BUREAUCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY: A STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY ON THE BUREAUCRATIC RESTRUCTURING PROCESS IN SORONG SELATAN REGENCY, WEST PAPUA, INDONESIA

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Abstract

Studies on the bureaucracy based on Weberian notions assume that the ideal conditions of the bureaucracy are independent of the influence of political interference and ethnic considerations. They do not adequately explain the relationship between bureaucracy and political identity. This study, based on the findings of research conducted in Sorong Selatan regency of West Papua, is part of the effort to fill the gaps in literature on the relationship between the bureaucracy and political identity.

With a focus on ethnicity as part of political identity, this study elaborates how the political identity works in two areas: bureaucratic restructuring process and recruitment of local government officials. It argues that during the phase of bureaucratic restructuring in Indonesia, ethnic influences were evident in the arrangement of institutional structures and the appointment of bureaucratic officials. Although the design of the institution was modern, the logic of local culture in the form of primordial ties and patronage systems determined the behaviour of bureaucratic officials. Bureaucratic institutions were set up not simply to follow the regulations stipulated by central government but also to accommodate the interests of various ethnic groups in the regency.

Ethnic interests also influenced the bureaucratic recruitment process in Sorong Selatan Regency by introducing the idea that the composition of bureaucracy should reflect the diversity of race, ethnicity, or gender of the population.
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Crawley, May 2015

Bambang Purwoko
Declaration

I hereby declare that the thesis submitted for examination is my own original work except where acknowledged in the references.

Student’s Signature  Date: 5 May 2015
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A. Background

This is a study on the inherent problems in adopting a formalistic approach in governing Indonesia, a country endowed with cultural and geographical diversity. It shows the difficulty in ensuring that bureaucracy becomes part of the governance culture at the local government level, given the fact that the behaviour of bureaucrats is culturally bound as opposed to the national level where bureaucracy is ideally independent of local culture.

The fact that local cultures are diverse, provides the rationale for relying on Weberian model of bureaucracy: neutral, rational, impersonal. There is a presumption that the Weberian model of bureaucracy suits the Indonesian context, with its militaristic view in governing the country. In such a perspective, the only feasible way to make the country governable is by ensuring individual citizens are reachable through a centralistic model of governance that operates through layers of bureaucracies. But the fact that local Indonesian cultural representatives are powerful enough to negotiate and, at some cases, to cheat the state, render the Weberian approach to bureaucracy unworkable.

Indeed, bureaucracy is meant to serve a country by making the best use of instrumental rationally, and better oriented toward achieving predetermined goals. Its notable characteristics includes, amongs other, to rely on hierarchy, continuity, impersonality, and expertise. The reliance on hierarchical chain-of-command and impersonal logic makes bureaucracy work in a dehumanised manner; confining employees in a formal structure that is in collision with social life. The obsessive application of the Weberian model of bureaucracy to achieve governability is counterproductive for Indonesia. Ironically, Indonesian government insists on adopting the model indiscriminately, and assumes that

bureaucracy is capable of defending itself from the subversion of its rules and standards. Indonesia is entrapped in an acute contradiction. There is scant conclusive evidence to suggest that Indonesia needs a centrally well-ordered government which operates uniformly throughout its vast territory.

This study is based on the premise that the local context is influential in shaping the performance of the bureaucracy. The active process of building solidarity and the mobilization of collective identity is apparent in local government administration in Papua and West Papua. This thesis uses the Sorong Selatan Regency in West Papua as a case study to learn how bureaucracy interacts with the local milieu.

The Sorong Selatan region of West Papua has experienced extensive administrative changes over decades. In the Dutch colonial period, Papua was generally referred to as Western New Guinea or Dutch New Guinea (*Nederland’s Nieuw Guinea*). After being integrated to Indonesia in 1969, its name was changed to West Irian Province. In 1999, Papua was initially to be divided into three provinces (*Papua, Central Papua, and West Papua*) but was simply divided into two: Papua and West Papua.\(^4\) Papua, comprising of Papua and West Papua, is one of the four provinces in Indonesia that are granted special autonomy encompassing ample political and cultural autonomy.\(^5\) Papua’s uniqueness is not only due to special autonomy but also due to its diverse ethnic groups,\(^6\) as well as the way ethnicity heavily influences the local government.

Papua is demographically unique compared to other parts of Indonesia: its population largely consists of the indigenous Papuans classified as Melanesian, while that of the other areas are predominantly Malay.\(^7\) In addition to the distinctive Melanesian phenotype and culture of its inhabitants, Papua is also characterized by its abundant natural resources. It has huge amounts of copper

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\(^5\) Other provinces are Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Special Territory of Yogyakarta, and Jakarta Capital Territory.


grain and gold ore deposits that are currently being exploited by the American company, *PT Freeport Indonesia*. There are approximately 30 million tonnes of high content copper deposits in this area. Many people call the Indonesian easternmost province the “Paradise Island” or "*El Dorado*” of the Pacific, where people can find gold nuggets scattered around like potatoes on an agricultural field.

Unfortunately, the development process in these regions is less advanced than that in the other regions of Indonesia. The abundance of natural resources does not make Papua a prosperous land for its communities. Papua is entrapped in underdevelopment and poverty. In term of Human Development Index, Papua is in the 33rd position while West Papua is in the 29th position of the 33 provinces in Indonesia.

The conspicuous condition of underdevelopment, in comparison with other regions in Indonesia, has been one source of local communities’ resentment and dissatisfaction with the central government in Jakarta. With the increasingly intensive implementation of both political liberalization and decentralization policy by the central government, by the end of 1999 and early 2000 the Papuans began to demand special attention from the central government. Particularly, they insisted on the implementation of a special autonomy policy for the Papua province. After a long and gruelling struggle, the central government finally responded to the Papuan demands with the enactment of the Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Essentially, the spirit of the Law is for the empowerment and respect of the fundamental traits of indigenous Papuan society within the Unitary State framework of the Republic of Indonesia. The various consequences felt by the Papuan and central government as a result of this policy lie on a wide spectrum. Changes in the governmental structure at the

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8 Armando, Mahler and Sabirin, Nurhabi., *Dari Grasberg Sampai Amamapare*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 2008, pp. 3-4
local level, the delegation of authority to a vast extent, an extensive fund mobilization, and the recognition of the indigenous society are the dominant colours in the political landscape of the government in Papua today. Since then, the policy has also been the central government’s formula to solve the problem of underdevelopment in Papua. Despite this implementation, special autonomy policy has not yet overcome the root problem of underdevelopment.12

Papua houses civil servants of various ethnicities, but the bureaucracy has not been able to create a situation where all could work together irrespective of their ethnic origin. The Sorong Selatan Regency13 in West Papua province is chosen here as a case study because it provides a good example of the uniquely diverse demographic character present in the rest of the region. The ethnic and social dynamics of the communities, including those living inland and in coastal regions, has a significant influence on the local bureaucracy. Further exploration of the influence of ethnicity on bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan Regency will shed light on the fundamental issues of government management in Papua and other regions in Indonesia.

B. Focus of the Study

This study focuses on the dynamics of local governance in Sorong Selatan, especially on its attempt to reform local bureaucracy. It uncovers a fundamentally different understanding on how local government establishes itself and administers the people. There is a history of strong interaction between the modern Indonesian political structure and the existing, yet prevailing, regional structures. This particular phenomenon represents the general trend in Papua, especially after the implementation of special autonomy policy as stipulated by Law on special autonomy, which encourages a synergy between modern governance system and the living of traditional values.


13 A regency is an area of administration / local government under provincial level in Indonesia. The regent is the head of this government. Sorong Selatan literally means “Southern Sorong”, as the regency is located south of the Sorong regency in West Papua.
The Sorong Selatan is a new Indonesian Regency, established in 2002. The
dynamic of Sorong Selatan is shaped by the formal imperative embedded within
the special scheme of autonomy of Papua (Law No. 21/2001). Legally the Sorong
Selatan regency is required to follow the law. A focus on this Regency can help
to elucidate the process through which the shape and the function of local state
is agreed upon; the process of ethnic politics within the ongoing state formation
and, more broadly, how the state and society interact.

C. Research Question

This study explores how ethnic politics (including identity politics) works in
two specific areas: 1) institutional restructuring of the bureaucracy; 2) appointment of local government officials. With the assumption that ethnic politics influences how local leaders run their bureaucracy, this study questions how local leaders meet the demands of political representation within the legal framework of national bureaucratic reform. The implementation of Law No. 21/2001 allows local political forces to interact within the given political structure set by the national government, and simultaneously allows ethnic politics to take place. The Law requires the existence of a central governance structure including heads of villages, heads of districts, regent, and a governor. Yet, the ways the locals respond to the law relies on their customary law. For the people of Papua, the acknowledgement and respect of customary law is of utmost importance when observing the Law, thus allowing primordial logic to drive local politics.

Indigenous Papuans in the region are represented in the political system by their traditional leaders who assemble institutionally in MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua) or Papuan People’s Council. This arrangement presumes that the political aspirations of the people are channelled through the local political parties and parliament, which at the provincial level has a specific name DPRP (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua) or Papuan Local Parliament. The mechanism is designed to communicate the aspirations of the Papuan people through the customary figures, political parties and local parliaments. Given the prevalence of ethnic-based interest and primordialism, it is not surprising to see that the people of the Sorong Selatan community tend to ignore these mechanisms and
prefer to communicate their aspirations directly to the Regent who is viewed as the top authority determining the allocation of financial resources. Bureaucracy, placed in the middle of the scheme, administratively supports the performance of local governments in providing public services. However, bureaucracy becomes a political arena for contestation among local ethnic groups in their struggle for local government resources. This brings to the fore the idea of representation: indicating that bureaucracy also services the demand for political representation beyond the legal framework.

Different ethnic groups have come to an agreement on the governance principles, namely "equity, balance, and togetherness". Both locals and bureaucrats interpret this principle as an imperative to sustain an ethnic representation in bureaucracy. As a new regency, Sorong Selatan is encountering new challenges. While the local government’s primary mandate is the provision of public services, the people also expect them to provide acceptable levels of financial redistribution.

The effects and manifestations of the special autonomy vary from one regency/municipality to another. However, in most cases, there is a common and strong expression of ethnic identity related to the issue of local representation. New demands for greater roles in the political structure (through local parliament) and modern government (through the bureaucracy) are continually emerging and solidifying. This results in a paradox at the level of policy implementation, special autonomy: the policy aimed at creating more room for the fulfilment of native rights creates new problems for the bureaucracy.

Recognizing the weaknesses and the potential unfairness in the implementation of the "equity, balance, and togetherness" principle, local government elites, in particular the Regent, began making strategic moves to reform the local bureaucracy. The first step was to evaluate the organizational structure of the local government institutions and to develop new institutions in accordance with the regulations at the national level with consideration of the

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15 Interview with Otto Ihalauw, the Regent of Sorong Selatan, in Teminabuan, 23 April 2010.
local context. The evaluation and preparation was conducted in 2008 and 2009 and came up against various local dynamics, including the local bureaucrats’ rejection to the new organization, which they believed would eliminate them from their strategic positions.

After successfully restructuring the local institutions, the bureaucratic reforms in Sorong Selatan continued with the appointment of bureaucratic officials by using a more objective procedure. This policy, too, was sharply criticised by the local bureaucrats, some of whom drove community groups and local politicians got involved. Such negative reactions escalated when it was found that the appointment of officials to the new organization was to be preceded by a ‘competency assessment’ for nearly all structural positions. Official competency assessment is a structural model for those to be appointed to structural offices and has not been commonly implemented, even in established regional administrations.

The resulting series of reform policies was a breakthrough for the local governments amid the strong politics of identity in Sorong Selatan. The reformative agenda attracted this researcher to conduct more intensive study: from the preparation stage of local government institutions to the appointment of structural officials into the bureaucracy. The technocratic processes in the governmental administration of Sorong Selatan do not belong only to the local officials but also to the traditional leaders or local elites of each ethnic group. In all processes, the influence of ethnicity on bureaucracy and governance in Sorong Selatan is visible. Politics of identity have become integral to the dynamics of local governance.

D. Theoretical Framework

D.1. Political Feature of Indonesian Bureaucracy

This section addresses the influence of ethnicity on the bureaucratic restructuring at the local level. This section begins with a theoretical discussion of the meaning of bureaucracy in reference to Max Weber, then elaborates on conceptual aspects related to bureaucracy, the politics of identity and ethnicity, and the patron-client relationship.
According to Weber, bureaucracy is the set of administrative tools designed using the principles of rational thought. Weber never explicitly defined bureaucracy. Weber did not even assume that the term “bureaucracy” would be part of the social science discourse. He instead explained in detail what he considered the most rational form of bureaucracy. Weber described the primary existing form of bureaucracy as “patrimonial bureaucracy”, being different from the rational bureaucratic type in which officials were appointed on contract. Weber pointed out that the form of “patrimonial bureaucracy” was found in the ancient Roman, Egyptian, and Byzantine empires.16

The idea of legitimacy is used by Weber to explain the principles of organizational classification. In his strongest statement, he says that the foundation of all authority, and thus any obedience to the commandments, is a belief in the prestige, the progress, and giving advantage to the rulers. These different forms of belief are associated with the differences in the power structures and organizational forms. Weber identifies three types of trust: first is the compliance to an authoritative direction given by a person with extraordinary and sacred character and whose idea inspires people. Weber calls this “charismatic authority.” Second, a command is obeyed solely because the subordinate feels compelled to obey the superiors whose legitimacy is underwritten by tradition. This is called “traditional authority”. Third, people believe that those who give orders do so according to the rules that underlie the law, which everybody obeys. According to Weber, this belongs to the “legal authority,” which has a rational characteristic.17 The third character is closely related to the notion of bureaucracy as a rational organization. That is why bureaucracy as defined above is an administrative tool designed with rational principles and with effective governance as its objective.

Based on the concepts of legitimacy, Weber then formulates propositions about “the structure of legal authority systems”18 where official tasks are arranged regularly and continuously and the tasks are categorized into separate

16 Albrow, loc.cit.
17 Albrow, op.cit., p. 40
18 Ibid.
functional areas, each has mandatory authority and sanctions; offices are hierarchically arranged, the rights to exercise control and to complain are specifically regulated. The rules for the task can be technical or legal, trained men are necessary to conduct both; there is separation between organisation’s resources and the individuals. The other proposition is that an office holder cannot appropriate the office, and administrations are run based on written documents.

Weber’s many bureaucratic characteristics can be summarized into four groups: hierarchy (each official has a clear competence with clear division of tasks), continuity (bureaucracy contains employees who are paid on a full time basis, with clear career structure), impersonality (tasks performed in accordance with clear rules, not because of like and dislike, and there are written records for each type of work), and expertise (officials are selected based on merit system, trained on their duties and functions, and have access to the office’s information).

In an ideal Weberian bureaucracy, the bureaucrats should be selected based on merit rather than such ascribed criteria as race, caste, or class. This conception is known as "neutral competence". The assumption is that bureaucracy has to be able to recruit the best candidates, and the merit system is a logical mechanism to fill the vacancy with the most qualified personnel. During its development, merit system is also applied for the purpose of removing the designation of administrative positions through political patronage. Thus it can also be used as a mechanism to eliminate the gap and the possibility of inefficiency and favouritism caused by political appointment.

Ideally, both the traditional (family, feudal) and transitional (charismatic leadership) considerations do not affect the workings of bureaucracy. Those who work in public organizations act in accordance with scientific principles. This conception of ideal Weberian bureaucracy is generally referred to as the modern system of public administration. However, it is not true to assume that the modern bureaucracy is run solely by an adherence to rationality. As shown by La

\[\text{Beetham, loc.cit.}\]

Palombara, research on organizations suggests that particularism, charisma, irrationality, and even the ascription, is part-and-parcel of bureaucratic power. This suggests that, to some extent, the organization model as shown by La Palombara is the integral characteristic of all organization systems regardless of primitive or modern organization. The most important thing is that most government organizations apply a bureaucratic structure which deviates from the classic model as introduced by Weber.\(^{21}\)

Bureaucracy has become an important instrument to support local government functions. As pointed out by Riggs,\(^{22}\) being a hierarchical organizational structure with officials appointed by higher authorities, bureaucracy is never democratic. Bureaucracy is designed to allow the authorities to manage the domains under authority, to expand their territory, and to protect the ruler from external factor’s interference. Modern democracy simply adds new tasks to bureaucracy and transforms them into an even robust machine of government administration.

The power of modern bureaucracy in the form of a hierarchical structure is designed to dominate and control the members of the organization efficiently. New forms of bureaucracy develop in the context of modern imperialism. Even in most democratic modern countries, a mechanism of colonial administration is also developed to enable them to maintain the long-term dominance over the colonized nations. As is the case with Indonesia, the existing modern bureaucracy is a legacy of Dutch colonial administration that controlled the Indonesian territory for hundreds of years.\(^{23}\) Governments use bureaucracy to deliver public services, which are increasingly required by citizens of modern states. In addition to delivering public services, modern bureaucracy can also serve as an organ of domination and exploitation. Bureaucracy can shift from a rational

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administrative machine aimed at achieving the goal effectively to an institution sustaining the power to maintain its dominance.\textsuperscript{24}

Karl Marx harshly criticised the Weberian concept of bureaucracy. The Marxist approach considers the state an instrument for the ruling class that control the production tools to perpetuate their domination and hegemony. Thus, bureaucracy is an instrument consisting of administrative systems or elements within the administration system, which carry out the functions of controlling and suppressing the class conflict. Bureaucracy is not a mere administrative machine implementing political policies but is the actor who actively controls the tone of the politics itself.\textsuperscript{25}

In the postcolonial states, which constitute the developing countries in general, bureaucracy shows a very different face from what has been formulated out of the European experience. The conceptual explanation of bureaucracy in Indonesia cannot be formulated only with reference to theories of bureaucracy that grew and flourished in Europe. These theories often lose its strength when they have to be used to analyse the bureaucratic practices in developing countries or postcolonial state including Indonesia. Karl D. Jackson,\textsuperscript{26} for example, uses the term “bureaucratic polity” to describe the characteristic of the New Order bureaucracy. The model developed by Jackson was borrowed from Fred Riggs’ conception, which was based on his research in Thailand. The “bureaucratic polity” model sees the power and participation in the political decision-making being in the hands of bureaucrats and top-level military officers supported by the technocrats. In decision-making, this elite circle tends to be immune from internal intervention but are rather accommodative to the aspirations from the international community. Technocratic and bureaucratic approaches characterize the formulation of policies, even if the actors are military officers. The actual political competition in these elite circles and the patterns of patron-client interaction characterize the relations within the circle of power. The model

\textsuperscript{24} Riggs, op-cit., p.350
\textsuperscript{25} Beetham, op-cit., pp.71-6
is used by Jackson as a framework to explain the characteristics of bureaucratic polity in Indonesia which has its own characteristics: 1) the most dominant political institution is the bureaucracy, 2) other political institutions (parliament, political parties and interest groups) are so weak that they are unable to control the bureaucracy, and 3) the masses outside the bureaucracy are politically and economically weak.

An alternative analysis of the New Order bureaucracy is the concept of “bureaucratic authoritarianism” coined by Dwight Y. King.²⁷ By utilizing Juan Linz’s findings on the case of transitional period of Spanish Franco regime, King conceived the “bureaucratic authoritarianism” model of Indonesia. King argues that, it would be appropriate to frame the Indonesian bureaucracy during the early New Order as bureaucratic authoritarianism characterized by four criteria. First, the highest authority was in the oligarchy or the military as an institution rather than in individual authority exclusively. Second, there was a prevalence of technocratic mentality to face the challenges of ideology. Third, the masses are willing to work within the framework of apathetic regime in line with the lack of care in mobilizing mass support on a sustainable basis. Fourth, there are effort to achieve a limited pluralism by using repression, co-optation, and the network of corporatist organizations to control all forms of opposition.²⁸

In Indonesia, bureaucracy presents itself as a politically powerful entity and, in many cases, becomes a pillar of the political regime in power. In the New Order era (1966-1998), the role of the Indonesian bureaucracy was not limited to administrative instrument to achieve goals effectively, but also served as a main instrument to the Golkar political party as the New Order’s strongest political machine.²⁹ In its development, bureaucracy has also had a dominant role in the political-governmental system of the New Order.³⁰

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²⁸ Ibid., pp. 110-111
²⁹ See Reeve, David (1985), Golkar of Indonesia, An Alternative to The Party System, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985,
global economy the bureaucracy played an active role in the capital protection of the country.\textsuperscript{31}

Aside from the military’s declining role, the present Indonesian bureaucracy has not changed significantly. Bureaucracy is a dominant institution serving as an effective, power-supporting machine. It has enormous power and capability to mobilize the masses through its programs. It is due to this enormous power that politicians try to control the bureaucracy in order to perpetuate their power.\textsuperscript{32} The growing power of the bureaucracy and its lack of accountability and neutrality has become a major theme in various studies on the Indonesian bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{33}

Some deviant pathology has also developed in the Indonesian bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{34} The signs of this include the misuse of authority, fear of change/innovation, and indifference to criticism and suggestions. As a result, bureaucracy has failed to properly serve the public. A number of projects are often left incomplete as bureaucrats sometimes lack the relevant skills and are reluctant to consult their supervisors for fear of revealing their weaknesses.\textsuperscript{35} Analysts concerned about this failure have demanded bureaucratic reforms.\textsuperscript{36}

Bureaucratic reform is an important issue, especially since the era of democratization and political decentralization of 1998. The purpose of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia goes hand-in-hand with the notion of good governance, where the principles of accountability, competence, participation, and equity are applied. At the national level, the Masterplan for Bureaucratic

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
Reform 2005-2025, introduced by central government, has been ratified and used as template for regulating local government.\textsuperscript{37} There are also national legislations in the form of the Laws and Government Regulation governing the structure and nomenclature of the local bureaucracy. As a result, in 2007-2008 all regencies/municipalities were simultaneously trying to reorganize their bureaucratic structure. Due to the national legislation, the structure of the local bureaucracy throughout Indonesia is relatively symmetrical. If local governments develop a different bureaucratic structure, their access to the central government finance could be cut off.

Bureaucratic uniformity through the national legislations has made it difficult for local governments to manage the bureaucracy. There is a contradiction between the decentralization policy, which provides local government with broader autonomy on the one hand, and the obligation to comply with the national regulations on the other hand. Local bureaucracy tends to be vulnerable to local influences and local bureaucracy (especially in regions outside Java and Bali) is heavily influenced by political affiliation, ethnicity, and religion.\textsuperscript{38} In the appointment of local government officials, bureaucracy is forced to accommodate the demands of local ethnic groups on their share of power. Studies conducted in several areas including North Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and Papua show that bureaucratic policies also accommodate the dominant ethnic groups in the particular regions.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{D.2. Ethnicity and Bureaucracy}

The word \textit{ethnic} or \textit{ethnicity} is a relatively new term in political sciences. The word originates from Greek \textit{ethnos}, which was derived from \textit{ethnikos} or

\textsuperscript{37} Padjadjaran University, \textit{Road Map Reformasi Birokrasi Indonesia 2005-2025}, Bandung, 2005.
\textsuperscript{38} Dwiyanto, op.cit, p.82
“heathen”. In Britain, the earliest use of the word began in the fourteenth century and during the mid-nineteenth century its meaning eventually referred to the “race” characteristics. In the USA, the word *ethnic* was used during World War II as a way of referring to Jews, Italians, Irish, or other groups of people considered inferior to the more dominant English people.

Though the word *ethnicity* has a very close relationship with the "minority issues and race relations", in social anthropology, ethnicity refers to the aspects of intergroup relations in which group members consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as having distinctive culture. Within ethnic groups there can exist a unique hierarchy. The idea of ethnicity is thus explicitly different from that of social class. The theories of social class always refer to the system of social stratification and distribution of power. Ethnicity, on the contrary, does not always refer to stratification. Thus it can be said that inter-ethnic relations are egalitarian. In this thesis, ethnicity is defined as “groups of people who are considered to have a shared identity, a common history, and a traditional culture heritage”.

In citing Narol, Barth mentions that the term in anthropology, *ethnic group* is considered as a population that largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction, and has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.

One important factor affecting the performance of Indonesian bureaucracy is ethnicity. The characteristic differences found in every ethnic group affect their take on bureaucracy. There are growing demands for ethnic groups to be involved in decision-making in the bureaucracy. Some studies suggest that a bureaucrat’s ethnic background has certain influence on the

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43 Ibid., p.7
behaviour of bureaucratic organizations. In practice, the bureaucrats’
behaviour is inseparable from their social backgrounds including their ethnic
origins. Institutionally-speaking, a bureaucracy representing the ethnic diversity
has huge potential to be a politically responsive bureaucracy.

It is surprising that to date in Indonesia there are only a few studies on
bureaucracy in relation to ethnicity. Brown’s study on Indonesian ethnicity
discusses more about the relationship between neo-patrimonialism and national
integration, which specifically looks at the case of Aceh. Meanwhile Chauvel’s
study mostly describes the fundamental problems that Papuans faced by looking
at historical factors and ethnicity as well as the influence of the governmental
models of both Dutch colonial administration and Indonesia on the rise of Papuan
nationalism.

As an archipelagic country with vast territory, Indonesia is divided into
530 local governments consisting of 497 regencies/municipalities and 33
provinces. Communities in each region are comprised of ethnic groups and sub-
ethnic groups. Government administration and local public services could be
more effective if the bureaucracy that implemented it was more adaptive to the
local context. This is supported by the implementation of the Law on regional
autonomy, which has facilitated the implementation of asymmetric
decentralization. Theoretically, the asymmetric instrument is a policy intended
to address two fundamental things that a country faces: the first is the political
dimension of the problem, including those rooted in the uniqueness and cultural
differences. The second is technocratic-managerial problems, i.e., the limited
capacity of a region in performing the basic functions of government. In
Indonesia, four provincial governments have special autonomy to implement

44 See in Abubakar, Burhanuddin, Studi tentang Perilaku Birokrasi Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota
di Sulawesi Selatan, in Suryanto and Sulistyow, Agustinus et-al, Accelerating Performance: Konsep
45 Nachmias, David and Rosenbloom, David H., Bureaucracy and Ethnicity, American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Jan., 1978), pp. 967-974 - Published by The University of Chicago Press
46 Brown, David, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, London and New York: Routledge,
1996.
47 Chauvel, Richard, Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation, Policy
different local government systems from the other provinces. Nevertheless, the
characteristics of the Indonesian bureaucracy remain centralized and uniform.

In general, the Indonesian bureaucracy adopts the values of the dominant
ethnic groups of the Javanese, resulting in the centralization of power and patron-
client relations.\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, the power that accommodates the values of the
dominant ethnic group at the expense of the other ethnic groups has the potential
to become an "ethnocratic state" as has taken place in Burma.\textsuperscript{49} Ethnocratic states
represent a situation where the state acts as an agency for the dominant ethnic
community in terms of ideology, policy, and resource distribution. One example
is in the recruitment of government and military officials, which is not
proportional, allowing majority group to dominate it. In the case of Burma, such
an ethnocratic model results in continued unresolved ethnic rebellion.

The Burmese case of ethnocracy can be used to explain the importance of
the implementation of a bureaucratic system that is more sensitive to local
contexts and is able to accommodate the diverse community. A bureaucratic
model that allows ethnic representation at the national level can be seen in 1960s
Zambia.\textsuperscript{50} Here, there was a response to ethnic diversity in the community. In
particular, ethnic groups tried to gain access to positions in the bureaucracy as
an opportunity for social mobilization and as a means to channel the group
interests in policy-making. The fundamental argument for the creation of
bureaucracy that embraces all segments of society is the assumption that every
state employee will articulate the values and interests in line with their social
background. This will then determine the substance and implementation of their
policies.

The challenge for Indonesia is how to implement a model of local
bureaucracy, which is sensitive to the characteristics of each particular region. In

\textsuperscript{48} Setiawan, Akhmad, \textit{Perilaku Birokrasi dalam Pengaruh Paham Kekuasaan}, Yogyakarta, Pustaka

\textsuperscript{49} Brown, op.cit., pp. 36-7

\textsuperscript{50} Dresang, Dennis L., \textit{Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian}, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 1605-1617 -
the past, failing to involve indigenous peoples in government administration was a mistake. While in the other regions of the Dutch East Indies, the colonial government employees were chosen from local elites, almost all governmental administrators in Papua were either foreigners (Dutch) or migrants (non-Papuans) who directly dealt with the Papuans. Ultimately, this developed a Papuan resentment with Indonesia its target.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, it is the author’s conclusion that the implementation of a bureaucratic system that gives opportunities for various Papuan local elites to take part would be more acceptable to local people and would be expected to be more effective in delivering the public services.

**D.3. Indonesian Bureaucracy in Papua**

The phenomenon of a stronger ethnic influence in Papuan bureaucracy can be observed in the rise of Papuan ethnocentrism subsequent to a long-lasting oppression by foreign powers, particularly from the time of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (1998-1999). Here, Wahid made a spectacular political breakthrough by replacing Irian Jaya with Papua and allowing Papuans to fly the Morning Star flag. Since then, ethnocentrism has been a fundamental issue in Papua.\textsuperscript{52}

Papuans consists approximately of 250 ethnic groups, all of which are autonomous and culturally independent. Each regards itself as the centre of the universe. The chiefs generally do not have full authority except as spokespersons for their respective community. Limited interaction in the past has led to the absence of tolerant culture among ethnic groups. In fact, in such cultural systems, it is difficult to institute a collective leadership that is recognized by all ethnic groups in Papua.\textsuperscript{53}

Through the Dutch colonial era, and up until 1969, indigenous people were not provided with opportunities to hold bureaucratic office. During the colonial period, top-level positions were only granted to Dutch officials while

\textsuperscript{51} Chauvel, op.cit., p. 42
\textsuperscript{52} Suwae, Habel, \textit{Identitas Cair Papua}, Yogyakarta, Kanisius, 2013.
middle and lower positions were given to non-Papuan bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{54} In 1969, Papua became Indonesia’s easternmost territory, and since then, bureaucrats from other parts of Indonesia, especially Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi dominated Papuan bureaucratic officials.

For Papuans, the Papuan identity (\textit{papuanhood, papuanness}) takes form in an ethnocentric and emotional sense.\textsuperscript{55} The rise of Papuan identity has counterproductively led to abandonment of both the political institutionalization and the strategic planning on how to build Papua into a more dignified and prosperous region. In its development, the newly celebrated Papuan identity had to deal with the rise of narrower ethnocentrism at the local level. Since 2001, new regencies had been set up, all of which were arbitrarily defined by the territorial boundaries that divide the ethnic groups. Thus, for example, Asmat Regency (carved out of Merauke Regency) was set out for Asmat ethnic group. Similarly, Maybrat regency constitutes of an approximately 100% Maybrats population. The waiting list includes candidates of regencies that are currently under preparation, for example, Muyu-Mandobo Regency out of Boven Digul Regency, which would become a shelter for Mandobo and Muyu people on the borderline with Papua New Guinea. There is also preparation to establish Numfor Regency that would separate it from the existing Biak-Numfor Regency, as well as the preparation to establish the Imekko Regency for the Imekkos in the present Sorong Selatan Regency. The common tendencies to name the regency based on the dominant ethnic group are prevalent in such names as Mappi, Tolikara, Sarmi, Nudga, Dogiyai, and Tambrauw which are derived from the dominant ethnic group in the regencies respectively.

The phenomenon of the increasing involvement of ethnic groups in Papuan bureaucratic structure reflects not only the strengthening of ethnocentrism but also the strong tradition of patron-client relations among ethnic groups in the region. As studies by Mansoben (1994) show, in every ethnic group in Papua there are always strong persons whose legitimacy is based on the property they own (land and livestock) or their ability to wage war against other

\textsuperscript{54} Chauvel, op.cit., 42.  
\textsuperscript{55} Suwae, op.cit.
ethnic groups. The strong persons become the “patron” who protects their “client” or the members of their ethnic groups. When ethnic warfare ceased to exist as Indonesian Government banned it and the control of land and livestock no longer had economic value, the patrons need another arena to support their source of legitimacy for their position within their community.\textsuperscript{56} Local elites of each ethnic group require a source of financial support that serves to maintain their position as patrons. In Papua, government bureaucracy is a modern organizational structure that is authorized to allocate and distribute power and financial resources. This necessitates the well-established patterns of patron-client relations among ethnic communities to transform and find a new arena in bureaucracy.

Patron-client relationships (or exchange relations) can be defined as a special case between two people involving an instrumental friendship in which a person with higher socioeconomic status (patron) utilizes the resources and influence to provide protection or benefits for people with lower status (client) who respond by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. In this context, two characteristics of patron-client relations deserve attention: differences in position, and flexibility in personal exchange. These two factors are visible in feudal society, consisting of landowners with high status and their followers in a traditional agricultural economy, forming a model patron-client relationship.\textsuperscript{57} The main characteristic of the patron-client relationship is that of interaction and/or exchange. As a form of social interaction and/or exchange, interaction between actors is characterized by exchanging economic resources for political collateral (support, vote, loyalty, protection). The relationship is not based on a formal legal contract but is rather informal and voluntary. Despite the absence of any formal contract, patron-client relations are generally very strong and long lasting. In general, patron-client relations is between individuals rather than groups, in which

\textsuperscript{56} Mansoben, op.cit.

individuals who have access to specific powers will act as a patron while the other individuals in lower position serve as the client.58

The patterns of patron-client relations can be used to explain the dynamics in bureaucracy in the region where ethnic groups play a strong role in the bureaucratic structure. Local elites of various ethnic backgrounds try to compete to hold strategic offices in bureaucracy because such positions will become a means for the distribution of resources for the members of each ethnic group. In return, members of the particular ethnic groups will provide support, loyalty, and solidarity to their elites who hold offices in bureaucracy.

E. Methodology

All data in this study was obtained in research conducted between 2008 and 2011. As a faculty member at Gadjah Mada University, in 2000 the author served as a member of the Boards of Examiners to select Sorong Regency’s bureaucratic officials who would take a Master’s program at the Graduate School of Local Politics and Regional Autonomy (S2PLOD), Gadjah Mada University. Again, in 2006 the author was assigned to the Team for Sorong Selatan Regency. These tasks provided the author with the opportunity to get to know and to learn more intensively the bureaucratic problems in Papua in general and in the two regencies of Sorong and Sorong Selatan in particular. Since 2008, the author has specifically been focusing a study on bureaucracy and ethnicity in Sorong Selatan Regency.

As a researcher-cum-consultant to whom Sorong Selatan Regent and officials always ask for advice on various problems in bureaucratic management in the regency, the author has had an unrestricted access to various documents and other information, some of which has become valuable data in this study. The author has unlimited data accessibility, which, in terms of methodology, is an important aspect in any study, as also endorsed by Sarsby in Bryman:59


Every field situation is different and initial luck in meeting good informants, being in the right place at the right time and striking the right note in relationships may be just as important as skill in technique. Indeed, many successful episodes in the field do come about through good luck as much as through sophisticated planning, and many unsuccessful episodes are due as much to bad luck as to bad judgement.

