit kann an Volcacijs Sedigitus gedacht werden, der beispielsweise von Caecilius sagt: *Caecilio palmam Statio do comico...*'²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ BLÄNSDORF 151 n. 35; COURTNEY 94; DE LORENZI 13 ff.

²⁹⁷ The Hec. alone is omitted. Cf. LAIDLAW (1959) 22; ZILLINGER 38.

²⁹⁸ Cf. ZILLINGER 38 f.; MALCOVATI (1943) 158 concurs in this judgement.

8. LYRIC POETRY

*ego vero omnem eloquentiam omnesque eius partes sacras et venerabiles
puto, nec solum coturnum vestrum aut heroici carminis sonum, sed etiam
lyricorum quoque iucunditatem*

TAC. dial.10,4

Overview:

8.1 orat. 183: Cicero on rhythm in lyric

8.2 Sen. ep. mor. 49,5: Ciceronian rejection of the *lyrici*

8.2.1 original position of the fragment; who were the *lyrici*?

8.1 orat. 183: Cicero on rhythm in lyric

Cicero makes two general declarations about lyric. The first occurs in a technical context, in the orator 183. It will be expedient to recall a part of the work's structure in order to apprehend this context clearly. After a more general survey of rhetorical theory (§37–139), Cicero proceeds to a detailed examination (§140–238) of composition which is 'the aspect of style most neglected by the neo-Atticists'¹: collocation of words and rhythm in prose. In this latter discussion of the nature of rhythm in prose (183 ff.) Cicero introduces the subject by stating that rhythm occurs naturally to a certain extent in prose, and that in fact, it is the senses (*iudicat enim sensus*) that detect rhythm. Comparing the rhythm that occurs in prose with that which occurs in poetry, he remarks that in poetry rhythm is of course more obvious (*res est apertior*); and it is immediately at this point that he interposes his remarks on exceptions to this rule, among whom are lyric poets:

quamquam etiam a modis quibusdam cantu remoto soluta esse videtur oratio,
maximeque id in optimo quoque eorum poetarum, qui *λυρικοί* a Graecis
nominantur, quos cum cantu spoliaveris, nuda paene remanet oratio...

MALCOVATI's (40) comment on this misses the mark: 'evidentemente anch'egli non sente la poesia lirica come costruzione poetica, anch' egli la considera più musica che poesia'. The passage merely states that in some measures the rhythm is much harder to discern, and if you take away the music, it *seems* (*videtur*) like prose, and this happens especially in the case of the best lyric poets: when you take away the music, what is left is *almost* (*paene*) bare²

¹ KENNEDY (1972) 256; the division of the text is his.

² Thus like Arist.'s (rhet. 1404b17) ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις.

speech (i.e. prose, unadorned by rhythm)³. But this discussion is of the rhythmic qualities of lyric only: it says nothing of the diction and stylistic aspects or of the content of lyric. It will be observed that Cicero admits that this low presence of rhythm occurs even sometimes in the Roman poets (*etiam apud nostros*) and he thereupon quotes a verse from Ennius' Thyestes to support this: the verse and what follows are *orationis...solutae simillima*. This admission is instructive, since we are not permitted to think that Cicero would ever have regarded tragedy, and above all, the work of Ennius, as unpoetic, and yet the comparison is made with the verse of those 'who are called *lurikoi* by the Greeks'. In marked contrast (the contrast is emphasised strongly by the conjunction *at* which introduces this section⁴) are Cicero's remarks (184) on comedy that immediately follow the passage just now quoted. He again notes the difficulty in discerning rhythm in comedy – the reference to *senarii* indicates that he means here Roman comedy –, but he also picks up again and in somewhat less detail a stylistic and content judgement about comedy made earlier in the orator (§ 67). He states here at § 184 that the dialogue of comedy is like everyday conversation (*similitudinem sermonis*), and the *senarii* are *saepe...abiectioni*, that is, commonplace, ordinary, mean, unelevated etc., so that it is almost impossible to discern rhythm and verse in them – hence he seems to sense a difference between the *nuda paene oratio* of lyric and the *similitudo sermonis* of the comic poets with its *abiectioni senarii*⁵. The discussion at § 67 was whether rhythm and verse constitute the essence of poetry. He decided that, although those two things used to constitute the criteria for judging poetry, this was no longer the case since, rhythm could now be found in prose⁶. Conversely, some have thought that the prose of writers such as Democritus and Plato has more right to be considered poetry than that of the comic writers. Two reasons are given for this statement: first, the language of Plato and Democritus: *etsi absit a versu, tamen, quod incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum*; second, there is nothing other than everyday talk in the comic poets – except for the fact that there

³ Interesting in connexion with this belief in the affinity of lyric and prose is Quint.'s (9,4,53) reference to certain *molesti grammatici*. Having stated that there is nothing in prose which cannot be reduced in *quaedam versiculorum genera vel in membra*, he goes on to compare this exercise with the efforts of the *molesti grammatici*, of whom there are some *qui lyricorum quorundam carmina in varias mensuras coegerunt*. Thereby is the affinity of prose and some of the lyric poets implied, for we are to understand that the rhythm of some of the lyric poets is, like prose, not as obvious (cf. C. in our passage: *quo est ad inveniendum difficilior in oratione numerus quam in versibus*) as in other poets, and therefore the task of reducing the poems of these lyric poets into regular measures (while possible, as in the case of prose) is rather pointless. Perhaps the reason for this is felt to be that such a task would necessarily involve arbitrary judgement.

⁴ So rightly SANDYS's comment on *at comicorum senarii*: 'in contrast to lyrical poets and the lyrical portions of drama' (my emphasis); & KROLL ad loc.: '*at* stellt die Komiker in Gegensatz zu den Lyrikern, da der Grund der *λογοειδεια* bei beiden verschieden ist.'

⁵ As KROLL ad loc. points out (see last note), C. knew there was a difference between the *λογοειδεια* of the lyric poets and that of the comic poets (indicated by *at*), but it does not seem to have been clear to him what this difference was (*brevis brevians*, agreement of ictus and accent, accentuation of the first of two short syllables resolving a long).

are short versicles in them: *apud quos* (sc. *comicos poetas*) *nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis*. The conclusion then is that certain styles and certain subject-matter count for more as far as the essence of poetry is concerned, than do mere rhythmic qualities. The stylistic and content defects which contribute to a given work's or a given genre's affinity with everyday conversation will injure its claim to being regarded as poetry, but lyric poetry is certainly not characterised by such deficiencies⁷.

The dismissing of rhythm and metre as criteria for poetry of course goes back to Aristotle poet. 1447b, albeit in a slightly different form, since in that place, the disputed criterion is metre alone, not rhythm and metre. In any event, the similarity of ideas between Aristotle and Cicero on this point seems to indicate a Peripatetic source for the latter. It is possible that this source was Theophrastus. We saw above in the chapter on Ciceronian definitions of poetry that Theophrastus' *περὶ λέξεως* has been suggested as a possible source for the sections of the *orat.* 66 ff., that is to say, one of the sources alluded to in 67: *video visum esse non nullis*⁸. A pre-Alexandrian source such as Theophrastus is also suggested for 183 by the fact that scholarly discussion of lyric metres, attempts at colometry and identification of responsion between stanzas all probably do not pre-date the great work of Aristophanes of Byzantium on lyric⁹. Aristotle himself in the *poetics*, while recognising that *μέλος* may possess *ῥυθμός*, does not include lyric metres under his term *μέτρα*¹⁰. Furthermore, the fact that before Aristophanes' edition the lyric texts were published in continuous lines in exactly the same fashion as prose¹¹ might have induced some pre-Alexandrian critic to make a remark which was to be the model for Cicero's *quos cum cantu spoliaveris, nuda paene remanet oratio*. On the other hand, if Cicero were not drawing on some pre-Alexandrian source, the 'published' text of lyric (whether Greek or Roman) in his own time cannot be considered as a factor directly provoking his remark, since the division of lyric texts into *κῶλα* seems to have been standard practice from the time of Aristophanes¹².

⁶ Cf. also discussions above, at §§ 2.6–7.

⁷ In this connection, one may cite Aul. Gell. 19,7,4, in which parts of Laevius' (perhaps the first Roman non-religious lyric poet, as we shall discuss below) poetry are regarded as close to the usage of prose, others, alien to it: *cetera enim, quae videbantur nimium poetica, ex prosae orationis usu alieniora praetermissimus*.

⁸ Theophrastus' interest in rhythm and metre was certainly known to C.: he was invoked at *orat.* § 172 as a more accurate authority than Aristotle on rhythm, especially in prose; and in the *de orat.* 3,184 f. his opinion is cited on the nature and quantity of rhythm appropriate to prose. In the same passage, Th. is demonstrated to possess a certain understanding of the dithyramb (*membra* looks like *κῶλα*). But note FORTENBAUGH's scepticism (1989, 52 & 54 ff.) regarding direct Theophrastian influence on C.'s understanding of rhythm. For a more positive view, see WISSE 180 ff.

⁹ PFEIFFER 185 ff.; ELSE 64 n. 254 points out that the *μετρικοί* (grammarians) who included metre in their studies, restricted themselves to the study of the hexameter and 'other simple recitative verses'. Theophrastus did write separate treatises on metres and music (Diog. Laert. 5.47; his interest in rhythm was observed in the footnote above) but we do not know if these dealt with lyric.

¹⁰ ELSE 38, 56–7, 64; LUCAS ad 1447b20, agreeing with him.

¹¹ PFEIFFER 185 ff.

¹² Cf. below n. 22. Also PFEIFFER 187; he quotes Dion. Hal. (admittedly not at Rome until just over a decade after C.'s death) *de comp. verb.* 22 where Aristophanes' (apparently standard) poetic colometry is

One is inclined to think that Cicero has Greek lyric poets in mind at *orat.* 183, because he mentions Greek authorities (*a Graecis nominantur*) and writes the name of the poets in Greek *λurikoί*¹³, although these arguments, even taken together, are obviously not conclusive. More significant than these, is the fact that, but for the *cantica mutatis modis* of Roman drama, there is no established Roman lyric tradition before or in Cicero's time in which *μέλος* (*cantus*) has a place. The introductory remark to the quotation of the bacchiac verse from Ennius' *Thyestes* (*fr.* CLI [v. 300] JOCELYN) is instructive here: for he states merely that in < some of > 'our' poets there is a phenomenon (removal of *tibicen* resulting in *orationis solutae similitudo*) similar to that which occurs in the *λurikoί* (removal of *cantus*, *μέλος* resulting in *nuda paene oratio*). Thus the Roman dramatists even *qua* composers of *cantica*, are not to be understood as being included under *λurikoί*, even though some parts of the poetry of the former are similar to the poetry of the latter. Lastly, the contrast between the poetry of those who are called by the Greeks *lurikoi* and some parts of the poetry of 'our' <poets> is crucial. That will, then, lead us also to exclude from *λurikoί* all the exponents of Roman genres sometimes regarded as lyric such as the *Carmen Arvale* or the *Carmen Saliare*¹⁴— their quasi-liturgical nature, as well as their indigenous origins will have prevented them in any case from being regarded by the Romans themselves as lyric poetry—, as well as a few early Roman poets who, it is known, composed some lyric hymns¹⁵.

The first Roman poets to turn their attention to the Greek lyric poets with a new spirit and with a desire to recreate an 'authentic' Hellenism, the pre-neoterics¹⁶, by whom I mean Q. Lutatius Catullus and his circle, proposed to themselves for the most part Alexandrian (hence, non-musical) lyric and other poetic models¹⁷, above all Callimachus¹⁸. Although

distinguished from rhetorical *κῶλα*. WHEELER *Catullus* 16 pre-supposes that the published format of Catullus' poems was verse by verse, and not in unbroken text. Three considerations make the publication of Catullus' lyrics in a prose-like format unlikely: 1) the disappearance of the musical element in lyric (and hence also musical notation above the syllables); 2) the corresponding increasing dominance of the 'written' aspect of lyric (cf. WHEELER 206 ff.); 3) Catullus' acute awareness of and frequent allusion to metre in the lyric verses (50,5. 12,10; 42,1 etc.). The decline (except in drama) of the musical element and the increased emphasis on the written (50,4) aspect of lyric in the Republican age, would further have contributed to the exclusion of lyric from the music genres, and the vindication of its place among the poetic genres, thus necessitating the adoption of published text formats more in agreement with those used for the other genres of poetry.

¹³ It is curious that if C. is drawing on a pre-Alexandrian source, he should use here what is apparently the later term *λurikoί* in preference to *μελικοί* (as in *opt.gen.* 1) which was the standard term in Greek poetic theory, although *λurikoί* was used in citations of editions and lists of the poets. Cf. PFEIFFER 182.

¹⁴ E.g. CASTORINA (1968) 3.

¹⁵ E.g. Livius Andronicus (*Liv.* 27,37); P. Licinius Tegula (*Liv.* 31,12) and a certain Memmia (*Isid. orig.* 1,39,17). Cf. also, of course, the later examples of Catull. 34, and *Hor. carm.* 1,21 (these last two, however were not performed, hence there was no *cantus* to remove) & *carm. saec.*

¹⁶ Cf. ALFONSI, *Poetae Novi* 'I precursori' 10 ff.

¹⁷ CASTORINA (1968) 14 ff. points out that Catullus is the first Latin poet to use the love epigram.

¹⁸ Cf. COURTNEY 75 ff., who suggests that Callimachus is introduced to Lutatius Catullus by Antipater of Sidon (*de orat.* 3,194) & Archias! Whether the 'circle' really existed is of course disputed, but the poets of the age, Valerius Aedituus, Porcius Licinus, Volcarius Sedigitus, and slightly after them Laevius, Matius, Sueius,

Laevius, first (perhaps) to use Greek lyric metres, was heavily indebted metrically to Anacreon¹⁹, in his taste for bizarre, erotic subject-matter²⁰ he is aesthetically and spiritually closer to the Hellenistic poets. Porphyrio, on Hor. *carm.* 3,1,2, while defending Horace's claim to originality (among the Romans) in lyric, virtually acknowledges Laevius' claim to being the first lyric poet of the Romans (at least metrically?): *Romanis utique non prius audita, quamvis Laevius lyrica ante Horatium scripserit; sed videntur illa non Graecorum ad lyricum characterem exacta*. There is general consensus that for none of these Roman poets themselves, nor for any of their successors was it the convention to use the lyre, or to set their lyrics to music²¹. Furthermore, even if Cicero were drawing upon pre-Alexandrian authorities who had continuous texts of lyric before them (in which case by *λυρικοί* is meant chiefly early and classical Greek lyric models), the format of the published text would probably not have been a decisive factor in helping him to form his judgement on the similarity of lyric to prose²². The argument in the orator is concerned with rhythm, not with the published format or appearance of the text.

8.2 Sen. ep. mor. 49,5: Cicero's rejection of the *lyrici*

The second general remark of Cicero on lyric is the notorious condemnation preserved in one of Seneca's letters (ep. mor. 49, 5) in which he says that if could live his life over again, he would not have the time to read the lyric poets: *negat Cicero, si duplicetur sibi aetas, habiturum se tempus quo legat lyricos*²³. The secondary literature on this slight utterance is relatively large, and has been concerned chiefly with determining to which work in the Ciceronian corpus the fragment belongs²⁴. A second question dealt with by some of the commentators, but one which has received less attention than it deserves is, to whom does

Catullus & the Neoterics, see, among many others, E. PARATORE: *Catullo « poeta doctus »*. Catania 1942, 59 ff; J.P. ELDER: 'Catullus 1. His poetic creed and Nepos.' *HSPb* 71 (1966) 143-49; CLAUSEN (1964) 187 ff.

