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CINDERELLAS? RESCUE, TRAUMA AND THE CIVIL LIABILITY ACTS

Peter Handford*

Some years ago, the late Professor Fleming suggested that the rescuer, once the Cinderella of the law, had since become its darling. 1 Fleming was referring primarily to the duty owed to rescuers who were physically injured in the course of a rescue attempt, but the statement could be applied with equal force to rescuers who suffered psychiatric injury as a result of their involvement at the scene of an accident: from the late 1960s onwards the law was ready to include rescuers alongside close family members as persons to whom a duty of care might be owed in such a situation. In recent years, however, there has been a major change. In England, at least, the ball is definitely over; in Australia, it seemed that the Civil Liability Acts, at least in New South Wales, might similarly have spoiled the party, but the High Court in Wicks v State Rail Authority of New South Wales 2 overturned a rather restrictive Court of Appeal decision and suggested that in at least some circumstances traumatised rescuers might still be owed a duty of care. However, the decision in Wicks highlights the fact that in the area of mental harm, as with much else, the Civil Liability Acts have created considerable disuniformity within the Australian law of torts.

The common law

Chadwick v British Railways Board 3 was the first case in which it was recognised that rescuers who suffered psychiatric as opposed to physical injury might be owed a duty of care. Mr Chadwick, who voluntarily assisted in rescue operations at the scene of a major train disaster near his home, suffered permanent mental injury as a result of his experience. Waller J held that injury by shock to a physically unhurt rescuer was reasonably foreseeable. Three years later, in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey, 4 the High Court considered the claim of a man who began to suffer symptoms of psychiatric injury some weeks after going to the scene of an explosion in the powerhouse in which he was working and helping to carry a badly injured workmate to the ambulance. Windeyer J’s leading judgment recognised that traumatised rescuers might be owed a duty of care, though in Mr Pusey’s case he held that the duty was based on the obligations owed by an employer to employees. Subsequent cases in England and Australia, and also in Canada, have confirmed that psychiatrically injured rescuers are owed a duty of care, and there is a substantial body of authority on the circumstances under which a person qualifies as a rescuer and various other points of detail, for example, confirming that the rescue attempt need not be successful. 5

In England, this position has been fundamentally affected by the unfortunate decision of the House of Lords in Page v Smith, 6 In Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 7 (which involved claims for psychiatric injury by relatives of persons killed or injured in the Hillsborough soccer disaster), Lord Oliver had classified rescuers as primary victims for the purposes of psychiatric injury law, because they were involved as participants, whereas those (such as relatives) who were simply witnesses of injuries suffered by others were secondary

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3 [1967] 1 WLR 912.
victims. It seems clear that Lord Oliver did not intend this classification to limit in any way the scope of the duty owed to rescuers and other primary victims, but Lord Lloyd in *Page v Smith* (not a rescue case), in the course of holding that the rules for primary victims were different from those applicable to secondary victims, hinted strongly that primary victims were persons who were “directly involved in the accident, and well within the range of foreseeable physical injury”.8 A few years later, in *White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police*9 (the second Hillsborough case), the House of Lords held that in light of the approach adopted in *Page v Smith*, police officers involved in rescue attempts were not owed a duty of care because the accident had already taken place and they could not be said to be within the zone of physical danger.

Australian law has decisively rejected the distinction between primary and secondary victims adopted by the English cases,10 and so cases such as *Chadwick* and *Pusey* can still be said to be representative of Australian common law. However, it seemed that the *Civil Liability Act* provisions on mental harm in jurisdictions such as New South Wales had affected the position of rescuers in a way not dissimilar to *White* - at any rate until the decision of the High Court in *Wicks*. This case suggested that the New South Wales statute can be read in a way that leaves some scope for the rescuer’s claim. In other jurisdictions much will depend on the wording of the individual provisions - which are different in nearly every case. This article therefore examines the *Civil Liability Act* provisions on mental harm and the way in which rescuers’ claims are likely to be treated in each state.

