Post-Suharto democratisation and the obstacles to a security community between Australia and Indonesia

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Abstract
This thesis considers the prospects of a security community between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. A security community is characterised by widespread identification and trust, and is distinct from both English School solidarism’s emphasis on purposive cooperation between states, and the democratic peace theory’s conception of states interacting in isolation from broader relations of rule. During the early 1990s, Paul Keating and Gareth Evans sought a degree of ideational convergence with Jakarta. They focused on promoting a common conception of regional security, which was reflected in the state-centric norms of cooperative security, multilateralism and trade liberalisation. These norms found institutional expression in the Cambodian peace settlement, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. However, Canberra and Jakarta were constantly challenged by widespread opposition in Australia towards Jakarta’s sovereignty over East Timor, demonstrating why the solidarist bilateral relationship during the late Suharto years was not a security community. According to the democratic peace theory, post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation should have steadily increased trust between Australia and Indonesia. However, this expectation has not occurred, and the absence of a security community is particularly evident in the fractious and partial quality of post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on state-building, regionalism, and asylum seekers. The democracies of Australia and Indonesia do not interact with each other in an ideational and material vacuum, but are located within broader relations of rule which condition the scope and quality of identification. In the post-Suharto period, these relations of rule have principally included the unequal power relations which constrain democratic institutions in Australia and Indonesia, the Australian aid programme’s fostering of neoliberal and technocratic forms of belonging in Indonesia, the militaristic bent of United States’ unilateralism, and the exclusivist quality of nationalism. These restrictive relations of rule have meant that the conditions have not been created for a security community between Australia and Indonesia which is based on their common humanity, not merely in terms of their relations as democratic states.
Candidate’s Declaration

Having completed my course of study and research towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, I hereby submit my thesis for examination in accordance with the regulations and declare that:

- The thesis is my own composition, all sources have been acknowledged and my contribution is clearly identified in the thesis.
- The thesis has been substantially completed during the course of enrolment in this degree at UWA and has not previously been accepted for a degree at this or another institution.

Will Lee
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Australia in the Asian Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPJ</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Agreement on Maintaining Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Closer Economic Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Consultative Group on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIBP</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGGI</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCLEC</td>
<td>Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td><em>Kecamatan</em> (district) Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPB</td>
<td><em>Komite Nasional Papua Barat</em> (National Committee for West Papua)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td><em>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</em> (Free Papua Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKRI</td>
<td><em>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia</em> (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td><em>Partai Komunis Indonesia</em> (Communist Party of Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLRI</td>
<td>Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Secure Australia Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>3G</td>
<td>Global Governance Group</td>
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Introduction

This thesis considers why post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation have not promoted extensive identification between Australia and Indonesia, contrary to the democratic peace theory. Paul Keating’s attempt in the early 1990s to build ideational rapport with Jakarta faced widespread opposition in Australia, because Indonesia was not a democracy. Yet, after over 15 years since Suharto’s resignation ushered in a process of democratisation and decentralisation, there is much to suggest that mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia remains fragile, if not elusive. For example, in a Lowy Institute for International Policy poll on Australian foreign policy in 2010, 71 percent of respondents thought that Indonesia was either an increased or an unchanged threat to Australia, compared to the early 1990s (Hanson 2010: 20). In addition, there are significant bilateral tensions over asylum seekers and, when compared to the Keating-Suharto years, less bilateral cooperation to shape regional institutions and order. This thesis argues that material inequalities and alienating relations of rule explain why post-Suharto democratisation has not led to widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia. The democratic peace theory, with its isolated account of state interactions, pays little attention to power asymmetries, the restrictive nature of nationalism, and the supervisory motivations of liberalism.

The introduction is divided into three sections. First, I argue that, contrary to the inclusive representation of security in elite conceptions of the bilateral relationship, the ambit of identification between Australia and Indonesia is often partial. Security, as conceived by Canberra and Jakarta, often privileges governments, militaries and business elites. Second, I consider the potential for post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation to expand the scope of mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia. In light of the democratic peace theory’s ontological blinkers and inability to account for material inequalities, I introduce the concept of security community to assess whether post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation have enhanced and expanded mutual identification. Finally, I outline the structure of this thesis.

Security and the elements of mutual identification in Australia-Indonesia relations

Security has been a perennial theme in Australia’s foreign policy towards Indonesia. Several quotes by Australian Prime Ministers and analysts illustrate this contention. In July 1966, less than a year after Suharto overthrew Sukarno, Harold Holt said that ‘with 500 000 to one million communist sympathisers knocked off, I think it is safe to
say a reorientation has taken place’ (quoted in Burke 2008: 122). A common refrain of Keating (2000: 126) was that ‘[t]he coming to power of the New Order government was arguably the event of single greatest strategic benefit to Australia after the Second World War … [Otherwise], Australians would have faced three decades of uncertainty, fear and, almost certainly, massively greater defence spending’. Faced with questions over Jakarta’s human rights abuses in West Papua, Tony Abbott maintained that ‘West Papuans could have the best possible life … as a part of an indissoluble Indonesia’ (quoted in Denton 2013). Finally, Hugh White (2013: 37) argues that as Indonesia rises geopolitically, ‘Australia will have to weigh the value of human rights in West Papua against the value of peaceful and cooperative relations with Indonesia’.

The notion of tradeoffs and inevitable sacrifices runs through the preceding quotes. Hence, visions of security, as blueprints of the good life and the protection of actors from harm, correspond with particular groups of mutual identification. These groups are often less encompassing than even the Australian and Indonesian nation-states which these quotes contend should be the loci of mutual identification. The beneficiaries of Canberra’s realist conception of security are governments, militaries and business elites (George and McGibbon 1998; Sullivan 1998). Many challenges in the bilateral relationship can be explained by the disjuncture between elite conceptions of community and the marginalisation of human security. For example, from 1975 to 1999, against widespread opposition in especially Australia, Canberra and Jakarta cooperated to maintain the latter’s denial of self-determination to East Timor. More generally, Canberra and Jakarta frequently lament the fragility in societal understandings of each other. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2010: 2137), in his address to the Australian Parliament in March 2010, nominated the ‘persistence of age-old stereotypes – [the] misleading, simplistic mental caricature that depicts the other side in a bad light’ – as the most enduring problem in the bilateral relationship. There is little consideration in these government pronouncements that governments may be the cause of societal animosity, especially when they argue that the human rights of some groups, such as those of refugees and West Papuans, can be dispensed with for geopolitical purposes.

The more Canberra attempted to foster ideational rapport with the New Order, the greater the gulf between elite conceptions of community and societal identification became. The Keating-Suharto years, the point of departure for this thesis, was conspicuous in the history of Australia-Indonesia relations for the chasm between
elite and societal identification. Upon becoming Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (1988) anticipated ‘the day when the interests of Australia and Indonesia are so varied and so important that we no longer talk of “the relationship” as though it were a patient of precarious health, sometimes sick, sometimes healthy, but always needing the worried supervision of diplomatic doctors’. In order to realise this objective, Evans proposed a process of ballast-building, which he and Grant (1995: 201) define as ‘a mutual desire to build up the relationship, layer by layer, across a wide range of activities, including defence, culture and commerce’. Put alternatively, Evans proposed an expansion of the scope of identification with Indonesia. As I argue in Chapter Two, this expansion of the scope of mutual identification was sufficient enough for the bilateral relationship to be considered as solidarist. In the English School, purposive cooperation between states distinguishes solidarism from pluralism, the latter confined to the minimal maintenance of international society, such as the exchanging of ambassadors and the balance-of-power as an institution to be invoked only when collective security is breached. Pluralism and even an anarchical international system describe Australia’s earlier relationship with Sukarno, as Indonesia was often seen through the prism of Cold War realpolitik. Yet, despite a strengthening of mutual identification after Suharto came to power, culminating during the Keating-Suharto period, because Canberra and Jakarta often quarantined the bilateral relationship from societal participation, I do not consider Australia-Indonesia relations in the early 1990s to be a security community. The so-called Jakarta lobby, which Burchill (1999) says includes ‘bureaucrats, academics and journalists’ in its membership, may be more extensive than a pluralist society of politicians and militaries. However, the characterisation of this group as a lobby suggests that it has a cause to galvanise against, which, in this case, is adverse public opinion towards Indonesia.

Magnifying the gulf between elite and societal conceptions of community with Indonesia, Canberra considered that not just the bilateral relationship, but also the wider project of Asian engagement, was in jeopardy if it failed to build ideational rapport with Jakarta. To quote Keating (2000: 126) again, without the New Order, ‘the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, two foundation stones of regional cooperation, could not have developed’. Asian engagement is a contested idea, operating as an umbrella for debates as varied as citizenship, geopolitics and the ethics of interacting primarily with privileged groups in Asia (Burke 2010; Gurry 1998; Jayasuriya 2008; Smith 2008: 59). Nevertheless, from Canberra’s perspective, reaping the benefits of Asia’s
economic growth in the early 1990s required genuflecting to the modalities of regional institutions, namely the elite-centred ASEAN Way. In Canberra’s vision of Asian engagement, Jakarta loomed large. Rawdon Dalrymple (2003: 162), a former Australian ambassador to Indonesia, calls Indonesia the ‘litmus test’ for Australia’s Asian engagement, arguing that ‘it has always been clear that if Australia had a troubled relationship with Indonesia, when other members of the region did not, it would be much harder to make progress with Australia’s engagement policy’. Therefore, if Canberra considered that the entire edifice of Asian engagement was at stake, then it was not going to readily jettison the objective of promoting ideational convergence with Jakarta. In turn, if the Australian public was already sceptical of the New Order, then any intensification of Canberra’s policy, in the name of Asian engagement, to foster ideational rapport with Jakarta was only going to entrench societal opposition.

Keating’s pursuit of ideational convergence with Suharto was emblematic of societal distrust towards Keating’s foreign policies. The secrecy which preceded the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 1995, Evans’ characterisation of the Dili massacre as an ‘aberration’, and Canberra’s failure to anticipate widespread opposition in Australia to General Herman Mantiri’s proposed appointment as Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia, among other developments, fostered societal alienation from Keating’s conception of Asian engagement and the bilateral relationship with Indonesia. Hence, the foreign and trade policy White Paper of August 1997, released about 18 months after John Howard took office, noted that ‘closer engagement with Asia [does not] require reinventing Australia’s identity [nor] abandoning the values and traditions which define Australian society’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997: iv). The implication of this pointed statement is that Keating and Evans had denied Australia’s identity in their foreign policy. This is a significant criticism if, as Burke (2010: 79) argues, ‘identity claims to anchor and define being, and thus seems hard to refute or challenge’. More broadly, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was established by Howard to rectify the increasing resort to treaties as an instrument of foreign policy, which allowed governments to circumvent democratic accountability. Notwithstanding Capling and Nossal’s (2003: 850) reservations regarding the Committee’s efficacy, Howard would have had the AMS in mind, signed just three months before Keating lost office. Therefore, the early 1990s were characterised by a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between government and societal conceptions of community with Indonesia.
There are several reasons why societal sentiment in Australia was hostile to Indonesia during the early 1990s. For one, Philpott (2001) argues that an influential discourse in Australia’s foreign policy sees Indonesia as Australia’s other, evidenced in the frequent use of dichotomies to describe the bilateral relationship. ¹ But from the perspective of the democratic peace theory, the main reason why Keating’s attempt to build ideational rapport with the New Order encountered so much societal resistance is because Indonesia was not a democracy. Therefore, the touted mechanisms of the democratic peace, such as mutual identification, dispersed centres of policymaking and the electoral moderation of belligerent governments, were hardly applicable to the New Order and its relationship with Australia (Chan 1997: 74). For example, a prevalent interpretation of the diplomatic controversy over the Jenkins articles, which detailed the rapacious business activities of Suharto’s family, was that the relationships between the government and media in both states were different. The Indonesian media was expected to regurgitate the New Order’s conception of the national interest, whereas the Australian media was more independent, a quality which the democratic peace theory contends would restrain bellicose governments. If Indonesia is now a democracy, as Canberra and Jakarta agree in their pronouncements, then this development should vindicate the democratic peace theory’s explanation of how mutual identification is achieved. In the next section, I survey how scholars have understood the significance of post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation for Australia-Indonesia relations. I argue that Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s conception of security communities is useful for examining whether post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation have expanded the scope of mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia, although, as I highlight throughout the thesis, their framework is not without its shortcomings.

**Post-Suharto democratisation, mutual identification, and the relevance of the security community concept**

Thus far, the main insight of the scholarship on Australia-Indonesia relations in the post-Suharto period is that there is a proliferation of actors involved in foreign policy, ¹

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¹ Evans and Grant (1995: 198) introduce their discussion on Australia-Indonesia relations with ‘no two neighbours anywhere in the world are as comprehensively unalike as Australia and Indonesia … the Indonesian archipelago and the continental land mass of Australia might well have been half a world apart’. As Philpott (2001: 382) puts it, ‘frequent repetition of [a discursive] convention has the effect of naturalising the particular characteristics highlighted and diminishing the sense of constructed-ness about them’. As I argue in this thesis, the common humanity between Australia and Indonesia is the casualty of these conventions, be they ‘strange neighbours’ (Ball and Wilson 1991) or democratic states.
especially that of Indonesia’s. Sulistiyanto (2010: 125 – 130) nominates the parliamentary committee on foreign policy, called Commission 1 or Komisi 1, ² think-tanks, and volunteers in humanitarian cooperation as important groups in the post-Suharto bilateral relationship, which were previously marginal in the formulation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Nabbs-Keller (2013) argues that Indonesia’s foreign ministry is no longer a fiefdom of the military, the former now adept at projecting the image of democracy.

Yet, it is important not to conflate a proliferation of actors in the formulation of foreign policy with extensive mutual identification. Here, I part company with Sulistiyanto’s (2010: 118) argument that ‘there is a potential for a form of “democratic partnership” to develop [which] could deepen the bilateral relationship by enabling [Australia and Indonesia] to deal with differences and rifts with a strong sense of maturity and responsibility’. Informed by the democratic peace theory, Sulistiyanto is arguing that analogous institutions in Australia and post-Suharto Indonesia, such as parliaments and a free media, in and of themselves promote widespread mutual identification.

There is much to support the contention that the post-1998 transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Indonesia has made little headway in fostering widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia. For example, comparing Chapters Two and Five, it is striking how attenuated what Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993: 19) call the ideational dimension of middle power cooperation has become between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. As recently as October 2014, Indonesia’s President-elect Joko Widodo indicated that he would be “stronger” on questions of [territorial] sovereignty than even his army-general election opponent, Prabowo Subianto’ (quoted in Garnaut and Bachelard 2014). However, my argument is not based on presenting countervailing evidence to that of the democratic peace theory, which replicates its positivism. This positivism also characterises much of the existing analysis on Australia-Indonesia relations (Catley and Dugis 1998). Rather, the thesis is grounded in a critical theory approach of examining whose representations of identification are dominant, and the material and social forces which render them so. Australia and Indonesia interact within numerous relations of

² On 18 September 2013, Tantowi Yahya, a prominent member of Commission 1, was interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Cooperation’s Lateline programme. Commenting on Tony Abbott’s proposal to unilaterally return asylum-seeker vessels to Indonesia, Tantowi Yahya found it ‘illegal’ and ‘offensive’ (Yahya 2013). As I argue in Chapter Six, democracy has little bearing on bilateral cooperation on asylum-seekers, as asylum-seekers are primarily framed, in an exclusionary manner, in relation to national citizenship.
rule, such as international society, neoliberalism and US unilateralism. These relations of rule are given little consideration by the democratic peace theory, with its isolated conception of state interactions. These relations of rule often impede widespread identification, but other forms of interaction, such as the interdependence of humanity, can promote it.

In order to assess how post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation have influenced mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia, I use the concept of security communities in two ways. They correspond to Robert Cox’s (1981) distinction between problem-solving and critical theories. My first usage of the security community concept follows Adler and Barnett’s (1998a) three-tier framework, which I elaborate upon in the next section and Chapter One. To summarise, Adler and Barnett highlight a number of institutions and processes which can extend mutual identification from elites to societies. Therefore, for example, we can evaluate whether the Abbott government’s New Colombo Plan promoted societal identification between Australia and Indonesia. As Adler and Barnett (1998b: 9) note, their framework builds upon Karl Deutsch and his colleagues’ earlier quantitative scholarship on security communities, by reflecting ‘developments in international relations theory [which] are exploring the role of identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics’. In other words, Adler and Barnett introduce a constructivist bent to Deutsch’s transactional approach to security communities.

The motivation underpinning the second way which I conceive of security communities is to stretch the boundaries of mutual identification. Throughout the thesis, and from the perspective of human security and emancipation, I reflect on the limitations of how Adler and Barnett have conceptualised security communities. In particular, Adler and Barnett are susceptible to Cox’s (1981: 126) criticism that ‘academic conventions divide up the seamless web of the real social world into separate spheres; each with its own theorising’. These conventions are appropriated by state elites to circumscribe the scope of mutual identification, as evidenced by the plethora of regional groupings, such as ASEAN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which claim the appellation of a community. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 30) concentrate on pluralistic security communities – ‘sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ – but they do not recognise how nation-states and nationalism often impede widespread identification. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 41) are agnostic on whether liberal-democracy is a prerequisite for a security community, arguing that ‘other intersubjective ideas … [such as] a shared
developmentalist ideology’ may be suitable prerequisites. However, Adler and Barnett are only deliberating between competing relations of rule, rather than the antinomies and limitations of any particular relation of rule. They do not engage with the scholarship which argues that there are gradations of liberal recognition (Williams 2001: 533), or that the freedom to perpetuate economic inequality is inimical to extensive identification (MacPherson 1966: 54). In the next section, I outline the structure of the thesis.

**Outline of the thesis**

In Chapter One, I recap Adler and Barnett’s security community framework. Their framework acts as an analytical crutch, but is not determinative of my assessment of how far post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation have enhanced and expanded identification between Australia and Indonesia. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 38) propose a three-tier framework of security community development. Their framework consists of precipitating conditions, the interaction of structure (power and knowledge) and process (transactions, organisations and social learning) categories, and the emergence of mutual trust and collective identity. More importantly, in light of the gradations of ideational explanations and referents of security in international politics, Chapter One distinguishes between a security community which is informed by critical theory and cosmopolitanism, or by English School solidarism, or by the democratic peace theory. These distinctions are important because they elucidate the limitations of mutual identification during the solidarism of the Keating-Suharto years, the subject of Chapter Two, and cooperation between Australia and a democratic Indonesia, the focus of Chapters Four to Six.

Chapter Two focuses on bilateral cooperation during the Keating-Suharto years, arguing that Australia-Indonesia relations during this period can be characterised as solidarist. According to the English School, the main difference between pluralism and solidarism is that there is purposive cooperation between states in the latter (Bull 2002 [1977]: 230 – 232; Buzan 2001: 475). Indeed, what is striking about bilateral cooperation in the early 1990s is that it contributed to regional cooperation on constructing a post-Cold War regional order. Therefore, important examples of Australia-Indonesia cooperation during this period, such as securing a peace settlement in Cambodia, establishing the APEC Leaders’ Summit and finessing what eventually became the ASEAN Regional Forum, had a regional dimension to them. The Agreement on Maintaining Security (1995), signed between Canberra and Jakarta in December 1995, committed both states to ‘develop such cooperation as
would benefit their own security and the region’. This region, termed the Asia-Pacific, had a broader conception of security than the militaristic one which prevailed during the Cold War, but crucially, still depended on states, the referent of security for solidarism, for its realisation. This disjuncture between ends and means to democratise security meant that states had significant incentives to ignore human rights abuses if it was in their geopolitical interests to do so. Jakarta’s continued denial of self-determination to East Timor was the most prominent example of this disjuncture during the early 1990s. Canberra and Jakarta settled on a conception of security which recognised cultural and group rights, but they did not extend this to East Timor, whose claim to self-determination was in keeping with even the thin social gruel of pluralist international society. As Canberra and Jakarta faced widespread opposition in especially Australia to Jakarta’s sovereignty over East Timor, extending to a general societal distrust towards Keating’s foreign policy, the bilateral solidarism during this period was not a security community.

Chapter Three is a bridge between the Keating-Suharto solidarist relationship and bilateral cooperation in the post-Suharto period, in which both states are now democratic. The Asian financial crisis eroded bilateral and regional solidarism, as evidenced by the eclipse of multilateral institutions such as APEC, in favour of an instrumental bilateralism and a region predicated on a more culturally exclusive East Asian identity (Beeson 2009c: 52). The Asian financial crisis was corrosive of human security, but it also highlighted the differences between Australia and Indonesia over the epistemes of political economy, which were previously downplayed amidst the seemingly inexorable economic growth of the early 1990s. To elaborate, it mattered more during financial crises, with their vociferous debates of blame and responsibility, that Australia and Indonesia subscribed to neoliberal and statist ideologies respectively, than during periods of economic growth. The Asian financial crisis led to democratisation in Indonesia and the independence of East Timor which tested Australia-Indonesia relations, demonstrating that the democratic peace theory has an overly teleological conception of what it considers to be the positive relationship between democracy and mutual identification. More importantly, from the perspective of sociological understandings of international politics, the democratic peace theory does not have an adequate grasp of the gradations of international society which influence state interactions. The reason why post-Suharto democratisation and the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)-engendered deterioration of the bilateral relationship occurred in quick succession is because East Timor’s belated independence restored a key tenet of pluralist international society, namely the self-
determination of former European colonies. Therefore, in an indictment of the democratic peace theory, although the authoritarian New Order’s sovereignty over East Timor impeded extensive identification between Australia and Indonesia, it does not follow that a democratic Indonesia’s facilitation of East Timor’s independence would yield widespread identification. In addition to the democratic peace theory’s inattention to the calibrations of international society, the latter logic can also be explained by the lengths to which Canberra and Jakarta stymied East Timor’s independence from 1975 to 1999, a denial and abrupt reversal which still cast their pall on the prospects of solidarism, much less a security community, in the post-Suharto period. 3 It may be that the past shadow of geopolitics frustrates current widespread identification, but as I discuss in the last section of Chapter Three, post-Suharto democratisation is also circumscribed by the broader relations of rule in which Australia-Indonesia interactions take place (Cumings 2001). These relations of rule are the unequal power relations which constrain democratic institutions, the continuing impunity of the Indonesian military over human rights abuses, the militaristic streak of US unilateralism in a post-September 2001 decade, and the Australian aid programme’s fostering of neoliberal and technocratic forms of belonging in Indonesia.

Chapter Four addresses the topic of how governments maintain interstate order in a context of domestic democratisation and decentralisation, in which geopolitical reasoning is increasingly illegitimate. It is important for critical approaches to security communities to query what is being democratised, and the extent to which this state of affairs elicits a response from the interests of interstate order and capital accumulation. Reflecting joint concerns that terrorism was eroding Jakarta’s capacity to maintain domestic and interstate order, bilateral police cooperation after the Bali bombings stemmed the deterioration in Australia-Indonesia relations occasioned by Australia’s leadership of INTERFET. Yet, state responses to terrorism are predicated not on the emphasis of our common humanity and interdependence, but merely on marshalling the rule of law, and seek to limit the scope of what constitutes politics in the interests of interstate order. Australia’s aid programme promotes a conception of political belonging in Indonesia which considers that democracy only has an electoral dimension, while sanctioning untrammeled economic inequalities. In addition, widespread dialogue and identification are hardly priorities for the resurrection of

3 For example, Yudhoyono (2010: 2138) cautioned the Australian Parliament that ‘we would like Australians to understand and appreciate that … the success of peace and reconciliation in Aceh and Papua is not trivial but a matter of national survival for us Indonesians’.
bilateral military and counter-terrorism cooperation in the post-September 2001 period, as evidenced by the impunity of Detachment 88 to suppress domestic dissent, and legitimised by the militaristic bent of US unilateralism. Therefore, Canberra and Jakarta may argue that democracy is an antidote against terrorism, but because their understanding of democracy is limited to electoral participation, the economic and geopolitical disaffections which engender terrorism remain unaddressed, while rampant capital accumulation is legitimised and strengthened by technocratic institutions.

In many respects a sequel to Chapter Two, Chapter Five analyses bilateral cooperation on regional institutions in the post-Suharto period. Although Australia and Indonesia are now democracies, Howard’s preference for bilateralism and his instrumental conception of the US alliance hampered regional community-building with Indonesia. Australia’s unquestioning approach to the US resulted in the former’s rapid loss of credibility – an important ideational currency – to undertake projects of regional solidarity and middle power diplomacy, as demonstrated in Kevin Rudd’s failed Asia-Pacific Community (APC) initiative. Even when Canberra reflected on Asian engagement, as Julia Gillard did with the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, its preferred group of mutual identification was the Asian middle class, defined instrumentally. In addition to repeating Gareth Evans’ inattention to how the Asian middle class may not be the harbinger of democratisation, because the fortunes of the Asian middle class are dependent on the developmental state instead, such a constituency which is privileged for its ability to consume insatiably is unlikely to promote extensive identification.

Finally, Chapter Six explains why bilateral cooperation on asylum-seekers is fractious and elusive. The pluralist international society contains a significant contradiction. Pluralism contends that the prospects for interstate order and individual wellbeing are best realised when everyone belongs to a nation-state, but pluralism simultaneously affords much latitude to nation-states to expel who they consider not to be in the national interest (Haddad 2008). Hence, asylum-seekers are only analytically intelligible because they are marginalised from the nation-state of their origin, as well as from Australian and Indonesian citizenships. No amount of technocratic cooperation, such as the Bali Process (Wesley 2007: 192 – 200), and offshore processing arrangements, even between democratic states, can paper over this contention that asylum-seekers are primarily constructed in opposition to national citizenships. Yet Adler and Barnett, in their focus on pluralistic security communities,
are oblivious to how nation-states and nationalism can constrain extensive mutual identification. This lack of identification occurs on many fronts – Australia towards an Indonesia which is at best ambivalent about preventing asylum-seekers from leaving for Australia, Indonesia towards an Australia which is perceived to be abdicating its humanitarian responsibilities as a developed country, and collectively, through forms of institutionalised indifference to the human security of asylum-seekers. In closing this introduction, and in another challenge to the democratic peace theory, it is worth noting that there are parallels between the fractious state of Australia-Indonesia cooperation on asylum-seekers, and disputes between democratic European states over the responsibility for irregular migrants, but this thesis focuses on explaining why, after 15 years of democratisation in Indonesia, its relationship with Australia seems no closer to a genuine security community than it was in the 1990s.
Chapter One
Security communities and post-Suharto Australia-Indonesia relations

Successive policymakers and government documents in Australia have invoked the imperatives of security to justify the importance of its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. The 1986 *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities*, more popularly known as the Dibb Report, notes that ‘the archipelago to our north is the area from or through which a military threat to Australia could most easily be posed’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1986: 4). As ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott recognised that his recommendation for Canberra to acquiesce in Jakarta’s invasion of East Timor was ‘a pragmatic rather than a principled stand’, but claimed that ‘this is what national interest and foreign policy is all about’ (see Way 2000, Document 169). Paul Keating (2012) is adamant that he was justified in seeking to ‘establish a totally new and durable basis for [Australia’s] relationship with Indonesia other than the one we had which saw everything through the prism of East Timor’, because Suharto ‘had brought peace and stability to [the] region’. Finally, amidst allegations that Indonesian security forces are using torture as a ‘mode of governance’ in West Papua, Tony Abbott insisted that West Papuans could have ‘the best possible life … as a part of an indissoluble Indonesia’ (quoted in Denton 2013).

It is debatable whether these governmental protestations of security have made humanity more secure. A familiar theme in Australia-Indonesia relations is the gulf between state and human security (Burke 2008: 161 – 164; George and McGibbon 1998: 411), whether expressed in East Timor’s struggle for self-determination or the scepticism of the Australian public towards what it perceives as Canberra’s accommodation of authoritarian regimes. Even from the self-interested perspective of realism, the Department of Defence foresaw in 1974 that Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor would jeopardise its defence cooperation with the Indonesian military (see Cotton 2004: 33).

This last example of the Department of Defence’s equivocation on whether Canberra’s acquiescence in Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor was in the national interest hints at the shortcoming of characterising Australia-Indonesia relations as unambiguously realist, especially in its mechanistic neorealist variant. Hugh White (2006: 45) argues that Australia has a ‘strategic ambivalence’ towards Indonesia, since ‘whether [Indonesia] is strong or weak, [it] offers both potential protection and
potential threats to Australia’. In other words, our conclusions about amity and enmity in international politics are informed by contingent analytical frames, for example, an Australia-Indonesia dyad, the Asia-Pacific, or human security. More broadly, in Wesley and Warren’s (2000: 13) article on the ‘currents of thought’ in Australian foreign policy, traditionalism draws on realism and culturally similar ‘great and powerful friends’.

I argue that a security community is an emerging analytical frame which policymakers and scholars are marshalling to explain important aspects of international politics. The term is widely attributed to Karl Deutsch and his colleagues (1957: 5), who in the geographical context of the North Atlantic, defined a security community as an arrangement ‘in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’. Demonstrating that International Relations (IR) scholarship and geopolitics are mutually constitutive (Hoffman 1987: 232), Deutsch’s monograph did not attract much scholarly attention until Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett edited a volume on security communities in 1998. The latter is the theoretical fulcrum for my thesis. The security community appellation has also been applied to areas which are far from exemplars of peaceful conflict resolution. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ideational parameter of Australia’s regional initiatives, aspires to a ‘Political-Security Community’ by 2015. Amitav Acharya, a prominent scholar on ASEAN, has written a monograph bearing the term ‘security community’ in the title, although he stresses that he ‘does not assume, a priori, that ASEAN has already become a security community in Deutsch’s terms – or perhaps become a fully-fledged security community’ (2009: 7). Further afield, Franke (2008: 325) claims that Africa ‘currently displays all the essential characteristics of (at least) a loosely coupled security community’.

Evidently, there is a need to ensure that the security community concept does not become analytically vacuous (Ditrych 2014). However, rather than solidify the concept at the outset by adding another definition, I align my understanding of security communities around configurations of political and economic processes. This approach promises to elucidate what an analytical frame or paradigm would elide, because, much like how Fry and O’Hagan (2000: 10) conceive of images in world politics, a frame emphasises some aspects over others. Conceptualising a security community as a process makes inroads into why, for example, despite Julia Gillard (2012) lauding Australia and Indonesia as ‘democratic neighbours’, there is much
bilateral acrimony over the asylum-seekers who traverse their territorial borders, as we will see in Chapter Six.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explain why a security community is an apposite frame for considering the significance of post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation for Australia-Indonesia relations. Second, I consider how English School solidarism and a security community differ in their accounts of how peaceful conflict resolution is realised. This distinction is important because when some scholars, for example Bellamy (2004: 116) and Franke (2008: 325), characterise Southeast Asia and Africa as a security community respectively, they are referring to solidarism’s contention that states can act in concert to achieve purposive goals. Indeed, Bellamy (2004: 98) recognises that ASEAN functions at a ‘strictly inter-governmental level’ and has little “downward” movement towards a regional identity within national identities’. Therefore, I argue in Chapter Two that Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the early 1990s approximates English School solidarism, while a security community frame is more appropriate to use to analyse the significance of post-Suharto democratisation, given the emergence of multiple political actors, for the bilateral relationship. Third, I review Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 37 – 48) three-tier framework on how security communities develop, consisting of precipitating conditions, the interaction of what they call structure and process variables, and the consolidation of mutual trust and collective identity. Their framework orientates, but is not determinative of, my analysis in Chapters Four to Six, about whether post-Suharto cooperation in Indonesia’s security sector, regionalism, and asylum-seekers has promoted collective identification between the states and peoples of Australia and Indonesia. I argue that post-Suharto interactions in these areas have not fostered collective identification, especially between peoples. This raises questions for the democratic peace theory, whose account of peaceful conflict resolution relies substantially on common institutions and the centrifugal perspectives of multiple political actors. Therefore, in the final section, I clarify the distinction between the democratic peace theory and a security community as a process, justifying why I marshal the latter to analyse the post-Suharto bilateral relationship. There is much ambiguity about whether liberal-democracy is a necessary condition for security communities to develop – Adler and Barnett (1998a: 41) consider that ‘other intersubjective ideas’ such as a ‘shared developmentalist ideology’ can also be suitable propellers of a security community. I argue that it is more pertinent to highlight the assumption of methodological nationalism by the democratic peace theory (Barkawi and Laffey 2001), a lacuna which is also shared by the
aforementioned debate on whether liberal-democracy is the *sine qua non* of a pluralistic security community. For one, by affixing the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, the democratic peace theory cannot account for, *inter alia*, the partial territorial fragmentation of the nation-state and non-territorial asymmetrical relations, as East Timor’s independence from Indonesia and the institutional expansion of the Australian state in response to the ‘arc of instability’ demonstrate respectively (Hameiri 2009: 561 – 564). These latter examples diminish trust between the states and peoples of Australia and Indonesia.

**Post-Suharto democratisation and the analytical framework of security communities**

As a microcosm of the policy of Asian engagement, Australia’s foreign policy towards Suharto’s New Order was premised on the marginalisation of public opinion. Asian engagement has numerous partialities (George 1996: 14 – 16; Gurry 1998), but chief among them is that the tentative transition from forward defence to the ‘concentric circles’ of defence self-reliance required accommodating Suharto’s authoritarian regime. As the Dibb Report put it, it would take ‘a fundamental change in present circumstances, which are characterised by a stable government in Indonesia’, for the aforementioned ‘from or through which’ formulation of potential military threats to gain traction (Commonwealth of Australia 1986: 4). The salience of geoeconomics in the 1980s reinforced this institutional bias of Asian engagement, evident in how prominent government departments and business corporations, following the lead of Ross Garnaut’s *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy* White Paper, spruiked the virtues of ‘enmeshment’ with Asia (Higgott and Nossal 1998: 272).

There are two accounts as to why public opinion was sidelined in Australia’s relations with the New Order. The first concerns the shifting bases and reproduction of what constitutes common sense in Australian foreign policy. In Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 40) parlance, knowledge represents ‘categories of practical action and legitimate activity’ in a security community. Although it is taken for granted in Australia today that the market is the most efficient allocator of the vast majority of goods and services, this was not always the case in the 1980s. Indeed, an important reason why Bob Hawke selected Garnaut to articulate the message of economic complementarity is that as an epistemic authority (Beeson and Stone 2013: 7; Young 1991: 298), Garnaut had better prospects of convincing a sceptical public and trade union movement to abandon what Paul Kelly (1992) calls the Australian settlement, of
which one of its tenets was industry protection. In other words, Asian engagement has an institutional bias because at its beginning, it had to overcome significant sections of public opinion which held that Asia was a military threat, a sentiment fostered in no small part by Canberra during the height of the Cold War. Constructivists who emphasise the importance of socialisation would contend that since the 1980s, public opinion has come around to Garnaut’s neoliberal vision of Asian engagement, although as Griffiths and Wesley (2010: 19) point out, the latter is of a ‘narrow [and] prudential’ tenor.

The second reason why public opinion was excluded from Australia's relations with the New Order relates to Australia’s Cartesian anxiety. Indonesia and the South Pacific loom large in the Department of Defence’s requirement to have a ‘secure and stable archipelagic screen’ (Ayson 2007: 222). It follows that even as the New Order ceased to exist, this requirement can be met by other means, for example, the promotion of an anaemic form of democracy which is reduced to electoral and market participation, as we will see in Chapter Four. Canberra’s insistence on ontological certitude means that although it claims to embrace Indonesian ‘difference’, this claim is secondary to the incorporation of ‘Indonesia into a pro-Western strategic and capitalist order’ (Burke 2007: 104). Therefore, amidst the loss of the Vietnam ‘domino’, Australia acquiesced in Indonesia’s denial of self-determination for East Timor in 1975. Australia’s policy only changed discernibly after Habibie announced in January 1999 that if East Timor rejected his proposal for autonomy, the territory would be granted independence. Even so, Canberra’s actions throughout 1999, especially its reticence in querying if the Indonesian military was the most appropriate actor to provide security for the independence referendum, engendered criticisms that Canberra continued to place Jakarta on a geopolitical pedestal (Maley 2000: 157).

Not only did Canberra dismiss domestic public opinion which was critical of Suharto’s human rights record, it also downplayed opposition in Indonesia to the New Order. After all, if Gareth Evans (1991: 3322) could argue that the 1991 Dili massacre was a case of ‘aberrant behaviour by a particular group within the [Indonesian] military’, he had to overlook, among other things, that the Indonesian military’s territorial command structure functioned as a penetrative surveillance mechanism for the New Order. We can accept Keating’s (2008) refrain that Suharto brought material benefits to many Indonesians, while recognising that, from the early 1990s, the New Order was beset by what Aspinall (2005: 4) calls ‘sultanisation’, which in circumscribing longstanding avenues for semi-independent political activity, crystallised the divide
between state and society. Philpott (2000: 56) argues that once post-World War Two North American scholarship reified Indonesia as a unified national community, it is explicable why internal political opposition, especially if it presses for autonomy or self-determination, is perceived by Western states as a threat to interstate order. Much Australian IR scholarship, with its canvas of an anarchical world of nation-states which constrains the policymaker, replicates this positivist prejudice of North American social science (George 1996: 17). Therefore, on the eve of Suharto’s political departure, even scholars who sought to promote human security and emancipation in the region, for example, Nancy Viviani (1997: 167), hoped in a positivist mould that ‘for Australia, smooth and stable transitions are desirable and, if possible, with a degree of democratic opening in the cases of Indonesia and Burma’.

The abrupt nature of Suharto’s resignation, followed by a revolving door of presidents, challenged Canberra’s longstanding expectation that presidential successions in Indonesia would be orderly and infrequent. After all, Australia’s apprehension towards Asia manifested itself not only in the White Australia Policy as an articulation of citizenship, but also in a marked preference for authoritarian leaders in the region, or what Burke (2007: 107) refers to as ‘[ideologically] “friendly” forms of otherness’. Harold Holt’s relief upon Suharto’s ascension that ‘with 500 000 to one million communist sympathisers knocked off, I think it is safe to say a reorientation has taken place’ was a sentiment which his prime ministerial successors continued to endorse (quoted in Burke 2008: 122).

Bearing in mind these observations on the trajectory of Indonesia’s domestic politics and its dissonance for Canberra’s cognitive map, I argue that post-Suharto democratisation and its significance for Australia-Indonesia relations are amenable to the analytical framework of security communities. There are two reasons for this. First, compared to what Jackson (1978: 4) characterises as the ‘bureaucratic polity’ of the New Order, whereby policy formulation was restricted to ‘less than one thousand persons comprising the bureaucratic, technocratic, and military elite’, there is a proliferation of salient political actors in post-Suharto Indonesia. Sulistiyanto (2010: 126) provides an overview of the expanded foreign policy constituency in Indonesia, highlighting its parliament’s Commission 1 on defence and foreign affairs, which has not hesitated to oppose what it perceives as Canberra’s unilateral approach to deterring asylum-seekers at Jakarta’s expense. Commission 1 member Tantowi Yahya’s September 2013 interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) Lateline programme, in which he argued that Abbott’s policy of unilaterally
returning asylum-seeker boats to Indonesia ‘annoys our sovereignty as an independent country’, is a notable example (Yahya 2013). Nabbs-Keller (2013) charts the post-Suharto civilian ascendency in Indonesia’s foreign ministry, which is a marked change from the New Order policy of *kekaryaan*, whereby serving military officers held civilian positions throughout the Indonesian bureaucracy. In conjunction with the shifting balance of civil-military relations, the protection of the human rights of Indonesian citizens abroad has assumed greater significance for the Indonesian foreign ministry, demonstrated in constant pressures on Canberra to release Indonesian youths who skipper asylum-seeker vessels (Nabbs-Keller 2013: 69).

Gindarsah (2012) argues that Indonesia’s decision to support Resolution 1747 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which imposed international sanctions against Iran for its suspected nuclear weapons programme, alienated religious mass organisations and political parties to the extent that Indonesia consequently abstained from Resolution 1803, the latter stipulating additional sanctions on Iran.

These examples of the attenuation of decision-making away from the Indonesian president and executive demonstrate that public opinion cannot be summarily dismissed in the post-Suharto bilateral relationship, as compared to that which prevailed during the New Order. Gindarsah’s aforementioned comparison between Indonesia’s response to UNSC Resolutions 1747 and 1803 portends obstacles to middle power cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, even if both countries are members of the same diplomatic forum. Conceptions of security communities emphasise societal interactions. In Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 47) third tier of security community development, collective identities ‘entail that people not only identify (positively) with other people’s fate but, also, identify themselves, and those other people, as a group in relation to other groups’. Although rather prosaic, Deutsch and his colleagues (1957: 58) also put great store in indicators of social communication, such as postal transactions and cultural institutions, to explain the development of amalgamated security communities, that is, a nation-state formed from hitherto separate entities. That they subsequently argue (1957: 66) that many of these indicators of social communication are not necessary in a pluralistic security community suggests that the latter is more accurately a solidarist society in the vein of the English School, with latent obstacles to interstate cooperation posed by the ontology of the self-regarding nation-state. Hence, it is important to distinguish between a security community’s emphasis on non-state interactions to realise peaceful conflict resolution, and English School solidarism’s retention of state initiatives in the pursuit of purposive cooperation. While policymakers and scholars
frequently conflate solidarism and a security community, I consider this distinction to be important because cooperation between Australia and Indonesia in the late Suharto years approximates English School solidarism. In other words, public opinion and societal interactions generally did not feature, except as a proverbial thorn in Canberra and Jakarta's side, as an explanation for bilateral cooperation in the immediate post-Cold War years. I consider the distinction between solidarism and a security community in further detail in the next section.

My point of entry into the second reason why an analytical framework of security communities is relevant in understanding the significance of post-Suharto democratisation for Australia-Indonesia relations is that the multiplicity of political actors in post-Suharto Indonesia has largely not fostered mutual trust between the societies of both countries. For example, Kevin Rudd would have hardly appreciated the speaker of the Riau Islands' provincial legislature, Nur Syafriadi, protesting that the arrival of asylum-seekers was a 'humiliation' for his province, in response to Yudhoyono's directive to the Riau Islands to process asylum-seekers from the impasse involving the *Oceanic Viking* in October 2009 (quoted in Allard and Coorey 2009). Put alternatively, the proliferation of actors in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy does not mean that collective identification between the states and societies of Australia and Indonesia will ensue. Increased interactions may well foster mutual trust, but it is not hard to see how the opposite can occur, especially if they are predicated on the supervisory intent of state-building in the war on terror, the subject of Chapter Four. Notwithstanding my reservations on whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a security community, Williams (2001: 543) argues that its inclusive recognition of the pluralist society of states conceals liberalism's disciplining power to distinguish between liberal respect, the negative right to be left alone, and teleological respect, which is accorded to those who are capable of following the moral law. The vicissitudes of increased interactions are also well-appreciated by Mansfield and Snyder (2002), who argue that actors in democratising states often promote nationalistic appeals which are unmediated by nascent domestic institutions, hence heightening the odds of interstate belligerence. Be that as it may, Mansfield and Snyder's argument succumbs to an assumption of methodological nationalism which I question in this thesis.

The disjuncture between the expansion of the foreign policy constituency in Indonesia and the persistently ephemeral nature of mutual trust between the states and societies of Australia and Indonesia demands that we interrogate the twin concepts of
security and community, which is the second reason why the analytical framework of a security community underpins my thesis. Marshalling Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities as my thesis’ analytical framework does not mean that I wholeheartedly agree with them on how a security community develops. As Hay (2002: 45) argues in relation to political theories, the analyst who is ‘only concerned to describe and catalogue or, [worse] still, to model an unfolding sequence of events’, risks being complicit in social injustices. Rather, I intend to engage with Adler and Barnett’s framework using the questions which Robert Cox (1981: 135) argues are essential to critical theory. For example, it is worth considering who stands to benefit from Adler and Barnett’s interpretation of security communities (Bøås 2000: 311), and why, even if policymakers assiduously adhere to Adler and Barnett’s prescription, the objective of collective identification between states and peoples may still be a fleeting prospect. The outcome of this broader inquiry into the construction of security and community assists in theory-building, feeding back into what Adler and Barnett have neglected to consider in their understanding of security communities. Chief among their shortcomings, as will be apparent in Chapter Six, is their focus on pluralistic security communities (1998a: 30), which retain the prejudice of sovereign states. As Burke (2013: 65) argues, Hedley Bull and Gareth Evans’ conceptions of ‘human purposes beyond ourselves’ and ‘good international citizenship’ respectively retain the ontological primacy of the nation-state, fallaciously implying that ‘it remains possible to reach out and also to withdraw, to decide when the national interest will trump humanity, and humanity be damned’. The tension between Australia and Indonesia over asylum-seekers stems from these people’s exclusion from the citizenship and national communities of both states, which is independent of whether Australia and Indonesia share ideational values such as democracy.

A caveat is in order before I turn to the distinction between English School solidarism and a security community, concerning why I propose a security community rather than the democratic peace theory to orientate my thesis. After all, Kantian rationales of the democratic peace also rely on the increased density of social interactions, such as the prevalence of common institutions and commercial relations, to account for peaceful conflict resolution (see Chan 1997: 75). My response, which I develop further in the final section of this chapter, centres on the democratic peace theory’s assumption of methodological nationalism. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 301) define methodological nationalism as ‘the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world’. Applied to the democratic peace theory, the assumption of methodological nationalism manifests itself in the
contention that the democratic peace theory can be refuted only if there is interstate war between two democracies. On this count, Australia and post-Suharto Indonesia vindicate the democratic peace theory, since they have not waged war against each other. However, I find this argument unconvincing because it overlooks the gamut of conflicts which states and societies are engaged in. For example, in response to Indonesia’s dissatisfaction at being forced to accept asylum-seeker vessels being repulsed from Australia, Abbott commented that ‘what happens outside of Indonesia’s waters is really, in a sense, something that the Indonesians are not directly involved in’ (quoted in Nicholson 2013). This terse exchange demonstrates that, on the question of asylum-seekers, there is hardly what Keohane (1986: 20) calls ‘diffuse reciprocity’ between Australia and Indonesia, and the political rhetoric even shows signs of interstate belligerence. More broadly, the democratic peace theory is deficient in accounting for the asymmetrical social forces which crisscross and stabilise the so-called dyads of Australia and Indonesia. Therefore, due to these limitations of methodological nationalism, I prefer to tether my thesis to the analytical fulcrum of security communities, adopting an interest in how security and community are envisioned, and what these constructions ignore.

To reiterate, an analytical framework of security communities is appropriate for investigating the significance of post-Suharto democratisation for Australia-Indonesia relations. This is because in post-Suharto Indonesia, public opinion and societal actors are increasingly important in determining the parameters of Indonesian foreign policy. This development can be contrasted with the primacy of state initiatives in English School solidarism’s account of purposive cooperation. However, although the democratic peace theory and a security community have a common emphasis on societal interactions as an explanation for peaceful conflict resolution, I prefer to marshal the latter as my analytical framework. This is because the democratic peace theory, with its assumption of methodological nationalism, poses obstacles to uncovering the social forces which circumvent the territories of Australia and Indonesia, and yet are sources of identification and alienation between them, as well as between their peoples. In the next section, I argue that, contrary to what some policymakers and scholars portray, the distinction between English School solidarism and a security community remains analytically important.
Comparing English School solidarism and a security community

Scholars often conflate English School solidarism and a security community, to the detriment of appreciating that there is a qualitative difference between the Australia-Indonesia relationship in the early 1990s, and the potential of post-Suharto democratisation to augur a security community between, additionally, the peoples of the two political communities. McAllister and Ravenhill (1998: 125) underscore what requires differentiation in this thesis when they observe that, three months after Australia and Indonesia signed the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security, over 60 percent of their survey respondents disagreed with the proposition that ‘[Australia] can trust Indonesia never to be a military threat’.

The frequent slippage between the referents of English School solidarism and a security community can be discerned from two examples. Makinda (2005: 279), responding to Bellamy and McDonald’s attempt to delineate an English School discourse of security, argues that they are muddying English School terminology when they (2004: 313) claim that ‘solidarists … focus on the provision of security within a world society inhabited by individuals’. On the contrary, according to Makinda (2005: 279), solidarism is about ‘states acting together to serve international society’. The second example is Higgott and Nossal’s chapter on Australia’s Asian engagement in Adler and Barnett’s (1998) edited volume on security communities. Higgott and Nossal argue that Australia’s Asian engagement under Hawke and Keating was largely institutional and marked by the contradiction of heightened defence spending, which could only be directed against the region. They nevertheless conclude that the aim of their chapter is to describe Australia’s transition between ‘two security communities, an “old” and a “new”’ (Higgott and Nossal 1998: 274, 286). My reservation towards Higgott and Nossal’s overly generous use of the term security community stems from Hedley Bull’s (2002 [1977]: 230) understanding of solidarism, namely ‘the idea that force can legitimately be used only to promote the purposes of the international community’. In this vein, the institutional predilection of Australia’s Asian engagement, such as the gamut of ‘Track II’ forums which promote cooperative security, can also be regarded as a fostering of solidarism, raising the question of whether solidarism and some references to security communities are referring to the same social developments.

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4 Here, I use the looser notion of ‘political communities’ rather than ‘states’ because the relations of rule of the latter exclude identification with non-autochthons, which is important in explaining why societal prejudice towards asylum-seekers has extended to a lack of trust between the states and peoples of Australia and Indonesia, the focus of Chapter Six.
It is not difficult to identify the source of this conflation between English School solidarism and a security community. Buzan (2001: 472) argues that the English School’s ‘methodological pluralism almost certainly precludes it from being set up as a “research programme” as that term is understood by mainstream (that is, positivist) American IR’. Martin Wight (1991: 260), referring to the tripartite of what he alternatively calls realism, rationalism and revolutionism, contends that ‘they both influence and cross-fertilise one another, and they change, although without, I think, losing their inner identity’. Therefore, while what encapsulates pluralism, solidarism and cosmopolitanism is widely appreciated, their boundaries are more contested. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 7) argue that a widespread sense of ‘we-ness’ is crucial in a security community, but are coy about when the elites coalesce with public opinion. Extrapolated to the topic of this thesis, there is little consensus on what the benchmarks are for determining when the Australia-Indonesia Institute (AII) and Australian Consortium for In-country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS) cease to be carriers of solidarism and become wellsprings of cosmopolitanism, arising from the numerous social interactions under their auspices.

Regardless of the fluidity at the margins of English School descriptors, for the purposes of this thesis, it is imperative that the term security community is not marshalled to describe solidarist aspirations and interactions. Bilateral cooperation during the late Suharto years approximates solidarism, the subject of Chapter Two. I initially allow for the possibility that post-Suharto democratisation can foster mutual identification between the states and peoples of Australia and Indonesia. Therefore, my thesis is guided by a framework of security communities. However, as Chapters Three to Six attest, the prospects of a security community subscribed to by both states and peoples are ephemeral, primarily because of how governments have conceived security communities, betraying state-centric preoccupations which are the province of pluralism and solidarism. In other words, my understanding of security communities leans towards the human referent of cosmopolitanism, or what Pitty, Stokes and Smith (2008: 203), writing about global citizens in Australia, call ‘a redefinition of Australian patriotism that reaches beyond the limits of what the state or the dominant political elites, or their populist protagonists, may deem appropriate’. My conception of security communities also means that, while I accept both Adler and Barnett’s general proposition that security communities are characterised by widespread ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, and their three-tier framework of security community development, I reject their distinction between
pluralistic and amalgamated security communities (1998b: 7; 1998a: 30). A pluralistic security community ‘retains the legal independence of separate governments’ (Adler and Barnett 1998b: 7) and hence, I propose, should be in the domain of English School solidarism. An amalgamated security community, on the other hand, is equivalent to a nation-state, eliciting prejudices which alienate non-citizens.

From the preceding discussion, it may appear that the distinction between solidarism and a security community is important only because, to paraphrase Makinda (2005: 281), terminologies which are unique to one IR discourse cannot be transplanted into a separate one without affecting the integrity of both discourses. Undoubtedly, the specificity of terms is an important reason for distinguishing between solidarism and a security community, a distinction which is invaluable in illuminating the tenor of Australia-Indonesia relations during the late Suharto years and the potential of post-Suharto democratisation to foster mutual identification between their states and peoples respectively. However, there is a more profound reason why we should be sceptical of the proliferation of statements by policymakers and scholars who have embraced the term security community, which concerns the varied purposes of IR theory (Dunne, Hansen and Wight 2013).

A widespread understanding of the purpose of theory is that it is predictive, meaning that scholars attempt to discern regularities in some aspect of international relations and extrapolate from them. When Waltz (1986: 329) contends that neorealism explains ‘a few big and important things’, he is invoking the predictive purposes of theory. However, a theory can also be conceived of as an image (Fry and O’Hagan 2000), which captures some aspect of international relations over others. Robert Cox (1981: 126), in his seminal article on social forces, observes that ‘academic conventions divide the seamless web of the real social world into separate spheres, each with its own theorising; this is a necessary and practical way of gaining understanding’. The import of considering a theory as an image is not only that it has its partialities, or what Cox (1981: 128) calls a ‘concealed perspective’. In addition, a theory which has widespread currency often guides policymakers as ‘accurate representations’ of the social world it purports to reflect (Hay 2002: 40). Put alternatively, a theory is often not predictive, but has a self-perpetuating dynamic as policymakers condition their actions to fulfil what the theory claims. Hay (2002: 40) argues that the more elaborate formal models of the polity and economy become, as evidenced in the construction of optimal taxation regimes and the marketisation of bureaucracies, the hypothetical nature of the initial assumptions of the rational actor...
pales into oblivion. The same tendency for theory to pre-empt practice can also be discerned in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and, as we will see, in the post-Cold War circulation of the term security community. The theory or image often purports to identify a novel development in international politics, but betrays continuing state-centric and Manichean ways of understanding the world.

The notion of security communities, together with visions of globalisation and the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989), was given a fillip by scholars amidst the post-Cold War euphoria. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 5), in introducing their edited volume on security communities, contend that ‘our nostalgia for security communities … is driven by changes occurring in, and theories of, international politics; both represent damaging blows to a realist paradigm that has dominated how policymakers and scholars alike think about international politics’. However, other scholars have criticised Adler and Barnett (1998b: 3) for exaggerating that their conception of security communities ‘thinks the unthinkable’ in international politics. For example, Bøås (2000: 311) characterises Adler and Barnett’s understanding of security communities as ‘mainstream constructivism light’, namely ‘research programmes [and] projects neatly placed close to neoliberal institutionalism and to the democratic peace thesis’. The extensive geographical scope of Adler and Barnett’s edited volume conveys the misleading impression that security communities are ubiquitous. What they (1998b: 4) fete as an emerging ‘transnational community of Deutschian policymakers’ who are ‘offering an alternative understanding of what is possible in global politics’, Bøås (2000: 310) considers instead to be the political and economic elites of a solidarist society, not the human security and emancipation of security communities. As Cheeseman (1999b: 290 – 291) observes, Canberra’s penchant for confidence and security-building mechanisms in the early 1990s was rather a concern for interstate security cooperation, which maintains the state-centrism of defence cooperation during the Cold War.

An analogous critique can be made of Peter Katzenstein’s (1996) edited volume on the culture of national security. Although presented as a constructivist contribution, Katzenstein (1996: 12) feels compelled to pay homage to rationalist approaches and ‘[deal] with what most scholars of national security would consider to be hard cases’. Put alternatively, Katzenstein is arguing the contradictory contention that ideas underpin our conceptions of security, but the nation-state and its derivative concepts such as national security and sovereignty remain asocial Waltzian billiard balls (see Barkin and Cronin 1994; Campbell 1998: 218). I recognise that although all
international politics is socially constructed in constructivist scholarship, in order to say something analytically meaningful about what is being investigated, some actors have to be taken as given, while others are problematised (Hurd 2008: 306). However, these flourishes of security community from some scholars do not undermine the interests of state and economic elites – what Falk (2004: 87) criticises as ‘globalisation-from-above’ and George (1996: 14) calls an ‘unconvincing amalgam’ of strands of neoclassical economics and conservative structuralism. Therefore, it is unsurprising that states, anxious for Cartesian certainty, have taken to declarations of security communities with considerable gusto in the post-Cold War period, but such declarations need to be critically assessed.

