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How to Endure Presentism

Abstract

Presentism and endurantism are natural bedfellows: arguments have been mounted from endurantism to presentism and vice versa. I generalise an argument against the compatibility between presentism and endurantism offered recently by Tallant (forthcoming). I then show how to reformulate endurantism so that it is compatible with presentism. I demonstrate that this reformulated version of endurantism can do the same work with respect to the problem of temporary intrinsics as can standard definitions.

Keywords: Presentism • Endurantism • Identity • Persistence

1 Introduction

According to presentism, only present entities exist, where ‘exists’ invokes our most unrestricted quantifiers: quantifier wide open, there are only present entities. Philosophers who define presentism in this fashion include: Crisp (2004a), Markosian (2004), Kierland and Monton (2007), Bourne (2006a,b) and Sanson and Caplan (2010). Presentism is sometimes formulated as the view according to which only present entities are real. I take this to be equivalent to the above.¹

Presentism and endurantism are closely allied for two reasons. First, there are compelling arguments from presentism to endurantism. These arguments seek to show that presentism is incompatible with endurantism’s chief rival, perdurantism, and so presentism requires an endurantist model of persistence (see Merricks (1999) and Benovsky (2009)).² Second, there are compelling arguments from endurantism to presentism. These arguments move from the central difficulty facing endurantism – the problem of temporary intrinsics – to the conclusion that adopting presentism is the endurantist’s best bet for overcoming the problem at issue (see Hinchliff (1996)).

Recently, Tallant (forthcoming) has argued that presentism and endurantism are incompatible with one another based on a particular, locative definition of endurance. This is an important argument: if successful it shows that the package of presentism and endurantism so defined is no good, which puts pressure on proponents of both views. In this paper, I suggest that Tallant’s argument generalises to other definitions of endurance on the market (§2). I proceed to redefine endurance so that it is immune to this style of argument (§3). Finally, I demonstrate that, when combined with presentism, the definition of endurance at issue has the capacity to solve the problem of temporary intrinsics, thereby making good on the presentist’s promise to get the endurantist out of strife (§4).

¹I will set aside the controversy concerning how to define presentism. See, for discussion, Crisp (2004a), Crisp (2004b), Ludlow (2004), Mason (2006) and Sider (2006).

²For responses to Merricks and Benovsky see Lombard (1999) and Magalhaes (2011) respectively.

2 Endurantism and Presentism

Tallant (forthcoming) argues that endurantism and presentism are incompatible. His argument for this claim is based on a particular definition of endurantism in terms of location relations. Such a definition may be stated as follows:

An object O endures from t_1 to t_2 iff O is wholly located at both t_1 and t_2 , without having a part located at t_1 and not t_2 , or a part located at t_2 and not t_1 (Parsons 2000, pp. 400–401).

Tallant's argument proceeds as follows. First, he maintains that endurantism is beholden to Lowe's (1998) conception of identity dependence, to wit:

Identity Dependence:

x depends for its identity upon y =df.

There is a function f such that it is part of the essence of x that x is $f(y)$.

Note, and this will be important later on, that the function f is only a *part* of x 's essence. Further features may be needed to fully flesh out what it is to be an x . When applied to persistence, claims Tallant, identity dependence forces the notion of 'a persisting object' to be analysed functionally. Based on Lowe's concept of identity dependence, and assuming Parson's locative definition of endurance, we can therefore say that an object O is a persisting object at a time t only if there is a function from times to locations other than t which O saturates. If presentism is true, however, then there is no such function, because there are no times other than t , so O is not a persisting object at time t . As Tallant puts the point:

Traditional bedfellows they may be, we nonetheless have reason to reject this union [of presentism and endurantism]. In order for an object, O , to persist over time, as opposed to simply being an instantaneous object, O must itself be (wholly) located at more than one time. Thus, the identity

of a persisting (enduring) object, as a persisting object, is identity dependent upon its existence at multiple times. There is a function, being an existent at times other than t , that O must saturate in order to be, at t , a persisting object. Since the existence of O at t and at t^* is inconsistent with presentism, so O does not persist. There are no persisting objects if endurance is true.