The data in this study was obtained through participant observation and ethnographic research. Through these two methods, researcher as observer and ethnographer took part and engaged in the lives of Sorong Selatan community and bureaucracy during 2008-2011, during which the author observed the behaviour of bureaucrats and community leaders as the key informants, recorded and analysed the conversation between them, collected the relevant documents, conducted interviews and discussions with small groups on certain topics. Referring to Bryman, this is a process of ethnographic research. Ethnographic research can also be understood as a method of cultural descriptions, or description and interpretation of cultural and social systems of a community, or the study of culture in order to understand the subject of research in their own perspective, or a research practice that places researchers in the centre or as part of the research subjects.

F. Chapter Structure

This thesis consists of six chapters organized as follows: Chapter I introduces the problem and the research questions, provides the conceptual framework, clarifies the methodology and outlines the presentation.

Chapter II, “Standards and Norm of the Indonesian Bureaucracy”, provides a literature review and describes briefly the making of the Indonesian bureaucracy since the Dutch colonial period through the early Republic, the Old and New Orders and up to the Reformasi era. It is maintained that the current Indonesian bureaucratic culture is simply a continuation of the feudal culture of both Javanese kingdoms and colonial administration. Although old regimes have fallen, the bureaucratic culture has not changed significantly. Bureaucracy in

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60 Ibid., p. 432.
Indonesia places a higher priority on the service of the government and the top-level officials, over the service of the public. In addition, Indonesian bureaucracy is also burdened by various centralistic regulations. The standards and norms of the Indonesian bureaucracy are uniform across its diverse territory, despite its regions’ unique socio-cultural characteristics.

Chapter III, “Cultural and Socio-political Settings of Indonesia’s Papua and Sorong Selatan Regency”, describes the socio-political settings of Papua in general and of Sorong Selatan Regency as the area of research. The chapter elaborates on the characteristics of the community, which is still strongly segmented by ethnicity, in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the bureaucratic structure. A general overview of indigenous people in the bureaucracy and the way patterns of inter-ethnic relations in the region shape the bureaucracy will also be presented.

Chapter IV, “Impacts of Political Identity on the Restructuring of Bureaucratic Institutions in Sorong Selatan”, evaluates the pre-existing governmental structure in Sorong Selatan and the subsequent reorganization of the local government institutions, as stipulated by the prevailing regulations and the implementation of local government functions. In evaluating the results of the old governmental structure after it began following the recommendations and implementation of new local institutions, several interesting socio-political dynamics were uncovered. These particularly relate to the local bureaucrats’ reactions to the new institutions. The objective of this chapter is to elaborate on some fundamental questions: whether or not the politics of identity work in such establishment of bureaucratic institutions? How do the politics of identity work? How does political identity affect the restructuring of local bureaucratic institutions and the appointment of structural officials to strategic positions in bureaucracy? What are the implications of political identity on the process of governance at local level?

Chapter V, “Ethnic Politicization in the Dynamics of Bureaucrat Recruitment Process in Sorong Selatan”, expounds on a variety of strategies applied by ethnic groups in Sorong Selatan to influence the process of bureaucrat appointment in local government. It also addresses the dynamics of the bureaucratic recruitment process involving strong bargaining power among a
variety of interests, particularly the ethnic and political interests of local elites. Based on the results of the analysis about various cases in question, it is concluded that an ethnic politicization process was taking place, where ethnicity was used as an instrument to support the interests of the candidates of local government officials and even to exert pressures on the Regent to satisfy the specific demands of certain ethnic groups. At the same time, the Regent also used the notion of ethnic balance as an instrument for securing both public support to the policies issued by the local government, and his political existence.

Chapter VI concludes the discussion by summarizing how political identity operates in each area studied and proposing some alternative ideas to explain how political identity becomes an integral part of the study of bureaucracy.
CHAPTER II
THE STANDARDS AND NORMS OF THE INDONESIAN BUREAUCRACY

A. Literature Review

Studies on bureaucracy have given significant contribution to the development of social studies in Indonesia. In addition to the benefit to the academic world, such study also has a real social relevance as it can be used as a basis for policy-making to build a better bureaucratic system. One of the important references in the study of bureaucracy is a book by Sutherland\textsuperscript{62} that uncovers the origins and historical development of Indonesia's bureaucracy from the era of Javanese kingdom to the Dutch colonial period. This book carefully highlights the transformational process of the Indonesian bureaucracy as a power instrument of Javanese kingdom in the past to that of the Dutch colonial administration, which at the same time functioned as an effective machine to support the political and economic interests of the colonial government.

Furthermore, in the New Order era there was further study on bureaucracy from a variety of perspectives. Dwight Y. King\textsuperscript{63} introduced the term “bureaucratic authoritarianism” as a criticism to the model of “bureaucratic polity” used by Karl D. Jackson\textsuperscript{64} to explain the bureaucratic model of the New Order in which both power and political decision-making authority were in the hands of civilian bureaucrats and military officers backed by technocrats. Another study, carried out by Reeve\textsuperscript{65}, explains the relationship between bureaucracy and politics by examining the case of Golkar political party. Reeve argues that bureaucracy in the early New Order became an effective political machine that played a major role for Golkar's triumph.

Mohtar Mas’oed\textsuperscript{66} examined bureaucracy from a political economy perspective and put bureaucracy as a political actor in the context of the global

\textsuperscript{62} Sutherland, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{63} King, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{64} Jackson, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{65} Reeve, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{66} Mas’oed, op.cit.
economy. This study posits that the bureaucracy is an instrument of the state to defend the economic interest, especially in Third World countries, with an indication of the politicization of bureaucracy for the sake of securing capital. Meanwhile, Ryaas Rasyid\textsuperscript{67} discussed bureaucracy from a governmental perspective in the context of Indonesia's national development in the 1980s. Santoso\textsuperscript{68} specifically highlights the dominance of bureaucracy in the political-governmental system of the New Order. It reviews the success of the bureaucracy in playing its role as a political actor, which was evident in its involvement in Golkar's victory in general elections. In addition, the book also reviews the role of bureaucracy in the successful development programs of the New Order era.

Miftah Thoha in 2002\textsuperscript{69} focuses on suitable bureaucratic behaviour for the Indonesian state administration. Bureaucratic behaviour is closely linked to the cultural approach that at that time was considered the most suitable framework in studying Indonesian bureaucracy. In 2007 Miftah Thoha\textsuperscript{70} also wrote a book about the bureaucracy with a focus on bureaucratic management in Indonesia. In addition to the studies on the behaviour and bureaucratic management by Miftah Thoha, Siagian\textsuperscript{71} also studied the pathology of bureaucracy. Some of the 'bureaucratic pathology' includes misuse of authority, prejudiced perception, conflict of interests, bribes, fear of change/innovation, arrogance, deceit, blaming others, lack of commitment, and indifference to criticism and suggestions. Bureaucratic pathology in Indonesia is also related to inaccuracy, counter-productive action, learning disability, hesitant attitudes, lack of initiative, inability to describe the policy of the leadership, and the tendency of bureaucrats to act in discordance with their duties.

Bureaucratic failure in creating quality public service delivery has spurred many publications centred on bureaucratic reform, including Agus Dwiyanto\textsuperscript{72},

\textsuperscript{68} Santoso, loc.cit.
\textsuperscript{69} Thoha, loc.cit.
\textsuperscript{70} Thoha, loc.cit
\textsuperscript{71} Siagian, loc.cit
\textsuperscript{72} Dwiyanto, loc.cit
Ambar Sulistyani\textsuperscript{73}, and Yuyun Purbokusumo\textsuperscript{74}. Dwiyanto explains the results of research on bureaucratic reform in some provinces in Indonesia and they assess the performance of the bureaucracy. This study attempts to explain how environmental conditions interact with the internal characteristics of bureaucrats that ultimately shape the practices and behaviour of public officials who tend to be power-oriented, to ignore the public interests, and to be very rigid in applying the procedures and regulations so that worsen the performance of the public services. Meanwhile, the book by Purbokusumo describes the background and process of bureaucratic reform in the Special Territory of Yogyakarta, and Sulistiyani’s writing highlights the aspects related to human resource management in the bureaucracy. Fadel Muhammad\textsuperscript{75} as the Governor of Gorontalo Province authored a book examining the practice of organizing the bureaucracy at the local level. Muhammad reviews the success of Gorontalo provincial government in managing the bureaucracy in the era of decentralization and regional autonomy. Muhammad goes some way in simplifying complex theories used to examine the performance of bureaucracy in provincial government.

Some works also study Indonesian bureaucracy’s connection to the social structure of the country. Joel. S. Kahn\textsuperscript{76} explains three important aspects that can be used to understand the ideology and social structure of Indonesia, namely: aliran (cultural stream), ethnicity, and patterns of patron-client relationship. Aliran is the terminology used by Clifford Geertz\textsuperscript{77} to describe the political orientation of community groups influenced by religious factors. Ethnicity is used to analyse political behaviour, as conducted by Liddle.\textsuperscript{78} Patron-client patterns

\textsuperscript{73} Sulistiyani, loc.cit
\textsuperscript{74} Purbokusumo, loc.cit
are used by sociologists and anthropologists to explain the pattern of relationships between individuals with different access to power and wealth. The pattern of patron-client relationships will be used in this thesis to explain the behaviour of bureaucrats and their relations with various ethnic communities.

Setiawan relates bureaucracy to the influence of ethnicity especially by the Javanese concept of power. The Javanese concept of power suggests a form of ethnic dominance (Javanese) in the bureaucratic management in Indonesia. Among the influence of Javanese control on bureaucracy is the centralization of power in the hands of the leader, the paternalistic style of management, and a strong Javanese culture of *ewuh-pakewuh* (“uneasiness, awkwardness, uncomfortable, ill at ease”) which is a Javanese custom not to say directly anything that could potentially insult the interlocutor or demean oneself. The embodiment of the *ewuh pakewuh* value in the bureaucracy is the will to live in harmony and with respect. The will to live in harmony is implemented through an attitude of “avoiding any potential conflict or dispute” while the will to live with respect underlies the understanding that one should pay attention to the degree and position to which one belongs.

Muhaimin’s work also states that the strong influence of Javanese culture on the bureaucracy is noticeable in the institutionalization of reticent attitudes and the pattern of patron-client relationships in management. The widespread patron-client patterns in bureaucratic management confirm the influence of traditional aristocratic Javanese styles on the local bureaucracy.

There are certain studies on Papua that focus either on the local government bureaucracy or on the problems of ethnicity in a particular region. Books by Yan Pieter Rumbiak, Sem Karoba, et al., Frits Bernard Ramandey et

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al.,\textsuperscript{83} and Bambang Purwoko\textsuperscript{84} deal with questions of Papuan special autonomy. Rumbiak elaborates the Papuan people’s disappointment to the Central Government at various periods since integration of Papua into Indonesia to partition of territories into new administrative entities, which have been coloured by violent conflict. Koroba argue that autonomy is actually a policy to accommodate a variety of interests: personal, local, national, regional and international interests, all of which actually lead to the same thing, that is, the search of material gains. Ramandey shifts focus toward the background of special autonomy implementation in Papua, including the policy principles. Meanwhile Purwoko analyses the eight-year implementation of special autonomy (from 2001 to 2008) and the impeding factors on its success.\textsuperscript{85}

To understand the problematic relationship between bureaucracy and ethnicity in Papua it is not sufficient to simply review the literature on decentralization or special autonomy, but also important to examine the fundamental socio-political aspect of the society. Mansoben’s take on the traditional political system is a helpful reference.\textsuperscript{86} This book describes the social structures of the indigenous people of Irian Jaya (now Papua), the varied patterns of leadership and religious systems. The book also provides information on the organization of traditional governance, organizational structure of central and regional organizations, as well as the relationship between power and economy in regard to the royal system of leadership. Mansoben’s elaboration on the types of leadership in Papua is highly relevant to explain the behaviour of ethnic groups in Papua and their involvement in the structure of local bureaucracy. Pim Schoorl,\textsuperscript{87} with a focus on on the history of governance in Papua, describes the early contact between Irian Jaya and the outside world, which was first


\textsuperscript{84} Purwoko, Bambang, Sintesa Laporan Evaluasi Implementasi Kebijakan Otonomi Khusus di Provinsi Papua, Departemen Dalam Negeri & Kemitraan (Partnership for Governance Reform), Jakarta, 2009.

\textsuperscript{85} Purwoko, loc.cit.

\textsuperscript{86} Mansoben, loc.cit.

established by the Dutch. Based on the articles written by the Dutch administrators in Papua it provides a detailed picture on the condition of its people during 1945-1962.

In the past ten years, there has been considerable research on the politics and governance in Papua. Two books whose content is relevant to this study are by Richard Chauvel\textsuperscript{88} on Papua nationalism and by Muridan S. Widjojo\textsuperscript{89} on 'Papua Road Map'. Chauvel describes the fundamental problems that Papuans faced by looking at historical factors and ethnicity as well as the influence of the governmental models of both Dutch colonial administration and Indonesia on the rise of Papuan nationalism. The part most relevant to this study is a description of the anti-	extit{amberi} (foreigner) sentiments among Papuan bureaucrats. Widjojo's \textit{Papua Road Map} identifies four sources of conflict in Papua: a) the effects of marginalization and discrimination against indigenous Papuans; b) the failure of development in education, health and economic empowerment of the people; c) contradiction between Jakarta and Papua on history and the construction of political identity; and d) accountability for past State violence against Indonesian citizens in Papua. Widjojo's examination about "papuanisation of the bureaucracy" is very closely connected with this study on bureaucracy and ethnicity in Sorong Selatan.

In relation to \textit{pemekaran} (regional partition) in Papua, a study by Andrew Mc William\textsuperscript{90} reviews comprehensively the consequences of radical decentralization policy in the form of waves of \textit{pemekaran} in Konawe regency, South Sulawesi and Teluk Bintuni regency, West Papua. Both regencies underwent different process of regional partition according to their own contexts of local politics and society. Nevertheless, the logic of regional partition elaborated in this study presents a critical overview of the discrepancy between the ample power extent and the lack of political capacities, which resulted in the poor governance and administration in the two regencies. The study compares

\textsuperscript{88} Chauvel, loc.cit.

\textsuperscript{89} Widjojo, loc.cit

the two pemekaran processes by identifying the trigger factors, the actors, the required resources and the administration of the new autonomous regions. Furthermore, it explains the political spectrum after the pemekaran. The resulting success and failure is analysed to see the extent to which cultural and structural factors significantly affect the sustainability of local autonomy.

Another study on Papua in relations to the pemekaran is by Aloysius G. Brata. It explains the political and government configuration in the form of regional expansion in Papua as a consequence of decentralization. This book elaborates on the factors that drove the pemekaran by identifying the various underlying interests. Using the perspective of a social democracy in which the public interest gets more emphasis than political compromise, the author tries to identify and analyse the two reasons for the formation of new autonomous regions: issues of social welfare and elite interests.

Discussions on Papua are often associated with conflict occurring in the region. Timo Kivimaki explains conflict resolution, through a more democratic approach with little risk of derivative conflict, takes precedence over security measures and the introduction of conflict resolution through dialogue and negotiation. The mapping of actors and interests in the conflict between the Indonesian government and Papuan separatist groups is also important here. According to Kivimaki, the involvement of the international community is important when conflict resolution requires a mediator to bring the involved parties together. With the need to consider unique local and social contextual factors, the international community opted for a more favourable conflict resolution mechanism through the re-enactment of peace values.

While these books deal with the issues pertaining to the political dynamics in Papua both before and after the enactment of Law No. 21/2001, a specific study on the newly-established regencies emphasizes the interplay between the new bureaucracy and ethnic interests is yet to be undertaken. Therefore, this study is an effort to fill the gaps in both theoretical and empirical levels on the


relationship between bureaucracy and the politics of identity. Here, identity politics has significant influence on bureaucracy and, being part of political identity, ethnicity must be considered in the establishment and management of bureaucracy.

B. The Indonesian Bureaucracy: A Brief Political History

The presence of bureaucracy in the Indonesian governmental structure has a long history. As Kuntowijoyo\textsuperscript{93} points out, there were two phases in the growth of bureaucracy in Indonesia. The first being the period of the Javanese Mataram Kingdom in the sixteenth to seventeenth century when bureaucracy was in the form of \textit{abdi dalem} in the king’s palace and functioned as an intermediary between the king and the people. The second was when the bureaucracy was operated by the \textit{priyayi} during the Dutch colonization, particularly from the eighteenth to mid-twentieth century (the 1940s).

\textit{Abdi dalem} were selected from the kingdom’s principalities to become employees of the royal court. Although bearing the title of \textit{abdi dalem}, literally meaning ‘servants of the royal family’, their position in the social structure was eminent. Due to their position in the royal circles, \textit{abdi dalem} and their family were also known as \textit{priyayi}, a prominent social position above the ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{94} No adequate data describes the structure and culture of the bureaucracy as \textit{abdi dalem} of the Javanese kingdom era, but the etymological sense of the term suggests that the bureaucracy was a structure consisting of the \textit{punggawa} serving a king, both in terms of the royal family’s domestic interests and in terms of the king’s representative when he communicated with his people.

During the Dutch colonial administration, the government employees were originally heirs to the local authorities, but also subordinates of the colonial officials. They later, became representatives of the Dutch administrators: much-feared and with intense influence and control. Those who worked in the Dutch

\textsuperscript{93} See Kuntowijoyo, \textit{Demokrasi dan Budaya Birokrasi}, Yogyakarta, Bentang, 1994, pp.155-188.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Priyayi} belongs to the upper class of the society attributed with distinguished standing. It also stands for a social class regarded as Javanese “nobles of the Robe”, a class with the highest position in the society due to their relations to the royal nobility. See \url{http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Priyayi}, retrieved February 8\textsuperscript{th} 2012.
colonial posts had enormous power over their people and territory since they were seen as gentlemen of high regard whom people had recognized as their leader beforehand. In the bureaucratic structure of that time, the local elite or priyayi were assigned to elevated posts; as Regent, other local authorities as wedana (district head), assistant wedana and lower bureaucratic positions. They were commonly referred to as pangreh praja and played an important role as a political tool in propping up the Dutch colonial rule. However, against their actual position and role at that time, the title pangreh praja was contradictory. At the beginning of his book, Heather Sutherland wrote:

Late colonial Java’s native civil service bore an impressive name: Pangreh Praja, the ‘Rulers of the Realm’. But this title, with its suggestion of pride and power, is at once justified and sadly inaccurate. For if in the indigenous context officials were the Pangreh Praja, to the Dutch they were the inlandsch bestuur, the ‘native administration’, the lower level of local government.95

It is unclear whether the title of pangreh praja, a term with gallant and charismatic tones, and inlandsch bestuur, which degraded the native officials to the second-class bureaucracy, were deliberately created by the Dutch for certain political purposes or were simply coincidence. The term pangreh praja embodied the notion that the native officials in the colonial administration were those on charge to rule or to command (pangreh) a particular region (praja). In their position as rulers, the bureaucratic apparatus executed the duties assigned by, and were responsible to the Dutch colonial officials. As governmental officials, they also exercised certain authorities that people in their territory had to obey. The very name and position as pangreh praja implied that they had an authority to set the public for a specific purpose outlined by the colonial government. Yet in their position as inlandsch bestuur, they were nothing more than administrative officers who had to execute the duties or order outlined by the colonial authorities, or the binnenlandsch bestuur (BB), a structure consisting of

European officials appointed as the representative of the Governor or Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies.96

The semantics of title notwithstanding, the Dutch sought to preserve a pre-existing bureaucratic structure and culture of the pre-colonial Javanese kingdom, reformatting it in a way that its main function was to be as a representative of the Dutch government in their political and economic goals. As Syukur Abdullah points out:

Basically, the Dutch colonial administration simply continued the pre-existing structure and replaced the power of the king with that of the Dutch authority from which they formed strong administrative corps to maintain their power in an attempt to suck the maximum profit from Indonesia’s abundant natural resources.97

The bureaucracy was an efficient and effective organizational machine from its beginnings, particularly in the exploitation of economic resources and maximization of profit-taking in the colony. The Dutch colonial government organized and recruited employees or ambtenaar by applying various rational and objective criteria. The appointment of the priyayi as an official in the Dutch bureaucratic structure was not based solely on lineage, but on the qualifying standards regarding their capability, education, social position in the society and, of course, loyalty.98

In other words, the transformation from abdi dalem to priyayi was actually carried out through the selection process, which in turn promoted the social position of local authorities in the society. It was these native elite who later transformed into a corps of native civil servants with the impressive title pangreh praja. Their presence can be seen as a result of structural evolution in the Dutch colonial bureaucracy in Indonesia. Not only did they play a role in eliminating the caste system, with the dominant European caste and the indigenous peasant caste, but also in the sense that they served as a link connecting the existing

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96 Binnenlandsch Bestuur (BB) is an Interior Administration or the European civil service in colonial Java. BB served as intermediary between the Colonial government and the local bureaucracy (Regents and their subordinates) called inlandsch bestuur. See Sutherland, ibid, pp. xv, 34-35.


98 See Kuntowijoyo, op.cit., p. 189. Also Sutherland, op.cit., especially Chapter I, pp. 1-18.
position of bureaucracy to the previous model of the Javanese royal government.99

Bureaucracy had also cast a new status among indigenous communities. At the same time, the creation of the bureaucratic model containing the local priyayi also favoured the power of the colonial government before the people. In Sutherland’s view, there was a general belief among the colonial rulers, that people’s respect for the native officials would secure the presence of the Dutch administration in Java.100 Sutherland’s account confirms the prevailing attempt for affirmation of legitimacy made by the Dutch in incorporating the indigenous bureaucracy into the government structure. In addition, the Dutch also established an indirect system of rule through the native bureaucracy who executed their commands. In other words, the model of the Dutch administration used layers of officials to control the society.101 The application of the indirect ruling system could also be interpreted as a form of colonial pragmatism to achieve their political objectives.102

Whatever the political or economic interests behind the establishment of bureaucracy by the Dutch, two colonial legacies are worth noting. First, the Dutch tried to establish a system with a relatively strong emphasis on objective and rational bureaucracy, i.e., a bureaucracy with fixed division of labour, punishment and reward system, and an orientation to the governing rules, all of which were known as the characteristics of the State of Efficient Administrators (beamtenstaat). Second, such a bureaucratic model was described as highly efficient and effective, with a strong emphasis on administrative tidiness, technical expertise and economic development.103 Those two legacies suggest that, since its formative stage, Indonesian bureaucracy has been normatively familiar with the merit system model or an objective and rational organizational model with specific sets of performance standards.

99 This argument, for example, appears in Fachry Ali, *Refleksi Paham Kekuasaan Jawa dalam Politik Modern*, Jakarta, Gramedia, 1986, pp. 71-81
100 See Sutherland, Chapter 10, “‘Traditional’ Authority and ‘Modern’ Officials”, pp. 140-143.
102 Santoso, op.cit, p. 43
103 Santoso, *ibid*, p. 44
Yet the fact that most official appointees belonged to the privileged social strata—the priyayi—also indicates a subjective pattern in the recruitment by which the Dutch sought the required social and political supports from local communities to secure their power. Likewise, a similar pattern occurred in the lower bureaucratic structures. Because the bureaucrat-priyayi had a relatively autonomous authority, it was not surprising that they also exercised their authority in appointing their subordinates by emphasizing the loyalty built up of personal relationships. Thus, the seeds of personal relationship-based recruitment models found their historical justification in the bureaucratic mechanisms of the Dutch colonial era.

However, the implementation of two bureaucratic traits, the attempt to establish a rational bureaucracy and the efficient working mechanism, were relatively successful from early 1900s to the last days of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia (1942). It can even be said that during this period the best bureaucracy in the history of Indonesia prevailed. At its golden age during the 1900s, Harry J. Benda points out, the Dutch East Indies government succeeded in creating the ideal form of the Administrators State, or a state with an efficient bureaucratic machine. This period came to an end when the Dutch lost the war to the Japanese in 1942, exited Indonesia and thus its colonial rule ended. Since the era of Japanese occupation to the period of Indonesian national revolution, the structure and form of the Dutch bureaucracy resumed and kept developing till the post-independence era. The inception of the Republic of Indonesia was immediately followed by the formation of governmental structures, from the central government to the regional ones. Sartono Kartodirjo reveals that the growth of bureaucracy went along with the political conjuncture of the central government extending to the local levels. As Ichlasul Amal observes, such a

104 Santoso, ibid, p. 44
106 Santoso, op. cit., p. 46
growth was due to the multitude bureaucratic positions in post-independence Indonesia available for native officials after such positions were abandoned by the colonial administration.

After the independence, various positions in the bureaucracy abandoned by the colonial administration were granted to those who had fought for Indonesian independence. In order to gain and strengthen the political support, the political leaders handed out various bureaucratic positions to their constituents.108

The assumption that bureaucratic positions were distributed as gifts indicated that the Indonesian bureaucracy began to shift from an organization applying the rational and objective standards of performance to a more patrimonial bureaucracy. One of the characteristics that developed was that the positions and the whole hierarchy in the bureaucracy were based largely on personal, patron-client relationships.109 In the logic of such a patrimonial bureaucracy, any recruitment appointment process were not based solely on the mechanism of meritocracy but also on other considerations which was close to the spoils system model110 organized through a variety of rules in its formality to impress a seemingly rational and objective nature.

Thus, since the early Republic (1945-1955), followed by period of the Old and New Orders (1955-1966 and 1966–1998) and even up to the Reformasi era (1998-present), there has been a tendency for bureaucracy to become an arena of reward for those who submit their personal loyalty to their masters. There has been a situation in which the Indonesian bureaucracy implements a covert model of spoils system. Such a system increasingly grew in line with the growth of the governmental structure, from the central government to the regional administrations.111

110 Spoils system is a practice in which appointment of officials is based on the contribution that the supporters of the ruling party gave, rather than on some objective criteria such as expertise and competence, independent of the officials political affiliation. See Carl Russel Fish, The Civic Service and The Patronage, New York, Longman, 1905.
111 The term “covert spoils system” implies the various practices in the bureaucracy from the recruitment, appointment to structural posts, and even the establishment of new bureaucratic
Actually, the root of the spoil system in the Indonesian bureaucracy to some degree could be traced back to the era of colonial bureaucracy in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, during which a mechanism called *magang* was introduced. The *magang* tradition, which was inherent in pre-independence bureaucratic system, has been further developed by Indonesian bureaucrats through employing their relatives or closest people as honorary workers while waiting for an official appointment as a civil servant. It is no secret that, in both central and local bureaucratic levels, on any civil servant recruitment, those who have become honorary workers in the bureaucracy will have a better chance of being selected although they are basically unqualified by the applicable rules.

The method prioritizing personal relationships over others in the bureaucracy is based on the premise that a subordinate is structurally under the superior’s control, since the subordinate’s career as a civil servant will be largely determined by the superior. In line with this, through a patrimonial bureaucracy, the bureaucratic authorities establish a network of power relations which allow subordinates to compete with one another to secure the master’s protection.

One of the interesting aspects underlining the transformation of Javanese royal bureaucracy to the Dutch and to a post-independence modern bureaucracy and even to the later periods (the Old and New Orders and the Reform era) is the persistent upward-orientation of the bureaucracy. That is, the bureaucracy remains oriented to serve the supervising master rather than serving the public. Such a format was deliberately created by the Dutch authorities on the basis that the bureaucracy was an arm of their power. However, the course in which the institution carried out as if it referred to the regulations, while actually it represents personal and subjective interest of the ruling officials.

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112 Sutherland, pp. 31-34. It is described that *magang* (unsalaried official, apprentice) refers to “a young *priyayi* who would attach himself to an official. The *magang* would perform menial domestic as well as office tasks until the master secured his appointment as a clerk, the bottom rung of the *Pangreh Praja* ladder”, p. 32.


114 Manuel Kaisiepo, *op. cit.* p. 27
Indonesian bureaucracy tends upward-oriented or pays more attention to obeying the ruling authorities instead of serving the public continues.

At the end of Sukarno’s reign and the beginning of Suharto’s rule, especially in the early 1970s, the bureaucracy reaffirmed its position as *pamong praja* to distinguish it from the old-but-often-used term *pangreh praja*. Actually, the term *pamong praja* itself had been introduced during the early days of the Republic (in 1946). As *pamong praja*, bureaucracy functioned “to sustain”, or were in charge of caring for or serving the public. This term stirred intense public opposition as in practice the bureaucracy was not showing its orientation to serve the public yet. Criticism and public spotlight at the bureaucracy became even more intense when in the 1980s a new term was coined: the bureaucracy was treated as *abdi negara* or the instruments in the service of the State rather than serving the public. The debate about the title kept going that eventually in 1990’s (to the present), bureaucracy has been positioned as *abdi masyarakat* or “servant of the public”. Even so, the question is always whether the label becomes more important than the actual performance. As the existing regulatory system requires bureaucracy to orient itself more on executing the top-down duties, the real position of the bureaucracy as public servant is a far cry from expectations despite its current label as “servant of the public”. Theoretically, bureaucracy should be an effective organization to support the government’s performance. In practice, however, it is often seen a cumbersome one: a massive organization with poor performance and is neither effective nor efficient.

### C. Indonesian Bureaucracy in the New Order

It is important to include a brief description of Indonesian bureaucracy since the New Order because the structure and culture of the existing bureaucracy have a historical embryo at the beginning of Suharto’s reign, especially through the enactment of certain regulations that became the key references in implementing the bureaucratic tasks. Since the early days of Suharto era, regulation of the bureaucracy previously applied by Sukarno’s administration was removed or replaced by newer regulations. On the other

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115 Sutherland, p. 154.
hand, many bureaucratic regulations produced during Suharto era are still in use in the present governance while attempts at replacing such regulations, if any, have been largely limited to a renewal or refinement rather than a total replacement.

During President Suharto’s era (1966 to 1998), bureaucracy was notorious for both its highly centralized orientation and its bulky organization. A close look into the condition of the New Order bureaucracy, particularly by looking at the magnitude of the cabinet membership from the first cabinet (1968-1973) to the last one (1998), indicates that the bureaucracy in the ministry constantly grew. At the beginning of Suharto’s rule, the cabinet simply consisted of 25 ministries. That particular number was reduced to 21 in the second cabinet but it increased again to 30 in the third cabinet and underwent a fantastic increase to 40 in the fourth cabinet and still added up to 41 ministries in the fifth and sixth cabinets. In the last cabinet formed during Suharto’s final terms (i.e. the *Kabinet Pembangunan VII* in 1998), the number was slightly reduced to only consisting of 37 ministries.116 The bloated bureaucratic structure at the central level could be interpreted as indicating the increasing number of governance issues to address along with the vigorous development program which was the government’s principal jargon at the time. It also suggests that the central government had an increasingly powerful role in governing the administration throughout Indonesia.

A centralized bureaucracy became a major feature of the New Order government. To some extent, the New Order governance had actually started some decentralization plan through the issuance of Law 5/1974 on Regional Government and Law 5/1979 on Village Administration. However, the two legislations failed to specify the implementation of the decentralization principles due to the absence of the implementing regulation as a follow-up. The implementation of public services was organized hierarchically. At the central level, the public service was conducted by the Ministry or Department, while at the provincial level it was carried out by the Provincial Office of the

Department/Ministry, and at the regency/municipality it was conducted by the Regental/Municipal Office of the Department/Ministry. From a top-down perspective, these bureaucratic chains represented the vertical control of the central government. In the particular period of 1966-1998, there was barely an autonomous agency or governing body at the provincial and regental/municipal levels, and if any, had very limited authority and was not supported by adequate budget.

D. Political Decentralization and Centralization of Bureaucracy

Along with the political liberalization after the fall of the New Order, the succeeding government of President B.J. Habibie began implementing the decentralization plan by introducing a far-reaching policy of regional autonomy. The implementation of the regional autonomy in Indonesia was formally marked by the endorsement of Law 22/1999 on Regional Government and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Central and Local Government. Both legislations provide the basis for the changes to the local governance and financial management. Changes also took place in the relations between the central and local governments as well as in the internal reforms of the governmental bureaucracy at the local level.

As a principle of local autonomy in governance, decentralization was the right choice as, theoretically, the principle is widely conceived to have many advantages. According to Osborne and Gaebler,\textsuperscript{117} decentralized institutions have four advantages: decentralized institutions are much more flexible that it will provide quick response to the changing needs of the environment and public (customer), compared to the centralized institutions, they are more effective and more innovative, and finally they bring about higher morale, more commitment, and more productivity.

For Indonesia, the governmental decentralization is a necessity. In relation to the decentralization, Cheema and Rondinelli summarize a number of arguments for the importance of decentralization in the third world. With regard to the bureaucratic restructuring at the local level, some important arguments for

\textsuperscript{117} David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, \textit{Reinventing Government}, Reading, MA, Plume, 1993
the implementation of decentralization in the third world are based on the following considerations.\textsuperscript{118} Firstly, decentralization enables local governments to formulate their programs and development plans based on the local needs and communities. Secondly, decentralization, which assumes the transfer of power from central to local levels, will be able to increase the sensitivity of the governmental apparatus to the problems that the society faces. Thus, decentralized government provides wider possibilities for the regional administrations to innovate in organizing their institutions in accordance with their potentials and workload. Public services will also perform better as no other administration but the local governments knows the problems in their environment better.

In general, there are three spirits of the law conceived by Law 22/1999. First, a paradigm shift from the centralized governance of the regional administration to decentralization. Second, a shift from the administrative to political decentralization or devolution. Third, while regental/municipal governments had only limited authority in the past, based on Law 22/1999 both local governments have very broad authority except in terms of foreign affairs, defence and security, monetary and fiscal policy, justice and religion.\textsuperscript{119} The above three administrative merits propel the profound extent of the new authority exercised by regency/municipality. According to Afan Gaffar, such major changes was made by the central government on purpose, as

The pronounced mission is to strengthen the local communities in order to increase the democratic capacity at both local and national levels and to restore the long-lasting, marginalized (and even denied by Jakarta) dignity and self-esteem of the local community.\textsuperscript{120}

In most cases, the decentralization policy through the implementation of Law 22/1999 and its replacement (Law 32/2004) also affects the restructuring of the bureaucracy at the local level. Restructuring is carried out by transforming

\textsuperscript{119} Hidayat, Syarif, “Orientasi Desentralisasi Perlu Diluruskan”, \textit{Junal Renai}, Salatiga, 2002, p. 77
\textsuperscript{120} Gaffar, Afan, et al., \textit{Otonomi Daerah dalam Negara Kesatuan}, Yogyakarta, Pustaka Pelajar, 2002, p.viii
the status of most civil servants, from being central government employees to the local ones. The goal is to create a more professional bureaucracy in providing public service at the local level. Restructuring is also done by enacting new institutional system at the local level. This is marked, among other things, by the issuance of various government regulations stipulating some relatively symmetrical local bureaucratic institutions. As a follow-up of Law 32/2004, the government issued PP 38/2007 on Division of Government Affairs between the Central Government, Province and Regency/Municipality and PP 41/2007 on the Organization of the Local Administration.

With regard to the bureaucratic restructuring at the local level, PP 41/2007 requires all regental/municipal governments to reorganize their institutions with reference to the particular regulation. Normatively, the reorganization of the local bureaucracy cannot be equated with any organizational restructuring in general. The restructuring of government or bureaucratic organization has certain distinctive characteristics. Bureaucracy, as Max Weber formulated, has to be imbued with such characteristics as the specialization or fixed division of labour, a hierarchy of offices, creation of rules to govern performance, separation of personal from official properties and rights and a clear, merit-based career path.