It is against this backdrop of the casual and haphazard use of the term security community that I elucidate how Canberra and Jakarta have understood what a security community is. I will begin with Jakarta’s understanding before turning to Canberra’s, as the former is more explicit in promoting this term in recent times. In February 2004, Jakarta formally articulated what an ASEAN Security Community would entail. Jakarta’s proposal was the culmination of several concept papers and speeches by the Indonesian foreign ministry and academics, affording Jakarta’s proposal what Acharya (2009: 259) calls a ‘surprisingly conceptual’ flavour. Yet, upon examining these concept papers and speeches, one discerns solidarist sentiments, if not statements revealing the nation-state’s impulse to control and be self-sufficient. Rizal Sukma’s speech to Indonesia’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in June 2003, in which he proposed an ASEAN Security Community to counter the Association’s introspection in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, is a case in point. Sukma (2003), the Executive Director of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, argues that an ASEAN Security Community should accord a greater emphasis on human security and people-to-people interactions, but it ‘will continue to place [the] national sovereignty of member-states as the highest principle that regulates intra-mural relations’. Acharya (2009: 263 – 264) observes that other ASEAN states diluted Jakarta’s proposal, to the extent that the final version in November 2004 omitted references to democracy and human rights as exemplary of ‘common socio-political values and principles’. However, even before Jakarta issued its official position in February 2004, what former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan calls ‘flexible engagement’ is interpreted in these concept papers and speeches in such a way that his expectation is dispensable if it is geopolitically inconvenient to Jakarta, for example, over accountability for human rights abuses previously committed in East
Timor and continued in West Papua. As Nabbs-Keller (2013: 68) puts it, for Indonesia’s policymakers, ‘it [does] not matter that [Indonesia’s] internal democratisation experience [is] far from linear or complete’, so long as post-Suharto democratisation can be marshalled in support of Indonesia’s aspirations for regional leadership. In other words, there are scarcely unambiguous and long-term dependable expectations of peaceful change in Jakarta’s understanding of a security community, only geopolitically expedient ones. Considering that Jakarta is a key gatekeeper of Canberra’s ambitions in regionalism, how Jakarta envisions ASEAN’s trajectory imposes limits on a security community encompassing Australia, Indonesia and the region.

Canberra has been more coy in articulating what it understands by a security community, but it has a record of promoting visions of multidimensional security, of which Gareth Evans’ December 1989 ministerial statement entitled Australia’s Regional Security was a prominent example. We can extrapolate from Evans’ statement about how Canberra conceives a security community. Analogous to Jakarta’s proposal of an ASEAN Security Community, declarations of novel and emancipatory foreign policy approaches in Australia’s Regional Security often betray solidarist and realist sentiments. Australia’s Regional Security is often credited for recognising the non-military dimensions of security and eschewing an overweening military role for Australia in the South Pacific (Boyle 2002: 313), supporting Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 10) contention that military balancing and the logic of anarchy writ large must be absent in a security community. However, important sections of the Ministerial Statement suggest that, just like how Evans understands good international citizenship (Burke 2013: 60 – 65; Wheeler and Dunne 1998: 854 – 856), the dependable expectations of peaceful change in a potential Australia-Indonesia security community are secondary to geopolitics. Canberra’s order of priorities can be identified from Paragraph 3 in the Ministerial Statement. If the overriding duty of any Australian government is the ‘protection of our physical integrity’ and sovereignty is understood as the ‘independence of basic political decision-making’ (Evans 1989), then there is not much expectation that mutual identification can transcend territorial borders and national communities. More generally, while recognising that the national interest is contested and fragmentary, there is often little coherence between Australia’s foreign and defence policy, especially in relation to Asia (Higgott and Nossal 1998: 274).
It should be evident by now that I am sceptical of many policymakers and scholars’ claims of the existence of a security community. When they contend that a particular arrangement of security governance is a security community, they tend to be referring to a solidarist society, in which states share purposive goals beyond practical coexistence (Nardin 1983: 11). Although it is possible that state elites in a solidarist society identify with each other, it remains that this mutual trust is sanctioned by the nation-state. Therefore, Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 30) distinction between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities is not only a legal one, but also a social one in which the nation-state determines affinities and identifications. Nevertheless, scholars who conflate solidarism with a security community at least recognise that ideas of mutual identification and trust explain peaceful conflict resolution. As Buzan (2001: 479) observes, the English School is studiously vague on delineating between the constituencies of solidarism and cosmopolitanism. What is more analytically egregious is scholarship which considers an improvement in interstate cooperation as evidence of a security community. Nathan (2006: 293), reflecting on scholars who characterise Southern Africa as a ‘nascent or embryonic security community’, argues that domestic political violence should disqualify a state from claiming the security community mantle. This is because domestic political violence jeopardises the security of peoples and states, as well as generating tension and mistrust among states (Nathan 2006: 277), the very sociological explanations which are germane to conceptions of security communities.

At minimum, a security community has to fulfil two criteria. Notwithstanding contestations over the boundaries separating the carriers of solidarism and cosmopolitanism, a security community has to elevate the security of people over states. Makinda (2005: 284) argues that all security should be people-centred, and debates over the boundaries between solidarism and cosmopolitanism, as well as the United Nations Development Programme delineating a separate field of human security, risk quarantining the injustices of the prevailing interstate order. The human referent of security is closely linked, in terms of what humanity can potentially achieve, to the second criterion of a security community, which is that of emancipation. Booth (2005: 181) defines emancipation as ‘the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions’. In the next section, I sketch Adler and Barnett’s three-tier conception of security communities, as it structures my analysis in subsequent chapters on whether post-Suharto democratisation has facilitated a security community between the states and peoples of Australia and Indonesia. We
can dispute Adler and Barnett’s underestimation of the relations of rule of nation-states, yet accept their sociological account of how mutual identification and trust are fostered.

**Adler and Barnett's conception of security community development**

Adler and Barnett’s edited volume on security communities captured the imagination of policymakers and scholars for two reasons. First, the book reflected post-Cold War sentiments that, at least in some regions, mutual identification and trust can overcome international anarchy. Although plagued by considerations of realism and the inattention to the localisation of security initiatives (Acharya 2004), *Australia’s Regional Security* and Gareth Evans’ complementary attempt to model the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the Asia-Pacific are emblematic of Australian foreign policy during the immediate post-Cold War years. Second, Adler and Barnett provide an analytical framework which allows scholars to evaluate the prospects of a security community in their respective areas of research interest. Put alternatively, the relationship between Adler and Barnett’s scholarship and Karl Deutsch and his colleagues’ conception of security communities in 1957 is comparable to that between neorealism and classical realism respectively. Classical realism’s assumptions of rationality and the omnipresence of material conflict are the *a priori* ingredients of neorealist debates on which configurations of polarity are propitious for the stability of the international system. Analogously, Deutsch and his colleagues have a general understanding that members in a security community ‘will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’, and they supplement this observation with what they consider to be the main traits of a security community, defined in a behaviouralist vein (1957: 5, 65 – 69). Adler and Barnett’s (1998b: 9) refinement to Deutsch’s scholarship is that they specify a three-tier roadmap by which states transition from international anarchy to mutual identification. These three tiers, as we will see, are more suitably grounded in the interpretive approach of constructivism. Yet, it is contradictory for Adler and Barnett to argue that security communities are socially constructed, yet quarantine the nation-state as a rational actor. Nevertheless, we can accept Adler and Barnett’s constructivist approach to how mutual identification among peoples and states develops, while rejecting their reification of the nation-state. In place of the latter, we might, for example, propose that the state has important functions of democratic representation and resource allocation, without endorsing its ontological corralling of people into a self-regarding repository (Burke 2013: 72).
Precipitating conditions are the first tier of Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 37) framework on how security communities develop. There can be any number of reasons why states and peoples decide to orient their relations cooperatively towards each other, without the expectation that a security community will eventuate. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 38) offer several precipitating conditions, of which two are important to Australia-Indonesia relations. First, states and peoples may subscribe to new interpretations of social reality, as when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation revised its rationale after the Cold War from an instrument of the balance-of-power to addressing internal issues of societal instability and political-cultural structures (Williams and Neumann 2000: 370). Second, states may form military alliances in response to an external threat. At first blush, this is a neorealist explanation *par excellence*, but it hints at a problem of security communities which Bellamy (2004) identifies. Assuming that mutual trust and social interactions develop from an expedient alliance, a security community may be more like, in Bellamy’s terms, a regional fortress rather than a global integrator. At its broadest, politics is the study of why actors are included and excluded from a governance complex. Similarly, I devote Chapters Two and Five to explaining what, if any, effect post-Suharto democratisation has on fostering a security community between Australia and Indonesia which is supportive of mutual identification and trust at a regional level.

Suharto’s political departure in May 1998 arguably challenged prevailing modalities of Australia-Indonesia relations, although a central contention of this thesis is that it is debatable whether his resignation heralded the construction of a security community. It is not necessary to subscribe to the impression of organisation which the ‘Jakarta lobby’ conveys to appreciate that Canberra tends to regard its ‘relationship with [Jakarta] as an exceptional case requiring careful management by “experts” with a proper sympathy for and understanding of Jakarta’s difficulties’ (quote from Burchill 1999; see also Aspinall 2012). During the New Order, the focus of this diplomatic management by Australia’s security professionals (Sullivan 1998) was on Suharto and Indonesia’s military. This focus was consistent with what Jackson (1978: 4) characterises as Indonesia’s ‘bureaucratic polity’ and Philpott (2000: 64) criticises as Anglo-American scholarship’s preference for ‘rational administration’ over ‘politics’, especially during the Cold War.  

5 To this prejudice of Anglo-American scholarship, we can also add its concurrently reified and malleable conception of Indonesian culture. As Philpott (2000: 79) observes, ‘what cannot be
theory within which we can situate Paul Keating’s (1995) statement that ‘we are not going to hock the whole Indonesian relationship on [East Timor]’, defying human rights constituencies in both Australia and Indonesia. Therefore, one might prematurely conclude that, amidst the increased salience of public opinion in post-Suharto Indonesia, there would be less of a need for Canberra to be an apologist for authoritarianism, hence portending mutual identification among the states and peoples of Australia and Indonesia.

Yet, such is the normative standing of the rhetoric of democracy that we would struggle to find official statements in which Canberra has opposed post-Suharto democratisation. On the contrary, the jointly-sponsored Bali Democracy Forum is replete with references to Indonesia’s ‘remarkable democratic transformation since 1998’ (Gillard 2012). The rhetoric of democracy is a norm, which Katzenstein (1996: 5) defines as ‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’. From Canberra’s perspective, as anxieties of the ‘balkanisation’ of Indonesia abounded between 1999 and 2001, Mansfield and Snyder’s (2002) thesis that inadequate institutionalisation in democratising states encourages unmediated political appeals and interstate belligerence seemed more compelling than visions of mutual identification. Therefore, the dilemma for Canberra after Suharto’s departure has been how to maintain interstate order without incurring the normative opprobrium which would follow the overt defence of authoritarian rule in Indonesia. In time to come, the imperatives of counterterrorism would provide justifications for governments to privilege interstate order over security communities (Foot 2005: 413). However, as we will see in Chapter Four, the punitive requirements of counterterrorism and the promotion of state-building and ‘democracy assistance’ are two sides of the same foreign policy coin. What Robinson (1996: 49) concludes of Washington’s ‘democracy promotion’ is applicable to Canberra too, namely that what is being promoted is polyarchy, ‘a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites’. The structural context in which Australia-Indonesia relations are embedded is often overlooked in personality discussions about whether, for example, Joko Widodo or Prabowo Subianto would prevail in the Indonesian presidential election in July 2014.

explained in terms of rationality or logic is expelled into the realm of culture’, including the defence of human rights abuses.
To reiterate, my contention is that the end of the New Order requires an analytical focus on considering whether post-Suharto democratisation is supportive of an Australia-Indonesia security community. I am emphatically not arguing that a security community which is engendered by post-Suharto democratisation is already upon us. Indeed, the preceding sketch of Suharto's political departure as a precipitating condition of security communities highlights two cautionary observations which inform my subsequent analysis. First, the Kantian link between democracy and mutual identification does not exhaust how we associate democracy with other social forces. Democracy can also be the proximate cause for the revision of nation-states and regional organisations, which ruptures mutual identification among states and peoples who are inclined to think nationally (Acharya 2009: 41). The self-determination of East Timor, which I analyse in Chapter Three, testifies to how democracy can be alternatively located within the consolidation and fragmentation of nation-states. Second, we should not be too quick to accept that Canberra is supportive of post-Suharto democratisation. As the rhetoric of democracy arguably sits in the pantheon of IR norms, it is important to specify what Canberra’s project of ‘democracy promotion’ is achieving and what remains profoundly undemocratic.

The second tier of Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 39) conception of security community development is the interaction between what they call 'structure' and ‘process' categories. Structural variables include power and knowledge, and process variables include transactions, organisations and social learning (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 38). It is the interaction between structure and process categories which transforms social relations among states and peoples. This dynamic interaction supports constructivism’s insight that agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Just as actors are constrained by ideational and material structures, social interactions and practices can transform structures. Although overall, post-Suharto democratisation is unsupportive of a security community between Australia and Indonesia, the interaction between structure and process categories varies for the three case studies of state-building, regionalism and asylum seekers. Therefore, the empirical analysis is spread across Chapters Four to Six respectively. In this chapter, I focus on how Adler and Barnett conceive of each category, and offer a few examples from Australia-Indonesia relations.

All security arrangements involve the operation of power, in order for them to be recognised as competent practices by participants and observers. A security community is no different in this regard. What distinguishes a security community is
that, instead of relying on what Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48) call compulsory power, institutional, structural, and productive variants of power are more salient. Compulsory power can be understood as the ability of one actor to ‘shape directly the circumstances or actions of another’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 49). It is often attributed to Robert Dahl’s (1957: 202 – 203) aphorism, embraced by realism, that ‘A has power over B to the extent that [s]he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’. When the Department of Defence’s 1971 Strategic Basis document assessed that ‘Indonesia has an extremely limited offensive capability and her capacity for effective deployment is very low’ (Paragraph 77), it was underscoring Jakarta’s lack of compulsory power (Commonwealth of Australia 1971). Compulsory power is the least felicitous of a security community, since it is premised on a conflict of interests, rather than mutual identification. Institutional power also emphasises the control of others, but the latter is mediated by organisations and institutions. In the post-Suharto period, an important reason why Australia and Indonesia are unable to pursue middle power cooperation in regionalism is because Australia privileges the compulsory power of the US directed at containing China, whereas Indonesia is more disposed towards the institutional power of the US, which freezes ‘configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future [collective action] choices of actors’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 52). Structural power, in contrast to compulsory and institutional power, downplays how actors seek to control others, instead highlighting how structures distribute ‘differential capacities, and typically differential advantages, to different positions’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 53). For example, Soederberg (2004: 2) contends in a Marxist vein that the reason why Indonesia among other states is in the Group of 20 is because the incorporation of ‘systematically important’ emerging market economies is necessary to bolster the power asymmetries of the Washington Consensus. Finally, productive power is concerned with the fixing of social meanings in international politics, which establishes the terms of political action (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 56). Marshall Clark (2011) argues that post-coloniality is a valuable frame for analysing Indonesian foreign policy. A structural interpretation of power would illuminate how global capitalism engenders the economic condition of post-coloniality, whereas productive power focuses on post-coloniality as a social taxonomy. Hence, dichotomies of developed and developing states continue to hamper Australia-Indonesia cooperation on asylum-seekers and greenhouse gas emissions, regardless of Hugh White’s (2013: 30) rationalist prediction that Indonesia’s national economy will be twice that of Australia’s in 2030.
The category of knowledge is comparable to that of power in that the former concerns what constitutes practical action and legitimate activity in a security community (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 40). As already noted, security communities and the democratic peace theory are analogous in their social recognition of like-minded societies and states as an explanation for mutual identification. Therefore, Adler and Barnett (1998a: 40) contend that ‘at the present moment if scholars of international politics are likely to identify one set of political ideas and meanings that are related to a security community, it is liberalism and democracy’. Yet, despite the similarity of social recognition, I argue in the next section that it is important to separate the research projects of security communities and the democratic peace. This is not because, as Acharya (2009: 36) and Adler and Barnett (1998a: 41) argue, other ideologies, such as the commitment in some parts of Asia to a developmental state, are competitors in generating widespread mutual identification. In the event, the developmental state, which sacrifices human rights for macroeconomic growth, demonstrates solidarism rather than a security community. Instead, the democratic peace theory is susceptible to charges of methodological nationalism and providing legitimation to Washington’s more militaristic policies. For example, until recently, the US adopted a belligerent response to Iran’s nuclear programme, even though Iran’s membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can be interpreted as supporting a more regulated international order. In contrast, the US supported India’s nuclear programme on the grounds that India is a democracy, despite India’s refusal to be governed by the Treaty (Hayes 2009). Put alternatively, the democratic peace theory considers that nation-states are the only sites within which democracy can prevail, overlooking how inclusive forms of rule at other sites, such as international regimes, can extend identification. Therefore, the research value of security communities lies in the importance of social recognition in fostering mutual identification, while suspending the naturalisation of neoliberal markets and polyarchy, which are particular applications of the democratic peace theory that do not promote emancipation.

Owing to the institutional salience of the democratic peace theory and the geopolitical power of the United States (Parmar 2013), the democratic peace theory looms large in the knowledge of what constitutes a security community. I have argued that, if we are committed to the objective of human security and emancipation, we should separate the research projects of security communities and the democratic peace theory. Yet, distinct from the research project of security communities is the question of how knowledge functions in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. It is revealing that
Jakarta’s interpretation of what constitutes a bilateral relationship, which is premised on some measure of ideational comity, often prevails over Canberra’s. In so doing, the security arrangement which transpires often approximates pluralism and solidarism rather than a security community, as Jakarta’s proposal for an ASEAN Security Community, which hardly makes inroads into the systematic moderation of Westphalian sovereignty, indicates. Of course, this is not to say that Canberra is a beacon of the democratisation of how economic, ideational, and political resources are allocated, far from it. Rather, as many scholars have argued, Australian foreign policy reflects a liminality in how Australia conceives of its identity in the world (He 2011; Higgott and Nossal 2008). Hence, it is not always obvious – as exemplified in the distinction between the ambiguities of Asian ‘engagement’ and the certitude of the US ‘alliance’ (Griffiths and Wesley 2010: 14) – that Australia evinces an interest in widespread mutual identification with Indonesia, although I am arguing from the perspective of human emancipation that Australia should have such an interest and norm. The failure of Australia’s policymakers and constituencies to even countenance possibilities of security community means that, in the geographical context of Asia, the power to promote knowledge claims favours proponents of a totalising Asian identity who reject the universality of human identification and interdependence.

On the ledger of the ‘process’ category, transactions are important in precipitating a security community. By transactions, I do not mean just the quantity of interactions, a critique which Adler and Barnett (1998b: 8) make of Deutsch and his colleagues’ scholarship. The latter were writing amidst the theoretical dominance of functionalism, which sought to attenuate the nation-state by promoting transnational and technocratic cooperation on basic functional needs, such as transportation, trade and welfare (Hettne 2005: 546). In contrast, a constructivist perspective on transactions is also interested in their social meanings, or what sociologist Emile Durkheim calls the ‘dynamic density’ of transactions, namely ‘the quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions that go on within society’ (quoted in Adler and Barnett 1998a: 41). To take a recent example, Tony Abbott (2012) argued that Australia’s foreign policy ‘should have a Jakarta rather than a Geneva focus’. Yet, the increased transactions which might follow from Abbott’s announcement are not necessarily premised on mutual trust, but on an instrumental understanding that maintaining Canberra’s policy of rejecting asylum-seekers is possible only with Jakarta’s cooperation, or at least, acquiescence.
Organisations are the second process category which Adler and Barnett consider to be indispensable for security community development. At first blush, organisations should be classified as a structural category because neoliberal institutionalism does not consider them to possess much autonomous standing and identity (Stein 2008: 208). For neoliberal institutionalists, given international anarchy, state parties to an agreement voluntarily consent to establish organisations which monitor compliance. However, if we consider that interactions in organisations have social significance, consistent with constructivist understandings of institutions as practices and norms (Duffield 2007: 4), an organisation can be a process category. Young (1991) argues that there are three variants of leadership in organisations, namely structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual. Structural leadership corresponds to neoliberal institutionalism, and more broadly, rationalist approaches, in that, regardless of how efficacious an organisation may be in managing collective action dilemmas, it confronts the spectre of a state withdrawing from the organisation all together, or a powerful state dictating the modalities of the organisation. In contrast, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership in organisations are more propitious for security community development. An entrepreneurial leader still advocates for the interests of, in this case, Australia or Indonesia, but in framing cooperation in a particular way, addresses the problem of the varied interests of states generating multiple equilibria (Young 1991: 294). An intellectual leader is, in many instances, one step removed from state interests, focusing on generative systems of thought (Young 1991: 298). In varying degrees, what entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership have in common is that they have the potential to change how actors conceive of their interests and each other. Hence, while rationalist approaches consider organisations as structures, the interactions within organisations can be characterised as processes which foster and enlarge the constituencies of mutual identification. In relation to Australia-Indonesia relations, Wesley (2007: 174 – 200) argues that the Bali Process is a novel example of ‘managerialising’, namely the technocratic emphasis on shared scales of welfare as opposed to the politics of competing sovereignties and values, particularly concerning the controversial issue of asylum-seekers. In other words, the Bali Process is a demonstration of entrepreneurial leadership. Yet, considering that asylum-seeker arrivals continue to erode mutual identification among the peoples and states of Australia and Indonesia, intellectual leadership on political belonging and responsibilities might be what is required instead.

Social learning, the final process category in Adler and Barnett’s framework, is important to security community development because it admits the constructivist
notion that actors’ understandings of their interests and each other are not immutable. Whether we subscribe to Adler and Barnett’s (1998b: 10) teleological depiction of states transitioning from a logic of anarchy to one of community, or their belief that identity can never be pre-constituted, the promise of security communities is predicated on the democratisation of conceptions of who can be trusted and identified with. In contrast, if we accept international anarchy as a given, as realism and liberalism do, then only the interests of the discrete nation-state are relevant and legitimate. Turning to Australia-Indonesia relations, there has been a shift from wholesale essentialist governmental and scholarly views of Indonesia – what Philpott (2001: 371) evocatively calls Australia’s ‘fear of the dark’ – to geopolitically-moderated forms of otherness (Burke 2007: 107). More broadly, Beeson and Jayasuriya (2009: 360) argue that Australia’s policy of Asian engagement illuminates not only how a monolithic Australia has reacted to a changing region, but also the contingent understandings of citizenship and political belonging in Australia. Therefore, even citizenship, a specific interpretation of political belonging which is deeply ensconced in the Westphalian state system, is not immune from reconceptualisations through social learning (Linklater 2007: 99 – 104).

In the third tier of Adler and Barnett’s framework, we should discern widespread trust and identification among states and peoples as the defining properties of a security community. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 46) define trust as ‘believing despite uncertainty’, and the predilection to do so stems from accumulated interactions which inform and are informed by ideational convergence. Members of a security community share a common identity, meaning that they have analogous conceptions of international politics which obviate the security dilemma and anarchy between them. Identity, regardless of how we conceptualise it and its power dynamics (Mattern 2001: 352), informs our actions and is the ‘ultimate claim to our being’ (Burke 2010: 79). Yet all too often, as Adler and Barnett (1998a: 47) are also aware but do not problematise, identity is defined in relation to an other which it must subsume and expel. This Manichean conception of identity engenders the problem, as highlighted earlier, of whether a security community is a ‘regional fortress’ or a ‘global integrator’ (Bellamy 2004). If politics is the study of why actors are included in and excluded from a political arrangement, then there will always be boundaries and partialities of a common identity in security communities. The challenge, from an emancipatory perspective, is to recognise that inclusion and exclusion are contingent rather than ontological distinctions (Burke 2013: 72). Therefore, rather than rigidly delineate the boundaries of mutual identification or to prematurely entertain claims of a world
society, this thesis harnesses the productive fluidity of the English School, especially the liminality between the constituencies of pluralism, solidarism, and cosmopolitanism (Buzan 2001: 479). Progress in the English School and constructivism is found in the crevices of extant political arrangements, in contrast to liberalism's teleological view of history. Nevertheless, while there is scope for fluidity in the constituencies of a security community, it gives the minimal coexistence of a pluralist society a wide berth. To reiterate, I do not share Adler and Barnett's exclusive concern with pluralistic security communities, which is broadly synonymous with solidarism and exhibits a prejudice of methodological nationalism. Instead, what I incorporate from Adler and Barnett's scholarship for this thesis is their exposition of how constructivist processes and structures can expand the constituencies of mutual identification and trust. In the next section, given the frequent conflation between security communities and the democratic peace theory, I take up Bøås's (2000: 311) challenge that scholars of security communities must avoid being 'neatly placed close to neoliberal institutionalism and to the democratic peace thesis'.

**Separating security communities and the democratic peace theory**

Scholars of security communities must take seriously the challenge of specifying what they are illuminating in international politics. A cursory review of the literature and elite pronouncements reveals a haphazard understanding of security communities. As mentioned earlier, Nathan (2006: 293) argues that scholarship which characterises Southern Africa as a nascent or embryonic security community 'mean[s] simply that there has been an improvement in state relations and security cooperation. This strips the concept of its specific meaning'. Closer to Australia, Collins (2007: 204) argues that the declarations of community by ASEAN leaders reflect the 'norms ... operating in a security regime rather than a community'. A regime operates on the rationalistic and verifiable basis of short-term sacrifices in exchange for long-term gains (Collins 2007: 206), in contrast to the widespread identification and trust in a security community. Analogously, the end of the Cold War and what Acharya (2009: 33) calls the 'Euro-Atlantic economic and political milieu' of Karl Deutsch's scholarship do not justify the *ipso facto* rush by policymakers and some scholars to declare security communities as ubiquitous. One can understand Adler and Barnett's (1998b: 15) concern to '[move] the scope of the study of security communities away from its traditional Northern Atlantic focus and toward[s] non-Western regions'. However, their inclusion of topics as varied as the US-Mexico relationship and the Gulf Cooperation Council conveys the impression that these relationships are 'at different phases in the
development of a security community’ (Adler and Barnett 1998b: 16), when fundamentally, it may be that geopolitical circumstances have merely engendered a temporary improvement in elite relations. Therefore, the scholarship on security communities must stake its analytical ground in relation to other IR perspectives which explain peaceful conflict resolution. Because of their conflation in policymaking and IR scholarship, the most pressing perspectives for differentiation are that between solidarism and security communities, and also security communities and the democratic peace theory.

To recap, the difference between solidarism and security communities is that states are the agents of purposive cooperation in the former, whereas security communities, in terms of their referent of security, are more akin to what English School theorists call cosmopolitanism or world society, which links ‘all parts of the human community’ (Bull 2002 [1977]: 269). Cosmopolitanism seeks to transcend the state system, elevating the global population as the focus of governance. In comparison, states remain important in security communities, not as the locus of nationalistic claims, but as contingent complexes of democratic representation and resource allocation. In this section, and picking up from the distinction between solidarism and security communities, I justify the analytical value of security communities by canvassing the differences with the democratic peace theory. The research projects of security communities and the democratic peace theory appear synonymous because they rely on social recognition as an explanation for why some states and peoples can overcome the security dilemma with some others. But in the democratic peace theory, social recognition competes with especially economic interdependence as an explanatory variable, which leads Gartzke (2007) to argue that what liberal-democratic states share is a ‘capitalist peace’ instead. I contend that the democratic peace theory is a misplaced framework to analyse widespread mutual identification, because it is constrained by an assumption of methodological nationalism which conceives of nation-states as asocial and unchanging dyads. Linked with this assumption are others such as the democratic peace theory’s understanding of conflict as being exclusively interstate and military in nature (Russett 1993: 12), and the democratic peace theory’s inability to account for changes in how nation-states are constituted, about which the English School and constructivism have a more compelling conceptual grasp. Finally, of utmost consequence for the extent of mutual identification are the foreign policy applications of the democratic peace theory, which narrowly focus on electoral participation while strenuously denying that neoliberalism is corrosive of democracy.
Methodological nationalism refers to the premise that nation-states are the natural units of analysis in social science, and therefore they can be discussed without reference to the social forces in which they are embedded (Agnew 1994: 58). Every IR contribution privileges some political actors over others, but the assumption of methodological nationalism should be singled out for critical commentary. This is because, through what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 325) call ignoring, naturalisation, and territorial limitation, it overwhelmingly vectors the discipline of IR. To take naturalisation – the shortcoming of not questioning the referent under study – as an example, the analyses of democracy and nationalism are often segregated, with little appreciation of how the latter circumscribes the former’s ambit (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 307). In the Australian context, what Paul Kelly (1992) calls the pre-1980s ‘Australian settlement’, which embraced Keynesianism and social democracy, was possible only because the White Australia Policy was an edifice of Australian nationalism, in turn stymieing mutual identification with Indonesia and the region.

In terms of how the assumption of methodological nationalism manifests in the democratic peace theory, the explanation of social recognition is not the worst transgressor. As I have argued, the research projects of security communities and the democratic peace theory appear interchangeable because they both depend on processes of social recognition, stemming from common institutions and norms, to explain why states and peoples are capable of peaceful conflict resolution with some counterparts. Nevertheless, other important explanations of the democratic peace theory betray the assumption of methodological nationalism. For example, democratic peace theorists contend that public opinion exerts a moderating influence on belligerent leaders (Chan 1997: 74). This argument assumes that, aside from making its opinions known through governments, the public has little agency. The explanation of moderate public opinion in the democratic peace theory taps into Robert Putnam’s (1988), and more broadly, liberalism’s, image of ‘two-level games’ in international politics, namely that domestic preferences often prevent the state from rationalistically pursuing its international interests (Moravcsik 1997: 544). Yet, if there is an enduring theme in Australia-Indonesia relations, it is that of governments defying public sentiment and vice versa (Mackie 2001: 142), as Canberra’s policy towards East Timor and West Papua and David Jenkins’ detailing of corruption in the Suharto family in 1986 illustrate respectively. Therefore, states are not, in the liberal tradition, dispassionate adjudicators of competing interests, but represent elite interests which
are not coterminous, even from the limited vantage of mediating public opinion, with those of peoples and societies. The analytical value of security communities here is that they afford more autonomy to societal constituencies to foster mutual identification, compared to the two-level knots inherent in the role of public opinion in the democratic peace theory. Of course, we cannot discount that societies can be the progenitor of widespread distrust, and Australia-Indonesia relations provide many cautionary tales. Nevertheless, as a first analytical cut to a prospective security community between Australia and Indonesia, it is important to recognise that peoples and societies have autonomy.

Stemming from the assumption of methodological nationalism, the democratic peace theory has a restrictive conception of conflict, which does not address the main sources of Australia-Indonesia tensions, nor provide a pathway for the two neighbours to overcome them. Barkawi and Laffey (2001: 10) observe that the democratic peace theory defines conflict as occurring between sovereign states which results in at least 1000 battle fatalities. In other words, the democratic peace theory subscribes to what Van Creveld (1991) calls a trinitarian conception of war, comprising of a government, a people, and a military ensconced within sovereign borders. Scholars of critical theory argue that the democratic peace theory’s state-centric understanding of conflict overlooks changing technologies of conflict, and the diverse relations of rule which political actors are embedded in (MacMillan 2012). For example, democratic peace theorists often include Germany and Japan in their scoreboard, without taking into account how they have been incorporated, in an economic rather than a Westphalian sense, into what Katzenstein (2005) calls the American imperium. Leaving aside the structural contexts which can be a more compelling explanation than ideational attributes for the democratic peace (Rosato 2003: 599), interstate war is not the main source of conflict between Australia and Indonesia. No less a realist authority than the 1987 Defence White Paper assesses that Indonesia’s military capability ‘is designed primarily to ensure internal security and to protect its very large and geographically diverse island chain’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1987: 15). Keating (2000: 142) argued that he negotiated the Agreement on Maintaining Security with Indonesia because ‘neither is a threat to the other’. Rather, the conflicts between Australia and Indonesia can be characterised as ontological, meaning that security is only obtained when a political actor ‘has confident expectations, even if probabilistic, about the means-ends relationships that govern [its] social life’ (Mitzen 2006: 345). Ontological security is fundamental to the extent that actors prefer ongoing conflict rather than to risk the ‘unsettling condition of
deep uncertainty as to the other’s and one’s own identity’ (Mitzen 2006: 342). Hence, Philpott (2001) traces the discursive tradition of portraying Indonesia as Australia’s antithesis, which in turn informs Australian foreign policy. Dalrymple (2003: 162) also contends that Indonesia is the ‘litmus test’ in Australia’s negotiation of the tensions between its geography and history. Therefore, the democratic peace theory, in its restrictive understanding of conflict as interstate war, does not have the conceptual tools to analyse the primary, ontological, terrain of conflict between Australia and Indonesia. On the basis of the democratic peace theory’s understanding of conflict, it would not be amiss to argue that Australia and post-Suharto Indonesia have not engaged in war, but we would have to ignore numerous instances of ideational distrust, such as the supervisory intents of Canberra’s policy of state-building and North-South chasms over asylum-seekers. In contrast, the second tier of Adler and Barnett’s framework of security communities admits a conception of ontological power and for transactions to transform the social context which the people and states of Australia and Indonesia inhabit.

The democratic peace theory’s assumption of methodological nationalism is also exhibited in its incomplete account of political change. The liberal explanation of the democratic peace is a tripartite scheme of the moderating influence of public opinion, economic interdependence, and social and institutional recognition, but within the parameters of nation-states which are already constituted. In this respect, the democratic peace theory is illustrative of what Cox (1981: 128) calls problem-solving theory, as it is more concerned with efficiency than justice. While we should be sceptical of the determinism and polyarchical tenor of democracy in Larry Diamond’s (1996) ‘waves’ of democracy argument, the remarkable consistency of which states are included in the democratic peace stable demonstrates that the theory’s overriding priority is to legitimise and entrench a Washington and capitalism-centred international order. Turning to Australia-Indonesia relations, even if all the aforementioned Kantian reasons for the democratic peace are evident, the theory cannot account for the consequences of changes in the constitution of nation-states on mutual identification. In Chapter Three, we will see that East Timor’s self-determination – a change in how Indonesia is territorially constituted – eroded mutual trust among the people and states of Australia and Indonesia, even if it occurred within the context of Habibie dismantling New Order authoritarianism. As Barkin and Cronin (1994: 111) argue, the nation and territorial state are competing legitimating principles of statehood, with one or the other privileged in different periods. Similarly, Griffiths and Sullivan (1997: 55) recognise that nationalism is not easily shepherded
into the state-centric IR theories of realism and liberalism. In contrast, while the scholarship of security communities recognises that nation-states can be important germinators of ideational comity, this is tempered by the understanding that the development and erosion of mutual identification are not beholden to the Westphalian nation-state. Therefore, the analytical framework of security communities is preferable to that of the democratic peace, because it has a keener appreciation of how political actors are contingently constituted, and as this changes, affects mutual identification and trust.

Finally, the democratic peace theory is highly influential on policymakers (Parmar 2013), whether from the vantage that theory and practice can be separated, or critical theory’s insight that political interests cannot be divorced from knowledge formation. Policies as varied as humanitarian intervention, foreign aid, and state-building are premised on the ostensibly straightforward proposition that democratic states do not engage in military hostilities with each other. To what purpose the democratic peace theory is directed, and whether this promotes mutual identification and trust, is therefore an important line of inquiry. When Suharto was ensconced in power, Keating, in a sentiment with which many Australian prime ministers would concur, could forward the fait accompli that ‘Suharto is the best thing in strategic terms that had happened for Australia; by bringing stability to the archipelago he has minimised the Australian defence budget’ (quoted in Blewett 1999: 101). From the perch of interstate order, if it is normatively untenable for Canberra to support Jakarta’s return to authoritarianism, then state security must be promoted within an attenuated framework of democracy. Macpherson (1966: 39) argues that the term ‘liberal’ in liberal-democracy sanctions the power relations of capital and private property, detracting from the operation of an undifferentiated general will which is democracy. Analogously, Robinson (1996) analyses Washington’s policy of democracy promotion in a Gramscian vein, arguing that its cultivation of polyarchy and a consenting civil society which is supportive of the transnational capitalist class was more tenable than the suppression of popular movements during the apogee of the Cold War. What Macpherson and Robinson’s arguments have in common is their recognition that privileged actors have an interest in circumscribing the scope of democracy. Therefore, just as the democratic peace theory as polyarchy restricts democracy to the election of elites from the same economic ilk, Canberra’s policy of state-building, as a response to the inability of states in the ‘arc of instability’ to provide apposite conditions for market-led development, delegitimises economic displacement as a subject of justice claims (Hameiri 2008: 365). In this regard, I dispute the democratic
peace theory’s image of an entire population, or even a majority, of a democratic state identifying with everyone in another democracy. In Chapters Four to Six, I demonstrate that the constituency of mutual identification in post-Suharto bilateral cooperation is much more limited than what the democratic peace theory purports. For example, in Chapter Five, the extent of what Canberra calls Australia’s ‘Asian Century’ is limited to the middle class, and even this is defined materially in terms of how much an individual consumes. From the perspective of the hegemony of the transnational capitalist class, articulating middle class consumerism as the dominant mode of political belonging ensures the perpetuation of economic polarisation, but staves off collective identification and organisation because mass aspirations are splintered into individual material desires (Robinson 1996: 378). Therefore, in contrast to the democratic peace theory, scholars of security communities should be concerned with expanding the constituency of mutual identification and trust. Ultimately, this commitment to democratising prevailing socio-political orders is what distinguishes the research project of security communities from that of the democratic peace theory.

**Conclusion**

The core contention of the literature about security communities is that widespread identification and trust can foster peaceful change between political actors. A security community, in its questioning of the assumption of methodological nationalism, is distinct from English School solidarism and the democratic peace theory. The scholarship of security communities should also be committed to democratising the constituency of mutual identification, in contrast to the democratic peace theory’s preservation of hegemonic and unjust socio-political orders. Humanity is therefore the referent of security for security communities. However, rather than declaring this objective out of hand, this thesis harnesses the productive tensions between the English School’s constituencies of pluralism, solidarism and cosmopolitanism to canvass the prospects of a security community between Australia and post-Suharto Indonesia. In this regard, Adler and Barnett provide a three-tier framework to consider how political actors, through the interaction of what they call ‘structure’ and ‘process’ categories, come to identify with each other. Structural variables comprise power and knowledge, while transactions, organisations, and social learning represent process variables. We can accept Adler and Barnett’s constructivist account of how mutual identification is fostered, without subscribing to their focus on pluralistic security communities, that is, widespread mutual identification within Westphalian forms of belonging. Framed in a negative sense, Adler and Barnett are arguing that a
pluralistic security community is a coincidence of nationalisms, which limits the constituency of mutual identification to autochthons. Therefore, there is always a possibility that nationalism will annul mutual identification in a pluralistic security community. In addition, as I argue in Chapter Six, despite the pervasiveness of the dichotomy between domestic consensus and international anarchy in many IR theories, state elites often define the national interest in ways which engender human displacement and suffering. By proposing that national citizens are at the heart of mutual identification, Adler and Barnett fail to address the contradiction in IR that states have much latitude in deciding what the national interest is, but the contested actor of the international community has little means at its disposal if states’ definition of the national interest is rather more prejudiced (Ellis 2009). Therefore, security communities should stake the analytical and normative ground that widespread mutual identification can augur peaceful conflict resolution, but not assume that the nation-state is the most propitious carrier.

In the next chapter, I analyse Canberra and Jakarta’s efforts to improve the bilateral relationship from the late 1980s to the eve of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, there was a flurry of purposive cooperation led by Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas, regarding for example, the Cambodian peace settlement, the development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and culminating in the Agreement on Maintaining Security. Yet, the bilateral relationship was constantly dogged by criticisms of Suharto’s human rights record in East Timor, and Canberra’s complicity in it. Therefore, bilateral cooperation in the late Suharto years can be characterised as a solidarist society, but not a security community because widespread mutual identification was conspicuously absent.
Chapter Two
Constructing a solidarist society during the Keating-Suharto years

Attempts to foster an Australia-Indonesia relationship which has some measure of ideational convergence preceded post-Suharto democratisation. The question for this thesis is the extent to which mutual identification is shared, bearing in mind that my conception of a security community embraces the security of humanity. The density of mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia is an important area of inquiry, since Hugh White (2006: 45) considers that Australia has a ‘strategic ambivalence towards no other country’. Put alternatively, there is room for contestation about whether the scope of mutual identification is too narrow or wide. More significantly, extant arrangements of identification in the bilateral relationship can be critiqued for their stymieing of human emancipation. This chapter analyses what is arguably the most concerted effort to promote a degree of mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia, namely during Paul Keating’s time in government. In so doing, this chapter serves as a contrast to the subsequent ones, in which the constituencies of foreign policy have expanded amidst post-Suharto democratisation. Yet, the bilateral relationship remains embedded in social forces which do not promote mutual trust, such as nationalism and Canberra’s subscription to Washington’s unbridled unilateralism.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, following what Adler and Barnett call precipitating conditions, I explain the impetus for Canberra and Jakarta promoting an ideational element in their relationship, or what Gareth Evans (1988) called ballast-building. The attenuation of Cold War tensions meant that superpower rivalries no longer overshadowed Southeast Asian conflicts, such as Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Therefore, superpower disinterest facilitated ASEAN and Australia’s respective roles as middle power mediators in the Cambodian conflict. Yet, initiatives of cooperative security were also a riposte to anxieties that, if the United States disengaged from Asia, the region would be ‘ripe for rivalry’ (Friedberg 1993/94). In other words, the promotion of cooperative security, such as the emphasis on multidimensional security in Evans’ Australia’s Regional Security Ministerial Statement in December 1989, was less a democratisation of security to include humanity, than a legitimisation of continued great power involvement in the region. At best, and this is the argument of this chapter, Canberra and Jakarta were ensuring that they were the fulcrum of a nascent solidarist society in the region. Hedley Bull
(2002 [1977]: 230) argues that solidarism is ‘a new phase of the states system, not its replacement by something different’, because its referent of security is the international society of states as a whole, not individuals and humanity.

For heuristic purposes, the second and third sections of this chapter are divided respectively into political and economic manifestations of Canberra and Jakarta’s modifications of realist conceptions of security. Demonstrating the inseparability of politics and economics, Australia has what Ravenhill (2001: 115) calls a ‘split personality’ towards the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, because the latter’s consensual modalities, even though they are at odds with accelerated trade liberalisation, might win Australia diplomatic plaudits for paying obeisance to the ‘ASEAN Way’. The second section examines Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and Cambodian peace settlement. These were important components of a solidarist society which, through confidence-building measures, attempted to transfer the prerogative of force from individual states to a society of states. It is worth remembering that, although since decolonisation, states in the Asia-Pacific constitute a society in a minimal, Westphalian sense – what English School theorists call pluralism – a frequent refrain of comparative regionalism scholars is that Washington’s ‘hub-and-spokes’ system of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific is deleterious for regionalism (Calder 2004: 139; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Put alternatively, in Sukarno’s Konfrontasi campaign to destabilise Malaysia and in Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, there remained persistent traces of what English School scholars call a system, in which the balance-of-power is the dominant logic of state interaction. The third section analyses Australia-Indonesia cooperation in APEC, focusing on debates on the forum’s modalities and objectives. Suharto’s support was crucial to translating epistemic and governmental sentiment in Canberra and Tokyo into a regional initiative. APEC insured against the disintegration of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations into competing regional trading blocs, and, from 1993 onwards, APEC grafted an annual heads-of-government meeting onto its trade liberalisation objective. The discussion on bilateral cooperation in APEC also shows that states do not interact in isolation, but are ensconced within domestic and regional arrangements. For example, Jayasuriya (2003) argues that ‘open regionalism’, the modality which APEC eventually settled on, facilitates concessions from the tradeable sector to domestic cartels in Asian developmental states. Analogously, Canberra’s enthusiasm for APEC can be marshalled to placate disgruntled domestic constituencies who bear the brunt of unilateral trade liberalisation (Higgott 1991: 10). Regardless of the utility of APEC
for what Putnam (1988) calls two-level games, an important reason for APEC’s diminishing salience is its lack of engagement with civil society groups (Ravenhill 2000: 327). This brings us back full circle to the question of the extent of constituencies necessary to sustain widespread mutual identification. In the final section, I use the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) to highlight the weakness of solidarism. Signed in the final months of Keating’s government, the AMS proposed to deepen bilateral cooperation ‘on matters affecting … common security’ (1995, Article 1(1)). Thus, the AMS situated the bilateral relationship in a regional society, notwithstanding debates on whether this society is more pluralist or solidarist. Such a regional society suppresses the goals of human security and emancipation which I claim for security communities. Suharto may have ‘personally overcome’ the opposition of a narrowly-constituted Indonesian military and bureaucratic elite to conclude the AMS (Gyngell 2007: 103), but the AMS was oblivious to how widespread opposition to Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor was also corrosive of common security. To the extent that many states cited Canberra’s complicity in Jakarta’s occupation in East Timor as the reason for declining to support the former’s bid for temporary membership of the UN Security Council in 1997 – 98, it is doubtful whether the denial of East Timorese self-determination was even consistent with the modest principles of a pluralist international society (Falk 2000: 99).

The end of the Cold War as a precipitating condition

In Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 38) framework of security community development, precipitating conditions are the reasons why erstwhile antagonistic actors begin to cooperate. These overtures may not herald a security community, as neoliberal institutionalism’s account of cooperation under conditions of international anarchy demonstrates. The attenuation of the Cold War in Asia was the timing for Canberra and Jakarta to foster a degree of mutual identification in their relationship. The Soviet decision to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam facilitated Australia-Indonesia cooperation on brokering a peace settlement in Cambodia, an important example of solidarism. As a narrative, the end of the Cold War also allowed Gareth Evans to impute an impression of coherence into Australian foreign policy (Leaver 1991). Yet, the unified and salutary phrase ‘end of the Cold War’ belies developments which were contradictory and infelicitous for security community development. For example, MacIntyre’s (1991: 117) assessment of Gareth Evans’ promotion of multidimensional security in Southeast Asia is that structural problems in the Australian economy prevented Canberra’s exercise of economic and ideational power. From a critical security perspective, the Secure Australia Project (SAP) was established to refute
what it saw as the increasing militarisation of Australian foreign policy as the Cold War was subsiding (Sullivan 1995: 147). The arguments of the SAP demonstrate the possibilities for widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia.

This section is divided into two main themes. First, I canvass the structural reasons which facilitated a relatively rapid improvement in the bilateral relationship from the nadir of the publication of the Jenkins articles in April 1986. The moderation of Cold War tensions, accompanied by anxieties of a strategic vacuum in the region, gave a fillip and urgency to regional cooperation, especially if it was anchored by middle powers (Beeson and Higgott 2014: 224; Crone 1993). Throughout the 1980s, Asian engagement as a public policy took on increased significance for Australia, evident in the publication of the Garnaut and Fitzgerald Reports, which dealt with the regional aspects of trade and immigration respectively. In Indonesia, there were analogous pressures to embrace a degree of trade liberalisation as the precipitous decline of oil prices in the mid-1980s meant that alternative export revenues had to be sourced to subsidise domestic cartels (Robison 1988: 71). The second theme of this section is the ideational constructs which accompanied these structural changes. I focus on two conceptions which were prominent in Canberra and Jakarta’s diplomatic lexicon in the period under review, namely middle power diplomacy and cooperative security. These two identities focused bilateral cooperation in, *inter alia*, APEC and ARF, and accordingly are critiqued for their utility in fostering a security community. Middle power diplomacy, as Gareth Evans (2006) notes, is not the ‘foreign policy equivalent of boy scout good deeds’. Rather, it reflects a rationalistic and English School societal understanding that a middle power such as Australia could not possibly expect to be triumphant from the power politics of realism. Cooperative security, as the ARF enacted it, was more about socialising states to be transparent in their military intentions, rather than the democratisation of who is being secured (Cheeseman 1993: 159; Dalby 1996: 72). Therefore, an examination of the constituencies of middle power diplomacy and cooperative security demonstrates that what Canberra and Jakarta were promoting in the late Suharto years was a solidarist society, not a security community.

The late 1980s to early 1990s was an anomalous period in the bilateral relationship between Australia and the United States. To be sure, there was no definitive break in their military alliance, such as that precipitated by New Zealand refusing to allow nuclear-powered vessels from accessing its ports in 1984. Australia-US relations were anomalous in the limited sense of what the 1987 Defence White Paper called
‘[Australia’s] policy of defence self-reliance is pursued within a framework of alliances and agreements’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1987: 1). Put alternatively, if forward defence required Australia to synchronise its defence policy with the US, then defence self-reliance offered more autonomy to Australia by conceiving of US strategic interests as a parameter. Paul Dibb argued that, primarily, ‘[Australia’s] defence forces would not be freely available for other situations that the United States might consider as in the general Western interest’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1986: 46). It is not necessary to further dissect this formulation to appreciate that here was a streak of autonomy expressed by Canberra which has been less apparent before and since (Beeson 2003; George 2003).

More pointedly, Canberra barely disguised its opposition to Washington’s imposition of tariffs on agriculture. Bob Hawke expressed his frustration that ‘protectionism is spreading like a plague’ and the ‘clear economic leadership, [namely GATT’s rules-based principles], provided by the US has dissipated’ (quoted in Dobell 2000: 32). In Higgott’s (1991: 15) analysis of the strategies available to small and big states in the international economic order, the US, by dint of its structural power, has the option of insisting that its trade deficits are levelled, in a way which is unfeasible for Australia. US pressure on Japan and South Korea to deregulate their economies in the 1990s, once the lustre was lost on the argument that Cold War rivalries justified their mercantilist policies, is instructive (Stubbs 2009: 10). Therefore, if, as Wesley and Warren (2000) argue, Australian foreign policy is comprised of the three ‘currents of thought’ of traditionalism, seclusionism and internationalism, the structural conflicts between Australia and the US as the Cold War concluded augmented the stocks of internationalism.

Tensions occasioned by the loosening of Cold War strictures also buffeted Indonesia-US relations. Feted by the US and many other states for deposing Sukarno, Suharto now found his regime under their scrutiny for human rights transgressions. In this respect, Australia was at variance with the US. Keating (2000: 88) opposed the Clinton administration’s attempt to link Indonesia’s record on workers’ rights to trade agreements. Notwithstanding Falk’s (2004: 114) argument that humanitarian intervention is coloured by geopolitical considerations, the increased salience of human rights in the 1990s distanced Jakarta and Canberra – the latter was particularly vulnerable to the ‘Asian values’ discourse (Wesley 1997: 539) – from the US. Kent (2001: 262) observes that the increasingly prosperous Asia-Pacific region created tensions between Keating’s multilateral human rights policies which
emphasised universalism, and his accommodation of cultural relativism in regional diplomacy. Fortuna Anwar (1994: 155), reflecting on the trajectory of Indonesia’s post-Cold War foreign policy, predicted that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) would assume a greater significance in its diplomatic repertoire. We can debate whether Indonesia’s hosting of the NAM Summit in June 1992 reflected a commitment to the democratisation of economic and security orders, or to resist US pressures to favour polyarchy over authoritarianism (Robinson 1996). Regardless, it is worth noting Hadiz’s (2004b: 56) dismay that Third Worldism amidst contemporary US-centred economic globalisation is characterised by ‘indigenism, reactionary populism and a strong inclination towards cultural insularism’, as opposed to demands for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s (Cox 1992: 175). Put alternatively, the comprehensiveness of security between Australia and Indonesia during the late Suharto years was truncated. When Keating (1996a) stressed the importance of Australia ‘seek[ing] its security in Asia rather than from Asia’, his foremost consideration was to lend credibility to defence self-reliance by engaging with regional elites and militaries. Keating (1996) cited Australia’s support for the ASEAN Regional Forum, defence ties with Malaysia and Singapore, and new partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, as evidence for his approach to the region (see also Evans and Grant 1995: 112 – 113). This vision of regional relations approximates solidarism – the ‘existence among states of a sufficient degree of solidarity in recognising common objectives and acting to promote them’ (Bull 2002 [1977]: 231) – more than a security community.

If there were geopolitical reasons for Jakarta to conclude that Washington’s tolerance of authoritarianism was waning, then for the purposes of a solidarist regional society, a complementary precipitating condition had to exist for Jakarta to reconsider its insular focus on national resilience. It may be that Cold War geopolitics and the Asian developmental state are two sides of the same coin (Beeson 2009a: 13), but the attenuation of the former did not in itself engender revisions to the latter. After all, a key insight of scholars who seek to correct the bias of moral cosmopolitanism in constructivist scholarship is that external norms have to be localised (Acharya 2004). As Fortuna Anwar (1998: 488) understands it, national resilience or ketahanan nasional is a ‘balanced resilience in all aspects of national life – ideological, political, social, economic – as well as in the defence and security fields’. We should be sceptical of the New Order’s organicist claims (Burke 2007: 109), but the point here is that national resilience envisages redistribution to various sectors in the nation-state. The contours of this ‘pact of domination’ are outlined by Robison (1988: 71),
comprising ‘the politico-bureaucrats who control the state apparatus, an upper bourgeoisie of major domestic client corporate groups, and those elements of international corporate capital that are integral to the state’s industrial strategy: the oil companies and the manufacturing investors’. As oil prices precipitously declined in the mid-1980s, a key source of subsidisation for rent-seekers was jeopardised. Therefore, the New Order was compelled to seek alternative sources of export revenue, hastened by increasing competition from China for investment funds (Ravenhill 2001: 107). Yet, despite Suharto assenting to APEC, he would have hardly satisfied the economic rationalists in Australia, who were by now dominant in policymaking (Pusey 1991). As many scholars recognise, APEC was beset by inadequacies of modalities and questions of purpose (Beeson 2007: 227). APEC’s woes become explicable when it is appreciated that there has been a symmetry between its modality of voluntary trade liberalisation, or what is known in APEC circles as ‘open regionalism’, and, as a representative example, Indonesia’s selective and instrumental embrace of deregulation (Chalmers 2006: 225). Hence, Jayasuriya (2003: 350) argues that, far from facilitating the Washington Consensus, APEC’s open regionalism aided regional transitions from state-led developmental projects to a system of nomenklatura capitalism, that is, ‘powerful domestic cartels connected to the ruling apparatus of political power’. Transposed to this chapter’s argument, pressures to secure export revenue made Canberra’s proposal for a regional institution in trade liberalisation attractive to Jakarta. But the selective nature in which APEC states have proceeded with trade liberalisation suggests that even characterising APEC as a regime – in Krasner’s (1982: 186) neoliberal institutionalist definition, ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ – may be overstated (Crone 1993: 524). More pointedly, civil society groups are in short supply in APEC and its epistemic communities, such as the neoliberal composition of its Eminent Persons Group (Ravenhill 2001: 126).

Therefore, there were structural pressures which encouraged Canberra and Jakarta to coordinate their relations as the Cold War ended. The aforementioned account supplements Crone’s (1993: 504) neoliberal institutionalist argument that declining power disparities between the US and middle powers in the region facilitated regionalism. This is because the US was animated by ‘preserving what can be salvaged from [its] former position’ (Crone 1993: 504), while the middle powers concluded that joint gains are preferable to being individually discriminated against. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the agency of Ali Alatas and Gareth Evans, both
appointed as foreign ministers of their respective countries in 1988, in improving the relationship from the nadir of the publication of the Jenkins articles. Dobell (2000: 37) notes that Alatas thwarted Malaysia’s attempt to compel ASEAN to withdraw its support for what was then an APEC in its infancy. Dobell (2000: 38) attributes this dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia to Alatas' 'view of the work Australia was doing with Indonesia to achieve a Cambodian settlement'. More generally, Alatas and Evans presided over the establishment of the Australia-Indonesia Institute, the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Meeting, and an increased frequency of defence cooperation (Boyle 2002: 307). Although Alatas and Evans did much to broaden the constituencies of the relationship, in the Dili massacre of November 1991 and the controversial proposed appointment of General Herman Mantiri as Ambassador to Australia in 1995, Australia’s Asian engagement was ‘mostly institutional’ (Higgott and Nossal 1998: 272).