Now, one might be tempted to say “so much the worse for identity dependence”, but such a reply would be too quick, for as Tallant argues:

[there are two] concerns with this response. Concern the first: assertion does not make it so. In all of the cases of dependence Lowe describes, reasons are provided for thinking that the dependence holds. So, some unpicking of those arguments and examples, or an independent argument against Lowe, will be required from my opponent. Concern the second: these dependencies (or something similar to them) really do look to hold in the cases described.

One obvious response to Tallant’s argument is to simply point out that it focuses on a certain way of defining endurantism. There are, however, other definitions on the market. So we should simply alter the definition to one of these instead. Here are three such definitions:³

1. An object O endures iff (i) it lacks temporal parts, and (ii) it exists at more than one time (McCall and Lowe 2009, p. 277).
2. Necessarily, for any x and any times the ts : if the ts are more than one and x exists at each of the ts , then x is wholly present at each of the ts . (Crisp and Smith 2005, p. 319).

³For alternative definitions of endurance, see Miller (2008).

3. An enduring object which exists at one time is identical to itself existing at another (Merricks 1994, p. 166).

Each of these definitions can be used to formulate a version of Tallant's argument for the conclusion that presentism and endurantism are incompatible. McCall and Lowe's (2009) definition seems to require that enduring entities exist at more than one time. But, if presentism is true, only a single time exists; there are no non-present times. *A fortiori* it is not the case that anything exists at more than one time. To put the point in terms of identity dependence, McCall and Lowe's definition requires there to be a function from times to objects existing at those times, a function that a given object O must saturate in order to be an enduring object. But because there are no past times if presentism is true, then there can be no such function. So nothing endures. Similar considerations apply to Crisp and Smith's (2005) definition, which explicitly quantifies over multiple times – the ts – and defines the endurance of an object over the ts . For something to endure given this definition, we require a function from times to wholly present objects existing at those times.

Finally, consider Merricks' (1994) definition. Merricks (1994) understands 'existing at a time' in a particular way. According to Merricks, 'x exists at time t ' is to be analyzed as: 'when t is present, then x exists'. Thus, fully spelled out, Merricks' definition of endurance is this:

An enduring object which exists at t when t is present is identical to itself at t' when t' is present.

Now, suppose that t is present. Then t' is not present. Given that t' is not present, an object O is not identical to itself at t' by the above definition. That's because t' 's being present appears to be a necessary condition for O at t to be identical to itself at t' . Similarly, suppose that t' is present. Then t is not present. Given that t is not present, O is not identical to itself at t by the above definition. The trouble, in short, is that only one time ever gets to be present, if presentism is true. Because only

one time gets to be present, the definition falters for objects that aim to be identical to themselves at multiple times. Again, to frame the trouble in terms of identity dependence, the endurance of an object requires the existence of a function from multiple times taken as present to self-identical objects at those times. Because only one time is ever present, and only one time ever exists, there is no such function.

Assuming identity dependence, there are two ways to address the broad problem that Tallant has identified. First, one might try to modify presentism by adding non-present times back in some form. So, for example, consider *ersatz* presentism (see Bourne (2006b) and Crisp (2007)). On one way of articulating this view, non-present times are sets of propositions describing the world at an instant. Only one of these times is accurate, or true. The rest of the times exist, it is just that they are inaccurate or false. An object can therefore exist at many different times. It does this by existing at the present time, and also at some abstract time. Existence at an abstract time is a matter of entailment: E exists at an abstract time T iff T entails 'E exists'. With the addition of times back into presentism, there is no reason why there cannot be functions of all kinds that take those times as arguments. This would seem to allow, once more, for the satisfaction of Lowe's concept of identity dependence.

Although I cannot fully argue the point here, this first strategy for addressing the incompatibility between presentism and endurantism comes at a cost. The addition of non-present times into presentism threatens to undermine one of the main motivations for presentism. As Tallant (2013) has argued, one compelling reason for adopting presentism is that it is more quantitatively parsimonious than the alternatives. It is more parsimonious partly because it denies the existence of past and future times. Adding these back in, even as abstract objects, makes presentism a less attractive view overall.

The second strategy for addressing Tallant's argument is to redefine endurantism so that the apparent incompatibility with presentism is dissolved. This is a better strategy since it does not require adding non-present times back into presentism

and so preserves one of the underlying motivations for that view. My goal in what follows is to outline and defend a strategy along these lines.

