South Asian States’ Participation in and Contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Case Study of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

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# Contents

Abstract......................................................................................................................... v

Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................... vii

List of Acronyms............................................................................................................. ix

Illustrations....................................................................................................................... xii

Defining the Problem & Study: Why South Asia?......................................................... 1

1. New Demands & Challenges of Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping.................. 25
   I. Background: The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War 28
   II. Intra-state Conflicts 38
   III. The Quantitative Growth in UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-
        Cold War Era 48
   IV. The 'New' Peacekeeping Operations 51
   V. The New Demands Relating to Troop Contribution 66
   VI. Demands and Challenges Relating to the Conduct of New Peacekeeping 74
   VII. What are the Suitable Strategies? 80
   VIII. Preparing The Peacekeepers: The Importance of Training for the
         Implementation of 'Softer' Peacekeeping 86
   IX. Summary 96

2. India - 'Marching to a New Beat'................................................................. 98
   I. The Context: India's World View 101
   II. UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War - The Indian Perspective 106
   III. The Emerging Global Context and Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping 121
   IV. Sources of Motivation 131
   V. India's Responses to Demands Relating to Troop Contribution 138
   VI. Adjusting to Demands and Challenges Relating to the Conduct of New
       Peacekeeping 147
   VII. The Practice of 'Softer' Peacekeeping 151
   VIII. Summary 171
### 3. Pakistan – ‘Back into the Boots’ in the Post-Cold War era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Context During the Cold War</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Pakistan as a Host State</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Pakistan as a UN Peacekeeper During the Cold War</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>The New Security Context and Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Sources of Motivation</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Pakistan’s Responses to Demands Relating to Troop Contribution</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Adjusting to Demands and Challenges Relating to the Conduct of New Peacekeeping</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>The Practice of ‘Softer’ Peacekeeping</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Bangladesh – The Participation of a Small State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>The Foreign Policy Context of a Small State and UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Sources of Motivation</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Bangladesh’s Responses to Demands Relating to Troop Contribution</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Adjusting to Demands and Challenges Relating to the Conduct of New Peacekeeping</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>The Practice of ‘Softer’ Peacekeeping</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. Conclusion: Rethinking South Asian States’ Participation in UN Peacekeeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Findings of present study</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>New Issues</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Future Direction</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Bibliography

- Appendix 1: UN Peacekeeping Operations (1948-2000).......................... 345
- Appendix 2: India’s Participation & Contribution (1947 - 2000)............. 349
- Appendix 3: Pakistan’s Participation & Contribution (1960 – 2000)......... 352
- Appendix 5: Geographic Distribution of Professional Posts in DPKO, UN....... 357
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree in any university, and to the best of my knowledge and belief contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text.

Kabilan Krishnasamy
For My Parents
Abstract

United Nations peacekeeping has become a very demanding and challenging enterprise in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of new types of armed conflicts often erupting within national boundaries has increased the need for more peacekeeping operations and new types of action and intervention. Currently, peacekeepers are confronted with rising demands for ground forces and troops to be deployed in complex, dangerous and risky peacekeeping operations. At the same time, conducting these operations has also become a challenge because their functions have broadened and become more complex in nature, and also because the emergence of new peacekeeping needs for the management of intra-state conflicts in many of today’s ‘rough’ operational environments. In these environments local behaviour and actions can be difficult to manage because they are predominantly shaped by the subjective elements of post-Cold War conflicts – perceptions, attitudes, and socio-psychological factors. Thus, peacekeepers today also need to develop an appropriate peacekeeping outlook that incorporates these new dimensions.

This study primarily examines the nature of participation of South Asian states – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh – in UN peacekeeping operations. It aims to: trace the place of UN peacekeeping in their foreign policy contexts; examine the sources of motivations; and assess the extent to which these South Asian states have responded to the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. To this end the thesis demonstrates that UN peacekeeping occupies a significant place in the foreign
policy agenda of South Asian states. It is argued that although financial benefits may be a reason for participating in peacekeeping, South Asian states are primarily motivated by political and security-related interests. Indeed, they pursue their active UN peacekeeping policy with the long-term view to enhancing their status and image in the international system and to realising foreign policy goals and interests such as: 'great' power recognition; mobilising international support against regional threats; and attracting foreign aid and investment for internal recovery.

South Asian states' strong commitment to UN peacekeeping can be seen in that they have been participating and contributing both quantitatively and qualitatively in line with the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. To date India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have made large and simultaneous troop commitments in more operations than in the past. Along with this their willingness to take risks and sustain commitment in hazardous operations has demonstrated South Asian states' reliability as a troop-contributors. Qualitatively, South Asian states have also responded to the new peacekeeping needs for the management of intra-state conflicts in the 'rough' operational environments. This can be seen in the development of a new peacekeeping outlook that takes a 'softer' community-oriented approach to post-Cold War peace operations.
Acknowledgements

I am always grateful to my guru and mentor, Dr. Samina Yasmeen for being a terrific friend, advisor and teacher, whose invaluable comments, research guidance and encouragement have played a major part in the thinking and writing process of this study. Moreover, her assistance in establishing contacts with various research institutes for undertaking fieldwork in South Asia and, her care, concerns and efforts for the advancements of both my present research work and future academic prospects will always be remembered and appreciated. Thank you guruji, for your friendship and also making the past four years of my life as a researcher and a student of international relations an exciting, fruitful and pleasant one.

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At the same time, I would also like to express my deep appreciation to a number of institutions that have helped me in carrying out my research and fieldwork. First and foremost, I would like to thank the University of Western Australia (UWA) for awarding me a scholarship for the full-four year term to undertake and complete the research study. Thanks are also due to the vice-Chancellery’s office and the department of Political Science, University of Western Australia (UWA) for providing financial support on various occasions. Special thanks must also be conveyed to the various South Asian academic institutions and military organizations namely, the Center for Policy Research, Jawaharlal Nehru University, United Service Institute and the Defence Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (India); Quaid-I-Azam University, Institute for Regional Studies, Foreign Affairs Office and the Inter-Service Public Relations, Pakistan Army (Pakistan); and Bangladesh International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dhaka University, Foreign Affairs Office, Bangladesh Military Cantonment (Bangladesh) for providing logistical and other critical support during my field-trip.

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Kabilan Krishnasamy
List of Acronyms

ADL  Armistice Demarcation Line
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASC  Army Supply Corps [Pakistan]
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
BANCON  Bangladesh Contingent
CFI  Custodial Force of India
CHT  Chittagong Hill Tracts
CIVPOL  Civilian Police [UN]
CNN  Cable News Network
COAS  Chief of Army Staff
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DMA  Deputy Military Advisor [UN]
DOMREP  Dominican Republic
DPKO  Department of Peace-Keeper Operation [UN]
DSCSC  Defense Service Command & Staff College
EU  European Union
FRAPH  Front Revolutionnaire pour l’ Advancement et le Progres ed Haiti (Paramilitary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti)
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNP  Gross National Product
ICRC  International Committee for the Red Cross
IGO  International Governmental Organizations [such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees]
IFOR  Implementation Force
INS  Indian Naval Ships
IPKF  Indian Peacekeeping Force
IT  Information Technology
JCO  Junior Commissioned Officer
JWG  Joint Working Group
KPNLF  Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
FUNCINPEC  Front Uni Nationale Pour UN Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif
LAC  Line of Actual Control
LOC  Line of Control
MA  Military Advisor [UN]
MINURSO  United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MIPONUH  United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Angola</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in Congo</td>
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<td>NADK</td>
<td>National Army of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Operation des Nations Unies au Congo [UN Organization in Congo]</td>
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<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>ONUMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Uganda-Rwanda</td>
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<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKBAT</td>
<td>Pakistan Battalion</td>
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<td>PRK</td>
<td>People's Republic of Kampuchea</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation for Development</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>SAOG</td>
<td>South Asian Growth Quadrangle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self Defense Force [Japan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI&amp;T</td>
<td>School of Infantry &amp; Tactics</td>
</tr>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General [UN]</td>
</tr>
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<td>TU</td>
<td>Training Unit [UN]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group [Chad]</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force [in Egypt and Israel]</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for Population Activities</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCIP</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNCRRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration in Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force [in Golan Heights]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>United Nations Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNIMOG</td>
<td>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
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<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
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<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force [in Somalia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observer in Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPF</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Forces [Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force [in Macedonia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force [in Former Yugoslavia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOP</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group [Namibia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTMH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [in Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan &amp; Syria]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observer Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-secretary General [UN]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

Graphs

Graph 1  UN Peacekeeping Operations (1948-99)  49
Graph 2.1  India's Participation in UN Peace Missions During the Cold War (1948-89)  107
Graph 2.2  India's Participation in UN Peace Missions (1948-99)  129
Graph 3.1  Pakistan's Participation in UN Peace Missions During the Cold War (1960-89)  191
Graph 3.2  Pakistan's Participation in UN Peace Missions (1960-99)  209
Graph 4  Bangladesh's Participation in UN Peace Missions (1980-1999)  272

Figure

Figure 1  The Zone of 'Fragmented' Peacekeeping  60

Table

Table 1  Intra-state Conflicts in the post-Cold War era  39

Maps

Map 2A  UNSOM II Deployment in Somalia, November 1993  162
Map 3A  UNTAC Deployment in Cambodia, 1992-93  238
Map 4A  UNMIH Deployment in Haiti, November 1995  298
## Photos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Photo 2B</th>
<th>Indian soldiers drilling a bore well for the supply of water</th>
<th>164</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Photo 2C</td>
<td>“Orphan Bonkay” in Baidoa</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo 2D</td>
<td>Indian officers negotiating with local warring factions</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo 2E</td>
<td>Brigadier Mano Bhaghat in a rapport-building mission with General Farah Aideed</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo 3B</td>
<td>Musical chair games organized by PAKBAT as part of CA</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo 3C</td>
<td>Pakistani soldiers assisting locals in the construction of roads in Cambodia</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo 3D</td>
<td>Peace Walks organized by PAKBAT before the UNTAC elections</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Defining the Problem & Study: Why South Asia?

United Nations peacekeeping is a peaceful means to managing armed conflicts and maintaining global peace and security through co-operation among the wider international community and states. At the most fundamental level peacekeeping involves the deployment of multinational forces, with the consent of opposing belligerents, as a stopgap measure to prevent further escalation of conflicts and at the same time create a suitable environment for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Put simply, UN peacekeeping is a "third-party intervention"\(^1\), with a view to positively affecting the course of international armed conflicts through diplomacy.

Most historians view peacekeeping as having begun in 1956 when the first major UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was created and deployed to the Sinai. Others believe that peacekeeping started in the late 1940s when the UN launched some early observer missions.

\(^1\) Third-party interventions have the following characteristics: "(1) It is non-coercive and voluntary; (2) it involves advocating either a particular outcome or a particular process (or both); (3) it attempts resolution; (4) it is impartial; (5) it changes the dynamics of the conflict situation". See A. Betts Fetherston, 'Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1 No. 1, Spring 1994.
in Palestine, Kashmir, the Balkans and Indonesia. Peacekeeping actually evolved from these early experiences. However, the roles and functions between observer and peacekeeping operations are very different. Whereas the former involve the deployment of small teams of unarmed blue berets to observe and monitor ground developments, peacekeeping operations involve lightly armed soldiers deployed as interpositional forces between belligerents in conflict areas. Despite the functional differences between observer mission and peacekeeping operation, one cannot separate the two types of interventions. This is because most peacekeeping operations include observer functions. While the study uses the term peace operations and peacekeeping operations interchangeably, it views observer missions as separate in cases where the UN has played a limited third-party role.

