14 A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense

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1 Strong and Neutral (Minimalist) Senses of "Qualia"

The terms "phenomenal character," "qualitative character," and "qualia" are used in a variety of senses, sometimes as if they are equivalent or closely connected (e.g., qualia are features that comprise or contribute to the phenomenal character of experiences), and sometimes as applying to different aspects of experiences. It is not surprising therefore that there are often puzzling features to qualia discussions. Some theorists find them so obvious as to not require justification, while others reject them as if they belong to the powers of darkness. Nor is it surprising that there might be, as many theorists have pointed out, both weak or metaphysically neutral senses of qualia, and strong, metaphysically committed senses. Accordingly, any discussion of qualia that hopes to make progress needs to explain the terminology carefully.

It does seem that, at some level, there is little problem in understanding what qualia are, and of knowing that they exist. For example, each of us has a wide range of experiences of very different character: the taste of a ripe juicy peach, the smell of newly mown grass, the feel of soft velvet, the seeing of a setting sun: In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like to for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has.¹

That is to say, there is something it is like for me to taste the juicy peach, to smell the newly cut grass, to feel the soft velvet, and so on. As Michael Tye points out, we can take it that the term "qualia," in this sense, applies to "the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental life," and that, in this neutral sense, "it is difficult to deny that there are qualia" (Tye 2003: 1).

We need to recognize, however, that there are at least two aspects to knowing what it is like to have a certain experience. One aspect concerns

knowing what it is like to be a *subject* of an experience; another concerns the “phenomenal” or “qualitative” character of the experience. Joe Levine describes these two aspects as follows:

- (1) there is something it is like *for me* to have this experience—this is the “subjectivity” of the experience;
- (2) there is the qualitative character itself: “Qualitative character concerns the ‘what’ it’s like for me: reddish or greenish, painful or pleasurable” (Levine 2001: 6–7).

Levine goes on to explain qualia in terms of this qualitative character of the experience. That is to say, qualia are those properties that constitute the qualitative character.

There is, however, a third aspect to the “subjective character” of experiencing—what we might term “a feel”—and some theorists associate qualia with this aspect. There are certain experiences where I know what it is to be a subject of the experience, but I am in no position to describe any qualitative character. This is the case, for example, with many acts of understanding: I can understand what you said when you asked “would you like some more tea?,” but there need be no distinctive, intrinsic, or qualitative features to that experience of understanding. Indeed, it seems possible that there could be a range of intellectual experiences, for example, thoughts of a certain kind without sensuous or qualitative character. (It seems that they may have a *feel* to them, but a nonsensuous one.)

It would seem, therefore, that we can identify a certain (subjective) character that is distinctive of certain types of experience, a character that is usually termed “qualitative character,” and what I shall call “phenomenal–qualitative character,” and we can distinguish these types of experience from other types that do not have a phenomenal–qualitative character (they have a “feel”). Given that this is so, it is possible to specify a sense of “qualia” such that qualia are certain types of qualities: those qualities that constitute this phenomenal–qualitative character. However, we have, so far, specified “phenomenal–qualitative character,” and hence, “qualia,” only in a neutral, minimalist sense. We have left it open as to what its metaphysical status is.

There is, however, another, stronger sense of “qualia,” and it is this sense that is understood (or at least, it ought to be) when people deny the existence of qualia. It is controversial in this sense whether qualia exist, not in the weaker, neutral sense. There are different conceptions of what this strong sense is. Daniel Dennett criticizes what I take to be a super-strong sense. I propose instead a more modest, but still strong conception:

Qualia are not only those qualities that constitute (or explain) phenomenal or qualitative character but, crucially, are qualities of a certain type: (a) they are introspectively accessible features of experiences; and (b) they are intrinsic, non-intentional features. In explaining this sense, we need to clarify what is meant by "intrinsic features." E. J. Lowe and Sydney Shoemaker interpret "intrinsic features of experience" as properties of *experiencing*, which, on the face of it, favors an adverbial theory of experience (Lowe 1995: 61; Shoemaker 1994: 29.) On another interpretation, the "intrinsic features" may be thought of as quality-instances presented in experience, presumably possessed by phenomenal items, for example, sensa or sense data, or fields. For the moment, I shall leave this question open. What is important is that both interpretations depend on drawing a contrast between two types of features experiences may have: an intentional or representational content and non-intentional, intrinsic features.