¹⁹ He used anacreontics and iambic dimeters: cf. COURTNEY 118 ff.; Prisc. GL 1,258 mentions a work (?) in *polymetris*.

²⁰ Even indicated by some of the titles of his works: *Erotopaegnia*, *Protesilaodamia*, *Sirenocirca*.

²¹ Cf. OCD, s.v. 'Lyric Poetry, Latin'; WHEELER *Catullus* 205 ff. However, there is, one might add, a curious little book, N.A. BONAVIDA-HUNT's *Horace the Minstrel*. Oxford 1969, in which the author dissents from the *opinio communis*, and contends on the contrary that Hor. was a musician, played the lyre, and composed in addition to the *carm.saec.* at least some of the other *carmina* for singing.

²² The same will apply in the case of the quasi-lyric (*cantica*) passages of Roman drama, for there is good evidence to show, at any rate, in the case of Roman tragedy, that these passages were divided into cola in the published editions: see JOCELYN (1967) 51 citing *orat.* 155 (cf. fr. XVII v. 43-4).

²³ 'Cicero's philistine remark about lyric poetry' is how BRINK *JRS* 51 (1961) 219 refers to it.

²⁴ The chief works are: MAI's famous edition of the *de re pub.* 288; H. USENER: *Dionysii Halicarnassensis de imitatione reliquiae*. Bonn 1889, 119; O. PLASBERG: *De M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensio dialogo*. Diss. Berlin 1892, 28; M. RUCH: *L'Hortensius de Cicéron: Histoire et Reconstruction*. Paris 1958, 74; L. ALFONSI: 'Cicerone e i « lirici ».' *RFIC* 38 (1960) 170-177; A. GRILLI: *Hortensius*. Milano-Varese 1962, 66 f.; E. HECK: *Die Bezeugung von Ciceros Schrift De re publica*. Hildesheim 1966, 45; K. BARWICK: *De re publica. Kommentar*. Heidelberg 1984, 370 ff.

lyrici refer? For it is not at all self-evident, as one might suppose, who these *lyrici* are, inasmuch as Cicero could have used the term in either a general way (referring to the whole genre), or in a specific way, that is, with reference to a selected group only of this genre. Given that the particular concerns of a given work can naturally have affected the way the term was employed, it will be seen that this question is to a certain extent connected with the first inquiry.

Despite all the work that has been expended on these questions, one cannot help feeling that it is impossible to settle them in any decisive way. This appears particularly to apply to the question of the fragment's original position in the Ciceronian corpus. Frankly, I do not think the evidence is strong enough to support conclusively either of the two main hypotheses regarding the position of the Seneca-fragment. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to review the evidence and the secondary literature²⁵, and from that, one may be in a better position at least to incline in one direction, without thereby committing oneself irrevocably to that particular view²⁶.

8.2.1 the original position of the fragment; who were the *lyrici*?

As to the placing of the fragment, the two works that have generally been put forward are the *de re publica* and the *Hortensius*. Supporters of both candidates generally take for granted that when Seneca says *negat Cicero* he does not mean that he is recording Cicero's *ipsissima verba*, but words placed by him in the mouth of one of the interlocutors in the alleged dialogue²⁷. Another suggestion of provenance from a collection of loose Ciceronian sayings has generally not found favour among critics. MAI (288)²⁸, MALCOVATI (40),

²⁵ The Germans HECK & BARWICK, the last two contributors to the subject, do not even acknowledge the work of the Italians.

²⁶ HECK showed admirable restraint in this matter, since, although his preferred candidate for the location of the Senecan fragment was the *Hortensius*, he admitted that a such a jibe at the lyric poets could not be ruled out altogether for the *de re publica*.

²⁷ ALFONSI (1960) 170-71 prefers to take the utterance as Cicero's own. MAI 288 first raised the doubt whether the Sen. fr. really contained C.'s own words: 'Habet ceteroqui id fragmentum hanc gravem dubitationem, quod Ciceroni loquenti, praeter prohoemia, in his libris nullus erat locus. Nisi forte Sen. ea quae Cicero alieno ore dici finxit, ipsi nominatim auctori tribuit.' We need not have recourse to MALCOVATI's (40) absurd alternative explanation for this inexact attribution, viz., that Seneca attributed the passage to Cicero out of that malice which he manifests towards Cicero elsewhere. In fact, Seneca approves of the judgement contained in the fragment, and therefore would not have attributed it to C. out of hostile motives. USENER 119 placed the fragment in introductory speech of the *Hortensius*.

²⁸ The first attribution to rep.: 'Libros nominatim de rep. non citat Seneca; commodum tamen hoc fragmentum pertinere existimatur ad poetarum reprehensionem, quam Cicero in quarto de rep. exsecutus est.' Works such as L.D. REYNOLDS-N.G. WILSON: *Scribes and Scholars*. Oxford 1991³ tend to make us forget how great MAI's edition of the rep. was. One gets the impression of a textual critic and paleographer whose task was above him; but as a commentator, his work was admirable. Cf. HECK 5: 'Mai...ließ die erste Edition 1822 in Rom erscheinen — eine erstaunliche Leistung, wenn man bedenkt, daß die Adnotationes dieser Ausgabe bis heute als Kommentar zu rep. unerreichbar sind'.

KRARUP (147), ZIEGLER (the editor of the Teubner text) and BÜCHNER all assign the fragment to the *de re publica*. BÜCHNER's (370 f.) defence for the attribution is this:

Zeugnis für den Abschnitt *de poetis* ist Aug. civ. 2,14:...*Cicerone qui cum de poetis ageret*. Man kann sich kaum vorstellen, daß Cicero hier ein Epos wie das des Ennius nicht erwähnt. Und da er Tragödie und Komödie behandelt, dürfte auch die...Lyrik nicht gefehlt haben... paßt eine solche Aussage am besten in eine Behandlung *de poetis* in Hinsicht auf den Nutzen für die *res publica*. Das Urteil ist hart und spielt mit der Länge bzw. Kürze des menschlichen Lebens wie schon Aristoteles.

Thus BÜCHNER posits two basic reasons for the attribution to the *de re publica*: 1) there is a section *de poetis* in the *de re publica*, while no such corresponding section is known to have existed in the *Hortensius*; 2) the context of the 'usefulness' to the state in the *de re publica* suits the suggestion of the shortness of human life in the fragment²⁹.

This is all very plausible, but obviously by no means conclusive. Certainly one can think of serious arguments against the attribution to the *de re publica*, and others for attributing the fragment to the *Hortensius* which are perhaps if no more cogent, at any rate, less fraught with difficulties³⁰. Thus, it is to the *Hortensius* that I am more inclined – albeit tentatively – to attribute the fragment and it is to the exposition of the reasons for this inclination that I now turn my attention.

In the first place, since it is clear from other fragments of Book IV of the *de re publica*, that Cicero had in mind Plato's condemnation of poetry in the tenth book of his republic, it is difficult to see why Cicero should have introduced lyric poetry into this section of his *de re publica*, seeing that there is no mention of lyric poetry, at least of lyric monody, in the 'corresponding' section from Plato's republic. This silence on Plato's part may seem to be a mere oversight, insignificant in itself, but when we examine the specific groups of poets singled out by Plato for condemnation, we see that there is a common element in each of them which is not shared by the lyric poets. For in this tenth book of the republic, Plato treats of poets as poets *qua* imitators and as poets whose works are performed before large audiences. The chief offenders are Homer, the tragedians and the comic poets. The audience comes in large crowds (*πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις* 604e4 f.) to watch (*τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες* 598e6; *τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα* 605e4 d; *πάσῃ θεωροῦν* 606b1) the

²⁹ He seeks to confirm this attribution by arguing that the fr. from Non. 308,38 in which some Platonic-style expulsion from the state is intended, is directed at the lyric poets. This too, however, is inconclusive: see discussion on this fr. below.

³⁰ The attribution defended by USENER 120; ALFONSI (1960); HECK 45 (tentatively); and the editors of the Hort.: PLASBERG, RUCH & GRILLI.

performances in the theatre (εἰς θέατρα 604e5). In the following passage, it will be seen that the kind of poetry with which Plato is dealing is chiefly imitative, and theatrical:

ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ... ἐπεικῶς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τὸν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ' εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως³¹ ἀπτομένους ἐν ἱαμβείοις (=tragedy) καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι (=epic) πάντας εἶναι μιμητικούς ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. (602b6 ff. comedy is discussed in 606c)

The mimetic element is of supreme importance. In the third book of the republic 393 ff. it is the *mimesis* element to which Plato chiefly objects, and it is the *mimesis* element which serves that on the basis of which he is able to divide poetry into three classes: all mimetic (tragedy, comedy), non-mimetic (dithyramb etc.), and mixed (epic). Indeed, it is the lack of that mimetic element in lyric monody that must partly explain its complete absence from Aristotle's poetics³², and likewise here in Plato's republic. For while lyric poetry may be concerned with *πάθη*, for Plato it must have been less misleading as far as truth and virtue are concerned (his first charge against poetry), and less affective and dangerous as far the corrupting of good men is concerned (τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι 605c7 – his second and most grievous accusation against poetry: τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν) precisely because it is deficient in the mimetic element, which alone is capable of 'triggering off' the sympathetic and unreasonable emotional response in us: χαίρομεν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες (605d3 f.). In the passage of St Augustine's civ. 2,4 where Cicero's treatment *de poetis* is mentioned, the emphasis is likewise on the theatrical and dramatic poets (that is those who enjoy through public performance a large audience readily subject to the sway of pathos as against reason: 604 a-b) and the performance of their works³³. St Augustine (whose text must reflect something of Cicero's) passes over Plato's *mimesis* theory. But the theatrical, or performance aspect of the poetry condemned by Plato is equally important as the quality and kind of poetry performed. In

³¹ On Plato's classification of Homeric epic as τραγικὴ ποίησις (cf. 598d where he calls Homer τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς τραγωδίας & 605c11), see the discussion in my chapter on tragedy § 6.1.

³² To be precise, the lack of *mimesis* that is advanced through *speech*. ELSE 37 explains: 'For him [sc. A.], the mimetic activity which is the business of poetry is carried forward primarily by *speech* ("verses used bare"); melody is a "sweetening," [1450b16] nothing more. The lyric mode has no real separate status in his theory.' Cf. also on the lack of comment of lyric diction in the poetics, ELSE 236 f.: 'λέξις has nothing to do with the songs, and conversely the μελοποιία has nothing to do with the dialogue. The 'diction' of the songs is a part of μελοποιία; if anything were to be said about it, it would have to be put under the latter heading. Actually Arist. says nothing about the diction of the choral odes in the poetics. The examples of λέξις in chs. 20–22 are taken exclusively from the epic and tragic dialogue; indeed, except for one very general reference to dithyramb [1459a9], lyric poetry is entirely ignored there.' One wonders also whether the relative unimportance of lyric by the time of Arist. may also have been a contributing factor to its neglect in the poetics.

³³ Significant in this connexion is rep. 4,9 which, as St. Aug. civ. 2,14 states, comes from the section *cum de poetis ageret* (sc. C.): *ad quos cum accessit [inquit] clamor et approbatio populi quasi cuiusdam magni et sapientis magistri, quas illi obducunt tenebras, quos invehunt metus, quas inflammant cupiditates?* Cf. HECK's (116) comment ad loc.: 'Die Stelle bezieht sich wohl nicht auf die Dichter allgemein, sondern auf die Dramatiker, gehört also in den Anfang der Kritik an der Komödie und am Drama überhaupt...'

fact this performance aspect suggests another reason why Plato links the epic with the tragic. In the republic 373b and 395a, as also in the Ion 532d, the rhapsodes 'actors of epic' (ὑποκριταὶ ἐπῶν as Hesychius calls them) are grouped together with actors of tragedy and comedy.

So now we have Plato, Cicero's model, and St Augustine who reports directly and indirectly what was in Cicero's text, and in neither is there mention of the lyric poets, at least, of the individual, non-choral lyric (as opposed to the dithyramb). There is more. From the fragments of the Bk IV of the de re publica, especially from fr. 9 onwards (9 = Aug. civ. 2,14; 10 = Aug. civ. 2,13;11 & 12 = Aug. civ. 2,9 etc.) there is clear emphasis on the theatre and the *effect* of the dramatic productions on the audience; and had more of Bk IV survived, there is little doubt but that some section corresponding very closely to Tusc. 2,27, written some years after the de re publica would have taken its place next to those just cited:

sed videsne poetae quid mali adferant? lamentantis inducunt³⁴ fortissimos viros, molliunt animos nostros, ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non legantur modo, sed etiam ediscantur. sic ad malam domesticam disciplinam vitamque umbratilem et delicatam cum accesserunt etiam poetae, nervos omnis virtutis elidunt. recte igitur a Platone eiciuntur ex ea civitate, quam finxit ille, cum optimos mores et optimum rei publicae statum exquireret.

The strikingly Platonic flavour of the condemnations is notoriously at odds with Cicero's own deep knowledge and patronage of the theatre, as we have noted before. 'Avec l'étude, avec la lecture, le théâtre a été la passion de Cicéron', remarked E. BERTRAND long ago³⁵. *A fortiori* do we insist upon a relatively close adherence to the Platonic model of the *poetarum reprehensio* in Bk. 4 of the de re publica. This relative faithfulness to Plato is confirmed by internal evidence in Bk. 4 itself: namely, section 4,4 p. 109.16-19 ZIEGLER, in which Laelius says that Scipio would not attack the Plato so dear to him; and perhaps also fr. 4.5 (=Non. p.362, 11): 'noster Plato' (unless this utterance is ironic). Lastly, if the report from Lactantius epit. 33 [38] 1-5³⁶ contains anything of Cicero's de re publica Bk. 4³⁷, Plato may also have been praised in similar terms to nat.deor. 2,32³⁸. All this points to a reverence for Plato's authority, and the implausibility of any unnecessary, radical deviation

³⁴ Note the stage terminology.

³⁵ 'Cicéron au théâtre.' Ann. de l'Univ. de Grenoble 9 (1897) 83.

³⁶ *huius* (sc. *Socratis*) auditor Plato, quem deum philosophorum Tullius nominat...

³⁷ Bk. 4 is regarded as a middle-source (Mittelquelle) for Lact.'s (epit. 33 [38] 1-5) critique of Plato by ZIEGLER 109; but KRARUP 144, following HECK 96 ff. omits it. One of the grounds upon which Heck based his rejection of rep. Bk. 4 as a Mittelquelle for Lact. was that 'der Ton des Lactanz...zu der... schonenden Behandlung Platons in rep. nicht paßt; Laelius sagt dort von Scipio, er greife Platon kaum an'.