Although the literature on UN peacekeeping is vast, it is only since the end of the Cold War that the study of peacekeeping has become a subject of great interest among scholars and policy-makers alike. So great are these interests a new journal, *International Peacekeeping*, has been established for scholarly works in the field. Moreover, in the early 1990s the UN also established a separate department to handle day-to-day matters relating to the management of peacekeeping. This has been largely due to the expanding nature of peacekeeping since the early 1990s.

In the first 40 years of the UN's history since 1945 there were only 13 peace missions established, mostly in the Middle East, South Asia and Cyprus. In contrast, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a dramatic quantitative growth in UN peace operations with more than 40 new missions launched in many parts of the globe - South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, Central America, not to mention in various

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3 Prior to the establishment of a separate department in 1992, peacekeeping was largely managed by the Office of Political Affairs and the Secretary-General's Executive Office. See Edward Marks,
parts of the African continent. This expansion has been due to the increase in need arising from the proliferation of what has been referred to as "protracted social conflicts"\(^4\) erupting within national boundaries. Many of these conflicts, which are characterised by humanitarian disasters, ethnic strife, collapsed institutions and economies, violence, and tribal struggles, have called for not only a rise in the need for more peacekeeping operations but also for new types of third-party intervention.

Subsequently, post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations have also undergone dramatic changes in terms of substance in order to cater to the needs arising in these conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, many missions are labelled 'new' or second generation to indicate the change in the functions and roles of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations\(^5\). The old military duties of monitoring and supervising cease-fires are accompanied by broad and non-military based functions ranging from election monitoring to the provision of humanitarian aid and public services to nation-building activities.

However, the qualitative changes in the new peacekeeping operations have resulted in a major "definitional wrangle"\(^6\), and a number of conceptual aspects and issues have dominated the present literature. For example, one aspect relates to the expanding goals and aims of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping today has undoubtedly extended into other phases of conflict management such as peace building with a view to preventing the recurrence of future conflicts\(^7\). In a recent and most extensive study

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\(^5\) Other labels used in the literature include "wider", or "expanded" peacekeeping.

\(^6\) Ratner, op. cit., p. 16.

\(^7\) There are four different types of peaceful conflict management tools: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. On the other hand, peace-enforcement, which falls under a different category of conflict management approach, resorts to the use of force to affect the course of international armed conflicts. This study views peacekeeping separate as different from peace-enforcement activity. For a full discussion see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, UN, New York: 1992. See also Fetherston, A. Betts, *Towards A Theory of United Nations*
conducted by the UN on redefining peacekeeping, it was recommended that there exists a need for UN peacekeeping operations "to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building on those foundations". This UN-study indicates that the new peacekeeping should extend itself into achieving more than an absence of war. In other words, peacekeeping should not be limited to the mere abatement of conflicts but must take on a pro-active peace process to achieve long-term goals. Fetherston has described this peace process as "positive" peace.

Another aspect relates to the use of force in carrying out the new peacekeeping operations today. One of the characteristics of traditional peacekeeping is that it involves interposition between competing factions as opposed to enforcement and the use of force in strictly controlled circumstances, usually only in self defence. However, the use of force only for 'self-defence' in UN peacekeeping operations has been broadened to include defending, not just the lives of the military in the field, but also the mission as a whole. In fact, the broad definition of 'self-defence' gives military commanders the authority to open fire on armed belligerents who stand in the way of their fulfilling the mandate. Hence, most contemporary operations have involved enforcement at some point or other. In the UN

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8 The study was initiated by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, who convened an expert panel to conduct a major new study on peacekeeping. The panel-study, which was headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister, was completed and submitted in July 2000. See Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: A Far Reaching Report by an Independent Panel, UN. Doc.


missions to Somalia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and East Timor, the enforcement of mandates became a significant part of the operation.

These conceptual aspects and issues are critical as a great deal of effort and time has been spent on understanding the changing nature of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the literature focuses heavily on the conceptual and definitional issues of peacekeeping; lessons learnt from specific peace missions; and assessments on the UN's performance in peacekeeping activities\(^\text{12}\). Some of these are often carried out to the exclusion of other issues, such as the nature of state participation in and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

The idea of states participating as part of a world body in the maintenance of global peace and security is not new. In fact, the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, relied on the participation and contribution of its member states to execute some of its global responsibilities such as third-party mediation in conflicts. The dispatch of military personnel, drawn from various member states, as part of an observer group to mediate the border disputes between Lithuania and Poland, Russia and Finland, and also the deployment of a judicial commissioned team to conduct a plebiscite in Silesia and the Saar are some examples. Although it is often viewed as a failure, the League of Nations is sometimes seen

as fostering a new era of co-operation which became a major step towards internationalising the responsibility of maintaining global peace and security.

Similarly, the United Nations seeks the co-operation and participation from its member states in global affairs. Article 2.5 of the UN Charter states that 'All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter..."13. Peacekeeping, which has now been in practice for more than fifty years, is perhaps the only UN activity that relies on the wider participation and co-operation of the larger international community for manpower and material support. Goulding states that peacekeeping involves "field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under the United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them,..."14.

An important pre-requisite in the setting up of a peacekeeping operation is that it must seek the consent of the sovereign state that is willing to host the peacekeeping operation. The principles established in the creation of the first peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to Sinai, in 1956 in the face of an Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, not only pointed to this but also set the precedent for subsequent missions. The then UN Secretary-General, Hammarskjold asserted that:

"...the force, if established, would be limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognised international law. While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not

14 See Goulding, op. cit., p. 455. The UN can only make a request for resource inputs, but the ultimate decision lies in each sovereign government that must give written consent for the utilisation of its military troops under the UN flag. For discussion on donor-state consent, see Robert C.R. Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands: 1991.
request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country."\(^{15}\)

Indeed, consent under international law is pertinent not only to host-states but also to the troop-contributors and hence the phrase, 'donor-state consent'. Since the UN is made up of sovereign states, consent is a crucial element in interactions between the organisation and its member states. Since there is no proper legal framework or arrangement that enforces states to participate in UN peacekeeping, the UN can only make a request to its member states. The ultimate decision lies with each sovereign government that must give written consent for the utilisation of its military troops under the UN flag. Furthermore, consent must also be sought 'at every stage of each operation'\(^{16}\). This provides contributing states some leverage to determine the level of their involvement, which in turn could affect the outcome and success of UN peacekeeping missions.

The first wave of state participation came in the late 1940s when a handful of nations (ranging between five and nine) deployed small, unarmed observation teams of blue berets in Palestine, on the border of India and Pakistan in Kashmir, in the Balkans and in Indonesia. However, it was not until the official creation of the UNEF that a more formalised structure was established for states to participate and contribute in UN peace operations. For example, until 1956 troops and peace observers were mostly under the command and control of individual national contingents instead of the UN Secretary-General and an appointed UN force commander.

The UNEF was one of the largest forces established, comprising 6073 military personnel and functioning approximately 11 years after its establishment in 1956. The major troop contributors were Brazil (Jan’53 – June’67), Colombia (Nov’56 – Oct’58),

\(^{15}\) This passage appears in paragraph 9 of the Second Report which was approved by the General Assembly in Resolution 1001 (ES-I), on November 7 1956. Alco cited in Siekmann, op. cit., p. 13.
Denmark (Nov’56 – June’67), Finland (Dec’56 – Dec’57), India (Nov’56 – June’67), Indonesia (Jan’57 – Sep’57), Norway (Nov’56 – June’67), Sweden (Nov’56 – June’67), and Yugoslavia (Nov’56 – June’67).

Since 1956 state participation in UN peacekeeping has grown significantly. Over the last half a century an estimated total of about 118 states, both members of the UN and non-members\(^\text{17}\), have participated in peacekeeping operations in different capacities. Some play an indirect role by providing logistical and financial support for the third-party intervention of UN peacekeeping. The majority participates directly by providing ground troops and personnel. The provision of ground personnel includes the following categories: command personnel, military personnel (actual troops that form the bulk of the peacekeeping force), medical personnel, civilian personnel, civilian police and logistics unit. For example, Canada was one of the largest providers of logistics units, in particular signals, engineer, air transport, and maintenance and movement control units from November 1956 until the mission was withdrawn in June 1967. Other contributors of logistics supply included Italy, Switzerland and the US.

Although both forms of state participation are critical, the troop contributors or the peacekeepers bear the major burden of executing the day-to-day peacekeeping duties in the field. However, little attention, if any, has been given to examining the role of states participating directly in the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. Consequently, without such analysis one cannot examine some of the new and unprecedented peacekeeping problems emerging in the field. The operational environments of present day missions are so different and complex from the past emergencies that peacekeepers require suitable field crafts and strategies to facilitate the implementation of new peacekeeping duties. Thus, if

we are to broaden our scope and understanding of peacekeeping, then we have to move beyond the mere conceptual debates into other areas, such as state participation, to shed greater light on the many practical problems faced in the field.

One particular deficiency in the existing literature is that it is limited and narrow in terms of coverage of countries that participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Findlay, in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, notes that the identity of peacekeepers today has broadened, with the participation of new categories of states in UN peacekeeping operations. Some of these new categories include the permanent members of the Security Council, the old enemies, namely Germany and Japan, the new independent states of Central Asia and also a variety of non-western third world states. In spite of this diversity there has been an over-emphasis in the literature about the participation of major powers or economically advanced countries such as the US, Russia, UK, France, Canada, Germany the Nordic states to the exclusion of the participation of third world countries.

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17 Switzerland, which is a non-member state of the UN, has been playing a major role in peacekeeping operations since its emergence in 1948. But its participation is limited in the sense that it largely provides material and financial assistance.


19 Ibid., pp. 2-7.

The major powers such as the permanent members of the Security Council are new to playing a direct role in UN peacekeeping operations. Traditionally, and for most of the Cold War era, their roles have largely been limited to the provision of logistical and financial support. This is obviously not in line with the traditional arrangement outlined in the UN Charter in which the primary responsibility of maintaining global peace and security lies with the permanent members of the Security Council. This means that the major powers in the Council are directly responsible for the conduct of military operations. Under the framework of collective security the permanent members constitute the majority of the troop composition and lead military operations with the primary aim of averting threats to global peace and security. This can be seen most evidently in the peace-enforcement operations, such as the Korean War of the 1950s and the Gulf war of 1990-1991. However, unlike such enforcement operations which aim to impose peace, UN peacekeeping is one area where field responsibilities and role of peace-maintenance has shifted to the wider international community.


21 Para 1 of Article 24 states that “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, United Nations, New York.

22 Apparently, this is not written explicitly into the UN Charter. It is indicated that the “permanent members of the Security Council were to be mainstays of UN striking forces because they were thought to possess the political and military weight to enforce the UN’s collective will”. See Larry L. Fabian, ‘From Collective Security to Peacekeeping’ in Soldiers without Enemies, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.: 1971, p. 5. See also Inis L. Claude Jr., ‘The Security Council’, in The Evolution of International Organisations, ed., Evan Luard, Praeger Publishers, London: 1966.
In fact, UN peacekeeping, at least for most of the Cold War era, did not depend on the permanent members of the Security Council to provide ground troops. The key explanation for this lies in the rationale for creating peacekeeping in the first place. Peacekeeping basically evolved as an innovative response to the inactivity of the UN to affect the course of international armed conflicts during the Cold War. The East-West rivalry between the two superpowers imposed a straightjacket on the UN in terms of carrying out its primary peace maintenance role. It was in this political climate that peacekeeping was created. At the same time, there was also some fear that the conflicting and parochial interests of the superpowers during the Cold War could significantly affect the operation and jeopardise the impartiality and credibility of the peaceful third-party intervention. Hence, permanent members were largely excluded from providing national contingents as part of peacekeeping forces.