In terms of foreign policy identities, middle power diplomacy and cooperative security were Canberra and Jakarta’s response to the attenuation of Cold War geopolitics. By dint of diplomatic usage, middle power diplomacy is associated more with Canberra, while Jakarta prefers the term cooperative security. Regardless, I contend that both conceptions share solidarist characteristics and shortcomings. Middle power diplomacy, in Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s (1993: 19) influential definition, is the predilection to embrace multilateralism and promote compromise positions in international politics. Australia’s promotion of a peace settlement in Cambodia, its establishment of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters (Higgott and Cooper 1990), and Indonesia’s diplomatic clout in the Non-Aligned Movement and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are examples of middle power diplomacy. Yet, there are reasons to be sceptical of Gareth Evans’ (1997: 18) claim that he ‘construct[ed] a foreign policy that would work for Australia in confronting this almost wholly new world in the 1990s and beyond’. Ungerer (2007: 550) argues that whether or not Coalition or Labor governments promote the middle power concept, it is ‘the closest Australia has ever come to articulating a self-conscious theory of foreign policy’. To the extent that this lineage exists, the middle power concept is ‘consistent with classical realist interpretations of international relations’ (Ungerer 2007: 540).

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6 In April 1986, journalist David Jenkins published a series of articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald* which were critical of the Suharto family’s business dealings. This led to a suspension of ministerial visits and Australian journalists working in Indonesia (Boyle 2002: 289 – 294). In thinking about the instrumentality of elite identification, Robison (1986: 134) argues that Indonesia’s actions are not a ‘general Indonesian cultural response but rather is the specific response of the dominant political estate’. 
This is because the realist understanding of a middle power as having middle-ranked material capabilities and the insight that institutions can perpetuate favourable arrangements of material power stem from the same rationalist tradition (Carr 2014: 79 – 80). Therefore, one should not presume that middle power diplomacy heralds cosmopolitan forms of identification. International society, a favoured arena of middle power diplomacy, is also circumscribed by ‘a hierarchy of levels or circles of moral community and criteria for inclusion or exclusion’ (Keal 2000: 70). These hierarchies can be cultural (Buzan 2010: 4), or what Blaney (2001: 35) calls ‘liberal bellicosities’, in which minority forms of belonging are expelled to the private realm. Middle power diplomacy may be an apposite adjustment by states to the attenuation of Washington’s hub-and-spokes arrangement of bilateral alliances, but this does not mean that human security and emancipation are incorporated. This shortcoming of middle power diplomacy becomes more apparent when it is appreciated that cooperative security downplays the human security dimensions of common security.

Cooperative security, as distinct from common security, underpinned the security regionalism which Canberra and Jakarta supported during the early 1990s. Alagappa (1998: 637) assesses that cooperative security, even if it has not instituted formal security regimes, helps to ‘create a normative context [which] can lead to the emergence of such regimes in the future’. In Acharya’s (2004: 241) analysis of norm localisation in Southeast Asia, the norm of cooperative security is internalised by regional institutions, but the various iterations of humanitarian intervention are roundly rejected. Therefore, we can argue that cooperative security constitutes ‘the normative basis or consensual knowledge (principles and norms) to govern the interaction of states in the region’ (Alagappa 1998: 644). However, cooperative security so defined has an ambivalent relationship with human security and emancipation, the defining features of a security community.

On the one hand, cooperative security admits some of the concerns of emancipatory perspectives, to ‘[free] people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions’ (Booth 2005b: 181). In the Asian values debate of the early 1990s, the rejoinder of Asian state elites to the argument that human rights are universal was that civil and political rights are vacuous if material needs are not met (Rodan and Hewison 1996: 47). Fortuna Anwar (1998: 488) claimed that the equitable distribution of development benefits was an objective of the New Order. However, not only was the New Order characterised by rampant cronyism, it also considered sovereignty and regime security to be more important priorities. The latter
priorities demonstrate that cooperative security is an attenuated version of common security. According to Dewitt (1994: 7), cooperative security, in contrast to common security, 'envisages a more gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions, … [recognising] the value of existing bilateral and balance-of-power arrangements in contributing to regional security and for retaining them'. For Clements (1989: 51), what he calls common security, which is what I refer to here as cooperative security, 7 is a response to capitalist economic integration, rather than devising economic development strategies which are supportive of social justice and ecological sustainability. Evans' (1990a) proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) was rejected by Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states for echoing the intrusiveness but interdependence of common security proposals found in the Palme Commission Report on Disarmament and Security in 1982, which recommended European negotiations on conventional and nuclear weapons (Katsumata 2009: 145). Cooperative security may replace common security on the grounds that the latter is inadequately localised for Asia and that bipolarity during the Cold War was not as pronounced in Asia as in Europe (Wiseman 1992: 45).

However, in frequent refrains that the ASEAN Regional Forum is unwilling to transition from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy (Simon 2007: 123), there is sufficient cause to contend that cooperative security privileges the state and its epistemic and military elites. In the next section, I elaborate how Australia-Indonesia cooperation in securing a peace settlement in Cambodia and establishing the ARF supports my argument that Keating and Suharto intended the bilateral relationship to propel a solidarist regional society.

**Australia-Indonesia cooperation on the Cambodian peace settlement and the ASEAN Regional Forum**

In the second tier of Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 39) framework of security communities, structure and process categories interact to transform the social environment of political actors. In this section and the next, I delve into specific diplomatic initiatives to elucidate how Canberra and Jakarta adjusted to the precipitating condition of receding Cold War tensions. For heuristic purposes, this section focuses on the Cambodian conflict and ARF as security issues, while the subsequent section discusses APEC as an economic initiative. This is purely an organisational distinction because in a functional sense, security and economics are

7 It is worth noting that Clements’ article focuses predominantly on ‘regional stress / tension points’ (1989: 57), that is, betraying a state-centric bias which is consistent with cooperative security.
intertwined, especially with production networks generating new cross-country linkages and vulnerabilities in the Asia-Pacific (Ravenhill 2013: 12). Additionally, in a vertical sense, regional institutions, in their encouragement of adaptation and provision of insurance and policy credibility, reflect anxieties of state insecurity amidst globalisation (Kahler 2004: 494).

In analysing the Cambodian peace settlement, I do not intend to replicate the prevailing focus of research in this area, which charts the changing interests of the protagonists. This angle has been covered by Dee and Frost (2003) and Frost (1991). Rather, I am interested in how Australia-Indonesia cooperation on brokering a peace settlement in Cambodia promoted a solidarist regional society. The emphasis here is on how the structural categories of power and knowledge interact with the process categories of transactions, organisations and social learning in Australia-Indonesia relations (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 39).

My first analytical move is Acharya’s (2009: 103) contention that ASEAN’s diplomacy on the Cambodian conflict was plagued by ‘the tension between a regionalist approach and one that sought to internationalise the conflict with a view to isolating and punishing Vietnam’. Translated into security norms, ASEAN states were divided between the rejection of great power involvement in regional conflicts, which was reflected in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration, and their tacit promotion of security linkages with the great powers, especially the US (Acharya 1991: 172). Indonesia, in its accommodation of Vietnam’s interests, belonged to the former camp. Along with Malaysia, Indonesia proposed the Kuantan Principle in March 1980, which called for Vietnam to end its dependence on the Soviet Union in exchange for ASEAN recognising Vietnam’s security interests in Indochina (Acharya 2009: 103). The Kuantan Principle was rejected by Singapore and Thailand, who argued that the Soviet-backed Vietnam was the more pressing threat to ASEAN’s security, rather than China’s support for the ousted Khmer Rouge, which was what Malaysia and Indonesia had in mind when formulating the Kuantan Principle (Acharya 2009: 104). Canberra’s perspective was more closely aligned with Jakarta’s, although less immediately motivated by what Buzan (2003) calls a regional security complex. Amidst widespread repugnance at Pol Pot’s human rights abuses and leadership tensions between Malcolm Fraser and Andrew Peacock, Canberra withdrew diplomatic recognition from the exiled Khmer Rouge in February 1981 (Dee and Frost 2003: 190). After Hawke came to power, Canberra improved its relationship with Hanoi through multilateral foreign aid, which, according to Frost (1997: 203),
attenuated intraparty tensions over East Timor. From this sketch, Australia and Indonesia held similar perspectives on the engagement of Vietnam.

The Cambodian peace settlement occurred on the heels of waning Cold War rivalries, suggesting that middle power aspirations of conflict mediation are contingent on the acquiescence of great powers. After Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ on regional conflicts occasioned a withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, Beijing followed suit in its distancing from the Khmer Rouge (Acharya 2009: 113). Yet, despite the favourable geopolitical circumstances, the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia in July and August 1989 floundered on questions of power-sharing, especially regarding the Khmer Rouge’s role in the interim and future governments of Cambodia (Dee and Frost 2003: 200). There were also disagreements over supervision arrangements for Vietnam’s military withdrawal, which it unilaterally announced to be complete in September 1989. Regardless, for the purposes of portending a solidarist regional society, Dobell (2000: 83) argues that the Paris Conference failed because France believed that ‘a solution would be worked out between the UN Permanent Five and imposed on the Cambodian factions’.

Seen in light of Dobell’s criticism, what was novel about Canberra’s subsequent diplomacy was not the idea of power-sharing, but the rehabilitation of the United Nations to facilitate and administer power-sharing (Evans and Grant 1995: 225). Michael Costello (1994: 103), the emissary for Gareth Evans, reflects that the protagonists to the Cambodian conflict broadly accepted Australia’s ‘Red Book’ proposal for a UN transitional authority, because Australia was ‘no threat to anyone involved in this; we were not seen as having a particular vested interest; and we had credibility’. Not having a vested interest, except in a broad sense of supporting global governance, such as that embodied by the United Nations, is an important characteristic of Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s (1993: 19) conception of middle powers. Canberra also ensured that while it devised the idea of a UN transitional authority, it was Jakarta, as the primus inter pares of ASEAN, who was the public face of promoting a Cambodian peace settlement (Costello 1994: 104; Dobell 2000: 82). 8 Canberra’s diplomatic consideration of Jakarta demonstrates that cooperative

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8 There are parallels here with Japan providing the intellectual and technical expertise to establish APEC, but owing to regional memories of the ill-fated Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and bureaucratic conflicts between Japan’s foreign and international trade ministries, Australia is widely perceived to be the brainchild of APEC (Dobell 2000: 30; Ravenhill 2001: 98).
security and the ‘ASEAN Way’ were the ideational foundations of this solidarist regional society during the early 1990s. In terms of constructivist understandings of power, Jakarta often prevailed over Canberra in defining the modalities of this solidarist regional society.

Although the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) demonstrated that sovereignty can be divided into its juridical, empirical and popular components, and each can be enacted by various state and non-state actors (Makinda 2001: 406 and 407), it is premature to conclude that UN state-building and the promotion of popular sovereignty were hallmarks of the solidarist regional society which I am highlighting. The boundaries between pluralism, solidarism and cosmopolitanism in the English School are fluid, but what was solidarist about this regional society in the early 1990s was that states were the guardians of cooperative security. In Alagappa’s (1998: 644) argument that Asian states ‘are now in a formational phase of an international society’, the contrast is with an erstwhile hierarchical tributary society, and, we might add, with the hub-and-spokes system of US bilateral alliances. The basis of Asia-Pacific solidarism in the immediate post-Cold War years was not the norm of humanitarian intervention or the cultivation of civil societies by external actors such as the United Nations (Wheeler and Dunne 1996: 107). It is curious that Makinda (2001: 417) omits the July 1997 Cambodian coup, in which co-Prime Minister Hun Sen ousted co-Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh, in his overly sanguine assessment that UNTAC is a ‘process of providing security to the people, and from that security can come democratic reform and other aspects of development’. Öjendal and Antlöv (1998: 536) argue that the ideational and material influence of the Asian values discourse – which is at best synonymous with a pluralist society – emboldened Hun Sen’s contravention of UNTAC’s objectives. They (1998: 536) quote Ali Alatas as saying that ‘[w]e [ASEAN] continue to be only interested in seeing whether we can contribute to the restoration of political stability in Cambodia’. Therefore, if the foregoing argument is that Australia and Indonesia were collaborating to promote a solidarist regional society, this applies only to a narrow window between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. The pluralist underpinnings and consequences of the Asian values discourse and the Asian financial crisis, the latter of which I discuss in Chapter Three, highlight the transience and fragility of this solidarist regional society.

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9 Makinda (2001: 406 – 407) defines juridical sovereignty as the recognition offered by the society of states, empirical sovereignty in the Weberian vein of state monopoly of territory and resources, and popular sovereignty as the ability of citizens to exact accountability from their governments.
The Cambodian peace settlement cannot be seen as evidence of a security community because its provisions for popular sovereignty were quickly undermined by state and regional elites. This assessment is given further credence by Australia-Indonesia cooperation in establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum. In the final analysis, the ARF is widely perceived to be established by ASEAN rather than Australia, owing to Australia's liminality with the region and a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). Canberra's foray into common security, such as Evans' proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), was emancipatory when compared to the geopolitics of the Cold War. However, once epistemic communities debated and disseminated Canberra's considerations of common security, a consensus emerged that for security regionalism to take root, Jakarta and ASEAN writ large rather than Canberra had to be the messenger, and the former's state-centric conception of cooperative security had to be deferred to (Pitty 2003b: 68). Specifically, in determining the outcome of the CSCA proposal, the epistemic community centred on the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was more influential than that of the Secure Australia Project (SAP). If Canberra had any intention to democratise security through a proposed CSCA, this was diluted to cooperative security by the time the ARF had its inaugural meeting in July 1994. Therefore, in an evaluation of consequence to the widespread mutual identification of security communities, Kent (2001: 263) argues that 'a gap slowly grew between the credibility of the Labor government's multilateral human rights policies, ... and that of its bilateral, regional policies, which varied according to the relative geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic pressures placed upon them'. These pressures were considerable, especially as reflected in Canberra's economic and ideational adjustments to promote Asian engagement (Dalrymple 2003).

In the preceding sketch of how cooperative security came to govern the workings of the ARF, epistemic communities played a significant role in debating and disseminating governmental ideas. In Haas' (1992: 3) influential definition, an epistemic community is 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area'. All systems of rule depend on a broader arrangement of knowledge, as it is more efficacious for elites to govern by consent. The interactions in epistemic communities are what Adler and Barnett (1998a: 41) call transactions. What requires our determination is whether a particular epistemic community promotes a security community, or legitimises a society of states. At the time of Evans' CSCA proposal, which built on Gorbachev's July 1986 speech in
Vladivostok calling for an Asia-Pacific equivalent of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, two competing epistemic communities were debating the ideas of common security. The first, CSCAP, promoted transparency through Track II diplomacy, namely government and military elites meeting in their private capacity (Simon 2002). In the constructivist account, these elites are socialised through repeated interactions to modify their conceptions of each other from enmity to amity. However, considering that Southeast Asian states and Australia continued to support Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor throughout the early 1990s, there is a sense that CSCAP was a participant in what Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]: 80) calls the ‘conspiracy of silence’ which states routinely agree to in order to marginalise human rights. Sullivan (1998: 421) criticises the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, which hosts the Australia CSCAP executive, for promoting ‘a mode of inquiry [which] expunges politics, ethics and responsibility from academic discourse on security’. The second epistemic community, SAP, presented a thorough critique of Canberra’s defence ontology, and explored alternatives to positivist ways of political action (Cheeseman and Kettle 1990; George 1992). For example, Smith (1990: 113) observed that Canberra had ‘two rhetorics of region’, arguing that defence self-reliance’s emphasis on contingencies should emulate Canberra’s conversion to regional economic interdependence. The ideational influence of CSCAP overshadowed that of SAP because the former incorporated liberal institutionalism within existing and therefore intelligible parameters of realism. Sullivan (1995: 149) argues that Peter Jennings, a senior Defence official, could simply dismiss the SAP as not intellectually credible because ‘[radical critiques] do not “speak” to the ingrained assumptions policymakers have of international security’.

Cooperative security, which is essentially a liberal interpretation of state cooperation, underpins the workings of the ARF, in contrast to any notion that security might be common. In doing so, cooperative security was legitimised by the epistemic community of CSCAP, which argues that the only adjustment states had to make in the post-Cold War period was to be more transparent with each other in their military acquisitions.

Cooperative security is not entirely consistent with ASEAN’s suspicion of great power involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts, as represented by the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration. This is because cooperative security potentially admits great powers, as the ARF did with China and the US. In other words, Jakarta had to adjust to the norm of cooperative security too, even if less adaptation was required of it compared to Canberra’s renunciation of the legalistic
implications, such as verification measures, of a proposed CSCA. ASEAN’s embrace of cooperative security arose amidst its marginalisation by the great powers in negotiating the Cambodian peace settlement. Although the settlement was testament to middle power cooperation between Canberra and Jakarta, the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, rather than ASEAN, led the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia. This was because ASEAN was divided by Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan’s call to ‘turn the Indochinese battlefields into market places’ (quoted in Acharya 2009: 114), which Indonesia saw as Thailand’s unilateral rehabilitation of Vietnam prior to a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict. More broadly, in a post-Cold War context where the great powers generally accommodated each other, ASEAN’s policy of opposing great power involvement threatened to be bypassed by them. Jones and Smith (2007: 184) argue that ASEAN has not presided over interstate war because great power rivalries cancel out each other, an argument which is ominous for Southeast Asia if the great powers come to an accommodation. In including the great powers in an arrangement of cooperative security, Jakarta had to moderate its claim to practice a ‘free and active’ (bebas dan aktif) foreign policy. However, this was not a particularly radical adjustment, considering that the New Order consistently identified with a US-led geopolitical and economic order, even if the regime rarely articulated it (Laksmana 2011: 109). Therefore, in Acharya’s (2004: 241) analysis of norm localisation in ASEAN, the norm of cooperative security was more readily absorbed by the Association’s existing worldviews of regional resilience and state sovereignty, than the norm of humanitarian intervention.

The characteristics and shortcomings of the ARF reflect the nascent passage of cooperative security, legitimised by the epistemic community of CSCAP. Compared to the bilateral alliances which dominated the region during the Cold War, the first ARF meeting in July 1994 at Bangkok consisted of 18 states and organisations, including erstwhile adversaries such as Vietnam and the US. The ARF’s expansive membership is arguably what Evans and Grant (1995: 116) had in mind when they reflect that ‘[the inaugural meeting] was felt by all its participants – and hailed by the regional media – to be the commencement of a structure and process of potentially very great significance’. However, great powers have been loath to subject themselves to the ARF’s purview if a conflict involves their interests. China’s insistence that the Spratly Islands dispute be negotiated bilaterally and the discrete establishment of the Six-Party Talks to resolve North Korea’s nuclear programme are instructive (Lim 1998: 123). The ability of great powers to unilaterally modify or
withdraw from a regional institution offers stronger evidence for an organisation operating in a neoliberal institutionalist mould and for pluralism, rather than for solidarism. Put alternatively, if this chapter demonstrates the existence of a solidarist regional society as a contrast to the expectations of a security community, the ARF highlights that even the characterisation of solidarism may be too generous. The ARF envisages three stages of development, namely confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and the elaboration of approaches to conflict resolution. However, the ARF remains confined to elite confidence-building (Simon 2007: 123), which suggests that the ARF primarily offers a diplomatic setting for managing interstate relations, rather than a democratisation of security. Leaver (1995: 185) goes so far as to suggest that, given the increased prevalence of intrastate conflicts in the early 1990s, interstate dialogue such as that offered by the ARF ‘offers a mechanism for averting the gaze of inquisitive neighbours’. All told then, the limitations of the ARF vindicate Leifer’s (1999: 28 and 29) pluralist argument that ‘ASEAN’s norms of state conduct are … part and parcel of the standard working practice of international society writ large and not in any way particular and exclusive to the Association or its regional locale’.

It might be expected that states would encounter fewer obstacles to purposive cooperation in trade liberalisation. Recalling functionalism’s explanation of ‘spillover’ from low to high politics, Clements (1989: 51) argues that capitalist economic integration exerts sustained pressures on Asia-Pacific states to moderate realpolitik. Smith (1990: 127, 129) wonders why Australia’s defence planners cannot emulate their economic counterparts’ rhetoric of regional interdependence, although he recognises that liberal economic rationalities can be indifferent to environmental and human exploitation. In the next section, I argue that while Australia-Indonesia cooperation was essential in establishing APEC and its Leaders’ Meeting, APEC has been stymied by the diverging economic epistemes of its members. In other words, before APEC can approximate the third tier of Adler and Barnett’s conception of security community development, there would need to be a consensus at the second tier as to what the relevant knowledge is.

**Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum**

Scholars often highlight economic reasons, such as the fear that the Asia-Pacific would be the casualty of competing regional trading blocs and economic
protectionism, for the creation of APEC (Pitty 2003a: 24; Ravenhill 2001: 79). While I do not dispute these arguments, for the purpose of analysing Canberra and Jakarta’s contributions to the nature of identification in APEC, I focus more on constructions of society and community. My analytical foray is informed by Bisley’s (2004: 260) argument that APEC reflects a bargain between states which are unabashed supporters of trade liberalisation, and those which are less persuaded of market competition, but nonetheless recognise the benefits of political dialogue in regional institutions. For the latter, the promise of immediate economic gains may be illusory, but they acquiesce in APEC’s brand of ‘open regionalism’ because cooperative action develops political capital which can be converted to collective advantage in the longer term (Bisley 2004: 258). In order to analyse what type of arrangement APEC is, I highlight Indonesia’s diplomatic importance in establishing APEC and its Leaders’ Meeting. In particular, Indonesia was instrumental in persuading Southeast Asian states that APEC would not eclipse ASEAN.

Second, I explain why Jakarta lent its imprimatur to the Bogor Declaration at the APEC meeting in November 1994, which promised ‘free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific no later than the year 2020’ (APEC 1994). States often rely on regional institutions to further domestic economic priorities. Just as a middle power such as Australia cannot depend on bilateral coercion if foreign tariffs are imposed on its exports, Indonesia had an interest in a modicum of regional trade liberalisation so that the cartelised sectors of its economy can continue to be sustained through side-payments (Jayasuriya 2003: 346). In essence, Indonesia’s sponsorship of the Bogor Declaration was instrumental rather than ideational. This assessment is consistent with Chalmers’ (2006: 209) argument that the ideology of pembangunan, which literally equates construction with something rising, with all its developmental state overtones, has a widespread subscription in Indonesia. In addition, prominent Indonesian economist Hadi Soesastro (1989: 867), while supportive of the deregulation of Indonesia’s economy in the 1980s, argued that to mute domestic opposition, deregulation should be framed as a ‘low politics’ issue of budgetary adjustment, rather than the national politics of competing economic

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10 Open regionalism underscores APEC’s intention that any gains from trade liberalisation through its auspices should also be extended to non-members (Ravenhill 2001: 140). There were instrumental reasons for open regionalism, such as the then low levels of intra-region trade and APEC having an eye towards reviving the intractable Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. However, this begs the question of APEC’s relevance once GATT was sufficiently alarmed by APEC’s creation to conclude the Uruguay Round, which it did in April 1994 (Beeson 2009c: 50). This example of open regionalism demonstrates that APEC functions more as a lobby group, rather than as an autonomous actor with its own episteme.
principles. Soesastro’s argument demonstrates that even proponents of deregulation have to accommodate the ideational influence of developmental state ideology in Indonesia.

My argument that Australia and Indonesia do not have a common episteme in APEC is bolstered by the third part of this section, which examines APEC as a whole to elucidate the competing priorities of trade liberalisation and technical assistance, as well as legalistic and consensual modalities, held by its members. These divisions were magnified by the Asian financial crisis, which I discuss in Chapter Three. In sum, on the eve of the Asian financial crisis, APEC was a solidarist society because its members could agree on the importance of a region-wide leaders’ meeting and trade liberalisation, the latter albeit for differing domestic reasons. APEC was not a security community because there was little epistemic consensus on what aspect of economics should be prioritised and secured. More importantly, there was an absence of widespread participation in APEC’s activities and deliberations, as evidenced by the business-centric composition of its Eminent Persons Group.

Constructivists question the neoliberal institutionalist argument that institutions are created in response to demand-side factors, such as the need to manage the externalities of economic interdependence (Aggarwal and Koo 2008; Kahler 2000). It may well be that geoeconomics was increasingly salient in the foreign policy agenda of regional countries in the 1980s, but constructivist and English School scholars argue that who leads diplomatic initiatives matters for legitimacy and followership in international politics (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1991). As mentioned, Australia was a more suitable candidate to promote APEC than Japan, notwithstanding that epistemic communities in both countries have had a long history of cooperation on the possibility of institutionalising regional economic cooperation. In an analogous vein, there were reasons for ASEAN to be suspicious of Bob Hawke’s January 1989 proposal in Seoul for an intergovernmental forum to pursue regional economic cooperation. For one, there were parallel moves afoot to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area, not to mention ASEAN’s anxiety that APEC would dislodge its diplomatic dexterity in nullifying competing great powers. More generally, while Ross Garnaut enthused about the Northeast Asian ascendancy, Canberra still primarily saw Southeast Asia for its military significance, especially as the first concentric circle in Canberra’s turn to defence self-reliance. This was evident in the reinvigoration of the Five Power Defence Arrangements and bilateral military exercises with Indonesia from the late 1980s (Ball and Kerr 1996: 96; Boyle 2002: 342). In other words,
Southeast Asian states had to be persuaded of Canberra’s credentials in economic leadership, which was hardly guaranteed as Canberra grappled with its specialisation of low-value-added export commodities (Higgott 1987: 199).

In this respect, the outcome of Jakarta’s efforts in persuading Southeast Asian states to support Canberra’s initiation of APEC was mixed. Although Australia initiated APEC, the latter’s modalities reflect the ASEAN Way of consensus and non-binding agreements. Dobell (2000: 37) notes that ‘Malaysian officials later complained at the skilful way [Richard] Woolcott had played his ASEAN cards, claiming that Suharto’s simple expression of willingness to listen had been used to leverage stronger endorsements from the rest of ASEAN’. Be that as it may, Australia’s coalition-building was not sufficient to extinguish Malaysia’s counterproposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus (Higgott and Stubbs 1995), which was the precursor for the subsequent ASEAN Plus Three grouping. Most likely, Jakarta persuaded other Southeast Asian states not to oppose Canberra’s initiation of APEC, because Jakarta was reciprocating Canberra’s contribution of diplomatic and technical expertise to the Cambodian peace settlement (Dobell 2000: 38). Jakarta’s influence was as the first among equals in ASEAN and Suharto was its elder statesman to whom other states deferred. Yet, Jakarta’s support for Canberra’s initiation of APEC does not lend itself to the condition of widespread mutual identification in a security community.

Amidst the plethora of multilateral institutions in Asia today, with the East Asia Summit and Trans-Pacific Partnership being prominent examples, it is easy to forget that a regional heads-of-government dialogue did not exist in the early 1990s. After three APEC ministerial meetings, Paul Keating (2000: 81) concluded that the ‘involvement of heads of government would provide the locomotive to drive a more ambitious APEC agenda’. Their involvement might provide the impetus for trade ministers to conclude protracted negotiations or further trade liberalisation. In addition, Keating (2000: 81) notes that ‘[the Asia-Pacific] was the only significant part of the world in which no structure existed to involve heads of government in regular dialogue … [I]n the Asia-Pacific, we stared at each other across a void, often suspiciously’. For Australia, this lacuna meant that its Prime Ministerial representation in regional institutions was limited to the Commonwealth and the South Pacific Forum, a significant impediment in its policy of Asian engagement (Gyngell and Wesley 2007: 100). Keating’s plan for an APEC leaders’ dialogue reflected constructivism’s insight that social interactions can transform how actors perceive each other (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 44). Yet, although there was a glaring gap
without a regional leaders’ dialogue, it could not be assumed that its establishment was a foregone conclusion. After all, Beijing, having agreed to the construction of APEC as a forum of economies in order to include Hong Kong and Taiwan, could be expected to oppose a heads-of-government meeting, with its implication of recognising the latter territories as sovereign equals (Keating 2000: 83). While it is unlikely that Jakarta influenced Beijing’s decision to participate in the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, considering that diplomatic relations between them were only re-established in 1990, Jakarta was again important in signalling to Southeast Asian states that it would not oppose Keating’s proposal. Keating (2000: 82) acknowledged that if Australia ‘encountered outright hostility … from Indonesia as the largest ASEAN country, it would mean that we faced an uphill task’.

The APEC Leaders’ Meeting has been versatile enough to deliberate on regional security issues such as terrorism and environmental degradation (Beeson 2009c: 53). It has also facilitated regional crisis diplomacy, especially the September 1999 meeting in Auckland, where the US diplomatically and financially pressured Indonesia to allow INTERFET to stem the post-referendum violence in East Timor. Even though the timing of this meeting was fortuitous, we can concede Keating’s broader point that the Leaders’ Meeting has facilitated trust between states in the Asia-Pacific. But it remains that the Meeting, and APEC more generally, only involves state and business elites, to the exclusion of other societal constituencies. More broadly, the coherence of an Asia-Pacific identity has always been more tenuous than other conceptions of the region, such as an East Asian one (Dirlik 1992; Wesley 1997: 532). This is a point which even Keating (2000: 93) recognises when he argues that ‘my opposition to expanded membership [to Mexico, Chile and Papua New Guinea] had nothing to do with any antipathy to these countries, but to the belief that if APEC got too big, or its membership became more diffuse, … we could not achieve what we wanted to do strategically’. The APEC Leaders’ Meeting is a form of diplomacy in international society in which states recognise each other as legitimate actors. Diplomacy can even promote trust and purposive cooperation between states, foreshadowing solidarism. However, there is little consideration in the composition and modalities of APEC of the need for emancipation and widespread mutual identification to enhance human security.

Owing to the salience of developmental state ideology in Indonesia, it is curious that the 1994 APEC meeting sponsored the Bogor Declaration, which called for free trade in APEC developed economies by 2010, and their developing counterparts by 2020. It
may well be that Suharto supported APEC and its Leaders’ Meeting because Indonesia was the rotating Chair in 1994, but diplomatic prestige is quite distinct from endorsing an ideationally dissonant agreement which had the potential to erode domestic client support for the New Order. Some scholars, such as Ravenhill (2001: 181), argue that the subsequent ambiguities and contestations in elaborating the Bogor Declaration demonstrate that Indonesia never intended to honour its trade liberalisation commitments. Others, for example Jayasuriya (2003: 346), contend that APEC’s architecture of open regionalism has enabled Indonesia to selectively liberalise, so that the domestic cartels on which the New Order depended for political support could continue to be underwritten. Regardless of whose argument is more compelling, what is incontrovertible is that trade liberalisation no longer captured the collective imagination of policymakers when the Asian financial crisis buffeted the region within a few years. This observation leads us to a broader discussion of APEC’s shortcomings, so as to demonstrate the transience of its episteme, or what Adler and Barnett (1998a: 40) refer to as knowledge.

APEC’s shortcomings can be distilled into disagreements over whether it should prioritise trade liberalisation or technical assistance, and legalistic or consensual decision-making (Beeson 2007: 224). Developing economies such as Indonesia have consistently held that APEC should be a forum for the transfer of technical expertise, and adhere to ASEAN’s practice of non-binding diplomacy. Australia, with one eye towards seeking acceptance in what Evans (1995a) calls the East Asian Hemisphere, has acquiesced in Indonesia’s stance, even if this has been at odds with the concerns of domestic constituencies in Australia that regional states would free-ride on its unilateral trade liberalisation (Ravenhill 2001: 117). These specific shortcomings of APEC are well-documented by scholars, but for the purposes of evaluating conceptions of community, they collectively mean that APEC does not fulfil Adler and Barnett’s (1998b: 40) criteria of knowledge in a security community as ‘categories of practical action and legitimate activity’. This assessment comes into stark relief over time, confounding constructivism’s assumption that sustained interactions socialise actors to trust each other. Not only did APEC capitulate to the IMF as the main actor in responding to the Asian financial crisis, a point which I discuss in Chapter Three, but John Howard palpably turned to bilateral trade agreements to pursue trade liberalisation (Ravenhill 2003). In doing so, Bisley (2004: 258) argues that ‘Australia’s approach to the region [now] appears to be driven by short-term calculations of interest and advantage and not by a broader view of the gains to be had through a more consistent, community-minded and broad-based engagement’. In other words,
Canberra’s relatively rapid loss of enthusiasm for multilateralism does not accord with Adler and Barnett’s (1998b: 32) argument that security communities are characterised by diffuse, not immediate, reciprocity. 11

In the last section, I argue that the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), signed in the final months of Keating’s government, was an articulation of solidarism between states. The AMS was the culmination of purposive bilateral cooperation in instituting cooperative security, a regional leaders’ dialogue and trade liberalisation. However, the smouldering discontent over Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor demonstrates that the bilateral relationship in the early 1990s cannot be characterised as a security community. The Timor Gap Treaty illustrates that Canberra and Jakarta could transcend nautical disputes to conclude an agreement which was in their collective economic interests. However, the Dili massacre and Australia’s invocation of technicalities over jurisdiction to shield Indonesia from the International Court of Justice, demonstrate that states in a solidarist relationship are as capable as those in a pluralist one of stymieing widespread identification.

The Agreement on Maintaining Security as a culmination of a solidarist regional society

Signed in December 1995, the AMS was significant for placing the Australia-Indonesia relationship within a regional context. For example, the AMS (1995) called for consultations ‘at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and the region’. This characterisation of the AMS stands in contrast to the Lombok Treaty of November 2006, which is more preoccupied with bilateral issues and territorial sovereignty (Gyngell 2007: 110). 12 That the Lombok Treaty, which was

11 Keohane (1986: 20), while exhibiting a rationalist predilection when he argues that ‘strong principles of reciprocity are not widely shared in contemporary international relations’, recognises that diffuse reciprocity may be necessary ‘in the interests of continuing satisfactory overall results for the group of which one is a part, as a whole’.
12 Widely commented on is Article 2 (3) of the Lombok Treaty, which states that Australia and Indonesia ‘shall not in any manner support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other Party’. Coming on the heels of Australia’s granting of refugee status to 42 West Papuan asylum-seekers in April 2006, Article 2 (3) can be interpreted as Australia’s reassurance to Indonesia that interstate order is paramount. More recently, in October 2014, West Papuan independence activists in Melbourne alleged that Indonesian students working for the Indonesian government are spying on their activities (Fitzsimmons 2014).
concluded amidst post-Suharto democratisation, reflects a narrower constituency of mutual identification is a challenge to the democratic peace theory. However, as I argue in Chapter Six, the democratic peace theory’s assumption of methodological nationalism subsumes democracy within nationalism. Asylum-seekers are therefore excluded from the ostensibly stable citizenships of Australia and Indonesia, which has consequences for limiting the scope of mutual identification. After all, the Lombok Treaty, especially Article 2 (3), was negotiated after Indonesia vehemently opposed Australia’s granting of refugee status to 42 West Papuan asylum-seekers (see footnote 12; Palmer 2006). The AMS was a coda to bilateral cooperation in promoting cooperative security, regional leaders’ dialogues in APEC and ARF, and trade liberalisation. DuPont (1996: 54) argues that ‘while the Agreement only relates to security, it must be seen in the context of Australia’s overall bilateral relationship with Indonesia, and the increasing cooperation between the two countries towards the goal of regional economic integration, and the development of a new security architecture for Pacific Asia’. Having analysed the regional context of Australia-Indonesia relations in the early 1990s, in this section I demonstrate how the bilateral military exercises of this period support my argument that Australia and Indonesia were seeking to orchestrate a solidarist regional society. I then turn to the widespread opposition against Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor, and Canberra’s complicity in it, to demonstrate why the bilateral relationship in this period was not a security community. The Timor Gap Treaty was supportive of solidarism, whereas the disaffection against Canberra and Jakarta’s policies toward East Timor failed to meet the expectation of widespread mutual identification in a security community.

The AMS (1995), in its endorsement of ‘mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field’, reflected the expansion of bilateral military exercises and exchanges in the early 1990s. Boyle (2002: 336 – 348) details the intelligence exchanges, combined military exercises, senior officer visits, and new management structures to administer defence cooperation during this period. Bilateral military exchanges were also occurring apace in Southeast Asia, lending to regional solidarism (Acharya 1991: 164). My argument of solidarism here derives from the nascent sense of state and military elites, such as Generals Peter Gration and Try Sutrisno, that military exchanges promote cooperative security, which these officials conflate with defence cooperation (Catley and Dugis 1998: 290). However, there is countervailing evidence that the objectives of these military exchanges were not shared, and hence there was little epistemic consensus on what is to be secured. For example, it is uncertain whether military exchanges can attenuate the gulf between
the diverging strategic cultures of Australia and Indonesia, with their respective emphases on external and internal threats (Booth and Trood 1999; Gyngell 2007: 114). In light of Habibie’s abrogation of the AMS in September 1999, it is clear that military exchanges did little to overcome the chasm between Canberra’s conception of East Timor through the prism of regional order and Jakarta’s organicist understanding of East Timor’s place in the Indonesian nation (Cotton 2004). Looking further afield to Southeast Asia as the region where Australia-Indonesia cooperation to promote solidarism is enacted, Acharya (1991: 166) observes that naval and air exercises are more common than land ones because the former are ‘less sensitive’. More significantly, for the purpose of assessing the extent of regional solidarism, he argues that ‘no ASEAN country sees an indigenous ASEAN security arrangement as a substitute for its security linkages with friendly external powers’ (Acharya 1991: 172).

Nevertheless, despite the preceding contestations over the objectives of military exchanges, the case for solidarism can be salvaged. Canberra paid special attention to Kopassus and Kostrad, the Indonesian army’s Special Forces Command and Strategic Reserve Command respectively, in its defence cooperation with Jakarta, because Indonesia’s political leadership was likely to be drawn from these elite forces (Boyle 2002: 346). Defence cooperation with Kopassus and Kostrad drew opprobrium from the Australian and Indonesian publics because of the elite forces’ human rights abuses. Societal consternation was only magnified amidst what Falk (2009: 168) calls the ‘golden years’, namely the early 1990s, of humanitarian intervention, because the need for such intervention in East Timor was ignored. However, defence cooperation supports solidarism because, given where political leaders were chosen from in the New Order, elite military identification could be the harbinger of purposive cooperation between governmental elites. Therefore, although there was equivocation over the objectives of military exchanges, they were important ballast, to use Gareth Evans’ metaphor, in elite identification and solidarism between Australia and Indonesia.

Despite the achievements of solidarism, Keating was continually dogged by criticisms that his approach to relations with Indonesia was secretive and contemptuous of human rights. These criticisms are not unexpected – Linklater and Suganami (2006: 59) argue that by nominating the observance of agreements and sanctity of property rights as the elementary goals of all societies, Hedley Bull is arguing from the perspective of the ‘socially satisfied’. Keating (2000: 126) does not deny that he marginalised human rights to construct a solidarist society with the New Order,
arguing that ‘the coming to power of the New Order government was arguably the event of single greatest strategic benefit to Australia after the Second World War … ASEAN and APEC, two foundation stones of regional cooperation, could not have developed [without the New Order].’ Although security agreements are normally negotiated in secret, DuPont’s (1996: 55) prescient observation that ‘the fragility of public support for the Agreement might yet prove to be its Achilles’ heel’ can be extrapolated to signify the crescendo of Keating’s approach to Indonesia. The AMS fed into concerns that public opinion was being sidelined by Canberra’s unilateral accession to international treaties, a democratic deficit which Capling and Nossal (2003: 838) argue continued, despite Howard’s establishment of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.

In terms of Adler and Barnett’s security community framework, the bilateral relationship in the early 1990s was characterised by the absence of widespread mutual identification between the societies of Australia and Indonesia. Indeed, even Keating’s vision of solidarism with Indonesia was not widely shared by the Australian public. This disjuncture between elite and public opinion is important in explaining why Keating lost the March 1996 election, and consequently, Howard’s instrumental conception of Asian engagement (Kelly 2006; Milner 2001: 35). The Australian public’s scepticism of Keating’s vision of solidarism with Indonesia centred on Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. The Timor Gap Treaty was testament to the achievements of solidarism, whereas the Dili massacre, among other examples of Indonesian repression, demonstrated that the bilateral relationship during this period was not a security community.

The Timor Gap Treaty demonstrated that states can overcome territorial – in this case, nautical – disputes to pursue their collective economic interests. Recall that purposive cooperation is the hallmark of states in a solidarist society, as compared to those in a pluralist society of coexistence (Buzan 2001: 475). The Timor Gap refers to a hiatus in the maritime boundaries to the south of East Timor, as its former coloniser, Portugal, declined to participate in negotiations with Australia and Indonesia during the early 1970s to delineate their maritime boundaries. Canberra had long been aware of oil and gas deposits underneath the Timor Sea. In the months preceding Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, Richard Woolcott argued that the Department of Minerals and Energy ‘might well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and that this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia … than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor’ (Way 2000,
Document 169). In the event, the Timor Gap Treaty did not demarcate the hiatus in maritime boundaries, but provided for a regime of joint exploration of seabed resources (Catley and Dugis 1998: 219). Therefore, the Timor Gap Treaty illustrates that Canberra and Jakarta could put aside their pluralist disputes over maritime boundaries, in favour of purposive cooperation in resource exploration.

The controversial image of Alatas and Evans toasting each other over the Timor Sea after they signed the Timor Gap Treaty is emblematic of their dismissal of East Timorese self-determination and human rights. Canberra and Jakarta extended neither solidarism nor the human security of a security community to the vast majority of East Timorese (Falk 2001; Salla 1995). While it is evident that East Timorese self-determination and human rights were paid lip service by Canberra and Jakarta, it is uncertain from the instrumental perspective of realism whether Canberra’s complicity in Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor supported the bilateral relationship as a society.

If international society is minimally comprised of rules and intersubjective understandings, then the denial of East Timorese self-determination was a violation of what Falk (2000: 100) calls first-order self-determination, namely ‘the struggle of a people to overcome alien rule, and achieve political independence within internationally agreed boundaries’. As early as February 1975, William Pritchett, a First Assistant Secretary in the Defence Department, proposed that ‘a basic treaty relationship’ between Indonesia and an independent East Timor would satisfy Australia’s concern with interstate order (Way 2000, Document 90). He presciently predicted that if Canberra did not do more to persuade Jakarta against invading East Timor, widespread opposition in Australia would continuously undermine defence cooperation as a solidarist project between Canberra and Jakarta (quoted in Cotton 2004: 33). Therefore, the Timor Gap Treaty was illustrative of solidarism between Canberra and Jakarta, but in rejecting the important tenet in pluralist international society of the self-determination of former European colonies, the foundations of bilateral solidarism in this period were fragile.

The Dili massacre of November 1991, the aborted appointment of General Herman Mantiri as Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia, and Portugal’s case against Australia at the International Court of Justice that the Timor Gap Treaty was invalid, demonstrate how the denial of East Timorese self-determination derailed bilateral solidarism at every turn. On 12 November 1991, Indonesian troops fired on demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery who were demanding for East Timorese independence, killing about 250 people. Evans (1991: 3322) downplayed the Dili
General Mantiri’s aborted appointment as Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia should be conceived in a similar, structural light. Jakarta eventually withdrew Mantiri’s appointment after stiff opposition from the Australian public against his record as an army commander in East Timor. But rather than focus on personalities, it is worth considering that government officials did not anticipate, or thought that they could ride roughshod over, widespread opposition to Mantiri’s appointment, because interstate relations are ensconced in a pluralist international society which legitimises violence against challenges to state authority. Therefore, Deutsch’s emphasis on pluralistic security communities, which Adler and Barnett (1998a: 30) replicate, is problematic for widespread mutual identification, because pluralism is not just the ‘legal independence of separate governments’ (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5), but a social arrangement in which states define what the national interest is. Purposive cooperation can result from the convergence of national interests, but it is always contingent, susceptible to state reinterpretations of the national interest, or what Burke (2013: 65) criticises as a ‘self-interested state subject rationally choosing to take up ends beyond its own’.

Just two weeks after the Timor Gap Treaty came into force in February 1991, Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Portugal argued that it remained the administering power of East Timor, as self-determination was denied to East Timor in 1975. On these grounds, Portugal contended that it was invalid for Australia and Indonesia to conclude a treaty which recognises Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor. The ICJ ruled that it could not make a determination on Portugal’s case, as to do so would involve passing judgement on Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, and Indonesia had not
consented to the Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, Portugal's case was ruled unresolvable on the basis of the rationalist predilection for state consent. Keating (2000: 128) may consider Portugal to be 'one of the world's most incompetent colonial powers', but in both the courts of a pluralist international society and legitimacy, the solidarist relationship between Australia and Indonesia was found wanting. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was at odds with post-World War Two decolonisation, which operated on the principle that former European colonies should be afforded self-determination within existing territorial boundaries (Hurrell 2007: 133). We may question the English School's teleological transition from pluralism to solidarism and to a world society, but the point here is that solidarism between Australia and Indonesia had fragile foundations. From the perspective of legitimacy in international politics, which Hurd (1999: 381) defines as ‘the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’, Australia's loss to Portugal of a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for the 1997 – 98 term was a stain on Australia and Indonesia's efforts to construct a solidarist regional society.

**Conclusion**

The relationship between Australia and Indonesia in the early 1990s can be described as solidarist, both in a bilateral and regional sense. The difference between pluralism and solidarism is that the latter admits purposive cooperation between states, whereas the former is an arrangement to tolerate different national interests. Bilateral defence cooperation reflected state elites' nascent understanding of the salience of post-Cold War confidence-building, which they blended with cooperative security. Cooperative security recognises that there are different referents of security, for example, economic and environmental security. But these modifications to neorealism do not satisfy Baldwin's (1997: 5) doubts that proponents of cooperative security are 'simply emphasising different aspects of a shared concept [of security]'. Crucially, cooperative security still envisages that states are the sole interpreters of what constitutes a security issue. States can occasionally promote human security, but they consider that they can revert to state-centric forms of security at will. Cooperative security is distinct from the democratising and emancipatory thrust of security communities as an arrangement of common security. This is because the latter recognises that peoples and societies are legitimate articulators of security concerns.
Bilateral defence cooperation was a microcosm of confidence-building activities in the region, such as those under the auspices of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). The bilateral relationship was solidarist in a regional context because Australia-Indonesia cooperation was important in fostering a region which promoted cooperative security, a regional leaders’ dialogue and trade liberalisation. The institutional manifestations of these ideas are the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and their respective leaders’ dialogue. Yet, despite the achievements of solidarism, the Australia-Indonesia relationship during this period was not a security community because it did not meet Adler and Barnett’s threshold of widespread mutual identification and trust. This is especially conspicuous with the widespread opposition against Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor, and Canberra’s structural complicity in Jakarta’s actions.

This brief period of solidarism was not to last. The Asian financial crisis undermined important tenets of bilateral and regional solidarism, such as the *fait accompli* of Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor and trade liberalisation respectively. In the next chapter, I argue that, amidst Canberra’s rush for economic opportunities in Asia, policymakers overlooked the diverging political economies between Australia and the developmental economies of many Asian states, including Indonesia. When Indonesia’s economy was growing rapidly in the early 1990s, Evans could predict to a sceptical Australian public that the burgeoning Indonesian middle class would press for democratisation from the authoritarian New Order, leading to mutual identification between the societies of Australia and Indonesia in the near future. Leaders may well overlook the lack of mutual identification when there are economic opportunities to reap, but identification, especially the solidarist variety of purposive cooperation in trade liberalisation, is much harder to sustain when there are economic maelstroms. The Asian financial crisis demonstrated that, not only had policymakers downplayed diverging conceptions of political economies during the early 1990s, but also that rapacious economic growth is deleterious for the widespread mutual identification of security communities.

Chapter Three also highlights the limitations of the democratic peace theory, engendered by its assumption that territorial borders are immutable. The Asian financial crisis precipitated Suharto’s resignation, democratisation in Indonesia, and East Timor’s self-determination. The liberal account of the democratic peace charts an inexorable path of economic interdependence and institutional constraints against interstate belligerence. Mansfield and Snyder (2002) question the liberal account,
arguing that in democratising states where domestic institutions are fledging, leaders often make unmediated nationalistic appeals which heighten interstate conflict. Their argument may be compelling in relation to Indonesian politicians who fan anti-Australian sentiments to garner votes in post-Suharto elections, but Mansfield and Snyder are still operating within the prism of unitary nation-states. Democratic peace theory's assumptions of teleological progress and methodological nationalism cannot explain why East Timor's independence amidst post-Suharto democratisation occasioned the disintegration of bilateral solidarism and societal identification instead. These conceptual shortcomings of the democratic peace theory illustrate why the scholarship of security communities cannot be the former's poor shadow. Instead, scholars of security communities must be attentive to the social forces which condition and change state forms, be they self-determination or neoliberalism.
Chapter Three
The erosion of solidarism: the Asian financial crisis and East Timor’s independence

This chapter illustrates two aspects of the Australia-Indonesia relationship which are predicated on a degree of mutual identification. First, mutual identification can dissipate, contrary to the teleology implied by Adler and Barnett’s argument that security communities develop through three tiers of increasing identification. From the erosion of consensus over what is to be secured, a different set of precipitating conditions may emerge, complicating consequent attempts at community-building. As agents, states can also decide that solidarism is no longer worth pursuing, settling instead for a pluralist society or the anarchy of an international system. Second, mutual identification is always situated in organisational units which are contingent. What these units embody is under constant contestation, be it the exclusion of asylum-seekers from Australian and Indonesian citizenships or East Timor’s independence from the Indonesian nation-state. To the extent that organisational units such as states and regional institutions are socially contingent, we cannot assume that mutual identification is unaffected by changes in the composition of these units. This argument is especially relevant in relation to IR’s preeminent actor, the state. For example, our axiomatic references to the state obscure how it is historically an organisational response to the expansion and financial exigencies of war-making, an imperative which is now less pressing for both Australia and Indonesia, as they are embedded within the non-territorial networks of US hegemony and neoliberalism (Hadiz 2006: 124; Spruyt 2002). Therefore, mutual identification is not only determined by the quantity of transactions, but also by the structures which states and peoples reside in. When these structures change, mutual identification can be augmented, but as we will see in this chapter, the reverse is equally possible.

Another way of thinking about the impact of changes in the constitution of structures on mutual identification is through the perspective of norms. Because norms are part of different social arrangements, norms can be in competition with each other. This chapter considers the consequences of a key argument of Chapter Two, namely that the norm of purposive cooperation in a solidarist society is at odds with the norm of self-determination, which is situated in the separate realm of decolonisation and the creation of post-colonial states.

The preceding observations on the disintegration of ideational relationships are supported by important developments in Australia-Indonesia relations between 1996
and 2001, the timeframe covered by this chapter. John Howard no longer talked of promoting mutual trust with Indonesia, notwithstanding that the constituency of this trust was limited to governmental elites under Keating. As Australia assumed leadership of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), Howard (1999: 10029) declared in Parliament that Australia should not seek ‘a good relationship with Indonesia at all costs or at the expense of doing the right thing according to our own values’. Wesley (2001: 309) argues that an important consequence of the Asian financial crisis for Australia’s interactions with Asia was one of image, be it Australia’s newfound role as instructor of neoliberalism or the region’s scepticism towards Australia’s recommendations of deregulation. Far from identification, the relationship between Australia and Indonesia during this period was characterised by the image of resentment (Higgott 2000). This chapter analyses the Asian financial crisis, East Timor’s independence and post-Suharto democratisation within the prism of the conditions for creating a security community.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I argue that structure is more important than agency, or what Adler and Barnett call process categories, in explaining the erosion of solidarism between Canberra and Jakarta. Before assuming office, Howard and Alexander Downer articulated a vision of Asian engagement which prioritised bilateralism and downplayed ideational convergence. But until the Asian financial crisis, Canberra continued to support the institutions of solidarism, namely the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), APEC and ARF. Indeed, in opposition, the Coalition’s reservation towards the AMS focused on its secretive negotiations, rather than its provisions to consult on bilateral and regional security. The second and third sections explain how the Asian financial crisis undermined bilateral and regional solidarism. The second section focuses on epistemic differences. Considering that Jakarta vigorously undermined the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) panacea of deregulation, Jakarta’s subscription to the trade liberalisation objectives encapsulated by the Bogor Declaration was instrumental rather than ideational. Therefore, amidst seemingly inexorable regional economic growth in the early 1990s, Canberra underestimated differences in political economies, which resurfaced when economic opportunities were scarce. The third section argues that the abeyance of the aforementioned solidarist regional institutions can be attributed to the Asian financial crisis. For example, after APEC deferred to the IMF in addressing the Asian financial crisis, there was a proliferation of bilateral trade agreements and regional economic cooperation predicated on a narrower and culturally-justified East Asian identity,
reflecting the diverging economic epistemes of neoliberalism and developmental state respectively.

The fourth section considers the consequences of East Timor’s independence for bilateral relations. While it is well-established that bilateral relations deteriorated after East Timor’s independence (Cotton 2004: 139), what is less remarked upon is that East Timor’s self-determination was conceivable only amidst post-Suharto democratisation. This observation raises questions for the democratic peace theory, which posits a positive correlation between democracy and mutual identification. Democratic peace theory is unable to explain why post-Suharto Indonesia’s facilitation of East Timorese independence should occasion a precipitous decline in Australia-Indonesia relations. This is because the democratic peace theory assumes that nation-states are unmalleable, or what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) refer to as methodological nationalism. For the scholarship of security communities to distinguish itself from the democratic peace theory, the former must be attuned to what Devetak (1995: 30) calls ‘the historical practices that mark [and erode] boundaries’, that is, the social milieu in which states interact. Adopting this critical approach to IR, I argue that, although post-Suharto democratisation may portend mutual identification between the societies of Australia and Indonesia, the contestation over East Timor’s legal status was rather a question of self-determination, which was prior to and independent of whether Australia and Indonesia have analogous political systems.

The final section sketches the tenor of post-Suharto democratisation, as a prelude to assessing the prospects of a security community between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. As media coverage surrounding the election of Joko Widodo as Indonesian president in July 2014 attested, Canberra tends to focus on whether a particular president may or may not be favourable to Canberra’s geopolitical interest. Canberra’s predilection towards personalities fails to consider how any Indonesian president or government leader anywhere is embedded in broader configurations of power and interest. Under the rubric of good governance, international financial institutions and foreign aid agencies have promoted a conception of post-Suharto democratisation which legitimises market inequality and interstate order (Ayers 2009). The neoliberal agenda of international financial and development agencies is important in understanding why Canberra can continue to promote interstate order without overtly supporting authoritarian regimes (Robinson 1996).
Howard and the pre-Asian financial crisis relationship with Indonesia

Bipartisanship on regional solidarism characterised Howard’s relationship with Indonesia before the Asian financial crisis. Scholars of Australian foreign policy argue that Coalition governments are predisposed to bilateralism and instrumental conceptions of the national interest, as opposed to Labor’s emphasis on multilateralism and a solidarist international society (Capling 2008: 610). This distinction is compelling when seen through the limited number of changes from Coalition to Labor governments, and vice versa, since World War Two. But structure and institutional stickiness or inertia impose their limits on the ideational persuasions of Australian governments. For example, Ungerer (2007: 550) argues that ‘the middle power concept is perhaps the closest that Australia has ever come to articulating a self-conscious theory of foreign policy’. This is because the middle power concept is informed by realist constraints and institutional creativity, an amalgam which Downer’s conception of Australia as a pivotal power does not capture (Ungerer 2007: 550). Therefore, from the perspective of agency, there are important differences between Coalition and Labor governments in how they understand and pursue Asian engagement. However, from the prism of structure, the Asian financial crisis is more significant in explaining the ensuing tenor of Australia’s relations with Indonesia and the region.

The soaring predictions of Howard’s first White Paper on foreign and trade policy demonstrated his temporary continuation of Keating’s solidarist approach to Indonesia and the region. Released in August 1997, a month after Thailand, under financial duress, removed the currency peg between the baht and the US dollar which led to a precipitous decline of the baht and other regional currencies, the White Paper declared that ‘the two most profound influences on Australian foreign and trade policy over the next fifteen years will be globalisation and the continuing economic rise of East Asia’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997: v). Recall that the coordination of externalities wrought by economic interdependence and the securing of continued US involvement in the region were important reasons why regional states established new institutions in the early 1990s, considerations which the White Paper supported (Commonwealth of Australia 1997: 47). To be sure, the White Paper foreshadowed the instrumentalism which is the hallmark of Howard’s approach to foreign policy. For

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13 This prediction is unremarkable in 2015 and the broad sweep since the 1980s. Yet, to appreciate how much the Asian financial crisis was responsible for Canberra’s retreat from this Panglossian prediction, consider that by March 1998, Howard (1998) argued that fiscal discipline had ‘fireproof[ed] the Australian economy against the worst ravages of the economic downturn in Asia’.
example, the White Paper pointedly noted that ‘preparing for the future is not a matter of grand constructs. It is about the hard-headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy: the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997: iii). Nevertheless, the examples which scholars marshal to argue that Australian foreign policy under Howard was instrumental, for example, Canberra’s refraction of INTERFET through the US alliance instead of the maintenance of a rules-based regional society, are consequent upon the Asian financial crisis. Therefore, if Howard and Downer had a coherent sense of their approach to foreign policy, the Asian financial crisis provided the canvas on which their ideas of instrumentalism were enacted.