³⁸ *audiamus enim Platonem quasi quendam deum philosophorum.*

from the model. On the other hand, when we speak of his relatively close adherence, we do not mean thereby to make Cicero the slavish translator of Plato, and thus we limit that adherence *to the extent that the Platonic model was consistent with his pragmatic aims* in the *de re publica*. Thus we acknowledge with BÜCHNER 370 that the myths of the gods' lies and the fact of the poetic utterances being *mimesis* at a third remove, an imitation of an imitation were unproblematic for Cicero³⁹. Plato's thought here was abandoned as being too abstruse and fastidious⁴⁰. On the other hand, the pragmatism inherent in the notion that exposure to the drama was dangerous and noxious to the people by enervating and rendering them effeminate (note again that this is Plato's chief complaint against poetry 605c) appealed to Cicero, and hence he follows Plato therein. There is also a pre-occupation particularly Roman – or at any rate felt by the Cicero and the Romans to be peculiar to themselves⁴¹ – in Cicero with the condemnation of the unbridled licence of comedy; with the defamation (or laudation) of prominent living men of the state; with the ignominious association of prominent men with the theatre⁴²: these are not issues that concern Plato in the 'corresponding' section of his republic. And in this we again see the pragmatic bias of the Roman. Likewise, Cicero rejects in Bk 4,5 the communism of Plato's republic. But these admissions of differences between the Ciceronian and Platonic texts only serve to support my contention that Cicero kept of Plato only what was consistent with the pragmatic aims in his work, and passed over what was not *apropos*.

Further proof that it is the dramatic and 'performance' poetry with which Cicero is only concerned in the *de re publica*, is the fact that he does not include the epic in his condemnations⁴³. On the contrary, not only do the Roman epic and Ennius, its chief

³⁹ But in Tusc. 3.2 f. C. shows concern with the tendency of the poets *qui magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt* to lead into error.

⁴⁰ C. condemns excessively abstruse investigations as being contrary to his pragmatist dogma of the βίος πραγματικός in several places: rep. 1,30: '*catus*' fuit et ab Ennio dictus est, non quod ea quaerebat quae numquam inveniret... magis eum delectabat Neoptolemus Ennii, qui se ait 'philosophari velle, sed paucis; omnino haud placere'. quodsi studia Graecorum vos tanto opere delectant, sunt alia ...quae vel ad usum vitae vel etiam ad ipsam rem publicam conferre possumus. Also off. 1,18 ff.: omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem... in hoc genere et naturali et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt...unum... alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias...cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est; virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit. Cf. de orat. 3,89. His 'man of action' applies his study to the general principles of a thing, taking from an inquiry only as much as he needs (de orat. 3,88: *tantum sumas quantum opus sit*) and eschewing long meditation on obscurities and little details: cf. de orat. 2,117: *tardi ingenii est rivulos consectari, fontis rerum non videre*, and ORBAN 187 n. 79 ad loc.: 'L'adjectif *tardus* qualifie le spécialiste incapable d'embrasser une matière dans toute son ampleur en saisissant les principes généraux'; & 187: 'C. tient en méfiance l'esprit scientifique. L'ardeur intempestive qui s'exerce sur des détails sans importance est le propre d'une curiosité stérile. Elle engendre une activité incohérente et infructueuse' Cf. Tac. Agr. 4.

⁴¹ Cf. above § 7.5.1.

⁴² St Aug. civ. 2,11 shows that in this fragment (13 ZIEGLER) C. was attempting to prove the ethical superiority of the Romans who did not – unlike the Greeks – honour men with important honours who had been involved with the theatre.

⁴³ The mentioning in rep. 4, (5), 5 = Non. 308, 38 of Plato's banishment of Homer in the republic; that would appear to belong to Laelius' (jocular) rebuking of Scipio's over-indulgent treatment of Plato: Laelius says that he would banish <Plato> to the same place that Plato banished Homer, on account of his

exponent, represent the highest forms of poetry for Cicero, as I have shown above in the chapter on the functions of the poet, but in the *de re publica* itself and in at least one extraneous fragment (V (1) 1 = Aug. civ. 2,21) Ennius is quoted and cited with approval five times, four of which occasions are references to the *Annales*⁴⁴. In fr. V (9) 11 Gellius criticizes Seneca's censure of Cicero's use of Ennius and Ennian language in the *de re publica*⁴⁵.

Naturally it is possible that Cicero might have grafted new material onto the existing body, but there are limits. The introduction of foreign themes such as the defamation in comedy are logical – for a Roman such as Cicero – progressions from the Platonic text. The lyric poets, on the other hand, take us too far afield: both from the Platonic text, and from Cicero's purpose. Thus the discussion of the lyric poets seems to have no business here in the *de poetis* section of Cicero's *de re publica*. The whole tenor of the fragments shows a relatively close adherence to the Platonic model – at least with regard to the condemnation of the poets – which excludes monodic lyric poets from the ambit of its discussion.

A less important objection to the attribution of the Senecan anti-lyric fragment to the *de re publica* is of course the actual form in which the fragment is preserved. For Cicero, as MAI 288 already pointed out, cannot have spoken in his own person except in the prooemia⁴⁶; to which objection BÜCHNER 371 added the further difficulty that so specific an utterance on the lyric poets could hardly have found a place in one of the prooemia. The solution commonly proposed to these objections is that Seneca himself read between the lines and merely attributed to the author himself the sentiment the utterance of which the latter had placed in the mouth of one of his interlocutors. A more serious difficulty, however, is that posed by the chronological relationship between the dialogue's setting and the *floruit* of the poets allegedly being attacked in the fragment. For certainly we are not supposed to think that Scipio or Laelius or any of the other interlocutors would have been thinking of the Greek lyric poets who had nothing to do with the Roman Republic (and the reading of whom would have surely have betrayed an extreme philhellenism of the kind to

communism, or impracticable theorizing: cf. MAI 281: 'Laelius, ut suspicor, dicit videri sibi Platonem ob praedictam doctrinae labem, aequae civitate eiciendum, atque ille Homerum...in eadem esse non patitur'; cf. HECK 188.

⁴⁴ One cannot countenance an alleged Ciceronian attack in the rep. on Ennius' *epos*, if that is what BÜCHNER 370 means to suggest when he says with reference to the alleged section in the rep. *de poetis* (cf. Aug. civ. 2,14 *Cicerone qui cum de poetis ageret*): 'Man kann sich kaum vorstellen, daß Cicero hier ein Epos wie das des Ennius nicht erwähnt hat'.

⁴⁵ Gell. 12,2,6: *postea hoc etiam addidit insulsissime (Seneca): 'Apud ipsum quoque', inquit, 'Ciceronem invenies etiam in prosa oratione quaedam, ex quibus intellegas illum non perdisse operam, quod Ennium legit'. Ponit deinde quae apud Ciceronem reprehendat quasi Enniana, quod ita scripserit in libris de re publica: ut Menelao Laconi quaedam fuit suaviloquens iucunditas, et quod alio in loco dixerit: breviloquentiam in dicendo colat.*

⁴⁶ MAI 288, quoted above n. 27.

which none of the interlocutors would willingly have admitted); on the other hand, if by *lyrici* we are meant to understand with BÜCHNER Catullus (who is called by St Jerome *scriptor lyricus*) and his circle, it is difficult to see how this is to be reconciled with the dialogue the setting of which is dated 129 B.C. Nor is the notion of a personal *Seitenhieb* on Cicero's part at the neoterics tenable; such an indirect invective is impossible without there being at the same time some concrete object of vilification that agrees with the historical context of the dialogue.

Accordingly, I am not inclined to take the view with regard to rep. fr. 4,(5),5 = 110,11 Z= Nonius p.308,38, in which the speaker appears in Platonic fashion to want to expel some of the poets from the state: *ego vero eodem quo ille Homerum redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe quam sibi ipse fingit*, that these poets must be, not the epic poets Homer and Ennius, but some others, namely the lyric poets. This idea of tying up the Seneca lyric fragment with the expulsion of the poets from the commonwealth was first suggested by MAI 288 and later revived by BÜCHNER 371:

Scipio hat prononciert seinen Standpunkt ausgedrückt – *ego vero* –, daß er desselbe wie Plato hätte tun können, gern tun würde, nun aber nicht mit Homer oder dem römischen Homer...sondern mit den Lyrikern, die das strenge Staatsethos untergraben. A. MAI hatte eine, seither wie es scheint nicht mehr bedachte, Erleuchtung, als er schrieb: *quare haud scio, an superius fragmentum, ubi mentio Platonis et Homeri est, huc (sc. ad tractationem poetarum et imprimis lyricorum) fere sit trabendum*. Dann würden sich beide Fragmente gegenseitig stützen.

Again, this is *prima facie* a tidy solution, even if the lyric poets do seem to have been arrived at as being the only other available poetic candidates. Nevertheless, as this idea of expelling the lyric poets disregards both the relative close adherence to the Platonic condemnation of the poets in which the lyric poets play a negligible rôle as well as the chronological difficulties to which I have just alluded, I should prefer another solution. One such solution was in fact already suggested by MAI himself earlier in the commentary (281) when he wrote on this very fragment:

Laelius, ut suspicor, dicit uideri sibi Platonem ob praedictam doctrinae labem, aequae ciuitate eiciendum, atque ille Homerum in eadem esse non patitur. (Nisi forte generatim sermo est de philosophis turpibus.)

The *praedicta doctrinae labes* to which MAI refers is the Platonic communism condemned in the fragment (= Non. p. 363,11) which is placed in ZIEGLER's edition immediately before our fragment in which the speaker alludes to the Platonic expulsion of Homer from the republic: *et noster Plato magis etiam quam Lycurgus, omnia qui prorsus iubet esse communia, ne quis*

civis propriam aut suam rem ullam queat dicere. HECK 188 follows MAI in making Plato the object of Laelius' banishment from the state; according to his interpretation the fragment belongs with that in which the Platonic communism is rejected (cf. HECK 194). The context would have, on this interpretation, Laelius objecting to Scipio's over-indulgent treatment of Plato. Against this hypothesis of making Plato the object of the banishment from the state, however, BÜCHNER has raised doubts⁴⁷. If these are accepted, and likewise if MAI's alternative proposition of *philosophi turpes* is similarly to be rejected, then perhaps BÜCHNER's other suggestion (Komm. 349) of making the tragic or the theatrical poets in general the object of the banishment will be the best.

I should spare some words for HECK'S (45) rejection of PLASBERG'S objection to the attribution of the Seneca lyric fragment to rep. Bk. 4 on the grounds of the absence of the lyric poets from Plato's *Dichterkritik*. In reply to this, HECK argued that these grounds were irrelevant in view of the fact 'daß Cicero rep. 4 gar nicht so stark an Platon orientiert ist, wie man allgemein glaubt'. Even if it were true⁴⁸ that Cicero deviated somewhat from Plato in rep. 4, as illustrated by rep. 4, (5), 5 and perhaps also by Lact. epit. 33 [38] 1-5, it of course does not necessarily follow that he did not adhere relatively closely to Plato with respect to the condemnation of the poets. In fact, if one considers Cicero's entrenched pragmatism, his relative fidelity to the Platonic model of the criticism of the poets appears in at least one respect a more attractive proposition than the contrary hypothesis. For in Plato's *poetarum reprehensio*, the whole emphasis is on poets who exercise a widespread influence on and enjoy widespread favour with, the *people* (cf. for example 604e4 f.); Cicero in his turn seems to reflect this concern at rep. 4.9: *clamor et adprobatio populi*⁴⁹. Certainly for both Plato and Cicero in their respective commonwealths, it is natural that in dealing with the poets they should be concerned above all with those who have the widest influence on the people. That is not the kind of poet, however, that many of the lyric poets (that is, if we

⁴⁷ K. BÜCHNER: 'Zum Platonismus Ciceros. Bemerkungen zum vierten Buch von Ciceros Werk De re publica.' in *Studia Platonica. Festschrift für H. Gundert*. Amsterdam 1974, 178 f.; cf. his Komm. on the rep. 349 & 371. I am not, however, entirely convinced by his argument that Laelius or any of the other interlocutors could not have uttered the wish to ban (on the grounds, for example, of his communism) the revered Plato, albeit C.'s *deus philosophorum*, especially inasmuch as Plato is regarded at 1,12 as discharging a *munus rei publicae* by inquiring and writing about the commonwealth. Such an utterance might surely have added lively banter and humour to the dialogue, and the incapacity of the interpreter of the rep. to see anything in the utterance but an entirely serious intention perhaps betrays rather a lack of humour that was not lacking to the dialogue's interlocutors.

⁴⁸ HECK's argument is in at least one respect unintelligible: in defence of his assertion (45) that C. did not follow Plato closely in Bk. 4 of the rep., he refers the reader to his comments (95 ff.) on Lact. epit. 33 [38] 1-5 (a critique of Platonic communism), only to prove in that place (97) that Lact. did *not* use C. (i.e. Bk. 4 of the rep., to which the Platonic communism discussion is by unanimous consent attributed) as a middle-source, inasmuch as C.'s treatment of Plato, the 'god of philosophers', in the rep. is sympathetic!

⁴⁹ Cf. C.'s condemnation of the popular poets' influence in Tusc. 3,3: *accedunt etiam poetae, qui ... audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus*.

exclude the composers of the dithyrambs⁵⁰ and choral lyrics) ever were, and at Cicero's time in Rome, would ever have *wished* to be (BÜCHNER 370: 'mit *lyricos* dürfte...vor allem an Catull und seinen Kreis gedacht sein (wie Hieron. Catull *scriptor lyricus* nennt)'). Catullus and his school are, if anything, an exclusive clique; they spurn and revile the poets of their day: Caesius, Aquinus, Suffenus, (c. 14; 22); likewise Hortensius, Volusius and other modern day Roman would-be Antimachuses: (c. 36; 95). They depend on the judgement not of the people or a mass audience, but of erudite and elegant critics like Valerius Cato:

mirati sumus unicum magistrum,
summum grammaticum, optimum poetam
omnes solvere posse quaestiones [=literary questions⁵¹].

So wrote M. Furius Bibaculus, one of the New Poets (possibly the same as the Furius of Catullus cc. 11, 16, 23, 26⁵²) fr. 2 BÜCHNER (=Suet. Gramm. 11.3), and another New Poet, perhaps Furius again (fr. 6 BÜCHNER) praised the same teacher as the only arbiter and maker of poets, the judge of the élite:

Cato grammaticus, Latina Siren,
qui solus legit ac facit poetas.

R. KASTER in his recent commentary on Suetonius picked up the *double entendre* (surprisingly overlooked until G. BRUGNOLI: *Studi suetoniani*. 1968, 112 f. noticed it) of *legit* nicely with this translation: 'who is the singular (se)lector and producer of poets...' Sometimes the New Poets haughtily conceal their utter lack of desire for a popular audience with mock self-deprecation, as in poem 14a (b): *siqui forte mearum ineptiarum / lectores eritis manusque vestras / Non horrebitis admoveere nobis...*; at other times, they are more open with their contempt for the popular tastes: *o saeculum insapiens et infacetum!* Catullus exclaims (c.43,8) and in similar vein: *at populus tumido gaudeat Antimacho* (c.95,10). GIGANTE'S comment ('Catullo, Cicerone e Antimaco.' *RFIC* 32 [1954] 72) is pertinent here: 'Il 'tumidus' richiama il *παχύ* dell' epigramma callimacheo; 'populus' è il volgo profano che indulge al raglio dell'asino, all'espressione gonfia ed adiposa'⁵³. Cicero himself noted the disdain of the erudite poet for the approbation of the masses in relating the famous anecdote about Antimachus⁵⁴ and Plato (orat. 191). It is hard not to see in his

⁵⁰ In opt.gen. 1, C. distinguishes dithyramb from melic; this together with the fact that the former was not practised in Rome (as the corrupt text of opt.gen. 1 seems to be indicating) justify us in excluding it from the *lyrici* mentioned in the Senecan fragment.