With the end of the Cold War, there was some pressure for the permanent members to take on ground responsibilities in peacekeeping operations. However, the response has been less than positive. Russia participates in peacekeeping when it relates to its own regional security. China maintains a cautious attitude to UN peacekeeping which results from its normative concern to protect state sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is not only reluctant to provide financial assistance but also in some instances it is reserved in terms of where its troops are deployed. While its troop contribution to peace operations in

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27 In 1993, President Bill Clinton called on the UN to do less peacekeeping because of the US reluctance to pay. He declared before the General Assembly that "if the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no". New York Times, 28
the Balkans have been significant, its involvement in some of the peace missions to Africa, especially since its bitter experiences in Somalia (1993), has been quite low. One recent example relates to the reluctance of the US to contribute troops in the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in 1999. At that time the UN had been facing significant problems in mobilising ground forces for Sierra Leone and the negative response from the West created some uproar in the international community and in the diplomatic circles at the United Nations. "Washington will not put an American Officer on the ground [in Sierra Leone]"28, stated the UN Chief Kofi Annan, who was disappointed by the reluctance of the superpower to share the burden of ground level participation in UN peacekeeping.

Industrialised states such as Germany and Japan are some of the new participating states in UN peacekeeping operations. But their level of involvement in the field has been also quite limited. This is because they are still bounded by their national constitutional restrictions. For example, Japan has constitutional restrictions on its deployment in harsh and dangerous warzones29.

Despite these limitations, most studies concentrate on the participation of major powers and industrialised states in UN peace operations. To some extent this is useful as the studies broaden the literature on state participation in UN peacekeeping operations. However, their choice and preference of states is mainly limited to advanced industrialised states and major powers to the exclusion of some of the third-world states. This is a concern, especially since the majority of the troop-contributors are from third world states30. This means that the contribution of Third World states is not widely publicised.

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28 Cable News Network (CNN) News Coverage.
30 The term 'Third World' is used to refer to a group of countries, which are now at least two-thirds of the world's total, that were once colonies of a few countries, including Belgium, Britain, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United States. However, there are important economic, political, cultural and religious differences between the third world states. For example, "economically diverse states such as the United Arab Emirates (gross national product (GNP) per
The reason for scholars often choosing the participation of major powers and economically advanced states over many of the third world states is not very clear. Perhaps, the choice is largely determined by the criteria used which focus on making multiple contributions in a single operation. For example, Neack has concluded that during the Cold War the most active peacekeepers were mainly the Western and Western-oriented industrialised states, namely Canada, Denmark, Australia, Ireland, Sweden and Finland. However, the author overlooks the fact that although the economically advanced states have the capacity to participate both directly and indirectly, the actual contributions of some of these states as peacekeepers during the Cold War was relatively small. Canada, for example, has participated in almost every peace operation during the Cold War (1948-89). But in terms of the provision of military troops alone, Canada has participated in only two large-scale peacekeeping operations. Much of its participation has come in the form of logistics support and support personnel such as medical personnel, command personnel and logistics support units.

Similarly, countries like Australia and Denmark have contributed large-scale troops to no more than two major UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. It is clear that the author has based the analysis simply on the fact that some of these states contribute more than one type of resource. In other words, they have been providing both troops and material (logistical and financial) support in various peace operations.

capita, $21,430 in 1993), South Korea ($7,660) and Mozambique ($90), politically singular countries such as Cuba (Communist one-party rule), Nigeria (military dictatorship), India (multi-party democracy) and Iran and Saudi Arabia, both theocracies, are uniformly perceived as belonging to the Third World”. In other sense, third world also refers to countries based on their relations and alignment with the superpowers during the Cold War. For example, countries belonging to the non-aligned movement are also generally seen as third world countries. But with the end of the Cold War, some argue that such categorisation no longer exists. For more discussion on the definitions of Third World, see, Jeff Haynes, *Third World Politics*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford: 1996, pp. 1-13. See also B. C. Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics*, Macmillan Press, London: 1996.  
Given their capacity to make multiple contributions, the economically advanced states will be held in higher regard than many of the third world states that are limited to making only troop-contributions. However, the criterion of multiple contribution is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the criterion is naturally advantageous to only a handful of states that are economically, financially and resourcefully wealthy. Hence, the literature does not represent the participation of the wider international community but focuses on certain categories of states.

Secondly, the criterion simply ignores the reality that some third world states have been participating in UN peacekeeping operations over a long period of time. For example, during the Cold War some of the early peacekeepers came not only from medium-sized economically advanced states but also from a number of third world states. Countries like Brazil, Fiji, Ghana, Indonesia, Senegal, Nigeria and Yugoslavia were some of the early third-world troop-contributing states. According to Neack, Ghana, Nigeria and Indonesia made troop-commitments to at least four major peacekeeping operations launched during the Cold War\(^ {33}\).

Since the end of the Cold War UN peacekeeping has witnessed significant growth in the number of participating states from the third world. Of the 49 states that participated for the first time in 1989, 41 of them were from the third world\(^ {34}\). These included Brunei, Cuba, Chad, Congo, Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Namibia, Niger, Mali, Malawi, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In spite of this growth and expansion, the participation and contribution of third world states in UN peacekeeping is largely neglected by scholars.

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\(^{32}\) During the Cold War, the UN established five major peacekeeping operations: Sinai mission - UNEF I (1956-67); the Congo - ONUC (1960-64); to Cyprus (1964 - present); Sinai - UNEF II (1973-79); and Lebanon - UNIFIL (1978-present). Refer to Ibid.

\(^{33}\) See Ibid., p. 187.

\(^{34}\) Findlay, ed., (1996) op. cit., pp. 4-5.
This study aims to address this problem and make a contribution to expanding the present scope of the literature. It does this by focusing specifically on the participation of the third world states of South Asia, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The factors that have shaped this choice are given below.

A first factor is that some South Asian states are traditional participants in overseas peace operations. Admittedly, South Asia is itself one of the longest beneficiaries of UN peacekeeping as international forces have been observing cease-fires between India and Pakistan in the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir since 1948. At the same time, some states from this sub-continent are pioneers in UN peacekeeping missions abroad. Notably, India has been regarded as one of the oldest and most consistent peacekeepers among not only the South Asian but also third world countries. Its participation began as early as 1947 when New Delhi decided to be part of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, a fact finding commission established to observe the ground developments over the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. India also played a high level political role in the UN General Assembly during the creation of the UNEF, the first major UN peacekeeping operation launched to monitor the cease-fires between Egypt and the Anglo-French-Israeli alliance in the Gaza.

Other examples of South Asian participation in early UN peace missions can be seen in 1958 when Nepal consented to deploy unarmed observers as part of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon. Similarly, Pakistan made its debut in 1960 when it provided logistics and support elements as part of the UN Peacekeeping force to the Congo. Thus the fact that these states have been some of the traditional participants in UN peacekeeping operations abroad cannot be trivialised. In this sense, South Asia as a region is very significant to the present study.

Secondly, South Asian states can be viewed as major participants because of their large and active troop-commitment to overseas peace operations. In fact, South Asian troop contributions have also outweighed the major powers and also some of the Nordic countries. At its peak during 1994 the UN deployed 73,393 military peacekeepers drawn from 76 countries. South Asian states alone accounted for 26 %\(^\text{36}\). The five permanent members of the Security Council contributed 17 % of the UN blue helmets\(^\text{37}\). Moreover, even Bangladesh's troop-contribution (5.31 %) was greater than some of the traditional peacekeepers like Canada (3.5 %) and Italy (1.12 %)\(^\text{38}\).

Despite the reduction in the overall strength of UN peacekeeping forces in recent years, South Asian peacekeepers continue to outnumber some of the Western industrialised countries. For example, during 1998 the total number of military peacekeepers deployed worldwide had declined to 14,347. Of these, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal accounted for 20 % (2,747), compared to the 14 % (1,897) by the P5s\(^\text{39}\). The industrialised G-7 countries and Russia and China, which largely dominate the global system both politically and economically, fell slightly shorter than the South Asian states with 18 % (2,288)\(^\text{40}\). Although traditional peacekeepers, such as the Nordic states, are identified for their excellent co-operative regional stand-by arrangements, their contribution constituted only 10 % (1,318) of the UN peacekeeping forces in 1998. The striking difference in the size of troop contributions makes the study of South Asian states' contribution and participation in UN peacekeeping worthwhile.

\(^{36}\) The breakdown is as follows: India (7.03%), Pakistan (10.94%), Bangladesh (5.31%), and Nepal (2.65%). See Jasjit Singh, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIX No. 4, July 1996, p. 553.

\(^{37}\) The share of the permanent members was as follows: the US (1.34%), Britain (5.11%), China (0.09%) and Russia (2.02%) and France (8.2%). Ibid, p. 553.

\(^{38}\) Ibid, p. 553.

\(^{39}\) These figures are calculated based on the information provided by the UN, Department of Public Information.

\(^{40}\) The troop contribution of the G-7 countries are as follows: Japan (0.31%), Germany (1.32%), US (4.06%), UK (2.89%), France (4.63%), Canada (2.07%), Italy (0.66%). The troop contribution of China and Russia figures at 0.24% and 1.39% respectively.
A third factor that has shaped the choice of South Asian states relates to their identity in terms of relative power structure in the region. India is a regional power not only because of its size, population, and Gross National Product (GNP) but also because of its economic, industrial and military capability. India has also emerged as a global power in Information Technology. It has the fourth largest army in the world and has conducted several nuclear tests in May 1998 as part of its desire to become a nuclear power. On the other end of the continuum, Bangladesh is a small state which is encircled by India on three sides of its border and has relatively low human resource development, a weak economy and low military capability. Pakistan exists in the middle of this continuum. It is relatively smaller than India but bigger than Bangladesh. Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, becoming the seventh nation to have exploded a nuclear bomb. However, Pakistan’s weak domestic situation, particularly its economy and political institutions, has made it difficult for Pakistan to compete with India for regional power status in South Asia. Given these differences, it is critical to examine how these states participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

It must be noted that this is not a study about theories of state participation. Rather, it is a country-specific study, examining the nature of participation of three South Asian states, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in UN peacekeeping operations. This involves three primary aims. The first aspect relates to tracing the place of UN peacekeeping in the context of each of the country’s foreign policy. State participation in UN peacekeeping cannot be examined in isolation but must be considered within the overall foreign policy context in which decisions are made. Without an analysis of this foreign policy context, an examination of the nature of state participation would lack depth. This is

\[\text{41 Compared to Nepal which is also a small state, Bangladesh is a relatively new peacekeeper that has been participating only since the late 1980s. Yet, it has outweighed Nepal in terms of the size of troop-contributions in a number of post-Cold War peace operations. For example, in 1994,}\]
because peacekeeping is part of a country’s foreign policy outlook and implementation. Also, policies designed to serve a state’s interest, including its level of commitment to UN peacekeeping, may alter both with perceptions of and responses to changes in the overall global environment. For some of the older peacekeepers like India and Pakistan, there may have been changes in this commitment over time which provide the basis for assessing how these states participate in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations.

A second aim is to examine the key sources of motivation for their active participation in and contribution to UN peacekeeping. States participate in UN peacekeeping because they have some motive to do so. A country’s foreign policy objectives and outlook generally shape these motives. They determine the willingness of states to act. International, national or even regional interests can drive these motives. The clear-cut identification of these motivations is difficult because they can be complex and inter-related.

At one level, there is a neo-liberal interpretation of why states participate in UN peacekeeping. The maintenance of order and security is identified by one analyst as a starting point for the development of a ‘common interest’ and a shared responsibility in the elementary goals of social life. Therefore, states may be motivated by a sense of good nature. As responsible citizens they have an obligation to serve the cause of international peace and security. Thus, some states may participate in UN peacekeeping due to their intolerance of some humanitarian crisis. For example, “in Rwanda, inaction may be an unacceptable response for compelling moral reasons, and public opinion may not tolerate inaction by the international community in the face of genocide.” In such situations states, as part of the larger international society and on strong moral grounds, may be motivated to

Bangladesh’s troop contribution (5.31%) was much bigger than the size of Nepalese troop contributions (2.65%). This is why Bangladesh is chosen over Nepal.

respond to the harsh and bitter realities of human suffering arising from civil conflict. Hence, the deployment of national contingents to close-to-home missions and in some cases to distant missions may be something significant.