*Rescue and the Civil Liability Acts*

The *Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report* of September 2002 (the Ipp Report) recommended that all Australian jurisdictions should adopt a statutory statement of the current law on the duty of care owed in cases of mental harm.11 The current law was that expounded by the High Court three weeks earlier in *Tame v New South Wales*.12 Had all jurisdictions accepted this recommendation, there would at least have been uniformity, but this is not what has happened. The varied legislative responses to this recommendation typify the unfortunate position of post-Ipp Australian tort law.

First, two jurisdictions, Queensland and the Northern Territory, decided not to adopt any legislative provisions on mental harm. In Queensland, the law remains entirely case-based; in the Northern Territory, the only legislative provision is one imported from New South Wales in 1956 which *extends* the common law duty of care to certain categories of relatives.13 This has no impact on the position of rescuers. In these two jurisdictions, therefore, it can be assumed that the duty owed to rescuers is still as stated in cases such as *Chadwick* and *Pusey*.

Next come the only two Australian jurisdictions that adopted the recommendations of the Ipp Report without attempts at addition or variance - Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory. (The Australian Capital Territory, like the Northern Territory, retains the earlier legislation extending the common law duty owed to certain categories of relatives,14 but since this in no way attempts to restrict the scope of the provisions introduced in 2002 and has no relevance to rescuers, it can be ignored for present purposes.) The legislation in these

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9 [1999] 2 AC 455.
10 See eg *Morgan v Tame* (2000) 49 NSWLR 21, Spigelman CJ at 24-26, Mason P at 42.
11 Recommendation 34.
13 See *Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956* (NT) s 25. Section 4 of the *Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944* (NSW), the model for this provision, was repealed in 2002.
14 See now *Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002* (ACT) s 36.
jurisdictions therefore provides that the defendant does not owe a duty to take care not to cause a plaintiff mental harm unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken. In cases of pure mental harm (ie mental harm other than that which is a consequence of personal injury), the circumstances of the case include whether or not the mental harm was suffered as a result of a sudden shock; whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril; the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured or put in peril; and whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

Should a case with facts similar to Pusey arise in WA or the ACT, it can be confidently predicted that the outcome would be the same. At the time Pusey was decided, sudden shock had not emerged as a separate requirement: it was first identified by Brennan J in Jaensch v Coffey in 1984, and was assumed to be essential until the High Court in Tame v New South Wales held that it was no more than a relevant factor. Though it was four weeks before Mr Pusey’s symptoms began to show, the facts in Jaensch v Coffey were not dissimilar and neither Brennan J nor any other judge ruled out Mrs Coffey’s claim on this ground; Brennan J was principally concerned with the situation where psychiatric injury resulted from the effects of giving post-accident care to badly injured victims. Mr Pusey could claim some relationship with the immediate accident victims, since they were his workmates, and there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, since the mine was Mr Pusey’s employer. The only circumstance that was not present was the second one: Mr Pusey could perhaps not claim that he witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril. Even here, however, the High Court’s interpretation of these words in Wicks might give some hope, as we will see, although they were set in a different context.

Though the legislation in the remaining four jurisdictions contains equivalent provisions setting out the circumstances under which a defendant owes a duty of care in cases of mental harm, the opportunity has been taken to impose restrictions additional to those which had been recommended by the Ipp Report. It appears that these states have used this opportunity to attempt to create a duty narrower in scope than that recognised by the High Court in Tame. In New South Wales, which was the first state to legislate, s 30(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm unless (a) the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril, or (b) the plaintiff is a close member of the family of the victim. However, s 30(1) provides that this limitation applies only in so-called secondary victim situations: it says that the section applies to the liability of the defendant for pure mental harm to a plaintiff arising wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with a third person being killed, injured or put in peril by the act or omission of the defendant.

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15 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5S(1); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 34(1). There are minor drafting differences: the ACT provision refers to “a reasonable person in the defendant’s position” rather than “the defendant”.
16 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5S(2); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 34(2). The ACT provision prefers “danger” to “peril”.
17 (1984) 155 CLR 549.
18 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 32; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 34; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 33. Each is subject to minor variations. The Victorian provision asks whether the defendant “foresaw or ought to have foreseen”; the South Australian provision refers to “a reasonable person in the defendant’s position” rather than “the defendant”; and the Tasmanian provision only lists two of the four circumstances - sudden shock and a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
19 “Close member of the family” is defined in s 30(5).
Rescuers, in almost all cases, will be unrelated to the immediate accident victim,\(^{20}\) and so s 30 requires that they must witness, at the scene, the accident victim *being* killed, injured or put in peril. Since rescuers usually come on the scene only after the accident has happened, the legislation prompted the question whether the common law duty to rescuers had been narrowed, in a way not dissimilar to the result of recent House of Lords activity in England.