Specialization is required in relation to the complexity of problems which is unlikely solved by single division. The division of labour is established with regard to the suitability of the institutions and its ranges of authority with the balanced distribution of the workload of each institution. Bureaucratic hierarchy is intended to divide the degree of authority, command and responsibility. Work mechanism or the rule of the game in the bureaucratic system connects the separate parts of the institutions so that synergy and regularity within the system prevail. The rule of the game should reflect the desired outcome (goal), have a clear direction and focus (clarity), should not be ambiguous, should be effective


and efficient, and project the future orientation (expectation). Meanwhile, the impersonal relationship is meant to distinguish the public area from the private one. With this distinction, the system is built on the foundation of professionalism (impersonal) instead of on friendship or family relationships (personal), and the career promotion is intended to guarantees every employee's career and future.

The promotion process of bureaucratic officials is by appointment, based on predefined criteria rather than by election or by vote. It is the appointment system that most bureaucratic officials depend on the superiors, in no way are affected by the people or voters. Ideally, a promotion in the structural positions of bureaucracy is carried out on the basis of seniority or merit, not on the basis of subjective considerations. In the Indonesian bureaucracy, a prerequisite for promotion is known as the DUK (Daftar Urut Kepangkatan, bureaucratic rank order), which is a set of administrative criteria indicating a civil servant’s rank order in a work unit. Within the DUK model, an official with a higher rank order has the opportunity to be appointed in a promotion compared to other officials with lower rank order. In reality, however, DUK is but often negatively interpreted in such sarcastic senses as Daftar Urut Kedekekan (“closeness-based order”, in which those appointed to strategic positions would be those who are close to the decision makers), Daftar Urut Keputaran (“affiliation-based order”), those being in the same political party with the decision makers will have greater opportunities for promotion, or even Daftar Urut Keuangan (“money-based order”) in which anyone who can pay the decision makers more, the person will have priority in a promotion. There is a wide gap between the expectation of bureaucracy as an ideal organization with a rational and objective characteristic as and the empirical realities in which deviations supplant the ideal bureaucratic model.

The characteristics of an ideal Weberian model of bureaucracy as described above do produce a standardized work flow controlled by a clear procedure. However, at the same time, if such an ideal model of bureaucracy is implemented as is, it would simply make bureaucracy serve the process without

123 The detailed requirements are then regulated through PP 100/2000 on Appointment of Civil Servants into Structural Posts. Article 6 of the legislation stipulates the candidate's seniority and rank, age, education, official trainings, and working experience.
clear output. A strict hierarchy in the bureaucracy does ensure certainty but is slow-moving at the same time. Excessive orientation to regulations often shifts the role of regulation from being a means to being the goal. In addition, an excessive orientation to the "procedures" (e.g., the need for the juklak, “implementation guidelines” or juknis, “technical guidelines”) would undermine the output attainment. Bureaucracy with such ideal characteristics also tends to be unresponsive to changes and to the changing context of the problems in the community. The works are standardized at the expense of the possibility for innovations to improve the public services. Even more detrimental, the hierarchical structure and the tiered authorization system hinder the bureaucratic implementers from making a quick decision for fear of reaction from their superiors/masters.

The Indonesian Government translated the ideal (Weberian) bureaucracy by issuing several regulations, for example, PP 84/2000 on Guidelines for the Organization of Local Administration. Over time, the governmental regulation was amended by PP 8/2003 and was replaced by PP 41/2007, which is valid at present. The latter regulation was designed with some underlying ideals. First, the spirit to overcome the confusion of nomenclature, the tupoksi (basic tasks and functions) and the span of institutional control of the local government in the previous regulation (PP 8/2003). Secondly, the spirit to limit the numbers of regional institutions in the hope that they will become more efficient, effective and accountable. This is evident from the standards to be followed strictly by local governments. Third, the spirit of asymmetric decentralization, so the composition and structure of local government institutions should not be uniform for all regions, as adjusted by PP 38/2007 on Division of Labour, by taking into account the typical characteristics of each region.

In practice, the asymmetric decentralization through the establishment of regional institutions is difficult to implement. Administrative decentralization as stipulated by PP 41/2007 and PP 38/2007 is not followed by fiscal decentralization policy. The local governments cannot establish regional institutions which are suitable with the characteristics of each region and is different from the structure of the central bureaucracy, because such asymmetric institutions will have the difficulty in budgeting. Any institutions within the local
government without the same nomenclature or similar authority to those at the central government will not be financed by the central government. Therefore, in order to obtain funding, the local governments tend to establish symmetrical or uniform institutions, which are similar across the local governments and are in line with the institutional structure of the central government.\textsuperscript{124}

In relation to the institutional restructuring at the local government stipulated by Governmental Regulations 84/2000, 8/2003 and 41/2007 consecutively, there have been a lot of deviations by the local administrations. Firstly, most local governments seek to establish a massive institutional structure by taking the maximum number of scoring calculations specified in PP 41/2007. This means that the local government failed to grasp the spirit underlying the particular regulation especially the efficiency of regional institutions. Such bulky institutional structures at the local level are deliberately established as a strategy to absorb as much governmental funds as possible.

Secondly, in creating the local institutions, the main consideration is generally how to create as many posts as possible to accommodate the local officials who previously had occupied a position in the bureaucracy. It is impossible for the local governments to cut these positions without some political risk. Therefore, the structure of the post was deliberately created to put those who already hold an office, as the local bureaucrats might not allow the removal of the officials for rationalisation or efficiency. The condition becomes even worse when the elected head of local administration also seeks to accommodate the officials who were part of the campaign train during the regional election.

Thirdly, in many regions, there are prevailing manipulations of PP 41/2007 by the local government. Such manipulation is carried out by merging some separate offices or agencies, with a single purpose to minimize the numbers

\textsuperscript{124} This argument repeatedly came out during the discussions on establishing the local institutions held by S2PLOD UGM for Grobogan Regental Government (Central Java) in 2005, for Yogyakarta Municipal Government in 2008 and 2010, for Sorong Selatan Regental Government (Papua) in 2010, as well as for various local governments, from both within and outside Java islands. In each discussion, the researcher served as either coordinator or one of the researchers at the S2PLOD UGM.
of the bureaucratic posts. As a result, many (often unrelated) functions are merged into a single office or governmental agency.\footnote{The phenomena can be found in some regencies such as Sleman, Grobogan, Magetan, Jember, and Sorong. See Gadjah Mada University Research Report, 2008.}

At the national level, on the other hand, no law strictly regulates the institutional structure of the national government except on the formation of cabinet as stipulated by Law 39/2008 on State Ministry. The particular Law stipulates that the President can form as many as 34 ministries.\footnote{Law 39/2008, Article 15.} It also specifies the organizational structure of the ministries consisting of the minister, secretariat-general, directorate generals, inspectorate general, agencies and/or centres as well as various regional implementing bodies and/or the overseas agencies in accordance with the statutory regulations.\footnote{Law 39/2008, Article 9.} However, there is no explicit ruling on what kind of ministries the Presidents could establish. The Law grants the President three kinds of authorities over the cabinet: to form/establish, to alter, and to abolish the ministries. The formation of ministries is to establish the ministries by using certain nomenclatures after the president took an oath/pledge, while the alteration of ministries is to change the nomenclatures of ministries by combining, separating, and/or changing the pre-existing ministries, and the abolition of ministries is to remove pre-existing ministry (or ministries).\footnote{Law 39/2008, Article 1 paragraphs (4), (5) and (6).}

Upon closer inspection of the provisions in Law 39/2008 on the State Ministry, it can be seen that a president enjoys broad flexibility in forming the supporting institutional governance at the national level. In addition to those already specified in Law 39/2008, bureaucratic structure at the central level reflects the elected president’s improvisation a few months after taking office. The additional bureaucratic posts are established to specifically accommodate those who actively contributed to the elected president’s campaign train earlier. Since being elected in the first direct presidential elections in 2004, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has established several institutions within the
Presidential Office, one of which was the President’s Special Staffs. The non-structural institution was established based on the Presidential Decree No. 40/2005. As an institution, President’s Special Staffs are

Presidential apparatus as the first unit to define, to focus and to formulate the President’s policies and to ensure that the President’s vision, mission, and instructions are comprehended by all ministerial levels and by the entire governmental apparatus at both central and local levels.\(^{129}\)

The definition illustrates the institution as a strategic one, whose presence has great significance in the organizational structure of the State. In fact, the President’s Special Staffs merely function as a shelter agency given to those contributed to the president’s election but could not be posted in any formal bureaucratic positions.

At the end of 2011, the President even appointed a number of deputy ministers, a move triggering a controversial debate as it confirmed the notion that the appointed ministers were based on an accommodation to the political parties and other figures actively supporting the President’s campaign during the election rather than on their capacity or capability to command the departments or ministries. As many ministers lack the required technocratic capabilities, deputy ministers had to be appointed from professionals who are experts in their field.

Such phenomena are showing increasingly inequality, in the governance between the central and local governments. On the one hand, the central government can alter the bureaucratic structure without being limited by regulation so that it can make political accommodations freely. On the other hand, the local government cannot establish a flexible bureaucracy which is accommodative to local conditions since all local bureaucratic institutions are regulated by the central government. Nevertheless, both president and regents/mayors have something in common in terms of legitimacy: both are directly elected by the people. In day-to-day management, especially in setting up the institutional bureaucracy, regents/mayors do not have any discretion as a

There are too many regulations concerning both institutionalization and staffing that regents/mayors have to obey in the local governance. All regulations that local governments must comply with (Law, Regulations, Ministerial Regulation or simply Ministerial Circulars) are generally of the same type for every region in Indonesia which has diverse characteristics just as the local conditions also vary. It is reasonably difficult to accept that a government regulation made by officials in Jakarta under a modern atmosphere and metropolitan settings should be applied uniformly to all regions in Indonesia including by the remote and isolated areas or the frontier regions, such as in Papua and other islands.

The strict national regulations governing the bureaucracy in the region could be instrumental in encouraging the region to meet the performance standards of a national bureaucracy and for demanding the local officials to stick with the regulations. However, the strict regulations could be counter-productive as it will lead to the covert defiance or manipulation among the local officials. The prevailing uniformity of bureaucratic regulations is not only in terms of bureaucratic structures at the local levels but also in terms of the qualification, rank, and educational standards. In fact, uniformity is also stipulated in the financial management (e.g., in the payroll system and in the allocation of expenditures for goods and services) whereas each region would have different needs according to local conditions. All of the uniformities do not seem to meet the real conditions and needs of each region.

To confirm the assumption about the dominant role of central government, the regulations dictated by the central government to govern the bureaucracy at the local level, both at the provincial and regency/municipality levels, should be mentioned. In the daily governance, the main foundation for the local government is Law 32/2004 on Regional Government and some implementing regulations including PP 38/2007 and PP 41/2007 (see previous section). In more technical sense, there are a number of government regulations specifically regulating the performance of the bureaucracy and civil servants in the area.
E. Recruitment and Promotion Process of the Indonesian Bureaucrat

This section explains the inconsistency of policy in the Indonesian bureaucratic structure between that at the central and and local levels. Such inconsistencies occur because of the laws regarding the institutions and the personnel are treated as if they apply only to local governments. For example, the institutional structure of the local government is tightly regulated Central Government Regulation (PP 41/2007) but the central government institutions (eg the number of ministries and other institutions) are not specifically addressed either by PP nor Law. This is also true of the personnel management.

At the central level, the president appointed the ministers, deputy ministers and other top-level officials based on meritocracy as the primary consideration, that is, on the basis of the candidates’ capacity and competence. However, the appointment may also be done within a patronage network that the president controls, namely, the political party to which the president belong or the ruling coalition parties. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in both terms of his administration (2004 - 2009 and 2009 – 2014), has always started the cabinet formation process with a phase called "ministerial candidates selection" carried out at the President’s house in Cikeas. However, it was unclear what criteria were to be used as the primary considerations whether or not a candidate will be appointed as a minister or deputy minister.

The appointment of officials at the lower levels such as Sekjen (Secretary General) or Dirjen (Director General) in the Ministry Offices is generally based on the criteria of competence and professionalism of the bureaucrats. However, certain political considerations (usually related to the candidates’ track-record, political orientations or political support for the ruling elite) will serve the determinant filter for whether or not the candidate will be appointed.

Another recruitment strategy that the president employs is the partisan model of appointments, in which the appointment of officials and bureaucrats is loaded with patronage significance. Bureaucratic officials are usually appointed from the ruling political party or coalition. Likewise, the recruitment schemes in various lower posts are also monopolized by the ruling party or coalition. In the context of Indonesian governance of the Reformasi, this model cannot be employed blatantly as bureaucrats are formally not allowed to join any political
party. In practice, however, it is very likely that any bureaucrats promoted to certain higher offices would have gone through a screening process to ensure their political orientation and support for the ruling party.

In addition to the above models of recruitment, the appointment of officials at the central bureaucracy is also carried out as a strategy based solely on pragmatic political calculations. It is true, for example, in the President’s appointment of the Special Staffs. In addition to simply accommodating the supporting groups, the appointment within this model does not take competence into account. The recruitment of the lower officials within the offices is also based on such a patronage.

At the local level, heads of the regional administration do not have the same opportunity to employ the above models of appointment although Law 43/1999 on Public Employment stipulates that kepala daerah (heads of local administration) is the Highest Supervising Official at the local level. There are some explanations for this limitation. First, although kepala daerah has an authority in the recruitment of bureaucratic officials, such administrative authority is restricted by various regulations made by the central government as Laws, Government Regulations and Decrees of the BKN (Indonesian Civil Service Agency) Head. Any violations to these regulations will result in strict administrative sanctions. Not only through such regulation, the authority of kepala daerahs is also controlled by an agency named Baperjakat in addition to the control carried out by the DPRD (local parliament). Second, even if the kepala daerahs were able to resist the limitation by exercising their authority to recruit officials as the central government does, they will have difficulty in appointing the officials into the appropriate post since the local bureaucratic structure along with the criteria of the officials appropriate for each office are

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130 Baperjakat (Advisory Board of Bureaucrat Position and Rank, see “List of Abbreviations, Terms and Nomenclatures”) is the official institution in every regency/municipality and province which functions to examine the process of structural appointments and to give the consideration to the Kepala Daerahs (Regent/Mayor or Governor). The Baperjakat was established to ensure the quality and objectivity in the appointment, dismissal, transferral (promotion and rotation) of civil services serving the Structural Posts at the Second Echelon (or lower). According to PP 100/2000 Article 14 paragraphs (4) and (5), the basic tasks of Baperjakat is to provide Highest Supervising Officials at the local level (or Regent at the regental level) with consideration in the promotion and de-promotion if the structural officials of the Second Echelon or lower. At the regental level, the Board is headed by the Sekda (ex-officio) and members consisting of Echelon III officials.
fully controlled by the central government. Any formation of new local institutions should be carried out through a long process in conformity to the laws and regulations and should also be endorsed by the DPRD. Under such restrictions and as kepala daerahs cannot establish new bureaucratic institutions for new officials, the only choice is to arrange the allocation and distribution of offices. In fact, if they insist on creating such new institutions, they will have difficulty in financing the institution by using the local budget as the components of budgeting in the Budget Plan are also strictly regulated by the central government. Moreover, the Budget Plan has to be approved by DPRD (and also by the governor) before being implemented by the district/municipality.

The multitude of controls leaving kepala daerahs with very limited choice in managing the local bureaucracy do not necessarily mean that no opportunities are left for the kepala daerahs to utilize bureaucracy as both administrative engine and a political wagon at all. The strategies that kepala daerahs employ, then, are manipulating the regulations and restrictions made by the central government. One of the manipulation models employed by the kepala daerah is in the promotion and de-promotion of bureaucratic positions by appointing the loyal officials to strategic bureaucratic positions. By strategic positions we mean bureaucratic posts with greater access to political support, such as the offices which have direct access to the population (voters) or offices which manage and have access to local financial resources that can be potentially used as a source of financial support for the political benefit of the kepala daerah. The bureaucratic manipulation committed by kepala daerah, however, is not solely for their personal benefits. In some cases, it is carried out to respond the socio-cultural conditions and the political characteristics of the local community which often demand the local government and kepala daerah to guarantee their interests even if it is sometimes contrary to the standard norms of local governance.

It should be noted that the personnel management at the local level is also fully controlled by the central government. The following description provides us with operational details on how the management of personnel at the local is carried out. Based on PP 98/2000 on Civil Servants Recruitment, the authority to recruit the prospective public employees belongs to the local government. In practice, however, the recruitment process of new civil servants for various
functions in bureaucracy is still fully controlled by the central government. In listing the vacant bureaucratic formations, for example, the BKN (National Agency for Civil Servants) often unilaterally sets the final formation while neglecting the proposed formations made by local government. Formally, the listing should be made by the local government according to the local needs and is proposed to the central government. In practice, the central government through the related ministries (or sectoral departments) and the BKN have more dominant role in listing the vacant formations for the local bureaucracy regardless of the actual needs of the region. The final listing of the State employment vacancies set by the central government does not often describe the real needs of the region to support the local governance. Any attempt for suitability (between the local’s needs and central government’s listing) is eventually determined by the local official’s ability to lobby the decision makers at the central government. Lobbying is contrary to the principles of accountability and transparency in the procurement of civil servants as stipulated by Laws or regulations issued by the central government.

Normatively, the recruitment or procurement of civil servants is basically intended to meet the shortage in the number and quality of personnel at the local government based on rational calculation according to the workload, and implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, objectivity, rationality, non-discriminatory and KKN-free. Indeed, as part of the decentralization policy in accordance with the prevailing legislations of PP 98/2000 on Civil Servants Procurement and Law 32/2004 on Regional Administration, the civil servants recruitment processes have been carried out at the local level. However, the decentralization of the civil servants recruitment is basically—in an administrative sense—covering only the technical preparations and execution of the recruitment process. The final decision in the selection of the civil servants as well as the civil service career arrangements remain at the central government authority.

At the local level, the series of activities in the civil servants recruitment (including the formation, announcement, registration, preparation of the testing...

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131 Appendix to PAN Minister B/1110/M.PAN/6/2005 dated June 9th 2005
materials, the selection process, publication of the selection results, proposal for permanent appointment, and placement into the assigned posts) are parts of the authority and responsibility of the Governor or Regent/Mayor as the Highest Supervising Officials at the local level. Furthermore, as a guideline for the Supervising Officials or other officials involved in assessing the Civil Servants to be promoted into the structural position, the Head of BKN issued Regulation 11/2008 dated June 6, 2008, in which the details of Civil Servants competency assessments in structural position are defined. At the regental level, the Regent as the Highest Supervising Officials at the local level has the authority to appoint and to dismiss the Sekda on the Regental Council’s endorsement, to appoint, to remove and dismiss the local civil servants within second-echelon structural or functional position.\textsuperscript{132}

The most important point to emphasise is that in the local governance, the central government sets a single national bureaucratic standard with which the local governments (through the kepala daerahs) should comply. It means that in the human resource management at the local level, kepala daerahs do have the authority but the exercise of such authority has to be within the limits set out by the regulations applicable to all regions in Indonesia. As the Highest Supervising Officials at the local level, Regents/Mayors have the authority to promote the local civil servants, appoint/dismiss the Sekda, and appoint civil servants to certain positions in the local bureaucratic structure by referring to the regulations endorsed by the central government.

In relation to the local bureaucratic performance, the authorities granted to the kepala daerah have both positive and negative sides. On the one side, as the human resource management at the local level can be carried out directly by the kepala daerah, the administrative process becomes much more efficient by reducing unnecessary extended administrative chains (as implemented prior to the decentralization, in which the management of local civil servants had to be handled by the central government through the Kanwil). Such administrative efficiency is expected to motivate improved performance of the local bureaucracy. On the other side, the authority to manage human resources also

\textsuperscript{132} PP 96/2000 Article 12 paragraph (1).
has potentials to pave the way for negative practices committed by the kepala daerah in the local bureaucracy. It is no secret that, as a consequence of the direct Pilkada since 2005, the local bureaucratic organization is capable of being hijacked by the political interests of both the candidates and the elected kepala daerah. Prior to the elections, bureaucracy becomes a means to garner support, shortly afterward bureaucracy would become an arena for political retribution. Local official appointment, which is one of the kepala daerah’s authorities, may shift from a technocratic process based on the merit system to a political process apt to the spoils system. It could no longer be based on the bureaucrats’ professionalism and competence but on kepala daerahs’ political interests. As a result, the authority for human resources management (conferred on kepala daerahs as the implications of decentralization) which should be positive, it might damage the performance of the bureaucracy that eventually disrupts the public services.

From the institutional side, even though the establishment of institutions has been regulated by PP 41/2007 and the local governments formally comply with the regulation for a variety of pragmatic reasons, in practice, the kepala daerahs seek to obey the letter of the Laws by reserving certain strategic positions in the bureaucracy for those who are considered instrumental in making them the elected kepala daerahs. With relatively limited political authority compared to the central government’ discretion by which the President could easily appoint the political officials (appointee) to the President’s Office or even to the Ministries, kepala daerahs use the bureaucratic structure on the local level to appoint certain officials as a political retribution. It is clear that the absence of any regulatory foundations for a political accommodation does not mean that there is no attempt for political accommodations at the local level. The difference is, while at the central level a president can officially appoint his/her political cronies into the formal structure of the bureaucracy typically set up for such a political accommodation, kepala daerahs at the local level do similar practices by utilizing the existing bureaucratic structures without creating a new structure outlawed by existing regulations.
CHAPTER III
CULTURAL AND SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING OF
INDONESIA’S PAPUA AND OF SORONG SELATAN REGENCY
IN WEST PAPUA PROVINCE

A. Papua’s Uniqueness in the Indonesian Context: The Special Autonomy Policy

Papua is an area with different characteristics to those in the other parts of Indonesia; one of which is demographic: Papua largely consists of the indigenous Papuans classified as Melanesian while the other areas are classified as Malays. Indigenous Papuans are dark-skinned and curly-haired. It is believed that the ancestors of the Papuans migrated from Africa and started to reside in the island as early as 50,000 years ago, or approximately during the late Ice Age. In 1545 a Spanish sailor, Ortis de Retez, reached the island which was then named Nova Guinea (New Guinea). Guinea was a place in Africa that de Retez had visited before and whose inhabitants had similar appearance with those in Papua.

The region is less developed than other regions of Indonesia and the abundant natural resources have not made Papua a prosperous land for its communities. Instead, the region is trapped by the problems of poverty and underdevelopment, with Papua’s geographical isolation since the Dutch colonial period identified as one of the fundamental causes. Efforts to break up the isolation had been made, among others, by the Church in their missions to introduce new values to the natives. Yet, such efforts were contrary to the Dutch approach to regional policy: they did not give enough room for the natives to take part in the government and regional development.

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133 Melanesia was a name given by Dumont d’Urville, a French explorer in the Pacific (Mansoben, 1994: 41). See also Karl Muller, Mengenal Papua, Daisy World Book, 2008, p. 58.
Little has bridged the gulf between Papua’s isolation and socio-economic development in the twenty-first century. It is estimated that until 2001, approximately 74.2% of Papuans lived in isolated areas without adequate access to public services and facilities for their economic activity.\footnote{Pusat Studi Kependudukan (Centre for Population Studies), Universitas Cenderawasih, \textit{Indikator Pembangunan Provinsi Papua}, Jayapura, 2001.}

The region’s isolation made it very difficult for the local community to access the basic services delivered by the local government, resulting in low standards of living among Papuans. They are among the lowest on the Human Development Index (HDI): thirtieth out of 33 provinces in Indonesia.\footnote{www.papua.go.id, retrieved November 11th 2010.} The low level of HDI is related to the minimal availability of health and educational infrastructure. In 2005, the number of people that have not benefitted from education facilities was 49.67%, while the percentage of university graduates was only 1.91% of the total population. Poverty is prevalent: in 2007, 40.78% of the total population in both Papua and West Papua Provinces were living in poverty. The health sector also suffers from similar problems. Infant mortality rate is still around 7.9%.\footnote{Ramandey, Frits Bernard et-al, \textit{Profil Otonomi Khusus Papua}, Jayapura, AJI Papua, 2005, p 38. www.papua.go.id, retrieved November 11th 2010.}

\section*{A.1. The Special Autonomy Policy}

The conspicuous condition of underdevelopment has been one of the sources of local communities’ resentment and dissatisfaction to the central government in Jakarta. The Papuans began to demand special attention from the central government as the latter implemented intensive political liberalization including a decentralization policy from late 1999 to early 2000.\footnote{Ramandey et-all, 2005.} In response, Papuans insisted on the implementation of a special autonomy policy for Papua province. After a long and gruelling struggle, the government enacted Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Since then, the policy has also
been a central government’s formula to solve the problem of underdevelopment in Papua.\textsuperscript{140}

The central government was expected to make up for its past mistakes in Papua. The main idea was to treat Papua in a reasonable way in accordance with the unique cultural characteristics of the society and abundant natural resources that the people owned, as well as to create a prosperous society, to build adequate infrastructure and to provide quality basic services. The essential spirit of Law 21/2001 is the empowerment of and the respect to various essential traits of indigenous Papuan society within the Unitary State frameworks of the Republic of Indonesia. The policy has had wide-ranging effects on both Papua and central government. Changes in the governmental structure at the local level, the delegation of authority to a vast extent, an extensive fund mobilization and the recognition of the indigenous society are the dominant colours in the political landscape of the government in Papua today.

Figure 1

The Framework of Special Autonomy Policy in Papua Province

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{140} In the appendix to Law 21/2001, the recognition of “kesalahan pemerintah pada masa lalu” (government mistakes in the past) was explicitly mentioned. This recognition would become a turning point in the changing relations between the Central Government and Local Government of Papua.}
The autonomy policy in Papua includes a variety of the basic sectors regulated in Law 21/2001 which are intended to empower Papuan society through the implementation of government policy and development programs. The special autonomy has three basic characteristics: first, significant separation of authority between the central and provincial governments; second, strategic and fundamental empowerment of Papuan indigenous communities; and third, establishment of a clean, effective and professional governance. Some fundamental issues pertaining to the characteristics of Papua’s special autonomy can be described as follows.

A.1.1. Recognition of Papuan Indigenous Culture

The cultural richness of Papua is not limited to the forms of fascinating symbols and works of art. The social structure of Papuan indigenous society represents the diverse cultures of indigenous tribes: it adheres to norms and orders of Melanesian indigenous society and is, in itself, invaluable cultural property. The Papuan social structure becomes one of the determining factors in the dynamics of indigenous life, including in the decision making process.

Therefore, Law 21/2001 provides several affirmative policies that give a wide sphere for protection and recognition of the indigenous society and encourage their participation in the development of Papua province. Among the provisions signifying the recognition policy to Papuan indigenous culture are the recognition of the Papuan flag and Papuan songs as cultural symbols, the

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142 Native tribes of Papua are still putting the traditional power structure as an actor or institution that is critical in making decisions collectively. The importance of traditional power structures in social systems of Papua province can also be seen more comprehensively in Johsz R Mansoben, **Sistem Politik Tradisional di Irian Jaya Indonesia: Studi Perbandingan**, Ph.D. Thesis, Leiden University, 1994
establishment of Papuan People’s Assembly as the cultural representation of Papua people, and the protection of customary society.

A.1.2. Recognition of Papuan Cultural Signs and Symbols

For Papuans, symbols are important cultural representations. Although frequently associated with local exoticism, when exercised, the cultural symbols in the Papuan contexts can create tension. The symbols can trigger conflict and prompt repressive measures from law enforcement. The Morning Star Flag (*bintang kejora/sampari*) is a symbol associated by central government with separatism spirit in Papua, but for some apolitical Papuans, the Morning Star is the symbol representing their spirit and existence as an ethnic group.143

Based on Law 21/2001, the government have made fundamental changes to prove that the respect to Papuan indigenous culture is more than lip service. Broader opportunities for Papuan cultural expression was given through the recognition of local symbols. For example, Article 2 paragraph (2) of Law 21/2001 states explicitly: “Papua province can have local symbols as the provincial coat of arms and cultural symbols for the glory of Papuan nature in forms of flag and song that are not posited as the symbols of sovereignty”. This Article illustrates the central government’s new approach manifest in policy, to tackle the problem of separatism in Papua.144

A.1.3. Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP)

The recognition to the existence of local culture in Papua is also manifest in the establishment of an institution named *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (Papuan People’s Assembly, hereafter referred to as MRP). The assembly is where certain

143 In 2011 there were several incidents regarding the Morning Star flag rising especially during the commemoration of Free Papua Movement anniversary on December the 1st. See for example a coverage by http://news.okezone.com/read/2011/12/01/340/536618/berikut-lima-insiden-pengibaran-bintang-kejora-di-papua.

144 The existence of regional symbols in the form of both flag and song is actually not a new phenomenon. There are many countries in the world who have implemented similar policies. These countries do not view the existence of a symbol of regionalism as a threat to the state sovereignty. For example, Malaysia’s fourteen states have different regional flags. Similarly, in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, there are flags representing the native tribes in the region such as Innuit (Eskimo), Aborigin, and Maori respectively.
powers to protect Papuan indigenous people’s rights are granted. Consisting of the members representing the customary society, religious community and women groups, MRP is a part of the governmental structure in Papua.

Based on articles 19-25 of Law 21/2001, MRP has some special powers related to public policy-making at the provincial level, particularly in direct relation to the protection of Papuan indigenous rights. Through the authority stipulated by Law 21/2001, MRP can give consideration and approval to the draft of Perdasus (Ordinance of the Special Territory) proposed by both Papuan Provincial Parliament (DPRP) and Governor. MRP’s authority and tasks, including to articulate and pay attention to the aspirations of customary communities, religious figures, and women groups, are regulated in Article 20 of Law 21/2001, of which implementation is specified further by Perdasus.

The establishment of MRP is officially characterized by the ratification of Government Regulation 54/2004 on MRP on December 23rd 2004. The MRP was established in 2005, four years after Law 21/2001 was ratified. As a relatively new institution, MRP faced challenges. The Law, for example, mandates that the partition of the region and any establishment of new autonomous entities in Papua should be with the approval of both the MRP and DPRP. However, the MRP was not consulted before all proposals on the partition of new regencies were made throughout Papua during.\textsuperscript{145} Many partition proposals were directly submitted to the central government through the Ministry of Home Affairs and directly processed by the House of Representatives. The fact that MRP has been frequently bypassed in political and governmental processes in Papua is an indication of alternative settlements at the central level.

In the case of the regency/municipality partition as described above, the MRP has prevented the MRP from optimally functioning in the new era. According to some members of the MRP, weaknesses in internal institutional structure and in the recruitment system have also impacted on limited functioning of the organisation.\textsuperscript{146}

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\textsuperscript{146}Interview with several members of MRP (Papuan People’s Assembly), Jayapura May 18th 2008.
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A.1.4. Protection of Customary Communities’ Rights

The existence of customary communities with a variety of social structures and values is the reality of Papuan life. The history of Papuan marginalisation was the backdrop for affirmative policy shifts from government. Law 21/2001 explicitly provides the protection of the customary society rights in its articles: Articles 43-44 translate the vision of protection into the basic provisions regulating the protection of customary society.

The customary societal rights recognized and protected by the Law include both the rights of customary law and individual rights. The protection of customary society is also clearly recognized in Article 38 by mentioning that economic activities involving the exploitation of natural resources in Papua should be done by respecting and recognizing the rights of local communities living in the region. The law also recognizes the existence of customary laws in addition to positive law formally prevailing throughout Indonesia.

A.1.5. Government Politics: Special Form of Autonomy in Papua

The special autonomy policy is also designed to create a unique governance structure in Papua Province, with an emphasis on autonomy. While other regions throughout Indonesia have autonomy at a regency/municipality level, Papua has at the provincial level. Provincial-level governance is regulated by Law 21/2001, but this is problematic as it must work through the regency/municipality autonomy structure implemented in the other regions throughout Indonesia through Law 32/2004. According to Law 32/2004, the emphasis of local autonomy is at the regency/municipality level, not at the provincial one.

In addition to the flow of the special autonomy fund from provincial government, there is negligible difference in the implementation of government at the regency/municipal level in Papua than in the other regions.147 The Law 21/2001, which sets the autonomy at the provincial level, does not seem to have a significant effect at the regency/municipal. The absence of regulation (in the

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147 See Purwoko, Bambang (2009), Sintesa Laporan Evaluasi Implementasi Kebijakan Otonomi Khusus di Provinsi Papua, Departemen Dalam Negeri & Kemitraan (Partnership for Governance Reform), Jakarta.
form of *Perdasus*) specifically regulating the patterns of relation between provincial and regency/municipal governments in Papua resulted in regency/municipal governments in Papua adhering more to the regulations at national level (Law 32/2004). Division of authorities between central and local governments in the organization of local institutions in Papua also refer to Government Regulations 38/2007 and 41/2007.

**A.1.5.1. The Structure of Local Government**

It should be noted here that the reference to the designation of local government (*pemerintah daerah*) is twofold. Depending on the context, local government could refer to either provincial government or regency/municipal government, as provinces, regencies, and municipalities have their own local administration and local parliament. With the decentralization policy as mandated by Law 22/1999 (revised by Law 33/2004), regencies and municipalities have played an even greater role in implementing the local administration.

Seen at the provincial level, the political specialty of local government in Papua is illustrated in the structure of the provincial government, being different from that in the other provinces. In this sector, special autonomy is implemented through the existence of the Papuan version of the local Parliament (DPRD) called DPRP (Papuan Local Parliament) and in the presence of MRP (Papuan People’s Assembly) found only in Papua. With the enactment of Law 21/2001, the forms of institutions in Papua’s provincial government are as follows:

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**Figure 2.**

*Institutional Scheme of the Papua Provincial Government*
The existence of MRP and DPRP in the governmental structure in Papua is closely related to the special authorities given to the province in the framework of special autonomy. The name of the Provincial Parliament (DPRD) in Papua changed to DPRP on March 15th 2005 in a plenary session.

A.1.5.2. Local Regulations

At the provincial level, the regulation of the division of authority in Papua is different from that in other provinces. The division of authority is regulated nationwide by Government Regulations 38/2007 and 25/2000. In both Government Regulations, only two types of authority are specified: the required and the optional authorities. In addition to the two authorities, there are special authorities mentioned in Law 21/2001, closely related to the products of local legislations known as Perdasi and Perdasus.

Perdasi is the product of local legislations (ordinance) at provincial level made to regulate authorities in accordance with national legislations. Provincial ordinances are made by the DPRP, the local legislative institution in Papua, and by the Governor as the Executive body. Perdasus (ordinances of the Special Territory) is the product of local legislation to regulate the special authorities owned by Papua province in accordance with the mandate of Law 21/2001. Unlike the drafting mechanism of the Perdasi, the Perdasus regulations are made not only by DPRP and Governor but also with the consideration and approval of the MRP. Until 2011, Perdasi and Perdasus as the operational bases of provisions...
in Law 21/2001 were inadequate, and at the operational level, impacted negatively on the daily governance in Papua. It is not surprising that in the daily governance in all regencies/municipalities in Papua as well as in Papua Barat province, the governmental bureaucracy referred more to Law 32/2004 on Regional Governance prevailing at the national level. The spirit of *otsus* (special autonomy) was used frequently as a justification for the urgency of policies fully affirmative to the interest of Papua indigenous community. However, the absence of more operative regulations derived from Law 21/2001 caused the local governments in Papua and Papua Barat provinces to operate without any formal legal basis as a reference in the implementation of special autonomy.