It should be noncontroversial that there is such a thing as the phenomenal-qualitative character to experiences, and with it, the existence of qualia, in a weak, neutral sense. What is a matter of dispute is whether there are qualia in the strong sense. There is a firm body of opposition, which holds that the phenomenal-qualitative character can be explained in terms of the intentional content of the experiences, and that there is no need for a stronger sense of qualia, for example, by Michael Tye, Gilbert Harman, Alex Byrne, Tim Crane, and many others. (There is a different version of intentionalism, that espoused by Austen Clark, but I shall ignore that complication.)

I shall argue, however, that if we examine some of the central arguments given for this position, intentionalism, we shall find that they do not establish the intended conclusion.

2 Can Qualia Vary without Variation in Intentional Content?

Qualia, in the strong sense, are non-intentional features of experience. As a result, it is commonly thought that the defender of qualia is committed to a certain view about the relation of the qualia to the intentional content of an experience. As Tye, for example, states:

(1) *Qualia* are intrinsic features of experiences which can vary without any variation in the *intentional contents* of the experiences. (Tye 2003: 1)

A similar view is presented by Crane (2001a: 83). He allows that a person could believe in qualia but hold to a version of intentionalism, one that held that all mental states, including pains, bodily sensations, and percep-

tual experiences, were intentional, that is, had an intentional structure. Such a version is *weak intentionalism*: all mental states are intentional, but some have non-intentional conscious properties, qualia. Crane rejects this view in favor of strong intentionalism, which denies that there are any conscious, non-intentional aspects to experiences; but for our purposes, what is significant is that he says that the thesis of weak intentionalism can be equally expressed as the claim that the intentional nature of certain mental states does not exhaust their phenomenal character: two experiences could share their intentional nature and differ in their phenomenal character.

If the qualia hypothesis is committed to (1) above, then given the relation of qualia to phenomenal character, it would follow that the qualia hypothesis is committed to thesis (2):

(2) Phenomenal character of experiences can vary without variation in intentional content.

It would seem, therefore, that the hypothesis would be disproved, if we could show that, for perceptual experiences (including pains) there is no difference in phenomenal character without difference in intentional content. Since it is just such a claim that Byrne (2001: 206–217), for example, seems to establish in his presentation of several thought experiments in his article in defense of intentionalism, qualia would seem to be under threat.

There are problems, however, with accepting (1) above, as it stands, as a characterization of the qualia theory's commitments. It holds only with respect to certain types of intentional content, and not, obviously, to the types of content presupposed by Byrne's thought experiments. Consider a typical account of perceptual experience, as presented, for example, by Alan Millar. According to Millar, "An experience of an *F* is one that satisfies two conditions: it is a *F*-type experience and it is such that it seems to the subject that an *F* is there" (Millar 2001: 1). An *F*-type experience is specified in terms of its typical causes: it is one that, roughly speaking, is an experience of the type that an *F* would yield under suitable conditions of normality. The second condition, which gives us the *content* of the experience, is satisfied if the experience is such that in the absence of countervailing considerations, its subject would believe that an *F* is there. (Note: this sense of "seems," though conceptual, is not an epistemic sense, but a phenomenological one.) The phenomenal character of the experience is spelled out with reference to experiences being *F*-type experiences, where the subject can only know what the phenomenal character is if she has the

experience in question. (It is not necessary that she have the concept of *F*, either to have the experience or to know the phenomenal character.) If a qualia theorist appeals to Millar's account, then not only can she accept (1) as a commitment of the theory, she can show that (2) is true.