3 Tensed Endurance

Consider again Parson's definition of endurance. To modify this definition, replace all talk of times with talk of the past and the present, and all talk of location at a time, with talk of being now located at a time, having been located at a time or going to be located at a time. This yields the following:

[Tensed Locative Endurance] An object O endures from the past to the present iff O is wholly located in the present and either O was wholly located at some time in the past when that time existed or O will be located at some time in the future when that time comes into existence.

TLE upholds Lowe's concept of identity dependence. How so? Well, according to TLE, a persisting object O depends for its identity on the fact that it is wholly located at the present time, plus the fact that it was wholly located at some past time or that it will be located at some future time. This gives us the left-hand side of the equality in Lowe's definition. On the right-hand side, we include a specification of the function from times to locations that O saturates *now* and that O also saturated in the past. More precisely:

A persisting object O depends for its identity on the fact that it is wholly located at the present time, and either it was wholly located at some past time or will be located at some future time

= df.

There is a function f^* that takes, as input, whichever time is present, where which time is present changes. The function yields as output a

location such that it is part of the essence of O 's identity as a persisting object that it is this function from whichever time is present to a location.

The function f^* takes a different time as an argument at each moment that is present. When t_2 is present, the function sends t_2 to whichever location O is wholly located at, at that time. When t_1 was present, however, the function sent t_1 to whichever location O was wholly located at, at that time. Because the function only ever takes the present time as an argument, it is not a function that takes in multiple times and yields a location for O at all of those times. Moreover, because which time is present changes, the inputs and the outputs of the function also change, which allows us to capture the idea that the very same object used to have a different location.

Despite not being a function from multiple times to locations, the function f^* still manages to capture something important about O 's identity as a persisting object, namely that part of what it is for O to persist is for O to be wholly located at each moment at which it exists. It is just that only one moment ever exists – the present – and so the inputs and outputs of the function at any given time are limited. The difference between TLE and the account of endurance considered by Tallant is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Function f on the left represents the multi-location function that Tallant argues is at odds with presentism. Function f^* on the right is the location function posited by TLE.

TLE avoids the argument that Tallant outlines. Because the function f^* is not

a function that takes multiple times as arguments, the non-existence of past times does not undermine the saturation of the relevant function. The function only ever takes in one time: the present time. *O* therefore saturates the function just when it has a location in the present. To be clear, however, the saturation of the function is just a *part* of the essence of *O*'s identity as a persisting object (which, recall, is in line with Lowe's original definition of identity dependence). *O*'s persistence is fully analysed in terms of the fact that the inputs of the function *change* with the passage of time. This is important: if all there is to *O*'s persistence is the fact that *O* has a location now as demanded by a given function, then it would be hard to differentiate a persisting object *O* from an instantaneous object. The full story about *O*'s persistence must therefore include facts about how *O* used to or will saturate the function from whichever time is present to a location.

Of course, this means that TLE requires that certain facts about the past/future and the present obtain. In particular, it must be a fact that *O* is wholly located in the present, and it must either be a fact that *O* was wholly located at some time in the past when that time existed or that *O* will be located at some future time when that time exists. So long as the presentist can accommodate these two facts, presentism is compatible with endurance.

This last point might seem a bit worrying, however. Consider the fact that *O* was wholly located at some time in the past when that time existed. The presentist can accommodate this fact so long as she can account for facts about the past. But it has been argued by some that presentists cannot account for facts about the past. So the proposed account of endurantism fails.

The response to this concern is straightforward: the presentist has a range of strategies available to her for accommodating facts about the past (see e.g., Bigelow (1996), Bourne (2006), Cameron (2011), Kierland and Monton (2007), Tallant and Ingram (2015)). Suppose that one of these strategies succeeds. Then the presentist can help herself to that strategy to develop TLE. Suppose that none of these strategies

succeeds. Then TLE fails, but only because presentism fails quite generally, and so the compatibility with endurantism is rather moot.

One might respond, however, that matters are not quite so straightforward. Given that I am arguing in favour of TLE, the onus is on me to show how TLE can be rendered compatible with a presentist strategy for accommodating facts about the past.⁴ This is especially important, one might continue, because Tallant himself considers a solution along the lines just described, involving the use of facts about the past to render presentism and endurantism compatible. He argues, however, that his preferred way of recovering facts about the past – nefarious presentism – won't work.