The matter was put to the test in *Wicks v State Rail Authority of New South Wales*. Two police officers were called to the scene of a horrific train derailment at Waterfall, south of Sydney, in which seven people had been killed and many injured. They had to deal with dead bodies and move the injured, in some cases entering wrecked carriages to extricate them. Fallen power lines presented a threat of electrocution. The plaintiffs claimed that this experience had caused them to suffer symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and other traumatic conditions. At first instance and (by majority) in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, it was held that neither plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril.\(^{21}\) Beazley JA, giving the main judgment in the Court of Appeal, said that the statute had to be interpreted by looking to the ordinary meaning of the words, and that applying this approach, the plaintiff had to be at the scene when the incident occurred and had to witness a person being killed, injured or put in peril. Here, it was the derailment that put the victims in peril, and when the plaintiffs arrived the derailment was over and the process of victims being put in peril had ended.

This suggested that the clock had struck twelve for traumatised rescuers and that the legislation had effectively eliminated the duty of care which had been developed by the common law. However, on further appeal, the High Court produced a more beneficent interpretation - whether or not it was one which had been intended by the New South Wales legislature. In a joint judgment, it said that it was not possible to assume that all cases of death, injury or being put in peril are events that begin or end instantaneously, or even within the space of a few minutes. Even if the deaths were instantaneous or nearly so, not all the injuries were suffered during the process of derailment: it could be inferred that some suffered further injury as they were extricated from the wreckage, or suffered psychiatric injuries as a result of what happened to them during the crash and its aftermath at the accident scene. Even if it was not appropriate to draw these inferences, the victims remained in peril during the rescue process.\(^{22}\) Each rescuer was therefore owed a duty of care. The High Court also made important observations concerning the relationship between s 30 and the duty of care provisions.\(^{23}\)

The position in the other three jurisdictions depends on whether the variations in the wording of the *Civil Liability Act* provisions equivalent to s 30 of the New South Wales Act give rise to material differences so far as the position of rescuers is concerned. In Victoria, apart from minor drafting differences,\(^{24}\) s 73 of the *Wrongs Act* 1958 is identical to s 30 of the New South Wales Act except that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages unless he or she witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in danger, or *is or was in a close relationship with the victim*.\(^{25}\) The close relationship required by this provision appears to cover a much wider group than being a close member of the family as required in New

\(^{20}\) For an exception see *Greatorex v Greatorex* [2000] 1 WLR 1970.


\(^{22}\) (2010) 241 CLR 60 at [44]-[49].

\(^{23}\) Ibid at [24]-[26].

\(^{24}\) Such as the use of the word “danger” instead of “peril”.

\(^{25}\) *Wrongs Act 1958* (Vic) s 73(2). As in New South Wales, s 73 is limited to the liability of a defendant for pure mental harm to a plaintiff arising wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with the immediate victim being killed, injured or put in danger by the act or omission of the defendant: s 73(1).
South Wales, and may for example extend to close friends or same sex partners; however, rescuers who are not in a close relationship with the victim must witness, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in danger, and it is presumed that the Wicks interpretation of the New South Wales provision would apply to this provision also.