Nevertheless, the qualia theorist can maintain that thesis (1) is a commitment only to certain types of (conceptual) intentional content, and that there are special cases of intentional content to which it is not committed. For these special cases, thesis (2) is false. For example, take one of the standard formulations of the argument from illusion, an argument in favor of sense data, and thus for one form of qualia theory, and against naive realism. As Howard Robinson, for example, sets out the argument, perceptual experience obeys what is termed "the phenomenal principle" (PP):

(PP) Whenever something appears to a subject to possess a sensible quality, there is something of which the subject is aware and which does possess that quality (Robinson 1994: 57–58).

According to this theory, then, provided that the experience has content at all, we will not have difference in phenomenal character without difference of intentional content, expressed in terms of how the thing appears—at least for content with respect to sensible qualities.

There are other forms of qualia theories where whether thesis (1) or its denial is a commitment will depend on how the intentional content is specified. In particular, it is possible for the qualia—the non-intentional qualities—to contribute to (be part of) the intentional content (Maund 2006: 256–258). That is to say, the intentional content may be specified in terms of qualia. One way this can happen is described by "projective" theories of content, for perceptual experiences. On these accounts, qualities intrinsic to the experiences are "projected" into the content of the experience. If this is so, then the qualia cannot vary without variation in the intentional content (for at least some species of intentional content). Another possibility is that the content of the experience is specified in terms of intrinsic qualities of the experience itself. For example, the content could be specified in terms of a power to cause an experience of a certain type, one that is to be explained in terms of the presence of qualia. Yet another possibility is that the content is specified in terms of the power of an object to look a certain way—where that way of looking is explained in terms of the presence of qualia (Shoemaker 2000).

Consideration of this range of possibilities brings out an important point about the arguments of strong intentionalists against qualia. Most

such intentionalists seem to me to work with too narrow a conception of perceptual experience—or at the very least, they fail to consider plausible alternatives to their own accounts. In particular, they fail to consider how a defender of qualia can combine his account with an intentionalist account of sense experience. One of the strongest of such accounts is that presented by Moreland Perkins (see Perkins 1983, but more especially Perkins 2005). On this account, perceptual experience has an intentionalist structure—it carries representational content—but that content is complex, containing nonconceptual and conceptual components. It contains a sensuous, nonconceptual representation—whose intrinsic properties are those characteristic of qualia—and a conceptual content. “For all forms of attentive (hence conscious) sense perception, every perception’s representative content is of two integrated sorts: perceptually attributed nonconceptual sensuous content is fused with perceptually attributed conceptual content” (Perkins 2005: 207).

Perkins illustrates the account with the example of feeling a toothache, which, he persuasively argues, is a case of sense perception: perceiving a tooth. We perceive the tooth by perceiving its aching condition. As I perceive this aching, the pain appears to me as if it belongs to the tooth. In order for the pain to appear to me in this way, “I must perceptually attribute to the tooth the very pain that is sensuously present in my consciousness.” As Perkins points out, one represents to oneself a sensuous quality as if it belongs to one’s tooth “by the method of exemplifying this quality within one’s sensory consciousness of the tooth” (*ibid.*: 205). Our felt pain can represent a tooth as trouble, but it can do so only when certain appropriate concepts—of a tooth and of a condition that needs to be changed or treated or fixed—are united with the pain within a complex perceptual representation (*ibid.*: 208). We have realistic representation of trouble in a tooth but only in virtue of misrepresentation—of the pain as if it is in the tooth.

To my mind, Perkins’s account of pain is the best account that is faithful to the phenomenology of pain experience. It is this sort of account that I have attempted to extend to visual experience more generally, and to color experience in particular (see Maund 2003, 2006). For the moment, all that I insist on is that this sort of account is far more sophisticated than the sketchy accounts discussed by most strong intentionalists, who deny the existence of qualia in the strong sense.

Once we make this distinction between different types of content, we can easily see how Byrne’s celebrated thought experiments on intentional content and phenomenal character lose their significance. For as I

have argued, a defender of qualia can admit that phenomenal character is supervenient on intentional content—at least for certain types of intentional content.