⁵¹ So KASTER ad Suet. Gramm. 11,3: the ability to discuss and handle literary problems (*quaestiones*) and propose solutions (*solutiones*, the *solvere* in the poem) was one of the hallmarks of a good *grammaticus*.

⁵² FORDYCE ad c. 23: 'a pleasant speculation' cp. ad c. 26; COURTNEY 200 is slightly more cautious.

⁵³ The epigram he refers to is fr. 398 PFEIFFER: *Λύδη καὶ παχὺ γράμμα καὶ οὐ τορόν* – apparently a reference to a long epic by Antimachus. J.P. ELDER (1966) 145 f. discusses the fragment in relation to Catullus in much the same fashion as GAGLIARDI.

⁵⁴ The disagreement between Cicero and the New Poets regarding the status of Antimachus of Colophon as a popular poet is curious. For the New Poets, as for their *κορυφαῖος* Callimachus (fr. 1.12 Pf. ?; fr. 398 Pf.),

remark following this anecdote an indirect allusion to the New Poets: *poema enim reconditum paucorum adprobationem, oratio popularis adsensum vulgi debet movere*.

Thus one cannot help feeling that Cicero, being a pragmatist⁵⁵, would not have felt greatly concerned about the lyric poets, especially their Roman representatives among the neoterics who, however disagreeable their *mores* may have been, exercised a minimal impact on the people⁵⁶. By aspiring to be exclusive, they will have in a sense made themselves irrelevant to Cicero's wide-reaching programme in the *de re publica*. Again, therefore, Cicero's relative adherence to the Platonic model of the *Dichterkritik* does seem most plausible.

What of the other attribution favoured by some critics, to Cicero's protreptic Hortensius? Here too the positive evidence is weak. Hence against editors of the Hortensius such as PLASBERG (1892), RUCH (1958)⁵⁷ and GRILLI (1962)⁵⁸ who accept the attribution, other editors of the same work such as SCHUETZ (1823), BAITER and KAYSER (1869) and MÜLLER (1882) omit it. BÜCHNER 371 states that BRINK *JRS* 51 (1961) 219 raised doubts against the attribution. Actually, BRINK was more cautious than this implies: 'The two fragments that now make this section into a criticism of poetry (Cicero's philistine remark about lyric poetry, and the definition of comedy) were placed in the Hortensius by USENER; they are transmitted without a title and may or may not belong here.' BRINK's two more significant objections to previous reconstructions of the Hortensius in which the Senecan anti-lyric fragment is accepted, have to do not so much with the validity of the attribution itself, as with the context in which the fragment is placed by the editors of such reconstructions. Thus he calls into question RUCH's arbitrary separation of *L'entretien préliminaire* and the *Synkrisis des disciplines littéraires*⁵⁹, as well as 'USENER's and PLASBERG's hypothesis of a full-scale "evaluation of the literary disciplines": such a synkrisis of the literary genres, BRINK insists, detracts from the crucial antithesis in the Hortensius between rhetoric and philosophy.

Antimachus represented the type of verbose poet capable of producing only the *πάχυ γράμμα καὶ οὐ τορόν* which they of course utterly rejected. For Cicero, he represented the proto-type of the Alexandrians and their Roman imitators of his day, and with some justice too, for as DOUGLAS rightly remarked on Brut. 191, 'he anticipated the Alexandrians in learned obscurity'.

⁵⁵ Observe that C. stresses in Bk. 2 of the rep., the subject of the work is not an imaginary commonwealth as in Plato's work (*praeclara...fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrens*), but an historical institution: so 2,3. 21 f. 51. Thus Scipio (Cicero) insists that he is dealing with real, not ideal conditions. On the Leitmotiv of Bk. 2 *quam sibi ipse fingit*, see BÜCHNER (1974) 175 f., 179.

⁵⁶ Cf. also GRILLI 66 on the Senecan anti-lyric fr.: '...il tipo di guidizio sta meglio nella parte introduttiva dell'*Hortensius* che nel IV *de re publica*, dove la questione dell'arte è trattata in tono politico...'

⁵⁷ RUCH's ed. received scathing criticism in BRINK's review *JRS* 51 (1961) 215–221.

⁵⁸ Also USENER 120.

⁵⁹ A similar division appears in GRILLI's ed.: see his table 'Hortensi dialogi forma' on p. 9.

But this doubt about the validity of the hypothesis of a section containing a synkrisis of the literary genres does not of course preclude the possibility of a few remarks on literature and on some of the literary genres being placed at the beginning of the dialogue (in which case the words would be Cicero's own): a restricted number of such remarks would certainly not injure the antithesis upon which BRINK insists. Indeed some of the fragments indicate that literature and poetry were discussed, or at any rate, touched upon, of which the most notable is fr. 48 MÜ.⁶⁰ in which one of the interlocutors asks Lucullus for *indicem tragicorum* from which he is to select those that are lacking to him⁶¹. These fragments most probably belong to the opening of the dialogue⁶². Indeed, remarks of a literary nature are regularly to be found in prooemia of Cicero's philosophical works, so in the *de legibus*, *de finibus*, *de divinatione*, *Tusculanae disputationes*, *Academica I*, *Cato maior*, *Laelius*: each has a prooemium which impresses upon the reader the literary background of the writer. A.E. DOUGLAS in a recent article, 'Form and content in the *Tusculan Disputations*.' (in J.G.F. Powell (ed.): *Cicero the Philosopher* Oxford 1995, 197 f.) has noticed the significance of the prooemia for the respective dialogues to which each belongs. While admitting that some of the prooemia were not written originally for the dialogues to which they were eventually attached⁶³ – a circumstance that applies rather more to the earlier than the later dialogues –, he argues convincingly that the prefaces are more than merely pleasant, superfluous reading, but in fact do 'often tell us things we should know'.

We now turn our attention to the question, who are meant by the *lyrici*, the answer to which will lend some further support to our preference for the Hortensius as the original location of the Senecan anti-lyric fragment. With respect to this question, I have already hinted at the group of poets at whom I believe the term is most probably directed. This is

⁶⁰ = 12 RUCH; 8 GRILLI.

⁶¹ See also the discussion of this fr. above at § 6.4. Other frs. which appear to be concerned with literary matters, include fr. 89 MÜ. / 9 GR. *quod alterius ingenium sic ut acetum Aegyptium, alterius sic acre ut mel Hymettium dicimus* (on which, see GRILLI's 63 ff. discussion); fr. 23 MÜ. / 92 GR. *ut ii qui combibi purpuram volunt, sufficiunt prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam, sic litteris talibusque doctrinis ante excoli animos et ad sapientiam concipiendam inbui et praeparari decet* (on which, see ALFONSI's 170 f. discussion): USENER thought the latter fr. belonged to the *synkrisis* in the opening of the Hort., but GRILLI 107 rejects this; fr. 25 MÜ. / 15 GR. which appears to be, as N. O'SULLIVAN has argued recently ('Caecilius, the "canons" of writers, and the origins of Atticism.' in W.J. DOMINIK: *Roman Eloquence*. London & New York 1997, 35 f.), one of the earliest select lists of 'best' authors in each genre.

⁶² A literary excursus might have developed naturally in the conversation which apparently began with the contemplation of the beauties of Lucullus' villa (fr.2) and apparently moved to a discussion of the fine arts. From this, one of the interlocutors may have taken the cue to broach the subject of the liberal arts. Cf. GRILLI 62 f. (less tentatively): 'D'altra parte è evidente come si concatenassero le singole parti del procedimento: eccetto Catulo, quando – primo a parlare – difende la poesia, avendo preso spunto a conversare sulle varie *artes* dalle bellezze artistiche che ornano la villa di Lucullo...'; also SÜSS (1966) 25.

⁶³ And yet it could be argued that the very fact that Cicero compiled a *volumen prooemiorum* and that he must have exercised some judgement in selecting the appropriate preface for a given dialogue – Att. 16,6,4 must be the exception to the rule! – shows the great importance Cicero attributed to the prooemium, and not, on the contrary, a lack of care regarding it.

the Roman 'lyric'⁶⁴ poets of Cicero's day, Catullus and his circle, the New Poets. Thus also GRILLI 66, although he thinks the utterance too strong to be that of Cicero himself, and would prefer to place it in the mouth of Lucullus, an 'uomo di guerra, di stato, d'affari'⁶⁵. Whether, however, the utterance really belongs to Cicero or Lucullus, both Roman patriots, the thoroughly Roman context of the dialogue, I believe, makes an acknowledgement of foreign, Greek poets less likely. The anti-lyric declaration is not a general literary judgement, but has contemporary, perhaps even personal, relevance. We have already noticed the chronological difficulties involved in attributing the fr. to the *de re publica*. The chronology involved with a reference to the New Poets, on the other hand, better suits the Hortensius, since it is around the widely accepted time of the writing (45?⁶⁶) of the Hortensius that two of the three famous references to the poets of the younger generation are made⁶⁷. Again, it has been argued above that the more pragmatic and political concerns of rep. 4 make that book a less suitable context for the fragment, the hostility of which is directed at a class of poets whose activities and influence effectively lie outside of the life of larger community. On the other hand, the fragment in my mind better suits the context of the Hortensius as a whole, even if the fragment belonged to the introductory part of the dialogue only. For it is not out of place to find in a protreptic work exhorting us to the study of philosophy declarations in favour of the judicious use of time and against the frivolous wasting of the same. Indeed, the context of Seneca's letter 49 itself in which the fragment is preserved, seems also to support the attribution to the Hortensius. For in that letter Seneca is discussing this very problem, viz., the shortness of life, and condemning the wasting of time on vain and ineffectual pursuits: it seems reasonable to suppose that Seneca would have turned to a work that similarly reflected such a concern (i.e. the Hortensius), rather than to a politico-philosophical work.

⁶⁴ So St Jerome calls Catull. a *scriptor lyricus*. Quintilian, however, never explicitly calls Catull. (or any of his circle) a *lyricus*, but apparently this is because he altogether ignores Catull.'s lyric productions. Possibly Catull. is meant to be understood as being among the *lyrici* mentioned at 10,1,96 of whom Hor. alone is said to be worth reading. In any event, Q. effectively treats Catull. as an iambic poet only (see esp. 10,1,96). On the other hand, Q. does call Horace *lyricus* or associate him with this title (1,8,6. 10,1,61. 96), and Horace, it may be agreed, was in some sense one of the spiritual heirs of the neoteric legacy. Against this, it may be urged that Quintilian in calling Horace a *lyricus* was merely validating Horace's own claims about being a *lyricus vates* (carm. 1,1,34) and about being the first to have brought Sapphic and Alcaean poetry to Rome (carm. 3,30,14 f. epist. 1,19,33 f.).

Quint. never speaks well of Catull.; on the contrary, in at least two places, 9,4,141 & 11,1,38 there is a negative connotation in his references to the poet. Perhaps in his lack of esteem for Catull. and his circle of *lyrici* Quint. was influenced by Cicero who was the object of his highest admiration (cf. e.g. 6,3,3).

⁶⁵ On GRILLI's interpretation, which follows RUCH's in positing a *synkrisis des disciplines littéraires*, Lucullus' utterance represents a part of his speech before he gives his preference to history in fr. 11 MÜ.

⁶⁶ Three dates have been variously assigned to its composition: 1) between the end of March to the middle of May of 45 (SCHANZ-HOSIUS I 523 f.); 2) between October 46 and March 45 (PHILIPPSON s.v. 'Tullius' II 13 1123–26); and the most radical proposal 3) around 62 (STROUX: 'Augustinus u. Ciceros Hortensius nach dem Zeugnis des Manichäers Secundinus.' *Festschrift R. Reitzenstein*. Berlin 1931, 109,1, cited by HECK 45).

⁶⁷ orat. 161 (46 BC); Tusc. 3,45 (45 BC); the third, Att. 7,2,1 belongs to a date only shortly before these (Nov. 50): all three utterances occur after the composition of the rep.

That judgement readily applies to the reading of the New Poets, whose programme and aesthetics combine tendencies directly opposed to all that Cicero regards as valuable in poetry, as we saw in the chapter on the function of poetry: introspectiveness, intense personal emotion; the lack of or even hostility to nationalism; that new kind of self-seeking Alexandrianism which aimed at authenticity without reference to national models or to the enrichment of the national literature; Epicureanism, excessive erotic interest, and predilection for the nugatory. For Cicero, a kind of poetry which makes these features its ideal, cannot be regarded as worthy of any attention⁶⁸.

On the other hand, it is clear, as has already been hinted at in the beginning of this chapter, that he did not apply this criticism blindly to all lyric. Thus also Quint. 1,8,5 recommends the lyric poets – in some cases with reservation only because he is here speaking of reading material for children –: some of them and some of their poems are not to be recommended for reading *nam et Graeci licenter multa et Horatium nolim in quibusdam interpretari*. In the opt.gen. 1 Cicero posits melic poetry next to dithyramb as one of the valid genres of poetry, in which it is possible for there to be a supreme exponent. Now, although he does not name whom he regards as the supreme exponent of lyric (although at orat. 4, he suggests it might be Pindar), it is safe to assume that only in a genre worth studying can one propose to oneself the inquiry *quid optimum sit* (opt.gen. 2). Elsewhere the lyric poets fare well or ill according as they discharge or fail to discharge the functions of the poet as they have been described in the chapter on that subject. So Pindar (Att. 13,38; fin. 2,11,5; orat. 4) and Stesichorus (Verr. 2,2,87; Cato 23) in celebrating the deeds of great men, performed an invaluable service to their communities, receive favourable reports from Cicero; likewise Simonides, who apart from celebrating fallen war heroes in threnodies, also helped the orator with his mnemonics (nat.deor. 1,60; Tusc. 1,59; Cato 23; de orat. 2,351 ff.)⁶⁹. Alcaeus takes a middle position: he is admired for his manliness and active involvement in affairs of the state (Tusc. 4,71) – *fortis vir* (probably also to be taken as a reference to the qualities of some of his poetry), but yet succumbs on occasion to frivolous erotic poetry (Tusc. 4,71; nat.deor. 1,79). Erotic lyric is, of course, utterly condemned and for that reason Anacreon and Ibycus (Tusc. 4,71) fall under the same adverse judgement as Alcaeus.⁷⁰ Thus we see, as we did at the beginning of this chapter, the untruth of MALCOVATI's (40) assertion that Cicero did not regard lyric 'come costruzione poetica'.

⁶⁸ W. C. McDERMOTT: 'Cicero & Catullus.' *WJS* 14 (1980) 78 who links the *lyricos* of the Senecan fr. with the *poetae novi*, sees a motivating cause for identifying the poets of the day with those referred to in the Senecan epistle, in the political turmoils afflicting C.'s life at the time. For further details regarding the nature and causes of C.'s antagonism towards the younger neoterics of his day, see above § 3.9 & § 4.10.

⁶⁹ Cf. Quint.'s (10,1,64) approval of Simonides.

⁷⁰ The references to Sappho in Verr. 2,4,126 & 127 are not specific enough to admit of any judgement.

9. CONCLUSION

I have tried to give in this study a comprehensive account of Ciceronian ideas on poetry. I have not only drawn upon explicit evidence in which Cicero speaks directly about poetry, but I have also attempted to extrapolate his ideas from other kinds of evidence such as poetic quotations and the comments attending them, discussions of literature in general, and above all, the rhetorical and philosophical treatises with their wealth of information on Ciceronian ideas not just about oratory and philosophy, but about other things as well, such as language, education, literature and the relationship of the Roman statesman, orator and gentleman to literature and literary *otium*.