A.1.5.3. Local Finance

The special autonomy policy involves an extremely large fund mobilization. Various provisions in Chapter IX of Law 21/2001 stipulate the budget posts including the balancing funds, block grants, and special autonomy funds. The Law also rules that the Government of Papua province will get the fund allocation for special autonomy from the central government amounting to 2% of the total National Block Grant.

It was noted that at the beginning of the implementation of special autonomy in 2002, the allocated fund amounted to IDR 1,382,300,000,000 or 70.57% of the total amount of the Papua’s Local Budget. At the first year of the special autonomy, conflicts of interest emerged between the local Legislative and Executive bodies causing the delay of the 2002 Local Budget endorsement, which in turn had a chain effect on the continuity of programs that should be funded by the Local Budget.\(^{148}\)

Over IDR 23 trillion of special autonomy funding was allocated by the central government for Papua province in the period of 2002-2010. This was distributed to provinces, regencies and municipalities in Papua with a comparative ratio of 60% for province and the remaining 40% for regencies/municipalities in Papua. There were only 14 regencies in Papua during

the initial period of the special autonomy in 2002. Thus, the regencies in Papua received between IDR 12.5 to 15 billion of special autonomy fund a year. However, as the number of regencies has increased, the share of the special autonomy fund amounts to only around IDR 5 billion per new regency, while the fourteen existing regencies continued to receive IDR 15 billion.149

In 2004 there was a change in the proportion of special grant divisions between the province and the regency/municipality. Based on Provincial Regulation 2/2004 and Gubernatorial Decree 39/2004, the proportion of fund division was reversed to 40% for province and 60% for regencies/municipalities.

Such an amount of special autonomy fund allocated to Papua has not solved the problems of underdevelopment in the region, partly attributed to an absence of clear budgeting guidelines, weak assistance and inspection of budget use, and the frequent delay in special autonomy fund disbursement. This then hindered the financing of the prioritised programs related to such basic services as education, health, people economy, infrastructure and the other supporting programs. In addition to the delay in the disbursement of special autonomy fund from the central government, the total funding received by the regency/municipality ranged from only 7 to 12 per cent of the Local Budget.150 Moreover, the allocation of funding is not clearly regulated by the Perdasus. The only reference to it is in the form of an agreement between the Governor and Regent/Mayor: a mechanism that could cause further difficulty in the implementation at the regency/municipal level as the use of the fund should be in accordance with the mechanism of State’s finance.

Until 2008, there were complaints regarding the degree of transparency of the provincial government in allocating the budget of the regency/municipality. Such problems influenced the readiness of regency/municipality in preparing the Local Budget plan. This, for example, occurred in Jayapura municipality, where in 2008 the Local Budget included the


150 Ibid, p 55.
allocation of temporary fund based on the Special Autonomy fund of the previous fiscal year.\footnote{Cenderawasih Pos, “Alokasi Dana Otsus ke Kabupaten Kota Diharap Lebih Transparan”, 6 February 2008.}

A.2. Problems in Special Autonomy Policy

The implementation of special autonomy still faces several challenges, both at ideological and practical levels. At the ideological level, there has been pessimism among the Papuan society regarding the future of the policy. There is a dominant perception that the political problems in Papua override the emphasis on development and welfare programs (Widjojo, 2010). The hindrances range from the demand for new regional partition, various demonstrations demanding for the rights of indigenous community, demonstrations demanding the return of special autonomy, to the issues on the requirements for the candidates of the head of local government, particularly before a local election.

The implementation of concrete programs to improve the indigenous Papuans’ standard of living is hampered by various challenges and obstacles, including a lack of consultation with communities. An inadequate fundamental legal framework as the basis of special autonomy policy has made implementing programs unnecessarily difficult. In addition, some institutions in the region at the provincial and at regency levels, also confront challenges related to the relatively low capacity of human resources. In sectoral aspects closely related to the delivery of basic services, problems often arose with Papuan community welfare programs, caused by three factors: poor planning, inappropriately targeted proportion and allocation of the special autonomy funding, and a weak control mechanism and insufficient evaluation.

Usually, the absence of \textit{Perdasi} or \textit{Perdasus} acting as operational derivatives to carry out the special autonomy policies cause problems at the implementation stage. Consequently, several policies did not have a standardized guideline for reference. The absence of such operational regulations caused the special autonomy funding to spring leaks, in addition to the lack of oversight.
Papua, fund management is handled entirely by the bureaucracy with no civil society involvement, which hinders the transfer of benefits from special autonomy policies to the community.\textsuperscript{152}

**B. Sorong Selatan Regency: Cultural and Socio Political Characteristics**

Located in Papua Barat province, Sorong Selatan\textsuperscript{153} is a relatively new regency created by the partition of Sorong Regency. Although declared officially in 2002 by Law 26/2002, it was only in 2003 that the local government activities began. In August 2005, a Regent was elected and the local government started composing a new local government structure to carry out local development and to deliver public services.

Sorong Selatan regency sits within the area of Papua Barat Province, sharing borders with Sorong Regency, Moluccas Province, Maybrat Regency and Teluk Bintuni Regency. It is as well geographically lined up with other regencies in potential growth areas such as Sorong Regency, Teluk Bintuni Regency, Kaimana Regency and Fak-Fak Regency. The topographic characteristic of this area is very complex: plateau comprising mountains and hillsides in its interior (40%), as well as lowland, swamps and coasts (60%). The distribution of area is as follows: mountains area covering Sawiat district and Fokour district; lowland composing Teminabuan district, a part of Seremuk district, Wayer district, and Moswaren district; shores and swamps scattered around Inanwatan district, Metemani district, Kais district, Kokoda district, North Kokoda district and a part of Saefi district.

The capital city of Sorong Selatan Regency is Teminabuan, a relatively more advanced district since it became the part of Sorong Regency in 1969-2002. Positioned on the bank of a river sailed by large ships, Teminabuan has adequate access for traders and visitors, who later in their journeys decided to reside there.

\textsuperscript{152} For a more comprehensive description on the evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy policy, see Bambang Purwoko, *Sintesa Laporan Evaluasi Implementasi Kebijakan Otonomi Khusus di Provinsi Papua*, Departemen Dalam Negeri & Kemitraan (Partnership for Governance Reform), Jakarta, 2008.

\textsuperscript{153} Sorong Selatan literally means “Southern Sorong”, as the regency is located in the southern part of Sorong regency, which up until recently is the most advanced regency in Papua Barat province.
In term of socio-economic aspects, Teminabuan is the most advanced district in Sorong Selatan regions at the time of writing. Overall, Sorong Selatan Regency comprises 13 districts: Inanwatan district with the capital of Inanwatan, Kokoda district with the capital of Tarof, Kais district with the capital of Kais, Konda district with the capital of Bariat, Moswaren district with the capital of Moswaren, Teminabuan district with the capital of Teminabuan, Matemani district with the capital of Mukim, Sawiat district with the capital of Wensnahan, North Kokoda district with the capital of Atori, Wayer district with the capital of Sungguer, Seremuk district with the capital of Haha, Saeﬁ district with the capital of Sayal, and Fokour district with the capital of Pasir Putih. After a new legislation assigning that a part of its area belongs to Maybrat Regency, today Sorong Selatan Regency covers an area of 3,946.94 km$^2$ and with the population of 52,253.

The geographical characteristics of Sorong Selatan regency are similar to that of the neighbouring areas in Papua. This area has a tremendous amount of natural resources including forests, minerals as well as flora and fauna. Unfortunately, the abundant natural resources have not been optimally used for people’s prosperity. Local government is far from being capable of providing people with such basic services as education, health and transportation and communication infrastructures.

Transport infrastructure is poor, making it difficult to reach Sorong Selatan areas, and also contributes to poor basic services. The socio-demographic characteristics of Sorong Selatan population are also inﬂuenced by their topographic environment. A study by Walker and Mansoben$^{154}$ found that the differences of Papua’s topography results in the variations of livelihoods and adaptation patterns among people to natural conditions they encounter, which in turn makes up the varying characters of the people. Populations of swamp areas, shorelines or river banks tend to gather, to hunt and to ﬁsh. They live a semi-nomadic life by burning down sago forests and cultivate them before moving on to clear up new sago ﬁelds. Meanwhile, those living in highlands usually grow

sweet potatoes and raise pigs. For the people living in mountainous area, pig is not only an economic commodity but also a representation of the owners’ status within the group.\textsuperscript{155}

These conditions differ from those of the communities living in coastal areas. The more accommodative coastal areas in which they reside allow for a higher mobility and relations with the outside. Coastal people usually adopt several occupations at once for livelihood, such as fishing, gathering, cultivating and trading. Koentjaraningrat\textsuperscript{156} classifies Papuan people into three groups according to their geographic locations and occupations: populations in coastal and downstream areas, inland communities, and people living in central mountains.

The native cultures of Papua which depend strongly on nature create different social dynamics from those among the other populations. Some key factors to understand Papua: first is the awareness that Papua is a region with rich cultural variations that strongly relates to the varying physical domiciles. Second is Papuan’s habit of inward-looking into their respective traditions. The success of any new political structure and culture in coexistence with this rich array of cultures determines the level of harmony in the relations between the new elements and the natives. Third, nature is a part of the life and cultural system of the Pauans. Fourth, Papuan cultures can be divided into several groups based on their ethno linguistic characters.\textsuperscript{157}

Studies on Papua and Sorong Selatan abound discussing ethnicities and bureaucracies as well as discovering socio political and cultural dynamics in general.\textsuperscript{158} However, to contribute to the discourse of ethnicity, especially in

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, pp. 12-18.


\textsuperscript{158} See, for example, the research of Edward Kocu in regards with the influences of ethnic rivalry on the attitude of the voters during the Sorong Selatan election in 2005 (M.A. thesis, S2PLOD UGM, 2006), and other UGM Master’s thesis such as by Suroso, Politik Anggaran, Studi tentang Proses Politik dalam Penganggaran di Sorong Selatan (The Politics of Budgeting, A Study on the Political Budgeting Process in Sorong Selatan - 2009), and by Petronela Krenak, Pengaruh Etnisitas dalam Pengangkatan Pejabat Struktural Eselon II (The Influence of Ethnicity on the Recruitment of Structural Officials of Echelon II in Sorong Selatan - 2011).
relation with governmental structures and bureaucracy in Papua, it is necessary to discuss further the relation between the ethnicity and governmental bureaucracy of Sorong Selatan Regency.

As new regency, Sorong Selatan encounters new challenges, one of which is the contradiction between people’s expectation and normative challenges in the governance. On the one hand, local government is formed to deliver public services as mandated by the Law, while people, on the other hand, have a quite high expectation that the new governmental structure will act not only as a body of public service but will even play a role to redistribute financial resources.

B.1. Ethnic Composition in Sorong Selatan

The people of Sorong Selatan live in original Papuan social structure, that is, heterogenic, fragmented, and non-institutionalized. Domiciled in the area of this regency are several groups of people who insist on clinging on their root values. Sorong Selatan is the home for at least 6 ethnic groups: Maybrat, Tehit, Saepi, Sawiat, Ogit and Immeko. Among the six ethnic groups, three are dominant in their quantity: the Maybrat, the Tehit and the Imekko. In addition to the three, there are another two ethnic groups playing important roles in the socio-political dynamics of Sorong Selatan: the non-Sorong Selatan Papuans and non-Papuan settlers.

The ethnic groups are scattered on several districts. The Maybrats, also known as mountain people, live in highlands covering the districts of Ayamaru, North Ayamaru, Mare, Aifat, East Aifat, Aitinyo, part of Teminabuan, Wayer and Moswaren. The Tehits inhabit the districts of Teminabuan, Seremuk, and Wayer, while the Imekkos occupy the districts of Inanwatan, Kais, and Kokoda. Each ethnic group represents a specific socio-political structure, which eventually forms the existing social interactions. The Imekkos are fishermen and farmers, while the Maybrats and Tehits dominate the local governmental bureaucracy.

The partition of Maybrat Regency has changed the composition and distribution of ethnic groups in Sorong Selatan regency. The number of Maybrat

people residing in Sorong Selatan significantly decreased to 11.4%, while Tehit and Imekko becomes majorities with a total distribution of 79%. The following is a description on how ethnic groups in Sorong Selatan have finally formed a unique interaction system. Based on Sorong Selatan topography (consisting of plateau, mountains and slopes as well as lowlands and shores), the population can be grouped as follows.

**B.1.1. The Maybrats**

According to Mansoben’s study\(^\text{161}\), the Maybrats are nomadic farmers, resorting to shifting cultivation systems. In doing so, they use ‘slash-and-burn’ method of land clearing. The cleared areas are then cultivated with tuber, taro and other crops. In the past, the Maybrats comprised smaller groups living separately following a kinship pattern but in 1934, they had their first permanent villages due to Dutch colonial arrangement. This policy lasted until 1950s.

In addition to the shifting cultivation, the Maybrats also used a barter system for trade. Their most important currency is what they call *Kain Timur* or Eastern Cloth. *Kain Timur* is a piece of woven fabric originating from the clusters of East Nusa Tenggara and Moluccas. Not only does the cloth serve as major currency, it also has religious significance since it is believed to have a magical power. This gives *Kain Timur* a special place in the life of the Maybrats. The wealth and status of a Maybrat are represented by the numbers of *Kain Timur* that the person owns. The more pieces of *Kain Timur* a person has, the richer and more influential they are, particularly in collective decision-making. People who specialize in the engagement of this barter system are called *Bobot*. Being a *Bobot* is far more than an occupation with economic significance because a *Bobot* performs a multitude of roles simultaneously: a banker, a politician and a priest who leads religious ceremonies.

\(^{160}\) See Local Development Planning Board (Bappeda) of Sorong Selatan, *Kondisi Sosial Budaya Masyarakat*, 2011.

\(^{161}\) Mansoben, op.cit., pp. 67-69.
The research of Elmberg mentions that in order to be a Bobot, a person must first show generosity by actually helping others in need. The person receiving help from a Bobot automatically becomes a kuasemā, or disciple. In Papuan leadership types, the existence of a Bobot is comparable to the authority of The Big Man, whose domain is limited to his own residence.

Most Maybrats choose to become civil servants, traders, fishermen, entrepreneurs, or employees in privately-owned business or farms. The languages spoken usually are Indonesian and Maybrat languages. For the Maybrats, becoming a civil servant, especially in bureaucracy, is a notable achievement. It then encourages education, since it is Maybrat belief that it is only by having good education, capability, capacity and personal qualities that a person can occupy a bureaucratic position rather than by depending merely on ethnic background.

According to a Maybrat public figure, one of the most important motivations for a Maybrat to complete a formal education is the hope to become a government officer. This comes with awareness that they might not survive the competition in private sectors, especially trading, which is dominated by settlers from South Sulawesi. This kind of awareness has been growing in prevalence among most Papuans that they should work in public sectors and leave the private sectors to the settlers.

Currently, many Maybrats hold important political role in Sorong Selatan's government. Prior to the implementation of special autonomy, the Maybrats had been known to have a dominant role in the governmental structure even in all parts of Papua Province. In Sorong Selatan, although the numbers of Maybrat bureaucrats decreased as many of them moved to Maybrat Regency in 2009, qualitatively they remain dominant because many are still occupying the strategic positions. Their opinions and decisions contribute significantly to the acceleration of the governance. Their comparative educational advantages and

162Ibid, p.83.
163 Interview with Karel Murafer, former bureaucrat of Sorong Selatan who moved into Maybrat district, June 7th 2010 in Sorong. He was elected as a Vice Regent of Maybrat in October 2011.
164 Interview with Yunus Duwit, (then) the Chief of Ayamaru district, Sorong Selatan Regency, Teminabuan 16 July 2010.
work ethos allow the Maybrat bureaucrats to have better positions in local
governments, not only in Sorong Selatan but also in the other regencies and even
in the provincial governments of West Papua and Papua.

**B.1.2. The Tehits**

The Tehit ethnic group identify themselves as the natives of Sorong
Selatan. They inhabit the plains especially in Teminabuan, Konda, Seremuk,
Sawiat, Fkour and Saifi districts, which collectively represents 24.2% of the total
area of Sorong Selatan Regency with the registered population of 16,800 or
45.5%.

The Tehits earn their living from working as civil servants, fishermen,
traders, farmers and entrepreneurs. The Tehits cherish their original traditions
passed on by their ancestors, and continue to practise their ancient values. One
of the practices is offering *Kain Timur* and a sum of money as a dowry.

The Tehits speak Indonesian as well as other Papuan native tongues such
as Tehit, Imian, Sfah, Maybrat, Gemna, and Ogit languages. They established a
committee named *Dewan Adat Suku* (DAS – Ethnic Customary Council) Tehit to
gather and preserve their inherited cultures and tradition and to vote for their
bureaucratic representatives.

The characteristics of the Tehits can be divided into two based on sub-
ethnic groups. The first group resides in the coastal area and consists of those
known to be gentle-mannered and ‘slightly lazy’\(^1\)\(^6\), to have delicate dialect, and
to be easy to compromise and relatively receptive to the outsiders. Each of these
sub-ethnic groups adopts very strong bond, especially in preserving their unity
and securing their representatives in the bureaucracy. The two objectives are
achieved through establishing *Dewan Adat* and appointing chiefs from every sub-
ethnic group.

The second group are known to be hard workers, easy to build strong
teamwork, good in traditional customs and religions and have a thick dialect.\(^1\)\(^6\)

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\(^1\)\(^6\) The description of this personality was put forward by several native Tehitian informants. This
quality is primarily caused by the natural resources which are abundant and easy to access,
pampering the locals with advantages in shifting cultivation practices.

\(^1\)\(^6\) Interview with Martinus Salamuk, a Tehitian who was the Head of Local Personnel Board, 4
April 2011.
This group lives in the highlands. In addition to establishing *Dewan Adat Suku* Tehit, this group also appoints chiefs from every sub-ethnic group to secure each sub-ethnic group's interests as well as their representation in bureaucratic structure.

Among the Tehits, there is a strong perception that bureaucracy is the same as traditional custom, in which bureaucracy is seen as representing the same power structures as in customary social relations. This encourages them to pay attention to the performance of bureaucracy to keep its accordance with the people's needs. Serving as civil servants is perceived as performing traditional governance. Strong concerns and hopes as the people's leaders who will meet their people's needs are attached to civil servants. In this group, every parent expects their children to be civil servants in the hope to that they would become the future leaders. It is thought that “it is better for our children to be civil servants than to become entrepreneurs.”\textsuperscript{167} Such a perception confirms that for them, traditional customs, bureaucracy and political domains are the same.

**B.1.3. The Imekkos**

Imekko, being the abbreviation of Inanwatan, Matemani, Kais and Kokoda, unites the four ethnic groups residing along the shoreline. The area inhabited by the Imekkos comprises 50% of the total area of Sorong Selatan regency. The Imekkos are distributed in the districts of Inanwatan, Matemani, Kais, Kokoda and North Kokoda, composing a total population of 15,942 or 43.1% of Sorong Selatan population.

The Imekkos are predominantly fishermen, but also private sector employees, farmers and traders, with a large number working as civil servants. The Imekkos established *LMA Imekko* (Customary Deliberative Council) to gather and preserve their cultural and traditional values, as well as to appoint officers to represent them in the bureaucracy.

The social characteristics of the Imekkos are similar to those of the Tehits. They tend to be open and receptive to foreigners, are generally less industrious.

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\textsuperscript{167} Interview with Michael Momot, the Chief of Tehit’s Ethnic Customary Council, May 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2011 in Teminabuan.
because they have been pampered with plenteous natural resources which are easy to get. The other similarity is seen in weddings, funeral, land ownership and custom penalties. While the Tehits barter *Kain Timur*, the Imekkos trade with vases, plates and ceramic items just like people in Fak-Fak and Serui.

While the majority of people work as fishermen and farmers, the Imekkos generally perceive civil servant as a dignified profession. Parents send their children to school in the hope that they would become civil servants. Infrastructural limitations make the people realize that fishing is no longer a secure means of the livelihood to raise the family.

School graduates also have strong desire to become civil servants, since there are hardly other career options. Had any company operated in Sorong Selatan, people would have more occupational options, higher salaries and many other allowances. Such an unfortunate absence of alternatives has been locking them in the thoughts that only by being civil servants that they would be proud of: life would be secured and financed by the State.¹⁶⁸

**B.1.4. Non-Sorong Selatan Papuans**

In this study, Non-Sorong Selatan Papuans in general refers to Papuan ethnic groups other than the big three of Sorong Selatan. The group comprises the ethnic groups of Biak, Serui, Wamena, Jayapura, Merauke, Fak-Fak, Bintuni and Manokwari. Among those, only Biak and Serui have People’s Councils. Most Non-Sorong Selatan Papuans are civil servants and fishermen. By ethnic groups, their known characteristics are as follows: Biak, Wamena and Manokwari are tough, while Serui is gentle.

The ways this group perceives bureaucracy and occupation as civil servants is similar to those of Sorong Selatan ethnics. For Papuans who are not Sorong Selatan natives, the structure and particularly the culture of bureaucracy is accepted as the tradition they practice among themselves, encouraging their strong concern and efforts to control it as the execution of their traditional

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¹⁶⁸ Interview with Dominggus Aifufu, the Chief of Imekko’s Customary Council (DAS Imekko), May 2nd 2011 in Teminabuan.
customs to meet the people’s needs. Serving in a public sector are regarded an extension of traditional government.

**B.1.5. Non-Papuan Settlers (Pendatang)**

Non-Papuan settlers, known as *pendatang*, started arriving in Sorong when Teminabuan was made the capital district as a part of Sorong Regency in early 1980s. In the earlier years, the Non-Papuans departing from Java and Sulawesi used to come as fishermen and traders. Some of them, generally from Java, were transported as transmigration participants and, being so, were given pieces of land at transmigration areas in Moswaren and its surrounding. Along with the development, they migrate to Teminabuan district, where most of them now reside in Kohoin and Kaibus sub-districts. This group consists of people from Bugis, Buton, Makassar, Ambon, Java and Toraja, and is estimated to compose 10% of Sorong and Sorong Selatan population.¹⁶⁹

They preserve their traditional customs, which are obvious in the dowry offering. In addition to speaking Indonesian, they also keep their mother tongue (Javanese, Ambonese, Bugis, Torajanese). Non-Papuans have good interethnic cooperations, both within themselves and with the Tehits, the Imekkos and the Maybrats. In general, this group has comparatively better quality human resources than the natives do especially seen from their education level.¹⁷⁰ Non-Papuan settlers have different character from one another. While Javanese are known as being gentle, tolerant and helpful, the Bugis-Makassarese are tough. They compete each other in business. The Buton people are receptive, easy to cooperate with, but are tough competitors in business.¹⁷¹ In general, this group is more dynamic. Most people of this group engage in economic and service sectors and commonly work as traders and motorcycle taxi drivers.

**B.2. Bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan**

¹⁶⁹ See Local Development Planning Board (Bappeda) of Sorong Selatan, *Kondisi Sosial Budaya Masyarakat*, 2011.


¹⁷¹ This information was obtained from Focus Group Discussion on The Characteristic of Sorong Selatan Society, held in Teminabuan, 11 April 2011.
The dynamics of Sorong Selatan’s government reveal the behavioural trends between the paradigms of modern politics and the primordial structure of the indigenous Papuans. Such phenomena can be seen in almost all corners of Papua, especially since the implementation of special autonomy policy aimed to synergize modern government system with traditional customs.

The effects and manifestations of the special autonomy vary from one regency/municipality to the others. However, in most cases, there is a common expression of ethnic identities related to the issue of local representatives. A similar phenomenon also emerges in Sorong Selatan. Such catchphrase as the local democracy strengthening, local empowerment, and even the natives’ rights restorations have been popular during the special autonomy era. New hopes on the settlement of unfairness and demands for bigger roles in political structure (through Provincial parliament) and modern government (through bureaucracy) continue to emerge and solidify.

However, at the level of policy implementation, special autonomy often ends up in a paradox, in which greater autonomy often leads to higher chance of poor governance as considerations of ethnic demands for representativeness in bureaucracy outweigh the presumed rational considerations in bureaucratic implementation. This is what happened in Sorong Selatan. The policy aimed for bigger room for the fulfilment of natives’ rights has created new problems in bureaucracy, not only in Sorong Selatan but also in Papua Provinces where the diverse cultures and social structures exist in its societies. The following is a description on the political and governmental dynamics of Sorong Selatan Regency in the special autonomy era.

**B.3. Representative Bureaucracy: Ethnic Accommodation**

*Putra daerah* was a perennial topic during the special autonomy era all over Papua. *Putra daerah* is translated as the maximization and prioritization of representatives from among the local societies to sit in political and bureaucratic positions. The term *putra daerah* is unfortunately seen in narrower view as being the representatives of each ethnic group in the government. The vast opportunity presented by this policy for the local human resources has changed the composition of bureaucratic structure, where the local representatives played
dominant roles in Papua’s local governments. This also holds true to Sorong Selatan Regency.

Representative democracy has been a dominant concept in the discourse of democracy in the modern era. Theoretically speaking, representative democracy is geared around the idea of popular governance through political parties that represent the people. Political parties run this representative role through their cadres elected through elections to sit in a legislative institution, which plays its role as an intermediary channel to articulate and aggregate people's interest to be actualized into government's policies. However, the case of Sorong Selatan, representative democracy is different. The main distinguishable characteristic in the practices of representative democracy in Sorong Selatan is that the representation is actualized not only through political parties and legislative bodies but also through the bureaucracy.

The main characteristic of Sorong Selatan’s government during the special autonomy policy has been the prevalence of strong ethnic influence on the dynamics of local government. This is obvious especially in recruitment process of bureaucratic officials, which is strongly influenced by politics of ethnic accommodation. The daily governance, both in bureaucracy and in political systems, is strongly related to ethnicity. Ethnic domination continues to determine the strength of one’s position and decisions in the governmental mechanism.

There has been a strong correlation between ethnic identification and communal way of life among the native people in Sorong Selatan. In their daily lives, Sorong Selatan natives live a very strong communal life. In most ethnic groups, when a child is sent to school, all members of the particular ethnic group will pay for the tuition collectively. In return, the beneficiary is under an obligation to return the favour to anybody from within the ethnic group in need. A successful member of a society carries a debt which the person has to pay back to the people. Brought to the public domain, such practices make the public services delivered by the local government inefficient for its orientation is often altered to fulfil personal interests.
There is a lack of emphasis on professionalism in the bureaucratic recruitment system, where there remains an emphasis on ethnicity.\textsuperscript{172} This is also closely related to the relationship patterns within the groups with the priority on returning favours among members of an ethnic of sub-ethnic group. If they manage to get a seat as a bureaucrat, they must then facilitate others from among their people to obtain positions in their subordinate, reporting lines.\textsuperscript{173}

This politically-accommodative policy is reflected in the local policies composed by the executives. The vision of Sorong Selatan Regency as written in the RPJMD (medium-term regional development plan) 2005-2010 includes \textit{togetherness, continuity and even distribution}. Most dominant ethnic groups interpret this governmental vision as an obligation to keep the proportionality of ethnic representation in the bureaucratic structure. This renders it difficult to uphold the regulations and the standards of modern government in a society with very strong traditional roots. The problems are way beyond aligning the interests and values of the settlers and the traditional values perceived to be a local wisdom. It must at the same time encourage agreement among local actors or among the ethnic groups themselves.

There is a dominant view among senior officials and other stakeholders\textsuperscript{174} that high rates of ethnic representation is essential for the local government to be perceived as highly responsive to people’s aspirations or, in other words, to ensure the fulfilment of each ethnic group’s aspirations. Besides strong ethnic influence in the governmental dynamics, this also identifies differences in the governing definition between local actors and the rationality standards of

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interesting description on the tradition of returning favours or gift practiced by traditional ethnic groups can be found in Marcel Mauss, \textit{The Gift, The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies}, W.W. Norton, New York – London, 1990, pp. 19-32.
\item Interviews with the Regent, the Head of Local Offices, members of People’s Representative Council, women figures, ethnic group figures, and religious figures. See Chapter I, especially on Methodology.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
modern political system. Even the necessity to keep the proportionality of ethnic representation in government is legitimated in the local development plans.\textsuperscript{175}

Concerns about the ethnic proportionality policy have grown among bureaucrats, especially when it was realized that in order to place their ethnic representatives in the bureaucracy, the more important aspects of capacity and real skills would often be compromised for ethnic considerations. Such a condition interrupts the effectiveness and productivity of government bureaucracy in delivering public services.\textsuperscript{176}

Nevertheless, there exists a strong preference among members of the society, bureaucrats and local politicians, that the public-oriented positions have to be occupied by indigenous Papuan. This leads to a variety of popular demands from ethnic group members for a position in the government through their people who have made their ways to strategic positions in bureaucratic structure. Thus, a bureaucratic position that should be assigned through a series of recruitment processes involving qualifications, administration and professionalism, is taken for granted and is claimed to certain group's entitlement.

The modern political system works beyond the primordial boundaries. Meanwhile, for the locals, such primordial boundaries are perceived as the basis of representation. These two competing logics result in irregular interaction between the modern political structures and the local values, promoting syncretism between two aspects: a structural modern governmental machine with various formal representative institutions with the spirit of ethnicity based on primordial values as its engine.

Another opinion held by bureaucrats and politicians is that ethnic representation in Sorong Selatan is politically important to keep the stability of the local government. Although making the local government politically stable, such a recruitment mechanism jeopardizes bureaucracy by compromising the

\textsuperscript{175} Interview with Agustinus Makamur (the Head of Socio-Cultural Section, Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan), S2PLOD UGM, Friday, June 13\textsuperscript{th} 2008.

\textsuperscript{176} Interview with Suroso (Secretary of Bappeda - Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan), Teminabuan, March 7\textsuperscript{th} 2011.
capacity and working capability of the bureaucrats, in that competency and professionalism become less significant than ethnic background.

Weakness in the control of competency standards causes difficulties in assessing bureaucrats’ quality standards. The poor quality of bureaucrats and politicians involved in the government is obvious from the unsatisfactory bureaucratic performance, worsened by lack of relative comprehension of governing processes. The performances of local governmental institutions, or known as SKPD (local government units) in composing planning and reporting documents are poor. Up to the beginning of 2011, an absence of SKPD strategic plan documentation meant there were no plans and budgeting for the five years following.\textsuperscript{177} Budgeting processes are influenced by compromises of personal interests between those in both executive and legislative sectors. While public needs are not accommodated, the budgeting is set on ‘agreements’ between the two.\textsuperscript{178}

The results of this dynamic have wide long-term effects, which are threatening the stability of the government itself. In budgeting, the vast accommodation for bureaucrats and politicians’ interests leads to inefficiency with corrosive effect on the quality of public services.

In the recruitment of the government officers, excessive accommodation to ethnic groups also translated to the poor quality of local government’s human resources. Among many problems arising from ethnic accommodation in Sorong Selatan Regency is the difficult application of professional-based recruitment system, resulting in a poor local government performance overall.

**B.4. Poor Capacity of Local Government**

Good local governance requires bureaucrats with adequate and proper capacities to perform their respective tasks. The educational level determines a person’s job capacity. As the logic goes, therefore, Sorong Selatan Regency will

\textsuperscript{177} A team from UGM assigned to mentor the local government in preparing the planning papers (Local Strategic Planning) in November 2010 discovered the fact that no Local Government Institution has Strategic Plans.

also need the well performing bureaucrats with excellent educational backgrounds in accordance with their respective positions and duties.

The data obtained in 2010\(^\text{179}\) shows that most civil servants in Sorong Selatan Regency are at least senior high school or university graduates. Only 44 out of 1,273 employees are junior high school or elementary graduates. In total there are more higher education graduates than senior high school graduates. It shows that statistically, Sorong Selatan Regency is supported by adequately qualified bureaucrats.

### Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/Academy</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,273</strong></td>
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A high level of education does not guarantee one’s capacity in performing the bureaucratic work. Most officers arrive at their offices at 10:00 a.m. and leave for home before 1:00 p.m., despite requisite working hours being between 8:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. six days a week. In addition, public employees including staffs and top-level officials also lack the minimal technical skills required, such as composing official letters, speech, let alone proposals for development activities.\(^\text{181}\)

\(^{179}\) Data from BKD (Badan Kepegawaian dan Diklat Daerah - Local Staffing and Training Personnel Board) of Sorong Selatan, 2010.

\(^{180}\) Data from BKD (Badan Kepegawaian Daerah - Local Personnel Board) of Sorong Selatan, 2010.

\(^{181}\) Interview with Suroso (the Secretary of Bappeda - Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan), March 7\(^{th}\) 2011, strongly confirmed the result of Competence Assessment for Government Official Structural Level at Echelon II, III, and IV for Sorong Selatan Regency, March 3\(^{rd}\) - 6\(^{th}\) 2011.
Due to the aforementioned ethnic accommodation, individual capacity among the officers in local government often fails to meet the minimum needs for administration tasks. This phenomenon, where officers and staffs are unable to perform their core tasks and functions then becomes the common symptom in local government. This lack of capability could be a product of discrepancies between educational backgrounds, insufficient training on governance, poor work ethos, and low personal capacity.

The discrepancy between the grading requirements and structural positions occupied by officers is emphasized by the pressure to accommodate ethnic accommodation. This causes specific problems. For instance, in assigning a position, the ethnic accommodation forces a person with poorer educational background and skills to occupy a position that actually requires a higher competence. A governmental agency requiring a bureaucrat with practical experience and technical competency in certain field as the head of the agency is then occupied by an officer who is a graduate of social sciences, without experience in the requisite field. Even most second-layer officers are former teachers with no experience in their respective fields.

Similar cases can be found in almost all local government institutions including Local Development Planning Board (Bappeda) which formally plays a role as the local development planning institution. In Sorong Selatan, the institution obviously encounters problems. None of the 32 employees is a certified planner which is a minimum standard qualification set out by Central Government for civil servants working in the Local Development Planning Board. Some high level officers, even those who formally hold university degrees, have problem with their capacity. The quality of human resources in the bureaucracy has been called ‘pathetic’, in that ‘most cannot even write a half-page letter’.182

Apart from the ethnicity problem in the bureaucracy that weakens the capacity of the local government, several negative cross-ethnic and rather personal attitudes also contribute to worsening the problem. One of them is the

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182 Interview with Suroso (Secretary of Bappeda - Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan), March 7th 2011, strongly confirmed the result of Competence Assessment for Government Official Structural Level in March 2011, identifying most bureaucrats’ poor capacity to express their ideas in writing.
reluctance of the public officials to reside in their office neighbourhood. Most of them choose to live in the more advanced town of Sorong. They often travel to Makassar or Jakarta, claiming their absence as official trips. Local government’s institutional budget is wasted on the so-called official trips’ transportation, accommodation and travel allowances.