However, scholars often question altruism as the key source of motivation for state participation in peacekeeping. In other words, states must have some specific reason for participating in and contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. Participation in UN peacekeeping is often used as a ‘mask’ for political intentions. Although peacekeeping serves broader global interests and the common good, the willingness of a country to participate in and the nature of its contribution to peacekeeping are primarily determined by its national interests. Such interests might range from acquiring some level of political identity such as ‘good international citizenship’ to a desire to exert some political influence in the international system. The issue of state interests in UN peacekeeping has been examined in some of the literature that focuses on the participation of the economically advanced states but does not address third world economies nor South Asian states in particular.

The third aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the strength of South Asian states’ commitment to UN peacekeeping. This involves examining their ‘response’ to the new

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43 Discussion paper, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, New York.
45 Neack, op. cit., p. 184.
46 The author emphasises the difficulty of reconciling national and international interests in UN peacekeeping. He suggests some ways in which the clash of interest could be reduced. For more discussion on these see Johansen, op. cit., pp. 282-302.
48 The term 'response' is used, in this context, interchangeably with participation and contribution. It does not refer to just policies but also the real contribution.
Why South Asia?

demands of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. The quantitative expansion in peacekeeping operations has imposed considerable strains on key financial contributors. However, the pressure for peacekeepers is much greater. Indeed, direct participants are now confronted by new demands and challenges relating to troop contribution and conducting new peacekeeping operations. These new peacekeeping operations have become a challenge not only because they involve qualitative and complex peacekeeping duties, but also because they must be conducted in the face of unprecedented challenges and realities in the field.

Most studies have focused on identifying the quantity and type of contribution in terms of resource inputs (numbers of ground troops, types of logistical support and financial contribution). However, although the size of troops and other resources are important, any analysis is incomplete without examining how peacekeepers perform qualitatively in the field. It is also important to examine the way peacekeepers manage new peacekeeping challenges in the field. The present study aims to contribute to this aspect of peacekeeping response.

The central argument of this thesis is that UN peacekeeping occupies a significant place in South Asian states’ foreign policy agenda. It is argued that although financial benefits may be a reason for participating in peacekeeping, South Asian states are primarily motivated by political and security-related interests. Indeed, they pursue their active UN peacekeeping policy with the long-term view to enhancing their status and image in the international system and to realising foreign policy goals and interests such as: ‘great’ power recognition; mobilising international support against regional threats; and attracting foreign aid and investment for internal recovery.

South Asian states’ strong commitment to UN peacekeeping can be seen in that they have been participating and contributing both quantitatively and qualitatively in line with the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. To
date India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have made large and simultaneous troop commitments in more operations than in the past. In addition their willingness to take risks and sustain commitment in hazardous operations has demonstrated South Asian states' reliability as a troop-contributors. Qualitatively, South Asian states have also responded positively to the new peacekeeping needs for the management of intra-state conflicts. This can be seen in the development of a new peacekeeping outlook that takes a 'softer' community-oriented approach to post-Cold War peace operations.

The study begins by setting the scene for examining the nature of participation of the South Asian peacekeepers. In chapter 1 the new demands and challenges relating to troop contribution and conducting new peacekeeping operations are identified and examined. The proliferation of new types of conflicts and subsequently the growth in UN peace operations have increased the demand for ground forces. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that making sizeable and simultaneous troop-commitments alone is not sufficient to qualify as a major peacekeeper. Troop-contributors must also be reliable in terms of having the willingness to take risks and also having the capacity to sustain their commitment over prolonged periods in many hazardous and dangerous operations.

Peacekeepers are also confronted by new demands and challenges as a result of the qualitative changes in UN peacekeeping which in the present-day involves mandates which are broad, multifunctional and non-military in nature, and which raise critical problems of familiarity, particularly for military forces. Peacekeepers are increasingly confronted by unprecedented new ground realities such as the management of consent for implementing these new broad duties. To this end, the chapter examines the issue of consent management, assesses the need to develop a fresh peacekeeping outlook and field strategies as a response to this challenge, and examines the importance of training for the implementation of these peacekeeping strategies.
Against the backdrop of these new demands and challenges, the study examines the nature of participation of the three South Asian states. Chapters 2 to 4 focus on three case studies. These case studies aim to determine whether India, Pakistan and Bangladesh respond to the new requirements relating to troop contribution and the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. In each case study the thesis traces the place of UN peacekeeping in the foreign policy contexts of the respective states (for older peacekeepers like India and Pakistan, the respective case studies take a comparative perspective to examine their level of commitment to UN peacekeeping both during and after the Cold War). This is then followed by an examination of the factors that motivate these states to participate actively in UN peacekeeping operations. The final part in each of the case study provides an assessment of their responses to the new demands and challenges relating to troop contribution and conducting new peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era.

The concluding chapter of the study rethinks the South Asian States’ participation in UN peacekeeping. The main aims of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, to summarise the main findings of the study. Secondly, to identify new issues related to South Asian peacekeepers. One of which relates to their concerns and dissatisfaction about their limited involvement in the higher administrative and decision-making levels of peacekeeping within the UN bureaucracy. Although the discussion provides a South Asian perspective of their overall engagement in the decision-making bodies of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) within the UN system, it is not intended to provide a case for greater South Asian states’ representation. Nor does the thesis suggest that the UN should readily hire South Asian candidates on the basis of their active participation in and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. At the same time their concerns should neither be ignored nor treated lightly. In fact, these concerns point to the need for carrying out new research in several areas. Thus, the third aim of the concluding chapter is to shed some light on future directions by identifying new areas of research.
The present study relies on both primary and secondary sources for examining South Asian states' participation in and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. In terms of primary sources, several major field trips have been undertaken for this project. The first phase of the fieldwork involved visits to New Delhi, Islamabad and Dhaka during October 1997 to April 1998. This fieldwork was carried out to examine some foreign policy documents and also to conduct interviews with some of the key decision-makers in the respective countries. Informal interviews were also conducted with at least two dozens military officers who had served in various peacekeeping operations, namely Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia. These interviews have been critical in providing the first-hand knowledge of direct field experiences of troops and have provided some insights into determining the South Asian approach to peacekeeping today.

As a final phase of the fieldwork, I visited the United Nations, New York, for data collection on the extent of involvement of third world troop-contributing states in the higher management levels of decision-making within the DPKO. I took up an internship position for three months in the Policy Analysis Unit, Office of the Under Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York (January to April 2000). This working experience provided beneficial insights into the management of peacekeeping at the higher levels of decision-making within the UN Secretariat. I was assigned to work on the 2000 session of the Special Committee on UN peacekeeping Operations, which is a forum through which member states discuss policy matters and debate issues related to peacekeeping. My capacity as a UN staff provided me with first-hand knowledge and experience of the administrative aspects of discussions and consultations in these closed-door meetings. During this research internship interviews were conducted with several policy makers in the offices of military operations, training and policy analysis of the DPKO. Therefore, the internship experience also constitutes an essential component of this study.
Material has also been drawn from local print media such as *The News* (Pakistan), *The Nation* (Pakistan) *Frontier Post* (Pakistan), *Dawn* (Pakistan), *The Muslim* (Pakistan), *Indian Express* (New Delhi), *The Hindu* (New Delhi), *The Independent* (Dhaka), and *The Daily Star* (Dhaka). A wide range of secondary sources on peacekeeping has been consulted. Several books on peacekeeping and also a range of journals have been examined including, *Survival, International Peacekeeping, Pakistan Horizon, Regional Studies, India Quarterly, Strategic Studies, Indian Defence Review, Bangladesh Army Journal* and *Journal of the Bangladesh International Institute for Strategic Studies.*
New Demands & Challenges of Post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping

The challenges confronting United Nations peacekeepers are much greater today than ever before. The old days where lightly armed uniformed soldiers patrolling along international borders to monitor and supervise cease-fires between two opposing countries are long gone. Instead, they are increasingly deployed thinly in intra-state 'protracted social' conflicts which are characterised by ethnic strife, humanitarian disasters, violence and 'rough' operational environments. While the implementation of post-Cold War peacekeeping functions seek the support of not only the warring parties but also the civil population as a whole, eliciting co-operation at both these levels is a challenge particularly in the 'rough' operational environments of the modern day conflicts. In these environments, the local community and warring groups' behaviour and actions can be difficult to manage because they are predominantly shaped by subjective elements such as perceptions, attitudes, and socio-psychological factors.

While the post-Cold War era continues to witness the proliferation of these types of international armed conflicts they have increased the need for more actions and new types of peacekeeping intervention. Indeed, UN peacekeeping operations have undergone
phenomenal changes in terms of both their number and substance. The number of peace operations launched has increased dramatically from 18 during 1948-1989 to 40 since 1990. Many post-Cold War UN peace missions are labelled ‘new’ to reflect the change in their roles and functions. The old military functions of supervising cease-fires and monitoring buffer zones are accompanied by new sets of broad civilian tasks and duties such as election monitoring, provision of humanitarian aid, demobilisation and disarmament, displacement of refugees, reintegration of civil society and nation-building exercises.

The question arises as to what these changes mean for peacekeepers and troop-contributing nations that bear the major responsibility of carrying out the job in the field. The brief answer to this question is that currently UN peacekeepers are expected to have the capacity and capability to meet new requirements of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. The growth and expansion of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era have created new demands and challenges for peacekeepers. The primary aim of this chapter is to identify and examine these new demands and challenges in two major areas: (i) troop contribution and (ii) the actual conduct of the new peacekeeping operations.

The increase in the number of peace operations, is referred to in this study as quantitative growth, has not only resulted in an upsurge in the demand for ground troops but has also imposed new sets of requirements on peacekeepers. It is argued in this chapter that although the size of troop-contributions matters, peacekeepers also need to be reliable in terms of “staying power” and the willingness to take risks in the hostile and harsh operational environments of post-Cold War conflicts.

At the same time, the qualitative changes in the substance of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations present another set of challenge which relates to conducting and implementing the new peacekeeping functions. This is a challenge not only because the functions are multidimensional and complex but also due to the emergence of new ground challenges and realities such as consent management in the ‘rough’ operational environments
of post-Cold War conflicts. To this end, the chapter argues that there is a need to develop a fresh peacekeeping outlook which is not only different from the traditional military-oriented approach, but which also incorporates the dimensions of the ‘rough’ operational environments and the new needs for managing consent today. As part of this fresh outlook responses such as the development of appropriate peacekeeping strategies are identified and examined. It is argued that peacekeepers on the ground today need to rely on the ‘softer’ aspects of military science to shape perceptions and attitudes in such a way that enables them to generate co-operative behaviour and positive reactions within local communities. The implementation of these new field strategies also raises the issue of developing suitable skills. Thus, the concluding section of the chapter discusses the importance of training and developing suitable training curriculum as part of the fresh peacekeeping outlook.

The chapter begins by tracing the evolution of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War. This provides a background to UN peacekeeping and at the same time to use it as a basis for showing how UN peacekeeping has changed in the post-Cold War era.

I. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING DURING THE COLD WAR

Peacekeeping is often called the invention of the United Nations\(^1\). This is because although we talk much about it today, peacekeeping is neither mentioned by name nor has any real legal provisions or constitutional basis in the UN Charter. Moreover, it lacks a clear and specific definition. For example, the UN defines peacekeeping as “one involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict”\(^2\). Another source views it as “a reversal of the use of military personnel foreseen in the UN Charter … Its

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practitioners have no enemies, are not there to win and can use force only in self-defence'.