A fundamental assumption of the work was that it was not only possible, but in fact necessary to transfer Cicero's rhetorical ideas to the field of poetics. I have attempted to show throughout the thesis and especially in the first chapter that Ciceronian literary thought is dominated to the extreme with rhetorical theory and with the ideas of his predecessors in this field, and hence the separation of poetics from the latter is highly undesirable in the case of Cicero. Rhetorical theory affected his ideas on literature and poetry in two ways. On the one hand, it encouraged him to approach all literature from a largely pragmatic perspective: he considers what effect on the audience is produced by a piece; whether it was persuasive; if so, how and why; how were the arguments arranged; whether this was effective and so forth. More importantly, rhetorical theory underlies his basic approach of treating style and form separately from matter. On the other hand, there is another way – and this is obviously related to the last mentioned point – that rhetorical theory affects his literary criticism: under its influence, he largely fails to consider not only the fundamental relationships and creative tensions between the various elements of a poem, but also some of the most important, yet more subtle means by which poets produce meaning and affect their audiences, such as imagery and sound – in short, Cicero largely ignores the very issues with which modern students of poetry are commonly concerned and the very elements to which such students most positively respond and from which they derive perhaps the greatest enjoyment. Hence the necessity to examine the rhetorical prejudices and assumptions underlying his approach to literature and poetry becomes apparent. I hope to have contributed something to an area of Ciceronian studies where consideration of the rhetorical influences on his literary criticism and on his style theories has been largely ignored.

scholarly literature on Ciceronian rhetoric and philosophy and on the literary scene of the late Republic that has arisen since the publication of MALCOVATI's pioneering work in this field. The thesis aimed also to reflect some of the advances made in the respective areas to which these more recent works have severally been devoted.

Let us now briefly survey the major conclusions reached in this study. In the second chapter, we encountered Cicero as critic trying to break away from traditional definitions of poetry, only to end up merely falling back on stylistic distinctions. A contrary tendency in Ciceronian literary thought was to stress the similarities between certain types of prose (especially rhythmic prose in the grand style) and poetry. However, ultimately he viewed poetry as an inferior art to oratory; it remained for him one of the *artes mediocres*. Ethico-political concepts such as those of *gravitas* and the *mos maiorum*, as well as the philosophical theory of the *βίος πρακτικός* of which Cicero approved, contributed to the notion of poetry as an *ars levior*.

I attacked MALCOVATI's and PENNACINI's interpretations of certain Ciceronian passages which appear *prima facie* to support a belief in a Democritean-Platonic theory of poetic inspiration. I argued that Cicero invoked such a theory when it suited his brief (as in the speech *pro Archia*) merely as a 'decorative' literary motif, and that most of the evidence elsewhere in Ciceronian corpus points in the same direction. Furthermore, while Cicero certainly did believe in the supremacy of the talent – he was further goaded to this position by his battles with the Atticists and neoterics who stressed *ars* above all –, this did not mean that he abandoned *ars* altogether. It is the combination of *ars* and *natura* that he admires in Lucretius (*ad. Q. fr. 2, 10(9),3*).

In the fourth chapter I took the speech *pro Archia* as the starting point for my investigation into Cicero's ideas on the functions of the poet. Six of these functions were established, all but one of which were aimed directly or indirectly at the service of the state. It was found that epic corresponded to the highest of these functions, and from that together with some other considerations we inferred that epic was for Cicero the supreme genre. Ennius in his capacity as an epic and national poet was in the judgement of Cicero's maturity the greatest of poets.

The fifth chapter revealed to us that there were educational, cultural and socio-political factors associated with the theatre which affected the development of Cicero's ideas on the dramatic genres and which accordingly need to be considered when we attempt to determine his attitudes to these genres individually. As a practical statesman, Cicero was not ignorant of the social, cultural and political importance of the theatre; he knew too the

importance of the theatre for the education of the Roman youth and for the training of the would-be orator; and lastly he valued his associations with prominent men of the stage.

In the chapter on tragedy, we observed Cicero taking over a long-established tradition of using the trag- words in transferred senses and moulding that tradition to suit his purposes. His use of trag- words in their transferred senses can tell us something about his ideas on tragedy. Briefly stated, these words are used by him in two ways: 1) to denote emotional displays or (emotion-driven) exaggerations 2) to denote solemnity (of style or theme) and elevation of style. Cicero was influenced by Platonic ideas in his hostility to certain aspects of tragedy (especially its capacity through pathos to render men effeminate). On the positive side, Cicero will have admired tragedy's inculcation of Roman aristocratic virtues through Greek myths dramatized under the influence of Roman ideas. From the literary perspective, Cicero believed that the function of tragedy was to serve as a vehicle of the grand style and to allow the composer scope to depict and manipulate the vehement emotions. He naturally preferred the national tragedy, although here the evidence suggests that the *crepidatae* versions of the Greek myths aroused greater interest in him than did the indigenous *praetextae*.

In the study on Cicero's views on comic poetry, we saw that there was almost no influence of a comedy-poetics source for the famous discourse on humour in the second book of the *de oratore*. Nevertheless, we argued that the principles of the discourse, especially those concerned with ethical parts of the theory of the laughable, probably would have been used by Cicero in his assessment of comedy. While obscenity was not personally to his taste, and while Cicero as a Roman gentleman could never have admitted to finding relish in it, Cicero was not particularly offended by it. More offensive aspects of comedy were: 1) its *flagitia* 2) its triviality (*levitas*) 3) its sympathetic presentation of amatory themes 4) its tradition (under its Greek form) of slander and invective against prominent men of the state. On the other hand, Cicero greatly valued certain types of comedy (Terence, and to a lesser extent, Plautus) for their aristocratic urbanity and wit on the one hand, and their purity of language and style on the other. In the Ciceronian conception of comedy, the type of ethos associated in ancient literary criticism with 'domestic realism' played a fundamental rôle; pathos, on the other hand, while not entirely negligible, was of far less significance.

Lastly, in the chapter on lyric, I argued that when Cicero speaks about the *λυρικοί* at *orat.* 183, he is referring to the Greek lyric poets. In the discussion of the rhythmic qualities of the lyric poets and of the comic poets, although they appear *prima facie* to be compared, in fact Cicero distinguishes between the proximity of lyric to 'bare speech' and that of comedy to 'everyday conversation'. Moreover, Cicero clearly felt that the stylistic qualities

of lyric guaranteed its claim to being poetry, since rhythm is not the sole, or indeed most important, criterion of poetry. We also examined the Senecan anti-lyric fragment and discussed its original position in the Ciceronian corpus. Although the evidence was not particularly compelling for one or the other side, I was more inclined to favour the attribution to the Hortensius over that to the *de re publica*. By the name *lyrici* mentioned in the fragment was intended a contemporary allusion to the younger neoteric poets of Cicero's age. The contempt that Cicero expresses for the *lyrici* in this fragment is the same that he expresses for the New Poets elsewhere – a contempt based on deeply-held ethico-political and aesthetic ideas.

The dissertation has shown that Cicero was essentially conservative in his ideas on poetry and on the poetic genres. These ideas were deeply-rooted in the rhetorical and, to a lesser extent, philosophical traditions to which the orator owed his training and to which he himself contributed. Although he was an enthusiastic reader and composer of poetry, his appreciation and evaluation of poetry almost invariably proceed from a purely rhetorical perspective. Only rarely do we observe him approaching something akin to an aesthetics of poetry divorced from that perspective. Hence the way he deals with poetry is, as with most ancient critics before and after him, remarkably mechanical and inorganic. His ethico-political outlook also affected his ideas on poetry; he viewed the highest functions of poetry to be moralistic and nationalistic, that is to say, to teach Roman *virtus* and to glorify the state and its great men. From these premises developed his later hostility to the neoterics (with whose movement in his youth he shared some common aesthetics and literary models); increasingly in his maturity he turned away from the neoterism which rejected moral and national issues as central concerns of the poetic art, which looked for its audience not to the wider community, but to the exclusive clique made up of friends and poets deeply imbued with Alexandrian literature and aesthetics. This somewhat retrogressive development in Ciceronian thought on poetry and poetic theory, a development which received much of its impulse from his ethico-political outlook, partly explains the curious circumstance whereby Cicero could on the one hand single-handedly revolutionize Roman rhetoric, or rather, bring about a renaissance of Aristotelian-Isocratean ideas on rhetoric, and at the same time, on the other hand, be profoundly attached to conservative views on poetry. Equally important for the explanation of this conservatism in poetics are those rhetorical influences which have just been mentioned: ancient rhetoric is after all, and despite its diversity at the hands of its various expositors, a continuous tradition. The consideration of this tradition and of its relation to the

understanding and practice of poetry might be pursued in other directions: a full-scale study of Quintilian's views on poetry would be useful and perhaps equally so, would be a more general history of the influence of rhetoric on poetic composition and the evaluation of poetry from Livius Andronicus to the end of the Republic.

10. APPENDICES

Overview:

Appendix I to § 2.5: Does Ev. 9 f. reflect Isocrates' sincere views on prose style?

Appendix II to § 3.3: ad Q.fr. 3,4,4

Appendix III to § 3.9: Atticist brevity

Appendix IV to § 4.7: rhetorical fascination with extempore verse composition

Appendix V to § 7.6.6 on *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* at off. 1,104

APPENDIX I: Does Ev. 9 f. reflect Isocrates' sincere views on prose style?

It has been objected by some that Isocrates at Ev. 9 f. is somewhat disingenuous, or at any rate, that he contradicts what he says elsewhere¹. O'SULLIVAN 52, however, while admitting polemical motivations inherent in the passage (i.e. against the 'poetic' prose of Alcidas) has argued that 'it is not necessary to rule out the possibility that Isocrates meant more or less what he said here...' Thus O'SULLIVAN argues that Isocrates' restricting in Ev. 10 of prose writers to τὰ πολιτικὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, conforms with his 'other claims (especially that of καθαρότης...) and his practice...' With regard to the first point about 'purity', O'SULLIVAN shows (44 f.) convincingly that Isocrates' boast about καθαρῶς λέγειν in 5,4 refers to an avoidance of unusual diction; with regard to the second point, O'SULLIVAN argues equally correctly that this claim of καθαρῶς λέγειν is reflected in Isocrates' practice, at any rate, as discussed by Dion. Hal. Dem. 4 (135,5 ff. U.-R.) & 18 (165,22 ff. U.-R.).

All this is true, but only up to a point. For how is καθαρῶς λέγειν in 5,4, meaning the 'avoidance of unusual diction', to be reconciled with Isocrates' declaration in 15,47 that his λέξις is ποιητικωτέρα? Let us by all means acknowledge the significance of the comparative, viz., that Isocrates is speaking only of his style *in relation to the law courts*, but O'SULLIVAN's other suggestion that λέξις here refers to one aspect of style only, namely rhythm, is highly

¹ Cf. NORDEN 52 n. 2; M. SHEEHAN: *De fide artis rhet. Isocrati tributae*. Diss. Bonn 1901, 33 f.: 'Saepe autem de numeris et ornatu ita dicere solet, ut existimes haec nullo modo oratori concedenda esse. Sed... hic habes calliditatem illam rhetoricam, qua omnium ornatissimus orator, omnem concinnitatem adhibens, sermone humili atque pedestri uti se simulet. According to SHEEHAN, 13,16 better represents Isoc.'s true opinions. Cf. also WERSDÖRFER 121: 'Wenn wir den Redner beim Wort nehmen und uns nur auf die Euagorasstelle stützen, gibt es keine Möglichkeit für einen künstlerisch gehobenen Prosastil. Doch Isokrates widerlegt sich selbst durch die reich geschmückte Sprache, in der er diese Ausführungen macht...' On the next page, however, WERSDÖRFER somewhat inconsistently adopts a position very similar to O'SULLIVAN's, arguing that there are good grounds for not regarding the Ev. passage as mere 'rhetorische Übertreibung'. Notice, however, that unlike O'SULLIVAN, the Jesuit does not understand Isoc.'s λέξις ποιητικωτέρα to refer to rhythm only, but to 'die Verwendung dichterischer Schmuckmittel'.

questionable. The fact that Isocrates describes the works of the kind favoured by himself as being similar to those composed *μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν* and *ἐν τοῖς μέτροις* does not of itself prove that *λέξις ποιητικωτέρα* refers to rhythm. It is surely more natural to take the descriptions of the latter kind of works (*μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεπονημένοις* and *ἐν τοῖς μέτροις πεπονημένοις*) as merely indicating a genre by its most obvious distinguishing feature (i.e. use of rhythm & metre) without connecting that genre in any way with the determination of *λέξις ποιητικωτέρα*. I doubt too, whether *λέξις* without some further qualification pointing *specifically* to rhythm can be understood as ‘style’ in so comprehensive way as to include rhythm. Ordinarily *λέξις* refers to style in the more restricted sense of diction (see LSJ s.v.²), and when rhythm and metre are spoken of in connexion with *λέξις*, they are not spoken of as components: see for example: rhet. 3,8 1408b21. 29 where Aristotle talks about rhythm and metre *vis-à-vis* lexis as the ‘shape (*σχῆμα*) of *λέξις*’, and compare rhet. 3,2 & poet. 22 where rhythm and metre do not feature as components of *λέξις*. Moreover, the addition of *καὶ ποικιλωτέρα* to Isocrates’ *ποιητικωτέρα* is, I think, really decisive: this term surely refers to a wide palette of ‘stylistic colours’³, in other words, ornamentation, such as is achieved by the figures of style and numerous other different embellishments⁴ (cf. Ev. 9 where the cognate is associated with the poets: *πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι*, and 5,27 *ποικιλίαις κεκοσμήκαμεν*⁵). It does not refer, as some may think, to the demand made in the putative *τέχνη* of Isocrates (Syrianus in Hermog. I p. 28,6 ff. R. = RADERMACHER AS B XXIV 22) that a speech should *μεμίχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ*⁶. The fact that *ποικιλία* is conjoined with *εὐρυθμία* in 5,27 does not contradict this, but on the contrary, proves only, as WERSDÖRFER 107⁷ rightly saw, that ornament *and* rhythm are fundamental postulates of the Isocratean *Kunstprosa*.

² Also Plat. apol. 17b8 *ὕμεις δὲ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν – οὐ ...κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους...ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ’ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκὴ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασιν...ἀτεχνῶς οὐν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως*.

³ WERSDÖRFER 109 & 124 compares Isoc.’s use of *ποικίλος* (& its cognates *δια-* and *καταποικίλλειν*) to C.’s use of *flos* and *colores* (e.g. Brut. 66. 233. 298. orat. 65. de orat. 2,54 *distinguere varietate colorum*). And just as WERSDÖRFER 107 associates *ποικίλος* above all with ‘den bunten Schmuck der Stilfiguren’, so does DOUGLAS ad Brut. 66 view *florem* as ‘any brilliant feature or rhet. adornment, κόσμος λέξεως...with especial reference to the figures...’ (he cites de orat. 3,96: *conspersa sit (oratio) quasi verborum sententiarumque floribus*).