The poor performance of the officers in general limits the time and quality of service allocated for the public in Sorong Selatan regency. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg, while the underlying problem is the weak governance tradition performed by the local government of Sorong Selatan Regency. To some extent, a bureaucrat’s strong bond to his or her ethnic origin causes relatively more complex problems in governmental dynamics.

Furthermore, the lack of awareness among the local government officials of Sorong Selatan of the importance of the formal mechanism in governance has caused another problem related to the effectiveness of its performance. The mechanism of governance accountability is paralysed by personal and ethnic considerations. Governance logic, which is supposed to serve the people’s interest, is transformed into an arena to serve certain group’s interest. Thus, the poor discipline, the inadequate personal capacity and the higher tensions to accommodate each ethnic’s interests in the government’s structure have enfolded public service activities and institutional basic functions in a greater problem.

**B.5. Anomalies in Governmental Functions**

The problems identified above limit the capacity of government officials and significantly impacts on the general quality of local governance in Sorong Selatan Regency. These accumulated weaknesses eventually produce functional anomalies in local government.

The first anomaly is the tendency of treating public service as communal service functions. In their daily lives, the people of Sorong Selatan Regency adopt very strong communal pattern. As mentioned before, when a child goes to school, the communal group will chip in for the tuition, and later demands for their favour to be returned. Members of these communities who successfully made his way to the governmental posts then will carry a social obligation to fulfil the
needs of their ethnic group in order to return the favour they previously received. Among those who hold the public offices, one prevalent method to return the favour they owe to their community is by offering their fellows some concessions, usually in the form of other offices.

Another common recruitment pattern in Sorong Selatan regency can be seen when an Agency is chaired by a bureaucrat from a certain ethnic group, it is almost certain that all lower officials in the particular Agency will be occupied by the people from the same ethnic group. There is a common saying that, “If I am a Maybrat, then I should gather my fellow Maybrats. Or if I am a Teminabuan, I will for sure want to work only with my relatives from Teminabuan”\(^\text{183}\) Not only on the recruitment process does this phenomena prevail, changes in bureaucracy elites are also followed by the changes in the formation which, again, is based on ethnic consideration. This condition narrows the governance process to be of the interests of a small group of people.

In discussions conducted with the Head of Social Services, it transpired that the most common program has been giving charity to people who submitted proposals. He even stated that\(^\text{184}\) the Office of Social Services was primarily established to drive the crowd carrying proposals away from the Regent’s Office. In 2008, the average numbers of proposals submitted to the Office of Social Services was up to twenty copies everyday, which made the Office spend IDR 15 billion annually on social charity.\(^\text{185}\)

The second anomaly can be seen in the volume of policy actioned without planning. Bureaucratic officials have poor capabilities to come up with well developed programs. Thus it is no surprise that most government activities are merely sectoral, and often accidental. On top of it, political decision-making process tends to look for any available opportunities to divert any previously planned and agreed policies. As a result, many development programmes end up without any clear benefit. One good example is the 2006 construction of a central, traditional market expected to be the centre of economic activities. Without any

\(^{183}\) Interview with Petronella Krenak, the Head of Training and Education Section of Local Staffing and Training Agency of Sorong Selatan, at PLOD UGM, Thursday, June 12th 2008.

\(^{184}\) Interview with the Head of Office for Social Affairs, September 17th 2008 in Teminabuan.

\(^{185}\) Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw in Teminabuan, 11 April 2011.
supporting facilities and infrastructures including road, water and electricity supply, no single trader from the old Teminabuan Market would move their business to the new, well-built marketplace several years after its completion in 2009.\textsuperscript{186}

The third anomaly is that various unclear and often overlapping regulations between central and local governments amplify the complexity of Sorong Selatan’s governance. The regulation on the usage of special autonomy budgets is a strong example of this anomaly. While allocating a vast amount of cash fund to Papua, the special autonomy policy has no clear legal framework concerning the usage and reporting of the fund. For the acceleration of infrastructure in Papua, the 2008-2009 Budget allocated was around IDR 1.4 trillion. The budget was distributed to both Papua and Papua Barat Provinces, where each province got IDR 800 billion and IDR 600 billion respectively, without any clear instruction on further distribution of this budget to the regency level. The utilization of such a budget is supposed to be regulated at provincial level through \textit{Perdasi}. Since the regulation was not yet formulated, the distribution then was executed based on the policies issued by the Governor or even the head of provincial office of public works. The result was the absence of standardized formulation in the distribution of special autonomy budget and, furthermore, an uneven distribution where not all regencies/municipalities were provided with a proportional distribution of the budget to their respective local needs.\textsuperscript{187} The story did not end here. Regencies/municipalities found it difficult to use the budget since the fund was used in sectoral manner (fields of top priorities such as education, health and people’s economic empowerment) following the patterns attached to the realized provincial and district budget (APBD). The problem lies in the absence of the regulation on the distribution and allocation of special autonomy budget in comparison with original realized district budget.

**B.6. Interaction with the Settlers**

\textsuperscript{186} Interviews with Suroso (Secretary of Local Development Planning Board) in Teminabuan, 4 April 2011 and with Regent Otto Ihalauw in Teminabuan 11 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw, September 19\textsuperscript{th} 2008, in Sorong.
Sorong Selatan’s geostrategic position at the crossing of shipping lanes opens up the opportunities for the native population to intensively interact with settlers. Among the large groups of settlers in Sorong Selatan came from Bugis, Buton and Makasar (generally initialized as BBM), who are commonly fishermen and traders. Compared to the locals who are still relying on their simple equipment, the BBMs have far better fishing technology. BBM traders also have strong chain of supplies from outside Sorong Selatan, including Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Java.

As explained previously, most people of Sorong Selatan engage in small-scale economic activities. The native population’s production activities are limited to meet the daily needs of their nuclear families. Meanwhile, the economic activities with larger production scopes are run by the settlers and various corporations headquartered outside Sorong Selatan. The fishing sector is dominated by BBM fishermen. The capability of the locals to replicate the success of the settler fishermen in making big profit from the shores of Sorong Selatan is quite low.

The more advanced settlers and the locals have actually initiated unique interaction dynamic. The natives who are strongly bound to the nature and still relying on simple ways of life can live side by side with the settlers who have use more advanced production techniques. The locals are quite receptive to settlers whose presence does not raise any significant social upheaval despite the settlers’ more advanced economy. According to the Head of Dinas Perindagkop (Local Department of Industry, Trade and Small Medium Enterprises), the locals are accepting of the settlers. The differences in income and prosperity do not raise any social jealousy among the locals. This phenomenon can be interpreted in two ways. The first possibility is that the locals of Sorong Selatan are open to settlers, the second that the locals are indifferent to change.

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188 Interview Nimrod Nauw, the Head of Local Department of Industry and Trade Service – SME, Sorong Selatan Regency, 4 April 2011.
189 Interview with Suroso (Secretary of Local Development Planning Board), 4 April 2011.
190 Interview with Nimrod Nauw, the Head of Local Department of Industry and Trade Service – SME, Sorong Selatan Regency, 4 April 2011.
An indication that the second possibility is more likely is shown by a local bureaucrat’s statement that the locals takes the phenomenon –differences in both income and human resource competiveness– as nothing they should be concerned about. This apathy is seen by some as a bold indicator of the locals’ low desire to earn a better living.\(^{191}\) There is no resistance whatsoever shown by the locals against the settlers’ trading activities. There is even no social conflict arising from struggles to win any job sector since the inception of Sorong Selatan Regency out of the old Sorong Regency.\(^{192}\) The locals’ failure to compete is perceived as normal and not leading to conflicts: according to a local officer, the local government will try its best to protect and ensure the economic enforcement of the locals so that they can learn from the settlers. The locals are not directly involved in the economy because they are not ready to get involved and are still satisfied with what they have at the moment.\(^{193}\)

Despite the absence of conflict between the locals and BBM or Javanese settlers, the economy is dominated by the settlers. When describing his own condition, Junus Duwit mentioned that in average, the locals, including those working as bureaucratic officials, cannot focus on themselves but have to take their families and ethnic groups into account, so that self improvement is really hard to achieve. However, he admitted that changes started to happen as the result of the economy that encouraged the locals to be more individualistic. The problem with the settlers usually is the habit of taking care of themselves, giving no attention to the locals. This might happen since their motivation is “earning money in Papua, not earning money in and for Papua.”\(^{194}\)

Another problem is “laziness”. In the past, many native young men worked as motorcycle taxi drivers, but now the settlers have taken these jobs. It seems that the locals have had difficulties in figuring out what to do to productively take part in social changes occurring in their homeland particularly in the context of

\(^{191}\) Interview with Yunus Duwit, when he was appointed as the Head of Socio-Cultural Section, Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan Regency, Teminabuan, July 22\(^{nd}\) 2009.

\(^{192}\) Interview with Nimrod Nauw, the Head of Local Department of Industry and Trade Service – SME, Sorong Selatan Regency, 4 April 2011.

\(^{193}\) Interview with Yunus Duwit, in Teminabuan, 22 July 2009.

\(^{194}\) Interview with Yunus Duwit, in Teminabuan, 22 July 2009
special autonomy that they now enjoy. At the same time, settlers also show no intention of involving the locals in their bigger-scale economic activities in the region.

**B.7. The Weakness of Governability**

Concluding this chapter, it should be added that the ethnicity problem is not the only factor to cause the disadvantages and poor performance of the bureaucracy. As a newly founded entity, Sorong Selatan Regency has no strong root in governance tradition. Since the Dutch's colonial era, indicated by the strong roles played by the church up to the era of special autonomy, there have been various policies to cope with the fact that the people of Sorong Selatan are left behind.

Throughout the periods prior to the decentralization era, Papuans' participation in the government activities had been denied. During the colonial era, the Dutch colonial structure gave barely enough space for the natives to take part in the government. Such a condition went on during the periods of Old Order (the era of President Soekarno) and the New Order (post-1965), when governmental structure in Papua was run by non-Papuan bureaucrats. Yet, decentralization and political liberalization since 1998 has provided Papuans with more space for the involvement in the political structures and government. Law 21/2001 carves more rooms for the locals through the implementation of special autonomy for Papua. However, this new opportunity was not accompanied with the preparation of local resources to enter such a modern governance mode. Special autonomy was even interpreted as a justification for the abandonment of technocratic qualifications of local human resources in managing a local government.

From time to time, a trend of weak governance in society and local government can be seen. Since the era of church mission to the New Order, the development programs aimed to cope with regional disadvantage and were carried out by external actors. The presence of the external actors as the main engine of these development programs caused a problematic learning process and program sustainability. The people and local government tend to act only as the recipients and technical executors of various programs while program
designing and reporting are performed by the external actors and rarely involving the native population in its conception.
CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACTS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

A. The Context of Local Bureaucratic Institutions

The restructuring of bureaucratic institutions in Sorong Selatan starting in 2008 took place within the context of a study conducted by the Gadjah Mada University's Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (hereafter cited as UGM Team). The study was conducted at the request of the Local Government of Sorong Selatan regency to establish bureaucratic institutions aimed at effective and efficient implementation of main government functions.

A formulation on the ideal structure for the new bureaucratic institution in Sorong Selatan preceded the whole process of bureaucratic restructuring. The structure had to operate within the context of national regulations specifically applicable to both Papua Province and West Papua Province, that is, the policy of special autonomy. The special autonomy-related policy issued on the base of Law No. 21/2001 was underpinned by normative considerations to accelerate regional development in the region, putting it on the pillars of infrastructure, education, health, and local economic community developments.

The establishment of new bureaucratic institutions in Sorong Selatan regency faced a fundamental question: could restructuring of bureaucratic institutions improve the performance of local government, particularly in addressing the local issues of Sorong Selatan? The restructuring of local bureaucratic institutions in Sorong Selatan regency was seen as an effort to empower offices so that a local government body could work properly to address the problems of the people. Normatively, the problems and the goals are embodied in the local government’s vision, mission, and strategic plans. Taken in a specific framework of special autonomy policy whose substance was to build the pillars of basic public services, the restructure was critical as Sorong Selatan had recently been named a Regency. It would mean that in the restructuring phase, the local government would need to lay the foundations of a strong government as the first step to meet the dreams of the community for the newly
established regency. The restructuring of government institutions in Sorong Selatan Regency needed to become a prerequisite for better public services.

B. Framework of the Restructuring of Bureaucratic Institutions

Within the framework of the policy on Papua’s Special Autonomy, the UGM Team was entrusted with conducting the study with the agreement of the Regent of Sorong Selatan. The study found that it is impossible to impose a normal standard of the restructuring of bureaucratic institutions, as stipulated in Central Government Regulation No. 41/2007.

The documents on the establishment of Sorong Selatan agency indicated that the concerns of the people revolved around provision of basic services, the development of infrastructures, and the strengthening of local economy. The establishment and development of local institutions had to be oriented toward the fulfilment of people’s expectations for the new regency.

The establishment of government is not a simple process consisting of the determination of nomenclature and the appointment of its officials. In addition to the capacity and capability of apparatuses, the functioning of local government as a system in relation to the people is largely determined by the local government traditions. At least, these traditions determine the specific mode of governance.

Although the main objective of the local bureaucratic restructuring was to respond the local issues, the principles of local bureaucratic reform (including the need to be responsive, transparent and accountable) were key references. In such a framework, the restructuring of local institutions would not only concern the aspects of the formation of Local Government Unit (SKPD) and appointment of the top officials, but also deal with the aspects of organizational relationships and the aspects of normative institutionalisation to encourage the proper functioning of local institutions. The next challenge became how to put the framework into practice.
C. The Socio-Political Dynamics in The Process of Restructuring Local Institutions

To understand the problems trapping the local government in detail, the following section maps influential aspects on the establishment of existing local institutions, then follows with a description and analysis of socio-political dynamics after the establishment of new institutions, as a result of the evaluation and recommendation by UGM Team. Sources come in the form of data obtained through field observation and in-depth interviews with all local government officials, both on-site (in Teminabuan and its surrounding areas) and off-site (by interviewing those attending the postgraduate program in UGM). This process was carried out to understand the background of the existing institutions and the socio-political situations contributing to the establishment of their offices. The mapping of aspects observed and the subsequent implications for restructuring local institutions is detailed below.

First, based on the study of the structure of the existing local institutions and in-depth interview with the policy makers, it was found that the lack of clarity in the reconstructing local institutions led to its vulnerability to political pressure and intervention. It was revealed that in the structure of old local institutions, there were offices from which the public did not benefit and which served no clear functions in the bureaucracy.

As a new administration, Sorong Selatan faced two demands. On the one hand, to immediately establish local institutions to run governmental functions, and on the other hand, human resources of the existing local government apparatuses did not have the capacity of constructing the local institutions properly. Most of the existing local bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan are transfers from other districts such as Sorong Manokwari and Jayapura. The early years of their service in Sorong Selatan saw their reluctance increase productivity in the bureaucratic sense. Most bureaucrats were still busy with the administrative requirements of the transfer. Most of their time was spent commuting from their homes in Sorong or Manokwari to Sorong Selatan, rendering inadequate the formation of the local institutions.

Secondly, the problems faced by local government in the establishment of the local institutions was not sufficiently mapped. In this case, policy makers
considered the establishment of local institutions the prime goal, rather than its ability as an instrument in developing local governmental capacity. In view of this process, it became apparent that the potential and capacity of bureaucracy was ignored. The reason for establishing the local institutions was dominated more by a necessity to accommodate group interests. Only scant consideration for the real needs of the region can be observed. In the reconstructing of local institutions, both potentials and capacity of the bureaucracy should have been taken into account and the bureaucrats should not have been entirely submissive to the ethnic and political group interests.

In the formation of the local institutions in Sorong Selatan in 2007, the senior Papuan politician Willem Saflesa served as the Chief of Special Committee of Local institutions. Saflersa was It was a local Parliamentarian and in his five-year tenure from 2004 he actively influenced the establishment of local institutions. In such a position, he recognized that the establishment of the local institutions was merely to provide senior Papuan indigenous bureaucrats with strategic official positions. On the overstuffed offices in Sorong Selatan bureaucracy, he stated:

"The draft of the organization of local institutions was entirely prepared by local government, the Executive. We observed that the composition was too big, but it was still appropriate according to Central Regulation. Therefore, the Local Office of Education was divided into two, namely: Office of Primary Education and Office of Secondary Education. However, we should understand that the establishment of new local government institutions is still entirely political-oriented, where senior local peoples fought with each other for various strategic official positions; it is a reason for taking the maximum allowed number of local offices."

This recognition confirms that the structure of local government institutions in Sorong Selatan in 2007 were not designed for optimal bureaucratic functioning.

Thirdly, in the appointment or recruitment of officials to the structural positions in the local institutions, this study unveils the prevalence of strong bargaining of group interests, to the extent that awarding offices was used as an incentive to support the ruling groups, at the expense of governmental

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sustainability and effectiveness. This model resulted in the limited number of objectively qualified officials in the regency. While an appointment might consider the ethnic group representation, it was not always based on professional qualification as provided by the Ministry of the State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform.\textsuperscript{196} On this issue, the Regent recognized that there had been difficulties in meeting the regulatory criteria on the officials’ standards of competence. In an interview, Regent Otto Ihalauw stated:

"We understand that what we did deviated from the normative standards of the regulatory provisions. However, had such normative standards been imposed, there would have been two possibilities. First, it would have been extremely difficult to have officials with the requisite qualification, and second, people would have judged the Regent as neglecting the people's interest, or the group’s interests of the local communities."

Nonetheless, there is no existing analysis on the officials’ capacities and competencies as their basis of appointment at the time of writing. Without such analysis, the Regent and top-level officials in the local government of Sorong Selatan regency are without basic guidance in appropriate standards for appointment. Normatively speaking, there has been at the national level a standardised qualification to fill the structural positions by echelon. At that time, however, the Local Government of Sorong Selatan regency did not refer to the particular standards of professional qualification in appointing any official. With no standards of qualification, the pursuit of groups’ interests was unregulated, resulting in the low level of professionalism in bureaucracy. In addition, the Regent serves as a single, dominant decision-making official. In a respondent’s words, "At the end, everything is at the Regent’s [subjective] discretion."\textsuperscript{198} It

\textsuperscript{196} Ministry of the State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform is a ministry in charge of empowering the state apparatus and promoting the bureaucratic reform. The ministry performs the main functions to formulate (and to coordinate the implementation of) the national policies in the empowerment of state apparatus at both central and local institutions, human resources personnel. The Ministry’s mission statement includes the tasks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of state apparatus, to improve the quality of public services, to improve performance and accountability of apparatus, to improve the coordination of supervision and to promote the professionalism of human resources personnel. See http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/ministries/ministers/state-minister-for-the-empowerment-of-state-apparatus/1645-profile/269-kementerian-negara-pendayagunaan-aparatur-negara-dan-reformasi-birokrasi

\textsuperscript{197} Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw, Yogyakarta, 12 February 2008.

\textsuperscript{198} Interview with several officials and staffs in Section of Law and Organization, Secretariat of Local Government of Sorong Selatan Regency. The statement was supported by the other
means that without submitting a respectful attitude and indication to maintain a harmonious relationship with the Regent, it would be hard for the particular candidates to be appointed in certain structural official positions even if they showed the professionalism. In other words, all the beneficences were used as the bases in decision-making. It shows that the leadership function is dominant in this context. To set up professional and accountable local institutions in the future, there should be a sound, established standard of mechanism for appointment of officials to make sure that an appointment does not depend on the Regent’s sole discretion. Although in political and technocratic terms, a regent has the justified authority on an official’s appointment, the regent’s dominant role can, indeed, put the bureaucratic performance (especially that in the strategic sectors) at stake, particularly when the regent does not immediately recruit or appoint officials for certain political calculation in the decision.

Fourthly, the upcoming establishment of the local institutions in Sorong Selatan relates to the coordinative interrelations among the Local Government Units. Although all institutions are parts of the local government of Sorong Selatan regency, there lacked an effective coordinating mechanism (particularly those in-interrelated functions). This led to excessive orientation to self-importance that, in turn, made inter-governmental-agency cooperation difficult. As a result, most development programs overlapped (and were not synergistic). The provisions of local institutions should not only specify nomenclature of Local Government Units and their respective authority and workload, but also formulate a mechanism of inter-institutional coordination. In the context of transition management, the following should be arranged: 1) the Standard Operating Procedures of institutional relations, both among the Local Government Units and between the Local Government Units and the Regent, and between the Local Government Units and District-Village; 2) the internal Standard Operating Procedures of each Local Government Unit on the mechanism of tasks performance in respective institutions.

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informant, staffs of the Local Development Planning Board, Sorong Selatan Regency. Due to ethical reasons as well as their position in the local bureaucracy, their identities are kept confidential. Interview was done on June 21, 2008 in Teminabuan.
After some deeper observations, it was found that the absence of good coordinative relations was actually owing to two things: 1) there was no detailed description of tasks in each local government agency, so that both officials and staffs did not have clear guidance for their respective tasks; and 2) coordination was difficult because each governmental agency was typically controlled by different ethnic groups that saw one another as competitors, making it almost impossible for them to develop a synergistic cross-coordination. The reality negated the principles of modern governmental organization in which it should be free from any primordial ethnic sentiments. As a matter of fact, local bureaucracy became an arena for the working of ethnic sentiments.

Fifthly, in terms of quality and quantity, the capacity of bureaucratic apparatuses to perform their functions and authority of autonomous local government remained poor. Therefore, it was necessary to arrange a comprehensive planning and management of personnel in terms of not only scope but also qualification to hold the offices and perform their tasks and responsibilities.

Sixthly, like the conditions of bureaucracy in Papua and Papua Barat provinces in general, the effectiveness and productivity of government apparatuses in Sorong Selatan was poor. One of the evident conditions was the low levels of discipline and presence in the offices. Without dedicated working spirit, the capacity for local institutions to realize the dreams of the establishment of new local government is limited. Therefore, as a follow-up to the endorsement of Local Ordinance on the local government institutions, the Local Government would need to issue a contextual instrument to monitor and evaluate the bureaucratic performance. The formulation of evaluation model could be a crucial agenda in a transition management. The institutionalization of work ethics would also be important to make sure that the local government apparatuses perform their main tasks and responsibilities. The drafting of civil servant ethics could be carried out in the transitional period of the restructuring.

Seventhly, having observed the pre-existing structure of local institutions, the UGM Team found that the local government tended to ignore the strength of local custom and community. Therefore, it was necessary for the upcoming local government organization to establish a mechanism to involve the local wisdom in
the government machination. To be effective, the government should have been based on customary mechanisms. It was also important to make sure that the concept of three-pillars-based government - a typical Papuan model of local administration, in which local government is carried out by involving three important actors namely Government, Customary Institution and Religious Institution - works as an organization mechanism.

As explained previously, the results of the study and recommendations of the UGM Team were used as a reference by the local government of Sorong Selatan regency to arrange the new local institutions. These were formally regulated in Local Regulation No. 3/2008 on Organization and the Working Procedures of Secretary of the Local Government, Local Regulation No. 4/2008 on Organization and the Working Procedures of Local Office, and Local Regulation No. 5/2008 on Organization and the Procedures of Local Technical Institutions.

In practice, although the arrangement of new local institutions was based on the results of a scientific academic study oriented to the interests of the implementation of effective and efficient government functions, some resistance to the resulting institutions prevailed among bureaucrats. Such resistance arose partly owing to their unpreparedness to adapt to the new structure that would require the local civil servants to work more professionally within the rational structure. The resistance to the new organization also emerged as the serving officials in various strategic positions would lose their offices because the particular positions required certain professional qualifications, while most of the serving officials, who were previously appointed merely based on ethnic representativeness, were barely competent.

In the discussion on draft of the structure of new institutions in the “White Building” just across the Regent’s official residence, the Regent invited all Heads of Local Government Agencies and three or four of their reporting officials (Echelon III and IV) for a presentation by the UGM Team on the rationale of the new local institutions. It was expected that the officials would give their respective opinions on the proposal of the new local government organization. On this occasion, however, most officials did not give their opinions, except several Echelon II official of Maybrat origins who generally have better education
and public speaking capacity. In general, most of the attending bureaucrats, particularly the non-Maybrat officials, seemed to understand and accepted the recommendation made by the UGM Team. The Head of the Local Development Planning Board, Roy Kambuaya, was particularly active: he repeatedly stated his opinions and support to the recommendation of the UGM Team. While most local officials seemed to support and agree with restructuring the new local institutions, less than a week later, anxiety was prevalent among the local bureaucrats, many being annoyed by the local institutions’ new organizational structure and felt they were on the verge of losing their official and strategic positions. An Imekko dignitary who was also an Echelon IV official and at the time was a graduate student at Gadjah Mada University said that he could understand both the Regent's and the UGM Team's goodwill in formulating visionary new local institutions, but the local bureaucrats and people from certain ethnic groups could not accept the fact that government organization will be rationalized. It was regarded as in line with Papuan indigenous’ aspiration to have their children as the officials in their own homeland.

In various official forums discussing the structure of the new local institutions, the majority of Papuan indigenous bureaucrats tended to be silent. The active participants who gave their opinions, including the Heads of Offices, were either attending a graduate study at UGM or the alumni of UGM’s graduate program. The explanation to this situation was simple: the bureaucrats with higher level of education had the confidence to convey their arguments in the forums with comparatively better capacity to articulate their ideas. They also generally were more rational in looking at the structure of bureaucratic institutions and had higher self-confidence that they would not lose their offices. Based on the minutes, among the active bureaucrats articulating their opinions

As his name indicates, Roy Kambuaya, is a Maybrat, particularly from Kambuaya district. Unlike the other Maybrat officials’ stance which was critical and resistant, Roy Kambuaya’s viewpoint showed more supports to the idea of bureaucratic restructuring. Later on, it was found out that he was greatly confident that the Regent would still secure his position as the Head of Local Development Planning Board. (Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Local Development Planning Board, Teminabuan 5 March 2011)

Interview with Hengky Gogoba, the Chief of Imekko Customary Council, Yogyakarta, June 18th 2008.
(asking question, proposing some changes in the organizational structure, or responding to the recommendation of the UGM Team) were either those of Maybrat origins or the non-Papuans.

The silence of some groups in the forums did not necessarily communicate that they took the proposal of new local institutions for granted. In fact, many of them did not accept it. They did not speak up in such forums, but on several occasions, they launched protests by storming into the Local Development Planning Board and the Section of Organization in the Local Government Secretariat, proposing their own version of the new local institutions, based on the argument of securing their positions in the bureaucracy. Some were trying to use the power of their ethnic masses to exert some pressure on the Regent to reconsider the bureaucratic rationalization plan. This was also exercised by their sending some dignitaries to the Regent’s official residence. It has been a long-time tradition or custom that when the Regent is in Teminabuan, in the evenings dozens of people lined up in front of the Regent’s residence, asking for an audience with the Regent. Many of them are traditional leaders who came to deliver the aspirations of their "indigenous children", especially those in the bureaucratic offices of Sorong Selatan regency.

Being aware of the emerging resistances, the Regent took a moderate path by not taking of the UGM Team’s recommendation to the letter. However, it turned out that the subsequent reorganization of the local institutions did not fully accommodate the desires of bureaucrats and the popular demands for ethnic representativeness either. There was a relatively long pause between the introduction of the UGM Team’s recommendation and the Regent’s actual decision of the new institutions. Some bureaucrats interpreted the long pause as indicating the Regent’s hesitation to apply the UGM Team’s recommendation in the reorganization of the local institutions that was, according to them, very good and ideal for the local conditions of Sorong Selatan Regency.201

201 Interview with Azis, Administrative Assistant at the Local Government Secretariat, in Teminabuan, September 19th, 2008 and with Martinus Salamuk, Head of Local Development Planning Board, Yogyakarta, October 2nd, 2008.
The Regent’s hesitation to take the new structure of the local institutions was actually caused by the strong pressures and demands of a significant part of the Echelon III and II bureaucrats who thought that they would lose the strategic official posts in the reorganization. For example, in the UGM Team’s recommendation, it is suggested that the social affairs should be handled by an institution at an office level (Kantor). It means that the highest official is the Head of Office whom, in terms of echelon, will be an Echelon IIIA official or at a lower level than a Head of Service. Then, some bureaucrats of certain ethnic groups who were ambitious of holding the position as Head of Social Service tried to exert some pressures on the Regent to delegate the social affairs to a Local Governmental Service (Dinas).202

Due to the demand and pressure from the social figures and bureaucrats backed by their respective ethnic group, the Regent could not finally take the UGM Team’s recommendation. This situation indicates a dualism with the Regent and several officials having some goodwill to build professional governance through the establishment of a rational organization. However, as one of the bureaucratic and political elite, the Regent could not simply ignore the demands and pressure of some groups of bureaucrats (who relied on the support of their respective ethnic solidarity) to accommodate their great desires and interests in the new bureaucratic structure.

The community and the bureaucrats were unwilling to accept the structural reforms suggested by the UGM. This unwillingness was expressed in various forms of rejection, either in direct refusal as articulated in the introduction of the new local institutions to all civil servants in Sorong Selatan regency, or passive rejection through resistance or disobedience by not performing the main tasks as officials in their respective Local Government Units.203 Although the new local institutions had not been included into Local Regulation, the recommendation for the structure of new local institutions by UGM Team clearly caused anxiety among the senior bureaucrats in Sorong

203 At the Focus Group Discussion on Institutional Restructuring Based on Government Regulation No. 41/2007, which was held in Teminabuan on 16-17 July 2008, some officials openly expressed their objection if their offices will be downsized or rationalized.
Selatan. Such anxiety arose from lack of understanding of many fundamental arguments presented by UGM Team for the new structure, which was supported by the Local Development Planning Board and the Regent. The bureaucrats, as most Papua’s indigenous communities living in the villages, were motivated by the desire not to support any reforms unless it benefitted their position, both personally and collectively. As an official at Echelon II whose Office was to be merged into other institutions, stated as follows:

“The rationalization process should be done carefully. We should remember that the officials of the existing institutions were appointed based on ethnic representation. So, if the top leaders, especially the Regent, would merge those offices --or even just two of them--, it would simply backfire, except there are new institutions for the existing officials, so that they would only be transferred to another offices rather than being eliminated. Otherwise, the incumbent officials would suffer and they would sue the Regent in the State Administration Court.”

He also stated that it was not only his personal personal, but also represented views of several bureaucrats, both those belonging to his own ethnic group and other ethnic groups. He claimed that most bureaucrats did not agree with the rationalization of organization, but were not brave to convey their own opinions. This was not out of fear of the Regent but of respect for the UGM Team that had experience in conducting research on such local institutions.

The statement suggests that they could have rationally accepted suggestions or recommendation of UGM Team which was supported by the Local Development Planning Board and the Regent, but individual and collective interests made them anxious that the new local institutions will only eliminate them from the existing strategic official positions, —significant as they had no other alternative for career or gaining income in the future. Resistance to the new local institutions can be observed in the following statement:

“The merger or the rationalization of institutions will clearly eliminate certain official positions. It will clearly cause social jealousy, and potential to trigger severe conflicts. Indeed, the Regent[is due for Election] ... in a year

204 Interview with one of Local Department Heads in which his department would be merged with another Agency, Jakarta, 13 June, 2008. Due to ethical reasons, informant’s name will remain confidential. Recordings and transcripts of interviews are kept by the researcher.
again. Since his victory is dependent on the bureaucratic position, if he is to win, he must also keep the official positions.”

The local bureaucrats tried to retain their official positions or institutions, even threatening repercussions in other areas, for example, like the planned Local Election. In addition to using the 2010 Local Election as an instrument to put pressure on the Regent, the bureaucrats also adopted other forms of resistance: they refrained from actively performing their assigned duties and tasks.

Incidentally, collecting data from governmental records and discussion and interviews in Teminabuan coincided with the preparation of the establishment of Maybrat regency from the partition of Sorong Selatan regency. When the draft of the UGM Team’s recommendation was discussed with local bureaucrats, many officials in Sorong Selatan were disappointed by the new suggested institutional structures. Having felt that they would no longer assume the strategic positions in Sorong Selatan, they sought an administrative transfer process to the-soon-to-be Maybrat regency. Several officials were from the dominant ethnic groups of the pending Maybrat regency (the Maybrats and the Ayamarus), and adopted apathetic attitude to the new organization of Sorong Selatan local government. Even worse, in their position as Sorong Selatan officials, they used official facilities to support the establishment of Maybrat regency. This became apparent when the Maybrat Regency was established and local elections were held in October 2011 to choose the Regent and Vice Regent. Of six candidates in the Election in Maybrat, three were former bureaucrats of Sorong Selatan. Likewise, most of the lower level bureaucrats in Maybrat were Sorong Selatan bureaucrats, who from the beginning anticipated to move to Maybrat.

The large number of local bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan who involved themselves in the preparation for the establishment of Maybrat regency indicates the weak loyalty among the bureaucratic officials in Papua province in general and in Sorong Selatan regency in particular. Their loyalty is indeed so strong to

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205 Interview with the Head of Local Department in which his Department will be downsized to becomes an Office level, Yogyakarta, 14 June 2008.
their respective ethnic interests that they can ignore the official tasks for their ethnic interest. For example, in early May 2011, an Echelon III B (Head of Division) official refused to be promoted into a higher position as Echelon III A (Head Office) and she mobilized a dozen villagers for a demonstration that embarrassed the Regent at the time of the inauguration ceremony of local officials, May 4, 2011. The official was from ethnic Tehit and her husband was a bureaucrat of Maybrat origin. There were suggestions that her refusal to accept the new position was due to her being shifted from her previous position as a holder of financial access to a new position which, although structurally higher, was “drier” financially. 206

In November 2008, she and other officials accommodated demonstrators from various villages in their homes. This demonstration became violent also involving an Echelon II official that the Regent highly favoured. The official was dissatisfied with the Regent as it regarded that he was not generous enough with facilities needed for the establishment of Maybrat regency, their homeland. The bureaucrat’s supporters in the demonstration came from some villages in the region of Maybrat and they brought traditional weapons (machetes and arrows) commonly used in tribal war, and surrounded the Regent House. Some Echelon II officials directly involved in the demonstration, urged the Regents to immediately sign a "Letter of Release of Subordinates Region", i.e., some districts of Sorong Selatan that would be part of the-soon-to-be Maybrat regency. 207

On initial review, the involvement of Echelon II officials in a demonstration to demand Sorong Selatan Regent’s support for the establishment of Maybrat regency seems unethical. The officials, who took the oath of loyalty to their office, reneged on their promises and tasks and resisted the Regent who is the highest supervising official in the local administration. The resistance as worked towards personal and ethnic interests, and were unrelated with their official responsibilities in Sorong Selatan.

206 Telephone interview with the Regent Sorong Selatan (Tuesday, 5 May 2011 at 15:00 p.m.), interview with Secretary of Local Development Planning Board (5 May 2011), and interview with Sudi Sasmita, S2PLOD UGM student who was conducting a research in Teminabuan when the demonstration took place (11 May 2011).

207 Telephone interviews with the Regent Sorong Selatan, 30 November 2008. A video documentation of the demonstrations is kept at the Regent’s office.
The most important point here is that there is low commitment, dedication and loyalty to bureaucratic tasks among the aforementioned officials, synonymous with strong commitment to their respective ethnic groups. The Regent Otto Ihalauw, on this matter, said:

“For Papua’s indigenous people here, it is very difficult to show their loyalty to both office and superiors. All they have is the loyalty to both personal and ethnic interests. Although we share the same meal on the same plate, once they have personal or ethnic interests, they will easily resist us although we are their superiors.”