**Narratives of economic growth and crisis**

Reflecting the permeability between economics and politics, the Asian financial crisis was as much an economic maelstrom as it was an epistemic contest (Hall 2003; Higgott 2000: 276). It is not necessary to recount the sharp increase in unemployment and decrease in economic growth in regional states from 1997 to 1999, except as they relate to Australia’s changing representations of Indonesia and to note that Indonesia was particularly affected by the financial crisis. The quantitative aspects and consequences of the Asian financial crisis are adequately detailed by Beeson and Robison (2000: 7 – 8) among others. For the purpose of what counts as legitimate knowledge in any relationship which is premised on ideational convergence, it is more important to consider the narratives of what caused the Asian financial crisis and how it could be resolved. A narrative has a congruent storyline and establishes a cause-and-effect relationship to a particular aspect of social life (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 54). I argue that Canberra and Jakarta had diverging narratives on what caused the Asian financial crisis and consequently, its remedies. As ideal types of economic organisation, Canberra subscribed to the relations of rule of neoliberalism, while Jakarta found the narratives of the developmental state more compelling. When there is boundless economic growth, as it seemingly was in Indonesia during the early 1990s, Australian policymakers and businesses were unlikely to query how profits were obtained. However, when economic opportunities dissipate, attributions of blame and responsibility reflect epistemic disputes on how economies should be organised.

Canberra argued that regional state elites’ distortion of market signals, more popularly and scathingly known as crony capitalism, had brought about the financial crisis.
Indeed, it is not always evident where the line should be drawn between the workings of the developmental state, by which the state cultivates indigenous industries through its generous provision of credit, and the outright raiding of public monies. Area studies scholars argue that the boundaries between legality and illegality in Indonesia are fluid and socially constructed, in contrast to the IR dichotomy between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy (Aspinall and van Klinken 2011: 2; Wilson 2006). The blurring of national and particularistic interests\(^{14}\) was especially apparent during the late Suharto years – Aspinall (2005: 4) characterises this period of the New Order as one of ‘sultanisation’. Jakarta’s awarding of the Timor national car project in February 1996 to a conglomerate controlled by Suharto’s son, Hutomo ‘Tommy’ Mandala Putra, is instructive. To be sure, Downer lobbied on Jakarta’s behalf to the International Monetary Fund in March 1998 that the latter should not impose onerous conditions on Indonesia to undertake deregulation. Downer argued that ‘[i]f the international community takes action which tears up Indonesia’s social fabric then the IMF programme would be counterproductive. The problem is that it is believed in Indonesia that implementation of the [IMF] package would break the back of the country socially’ (quoted in Kelly 2009: 472). However, Downer’s advocacy has to be seen through Canberra’s abiding concern with the stability of the Indonesian state (Dibb 2001), not competing conceptions of why the financial crisis occurred. On the latter, Canberra’s argument was that rapacious state and business elites in Indonesia had undermined market efficiency. It is a matter of debate whether Canberra’s neoliberal stance was cognitive, or an instrumental assurance of fleet-footed capital constituencies (Wesley 2001: 304), a strategy which Beeson and Bell (2000: 309) question in light of the financialisation of the global economy. Regardless, remedies such as Downer’s (1998) “staying the course” on economic reform and liberalisation is important if the region’s economies are to emerge stronger’ were staples of Canberra’s diplomatic toolkit until the global financial crisis a decade later, with its origins in the US financial heartland.

Jakarta, along with many regional states, conceded that the benevolent thrust\(^{15}\) of the developmental state was subverted by predatory elites. As capital becomes

\(^{14}\) My contrast between national and particularistic interests should not be taken to mean that there is an all-encompassing national interest (see Camilleri 2003). Even unadulterated conceptions of the developmental state, which are broadly synonymous with elite conceptions of Asian values, marginalise workers’ rights and social security (Pettman 2005: 170).

\(^{15}\) Rodan and Hewison (1996: 47) elaborate how East Asian regimes define good government: ‘political stability; wise leadership; sound bureaucracies based on meritocracy; economic growth with equity, but rewarding enterprise and achievement; fiscal prudence; social policies in such fields as housing, education and health care that make every citizen feel a
increasingly autonomous, the notion of technocrats acting virtuously in the national interest contends with that of predatory coalitions transcending the nation-state. Accordingly, from a developmental state perspective, the solution to rapacious rent-seeking is more stringent regulation, coupled with the post-Asian financial crisis development of monetary regionalism and currency swaps (Dieter 2008: 492; Webber 2001). However, Jakarta considered that the neoliberal remedies of the IMF and US, which Australia supported, amounted to robbery and opportunism (Higgott 2000: 274; Weiss and Hobson 2000: 68). In particular, Jakarta resented the IMF for insisting that debts to foreign banks be paid, hence allowing the foreign banks to evade moral hazard, whereas Indonesian financial institutions were left to their own devices (Higgott 2000: 275). Narratives are not empty rhetoric, as they can be identified with constituencies which have much to lose from one course of economic action over another (Dalrymple 1998: 235; Robison and Rosser 2000: 180). For example, MacIntyre (1995: 162) argues that the liberal economic epistemic community in Indonesia has to 'proceed by stealth', advancing its policy prescriptions without recourse to neoliberal vocabulary. This rhetorical limitation on neoliberals in Indonesia reflects the historical dependence of Indonesia’s capitalists on political gatekeepers for market access, in contrast to the template depicted in Barrington Moore’s seminal work of a restless bourgeoisie in conflict with a land-owning aristocracy which heralded liberal-democracy (see Jayasuriya 1995: 131).

Nevertheless, if narratives are evaluated on their own merits, or what Risse (2000) calls a logic of arguing, there was hardly what Adler and Barnett (1998a: 43) call a 'belief in a common fate' between Canberra and Jakarta, both in diagnosing the causes of the Asian financial crisis and its remedies. Canberra’s diplomacy in the financial crisis was predicated on distancing itself from Jakarta and the region, demonstrated in Peter Costello’s argument that ‘with international capital pouring out of the region, the Asian miracle was collapsing and it was not so desirable [for Australia] to be viewed as part of Asia’ (Costello and Coleman 2008: 175). In addition, if Canberra argued in the 1980s that it had to change economically and ideationally to partake in the Northeast Asian ascendancy, it now emphasised the geographic breadth of its economic links. Marking the 15th anniversary of the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement with New Zealand (CER) in March 1998, Tim Fischer (1998: 1714) stressed that 'we do not just look to Asia; we look to the whole world for our trading opportunities'. On Indonesia’s part, despite Canberra contributing $1

stakeholder; national teamwork and partnership between government, business and labour; acceptance of the rule of law and an independent judiciary; and relative lack of corruption'.
billion to Indonesia’s IMF package, Habibie still found cause to exclude Australia from the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting, demonstrating that narratives of identification were as important as, if not more than, Howard’s protestations of Australia’s practical help. From an analysis of diverging narratives of the Asian financial crisis, I now consider how they affected the institutions of regional solidarism which Keating constructed and Howard initially maintained.

The erosion of institutions of regional solidarism

Financial crises can be the precipitating conditions for mutual identification. States and societies, recognising their economic interdependence, may conclude that more intensive and binding forms of cooperation are required. Such a conclusion of neo-functionalism or ‘spillover’, prominent in the scholarship on European integration, assumes that there is a convergence of interpretations on what caused the financial crisis. As I argued in the previous section, this confluence of understandings was not evident during the Asian financial crisis. The ideational impasse over who was responsible for the Asian financial crisis eroded support for the norms and institutions of regional solidarism, namely cooperative security, the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s ousting of co-Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in August 1997 had more to do with domestic political rivalry than the Asian financial crisis, but this undermining of the Cambodian peace settlement heightened the sense that cooperative security was dissipating. The Asian financial crisis vectored the development of mutual identification in two ways, both of which were infelicitous to Australia’s prospects in regional community-building. First, regional states coalesced around a culturally-defined East Asian identity which excluded Australia. Their rejection of Australia’s Asia-Pacific conception of the region was evident in the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three grouping, which resurrected Mahathir’s East Asian Economic Caucus. Second, Canberra became markedly less enthusiastic towards the institutions of regional solidarism and turned towards instrumental conceptions of its alliance with the US. For example, Downer (2000) made an oft-quoted distinction between cultural and practical regionalism, arguing that Canberra would only participate in the latter, notwithstanding that what seemingly passes for instrumental cooperation is often premised on constructions of affinity. The character of Australia-Indonesia relations changed from 1997, not from the ascension of Howard in March 1996. Benchmark dates in IR, according to Buzan and Lawson (2014: 451), ‘stand as demarcation points for examining a range of transformational processes and act as markers for a concentration of interlinked – or nested – events’. In Australia’s relations with Indonesia and the region, 1997 is such a year, for the Asian financial
crisis presaged East Timor’s potential independence and cast an ideational shadow on future attempts by Australia to promote mutual identification and trust, if any such attempt was forthcoming in the first place.

Although Canberra was not involved, Hun Sen’s ousting of Norodom Ranariddh, coupled with the dispute between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore over the attribution of responsibility for the haze blanketing their countries in 1997 and 1998, created a permissible context for elite-centred and realist approaches to conflict (Cotton 1999; Dauvergne 1998). Öjendal and Antlöv (1998: 536) observed that ‘due to both the practice and the rhetoric of Asian values politics – there will be no aggressive, consistent or sustainable resistance to [Hun Sen’s] takeover from the side of ASEAN’. Analogously, although the haze originated from Indonesia, Malaysian and Singaporean companies are important investors in Indonesia’s logging industry, highlighting the contradictions between ASEAN’s state-centrism, the non-territorial logic of capital accumulation, and the interdependence of humanity. Therefore, if Keating and Evans put great store in ASEAN to be a norm entrepreneur of cooperative security (Katsumata 2009), they would have been disappointed as ASEAN vacillated between non-interference and what former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan called ‘flexible engagement’ in addressing Hun Sen’s coup, the haze in Southeast Asia, and in time to come, abuses committed by Burma’s military junta.

The Asian financial crisis could not galvanise the ASEAN Regional Forum to transition from confidence-building measures to the development of preventive diplomacy, a key expectation of Evans when he proposed an Asia-Pacific equivalent of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in July 1990. During the nascent years of the ARF, coinciding with the Asian financial crisis, the ARF was preoccupied with resisting Beijing’s insistence that the Spratly Islands dispute should not be mediated by the ARF. To the extent that Beijing subsequently became an avid proponent of multilateralism, its anxiety to attenuate the ‘China threat’ discourse is as plausible an explanation as ARF’s efforts to socialise Beijing into the workings of multilateralism (Eaton and Stubbs 2006; Roy 1996). To be sure, the communiqué of the 1998 ARF meeting in Manila noted that neoliberal restructuring has to consider ‘the less privileged sectors of society’ (ARF 1998: Paragraph 12), a recognition that human security is often incompatible with elite interests. But this recognition was tempered by the concurrent expansion of ASEAN to include Burma, Cambodia and Laos, states which, owing to considerations of regime stability, are wary of arguments that dilute Westphalian sovereignty and non-
interference (Webber 2001: 351). Therefore, considering that the ARF was beset by Beijing’s asymmetrical claim of bilateralism and the tension between deepening and widening which institutions encounter when they expand their membership (Calleo 2001: 297), the ARF was not a site of purposive cooperation during the Asian financial crisis. It may be that Howard was ideationally opposed to multilateralism, but nevertheless, his second White Paper on foreign policy concluded that the ARF’s ‘efforts to develop tools of preventive diplomacy and conflict management have faltered’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2003: 77).

Considering that APEC was expressly established to address economic issues – the inclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan was only possible if APEC was constructed as a forum of economies (Keating 2000: 83) – APEC’s inability to tackle the Asian financial crisis is the most striking failure among the institutions of regional solidarism which Keating and Suharto bequeathed. APEC’s brand of open regionalism, whereby a state’s extension of trade liberalisation to another state is afforded to all others, demonstrates that what APEC’s creators had in mind was not an insular regional trading bloc, but a means to pressure the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations, which established the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to arrive at a timely conclusion. APEC’s creators favoured open regionalism because many regional states had more substantial trading relationships with states outside the region, rather than within it, an outcome of the US’ promotion of bilateralism or ‘hub-and-spokes’ relationships with Asia (Beeson 2005: 978). Therefore, once the lobbying purpose of APEC was achieved when the Uruguay Round concluded in April 1994, it was unclear what economic function APEC had that was not already been covered by the WTO, whose rules are more enforceable.

The Asian financial crisis heightened regional disquiet over APEC’s relevance and purpose in two ways. First, the two member states which were materially in a position to address the financial crisis, Japan and the US, differed over its solutions. Japan proposed an Asian Monetary Fund in August 1997 to bolster beleaguered regional currencies (Amyx 2002: 6), in keeping with its stance that APEC should be a forum for technical cooperation. The US opposed Japan’s foray into an independent initiative, ensuring that its preference for the IMF’s antidote of financial deregulation defined the solution to the Asian financial crisis instead. Considering that the APEC Secretariat was hardly in a position to be the locus for the articulation of solutions to the financial crisis because sovereignty-conscious member states understaffed it, the absence of a hegemon in APEC which could shoulder the inequitable costs of
tackling financial crises highlighted APEC’s diminishing relevance (Mattli 1999: 42). If Labor had been in government during the Asian financial crisis, it might have proposed that APEC should lead the response to the crisis, consistent with its preference for multilateralism. However, the material scale of the financial crisis – Japan offered to contribute $100 billion to the proposed Asian Monetary Fund, dwarfing Australia’s contribution of $1 billion each to the IMF packages for Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand – was such that only either Japan or the US, or bilateral cooperation between them, could determine the nature of the response to the Asian financial crisis. On this count, the US preference for IMF-led neoliberal restructuring dominated the regional response, which marginalised APEC as a result.

The second reason why the Asian financial crisis eroded APEC’s purpose was because the North American states attempted to graft a human rights agenda onto its explicitly economic rationale (Ravenhill 2001: 211). The norm of cooperative security in the regional solidarism of the Keating-Suharto years was at best ambivalent about the notion that human rights are indivisible and universal, preferring the formulation that states can withhold civil and political rights if they consider that economic growth is more pressing. Yet, Canada, as the host of the 1997 APEC meeting in Vancouver, proposed that APEC should expand its ambit to the protection of human rights. The following year, US Vice-President Al Gore (1998) commended opposition protestors in the host country of Malaysia, as ‘democracy confers a stamp of legitimacy [which economic] reforms must have in order to be effective’. Gore’s comments did not go down well with Malaysia, which by then had already enacted capital and currency controls in defiance of the US and IMF’s prescriptions. The post-financial crisis fillip to East Asian regionalism may not be more efficacious than that centred on the Asia-Pacific – as a grouping to foster regional economic integration, the ASEAN Plus Three is bedevilled by frosty relations between China and Japan. Nevertheless, East Asian regionalism maintains the regional solidarism of the early 1990s, sharing a presumption that human security has little autonomy outside the state. Australia may have identified with the interests of state security when it advocated the New Order’s cause against the IMF, but Australia’s efforts were insufficient to prevent its exclusion, together with Canada and the US, from East Asian regionalism. Since the Asian financial crisis, APEC has variously embraced crisis diplomacy, counterterrorism and climate change agendas. Constructivists might take APEC’s evolving agenda as evidence that an institution is capable of adaptation, but APEC’s revolving door of agendas also demonstrates that it is uncertain of its purpose.
Thus, Australia and Indonesia had diverging views on how to respond to the Asian financial crisis, as well as on the respective roles of regional and international institutions. These ideational differences eroded the institutions of regional solidarism which Keating and Suharto constructed. More importantly, the Asian financial crisis undermined the human security of many in especially Indonesia, which greatly limited the prospects for widespread identification (Burke 2001). In the next section, I analyse East Timor’s independence, focusing on two aspects. First, and very vividly, East Timor’s independence cast a shadow of distrust over subsequent attempts by Australia and Indonesia to promote mutual identification. Second, and often less remarked upon, East Timor’s independence occurred in a context of democratisation in Indonesia, confounding democratic peace theory’s expectation that the democracies of Australia and Indonesia can only grow in trust. This anomaly suggests that scholars of security communities must be attuned to changes in the contexts in which identification and trust are situated, be they nation-states, international society, or capitalism.

**East Timor after the Asian financial crisis**

To recall Chapter Two, the bilateral relationship during the Keating-Suharto period was not a security community, because widespread opposition towards Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor highlighted the elite tenor of Australia-Indonesia relations. Solidarism describes the purposive cooperation between Canberra and Jakarta on regional institutions such as APEC and post-conflict reconstruction in Cambodia, in contrast to the coexistence and toleration of differing national interests which English School theorists call pluralism. Yet, the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia was at odds with pluralist international society in an important sense. International society differs from an international system or *realpolitik* in that the former has benchmarks on who qualifies as a member and therefore can claim not unsubstantial rights such as representation in international organisations and the domestic monopoly of violence. East Timorese independence was a matter of self-determination for former European colonies, a benchmark discernible from the independence of former colonies as diverse as Ghana and India. I have demonstrated in this chapter that the Asian financial crisis undermined solidarism between Canberra and Jakarta, but the crisis also created a context in which East Timor’s self-determination, a tenet of pluralism, could be restored. In the process, mutual identification between Canberra and Jakarta evaporated, extending to their societies in the form of mass protests (Goldsworthy 2003: 246).
In an immediate sense, Canberra’s facilitation of East Timor’s independence through its leadership of INTERFET eroded mutual trust between Canberra and Jakarta because, outside of ASEAN, Canberra was Jakarta’s staunchest diplomatic supporter, claiming that the latter’s sovereignty over East Timor was all but irreversible. Therefore, the dominant trope in Jakarta’s interpretation of Canberra’s leadership of INTERFET and acquiescence in being depicted as the US’ deputy sheriff was one of betrayal (Soesastro 2000: 133). From the analytical perspective of this thesis, aside from the disciplinary gatekeeping of IR, there is no inherent reason why mutual identification must occur only between states. Shorn of the assumption of methodological nationalism, it becomes possible to appreciate that a precipitous dissipation of trust can accompany democratisation, as occurred between Canberra and Jakarta when Habibie initiated East Timorese self-determination against the backdrop of democratisation. This pairing of alienation and democratisation is at odds with democratic peace theory’s expectation that, given two dyads of democratic states, trust between them will only flourish. History matters in explaining why patterns in IR go awry, although Lawson (2012: 222) argues that ‘neither [social science nor history] serves as the under-labourer – or coloniser – of the other’. Rather than marshal history in a post-hoc fashion to explain anomalies in IR, I argue that relations between Australia, East Timor, and Indonesia are located in the gradations of international society. To the extent that Australia-Indonesia relations fractured over East Timor’s independence, their distrust can be explained by the belated accounting of pluralist international society that East Timor should be a candidate for self-determination.

The interactions between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor from 1997 to 1999 are the subject of extensive analysis by scholars from different analytical traditions. As a snapshot, Cotton (2004) analyses Australia’s about-turn on East Timor’s independence from the English School concept of regional order, Maley (2000) focuses on the role of United Nations agencies and the volatility of decision-making processes in Indonesia under Habibie, while Pietsch (2010) situates his doctoral study of Australia’s leadership of INTERFET within a Marxist framework of imperialism. These analyses complement the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) account of East Timor’s challenge to Australian foreign policy from 1998 to 2000 and the earlier publication of primary documents relating to Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor in November 1975 (DFAT 2001; Way 2000). I do not intend to replicate these accounts and analyses. Instead, I sketch two aspects of Australia’s role in the final years of East Timor’s route to independence which explain
the erosion of identification between Australia and Indonesia, both between their states and societies. First, Howard was quite content for Australia’s leadership of INTERFET to be depicted by journalists as an instance of being the US’ deputy sheriff (Brenchley 1999), as opposed to alternative formulations such as being a good international citizen. The predominant framing of Australia’s role in INTERFET in terms of the US alliance and military triumphalism eroded trust between Canberra and Jakarta, because the solidarist relationship which they forged in the early 1990s rested on a mutual silence over Jakarta’s trampling of human rights in East Timor. Second, and contrary to the first narrative that Australia liberated East Timor, Canberra went to great lengths to shield Jakarta from international pressure even during the lead-up to East Timor’s independence referendum, especially in Canberra’s reluctance to press Jakarta for an international security force to maintain the security of the referendum. These two narratives may be diverging, but I argue that each was corrosive of a different constituency in Australia-Indonesia relations. Canberra’s acquiescence in being portrayed as the US’ deputy sheriff eroded identification between the state elites of Australia and Indonesia, whereas Canberra’s defence of Jakarta’s insistence that it retain responsibility for the security of the referendum was deleterious to the human security of the East Timorese.

Canberra interpreted its leadership of INTERFET as evidence of the durability of its alliance with the US, and that Australian values were finally if belatedly reflected in foreign policy. In so doing, Howard rejected key tenets of the regional solidarism which Keating and Suharto forged, namely Keating’s preference for embedding the Australia-US alliance within multilateral institutions and the idea that it was incumbent on Australia to undertake ideational adjustments, be they to suit ASEAN’s legitimisation of authoritarian regimes or to promote domestic knowledge of Asia, respectively (Dobell 2000: 66). As INTERFET arrived in East Timor, Howard’s (1999: 10029) statement to Parliament that ‘a good relationship with Indonesia [cannot be] maintained at all costs or at the expense of doing the right thing according to our own values’ illustrated Canberra’s alienation from Jakarta. Yet, it is important not to overstate this ideational gulf. As Howard, like all post-World War Two Australian Prime Ministers, recognised in the same speech, ‘Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia. How it develops and behaves will influence the strategic balance in our region’ (Howard 1999: 10029). What Howard’s conceptions of Australian values and the US alliance had in common were their ‘top-down, statist, power-centric, masculinised, ethnocentric, and militarised worldview of security’ (Booth 2005a: 9; see also Burke and McDonald 2007). In this respect, Canberra’s framing of
INTERFET as fidelity to Australian values was not dissimilar to Keating’s defence of the New Order’s human rights record. In sum, in the post-INTERFET period, Canberra’s object of identification shifted from Jakarta to Washington, but not its state-centric emphasis on military security.

In contrast to Canberra’s interpretation of its role in INTERFET as the enactment of Australian values, many scholars argue that Canberra was always sensitive to Indonesia’s state security (Cotton 2004: 92), even as Indonesian militias attempted to annul the results of East Timor’s independence referendum through violence. Several aspects of Australian foreign policy towards East Timor in 1998 and 1999 are instructive in this regard. By prefacing his much-analysed letter to Habibie in December 1998 with the statement that ‘it has been a longstanding Australian position that the interests of Australia, Indonesia and East Timor are best served by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia’ (reproduced in DFAT 2001: 181), Howard’s preference for a long period of autonomy preceding an independence referendum for East Timor should be interpreted as Canberra’s attempt to forestall East Timorese independence. The competing interpretation of Howard’s letter, that Canberra was wavering in its opposition to East Timorese independence, is unpersuasive because Howard argued that ‘the successful implementation of an autonomy package with a built-in review mechanism would allow time to convince the East Timorese of the benefits of autonomy within the Indonesian Republic’ (DFAT 2001: 181). Next, even though Australian intelligence agencies were aware that the Indonesian military was arming pro-integration militias in East Timor (Ball 2001: 43), Canberra cautioned against pressuring Jakarta to accept an international security force to maintain the security of East Timor’s independence referendum. Canberra may have considered that Jakarta would scuttle the referendum if it did not have sole responsibility for security, but it remains the case that, until the post-referendum crisis, Canberra’s calculus was weighted towards Indonesia’s territorial security rather than the human security of the East Timorese. Finally, as Indonesian militias embarked on a scorched earth policy after the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence, Howard argued that Jakarta’s consent, even if given under diplomatic and financial duress by the US at the APEC Summit in Auckland, was an unconditional requirement for INTERFET’s deployment to East Timor. I am not arguing that Canberra should have unilaterally deployed a peacekeeping force to East Timor, but it is clear that the considerations of pluralist international society, such as non-interference and state consent, still weighed heavily on Canberra, even in the face of worsening human suffering.
Thus, there are two diverging narratives of Australia’s leadership of INTERFET. The first focuses on Australia’s leadership of INTERFET as an enactment of a militaristic reading of Australian values, while the second is more equivocal towards the first narrative of Australia’s liberation of East Timor, pointing to the dictates of pluralist international society. The first narrative eroded trust between Canberra and Jakarta, whereas the second narrative was damaging to human security and emancipation, not least of the East Timorese. Nevertheless, there is a common leitmotif of the disintegration of trust, be it Habibie’s abrogation of the Agreement on Maintaining Security as a rebuff to the regional solidarity of the Keating-Suharto years, the frostiness of the bilateral relationship until the Bali Bombings in October 2002 rekindled police cooperation, or the mass protests at Indonesian embassies and consulates in Australia. The theme of distrust between Australia and Indonesia was evident in Howard’s (1999: 10028) statement that ‘relations between countries do [not] turn on the personal rapport of leaders, the sentiments of governments or so-called special relationships’, as well as in Cotton’s (2004: 141) conclusion that ‘the Keating and Evans’ legacy [of multilateral institutions] was … largely discarded’.

The loss of trust between Australia and Indonesia after INTERFET is an apposite example of Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 58) argument that ‘many of the same social processes [which] encourage and serve to reproduce the security community are also associated with its decline. Most important, of course, is the loss of mutual trust’. However, as I argued in Chapter One, it is important for the scholarship of security communities to distinguish itself from that of the democratic peace theory, because the latter also marshals converging identities and values as an explanation for peaceful conflict resolution. One way in which scholars of security communities might attempt this differentiation is to appreciate that communities do not interact with each other in isolation, but are located in broader and contingent arrangements of international society and capitalism among others. Notwithstanding Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995 and 2002) distinction between democratisation and democracy, the democratic peace theory is unable to account for why Habibie’s democratic initiatives, such as his lifting of media restrictions and release of political prisoners, led to the disintegration of trust between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor’s independence. My intention here is less to question the democratic peace theory,

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16 Their distinction can be read in a problem-solving vein, namely the preservation of US hegemony or what Katzenstein (2005) calls the American imperium which binds the liberal-democracies of Australia, Japan, North America and Western Europe.
than to demonstrate that Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities, despite claiming to ‘[think] the unthinkable … that community exists at the international level’ (1998b: 3), also pays insufficient attention to social forces beyond the nation-state. While it is observable that East Timor’s independence led to the erosion of identification between Canberra and Jakarta, the explanation for their alienation lies in the gradations of international society which connect Australia, East Timor, and Indonesia. In this respect, there is a parallel literature which debates whether INTERFET was evidence of a solidarist international society, or a confluence of geopolitical factors (Cotton 2001; Pureza 2004; Wheeler and Dunne 2001). If East Timor’s independence is a belated accounting of the standards of self-determination in a pluralist international society, then this was only brought about by a confluence of geopolitical factors. Nevertheless, what both accounts of INTERFET as evidence of a solidarist international society and a confluence of geopolitical factors have in common is their grounding in the gradations of international society. Therefore, studies of security communities cannot analyse bilateral relationships in isolation from the broader relations of rule in which states and societies interact, as this replicates the dyadic blinkers of the democratic peace theory.

East Timor’s independence can be explained as the belated accounting of the standards of self-determination in a pluralist international society. This is a more compelling explanation than the erosion of trust between Australia and Indonesia, which was more an effect of East Timor’s independence than its cause, and as an exception to the positive correlation between democracy and trust in the democratic peace theory, which assumes that states are unchanging units interacting with each other. In the interests of order, international society has benchmarks to determine which societies can successfully claim statehood. These benchmarks can be the European standard of civilisation which Japan was simultaneously excluded from and attempted to emulate by being a colonial power (Suzuki 2005), or arguments of disproportionate contributions to World War Two, which France marshalled to secure its position as one of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (Heimann 2015). Therefore, not every group which considers itself to have a common identity or to be persecuted by another group in an existing nation-state can successfully claim statehood, according to the perspective of international society.

From the post-World War Two period until the present, there were two main spurts of self-determination, namely the independence of former European colonies between the 1950s and 1970s, and that occasioned by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
late 1991. East Timor, being a former Portuguese colony, falls within the former category in a way that West Papua, despite analogous arguments that it is ethnically different and persecuted by Indonesia’s Javanese majority, does not. Being a former European colony which had its self-determination disrupted by Indonesia’s invasion meant that East Timor’s case for independence resonated with the language of international institutions, if not always their realpolitik. For example, the UN constantly referred to Portugal as the administering power for East Timor, the implication being that East Timorese self-determination was a question of when and not if. In addition, successive UN General Assembly resolutions on East Timor were prefaced with ‘the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (United Nations 1982; see also Dunne and Wheeler 2004). Although the number of states which supported these resolutions declined over the years in tandem with Indonesia’s increasing geopolitical clout, East Timor became a beneficiary of the restrictive criteria on which group can successfully claim self-determination.

Suharto’s resignation triggered centre-periphery tensions in provinces as diverse as Aceh and South Sulawesi (Aspinall and Berger 2001; Bertrand 2004). However, only East Timor was able to mount an argument of historical grievances and self-determination in relation to pluralist international society. To be sure, without a confluence of geopolitical factors, such as the Asian financial crisis and Suharto’s departure, no amount of references to the standards of self-determination in a pluralist international society would have sufficed for Indonesia to reverse its occupation of East Timor. However, once the geopolitical circumstances were present, the prospects of self-determination were stronger for East Timor than for West Papua. This was because pluralist international society does not consider egregious human rights abuses and a common group identity as sufficient conditions for self-determination. 17 It was the belated rectification of self-determination for East Timor which eroded trust between Australia and Indonesia, not the type of political system which Indonesia had when it transferred sovereignty to East Timor. This is an argument which can be made only from the perspective of international society, and not from the premise of Australia and a now-democratising Indonesia interacting with each other in isolation. In the next section, as a prelude to the case studies of Chapters Four to Six, I sketch the tenor of democratisation and decentralisation in

17 Therefore, West Papuan independence activists emphasise the mishandling and unrepresentativeness of the 1969 Act of Free Choice as much as, if not more than, the human rights abuses committed by Jakarta.
post-Suharto Indonesia. Far from being a propeller of widespread mutual identification, democratic institutions in Indonesia often confront asymmetrical politico-economic power, whether wielded by oligarchs, militaries or the international financial and development institutions promoting neoliberalism. More generally, democracy is confined within repositories which do not always promote widespread identification, such as the nation-state and US unilateralism. To the extent that Indonesia’s – and Australia’s – democracy is constrained by asymmetrical power and alienating repositories, mutual identification and trust between Australia and Indonesia, even in the post-Suharto period, remain illusory.

Democratisation and decentralisation in post-Suharto Indonesia

Indonesia is often lauded by governments and surveys of democratic progress as a thriving democracy. Indonesia’s status as democratic exemplar is given an additional fillip by its merging of Islam and democracy (MacIntyre and Ramage 2008: 32), amidst a post-September 2001 decade where detractors argue that the two are incompatible. Julia Gillard (2012) remarked at the Bali Democracy Forum that ‘[Indonesia has] a thoroughly democratic system, thoroughly home grown and rooted in the people’s own culture and values’. Barack Obama (2010), in a speech at the University of Indonesia in November 2010, commended Indonesia for ‘[charting] its own course through an extraordinary democratic transformation – from the rule of an iron fist to the rule of the people’. From 2006 to 2013, Freedom House (2015) listed Indonesia as free in its Freedom in the World survey, as compared to verdicts of partly free and not free for the rest of Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbours. My argument is not that these assessments are incorrect. Rather, by excluding and not measuring what areas of life state and business elites do not want to democratise, these assessments legitimise an elite-centred conception of democracy. The critique which Robinson (1996: 100) makes of the Journal of Democracy and US electoral assistance can be equally applied to Freedom House, in that it ‘plays an important integrative function in transnational class formation, and especially in South-North elite linkage’. The inadequate attention to unequal power relations means that the prospects of a security community between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period continue to be bleak, with government notions of community privileging state and business elites.

The rationale and legal basis for post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation are straightforward and laudable from the perspective of the widespread mutual identification of security communities. For more than three decades, the New Order
centralised power in Jakarta, stifling autonomy and fomenting dissent in the regions. Therefore, decentralisation served to correct the New Order’s overweening centralisation of power, lest the nation-state of Indonesia disintegrate from the numerous and vociferous regional calls for secession after Suharto departed. Democratisation was intended to rectify Suharto’s privileging of particularistic interests in the early 1990s, especially those of his family and associates, as compared to the functional groups embodied in Golkar, the political party sanctioned by the New Order. The legal basis for post-Suharto decentralisation was also succinct, set out in Laws 22 and 25 of 1999. They respectively dealt with the devolution of political authority and the revision of fiscal arrangements between Jakarta and the regions (Aspinall and Fealy 2003: 3). Successive post-Suharto presidents, with the exception of Megawati Sukarnoputri, have implemented initiatives which attenuate the authoritarianism of the New Order, such as a less doctrinaire approach to the state ideology of Pancasila and the loosening of restrictions on media coverage. These initiatives are extensively detailed by scholars of Indonesian domestic politics (Hadiwinata 2003; Ziegenhain 2008), so they do not need detain us here.

International financial and development institutions such as the World Bank promote the notion that democracy and decentralisation can be willed by politicians and especially technocrats (Hadiz 2004a: 698). If the predictions of these institutions go unfulfilled, they attribute this discrepancy to the incorrect application of sequencing prescriptions, but rarely do they consider that technocrats confront unfavourable arrangements of power and interest. For these international institutions, society is a blank canvas on which liberal-democratic institutions are drawn. To reiterate, my argument is not that Canberra and international development actors are mistaken in contending that Indonesia is now a democracy. Rather, they are capturing a truncated vision of democracy which Falk (2004: 87) calls globalisation-from-above and Robinson (1996: 49), following Robert Dahl, calls polyarchy. It is important for scholars of security communities to specify what is being democratised. A limited scope of democracy, for example, the restriction of democracy to an electoral choice between two similarly-constituted groups of elites, frustrates the widespread mutual

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18 Overlapping with the terrorist attacks in the US and Bali, Megawati Sukarnoputri’s term as President was associated with a militaristic approach to secessionist movements, especially the imposition of martial law in Aceh (Mietzner 2009: 229).
19 For example, this may mean that the constitutional redrafting of civil-military relations cannot precede the withdrawal of military representation in the parliament.
20 Compare this asocial conception of society to Jessop’s (2001) overview on the relational nature of the state.
identification which I am claiming for security communities. In addition, scholars of security communities have to be sensitive to the contexts in which democracy, or any other type of political system, exists. The cause of widespread mutual trust is hardly served if democracy is confined to the nation-state in a pluralist international society, which is a more significant impediment to identification between Australia and Indonesia now that they have converging political systems. Hence, I argued in the previous section on East Timor’s independence that it is important to identify the potential for identification between Australia and Indonesia in the gradations of international society. In the subsequent paragraphs, I discuss four examples of unequal power relations and unfavourable repositories of democracies which hamper widespread mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. They are the predatory power of oligarchs in Indonesia, the considerable influence which the Indonesian military wields by raising the spectre of Indonesia’s territorial disintegration, \(^{21}\) US unilateralism in the post-September 11 decade, and the nation-state as a dominant locus of political belonging. These examples contextualise why, despite having converging political systems, Australia-Indonesia cooperation on counterterrorism and state fragility, regional institutions, and asylum-seekers – the subjects of Chapters Four to Six respectively – has not translated to widespread mutual identification in the post-Suharto period.

The first reason why similar political systems of democracy in Australia and Indonesia may not portend widespread mutual identification is because the institutional trappings of democracy are often fronts for profoundly undemocratic actors. Political economists on Indonesia, Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, are the chief proponents of this assessment of post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation. For example, they (2004: 228) observe that many post-Suharto cabinets are multi-party ‘rainbow coalitions’, the main ingredient holding them together being access to state resources, rather than a common ideology and programme. More recently, in October 2014, Joko Widodo, against expectations that his prior distance from state and business elites would predispose him towards human security and emancipation, appointed Ryamizard Ryacudu as Indonesia’s Defence Minister. As Army Chief of Staff in the mid-2000s, Ryacudu proposed the intensification of military operations in

\(^{21}\) It should be emphasised that oligarchic behaviour and the salience of the military in disseminating a realist and state-centric conception of security are not confined to Indonesia. Writing about the militaristic tenor of ANZAC commemorations, McDonald’s (2010: 288) argument that ‘approaches to the study of international relations need to take seriously the role of memory politics in coming to terms with conditions of possibility for particular security policies and practices’ is instructive.
Aceh after the tsunami of December 2004 to quash the Free Aceh Movement. Aspinall (2014) concludes that ‘it is surprising just how far [Widodo] has gone in making these compromises’ to accommodate the forces of patronage.

If the institutions of democracy can be appropriated by undemocratic actors, then decentralisation can also be marshalled for exclusivist purposes. Post-Suharto decentralisation has often been accompanied by the proliferation of taxes at the local level and calls for local people or putra daerah to be given preference in the control of local government and resources (Aspinall and Fealy 2003: 6; Malley 2003). In the neo-institutionalist development literature, such as that promoted by the World Bank, decentralisation is about narrowing the institutional distance between decision-makers and society as a stakeholder, hence fostering accountability. However, without a narrative and counteraction of unequal power relations, decentralisation can often result in a proliferation of ‘little Suhartos’ (Aspinall and Fealy 2003: 5; Hadiz 2010: 53), whose agendas are more exclusivist than national leaders. In Chapter Six, we will see that provincial governments, pleading economic and social burdens, have often successfully resisted Jakarta’s plans to detain or temporarily settle asylum-seekers in their territories. In contrast, Gyngell (2007: 103), writing about the Agreement on Maintaining Security, observes that Suharto had ‘a broader view of the relationship with Australia than many of his senior officials, having personally overcome opposition within the Indonesian military and government to secure agreement’. If authoritarian governments and the widespread mutual identification of security communities are at cross-purposes, the former is nevertheless able to promote solidarism in ways which the decentralisation of exclusionary and predatory behaviour cannot.

At best, the Indonesian military has an ambivalent relationship with post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation, and the objective of widespread mutual identification. An important shortcoming of the notion and scholarship of civil-military relations is the assumption that civilian leaders and militaries are diametrically opposed to each other. An analogous critique can be made of Samuel Huntington’s argument that a professional military has a corporate identity. By contending that ‘the members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from [civilians]’ (1957: 10), he assumes that militaries are devoid of societal moorings. But considering that Indonesia’s military emerged out of guerrilla movements which were resisting the reimposition of Dutch colonialism after World War Two, it is explicable why the Indonesian military might be opposed to
the idea that it should be subservient to civilian leaders. Therefore, during the New Order, the Indonesian military conceived of itself as a people’s army, as compared to the assumption of societal chasm in Huntington’s understanding of military professionalism. The Indonesian military’s self-conception was reflected in the doctrine of *dwifungsi*, namely that the military has dual functions in military and political affairs (Honna 2003: 3). Organisationally, conceptions of Indonesia’s military as a people’s army translated to the territorial command structure, whereby a military command would exist even in the smallest of towns and villages. In the post-Suharto period, *dwifungsi* and the territorial command structure came in for sustained criticism, because the New Order used them as instruments of mass surveillance and repression. Nevertheless, considering that there are fundamental questions being asked of the role of militaries amidst changing forms of warfare (Kaldor 1999), militaries can evolve in ways which reclaim the mantle of societal identification and trust, such as through their involvement in disaster relief operations (Guilloux 2009).

However, this sanguine recommendation on how the Indonesian military can promote widespread mutual identification in the post-Suharto period, which is obsequious to its founding ethos as a people’s army, is tempered by its continuing authoritarian dispositions and doubts on its commitment to human rights. In particular, the Indonesian military has capitalised on intra-civilian conflicts to promote militaristic and state-centric approaches to conflict, as well as shielding officers suspected of human rights abuses in East Timor from judicial investigation (Kingston 2006: 273). When the Indonesian military defied Abdurrahman Wahid’s order for a state of emergency in February 2001, its justification of ‘neutrality and non-involvement in practical and partisan politics’ can be interpreted as military intransigence as much as, if not more than, the protection of democratic institutions (*Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, quoted in Mietzner 2009: 221). The former interpretation is more compelling because of the military’s avid promotion of the doctrine of *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI)* in the post-Suharto period. Translated to the ‘Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’, the Indonesian military uses *NKRI* to justify militaristic responses to ethno-religious and separatist conflicts (Mietzner 2009: 228). The Indonesian military’s evasion of accountability for human rights abuses in East Timor is manifested not only in its refusal to extradite suspected officers, but it is also the prime beneficiary of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor’s temporal limitation of a proposed international tribunal for East Timor to crimes committed between January and October 1999 (Nevins 2002: 530). These actions of the Indonesian military can simply be explained on the grounds of interest – the
military can be expected to consolidate its institutional interest if the cohesion of civilian leaders, who have hitherto been curbing the military’s privileges and unaccountability, is now fracturing. However, the Indonesian military’s opposition to human rights and security is emboldened by US unilateralism in the post-September 2001 decade, to which I now turn.

No account of Australia-Indonesia relations in the post-Suharto period, including the prospect of a security community, is complete without discussing the role of US unilateralism. Political actors do not interact with each other in isolation, but are embedded within a web of meanings and structures which condition the scope of mutual identification. US power is multifaceted, encompassing ideational, institutional and military dimensions (Beeson 2006; Ikenberry 2004). The notion of hegemony illustrates that some actors consent to US leadership, in exchange for the US’ provision of international public goods, such as its underwriting of the various security dilemmas which impede multilateral cooperation (Cox 1983: 172). In other words, there is a measure of legitimacy in US hegemony, which is not easily obtained if the US relies predominantly on material force. Yet, US foreign policy in the immediate years after the September 2001 terrorist attacks had a decidedly instrumental flavour, reflected in George W. Bush’s policies of pre-emptive military attacks and so-called democracy promotion through the use of force. His policies, known as the Bush Doctrine, were supported by Canberra under Howard, who argued that ‘it stands to reason that if you believed that somebody was going to launch an attack against your country, … and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternative other than to use that capacity, then of course you would have to use it’ (quoted in McGrath 2002). Indonesia, along with many states and societal actors in Southeast Asia, rejected Howard’s arguments, even though he was rehashing the conception that all states have a right to self-defence, a longstanding tenet of the international system and pluralist international society. Nevertheless, Canberra’s image of itself as Washington’s ‘deputy sheriff’, informed by its approval of US unilateralism, impeded widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia.

All accounts of security community require a conception of change, if they are to explain how the constituency of mutual identification can be expanded. Although scholars of security communities admit a role for power, especially the power to shape discourses and meanings, Bush and Howard’s argument that force may be necessary to foster liberal-democracy undermines widespread identification. Liberalism contains a tension between the universality that people are capable of
cooperation and governing themselves, and a hierarchical conception of the
relationship between liberals and non-liberals (Jahn 2007b: 224). Put alternatively,
liberalism is unable to reconcile its optimism on the prospects of cooperation, and the
stronger record of dyadic, as compared to monadic, versions of the democratic peace
theory. For Canberra, this tension in liberalism has been resolved by what Blaney
(2001: 38) calls liberal bellicosities, which includes, among other exclusions, the
expelling of human identification and solidarity to the private realm. This exclusion of
human solidarity, manifest in Canberra’s projects of state-building and democracy
promotion in Indonesia, echoes the pervasiveness of modernisation theories in the
1960s, during which the forms of interaction of the intervened were deemed to be
antiquated for the purposes of bureaucratic and market interactions. Put alternatively,
when Washington and Canberra promote democratic identification, it is not only
brought about by force, but also reduced to electoral democracy and market
citizenship (Gill 1998), which hardly improves the human security of many in Australia
and Indonesia.

Finally, as it was during the late Suharto years, and arguably ever since Indonesia’s
independence in August 1945, the prospect of widespread identification between
Australia and Indonesia is constrained by the relations of rule in nation-states. By the
latter, I am referring to the body of thought which maintains that the nation-state is
self-sufficient, discrete and homogeneous, sanctioning the often violent elimination of
difference (Burke 2013: 65; Linklater 2007: 67). When Suharto was in power, the
prospect of widespread identification was hampered by assessments that Australia
and Indonesia had incongruous political systems, obscuring analyses of how the
relations of rule in nation-states impose limits on the extent of mutual identification.
Now that Australia and Indonesia have converging political systems, scholars are in a
better position to consider how the relations of rule in nation-states constrain the
quality of mutual identification. For example, in Chapter Six, I argue that refugees are
the outcome of a significant and irreconcilable tension in pluralist international society.
This society considers that the prospects for order are the brightest if everyone
belongs to a nation-state, yet this society affords much latitude to nation-states to
define their national interest, causing much displacement of especially minorities
whom other states similarly reject (Haddad 2008). Therefore, the tension between
Australia and Indonesia over the responsibility for the increased number of asylum-
seekers traversing their territories since the late 1990s has little to do with whether

See also Williams’ (2001: 533 – 535) discussion of Bonnie Honig’s distinctions between
reverence-respect, teleological respect, and liberal respect.
both states have analogous political systems, and much more to do with representations of asylum-seekers as neither Australian nor Indonesian (Malkki 1995).

The discussion of competing relations of rule in nation-states broadens to how writing and representations perpetuate the construct of the self-regarding nation-state, which impedes widespread mutual identification. For example, when Tony Abbott, commenting on Jakarta’s opposition to Canberra’s forcible return of asylum-seeker vessels to Indonesia, said that ‘what happens outside of Indonesia’s waters is really, in a sense, something that the Indonesians are not directly involved in’ (quoted in Nicholson 2013), he was invoking the language of sovereignty and non-interference. There are different ways by which we can disprove Abbott’s statement, for example, through the perspective of international law and regimes. However, my argument is not that Abbott is incorrect, which replicates unhelpful distinctions between fact and fiction, intention and reality, and theory and practice in IR. 23 Rather, my argument is that scholars of security communities, extending to cosmopolitan citizens (Stokes, Pitty and Smith 2008), have responsibilities for what Rajaram (2004: 202) calls disruptive writing, the literary resistance to ‘perspectives on space and identity [which are] premised on boundary-making’. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 4, 7) are not exemplars of disruptive writing, given their elite-centred and enclosed focus on a ‘transnational community of Deutschian policymakers’ and pluralistic security communities for their legal independence. Therefore, Ditrych (2014: 356) argues that, for the contributors to Adler and Barnett’s (1998) edited volume, ‘security communities are often conceived instrumentally as serving states’ interests (including through coordination of common defence against external threats), rather than as results of existing dependable expectations of peaceful change among the concerned societies’. Compared to interstate relationships, a security community which is premised on the interdependence of humanity is not only more democratic, but also more enduring, as it is not governed by coercive forms of rule.

**Conclusion**

This chapter is a bridge between my earlier analysis of the Australia-Indonesia solidarist relationship during the late Suharto years, the focus of Chapter Two, and

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23 These distinctions reinforce the perception that scholarship has no bearing on events or the ‘real world’, just as policymakers contend that they are pragmatic and do not take their cues from scholars, which often legitimise realist and unjust approaches to conflict (O’Tuathail 1996: 52).
the assessment of the prospects of a security community amidst post-Suharto
democratisation and decentralisation, the subject of the next three chapters. Prior to
the Asian financial crisis, Canberra’s image of Asia was one of an economically and
geopolitically rising region, which not only required cooperation to manage problems
of interdependence, but also adjustments by an economically-struggling Australia to
accommodate Jakarta’s vision of regional order. Key elements of Jakarta’s vision
included the norms of cooperative security, state sovereignty and multilateralism,
organisationally reflected in the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. The Asian
financial crisis was a crisis of human security, but it was also a challenge to the
epistememes which underpinned the regional solidarism of the late Suharto years. In the
rush to capitalise on economic opportunities in Indonesia and the region, Canberra
downplayed the diverging epistememes it had with Jakarta on explanations of economic
growth and crisis, namely the divide between neoliberal and developmental state
models. Yet, amidst recriminations of blame and responsibility for resolving the Asian
financial crisis, epistememes of political economy could not be ignored. More generally,
Howard questioned the utility of regional institutions in addressing the financial crisis,
citing inefficient lowest-denominator-outcomes. In combination with Australia’s
comparatively sound economic record during the Asian financial crisis, Howard’s
scepticism towards regional institutions spelt the eclipse of the Australia-Indonesia
relationship as the fulcrum of regional solidarism.

The Asian financial crisis, which led to Suharto’s resignation, reopened what state
elites considered to be settled in the solidarist relationship between Australia and
Indonesia, namely the question of East Timor’s self-determination. Recall that the
bilateral relationship during the early 1990s was not a security community because of
widespread opposition towards Jakarta’s human rights abuses in East Timor, which
Canberra was complicit in. Australia’s leadership and representation of INTERFET as
deputising for the US fractured solidarism with Indonesia, because Australia-
Indonesia solidarism during the late Suharto years was predicated on the
understanding that Australia would defend Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor,
especially in diplomatic forums. Australia’s facilitation of East Timor’s independence
in September 1999 was therefore a reversal of Canberra’s commitment to Jakarta’s
sovereignty over East Timor, which eroded trust and cast a pall on subsequent
attempts to promote ideational convergence.

After almost 25 years of Australia supporting Indonesia’s sovereignty over East
Timor, it is unsurprising that themes of betrayal and distrust dominated the post-
INTERFET relationship between Australia and Indonesia. As Marty Natalegawa, then a spokesperson for the Indonesian foreign ministry, commented in March 2003, ‘we know the Australian government’s view in support of our territorial integrity … At the same time, we will make known our concern not to allow certain groups under the guise of democracy, free speech and the like basically to try to disrupt and disturb our national unity which we will defend, as would any other sovereign country’ (quoted in Skehan 2003). In other words, as Chauvel (2004: 49) puts it, Canberra’s support for Jakarta’s sovereignty over East Timor ‘evaporated when it mattered most to Jakarta’. Once Canberra decided to throw its lot with realpolitik when the question of East Timorese self-determination arose in the mid-1970s, any subsequent breach was bound to undermine bilateral cooperation and trust, be they of the pluralist or solidarist variety. At an immediate level, therefore, the prospect of a security community between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period has been hampered by the disintegration of trust, occasioned by Australia’s leadership of INTERFET. Constructivists and analyses of Australia’s middle power diplomacy put much store on credibility as a currency of power, regardless of whether it is applied to instrumental or ideational purposes. This credibility with Jakarta was eroded when Canberra led INTERFET.

I have argued that the primary explanation for the disintegration of trust between Australia and Indonesia lies in the gradations of international society. Specifically, as a former European colony, East Timor’s case for self-determination had many precedents in pluralist international society, even if its realisation was delayed by 25 years and then occurred only as a result of the confluence of geopolitical factors. As a contrast to the democratic peace theory’s isolated conception of state interactions, it is important for scholars of security communities to situate state and societal interactions within broader analytical categories which affect the scope and quality of mutual identification. Therefore, as a prelude to explaining why post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation have not improved the prospects of widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia, I nominated four developments and constraints which condition the interactions between these two democracies. They are the unequal power relations which adversely permeate the democratic institutions of these two countries, the impunity of Indonesia’s military in abusing human rights and perpetuating insecurity, the militaristic bent of US unilateralism in the post-

24 Or, in another formulation by Chauvel (2004: 49), from Jakarta’s perspective, ‘the credibility of these statements, [in which Canberra professes support for Jakarta’s sovereignty over West Papua], … is in inverse proportion to their frequency’. 
In the next chapter, I analyse how Canberra has responded to terrorism in post-Suharto Indonesia. Amidst concerns that, paralleling the South Pacific, Indonesia was becoming a failed or fragile state, Canberra’s aid programme emphasised the strengthening of Indonesia’s domestic institutions. However, Canberra’s aid programme was premised on limiting popular participation, in favour of the directives of technocrats. Canberra contended that its technocrats are apolitical, whose only interest is to promote good governance. However, Canberra’s argument reflects a truncated conception of what constitutes politics. Representations of being apolitical, most apparent in aid programmes and bureaucracies, are contestable precisely because they seek to define predominant modes of political belonging and downplay, or even outlaw, alternatives. For these technocrats, the model Indonesian citizen in the post-September 2001 decade of US unilateralism was one who accepts that democracy has only an electoral dimension, believes that economic inequality should not be contested, and excuses human rights abuses in the name of counterterrorism. Such a conception of political belonging diminishes the prospects of a security community, or, if mutual identification is realised, the dimensions of human security and widespread participation are absent.
Chapter Four
Counterterrorism and the promotion of interstate order amidst post-Suharto democratisation

This chapter considers how states maintain interstate order in a period where an increasing number of them are democratic. During the New Order, Jakarta, emboldened by a sympathetic Canberra, could violently repress domestic opposition and justify its actions with reference to interstate order and regime stability. US President Gerald Ford’s oft-quoted statement to Suharto on the eve of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, that ‘we will understand and will not press you on the issue’, is instructive (US Department of State 1975: Paragraph 42). In comparison, in a democratic Indonesia, it is normatively untenable for Jakarta to quell domestic opposition by referencing the geopolitical expectations of other states. For example, electoral and religious considerations among other beliefs prevented Megawati Sukarnoputri from committing to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The empirical focus of this chapter is on counterterrorism and foreign aid. However, the overarching theme is the tensions between what Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]: 8, 19) calls international order, ‘a pattern of activity [which] sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states’, and world order, the ‘patterns or dispositions of human activity [which] sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among [humanity] as a whole’. My understanding of security communities is similar to that of Bull’s world order in the sense that humanity is the referent of security, although, in deliberating on the potential for extensive identification and trust, my conception is more expansive than Bull’s delineation of the elementary social existence of humanity as constituting world order.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section marshals Bull’s seminal work, *The Anarchical Society*, to explain what is meant by order, and how the order which continues to exercise a stranglehold on the discipline of International Relations, international order, is at odds with world order and justice. My conception of security communities is motivated by the interconnectedness of humanity, which Bull thought was ideationally and organisationally implausible when he wrote *The Anarchical Society* in 1977. The second section, corresponding to the precipitating conditions in Adler and Barnett’s framework of security communities, argues that Canberra perceived the nascent years of post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation through the prism of the arc of instability. As ethnic conflicts and secessionist movements accompanied post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation in its
early years, Canberra was more wary of the disintegration of the Indonesian nation-state, than supportive of any expressions of indigenous identity which democratisation and decentralisation may bring. Yet, the precipitous deterioration of the bilateral relationship after East Timor’s independence prevented cooperation on bolstering domestic stability in Indonesia. The Bali bombings in October 2002, discussed in the third section of this chapter, rekindled security cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. Their respective police forces, the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), led the post-INTERFET improvement in security cooperation. Police cooperation reflected the anxieties Australia had over cooperation with the Indonesian military, which was still diplomatically isolated over the human rights abuses it committed while disrupting East Timor’s self-determination. Police cooperation was emblematic of an emerging tendency for governments to channel security cooperation through bureaucracies – what Slaughter (1997) calls transgovernmentalism – rather than prosecute the case through democratic institutions that the human security of Australia and Indonesia are inseparable.

The fourth and fifth sections illustrate this narrowing of widespread identification in the so-called war on terror, in favour of interstate order through bureaucracies and seemingly apolitical knowledge. The fourth section considers the increasing emphasis on the rule of law in Australia’s foreign aid to Indonesia, and the fifth section analyses the reinvigoration of bilateral military cooperation as an instance of governments narrowing the boundaries of human identification and solidarity. Finally, the sixth section sketches the tenor of mutual identification fostered by the post-September 2001 emphasis on bureaucratic cooperation and apolitical knowledge.