Having said that, we need to recognize that there is a range of important cases in which the theorist is committed to thesis (1), or something similar. What's more important, with respect to such cases, there is good reason to think that both the thesis and its consequence, thesis (2), are true, and that as a result, intentionalism is false. There are, for example, experiences that have phenomenal-qualitative character, but do not have intentional content, at least of the right sort. There are visual experiences that have phenomenal character but no intentional content; for example, when my eyes are shut, particularly in a darkened room, then I have experiences of mottled gray type. They do not represent any state of affairs. Edmond Wright points to a range of experiences with such a character, for example, subjects' experiences of "hypnagogic" imagery when they go to sleep and "hypnopompic" imagery as they wake up (Wright 2005: 92).

There are other experiences that do have content, for example, they indicate the presence of a light in a certain direction, but this content is clearly different from the phenomenal character. A. D. Smith cites research with respect to patients who are described as having their sight restored by medical operations (Smith 2002: 140). Typically, these patients are not totally blind but did have visual experiences before the operation. Those experiences, however, only enable the subjects to perceive shades of light and darkness. With these subjects, the experiences, I claim, illustrate indirect realism rather than direct realism. With these subjects, we can conceive a situation in which the subjects' experiences should change so that the experience, with the same phenomenal character, should have a different content. In other words, with respect to these experiments, intentionalism of the strong variety fails.

3 Phenomenal Character and Transparency: The Three Explanatory Hypotheses

There is an important aspect to perceptual experience—the well-known "transparency," or "the diaphanous nature," of perceptual experience. As Crane points out, following J. J. Valberg (1992), when one introspects one's experience, one seems to discover no feature of the experience, but only features of independently existing objects: "One looks at the redness of a glass of wine, looking for non-intentional properties of experience, and all one finds is an apparent property of the wine: its redness" (Crane

2001a: 85). This feature of experience forms a substantial part of the argument many theorists present for intentionalism, and against theories that postulate sense data or qualia in the strong sense. My aim in this section, and the next, is to take this phenomenon—the transparency of perceptual experience—and turn it against the (strong) intentionalists. I shall argue that the phenomenon supports a different conclusion: that there exist qualia in the strong sense.

Michael Tye has provided one of the strongest and most detailed formulations of this argument from transparency (Tye 2000: 45–68). Tye explains the transparency of perceptual experiences as follows. First, he asks the reader to “focus your attention on the scene before your eyes and on how things look to you. You see various objects by seeing their facing surfaces.” In seeing these surfaces, he adds,

you are immediately and directly aware of a whole host of qualities. You experience these qualities as qualities of the surfaces. You do not experience any of these qualities as qualities of your experience. There are no qualities of the experience that one is aware of; one is simply aware of the qualities of the objects seen. The experience of seeing is transparent. (Tye 2000: 45)

Since you are not directly aware of any qualities of your inner experiences, your experience is transparent to you. But when you introspect, Tye argues, you are certainly aware of the *phenomenal character* of your visual experience. “Via introspection you are directly aware of a range of qualities that you experience as being qualities of surfaces at varying distances away and orientations; and thereby you are said to be aware of the phenomenal character of the experience” (ibid.). By being aware of the external qualities, you are aware of what it is like for you, and hence, of the phenomenal character.

Tye is right to draw our attention to the “transparency” or “diaphanous nature” of perceptual experience. In perceptual experience, I seem to be aware of qualities of certain objects, of experience, and not of the way of experiencing them. There seem to be three possible hypotheses open about the nature of these qualities (and the objects). They are: (1) qualities of physical objects themselves; (2) qualities of objects, specifiable in the content of experience; and (3) phenomenal qualities, that is, quality-instances or qualities of phenomenal items, presented in experiences. On the last hypothesis, the objects are phenomenal objects which we (mis)take for physical objects.

Tye dismisses the first hypothesis as unintelligible. This response, with respect to naive realism, is far too quick—as Michael Martin and A. D.