The statement is supported by one of the woman figures in Teminabuan:

“In Papuan civil servants’ way of thinking, it is still difficult to be loyal to their superior. Especially, if the civil servants are considered rich by their ethnic group.”

The anxiety among the bureaucrats over the bureaucratic rationalization and the vagueness of official positions due to the delay in the appointment to the new offices disrupted the public service delivery in Sorong Selatan.

The escalating tension related to the preparation for the establishment of Maybrat regency illustrates the nature of relations among bureaucrats and between the bureaucrats and the Regent. The bureaucrats tended to ignore the formal limitations usually applied in the bureaucratic structure, i.e., the hierarchy of officials, impersonal relations, and loyalty to the supervising officials.

During the political anxiety triggered by local problems, it seemed that Sorong Selatan bureaucracy lost its strength as an organisation. A place in the bureaucracy was a sojourn for ethnically-diverse bureaucrats who did not observe the existing regulations. At the time, it can be said that there was little coordination among bureaucrats from different institutions, and work relations suffered among bureaucrats within the same office. The Antagonistic relations

208 Interview with Otto Ihalauw, Jakarta, 8 December 2008.
209 Interview with Regina Salambauw, originally Tehit ethnic, local government official at Teminabuan district office, 6 Mei 2011.
210 The stagnation took place several times since the mid 2008 when the issue of institutional restructuring began circulating, at the end of 2008 when new institutions had been established but no officials was appointment, and during 2009 and early 2010 when most bureaucrats were busy with the Regency Election. The situation only began to recover in the beginning of 2011 after the new officials had been inaugurated. Sorong Selatan Regency Election was held in August 2010, in which the incumbent Regent Otto Ihalauw chose Samsuddin Anggiluli (an Imekko bureaucrat) as his running mate, was re-elected and inaugurated in November 2010.
among senior bureaucrats as well as between the bureaucrats and the Regent meant resistance from several senior bureaucrats of the Regent was conspicuous. Overt demonstrations of this kind were spurred by the fear that they would not hold coveted official positions in the new structure of the local institutions.

Sorong Selatan bureaucrats of Maybrat origins were the crucial group to respond the suggested new organization and were able to express openly their disagreement to the Regent. The reason was that they had a bargaining position as they constituted a relatively dominant group in Sorong Selatan bureaucracy and they generally had better education and capacity. On various occasions, they said that in terms of capacity and competency, they were more eligible than their colleagues of other Papuan origins. In addition, the fact that the reorganization of the local bureaucracy coincided with the final step of the preparation for the establishment of Maybrat regency encouraged them to take more critical stance against the Regent.

In general, bureaucrats of Tehit and Immeko origins as well non-Sorong Selatan Papuan and non-Papuan bureaucrats accepted the new organization for different reasons. The Tehit bureaucrats accepted the new organization as long as it provides them (as indigenous people of Teminabuan, or generally referred to as “the local owners of Sorong Selatan”) with strategic positions for example, the Head of Local Department, Board, or Office. The Tehit bureaucrats also believed that their existing support for the local development program, as well as their commitment to support Otto Ihalauw in the 2010 Election would have positive effects, including the Regent’s affirmation to the Tehits in general and to the Tehit bureaucrats in particular.

The Tehit bureaucrats also understood the political circumstances of the time. The establishment of Maybrat regency was positively interpreted: the local bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan would only provide them with better opportunities gain bureaucratic official positions that would be abandoned by the Maybrats. In such a condition, it was reasonable that during the reorganization of

211 Interview with several Heads of Local Departments, 17 September 2008 in Teminabuan.
the local institutions, the Tehits did not show any resistance. Many of them even wished that the new structure could be immediately ratified and implemented.

The same was also true to the bureaucrats of Imekko origins. Most readily accepted any policies of local government and did not show any resistance to the Regent. Having contributed to Regent Otto Ihalauw’s election in 2005 with the largest number of supporting votes, with the 2005-2010 Vice Regent being an Imekko also helping, the Imekkos strongly believed that the Regent would pay better attention to them. However, their being confident was due not only to their bargaining power but also to their social characteristics: the Imekko bureaucrats and community were observably more accommodating of the policy of local government. They were aware that they had insufficient representatives and higher officials in bureaucracy. As the Imekko community settle in remote area which is also geographically difficult to access, they were left behind in education affecting the limited number of either civil servants or bureaucratic officials among the Imekkos. The Imekko bureaucrats and people would keep supporting the Regent’s policies because they had been enjoying various local government programs deliberately implemented for Imekko fishermen, for example, the assistance of motor boats, the provision of fuel supplies, and the building of an ice-cube factory, which the Imekkos interpreted as an invaluable support. Thus, the Imekko bureaucrats readily accepted and expected the new offices in the new bureaucracy would come to existence soon. To a certain extent, there existed certain groups of Imekko people and bureaucrats seeking to influence the reorganization process, but their sole orientation was to make sure that the Regent would appoint their representatives in strategic positions.

Meanwhile, many non-Sorong Selatan Papuans and non-Papuan groups thought that the new organization of the local government would improve the performance of the local government. There were few non-Sorong Selatan Papuan bureaucrats and they were typically employed at the Regent’s request as they possessed the administrative skills and technical qualifications that other ethnic groups lacked. Generally they serve in the Health, Education, Public Work and Agricultural Offices.

The non-Papuan bureaucrats are generally Javanese, Torajans, Bataknes, Manados, and Bugis. People of this group are not entirely foreign as most of them
were born, nurtured, educated, and eventually employed by the local government in Papua. However, phenotypic differences and ethnic ancestry have put them into the ‘outsiders’ category. The education and work capacity of most non-Papuan bureaucrats was generally better than those of the Papuans. On average, they also have better skills in performing the primary governmental tasks. Therefore, in nearly all local government agencies in Sorong Selatan, the non-Papuan bureaucrats played very important roles although their official positions may not be strategic ones. In the policy of the Regent, non-Papuan staff were always placed in each local government agency (in Local Departments, Boards or Offices) as backup to the indigenous Papuan bureaucrats perhaps inadequately prepare for their tasks.

On the restructuring of local government institutions, the non-Papuan bureaucrats saw restructuring and rationalization as necessary. They had been uncomfortable with the existing structure of local institutions that did not function properly. Many of them also complained about the low level of bureaucratic performance due to the low level of work discipline and work ethos among the local civil servants and bureaucrats. The restructuring would increase the bureaucratic performance. Although some thought their education and competence were better, they tended not to be too ambitious as they believed it would trigger the Papuan indigenous bureaucrats’ jealousy. For them, it was sufficient that they could hold the second or third positions at their office (a secretary or deputy to the Office Head). Thanks to the skills they had, the Regent would have to have at least one structural official taken from this group of bureaucrats in each echelon. The appointment of non-Papuan bureaucrats in structural position in each echelon (IV, III or II) was seen as providing a reliable back-up. Therefore, non-Papuan bureaucrats believed that as long as they worked well, they would have good positions even without having to pressure the Regent. Although many of them were eventually appointed Heads of Local Department, Board or Office, generally they had no observable ambition to occupy high positions in the local government bureaucracy. There is a strong concern among them that the strategic bureaucratic positions would put them in peril and discomfort as they would easily become a target of indigenous bureaucrats’ jealousy. The impacts of the jealousy would be borne not only by the
bureaucrats in persons but also by their respective families or by the non-Papuan communities collectively.

**D. The Impacts of Political Identity in the Restructuring of Local Institutions**

The strong resistance, even that indicated by Echelon II and III bureaucrats, to the plan of the bureaucratic rationalization had forced the Regent to eventually take accommodative attitude. In the technocratic view, the accommodative policy might lead to disadvantages for local government because the organization of local institutions established tends to be bloated, inefficient and ineffective, not performing tasks well, resulting in huge operating costs. This chapter is guided by some questions: how do the politics of identity work, particularly in the establishment of bureaucratic institutions? What are the implications of identity politics on bureaucracy and the process of governance at the local level?

In analysis of fieldwork data including interviews, documentary research, and intensive discussions with the bureaucrats and social figures in Sorong Selatan, the individual and collective influence of bureaucrats and politicians in the establishment of local government institutions is evident. This was observed to be a trend particularly among those of Maybrat origins, while the Tehit, Imekko, non-Sorong Selatan Papuan as well as non-Papuan bureaucrats seem to use a style of intervention.

There are tendencies towards the influences of politics of identity on the restructuring of the local institutions, which are observable in at least three intertwining interests including ethnic interests, individual and collective interests, and local bureaucrats’ interests regardless of their ethnic background. It is possible that their resistances to the rationalization of the local institutions as well as their attempts to influence the structure of local institutions in such a way that the new organization would still provide them with certain strategic official positions simply represent a move to secure their collective interest in the offices. At this point, it appears that the local bureaucrats of different ethnic groups simultaneously struggled to make the new institutions accommodative to
their designs on certain positions. As yet, any conflict indicating the inter-ethnic interests in the bureaucracy has not been evident.

The data shows that the bureaucrats of different ethnic backgrounds tended to unite in struggling for their respective interests to hold the new local institutions. Moreover, Papuan indigenous bureaucrats also showed more open and friendly attitudes to non-Papuan bureaucrats of Javanese, Sumatran, and Celebes origins. In the discussion on the structure of new local institutions involving the bureaucrats of various levels, it is clearly seen that the non-Papuan bureaucrats were more capable of articulating their thoughts. There were many occasions where the Papuan indigenous bureaucrats asked their non-Papuan colleagues for help in communicating their thoughts and opinions to the UGM Team and the Regent because non-Papuan bureaucrats were regarded as having better communicative skills.

The strong resistance by the Echelon II and III bureaucrats to the rationalization had forced the Regent to eventually take accommodative measures. In a technocratic view, the accommodative policy had led to the local government’s disadvantages because the resulting organization tended to be overstaffed, inefficient, and ineffective. The 2010 and 2011 Local Budget shows that most of the expenditures are for the operational costs of officials and office supplies, which amount to approximately 70%. It means that there are only 30% of the funds allocated to the development programmes for the local communities. Still, the 30% of the budgetary allocation is not spent for public infrastructures that local communities can access because it had still to be subtracted by the costs of public procurement.212

In terms of the organizational size, the new bureaucratic organization—which comprises 13 Local Departments (Services), four Boards, and five Offices—for a region with the population of only 57,000 is too big. As comparison, Sleman regency in the Special Region of Yogyakarta with the population of 1,100,000 has a more rational bureaucratic organization that comprises only 9 Local Departments (Services), 5 Boards, and 6 Offices. Such a comparison is important

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212 See the Budgetary General Policy (Kebijakan Umum Anggaran—KUA) and the Preliminary Budget’s Priorities (PPAS) in Sorong Selatan regency for 2010 and 2011.
and relevant to make because the governmental institutions are meant to deliver public service to the society. As the logic of Law 32/2004 goes, the fewer the number of the population, the smaller the size of the government organizations should be.

When a line of reasoning was presented to the bureaucrats and politicians in Sorong Selatan that the establishment of institutions should also take the scope of service areas and the number of population to be served into account, most of them tended to ignore it and insisted that Sorong Selatan should take the maximum number of institutional organizations. In terms of the scope of service area, Sorong Selatan does comprise a very vast region, most parts of which are nearly inaccessible. Therefore, at the time it was suggested that the governmental institutions should not be concentrated in Teminabuan (the regency’s capital) but would be distributed in several districts. However, the suggestion was regarded as unrealistic because the officials would be reluctant to be placed in remote districts. In more developed regions, particularly in Java, Sumatera, Bali and several parts of Celebes and Borneo, most government offices are located in the capital. One could easily understand such a placement because of better access to transportation from the most remote villages in those regencies. Thus, in accordance with Government Regulation 41/2007, many regency governments in Java set up their Technical Service Units (UPT – Unit Pelaksana Teknis) at the district level. In Sorong Selatan, as also common in other area in Papua, bureaucrats tended to be reluctant to set up the UPTs at the district level because the officials would not like to be placed in districts outside the capital city.

It is clear that for Sorong Selatan bureaucrats and politicians, the logic of the establishment of institutions did not necessarily correspond to the effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery, but rather, most importantly, the availability of official positions in each of the new institutions. The perspective is again based on an understanding that the local government bureaucracy is a strategic place for the livelihood of indigenous people with great ambition of enjoying their positions as civil servants in their own region. One of the bureaucrats said:

"During the New Order era, being Papuan indigenous people, we ironically had no opportunity to hold any offices because almost all posts were occupied by Javanese, Sumatrans or Torajans. It simply got even more ironic
that when we do hold the post now, the bureaucracy of local government will be rationalized. So, when will we gain the opportunity of being the masters in our own land?”

Such a statement does not belong to a single bureaucrat but reflects the common perception of the Papuan indigenous bureaucrats along with their euphoria in enjoying the strategic posts in local government in the special autonomy era. When it was suggested to Papuan indigenous bureaucrats that a bigger institution may result in inefficient Local Budget spending, some of them replied lightly: “Well, the money we spent is ours... it is the Special Autonomy fund belonging to Papuan indigenous people. Let us determine ourselves what the money is for.”

How do the politics of identity work in the establishment of local institutions? Conceptually, the restructuring of local institutions should be done by referring to several basic principles. First, the principle of necessity, which means that it should answer the questions: Is the establishment of Local Department, Board, or Office actually needed by the local communities? Who are the people that actually need the local government institutions? Second, the principle of benefit. This means that in establishing the institution, it should answer the question: does the existence of local government institutions bring about benefits for the society? What are the benefits of the new local institutions for society and local government, particularly for realizing the effective and efficient local governance? Third, the principle of resource availability, in that it addresses these questions: once the institutions are established, are human resources available sufficiently to perform well? Are there also adequate financial resources to support the functioning of the local institutions?

However, for most Papuan bureaucrats, such normative considerations were not part of their concern. Although the conceptual notion on the importance of such ideal principles in the establishment of local institutions had been communicated to the local bureaucrats from the very start, there was a tendency to keep the bad habit of “being comfortable with ignorance” and to ignore the

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213 Interview with Karel Murafer, a Maybrat, the 2007-2008 Head of Sorong Selatan regency’s Local Income Service, Yogyakarta, 16 June 2008.
214 Focus Group Discussion on the structure of the new local institutions, attended by several Echelon III officials with various ethnic backgrounds including Tehit, Maybrat and Imekko as well as Javanese, in Teminabuan on 17 September 2008.
normative consideration. Hence many of them insisted that the structure of the new local government institutions in Sorong Selatan is a part of the local government policies to provide Papuan indigenous people, particularly the civil servants or officials in bureaucracy, with reasonable positions. The restructuring of institutions, or commonly understood as the rationalization of bureaucracy, is seen negatively as leading to the loss of their strategic official positions and, therefore, such a restructuring is unacceptable. Rationalization of the local institutions is regarded as a policy that infringed the spirit of the Special Autonomy that would give as big chances as possible to Papuan indigenous bureaucrats to take part in the local government. Although the establishment of new local institutions is actually not identical with rationalization, the local bureaucrats’ resistance explicitly reflected an anxiety that the new structure would mean the marginalization of Papuan indigenous bureaucrats. In the particular context, it seems clear that the local bureaucrats viewed the bureaucracy not as a government machine to serve the public effectively and efficiently but as an arena for securing personal livelihood. They also took bureaucracy for granted as belonging to the Papuan indigenous bureaucrats. Such an understanding is enhanced by a common misperception that in the Special Autonomy era, all governmental programs and policies should be in the hands of Papuan indigenous people.

In this case, it seems clear that the politics of identity works in the recognition of all public resources in the region including financial resources (local budget), the structure of local institutions, and local government policies should be solely used for and to the rights of the indigenous people of Papua. In the context of local institutions, they argue that the structure of local institutions should also guarantee the availability of strategic official career paths for the Papuan indigenous bureaucrats based on ethnic balance regardless of their background or capacity and competence. In other words, the strong effect of the politics of identity in the establishment of new institutions was ironically negative on the performance of local government.
CHAPTER V
ETHNIC POLITICIZATION IN THE DYNAMICS OF THE BUREAUCRAT
RECRUITMENT PROCESS

A. The Needs of Bureaucratic Reform

Once the reform of the old institutions gave way to new bureaucratic ones, the Regent’s next task was to appoint the structural officials to the new offices. Governance reform would not have significant effect on the improvement in bureaucratic performance unless it was followed by an appropriate appointment of bureaucratic officials. A Local Ordinance endorsed in 2008 was the basis for a recruitment process beginning in 2009. However, the recruitment process of the officials was temporary in nature, or was done to make sure that there was no vacuum in the structural positions of the local government organization. In addition, not all vacant official positions could have been assigned. It was only after Regent Otto Ihalauw was re-elected for the second term (2010-2015) and was inaugurated in November 2010 that a more organized bureaucratic recruitment process began.

As an endeavour for bureaucratic restructuring, the Sorong Selatan Regent made a breakthrough in competence-based human resource management by applying a competency assessment for 320 structural officials consisting of Echelon II (Top Level Manager), Echelon III (Middle Level Manager), and Echelon IV (Low Level Manager). The competency assessment test, which also includes a psychological test, was meant to map competence and personality of the local bureaucrats in such a way that they could be placed in the appropriate positions and that proper capacity development programs in accordance with their respective needs could also be given. The competency assessment was undertaken by the Gadjah Mada University’s Competency Assessment Team (hereinafter the UGM Team) founded upon the request of Sorong Selatan Regent in his effort to formulate the framework for the local bureaucratic reform.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{215} The UGM Team consisted of senior faculty members from the Faculty of Socio Political Sciences and the Faculty of Psychology
The aim of the competency assessment for all bureaucratic officials in Sorong Selatan was to build a corps of professional civil servants in the region. It was assumed that through the competence-based civil service management, the performance of the bureaucrats would improve significantly. In addition, the recruitment process of the structural officials that once was weighted by the consideration of ethnic representation would be replaced by a results-based outcome measuring bureaucrats’ competence and professionalism. Regent Otto Ihalauw admitted in an interview in 2011 that, during the first term of his regency (2005-2010), the appointment of officials into the structural positions were mainly on the basis of ethnic and political factors. More explicitly, the Regent said that 75% of the officials appointed to Echelon II and III were based on ethnic representation and political accommodation, and only 25% were based on the bureaucrats’ competence and professionalism. However, in the second term (2010-2015), the Regent strongly insisted on reforming the mechanism of official recruitment by reversing the considerations. It means that 75% of them would be appointed based on education, work experiences, competence and other objective considerations, while 25% was based on ethnic representation and accommodation to political demands.\textsuperscript{216}

The competency assessment had several objectives. First, to develop and apply the process of civil servants’ capacity assessment based on competence in appointing the structural officials. Second, to increase support of human resources, in accordance with the principle of ‘the right person in the right place’, particularly for structural officials, to improve the local governance. Third, to increase competence and capability of the future leaders in the local government of Sorong Selatan regency.\textsuperscript{217}

The methods to be used in the competency assessment for local bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan were simulation methods containing several question models, case analysis exercises, and psychometric test to measure the

\textsuperscript{216} Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw, in Sorong, 29 January 2011.

\textsuperscript{217} Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw in Teminabuan, 3 March 2011. Most of what was said resonated the Terms of Reference (ToR) prepared by The UGM’s Centre for Capacity Development and Networking (PPKK Fisipol UGM).
bureaucrats’ capacity, personality, managerial capacity, and leadership. The simulation were meant to measure the bureaucrats’ individual competence and consisted of four types of tasks including filling in the ‘job experiences’ form, the random task exercising, proposal writing and strategic plan/business plan writing, in-depth interview, and leaderless group discussion (LGD).

The bureaucrats were asked to fill in a form with their career trajectory track record as civil servants from the recruitment in the first year to the last official position. The random task exercising was to measure the bureaucrats’ administrative capacity and the capacity of operating the policies, particularly for Echelon IV. In the model, bureaucrats were given the questions of government administrative cases and were asked to give some recommendation or policy brief to the leaders to overcome certain problems. The proposal writing was meant to measure the bureaucrats’ capacity in operating the leaders’ policies into academic documents and official documents. Finally, the strategic plan or business plan writing was to measure the bureaucrats’ strategic planning capacity in arranging the institutional vision, mission, and strategy, so that they could give significant contribution to regional development (for Echelon II). Meanwhile, in-depth interview and LGD were the evaluation models to observe the bureaucrats’ competence in understanding problems according to their respective fields as well as in constructing alternative solutions to overcome the existing problems, particularly for 78 bureaucrats of Echelon II and III that were projected to occupy certain strategic official positions.

According to the Regent and several officials of the local government of Sorong Selatan regency, in view of the background and the objective, the competency assessment activities had numerous positive values, all of which were inseparable from the enthusiasm of the Regent and several officials to build a competent, professional, and accountable bureaucracy. The competence assessment was inseparable from previous activities either, including the restructuring of new local institutions carried out in 2008 and 2009.

**B. Socio-political Dynamics before the Competence Assessment**

As the Regent and the officials of the BKD (Board of Local Staffing and Training) started to introduce the program, it was expected that any local
bureaucrats that would take part in the competency assessment could prepare
the required documents of qualifications. However, the effects of the introduction
to the competency assessment plan were beyond expectation due to severe
reactions not only from the bureaucrats but also from some politicians and even
from customary figures that had nothing to do with bureaucracy.

From the end of 2010 to February 2011, there were diverse responses
from bureaucrats and communities to the upcoming competency assessment.
Responses were not only from within the bureaucracy but also from a number of
politicians in Local Parliament (DPRD) and some customary figures. According to
the Regent and several officials of the BKD, some officials in the Local Government
Units, particularly those that had been enjoying the official positions for a long
time, began to show anxiety and rejected the competence assessment plan. They
channelled their anxiety through the members of local parliament. Upon
accepting an “entrusted message” from the bureaucratic officials, the members of
the Local Parliament stated that the Regent had to cancel the competency
assessment plan and to pursue the principles of even distribution, justice and
balance or the principle of ethnic composition-based offices distributions as
implemented during Regent Otto Ihalauw’s first term (2005-2010). Those
rejecting the competency assessment said that “after the official competency
assessment, those who will occupy the strategic positions will eventually be the non-
Papuans.” They also said that in the recruitment of the structural officials, “we
should be the master in our own region.”

Sorong Selatan Local Parliament also responded officially to the plan of
competency assessment. In a plenary session, the speaker of Hanura Party stated
that competency assessment plan should be aborted. Reaffirming what they had
stated informally to the Regent, in the parliamentary plenary sessions, some
politicians argued that if the fit and proper test was to be performed, it would not
only give way to the appointment of more non-Papuans into structural offices but
also eliminate the Papuan indigenous officials.

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218 Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw, in Sorong, January 29th 2011.
219 Minutes of Sorong Selatan Parliament Session on February 24th 2001. Source: Secretariat of
Unlike some politicians resisting the competency assessment, most local people supported the activity. It was articulated among others by customary leaders that came to the Regent’s and Vice Regent’s Official Residences or via SMS (text messages) supporting the Regent’s decision.220

In various forums, the Regent continuously tried to explain the urgency of the competency assessment and to respond the objections from officials in the bureaucracy including attacks by local politicians in the Local Parliament (DPRD). The Regent said that, “...it is true that we should be the master in our own land, but be a good master. Don’t be ironically the master for ourselves but ignoring the main tasks and responsibilities of serving the public.” In this statement, the Regent insisted that the assessment would still be done to make sure that the right person would occupy the right structural position. In relation to the principles of even distribution, justice and balance, the Regent recognized that during the first term of his leadership, the filling of structural positions was carried out by putting the principle of ‘ethnic balance’ first.

Among the controversy engulfing the bureaucrats, politicians and communities in Teminabuan and its surroundings, the competency assessment was conducted on 7-9th March 2011. The activity ran without any disruption. The dynamics of the process and the discussion of results as well as its follow-up in form of a policy on the appointment of structural officials to Echelon II, III, and IV in the Local Government of Sorong Selatan regency are explained below.

C. The Result of the Competency Assessment

The competency assessment can be an instrument for minimizing the strong pressures of the politics of identity through local ethnic and political forces. Nevertheless, there is space for the Regent and the Baperjakat as the authoritative institutions in the promotion and demotion of officials, to consider ethnic representation as a compliment to the competency assessment.

220 Interview with Samsuddin Anggiluli (Vice Regent of Sorong Selatan) and Ahmad Samsudin (member of Sorong Selatan Local Parliament from Prosperous Justice Party - PKS), Yogyakarta February 27th 2011.
The competency assessment for local bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan was attended by 18 Echelon II officials, 40 Echelon IIIA officials, 47 Echelon IIIB officials and 200 Echelon IV officials. In addition, 10 functional officials from within and without took part in the assessment. Those ten people were medical doctors that were to be recruited as officials in the Local Public Hospital and in Health Service as well as several candidates for Heads of Offices whom previously held official positions at Echelon III or II in Technical Offices (Education, Health, Agriculture, and Mining) from outside Sorong Selatan regency. Thus, in total 315 bureaucrats participated in the competency assessment.

The resulting corpus of documents showed the complete personal data of everybody taking part in the competency assessment. The corpus of documents consists of: 1) Personal data sheets containing information about Name, civil servant ID’s number, current position, and Local Government Unit where a civil servant serves. 2) Individually bundled document sheets that consist of complete documents of curriculum vitae, job experiences, competences score, and psychological score.

Every single aspect of assessment in the documents of Competency Score and Psychological Score weighs between 1 (the lowest) and 5 (the highest). The average score obtained in each aspect assessed is then interpreted to give a more comprehensive picture of the competence and psychological condition of participants, which will further be made as matters of consideration for the Regent and Baperjakat to decide the promotion or demotion of officials.

It was revealed that the average competence of the bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan was below the determined standards. Measured by the standard set of criteria as provided by various regulations derived from the Government Regulation No. 100/2000 (particularly regulations of the Administrative and Bureaucratic Reforms Minister and regulations of the Head of National Agency 221

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221 The overall scores of Sorong Selatan bureaucrats were lower than those in some regions in Java but were comparable to the other areas in both Papua provinces. However, at the time of the research, there were only few regencies/municipalities that conducted Competency Assessment before appointing bureaucrats to structural offices. Therefore, the Regent's policy to conduct the Competency Assessment was a breakthrough despite facing two crucial facts: (1) Sorong Selatan was a new regency located in the less developed region, (2) Ethnic aspirations for bureaucratic representativeness was very strong.
for Civil Servants), there were many Echelon II, III, and IV officials whose score were less than 3 in a score range of 1 to 5 while, in fact, 3 is the minimum required score that a bureaucratic official should achieve. The poor condition was true to Echelon II officials because out of 17 participants, there was only one bureaucrat who achieved the average score higher than 3 and two bureaucrats with the average score of 3. It means that less than 20% of the bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan occupied position commensurate with their competency level as Echelon II officials. A relatively better result in the overall poor condition was shown among Echelon III and IV officials, where the numbers of officials whose average score was higher than 3 were 20% and 25% respectively.

From this observation, it was concluded that great difficulty arose in seeking the appropriate official candidates for certain structural offices. It is possible that such a phenomenon exists not only in Papua but also in the other regions throughout Indonesia due to the poor quality of bureaucrats.

Due to scarcity of qualified human resources among the civil servants, the local government of Sorong Selatan regency underwent a crisis. Realizing that the local government lack of HR, the Regent said that the existing bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan was indeed dominated by officials and civil servants who had no sufficient skills to work because they had no required technical skills to perform sectoral tasks in their offices. In addition, as a relatively new regency resulted from the partition policy, Sorong Selatan was supported only by civil servants who were transferred from the other regions and, in general, those transferred to a new regency did not belong to the qualified group in the previous governmental units because those with high quality were kept by the old regency.

Based on the result of the competency assessment, it was revealed that although there were many officials with good competence and psychological score in certain aspects of assessment, they had problems in the other aspects. Most of the problems were related to financial management and various problems related to social relationship and household. Many of them with good competence score had problematic household, and were classified irresponsible for the use of budget when they served as Heads of the Local Government Unit or other Echelon II positions. It was a serious problem that needed immediate actions.
response, otherwise it would cause the delay of local development programs and specifically bring about legal consequences to the particular officials.\textsuperscript{222}

The process of promotion and rotation of officials based on the result of competency assessment was an extraordinary progress for Sorong Selatan as new regency in West Papua province, and it faced a variety of problems related to the reform of personnel management.

The greatest challenge in realizing a professional bureaucracy at local level is to formulate the clarity in direction and goal of the establishment of local government. The tasks of local government are to protect the society and to ensure their welfare in a democratic setting, to bring the public services closer to the society and to increase both efficiency and effectiveness in the public service. Local government also has to utilize local potentials and diversity. Meanwhile, bureaucracy is an instrument of local government to perform these tasks. If the existence of local government is to the interest of the society, will any attempt to create a bureaucracy that is free from the community’s intervention become relevant to the goals in the establishment of the local government? It was such a dilemma, among others, that was around in Sorong Selatan. On the one hand, the Regent and several elites of bureaucracy (with the support of the UGM academicians) tried to build a local government by implementing the principles of good governance, including the principles of accountability, competence, participation, equality, and law enforcement. On the other hand, local communities expected that the local government as well as the structure of bureaucratic institutions were parts of the communal life of the society and should accommodate their interests. In such context of debates, it is understood that what was taking place in Sorong Selatan in the official recruitment process in the bureaucracy did not become purely objective and rational or simply based on the result of the competency assessment.

The combination between the result of the competency assessment and complementary consideration related to both ethnicities aspect and politicians’

\textsuperscript{222} Interview with Regent Otto Ihalaaw, Yogyakarta April 19\textsuperscript{th} 2011. Some bureaucrats actually had good potentials and capacities but they had some administrative issues related to their financial accountability, and the Regent asked them to solve all the relevant issues before being promoted.
pressure badly affected the non-Papuan bureaucrats whom generally had comparatively better scores and capacities than Papuan indigenous bureaucrats did. Explicitly, it can be said that competency assessment did not have significant effect on the promotion of non-Papuan bureaucrats. Having good competence and psychological scores the competency assessment did not guarantee that they would automatically be appointed or promoted to certain offices. Only non-Papuan bureaucrats who were strongly supported by certain customary society could be included into the list of nominees for certain official positions. For the remaining non-Papuan bureaucrats, at least temporarily, a good score in the competency assessment would not have a positive effect on their own career in bureaucracy.

Despite being not optimally used, the documents of the competency assessment results still brings great advantages for the Regent and local government of Sorong Selatan because they can serve as a comprehensive database containing the clear personnel map of human resource condition in the region. The documents could also be taken into consideration for the process of strengthening the capacity of local apparatus and the rotation mechanism of bureaucratic leadership in the future.

In fact, there were various responses from both bureaucratic elites and customary figures. Surprisingly, the first response came from one of the Regent’s Expert Staffs who said that the fit and proper test was largely appreciated by local society in Sorong Selatan, but after the inauguration of officials on May 4th 2011, many people and lower level bureaucrats were disappointed because the result was different from what they expected. The official went on that many expected that the result of competency assessment to be conveyed to public transparently, adding that the placement of officials was considered out of their expectation and was not appropriate with the background of education and official positions either.\(^{223}\)

Reconfirming his previous statement, he stated that the Regent have arbitrarily appointed the structural officials of the local government of Sorong Selatan regency by ignoring the capacity or expertise of the bureaucrats

\(^{223}\) Interview with Mr. D (Expert Staff of Sorong Selatan Regent), May 16th 2011.
appointed to Echelon II offices. The Regent’s Expert Staff expressed their disappointed to the Regent, regarded as being unprofessional and even asked the UGM Team to publish the result of the competency assessment in the media while threatening that unless the result was published, they would file a suit to the Civil Administrative Court because the competency assessment was financed by the Local Budget.224

The demand for the publication of the result of competency assessment was also articulated by several members of the Local Parliament who were attending the Education and Training Program on the Strengthening of Sorong Selatan Local Parliament’s Capacity in Yogyakarta in June 2011. They questioned the speaker whom by chance was the Head of the UGM Team, for the reasons of the decision not to publish the result of competency assessment, so people would learn those who had achieved either high score or lower score. They argued that the announcement would help the society know the capacity and competence of officials appointed Heads of Local Departments, Heads of Boards, or Heads of Offices.225

To the inquirer, the speaker explained that the result of competency assessment including as the complete documents of personal data, career track record, and competence score and psychological score of the bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan regency were the official documents of local government containing “confidential data of official positions” and were only used in circumstances related to the governmental tasks. It was also explained that the transparency in the implementation of government was not necessarily meant the publication of all data on government officials, especially if the data was not directly associated with the interest of the society.

*Not only is the public announcement of the results of the competency assessment through mass media unethical as far as the bureaucracy is concerned, it even breaches the bureaucrats’ personal privacy and confidentiality. Moreover, the announcement has basically a risk of embarrassing bureaucrats and local people of Sorong Selatan themselves,*

224 Telephone interview with one of the Expert Staffs for Sorong Selatan Regent, May 16th 2011.
particularly the ethnic groups that have been severely struggling for the appointment of their indigenous children in the bureaucracy.

Many bureaucrats that were supported and proposed by certain ethnic groups to be appointed officials had neither high competence score nor good psychological score. To the contrary, many officials with better capacity were not promoted merely because they were non-Papuan bureaucrats.226

To make the explanation on the information of the result of competency assessment clear, the Head of the UGM Team, opened the files available on his computer to show the complete data and scores of bureaucrats without showing their name and official positions so that the members of Sorong Selatan local parliament could learn the result of the competency assessment and psychological score. Upon being given such a clear explanation, the members of DPRD began understanding all that the Regent and the UGM Team did and eventually gave full support for a continuous optimization of the documents as the reference for personnel management in Sorong Selatan.227

D. The Process of Bureaucratic Appointment to Structural Offices

The process of official recruitment or promotion was immediately done as a follow-up to the competency assessment. According to governmental rules elaborated in Regulation 100/2000, the requirements for appointment in a Structural office include: a) an active civil servant; b) is occupying a level lower than the prerequisite Echelon; c) has the required qualification and educational level; d) all assessed elements of the working achievement in the last two years have at least a good score; e) have the required official competence; and f) physically and mentally healthy.

The Government Regulation also provides additional requirements in considering the appointment of structural officials, i.e., factor of seniority in rank, age, education, and training in position, as well as work experience. All the requirements clearly describe that a merit system model should be used in the

226 Ibid.

227 The explanations were provided by the Head of the Competency Assessment Team as one of the speakers at the Training Program for the Strengthening of Sorong Selatan Parliament which was held in Yogyakarta 16-17 June 2011
process of official recruitment in bureaucracy. The provisions of competence, education, and achievement are evidences of the use of merit system model. Meanwhile, the documents provide a clear picture of educational and career backgrounds, personality conditions, competence, achievement, and leadership capacity of all existing bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan. By using the data as the basis of the appointment of bureaucrats to structural positions, the Regent was actually trying to implement the merit system model in the management of local government in the region.