The International Peace Academy provides a more elaborate definition of peacekeeping: "the prevention, containment moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace". Peacekeeping is also identified as a "counselling" activity which has been invented to manage conflicts through peaceful and diplomatic means such as negotiations and mediations. One writer has argued that this lack of clarity in definition "provides a measure of flexibility that serves political and operational purposes of peacekeeping".

Nevertheless, as a peaceful third-party intervention, UN peacekeeping operations are fundamentally guided by three key principles. Firstly, peacekeeping seeks the consent of the parties at war. Consent legitimises the presence of UN peacekeepers in the field. Unlike the 'hard' style of managing conflict, that is by enforcing peace, peacekeeping generally is not intended to impose peace but aims to create a conducive environment so that it can keep the peace, while parties settle their differences at the negotiating table.

Secondly, the impartiality of peacekeepers is critical in the conflict management process. When UN peacekeeping forces enter conflict zones they are not suppose to take sides but are required to arbitrate and mediate impartially. Unlike peace-enforcement, peacekeeping does not draw a distinction between victims and aggressors. Impartiality, which is one of the most powerful 'weapons' of UN peacekeeping, must be practised at

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every level of the conflict management process. However, it can be difficult to sustain impartiality over prolonged periods of time especially under conditions of stress and when protagonists accuse the peacekeepers of showing favour in order to disrupt the peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, impartiality is something that cannot be merely asserted but it must be shown. The impartial actions of the peacekeepers would not mean anything unless they were perceived to be such. Therefore, perception of the parties and disputants in a conflict is a very crucial determinant in shaping the credibility of the peacekeepers as an impartial mediating force in the field.

The third principle relates to the presence of UN peacekeepers as a non-threatening force. This provides an alternative to the battlefield, such as the political management of disputes at the negotiating table and enables disputants to give their consent for a UN peacekeeping presence. Thus, peacekeepers relied on the art of negotiation and political diplomacy in the third party mediation of disputes. This was possible because in traditional peacekeeping situations the impetus for peace frequently came from the conflicting parties themselves.

Peacekeeping, which occupies a major place in the peace maintenance role of the United Nations has had an unclear beginning. Some consider that the idea of intervening in conflicts as a peaceful third-party mediator is neither new nor something exclusive to the United Nations and that the origin of peacekeeping can be traced far back to pre-UN days. In the early 1920s, the League of Nations, on various occasions, mounted several peace operations to manage border disputes in Silesia and the Saar on the German-Polish border,

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10 Ibid., p. 1. See also Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, Chatto & Windus for
and other territorial disputes between Lithuania and Poland, Finland and Russia, and Bulgaria and Greece. Some of these operations took the form of observer missions, fact finding teams, commissions of inquiry, plebiscite and administrative commissions, and judicial panels.

However, peacekeeping is widely viewed as having evolved during the Cold War, that it is the "child of the Cold War, born of the United Nations' frustrations at its inability to enforce the peace as envisaged in its Charter ....". According to article 24.1 of the UN Charter, the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security lies with the Security Council. The UN was established with high hopes in the General Assembly of better implementing this collective security arrangement. However, such hopes soon fell prey to the Cold War rivalry between the two Superpowers. The ideological differences within the Security Council rendered it difficult for that Council to fulfil its primary function. Hence, while in its infancy stages the UN was faced with impotence in terms of fulfilling its fundamental peace-maintenance and security role. It was in this political climate that peacekeeping emerged as an "inventive response" to the straightjacket imposed on the UN by the East-West rivalry.

The UN's peacekeeping experience during the Cold War has been categorised into four different periods: the nascent period (1948-1956); the assertive period (1956-1966); the

13 It states that "in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,...". Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice.
dormant period (1967-1972); and the resurgent period (1973-1978). Fetherston contributes to this categorisation by identifying the post-resurgent phase as the maintenance period (1979-1987) of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War.

The “nascent” period is when the UN first experimented with peacekeeping by deploying small, unarmed observation teams of blue helmets in the Middle East and South Asia. In 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was created and deployed to monitor, certify and report on the status of the cease-fire agreements signed by Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Later in 1949 the UN dispatched another team of observers as part of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), following the Indo-Pakistan war over the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Their task was to monitor the ground developments and observe the implementation of the cease-fire-agreement. These small-scale observer missions can be viewed as the early experiments of the UN in peacekeeping. In fact, up till the mid-1950s these observer missions figured as the key instrument of the UN to prevent or manage international armed conflicts.

The term ‘peacekeeping’ only came into use with the creation and deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to the Sinai in 1956. However, the name was officially formalised in February 1965 following the establishment of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, an international forum to deal with matters related to peacekeeping. The UNEF, which was created in the wake of the Anglo-French-Israel attack on Egypt following the latter's nationalization of the Suez Canal, is generally viewed

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17 See Fetherston, (1994), op. cit., pp. 27-9. See also Appendix 1 for breakdown of the different periods.
19 Ibid., p. 1.
as setting the precedent for many of the future UN peace operations. As a result, the pre-UNEF peace missions are generally viewed as *ad hoc* operations, for they were largely loose in terms of structure and creation. For example, in the early observer missions ground personnel were largely deployed under the command of individual national militaries and it is only since the UNEF that international forces have been placed under the direct command of the UN Secretary-General and the appointed Force Commander. Hence, in this sense the UNEF and the post-UNEF peace observer and peacekeeping missions have been viewed as truly international forces.

Nevertheless, the creation of the UNEF also provided some basis for drawing some general distinction between an observer mission and a peacekeeping operation. Though the two types of interventions are related, they differ in terms of the degree of involvement in managing conflicts. Indeed, peacekeeping operations and observer missions are related in the sense that the former generally includes observation functions. But peacekeeping operations are more active in nature than observer missions. Observer missions involve tasks mandated to do no more than fly the UN flag and observe the implementation of the cease-fire agreements. Peacekeepers, on the other hand are deployed as interpositional forces mandated to actually do something to freeze the conflict and 'keep' the peace. For instance, when the UNEF arrived in Egypt, its key functions were to interpose between the belligerents, to supervise the truce, to monitor the cease-fire by patrolling along the
demarcation line.

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23 Ibid., p. 32.
international borders and to supervise the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli troops\textsuperscript{25}.

For approximately ten years after the creation of the UNEF in 1956, the UN became increasingly active in peacekeeping operations. This is referred to as the "assertive" period of UN peacekeeping. During this period alone the UN launched eight peace missions which form the bulk of the total 13 peace missions launched in the 40 years of the UN's history since 1945 (see Appendix 1). Let us briefly examine some of these missions.

It can be argued that most of the missions launched in this assertive period were border missions with the exception of the mission to the Congo. In fact, among all the peace missions launched during the Cold War only one, the UN Force in Congo (1960-64) broke the pattern of traditional peacekeeping roles and functions. Arguably, the UN may have become slightly over-ambitious in its efforts to bring about some changes to the political life of Congo. Indeed, it is said that the then Secretary-General Dag Hamarskjöld, "in his brave idealism, thought the Organisation really could bring freedom to a poor and politically unsophisticated people in a rich land coveted by the powerful"\textsuperscript{26}. However, the conduct of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which faced considerable difficulty implementing its mandate, became a highly controversial affair\textsuperscript{27}. Nevertheless, the mission to the Congo was the first experience for the UN to operate within a national jurisdiction.

However, in most cases the UN limited itself to deploying its peacekeeping forces in border missions. Some examples are cited here. In 1958, while still functioning in the

\textsuperscript{26} The quote is cited in 'Time to Redefine Peacekeeping', \textit{UNDiplomatic Times}, Monthly Issue, UN, New York: February 2000. The UN membership placed enormous confidence on the Secretary-General Dag Hamarskjöld, who had achieved some success in the creation and deployment of UNEF. Apparently, the general mood within the UN was one of "leave it to Dag", which led to the creation of the Congo mission. See Alan James, 'The Congo Controversies', \textit{International Peacekeeping}, Vol. 1 No. 1 Spring 1994b, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{27} Many of these controversies arose because the dominating political purposes were not shared by the key political actors, including the concerned parties, the permanent members, troop-contributing states, Secretary-General and the Secretariat as a whole. One of these controversies revolves around the issue of the use of force in the Congo, which at one stage led to anti-UN sentiments among the Western states. James examines how different political actors, both within Congo and the UN, used
Sinai the UN launched a peace mission to Lebanon which was facing internal unrest. The uprising started when the President Camille Chamoun, a Christian, changed the constitution to facilitate re-election. Some Lebanese rebel and fundamentalist groups resisted this through violent activities and relied on arms supplied from Syria. However, although the internal tensions within Lebanon were escalating, the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was not mandated to arbitrate or mediate in the internal conflict. Instead, its function was limited to observing the developments and activities along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Peace observers were deployed with the consent of the relevant parties to observe and ascertain whether any illegal infiltration of personnel or arms was taking place across the Lebanese border.28

In 1962, the UN established a Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to oversee the withdrawal of the Dutch forces from West Irian. The force primarily monitored the cease-fire between Dutch and Indonesian forces and helped to supervise the handing over of the former Dutch colony to Indonesia.29 Three months after the completion of the UNTEA mission in April 1963, the UN established an observer mission in Yemen. This was part of the UN initiated disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Revolutionary government in Yemen. Subsequently, UN peace observers were required to monitor, certify and report on Saudi Arabia ending its support for the monarchy and on Egypt’s withdrawal of troops from Yemen.30

In 1964 the UN launched the third major peacekeeping operation of the assertive period, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This was in spite of the UN’s near financial exhaustion from its heavy commitments in the Sinai and the Congo.31 The UNFICYP was created and established in the face of an internal unrest related to constitutional and political

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problems between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot ethnic communities. Nevertheless, the peacekeeping force was mandated to supervise well-demarcated cease-fire lines and maintain buffer zones between the Cyprus National Guard and Turkish Forces. The primary purpose was to create and maintain a climate of inter-communal stability conducive to the search for a peaceful settlement.

However, the absence of a political settlement between the two communities in Cyprus has resulted in the continued presence of the UNFICY until today, even though the size of the force has shrunk. In fact, the limited success in Cyprus has also led to some thinking within the UN about reducing the UNFICYP to an observer mission.

The assertive period of UN peacekeeping came to an end with the establishment of a second observer-border mission to South Asia, the UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (1965). This was an interim mission created out of the fear that the renewed fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could affect the long-standing presence and functioning of the UNMOGIP. The UNIPOM functioned for only six months, until March 1966, when it was absorbed by the UNMOGIP. For almost seven years afterwards, peacekeeping remained "dormant". The UN did not create any new peace missions, though trouble in the Middle East had started to re-surface.

Indeed, the termination of the UNEF at the request of President Nasser of Egypt in 1967 led to another military confrontation, the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War. The war resulted in not only the defeat of Egypt but also further Israeli occupation of the Sinai. By

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31 Ibid., p. 40.
32 Cyprus, which gained independence from the British in 1960, is a ethnically mixed state, with Greek Cypriot and Turkish communities forming a majority of 80% and a minority of 20% of the population respectively. In December 1963, a series of constitutional crises led to a major outbreak of conflict between the two communities. See Ibid., p. 40.
34 Ibid., p. 55. See also UN Document S/25492, 30 March 1993, para 15.
35 See John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-
this time doubts about the capacity of the peacekeeping system to maintain peace and security were growing within the UN membership. Egypt, which had initially requested for the withdrawal of the UNEF, blamed the UN for leaving. The Israelis, on the other hand, refused to have any international presence and preferred to manage the conflict in its own way.

Both Egypt and Israel's reactions only made matters worse and in 1973 the Yom Kippur war broke out between Israel and Egypt-Syria, which resulted in the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. It was then that the US undertook a diplomatic mission with a view to making some truce between the Israelis and the Arabs. The initiative eventually led to the signing of cease-fire agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria, and subsequently the establishment of new peace missions to oversee the implementation of those agreements. Thus, the world witnessed a "resurgence" in UN peacekeeping (1973-78).