Tallant has sold his own view short. In order to address this further challenge, then, I will sketch out a version of nefarious presentism that is compatible with TLE. As noted, Tallant considers the use of nefarious presentism as a way of meeting his challenge. He frames the issue in terms of perdurance, but presumably the same would apply to endurance:

Some presentists ... look to deploy 'in virtue of' language, without making any ontological commitments... They tell us that there were dinosaurs is true because there were dinosaurs, where that claim is not one that commits us to the existence of anything in the past or present. More, they say that there were dinosaurs is true in virtue of there having been dinosaurs... call this a 'nefarious' response to the truth-maker objection. If that move can be made in response to the truth-maker objection ... then perhaps something analogous can be done here. Perhaps we can say that, just as true propositions get to be true in virtue of how things were, so (for instance) our perduring whole has its identity in virtue of the way that entities were, without taking that to commit to the further existence of anything over and above what presently exists.

⁴I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.

Tallant raises two difficulties for this ‘nefarious’ response. First, he once again casts doubt on the idea that there is a function that can underwrite the identity dependence of an enduring object. The thought being that nefarious presentism does nothing to make such a function available. As he puts the point:

...my concern is that there is a trans-temporal identity dependence: a dependence of the present object upon the past. Identity dependence consists in there being a function that takes (at least) one entity as an input and generates an output ... Simply, then: what kind of function is saturated by a now past, non-existent entity? There is no obvious response.

I agree with Tallant that nefarious presentism cannot underwrite the f function. The problem lies with tense. In the quoted passage above, Tallant asks “what kind of function is saturated by a now past, non-existent entity?” But note the tenseless ‘is’ in this sentence. This tenseless copula forces the presentist to find a function that takes, as an argument, some past time, or past object and send it to a location. Since there are no past entities or times even if nefarious presentism is true, then there just is no such function. However, as I have argued, there is an alternative, ‘tensed’ function available – the function f^* . This function is not (tenselessly) saturated by a past, non-existent entity. Rather, f^* *was* saturated by a past entity, when that entity was present. This function, in conjunction with nefarious presentism, can meet Tallant’s challenge. All that the nefarious presentist needs to do is supply the relevant facts about the past. There is no need for her to try and find a way to saturate the f function, or explain how that function can be saturated given the resources she has available.

In short, then, the nefarious presentist can say the following: an entity endures when it has a location now (by f^*) and *had* a location in the past (by f^*), where this latter fact is delivered by the nefarious strategy of cheating. Of course, if nefarious

presentism itself presupposes the saturation of f^* in the past in order to be viable, then the nefarious response will be of no use in addressing Tallant's challenge. But I see no reason to suppose that this is so.

This brings us to the second difficulty outlined by Tallant for nefarious presentism. The problem, Tallant argues, relates to a more general problem concerning singular propositions. He frames the problem as follows:

Supposing that propositions are complex entities, which refer in virtue of being partly constituted by their referent, what entity can constitute a past-tensed singular proposition that refers to a merely past entity? ... To give a case, consider: <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>. For this proposition to be the very thing that it is, a proposition that directly refers to Julius Caesar, Caesar must exist and constitute the proposition. If Caesar does not exist, then there is no constituent of this putative singular proposition. If there is no constituent, we have no referring singular proposition that picks out Caesar.

Applied to nefarious presentism, then, the worry is this. For TLE to be viable a certain fact about the past must obtain: namely, it must be the case that O saturated the function f^* . This fact holds, however, only if the proposition < O saturated the function f^* in the past> is true. But that's a singular proposition twice over: it features O – a particular object – and f^* – a particular function. Accordingly, the proposition at issue must, at a minimum, have O as a constituent. If O is a non-existent entity, however, then O cannot be a constituent of the proposition in question. So there is no such proposition. So it is not the case that O saturated the function f^* in the past.

One response to this kind of worry is to simply point out that O exists in the present and so it is available to be the constituent of the proposition < O saturated the function f^* in the past>. Similarly f^* exists now, and so is also available to be

the constituent of the relevant proposition. But this response only goes so far; it is not generalisable to claims about wholly past entities. For example, suppose that O existed at t_1 and t_2 but that by t_3 O has gone out of existence. Furthermore, suppose that t_3 is present. Then for it to be the case that O endured, despite the fact that O no-longer exists, the proposition $\langle O \text{ saturated the function } f^* \text{ in the past} \rangle$ must be true. This time, however, O is not available to be a constituent of that proposition. So the problem remains.