In addition to referring to Government Regulation 100/2000, the process of official promotion is also done by involving an institution called Baperjakat, which is entrusted with the quality and objectivity in the appointment, dismissal, transfer of civil services as structural officials of Echelon II and below. The primary task of Baperjakat is to provide the Regent as the Highest Supervising Official in the process of promotion and demotion of structural officials of Echelon II and below. The composition of Baperjakat at a regency level consists of Head (occupied by Local Secretary) and members consisting of Echelon III officials.

In the first term of Regent Otto Ihalauw or five years prior to the competency assessment in 2011, bureaucrat appointment process were heavily influenced by ethnic considerations and tended to ignore the appropriateness between bureaucrats’ rank and structural positions to occupy. For example, specifically in the Echelon II offices in 2010, of the 26 positions, 20 of them were occupied by bureaucrats without appropriate qualifications in terms of their rank and tenure, not to mention their competence and work skills. This was due to ethnic backgrounds being taken into account in the appointment of officials rather than the skill background or the capability to satisfy the administrative

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228 Article 14 paragraph (1), Government Regulation 100/2000.
229 Baperjakat of Sorong Selatan consists of 7 (seven) senior bureaucrats including the Secretary of the Local Government as the ex-officio Head and member, Assistant Secretary of Local Government for Administration as the Deputy Head and member, Head of Local Staffing and Training Board (BKD) as the Secretary and member, Head of the Local Inspectorate as a member, Head of the Organization Division as a member, Head of Legal Division as a member, Head of Career Development at BKD as a member. Sources: Documents of BKD of Sorong Selatan, 2011.
requirements. A strong ethnic consideration was an indication of both the weakness of Baperjakat and the stronger role of the Regent in the appointment of offices. The central role of the Regent in the recruitment of officials also suggests why ethnic groups represented by the customary figures tried to actively lobby the Regent to get their representative bureaucrats appointed to strategic positions in the local government organizations.

In the process of official promotion in Sorong Selatan in 2011 (as a follow-up of the competency assessment activity), the Regent seemed to have a dominant role. However, the Regent did not lead in an authoritarian way and did not place the officials at his disposal without sound basis. The initial process of placement for the candidates of Echelon II and III officials was accompanied by Secretary of Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan, the Regent official confidant. The initial process consisted of the arrangement of a draft on the composition of officials in each Local Department, Board and Office in the local government of Sorong Selatan regency. The draft would be discussed with the Secretary of Local Government of Sorong Selatan as the Head of Baperjakat.

For that purpose, the first thing the Regent did was to select bureaucrats with the highest score of competency assessment and to ask the UGM Team for clarification related to the meaning of each score obtained by the bureaucrats and to predict the bureaucrats’ capacity if they were to be assigned to a certain office. The Regent also asked a psychologist whom was also a UGM Team member, for consideration, particularly on issues related to the bureaucrats’ personality, for example, the bureaucrats’ cognitive capacity, motivation, cooperation and leadership potentials.

After the above process was done, i.e., by temporarily placing the names of potential bureaucrats in certain official positions, the Regent then looked at the ethnic background of each bureaucrat to see the ethnic composition in all the existing structure of official position. Although ethnic balance was not the main factor, the Regent thought it important for him to keep the harmonious

ethnic composition to avoid any possible unrest among indigenous people. The ethnic balance was still a necessity to make sure that there would not be domination of bureaucratic officials of certain ethnic origins at the expense of other ethnic groups. It is worth noting that the ethnic composition was the second consideration just after the rational objective basis which was the result of competency assessment of the bureaucrats.

Closely related to the consideration of ethnic balance, it is interesting to observe the fact that the Regent also tried to implement an “affirmative policy” by appointing several officials from a certain ethnic group that actually has no qualified bureaucrat for Echelon II. The affirmative policy was apparently taken considering that the particular ethnic group had been known as being deprived of officials candidate due to various factors, yet socio-politically speaking, the ethnic group had the biggest support for the Regent and the Vice Regent and was also well-known for their being very accommodative to the policy of local development. Therefore, the Regent saw it important to recruit Echelon II officials from this ethnic group although they were unqualified in view of administrative and competence aspects. As part of the risk management, any Local Departments, Boards or Offices led by the officials of this ethnic group origin would have, at the second layer (i.e., Secretary of Local Department or the Heads of Sections), some bureaucrats with high level of competence and skills.

In addition to the consideration of ethnic balance, the other aspects the Regent took into account relate to the bureaucrats’ personality and performance in previous official positions. Included in the consideration was the input of social groups on the candidates whom certain social group did not support because those candidates never helped such social groups. In addition, there were also input concerning the candidates’ activity in the society. Such inputs did not become the main considerations for the Regent but were discussed as the additional consideration to see to what extent those aspects would influence the effectiveness of bureaucratic performance in the future.

Along the step of arrangement of draft on the candidates of bureaucratic officials, the Regent also received a lot of SMSs from the society, police officer, and those within the internal circles of bureaucracy. There were concerns that Muslims maybe influencing the Regent’s decisions as they expressed their
support for competency based appointments, but also concern that non-Tehit would be in dominance in the bureaucracy. The concerns were not expressed just through the formal channels but also using private sms messages which used the language of affiliation and family-membership. In the sms messages, each of the senders used Adek (younger brother) to refer to themselves and Kakak (older brother) to address the Regent. The purpose of such designation in the political communication is clear: to show that they are all a family, have similar norms and understandings, and so the views of concerned should be heard.

In response to the pressure from some ethnic groups, the Regent issued auxiliary appointments to family members, so as to ease tensions.231

Among various opinions closely related to the appointment of structural officials in local government, an opinion by a member of local parliament from the Democratic Party (PD) confirmed that in general the local parliament members could eventually accept the Regent’s policy. Although there were several weaknesses in the appointment of structural officials, as a member of parliament he would accept the policy. He said that,

“...there are some inappropriate placements of officials where some people ideally should not occupy the positions. However, it is completely the policy of the Regent. We can only accept it. Indeed, there are several politicians who cannot accept it, but it is because of the interest of family. In general we can accept it. The composition of indigenous and non-indigenous officials, I think, is balanced. Now it is the Regent’s second term, and he should work more professionally. It should not be done as a learning process as an excuse to make the same mistakes. For example, the Director of Local Public Hospital and Head of Health Service. If there is no appropriate indigenous candidate, any candidates with sufficient capacity can be placed, although they are outsiders.”232

The politician’s opinion might reflect the general attitude of stakeholders in Sorong Selatan, politicians, bureaucrats, and local community. The opinion also confirmed an indication that the politicians’ criticize the competency assessment and the appointment of officials, as it is not based on a motivation for checks-and-

231 Interview with Suroso (Secretary of Bappeda, Local Development Planning Board) and with a bureaucrat in Sorong Selatan who would respond on condition of anonymity especially due to his criticism to the Regent. The interviews took place in Teminabuan, 9 March 2011.
232 Interview with Rico Sia, member of Sorong Selatan Local Parliament, Yogyakarta, 16 June 2011 at 08.00 - 08.45 am.
balances in building a professional and accountable bureaucracy. The critiques and demands of politicians to the Executive were largely based on the personal and familial interests, especially to influence the Regent or the Executive to promote the bureaucrats from their family to strategic offices.

After the process of the appointment of bureaucrats to the new official positions, the bureaucrats and society more broadly accepted the results. Those who initially rejected the competency assessment and the process of bureaucratic appointment to structural offices also eventually conceded. Although there was dissatisfaction as some candidates could not get Echelon II offices, the dissatisfaction was expressed through criticisms spread via text messages. Those who completely supported the Regent’s policy were satisfied either, as their expectation on the performance of officials with sufficient capacity and competence as well as high commitment and dedication to the tasks of bureaucracy was not completely met.

The volatile dynamic and local resistance associated with the competency assessment and the inauguration of officials, implied the difficulties in conducting the bureaucratic reform and in reforming personnel management to create a professional, effective and efficient bureaucratic machine. Uncertainty remained as to whether the competency assessment for officials would have positive effect on bureaucratic performance. It also remained to be seen whether the 3:1 competency-assessment-result-to-ethnicity ratio would produce a better bureaucracy.

In HR management, the process of selection and the assessment of performance is only a small part of the cycle. Other important factors include training and development as part of capacity-building, the restructuring of salary systems, incentive/disincentive structures, and the efforts of building organizational commitment for the civil servants. The problem faced by the local government of Sorong Selatan regency was the low level of personnel performance: less motivation, minimal discipline, and a lack of understanding of main tasks and functions.

The competency assessment, and the appointment of officials based on its results, does not necessarily increase the performance of bureaucracy as a whole. There are three additional aspects that should also be considered for local
government to realize good governance. First, the development of bureaucrats’ capacity at individual level. Second, there should be development of organizational capacity. In this case, the organization of local government in Sorong Selatan should be restructured in such a way that it is adaptive to the needs of local society and has clear procedure or main tasks and functions. Third, the creation of a system with the regulations at the local level, both Regency Regulations and Local Ordinances, encouraging bureaucracy to serve the public better. Regulations at the local level become the important basis of regulating the performance of bureaucrats by using an appropriate reward and punishment system, strict control, and law enforcement.233

E. The Politics of Ethnic Representation in Bureaucratic Positions

The official competency assessment received strong support from the Papuan people, particularly the customary figures. As a brief reminder, in the period prior to the official competency assessment activity, some officials who were not prepared to take part used their ethnic and political influences to disrupt the policy. The officials and politicians strongly believed that the result of competency assessment would marginalize the indigenous officials and would give ways to the appointment of non-Papuan bureaucrats to strategic positions.234 When the competency assessment did take place, the pressures of ethnic groups and the political powers in Sorong Selatan were then directed more to influence the Regent in bureaucrat promotion. Through lobbying by means of various media, including telephone calls and SMS, those customary figures, politicians, and clans of the officials sought to influence the Regent to accommodate their demands. The Regent was also asked to limit the appointment of non-Papuan officials, that is, the non-indigenous Papuans, although they were born, nurtured, and worked in Papua.235

234 Interwiew with Suroso, Secretary of Local Development Planning Board, March 5, 2011.
235 The discourse and debate on the terms "putra asli" (indigenous Papuans) continues in Papua, not only in bureaucracy but also among politicians. One reason is the absence of a clear explanation on the meaning of "indigenous Papuans" as set forth in Law 21/2001.
As a central figure in bureaucracy and politics, the Regent was asked to balance the two needs. First was the need for building a strong government with the support of the competent, professional, transparent, equal, and accountable bureaucracy. Second was the need of a group of ethnic communities prioritizing the ethnic representation in public offices, and the demand of politicians as well as the political campaign staff in the 2010 Regental Election could get a strategic and official position in bureaucracy. In May 2011, the second group threatened to launch protest on the inauguration of new officials.

Apart from the two conflicting groups, support came from customary figures representing the larger society. This meant that the Regent could continue reforming human resource management through the competency assessment, and thus establishing a bureaucracy consisting of officials with sufficient capacity, competence, and willingness to serve the public. Amidst the exhortation and pressure of politicians and ethnic groups for fear of being eliminated from public offices, the Regent and Baperjakat had balance the strengthening of local government through the appointment of professional officials with the accommodation of ethnic political representation.

Data of the study toward, during, and after the inauguration of officials on May 4th 2011 indicated a variation in pressures exerted by the politics of identity on the Regent in the arrangement and placement of the bureaucratic officials. Ethnic identity becomes an important factor as a vehicle of supporting the interests of a group of officials or local people from their respective ethnic groups. Each of the existing ethnic groups in Sorong Selatan has a different strategy and intensity in influencing the local government policy on the bureaucratic reform. Variation in ethnic pressures was due to the difference in ethnic characteristics as well as in the dynamics of socio-political interaction between certain ethnic group and the Regent and the Vice Regent. In the context of local politics in Papua in general and in Sorong Selatan in particular, the Regent (and to certain extent also the Vice Regent) is a central figure that could be a determining factor in the process of political interaction at a local level. The Regent has a central role in determining the political direction, attitude, and orientation of social groups in their regions. This means that although the local government has modern institutions in forms of Local Departments, Boards, and Offices which are led by
bureaucrats with clear main tasks and functions, all policies are determined by the Regent. As a result, the community or social groups and even political organizations, including formal political institutions such as the DPRD, have always sought to have special access to the Regent to access the allocation of policy and budget. It is true in the appointment of structural officials to Echelon II offices (Heads of Local Departments and Heads of Boards) and Echelon III (Heads of Offices and Heads of Sections or Heads of Divisions), where closeness to the Regent became one of the important factors to see whether or not someone will be appointed to certain structural position.

In relation to the appointment of structural officials in Sorong Selatan started in March 2011, each ethnic group lobbied the Regent in a different manner. For example, the Imekko society, known for its small numbers of officials due to its limited human resources, nominated four candidates to be appointed as the Heads of Services including Kewetari for Head of Education Service, Abidoy for Head of Transportation Service, Aris for Head of Health Service, and Agus Wawafma for Head of Forestry Service. All the candidates were directly proposed to the Regent. According to the Chief of Imekko Customary Council (LMA), they realized that everything was at the Regent’s discretion.

“If, at the end, the Regent rejects the nomination, the Imekko community should be able to accept the decision, not all candidates we proposed should be accepted as the officials, because we understand the other considerations that the Regent takes into account. However, there are other ethnic groups that tend to force the Regent to accept the candidates they proposed, In fact, their capacities, as seen from their experiences, may not be sufficient for the official positions.”

According to Imekko LMA Chief, there were at least two reasons to nominate the candidates to the Regent. First, they were considered as having practical experience in the Local Departments because they had been serving in each of the Local Department. Second, they had the ability to serve the Imekko community, to provide them with fuels for traditional boats, and to provide them with food and other needs. Thus, it was expected that if they occupy the strategic

236 Interview with Dominggus Aifufo, Chief of Imekko Customary Council May 2nd 2011 in Teminabuan.
positions in the bureaucracy, they would be able to pay more attentions to the nominating groups.\textsuperscript{237}

It is also revealed that the bureaucrats had several strategies to get nominated. Certain bureaucrats asked certain social groups to nominate them to the Regent. One of the cases was a self-promotion by an official of Echelon III (Head of Section) in the BKD asking certain social groups to urge the Regent to nominate him as Head of Local Department of Education. The same was also done by one of the Echelon III officials in Local Development Planning Board who craved to become Head of Local Department of Education. The official mobilized support by collecting signature of all teachers as the members of teachers association (PGRI) of Sorong Selatan and the community in his village of origin. On who would be appointed Head of Local Department of Education greatly depended on the Regent's consideration on which one of the two nominated candidates gave more support in the previous Regent's election.\textsuperscript{238}

There were varied responses from the Moswaren community due to their disappointment in the failure to appoint an Echelon II bureaucrat from their ethnic group. As an expression of dissatisfaction, they claimed their area in Sorong Selatan regency as a part of Maybrat regency and demanded to join Maybrat regency. They destroyed the boundary marker between Sorong Selatan and Maybrat and built a new marker deep into Sorong Selatan territory conjoining Moswaren area to Maybrat regency. This was in response to an unfulfilled demand that their customary children have official positions in the bureaucracy, one of which was Head of Moswaren District, which was occupied by a non-Sorong Selatan Papuan at the time.\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{237} ibid.

\textsuperscript{238} Interview with Ansar Sija', the Chairman of Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (Ansor Youth Movement) of Sorong Selatan, May 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2011 in Teminabuan. Ansor Youth Movement (abbreviated as GP Ansor) is a youth community organizations affiliated to the biggest religious community organization in Indonesia, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU). This opinion then confirmed with the Regent in the meeting to discuss the impact of new policy on bureaucrat promotion, Yogyakarta 18 May 2011.

\textsuperscript{239} Interview with Suroso (a Javanese), the Secretary of the Bappeda of Sorong Selatan, May 8\textsuperscript{th} 2011 in Teminabuan. The Head of Moswaren District at the time (Hanok Romanic) was a bureaucrat from Biak (the northern part of Papua province). On another occasion, Suroso said that the absence of Moswaren bureaucrats in the positions of Echelon II and III was merely because of the negligence of the Regent and the Baperjakat in the process of bureaucrat's
Tehit bureaucrats also reacted strongly to the Regent’s appointment of officials. However, the reaction did not completely represent the ethnic group’s rejection because they reflected personal cases rather than a collective reaction. There was a perception among some Tehit bureaucrats that their positions in bureaucracy were the inherent rights attached to them as Papuan indigenous people, and had nothing to do with the achievement or performance. Furthermore, bureaucratic position should become local government’s appreciation to their identity and even their ethnic community’s identity based on their acclaimed dedication to the establishment of the regency. The bases for claiming their dedication came in form of the use of customary lands to build such public infrastructures as governmental offices, roads, and other local economic facilities as markets, transportation terminals, and ports. Based on such reasoning, it is clear that the process of bureaucratic appointment was not merely the domain of the Regent but also a domain of influences among customary figures who thought that they had given up their customary lands to local government as well as an arena for bureaucrats from various ethnicities claiming their respective rights in the bureaucracy.

What really happened was an anomaly in a framework of bureaucracy. The anomaly in the body of bureaucracy explicitly took place on the inauguration of Echelon II and III officials in Teminabuan on May 4th 2011. A Head of Section (Echelon III B) promoted to Head of Office (Echelon III A) rejected the official position and even refused to be inaugurated. Not only rejecting to be promoted and appointed in the new position, the official even joined group of people from the same ethnic group and launched a demonstration to disrupt the inauguration. The demonstration was carried-out as a protest because the new position was not the one she expected.

According to several members of the community, two days before the inauguration, the officials met the Regent and begged to occupy the current position as Head of Section in BKD.240 However, most bureaucrats, particularly appointment, and the Regent promised to pay more attention and would fix this. Interview with Suroso, 16 June 2011.

240 Interview with Sudiana Sasmita, S2PLD UGM student who was conducting a research in Teminabuan on the day of inauguration and demonstration, 17 May 2011.
those of different ethnic origins than that of the official, stated that during her tenure as Head of Section in BKD (whose task was to manage personnel affairs of bureaucrats), the official did not care for the careers of bureaucrats from the other ethnic groups and only cared for the bureaucrats of her ethnic group. Several bureaucrats of different ethnic groups urged the Regent to rotate her away from the position as Head of Section in BKD.241

In addition to the demonstration by the BKD official, another demonstration was also conducted by a group of people and a wife of a BKD Head who was disappointed that her husband was not promoted as expected. Several sources said that it was because the particular official expected to be the Head of Local Development Planning Board. When the inauguration took place, the disappointed Echelon II bureaucrat loudly stated that, “we and people of our villages have big contribution to win Otto Ihalauw, while those from the other ethnic groups prioritized by Otto Ihalauw did nothing.242

The emergence of protests from both bureaucrats and people as reactions to the appointment and inauguration of structural officials in May 2011 might be due to the unclear criteria used as the basis of decision-making by the Regent and Baperjakat. Moreover, it might be that the local government (the Regent and Baperjakat) had clear criteria but it was never communicated publicly to the local people.

When the nomination process during the second and the third weeks of April 2011 was re-observed, it is clear that the main contention was the result of the bureaucrats’ competency assessment, particularly for indigenous bureaucrats from Sorong Selatan with relatively high score in both competence and psychology. Second consideration was ethnic balance; the efforts to make sure that each ethnic group got proportional places in the bureaucratic positions. However, the final result of the official structure did not satisfy everybody. Some argued that in appointing Echelon II and III officials a inaugurated on May 4, 2011,

241 Interview with Regina Salambauw, a Tehit woman figure, 6 May 2011 in Teminabuan. Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, 18 May 2011.

242 This information was obtained from local people who heard the words of the Head of a Local Board at the time of the demonstration. Sources: Sudiana Sasminta, S2PLOD UGM student who was at that time conducting research in Teminabuan.
the Regent was regarded as paying insufficient attention to ethnic composition. Of the Echelon II officials (Head of Local Department and Head of Board), most were Tehits living in Teminabuan city, while the numbers of officials from Sawiat sub-ethnic domiciling outside Teminabuan district as well as the number of Echelon II officials of the other ethnic origins were small. It led very strong pressure from the ethnic groups living in rural areas (outside Teminabuan city) to the Regent.

“Otto Ihalauw was regarded as prioritizing those who contribute to his victory in the Regent Election. Even, in the Local Development Planning Board of Sorong Selatan, three outsiders were appointed Echelon III officials. Whereas, actually the case was that the quota of outsiders for Echelon III was one for each Office. Although the Local Development Planning Board indeed requires skilful personnel like the outsiders, the placement of three outsiders in the Local Development Planning Board could be regarded as accommodation to the political campaign staffs because they were by chance the people close to the Regent.”

Some other people also regarded that Regent Otto Ihalauw used the governmental policies for his political interest to run for the second term by implementing programs directed to draw more sympathy from local people rather than to public service in general. One of the policies was the aid program in Kokoda area through the provision of solar cells for the society. Another thing which many criticized was the numerous programs which were intensified when the 2010 Regent Election was approaching. In the context of government politics, these efforts were part of a fair policy because other forms of aid were also given to social groups in other districts. However, most people regarded that all the policies were part of Otto Ihalauw’s political campaign to win the support of the society, as the distribution of the governmental aid was done just before the 2010 Regent Election. Actually, all policies had no relation to the process of the appointment of structural officials in 2011, but many disappointed bureaucrats and people from various ethnic groups then used the policy issue as a means to criticize the Regent.

243 Interview with Suroso (a Javanese), Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, 8 May 2011 in Teminabuan.
244 ibid.
The big role the local people’s forces played was another interesting observation in Sorong Selatan, exceeding the power of some lobby groups. In determining the position of structural officials in the bureaucracy, local people through customary figures actually had more decisive power compared to the supporting political parties. In the 2010 Local Election, the Golkar Party, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the Hanura Party had no consensual contract with the Regent on the allocation of what percentage of officials in bureaucracy. It happened because the earlier demand of the supporting parties was not responded to by the Regent and the three parties did not forcefully demand it. In fact, it was the social groups which aggressively demanded and influenced the Regent in determining official positions in the bureaucracy. It indicates that the political parties had no self-confidence to demand the allocation of official positions in bureaucracy to the Regent. Their influences were weak compared to those of the social groups in Sorong Selatan.245

The ethnic groups of Imekko, Tehit, and Maybrat had various demands for the Regent. The demands of the Imekkos were more oriented to meet the needs of the society, for example, the needs of fishermen and the needs for other transportation infrastructures. However, the Imekkos did not get to the point of compelling their demand to be met because they understood the Regents’ considerations. It was also because the Imekkos have limited human resources to be placed in the bureaucracy. Unlike the Imekkos, the Tehits and the Maybrats strongly demanded that their customary people should occupy the positions of the bureaucracy. It was because the number of social figures in the bureaucracy from the two ethnic groups was higher than that of the Imekkos. The Tehits residing in the district of Teminabuan and Seremuk had the highest number of social figures occupying the official position in the bureaucracy. This group have the largest number of ethnic members with greatest influence in Sorong Selatan.

Meanwhile, among the bureaucrats of Maybrat origins, there were also various responses to the policy of the appointment of officials in the bureaucracy. It was because the position the Maybrats was dilemmatic after the establishment

245 Interview with Ansar Sija’, the Chairman of GP Ansor (Ansor Youth Movement) of Sorong Selatan, 2 May 2011 in Teminabuan. Also see footnote 31.
of Maybrat regency. Most bureaucrats who had prepared themselves to move to Maybrat regency invested their time, thought, and financial resources in the process of establishment of Maybrat regency. Therefore, when the new regency was established, they could easily move to Maybrat regency. However, for the other bureaucrats of Maybrat origins who did not have direct investment in Maybrat regency, they kept serving in Sorong Selatan because they thought they were less accepted in Maybrat and regarded as being a part of the Tehits residing in Sorong Selatan. This caused some dilemmas because the Tehit community and bureaucrats could not accept their presence. Although the bureaucrats of Maybrat origins in Sorong Selatan tried to show their loyalty and work dedication in the bureaucracy, they still could not be accepted by their colleagues of Tehit bureaucrats and they were still regarded as outsiders. Yet it is worth noting that, despite the relatively small number of Sorong Selatan bureaucrats of Maybrat origins after the establishment of Maybrat regency, their positions were still taken into account by the Regent.

F. Ethnic Representation in the Bureaucracy

As a follow-up to the competence test performance as the basis in the structural official recruitment, until November 2011 the local government of Sorong Selatan regency through the Regent and Baperjakat successfully appointed 116 Echelon II and III officials. The bureaucrats with were appointed to various positions, from the levels of Head of Local Department and Head of Board (Echelon IIB) or Head of Office (Echelon IIIA) to those of Head of Section and Head of Sector (Echelon IIIB). For the positions of Echelon II and III in all the existing institutions in Sorong Selatan, there should have been 123 official positions but due to a variety of considerations, seven offices were still vacant including Head of Health Service, Head of Public Work Service and several lower positions in it (Heads of ‘Bina Marga’ (road-work) Section, ‘Cipta Karya’ (housing) Section, and ‘Water’ Section), Head of Infrastructure within the Transportation Service, and Head of Data and Cooperation Section in the Local Development Planning Board (Bappeda). A further examination to the seven offices suggested

246 Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, Teminabuan, 5 March 2011.
that those were positions that require technical qualifications or specific experts and to date there was no bureaucrat in Sorong Selatan considered as satisfying the qualification to be appointed in the position.

In view of ethnic composition, of 116 Echelon II and III officials in the Local Government of Sorong Selatan regency, there were 37 bureaucrats from Tehit, 26 from Maybrat, only 11 from Imekko and, quite surprisingly, there were 42 ‘outsider’ bureaucrats, which collectively comprise the largest number compared to other three ethnic groups separately. A closer look at the 42 ‘outsider’ officials, there were only four non-Sorong Selatan Papuans (3 bureaucrats of Biak origins and 1 bureaucrat of Serui origin). The remaining 38 people were non-Papuan bureaucrats, that is, Javanese, Torajan, Makassarese, Ternate, and Batak (North Sumatran). In the recent structure of bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan there are about 64% of Sorong Selatan indigenous bureaucrats, consisting of the Tehits (31%), the Maybrats (23%), and the Imekkos (10%), while the total number of bureaucrats of non-Sorong Selatan origins amounts to 36%.  

The composition of officials based on ethnic background is interesting to observe because it will explain the working of the politics of identity in Sorong Selatan on the one hand, and the efforts of maintaining sustainability of the performance of bureaucracy on the other hand. From the number and official positions, bureaucrats of Tehit origins were still dominant because in addition to their number, nine of them were in the positions of Echelon II, including the top position in the bureaucratic structure (Secretary of Local Government), Expert Staff, Head of Service and Head of Office. There were also many positions of Echelon IIIA (Head of Office) occupied by the Tehit bureaucrats. Compared to the bureaucrats from the other indigenous ethnic groups of Sorong Selatan (the Maybrats and the Imekkos), the Tehit bureaucrats were those occupying most of the important official positions in the bureaucracy, including the Director of Local Public Hospital. Although it was only an Echelon III position, it was regarded as a very strategic position. It can be said that the Tehits dominated the structure of the bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan in 2011. The second position was the

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247See Bappeda Sorong Selatan, *Data Pejabat Eselon II dan III berdasarkan Latar Belakang Etnis*, November 2011. Complete data on names and positions of each bureaucrat and their divisions based on ethnic background can be seen at the end of this chapter.
Maybrats. Although the number of Maybrat bureaucrats was only 26, a large number of them occupied strategic positions: seven of them were at the positions of Echelon II consisting of Expert Staff, Secretary of Local Parliament and several Heads of Services. Finally, the number of Imekko bureaucrats was merely 11, and only three of them occupied the Echelon II offices consisting of one Expert Staff and two Heads of Services.

Meanwhile, among the 42 bureaucrats from ethnics outside Sorong Selatan, only five officials held the positions of Echelon II, i.e., an Assistant Secretary of Local Government, an Expert Staff, a Head of the Local Department of Forestry, a Head of the BPKAD (Local Financial and Asset Management Board), as well as a Head of Inspectorate or Local Inspection Board. Observing the positions of bureaucrats from ethnics outside Sorong Selatan in the structure of bureaucracy, there was a strong belief that they were not merely a balancer in the context of ethnicity, but also as a back-up or even a driving force for the working of bureaucratic machines. The Local Department of Forestry was strategically-placed, owing to the numerous problems that should be handled related to the issues of forest function transfer and the intense of illegal logging in Papua in the last several years. Also, the positions as Head of BPKAD and Head of Inspectorate were vital in assuring the implementation of accountable government and development administration. So was the position of Assistant Secretary of Local Government, which the driving force for the functioning of organizational machines in the scope of the Secretary of Local Secretariat and thus was very important in Sorong Selatan. At the lower level or Echelon III, the bureaucrats from non-Sorong Selatan ethnic groups were largely placed in a position as Secretary, so it is not surprising that there were 12 bureaucrats placed in the position as the Secretary of Local Department and the Secretary of Board, and Secretary of Hospital. Moreover, there were also two bureaucrats placed as the Heads of Offices, i.e. the Office of Women Empowerment (Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan) and the Office of National Unity and Society Protection (Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat). Positions occupied by bureaucrats of non-Sorong Selatan origins are particularly meant by the Regent as the positions to back-up the positions of Sorong Selatan indigenous bureaucrats. As conveyed by the Regent, since the beginning of the process of
bureaucratic official recruitment, the main objective was to create a local
government bureaucracy that could work and serve the public better. The
demand to perform the tasks of delivering good public service and the capacity
of creating a transparent and accountable responsibility system in accordance
with the prevailing regulations become the tasks specifically mandated to the
candidates that would be appointed in the respective official positions. However,
the Regent also realized that the ideal demand could not be satisfied by the
indigenous bureaucrats of Sorong Selatan and, therefore, they need to be backed
up by the outsider bureaucrats, whom had good skills and performance based on
the observation and objective results of the objective test.248 For some indigenous
bureaucrats who realized the importance of cooperation to achieve the good
performance of institutions, the placement of the 'outsider' bureaucrats in the
strategic positions did not cause problems. They even found the outsiders
helpful.249 However, the outsider bureaucrats themselves thought that their
positions in bureaucracy did not only become the back-ups for indigenous
bureaucrats in the sense not only that they had to help the running of the
bureaucracy but also that they had to take over heavy duties without adequate
support and facilities. However, when the time comes to see the outcome, the
indigenous bureaucrats (in their position as the highest official in the institution)
would readily claim it.250

Sociological reality indicates that the ethnic groups in Sorong Selatan have
great attention to the process of bureaucratic appointments to the structural
positions. In each ethnic community, people enthusiastically talked about the
circulated names of social figures among their respective ethnic groups
nominated to Head of Services, Head of Board, and Head of Office. Here, each
ethnic group felt to have great interests in order that their figures appointed in
the certain structural positions.251 In the placement of bureaucratic officials,
there were two ways to demand for the positions in bureaucracy. First, social

248 Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw, Yogyakarta 19 April 2011.
249 Interview with Martinus Salamuk, Head of BKD Sorong Selatan, Yogyakarta 17 May 2011.
250 Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, Yogyakarta, 20 May 2011.
251 Interview with Sudiana Sasmita, S2PLOD UGM student who was conducting a research in Teminabuan on the day of inauguration and demonstration, 17 May 2011.
group proposed certain names of the candidates to the Regent based on considerations that the candidates could meet the need of their group. Second, certain bureaucrats asked social groups to nominate them to the Regent in the hope that they would be appointed to the expected official positions in bureaucracy. The following section describes a general account on each ethnic community’s strategies in lobbying for their representation and the resulting bureaucratic officials from each ethnic group.

F.1. The Imekkos

The Imekkos were well-known for their fine attitude and did not like to impose their own desire let alone exerting pressure in nominating their bureaucrats. Although they tried to lobby the Regent to appoint their people to offices at the level of Head of Local Department or Head of Board, this ethnic group was seen as the most readily-accepting the Regent's final decision. Realizing that there was no bureaucrat of Imekko origins who satisfied the requirements for Echelon II offices, the Imekkos nominated non-Imekko bureaucrats whom were considered having great attention and care to the development of Imekko society. They proposed several names of non-Papuan bureaucrats to be appointed as Head of Local Department. Such a flexible and accommodative attitude of the Imekkos was also utilized by several bureaucrats with ambitions to occupy the position as structural official but have no strong support from local society. It occurred, for example, in Imekko area, particularly in Kais region, when a non-Imekko bureaucrat asked the social group to nominate him as Head of the Local Department. In return, the bureaucrats of course promised to give aid for the sake of Imekko community, known for prioritizing their social group’s needs first.

The Immekos’ attitudes can easily support the figures from outside Imekko as long as they can give attention to their ethnic collective interest. This explains their strong support to Regent Otto Ihalauw although Otto Ihalauw was

252 Interview with Dominggus Aifufu, Chief of Imeko Customary Council, 2 May 2011 in Teminabuan.

253 Interview with Ansar Sija’, the Chairman of GP Ansor (Ansor Youth Movement) of Sorong Selatan, 2 May 2011.
not an indigenous Papua but was an Ambonese descent from a small Kay island in south western of Papua. As the owner of the majority of votes (approximately 40% of the total voters in Sorong Selatan) the Imekko community has a very important role in winning the Regent and Vice Regent. It is not surprising that during the two terms of his regency, Otto Ihalauw chose the indigenous Imekko as his running mates Tom Dedaida for the first term (2005-2010) and Samsudin Anggiluli for the second term (2010-2015). Otto Ihalauw’s decision to choose his running mate from the indigenous Imekko generated an increasingly strong support from the Imekkos to the policies of local government in general and the policies of the Regent and Vice Regent in particular. 254

Although the Imekkos tend not to impose their demand to lobby the Regent to appoint officials from Imekko, the Regent would still pay great attention to the existence of Imekko bureaucrats. In the process of appointing the structural officials of Echelon II, when the Regent saw that there was no indigenous bureaucrat from Imekko to be appointed as the Head of Local Department because the requirements of administration and competence value were not met, eventually he sought for bureaucrat figures with the minimum of administrative requirements to be appointed by Head of Local Department. Then, the Regent appointed an Imekko bureaucrat (who was serving as Secretary of Personnel Board (BKD) Head of the Local Department of Manpower and Transmigration although in view of rank and echelon he had not meet the requirement,255 and personally the bureaucrat stated that he did not want to occupy the position as Head of Local Department. He also felt that he was more comfortable to be the Secretary of Local Personnel Board in accordance with his own condition. The policy of the Regent to appoint the indigenous bureaucrat of Imekko ethnicity as Head of Local Department with no requirement of administration and competence test was an unusual action. It occurred as a result of the Regent’s desire to maintain ethnic representation and to compensate the Imekkos’ dedication in supporting him, and that up to the time there was no single Imekko bureaucrat serving as Head of Local Department. In this case,

254 Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, 5 March 2011 in Teminabuan.
255 The Result of Competence Assessment, Gadjah Mada University Team, 2011.
ethnicity could be used as a political instrument to urge the Regent to meet individual demand of bureaucrats from certain ethnic group. Alternatively, ethnicity was also used as an instrument to assure the perpetuity of ethnic group’s support to local government’s policies in general and the continuity of the political existence of the Regent in particular.256

F.2. The Tehits

Unlike their attitude that tended supportive and accommodative to the Regent’s first policy of local institutions restructuring previously, the Tehits tended to take severe attitude and strong in the Regent’s policy of bureaucratic appointment in 2011. They demanded that their indigenous people could be appointed and occupied bureaucratic positions. One explanation of the tendency of the Tehits’ attitude which strongly demanded the official positions in bureaucracy is that their perception that they were the only indigenous Teminabuan and, therefore, they were more entitled to become bureaucratic officials in the region. In addition to the claim as the only indigenous Teminabuan, their strong demand also underlain the fact that the Tehits have more bureaucrats compared to other ethnic and most of them have also the qualifications of high levels of education.257

Although in terms of population, the Tehits were smaller in size than the Imekkos, the fact that they generally reside in districts around Teminabuan and thus have more access to the capital of Sorong Selatan, it is not surprising that the Tehits also had also a feeling of having contributed more to win Otto Ihalauw in the previous Local Election. In fact, many members of Otto Ihalauw’s political campaign staffs in the 2005 and 2010 Local Elections were Tehits. In addition, many consolidating posts for the Regent were built along the streets of several districts within the Tehit areas. Tehits thus felt deserving of more of the Regent’s attention, both in the allocation of budget for development programs and in the appointment of bureaucratic officials. The decreasing number of Maybrat

256 Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, May 8th, 2011 in Yogyakarta.
257 Interview with Martinus Salamuk (a Tehit bureaucrat), The Head of Local Personnel Board, 8 May 2011 in Yogyakarta.
bureaucrats as many moved to new Maybrat regency also encouraged the Tehit bureaucrats to perform better in bureaucratic official positions.