**Order and justice**

Order, in Bull’s (2002 [1977]: 3 – 4) definition, is ‘a pattern [which] leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values’. He considers that across time and cultures, societies have sought three elementary goals, namely security from violence, the honouring of promises and agreements, and the sanctity of property rights (Bull 2002 [1977]: 4). We can contest the inviolability of property rights from distributive and ethical standpoints. For example, the enrichment of Indonesian state officials owing to their organisational proximity to Jakarta’s deregulation programme in the mid-1980s generated gaping inequalities which undermined societal order, not to mention justice (Robison 1997: 36). Nevertheless, at present, the international society of states is the predominant, though not
unassailable, response to the quest for order. Students of the English School are familiar with the institutions which the society of states deploys to promote international order. These institutions are: war when territorial sovereignty or collective security is breached, the managerial role of great powers, the balance of power, diplomacy and international law. Later in the chapter, I argue that, amidst an increasing number of democratic states, the rule of law is displacing the geopolitical rationales which underpin some of Bull’s international society institutions, such as the balance of power. This displacement illustrates Makinda’s (2002) argument that international society is an evolving institution, although the prospects of a security community which embraces identification at the level of humanity are not improved.

The international society of states is a particular way to resolve the problem of maintaining order. However, its contemporary fixture in social organisation and mentalities does not mean that Bull’s criteria of order are adequately met. For one, proponents of human security note that, despite international society’s almost universal territorial coverage, many individuals and communities still live in fear of violence and dispossession, not least in Australia and Indonesia (Burke 2012: 94). Bull himself canvassed the prospects of world order, that is, the patterns of social life which sustain humanity as a whole (2002 [1977]: 19). A comprehensive vision of world order has to include, in light of global challenges such as global warming and gross economic inequalities, a commitment to human security and a widespread awareness among individuals and communities that they are interdependent and mutually vulnerable. In Part Three of The Anarchical Society, Bull explores some alternatives to international society which may or may not enhance world order. Here, I briefly discuss two of these alternatives which are relevant to my thesis. First, the solidarity of states can be marshalled to promote world order, or merely assemble a pattern of cooperation between states which is denser than international society (Bull 2002 [1977]: 230). The distinction between solidarism and pluralism in the English School highlights these gradations of cooperation in international society, and is germane to my argument in Chapter Two that bilateral cooperation under Keating and Suharto did not contribute to world order. Second, the ideological homogeneity of states can service world order, but it can also, as I argue in this chapter, reflect US hegemony and its dissemination of rule of law imperatives to justify various forms of intervention (Bull 2002 [1977]: 237; Reus-Smit 2013).

More fundamental than achieving world order, as Bull (2002 [1977]: 74) was also cautiously aware, we can ask if justice should have more priority than order. The
international society of states was a response to the problem of maintaining order, but as it developed its own attributes over time, international society often became antithetical to not only world order, but also justice. Bull’s (2002 [1977]: 80) oft-cited phrase, the ‘conspiracy of silence’, refers to an understanding between states that they are the only subjects of international law, and that the rights and duties of individuals and non-state communities are subordinate to those of the state.

The consequences of prioritising international order over justice are deleterious for widespread identification and trust between Australia and Indonesia. The Lowy Institute for International Policy publishes an annual poll on the extent to which its Australian respondents identify with various countries. We can debate what the Institute and respondents consider to be identification, but what is incontrovertible is the pattern of wariness towards Indonesia in the poll results. With a score of 100 denoting complete identification, Indonesia has consistently registered a score in the low 50s from 2006 to 2014 (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2015), a period well into post-Suharto democratisation. It may be objected that there are other explanations beside the injustices of international order for these dismal results, such as the spate of terrorist attacks in Indonesia from October 2002 onwards. However, as a frame to explain the bilateral relationship from Indonesia’s independence in 1945 to the present, the tension between international order and justice is more comprehensive than those of the democratic peace theory and an Australia divided between its geography and history.

My conception of security communities is more sympathetic to justice than international order, because widespread identification and trust are much harder to attain if justice is denied. I agree with Bull (2002 [1977]: 75) that ‘justice is a term which can ultimately be given only some kind of private or subjective definition’, although the same recognition of contingency should be extended to his conception of order. Notwithstanding the contested nature of justice, the effects of its denial or inequitable application on widespread identification can be seen in the societal alienation engendered by the relatively light sentences meted out to some perpetrators of the Bali bombings and the continuing impunity of the Indonesian

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25 Two of these attributes are the coercive expansion of international society from Europe to Africa and Asia (Keal 2000; Suzuki 2005), and the codification of states as the only actors in international treaties and statutes such as the UN Charter.

26 The theme of Australia having to choose between its geography and history is an influential one in scholarship and public discourse, even though it is a reductive interpretation of Australian foreign policy (Milner 2001; White 2010).
military for the journalists killed at Balibo in October 1975. In the next section, I discuss how the arc of instability became a shorthand for Australia’s concern that the Asian financial crisis and Suharto’s tumultuous departure were eroding Indonesia’s capacity to maintain order, both domestically and in its relations with other states.

**Australia’s arc of instability**

Between the Asian financial crisis and the Bali bombings, Canberra’s concern with interstate order in Southeast Asia was heightened. Recall that after the Vietnam War, Australia changed its defence policy of forward defence, in favour of a ‘concentric circles’ approach to defence policy. The former policy promoted supporting the US in geographically distant wars, whereas the latter policy informed the geopolitical and ideational accommodation with geographically proximate states such as Indonesia (Cheeseman 1991: 432). During the early 1990s, Australia and Southeast Asia may have cooperated on issues which reflected a broadening of security from a military dimension, but this did not extend to altering the state boundaries in Southeast Asia, regardless of how unjust they were to some groups within them. Therefore, purposive cooperation or solidarism between states is not inconsistent with a stable territorial map of Southeast Asia to simplify Australia’s defence planning. After all, ASEAN was as much the locus of security regionalism as it was a bulwark to secure and legitimise state regimes against separatist groups (Narine 2004).

The Asian financial crisis not only eroded solidarism between Canberra and Jakarta, but also loosened the grip of regional states on disaffected provinces, a control which Canberra depended on for its straightforward geopolitical map of the region. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia was the main contributor to this image of balkanisation, with Aceh, East Timor and West Papua the provinces most vigorously contesting their inclusion in the Indonesian nation-state (Aspinall and Berger 2001; Bertrand 2004; Chauvel 2006). Just as alarmingly for Canberra, centre-periphery conflicts in nearby Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands gave this image further currency (Firth 2013: 362 – 364). The spectre of Indonesia’s disintegration was canvassed by Australian government pronouncements and scholarship. The 2000 Defence White Paper, released just over a year after East Timor voted to be independent of Indonesia, considered ‘the resolution of religious, separatist and other challenges to the cohesion and stability of Indonesia’ to be an issue of concern for defence planners (Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 20). Paul Dibb (2001: 839) warned that ‘with so many factors pulling Indonesia apart, prudent policymakers cannot assume that effective rule from Jakarta will continue. The disintegration of Indonesia must now
be assessed as a significantly high risk’. In another article, Dibb, Hale and Prince (1999: 18) conclude that ‘a balkanised Indonesia, a broken-backed Papua New Guinea and a weak New Zealand are very real prospects [for Australia]’.

The characterisation of the arc of instability focused on these simultaneous centre-periphery conflicts in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands (Rumley 2006: 16). Yet, the arc of instability should not be analysed only as a descriptor of domestic conflicts in Indonesia and the South Pacific, but also as a metaphor in international politics. Metaphors, or what Fry and O’Hagan (2000) call images, focus the attention of policymakers and can be marshalled for political contestation. McDonald and Merefield (2010: 189) argue that governments often ‘strategically use … domestically resonant narratives of history, culture and identity’ to discredit their political opponents and garner public support for controversial decisions. For example, the Labor Party used the image of the arc of instability to argue that Howard was overly focused on supporting US counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, while leaving unchecked instate conflicts and underdevelopment in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (Rudd 2007). Conversely, the Coalition contended that the Labor Party had little appreciation for how global security challenges, such as terrorism and money laundering, increasingly transcended physical distance.

More importantly, metaphors elevate some explanations and panaceas to political developments, at the expense of others. As an indicator of what Canberra’s policy response would focus on, the arc of instability metaphor summarises that these domestic conflicts occur because regional governments are unable to impose order on their societies. As Ayson (2007: 216) puts it, the arc of instability conveyed the idea that Australia was ‘a prosperous and politically stable country looking out on its closest northern neighbours which comprised a chain of countries with weakened economies, institutional deficits and significant domestic instabilities’. Hirst (2008: 241) argues that Our failing neighbour – Australia and the future of Solomon Islands, a 2003 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), connected underdevelopment in the Solomon Islands with interstate disorder and global insecurity. In contrast, Canberra’s understanding in the 1990s of South Pacific underdevelopment as a localised humanitarian issue did not make such a connection. Neither would a diagnosis of ethnic and kinship groups monopolising particular law enforcement agencies, such as the judiciary and police, lead to a discursive connection with global terrorism (Nevins 2007: 164). Canberra subsequently relied on
ASPI’s expansive interpretation of the consequences of the arc of instability to lead the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), jettisoning its previous policy of non-intervention. Compared to Australia’s interventions and peacekeeping missions in other states and territories, RAMSI is notable for the participation of an extensive array of bureaucratic actors who were previously considered to be primarily domestic actors, such as the Australian Federal Police, Treasury and the Department of Education. These bureaucratic actors would similarly be active in Australia’s foreign aid programme in Indonesia, focused as it is on a neoliberal conception of good governance, even if geopolitical asymmetries impose limits on the extent to which Australia can bolster domestic order in Indonesia. Therefore, if Canberra’s assessment is that Jakarta’s inability to impose domestic order is engendering the arc of instability, then accordingly, Canberra’s solution is to bolster Jakarta’s ability to maintain order over Indonesian society.

Yet, in the immediate post-Suharto years, Canberra could not resort to the supply of military equipment and the training of Indonesian military officers in order to strengthen Jakarta’s coercive abilities. For much of the New Order period, bilateral military cooperation not only promoted solidarism between military elites, many of whom in Indonesia became senior government leaders, but also allowed Jakarta to act with impunity in suppressing internal dissent (Boyle 2002: 346). On an immediate level, the erosion of trust between Australian and Indonesian elites after INTERFET led to the suspension of bilateral military cooperation. Howard (1999: 10028) quashed notions of a special relationship with Indonesia, and recalling Lord Palmerston, argued that Australia had permanent interests in interstate order which could occasionally engender conflict with otherwise longstanding partners. In turn, Abdurrahman Wahid reportedly described Australia’s triumphalism over its leadership of INTERFET as ‘infantile’ (quoted in Cotton 2004: 139). But more fundamentally, there were broader dynamics which ensured that when cooperation to bolster Jakarta’s ability to maintain domestic order resumed, military cooperation and the outright promotion of authoritarianism, as was the policy of many Western states during the Cold War, would not be centrepieces of Canberra’s policy. For one, the argument that Australia’s leadership of INTERFET marked a triumph for humanitarian intervention was an influential one, promoted by Canberra, even as I argued in Chapter Three that East Timor’s independence can be more consistently interpreted through the lens of self-determination principles in pluralist international society.
More generally, by the 1980s, it was uncertain whether authoritarian regimes continued to best further the interests of transnational capital, which primarily require order and stability. For example, in Southeast Asia, Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown by a groundswell of societal opposition. During the 1950s and 1960s, business groups in the West lobbied their governments to support authoritarian regimes in developing states, as authoritarian regimes protected the nascent commodification of land from societal opposition. However, as the involvement of these authoritarian regimes in their economies grew, so did the developmental state interests which resisted neoliberal restructuring. Suharto and his associates’ lacklustre implementation of the IMF packages during the Asian financial crisis is instructive (Dalrymple 1998: 235). Robinson (1996) argues that, as a result of uncertainty over authoritarian regimes’ commitment to neoliberalism, US policy towards developing states has shifted from the outright promotion of authoritarianism to the fostering of polyarchy. Polyarchy limits the scope of democracy, often to an electoral choice between elites who are similarly committed to neoliberalism, while large swathes of social life are excluded from political contestation by placing them under the purview of bureaucracies and statutory authorities (Gill 1998). Therefore, instead of supplying military equipment which may be used to suppress domestic dissent, Australia’s foreign aid is now focused on promoting neoliberal forms of interaction, such as the acceptance that economic inequality is not a proper subject for political contestation, in Indonesia’s education system and judiciary. Polyarchy relies more on the conditioning of relations of rule which is central to Gramsci and Robert Cox’s conceptions of hegemony, than on the coercive capacities in Weber’s understanding of the state as the monopolisation of legitimate violence in a given territory. Nevertheless, even technocratic cooperation requires a modicum of intergovernmental trust, and this was in short supply between Australia and Indonesia after the former’s leadership of INTERFET.

The Bali bombings and bilateral police cooperation

The Bali bombings 27 of October 2002 rekindled security cooperation between Canberra and Jakarta. Marking the tenth anniversary of the Bali bombings, Howard (2012) said that ‘those who were responsible for this terrible deed may have hoped a number of things; they may have hoped that they would have driven Indonesia and Australia further apart. Instead of that, they brought Indonesia and Australia closer together’. Alexander Downer (2012) echoed Howard’s views, noting that Australia’s

27 An account of the Bali bombings can be found in Gyngell and Wesley (2007: 174 – 181).
response to the Bali bombings ‘was not to be angry with Indonesia, but to work with the Indonesian government to try to make sure that such an event would not happen again’. Translated to Adler and Barnett’s framework of security communities, the Bali bombings provided the precipitating conditions which lifted bilateral security cooperation from its post-INTERFET dormancy and wariness.

This section has two objectives. First, I consider why the Bali bombings resurrected bilateral security cooperation. I argue that, for Canberra, the Bali bombings conflated the issues of terrorism, separatism and asylum-seekers to portray a Jakarta which was unable to maintain domestic order. This depiction also concerned Jakarta, sufficient enough for it to respond favourably to Canberra’s proposal of a joint police investigation into the Bali bombings. Second, I consider why the police forces led the investigations into the bombings, and not the militaries which Canberra and Jakarta had spent much diplomatic capital on during the early 1990s. After all, Canberra trained Kopassus, Indonesia’s Special Forces Command, for this very reason of counterterrorism (Boyle 2002: 346). At an immediate level, the Indonesian military was discredited for its human rights abuses in East Timor, especially those committed as the territory was preparing for its referendum on independence. More fundamentally, the choice of the Indonesian police as Australia's counterpart in investigating the Bali bombings reflects the recognition of Western states and international development agencies that societal opposition is muted if cooperation on maintaining order is predicated on the rule of law, as compared to that governed by material asymmetries. The police and military embody these two logics respectively. Yet, the rule of law is not a monolithic concept, but is often used by state elites to circumscribe the boundaries of mutual identification (Jayasuriya 2002: 109). For example, elite conceptions of the rule of law impede societal mobilisation against torture and the death penalty not only for terrorists, but also for the many who find themselves in the dragnet of the appellation of terrorism (Jackson 2007). If an issue is defined to be in a relationship with the law, such as the post-September 2001 implementation of laws which sanction torture and the indefinite detention of suspects without trial, then proponents of social change are hobbled by the discourse of unlawfulness. Therefore, the wider the delineation of what elites include in the rule of law, the poorer the prospects are of a security community which is premised on the common humanity of Australians and Indonesians.

The Bali bombings were the culmination of developments which demonstrated to Canberra that Jakarta was unable to maintain domestic order. The centre-periphery
and ethnic conflicts which followed Suharto’s resignation can be understood as a societal protest against the New Order’s roughshod treatment of human security, with concomitant expectations that post-Suharto governments would retract militaristic approaches to conflict resolution (Burke 2001: 217). However, Canberra did not perceive these post-Suharto domestic conflicts through the prism of the exacerbation of human suffering which state-centric conceptions of security and economic development often bring. Instead, as I demonstrated earlier in the chapter, Canberra was concerned that the arc of instability had expanded from the South Pacific to include Indonesia. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2002: 27) warned of the potential for animosity between Australia and Indonesia because ‘Indonesia’s weak government is at present incapable of delivering … an effective response to terrorism’. Therefore, from the perspective of nation-states, there are limits to democratisation, which, in this case, are those imposed by the Cartesian anxiety to ensure that state boundaries are fixed and states have total control over their societies.

The increased number of asylum-seekers from the Middle East transiting through Indonesia during the post-Suharto period was also perceived by Australia to be an instance of Indonesia’s inability to secure its territorial borders. If national citizenship is the principal means by which people are organised, then the consolidation of this arrangement is dependent on the accentuation of hierarchies between citizens and non-citizens (Hindess 2000: 1491). For example, within a nation-state, non-citizens often have to explain and register their whereabouts with the authorities. However, as the number of asylum-seekers seeking refuge in Australia increased from the early 2000s onward, Australia considered that not only Indonesia was unable to document the whereabouts of asylum-seekers, it was also unwilling to prevent asylum-seekers from leaving for Australia. Downer, when asked in August 2001 why Indonesia refused to accept the asylum-seekers from the MV Tampa, said that ‘the Indonesian position … [is that it has] a substantial problem with illegal people movements into Indonesia’ (Downer 2001). Hence, the mainstay of bilateral cooperation on asylum-seekers is Australia’s provision of funds and personnel to strengthen Indonesia’s capacity to detain asylum-seekers, such as the construction of the Tanjung Pinang detention centre and revision of Indonesia’s immigration legislation (Nethery, Rafferty-Brown and Taylor 2013). In Chapter Six, I argue that a security community which respects the universality of human rights cannot be built on the bilateral management of asylum-seekers. Governments contend that measures such as offshore processing and the Bali Process improve the prospects of resettlement for refugees in UN
refugee camps. However, from the perspective of human security, these initiatives are motivated by the preservation of domestic and interstate order. Regardless of this contestation of the purpose of state cooperation on asylum-seekers, the pernicious treatment of asylum-seekers, using the language of deterrence, is attributable to a limited conception of the Australian and Indonesian national communities which excludes asylum-seekers. For now, from the perspective of order advanced by this chapter, the increase in the number of asylum-seekers during the immediate post-Suharto years demonstrated to Australia that Indonesia, an important transit state, had little control over the movement of asylum-seekers.

The Bali bombings occurred against the backdrop of domestic conflicts and asylum-seekers transiting through Indonesia. There are several ways to analyse the Bali bombings, but from the Weberian criteria of having a monopoly over physical force within a state, the Bali bombings demonstrated that Jakarta was increasingly unable to fulfil this criteria. What is significant about the Bali bombings is that, unlike the centre-periphery conflicts and Jakarta’s inability to detain asylum-seekers, Jakarta now agreed with, or at least acquiesced in, Canberra’s assessment that it had problems in enforcing domestic order. As members of a society with common standards of behaviour, states expect each other to be responsible for the integrity of state authority and power within their respective territories (Bull 2002 [1977]: 25). This mutual expectation transcends the specific challenges to domestic order in each state, be they terrorism or expressions of non-state identity. Wesley (2007: 102) refutes the argument that the Bali bombings strained the Australia-Indonesia relationship. Instead, he (2007: 194) argues that Indonesia was increasingly receptive towards allowing foreign assistance to bolster its capacity in maintaining domestic order, as its ‘governance prestige’ was in doubt. The governance prestige which Wesley is referring to is the standards of behaviour in international society, such as enforcing domestic order, and increasingly, embracing neoliberal forms of interaction. In another analysis of the Bali bombings, co-authored with Gyngell, they highlight Canberra’s success in persuading Jakarta to suspend its sensitivities about sovereignty, and to recognise that ‘an important line had now been crossed: that the threat of militant Islamic groups like Jemaah Islamiyah had to be faced and dealt with’ (Gyngell and Wesley 2007: 178). Therefore, the Bali bombings were the precipitating conditions which rekindled security cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, but

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28 Hamilton-Hart (2005: 312) argues that studies of terrorism in Southeast Asia typically analyse terrorism on the canvas of Islam, while other analytical frameworks such as differing types of religious extremism and violence are given little consideration.
the security which was promoted was that of the state and international society, not that of humanity.

Notwithstanding the analogous objective of interstate order which Keating and Suharto also sought, the actors involved in investigating the Bali bombings were different to what they might have been if they had occurred in the early 1990s. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Indonesian National Police (POLRI) led the investigations into the Bali bombings, whereas the militaries were conspicuous for their absence. Recall that in Chapter Two, Canberra considered bilateral military cooperation to offer the best prospects in building solidarity between elites, as well as facilitating Jakarta’s suppression of domestic opposition. Yet, in a recent Australian Strategic Policy Institute report on the AFP-POLRI relationship, it commends the relationship for ‘[moving] from simple information sharing, to capacity building, and into truly cooperative operations. [It has] also withstood most of the fluctuations in the broader bilateral relationship’ (Connery, Sambhi and McKenzie 2014: 2). Therefore, despite protestations from the Department of Defence in Australia that ‘Kopassus is currently the most capable counterterrorist force in Indonesia’ (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2004: 39), the actors which legitimise the maintenance of order in the post-Suharto period are different from those during the New Order. The Australia-Indonesia relationship does not exist in a material vacuum, but interacts with the evolving norms of international society and public opinion. Applied to Adler and Barnett’s framework, although the objective of security cooperation remains interstate order, the process category of organisations and structural category of knowledge now favour the police. Using the investigation into the Bali bombings as a microcosm of broader changes in how security cooperation is prosecuted, I now explain why the police has displaced, but not entirely eliminated, the military as the vehicle for post-Suharto cooperation on promoting order. The first two reasons are specific to the Australia-Indonesia relationship, while the final reason has structural consequences for how states justify security cooperation in a period where an increasing number of them are democracies.

Despite possessing the capability to undertake counterterrorist operations, the Indonesian military was discredited by the human rights abuses it committed during the late 1990s in East Timor. 29 Societal antipathy, both in Australia and Indonesia, towards the repressive nature of the Indonesian military is a longstanding

29 These crimes are extensively documented by, for example, Murdoch (2001), Tanter, Ball and van Klinken (eds.) (2006), and Wilkinson (2000).
characteristic and impediment to the bilateral relationship. After the Indonesian military’s sponsorship of a scorched earth policy in East Timor as punishment for voting for independence, this aversion was also held by policymakers in Australia. Scholars speculated whether INTERFET heralded a norm of humanitarian intervention, although many advised caution, noting that the norm still depended on the geopolitical interests of major states (Cotton 2001; Falk 2009: 168). Special forces activities and joint exercises between the Australian and Indonesian militaries were suspended after East Timor’s independence. Reflecting on the suspension of these exercises, the Department of Defence (2003: 7) noted in its submission to the 2004 parliamentary inquiry into the bilateral relationship that ‘the East Timor crisis reduced the level of mutual confidence in the defence relationship’. More significantly in a geopolitical sense, the United States extended Indonesia’s exclusion from its International Military Education and Training programme to all military ties between them. Therefore, in such a climate of widespread distrust, the involvement of the Indonesian military in the investigation into the Bali bombings would have exacerbated opposition from the Australian and Indonesian publics.

Not only was the Indonesian military diplomatically isolated after East Timor’s independence referendum, its standing in Indonesia was also declining in relation to the police. 30 Considering the indispensability of the military to New Order rule, Suharto’s departure was accompanied by vociferous calls to reform the military. These calls were informed by the civilian-military dichotomy which Huntington (1957) promotes in his conception of military professionalism. Notwithstanding the constructivist insight that the civilian-military dichotomy is fluid in Indonesia because the military is comprised of former guerrilla movements which were integral to societal resistance against the Dutch colonisers (Beeson and Bellamy 2008: 127 – 130), Habibie separated the police from the military in 1999 to facilitate civilian oversight of the military. Suharto incorporated the police into the military upon assuming power in 1965 because he considered the police, along with the navy and air force, to be sympathetic to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) (Meliala 2001: 422). Despite the Indonesian police’s nascent autonomy from the military after 1999, its leadership of the investigations into the Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks has, in the assessment of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, helped it ‘to assert itself as an

30 To be sure, the diplomatic isolation of the Indonesian military was arrested as the US-led war on terror intensified (Hadiz 2006: 134). Therefore, the prominence afforded to the police forces to investigate the Bali bombings can be thought of as an interlude between the widespread revulsion towards the Indonesian military’s human rights abuses in East Timor and the hardening of militaristic responses to terrorism.
institution separate from the military' (Connery, Sambhi and McKenzie 2014: 6). In addition, the Institute continues, despite continuing concerns about police corruption, these high-profile investigations have ‘greatly improved POLRI’s credibility with government and the Indonesian people’ (Connery, Sambhi and McKenzie 2014: 6). Thus far, these two reasons for the prominence of the Australian and Indonesian police forces in the post-Suharto bilateral relationship relate to the changing stature of specific actors such as the Indonesian military. The final reason, the shift from geopolitical reasoning to that based on the rule of law, has structural consequences for how states justify security cooperation and intervention.

During the Cold War, states often invoked geopolitics to justify security cooperation and intervention. As a contest which reduced politics to material asymmetries, the Cold War exemplified the geopolitical tradition that ‘geography … is taken to be a finished, fully meaningful visual text with complete, monological messages of transcendent significance’ (O’Tuathail 1996: 52). Gerald Ford’s indication that the US would overlook Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, noted in the introduction of this chapter, demonstrates the acceptability of the balance of power as a mode of interaction between states during this period. Canberra also subscribed to such geopolitical reasoning, as evidenced by its acquiescence in Suharto’s murderous purge of the PKI.

There are several explanations as to why geopolitical reasoning is ebbing, but they all lead to the same conclusion that the rule of law is replacing geopolitics as the rationale for security cooperation between states. First, from the perspective of legitimacy, it is less appropriate in the post-Cold War period for states to argue that, by dint of material asymmetries, they have the right to intervene and impose intrusive forms of cooperation on their less powerful counterparts. Before 1999, Australia opposed self-determination for East Timor, but the basis of Australia’s opposition has changed over the decades. In the late 1970s, Australia presented Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor as a geopolitical fait accompli. By the early 1990s, Australia was persuading Indonesia to consider internal autonomy for East Timor, citing changes in the consensus of international institutions towards self-determination (Salla 1995: 220). In particular, while international institutions were more accommodating of representational rights, and human rights in general, this change did not come at the expense of interstate order. Gareth Evans (1995b: 575), addressing the Senate in February 1995, argued that self-determination ‘is presently subject to quite a lot of international rethinking, particularly because of the
proliferation of claims to self-determination by national entities within larger sovereign states, as distinct from the more familiar colonial context’. For Evans (1994b: 2973), it would satisfy international institutions, and he erroneously believed, public opinion, that self-determination ‘mean[s] genuine respect for different ethnicities and genuine respect for human rights claims of particular groups within larger national or state entities’. Notwithstanding that, in 1995, East Timor had not yet exercised its self-determination from Portugal, international institutions, especially the UN, were vital sites of implementation and legitimacy for the solidarist relationship between Australia and Indonesia. In sum, to recall Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 40) framework of security communities, knowledge represents ‘categories of practical action and legitimate activity’, even though the knowledge of changing bases of self-determination fosters the encasing of human rights within the framework of interstate order instead.

The changing prescription for the promotion of neoliberalism is the second reason why the rule of law is eclipsing geopolitics as the rationale for security cooperation between states. During the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism was characterised by deregulation and privatisation programmes – in short, the dismantling of the state as a Keynesian, social-collectivist institution. The IMF packages administered to Indonesia after the Asian financial crisis epitomised this early phase of neoliberalism (Robison and Rosser 2000: 179). The fire sale of domestic and public enterprises to foreign investors may well have suited the proponents of neoliberalism. However, the institutional consequences of a deregulation agenda which is restricted to the wholesale selling of enterprises, such as the inability of bureaucracies to cope with the recording and enforcement of contracts, undermine the institutional stability which markets require to function with certainty. As Hadiz (2004a: 705) notes in relation to Indonesia, ‘decentralisation has resulted in confusion about the distribution of power and authority between different levels of government … which frighten[s] investors’. Post-Suharto decentralisation is comparable to deregulation because the former is premised on visions of subsidiarity and individual autonomy, while ignoring the largely unregulated asymmetrical power relations which accompany its implementation (Hadiz 2004a: 699). Therefore, the current phase of neoliberalism is characterised by the strengthening of states so that they can offer institutional stability to markets and their relations of rule. For example, a key focus of state-building is to specify in the judiciaries of developing states what is permissible as justice claims, elevating property rights while dismissing injustices and displacements caused by structural

31 Hurd’s (1999: 381) conception of legitimacy, ‘the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’, is similar to Adler and Barnett’s understanding of knowledge.
economic forces. Peck and Tickell (2002: 384) refer to the contrast between these two phases of neoliberalism as ‘rollback’ and ‘rollout’, that is, regulatory, neoliberalism respectively.

The rule of law relates to regulatory neoliberalism in that the latter is predicated on a particular conception of the former. The state is an important adjudicator of what constitutes legality and illegality, and should it take up the cudgel of neoliberalism, it restricts the scope of identification and trust (Wesley 2008: 380). For example, there are hardly any institutional and legislative implements available to challenge the commodification of labour and the suppression of collective stewardship of the commons, both in Australia and Indonesia (Harvey 2007: 35). Constitutionalism, as an idea which supports principled interactions and limits on state power, can underpin a security community which is not tethered to elite interests. However, as Jayasuriya (2002: 101) argues, there are two variants of constitutionalism. The first promotes participation and accountability, whereas the second insulates the economy from questions of fairness and justice. It is the latter variant of constitutionalism which informs regulatory neoliberalism, as evidenced by Friedrich Hayek’s (1982: 52) contention that the state is just one of four separate spheres of interaction, the other three being the economy, politics, and society. Each sphere has its own logic, and the role of the state is not to challenge how the other spheres operate, but to provide a regulatory environment which is favourable to the economy. Hence, the ubiquitousness of cooperation predicated on the rule of law reflects the assessment of neoliberals in state-building initiatives that institutions stem the gyrations of an earlier period of deregulation, which can be thought of as an economic parallel to geopolitics. However, in an understanding which diminishes the prospects of a security community between Australia and Indonesia, neoliberals do not consider the rule of law to signify principled interactions and commitment between societies. Rather, for neoliberals, the rule of law insulates the economy from challenges of fairness and justice.

Schiller, Lucas and Sulistiyanto (2008: 57), writing about the May 2006 mudflow disaster in East Java which displaced at least 37 100 residents, argue that the claim by the gas-well owners that the mudflow was due to natural forces evades the complex of politico-business interests in Java’s natural resources.

Harvey (2007: 34 – 35) offers more examples of what he calls accumulation by dispossession, such as the use of the credit system to perpetuate indebtedness in states and societies. In converse, these examples highlight a more emancipatory vision of security communities than what state elites, such as those in ASEAN, have in mind by this term (see Collins 2007).
Third, the growth in foreign policy actors in Australia and Indonesia is concentrated on the agencies which promote rule of law or technocratic cooperation, such as the police forces, judiciaries, central banks and corporate regulators (Wesley 2011: 266). Whether it is because threats previously emanated from the territorial nation-state or that the discipline of International Relations had, and still has, an assumption of methodological nationalism (Agnew 1994), foreign policy primarily involved states and militaries competing with their foreign counterparts. Gyngell and Wesley’s (2007: 19) definition of foreign policy, ‘all actions of state directed in whole or part outside of the boundaries of the state’, highlights this emphasis on adversarial interactions between actors which represent the Westphalian nation-state. Globalisation, as contested as this term is, has spawned what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls a world risk society, in which actors are more concerned about the risks which are decoupled from the territorial nation-state, than the threats from other states (see also Hameiri 2010: 88). Terrorism, an issue which has dominated Australia-Indonesia relations in the post-Suharto period, epitomises the concerns of world risk society. Because it is difficult to attribute the motivations of terrorists to any particular state, analysts of a world risk society argue that a raft of technocratic institutions is needed to regulate individual and societal behaviour. Hence, the purpose of directing Australia’s foreign aid in the post-Suharto period to elaborating and harmonising Indonesian laws has not been to cultivate Indonesia’s identification with Australia, which is what a state-centric conception of foreign policy, especially its subset of diplomacy, would argue. Rather, the rule of law specifies what individuals can and cannot do in a world risk society characterised by the nation-state having to compete with other ideas and entities for identification. In so doing, these specifications of the rule of law reduce the risks of people supporting terrorism.

As an approach to defusing conflicts of values, the rule of law can insulate the elite and institutional aspects of the Australia-Indonesia relationship from the acrimonious ideational disputes which have characterised it, be they disputes of religion or societal organisation (Ricklefs 2004). The premise of the Copenhagen School of security studies is that the expansion of security referents beyond the state, to include humanity and the environment among others, is possible only if the referent is elevated above political contestation (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998: 21). Wesley (2007: 184) argues that a managerial approach to conflicts, as evidenced by the Bali Process on people-smuggling, can offer a template for the bilateral relationship, in contrast to what he demarcates as politics, which ‘directs attention to jurisdictions, rival goods, rights and responsibilities’.
In general, however, the rule of law reflects a regulative approach to societal interactions, at odds with critical theory’s commitment to ‘[embrace] no static interest save that of the primordial human being and the species in nature’ (Booth 2005a: 12). A technocratic approach to Australia-Indonesia relations may well satisfy the elite interest in control, but does little to challenge the ‘simple interpersonal ethical frameworks … of pride and respect, honour, justice and fairness, arrogance and ingratitude’ which concern Wesley (2007: 200) and many scholars of the bilateral relationship. These divisive societal conceptions of the bilateral relationship can be counteracted only by arguments which stress the common humanity of Australia and Indonesia, which defines my understanding of a security community. From the perspective of critical security, a significant shortcoming of the aforementioned premise of the Copenhagen School is that, in some instances, political contestation is precisely what is required to secure a referent, as well as to challenge a referent which shields injustice and elite orders. McDonald (2011: 284) criticises the Copenhagen School for ‘[lacking] the philosophical resources to assess the desirability of various forms of deliberation and debate, and indeed what policy outcomes might be seen as progressive’.

In sum, it is evident that my understanding of the rule of law is less as a series of proscriptions on behaviour, than as a mode of governance which marshals notions of neutrality and rationality to deny challenges of justice and fairness. There are echoes here of modernisation theory. Influential during post-World War Two decolonisation, modernisation theory considered that the state had to be insulated from what the theory deemed to be the illogical and illegitimate nature of societal cleavages, hence perpetuating the gulf between states and societies (Jahn 2007a: 96). To reiterate, the extension of state cooperation predicated on the rule of law can be explained by the discrediting of material asymmetries as a justification for security cooperation and intervention, the shifting consensus on how best to promote neoliberalism, and the state’s expansion of bureaucratic instruments to regulate the diffuse risks and identities of globalisation. In the next section, I analyse the creation of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, among other initiatives, as an example of the imperatives of the rule of law in Australia’s foreign aid to Indonesia in the post-Suharto period.
Considerations of the rule of law in Australia's foreign aid

If promoting the rule of law is an important motivation for Australia to undertake security cooperation with Indonesia in the post-Suharto period, then we can expect its implementation to be funnelled through Australia’s Overseas Development Assistance, or more commonly known as foreign aid. Foreign aid, and other instances of good international citizenship, may well enhance human security but it is subject to the ontology of what Burke (2013: 65) calls a ‘self-interested state subject rationally choosing to take up ends beyond its own’. For example, Tim Costello (2014), the chief executive of World Vision Australia, noted that cuts to foreign aid comprised 20 percent of savings in the 2014-15 national budget, when foreign aid is only 1.3 percent of government spending. In addition, foreign aid is spent on projects which reflect prevailing concerns in Australian foreign policy. Therefore, foreign aid is influenced by the national interest, which is not only contingent, but as Camilleri (2003) reminds us, also legitimises partial and elite interests.

There is a symmetry between the objectives of Australia’s foreign aid and Australia’s foreign policy, which can be illustrated by examples from recent decades. In the 1980s, Australia’s foreign aid was influenced by the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank, especially the notion that deregulation and privatisation were the solutions to alleviating poverty. Far from recommending that Australia’s foreign aid should singularly focus on promoting human security, the Jackson Report argued that Australia’s foreign aid should have a ‘triple mandate’, consisting of poverty reduction, the national interest, and trade promotion (Commonwealth of Australia 1984). Higgott (1986: 46 – 47) criticises the Jackson Report for not having a ‘theory of society and/or politics to go with what it considers to be rational, self-evident economic policy’. Asian engagement, as Canberra approached it in the early 1990s, was predicated on an Australia which was economically languishing behind Southeast and Northeast Asia. Therefore, a substantial portion of Australia’s foreign aid during this period was directed towards subsidising Australian firms to successfully tender for infrastructural projects in developing countries, otherwise known as the Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF).

Promoting what the neo-institutionalist literature calls good governance now comprises a sizeable proportion of Australia’s foreign aid (Firth 2005: 280). In the 2014-15 financial year, Australia allocated 18 percent of its foreign aid to ‘effective governance: policies, institutions and functioning economies’ (DFAT 2015). The proportion of Australia’s foreign aid allocated to institutions is higher when one
incorporates the 13 percent spent on ‘infrastructure, trade facilitation and international competitiveness’ (DFAT 2015). A more compelling measure of the institutional focus in Australia’s foreign aid can be found in which aid programmes have occupied the attention of scholars and policymakers. In the post-September 2001 period, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and the Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP) in Papua New Guinea have stood out for analysis (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007; Hameiri 2007). These programmes are notable because they adopt a technocratic approach to foreign aid, involving a whole-of-government effort which encompasses the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Treasury and the Department of Education among other agencies. In contrast, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), together with its predecessor, the Dutch-led Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), were in the mould of interstate cooperation, defined narrowly to include state leaders and foreign ministries only. These changes in conceptualising foreign aid reflect the changes in International Relations scholarship and practice as to what constitutes state influence and boundaries. In Australia’s foreign aid to Indonesia, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) is the most significant manifestation of the turn to promoting the rule of law in Australia’s foreign aid.

Established in 2004 and located in Semarang, East Java, JCLEC focuses on ‘research, law enforcement education and training, and operational support in response to specific terrorist threats or attacks’ (AFP 2004). The Centre’s website is essentially a catalogue of the activities organised under these three themes (JCLEC 2015), with little appreciation for the historically contingent causes of conflict. Australia allocated $36.8 million worth of expertise, technical support and training courses – the governance component of its foreign aid – for JCLEC’s first five years of operation between 2004 to 2008 (AFP 2004). In its latest annual report, the Centre notes that Australia ‘continue[s] to be the principal donor and deliverer of training programmes’, covering the gamut of crimes from terrorism to people smuggling (JCLEC 2014: 30). For the purposes of this thesis, what is significant is not the activities conducted under JCLEC’s auspices, but the type of community it seeks to help create.

34 Indonesia disbanded the IGGI in retaliation for threats from foreign donors to suspend aid after the Dili massacre of November 1991. Yudhoyono terminated the CGI in January 2007, citing Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in managing its foreign debts.
The interactions in JCLEC demonstrate socialisation or social learning, a key constructivist concept used to explain change (Checkel 2001). Adler and Barnett (1998a: 43) define social learning as ‘an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality – what people consider real, possible and desirable – on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge’. Bellamy (2004: 24) describes the process of social learning as one whereby ‘actors justify their actions in terms of what they perceive to be common norms and those justifications are evaluated by the society’. Pickering (2004: 226), writing about state cooperation to deter asylum seekers, argues that incompatible laws between states subject such cooperation to the more volatile logic of national security. A recurring theme in this chapter has been that geopolitics invokes notions of competing values and jurisdictions. These notions, when held by substantial sections of the public, irrespective of the type of government a state has, hinder states’ collective interest in order. Applying what Collyer (2012: 290) argues about the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to JCLEC, framing cooperation on asylum seekers as a matter of law enforcement rather than geopolitics therefore ‘allow[s] the deportation process to appear as a technocratic and essentially depoliticised problem-solving exercise’. In other words, JCLEC has the capacity to insert bureaucratic distance and regularity into, but not eliminate, what is fundamentally a transfer of populations between geopolitically hierarchical states. If asylum seekers are the product of international society affording nation-states much latitude to decide who should be in their respective national communities, as I argue in Chapter Six, then the deportation of asylum seekers primarily hinges on geopolitics. A similar dynamic of the attempt to impose the rule of law can be discerned in Yudhoyono’s (2010: 2139) announcement to the Australian Parliament in March 2010 that Indonesia would criminalise people smuggling. By legislating against people smuggling, Yudhoyono placed at one remove criticisms in Indonesia that material asymmetries compel it to accede to Australia’s demand that it intercept asylum seekers bound for Australia.

JCLEC has the potential to be a community of regional law enforcement forces, albeit one which is incompatible with critical theory’s call to question existing orders. Commemorating the 10th anniversary of JCLEC, Justice Minister Michael Keenan

35 In light of this paragraph’s argument on the harmonisation of laws, there is reason to believe that JCLEC would emulate the ‘best practices’ of IOM. Under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on asylum seekers between Australia and Indonesia, Indonesia intercepts and transfers asylum seekers who are bound for Australia to IOM (Nethery, Rafferty-Brown and Taylor 2013: 95). The IOM has a history of persuading asylum seekers to return to their respective states, using monetary incentives provided by the destination state (Collyer 2012: 284).
(2014) noted that it ‘has been at the heart of Australia’s strategic partnership with Indonesia on law and justice cooperation. It has become a “Centre of Excellence” for the delivery of international best practice in law enforcement training’. These comments support Deflem’s (2000: 772) argument that ‘expert knowledge systems about a cross-national rise and internationalisation of crime’ are important for international police cooperation to develop. Deflem’s argument recalls a key tenet of the English School, namely that members of a society have a common understanding of how a particular aspect of the world works. However, there is very little that is extensive about a community of regional law enforcement forces. Neither is it emancipatory if the rule of law disciplines people to ignore deliberations of justice. There are echoes here of the bilateral military cooperation which was central to the solidarist relationship pursued by Keating and Suharto. Therefore, the community represented by JCLEC is discordant with my conception of a security community between Australia and Indonesia.

As the example of JCLEC demonstrates, the rule of law can be understood as a set of regulations around which a community is formed. However, there is another way to conceptualise the rule of law, and that is as a mentality which structures the parameters of acceptable behaviour. Adopting an ideational conception of the rule of law, as opposed to a literal one of rules and regulations, allows us to identify the limits beyond which a constituency will not identify with others.  

36 Neoliberalism is not only a capitalist mode of production and exchange, but also a form of social relations. For example, Pusey (1991: 6) documents the shift in bureaucratic power in Australia from the programme and service departments to the whole-of-government departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, and Finance (see also Beeson and Firth 1998).

In a neoliberal society, the ‘individual … has no “public” ties other than contractual ones ‘freely’ entered into through the marketplace’ (Ayers 2009: 18). In explaining how neoliberalism expanded from its American heartland to acquire hegemonic status, we cannot ignore the fostering – critics would say imposition – of neoliberal mentalities in many parts of the world. Neoliberalism taps on all four dimensions of Barnett and Duvall’s (2005: 48) conception of power, namely compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power. Although there are overlaps with the other dimensions of power, the fostering of neoliberal mentalities in developing states is primarily a manifestation of structural power – the ‘co-constitutive, internal relations

36 For example, as Indonesia prepared to execute Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi noted that the death penalty is ‘a law enforcement against extraordinary crime, a law enforcement by a sovereign country’ (quoted in Brown et al. 2015).
of structural positions [which] define what kinds of social beings actors are’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 52). The relationship between capital and labour is an important example of structural power because material asymmetries determine the capacities and social roles of these actors (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 53). In a similar vein, foreign aid is not only about the dispensation of goods and services, but also conditions its recipients to act in ways which promote neoliberal social relations.

Not only does Australia spend a significant portion of its foreign aid on institution-building in developing states, its foreign aid is also premised on a partial, neoliberal conception of civil society, limited to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international development agencies. This truncated conception of civil society recreates itself through the prominent role it is given by neoliberal foreign aid. Recall that in a neoliberal society, the state is not eliminated, but protects markets and civil society, the latter defined instrumentally as ‘a network of distinctively economic relations, the sphere of the marketplace, the arena of production, distribution and exchange’ (Wood 1990: 61). Ayers (2009: 16, her emphasis) argues that neoliberalism is not concerned with civil society per se, but rather, it is ‘the relationship between the government and the NGO community, qua civil society’ which neoliberal foreign aid pays attention to in developing states. Specifically, neoliberal foreign aid seeks to ensure that NGOs are the bulwark against the state returning to the redistributive mechanisms which characterised its socialisation of politics in an earlier, Keynesian period (Hameiri 2008: 365). There are alternative manifestations and conceptions of civil society, such as the decidedly anti-democratic paramilitary forces which Wilson (2006) argues have proliferated in the post-Suharto period, but also those which embrace the interdependence of humanity.

To take an example of how neoliberalism’s conception of civil society replicates itself in foreign aid to Indonesia, Carroll (2009: 455) argues that the World Bank-initiated Kecamatan (district) Development Programme (KDP) is novel because districts are allowed to decide what projects they want – a demonstration of neoliberalism’s understanding of civil society. KDP’s promotion of subsidiarity and choice may be laudable, but neoliberal values such as competition, transparency and accountability are also inculcated, especially given the debt-based funding structure of the Programme (Carroll 2009: 463).

37 In a similar vein, Robinson (1996: 111) argues that the purpose of US electoral assistance to developing states is to ‘organise an elite and to impose it on the intervened country through controlled electoral processes’.
Regardless of the aid programme in question, what is of interest to this thesis is the type of community created by foreign aid in the neoliberal mould. Transparency and accountability are desirable values in a security community, since they resolve one way or another the foundational debate in International Relations on the character of human nature. However, when these values are deployed to service the market, they, like the AusAID-sponsored microcredit schemes which Wanner and Rosser (2012: 456) analyse, ‘plug into the existing structures and flows of capital without questioning or challenging the structural inequalities [which] gave rise to and perpetuate poverty in the first place’. Given that neoliberalism conceives of the economy as an autonomous realm with its own internal logic which sanctions massive inequality and the privatisation of the commons, widespread identification can only be achieved by allowing the state to rectify some of these injustices. In this respect, I part company with Tilly’s (2007: 117 – 118) argument that ‘the democratic accomplishment consists of insulating public politics from whatever material inequalities exist’. Tilly’s conception of democracy is a polyarchal one, restricted to the choosing of governments which are constrained by the technocratic institutions of neoliberalism, while vast sections of Australian and Indonesian societies lead economic livelihoods which are profoundly precarious and undemocratic. More generally, while acknowledging that governments have to justify to their societies how providing foreign aid is in the national interest, the tethering of foreign aid to the nation-state generates expectations that the recipient will reciprocate in some other, usually diplomatic, way. These expectations are those of dependence, not the interdependence which characterises humanity and my conception of a security community. Aid given by individuals and humanitarian groups can attenuate the logic of the national interest, but as the debate on human security in Australia and elsewhere shows, the challenge posed by the path dependency of state security is formidable (Camilleri 2012: 58). In the next section, I use the example of bilateral military cooperation in the so-called war on terror to argue that what the rule of law cannot discipline, realpolitik takes over.
The realpolitik of bilateral military cooperation

Cooperation to promote the rule of law requires the power to marginalise alternative forms of interaction. Hameiri (2008: 367), writing about the increasing managerialism of Australia’s foreign aid, argues that ‘managerialism is itself political in that it seeks to circumscribe expressions of conflict and disagreement, by either excluding these altogether or by channelling them into arenas of participation where they can be managed’. For example, a concern of the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) design document is that, in Indonesia, the ‘resolution of disputes (particularly commercial disputes) is highly unpredictable’ (AIPJ 2010: 5). Therefore, we can expect the AIPJ to influence the Indonesian judiciary to pay close attention to the honouring of business contracts, narrowing the lenses of justice and the avenues of recompense for structural economic dislocations. The discourses of neoliberalism, such as the rule of law, good governance and partnership, are what Fowler (2000: 3) calls a ‘mystification of power asymmetry’. This mystification is Crawford’s (2003) assessment of the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, as declarations of partnership belie the neoliberal agenda of its foreign donors. In particular, the Partnership’s programmes, such as anti-corruption measures and the strengthening of legal certainty, promote economic liberalisation rather than democratic accountability (Crawford 2003: 153).

Despite those advocating the rule of law claiming it to be impartial, it bears the imprint of what Barnett and Duvall (2005: 49) call compulsory power – the ‘relations between actors [which] allow one to shape directly the circumstances or actions of another’. The impartiality of the rule of law is qualified by compulsory power in two ways. First, the law affects those whom it governs differently. Material inequalities mean that the powerful can successfully lobby to have unfavourable laws rescinded, while the poor are restricted to protests and the promotion of public awareness, ideationally important as they are. Rosser, Roesad and Edwin (2005: 67), writing about the politics of inclusion in post-Suharto Indonesia, argue that the Ministry of Forestry, fearing the loss of rent-seeking opportunities, stalled legislation which would have slowed the commodification of land. Rosser (2013: 253), in his analysis of how the economy conditions the protection of human rights in Indonesia, argues that ‘we need

38 Realpolitik and geopolitics are similar in that they privilege material factors in their accounts of international politics. However, geopolitics focuses on the material endowments a state has which are consequential for international politics, such as territory, population size and national income. Realpolitik is broader because it denotes a mode of thought, which is why it can be used in a variety of contexts besides interstate relations, such as, in this case, Australia’s contribution to the Indonesian military’s counterterrorism capacities.
to first understand [oligarchic] interests in relation to particular rights or sets of rights and how these interests are shaped by the structure of the Indonesian economy’. In other words, civil and political rights are often prioritised over socioeconomic rights in the laws of a capitalist society. Therefore, without an account of the material sources of power and powerlessness, the rule of law in itself cannot be taken as an assurance that principled interactions will be followed.

Second, if the law cannot discipline its subjects, the powerful still have the option of mobilising compulsory power. The Bali Process, and indeed the edifice of immigration policy, conveys to asylum seekers that migration should be orderly, that is, determined by the state. If immigration law cannot deter asylum seekers from arriving in Australia, they are subjected to mandatory detention and the excision of Australia from its migration zone (Devetak 2004). This excision reduces the asylum seeker to what Giorgio Agamben calls bare life, namely ‘that which cannot be rendered sufficiently human (as territorial sovereign power recognises the concept)’ (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007: xx). In an analogous vein, counterterrorism laws are accompanied by extraordinary measures to institute indefinite detention and regularise torture, both in Australia and Indonesia. These measures demonstrate Carl Schmitt’s (1985 [1922]: 5) aphorism that the sovereign ‘is he [or she] who decides on the exception’ (see also Huysmans 2008). In a context where the rule of law increasingly governs cooperation on promoting order between Australia and Indonesia, the carte blanche which their militaries have in the ‘war on terror’ constitutes just such a sovereign exception.

Isolated after East Timor’s independence referendum, the Indonesian military was diplomatically rehabilitated after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. Accelerating a predilection already evident before the attacks, George W. Bush’s response to the attacks reflected a unilateral and militaristic conception of US foreign policy (George 2003). The US compelled other states to support its understanding of its transcendental role in international politics, or face being depicted as supporting terrorism. Washington referred to Southeast Asia as the ‘second front’ of terrorism, even though longstanding conflicts in Aceh and the Southern Philippines can be more compellingly framed as examples of a societal group’s discontent at being underrepresented in state institutions (Acharya and Acharya 2007). In relation to

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39 In October 2014, a group of anti-war protestors alleged that they were tortured by officers from the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) on Swan Island, Victoria (Milligan 2014). See also McKeown (2009) for an analysis of the regression of the norm against torture in the US.
Indonesia, a national security waiver enabled the US to circumvent human rights-related legislative restrictions on resuming military cooperation with Indonesia (Heiduk 2014: 310).

This geopolitically permissible context – what Holland (2013) calls political possibility – allowed Australia to follow suit. In June 2003, the Department of Defence (2003: 8) advised a parliamentary inquiry on the bilateral relationship that it had approached Indonesia about ‘how best to resume limited defence cooperation to combat terrorism, specifically in the areas of hostage recovery and counter-hijack’. The Lombok Treaty of 2006, which replaced the Agreement on Maintaining Security, departs from the principles of associational and organisational freedom. Article 2 (3) of the Treaty commits Australia and Indonesia to not support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other Party’ (DFAT 2006).

Considering the diplomatic controversy over Australia’s granting of protection visas to 42 West Papuan asylum seekers earlier in 2006, this Article is primarily intended to allay Jakarta’s concern that Canberra was equivocal in its support for Jakarta’s sovereignty over West Papua. With a training facility at JCLEC, Indonesia’s Detachment 88 is the centrepiece of Australia’s efforts to bolster Indonesia’s counterterrorist capacities. Although the Detachment is organisationally part of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) rather than the Indonesian military, the persistent charges of human rights abuses levelled against it suggest that realpolitik governs Australia’s engagement with Detachment 88.

Contrary to the aforementioned parliamentary inquiry’s expectation that post-Suharto military cooperation can isolate the perpetrators of human rights abuses (Commonwealth of Australia 2004: 40), Detachment 88 seamlessly straddles counterterrorism and the suppression of internal dissent. In part, this malleability reflects Indonesian law’s conflation of terrorism, separatism and insurgency (Australian Federal Police 2012), a conflation which is not on the agenda of bilateral cooperation to promote the rule of law. The human rights violations committed by Detachment 88 are numerous and systemic. In September 2010, Detachment 88 was

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40 In the next paragraph, I argue that the Australian Department of Defence’s reluctance to promote democracy in the Indonesian military facilitates Detachment 88’s impunity.
accused of torturing activists from the Republic of South Maluku, a separatist group which is based in and around Ambon (Allard 2010). Their transgression was a plan to attach their group’s flags to helium-filled balloons at a regatta, in view of foreigners and President Yudhoyono (Allard 2010). In August 2012, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s 7.30 Report alleged that Detachment 88 was responsible for the assassination of Mako Tabuni, the leader of the National Committee for West Papua (KNPB) (Cooper and Main 2012). Compared to the Free Papua Movement (OPM), KNPB uses non-violent means to draw attention to the coercive and partial nature of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, demonstrating that Detachment 88 is indiscriminate in its suppression of separatist groups in West Papua. Finally, in January 2013, Sidney Jones (2013) from the International Crisis Group warned that Detachment 88’s policy of killing suspected terrorists without a proper trial was fuelling attacks on the police.

Detachment 88’s flagrant disregard for human rights demonstrates that, against the general canvas of democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia, there are influential pockets of the bilateral relationship which still subscribe to a realpolitik logic. In the post-Suharto period, democracy is an important frame through which Canberra and Jakarta conceive of their relationship. For example, they both use the Bali Democracy Forum to convey that democracy transcends cultures and religions, even though this message says little about democracy’s ontological blind spots of the nation-state and capitalist accumulation, to name a couple. Notwithstanding such a truncated conception of democracy, democracy and human rights do not feature in the Department of Defence’s (2003: 3) objective that

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\text{Australia, through the defence relationship, will continue to encourage the Indonesian military to play an appropriate role in the future of Indonesia – characterised by professionalism, respect for the rule of law, and responsiveness to government direction.}
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As for its Indonesian counterpart, the barely tacit endorsement of the Australian and US militaries that human rights are dispensable in the war on terror has dashed fleeting efforts under Abdurrahman Wahid to promote democratic accountability of the military (Mietzner 2009: 214). More generally, the impunity of Detachment 88 demonstrates that even if the rule of law guides principled interactions, it will flounder under the shadow of sovereign exceptions. The lesson here for fostering a security community is not only that it should be oriented around humanity, but also that governments cannot appropriate for themselves unaccounted power in the name of national security. In the final section, I sketch the type of identification which the rule of law, interspersed with realpolitik, has fostered in the post-Suharto period.
Community under the rule of law and realpolitik

Although Adler and Barnett do not consider how nation-states impede widespread identification, they offer a regenerative portrait of what security communities should look like. In the final tier of security community development, Adler and Barnett (1998a: 45) describe the relationship between trust and identity as ‘reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can strengthen mutual identification, and there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification’. Similarly, for Deutsch et al. (1957: 66), a security community is characterised by ‘the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence’. However, bilateral cooperation to promote order imposes control and surveillance, not mutual responsiveness. I consider the type of identification fostered by realpolitik first, as identification between states is in the familiar terrain of the state-centric nature of International Relations. I then turn to the rule of law, arguing that it places at many removes the interdependence of humanity.