Smith have independently shown (Martin 2002; Smith 2002). The hypothesis may be false but it is not unintelligible. Take, for example, Tye's own description of the transparency of perceptual experience, when as he says, we see various objects by seeing their facing surfaces: "Intuitively, the surfaces you see directly are publicly observable physical surfaces. In seeing these surfaces, you are immediately and directly aware of a whole host of qualities. You may not be able to name or describe these qualities but they look to you to qualify the surfaces; you experience them as being qualities of the surfaces" (Tye 2000: 46). In his own terms, this is the intuitive view. Why is it wrong to think that these qualities are actually qualities of the surfaces? It seems to me that the sense-datum theorist was trying to capture the intuition that they are publicly observable qualities, while at the same time, reinterpreting that intuition.

More needs to be done, therefore, than Tye offers us, before we can dismiss naive realism. And following that, more needs to be done to rule out the sense-datum theory, or better, a theory that postulates qualia, in a suitable strong sense. It seems to me that what Tye calls "the familiar grounds" for dismissing the theory are not very good grounds at all (Maund 2003: 89–129). Moreover, those arguments were not aimed at showing that the sense-data theory was false, but rather that particular arguments for sense-data were defective. So, even if these counterarguments were effective, they don't show that sense data do not exist, and hence, they do not give reasons for excluding the sense-data hypothesis in this context, where it is put forward as an explanatory hypothesis. Crane, in an insightful historical essay, shows how much classical criticism of sense-data theories was flawed because of its misunderstanding both of the intentions of the sense-data theorists, and of the different ways the term "sense datum" was used. (Point of clarification: because of the ambiguities with the term "sense datum," I prefer the term "sensa." The term "qualia" can then be applied to the qualities of sensa. It should be borne in mind that Wilfred Sellars, the foe of "the Given," argues for the postulation of sensa [Sellars 1971].)

Martin has a different take on transparency from Tye, drawing a different consequence about the significance of the transparency claim. He reads it as providing the basis for an objection to the sense-datum account of experience (and as a result, to those accounts of experience in terms of phenomenal qualities in the strong sense): "The diaphanous character of experience would seem to indicate a lack of evidence for the existence of sense-data at a point where one would expect to find it. At the same time, introspection seems to reveal aspects of experience which a sense-datum

account is ill-equipped to explain, but which can be explained in terms of an intentional theory" (Martin 2002: 378). This point is important for the strategy followed in Martin's paper, for he goes on to describe examples of other kinds of experiences which enable him to construct a parallel objection to the intentionalist theory. Martin's argument seems to be that just as the transparency phenomena provide an objection to the sense-datum theory, these other examples allow a parallel objection to be raised to the intentionalist theory. The outcome is said to leave the naive realist in a much stronger position than was at first thought.

It is important to recognize, however, that Tye does not defend the intentionalist theory in the way Martin describes. That is, he does not claim that the transparency phenomena present the basis for an objection to the sense-datum theory. On the contrary. What he argues is that this theory does provide one explanatory hypothesis for the transparency phenomena, but that it is a hypothesis that can be excluded on other grounds, ones he says are "all too familiar," that is, on grounds quite separate from those pertaining to the transparency phenomena. This point is important, for Martin's strategy would seem to work only for a theorist who adopts a different approach from that of Tye.

It is quite true that, on the sense-datum/sensa hypothesis, the phenomenology of our ordinary perceptual experiences is challenged. That phenomenology is not altogether rejected, however. The point about the sense-data theory is that its advocates claim that this theory makes the best sense of the phenomenology, that is to say, it captures more than any other theory does of the phenomenology that is compatible with what else we know. It saves as much as it is possible to save. The aim of the explanation is to explain the transparency within the framework of the phenomenology of the situation. It may not be possible to save everything about the phenomenology, but the aim is to preserve as much as it is possible to save, and to explain the errors, insofar as there is error.