The first operation of this period was the deployment of the peacekeeping force, the UNEF II (October, 1973), in the Sinai to monitor and supervise the cease-fire between Israeli and Egyptian forces. While this mission was underway there were fears that the stability in the region could be affected by the still uncontrolled rising tensions in the Israel-Syrian sector. Hence, the UN quickly created an observer mission (June 1974) based on the Disengagement Agreement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The agreement included two phases of operation: (1) a short-term arrangement for an immediate disengagement, the

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Ibid., p. 5.
The diplomatic peace-making mission was headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger. The mission was a very tedious and hectic affair. At one stage, it is described that "for thirty-four weary days [Kissinger] was to shuttle back and forth between Damascus and Jerusalem, greeted by hostile demonstrations...in Israel and sullen stares in the streets of Damascus". Mackinlay, op. cit., p. 126.
In April 1974, the Israeli and Syrian military fought each other for the possession of key tactical ground on Mount Hermon, which overlooks the deserted Syrian town of Quneitra, known as Golan. The conflict resulted in Israeli incurring the "heaviest casualties in a single day since cease-fire". See Ibid., p. 126.
creation of buffer zones and the separation of the opposing military forces; and (2) a long-term cease-fire in the Golan.\footnote{Ibid., p. 128.}

The third operation of the resurgent period took place following the Israeli attack on Southern Lebanon in 1978. Unlike the two previous missions, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had a more complicated and complex task. The key functions of the UNIFIL were to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, to restore regional peace and security, and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its authority to Southern Lebanon.\footnote{Bjorn Skogmo, \textit{International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988}, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London: 1989, chapter 3.} However, performing and implementing these complex mandates was extraordinarily difficult, especially given the grim ground realities. The UNIFIL had to deal with Israel which was quite resentful of the presence of the peacekeeping force.\footnote{Ibid.} It had to deal with different armed groups, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the de facto Lebanese Christian Militia which were both operating in pursuit of their own agenda and ideas.\footnote{Wiseman, ed., op. cit., p. 52. See also Ibid.}

Following the deployment of the UNIFIL, the UN did not launch any new peace operations. Instead, from 1978 to 1988 the UN was managing some ongoing and old missions in Palestine, Kashmir, Cyprus, Golan Heights and Lebanon. This period is identified as the maintenance period of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War.

The following observations can be drawn from the evolution of peacekeeping in the old war era. Firstly, it can be argued that most peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were carried out along well-demarcated cease-fire lines and boundaries. The peace operations undertook well-defined and clear tasks, mostly supervising and monitoring cease-fires and observation functions. Thus, many of the traditional peacekeeping
operations were "straightforward"\textsuperscript{44} and clearly defined in terms of their functions and
duties. Secondly, the majority of the peace missions dealt with inter-state conflicts. Thirdly,
most operations were concentrated in selected areas such as the Middle East, South Asia
and Cyprus. Fourthly, the aims of most of the traditional operations were largely limited to
presenting a stopgap, interrupting conflicts and creating a suitable environment for the
opposing parties to engage in peaceful negotiations and reach a favourable political
settlement.

\section*{II. INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS}

The post-Cold War era has been characterised by a proliferation of new types of armed
conflict. Arguably, international peace and security today has been predominantly
threatened not by wars \textit{between} states but by increasing episodes of escalating violence and
conflicts often erupting \textit{within} national boundaries. In fact, the old border wars have been
far outweighed by intra-state conflicts which are characterised by humanitarian disasters,
ethnic strife, collapsed institutions and economies, violence, and tribal struggles.
Wallensteen and Sollenberg conclude that between 1989 to 1996 there were 101 armed
conflicts in 68 different locations and of these only two were conflicts between states\textsuperscript{45}. For
example, in 1994 alone there were about 35 conflicts within national boundaries in different
parts of the world\textsuperscript{46} (See table 1).

\textsuperscript{44} This term has been generally used in the literature on peacekeeping in a comparative sense to give
an impression that many of the traditional peacekeeping duties were simply less complex and
complicated.

\textsuperscript{45} The two interstate conflicts were between India-Pakistan in South Asia and between Nigeria and
Cameroon in Africa. See Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflicts, Conflict
339.

\textsuperscript{46} Jasjit Singh, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Challenge of Change', \textit{Strategic
Analysis}, Vol. XIX no. 4, July 1996, p. 541. Similarly in 1995, there were 34 internal conflicts
worldwide. For a list of these conflicts, location, and the evolution of these conflicts, see Michael E.
Table 1: Intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western Bosnia, and Russia-Chechnya;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Cambodia, India (Kashmir, Assam, Punjab, Manipur, Nagaland and Naxalities groups), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Angola, Chad, Djibouti, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Many of these intra-state conflicts have been taking place in the context of the termination of colonial rule and in the context of the global changes of the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990 have not only ushered in a new era of global politics but have also unleashed some of the dormant micro-level ethnic conflicts that have been simmering for many years. Long-standing bitter rivalries among different ethnic groups, tribes and clans in these micro-level conflicts have often been suppressed as states were primarily used as proxies in the global rivalry between the two superpowers. Hence, for more than forty years the Cold War made it difficult for any international effort to manage these conflicts. Therefore, some of the animosity and bitter rivalries that have existed along ethnic and communal lines within states have now taken their own course.

Moreover, the end of colonial rule in some regions has left state political

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institutions and structures in such a fragile position that they cannot survive the internal power struggles among various factions and parties. This is referred to as the 'failed state' phenomena. 'Failed' states are largely the result of the progressive erosion of state structures and institutions due to internal power struggles. In Somalia, for example, the persistence of tribal loyalties and constant clan-based fighting among various political factions has weakened significantly any attempt to build a strong Somali state. This reached its climax in 1991 when the regime could not sustain itself in the face of escalating violence, armed conflict and natural disasters such as famine and drought.

The nature of many intra-state conflicts is complex and enduring. The following are characteristic features of intra-state conflicts. A first feature relates to the causes of intra-state conflicts. The literature on the causes of internal conflict is vast and scholars have attempted to identify these causes in different ways. Brown, for example, reviews the literature and identifies four main clusters of factors. The first cluster relates to structural factors relating to the weakness of states in terms of political institutions, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography. It is argued that states with ethnic minorities are more prone to problems of internal conflicts. The second cluster consists of four factors. The first relates to discriminatory political institution where the state apparatus implements policies that may ignore the sentiments of ethnic minorities. Secondly, some ethnic communities may subscribe to exclusive national ideologies rather than fitting into the uniform civic nationalism. This can be seen as the case in the Balkans where different ethnic communities had different brands of nationalism. A third factor relates to inter-group politics where

48 Ibid., p. 74.
51 The four clusters of factors are discussed at great length in Brown, op. cit., pp. 12-22.
different interest groups and political factions operating with own set of agendas and aims may clash with one another as a result of the failure to reconcile differences. Fourthly, elite politics may be a factor as leaders may pursue personal policies and employ certain tactics that might aggravate intra-state tensions. One example of this points to the actions of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia.

The third cluster relates to economic and social factors such as discriminatory economic systems and the widening of social gaps as a result of industrialisation and economic development. The fourth cluster relates to cultural and perpetual factors. This points to cultural discrimination against minorities which could also aggravate tensions between ethnic communities. While these clusters of factors provide some depth to understanding the causes of internal conflicts, Brown is of the view that poor leadership and actions of leaders are the catalysts that usually aggravate ethnic tensions and internal conflicts

Another interesting approach taken by a number of scholars relates to the ‘needs’ theory, which has subsequently led to labelling most intra-state wars as “protracted social conflicts”. Indeed, intra-state protracted social conflicts are different from the traditional inter-state conflicts in the sense that the sources of tension are found not in the traditional sphere of competition for scarce resources such as territory and other environmental factors (for example, the water dispute between India and Bangladesh) but in the "frustration of

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52 Ibid., p. 15.
53 Ibid., p. 18.
compelling needs. People fight with one another within a country because of the fact that they are in need of something. At one level, internal conflicts are caused by the deprivation of basic human needs such as food, water, medical facilities and also psycho-social needs like security, political identity, leadership and power. At another level, the need to protect the cultural and societal values that bind the identities of individuals in an ethnic and communal setting may also be a cause for prolonged violence and domestic dispute.

A second characteristic feature of intra-state conflicts is that they are based on ethnic differences. The term “ethnic” is used here in the broadest sense because it is often used “to describe a wide range of intra-state conflicts that are not, in fact ethnic in character.” The struggle between the Khmer Rouge and other factions in Cambodia and the clan based-rivalry in Somalia are examples of this. Why then do we commonly describe all intra-state conflicts as “ethnic” conflicts, even though they are not ethnic in nature? Perhaps, one reason for this is the way authors define an ethnic community.

An ethnic community is defined as a “named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity.” Smith identifies six factors that define an ethnic group. First, individual groups must have a name so as to generate a collective identity within the group. Normally, individual loyalties are “completely rigid” in an ethnic community. Second, individuals within the group must have a shared belief of their origins. Third, members of the group must share historical memories and experiences generally passed down by word of mouth. Fourth, an ethnic community must have a shared culture.

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57 Fetherston (1994) op. cit., p. 8.
generally based on a variety of aspects such as food, clothing, customs and practices. Fifth, the group must have a special bond or sense of attachment to a specific piece of territory which it may not necessarily occupy. Finally, the people within the group must have a common ethnicity in terms of their thinking and projection.

Thus, ethnic conflicts relate to a situation where groups clash with one another over issues related to one or all of the above conditions. Although the above listed conditions are clear, Smith’s conception of ethnic community is quite broad and he also includes groups defined in terms of religion and tribal distinctions. On the other hand, Kaufmann points out that ethnic community identity is different from religious group identity. This is because the degree to which membership rules defining the identity of each group can change varies. He states that membership rules are harder to change for religious identities than for ethnic identities. This is because, although membership change for religious identities mainly depends on belief, the acceptance of new faith in a group may be denied. Ethnic identities, on the other hand, depend on the combination of language, culture, and religion which are more difficult to change.

Thirdly, intra-state conflicts entail a high level of violence mostly borne by the local population and resulting in massive humanitarian disasters. The acts of genocide in Rwanda, the mass killings in Somalia and the brutal acts of mutilation in Sierra Leone are some examples. Many recent conflicts are in fact low-intensity wars fought with traditional military means. James argues that "arms [in civil conflict] are likely to be in the hands of

60 See Ibid., pp. 28-31.
61 The internal conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1998 provides a useful example. One of the causes of the conflict relates to Serbs territorial claims over Kosovo. Although ethnic Albanians made up majority of the population (77 percent), Serbia’s claims were partly based on the grounds of its deep-rooted historical legacy and that Kosovo was once the “cradle of Serbia”.
64 Ibid., p. 141.
groups who may be unskilled in their use, lack tight discipline, and probably engage in guerrilla tactics. Light arms are also likely to be kept in individual homes, and may be widely distributed. In Somalia (1993) and Sierra Leone (1999), for example, rebels have access to high-tech light weaponry such as mini-rocket launchers and sniper rifles. This has partly been a result of the phenomenal spread of small arms and light weapons during the Cold War when states were used in proxy wars by the Superpowers. Now that the Cold War is over we find many of these small arms in the hands of trigger-happy rebels who seek power by constantly resorting to violence. This not only increases volatility and risk in the operational environment but also becomes extremely difficult to control.