⁴ Also significant in this connexion is the description of Isoc.’s style in Dion. Hal. Isoc. 2 (p.57,5 f. U.-R.) *πεπονημένην μᾶλλον εἰς σεμνότητα πομπικὴν καὶ ποικίλην*... For a more extensive discussion of *ποικίλος*, see WERSDÖRFER 107 ff.; also 121 where he practically equates ‘die schmückenden ὀνόματα’ (i.e. the exotic, the newly coined, the metaphorical etc.) with the means of *ποικιλία*. He cites in support of this Plat. Menex. 235a where the orators of epitaphia are said to glorify the fallen in such a way *ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἐκάστου λέγοντες, κάλλιστα πῶς τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες, γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς*.

⁵ Possibly also 13,16: cf. LSJ s.v. *καταποικίλλω*

⁶ In any event, doubts have been expressed whether this part of the fragment is really Isocratean: cf. GRUBE (1965) 42: ‘the confused sentence about...prose and rhythm sound more Aristotelian than Isocratic...’

⁷ In a similar fashion, the related term *κομψός* signifies ‘das Feine, Gezierte und Gedrechelte der *rhythmisch* gehobenen Sprache’: cf. WERSDÖRFER 105 ff.

Accordingly, it would seem, Isocrates *is* claiming in 15,47 that his style is more poetic and more richly ornamented⁸ – chiefly, that is, in relation to the style found in the law courts⁹; nor is this claim one relating to rhythm only, or perhaps one relating to it at all. Again, Isocrates' boasts about his use of rhythm in such passages as 5,26. 13,16, are plainly at variance with what he says about rhythm in Ev. 10. O'SULLIVAN's argument against this, namely that 'μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοί are absent in a sense from Isocrates' prose' since the 'use of them is radically different from that found in poetry'¹⁰, is specious. How is it possible that one who is and was identified with the introduction of rhythm and periodic constructions, or at any rate, with the perfection of their use¹¹; who himself elsewhere recommends rhythm (especially the iambus and the trochee)¹² or even boasts of his own felicitous employment thereof¹³, should not have more carefully qualified his remarks about the absence of rhythm in prose, had he really been sincere here? Lastly, his denying the orator the use of metaphors is also somewhat inconsistent, for while perhaps it does not disagree seriously with anything else he says, especially inasmuch he generally does not recommend metaphors elsewhere¹⁴; and while it may be accepted that in practice he generally eschewed them, yet he nevertheless *did* use them himself, albeit in a cowardly and timid way: so Dion. Hal. Dem. 18 (p. 166,15 f. U.-R.) ἄτολμός ἐστι περὶ τροπικὰς κατασκευὰς καὶ ψοφοδεΐας¹⁵. On the following points in Ev. 9 f., then, on ornaments and stylistic devices, on metaphor, and on rhythm, Isocrates elsewhere contradicts himself, either in theory or in practice.

Is all this simply a matter of hypocrisy, excusable on the grounds of his polemic against Alcidas? That is undoubtedly part of the explanation, but the context of Ev. 9 f points to an even more obvious reason. Isocrates wishes to stress the magnitude of the orator's

⁸ On Isoc.'s use of ornaments, cf. also Dion. Hal. 18 (166, 3 U.-R.) πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων ἔχει.

⁹ Confirmation of this is found in 12,1 where Isoc. speaks of the style of the usual oratory in the law courts as being deficient in all κομψότης. Cf. ep. 9,5 where κομψῶς is contrasted with ἀπλῶς.

¹⁰ He continues thus: '–and, as WERSDÖRFER admits, συμμετρία (by which Isoc. defines poetic rhythm here) is not to be found [sc. in Isoc.'s prose]...' But again, this will not do; for Isoc. also defines poetic rhythm by εὐρυθμία, which, as we shall see, is a quality that Isoc. unequivocally attributes to his own style.

¹¹ Isoc.'s own pupils, in particular Naucrates, claimed for him the distinction of being the first to introduce rhythm into prose, a claim which C. himself initially recognised (de orat. 3,173. Brut. 32); in the orat. 38 ff. & 175 he acknowledges that Thrasymachus really is more entitled to this distinction. At any rate, C. recognises Isoc.'s contributions to the development of the rhythmic prose in orat. 40; if Gorg. & others applied *minuta et versiculorum similia*, and seemed insufficiently *rotundus*, Isoc. *primus instituit dilatare verbis et mollioribus numeris explere sententias*. On his frequent use of rhythm and the period, see also Dion. Hal. Isoc. 2 (p. 57,12 f. U.-R.) & 12 (p. 72,2 ff. δουλεύει γὰρ ἡ διάνοια πολλάκις τῷ ῥυθμῷ λέξεως). Cf. also NORDEN 118, on rhythm as a postulate of the *Kunstprosa*.

¹² So states the fr. of the τέχνη attributed to Isoc. preserved in Syrian. in Hermog. I, p. 28,6 ff. (= RADERMACHER AS B XXIV 22 already partially quoted: but his text is incomplete as O'SULLIVAN 52 n. 166 points out): ὅλως δὲ ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω (ξηρόν γάρ)· μὴδὲ ἑμμετρος, καταφανὲς γὰρ· ἀλλὰ μεμίσχῃ παντὶ ῥυθμῷ, μάλιστα ἱαμβικῷ καὶ τροχαϊκῷ. Cf. NORDEN 53.

¹³ Cf. his claim about εὐρύθμους ...εἰπεῖν : 5,27. 13,16. Cf. also WERSDÖRFER 109.

¹⁴ Yet one version of the fr. just cited from Syrian. in Hermog. has δὲ δὲ τῇ μὲν λέξει...χρηῆσθαι ... μεταφορᾷ ἢ μεταφορᾷ μὴ σκληρᾷ...

¹⁵ Cf. also Dion. Hal. Isoc. 2 (p. 56,18 f. U.-R.).

task in replicating the poets' success without the aid of *their* numerous devices and it is this desire that leads him to overstate the case and to exaggerate the paucity of resources at the orator's disposal in comparison with those of the poets (τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ἀποτόμως καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς...)¹⁶.

¹⁶ So rightly NORDEN 52 n. 2, relating, however, the arduousness of the task more specifically to Isoc. himself: '...[Isoc.] sagt das nur, um sich einen größeren Glorienschein zu verschaffen, da er es trotz dieser Nachteile so ausgezeichnet mache.'

APPENDIX II (to § 3.3): ad Q. fr. 3,4,4

WATT's OCT text

de versibus quos tibi a me *scribi* vis, deest mihi quidem opera, quae non modo tempus sed etiam animum vacuum ab omni cura desiderat; sed abest etiam ἐνθουσιασμός, non enim sumus omnino sine cura venientis anni, etsi sumus sine timore.

SHACKLETON BAILEY's Cambr. & Teub. text

de versibus quos tibi a me *scribi* vis, deest mihi quidem opera sed abest etiam ἐνθουσιασμός, qui non modo tempus sed etiam animum vacuum ab omni cura desiderat. non enim sumus omnino sine cura venientis anni, etsi sumus sine timore.

SHACKLETON BAILEY in his commentary and in *PCPhS* 7 (1961) 4 gives two reasons for altering WATT's OCT text: 1) the relative clause *quae...cura desiderat* cannot refer to *opera* if the latter is taken to mean either 'leisure', 'spare time' (L-S; TYRELL-PURSER ad loc. on the basis of Plaut. Merc. 286) or 'facultas laborem perficiendi' (cf. TLL s.v. 664,49: 'facultas/voluntas agendi'): '[i]n either case', writes SHACKLETON BAILEY in his article, '*opera* might be said to require time, but I find it hard to see how it requires a mind free from all care'; 2) the words of the clause *sed abest... ἐνθουσιασμός* as they stand in the MSS 'interrupt the connexion between *animum vacuum...desiderat* and *non enim...timore*'.

I do not feel that these are sufficient grounds for altering the text. There is no denying that the passage is difficult – chiefly because of the peculiar use of *opera* – but I think it can be shown that the text as found in the MSS is capable of producing satisfactory sense. SHACKLETON BAILEY's second objection to the MSS reading hardly stands on its own, but rather has for its purpose the supporting of the first objection. In fact the interruption caused by the clause *sed abest... ἐνθουσιασμός* is not so great, and SHACKLETON BAILEY's tidying up of the text may be too neat and fastidious – we are, after all, dealing not with a strictly reasoned treatise but with an intimate letter to a brother, with all the casualness that such a piece implies. SHACKLETON BAILEY's remark on this clause in the commentary is completely unjustified: '[n]or can *opera* require a mind free from every care, as poetic inspiration does (cf. ...3,5,4)'. In the first place, whether *opera* means 'leisure' or 'ability and/or will to do a job' (observe that so far is SHACKLETON BAILEY's comm. from repeating the claim made in the article of 1961 that 'no parallel seems to exist' for 'facultas laborem perficiendi', that parallels are in fact given!¹⁷), what is so difficult in seeing how it might be said to require a mind free from all care – especially if, in the second case, that ability and/or will to do a job, is associated more intimately not merely with any job, but with the particular job of poetic composition? To come into possession of leisure or spare time does not necessarily mean that the mind will be at the very same time free from all

¹⁷ He cites ad Q. fr. 3,6,3 (*etsi distentus cum opera tum animo sum multo magis*) & Plaut. Merc. 286; in the article of 1961, SH. B. insists that the last cited use from Plaut. must mean 'available leisure'; in the comm., he cites the verse in support of the alleged sense 'ability and/or will to do a job'. Equal in value to, or better still than, either of these are inv. 2,130 (*scriptori neque ingenium neque operam neque ullam facultatem defuisse*); leg. 1,8 (*quem* [sc. *laborem*] *non recusarem, si mihi ullum vacuum tempus et liberum; neque enim occupata opera neque animo impedito res tanta suscipi potest; utrumque opus est, et cura vacare et negotio*); fam. 5,8,2; 13,29,2. Cf. TLL s.v. 664,51 ff.

care; and it is perfectly reasonable to state that the 'ability and/or will to do a job' requires a similar mental state, since surely it is a commonplace that the work of poets is a delicate and superlatively individual task, and accordingly it is not out of place for a given poet to demand tranquillity and freedom from mental disturbance (pace the *furor* enthusiasts!). Perhaps not every poet will insist on these conditions, but it is enough that some will: Lucr. 1,41 f., Catull. 68,20 ff., Ov. Trist. 1,1,39, Juv. 7,57 have similar ideas about being prevented or hindered from (profuse) poetic composition by anxieties for personal or public causes. Thus acceptable sense can be got out of the MSS readings on this point. The preferred interpretation of the passage in question, in the light of what has been said above, would be this: Cicero is saying that he lacks the 'facultas/voluntas versus scribendi' (almost 'energy' or 'determination' – cp. *inv.* 2,130 – for the task of writing poetry) which requires time and a mind free from care. Thereupon he adds another excuse, a clever conceit made with tongue in cheek¹⁸, that the *enthousiasmos* is also absent; the reason for this absence is the same as that which explains his lack of *opera: cura*. He further clarifies this *cura* by describing it as *cura venientis anni*. Logically, however, the explanation referring to the times and the state of affairs as causing him anxiety really belongs to the first clause, or rather to the whole passage, and not to the *enthousiasmos* clause only. The anxiety caused by the times and the state of affairs explains his whole disposition, his state of mind, that is to say, his apathy, his lack of energy, and, as he says in jest, the absence of *enthousiasmos*.

Support for this interpretation of *cura venientis anni* clause as referring to the whole passage can be adduced from a comparison with the analogous sections in ad Q.fr. 3,5,4 and 3,6,3, each belonging to letters written within weeks of our letter, 3,4. In neither 3,5,4 nor 3,6,3 is lack of poetic inspiration (*enthousiasmos*) given as an explanation for Cicero's inability to comply with Quintus' repeated requests for poetry. In 3,5,4, he lacks time (*incredibile est...quam egeam tempore*) and anxiety has robbed him of the *animi alacritas* necessary for *poema* – *poema* here is decidedly not the same as poetic inspiration or *enthousiasmos*¹⁹, but rather 'poetic composition' (so rightly EWBANK 21); in 3,6,3 Cicero explains his inability as being due to his preoccupations *cum opera tum animo* (= time (?) / [energy/inclination] (?) / work²⁰(?) & anxiety)²¹. Observe that the 'quaedam animi alacritas' ('zeal' 'eagerness' 'enthusiasm' – in the English sense! –; cf. OLD s.v.) of ad Q. fr. 3,5,4 better corresponds to our *opera* as understood in the senses suggested already of 'energy' and 'determination,

¹⁸ On humour in the letters of this period, cf. SHACKLETON BAILEY: *Cicero*. 88 (quoted above).

¹⁹ GAGLIARDI 270 also erroneously describes ad Q. fr. 3,5,4 as one of several Ciceronian 'più o meno precise reminiscenze democritee o platoniche e...espressioni piuttosto vaghe ed indefinite'.

²⁰ Cf. OLD s.v., 4.

²¹ For another *recusatio* invoking work (?) / *opera* and anxiety as reasons for the refusal, cf. leg. 1,8 quoted above.

than to poetic inspiration or the divine *adflatus*. Thus we have a series of three letters to Quintus (3,4,4; 3,5,4; & 3,6,3) written within the space of about a month, in each of which letters Marcus refuses requests for him to compose poetry. Anxiety – though described in different terms²² – is the reason given for each *recusatio*; the three also seem to have in common a complaint about a lack of time (unless the *opera* of 3,6,3 means not ‘free time’, but ‘work’ or ‘work load’)²³. The fact that those two factors – 1) anxiety & 2) lack of time /preoccupation with work – uniformly appear in each of the three letters proves that they, and not the lack of poetic inspiration, constitute the crux of the problem. For in fact it is only in the first letter that reference is made to a (quasi-)preternatural explanation: the absence of *enthousiasmos*. This consideration further makes that appeal to the absence of *enthousiasmos* look like a facetious aside, or a joke added in the manner of an afterthought. It shows above all, as we have argued, that the reason (*cura venientis anni*) attributed *prima facie* to that absence of *enthousiasmos* really belongs to the whole passage, rather than to the absence of *enthousiasmos* alone. SHACKLETON BAILEY’S emendation destroys the parallelism between the three letters by removing the (quasi-)preternatural factor (*enthousiasmos*) from its incidental status and by elevating it to a prominent position in the ‘equation’. It does this by making the two factors 1) anxiety²⁴ & 2) lack of time the refer not to Cicero’s lack of energy and determination to compose poetry (also implied by 3,5,4 & 3,6,3), but on the contrary, to the absence of *enthousiasmos*. By making the absence of *enthousiasmos* a main component in the ‘equation’, SHACKLETON BAILEY’S emendation also somewhat destroys the humour of the passage, by failing to recognise that *enthousiasmos* is, as I have already stated in the above chapter, merely a humorous aside, a sophisticated dressing up of an otherwise ordinary explanation²⁵.

²² 3,4,4: *animum vacuum ab omni cura*; 3,5,4: *quadam animi alacritate, quam plane mihi tempora eripiunt*; 3,6,3: *distentus...animo*.

²³ 3,4,4: *opera, quae...tempus desiderat*; 3,5,4: *incredibile est...quam egeam tempore*; 3,6,3: *distentus...opera..*

²⁴ It might also be added that SHACKLETON BAILEY fails to prove his assertion that the poetic inspiration of *enthousiasmos* requires a ‘carefree mind’. Contrary to what SHACKLETON BAILEY alleges, ad Q.fr. 3,5,4 does not provide proof of such a link, since *poema* is not poetic inspiration, but rather, poetic composition. In Plat. Phaedr. 245 a the madness from the Muses is said to take hold of a *ἀπαλήν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχὴν*, but the exact import of *ἄβατον* (lit. ‘untrodden’) in this instance is unclear.