4 Sensa and Intentional Content

Suppose that there are states with qualia—in the strong sense; indeed let us suppose that there are sense data, in the sense of *sensa*. Then the experience of sensing these *sensa* will have nonconceptual content, for they will be causally correlated in appropriate ways to corresponding physical qualities and states. Indeed they will carry all the same nonconceptual content as the brain states that underpin the qualia. The point is that the nonconceptual content will be based on the "structural isomorphism" between

the inner state and the relevant input. (For a helpful discussion, see Wright 2006: 73–79.) Moreover, on the right version of the *sensa* theory, the *sensa* will have representational content, much in the way that a map of New York will represent states of that city. For on this theory, the *sensa* will be the sorts of states that a competent perceiver will have the capacity to use as a basis for recognizing the presence of the qualities of physical objects. On a theory such as that of Perkins (and Maund) they will form nonconceptual components of complex representational states.

So if we are trying to explain the transparency of perceptual experience, then intentionalism as such is not an alternative to *sensa* theories. The proper rival is a particular version, strong intentionalism or reductive intentionalism, which is spelled out in terms of certain kinds of content. Putting the point another way, if the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences, which we become aware of in introspection, is to be explained simply in terms of the content of the experience, that content will have to be specifiable in terms applicable to physical qualities of physical bodies. I propose to argue that there are strong reasons to think that such a condition cannot be satisfied and that the only viable form of intentionalism is one compatible with *sensa* theories.

To assess versions of intentionalism properly, we need to specify the properties contained in intentional content. It is plausible, for example, as Byrne states, that the content will be of the following sort: “There is a bulgy, red tomato on a billiard-table before me” (Byrne 2001: 202). Or, as Crane describes: “One looks at the redness of a glass of wine, looking for non-intentional properties of experience, and all one finds is an apparent property of the wine: its redness” (Crane 2001a: 85).

Let us concentrate on the property, *red*, that is said to be part of this content. A strong intentionalist is committed to holding that this property is a physical, objective quality of physical bodies. We have here a challenge for intentionalists: to provide a physicalist account of color. Strong intentionalists such as Tye and Byrne are confident that they can meet the challenge. If they cannot, their account is in trouble. I shall argue that they do not succeed.

Tye and fellow intentionalists, such as Byrne and Hilbert, endorse a version of reductive physicalism with respect to color—the view that colors are physical properties whose natures are discoverable by empirical investigation (Tye 2000; Byrne and Hilbert 2003). They argue that, in the case of surface colors, these properties are types of spectral reflectances, ones that meet certain conditions. This view, it is held, is consistent with the commonsense view about colors and, it is argued, shows how we can maintain

the commonsense conception in the face of any factual claims made by color science—despite claims to the contrary.

The intuitive conception of color, Tye argues, is “one of mind-independent, illumination-independent properties” (Tye 2000: 148). However, this characterization of the commonsense conception omits certain other important features. The most important of these, as Hardin, Thompson, Maund, and others have pointed out, is that colors are of such a character that collectively they can be ordered into an array with a significant, distinctive “4 + 2” structure, that is, the structure based on the four unique colors blue, yellow, red, and green, with the two achromatic colors, black and white. If we take all of these features into account, the physicalistic reductionist account fails. The set of spectral reflectances simply do not stand together in the right kind of way.

Tye, and Byrne and Hilbert, have made a response. The physicalist account of color, they hold, can be adjusted so as to accommodate the facts raised by in this objection. The proposal draws on the model of opponent processing that Hardin describes as part of the explanation of why our experiences of color have the structure that they do (Hardin 1988). According to the model, chromatic color experience is the result of neuronal activity in two channels, one for green–red experience and the other for blue–yellow, where the channels are related to light-sensitive cones in the eye.² With this model, the distinctive 4 + 2 structure characteristic of the group of perceived colors can be understood as resulting from distinctive forms of opponent processing, in the relevant neural processes. The physicalist proposal that is offered as a counter to the objection raised by Hardin and others is as follows. We can specify a given color, say, unique red, by the following schema:

A surface is unique red iff it has one of the group of reflectances that, other things being equal, under normal viewing conditions, enables it to reflect light that produces opponent processing distinctive of the experience of pure red.