In Tasmania, it may well not be necessary to rely on Wicks to preserve the duty owed to rescuers. Section 32 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) is identical in wording to s 30 of the New South Wales Act, subject to one all-important difference: it provides that (except where the plaintiff is a close member of the family of the victim) the plaintiff cannot recover damages for pure mental harm unless he or she witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril or the immediate aftermath of the victim being killed or injured. The problem with the original New South Wales provision was that it could be read as negating the aftermath principle as developed by the common law from the 1960s onwards. In a series of well-known decisions, the law first relaxed the original requirement that the plaintiff perceive the accident with his or her own senses and deemed it sufficient that the plaintiff be present at the aftermath of the accident at the scene, and then widened the concept by ruling that viewing the aftermath in hospital was sufficient. The Tasmanian provision has preserved the notion that it was enough if the plaintiff was present at the aftermath of the accident, at the scene at least. When Wicks was in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the majority judgment controversially made use of the different wording of the Tasmanian Act to confirm that the New South Wales Act was limited to cases where the plaintiff actually saw the accident happen. As a result of the overturning of the Court of Appeal’s decision this interpretation must now be open to doubt. However, so far as Tasmania is concerned the interpretation of “witnessing, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril” is immaterial, at least so far as rescuers are concerned, because the rescuer will normally be a person who witnesses the immediate aftermath of the victim being killed or injured.

In New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, it seems that by one means or another it may be possible for rescuer claims to be brought within the ambit of the Act. But this is not the case in South Australia, because of a crucial difference in the wording of the legislation. Section 53(1) of the South Australian Civil Liability Act 1936 provides that damages may only be awarded for mental harm if the injured person is a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of a person killed, injured or endangered in the accident, or if the injured person was physically injured in the accident or was present at the scene of the accident when the accident occurred. This form of words avoids some of the complications of the provisions in force in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania. It means that the decision in Wicks has no direct effect in South Australia, and so South Australian courts will not have to apply the doctrine in Wicks which suggests that in a rescue situation further injuries might be happening during the rescue process, or that some people may still be suffering psychiatric injuries at that point, or that the victims or some of them remained in peril after the accident had happened. However, the problems for rescuers in South Australia stem from the fact that s 53, unlike its counterparts in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, is not limited to cases where liability for pure mental harm arises wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with the immediate victim being killed, injured or put in peril by the defendant’s act or omission: there

26 And so it is again limited to the liability of a defendant for pure mental harm to a plaintiff arising wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with the immediate victim being killed, injured or put in peril by the act or omission of the defendant: Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 32(1).
27 S 32(2).
28 For a full discussion of the cases, see Handford, above n 5, 217-222.
29 McColl JA, who dissented, was not prepared to accept the submission that the meaning of s 30 should be influenced by the different wording of the Tasmanian Act: [2009] NSWCA 261 at [120].
30 It should be noted in passing that the relatives covered by this provision are different from those in New South Wales or Tasmania: grandparents and grandchildren are included, but siblings are not.
is no equivalent of the New South Wales s 30(1) or the similar provisions in Victoria and Tasmania. I have argued elsewhere\(^{31}\) that it may not have been necessary to rely on s 30(1) in Wicks. The High Court emphasised that all parties in that case had assumed that the claim had to be characterised as one arising in connection with another being killed, injured or put in peril,\(^ {32}\) whereas Lord Oliver’s seminal judgment in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police had classified rescuers as primary, not secondary victims. This suggests that rescuer cases can be put in a category different from that identified by s 30(1). However, this argument is not open in South Australia, where there seems no way in which the police officers in Wicks, for example, could satisfy the requirements of s 53(1). It could surely not be said that they were present at the scene of the accident when the accident occurred, and even given the High Court’s extensive interpretation of the differently worded New South Wales provision it is surely not possible to say that the accident was still happening when they commenced rescue operations. In South Australia, it seems that Cinderella is well and truly back in the kitchen.

The mental harm provisions, like much else in the Civil Liability Acts, suggest that whether or not the reforms stemming from the Ipp Report are thought to have been desirable, the lack of uniformity that now prevails in Australia is to be deplored. Until 2002 Australian tort law was predominantly case law, and uniformity was preserved by the role of the High Court as a final court of appeal. Where there had been statutory intervention, as for example in the introduction of apportionment for contributory negligence, uniformity had generally been maintained by adherence to English legislative precedents. After 2002, that uniformity no longer exists. As the rescue example and much else show, there is now a tendency for Australian tort law to vary from one state to another, as it does in the USA. This is surely undesirable. Is there any reason in logic or policy why rescuers in South Australia, for example, should be worse off than anywhere else?

\(^ {31}\) Handford, above n 2, at XX.

\(^ {32}\) (2010) 241 CLR 60 at [39].