A fourth characteristic of intra-state conflicts relates to the major actors. Unlike border disputes, the neat identification of disputing parties in most of intra-state conflicts is simply impossible. Interstate wars are primarily dyadic with the states themselves the primary actors in the conflict. In intra-state conflicts, however, the collapse of state structures leads to the emergence of a variety of players ranging from government-direct modern armies to non-state actors such as guerrillas, warlords, tribal and clan leaders, and militia groups, each operating simultaneously with their own set of objectives and agenda. In Somalia (1992-95), for example, there were 33 warlords fighting with one another for political autonomy in various parts of the country. In the civil conflict in Lebanon (1978 to present), fighting has been taking place among at least a dozen of different rebel groups.

Fifthly, the distinction between civilians and fighters in the protracted social conflicts is virtually non-existent as the warring factions from various subnational groups

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66 In the late 1970s, for example, the US supplied small and light weapons into Somalia and also sold some military equipment on a commercial basis. All this was done with a view to maintain its presence in parts of the African continent during the Cold War. See Michael, Moodies, 'Constraining Conventional Arms Transfer', *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science*, Vol. 535, September 1994. See also Hartung, William D., and Bridget Moix, *Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War*, Arms Trade Resource Centre, World Policy Institute at the New School. Paper Presented at Seminar in the United Nations, New York: January 2000.
operate in different parts of the country each with its own militia or simply as armed bandit groups. Indeed, most of these conflicts take place in non-traditional locales such as villages or urban settings. This not only absorbs the local population into the conflict but also identification of the fighting groups is hindered by their integration into local communities and civil populations.

Sixthly, the operational environments of intra-state wars are also vastly different from interstate conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping operated in security environments where there was some peace to be 'kept'. Peacekeepers were generally deployed following a cease-fire agreement or once the opposing sides had decided to try diplomacy. Hence, in the past emergencies peacekeepers mostly patrolled along a well-demarcated cease-fire and neutral border. However, the days of conducting UN peacekeeping operations in such calm and predictable environments are over. The post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are conducted in operational environments which are highly fluid and volatile. Today, peacekeeping operations are mostly deployed in the midst of ongoing conflicts and military troops are required to carry out their work in an environment where there is no peace agreement among warring parties. Indeed, peacekeepers function in operational environments which are not only unprecedented but also relatively 'rough'.

The present day operational environments are 'rough' not only because they are highly militarised in terms of the increasing violent activities, but also because local populations and warring parties' behaviour and actions may be difficult to manage because they are predominantly shaped by subjective elements such as perceptions, attitudes, cognition, psychological elements and personal experiences. Indeed, this study uses to the

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68 Fisher identifies this as part of what is called as the philosophy of phenomenology, "which maintains that we develop our picture of the world through our senses and that our subjective experience thereby provides the reality out of which we operate". Fisher, op. cit., p. 6. See also Julie E., Criss, and Johnson, Paula B., 'Community Psychology Applied to Peace Studies', in Conflict and
term 'rough' in terms of the human and subjective dimensions that shape most of the contemporary operational environments. Nordstrom has argued that "to understand [civil] conflict and solution [of today] is to delve into the complexities of human experience [and behaviour]"9. In other words, peacekeepers must look beyond the physical challenges in order to manage post-Cold War peacekeeping operations effectively.

One could argue that the subjective elements are not exclusive to interstate conflicts. In other words, perceptions, attitudes and socio-psychological factors also play a role in conflicts between states. This is undeniable, but the level and intensity of these factors affecting the two different types of conflicts vary. In interstate conflict the subjective factors such as perceptions, attitudes and psychology largely play a role at the leadership level where main decisions are made. Since the state controls the actions and reactions of the respective military in war, the operational environment can be quite predictable once the differences between leaders are resolved. On the other hand, in intra-state conflicts the operational environment poses a bigger challenge to peacekeepers not only because of the presence of many actors in the field but also because each group's actions and behaviour are controlled by their individual subjective aspects. Thus, the degree to which subjective aspects shape operational environments is much higher in intra-state conflicts than in interstate wars. It is for this reason that this study uses the term 'rough' as a term to differentiate the operational environments of intra-state conflicts from interstate wars.

The actions, reactions and general behaviour of fighting groups in the 'rough' operational environments can be difficult to manage and control for a number of reasons. First, the subjective forces increase as the "conflict escalates into an overtly violent stage, and subsequently, the perception of the 'other' is stereotyped and eventually viewed as 'non-

human”\textsuperscript{70}. Second, different fighting groups may have “differential valuing of interests and needs”\textsuperscript{71}. In other words, warring groups may have different priorities attached to a particular issue or need. In such situations, the perceptions, attitudes and values held by locals and fighting groups in the conflict may shape their own behaviour and responses vis-à-vis the other parties. In fact, Fetherston notes that “perceptions (which are made up of individuals’ experiences, values, cultures, emotions, psychology) of issues and the reactions of the ‘other’ (including the mediator) matter and are also changed by the process of the conflict”\textsuperscript{72}. Negative perceptions and misperceptions, obviously result in resistance by locals and warring factions and an escalation of conflict and aggression.

Third, the local communities’ bitter experience of everyday situations in a conflict also intensifies the subjective forces\textsuperscript{73}. Civil conflicts which represent the worst manifestations of domestic and human violence also breed a totally different culture of violence\textsuperscript{74}. Fighters often use the civilian population as targets to assert and express their dissatisfaction. The calculated use of rape\textsuperscript{75}, acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing in many modern day conflicts such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor all reflect the plight of civilians caught in a civil war. In such ‘dirty’ wars, violence has been the dominant means through which most warring groups operate.

When local communities experience rape, physical brutality or ethnic cleansing as terror tactics the impact on the lives of people is severe. The psycho-social scars which penetrate the minds of the victims are so intense that they not only "last long beyond the

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp. 10-12.
\textsuperscript{72} Fetherston, (1994), op. cit., pp. 10-12.
'physical fact of brutality' but it may [even] take about 15-20 years for the problem to surface. The everyday experiences of torture and physical brutality also shape perceptions which can, in turn, affect the way civil communities behave, relate and react to one another and towards the peacekeepers sent to 'help' them. Given the importance of civil communities in carrying out some of the broad peacekeeping tasks, these behaviour and more importantly the psychological factors that shape them must be considered carefully.

Therefore, it can be seen that the nature of conflicts has changed significantly in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of many of the protracted social conflicts which have new and distinct features has undoubtedly increased the responsibility of the UN in third-party intervention.

III. THE QUANTITATIVE GROWTH IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Undoubtedly, the UN has been playing a more active role in peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War. This has taken shape against the backdrop of the increasing relevance of the UN and the role of the international community in the maintenance of global peace and security in the post-Cold War international system. Major global developments such as the end of the Cold War and Gulf War have set the scene for the growing role of the UN and the international community in global peace-maintenance activity. The Gulf War of 1990-91, which marked the beginning of the New World Order, saw the role of the international community in maintaining global peace and security. It was the first time since the 1950 Korean War that the international community as whole engaged on a large scale to act against Iraq for its invasion and violation of Kuwait in 1990. As Esman and Telhami note, the Gulf War of 1990-91 was "remarkable in its use of substantial capabilities of member states under the authorisation of the UN Security Council

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to implement UNSC resolutions, and in the degree of international intrusion into the sovereignty of Iraq, even after it was forced to withdraw from Kuwait\textsuperscript{77}. Indeed, the Gulf War had set an important precedent for the increasing relevance and role of the international community in the post-Cold War international system.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Graph 1: UN Peace Operations (1948-1999)}
\end{center}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\end{figure}


Since 1990 the UN also has found new self-expression in the international system. The number of member states in the UN has increased from 140 in the 1970 to 184 in

1994\textsuperscript{78}. The increase in membership has occurred as states have started to recognise the growing importance of the UN as an important international Organisation and a multilateral forum that represents the interests of the international community. Some argue that the UN has emerged as an independent and autonomous actor in the post-Cold War international system\textsuperscript{79}. The role of the UN's Secretary-General in world politics has gained increasing prominence. As Karen and Kams argue, it is through the Secretary-General's leadership that the UN "is transformed from being a forum of multilateral diplomacy into something which is more than the sum of its inputs ... and [which] make[s] more decisions on behalf of the whole community of nation-states"\textsuperscript{80}.

It is against the backdrop of increasing relevance of the UN that peacekeeping operations have experienced a quantum leap in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the quantitative growth in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era has been remarkable. Graph 1 which contrasts the number of peace operations launched in the period 1948-1999 has been drawn in relation to the different phases of UN peacekeeping operations as shown in Appendix 1. In the 30 years of UN peacekeeping from 1948, the Organisation launched only 13 peace missions. The most active period was during 1956 to 1966 when the UN launched three peacekeeping operations and five observer missions. In the next six years (1967-72), the UN did not launch any new peace missions. Although the period 1973-78 saw only a gradual rise in the UN's level of activity, it launched two peacekeeping operations. This included a second operation to the Sinai (UNEF II) in 1973 and an Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 59. See also Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, 'The UN in a New World Order', \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 70, No. 2 Spring 1991.
Again from 1979 to 1988, the UN launched no new peace operations, but was active in servicing some of the old observer missions and peacekeeping operations. Then in the late 1980s the level of activity of UN peacekeeping gradually started to increase. The UN created six new observer missions - in Afghanistan (1988), Iran-Iraq (1988), Angola (1989), Namibia (1989), Central America (1989) and Nicaragua (1989). This renewed level of activity of UN peacekeeping then increased further following the end of the Cold War.

Since 1990, more than 40 new peace missions have been established worldwide. In particular the period 1990 to 1994 can be identified as the 'new' assertive period of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations (see Appendix 1). The UN was at the peak of its activity during this period. Within those four years 18 new peace missions were launched in 15 different locales in various regions (for example, the African continent, Central Europe, Central America, and Asia). Eight out of the 18 new peace missions have been large-scale peacekeeping operations functionally more demanding than observer missions. These peacekeeping operations have been launched in Western Sahara (1991), Cambodia (1992), the former Yugoslavia (1992), Somalia (1992 & 1993), Mozambique (1992), Haiti (1993) and Rwanda (1993). Since the mid-nineties the number of peacekeeping operations has continued to increase with an additional 18 new peace operations, for example, in Angola, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the Congo.

IV. THE 'NEW' PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Today many UN peacekeeping operations have been identified as 'new' to reflect the qualitative change in their substance and roles. Indeed, UN peacekeeping today bears little resemblance to its original form. In past emergencies peacekeepers were deployed as interpositional forces and hence, carried out the straightforward and clearly defined military functions including monitoring and supervising cease-fires, border patrolling and monitoring buffer zones. Today, the UN has launched very few missions that have such
clear cut functions and duties. Of the 37 new peace missions launched during the last ten
years since 1990, only four missions could be considered as traditional peace operations.
These were missions in: Iraq-Kuwait following the 1990-91 Gulf War; Uganda-Rwanda in
the face of cross-border firing between rebels of the two countries (1993); the Aouzou Strip
following territorial disputes between Chad and Libya (1994); and the recent border dispute
between Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000).

These days military peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in unmapped labyrinths
of guerrilla warfare and civil conflicts which take place as “complex emergencies”\textsuperscript{81}. These
new emergencies produce multiple crises: collapsed state structures, human tragedy caused
by prolonged famine and drought, large-scale fighting between rebel groups, atrocities such
as genocide and ethnic cleansing, and constant looting by bandits and warring factions\textsuperscript{82}. Peacekeeping operations now take a multi-dimensional approach in managing civil
conflicts. That is, such emergencies require a multi-faceted international response which
involves a combination of political, humanitarian and military roles at various levels of
operation.