²⁵ EWBANK’S (21 f.) sound interpretations of both ad Q. fr. 3,4,4 & 3,5,4 illustrate how similar the letters are in theme, and at the same time suggest that Shackleton Bailey’s transposition of the *ἐνθουσιασμός* clause would destroy this parallelism.

APPENDIX III (to § 3.9): Atticist brevity

In section § 3.9 it was argued that many of the aesthetic and literary values of the Atticists resembled those of the New Poets. Among other things, the New Poets favoured the small over the big poem. This is in a certain sense analogous to the preference of the Atticists for brevity over copiousness and amplification. In this appendix I shall attempt to establish that brevity was in fact a fundamental part of the Atticist programme.

Cicero himself defines *brevitas* in the part. 19 – it is significant that this follows a description of what constitutes obscurity of style: *aut longitudine aut contractione orationis*–, as being achieved by *simplicibus verbis, semel una quaque re dicenda, nulli rei nisi ut dilucide dicas serviendo*. DOUGLAS in his commentary on the Brutus (xliii) lists *brevitas* as one of the ‘slogans or catchwords’ associated with the ‘Plain or Attic style’; in Brutus 63, Cato is compared to Lysias, the chief model of the neo-Atticists: their common traits are enumerated as follows: *acuti sunt, elegantes faciti breves* (note too that *acutus* is also a term closely associated with the Atticists: see Brutus 291; similarly *elegans* [=careful and exact choice of words]: see orat. 81, 83; DOUGLAS xliii for other references). In Brutus 66 ff. Cato’s lack of success is attributed to that excessive *brevitas* and use of *concisae sententiae* which caused Thucydides and his imitator Philistus of Syracuse (Quint. 10,1,74) to fail in comparison with Theopompus, and Lysias in comparison with Demosthenes. Thus also is Thucydides, another of the Atticists’ chief models (Brut. 287; orat. 30; opt. gen. 15) described as *brevitas* (Brut. 29) and to such a degree that he is *interdum subobscurus*²⁶. In the de orat. 2,56, Cicero writes of him: [Thucydides] *ita creber est rerum frequentia ut verborum prope numerum sententiarum numero consequatur, ita porro verbis est aptus et pressus*; and again later in the same book (2,93 also of Pericles and Alcibiades): *subtiles, acuti, breves, sententiis magis quam verbis abundantes* (cp. L.-P. ad 2,56: ‘immer wieder wird die brevitas des Thukydides vermerkt’)²⁷. After the passage from the Brutus where Cato is compared with Lysias, a detailed description of Lysias is given, in which appear numerous terms associated with the Plain Style, and which all are suggestive of brevity (64):

habet enim [sc. Lysias] certos sui studiosos, qui *non tam habitus corporis opimos, quam gracilitates* consecretur, quos, valetudo modo bona sit, *tenuitas ipsa*

²⁶ DOUGLAS ad Brut. 29 cites a complaint of Dion. Hal. Thuc. 51, 55 that Thuc. is unintelligible without a commentary (γραμματικῶν ἐξηγήσεων); mention is likewise made of his brevity (βραχύτης) and obscurity (ἀφανέστερων). Cf. 24 = 363 U.-R.: ἐκδηλότατα δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ χαρακτηριστικώτατα ἐστὶ τὸ τε πειρᾶσθαι δι’ ἐλαχίστων ὀνομάτων πλεῖστα σημαίνειν πράγματα καὶ πολλὰ συντιθέναι νοήματα εἰς ἓν, καὶ <τὸ> ἔτι προσδεχόμενον τι τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀκούσεσθαι καταλείπειν ὑφ’ ὧν ἀσαφὲς γίνεται τὸ βραχύ. Quint. 10,1,73: *densus et brevis et semper instans sibi Th.*

²⁷ C. in opt. gen. 15 ff. further explains his objection to the ‘Thucydidean’ Atticists: ‘aliud est enim explicare res gestas narrando, aliud argumentando criminari crimenve dissolvere; aliud narrantem tenere auditorem, aliud concitare...qua re si quis erit qui se Thucydideo genere causas in foro dicturum esse profiteatur, is abhorrebit etiam a suspitione eius versatur in re civili et forensi’.

delectat –verum etiam certe genere toto *strigosior* –, sed habet tamen suos
laudatores, qui hac ipsa eius *subtilitate* admodum gaudeant.

Subtilis is precise, plain, matter-of-fact, and is opposed to copiousness suggested by the *genus grande* (cp. DOUGLAS ad Brut. 35). Other terms used to describe Lysias also suggested brevity and terseness of style: his thinness and jejunity (*tenuis* & *ieiunior*: opt. gen. 9.); both terms used frequently of the Plain Style and Atticism. Calvus' style is described as *attenuata* (Brut. 283) and lacking in blood (=vitality); and Calvus deliberately cultivated leanness or sparseness (*exilitas*: 284). In Brut. 285 in addition to *ieiunitas*, the characteristics of the Atticists also consist of dryness and poverty (*siccitatem et inopiam*); and later (289) it is said that the manner of the Atticists is *anguste et exiliter dicere*. Lastly, the exponents of the Plain Style in *orat.* 20²⁸ are described as *tenuēs, acuti, omnia docentes et dilucidiora non ampliora facientes, subtili quadam et pressa oratione limati*, where *pressa* ('concise') has been shown by SANDYS *ad loc.* with numerous examples given to have been a keyword for the Atticists (cf. DOUGLAS ad Brut. 35). With the exception of *pressus*, which is indisputably synonymous with *brevis*, it must be admitted that the other terms may be understood as reflecting other stylistic concerns than length of expression, composition and subject matter:²⁹ as for example, richness of style, diction, amplification and so forth. However, it is difficult to see, even if this claim were granted, how the stylistic characteristics denoted by these terms could be reconciled with a long, verbose manner of speaking. A very important Ciceronian testimony that supports this contention is opt. gen. 2, where Cicero describes the three styles, assigning to each peculiar values held exclusively by it. He characterises the orators of the grand style as *grandis aut gravis aut copiosus*, and those of the plain style as *tenuis aut subtilis aut brevis*. *Tenuis* is the term used throughout Cicero's important discussion of the Plain Style in the orator (75–90); the orator of this style is more concerned with the thought than with the words (77): *de re hominis magis quam de verbis*: compare Cicero's definition of brevity in *de orat.* 2,326: *est brevis, cum tantum verborum est, quantum necesse est*; and part. 19 already cited above. Lysias according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lys.* 4 [12–13 U.–R.]) was unrivalled in his ability to combine lucidity (*σαφήνεια*) with brevity (*τό γε βραχέως ἐκφέρειν τὰ νοήματα*); Dionysius explains the reason for this superiority as follows: *τούτου δὲ αἴτιον, ὅτι οὐ τοῖς ὀνόμασι δουλεύει τὰ πράγματα παρ' αὐτῷ, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ ὀνόματα*. The orator of the Plain Style furthermore is to eschew the use of the period, and instead ought rather to favour sentence structures composed of the 'short and concise clauses' (SANDYS): *contracta et minuta* (78). In connection with rhythm and structure, one might also point to Cicero's discussion of L. Crassus in the *Brutus*. He

²⁸ Cf. *orat.* 29: *qui [Pericles] si tenui genere uteretur...*

²⁹ For a description of *brevitas* of material in *narratio*, see *inv.* 1,28.

seems to have been associated with the *Latinitas* movement (Brut. 143 cp. KENNEDY 1972, 85), itself connected with the tradition of the Plain Style. At Brut. 162 his sentence structure is described as follows:

quin etiam comprehensio et ambitus ille verborum, si sic περίοδον appellari placet, erat apud illum *contractus* et *brevis*, et in membra quaedam, quae κῶλα Graeci vocant, dispartiebat orationem libentius.

In speaking of the Stoic predecessors to the Atticists with their exactness of diction, with their plainness and straightforwardness, KENNEDY (1972) has written:

We must not regard the orator in the plain style as unemotional, but his emotion is that of a sharp sword or intense and sudden piercing flame, not of a massed army or a wall of fire, and he expresses his emotion by the choice of words [*elegans*] and by their delivery, not by *the number of words, the piling up of clauses, the multiplication of examples, or other kinds of amplification*. [my emphasis]

DOUGLAS (xxxvi & ad Brut. 50) also points out that Hermagoras, against whom Cicero wrote in the *de Inventione*, is believed to have been under Stoic influence (as the characterisations of his style in the Brut. 263 & 271 as *inops ad ornandum* & *non satis opima* seem to bear out). Diogenes Laertius in his chapter on Zeno (vii 1. 59) informs us also that the Stoics held συντομία = *brevitas* to be one of the virtues of style. In discussing the development of oratory in Greece in the beginning of the Brut. 49–50, Cicero noted that oratory was chiefly an Athenian phenomenon; and having dismissed Argos, Corinth, and Thebes as centres of oratorical and rhetorical activity, proceeds to speak slightly against the Lacedaemonians, whose brevity of speech was of course notorious and proverbial among the ancients. They could never have produced an orator, since *brevitas...laus est interdum in aliqua parte dicendi, in universa eloquentia laudem non habet* – a comment perhaps also intended indirectly for the Atticists who made brevity one of the virtues of their style.

APPENDIX IV (to § 4.7): rhetorical fascination with extempore verse composition

A peculiar rhetorical interest in poetry is touched upon in the speech pro Archia §§ 17 f. where Cicero compares the esteem in which Roscius' artistic abilities were held and the admiration that is owed to Archias' ability to extemporise in verse on contemporary events and to make variations on the same theme³⁰. This ability to extemporise in verse is spoken of highly again in the de oratore 3,194: on this occasion it belongs to the epigrammatist Antipater of Sidon (roughly coeval with Archias³¹): *quod si Antipater ille Sidonius ille, quem tu probe, Catule, meministi, solitus est versus hexametros aliosque variis modis atque numeris fundere ex tempore tantumque hominis ingeniosi ac memoris valuit exercitatio ut, cum se mente ac voluntate coniecisset in versum, verba sequerentur, quanto id facilius in oratione exercitatione et consuetudine adhibita consequeremur!* The context of the praise in the de oratore reveals yet again the pragmatic nature of this rhetorical interest. Cicero has been urging the variation of rhythms (*horum vicissitudines*) in order to avoid both monotony and the appearance of having spent much labour on any given speech. To this he adds and recommends the cultivation of extempore speaking: with practice and experience this is not unattainable, since even a poet whose task is rendered more difficult by virtue of the fact that he has to produce verses in sundry metres, has mastered this art. Therein can we detect another source of disagreement between Cicero and the neoterics: one cannot conceive of the fastidious and careful neoteric Alexandrinists and their successors thinking too highly of such an off-the-cuff faculty³². Catullus boasts (95,1 f.)³³ that his friend the poet Cinna took eight years to complete his Zmyrna and Horace ars 388 taking a hint from him³⁴ advised a period of the same number of years in which a work should lie unpublished (only after, of course, being subjected to a careful re-working and editing by an Aristarchus: ars 419 ff.), and conversely disparaged Lucilius for holding it to be a great accomplishment because he could compose two hundred verses in an hour standing on one foot (sat. 1,4,9–10). Suetonius' account in the de poetis of the painstaking process of Virgil's composition provides a stark contrast to Plutarch's report (Cic. 40) that Cicero could in his leisure compose five hundred verses in a

³⁰ On the whole subject of extemporaneous verse composition in antiquity, see also HAZEL L. BROWN: *Extemporaneous Speech in Antiquity*. Diss. Chicago 1914, 64 n. 271.

³¹ OCD² s.v. 'Archias' (3): fl. c. 120 B.C.

³² So also A. RONCONI 90.

³³ This is not to deny that the neoterics could also exhibit facility in verse composition when they wanted to: cf. Catull. 50 (but note that each of the poets is still depicted as writing: *scribens*). On the other hand, the context of the poem in which a *ludus poeticus* in the literal sense is described suggests a difference between the poetic activities the neoterics pursued in private in order to amuse themselves and the poetry they wished their public to see. For there is no hint in any of Catull.'s published poems that any one of these poems was the product of some off-the-cuff performance or poetic improvisation; on the contrary, his whole book is *arido...pumice expolitus* (c. 1).

³⁴ COURTNEY 214.

night. Others influenced by the rhetorical schools also held rapid verse composition in highest esteem: Cicero's colleague Hortensius is said by Catullus in the same poem to have composed 'five hundred thousand verses in one <year?>'³⁵; and Quintus Cicero finished four tragedies in sixteen days (ad Q. fr. 3,5,7). This fluency (*animorum incredibiles motus celeritatemque ingeniorum*: Arch. 17) is, admittedly, not the same thing as extempore composition, but the impulse behind each, and the cultivation and acceptance of each, belong for the most part to the same men of letters, united by their common patrimony of rhetorical ideas and debt to the schools. In later times the extempore poetic genre did enjoy a certain vogue among the Romans: Augustus (Suet. Aug. 98,4) seems to have indulged in it on occasion – and in Greek –, as did Titus (Suet. Tit. 3,2) and there appear to have been collections of VERSVS EXTEMPORALES (CIL 6.33976), but this development is only consistent with the increasingly rhetorical nature of the literature and the higher emphasis placed on extempore speaking (Augustus [Suet. 84] was an accomplished practitioner) as Tacitus dial. 6,6 attests: *sed extemporalis audaciae atque ipsius temeritatis vel praecipue iucunditas est*. Still, the poetic variety of extemporising is a curiosity; it seems to have been among the Romans of a predominantly epigrammatic type exhibiting isolated, aphoristic verses. The continuous variety of a more substantial nature, if it existed at all, or extempore poetry produced by professional poets must have been rare; a remark of Quintilian's (10,7,19) in which he brings together Archias and Antipater bears this out: *ceterum pervenire eo debet [sc. orator] ut cogitatio non utique melior sit ea sed tutior, cum hanc facilitatem [sc. extemporalem] non prosa modo multi sint consecuti, sed etiam carmine, ut Antipater Sidonius et Licinius Archias (credendum enim Ciceroni est)*. The clause following this: *non quia nostris quoque temporibus non et fecerint quidam hoc et faciant*, must naturally refer not to orators or declaimers as is made evident in the subsequent passages, but to poets who have cultivated and are still cultivating the faculty of extemporising, and yet Quintilian's reluctance to name any of these contemporary poets (instead of the two well known poets) indicates the recessive nature and minor status of the activity. One might note in passing, too, that another aspect of this 'rhetorical' fascination with extemporary verse further manifests itself in the passage from the pro Archia where Cicero expresses admiration for the poet's ability to dilate upon contemporary and topical events (18: *de iis ipsis rebus, quae tum agerentur*) – again, surely a strange and unusual taste as far as the poetry of the day was concerned. To make topical allusions of the sort made directly or indirectly in the plays is one thing³⁶; to select current

³⁵ The commentators agree in identifying 'Hortensius' as the orator, but recently COURTNEY 231 expressed doubts, proposing that Volusius (author of the *Annales* at which Cat. sneers) should be read instead of Hort.