Geopolitics and realpolitik promote an understanding between states that their prerogative to use force and define security is an untrammeled one. This understanding constitutes a society, but its ideational content ranks far behind other arrangements which facilitate peaceful conflict resolution, such as English School solidarism and a security community. In Indonesia, separatist groups are the main casualties of a realpolitik approach to bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. As the impunity of Detachment 88 demonstrates, it does not differentiate between terrorists and separatists, violent or otherwise. I am not arguing that what defence planners call a balkanised Indonesia is desirable, regardless of the yardstick used. Considering that, at its widest, international relations is about the arguments for inclusion and exclusion (Linklater and MacMillan 1995: 13), with centre-periphery relations just one of many axes of division, there is no guarantee that the fragmentation of Indonesia into its provinces will bring about peaceful conflict resolution. Rather, my argument is that a realpolitik approach to counterterrorism removes the avenues of deliberation as to what constitutes Indonesia, which can obviate terrorism. Turning to Australia, Muslim communities are on the receiving end of Canberra’s militaristic approach to counterterrorism. They are singled out to demonstrate their loyalty to what Abbott (2014) called ‘team Australia’, which was as much a means of ideational coercion as it was a society. In addition, Muslim leaders were expected by Abbott (2015) ‘to say that [Islam is a religion of peace] more often, and mean it’, an insinuation which was
not visited on other community leaders. Therefore, separatist groups in Indonesia and Muslim communities in Australia are the casualties of their countries’ *realpolitik* approach to counterterrorism cooperation. The general import here is that any societal actor can be expunged by edicts of the national interest.

Because order is central to the regular functioning of domestic and international societies, it appears harder to argue that the rule of law diminishes widespread identification. Societal opposition to *realpolitik* is swift and unambiguous, as the reactions to Abbott’s ‘team Australia’ comments demonstrated. For example, Malcolm Fraser said that ‘you have got to be able to debate, and using that term is almost an attempt to stop or shut down debate’ (quoted in Cornwall 2014). One may respond that the law is necessary to clarify the boundaries of identification. However, based on this chapter’s argument that technocratic cooperation naturalises neoliberalism, I have a different understanding of the relationship between the rule of law and widespread identification. There are fundamental needs which bind humanity, for example, the need for air, water and community. What the law does is that it imposes additional requirements to access these needs, such as when the commodification of land compels subsistence farmers to weather the volatilities of agricultural trade, including those engendered by subsidised European Union and US agriculture. In other words, the interdependence of humanity becomes dimmer as the law extends its reach into individual and collective mentalities. The intrusiveness of the law applies whether we are referring to the Australia-Indonesia community of law enforcement officers, or the complex of laws which naturalises neoliberalism.

**Conclusion**

Order is keenly sought by dominant actors, which, in international society, are states. The state may be revolutionary in comparison to feudalism and religious authority, but as Bull (2002 [1977]: 90) puts it, even the revolutionary ‘looks forward to the reestablishment of an order [which] will secure the just changes he [or she] wishes to bring about’. However, there are different routes to consolidate order. In this chapter, I have identified two ideal-typical modes of maintaining order, namely geopolitics and the rule of law. Geopolitics, or *realpolitik* depending on the context, privileges material power and discounts legitimacy in its pursuit of order. Geopolitics describes the Cold War’s overriding interest in the polarity of the international system, and explains why Australia welcomed Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Owing to widespread opposition, geopolitics has waned as a mode of interaction between states, especially democratic ones. To be sure, there are important exceptions to this observation, such as
Australia and Indonesia’s tacit acceptance that Detachment 88’s suppression of domestic dissent is a necessary price to pay for counterterrorism cooperation. Nevertheless, the eclipse of geopolitics does not mean that states have lost sight of their objective of order. Canberra was concerned that the Bali bombings marked the height of Jakarta’s inability to maintain domestic order, which threatened to foment the regional disorder which had long exercised Canberra. The metaphor of the arc of instability encapsulated Canberra’s concerns with regional disorder. Importantly, Jakarta held the same concerns, as the Bali bombings, coupled with separatist pressures, eroded its authority and monopoly of violence. These converging concerns between two democratic states were the precipitating conditions which led to the post-INTERFET renewal of cooperation to promote order, this time based on the rule of law.

In evaluating the type of community which is promoted by the interaction of process and structural categories, the rule of law fosters a community which is partial and anaemic. These two qualities correspond to the two ways which I have conceived of the rule of law. First, to the extent we can identify a community, it is between the police forces of Australia and Indonesia, now jointly trained in law enforcement and counterterrorism at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. The elite-centric tenor of this community reflects Haas’ (1992: 3) conception of an epistemic community, that is, ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’. In other words, the community between AFP and POLRI is no different to that between engineers or surveyors, which is based on professional knowledge rather than on fulfilling universal human needs.

The consequences for identification of the second manifestation of the rule of law are more widespread, albeit in an anaemic sense. Neoliberalism is as much an exercise to construct state institutions which condition individual and collective mentalities, as it is about the contraction of the state through deregulation and privatisation. The rule of law, especially in its use of technocratic institutions to insulate the market from redistributive interventions, elevates neoliberalism above political contestation. In the post-September 2001 period, Australia’s foreign aid to Indonesia has prioritised neoliberal conceptions of good governance and state capacity. To take two examples, judicial aid informed by neoliberalism narrows the scope of justice claims, just as microcredit schemes naturalise market citizenship. The market conditions the interactions of people and societies, but this is an anaemic form of widespread
identification because it imposes additional requirements to access what are fundamental human needs, such as air, water and community. In the next chapter, I consider the type of identification fostered by bilateral cooperation on regionalism in the post-Suharto period.
Chapter Five
Post-Suharto bilateral cooperation in regional institutions and order

In many respects, this chapter is a sequel to Chapter Two. There, I argued that on the eve of Suharto’s departure, Canberra and Jakarta shared a common vision of regional order. The components of this order were multilateral dialogue, confidence-building exercises, and a belief that security is comprehensive – the ‘ASEAN Way’ in short. The Agreement on Maintaining Security (1995) made references to the ‘stability, progress and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region’ and ‘common security’. This suggests that its drafters not only valued the bilateral relationship, but also considered it worthy as a template for regional order. However, if as Keating (1996b) claimed, Indonesia’s ‘security outlook has great similarities with our own’, this raises the question of why the Agreement had to be negotiated in secret. One can only surmise that Keating’s observation had many less adherents than what he had represented. Therefore, despite collaborating to establish the contours of regional society in the immediate post-Cold War period, such as Alatas and Evans’ pursuit of a peace settlement in Cambodia, these initiatives rang hollow for many in the Australian public who were sceptical of the New Order’s democratic credentials, especially in relation to East Timor. Recalling Hedley Bull, the bilateral relationship in this period can be regarded as solidarist, since Canberra and Jakarta cooperated to promote a regional order which was denser than mere coexistence. Yet, as Bull (2002 [1977]: 230) notes, solidarism is ‘a new phase of the states system, not its replacement by something different’.

The expectation, then, was that democratisation in Indonesia would remove a significant obstacle to the vision of Canberra and Jakarta collaborating to promote a rules-based regional order. While Indonesia existed under authoritarian rule, it could hardly be said that its participation in instituting a rules-based regional order was credible. In contrast, a democratising Indonesia may be expected, as Acharya (2003) argues, to demur from existing regional institutions and recast them, especially if they bolstered the previous authoritarian regime. Such an order, approximating solidarism, would not, in the first instance, prioritise human security and widespread mutual identification. Nevertheless, these principles are less likely to receive roughshod treatment in a rules-based regional order, than in an international system and pluralist international society. The extension of identification between Australia and Indonesia
to regional sites is also important if, as Bellamy (2004) puts it, a security community is to be a global integrator and not a regional fortress.

This chapter questions the proposition that democratisation in Indonesia would axiomatically herald a more inclusive regional order. There has been a conspicuous absence of cooperation between Canberra and Jakarta on regionalism since the late 1990s, much less an effort to render it more inclusive. Howard was notably reticent towards multilateralism, while Kevin Rudd’s proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community (APC) received a lukewarm reception in Jakarta. The contrast with the raft of diplomatic initiatives led by Alatas and Evans could not be starker, especially since some scholars consider that the strategic vacuum which was propitious for middle power diplomacy in the early 1990s is present in the region again (Beeson and Higgott 2014). Therefore, this chapter explains why post-Suharto democratisation has not led to bilateral cooperation to promote a more inclusive and principled regional order.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. In the first section, I argue that a region should be conceptualised as an autonomous actor, rather than as a derivative of the nation-state. The latter conception of a region limits the parameters of identification to between states, foreclosing the potential for a region to promote identification between people. Therefore, I conceive of a region as a coalition of actors, enabling us to discern communities which are not bounded by the nation-state. The second section argues that there is little correlation between the appellation of a state’s political system, such as, democracy, and the characteristics of the regional institution which the state is a member of. A more compelling explanation for the contours of regional institutions can be found in the coalitions which dominate, in this case, in Indonesia and Australia. The third and fourth sections elucidate these prevailing coalitions in post-Suharto Indonesia and Australia, arguing that they do not support bilateral cooperation to foster an inclusive and principled regional order. The fifth section analyses Rudd’s failure to establish his Asia-Pacific Community. His inability to do so was attributable to the erosion of Australia’s credibility as an exemplar of middle power diplomacy, brought on by Canberra’s continued conception that US unilaterialism, and hence, bilateralism, was unambiguously in Australia’s national interest. The sixth and seventh sections marshal my broader understanding of regions to argue that, often, the regions and groupings which Australia and Indonesia join undermine widespread identification. The sixth section highlights Canberra’s preference for engaging with the Asian middle class in Julia Gillard’s Australia in the
Asian Century White Paper. The seventh section argues that the Group of Twenty (G20), of which Australia and Indonesia are members, is not grounded in a widespread consensus on how to respond to financial crises.

**Security communities and conceptions of regions**

In order for cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on regional order to develop into a security community, two aspects of regions have to be highlighted. First, regions are autonomous in that they have constitutive effects on political belonging that are independent of their creators, which are often states but not exclusively so. Second, regions are always partial in some important sense, be it in terms of space, constituencies or interests. In this vein, the G20 may not be readily thought of as a region compared to ASEAN and the European Union, but this is attributable to the predilection of governments and some scholars to consider regions in overwhelmingly cultural or geographical terms. Accordingly, this second condition requires identification as to who or what is being included and excluded from the relevant region, and whether such an arrangement is supportive of a security community. If we fail to appreciate these two characteristics of regions which are agential and contingent respectively, then the most we can expect of bilateral cooperation in regional order is a solidarist interstate society (Makinda 2005). As we saw in Chapter Two, the solidarist society that Canberra and Jakarta forged was continually buffeted by the absence of widespread collective identification. The borders of nation-states, to quote Burke (2013: 69), ‘do not somehow ontologically precede international society but have been its creation, often at the price of enormous injustice, conflict and suffering’. His insight is germane in canvassing the pathways from regional institutions to security communities.

The first characteristic of regions which is essential in transforming a regional order to a security community is to recognise that regions are not just proxies for their state creators, which is highlighted by Adler and Barnett. In what they call a tightly coupled security community, peoples’ identities are coterminous with those of the community, rather than those of the states and coalitions which initiated it (1998a: 48). Institutions do not just include formal organisations, but encompass ‘relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules’ (Duffield 2007: 7). The complexes of an institution do not always lend themselves to ready supervision by its creators, especially after an extended period of existence. In other words, in terms of its ability and coherence to act, a regional institution is potentially more than the sum of its parts. As a counterpoint, we will see in Chapter Six that despite having
shared interests in reducing the numbers of asylum seekers, a security community between Australia and Indonesia cannot be formed on the heels of cooperation to intercept asylum seekers, since such cooperation is premised on preserving national homogeneities.

The autonomy of regions is not always appreciated by Canberra, but is important in creating opportunities for regional orders to become security communities. Especially under Howard, regional institutions were reduced to the actions of states in maintaining Westphalian order and promoting economic interests. This was encapsulated by Downer’s (2000) distinction between ‘cultural’ and ‘practical’ regionalism, reflecting his clear preference being for the latter. Howard would later discover that his prevarication in acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation threatened to derail Australia’s participation in the East Asia Summit, even if the Treaty is widely regarded as being ineffectual in resolving regional military tensions (Richardson 2005: 360 – 363). States may circumscribe the subject matter of foreign policy to prioritise military security and economic growth, but equally, perceptions of trustworthiness vector these ostensibly rationalist interactions.

The shortcoming of conceiving identity as the sole preserve of nation-states, with the consequence that there is apparently no ideational commonality between Australia and the region, is not confined to governments. Even in more considered analyses of Australia’s ambivalent relationship with the region, identity and values are tethered to the nation-state. For example, Higgott and Nossal (2008: 624) argue that Australia is a ‘static liminal’, with its connections to the Anglosphere waning but being seemingly unable to cross the threshold to an Asia-Pacific future. They elaborate that the latter is elusive because the ‘widespread attachment [in Australia] to the idea that all human beings are equal’, both in societal and state-society interactions, is not shared by its regional neighbours (2008: 628). Human equality and emancipation are not extinguished just because states and political elites refuse to subscribe to these ideals. Additionally, Higgott and Nossal’s explanation of why Australia remains an ‘odd man out’ in the region neglects to consider how neoliberalism has altered coalitions and the rationales of states, especially the emergence of what Cerny (1997) calls the ‘competition state’. Higgott and Nossal’s state-centric conception of political values can be contrasted with Wesley’s. Although he argues that culture persistently excludes Australia from political, as compared to functional, conceptions of the region, Wesley appreciates that culture ‘as a political device is necessarily ascriptive and situational’ (1997: 535).
Elsewhere, in Higgott and Nossal’s deliberation of the prospects of Australia and Asia forming a security community in the 1990s, there is a continual slippage between the role of identity in a security community and a solidarist interstate society. Writing in Adler and Barnett’s edited volume on security communities, Higgott and Nossal (1998: 272) acknowledge that Australia’s Asian engagement is largely institutional, anomalous with the patchiness of societal identification. Yet, other sections of their chapter appear to be an explanation of the obstacles to Australia forming a solidarist interstate society with the region. Hence, Higgott and Nossal (1998: 274) highlight the contradiction between Canberra’s defence spending against military threats that can only come from the north and the promotion of Asian engagement, which is barely reconciled with the emphasis on ‘security cooperation’ with regional militaries.

All too often, liminality, a perennial theme in Australia’s relations with the region, is conceived to be static. This is how Howard justified Australia not having to ‘choose between its geography and history’. However, there are alternative ways of understanding liminality, which have emancipatory potential to transform extant assemblages of International Relations (IR) concepts in Australia-Indonesia relations and the regional context in which they interact. Mälksoo (2012: 484) argues that ‘liminality offers a fundamental critique of the conventional onto-spatial imagination of IR, with [the latter’s] traditional focus on policing the “sensible boundaries” of statehood, sovereignty, international system, identity, and security’. Rather than accepting structures as imposing order, which has spawned modernisation projects in various manifestations premised on the completeness of Anglo-European identity, liminal perspectives see an immanent world characterised by ‘continuous flows between different forms and ways of being’, not asking why change happens but ‘what underlies the impression of continuity’ (Mälksoo 2012: 485; Philpott 2000: 77). Therefore, liminality, as applied to what Robert Cox calls historical structures rather than IR, should pique our interest in explaining the autonomy and coherence of actors other than nation-states.

Yet, the call to investigate the agency of regions is palpably not an argument that all regions are security communities. Agency is chiefly required to separate the identity of regions from that of states, without which the extent of bilateral cooperation in regional order is a solidarist interstate society, not a security community. Once a region is identifiable as an actor, we have to evaluate whether it promotes mutual
trust and widespread identification, the defining qualities of a security community. At this juncture, it becomes evident that all regions are partial, privileging certain constituencies and narratives. This is the second consideration in determining whether a regional order has the potential to be a security community.

Governments in Australia often betray an understanding of regions as complete and whole. This applies whether Canberra is promoting a cultural, geographical, or material conception of the region. A few examples should suffice. Within the region, Gareth Evans (1990b) considered Australia to be the ‘odd man in’. Downer (2000) was sceptical of ‘cultural’ regionalism, as he concluded that Australia has no normative affinities with the region. Rudd, when proposing an Asia-Pacific Community, had in mind ‘a regional institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region – including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region’ (2008). These pronouncements demonstrate, as discerned from Mälksoo’s conception of liminality, the proclivity of IR to police and impose order. However, arguably to a larger extent than most countries, Australia testifies to Katzenstein’s (2005: 12) aphorism that regions are ‘not simply physical constants or ideological constructs, but express changing human practices’. Evans’ cartographic presentation of Australia as being part of an East Asian Hemisphere and Rudd’s proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community faltered because they were deficient as Coxian historical structures. As Saull (2012: 330) points out, a historical structure does not just include state authority and capital, but extends to the ideas and consciousness which underpin it. In other words, there is an arrangement of interests and ideas which synchronises a historical structure, failing which the coercive and contested elements of the latter become apparent. Accordingly, constituencies are pruned or incorporated into a historical structure, affording a region its particular character, even as it is simultaneously coherent.

It is worth spelling out how these statements of a region’s partiality apply to the Asia-Pacific, Canberra’s preferred descriptor of its region. Strikingly, the Pacific Islands do not feature in any sustained way in the Asia-Pacific, despite lending its name to the latter appellation. Neither, it should be added, do the majority of Asia’s population who participate unequally as unskilled labourers. Rather, ‘rim-speak’, otherwise known as the Pacific Rim, originated from the US prodding of South Korea and Taiwan to embrace export-led capitalist development in the 1960s, in order to reduce the bulk grant aid of the previous decade that was stoking the first post-war US trade
deficits (Cumings 1998: 54). Even as much of Northeast Asia subsequently became exemplars of the developmental state, this was still compatible with Washington’s hub-and-spokes vision of the Asia-Pacific. After all, the US saw the consolidation of capitalist economies of all hues in Northeast Asia as both a security and economic imperative. To the extent that the developmental state focused on national industries and exports to American markets, the agency of a nascent indigenous region was susceptible to being thwarted by the US, which the latter unhesitatingly did in relation to Japan on several occasions (Beeson 2009b: 505). This conception of the Asia-Pacific, as an amalgam of neoliberal economies and security as interstate order, is subscribed to by Canberra and highly corrosive of widespread mutual identification (Dalby 1996; George and McGibbon 1998). Given the foregoing argument that regions are autonomous and partial, it is important to identify their underlying coalitions in Indonesia amidst post-Suharto democratisation, as well as those prevailing in Australia over the corresponding period. However, before undertaking this, it is worth evaluating the scholarship on the relationship between domestic democratisation and regional institutions.

**Domestic democratisation and regional institutions**

It is problematic to assume that the domestic governance arrangements of a state are axiomatically reflected in the regional institutions it is involved in constructing. States often consider foreign policy to be a realm of anarchy, in contrast to the consensus-derived hierarchy of domestic policy. In the development of regional institutions, middle powers such as Australia and Indonesia can be overruled by other states with more material and discursive power, engendering a misalignment between the governance arrangements of the regional institution and its less influential member-states. Proposals for regional cooperation are often made by coalitions with a sectional interest, and cannot be extrapolated to mean that they are endorsed by the state they represent writ large. This is notably the case in the area of trade liberalisation, where supporters advocate for the commitments of regional institutions to be made binding in order to sideline protectionist compatriots. Therefore, it is more prudent to consider the development of regional institutions in terms of coalitions, rather than adopt an assumption of methodological nationalism which, as we will see, is a poor premise to read off the complexion of regional institutions and order.

As ideal types of domestic political systems, authoritarianism and democracy can be situated on opposite ends of a spectrum. Yet, these labels are often inaccurate descriptors of the regional institutions and orders to which the same states have lent
their imprimatur. A few examples drawn from Australian and Indonesian foreign policy highlight this point. The multilateral protection of human rights is an important aspect in the development of security communities because the primary lodgement of human rights within the nation-state is a potential impediment to identification with non-citizens. However, under Howard, Canberra was contemptuous of the UN human rights treaty bodies, claiming that they had no business in critiquing its contentious policies toward native title and refugees. For Kent (2002: 78), Howard’s volte-face from Evatt’s energetic promotion of an international rule of law through UN auspices was evidence that ‘liberal democracies are capable of unexpected, even radical, change which bears little relation to the norms on which their own political systems are based’. More broadly, preferences are at the heart of Andrew Moravcsik’s attempt to articulate a liberal theory of international politics, not a shared intellectual history or normative commitment. If foreign policy reflects ‘social views about legitimate borders, political institutions and modes of socioeconomic regulation’ (Moravcsik 1997: 525), it follows that these perspectives are not necessarily liberal-democratic ones. It appears that many contributions of the constructivist vein are susceptible to the same lacuna, premised as they are on the teleological development of ‘nice norms’ (McKeown 2009: 7).

In Indonesia’s case, although Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ did not brook alternative expressions of self-determination in, for example, Aceh and West New Guinea, he was a strident critic of neocolonialism and its inequitable international economic order. In considering what kinds of regional orders facilitate security communities, Cox (1992: 174) argues that demands for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s were strongly resisted by the First World because they challenged multilateralism ‘as an instrument for institutionalising the core-periphery structure of domination’. More recently, even in the post-Suharto period, domestic political systems are not seamlessly reflected in foreign policy outcomes. For Kai He (2008), post-Suharto Indonesian state behaviour stems from varying combinations of political legitimacy and international pressure. Although Indonesia is nominally a democracy, we can argue that the directly-elected Yudhoyono was more politically legitimate than the indirectly-elected Wahid and the transitionally-appointed Habibie, which differentially circumscribes their foreign policy actions. In terms of the purposes of counterterrorism (Foot 2005), Megawati Sukarnoputri and Yudhoyono faced less international pressure to rein in human rights violations committed by the military, as compared to Habibie over militia activity in East Timor. He (2008: 54) argues that it is these calibrations of political legitimacy and international pressure which explain why,
for instance, Habibie ‘compromised in deeds’ in relation to East Timor’s independence and merely ‘compromised in words’ in response to pressure from Beijing over the anti-Chinese riots which preceded Suharto’s resignation.

Even when a state can directly project its domestic political system onto the regional institutions in which it participates, there is the question of how potential partners will respond, given that the same governance arrangements are now located in a different frame. A democratic state may be supportive of an erstwhile authoritarian state embracing democracy, but the same affinity may not be forthcoming if the latter state – especially if it is a neighbouring one – aspires to regional leadership based on its newfound political values (Rüland 2009). There is an inherent tension between Jakarta’s recent initiatives to democratise ASEAN’s modalities through, inter alia, an ASEAN ‘Security Community’, and the longstanding formal equality of the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Acharya 2009: 260). Rüland’s (2014: 256) assessment is that such proposals for a ‘people-centred’ ASEAN only ‘address details of policy implementation and mobilise the population, but they do not transform the agenda set by governments’. If so, it is not unfounded for smaller states to be concerned that there is a slippery slope separating Jakarta’s efforts at democratising ASEAN and its nationalist ambitions.

Tellingly, there is scant evidence of a ‘coalition of democracies’ – which can include ASEAN’s dialogue partners such as Australia and Japan – lending its diplomatic weight towards Indonesia’s democratic leadership of ASEAN. This conspicuous absence of ‘like-minded’ support only magnifies the scepticism of Jakarta’s authoritarian neighbours towards its democratic leadership claims, since they joined ASEAN to strengthen state sovereignty. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1991: 395) argue that the actions of follower or subordinate states should be analysed in their own right, and not as a function of dominant states. In this vein of followership, Indonesia’s democratic leadership ambitions are received with ‘a sense of unreliable support from the “base” region of [Southeast Asia]’ (Quayle 2013: 322).

To reiterate, there is no neat correlation between the label of a state’s domestic political system and its preferences on how regional institutions should be organised. Democracies often act in ways which are contrary to such a characterisation, especially when they incorporate balance-of-power considerations in the construction of regional orders. A blanket portrayal of Indonesia as a democracy obscures the varying levels of political legitimacy which each post-Suharto president enjoyed, in turn affecting the parameters and tenor of regional initiatives. Representatives of authoritarian states are capable of agitating for a more equitable international
economic order which, if realised, aids the cause of security communities. However, we cannot ignore the material and ideological ties which bind the elites of core and periphery states. In other words, in order to uncover why post-Suharto democratisation has not ushered in ideational cooperation between the middle powers of Australia and Indonesia in the construction of regional institutions, we have to sacrifice theoretical parsimony and sketch the development of relevant coalitions in and across these two states. Therefore, in terms of Adler and Barnett’s framework of security communities, the dominant coalitions regarding the tenor of regionalism are the precipitating conditions which explain the absence of post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on the development of regional institutions and orders. Indonesia’s attempt to exercise a form of democratic leadership in ASEAN was received coolly by other Southeast Asian states, while in Australia, Howard eschewed multilateralism for bilateralism.

The three regional initiatives discussed in this chapter exhibit similarities and differences in their scope and tenor. First, Rudd’s proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community (APC) is most identifiably in a realist cum liberal-institutionalist vein, informed by his caution against assuming that ‘peace, harmony and concord are somehow predetermined and therefore inevitable for our region’ (2009a). If Rudd’s formulation seems studiously vague, the lively scholarly debate over the rise of China and its implications for regional order provides clarification as to what was underpinning the APC proposal (Beeson 2013; White 2010). While responses to the APC idea from officials in Jakarta ranged from scepticism to cautious support, it was remarkable that there was little collaboration between Canberra and Jakarta in presenting this proposal to the region. This stands in contrast to Evans’ recognition that Jakarta, who was attempting to articulate a common ASEAN position on the Cambodian conflict in the late 1980s, had to be supportive if Canberra’s proposal for a UN transitional authority in Cambodia was to gain traction (Frost 1997: 207 – 208).

Second, the Australia in the Asian Century (AAC) White Paper addressed a domestic audience as much as a regional one. Therefore, we should not expect that it was written with regional perceptions much in mind. Nevertheless, as the White Paper is skewed towards courting the Asian middle class, questions should be asked as to whether this is an appropriate constituency for furthering the cause of security communities. Third, mirroring the rise of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Canberra and Jakarta have been avid members of the Group of Twenty (G20), which eschews delineating regions based on geographical
proximity. However, as in the AAC White Paper, the jury is still out on whether the G20 rectifies Rudd’s (2009b) charge that neoliberalism ‘has been revealed as little more than personal greed dressed up as an economic philosophy’. Considering that functionalism is very much ‘an ideology of western capitalist powers’ whose endurance lies in its ability to present technical expertise and intervention as apolitical (Cox 1992: 171; Gill 1998), we should be attuned to the possibility that Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the G20 on social protection and remittances has the same pedigree.

It is evident from the preceding preview of the three case studies that the membership and ambit of what is to be governed by regional institutions differ, even as there is a considerable degree of overlap. In explaining this variability, Hameiri and Jones (2013) direct our attention to the intense contestations attending how non-traditional security issues are identified and governed. In an empirical sense, what we know as ‘globalisation’ is not particularly new – it has parallels with the proliferation of capital and railways in the late 19th century, seemingly unencumbered by national governments. Rather, what is more novel is that, especially since the dilution of the Keynesian welfare state, some sections of the Australian state, in order to solve common security challenges, have established coalitions with foreign constituencies and in ways which the state-centrism of IR would not have anticipated. For example, Slaughter (2004: 14) coins the term ‘transgovernmentalism’ to describe ‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide countries from one another’. In Cerny’s conception of the competition state, transnational elites share ideational linkages that are ‘traditionally associated in domestic-level political sociology with class, elite and “neo-pluralist” analysis’ (2010: 16). Be that as it may, it is not a foregone conclusion that all affected parties to a security problem are represented in the corresponding regulatory regime. Material and discursive resources are rarely distributed evenly, and these asymmetries affect the topography of regional institutions and orders. To appreciate what is at stake here, consider that the extent of a state’s territorial jurisdiction has implications for the size of internal markets and the number of people possessing convergent identities (Hameiri and Jones 2013: 466). So it also is with a regional institution, as a social relation and manifestation of power.
**Indonesia: conditional democrats**

In considering how post-Suharto democratisation conditions Australia and Indonesia’s participation in the regional institutions and orders discussed in this chapter, I sketch the two main assessments of Indonesia’s democratic transition. At first glance, these assessments are antithetical, as they have different intellectual forebears, namely the scholarship on the democratic peace and political economy. I contend that these assessments are not so much incompatible as elucidating different aspects of post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation, which explains the varying jurisdictions and qualities of the regional institutions under review.

The first verdict on post-Suharto democratisation considers that there is now a plurality of domestic actors and institutions which, although complicating calculations of the national interest, constrains state belligerence (Sulistiyanto 2010). Recall that the moderating influence of public opinion and repeated interactions between institutions which have a marked preference for non-violent conflict resolution are important Kantian rationales for the democratic peace (Chan 1997: 74). The Indonesian foreign ministry, which was largely a fiefdom of the military during the New Order, is now increasingly attuned to the uses of ‘soft power’, accrued from the alluring combination of democracy, Islam, and pluralism (Nabbs-Keller 2013). The Indonesian parliament has been similarly rehabilitated as an adjudicator of competing interests, given the negotiated nature of Indonesia’s democratic transition between New Order and moderate opposition elites, as opposed to a wholesale uprooting of authoritarian rule (Ziegenhain 2008: 189).

The effects of these liberal-democratic changes in Indonesia’s political institutions are primarily felt in the realm of foreign policy. The Bali Democracy Forum, while potentially having the same shortcomings of ineffectiveness as ASEAN, extends the boundaries of political possibility in ways which were not possible under Suharto. Jakarta was also at the forefront of efforts to establish an ASEAN ‘Security Community’, which if successful, would have included a standing peacekeeping force. Perhaps in recognition that such a force requires Southeast Asian states to attenuate the norm of non-interference and share threat perceptions, Jakarta has admitted foreign peace observers in Aceh, although not in West Papua (Acharya 2009: 265).

What is more conclusive about Jakarta’s attempts to weaken the stranglehold of sovereignty in ASEAN is that they collide with the ambivalent and occasionally antagonistic reactions of other member-states to Jakarta’s frequently-expressed
ambitions to be the ‘first among ASEAN equals’. As Rüland (2009: 379) puts it, 'Indonesia’s self-styled role as ASEAN’s “normative power” is regarded by fellow ASEAN members as a dual threat: it nurtures apprehension about Indonesian hegemony in ASEAN and, especially in the non-democratic ASEAN member states, fears of an erosion of domestic political stability’. More broadly, Ian Clark (2009) observes that international society has not satisfactorily reconciled its pluralist foundations and the growing – but by no means overwhelming – number of states and regional institutions which differentiate on the basis of whether their counterparts abide by democratic principles. In considering the potential for security communities to develop from regional orders, this equivocation by some Southeast Asian states towards democracy at the system level demonstrates that it matters where ideas about political organisation are applied. Therefore, Jakarta’s proposal for an ASEAN peacekeeping force was scuttled by other member-states. Acharya (2009: 267) considers that the ASEAN ‘Security Community’, as it now stands, is a ‘truncated version of the original Indonesian proposal’. In sum, the implications of the democratic peace are most evident in foreign policy – consider that projects of democracy promotion, such as state-building, are informed by the misleadingly parsimonious proposition that democracies do not fight each other. Yet, it is precisely in the terrain of foreign policy where competing considerations of geopolitics and security dilemmas abound. Concurrently, this privileging of foreign policy by the democratic peace theory means that it has less to say about the political economy and domestic politics of Indonesia’s democratic transition, which influence the material, and more broadly, non-national basis of regional institutions.

The second assessment of post-Suharto democratisation is decidedly materialist in flavour. The main proponents of this view are Robison and Hadiz (2004), who consider that the institutional trappings of democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia disguise their appropriation as vehicles of patronage by New Order elites. Government and opposition are not delineated by ideological differences, but by access to state resources. Rosser and Edwin (2010: 10) argue that the post-Suharto legal requirement on Indonesian conglomerates to address issues of ‘corporate social responsibility’ reflects the dominance of predatory interests within the Indonesian bureaucracy and political parties. For these oligarchic actors, the monetary contributions from companies for corporate social responsibility projects are advantageous in nurturing patronage networks for reelection purposes.
If the classical definition of democracy is ‘rule by the people’, political economists are quick to observe that this ideal is rarely characteristic of societies and states. In deliberating why the term ‘liberal’ is often affixed on democracy, Macpherson (1966: 39) argues that the liberal-democratic state, ‘like any other state, exists to maintain a set of relations between individuals and groups within the society which are power relations’. In a capitalist society like Australia, these asymmetrical relations stem from the lack of land or capital for most people, and hence they ‘have to work on someone else’s’ (Macpherson 1966: 42). Similarly, descriptors such as unconsolidated or patrimonial democracy, which have been used to characterise the domestic politics of post-Suharto Indonesia (Davidson 2009; Webber 2006), convey that some actors have more material or discursive resources than others, and hence democracy is not as ideal as it could be. Considering that the instrumental reasons for the establishment of regional institutions include the monitoring of state compliance and the reduction of transaction costs (Keohane 1989), actors who are disadvantaged by them have good reason to resist having their interests being governed by the regional institution in question. Therefore, an understanding of the political economy of Indonesia’s democratic transition, especially the resilience of oligarchic elites, sheds light on its role in influencing regional institutions as arrangements of partiality.

**Australia: bilateral preferences**

The previous section argued that Jakarta is increasingly prepared to reference democratic principles in its bid for regional leadership, although the politico-business oligarchy of the New Order is still very much a feature of Indonesia’s domestic politics. Nevertheless, in evaluating the prospects of Australia-Indonesia cooperation to create the kinds of regional institutions which would generate security communities, what occurs in post-Suharto Indonesia is only a partial account. Unfortunately, developments in Australian foreign policy over the corresponding period have imposed further obstacles to the fulfilment of security communities through the pathway of regional institutions. Bearing witness to the Asian financial crisis and East Timor’s independence crystallised Howard’s contention that as a foreign policy approach, bilateralism is superior to the lowest-common-denominator outcomes of multilateralism. If, according to the 1997 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, the Australian national interest is the ‘[military] security of Australia and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997), it is unlikely that Howard would subscribe to the constructivist argument that institutions perform socialisation functions and promote trust. Indeed, Downer (2000) would have no part in what he dismissed as ‘cultural regionalism’. In contrast, this key
constructivist insight underpinned Evans and Alatas’ promotion of cooperative security as the functional basis of the ASEAN Regional Forum, notwithstanding doubts over its effectiveness in resolving regional security challenges. In the discussion that follows, I marshal Ravenhill’s (2003) analysis of Australia subscribing to a ‘new bilateralism’ of preferential trade agreements and the renewed scholarly interest in the obstacles to Australia’s middle power diplomacy (Beeson and Higgott 2014) to explain why Australia-Indonesia cooperation on regional institutions has stalled in the post-Suharto period.

Even though reservations about APEC’s membership coherence, mode of operation and purpose have dogged it throughout its existence (Ravenhill 2000), it was the Asian financial crisis which precipitated widespread equivocation towards the grouping’s relevance and more generally, the efficacy of multilateral dialogue (Cheeseman 1999a; Wesley 2001). Many Asian member-states were disillusioned that the United States, with initial acquiescence from Australia, successfully nominated the IMF over APEC as the primary forum to undertake crisis-funding support, ‘with all the accompanying implications of painful restructuring processes’ (Higgott 2000: 270). As I argued in Chapter Three, it was the Asian financial crisis which changed the tenor of Australia’s Asian engagement, not Howard’s commitment upon assuming office in 1996 that he would privilege bilateralism over multilateralism. Indeed, as late as May 1997, Downer remarked that Asia is ‘more than a geographical concept’ and had become ‘a place of common concerns, and importantly, joint aspirations’ (1997). Downer’s comments about Asia referred precisely to the ‘cultural regionalism’ which he would repudiate in 2000, and which, in the early 1990s, had compelled Hawke and Keating to accept a consensual approach to regional trade liberalisation.

From the Asian financial crisis, there were two related developments which have implications for regional institutions and architecture (Tow and Taylor 2010). First, there was a flurry of regional initiatives predicated on a narrower East Asian identity, spurning the expansive Asia-Pacific conception of the region which Canberra had tried to cultivate (He 2011: 275). The regularisation of the ASEAN Plus Three forum, which includes China, South Korea and Japan, and the Chiang Mai currency swap arrangement, are testament to a reconsideration of the membership of regional institutions. For Canberra, despite protestations that it had provided practical help in the form of contributing to the IMF bailout packages for Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, it was rebuffed by Malaysia and Indonesia when a proposal was made to
link the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economics Trade Agreement (CER). However, not all Asian states were entirely persuaded of the merits of excluding Australia and the United States from regional institutions, especially those which consider their national economic interest to reside in expanding market access rather than insulating the developmental state. Bilateral preferential trade agreements, the second outcome for regional architecture from the financial maelstrom, were thus given a fillip, and Australia negotiated them initially with Singapore and Thailand, the more enthusiastic proponents of linking AFTA and CER. There are, according to Ravenhill (2003: 302), other reasons why there was a ‘new bilateralism’ in relation to trade liberalisation, such as the demonstration effects from other regions that bilateral agreements can be a precursor to international ones. Therefore, for Howard (2000), ‘many paths [could] lead to Bogor’, the latter a reference to the 1994 APEC summit which boldly declared that there would be ‘free and open trade and investment’ for industrialised and developing economies by 2010 and 2020 respectively. Nevertheless, for the purposes of considering why Canberra had lost its appetite for the regional initiatives which were so central to Evans’ middle power diplomacy, the institutional paralysis of APEC and ASEAN in resolving the Asian financial crisis cannot be underestimated.

Yet, Canberra’s post-financial crisis preference for bilateral relationships was not without its shortcomings, especially when measured against the yardstick of mutual identification and trust, the key attributes of a security community. Cotton (2009: 160) may well be correct when he argues that, referring to the ostensible durability of Australia’s regional relations after leading INTERFET, ‘the region must be disaggregated to comprehend the total response’. But the parsimony of bilateralism must be weighed against the unsubtle impression that Canberra was interested in Jakarta, and more broadly Asia only, for instrumental reasons, be they geopolitical (in)security or economic gains (Griffiths and Wesley 2010: 19). The pragmatism which Howard favoured in bilateralism was at odds with the diffused reciprocity, the expression of ‘some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism’, in a security community (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 31). Bisley (2004: 258) is critical of Australia’s preferential trade agreements because they betray an approach to the region which is ‘driven by short-term calculations of interest and advantage and not by a broader view of the gains to be had through a more consistent, community-minded and broad-based engagement’. Bisley’s reservations have significant import for an Australian state which is widely perceived to have no natural geopolitical region (Beeson and Yoshimatsu 2007).
Even when Rudd claimed to be pursuing ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, his diplomatic initiatives, when compared to Hawke and Keating, pale in terms of the instrumental currency of whether they succeeded or had widespread acceptance. Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community proposal, which I will discuss in the next section, and the difficulties of negotiating a post-Kyoto Protocol agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference at Copenhagen in December 2009, testify to the hollowness of his brand of middle power diplomacy. Much has been made by commentators of Australian domestic politics about the haphazard nature of decision-making under Rudd and the travails of minority government which Gillard had to contend with, and there is something in this when considering the incoherence of domestic actor perspectives and its implications for foreign policy. But on the ledger of Australian foreign policy, it should strike us as curious that Rudd (2008) did not attribute any relative weighting to the ‘three pillars’ – the US alliance, Asian engagement, and comprehensive participation in the United Nations – which constitute his conception of creative middle power diplomacy (Gyngell 2008). These three aspects of Australian foreign policy have always been concurrently present in one form or another since the 1970s, so it is difficult to see what was particularly novel about Rudd’s conception. This inability to consider the relation between the three pillars is a shortcoming which some scholars have seized upon in deliberating why Labor’s second bout of middle power diplomacy was so brittle.

Specifically, it is debatable whether Australia’s US alliance, especially in its unquestioning manifestations, is consistent with Asian engagement and the ‘generalised principles of conduct’ (Ruggie 1992: 571) that are the mainstay of multilateralism. Beeson and Higgott (2014: 229) argue that the asymmetry of the Australia-US alliance has ‘the potential to constrain the policy options available to strategically dependent allies’. In Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s (1993: 19) influential book on middle powers, they consider such states to ‘pursue multilateral solutions to international problems’ and embrace ‘compromise positions in international disputes’ among other attributes. What can be said about these behavioural characteristics of middle powers is that they disproportionately draw on what Young (1991) calls entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership, which although a preserve of great powers too, do not exhaust the sources of their power. It is also evident from Cooper and his colleagues’ definition that for middle powers to negotiate compromise positions, they either have to marginally deviate from the interests of great powers, or the latter have to acquiesce in accepting the compromise position which is being proposed.
This question of the options available to great powers in response to middle power diplomacy speaks to the double-edged nature of Cox’s (1987: 7) conception of hegemony, which is that it ‘ensure[s] the continuing supremacy of the leading state … but at the same time offer[s] some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful’. By most accounts, Cox’s understanding of hegemony is borne out by the US from the end of World War Two until the 1970s (Beeson 2003; Ikenberry 2001). For example, the US created and sponsored the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as underwrote the security accord between France and Germany in order to ignite West European integration. Such a demonstration of US hegemony has been in short supply since the Cold War ended, exposing the coercive elements of US power, as demonstrated in its unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 and intransigence towards the International Criminal Court. For the purposes of Australian foreign policy, Howard and his prime ministerial successors have been content to offer unqualified support to US unilateralism, as Rudd’s (2009c) declaration that the US alliance is the ‘bedrock’ of Australian security demonstrated. Canberra’s inability to conceive of the advantages of the US alliance as broader than the latter’s military preponderance undermines its credibility as a middle power, a key ingredient if Canberra intends to pursue coalition-building and good international citizenship.

Therefore, my argument is not that the US is irrelevant to regional institutions. On the contrary, the US is singularly positioned to organise tradeoffs and provide the public goods which liberal institutionalists argue are indispensable for the functioning of institutions amidst international anarchy (Mattli 1999). Rather, the point is, if Canberra is merely following Washington’s instrumental interests, as it has been since Keating, and arguably well before then, then there is little reason to expect regional states to look to Canberra for the resolution of security challenges which are hamstrung by realist thinking. Arthur Tange, the former Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, considered that the Colombo Plan hardly compensated for the ‘lack of Australian support [for the region] on more fundamental questions such as “American intervention” or “colonialism”’ (quoted in Gifford 2001: 178). The lack of independence from the US in Australian foreign policy has been a longstanding obstacle to identification, even at the elite level, with Asia. From the preceding sketch of the precipitating conditions in the development of regional institutions, I now elaborate how they vector the case studies under review.
Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community proposal

In June 2008, in an address to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, Kevin Rudd proposed an Asia-Pacific Community (APC) as the centrepiece of his foreign policy pillar of Asian engagement. Despite envoy Richard Woolcott’s regional consultations which led to a conference in Sydney in December 2009, Rudd’s proposal failed to materialise. This episode illuminates the obstacles to Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the development of regional institutions and orders.

As a window to the analysis that follows, I highlight two aspects of Rudd’s speech. The first aspect does not stand up to scrutiny and the second one is obscure if there is no attempt at clarification. First, he called for ‘a regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action’ on economic and security challenges (2008). However, it is hard to discern how Rudd’s proposal avoids duplicating the functions of ASEAN and its cognate forums such as APEC and the East Asia Summit. For one, Keating (2000) considers that APEC’s achievements extend beyond regional trade liberalisation to include an annual summit where leaders of the major regional states are in attendance. The 1999 APEC meeting in Auckland, where Jakarta was pressured to accept international assistance to quell the post-referendum violence in East Timor, demonstrates the malleable purposes of existing regional institutions which refute Rudd’s claims. Second, Rudd (2008) expressed a veiled concern that if his proposal was not acted upon, the region ‘run[s] the risk of succumbing to the perception that future conflict within our region may somehow be inevitable’. This statement, although ambiguous, reflects an appreciation that institutions can be harnessed for the management of relations between major regional states. Therefore, Rudd’s proposal (2008) makes glowing references to European integration, ‘where centuries of animosity have been transformed into an unparalleled degree of transnational cooperation’.

From these two aspects of Rudd’s address, I argue that post-Suharto bilateral cooperation in regional institutions was unforthcoming because the ‘ASEAN Way’ still has purchase over the workings of regional institutions. In addition, the management of geopolitical relations and what Clark and Reus-Smit (2013: 48) call ‘special responsibilities’ between great powers in the region is an undertaking in which middle powers such as Australia have limited input, especially if Australia is considered to be a proxy for US interests. These two explanations are related, as the minimalism of the ‘ASEAN Way’ allows great powers to postpone their responsibilities in negotiating a solidarist regional society, which may include the promotion of values that are also
germane to security communities, such as democracy and human rights (Goh 2011: 394). This assessment of the APC corroborates my argument in the previous sections that the obstacles to regional institutions in the post-Suharto period were the tensions generated when pluralist and solidarist regional societies, with their divergent conceptions of where democratic values should reside, overlap, as well as the diminishing credibility of Australia’s middle power diplomacy.

Jakarta’s response to Rudd’s APC proposal was decidedly lukewarm. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda commented that ‘we are still waiting for the results of the Australian study and consultation under the leadership of ambassador Woolcott. It [is] good that he has conducted consultations with many countries in the region. We are waiting to see what the substance of the Australian proposal is’ (quoted in Sheridan 2009). There is something in the widespread perception that Rudd’s proposal was hasty and unduly prescriptive, as articulated by Singapore’s ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh (2009) among others. However, this assessment is too general to have analytical import. Instead, I contend that Jakarta’s reticence can be distilled to the realist argument that rising powers are loath to bind themselves to the logics of appropriateness of institutions, and vice versa. Recall that Jakarta’s efforts to incorporate democracy as the basis of a solidarist regional society have not garnered widespread acceptance, since its smaller neighbours are anxious to preserve the state sovereignty which the ‘ASEAN Way’ affords to compensate for their lack of geopolitical clout. Either way, Canberra should not be surprised at Jakarta’s reluctance to cooperate on establishing an APC, since equally, there was speculation that Rudd’s rationale was to prevent a ‘Chinese Monroe Doctrine’ and an ‘Asia without the US’ (Maley 2010). These realist motivations are at variance with the double-edged nature of Evans’ middle power diplomacy in the early 1990s, which concurrently enhanced Australia’s geopolitical interest and afforded other actors some degree of autonomy and satisfaction. This appropriation of regional institutions for realist purposes elucidates Goh’s (2011: 390) argument that ‘the limits of the middle-ground, combination approach of complex balancing is that it could end up channelling great power balancing behaviour into a stagnant pool of non-military but still deeply political and ultimately non-productive blocking manoeuvres’.

If Jakarta’s response to the APC proposal was non-committal, the same cannot be said of its smaller neighbours, who rejected it outright. Realist indicators such as geopolitical clout, population size and aggregate economy mean that, as compared to the latter, Jakarta had less to be concerned with about being marginalised from any
proposed reconsideration of regional order (White 2013). Put alternatively, in Southeast Asia, Jakarta has arguably the most compelling case to be heard on how unequal power in the broader region is to be subdued, and legitimated through the provision of public goods (Goh 2011: 376). Therefore, geopolitical asymmetries explain why many of Indonesia’s neighbours put up a spirited opposition against the proposed APC. Thailand’s former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva cautioned that ‘both Japan and Australia proposed bigger communities, which is a test for us … ASEAN must be firmly integrated when we enter a bigger community’ (quoted in Goh 2011: 385). In the aforementioned opinion piece by Singapore’s Tommy Koh (2009), he dissented from the conclusion by the co-chairperson of the December 2009 Sydney conference on canvassing the form of the APC, Michael Wesley, that there is widespread support for a concert of powers, because this would ‘presumably replace ASEAN’.

For now, what can be said with some certainty is that, in explaining the failure of the APC proposal, the opposition of Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbours was more decisive than Indonesia’s guarded optimism towards what Rizal Sukma (2009) calls a ‘post-ASEAN’ foreign policy. Scholars who are sympathetic to constructivist approaches would characterise this assessment of the APC’s failure as a vindication of ASEAN’s ‘competence power’, that narratives of accomplishment and a common destiny are as, if not more, important than coercion in explaining actor behaviour (Eaton and Stubbs 2006: 146). This notion of competence power supports Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 39) contention that power in a security community can be ‘understood as the authority to determine shared meaning’. Be that as it may, ASEAN has never been able to shake off the criticism that it is no different to a pluralist regional society (Leifer 1999: 28). Acharya’s (2004) characterisation of ASEAN as a ‘localisation’ of the European Union attests to the influence of corporatist and organicist ideas in the former. Burke’s (2007: 109) objection to organicist mottos within the nation-state, such as Indonesia’s ‘Unity in Diversity’ (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), is that they ominously portend the ‘tranquilisation of political life’ by state elites, which obstructs the emancipation and mutual identification required for a security community. Therefore, while ASEAN successfully thwarted the APC’s establishment, ASEAN’s justification that it already constitutes a security community has to be regarded with much scepticism.

In canvassing why ASEAN’s claim to be a security community is unconvincing, Goh (2011: 386) argues that the Association’s ‘carefully constructed self-insulation from
the vagaries and dangers of external power politics’ can only go so far in fostering a solidarist regional society, much less a security community. On the other end of the spectrum, from the lens of great powers, Clark and Reus-Smit (2013: 45) challenge the oft-cited tension between interstate order and human justice, proposing instead the notion of great power ‘special responsibilities’ to capture the shifting boundaries of what are often understood to be irreconcilable concepts in IR. They contend that the ambit of these special responsibilities has expanded in the post-Cold War period, from the maintenance of interstate order to the relative infrequency of utilising Security Council vetoes to frustrate humanitarian intervention. These contributions from English School scholars demonstrate that power is indispensable in developing a solidarist regional society, mirroring Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 39) observation that ‘power conventionally understood can be an important factor in the development of a security community by virtue of a core state’s ability to nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance’. This is in marked contrast to Acharya’s (2009: 185) argument that ASEAN is leading Asian regionalism by default and from a position of geopolitical weakness, since the great powers are wary of each other’s ambitions toward regional institutions.

Therefore, a solidarist regional society, while offering more than its pluralist counterpart, requires great powers to negotiate what Clark (2001: 61) calls the ‘regulative peace’, namely the normative instruments by which a peace settlement is ‘justified, defended, and possibly modified’. The regulative peace may encompass the promotion of social justice and solidarity, but the point of the aforementioned English School scholars is that the contents of the regulative peace have to be endorsed by the great powers. The negotiation of a regulative peace in the region is an undertaking which, in a geopolitical sense, Jakarta has a more compelling claim to than Canberra, but the latter does itself no favours by mimicking the strategic preferences of Washington. Considering the scholarship on the behavioural dimension of middle powers claims that they can overcome structural constraints through multilateralism and rules-based diplomacy (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993: 19), it is not evident what Canberra can contribute of late to regional institutions which cannot be read off from Washington. What Keating (2012) laments as Australia’s ‘[trading] down in the big stroke business’ of regional institution-building is magnified because, as compared to how the APEC Leaders’ Meeting was established in the early 1990s, China has now unambiguously joined the ranks of great powers in the region and ‘does not need [Australia] to help construct its foreign policy’. Therefore, there was little evidence of Australia-Indonesia cooperation in realising Rudd’s APC
vision because many of Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbours were opposed to it. Yet, to the extent that the pluralist ‘ASEAN Way’ remains diplomatically salient, it blights the prospects of a solidarist regional society which could offer pathways to the emancipation and social justice in security communities. What English School solidarism entails is principally a matter for great power negotiation, and while this excludes Australia by virtue of geopolitical weight, Australia has detracted further from its case to be included by unquestioningly adopting the strategic preferences of the US.

**Gillard’s *Australia in the Asian Century* White Paper**

The previous section on the APC highlighted a state-centric perspective on regional institutions, namely that they are proxies for the balance-of-power, with some modicum of possibility that they can herald a solidarist regional society. More broadly, IR has a territorial bias (Agnew 1994), engendering the aforementioned perspective that regional institutions have no autonomy beyond what states countenance and rendering invisible flows of capital, displacement, and risk which traverse territorial boundaries. What Cornwall and Brock (2005: 1047, 1057) argue in relation to the ‘buzzwords’ of development policy is applicable to regional institutions too, that the discursive ‘chains of equivalence’ which connect neoliberalism, ownership, and accountability stem from the frame of reference which dominant actors use to interpret the world. Juxtaposed with Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities, it is ‘the knowledge that represents categories of practical action and legitimate activity’ (1998a: 40) which is of interest, delving into the political contestations of what constitutes practical action and legitimate activity. With these comments on the partialities of regional institutions in mind, I argue that Julia Gillard’s *Australia in the Asian Century* (AAC) White Paper reflected a neoliberal vision of Asian engagement, one which did not promote the emancipation and mutual identification, bar the instrumental variant, required in security communities.

Released in October 2012 at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the White Paper articulated the economic targets and benefits of Asian engagement by 2025. Widely commented upon in the newspapers was the economic benefit that Australia’s average real national income will be about $73 000 per person in 2025, an increase from $62 000 in 2012 (Coorey 2012). The White Paper also envisaged, among other goals, that a third of board members in Australia’s top 200 publicly listed companies and Commonwealth bodies ‘will have deep experience in and knowledge of Asia’
The middle class of Asia and Australia, defined instrumentally as ‘households with daily expenditures of between US$10 and $100 per person’, occupied pride of place in the Australian government’s Asian Century (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 63). The middle class’ mobility and ‘desire for higher quality, and potentially tailored, goods and services’ inform the White Paper’s unusually liberal interdependent and comprehensive visions of security – ‘[Australia] seek[s] security in a broad sense … security must be sustainable in all its meanings – workable, defensible, viable and maintainable’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 63, 224; see also Barker 2012). As the White Paper was oriented around the ‘national’ economic interest of Asian engagement rather than Australia-Indonesia relations, we should not expect to find the latter as a systematic feature of the White Paper. Rather, the White Paper’s import is that a particular constituency traversing Australia and Indonesia, the middle class, was seen as emblematic of Asian engagement. For the purposes of security community development, this is problematic for two reasons. First, underpinning the allegedly monolithic middle class are different political economies in the region, which complicates what constitutes practical action and legitimate activity. Second, even if the political economies of Asia and Australia are homogeneous, it is not evident that the middle class is the appropriate harbinger of a security community between Australia and Indonesia.

It is not necessary to revisit the voluminous literature on the pathways of democratisation to illustrate that states have differing conceptions on how economics and politics intersect (Grugel 2003). Suffice it to note that what Gareth Evans (1994a) called ‘convergence’ in the early 1990s, the assumption that Asia and Australia would share liberal-democratic values as the former undergoes economic growth, has not been unambiguously realised. Primarily, this is because in many parts of Asia, the state is the midwife of industrial capitalism, and hence the middle class has little instrumental appetite to clamour for democratisation (Rodan 1996: 6). This causation is diametrically opposed to the White Paper’s assumption of liberal interdependence, which traces its intellectual genealogy to capital interests overthrowing the feudal state. Recall how we saw earlier in the chapter that, government and opposition in post-Suharto Indonesia are not delineated by programmatic differences but by differing access to state resources. To quote Robison and Hadiz (2004: 232), ‘political parties have been less a vehicle to advocate contending policy agendas than machines for the capture of the terminals of patronage’. Therefore, in a speech to the Melbourne-based Asialink in May 2012, what Australia’s ambassador to Indonesia Greg Moriarty (2012) lamented as Indonesia’s economic nationalism is less
attributable to, as he claims, the ‘unevenness investors experience from time-to-time
in a fast-growing emerging economy’, than to manifestations of what dominant actors
in Indonesia consider to be the national economic interest. More broadly, amidst the
tempest of the ongoing global financial crisis, Stubbs (2011: 159) argues that it has
given a fillip to developmental state coalitions as the Washington Consensus wavers.

The point of these observations on the gamut of politico-economic arrangements in
the region is that these arrangements have consequences for the practical action and
legitimate activity which constitute knowledge in a security community, key questions
which are overlooked by the White Paper’s soaring projections of liberal
interdependence. The knowledge of political economy may be trivial when economies
are booming, but as Canberra discovered during the Asian financial crisis,
protestations of practical help in the form of monetary contributions to IMF bailout
packages were insufficient to prevent regional states from initiating cooperative
projects which shunned identification with Canberra’s preferred Asia-Pacific identity.
Therefore, Robison (2012) speaks to these concerns over politico-economic
organisation when, in his submission to the White Paper task force, he questions if
the Asian Century cursorily describes a ‘shift in economic weight across the globe’ or
portends ‘new ideas about how economic and political life as well as cultural practices
will be organised’.