This schema can be modified for all other colors, and especially for binary colors such as orange, purple, turquoise, violet, and so on.

As it happens, there is a further problem that is fatal to the objectivist, reductionist approach to color, followed by Byrne and Hilbert, Tye, and others. As Hardin (2004) has argued, there is no non-arbitrary way of identifying the class of “normal” observers so that we can specify the right class of reflectances as the basis for unique red, or for any of the other colors. Among competent color perceivers, there is considerable statistical spread:

what one person identifies as a pure red (green, . . .) another will judge to be slightly blue, another slightly yellow, and so on. The reflectance profile for unique red (green . . .) will differ for different members of the "normal group."

The upshot of consideration of these problems is that the best attempt to produce a physicalistic account of color is that color is a relative property, a disposition to produce certain type of response in neural processes of certain kinds of perceivers. The property, that is to say, is relativized to kinds of perceivers.

The result, then, of this attempt is that the content of perceptual experiences is specified in terms of the disposition to induce certain sorts of response. There are two possible theories of what these neural processes might be. One is that they are the neural processes claimed (alleged) to be identical with the experiences themselves; the second is to take the relevant neural processes to be neural processes at an earlier stage of color-processing. Neither possibility is open to the intentionalist. The problem with the first possibility is that it violates the condition of transparency. We are asked to take it as given that the visual experiences reveal not qualities of the experiences but qualities of physical objects. If we accept the first possibility we are admitting that visual experiences do reveal features of the experiences themselves. The second possibility is hardly better. Admittedly, it does not commit us to saying that in introspecting our visual experiences we are aware of features of the experiences, but it commits us to saying that insofar as we are aware of the independently existing physical objects, we are not directly aware of their physical qualities; rather we are aware of them only indirectly, being aware more directly of our neural processes.

In view of these objections, the reductionist view of color as a perceiver-independent quality of physical objects fails. Accordingly, the intentionalist account of phenomenal character favored by Tye and Byrne fails.

There is a different form of strong intentionalism, one that Crane defends, which is also explicitly based on the phenomenon of transparency. According to Crane's version, the phenomenal character is fixed by a combination of the representational content and the intentional *mode*, and not by representational content alone, as on Tye's version. (By "mode" Crane means the form the intentional state takes, e.g., whether it is a case of believing, perceiving, supposing, understanding, etc.) According to Crane, "the intentional content of a pain might be something like this: my ankle hurts" (Crane 2001a: 86). Hurting, he adds, is therefore not just a matter of a part of one's body having an intrinsic property, but rather a

matter of that body part and its properties apparently affecting oneself. Hurting thus has a relational structure: the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, and the mode is feeling.

But this is far too quick. The content of typical pain states is not just that, say, my ankle is hurting, but that it is hurting in a special way: I feel a sharp pain in my side; I have a dull pain in my chest, a pulsating pain in my hand, a throbbing pain in my head, and so on. That is to say, pains don't just hurt: they throb, they pulsate, they are sharp in character. Accordingly, Crane cannot hope to account for all the phenomenal-qualitative character of pain states simply by appealing to the objective content—the ankle—and the mode, that is, the hurting (the feeling). There is the other aspect as well—the pulsating, throbbingness, dullness, sharpness, and so on.

Neither Tye's account of pain, nor that of Crane, compares favorably, I submit, to that presented by Perkins (see section 2), an account that accommodates strong qualia.

Conclusion

I have examined, and found wanting, several important ways on which strong intentionalism has been defended against qualia theories. I have suggested ways in which a proper qualia theory should be presented and defended. In particular, such a theory is better placed to explain the transparency of perceptual experience.

Notes

1. This quote is taken from Michael Tye's entry on "qualia" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
2. In describing the model, I draw upon the description that Tye (2000: 160–165) offers.

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