Still, this is instructive as it shows us where the real trouble lies: with singular propositions that are about wholly past entities. With respect to these propositions, the nefarious presentist should cheat again. Consider the basic nefarious line. The nefarious presentist maintains that propositions about the past are true in virtue of how the past was. This notion of ‘in virtue of’ is not ontologically committing. As Schaffer (2010) argues, the ‘in virtue of’ notion at issue – the one used in truthmaking circles and the one that the nefarious presentist is pillaging – is an instance of grounding. But, as Bennett (2017) argues, constitution, which is used to characterise singular propositions, is also an instance of grounding; to say that a proposition P is constituted, partly, by O is to say that P exists in virtue of O . Once the nefarious presentist has allowed that propositions about the past can be true in virtue of how things were, where this claim fails to be ontologically committing, then she can do the same with respect to constitution. The two cases of ‘in virtue of’ have a common root in grounding, and so if one case of grounding is ontologically light-weight, then I don’t see why one cannot hold a similar attitude toward the other case of grounding.

Of course, this requires saying that singular propositions are constituted by entities that don’t exist, but that used to exist. This might seem odd, but I don’t see it as any more perverse than the view that propositions about the past are true in virtue of things that used to exist but that do not exist now. Both are forms of ontological cheating, to be sure. But they are forms of cheating that are unified by the underly-

ing notion of grounding. This unification carries the license to cheat from one case to the other.

In sum, then, the compatibility between nefarious presentism and TLE can be achieved in two ways. First, by using nefarious presentism to recover facts about the past that then support the function f^* and, second, by pushing the nefarious presentist to cheat their way into singular propositions about the past. Once we see how the compatibility can be achieved with nefarious presentism, we begin to see how to render TLE compatible with other versions of presentism as well. Indeed, TLE is compatible with any version of presentism that can recover facts about the past as well as singular propositions about wholly past entities. One such view is Ingram's (2016) thisness presentism. According to this view, propositions about the past are true in virtue of primitive thisnesses that exist now and that constitute singular propositions about wholly past entities. Ingram's version of presentism, if viable, has the resources needed to scaffold TLE, and the associated f^* function without a need for cheating.

Now, in response, one might argue that the combination of TLE with nefarious presentism or thisness presentism amounts to an analysis of endurantism in terms of truth. Tallant considers such an account of endurance. Roughly, on the view that he considers, O endures iff it is true that O was wholly present and it is true that O is wholly present now. Here's what Tallant has to say about such an account:

Even were it the case that those presently existing posits made it true that O was wholly present, that's irrelevant to the task in hand. Endurance (e.g.) analyses persistence as a matter of O 's being wholly present at a range of times. It does not analyse persistence in terms of it being true that O was wholly present at a range of times. Of course, against an eternalist backdrop, where we assume the existence of objects past, present and future, there is little difference between these two conditions; if it's true that O is F at t , then O exists, at t , and is F . But, on the presentist

model, matters are very different. So, to the point of this response: if we analyse the persistence of *O* in terms of truths, we aren't adopting either endurance or perdurance; neither view analyses persistence in terms of what is true.

It might be thought that Tallant's objection applies to TLE as well. But TLE does not analyse endurance in terms of truth. It analyses endurance in terms of what used to be the case and what will be the case. Granted, we express facts about what used to be the case and what will be the case using true propositions, but that doesn't turn the analysis into one in terms of truth. Something similar is true for any definition. For example, suppose that I define a table as follows: *x* is a table iff *x* has a flat top and four legs. This definition analyses being a table in terms of facts about the top and the legs. We can express those facts in terms of true propositions: it is true that *x* has four legs and it is true that *x* has a flat top. But that doesn't mean that the definition is one that analyses what is to be a table in terms of truth. The definition doesn't mention truth at all. And so it is with the definition of TLE.

That being said, the quoted passage from Tallant can be used to formulate a related concern for TLE. The concern is that TLE is not endurantism. It is not endurantism precisely because it does not feature a function from multiple times to locations. To address this concern, let us step back for a moment and ask: what makes a view an endurantist view? Endurantists are trying to capture a pre-theoretic intuition; an intuition about what it is for an object to persist. This pre-theoretic intuition, as far as I can tell, is something like the following: intuitively, the entirety of an object is present at each moment of its existence.