To the extent that references to convergence have disappeared from Australia’s
diplomatic lexicon, it does not reflect Canberra’s recognition that politico-economic
organisation is variable and contingent. Rather, notwithstanding Keating’s diplomatic
support for authoritarian leaders as a controversial aspect of Asian engagement,
successive Prime Ministers since have recoiled from issues of political belonging and
responsibilities raised by Asian engagement. As Baogang He (2011: 282) observes,
Rudd’s promotion of Asian literacy, a key focus of the White Paper, can be interpreted
as a Western state attempting to be familiar with Asia, rather than fostering a family
which is broadly synonymous with the mutual identification and solidarity in security
communities.

Therefore, even if we admit the implausible contention that the political economies of
Asia and Australia are homogeneous, it is not evident that the Asian middle class, as
the ideal constituency of the Australian government’s Asian Century, is the opposite
harbinger of a security community. Its unsuitability stems from the White Paper’s
aspirations for the Asian middle class to be cogs of neoliberalism whose primary
motivation is to consume more goods and services. Notwithstanding that the Asian middle class can and does resist the instrumental characteristics attributed to it by the White Paper, this constituency is not immune from Falk’s (2009: 78) critique of global corporate elites masquerading as world citizens, that they hardly contribute to global public goods and are indifferent to the welfare of all planetary species.

In thinking about how Falk’s comments on political belonging pertain to a security community between Australia and Indonesia, George and McGibbon’s (1998) warning about the ‘dangerous liaisons’ of Asian engagement as neoliberal foreign policy remains instructive. Written at around the same time as Canberra’s foreign and trade policy White Paper failed to anticipate the human suffering of the Asian financial crisis, they argued that the unevenness of capitalist development and its failure to account for economic externalities had precipitated significant social tensions and ecological destruction in regional states, not least Indonesia (1998: 405). More to the present, Canberra’s efforts to address global warming, a not insignificant source of displacement and risk in Indonesia, have been circumscribed by the ‘expansionary [and] consumer-oriented logic of capitalism’, especially that espoused by Australia’s iron ore and coal industries (Beeson and McDonald 2013: 341). Therefore, the valorisation of the Asian middle class in the AAC White Paper creates two obstacles to a security community between Australia and Indonesia. First, the White Paper ignores the divergence in political economies between Australia and Indonesia. This is a divergence which binds the Indonesian middle class to the Indonesian state and its oligarchs, not the Australian middle class. Second, and more fundamentally, the White Paper’s privileging of conspicuous consumption as the basis for identification fosters social anomie and dislocation across the region. The AAC White Paper continues the lineage of Canberra conceiving of Asian engagement in largely instrumental terms, devoid of ethics and responsibility. These partialities of the White Paper transcend changes in government, so long as the national interest provides legitimation for self-centred behaviour (Camilleri 2003: 432).

Australia, Indonesia and the Group of Twenty (G20)

The AAC White Paper’s privileging of the middle class as the centrepiece of Asian engagement demonstrates that regions are not always geographically organised. The scholarship on regionalism has increasingly recognised, to quote Katzenstein (2005: 36), that while regions are ‘given’ by geography, they are ‘made’ through politics. Jayasuriya (1994: 412; his emphasis) similarly alludes to the political contestations which underpin regions when he defines regionalism as ‘a set of cognitive practices
shaped by language and political discourse, which through the creation of concepts, metaphors [and] analogies, determine how the region is defined’. For example, Hameiri (2013: 329) considers the politics of scale to be significant in explaining why some coalitions vigorously insist that their interests be regionalised and therefore placed beyond domestic accountability, while others arrive at the opposite conclusion. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 33) also argue that ‘a shared identity need not be tied to contiguous space’, although their example of Australia as a physically distant member of what they call a Western security community can be alternatively interpreted in the vein of a shared subscription to US hegemony and neoliberalism among other instrumentalist explanations. The Group of Twenty (G20), which Cooper (2010: 741) characterises as an ‘improvised crisis committee’ to address the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 – 09, is an example of a group which is not premised on geographically proximate states. Bringing together developed and developing states to lend an imprimatur of legitimacy to resolving the GFC, the G20 is an increasingly prominent aspect of Canberra and Jakarta’s diplomacy. Brisbane hosted the Leaders’ Summit in November 2014, seemingly supporting Rudd’s (2011) contention that G20 membership is the ‘absolute core’ of Australia’s foreign policy, providing Australia with ‘a platform to engage directly (not indirectly through the proxy of others) on the critical challenges of the global economy, the environment and climate change’. My scepticism regarding the G20’s achievements stems from its repeated failures in addressing global warming. Regardless, Yudhoyono (2009) also considered the G20 to be ‘representative of a multi-civilisation global community’.

In the next section, I canvass the foreign policy motivations for Australia and Indonesia’s participation in the G20 and review their bilateral initiatives under the G20’s auspices. From this discussion of precipitating conditions, I argue that bilateral cooperation in the G20 is promising because the G20 circumvents intractable tensions between geography and history in Australia’s regional diplomacy and provides a diplomatic setting for Jakarta to experiment with a broader foreign policy which is not unduly restricted by ASEAN. Yet, considering the G20 is beset by criticisms of legitimacy deficits and being narrowly concerned with macroprudential financial regulation (Helleiner 2010: 622), the most we can expect of Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the G20 is that it foreshadows solidarism rather than a security community.

The GFC, the proximate reason why the G20 was brought out of relative obscurity and upgraded from a meeting of central bankers and finance ministry officials to that
between heads-of-government, has been detailed elsewhere (Baker 2010; Beeson 2011). Suffice to say that the GFC was not just a financial maelstrom, but extended to the erosion of what Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital, in this instance, of neoliberalism. Translated to Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 40) conception of security community development, the knowledge – what constitutes practical action and legitimate activity – of the Washington Consensus has been widely challenged. As Prime Minister, Rudd (2009b) declared that the neoliberal ‘emperor has no clothes’, although questions can be asked of how thoroughgoing his implementation of social democracy was. Taxpayers’ dissatisfaction at bearing the brunt of public expenditure cuts and having to rescue financial institutions which impose moral hazard on the public has crystallised countervailing societal interests which are dispersed during periods of economic growth (Baker 2010: 652). Equally, it is unsurprising that a sense of Schadenfreude abounds in parts of Asia, considering the IMF strenuously advocated financial deregulation to stave off the Asian financial crisis (Helleiner 2010: 629).

Although the ideational fortunes of neoliberalism have waned, the G20 has not adequately addressed questions of legitimacy in global financial governance, as well as global warming. These shortcomings undermine the principles of consent, avoidance of serious harm and sustainability in Held’s (2004: 389) conception of cosmopolitan values. Sooderberg (2010: 529) argues that the G20 perpetuates neoliberalism in core states, since ‘systematically important’ emerging economies, namely those which receive large private capital flows, are now incorporated and disciplined to structure their institutions in ways which are agreeable to the market. As the host of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in 2014, Tony Abbott went to great lengths to exclude global warming from its agenda (Cox 2014). Therefore, the G20 does not promote widespread identification, although in terms of state interactions, the G20 is an increasingly prominent component of Canberra and Jakarta’s foreign policies.

As the G20 is an amalgam of developed and developing economies, Australia’s participation ameliorates the perpetual need to reconcile its geography and history in its regional diplomacy. It is worth recalling that the Asian financial crisis spurred regional initiatives which were predicated on a culturally-defined East Asian identity, much to the chagrin of Australia, having contributed $1 billion each to the IMF packages for Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. Therefore, Australia’s participation in the G20 accentuates its middle power credentials, especially on issues which are delineated on a functional rather than geographical basis, as the
Cairns Group (Higgott and Cooper 1990) and the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons demonstrated in an earlier period.

For Indonesia, participation in the G20 is a tentative demonstration of a broader foreign policy which is not limited by ASEAN. Marty Natalegawa argues that ‘in any international forum, including ASEAN and [the] G20, Indonesia will bridge different views between nation-states and show Indonesia’s moderate and strong views’ (quoted in and translated by Hermawan et al. 2011: 42). Notwithstanding the establishment of an ‘ASEAN G20 Contact Group’ to coordinate the positions of the ASEAN states (Hermawan et al. 2011: 76), Indonesia is the only ASEAN country to be represented in the G20. Recall that compared to the vociferous opposition of Singapore and Thailand to Rudd’s APC proposal, Indonesia’s response was more ambivalent. Regardless of the form regional institutions will take in the foreseeable future, Indonesia’s inclusion is assured because of its geopolitical significance. It should also be noted that Singapore is leading the Global Governance Group (3G) to press for the views of small and middle powers to be included in the G20’s deliberations, leading Slaughter (2013: 47) to question if, with Australia and Indonesia as members, ‘the G20 is consistent with the principle of multilateralism and existing forms of multilateral cooperation’. Therefore, the G20 moderates the diplomatic obstacles which prevent Australia and Indonesia from realising their potential for middle power activism in the region. For Australia, these obstacles are ideational, and for Indonesia, they are rooted in the pluralist regional society which is ASEAN.

The 2010 G20 Leaders’ Summit in Seoul tasked Australia, Indonesia and Italy to co-chair the ‘Growth with Resilience’ section of its inaugural Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. The Action Plan stipulates that the three countries are to prepare proposals on how social protection systems and international remittances can insulate communities in developing countries from external financial crises (G20 2010: 7). More scholarly work is required to cut through the swathe of governmental and think-tank reports on the G20, which is beset by what Soederberg (2010: 532) calls the ‘disappearance of history and politics from policy discourse’. For now, we can accept that elite socialisation has occurred over the course of elaborating what constitutes ‘Growth with Resilience’, without supposing that a security community is being forged over Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the G20. In other words, while the G20 has potential to become a solidarist regional society, it is unlikely to be a security community.
The reasons why bilateral cooperation in the G20 does not foster a security
community reside not in the minutiae of these bilateral interactions, but in broader
factors pertaining to the G20’s legitimacy deficit and absence of a comprehensive
vision for global financial governance. In other words, while Canberra and Jakarta do
not have to contend in this forum with tensions between geography and history and
the insistence of smaller ASEAN states on the sanctity of state sovereignty
respectively, for the purposes of security community development, they nevertheless
have to address these limitations of the G20.

Although there is something in Rudd’s observation that efficiency and
representativeness can be at cross-purposes in institutions, 41 it is not evident that the
G20 has satisfactorily reconciled these two considerations. Given that it is possible to
conceive of the G20 as an extension of the G8’s modalities, both forums demonstrate
what Finnemore (2005: 204) calls a ‘like-mindedness’ of numbers rather than some
principled manner which guides behaviour in circumstances that may not be
expedient for members. The reservation of the aforementioned Global Governance
Group (3G) is that powerful states are unilaterally instituting rules which affect the
international community, as problematic as this latter term is (Ellis 2009). In short, for
the 3G, the G20 has not demonstrated that it embodies the ‘generalised principles of
conduct’ which are germane to Ruggie’s (1992: 571) definition of multilateralism. A
more trenchant critique of the G20 is that it has not articulated a widespread
‘consensus around a broader economic ideology of the kind’ which the Bretton
the G20’s technocratic focus on macroprudential regulation, namely the rejection of
the efficient market hypothesis, overlooks the G20’s inability to ‘provide the basis for a
wider-ranging reordering of political and social relations, or for new social pacts, and
… an alternative growth model’. It should be acknowledged that what Ruggie (1982)
calls the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the Bretton Woods institutions is perhaps unique,
established in the aftermath of World War Two and amidst a far more unassailable
dominance of the US (Helleiner 2010: 621). Nevertheless, Baker’s critique, when
extrapolated to Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 43) conception of security community
development, means that the G20 hardly exemplifies an institution which facilitates a
belief in a common destiny.

41 The relevant quote is, ‘[s]ome now argue for a G193 – to gain the perfect legitimacy of the
total membership of the UN. But with perfect legitimacy comes equally perfect ineffectiveness
in dealing with the complex, dynamic and potentially destructive beast called the global
economy’ (Rudd 2011).
Conclusion

Compared to the regional aspirations of the 1995 Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on regional institutions and orders has been decidedly patchy. For Indonesia, attempts to promote a foreign policy premised on democratic principles have not been welcomed by its smaller, and therefore, sovereignty-conscious ASEAN neighbours. The political economy of post-Suharto Indonesia reveals further obstacles to creating a security community, especially the decentralisation of corruption and New Order-era elites’ usurping of democratic institutions. In the period under review, Howard resiled from multilateral initiatives and subscribed to an understanding of the US alliance which is limited to Washington’s military strength. It should be noted that this instrumental conception of the US alliance extends to Howard’s Labor successors. Middle power diplomacy, a potential pathway to a security community but hardly its substitute, was erased from Howard and Downer’s foreign policy repertoire.

The fortunes of Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community proposal, Gillard’s *Australia in the Asian Century* White Paper, and Australia-Indonesia cooperation in the Group of 20 can be elucidated by the aforementioned sketch of post-1998 Australian and Indonesian foreign policies, supplemented by perennial themes in Australia’s Asian engagement. Rudd’s APC proposal failed to gain traction because the smaller Southeast Asian states were anxious to ensure that the diplomatic centrality of ASEAN to regional institutions is maintained. In addition, regional states were cognisant that the APC proposal barely disguised Canberra’s eagerness to circumvent the then exclusion of the US from the East Asian Summit. Even when Australia and Indonesia were cooperating to promote particular visions of regional institutions and orders, it is not evident that these proposals lent themselves to the emancipation and social justice of security communities. The AAC White Paper privileged the middle class for its consumerism, perpetuating a longstanding economic bias in how Canberra has approached the policy of Asian engagement, largely devoid of ethical responsibility. Bilateral cooperation in the G20 can facilitate elite socialisation on the virtues of macroprudential regulation. In addition, the G20 is not delineated by geographically proximate states, which means that the tensions between Australia’s geography and history and some ASEAN states’ disapproval of Indonesia’s democratic leadership do not come into sharp relief. However, it is far from clear that the G20 adequately reconciles the tensions between efficiency and representativeness in institutions, and offers a vision of a widespread common destiny.
In the next chapter, I consider why post-Suharto democratisation has not made much difference to how Canberra and Jakarta interact on the asylum-seekers which traverse their territories. If anything, democratisation in Indonesia has exacerbated the obstacles to a diplomatic solution which enshrines the right of asylum-seekers to seek refuge. The primary explanation for the cul-de-sac of Australia, Indonesia, and regional states shuffling asylum-seekers from one territory to another resides in the incompatibility between democracy as a universal value and the nation-state’s circumscription of political belonging.
Chapter Six
Asylum seekers and the pluralist security of Australia and Indonesia

The acrimonious dispute between Canberra and Jakarta over the asylum seekers traversing their borders provides the most conspicuous evidence that a security community is absent. Regarding the condition of widespread mutual identification, only 30 percent of respondents in the 2013 Lowy Institute Poll agreed that ‘Indonesia helps Australia combat people smuggling’ (Oliver 2013: 13). More tellingly, if we arrange the explanations for peaceful conflict resolution on a continuum based on their dependence on instrumental force, there are occasions when even the presence of a pluralist society of states which minimally observes Westphalian sovereignty is doubtful. Abbott’s proposal in August 2013 to unilaterally purchase Indonesian fishing vessels which might otherwise be used to transport asylum seekers, even if widely criticised for its unfeasibility, provoked Jakarta’s ire that its sovereignty was being impinged upon. More generally, there is a persistent impasse in reasoning which explains why, after over a decade on from the MV Tampa’s arrival, the domestic political debate on asylum seekers in Australia shows no sign of abating. Regardless of the number of refugees which Canberra admits, both humanitarian constituencies and those more inclined towards punitive measures are unlikely to be mollified. This impasse suggests that we need to interrogate how this debate is framed, consistent with what Robert Cox calls critical theory.

This chapter argues that a security community will not transpire from bilateral cooperation to deter asylum seekers because it is premised on preserving national homogeneities, the antonym of widespread identification. Asylum seekers, and if their claims are successful, refugees, are taxonomically unintelligible outside the pluralist society of states which affords much latitude to its members, short of transgressing territorial borders, to determine the composition of their national communities (Haddad 2008; Hurrell 2011: 89). This autonomy applies equally to source countries from where persecuted minorities are fleeing, and the economic basis of migration in destination states such as Australia. In this respect, given that economic worth defines Australia’s migration programme and increasingly its domestic social interactions, there is a greater imperative to assert Westphalian sovereignty in relation to a particular group to assuage the economic precariousness of the rest. Because asylum seekers in large numbers are perceived to impose undue economic costs and undermine sedimented notions of national identity, Canberra’s hostility
towards asylum seekers extends to Jakarta, whose reluctance in preventing them from leaving for Australia is also in its pluralist national interest.

This chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I argue that neoliberal restructuring is an important precipitating condition in elucidating the pernicious treatment of asylum seekers amidst the growth of regular, economic migration in Australia (McNevin 2011). The second section argues that post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation is salient to the extent that asylum seekers transiting through Indonesia are harassed by localised forms of authority, consistent with Aspinall’s (2011: 312) assessment that patronage networks constitute Indonesia’s present ‘deep architecture of politics’. However, geopolitics eclipses these everyday obstacles when asylum seekers surface, whether they are detained at Christmas Island or the subject of labyrinthine population transfers. This argument is demonstrated through an examination of the interaction of structure and process categories in Adler and Barnett’s framework, the subject of the third to fifth sections. The managerialism of the Bali Process hardly transcends the prejudice of discrete nation-states. In addition, bilateral cooperation to intercept asylum seekers in Indonesia is governed by national security considerations, as opposed to the rule of law. Finally, the sixth section argues that bilateral cooperation on the exclusion of asylum seekers does not herald widespread identification. Adler and Barnett underestimate how the lodgement of identity and society within the nation-state, which is how the issue of asylum seekers is framed, weakens widespread identification. Pluralism does not just denote separate legal jurisdictions, but also the relations of rule of the nation-state. These relations are never entirely effaced in communities which are bounded by nation-states.

**Neoliberal economies and irregular human movements**

In October 2012, Tony Abbott (2012) gave a speech in Jakarta where he observed that ‘people smuggling has become a first order economic and security issue’ for Australia. Implicit in his statement was the idea that the same cannot be said of Indonesia. Indeed, Abbott (2012) reflected that ‘if Australia wants Indonesian cooperation in dealing with our first order issues, we need to cooperate even more closely with Indonesia on its first order issues’. Hugh White (2013) echoes this sentiment of divergent priorities, arguing that Australia’s appropriation of its bilateral relationship with Indonesia to ‘[deflect] domestic political pressure’ on asylum seekers is not in keeping with Indonesia’s geopolitical ascent. These observations indicate that the exclusion of asylum seekers does not exercise Canberra and Jakarta in equal
In Chapter Five, I argued that suspending the presumption of methodological nationalism reveals a community centred on the middle classes of Australia and Indonesia, which is generally synonymous with material interests. Compared to Hawke and Keating’s conception of Asian engagement, there is now little expectation that the middle class will be the harbinger of democratisation in Asia, problematic as this assumption was. There is, in short, an accelerating shift of the axes of political belonging from the territorially bounded citizen to the dictates of capital. Howard and his successors have presided over a marked increase in regular migration, from an annual intake of 73,587 migrants in 1996–97 to 184,998 migrants in 2011–12 (DIBP 2014, Table 3.2). Crucially, the composition of the migration programme now favours skilled migrants over family reunification, that is, it reflects an instrumental demonstration of one’s utility. The latter group has fallen from 50.5 to 31.7 percent of new arrivals over the corresponding period (DIBP 2014, Table 3.2). An important clue as to why asylum seekers are treated punitively lies in a frequent refrain of Howard (2010: 395) and other politicians, namely that ‘public support for orthodox immigration’ is contingent on Australia ‘[controlling] its borders’. I contend that this formulation is more convincing when presented in the negative. Because asylum seekers are not justifying their inclusion into society on economic grounds, they generate antipathy from the many who are enfeebled by the state-sanctioned materiality of social interactions, not just in relation to the economic basis of Canberra’s migration programme, but extending to the casualisation of the workforce and the increasing inequality in private incomes. Essentially, the social dislocations of neoliberalism are weighed on a group which is scarcely to blame for them.

We cannot appreciate how states can privilege non-citizen interests if we are wedded to the Hobbesian dichotomy of international anarchy and a unified, domestic hierarchy. While many can readily pinpoint developing and failing states for being buffeted by particularistic interests, they are unable to take the same scalpel to developed counterparts such as Australia. This is because these elite interests are often congealed and institutionalised in the latter, while political contestation is more apparent in the former. Nevertheless, even an examination of the Australian context can correct the Hobbesian external-internal straitjacket, illustrating that states are not
‘neutral places for legislative deliberation, but expressions of power, profoundly unequal terrains which, reflecting social inequalities, promote some interests while marginalising others’ (Jones 2009: 391). The account of neoliberal restructuring in Australia is a familiar one. From 1983, Hawke and Keating initiated what is known as economic rationalism in response to Australia’s lacklustre performance in manufactured exports, itself part of a wider crisis of stagflation. In so doing, they retreated to a conception of civil citizenship, the first rung of T.H. Marshall’s graduated account of citizenship which primarily comprises the ‘rights’ to sell one’s labour to underpin the elaboration of bourgeois property codes (see Sparke 2006: 156). Suffice to say that economic restructuring is never politically neutral, since it buffs some groups more than others, such as those affected by the discontinuation of services in rural areas. Compensatory policies directed at low-income earners provided some measure of relief from privatisation, although these largely addressed its symptoms rather than causes.

For our purposes, the more significant move by Howard to arrest the electoral appeal of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party was his deflection of the anomie associated with globalisation onto what McNevin (2011: 74) calls ‘carefully constructed scapegoats’, especially but not limited to asylum seekers. Even before the terrorist attacks of September 2001, in response to an increased number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq arriving by boat, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock was already observing that ‘the information that is available to us suggests that whole villages are packing up and there is a pipeline’ (quoted in McNevin 2011: 76). In addition to asylum seekers, trade unions and community groups organised around justice goals were derided as ‘special interests’ (Burke 2008: 182). However, this designation does not extend to big business and its collaborators in government which have disproportionately benefited from neoliberalism. Therefore, the vilification of asylum seekers serves to deflect anxieties over the dislocations of economic rationalism, while keeping its basis and palatial constituencies intact. Foreboding advertisements warning asylum seekers arriving by boat that they will never be settled in Australia under Rudd’s Papua New Guinea ‘solution’ of July 2013 appeared in local newspapers more often than in foreign ones.

State elites often impose social and territorial regulation on the dispossessed, necessary to obfuscate the recognition that asylum seekers, to take an emblematic example in the Australian context, are symptoms of powerful, if camouflaged, relations of inequality. If realism is a poor guide to the intentions of states and peoples
amidst neoliberalism, these actors nevertheless still seek ontological security, namely a stable cognitive environment established by the systematic relation of ends to means for agency to be meaningful (Mitzen 2006). The routine and prohibitive cost of detaining asylum seekers performs such a function for the Australian state, supporting Mitzen’s (2006: 342) contention that ontological security is compatible with ‘harmful or self-defeating relationships’, which is preferable to the ‘unsettling condition’ of being uncertain of one’s own identity. Therefore, as long as a community is comprised of nation-states, they will be anxious to retain their distinctiveness, and not entirely cede their identity to the community.

Reordering political belonging in post-Suharto Indonesia

The policing of asylum seekers is a priority for Canberra because it is a diversion from the recognition that state elites, not just in Australia, are active participants in undermining the national community with market dictates. The displacements of the market produce asylum seekers, who border policing reacts to (Marfleet 2006). Conversely, without the diplomatic pressure from Canberra, asylum seekers are less salient in understandings of what defines the Indonesian nation-state. I develop this argument with reference to Aspinall’s (2011: 312) assessment that patronage networks constitute Indonesia’s present ‘deep architecture of politics’. The primary consequence of the politics of patronage for asylum seekers transiting through Indonesia is that they are more likely to be affected by localised forms of authority, such as criminal gangs and civil patrols, than the national ascription of political belonging. Essentially, the problem when conceived thus is one of institutional incapacity amidst democratisation and decentralisation, which as long as asylum seekers are bound for Australia, is not a priority for Jakarta. But when the responsibility to deter asylum seekers is the subject of bilateral cooperation insisted upon by Canberra, Jakarta is only all too ready to take up the cudgel of the pluralist national interest.

Owing to its conspicuousness, scholars have given violent conflict of all hues in post-Suharto Indonesia a wide airing, conveying a impression that what needs to be analysed is the innateness of violence in Indonesian society. Besides pogrom-like clashes between ethnic groups, some of which display institutional and secessionist dimensions, our attention is also directed to paramilitaries, vigilantism and other comparable acts allegedly motivated by primordialism. Arguably, there are residues of the politics of vague rumours and allegations which was pervasive under Suharto, in
which mysterious ‘criminals’ abounded in the tabloids, justifying the New Order’s will to rule (Barker 1998). Nevertheless, agglomerating different types of violent conflict, usually as a mapping of datasets, overlooks the sociological processes which produce violence.

In this respect, Bertrand (2008) argues that what requires explication is the temporal clustering of violent ethnic conflict in Indonesia, peaking between 1995 and 2002, and then subsequently tapering off, even if it remains spectral in everyday state repertoires. For him, 2002 marked Megawati Sukarnoputri’s contingent embedding of institutional predictability, demonstrated in the rejection of an Islamic state, concluding peace agreements in Sulawesi and Maluku, as well as the repealing of discriminatory measures against the Chinese minority (2008: 443). The similarities here with prior regime upheavals and the renegotiation of what Aspinall (2011: 312) calls a ‘deep architecture of politics’, of which violence is but a manifestation, are striking.

Nationalism is more compellingly conceived as a discursive and material field within which political action is summoned to realise the nation-state (Sidel 2012: 120), than any romanticised notion of the people. This is especially discernable in Indonesia’s case, concurrently imagined as secular but religious, singular but diverse (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), suggesting that national models, namely the institutional architectures establishing how individuals, groups, and ideologies are to be recognised, have to be interpreted and jostled for (Bertrand 2008: 435).

For now, the institutional imprint of ethnicity in Indonesia is limited to idioms, rather than ‘impressing ethnically-defined interests’ on the state (Aspinall 2011: 299). This assessment of ethnicity in Indonesia is attributable to the critical junctures of post-Suharto institutional design, such as decentralising political and fiscal authority to second-tier districts rather than provinces, and the requirement for district heads and their deputies to be elected on the same ticket. These choices promote the patronage networks which influence allegiances in Indonesia, yet ethnic claims are one level removed from state institutions (Aspinall 2011: 313).

Of course, ethnicity is not the only axis on which the nation-state pivots; language, location, and religion are notable axes too. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the instrumental and clientelist tenor of post-Suharto ethnicities provides an important clue as to the obstacles facing asylum seekers as they travel through Indonesia. They are more likely to be harassed by localised forms of authority, such as criminal gangs and civil patrols, than the national ascription of political belonging. This dovetails with
Barker and van Klinken’s (2009) account of institutional patchiness in Indonesia, resulting in various non- and semi-state actors, made through unequal personal relationships, claiming to be sanctioned by the state. As long as asylum seekers are, in the main, bound for Australia, Jakarta is unlikely to unilaterally strengthen its institutions to detain them. Wong (2005: 91) observes that frontier borderlands in Southeast Asia, where asylum seekers and people smugglers converge, are largely marginal to the concerns of state elites. Canberra’s insistence that Jakarta intercepts asylum seekers is at odds with the longstanding existence of substantial illicit cross-border movements of commodities, including labour, in Southeast Asia, dating back to pre-colonial times and often with the complicity of state representatives. Rather, given the context of post-colonial independence, these state elites are more preoccupied with what Krasner (1999: 3) calls international legal sovereignty, namely ‘the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence’. Therefore, for an Indonesia which is in the midst of democratisation and decentralisation, ‘the touchy question of sovereignty is not necessarily, or not yet, identical to that of immigration control at the border’ (Wong 2005: 91). In contrast, Australia’s concern with excluding asylum seekers reflects what Krasner (1999: 4) calls interdependence sovereignty, that is, ‘the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state’.

**The pluralist national interest in the Bali Process**

Jakarta’s lacklustre record in preventing asylum seekers from leaving for Australia rankles with Canberra, interested to demonstrate that the territorial nation-state is still a meaningful category of political belonging in the throes of neoliberal restructuring. The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, founded and chaired by Canberra and Jakarta since 2002, prides itself on a ‘cooperative framework approach’ to manage irregular movement in the region (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2011: 3). Downer’s (2004) assessment was that the Process ‘has been successful in creating a regional environment in which countries are increasingly cooperating at political and operational levels to combat people smuggling and trafficking’. These sanguine characterisations are largely misplaced for two reasons. First, the Bali Process was mooted in response to what Brennan, writing in 2007, calls ‘the fourth and biggest wave of boat people in modern Australian history’, with the 8300 asylum seekers arriving between mid-1999 to mid-2001 doubling those who had arrived since 1989 (2007: 48). Jakarta’s cooperation to deter asylum seekers was hardly assured in 2002, as the bilateral relationship teetered...
over East Timor’s independence and Howard’s deputy sheriff gaffe. To the extent that the Bali Process was even established, it is doubtful that this was an outcome of what Adler and Barnett (1998a: 38) call ‘new interpretations of social reality’ as a precipitating condition for security community development. Brennan (2007: 49) suggests that a significant quid pro quo for Jakarta agreeing to ‘appear at the table’ was Canberra relinquishing any countenance of an international tribunal to try Indonesian military officers for human rights violations in East Timor. Fairfax Media’s Indonesia correspondent, Michael Bachelard, echoes this notion of differing motivations towards the Process. Reflecting on the April 2013 ministerial meeting, he observes that ‘Indonesia and dozens of other countries are conscripted into a political debate, which really runs only in Australia’ (Bachelard 2013).

The second and fundamental reason why we should be sceptical of effusive assessments of the Bali Process as an exemplar of regional cooperation to manage asylum seekers lies in the partiality of the pluralist nation-state, which is how Canberra and its counterparts frame the issue. This reservation is not reducible to differing preferences, but highlights the relations of rule of the nation-state which Adler and Barnett ignore when they conceive of it as the fundamental unit of analysis. The need for cooperation arises because policymakers are socialised to think in terms of source, transit and destination states, establishing an insolubility of interests. These nomenclatures are what Nyers (1999: 4) describes as limit-concepts, expressing the foundational ‘limits of a certain logic of intelligibility’, in this case, the national community. Hence, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) notes that ‘while all states have a strong interest in better managed systems, the goal of managing migration may be quite different from state to state … Reaching shared goals is a prerequisite for carrying out joint capacity-building measures’ (quoted in Taylor 2005: 576). Often, it is not even clear what these shared goals are, as when Kevin Rudd and Chris Bowen (2011) lauded the 2011 Bali Process ministerial meeting, the supposed framework, for its adoption of an ‘regional cooperation framework’. Meanwhile, so-called readmission agreements between destination and source countries of asylum seekers are particularly difficult to administer, because state elites in the latter are not unaware of the remittances involved or that asylum seekers are blemished in ways which are inconsistent with elite conceptions of the nation-state (Ellermann 2008: 169).

State reflexes explain the pointed choice of the term ‘process’ to designate cooperation in this area. Predictably, they manifest in the ASEAN Way defining the
Bali Process. After enumerating the core principles on which a cooperative framework is to be founded, the Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 2011 Bali Process meeting qualifies that they are voluntary. In any case, the Statement (2011: 2) declares that it is of a ‘non-binding nature’. Therefore, and ominously for Canberra, there is arguably more than just the spurning of its unilateral actions motivating former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s insistence that ‘everything should be under the framework of the Bali Process’, meaning that everything is contingent and could be altered. As Greg Sheridan (2013) puts it, ‘the Bali Process is a synonym for glacial inactivity, but without the average glacier’s sense of urgency’. Wesley’s (2007: 194) explanation of Jakarta’s surprising alacrity to co-chair the Process back in 2002, that its ‘governance prestige’ was precariously perched after the Asian financial crisis, is exactly that, and cannot be extrapolated to demonstrate that Jakarta has been persuaded to identify with Canberra’s interest in deterring asylum seekers.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the Bali Process raises the question of what sort of relations of rule Canberra is attempting to impart to Jakarta. The aforementioned core principles acknowledge ‘human life and dignity’, but they are to be fulfilled in the context of ‘orderly migration’, ‘consistent assessment processes’ and if not found to be refugees, during repatriation to countries of origin (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2011: 3). These regulations are reminiscent of Immigration Minister Gerry Hand’s (1992: 2621) justification in 1992 that the introduction of the mandatory detention of asylum seekers was necessary to cordon off ‘open-ended doctrines of natural justice and unreasonableness’. In other words, the relations of rule of the nation-state determine where human dignity is realised. The Bali Process seeks to fortify national homogeneities, which hardly promotes widespread identification. To the extent that Jakarta is socialised by the Bali Process, it is an identification bounded by institutionally dominant states. Hence, Indonesia’s Head of Immigration Detention Djoni Muhammad reacted with incredulity to Canberra’s proposal in November 2012 to increase its refugee intake and accelerate processing periods for asylum seekers in Indonesia. According to Muhammad, Canberra’s proposal ‘would just be like an advertisement. Other people waiting in Malaysia and other places would immediately come here saying “it is good in Indonesia; it is a much swifter process there”’ (quoted in Roberts 2012).

State predilections are evident not only in the operation of the Bali Process, but also in its very establishment, adding to the pitfalls of what Alter and Meunier (2009) call international regime complexity. Essentially, this characterisation of regimes is a
variant of the realist refrain that extra-state organisations are vehicles for the pursuit of state interests. There is no shortage of politicians in Australia who begrudge the Refugee Convention, with former Immigration Minister Scott Morrison lamenting that its ‘protection has been extended to people who are flying halfway around the world’ (quoted in Cullen 2012). This mirrors the patent aversion of most Asian states, including Indonesia, to accede to the Convention, which Davies (2006: 570) attributes to the Eurocentrism in its founding deliberations and the identification of who qualifies as a refugee. In this respect, the inclusiveness of the Bali Process’ membership, now encompassing forty-five states, reflects rather the collective smothering of the Refugee Convention, than a gravitation towards Canberra’s co-leadership. Put alternatively, there is scarcely a regional community which is not derivative of the particularistic interests of its members. Therefore, while it is plausible that deeper and wider institutionalisation binds the behaviour of hegemonic actors, it is not inconceivable either for regime proliferation to attenuate previously negotiated focal points, and, if mandates are contradictory, to dilute all actors’ sense of legal probity (Drezner 2009: 66).

Nevertheless, regime complexity privileges the well endowed, by virtue of their wielding of ideational and material resources to direct common epistemes. The latter often transcends reified structures of institutional boundaries, such as those between nation-states in the Westphalian international system. Canberra has adjudicated the background knowledge of the Bali Process by prising spontaneous asylum seeking from the refugee regime to what Betts (2010: 16) calls the travel regime, whose stock-in-trade is passports and official documents – being legal, in short. Background knowledge, as defined by Adler (2008: 202), does not mean that actors’ stated preferences will be homogeneous, but is antecedent to them, structuring differences around pervasive understandings of reality. In other words, the prevarication of regional states, citing sovereignty, towards Canberra’s crusade of criminalising people smuggling, is distinct from their acceptance of Canberra’s portrayal of asylum seekers as illegal. Jakarta often demurs from cooperating with Canberra on deterring asylum seekers, but this does not mean that the two neighbours do not share common albeit pernicious epistemes on the latter. For example, Indonesia’s head of diplomatic security, Sujatmiko, in response to a standoff with 254 Sri Lankan asylum seekers off the port of Merak in October 2009, noted that ‘for the Indonesian Government these people are illegal people, illegal immigrants and the place for them is actually the jail’ (quoted in Rodan 2011: 175). Just as the refugee stabilises the territoriality and identity of nation-states, so the travel regime confines asylum seekers
in transit countries through the requirement for official documentation, enabling Canberra to surreptitiously argue that it still observes *non-refoulement* (Betts 2010: 26).

In one of the few scholarly analyses of the Bali Process, Wesley (2007: 174 – 200) glowingly appraises its managerialism, which focuses on ‘governance shortfalls, levels of policy competence and expertise, and gaps in the supervision of common problems’. He contrasts this to ‘politics’, which provocatively frames issues in terms of incompatible jurisdictions, rights and responsibilities. Wesley (2007: 182) claims that, prior to the establishment of the Process, politics explains the inability of asylum seeker arrivals to foster a solidarist society between Canberra and Jakarta, much less a security community. Thouez and Channac (2006: 381) are also sympathetic to explanations of benign, technocratic lesson-drawing in the proliferation of regional consultative processes in the field of irregular migration, content to assume that ‘by their very nature, they explicitly lead to convergence and harmonisation of migration practices’. Arguably, pointed nationalistic statements such as Howard’s ‘this sort of analysis [decrying Canberra’s intransigence towards the *Tampa’s* disembarkation on Christmas Island] always assumes Australia is wrong and Indonesia is right’ have receded (Wesley 2007: 181), although there is still a latent resignation cum resentment at Jakarta’s rejection of Canberra’s peddling of the purported merits of turning asylum seeker boats back. This resignation hints at how interstate tectonics in population management are presently channelled, mirroring respectively Welch’s (2012: 331) distinction between ‘noisy’ and ‘quiet’ means of excluding asylum seekers, the latter including the stonewalling of refugee claims through labyrinthine population transfers. Hence, when asked to confirm whether Canberra had requested Jakarta to play a greater role in intercepting asylum seekers, Defence Minister Stephen Smith (2013) said that ‘the most important thing is working together, not just bilaterally, but working together within our region to do everything to stop the movement [of boats]’.

In addition to the Bali Process, the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA), established in 2000, features the International Organisation for Migration as another bureaucratic midwife of geopolitical asymmetries. Under this arrangement, Indonesian authorities intercept asylum seekers suspected to be travelling to Australia, transferring them to IOM for case management and care, only after which a second referral to UNHCR for determination of refugee claims occurs (Nethery et al. 2013: 95). Canberra funds the Agreement and its pursuant network of detention
centres. Hence, the IOM inserts bureaucratic distance and regularity into what is fundamentally a transfer of populations between hierarchically situated states, occasionally by force as performative reminders and more commonly through prolonged periods of legal limbo in transit states (Collyer 2012: 290; Mountz 2011: 125). To the RCA one might add the innumerable ‘solutions’ Canberra has attempted to foist on regional states over the decade – Pacific, Malaysia, East Timor, and Papua New Guinea – all of which are premised on limiting unplanned access to the shrinking migration zone.

In the final analysis, managerial frames scarcely conceal the parcelling into national populations as a, if not the, pillar of Westphalian governance, rendering intelligible the irrepressible urge to label and deport (Hindess 2000: 1494). If the intention of the Bali Process is to exude professionalism, it is in the vein of how Edward Said understands this term, the attitude of ‘not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontentious and unpolitical and “objective”’ (quoted in Sullivan 1998: 422). It remains that the movement of people across territorial borders, in this case the non-nationals of a prospective pluralistic security community, has a radically different character to that of intrastate movements because of this governance system of national populations. This aspect of the nation-state’s relations of rule is far more significant than what Adler and Barnett’s (1998b: 7) understatement of pluralistic security communities as occurring between the ‘legal independence of separate governments’ allows for. The Bali Process is able to concentrate on ‘the collaborative development of policy capacity’ only after ‘potentially divisive issues [are] noted and shelved’, two points which Wesley (2007: 197 –198) makes in isolation. A community of practice, of which security communities are a subset, is characterised by self-restraint, endowing practitioners with a sense of joint enterprise (Adler 2008: 199). However, this shared commitment is lacking in the Process, where commentators continue to evaluate it in Manichean terms such as ‘Canberra cannot just waltz into the Bali Process and expect its regional partners to cooperate [on regional assessment centres]’ (Douglas and Schloenhardt 2012: 23). More trenchantly, Wesley betrays a statist bias of primarily describing extra-state institutions in terms of their efficacies, while justice and accountability are vernaculars reserved for the territorial nation-state (Devetak and Higgott 1999: 489). It is difficult to appreciate how the wellbeing of the Indonesian people, let alone refugees, can be the basis of mutual identification if justice is confined to the nation-state. In the next section, I use the
Oceanic Viking’s extended voyage in October 2009 and other ‘upstream disruption’ initiatives in Indonesia to reiterate the predilections of nation-states.

**The Oceanic Viking in between decentralisation and national security**

In October 2009, the *Oceanic Viking* rescued 78 Sri Lankan asylum-seekers in Indonesia’s search and rescue zone. Although a prior bilateral agreement stipulated that those rescued from private vessels were to alight in Indonesian territory, this incident was unique because it involved an Australian government vessel (Ford, Lyons and Palmer 2010: 29). Hence, an ad hoc arrangement was negotiated between Rudd and Yudhoyono for the asylum-seekers to disembark in Indonesia. In post-Suharto Indonesia, Canberra cannot assume the President’s consent is sufficient for implementing its objectives. Although the asylum seekers eventually disembarked in the Riau Islands, vociferous objections to that place being, in the words of Governor Ismeth Abdullah, a ‘dumping ground’, were a marked change from what had been expected under the centralised and authoritarian New Order. Nur Syafriadi, the speaker of the Riau Islands’ legislature, claimed that the arrival of the asylum seekers was a ‘humiliation’ and his province ‘is not the place for accommodating people like this’ (quoted in Allard and Coorey 2009). Notably, the governor relented to what Rudd and Yudhoyono agreed only after receiving assurances that the asylum seekers would not be forcibly compelled to leave the vessel and their stay, or more accurately detention, on the Riau Islands was to be limited to four weeks before shuffling them on again. These demands were, on the main, complied with (Ford, Lyons and Palmer 2010: 31). On a decision-making level, the *Oceanic Viking* episode demonstrated that Canberra’s erstwhile assumption of its national interest to be singularly found in influencing policymakers in Jakarta, especially the President’s office, is now tenuous.

Nevertheless, once the media’s attention is engaged, my argument on asylum seekers primarily buffeted by localised forms of authority in Indonesia, matched by authorities’ nonchalance towards their means of subsistence and onward departure to Australia, is diluted, regardless of the stratum of government. Syafriadi’s barbed quip of ‘why would not Australia accept them? Australia is famous for accepting human rights and providing humanitarian assistance’, coupled with his earlier misgivings, could as conceivably have been uttered by a politician from Jakarta (quoted in Allard and Coorey 2009). Compared to Australia, Indonesia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention. This is not to put Canberra on a moral pedestal, since it selectively picks the UNHCR and IOM’s competencies to administer and legitimise its regional solutions. This is an example of what Betts (2010: 16) dubs ‘bypassing
without overtly violating’ the Convention, supporting English School and institutionalist perspectives on the constraints of regimes on overtly aberrant behaviour. However, this veneer of legitimation is dispensed with in the Indonesian context; if asylum seekers are the subject of media attention and geopolitics, they are simply illegals and deportable at sovereign whim. Tellingly, Canberra does not expect nor persuade Jakarta to be a ‘good international citizen’ by subscribing to the Refugee Convention.

Therefore, Canberra spares little expense in outsourcing the edifices of sovereign deportation to Indonesian locales – a shift of the governance logic of refugees from the law to national security (Bashford and Strange 2002: 511). Nowhere is this more apparent than the inclusion of irregular migration in Canberra’s 2010 Counter-terrorism White Paper, telling for its content as much as its very appearance in a national security document. It approvingly notes that the Border Management Capacity Building Partnership, known by its Indonesian acronym CEKAL, ‘facilitates the detection of people of immigration concern and assists in preventing … irregular migration across the Indonesian archipelago’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 39). This formulation is intelligible only when seen from the localities not bound by the Refugee Convention (McNevin 2011: 88). Abbott also justifies his ‘turning back the boats’ policy in terms of sovereignty, arguing that this action is ‘simply a matter of course … What happens outside of Indonesia’s waters is really, in a sense, something that the Indonesians are not directly involved in’. Predictably, Mahfudz Siddiq, the head of Indonesia’s parliamentary commission for foreign affairs, rejoined that ‘with [the] wrong perception, even Indonesia could pull out from these cooperative agreements regarding people smuggling’ (quoted in Ireland 2013).

Another avenue of uncovering the regional wastelands and annexes of national security rationalities is discerned in the nominal legality of seeking asylum in Australia. The spleen then directed at people-smugglers, prominent during the Rudd years, is linked to calls for Jakarta to criminalise this ‘evil trade’, highlighting a disjuncture in criminal justice systems. As Pickering (2004: 226) observes, the crevices in which Indonesian laws cannot be made equivalent with those in Australia then assume, in the Westphalian scheme of things, an appellation of national security for bilateral cooperation to occur. Finally, the detention centres dotting the Indonesian archipelago, as they also are on the edges of the Australian territorial imagination, are prison-like. This subtle distinction is important because it locates detention centres within the genealogy of quarantine and enemy internment (Bashford and Strange 2002: 511). There is no expectation that asylum seekers can be rehabilitated through
labour, punitive or otherwise, since they are not there for an infraction so statutorily defined.

It might be supposed that a community could be forged on the joint and widespread enterprise of punitively treating asylum seekers. Presumably this is what Yudhoyono had in mind when he lamented that

> Australia and Indonesia, we are both countries that have become victims. We have been victims of this act of people smuggling. Many citizens arrive from other countries and give us burden. They give us social burden. They give us economic burden. When some continue their journey to Australia, that brings more burden. Together, Australia and Indonesia can overcome this issue and the solution lies in cooperation (quoted in Hawley 2013).

However, because both Canberra and Jakarta conceive this issue through the prism of foreign policy, in the Hobbesian sense of ‘all actions of state directed in whole or part outside the boundaries of the state’ (Gyngell and Wesley 2007: 19), Yudhoyono’s expectation of cooperation is unlikely to occur. How asylum seekers should be treated is a vociferous debate in Australia because, as I argued, deterring them is a diversionary reminder that the territorial nation-state is still a meaningful category of political belonging despite neoliberal restructuring. There is a foreign policy dimension to the domestic debate on asylum seekers, in that other states have to be enlisted in preventing asylum seekers from reaching Australian territory, which is what the Bali Process seeks to do, through the harmonisation of relevant national policies. To the extent that post-Suharto democratisation and decentralisation is significant, the fragmentation of authority means that asylum seekers can travel around Indonesia largely unimpeded. This has not weakened Jakarta’s international legal sovereignty, which has little to do with whether it can regulate the whereabouts of people. But when Canberra imposes the exclusion of asylum seekers as a foreign policy cum national security issue upon Jakarta, it activates an insolubility of interests wrought by foreign policy’s dichotomy between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy which holds that pluralist order is best maintained if there are discrete national populations. This is despite the reality being rather incongruous, with clichéd visions of globalisation in Australia and Indonesia, and porous territorial borders in the latter. Members in a pluralistic security community not only have the ‘legal independence of separate governments’ (Adler and Barnett 1998b: 7), but they also have discrete foreign policies to safeguard imagined national communities from unwanted others, and to pursue what they consider to be the autonomous national interest. As far as
asylum seekers are concerned, the prospects for a security community between Australia and Indonesia are dim not because of any political system they might share, but from the prejudices of separate nation-states – Australia and Indonesia are thought to be destination and transit states respectively – toward (some) non-citizens. Haddad (2008: 51) echoes this point, observing that 'as a concept the refugee could not exist in the universitas because she is only created when boundaries are erected'. Yet, these boundaries and the partialities they impart remain intact in Adler and Barnett’s framework and the statist notion of foreign policy. Next, I survey the process categories in the second tier of Adler and Barnett’s framework, arguing that the transactions conveying representations of asylum seekers are unsupportive of mutual identification between Australia and Indonesia.

**Transactions and the representations of asylum seekers**

For the journeys of asylum seekers to have geopolitical significance, it would be remiss not to consider the role of transactions, especially those circulated by the media, in (re)producing hegemonic boundaries and identifications. When Adler and Barnett (1998a: 39) speak of a series of social interactions that transform the milieu in which states and their peoples are embedded, they clearly do not mean, at the risk of exaggeration, casting the widest net on unstructured conversations as such. Rather, in an Andersonian voice, they envisage changes in social narratives in which people cognitively locate themselves. These storylines underpin the social institutions and formal organisations which we objectify and accept as common sense. To the extent that there are shifts in social narratives in the post-Suharto period, it is in the direction of alienation towards asylum seekers and the Indonesians who do little to prevent them from reaching Australia. Scholars are in general agreement that the media deploys binary tropes such as law-abiding versus criminal and genuine versus bogus to efface identification with asylum seekers (McDonald 2005; Pickering 2001). Regarding the refusal of the Sri Lankan asylum seekers to disembark from the Oceanic Viking onto Indonesian territory, journalist Michelle Grattan (2009) echoed realism’s concern about the anarchical perils of any undermining of the sovereign when she wrote that

> for [Canberra] to have to change its tune and take them [to Christmas Island instead] would be a big backdown, ... taking the bigger issue of Australia’s border protection policy into uncharted waters.

The controversy occasioned by Scott Morrison’s insistence in 2013 that the Immigration Department call asylum seekers arriving by boat ‘illegals’ also
demonstrates that what is at stake is not just the political language of the media, but its vectoring of the boundaries of collective identification linking Australia, Indonesia, and asylum seekers. Stephen Ames, the Canon of St. Paul’s Cathedral in Melbourne, observes that the illegal appellation creates ‘[the impression in the community that] they have broken a law, there is something wrong here’ (quoted in Griffiths 2013a).

I agree with Linklater’s (1992) observation that at its broadest, politics is the study of how and why social actors include and exclude each other. Thus conceived, states are ‘systems of inclusion and exclusion’ (Linklater 1992: 78). A key aspect of a state’s ontological security is its ability to define what it is not, and hence asylum seekers are often characterised in opposition to a pristine and homogenous Australian national community. It may well be inescapable that social actors define themselves in contradistinction to others, but there is little trace in the media’s Manichean depiction of asylum seekers that the foreigner plays a pivotal role in nourishing political communities instead (Nyers 2003: 1075). Arguably, immigration provides regenerative evidence that Australia remains choiceworthy (Nyers 2003: 1077), relevant if a prospective Australia-Indonesia security community is to compellingly argue that it is normatively more appealing than other regional security arrangements predicated on military force and analogous regulative instruments. We can entertain alternative explanations that members in a pluralistic security community are less likely to engage in military conflict with each other because of, for example, the disciplining influence of markets rather than mutual trust. Regardless, these alternative explanations do not detract from Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 53) argument that the institutions of security communities are more inclusive and autonomous than those of contending security arrangements, which is negated when asylum seekers, or any constituency, are surveilled by military-like methods.

Consequently, it is tempting to recommend an antidote of desecuritisation, a reversion to the proceduralism of democratic politics in the vein of the Copenhagen School, to sever the epistemes which conflate asylum seekers, national security, and Indonesia. Such an antidote requires a protracted process of political contestation. Arguably, what Adler and Barnett call pluralistic security communities are comparatively rare as a security arrangement because the development of mutual trust between states in an anarchical international system is painstakingly glacial. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 46) note that ‘the social construction of trust shifts our attention to the beliefs we have about others, beliefs that, in turn, are based on years
of experiences and encounters’. But when Julia Gillard (2010) spoke of having ‘open and honest’ discussions about asylum seekers upon coming to office, she palpably was not initiating a conversation on how the public can identify with asylum seekers, much less Indonesia. Her comment that ‘it is wrong to label people who have concerns about unauthorised arrivals as “rednecks”’ is instructive here (Gillard 2010). McDonald (2011: 284) argues that the Copenhagen School does not ‘provide the resources to assess different forms of deliberation in terms of their progressive potential’. This vacillation of (de)securitisation, since many contemporary issues would be resolved by being designated as security concerns, stems from the coexistence in the Copenhagen School of Schmittian influences, discussed in the next section, and its considerable success in democratising the security appellation to non-military fields, especially in IR scholarship and practice (Aradau 2004: 394). Thus framed, the issue of how to manage asylum seeker arrivals is reduced to choosing between securitisation and desecuritisation, yet it is not immediately obvious what the choice should be, since both contain their own pathways of propagating and severing mutual identification.

I highlight this securitisation versus desecuritisation straitjacket, a lacuna of the Copenhagen School, because it mirrors a prevalent conception of community which is enthusiastically endorsed by Canberra and Jakarta. Before discussing this conception, it is worth reiterating that in Adler and Barnett’s framework, community shoulders much of their explanation on how peaceful conflict resolution is fostered. Specifically, what community presently entails for Australia has to sufficiently expand to encompass the interests and narratives of the Indonesian polity, and vice versa. Although Adler and Barnett (1998a: 37) envisage that states remain ‘free agents’ in a pluralistic security community, crucially, the individual preferences of member-states are ‘cognitively framed by the shared understandings of the community’. Adler and Barnett’s expectation of a degree of equivalence between the identity and interests of the member-state and pluralistic security community is barely fulfilled by bilateral cooperation to exclude asylum seekers, the objective of which is to fortify national homogeneities. We need only consider the ease with which Jakarta threatens to annul the intelligence-sharing cooperation on people smuggling whenever there is a bilateral dispute to ascertain the absence of diffused reciprocity, that is, transactions

42 Rawdon Dalrymple, the Australian ambassador to Indonesia from 1981 to 1985, echoes this point, observing that fifteen years of democratisation hardly begins to erase the path-dependent legacy of military dominance over Indonesian politics and society which impinges on where Australian diplomats believe influence resides in Indonesia. Interview, Sydney, 17 July 2012.
premised on obligation and responsibility rather than immediate self-interest, regarding the stemming of asylum seeker arrivals.

The bilateral impasse over asylum seekers is emblematic of where Canberra and Jakarta, extending to anyone who is inclined to think nationally, understand community to inhere. Whenever the subject of values and ethical possibility in foreign policy is mooted, Canberra engages in a continual slippage between community and nationalism. Its foreign policy White Paper of 2003 declares that ‘Australia’s identity is strong. We have developed our own distinctive culture and sense of confidence’ (DFAT 2003: vii). There is little evidence in this crude conception of how the ‘foreign’ conditions notions of Australian citizenship (Beeson and Jayasuriya 2009). Neither is there any inkling that foreign policy is a hazard at Cartesian mastery that ignores the fundamental interdependence of animals, humans, and the ecosystem (Burke 2013). An alternative way of underscoring this limited vision of community is to consider that Canberra and Jakarta often deploy the rhetoric of values to alienate each other. To take a conspicuous example, after the INTERFET intervention, Howard (1999: 10029) declared in his ‘home truths’ speech to Parliament that ‘these links in our history [to Europe and America] are not an embarrassment to be lived down – quite the contrary. We have stopped worrying about whether we are Asians … We have got on with the job of being ourselves in the region’. Leaving aside Howard’s partial recollection of Canberra’s involvement in East Timor, his speech demonstrated that for Canberra, values are to be a marker of superiority and difference with especially Jakarta (Burke 2010: 80). This triumphalism is at odds with Adler and Barnett’s argument that visions of community have to be malleable and extended beyond the nation-state for pluralistic security communities to take root. Yet, there is a sense in which their call to recast community is unattainable if we are obeisant to Gyngell and Wesley’s (2007: 275) contention that nationalism ‘is the most powerful force holding societies together’. In the final section, I reflect on whether the unremarkable conclusion that mutual trust on asylum seekers is ephemeral between Canberra and Jakarta is a nonstarter, since Karl Deutsch and his successors are caught in a territorial trap between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities (Agnew 1994). Their reification of the nation-state also sheds more light on the inability of Canberra and Jakarta to conceive of community and society as anything other than a monolithic entity, which correspondingly deals with asylum seekers and other security issues in a challenge versus resistance dichotomy.
Asylum seekers and the amalgamated-pluralistic divide in Adler and Barnett's conception of security communities

By now, it is evident that as far as asylum seeker arrivals are concerned, mutual trust and identity – the defining features of the third tier of Adler and Barnett's framework – only exist as an interstate, 'conspiracy of silence' mimicry between Canberra and Jakarta. In the short period of time since Abbott assumed office, he has demonstrated a proclivity to enlist the cooperation of regional states to detain asylum seekers by being blasé about what he calls the 'grandstanding' of West Papuan activists and the ‘difficult things’ of the civil war in Sri Lanka (quoted in Doherty 2013). The state-centrism in International Relations theory and practice explains their assumption that order and justice are best realised by a pluralist society of nation-states. However, in order to attain this ideal of a sedimented nation-state, webs of power relations have to be formed and affirmed (McSweeney 1996). Hence, asylum seekers are discordant with the economic basis of Australia’s immigration programme and some groups in source countries such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are persecuted because of ethnically-framed differences, which Abbott seeks to dismiss. Equally, Jakarta is loath to accept asylum seekers from the Middle East because, as Dewi Anwar Fortuna bluntly observes, ‘they would be social burdens to Indonesia. [In any case], they did not want to come to Indonesia’ (quoted in Lane 2013). From the isolated perspective of individual nation-states, it is apparent that this moulding of national communities is discriminatory, displacing some people beyond territorial boundaries while buttressing other groups. Indeed, for Bull (2002 [1977]: 56), states have the contingent variability of institutions, especially when states have to ‘suppress irreconcilable agitators or heal social cleavages’ to maintain domestic order and legitimacy. Maley (2003: 189 – 190), quoting Ullmann-Margalit, argues that the state's control of people movements is little more than a ‘norm of partiality’, since interdependence sovereignty is but one of several forms of sovereignty in Krasner’s conception. It is also the dimension that is more tenuous than the rest, given globalisation. However, from the societal perspective that order and justice are best assured by the minimal coexistence of nation-states, those who are displaced as such do not find ready acceptance from other nation-states which consider themselves completed components of this pluralist society. Refugees are created from the womb of sui generis and irreconcilable national interests in a pluralist society of nation-states, underpinning Haddad’s (2008: 51) aphorism, recalled earlier in this chapter, that ‘as a concept the refugee could not exist in the universitas because she is only created when boundaries are erected'. Dynamics of displacement and consolidation thus coexist uneasily in English School
pluralism, which are activated when Adler and Barnett propose constructing security communities on the canvas of pluralistic nation-states.