³⁶ Actually, more often it was the productions themselves through emphatic and tendentious delivery that such allusions were forced out of the texts (see for example: Sest. 117 ff. esp. 118, 123); or the political mood of the audience itself often gave a play a fresh relevance and renewed topicality: see WRIGHT 4 ff.

affairs for one's subject is another. The intention of this section of the speech pro Archia is to excite the audience with the same enthusiasm that Cicero has for Archias' poetic activities, and which the audience had for Roscius. Cicero tries to entice and tempt the audience to this by emphasising the freshness, the novelty – *cunctarum novitas carissima rerum!* – and the relevance (to the concerns of the day) of Archias' subject matter; it is not the hackneyed or recondite or abstruse stuff of other poets. Now this discussion of contemporary affairs is best handled by the extemporiser because he alone can perceive the disposition of the audience, their collective political mood, and can speak about that which they wish to hear; he is able, Alcidas says, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἄμεινον χρῆσθαι (22).

Lastly, it does not need to be stated that there is, of course, also latent in this approval of poetry that treats *de iis ipsis rebus, quae tum agerentur* a further reference both to the encomiastic power of poetry³⁷, and to the poet's function of giving guidance and moral lessons, both of which I discussed above. For it is evident that the contemporary events spoken of here must mean *significant* events (otherwise what precedes and what follows in the speech are contradicted), mostly of political or historical interest (perhaps represented by Cicero's own semi-historical poems), and not merely the social trifles and gossip of the day – Catullus' *nugae*. Out of these significant events the poet will select and treat those instances of excellence and virtue, of baseness and turpitude from which to elicit lessons of true moral value which is part of his civic duty.

This interest in improvised poetry can be traced back to the enduring sophistical and rhetorical fascination with ability to speak on the occasion on any given subject. In Cicero this ability is intimately related with his 'maximalistische Konzeption des orator' (L-P ad 1,75) who, through vast education and learning *de omnibus rebus possit copiose varieque dicere* (de orat. 1,59)³⁸. The promise (epangelma) to meet the demands of the occasion and to transmit the ability to pupils has its own tradition that goes back to Gorgias³⁹ who converted the philosophical concept of *καιρός* ('that which is fitting in time, place and circumstance'⁴⁰) into a rhetorical term, and to his disciple Alcidas⁴¹. The study and

³⁷ For encomia under the guise of history cf. Att. 1,19,10: *tertium poema* [sc. de consulatu meo] *expectato, ne quod genus a me ipso laudis meae praetermittatur. hic tu cave dicas, 'τίς πατέρ' αἰνήσει;'; si enim apud homines quicquam quod potius [si] laudetur, nos vituperemur qui non potius alia laudemus; quamquam non ἐγκωμιαστικά sunt haec sed ἱστορικά quae scribimus.*

³⁸ Cf. also L-P I 58 ff.

³⁹ Plat. Gorg. 447 c: ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιο τῶν ἔνδων ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. Cf. Philostr. V.S. I, 1 (D-K 82 A I a) tells us that Gorgias was the first extemporiser: παρέλθων γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων δέατρον ἐδάρρησεν εἰπεῖν 'προβάλλετε' καὶ τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἀνεφδέξατο, ἐνδεικνύμενος δήπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ. C. discusses the Gorgianic epangelma at de orat. 1,103 & 3,129; cf. also UNTERSTEINER *Sophists* 196 f.

⁴⁰ UNTERSTEINER 197 quoting FUNIAIOLI *Studi* 176.

practice of extemporising will provide the orator with practical balance to his regular (and rather artificial) exercises in meditated declamation⁴², and aid him in keeping his command of *καίτοι* fresh and trenchant. At *de oratore* 1,150, Cicero explicitly recommends the regular practice of *subito dicere*, as being *utilius*, and again at 1,158, as we have seen, he enjoins the improvised criticism of various writers of differing genres, first among whom are the poets (cf. 1,257 *de alieno subita...disputatio*). Quintilian in the same passage already cited (10,7,19) in a more obvious manner compares and contrasts rhetorical *facilitas extemporalis* with that of the poets. I stated above that the clause *non quia nostris quoque temporibus non et fecerint quidam hoc et faciant*, must refer to extemporisers not in *oratio*, but in *carmine*. The sentence that follows this bears this out. For, having already stated the necessity (*debet*) of cultivating and mastering extemporising in speech, he denies this necessity to the cultivation of extemporising in verse. That is a faculty, an activity that it is artificial and alien to the verisimilitude that the orator wants (*non...probabile*), and Quintilian explains that he only cited it as an *utile exemplum* to encourage those in training for the forum with the hope of attaining this faculty, when they realise – so it is implied – that it has been accomplished in poetry, which as far as extemporising is concerned, must be reckoned a far more demanding feat. In the passage just cited from the *de oratore* we learn that there are three modes of speech composition, independent of each other, and yet all three are necessary – to varying degrees – to the orator's training and practice. The first is extemporary composition (*subito dicere*), the second, composition by mental preparation and rehearsal (*commentatio et cogitatio*), and the third, written composition (*scriptura*); the last two enable the orator *paratius atque accurate* ('in der literarischen Kritik ein wichtiger Begriff' – L-P ad loc.) *dicere*. Antonius in his reply to Crassus at 1,257 faithfully reproduces this triad in much the same phraseology (observe the repetition of the concept of *accurate*). In this sequence, there is a corresponding order of importance; interestingly, in the passage that we have been looking at regarding the poetic compositions of Archias, the triad is paralleled (albeit in truncated form) and the same ascending order of importance is likewise implicit. Having finished his description of Archias' extemporary work, Cicero then

⁴¹ On his speech on the Sophists, see HOOK (1919); KENNEDY (1963) 172; on the difference between his conception of *καίτοι* ('unpredictable quality') and that of Isocrates, see O'SULLIVAN (1992) 91 f.

⁴² On declamation: S. BONNER *Rom. Declamation*. Liverpool 1949; Clarke *Rhet. at Rome* 85 f; KENNEDY (1972) 91 ff., 312 ff.; DOUGLAS on Brut. 310 collects passages on C.'s use and practice of declamation. There is no explicit evidence to show that C. practised extempore declamation – *pace* L-P I 247. On the other hand, in the Tusc. 1,7 written but a little later, he describes his *senilis declamatio* (here, declamatory exercises in philosophical discourse): *ponere iubebam, de quo audire vellet; ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam*. However, the description of these *declamationes* seems to suggest that C. still permitted himself a little time to prepare his discourse, since he would speak *after* the proposer of the subject had expressed his view, and furthermore, he recognises this rather theatrical business of declaiming on the spur of the moment on a subject chosen by another is *more Graecorum*. Quint. (10,7,21) mentions with extreme disgust certain declaimers who attempted their art extempore, and who were even so perverse in their ambition to exhibit this faculty as to ask their audience for a word with which to start (*ut...verbum petant quo incipiant*)!

concludes this section of the speech with the following remark: *quae vero accurate cogitateque scripsisset ea sic vidi probari ut ad veterum scriptorum laudem perveniret*. These other works are the fruits of the second and third processes: thought and contemplation, and the writing with meticulousness. *Paratius* is conspicuously absent, and naturally so, since it refers to a skill, a quality, outside the condition of the poet. PENNACINI (67) justly set much store by the phrase *probari ut ad veterum scriptorum laudem perveniret*; he found in it evidence of the concept of classicism operating in Cicero's critical thought, 'anche se il vocabolo *classicus* non era ancora usato in questo senso'. Poets are not to be judged by subjective, arbitrary criteria, but through universal standards of judgement one may compare authors even though they be separated by vast intervals of time. Yet the *quasi*-technical term *accurate* has been manifestly neglected by him, no doubt because of the inconvenience and difficulties that it causes his hypothesis regarding the *ars-ingenium* dichotomy in Ciceronian literary theory. On that subject, the reader is referred to § 3.8 above.

APPENDIX V to § 7.6.6 on *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* at off. 1,104

The meaning of this phrase *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* is uncertain. Commentators have usually understood it to refer to Old Comedy (see, e.g. HOLDEN ad loc.), and prima facie that seems to be what the text says. However, consideration of the context as well as a comparison with other texts in which C. condemns the slander and invective of Old Comedy – with which much of the humour is bound – leads one to question whether this is correct. Three solutions, then, may be proposed to this problem:

1) C. does not mean by *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* the Old Comedy specifically, but the comedy of the Athenians in the general ‘the comedy of the Athenians of old’, with more emphasis intended on the New Comedy (hence parallel with *Plautus noster*). While there does not appear to be any exact instance of *antiqua comoedia* referring to New Comedy, in at least one instance, Porph. ad Hor. sat. 1,10,18, *antiquas comoedias* (but note the plur.) seems to be a generalising term ‘the comedies of old’, not referring specifically to our Old Comedy. On the other hand, the usual term among Roman writers to denote the ‘old’ of our Old Comedy appears to be *vetus*. I count 15 instances of this usage among Roman writers; 5 instances of *antiqua*; 3 or possibly 4 of *prisca* (although in 2 of these, Hor. sat. 1,4,2. & 1,10,16 the metre forbids either *vetus* or *antiqua* in this position). Of the four instances in C. (de orat. 3,138. Brut. 224. leg. 2,37. off. 1,104), only in off. 1,104 does C. use *antiqua*; in the other three passages we find *vetus* (with its variants). Nevertheless, even this is not sufficient to prove that *antiqua* in off. 1,104 refers, not specifically to Old Comedy, but in general to the ‘comedy of the Athenians of old’, since C. is no strict observer of technical terminology, and indeed often consciously eschews it. Still, it must be admitted that even if C. did use *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* in a general way as referring to all of Attic comedy, it is hard to see how this should not also include Old Comedy. Moreover, if one abandons the traditional interpretation, one still has to account for the evidence of leg. 2,37, to be discussed below. Accordingly, this proposal must be rejected.

2) C. does mean the Old Comedy: he was led to choose Old Comedy as an example of refined and gentlemanly humour by one of his sources (perhaps even Panaetius himself⁴³) in which Old Comedy was praised for its wit and humour as a legitimate form of gentlemanly sport. It will be recalled that obscenity was not problematic for the Stoics since they did not believe there was such a thing: see fam. 9,22; the objection to slander and

⁴³ ROSTAGNI (1922) 140 n. 4 thinks off. 1,104 contains ‘il pensiero degli Stoici, rappresentato da Panezio’; RAMAGE (1973) 36 is more reserved.

invective in poetry was more a Roman concern. In choosing Old Comedy, however, as an example of his gentlemanly humour, he ignored the discrepancy of which he was now guilty between earlier statements that he made condemning slanderous or defamatory comedy and this utterance in which he praises the humour which this kind of comedy exhibits. Slanderous and defamatory humour, especially of the type directed against prominent men in the state, would appear to transgress the boundaries of the *iocus ingenuus et liberalis* referred to in passages such as *de orat.* 2,237 f. and 247.

3) C. does mean the Old Comedy: if we take him to mean here principally, if not *exclusively*, Aristophanes, Old Comedy's most famous exponent, we should suppose that he chose to ignore the slander and obscenity contained in some of the Aristophanic jokes⁴⁴, and remembered above all his humour as being *elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum* – qualities of wit which allowed him on another occasion to call Aristophanes the *facetissimus poeta veteris comoediae* (*leg.* 2,37). Moreover, it is these qualities of wit that are outstanding in Aristophanes: the kind of jokes that C. would not have approved really amount to little in comparison with the former sort of humour that C. admired. Again, Aristophanes can be at times, despite his occasional obscenities, a highly moral poet: his formulations concerning the civic functions and moral duties of the poets – by common consent not just parodies of the great tragedians' belief in their own importance and high purpose, but also serious reflexions on the rôle of poetry in the community – these formulations that he places in the mouths of characters in the *ranae* (e.g. 1009. 1030 ff. 1053 ff.) are certainly not far removed from Ciceronian ideas. Lastly, it is interesting that Aristophanes thought of himself in similar terms as those used by Cicero at *off.* 1,104 and *leg.* 2,37 regarding the '*Atticorum antiqua comoedia*'⁴⁵. At *nub.* 520 ff.⁴⁶ Aristophanes insists upon the greater refinement (542) and restraint (*σώφρων* 536) of his humour, its lack of obscenity (537 f.), and its greater ingenuity and wittiness (*οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ζητῶ ἔαπατᾶν δις καὶ τρις ταῦτ' εἰσάγων, / ἀλλ' ἄει καινὰς ἰδέας ἐσφέρων σοφίζομαι, / οὐδὲν ἀλλήλαισιν ὁμοίας καὶ πάσας δεξιάς* [546–8]) in comparison with the comedies of his rivals. He claims also that in his use of lampoonery, he knew when to stop; his rivals on the other hand were immoderate in this

⁴⁴ Cf. QUADLBAUER (1960) 56: 'C.'s Grundhaltung gleicht der Platos: Anerkennung der individuellen Größe des Aristophanes, aber grundsätzliche Ablehnung der Spottsucht der Alten Komödie für einen idealen Staat.' & 57: 'In ästhetischer Hinsicht wertet jedenfalls C. Aristophanes und Menander positiv.'

⁴⁵ But QUADLBAUER (1960) 41 thinks it was a common attitude of the poets of Old Comedy to regard oneself as aesthetically superior to one's predecessors.

⁴⁶ Other passages too similarly indicate Aristoph.'s belief in his greater sophistication and refinement in comparison with his rivals: cf. *vesp.* 57 ff. 1049 ff. *pax* 740 ff.; I must thank my supervisor Dr N. O'SULLIVAN for three of these Aristophanic references.

department⁴⁷. If it is too optimistic to contemplate Cicero being familiar with such texts (see JOCELYN 1973; QUADLBAUER 1960, 55), perhaps at any rate he knew of a tradition which, based on Aristophanic texts such as this last cited passage, represented Aristophanes as more refined, more witty, and less coarse than his rivals. The similarity of ideas between off. 1,104 and nub 520 ff. tantalizes us so to think that he did⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ Cf. Σ nub. 96: ἔπειτα Εὐπολῖς, εἰ καὶ δι' ὀλίγων ἐμνήσθη Σωκράτους, μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀριστοφάνους ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς Νεφέλαις αὐτοῦ καθήψατο.

⁴⁸ As to the urbanity praised at off. 1,104, there is a fragment, fr. 706 K-A, presumably praising someone's (perhaps the poet's) 'city' language: on the one hand, it is not the urban, over-effeminate kind (ἀστεῖαν ὑποδηλυτέραν); on the other hand, it is not illiberal and over-rustic (ἀνελεύθερον ὑπαγροικότεραν).

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A note on abbreviations: throughout the thesis I have referred to Latin texts and authors by the abbreviations used by TLL. Greek authors and texts are of course more problematic: here I have elected to use abbreviated forms of the traditional Latin titles which are slightly fuller than the abbreviations used in LSJ.

Select List of Editions & Commentaries

Standard editions (OCT or Teubner) of the texts cited have been used throughout. Significant discrepancies between editions or between accepted emendations and the readings of the MSS have been noted. The following list includes some of the more important or less widely used editions and commentaries not found in OLD or TLG Canon³.

ARISTOTELES	[Arist.]
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*But while they talked, across the pole of heaven
Had swept the Charioteer who drives from Dawn,
And dalliance had soon eaten up the dole
Of time allotted: so the Sibyl warned –
Down comes the night, Aeneas: all too fast
We weep the hours away...*

FLECKER's transl. of Aen. 6,535–39