The strong demand for ethnic Tehit bureaucratic positions was in part due to the fact that they are the ethnic group with large number of population and that played important role in the political campaign staff that that had won the Regent in both 2005 and 2010 Local Elections. As an ethnic group residing in Teminabuan, the Tehits was also considered as a social group giving a great contribution to the provision of public infrastructure such as local market and transport terminal. Although for the sake of the lands exemption the Local Government had to spend a lot of money amounting tens of billions rupiah, the local community thought that money could not sufficiently pay the compensation over the use of the customary lands. For them, the Local Government were also required to provide the indigenous people whose lands had been used by local government for public facilitations with sustainable employment in bureaucracy.

Within the Tehits, there are several sub-ethnicities including Tehit, Sawiat, Saifi, Ogit, Imyan, and Salakhma. The Tehit sub-ethnicity, due to residing in Teminabuan and Seremuk districts, has the largest number of bureaucrats occupying the strategic positions of bureaucracy. This sub-ethnicity is represented by many bureaucrats and is the most influential sub-ethnicity in Sorong Selatan. The highest career in Sorong Selatan local bureaucracy (Secretary of Local Government) was occupied by an official from this sub-ethnicity, Dortheis Sesa. Before serving the Secretary of Local Government of Sorong Selatan, Sesa was Head of Local Development Planning Board in Manokwari regency. He was called back by the Regent and appointed Secretary of Local Government in 2009. The appointment of Sesa was largely understood as the effort of retaining voters from the Tehits group in the 2010 Regent Election to the political interest of Otto Ihalauw.

In addition to the Secretary of Local Government, various positions ranging from Head of Local Department, Head of Board, and Head of Office to the lower levels, i.e. Heads of Sections, are largely occupied by the Tehit bureaucrats. At the level of clan within this sub-ethnic, there are three clans occupying more official positions of bureaucracy compared with the other clans, i.e. Thesia, Momot, and Sesa. There are four top level officials from Thesia clan residing in
Teminabuan municipality, while Momot and Sesa clans have three top level officials each. Furthermore, the figures from the three clans occupy top level offices, namely, Head of Local Department, Head of Board, and Head of Office.

Then, Sawiat sub-ethnic placed two figures as Head of Board and Head of Office, i.e. Martinus Salamuk that is retained as Head of Local Personnel Board, and Petronela Krenak that is appointed as Head of Women Empowerment Office. Then, one official of Head of Organization Section was occupied by Marten Krenak. Meanwhile, the Heads of the Districts where this sub-ethnic reside, i.e., Sawiat and Fkour districts, was also occupied by bureaucrats of Sawiat sub-ethnicity.

Saifi and Ogit sub-ethnicities successfully placed their figures as District Heads. Mr. IM from Ogit sub-ethnic is retained as Head of Konda District where this sub-ethnicity resides. Then, Mr. SS from Saifi sub-ethnicity was appointed as the Head of Saifi District. Still in Tehit ethnic group, the Imyan and Salakhma sub-ethnicities with relatively small number of population was less considered in the placement of official positions in bureaucracy.

The explanation of a relationship between ethnic and sub-ethnic background and bureaucrats with their positions in the bureaucracy illustrate the close relationship between them, that is, the official placement policy in the position of bureaucracy is inseparable from the concerned ethnic background. It means, although from the beginning it was explained by the Regent that the process of official placement in the bureaucracy will be conducted objectively and rationally based on the result of the competence test, in practice, it was difficult for the Regent to avoid ethnic political set as the bases of main considerations in the promotion and demotion of bureaucratic officials. The result of the competence test was used as an instrument justifying the competence and the appropriateness of group rank of a bureaucrat, but ethnic consideration also became a decisive factor to determine whether or not a bureaucrat would be appointed to certain office.

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258 Petronela Krenak refused the promotion. See Chapter IV, especially Note 18, for details.

259 Head of Sawiat District is Mr. AS of Sawiat sub-ethnic origin, while Head of Fkour District is Mr. MB who is also a Sawiat origin.
The greater portion of the Tehit sub-ethnicity in the composition of official positions in the bureaucracy led the other sub-ethnicities to protest the Regent. Among the Echelon II and III officials who were inaugurated on 4 May 2011, numerous Heads of Local Departments, Heads of Boards, and Heads of Offices were from Tehit and particularly those residing in Teminabuan. It led the other ethnic groups that felt to be neglected by the Regent to exert their aspiration and asked him conduct the appointment more fairly and proportionally regarding ethnic background. The protest from non-Tehit ethnic groups was, among others, expressed by disclosing the data that Tehit people and bureaucrats did not entirely support the Regent Otto Ihalauw and the Vice Regent Samsudin Anggiluli. According to the protesters, the Tehits and several sub-ethnics tended to be divided in giving support to Otto Ihalauw in the 2010 Local Election. It was evident from votes gained by one of the candidates (Dance Flassy of Tehit sub-ethnic origins) who scored a second position and gained 2,160 votes in Teminabuan district and 305 votes in Seremuk district. Based on the data, according to those protesting the domination of the Tehits in bureaucracy, it was not reasonable that the Regent spoiled the Tehits by providing them with a lot of strategic positions in the bureaucracy.

F.3. The Maybrats

A relatively strong support to the candidacy of Regent Otto Ihalauw in the 2010 Local Election was shown by the Maybrats in Sorong Selatan. Among the Maybrats, the grouping into sub-ethnicities did not occur because they are more consolidated as one ethnic group. Their solidity was partly the impact of the partition of Maybrat regency from Sorong Selatan. If they were to move to the new Maybrat regency, they would be less accepted because they were regarded as a part of the Tehits residing in Sorong Selatan. Yet if they chose to continue residing in Sorong Selatan, they were not well-accepted by Tehits because they were regarded as outsiders and competitors for the indigenous ethnic of

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260 Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Bappeda of Sorong Selatan, 7 May 2011 in Teminabuan.
Teminabuan. In such a dilemmatic position, bureaucrats of Maybrat origins chose to support Otto Ihalauw to secure their strategic existence in the bureaucracy of Sorong Selatan.

In the 2010 Regent Election, even the Maybrats did not show strong support to the candidate of Maybrat origins, Origenes Ijie, who only gained 2,711 votes, far from the 15,611 votes gained by Otto Ihalauw. The strong support of the Maybrat people and bureaucrats to Otto Ihalauw in the 2010 Election and also to the Regent’s policy in the appointment of structural official positions are two interesting phenomena because the support was obviously different from that showed by the Maybrat bureaucrats that tended to be very critical during the restructuring of local institutions in 2008. After the establishment of Maybrat regency in 2009, many Sorong Selatan bureaucrats of Maybrat origins moved to Maybrat regency. They were generally those who were critical to the policies of the Regent. Meanwhile, the Maybrat bureaucrats who chose to reside in Sorong Selatan were those with high commitment, dedication and loyalty to work in the bureaucratic structure in Sorong Selatan and were not influenced by the establishment of Maybrat regency.

This also explains Regent Otto Ihalauw’s policy to place a quite large number of bureaucrats of Maybrat origins in the strategic positions of the bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan. In addition to his belief to the dedication and loyalty shown by the Maybrat bureaucrats by residing in Sorong Selatan, generally bureaucrats of Maybrat origins have also very good education, capacity, competence, and skills to work in local government. Several bureaucrats of Maybrat origins who helped Regent Otto Ihalauw both in performing the government tasks and in winning the 2010 Local Election were still retained and appointed to strategic official positions. Among the Maybrat bureaucrats occupying the Echelon II offices included Nimrod Nauw as Head of Disperindagkop (Local Department of Trade, Industry, Cooperative and Small and Medium Entreprises), Yunus Roy Kambuaya as Head of Bappeda (Local Development Planning Board), Stefanus Kocu as Head of Local Department of

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263 Interview with Karel Murafer (a Maybrat bureaucrat), May 8th, in Yogyakarta.
Fishery and Marine, Alexander Duwith as Expert Staff in Local Autonomy, Dance Nauw as Expert Staff in Economy, and Lambert Atanay as Expert Staff in Governance. Meanwhile, other Maybrat figures who were promoted to new position were Yunus Duwit as Secretary of Local Parliament from his prior position as one of the Chairs of Local Development Planning Board. A relatively large number of Maybrat bureaucrats in Echelon IV and III were Heads of Districts and officials in several Local Government Units.

F.4. Non-Sorong Selatan Papuans and Non-Papuans

In the process of promotion and demotion of officials in the bureaucracy, the activity of bureaucrats from the last two groups, namely the non-Sorong Selatan Papuans and the Non-Papuan' outsiders' (pendatang) were not recognized, either in lobbying the Regent or other attempts to seek official positions. Individually, there were several Echelon III officials of Non-Papuan origins trying to utilize the support of the locals, particularly the Imekkos, to be promoted to Echelon II offices. Collectively, however, there was no lobby by both bureaucrats and social groups supporting them to influence the appointment of officials in the bureaucracy.

As explained in the previous chapters, both non-Sorong Selatan Papuans and non-Papuan bureaucrats have better qualification compared with their indigenous counterparts more broadly. Yet most of them chose to keep calm and to avoid struggling for the positions of local government offices in the bureaucracy because they realized that it would cause jealousy among the other bureaucrats or even among the indigenous people. Therefore, the common attitude showed by the non-Sorong Selatan Papuan and non-Papuan bureaucrats were “fully devolved the appointment at the Regent’s discretion” whether or not they will be appointed to an official position. According to them, as civil servants in bureaucracy they did want the official positions in accordance with their own capacity and ability but they also realized that there was a complexity

264 Interview with Suroso, Secretary of Sorong Selatan Bappeda, 8 May 2011 in Yogyakarta.
265 Interviews with a group of non-Sorong Selatan Papuan bureaucrats, especially Echelon IV, at Melati Hotel, Teminabuan, 6 March 2011.
of problems around the promotion of officials in Sorong Selatan where ethnic balance should be maintained, which in turn led them to take the situation for granted. They expected that if the governance has increasingly been better and the local communities have more and more understood the mechanisms of task performance that bureaucracy should carry out, the process of official recruitment and appointment could be done more fairly and equally without discrimination in ethnic, religious and gender backgrounds.\textsuperscript{266}

However, the fact that non-Papuan and non-Sorong Selatan Papuan bureaucrats did not show intensive lobby activity to the Regent and the Secretary of Local Government did not necessarily mean that no effort was done to get promoted. Unlike most bureaucrats who relied on the power of ethnic identity, the “outsider” bureaucrats generally relied more on the capacity, discipline, and sincerity in their job. Some outsider bureaucrats, for example Javanese, strongly believe that the Regent would take their lives and careers in the bureaucracy into account. In a popular proverb, one should pursue the principle of “berakit-rakit ke hulu berenang-renang ke tepian, bersakit-sakit dahulu bersenang-senang kemudian” (no pain, no gain). For them, it means that if they work hard now, they will for sure enjoy the life both in good official positions and other forms of rewards.\textsuperscript{267}

There were many “outsider” bureaucrats who had from the beginning showed their commitment and dedication in developing Sorong Selatan regency who then received special attention from the Regent and were also appointed to strategic positions.\textsuperscript{268} The Regent could realize this by proportionally combining two groups: the selected indigenous bureaucrats and the outsider bureaucrats with good qualifications. In this case, the Regent also realized that it is simply impossible to ignore the existence of the pendatang bureaucrats because factually they have significant roles in bringing the progress to the local government of Sorong Selatan.

\textsuperscript{266} Interviews with a group of non-Papuan bureaucrats of Sorong Selatan Regency, especially Echelon IV, at Melati Hotel, Teminabuan, 7 March 2011.

\textsuperscript{267} Interview with Azis (a Javanese), an Echelon II bureaucrat in Sorong Selatan Teminabuan 7 March 2011.

\textsuperscript{268} Interview with Regent Otto Ihalauw, 8 May 2011 in Yogyakarta.
G. Ethnic Politicization in the Appointment of Structural Officials

The various responses among the communities to the two main policies taking place at the first six months of 2011 illustrates the complexity of problems faced by local government in Sorong Selatan. As a new region resulted from a partition policy (pemekaran), the existence of bureaucracy provided the communities with a hope to directly have access to the bureaucracy.

As commonly seen in all new regions as results of the partition policy and in the regions suffering from economic underdevelopment, local government becomes an important agent in the cultural and socio-economic activities which are the main sources of money. Goods and service transactions at a local level are greatly determined by money circulation from the Local Budget. To be the part of the bureaucratic structure, or more explicitly to have access to decision making in the bureaucracy, will assure someone or even a group of people to have access to financial sources. Thus, bureaucracy can be taken as a means of livelihood where the sources of livelihood can be gained. The struggle of a community to become a part of the bureaucratic structure is a struggle to maintain and to manage their own selves and families as well as the society.

Bureaucracy can also be regarded as a modern organization in Papua in line with the increasingly eroded traditional values due to the changes in socio-economic sector, industrialization and technological advancement. In the local traditional communities, particularly in Papua’s Sorong Selatan, the existence of a person within social stratification is determined, among other things, by the ownership of customary symbols in forms of property and social position. One will be regarded as a strong person within the social environment if the person and the family have enormous tracts of land, numerous cattle, pigs, many pieces of kain timur, and other customary symbols with highly significant meaning in economic perspective. With the changes in the traditional life, the symbols of customary sources have no longer a significant meaning to determine the social position in a society. Among the factors considered as more influential are the achievements in education, capacity to interact with the outside world and official positions in local bureaucracy, as the latter also indicates an access to financial sources that will mean a lot for the welfare of the ethnic communities.
The indigenous people in Sorong Selatan take bureaucracy as an arena for the unfolding socio-political contestation and struggle for their economic resources. Although the local community and bureaucrats may not be aware of the notion of representative bureaucracy, various practices carried out in Sorong Selatan is similar to what is theoretically known as a model of representative bureaucracy, which assumes that the conditions of a governmental bureaucracy reflect the population in terms of such indicators as race, ethnicity or gender.\(^{269}\)

If closely examined, the bureaucratic structure in Sorong Selatan is actually a reflection of the social structure of the community, especially viewed from the diversity of the ethnic backgrounds. Such conditions have been around since the early days of the regency in 2003 and, later on, were formally affirmed by the local government's vision in 2005 which mentioned the importance of the principle of PKK (equity, fairness and balance) in regional development. By equality the local government meant that all existing resources in the area can be enjoyed equally by all levels of society and all ethnic groups, while fairness and balance obviously stand for the majority's take that all available resources (including those within the local bureaucracy and their financial properties) should be shared fairly. A simplistic sense of fairness and balance translates that the majority ethnic group would have a majority share that the small ethnic groups would simply have fairly small portion. It is such a proportional distribution of the position that the locals consider a proper implementation of the justice and balance principles. The theory of the correspondence between the state of the bureaucracy and the condition of the population is known as the passive representation, which in turn will shift to an active representation, where the process of policy formulation and aspiration will benefit the various groups within the particular entity.

What took place in Sorong Selatan might still be in the phase of passive representation, when the representation of ethnic groups within the bureaucracy is emphasized on the quantitative proportion rather than on a proportional

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policy formulation process. Even in the policy formulation, what actually prevails is a condition referred to as sectoral disproportionality. That is, if a certain sector in the bureaucracy (whether educational, health, agricultural or economic) is controlled by bureaucrats from a certain ethnicity, then the majority of the policy in the particular sector would be oriented to the needs of the particular ethnic group to which the bureaucrats belong. Thus the direction and scope of a policy is not based on the achievement of the target groups equally based on their area of residence. Rather, the main targets of the policies, especially those with higher significance to the community, are usually dedicated to the head of SKPD's fellow ethnic members.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

This chapter seeks to reiterate the answers to the research questions posited in the previous chapters. As mentioned, this study focuses on the relationship between bureaucracy and ethnicity and started out from the idea that local context (ethnicity) has a strong influence on bureaucratic behaviour. This was affirmed by extensive study on bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan regency in the Indonesian Province of Papua Barat. The findings confirm an underlying discrepancy between the formal theory of modern bureaucracy and its implementation at the local level that is heavily influenced by ethnicity and identity politics.

Therefore, this study reveals a new form of interaction between the ideal notion of the modern Weberian bureaucracy and the values of ethnicity in Sorong Selatan. The nature of the interaction process is mutually influential, where the adoption of Weberian bureaucratic values affects the existing values of ethnicity while the dimensions of ethnicity and identity politics counterattack by embedding some local-traditional values to the modern framework. Such political bargaining is clearly visible in the process of bureaucratic reform undertaken by Sorong Selatan Regent.

In the process of bureaucratic reform, the Regent as the bureaucratic authority in Sorong Selatan encountered some challenges. On the one hand, the regent had to comply with the rules of the formalistic Weberian bureaucratic system stipulated by central government. On the other hand, the regent had also to conform to local wisdom to accommodate ethnicity and identity politics. Measures taken by officials in Sorong Selatan to reform the bureaucracy, for example in the recruitment for structural offices, was in the interests of satisfying the desires of ethnic representatives in the management of the bureaucracy while still following the formal procedures of modern bureaucracy. In political science literature, this strategy is known as representative bureaucracy.

To arrive at this conclusion, this study used bureaucracy and ethnicity as concepts as a theoretical framework to analyse the phenomena of bureaucratic reform in Sorong Selatan. In this case, the concept of bureaucracy in question is
the Weberian model that central government adopts. Meanwhile, ethnicity includes a variety of cultural elements related to values, characteristics and group interests based on ethnic basis. Therefore, the intersection of these two concepts has set a background for the consolidation of the notion of representation in bureaucracy.

Decision-makers at the central government generally assume that the ideal model of bureaucracy works when the four characteristics of Weberian bureaucracy (hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and competency) are implemented to reflect good governance. In addition, there is yet another general assumption that bureaucratic process imbued with those values can be implemented uniformly and symmetrically throughout the regions. In practice, however, this study found different facts, in which the ideal concept is often in jeopardy upon its encounter with the local values of ethnic groups.

In its implementation in Sorong-Selatan regency, the four principles of Weberian bureaucracy collided with the strong local culture that emphasizes ethnic balance in bureaucratic composition. The strong interest of ethnicity and the pressure of identity politics resulted in a different notion of modern bureaucracy as perceived by community. Cultural context in the form of ethnic heterogeneity and identity politics had its own rule that puts forward primordial ties, communality, and traditional attachment. These three tribal values are prevalent in the culture of Papuan community in general and in Sorong Selatan in particular. Moreover, primordial ties and commonality are also inherent in the bureaucrats’ behaviour and mentality. Therefore, the local characteristics affect the implementation of modern bureaucracy that the central government prescribed.

The characteristics of modern bureaucracy also collided with the second concept, namely ethnicity, an aspect of social relationships that justifies the differences in characteristics and existence of a group to those of another. In addition, ethnicity also stresses a sense of similarity in identity, historical origins and cultural heritage within a group, which distinguishes it from the other groups. Each of the tribal identity features an internal power relation known as the patronage system that is closely related to the interaction between a patron
as an actor with the highest social standing in the particular ethnic group and clients that include all community members of the group or tribe.

The presence of such systems becomes a factor reinforcing ethnicity. The strong patron-client relationship forms an interaction between the two parties based on the exchange of resources. On the one hand, patrons use their power to use the resources and influence others to protect their clients, on the other hand, the clients also give their patron "reward" in the form of various support including mass mobilization, support during the election period and political lobbying. The system is prevalent in each ethnic and sub-ethnic group in Sorong Selatan, strong enough to influence the course of the local bureaucracy.

How ethnicity and patronage affected the course of the modern Weberian bureaucracy is very interesting. As shown in the previous chapters, the influence of ethnicity is noticeable in two important moments, namely bureaucratic restructuring and recruitment of local government officials. The two moments become the arena where informal dimensions of ethnicity and identity politics affected the formal rules of the Weberian bureaucratic system. The results of study showed that:

First, during the phase of bureaucratic restructuring, ethnic influences were evident in the arrangement of institutional structures and the appointment of bureaucratic officials. The findings showed that although the design of the institution was modern, the operating logic of the bureaucratic officials in Sorong-Selatan was still dictated by the local culture in the form of primordial ties and patronage systems. Bureaucratic institutions were set up not simply to follow the regulations stipulated by central government but also to accommodate the interests of various ethnic groups in Sorong-Selatan. Primordial ties and patronage systems affect both the direction and design of bureaucratic institutions.

Ethnic politics were apparent in the way the Tehits, the Imekkos and the Maybrats exerted pressure in the bureaucratic restructuring, making it the arena for competing ethnic groups to secure as many offices as possible for their representatives to occupy in the new bureaucratic structure. In this case, the principles of professionalism, competence, and some ideal characteristics of modern bureaucracy were put aside for the sake of satisfying the interests of the
competing bureaucrats and political actors of various ethnic groups. Those actors often fought one another over certain bureaucratic positions to maintain the presence of their ethnic groups in bureaucracy.

Bureaucratic restructuring was carried out not by the need to create an effective and efficient organization but was driven by the interests of local bureaucratic elites in securing their positions and in maintaining connection with their group. In addition, in the process of bureaucratic restructuring, informal leaders who claimed to be the mouthpieces for each ethnic group also involved themselves by giving another intense pressure on the bureaucratic restructuring. Thus, in the restructuring process, the Regent tried to kill two birds with one stone: to comply with the formal regulation of the central government and to accommodate the ethnic interests.

Second, there was also strong influence of ethnic interests in the bureaucratic recruitment process. This study showed that in the appointment of officials, 65% were appointed by ethnic consideration. They were appointed solely to satisfy ethnic representation in bureaucratic positions. Only about 35% of officials were appointed based on competence, experience and professionalism. Such a strategy was adopted based on the notion to create a bureaucratic composition that reflects the diversity of race, ethnicity, or gender of the population.

The composition of bureaucrats in Sorong Selatan also shows the dominance of the Tehits, the Maybrats and the Imekkos. Tehit is an ethnic group with the strongest influence on Sorong Selatan government policy including in the bureaucrats recruitment. It also illustrates how much the Tehit informal leaders involved in the local political process. Judging from the amount, 65% of the bureaucrats are Papuan of Sorong Selatan origins (including 31% for Tehit, 23% for Maybrat, and 10% for the Imekkos) and only 35% of the bureaucrats are non-Papuan migrants. The composition shows that there is a correlation between the ethnic composition in bureaucratic positions and that of Sorong Selatan population as a whole. Ethnic representation in bureaucratic positions becomes an important aspect that Sorong Selatan regent had to pay attention to in order to create a political balance in the hope that support for the local development programs could be garnered.
The influence of ethnicity in the course of bureaucracy in Sorong Selatan is visible not only from the ethnic composition of the bureaucrats but also from the intense use of various political communication methods. At the recruitment stage, for example, political lobbying was common among indigenous leaders, politicians and the officials' extended family members to influence the regent, so that certain offices could be secured for them. In addition, the lobbyists also demanded Regents not to accommodate non-Papuans in the bureaucratic structure. The practice was diametrically opposed to the demands of the modern bureaucratic formal rules that put forward the principles of professionalism, competence, and equality.

At this phase Sorong-Selatan regent tried to build the bureaucratic institution with two objectives: first, to establish a competent, professional, transparent and accountable local government bureaucracy in compliance to the rules of modern bureaucratic ideal; secondly, to take strategic measures in the formation of bureaucratic structure to accommodate ethnic representation. Therefore, the regent tried to get around this by adhering to the formal administrative procedures stipulated by the central government while accommodating the demands for representation by the various groups in society.

The Regent made various attempts to keep the sub-systems in the community (as these are required for political and governmental support) and to comply with the letters of the law as set out by the national regulations. This phenomenon shows the process of adjustment between the notion of Weberian bureaucracy and the local political contexts. Weberian bureaucracy demanded a "neutral competence", a full compliance to the merit system rather than ethnic and primordial considerations, but the Regent is also obliged to take different steps to seek the balance of ethnic heterogeneity and political stability.

In governing local bureaucracy, the Regent put forward the principles of equality, balance, and fairness among ethnic groups. The principle of equality refers to the equal opportunity to benefit from the available resources while the principles of fairness and balance refer to the fair division of resources (including local bureaucratic positions and material). In addition, by fairness they meant a proportional distribution, in the sense that the larger the size of a social group, the bigger the portion of the resource for them will be, and vice versa.
Representation and ethnic accommodation become the main logic for Sorong-Selatan Regent in reforming the bureaucracy. In the end, the resulting bureaucratic model also displays a different character from that of the modern, Weberian-style bureaucracy. These principles are emphasized by the Sorong Selatan Regent to maintain ethnic representation in governmental structures. In the modern theory of bureaucracy, the local officials in Sorong-Selatan are unconsciously practicing some representative bureaucracy.

Questions about representative bureaucracy and whether the concept is in accordance with the measures that Sorong Selatan Regent took has led this study to the last conclusion of the intersections between bureaucracy and ethnicity, namely the passive and active representation.

Based on the findings in the field, it is sufficient to say that the phenomenon in Sorong Selatan bureaucracy is still at the stage of passive representation, as representation in bureaucracy still emphasizes the ethnic proportions in terms of quantity and has not gone deeper to the responsive policy formulation process. In this case, any strong relationship between ethnic composition in the bureaucracy and the process of policy-making has not established yet. Active representation is not found either due to the absence of increasing responsiveness in the policy made by the bureaucrats for the particular segment of society that they represent. In other words, at this stage, the basic model of passive representation practiced in Sorong Selatan has not yet fully led to active representation capable of improving the quality of public services.

From the discussion and analysis presented above, three interesting points can be drawn: first, the notion of a modern organizational management of Weberian-style is not necessarily applicable in the implementation by local governments in Indonesia. This study shows that considerations of ethnic accommodation proved to rule out the principles of modern bureaucracy. In the case of Sorong Selatan, this is obvious at the three stages: restructuring of bureaucratic institutions, recruitment of bureaucratic posts, and budgeting process. This affirms that bureaucratic implementation at the local level is inseparable from the strong regional contexts, especially ethnicity.
Second, there is a shift of bureaucratic logic from a Weberian bureaucracy to representative bureaucracy, especially in areas where ethnicity prevails. When applied in such local context as Sorong Selatan regency, the management of modern Weberian bureaucracy is not in line with the tradition, logic and behaviour of the local ethnic communities. In the above three stages, strong influence of ethnicity is so prevalent that Sorong Selatan Regent put forward ethnic representation accommodation while still being subject to formal rules of modern bureaucracy. Third, although there is a correspondence between the strategy of bureaucratic reform by Sorong Selatan Regent and the logic of representative bureaucracy, the type of representation found in Sorong-Selatan is at the stage of passive representation. That said, ethnic representation in bureaucracy merely emphasizes the quantity and has not gone deeper to the aspects of bureaucratic responsiveness to the groups that the bureaucrats represent.
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Administration]. Amended by UU No. 22/1999

UU No. 5/1979 : Law on *Pemerintahan Desa* [Village Administration].
Amended by UU No. 22/1999

UU No. 22/1999 : Amendment to UU No. 5/1975 and 5/1979. Amended
by UU No. 32/2004

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Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah* [Fiscal Balance between
Central and Local Governments]

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Civil Servants]

PP No. 38/2007 : Government Regulation on *Pembagian Urusan
Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah, Pemerintah Daerah Provinsi, dan Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten* [Division
of Governance between Central Government, Province, and Regency/Municipality]
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<td>Presidential Decree on <em>Staf Khusus Presiden</em> [President's Special Staffs]</td>
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<td>Government Regulation on <em>Pembinaan Jiwa Korps dan Kode Etik</em> [Moral and Ethical Codes of the Civil Servants]</td>
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<td>Government Regulation on <em>Pengadaan Pegawai Negeri Sipil</em> [Civil Servants Recruitment/Selection]</td>
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<td>Government Regulation on <em>Pengangkatan PNS dalam Jabatan Struktural</em> [Civil Servants Appointment into Structural Positions], amended by PP No. 13/2002</td>
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<td>Government Regulation on <em>Disiplin Pegawai Negeri Sipil</em> [Civil Service Discipline]</td>
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UU No. 1/2004 : Law on Perbendaharaan Negara [State Treasury]
UU No. 15/2004 : Law on Pemeriksaan Pengelolaan dan Tanggung Jawab Keuangan Negara [State Audit]
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PP No. 58/2005 : Governmental Regulation on Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah [Regional Financial Management]
List of Abbreviations, Terms and Nomenclatures

The following are Indonesian bureaucratic abbreviations, acronyms, terms, and nomenclatures used throughout the thesis. The represented words for each acronym and abbreviation are also included.

- Depending on the context, “daerah” may refer to either Province or Regency/Municipality
- Words in quotation marks are the literal English translation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abdi dalem</td>
<td>“His Majesty’s servants” or “servants of the Royal family”, the title for bureaucracy in the Mataram Kingdom of Java</td>
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<tr>
<td>priyayi</td>
<td>hereditary Javanese elite; [nobles (of Robe)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>punggawa</td>
<td>courtier in Javanese royal palace</td>
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<tr>
<td>pangreh praja</td>
<td>“rulers of the realms”, a title attributed to Javanese native civil service during the Dutch colonial era</td>
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<td>pamong praja</td>
<td>“sustainers of the realms”, a title coined by New Order for the civil servants</td>
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<tr>
<td>abdi negara</td>
<td>“servants of the State”, a title coined by New Order in the 1980s for the bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>abdi masyarakat</td>
<td>“servants of the public”, a title coined by New Order in the 1990s for the bureaucracy (still in use to the present)</td>
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<tr>
<td>wedana</td>
<td>a district head of the Dutch colonial administration</td>
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<td>magang</td>
<td>public service apprenticeship</td>
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<tr>
<td>UU</td>
<td>Undang-undang, Law, primary legislation endorsed by the House of Representatives</td>
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**PP**: *Peraturan Pemerintah*, Government Regulations, delegated legislation

**Pemda**: *Pemerintah Daerah*, Local Government (in general use)

**Kepala Daerah**: Head of Local Government (generic), Governor, Regent, Mayor (specific)

**Pemprov**: *Pemerintah Provinsi*, province, provincial government

**Pemkab/ Pemkot**: *Pemerintah Kabupaten/Pemerintah Kota*, regency/municipality

**Kabinet Pembangunan**: “Cabinet for Development”, a series of seven consecutive cabinets formed by President Suharto from 1968-1998

**KORPRI**: *Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia* [Corps of the Indonesian Civil Servants]

**Golkar**: *Golongan Karya*, “the Functional Group”, the definite ruling party of the New Order established in 1971, consisted primarily of the civil servants and bureaucrats (and their families) organized by the *KORPRI*

**Kanwil**: *Kantor Wilayah*, Provincial Office of Department/Ministry during the New Order era

**Kandep**: *Kantor Departemen*, Regencial or Municipal Office of Department/Ministry during the New Order era

**DUK**: *Daftar Urut Kepangkatan*, bureaucratic rank order. Among the sarcastic language games reflecting the practices are: *Daftar Urut Kedekatan* [closeness-based order]

**juklak/juknis**: *petunjuk pelaksanaan/petunjuk teknis*, “implementation guidelines, technical guidelines”; detailed administrative procedures for implementing a particular policy
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<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>tupoksi</strong></td>
<td><em>tugas pokok dan fungsi</em>, the basic tasks and functions (of a bureaucratic unit)</td>
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<td><strong>pemilukada, pilkada</strong></td>
<td><em>pemilihan umum kepala dan wakil kepala daerah</em>, <em>pemilihan kepala daerah</em>, “election of regional head”. Applicable to gubernatorial election and regential/mayoral election.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Setda</strong></td>
<td><em>sekretariat daerah</em>, regional bureaucratic secretariat; both at the province and at regency/municipal levels</td>
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<td><strong>Bappeda</strong></td>
<td><em>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah</em>, Regional Planning Board</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LTD</strong></td>
<td><em>lembaga teknis daerah</em>, Regional Technical Institutions (the Bappeda, Regional Hospital, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UPT</strong></td>
<td><em>Unit Pelaksana Teknis</em>, “technical operation units”, various technical implementation units established by the Regional Services. Not to be confused with LTD (<em>lembaga teknis daerah</em>)</td>
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<td><strong>Dinas Daerah</strong></td>
<td>Regional Services (both in Province and in Regency/Municipality)</td>
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<td><strong>Surat Edaran (Menteri)</strong></td>
<td>(Ministerial) Circular</td>
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<td><strong>Permen</strong></td>
<td><em>Peraturan Menteri</em> [Ministerial Regulation]</td>
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<td><strong>BKN</strong></td>
<td><em>Badan Kepegawaian Negara</em> [State / National Agency for Civil Servants]</td>
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<td><strong>BKD</strong></td>
<td>Badan Kepegawaian Daerah [Local Agency for Civil Servants]</td>
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<td><strong>Sekjen</strong></td>
<td><em>Sekretaris Jenderal</em> [Secretary General], a first-echelon bureaucratic post at the central bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dirjen</strong></td>
<td><em>Direktur Jenderal</em> [Director General], a first-echelon bureaucratic post at the central bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Baperjakat : Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan, 
Advisory Board for Bureaucratic Position and Rank

DPRD : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
[Provincial/Regencial/City Council, Local Parliament]

APBD : Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah [Local Budget]

RAPBD : Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah 
[Local Budget Plan]

KKN : Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme [corruption, collusion, nepotism]

Raperda : Rancangan Peraturan Daerah [Local Ordinance Draft]

Raperbup : Rancangan Peraturan Bupati [Regential Regulation Draft]

RKPD : Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah [Local Government's Annual Plan]

Panggar DPRD : Panitia Anggaran DPRD [Local Parliament's Budget Committee]

TAPD : Tim Anggaran Pemerintah Daerah [Local Government’s Budget Team]

KUA : Kebijakan Umum Anggaran [Budgetary General Policy]

PPAS : Prioritas Plafon Anggaran Sementara [Preliminary Budget’s Priorities]