The locative definition of endurance that Tallant works with is an attempt to provide a rigorous account of this pre-theoretic intuition, one that clearly sets endurantism apart from rival theories of persistence. This locative definition of endurantism has resulted in a theory that deploys a function that takes in multiple times as arguments. But that's not the only way to do justice to the pre-theoretic intuition at

stake. Another way of accommodating the intuition is via TLE. For if TLE is true, then it is still the case that the entirety of an object exists at each moment of its existence. It is just that not all of its moments of existence, themselves, exist. And so we need to talk about how that object was at moments that merely existed or will exist, which is precisely what TLE does.

Still, perhaps Tallant is correct that the term ‘endurantism’ should be reserved for the view he considers. Let *endurantism** be the view that a persisting object wholly exists at the present time and either wholly existed at some non-present time when that time existed or will wholly exist at some non-present time when that time exists. TLE won’t get you *endurantism*, but it will certainly get you *endurantism**. *Endurantism**, however, can still handle the motivating intuition behind *endurantism*. Furthermore, as I will now demonstrate, the combination of presentism and TLE still provides a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. Indeed, TLE underwrites the very same solution as standard *endurantism*.

4 The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

Recall the crux of the problem of temporary intrinsics: objects persist through changes. For instance, a candle existed when it was straight, and is presently bent. Properties like ‘being straight’ and ‘being bent’ are monadic properties. What’s more, they are properties that the candle itself has. But these properties are incompatible with one another: a candle cannot be both bent and straight. And yet, that is precisely what seems to be required. This is thought to be a problem for *endurantism* in particular because only the *endurantist* requires that the very same object – the candle – possesses both of the properties in question (see Haslanger (1989)).

In response to this problem, Hinchliff (1996, pp. 123–124) outlines the ‘presentist’ solution.

The presentist maintains that the candle itself was straight and is bent.

The presentist blocks the inference from this claim to the contradiction that the candle is both straight and bent by appeal to his view of time. According to presentism, being straight is a property the candle had, but it is not a property the candle has. Having been straight is no more a way of being straight than not being straight is a way of being straight. Being straight is a way the candle was, not a way the candle is. The way the candle is, according to presentism, is the way it presently is—bent. The presentist thus preserves all of our intuitions about change without contradiction.

Because the candle *was* bent and is *now* straight, there is no inconsistency. An inconsistency only arises if we are forced to say that the candle is (tenselessly) both bent and straight, which is precisely what the presentist will deny. Hinchliff's solution, then, is to tense the having of properties by the candle.

Well and good, but if the candle itself endures by existing at multiple times in a tenseless sense, then Hinchliff's solution won't work. True enough, we get to say that the candle at t_1 was straight, and that the candle at t_2 is now bent, but if we must also assume that *there is a candle at t_1 that was bent*, then we will be forced to accept that the candle exists at multiple times, which will undermine presentism in the manner already discussed.

Instead, what we should say is that *there was* a candle at t_1 , and that this candle *was* straight; we must push the tense all the way through to the underlying definition of endurance. This is precisely what TLE allows us to do. According to TLE, the candle was wholly located at t_1 , and is wholly located at t_2 . Hinchliff's solution can thus be understood as follows: when the candle *was* wholly located at t_1 it *was* straight, and *now* that the candle is *now* wholly located at t_2 , the candle is *now* bent. There is never any time at which the candle is both bent and straight. What's more, the candle itself is not wholly located at more than one time.

I don't think I'm adding all that much to Hinchliff's proposal. I am simply re-

framing his broad solution in both locative and tensed terms to facilitate a thoroughly tensed approach to endurance and to property possession. Still, I hope the point is clear enough: TLE provides exactly what is required to make a presentist solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics viable.

5 Conclusion

I'm sure there are other objections that might be made against TLE. I look forward to hearing them. For now I hope to have said enough to make a preliminary case for a tensed approach to defining endurantism in the face of Tallant's argument. Such an approach promises to render presentism compatible with an account of persistence more generally, whilst offering a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. Granted, TLE may not be endurantist in name, but it certainly seems to be endurantist in spirit, which is what matters.⁵

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