More modestly, even if we accept Adler and Barnett’s combination of self-regarding nation-states and mutual trust which constitutes the parameters of their framework, there is a scarcity of regularised decision-making on asylum seekers, stymieing dependable expectations between Australia and Indonesia. Trust is built on iterated knowledge and experience which promises that, despite uncertainty, others will act in a consistent manner (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 46). For a security community to eventuate, this behaviour has to be supportive of peaceful conflict resolution. Yet, in response to Jakarta’s refusal to accept around sixty asylum seekers rescued by an Australian vessel off the south coast of Java in November 2013, Scott Morrison lamented that ‘there is no real rhyme or reason to [Jakarta’s actions]’ (quoted in Griffiths 2013b). Jakarta’s unpredictability is illuminated by the Foucauldian insight that the sovereign compensates for its inability to dictate every minutiae of one’s life by fostering various disciplines and panopticons, including the episodic demonstration of sovereign power. Accordingly, Foucault’s insight is also germane to the Australian state. As Rajaram (2004: 222) observes, asylum seekers represent an area of bilateral cooperation in which the normal law cum declared site of political interactions, what Adler and Barnett (1998a: 40) refer to as the legitimate activity that facilitates mutual trust, has to transgress itself for territorial sovereignty to be meaningful. In other words, asylum seeker arrivals incapacitate the combination of collective identification and autonomous nation-states.

The two reasons which I have just outlined as to why asylum seeker arrivals are unconducive to collective identification between Australia and Indonesia can be classified into what Robert Cox (1981) calls critical and problem-solving theories respectively. If the critique of Jakarta is that its stance on asylum seekers is haphazard, it might be supposed that the antidote is efficient and predictable policymaking. This prescription approximates Adler and Barnett’s (1998a: 43) contention that what is required for erstwhile antagonistic nation-states to transition into a pluralistic security community is a mere ‘belief in a common fate’ that, in this case, untrammelled asylum seeker arrivals are not in the national interests of Australia and Indonesia. Indeed, Wesley (2007: 190) considers that this reinterpretation of social reality is the crowning achievement of the managerialism of the Bali Process, transforming the issue of asylum seeker arrivals from a solvent to a glue in the bilateral relationship. Yet, the shortcoming with this line of problem-solving
reasoning is that, although vast numbers of Australians and Indonesians, as well as their governments, deem asylum seekers to be social burdens, this common perception of hostility has not translated into the collective identification and mutual trust of a pluralistic security community. This disjuncture is attributable to the social construction of asylum seekers as threats to the buttressing of nationally-defined interests.

Another indicator that Canberra and Jakarta conceive of asylum seekers in the vein of problem-solving theory, especially the exercise of ‘[reducing] the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination’ (Cox 1981: 88), is when the governments portray their arrivals as but an issue, albeit an prominent one, among many in the bilateral relationship. What is then required of Canberra and Jakarta is a bartering of priorities, as when, to recall Abbott’s (2012) quote at the beginning of this chapter, ‘if Australia wants Indonesian cooperation in dealing with our first order issues, we need to cooperate even more closely with Indonesia on its first order issues’. Conversely, in response to allegations in November 2013 that Canberra tapped the telephone conversations of Yudhoyono and other senior Indonesian leaders, Marty Natalegawa announced that cooperation on people-smuggling was ‘absolutely’ under review (quoted in Roberts 2013).

I draw attention to the contradictions of English School pluralism because they are manifest in Canberra and Jakarta’s approach to asylum seekers and citizenship more broadly. Additionally, although Adler and Barnett expand the constituencies and prescribe different means by which peaceful conflict resolution can be achieved, the ontological primacy of the nation-state remains undisturbed in their conception of pluralistic security communities. In effect, Adler and Barnett replicate the same contradictions of pluralist international society. The swiftness in Jakarta’s suspension of people-smuggling cooperation in November 2013, as retaliation for suspicions that Canberra had tapped the telephone conversations of Yudhoyono and other senior Indonesian officials, quashes any notion that collective identification exists in relation to asylum seeker arrivals. It might be supposed that the fragility of mutual trust on asylum seekers is solely in response to the heightened strains on the bilateral relationship during this period, a contention which I reject. Instead, the more durable explanation for the lack of identification on asylum seekers, stretching back to the MV Tampa’s arrival, lies in the growing contradictions in how states and their peoples understand citizenship and globalisation. Regarding the prospects of a security
community between Australia and Indonesia, even Wesley (2007: 200) concedes that the Bali Process has ‘not necessarily’ depoliticised the issue of asylum seeker arrivals at a popular level, only at a governmental one. The fundamental obstacle to security communities here is one of territorial thinking, encompassing prose, knowledge and identification (Campbell 1998; Rajaram 2004). To begin dismantling territorial thinking, why Adler and Barnett reflexively distinguish between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, as Karl Deutsch and his colleagues also did in 1957, deserves more scrutiny.

Adler and Barnett (1998a: 30) resile from explaining why they distinguish between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, a distinction which they then invoke to focus on the latter. They are concerned with the pluralistic variant because ‘it is this form that is theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics and international relations theory’ (1998b: 5). Adler and Barnett make no attempt to interrogate why this distinction, just one of several similar dichotomies of domestic and international in IR theory, is habitually made by scholars and practitioners. In the event, focusing on what is theoretically closest to current developments invariably leads down the path of problem-solving theory.

On this count of reifying territorial sovereignty, Deutsch and his colleagues (henceforth Deutsch) do not fare much better. For him, an amalgamated security community, interchangeable with the Westphalian nation-state, is defined by ‘the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation’ (1957: 6). In contrast, a pluralistic security community ‘retains the legal independence of separate governments’ (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6). Following Deutsch’s line of reasoning, every amalgamated security community is previously pluralistic in some respect, if not always constituting a security community. Therefore, it is curious why a separate, category of analysis is necessary once a common government is established.

This puzzle is clarified when we delve into what Deutsch considers to be the other characteristics separating amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. The former satisfies the more exacting threshold of a ‘distinctive way of life’, compared to ‘a set of compatible major values’ in its pluralistic counterpart (Deutsch et al. 1957: 133). To be distinctive, Deutsch continues, an amalgamated security community has
to possess some salient values and institutions that are ‘different … from those currently prevailing among important neighbours’ (1957: 133).

There are two misgivings regarding these distinctions. Despite staking the ground that security communities are more pacifist than other arrangements in the name of security, Deutsch is unable to escape from Hegelian influences that require juxtaposing one’s identity ‘against an other that it must subsume, eliminate or expel in the passage to its own realisation’ (Burke 2010: 79). This eradication of alternative forms of identity and political belonging was in full flight in Canberra’s support for Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor, which had nothing pacifist to commend it. Although Adler and Barnett adopt a less Manichean posture, they still envisage security communities as coalescing around the ‘positive images’ of ‘powerful and successful states’ (1998a: 40). In other words, some actor has to disavow its identity, an anchor to one’s being, in order to be admitted to the security community. If security communities are conceived in this binary manner, the prospects for one existing between Australia and Indonesia are especially bleak, considering that Australia’s historical anxieties toward Asia have been overwhelmingly projected upon Indonesia, precipitating a foreign policy that prioritises geopolitical stability over collective identification. Therefore, there is a double obstacle here to security community development engendered by representations and enactments of difference to the nation-state, first by asylum seekers and second by a distrusted Jakarta which is lukewarm in acting to prevent them from departing for Australia.

The second and more trenchant criticism of the insistence on a separate category of amalgamated security communities lies in the problematic notion of a distinctive way of life. If the forms of belonging of the Westphalian nation-state are indeed unique, then this should preclude any sharing of compatible major values with its counterparts, which, as just noted, underpin Deutsch’s conception of pluralistic security communities. Therefore, Deutsch creates a Gordian knot when he supposes that collective identification and mutual trust can be forged between states which perceive themselves to be autonomous and distinctive, an impasse replicated by Adler and Barnett. Indeed, the main argument of this chapter is that collective identification between Australia and Indonesia on asylum seekers is implausible as long as they both consider themselves as possessing distinctive national communities.
Yet, it is far from evident that every nation-state embodies a distinctive way of life. Several examples should suffice here. Pettman (1992), among others, argues that the homogenisation of Australian national identity responds to the reified need to confront an external world of anarchical and aggressive competition. Camilleri (2003: 433) contends that if the national interest is not to be carte blanche for self-centred behaviour, as Canberra occasionally contemplates through the rubric of good international citizenship, then it has to canvass where it stands on the reconciliation of the global interest. In this formulation, the distinctiveness of life in the Westphalian nation-state would appear markedly less so. The interdependence of humanity and the environment is a theme that Burke (2013) also pursues, in calling for a ‘cosmic perspective’ on the good state.

In light of such countervailing evidence, the amalgamated security community functions more as an artefact of governing the broader human population (Hindess 2000: 1494). Hindess’ characterisation of the nation-state as an artefact, coupled with my earlier emphasis on what the state considers to be its distinctive forms of belonging, empathically does not mean that its effect on asylum seekers is on the level of what Grosz calls ‘contemplative reflection’ (quoted in Sullivan 1998: 422). Adler and Barnett (1998a: 47) contend that ‘knowledge … empowers the state to act in the world and contributes to the development of mutual responsiveness’, but the opposite is equally plausible. Because policymakers predominantly operate within a positivist mould, they can speak of the Australian state as an ideal-type shorthand which has to be protected from asylum seekers, oblivious to the flows and contestations of people and ideas which have afforded the state its essentialised appearance (Agnew 1994: 58). In Australia and elsewhere, ideals of liberal-democracy and tolerance are fêted while neglecting the watchtower of the state which restricts to whom these ideals are extended. Asylum seekers and the indifferent transit state which is Indonesia endanger this corralled conception of an amalgamated security community cum Australian nation-state, hence legitimising a raft of measures which is strikingly at odds with what Adler and Barnett (1998a: 30) call peaceful change.

It is important to question these instances of methodological nationalism, namely the assumption by assertion and omission that the nation-state is ‘the natural social and political form of the modern world’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 302). This is because they objectify society and community, when instead our tentative cognition of what it means to be Australian or Indonesian is conditioned by a ‘labelling process.
which reflects a conflict of interests at the political level’ (McSweeney 1996: 85). Collective identification between Australia and Indonesia is hampered because underlying the punitive measures meted out to asylum seekers is the anxiety felt by many that asylum seekers are incompatible with Australian society. It is a measure of the pervasiveness of the assumption of methodological nationalism that this wariness occurs in a society where immigration almost has the stature of a foundation myth. Jakarta also justifies its reluctance in acting to prevent asylum seekers from leaving for Australia in terms of the ‘social burdens’ they pose to the Indonesian body politic, much to Canberra’s chagrin and, oddly enough because of the symmetrical positions of the two neighbours, incomprehension.

It should be noted that these conceptions of society in a social vacuum are not restricted to rationalist theories. The Copenhagen School argues that any referent can be the wellspring of collective identification – above political contestation, in the School’s parlance – as long as the requisite knowledge and coalitions are fostered. Nevertheless, Wæver and his colleagues also betray an understanding of society which is devoid of fluidity and negotiation when they define societal security as ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions’ (1993: 23; their emphasis). With a different lead author, they contend that societal security is to be assessed with reference to identity, in contrast to the material and organisational bases of state security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 119). Therefore, it is unsurprising that they conceive of threats to identity and therefore societal security as ‘always a question of the construction of something as threatening some “we”’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 120). The Copenhagen theorists nominate migration, horizontal competition (influence from neighbouring cultures), vertical competition (integrating or decentralising pressures) and depopulation as the primary threats to societal security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 121), strikingly similar to state discourses on what undermines societal cohesion. By assuming that a national society is already in place – what Doty (1996: 82) criticises as an understanding of society as a ‘fully constituted exemplary self’ – the Copenhagen theorists consign the management of asylum seekers between Canberra and Jakarta to a challenge-resistance dialectic. The Copenhagen School’s failure to critique the oppositional logic of realist security means that its conception of societal security is tantamount to ‘realpolitik carried on in a different arena’ (Doty 1996: 78; see also McSweeney 1996).
Therefore, despite the rhetoric from the Bali Process that ‘the root causes of irregular movements in the region [are] complex and multidimensional’ (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2013: 3), Canberra and Jakarta’s interactions on asylum seeker arrivals are confined to displays of deterrence and population transfers which reflect geopolitical asymmetries. There are echoes here of the discourse of cooperative security in the 1990s, namely the argument propagated by ASEAN and Gareth Evans that regional security is indivisible and should be pursued through multilateral initiatives. What is novel about ASEAN and Evans’ proposal is the deployment of various policy instruments, not the referent of state security itself. This argument is demonstrated in Evans’ Australia’s Regional Security statement of December 1989 that ‘the policy responses or instruments available to protect Australia’s security are multidimensional’ (Evans 1989). Sullivan (1998: 432) criticises the Track Two meetings under the aegis of the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) for their predilection towards practical and policy outcomes, which is not surprising as the Council is effectively an ‘extra-official arm of state power’. His misgivings of CSCAP can easily be extended to the Bali Process.

There is much to agree with in Burke’s (2010: 79) observation that identity ‘claims to anchor and define being, and thus seems hard to refute or challenge’. However, given that identity is all too often marshalled to legitimise exclusivist understandings of national community which impede identification with non-autochthons and global concerns, the challenge of resisting Hegelian formulations of identity is one which cannot be demurred from. At the least, we should query if there is anything more fundamental than identity to premise security communities upon. Some guidance can be taken from environmental activist David Suzuki’s solution to conflicts between farmers and environmentalists in Australia over the stewardship of land, namely a return to the drawing board of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Appearing on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Q & A programme in September 2013, Suzuki argues that

Can we all agree on what the foundation of our species is? … I would start off by saying that we are biological creatures and absolutely the highest priority we have is a breath of air… And then you can go through water and soil that gives us our food, sunlight that gives us our photosynthesis that gives us our energy and biodiversity, which is what keeps us alive as animals. And then if say those are our most fundamental needs that have to be protected, then you can begin to ask: How do we make a living?
How do we farm without compromising those fundamental things?
(Suzuki 2013)

In a similar vein, in a Boyer Lecture presented in November 2013, Governor-General Quentin Bryce (2013) promoted a conception of Australian citizenship in which ‘an ethic of care guides the way we lead, where the young, elderly, Indigenous, the newly-arrived [and] people with disabilities are treated with dignity and respect and are able to be the best and healthiest they can be’. What Suzuki and Bryce have in common is their recognition that community is far more interdependent and universal than what the enclosed nation-state allows, in turn facilitating a vision of security which prioritises the fundamental needs of life. Applying the insight of what Richard Falk (2004: 87) calls ‘globalisation-frombelow’ to security communities does not mean that Australian citizenship is diminished. As Pitty, Stokes and Smith (2008: 203) make clear, the global citizens in their edited collection ‘retain a strong allegiance to Australia and its people’. It is this allegiance that redoubles their efforts to widen the meaning of Australian citizenship from a staid, legal category to the ‘quality of participation in public life’ which is not constrained by the nation-state (Pitty, Stokes and Smith 2008: 205).

**Conclusion**

In response to the loss of 90 lives at sea during a one-week period in June 2012, Canberra commissioned an expert panel, led by the former Chief of the Defence Force Angus Houston, to recommend suggestions to prevent further tragedies from recurring. I am less interested in the merits of individual recommendations than the panel’s terms of reference, which revealed much about where Canberra envisaged the boundaries of community to be. Among other criteria, the panel was mandated to be cognisant of ‘source, transit and destination country aspects of irregular migration’ and ‘Australia’s right to maintain its borders’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2012b: 9).

These parameters demonstrate the argument of this chapter, namely that the partialities of the nation-state are the main obstacle to widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia on asylum seekers. Individually and collectively through what the English School calls a pluralist international society, the nation-state presumes that it offers the sole and best answer to the maintenance of order and justice, specifically the legitimation it provides for the welding of the citizen, state (territory), and nation. Therefore, the unregulated arrival of asylum seekers claiming political persecution unsettles the ostensibly finalised constitution of the Australian
nation-state. By placing the pluralistic nation-state squarely within their framework of security community development, Adler and Barnett import the prejudices of the nation-state which impede identification with non-autochthons and global concerns. In this regard, the question of the condition of Indonesia's democracy is a secondary one, demonstrated by the persistence of bilateral acrimony over asylum seekers, independent of post-Suharto democratisation and domestic politics. There are parallels here with intra-European recriminations over irregular migrants, whereby the protagonists are all democratic states.

Significantly, even the pluralist international society is far more contingent than what Canberra and Jakarta betray in their policies of deterrence toward asylum seekers. Hedley Bull's (2002 [1977]: 9 – 16) contrast between international society and the asocial international system directs our attention to the contingency and path-dependency of the former. To be sure, these norms have not been unambiguously supportive of collective identification with asylum seekers and Indonesia as an indifferent transit state. The moulding of Australia's national interests to privilege neoliberal forms of political belonging is an important case in point. These norms also go to the heart of the contradictions in English School pluralism which are generative of asylum seekers, namely those between the portrait of a world of sedentary nation-states and the latitude afforded to all of them to determine who and what are in their national interests. Nevertheless, because norms are the product of shifting coalitions and epistemes, they are not immutable. Therefore, I have argued for a keener appreciation that the amalgamated security community cum society of Australia is contingently constituted and interdependent with other communities which are not necessarily nationally-defined. Society is not an object with an essential character, the proximate reason why so many consider that it is under siege by asylum seekers. For now, the main obstacle to widespread identification on asylum seekers is the representations of them as a threat to the national communities of Australia and Indonesia.
Conclusion

This thesis sought to understand why, contrary to the expectations of the democratic peace theory, widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia has not accompanied post-Suharto democratisation. The deterioration of the bilateral relationship and societal trust after Australia’s leadership of INTERFET in East Timor occurred in tandem with Habibie’s implementation of democratic reforms in Indonesia. Even if we accept that the mutual distrust occasioned by East Timor’s belated independence was a legacy of Suharto’s authoritarian rule, there is little evidence that identification and trust govern state and societal interactions between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. The primary objective of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation is to bolster Indonesian law enforcement agencies’ capacities to thwart terrorism, and often also domestic dissent. Compared to the early 1990s, Australia and Indonesia hardly cooperate on promoting regional order, much less render it more inclusive. Most conspicuously, there is a lack of trust on cooperation to exclude asylum seekers, evident in frequent threats by Indonesian politicians to suspend the limited bilateral cooperation which exists on this issue whenever there is another diplomatic dispute between Australia and Indonesia. Not only are the foundations of bilateral cooperation on excluding asylum seekers fragile, but the human security of asylum seekers is imperilled by mutual charges that they are neither the responsibility of Australia nor Indonesia. Their denial of human security to asylum seekers, among other marginalised groups, means that identification is not as extensive as it could be.

This thesis is a comparison of three perspectives which argue that identification is as important as, if not more than, material forces in explaining International Relations. These three perspectives are Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s conception of security communities, English School solidarism, and the democratic peace theory. Solidarism, as understood by the English School, best describes Australia-Indonesia relations in the early 1990s. I then analysed the obstacles to widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period, examining bilateral cooperation on state-building, regionalism and asylum seekers. Generally speaking, these obstacles are the asymmetrical power relations which the democratic peace theory pays insufficient attention to, and the privileging of the nation-state as the fundamental reference of social and political life, which both the democratic peace theory and Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities betray. Therefore,
The conclusion is divided into three sections. First, I explain why the lack of widespread identification between Australia and a democratising Indonesia is an important question in International Relations. I argue that Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s (1998) conception of security communities offers a useful analytical framework to answer this question. The import of Adler and Barnett’s framework is not only that its three tiers of security community development, namely precipitating conditions, the interaction of structure and process categories, and the culmination of identification and trust, can be applied to Australia-Indonesia relations in the post-Suharto period. Adler and Barnett’s framework also allows for comparison with other conceptions which argue that identification is important for peaceful conflict resolution, such as English School solidarism and the democratic peace theory. This comparison clarifies the solidarist tenor of the bilateral relationship under Keating and Suharto, both of whom sought a measure of identification between Australia and Indonesia. In addition, a comparison of the different permutations of ideational understanding elucidates the ontological blind spots of Adler and Barnett’s framework, particularly those related to the relations of rule of the nation-state and market. To be sure, these ontological blinkers are not exclusive to Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities – solidarism and the democratic peace theory share similar shortcomings.

The second section of this conclusion recaps the arguments made from Chapters One to Six, organised under the theme of the obstacles to a security community between Australia and Indonesia. Chapter One explains Adler and Barnett’s framework, particularly the three tiers of how they envisage security communities developing. This chapter also canvasses the similarities and differences between English School solidarism, the democratic peace theory, and Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities. Considering that these perspectives share the nation-state as a security referent, I argue that scholars should avoid duplication and explore the emancipatory potential of security communities. Primarily, scholars can explore this potential by adopting humanity as the referent for security communities. In Chapter Two, I focus on bilateral cooperation during the Keating-Suharto period, arguing that the bilateral relationship can be characterised as solidarist. Chapter Three focuses on the erosion of solidarism, using the examples of the Asian financial crisis and East Timor’s independence. This chapter also sketches the tenor of post-
Suharto democratisation and decentralisation, as a preview of the material inequalities which permeate cooperation between the democracies of Australia and Indonesia. These material inequalities limit the scope of identification and trust. Chapters Four to Six are the case studies of post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on promoting order in Indonesia, regionalism, and asylum seekers. In each of these chapters, I consider the extent to which bilateral cooperation has promoted widespread identification and human security, the two criteria which define my understanding of a security community.

The third section of this conclusion abstracts from the immediacy of Australia-Indonesia relations and critiques Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities. As Steve Smith (2004: 504) puts it, scholars cannot ‘avoid the moral and political ramifications of their scholarship, since that scholarship is based in a set of social forces toward which it is either supportive (either explicitly or implicitly) or opposed’. Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities can be critiqued on two counts. First, they overlook the hegemonies of liberalism, such as the naturalisation of neoliberalism in bilateral cooperation to promote the rule of law, which circumscribe widespread identification and human security. In other words, I consider that a social conception of democracy is more promising than a liberal, individualist conception of democracy for promoting widespread identification. The former conception maximises general welfare, while the latter conception can be equated to the democratic peace theory (Widmaier 2005: 432). Second, Adler and Barnett underestimate the relations of rule of the nation-state in impeding widespread identification and trust. Put alternatively, the complex of national sovereignty bounds Adler and Barnett’s understanding of widespread identification. Given that the state continues to influence the loyalties of many in social and political life, I conclude this thesis by outlining how the state can be compatible with widespread identification and human security.

**Significance of the research question and theoretical framework**

The bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia has long been characterised by a disjuncture between elite and public sentiment. At the governmental level, Australia has generally recognised that, owing to Indonesia’s

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43 The relevant quote is ‘[w]e are concerned with pluralistic and not amalgamated security communities. We define a pluralistic security community as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 30).
geopolitical significance and its gatekeeping role in ASEAN and cognate regional institutions (Dibb 2001), it is incumbent on Australia to foster ideational understanding with Indonesia. However, at the societal level, Australians and Indonesians have frequently viewed each other with suspicion and distrust. Over the approximately five decades of Sukarno and Suharto’s regimes, there were numerous examples of this chasm between elite and public opinion, the most longstanding being attributable to Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor. From the vantage of any point during these five decades, it was not unreasonable to suggest that if Indonesia became a democracy, the gulf between elite and public opinion would be narrowed. After all, the democratic peace theory claims that democratic states enjoy a dyadic peace because of their mutual assurance and recognition that the peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms they use domestically will be extended to each other (Doyle 1986: 1161). In addition, one might look to the post-World War Two transformation of Australia’s relationship with Japan, and conclude that democratisation in Indonesia would also catalyse widespread identification.

After over 15 years since Suharto resigned and Indonesia began a process of democratisation and decentralisation, it is far from evident that widespread identification characterises Australia-Indonesia relations. Even allowing for the resolution of East Timor’s self-determination, bilateral conflicts which can be explained by some variant of societal distrust continue to occur on a recurring basis. Canberra’s indifference to societal concerns that Indonesia’s Australian-funded Detachment 88 is torturing West Papuan separatists is reminiscent of its geopolitical complicity in Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor. Notwithstanding the deleterious consequences for the human security of asylum seekers, their exclusion has considerable support from the Australian public. Yet, Indonesia, as what Wesley (2007: 185) calls a transit country, has very little incentive to prevent asylum seekers from leaving for Australia, straining the bilateral relationship. The lead-up to and the execution of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran in April 2015 elicited competing discourses of national values and honour, as did Australia’s ban on live cattle exports to Indonesia in 2011, and revelations in 2013 that Australia spied on the phone calls of President Yudhoyono and his wife. Reflecting these societal hostilities, with a score of 100 denoting complete identification, Indonesia has never received more than 54 in the Lowy Institute for International Policy’s (2015) annual survey of Australian respondents on their level of identification towards other countries. This survey commenced in 2006, already almost a decade into post-Suharto democratisation. Even at the governmental level, Tony Abbott reflected that ‘there is a sense in which
we kind of know what the decisions in Washington or London will be. We can be less certain about decisions that might be made in Jakarta’ (quoted in International Institute for Strategic Studies 2013: v). Given that Abbott’s comments were made in the context of questions about his inaugural prime ministerial overseas trip, the choice of Indonesia reflects Canberra’s unfamiliarity, rather than identification.

These alienations and hesitations pose important questions for the democratic peace theory, whose substantial influence in International Relations spans from US discourses of regime change, to the veritable industries of international development, private foundations and electoral assistance (Parmar 2013). To be sure, there is a separate and important debate as to whether Indonesia is democratising, and what kind of democracy Indonesia is (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Webber 2006). Nevertheless, the vaunted mechanisms of the democratic peace theory, such as the constraints of public opinion on belligerent governmental behaviour and the mutual recognition that being a democracy signifies a graduation from anarchical interstate relations, do not characterise Australia-Indonesia relations in the post-Suharto period. Indeed, it is unlikely that much will come out of Sulistiyanto’s (2010: 117 – 118) prediction that since ‘Indonesia and Australia are democracies, there is a potential for a form of “democratic partnership” to develop that could deepen the bilateral relationship by enabling them to deal with differences and rifts with a strong sense of maturity and responsibility’. Chapter Four argued that, in promoting order, democratic states can circumvent the illegitimacy of realpolitik by fostering institutions and mentalities which reduce the scope of democracy to electoral participation. In Chapter Five, I argued that while democratic states have different preferences regarding regionalism, the democratic peace theory does not offer mechanisms for them to be reconciled. In reifying the dichotomy between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, the democratic peace theory argues that shared domestic characteristics prevent interstate conflict. However, the theory does not claim that democratic states can overcome different preferences regarding international politics to pursue purposive cooperation. Put alternatively, if democratic states cannot agree on the tenor of regionalism, they revert to the minimal coexistence of pluralist international society. Chapter Six argued that democratisation in Indonesia is immaterial to improving the prospects of bilateral cooperation on excluding asylum seekers, as they are primarily defined in opposition to the national communities of Australia and Indonesia. Therefore, this thesis can be read as a response to the arguments of democratic peace theory, as well as an analysis of the social forces operating between Australia and Indonesia.
I have not used the democratic peace theory as my theoretical framework, but the initial observations on how little the democratic peace explains contemporary developments in the bilateral relationship are only a partial justification. The other reason why I have not used the democratic peace theory to orientate my thesis is because I am cognisant and keen to redress the critiques of the democratic peace theory. The criticisms of the democratic peace theory can be divided into two groups. The first takes issue with the theory for endorsing a polyarchal or electoral view of democracy (Robinson 1996). In this reading, the domestic institutions of democracy common to Australia and Indonesia are sufficient for the democratic peace theory, even though many people in both countries, especially Indonesia, live in profoundly undemocratic conditions. The second category of criticisms contends that the democratic peace theory has an excessively state-centric conception of conflict, limited to the trinitarian foundations of interstate war, namely the idea that conflict must comprise the distinguishable parties of a government, army, and people (Barkawi and Laffey 1999: 409). In turn, the democratic peace theory is unable to account for the conflicts which transcend territorial borders (Agnew 1994). Partialities such as the prioritising of the Asian middle class in Australia’s Asian engagement are analytically incompatible with the democratic peace theory’s assumption of methodological nationalism. Therefore, in order to analyse the non-state interactions in the post-Suharto bilateral relationship, a framework which allows for the analysis of these interactions is required.

Adler and Barnett’s understanding of security communities partially corrects these conceptual shortcomings of the democratic peace theory. Accordingly, I have not adopted their framework in a wholesale manner. As mentioned, Adler and Barnett offer a three-tier framework to conceptualise how security communities develop. The initial point to be made here is that there is no reason, aside from the one imposed by the hegemonic position of the state in the International Relations discipline, why the variables which Adler and Barnett nominate have to be restricted by the nation-state. For example, the variables of transactions, organisations and social learning, which Adler and Barnett (1998b: 38) classify as processes, are often independent of the nation-state. Yet, Adler and Barnett’s framework confirms the criticisms of the democratic peace theory in other respects. I have already noted that their focus on pluralistic security communities, that is, communities formed between sovereign states, underestimates the divisive nature of nationalism. Their conception of power can also be faulted for privileging its ideational aspect, in a narrow state-centric
sense, of ‘the authority to determine shared meaning [which] constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states’ (Adler and Barnett 1998b: 39), while paying scant attention to the class inequalities which restrict societal participation to state and business elites. Therefore, given that democratisation is accompanied by a proliferation of state and societal interactions, I use Adler and Barnett’s three tiers of security community development to analyse these interactions. However, I part company with Adler and Barnett by not assuming that the nation-state is the most suitable referent for a security community. Having established the significance of the research question and Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities, I now recap what I have argued in this thesis.

**Obstacles to a security community between Australia and Indonesia**

The objective of Chapter One was to clarify Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities, and consider how it differs from other arrangements which depend on identification to achieve peaceful conflict resolution. These other arrangements are English School solidarism and the democratic peace theory, both of which are significant in debates and attempts at promoting identification between Australia and Indonesia. Adler and Barnett argue that there are three stages in the development of a security community. These stages are precipitating conditions, the interaction of structure and process categories, and the development of identification and trust. Precipitating conditions refer to any number of reasons why actors decide to cooperate, for example, Australia and Indonesia’s mutual interest in order after the Bali bombings in October 2002. In the second stage, structural factors comprise of power and knowledge, while process factors include transactions, organisations and social learning. How structure and process factors interact depends on the subjects under inquiry. These subjects are the focus of Chapters Four to Six. In the final stage of Adler and Barnett’s framework, there is a marked maturing and expansion of identification, the defining features of their conception of a security community. Therefore, Adler and Barnett’s framework offers markers by which we can assess post-Suharto bilateral cooperation. For example, we can identify the increasing number of asylum seekers from the Middle East after the US invasion of Afghanistan as a precipitating condition for Australia-Indonesia cooperation on asylum seekers. Subsequently, we can argue that the Bali Process represents Australia’s attempt at constructing a shared understanding of a problem (Perera 2007: 215). Finally, we can conclude that widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia has not transpired because asylum seekers are only analytically intelligible as an exclusion from individual national citizenships. In other words, whether Indonesia is or is not a
democracy has little bearing on its disinterest, barring material assistance (Nethery and Gordyn 2014), to cooperate with Australia in preventing asylum seekers from leaving for Australia.

Chapter One also considered how Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities differs from English School solidarism and the democratic peace theory. As Adler and Barnett (1998b: 10) are also aware, there are different perspectives which argue that identification is important for the prospects of cooperation, for example, a common cultural-religious civilisation (Huntington 1993) and a shared historical experience against a common threat (Williams and Neumann 2000). I have chosen to focus on English School solidarism and the democratic peace theory. The former is germane to Keating and Gareth Evans’ attempts to foster ideational understanding with Jakarta, while the latter is the puzzle which this thesis tries to solve. In particular, the democratic peace theory is unable to explain the lack of widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. At this juncture, it is important to acknowledge that other scholars have a different interpretation of solidarism to mine. For example, Wheeler (1992: 468) argues that ‘[the Grotian] conception of international society assumes that individuals are its ultimate members and that they have rights and duties in international law: individuals are legitimate subjects and not objects of international society’. My understanding of solidarism, following Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]: 230), is a state-centric one, that is, ‘a new phase of the states system, not its replacement by something different’. Ultimately, these perspectives are unbridgeable as they have different referents, but it is worth heeding Buzan’s (2001: 472) call to develop the English School’s ‘historicist, constructivist, and methodologically pluralist approach to [International Relations]’. In particular, the English School’s tripartite elements of international system, international society, and world society are ‘in continuous coexistence and interplay, the question being how strong they are in relation to each other’ (Buzan 2001: 476).

The difference between solidarism and Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities is that the former is largely controlled by state elites, whereas the latter admits societal interactions, albeit bounded by the nation-state. Put alternatively, in solidarism, state elites are engaged in mutual identification, while in Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities, the state is the parameter beyond which societal interactions cannot breach. Therefore, authoritarian states can be party to solidarism, but it is doubtful whether their societies can promote a security community. These distinctions are important in explaining the nature of the bilateral relationship under Keating and Suharto.
If Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities is unmodified, then there is not much difference between it and the democratic peace theory. As mentioned, the value of Adler and Barnett’s framework to this thesis is most apparent if we can conceive of its variables, such as power and knowledge, as not tethered to the nation-state. This separation of social forces from the analytical lens of the nation-state is crucial for explaining why post-Suharto democratisation has not promoted widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia. If we accept Adler and Barnett’s framework as it is, then it is vulnerable to the same charges of elitism and a truncated conception of democracy which are levelled against the democratic peace theory. Adler and Barnett are upfront about their preference for a ‘transnational community of Deutschian policymakers’ (1998b: 4, their emphasis) and their ‘bias … to look to policymakers and other political, economic, and intellectual elites [which] … are tied to the development of a security community’ (1998a: 44). If so, we should not be surprised that Bøås (2000: 311) characterises Adler and Barnett’s framework as “mainstream constructivism light”; research programmes / projects neatly placed close to neoliberal institutionalism and to the democratic peace thesis’. Ditrych (2014: 351) clarifies what is deficient in the democratic peace theory and Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities: they are confined to ‘formal institutions or practices in narrowly limited transnational fields inhabited by political elites’.

Chapter Two ascertained what kind of relationship Keating and Evans were developing with Indonesia in the early 1990s. I argued that the bilateral relationship during this period was solidarist, since its defining feature was ‘to make force solely or chiefly the instrument of international society as a whole’ (Bull 2002 [1977]: 231), or more accurately, the instrument of a regional society of states. The distinction between mutual support in an anarchical international system and solidarism was highlighted in Evans’ inaugural speech on Indonesia as Foreign Minister. He remarked that ‘for many years now we have possessed what could be called common strategic interests. These interests are important, but they have not been enough to give ballast to the overly intense political relationship’ (Evans 1988). The achievements of solidarism were demonstrated in bilateral cooperation to broker a peace settlement in Cambodia, the elaboration of a regional code of cooperative security, and the development of its organisational manifestations in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping. Collectively, these initiatives can be interpreted as an attempt to define regional relations after the Cold War, whose hub-and-spokes architecture in the Asia-Pacific,
attributable principally to the US preference for bilateralism, was unpropitious for regionalism (Beeson 2005). Yet, the ideational dividends of solidarism did not extend to the societies of Australia and Indonesia. If anything, their governments went to considerable lengths to regulate and discredit societal participation, especially if it was critical of the New Order. Societal opposition against solidarism between Canberra and Jakarta centred on Jakarta’s occupation and human rights abuses in East Timor. Canberra and Jakarta’s quarantining of East Timor from the norms and diplomacy of cooperative security highlights how the determination of identification was the province of states, the *sine qua non* of solidarism. Therefore, I conclude that the bilateral relationship under Keating and Suharto was solidarist. While the proponents of the democratic peace theory would argue that the solution to this disconnect between elite and public sentiment lies in Indonesia becoming a democracy, subsequent chapters argue that the democratic peace theory has an inadequate account of the asymmetrical social forces which transcend similar domestic institutions.

Chapter Three analysed the erosion of solidarism between Canberra and Jakarta, symbolised by Habibie’s abrogation of the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security. This chapter also sketched the tenor of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia, to provide an indicator of the material inequalities which affect post-Suharto bilateral cooperation. The disintegration of solidarism was attributable to the Asian financial crisis and East Timor’s independence. Canberra and Jakarta had differing prescriptions on how to solve the Asian financial crisis, with their prescriptions divided along neoliberal and statist lines respectively. These ideational divergences highlight Australia’s underestimation of the role of political economies in its economic relations with Indonesia, and Asia more broadly. To elaborate, Australia, in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, had a neoliberal antidote to Indonesia’s economic difficulties. However, in Indonesia, the middle class and many conglomerates are the creation of the state. Hence, there is little reason to expect that they will support neoliberal interventions in the Indonesian economy. Above all, the Asian financial crisis had ruinous consequences for the human security of many in Indonesia, underscoring the need to conceive of community as not exclusive to the state.

I then argued that East Timor’s independence was a belated observance of the norm of self-determination in pluralist international society, not a principled conversion by Australia to humanitarian intervention. Solidarism is ideationally denser than
pluralism, yet Keating and Suharto’s denial of self-determination to East Timor was at odds with even the ideational parsimony of pluralism. In the interests of order, former European colonies are just one of a few groups who can successfully claim self-determination. This norm explains why East Timor’s case for independence resonated in the court of international society. In contrast, West Papuan separatists are not helped by West Papua’s history as a part of the former Dutch East Indies, whose successor state is Indonesia.

East Timor’s independence presents a problem for the democratic peace theory, namely the simultaneous occurrence of post-Suharto democratisation and the precipitous decline of Australia-Indonesia relations over East Timor. In order to explain this conundrum, I argued that the democratic peace theory conceives of the state as a monolithic entity, not dissimilar to the billiard ball analogy of the state in neorealism. However, East Timor’s independence demonstrates that the composition of nation-states, be it in a territorial or ideational sense, is subject to renegotiation and contestation. This contingency of nation-states explains why the predictions of the democratic peace theory do not always eventuate. Put alternatively, the separation of East Timor from Indonesia derailed the pathways of transition postulated by the democratic peace theory between Australia and Indonesia. Nevertheless, because nation-states are contingent arrangements, they also have the potential to reject the excesses of nationalism and contribute to widespread identification.

My outline of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia demonstrated that post-Suharto bilateral cooperation does not take place on a new institutional canvas, but confronts material asymmetries carried over from the New Order. In the post-Suharto period, New Order figures have appropriated democratic institutions for their material enrichment. This means that the dividends of identification from democracy in Indonesia are doubtful, since Australia is cooperating with the same authoritarian figures from the New Order, albeit now clothed in the institutional garb of democracy. Prabowo Subianto, a former army general who is widely suspected to be responsible for the disappearance of democracy activists during the tumultuous weeks before Suharto’s resignation, nearly won the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia. If Prabowo Subianto had been successful, Canberra would have had little choice but to overlook his dismal human rights record.44 Similar comments on the pervasiveness of authoritarian interests in Indonesia’s democratic institutions can also be made about

44 Indeed, a few days before Indonesia’s presidential election in July 2014, Canberra removed a ban on Prabowo Subianto from visiting Australia (Garnaut 2014).
Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu, a former army general who oversaw martial law in Aceh.

Chapter Four considered how democratic states cooperate to promote order, in an ideational environment where the use of material force to secure elite interests is increasingly illegitimate. I argued that the rule of law is displacing geopolitics as the justification for Australia-Indonesia cooperation on promoting order. The former invokes positive notions of impartiality and bureaucratic efficiency, whereas the latter is in the realm of unfairness. In terms of Adler and Barnett’s framework, the Bali bombings were the precipitating condition for post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on promoting order. Coming on the heels of ethnic and separatist conflicts in Indonesia, Canberra was concerned that Jakarta was unable to maintain domestic order. This was a concern which Jakarta shared, as the monopolisation of violence is fundamental to state elites’ understanding of statehood. In the main, the rule of law now governs bilateral security cooperation, so as to minimise charges of Australian interference in Indonesia’s sovereignty. Sanctioned by Manichean views that the US is entitled carte blanche in the ‘war on terror’, the impunity of Detachment 88 is an important exception to this development of the ascendance of the law in governing bilateral security cooperation. The institutional manifestations of the rule of law can be found in the prominence of the police forces – the AFP and POLRI – in the bilateral relationship, and the promotion of good governance in Indonesia through Australia’s foreign aid.

The rule of law’s consequences for community can be conceptualised in two ways, neither of which are promising for widespread identification. First, the rule of law has facilitated a community of law enforcement agencies, centred on the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. These agencies have a common conception of the law and how to enforce it, in which case the nature of their community is a professional one. Those who do not have the knowledge of law enforcement are excluded from this community, much less societal participation in the drafting of the law. Second, contrary to the claims of the police and bureaucratic agencies, the law is not impartial, but always has a particular view of justice. In neoliberal conceptions of the law, their objective is to socialise people to internalise market logics and abandon alternative forms of identification. For example, because Australia’s judicial aid to Indonesia does not admit the damage caused by what economists call externalities, many in Indonesia are unable to seek justice for structural economic dislocations, such as those caused by industrial pollution. In a similar vein, foreign aid programmes
to instil market citizenship sever the relationships which people have with their land and community. Hence, the law is not just a set of rules and regulations, but actively crafts the nature of identification. For neoliberal conceptions of the law, the community which they shape is restricted to market interactions and the honouring of contracts.

Chapter Five analysed the type of community which is fostered by post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on, in the first instance, regionalism. Nevertheless, regionalism, which denotes state interactions in an organisational setting, is only a part of Australia’s participation in the region at large. In this chapter, I also focused on the ideational aspect of Australia’s Asian engagement. The interest of middle powers in exploring alternatives to the regional dominance of the US and China has been the precipitating condition for post-Suharto bilateral cooperation on regionalism. China’s hegemony may be unpalatable for the US’ regional allies, but the US is also encouraging them to pursue geopolitical cooperation between themselves. Multilateralism appeals to democratic middle powers such as Australia and Indonesia because it accentuates their powers of persuasion and coalition-building, while downplaying their limited material capabilities. Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community (APC) proposal reflected these strengths and limitations of Australia. However, the APC’s failure demonstrated not only Rudd’s inattention to how the Community would relate to existing regional institutions, but also regional states’ distrust of Australia’s militaristic conception of its alliance with the US. Rudd made insufficient inroads into reversing Howard’s conception of Australia as the regional enforcer of US unilateralism, evident in Rudd’s inability to articulate the balance of priorities in his three pillars of Australian foreign policy. In contrast, Indonesia has a more mediated understanding of the US’ role in the Asia-Pacific, which is informed by the US’ underwriting of pluralist international society (Beeson and Lee 2015: 235). Therefore, Australia’s unquestioning approach to the US explains the inability to realise even the limited identification which the APC would have generated between the middle powers of Australia and Indonesia.

Australia’s interactions with the region are not limited to regionalism, but also disclose an ideational component concerning who Australia would rather engage with. Those with capital are privileged by Australia’s foreign policy, demonstrating that the term Asian engagement is far more partial than it suggests. The Group of Twenty (G20), which Australia and Indonesia sought to be included in, is novel because it is not defined by geographical contiguity. This characteristic of the G20 downplays the
tension between Australia’s geography and history, a longstanding impediment to
Australia assuming a leadership role in regional institutions. Similarly, the G20
benefits Indonesia because, in this forum, Indonesia is less beholden to the concerns
of sovereignty which preoccupy its smaller ASEAN neighbours. However, considering
that the G20 functions as a moral hazard to the risks taken by financial institutions
which led to the global financial crisis, the G20 can also be analysed through the
prism of class. In Australia, Julia Gillard’s *Australia in the Asian Century* White Paper
reveals a similar preference to engage with those who benefit Australia economically,
in this case the Asian middle class. This preference may be in the interest of
businesses in Australia, but we should not presume that the community which they
foster is extensive. In particular, Australia’s regional economic blueprints are often
silent on environmental degradation and poor working conditions in Indonesia, which
raise questions of ethics and responsibility in Australia’s Asian engagement.

Chapter Six analysed the type of community which is promoted by post-Suharto
bilateral cooperation on excluding asylum seekers. The precipitating condition for this
cooperation was the increasing number of asylum seekers who arrived in Australia
after the US invasion of Afghanistan, as well as considerable societal opposition in
Australia towards their arrival. I argued that Australia and Indonesia have little
common ground to sustain cooperation on asylum seekers. While Indonesia has little
interest in preventing asylum seekers from leaving for Australia, Australia is keen that
Indonesia intercepts them. This incompatibility of interests can be explained by a
contradiction in international society’s conception of political belonging. International
society betrays an understanding that order is achieved when everyone belongs to a
state. However, international society also affords states much latitude in deciding who
should be a citizen, and more broadly, what is in the national interest (Haddad 2008).
Therefore, Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority may decide that Tamils are not part of the
national community, but Australia and Indonesia are not obliged to include Tamils, as
asylum seekers, in their respective understandings of national citizenship either. The
type of political system which Indonesia has makes little difference to its
unresponsiveness to Australia’s entreaties to intercept asylum seekers, since asylum
seekers are only analytically intelligible in the context of international society’s
contradictions on political belonging. There are parallels between Australia and
Indonesia’s incompatible objectives on asylum seekers, and intra-European tensions
on irregular migrants, exemplified by the ongoing displacement of Syrians from civil
war, where all the receiving protagonists are democratic states. Plainly, in terms of
identifying the scope of community, asylum seekers are not included in bilateral
cooperation to exclude them. The human security of asylum seekers is jeopardised by representations of them in Australia as queue jumpers, and Yudhoyono’s depiction of them as ‘social and economic burdens’ (quoted in Hawley 2013). Yet, the foundations of bilateral cooperation on asylum seekers are brittle, since there is little agreement between Canberra and Jakarta on what the objective of cooperation is. The Bali Process merely obfuscates what are irreconcilable objectives, or acts as a clearing house to deport asylum seekers to other countries in exchange for compensation. Therefore, cooperation on asylum seekers is not only sponsored by Canberra, but is also subject to annulment by Jakarta when there are unrelated diplomatic conflicts, such as during revelations in 2013 that Canberra was spying on Yudhoyono and his wife’s telephone calls.

In sum, the thesis has explained why the proposition that widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia would accompany post-Suharto democratisation has been wishful thinking. As Hugh White observes, ‘Keating managed to generate a sense of excitement and potential in the relationship when it was still a dictatorship. Now we have a robust democratic system in Indonesia, but somehow the relationship does not seem to have gone anywhere’ (quoted in Hall 2010). In the final section, I argue that Adler and Barnett pay insufficient attention to two obstacles to widespread identification, namely nationalism and the inequalities of liberalism. This inattention is also held by policymakers who use the term security community haphazardly to signify enhanced interstate cooperation, such as proposals for an ASEAN Political-Security Community.

**The shortcomings of Adler and Barnett’s conception of security communities**

This section abstracts from the immediacy of Australia-Indonesia relations and asks why, even if policymakers scrupulously followed Adler and Barnett’s framework, widespread identification is unlikely to transpire. I argue that Adler and Barnett pay inadequate attention to how nationalism and the inequalities sanctioned by liberalism hinder widespread identification. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the world’s population live in territorially-demarcated states and look to them for identity and security. Hence, I conclude the thesis by outlining how states can contribute to widespread identification, or at least not exacerbate alienation. Linklater’s (2002) benchmark of not harming anyone and Burke’s (2013) argument that the state should just be a site of legal self-determination inform my concluding remarks.
Adler and Barnett’s concept of pluralistic security communities explains much of why widespread identification has not eventuated between Australia and Indonesia. To elaborate their term, a pluralistic security community consists of two or more sovereign states whose people widely identify with each other. In other words, Adler and Barnett are arguing that widespread identification can overcome the divisive nature of national sovereignty, such as its assumptions of self-sufficiency and mastery. My thesis has demonstrated that when widespread identification is bounded by the nation-state, the loyalties to the latter often take precedence. This insight is particularly relevant to Chapter Six. Australia and Indonesia may both be democracies, but Australia considers Indonesia to have a lacklustre approach to cooperation on excluding asylum seekers. In turn, Indonesia considers Australia to be overbearing by insisting that Indonesia, a developing country, should be responsible for asylum seekers. As I argued, this mutual hostility can be explained by the fact that neither Australia nor Indonesia consider asylum seekers as part of their respective national communities. Therefore, Adler and Barnett’s optimism that widespread identification can flourish between nation-states is predicated on a contingent convergence of national interests. When this confluence of national interests is absent, it is debatable if widespread identification will always overcome nationalism. Scholars of security communities, at least those working in the critical and cosmopolitan way I have approached this concept, have to pay attention to how nation-states can sustain widespread identification, and not rely on a coincidence of similar national interests.

Adler and Barnett are also inattentive to how the inequalities condoned by liberalism dilute widespread identification. The only equivocation they have about liberalism is whether other values can facilitate a security community. For example, Adler and Barnett (1998a: 41) argue that a ‘shared developmentalist ideology … similar to that pursued by Southeast Asian states’ can promote widespread identification. It is doubtful that developmentalism can foster widespread identification, as it is dismissive of human rights and environmental damage. Nevertheless, my criticism of Adler and Barnett here centres not on the possibility that other values, such as the interdependence of humanity, are more promising of a security community. Rather, I have reservations toward their conflation of liberalism and democracy. Adler and Barnett (1998a: 40) contend that ‘if scholars of international politics are likely to identify one set of political ideas and meanings [which] are related to a security community, it is liberalism and democracy’. Yet, Adler and Barnett’s conflation ignores
how democracy is curtailed by the inequalities of liberalism (Macpherson 1966), which impede widespread identification. I now consider two of these inequalities, namely those engendered by the right to accumulate capital, and the supervisory motivations in creating liberal subjects.

Classically, democracy is the direct rule by the people and liberalism is a series of safeguards to check the power of the majority. Democracy and liberalism appear in various combinations throughout the world. For example, considering the persecution of the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia, we can argue that the lack of protection for minority groups stymies widespread identification. In terms of Australia’s foreign policy towards Indonesia, the most conspicuous manifestation of liberalism is the right to accumulate property and capital. A state-centric approach to community will not capture the fact that, in Canberra’s efforts to attract the Asian middle class, the relevant community is between those who have capital. Such a community is not only truncated numerically, but also ignores its predatory logic of accumulation by forcing others into indebtedness and displacement. Therefore, Australia and Indonesia may be democracies in an electoral sense, but it is hard to discern the gains of widespread identification when, as in May 2012, my university, the University of Western Australia, invited Aburizal Bakrie to give a speech on the bilateral relationship. As one of the leading contenders for the 2014 presidential election, Aburizal Bakrie was significant to state and business elites in Australia. However, given the allegations that his conglomerate was responsible for the 2006 mudflow disaster in East Java, Aburizal Bakrie’s fêting by Australian government officials demonstrates the limits of identification engendered by liberal endorsements to accumulate capital and property without compunction.

The inequalities of liberalism are not only material ones. Liberalism is also a disciplinary scorecard of where its guardians situate others in relation to them. Hindess (2001) argues that liberals have two choices on how to foster liberal subjects, namely the self-regulation inculcated by the market and governmental policing of social life. Should the market fail to instil neoliberal values of enterprise in individuals and societies, policing steps in to fill the void. Hindess highlights three policing attitudes which liberals have adopted to precipitate or foreclose the betterment of their subjects. These attitudes are: ‘hopeless cases’, ‘the subjects of improvement’, and the ‘ethos of welfare’ (Hindess 2001: 102 – 109). It is the medial category which concerns us here, given the raft of Canberra-based and international institutions operating in Indonesia, all seeking to influence its governance (Hamilton-
Hart 2006). As I argued in Chapter Four, promoting the rule of law, as a signifier for the neoliberal scope of identification, is the objective of these technocratic institutions. Liberal subjects may well emerge from this immanent surveillance of the Indonesian population, but the architects of state-building should not mistake a hegemonic peace for a widespread and autonomous one. Put alternatively, the supervisory interactions between the formal democracies of Australia and Indonesia are discordant with Deutsch et al.'s (1957: 36) flourishing portrait of ‘mutual attention, communication [and] the perception of needs’ in security communities.

For a community to be extensive, it should be based on the interdependence of humanity, not the relations of rule which divide it, be they nation-states or classes. My conception of a security community between Australia and Indonesia is achievable, but policymakers and supporters of mutual identification have to address the social forces which alienate these two societies. John McCarthy (2015), a former Australian ambassador to Indonesia, argues that ‘Australia should work on the basis that most bilateral problems are cultural’. What McCarthy understands by cultural problems stems from the feelings of superiority and self-sufficiency which nationalism and neoliberalism exacerbate. Contrary to the democratic peace theory, widespread identification is not realised by the mere coexistence of similar political systems. Neither is identification achieved by the presence of an Indonesian president who is supportive of Australia’s geopolitical decisions. Such an identification is, at best, elite-centric and temporary. The transition from President Yudhoyono, who was widely perceived to be accommodating of Australia’s geopolitical undertakings, 45 to President Joko Widodo is revealing in this regard.

Yet, the vast majority of the world’s population lives in nation-states and looks to them for identity and security. Therefore, scholars of security communities have to consider how states can contribute to widespread identification, or at least not compound alienation. Linklater (2002) accepts that the bond we have with co-nationals is stronger than that with the rest of humanity. Towards the latter group, he proposes a negative criteria of not doing any harm. I argue that such a criteria has to include structural harm and violence, especially the impersonal dislocations of the market and the reification of the nation-state by scholars researching in a rationalistic vein. The obstacles to widespread identification between Australia and Indonesia are often of a structural variety, which cannot be discerned from observable interactions of bilateral

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45 In particular, while registering diplomatic concerns, Yudhoyono did not mobilise nationalist forces in response to Gillard’s welcoming of a US Marine base at Darwin in November 2011.
cooperation. Burke (2013: 69; his emphasis) argues that Linklater’s differentiation between autochthons and the rest of humanity does not go far enough in appreciating that ‘human existence is – in its factuality, across space and through time – transnational’. Instead, Burke (2013: 59) considers that the state should just be a site of legal self-determination, rather than a Hobbesian one of untold injustice, conflict and suffering. His sentiment is one which fishers and traders plying the fringe of the Australian mainland with diminishing liberty will recognise, testifying to alternative and age-old communities between Australia and Indonesia which transcend the logic of the nation-state.
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