Hence, UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has been forced into non-
traditional roles. Ratner describes this new role as “administrator, mediator and guarantor”\textsuperscript{83}
reflected in such complex and multifunctional roles and duties as:

• the monitoring and organisation of elections;
• the provision of humanitarian assistance and securing safe conditions for its delivery;

\textsuperscript{81} ‘Complex emergencies’, ‘complex crisis’ and ‘humanitarian emergencies’, are terms that have
gained increasing usage in the literature to capture the reality of the post-Cold War conflicts. It is
officially stated that “complex emergencies combine internal conflicts with large-scale displacements
of people, mass famine, and fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions. Some
complex emergencies are exacerbated by natural disasters and severe inadequate transport networks”.
See Adam Roberts \textit{Humanitarian Action in War}, Adelphi Paper No. 305, Oxford University Press,
Oxford: 1996, p. 11

\textsuperscript{82} Ramesh Thakur, ed., \textit{The United Nations at Fifty: Retrospect and Prospect}, University of Otago
New Demands & Challenges

- disarmament and demobilisation;
- mine clearance;
- military and police training;
- civil administration;
- the repatriation of refugees and replacement of displaced populations;
- the maintenance of law and order; and
- nation-building activities.

Consequently, new peacekeeping operations have broad aims and objectives. In traditional peacekeeping the objective was to freeze the conflict by interposing between belligerents and avoid further aggravation by keeping an agreed cease-fire. However, 'New' peacekeeping "rejects this limitation". "By working from the starting point of a political settlement," Ratner claims, the 'new' peacekeeping of today "seeks to end the underlying dispute, not simply avoid its aggravation". In other words, it proceeds from the premise that peacekeeping should have long-term goals and aims for achieving sustainable peace. In so doing new peacekeeping has entered into other phases of conflict management such as peacemaking, peace building and even peace-enforcement. However, while peacekeeping is compatible with peacemaking and peace-building activities, it differs significantly from an enforcement operation. The following provides a discussion on these activities.

**Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement**

Conceptually, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are very distinct operations. First, unlike peacekeeping, the latter *imposes* peace on disputing parties. Tharoor points out that

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83 Ratner, op. cit., pp. 44 & 50.
84 Ratner, op. cit., p. 22.
85 Ibid., p. 22.
86 Stephen John, Stedman, and Donald Rothchild, Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-
peacekeepers "by definition and practice, cannot impose their will on those who do not wish to keep the peace"\(^{87}\). Second, peace-enforcement does not require consent and authorises the use of force by clearly drawing a distinction between the aggressor and the victim. In peacekeeping, this distinction is not made. Fundamentally peacekeeping depends on the key principles that guide its practice: the consent and co-operation of the parties; the impartiality of the peacekeepers; and the presence of a non-threatening force. Third, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are different in their place in the UN Charter\(^{88}\). In contrast to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement exclusively falls under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the term peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, it is often referred to as a peaceful means of managing conflicts under Chapter VI of the Charter. Some tend to classify peacekeeping as part of Chapter six-and-a-half. This requires some explanation.

When the UN deployed its first peace mission in the late 1940s the ground forces were unarmed. Only following the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operation in 1956 were UN peacekeepers lightly armed because they began to be entrusted with more intrusive roles such as monitoring truces and cease-fire agreements, supervising the withdrawal of troops and patrolling buffer zones and other checkpoints. The purpose was purely self-defence and arms were to be used only as a last resort.

However, the use of force in new peacekeeping operations has been broadened somewhat to include defence, not just of the lives of the military but also of the peace mission as a whole. The broad definition of 'self defence' gives military commanders the authority to open fire on armed factions who stand in the way of fulfilling the mandate\(^{89}\). Indeed, the management of conflicts could either rely on the 'logic of peace' or 'the logic of

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Choosing the former would require the managers of conflict to subscribe to the laws of consent and impartiality. Most of the post-Cold War peacekeeping missions are largely a hybrid of the two mutually exclusive activities, namely peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.

A major explanation for this is a contextual one. As most of the operations take place in the midst of an ongoing war, enforcement action by peacekeeping forces has almost become necessary to contain the aggression and violent activities of the 'spoilers' who feel disadvantaged by the status quo. For example, in Somalia enforcement was a major deterrent against attacks on humanitarian relief convoys by the looters and small rebel groups. In Bosnia, the UN Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993 authorised the use of NATO air power against Bosnian Serbs to protect the UNPROFOR's mandate and the use of safe havens.

New peacekeeping is often seen to be traversing between a defensive posture and an assertive one. This is akin to labelling of post-Cold War peacekeeping as "muscular", and subsequent criticism that such a term is only indicative of an assertive peacekeeping rather than a reactive one. The use of force in new peacekeeping operations has generated much debate in the literature. Traditionalists such as Slim are critical that "the temper of new peacekeeping has shifted away from exerting a more traditional moral authority to a more aggressive physical authority". On the extreme end, there are strong views claiming that peacekeeping operations today must be empowered to manage conflicts in harsh and

90 Tharoor, op. cit., p. 60.
92 James, (1994a), op. cit., p. 18.
hostile operational environments.\textsuperscript{94}

Traditional peacekeeping was never intended to address the kinds of violence confronted in many of the intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era. In fact, Ambassador Robert Oakley, the US Special Envoy to Somalia, points out that traditional peacekeeping methods cannot deal with the new waves of intra-state violence and humanitarian crises arising from local conflicts.\textsuperscript{95} This has led to identifying the UN and peacekeeping to be in a state of crisis. However, the cause of this crisis differs among several thinkers. Oakley argues that the UN is “threatened with a crisis of credibility”\textsuperscript{96} because of the weakness of the traditional methods of peacekeeping to manage intra-state conflicts. Academics such as John Ruggie anticipate this crisis because of the UN’s “growing misuse of peacekeeping”\textsuperscript{97} in conflict management. One scholar argues that if force is necessary in peacekeeping then it should be mandated under a totally different force. For Adam Roberts the crisis is because new peacekeeping has become a “much more interventionist [activity]”.\textsuperscript{98}

Most UN peacekeeping missions have an ‘interventionist’ character because they mostly take place in spite of the lack of consent among major warring parties. As Diehl notes, UN interventions could take place at four different stages namely: pre-disruption, in the midst of disruption, after a cease-fire among warring parties, and following a peace

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
New Demands & Challenges

agreement. Unfortunately, most operations today take place in the midst of disruption, as in this phase international sentiment towards humanitarian disasters is at its highest. At the same time, this is also the phase where peacekeepers are confronted by rising levels of resistance and the key principles, such as consent, impartiality and presence as a non-threatening force, come under increasing threat. One example that could further illustrate this point relates to peacekeeping operations that respond to humanitarian crises.

Intra-state conflicts are increasingly dominated by humanitarian crises of various sorts, for example loss of lives due to hunger and starvation (Somalia), acts of genocide (Rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (Bosnia-Herzegovina). These human disasters call for new kinds of peacekeeping-humanitarian action. As noted in chapter one, new peacekeeping has taken on several challenging roles: providing safe areas and guaranteeing free passage, the protection and delivery of relief convoys, the protection and escort of humanitarian relief agencies, or the direct delivery of logistics and medical health; and the distribution of aid supplies, the resettlement of displaced populations. Yet, most new peacekeeping operations that respond to such humanitarian disasters have failed. For example, in Somalia, the humanitarian operation in 1995 not only failed but led to the humiliating withdrawal of troops, without achieving any significant result. In Bosnia, the UN was 'toothless' in responding to the Serbian attacks on the so-called UN safe havens. In Rwanda and in Zaire the UN record in protecting human lives against acts of genocide has been described as 'pitiful'.

The failure of most of these operations has been attributed to several factors, such

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102 Although UNPROFOR was mandated under chapter VII of the UN Charter, force was not implemented in practice, especially when the Serbs raided the safe areas by an air-attack. L. F. Lowenstein 'Peace-making without Power is Pathetic! (The Dilemma in Bosnia), *International Journal of Group Tensions*, Vol. 25 No. 4, 1995.
as a lack of readiness by the international community to devote sufficient resources, the
time taken in preparing the mission and the lack of clarity of the peacekeeping mandate. A
fundamental factor has been that most of these missions are non-consensual in nature, not
because the UN has little regard for consensual peacekeeping (although most of the present
day interventions may project this view), but because circumstances have made it difficult
to establish consent prior to intervention.

Currently, most humanitarian operations are carried out before a cease-fire
agreement because of the urgent need to respond to the humanitarian crises in warzones.
Johansson argues that the task of seeking consent from the conflicting political parties has
been subordinated by international efforts to assist victims, even before a political and
cease-fire agreement is reached104. At one stage, Boutros Ghali re-defined peacekeeping as,

"The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving
United Nations military and/or civilian police personnel and
frequently civilians as well"105.

One reason for the erosion of consent is the difficulty in obtaining it in emergency
situations. The lack of political will and the unreliability of consent of the major political
parties is indeed a reality106. Past experiences indicate that party leaders often pay lip
service to cease-fire agreements. This can be seen in Somalia and also in the actions of
Serbian leaders in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, any delay involved in seeking political

103 Adam Roberts, (1996), op. cit., p. 7
104 Eva Johansson, 'The Role of Peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish Experience in UNPROFOR',
106 See David Roberts, 'More Honoured in the Breech: Consent and Impartiality in the Cambodian
consent means that more lives are lost.

Secondly, the role of the global media and its impact on public opinion may also play a part in aggravating actions of the international community\textsuperscript{107}. Media coverage of human disasters may profoundly affect public opinion, which may reflect intolerance of inaction by the international community, particularly in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, from a global point of view the human rights of citizens take precedence over state-sovereignty in humanitarian-peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{108}. This is reflected in a statement by Kofi Annan which calls for a fundamental reconsideration of the issue of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the protection of the rights of individuals. He stated "that when we read the UN Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them"\textsuperscript{109}.

The combination of these factors - namely media and public opinion pressures, the futility of seeking consent and the possible consequences of a delay in acting - often forces the UN to intervene in civil wars even before the conflicting parties have agreed to a ceasefire and before they have consented to the presence of a peacekeeping force.

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\textsuperscript{108} Adam Roberts., (1996), op. cit., pp. 1-2
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{The Economist}, September, 1999.
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Consequently, the lack of political consent has resulted in weakening the presence of peacekeepers in the operational environments. Local parties and warring factions often oppose and resist the peacekeeping force by resorting to violent activities targeted against UN humanitarian-peacekeeping missions. This may be done to worsen the existing crisis so that other parties and local populations may lose faith in the UN presence. The constant looting and violent disruptive activities against humanitarian relief convoys by bandits, small rebel groups and other 'rogue' elements pose a major threat to the overall security environment, as was often the case in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. In such cases of disorder, peacekeeping forces need to be empowered to confront it.

Figure 2.1 captures the state of most new peacekeeping operations, which are launched with limited consent or the absence of consent. It shows how new peacekeeping crosses the consent line and becomes indistinguishable from peace-enforcement. The partial merging of new peacekeeping and peace-enforcement means that a zone of 'fragmented'
peacekeeping (the shaded area in figure 1) can be identified. 'Fragmented' peacekeeping relates to a situation where once a peacekeeping force has moved from consensus to exerting force the peacekeepers can be said to have lost credibility in their peacekeeping ability.

UN peacekeepers often become trapped in a zone of 'fragmented' peacekeeping. The image of the peacekeepers as a ‘non-threatening’ has been almost entirely destroyed. The chances of being perceived as otherwise are very high. For example, in Somalia, the use of force by the US peacekeepers in disarming General Aideed’s militia not only aggravated the situation but also placed the peacekeeping force in a situation where it was difficult to return to the role of impartial third-party ‘peacekeeper’. Rather, they were increasingly viewed as an ‘enemy’ of Aideed’s Somali National Alliance and this eventually resulted in direct military confrontation. Instead of changing this negative image, the operation further damaged the image of impartiality. In fact, the goals and objectives of the UNOSOM II changed from peacemaking and carrying out humanitarian mission to fighting Aideed and his forces. Thus, the use of force significantly undermined the peacekeeping force as parties to a conflict become less amenable to its presence. This is because of the fear that peacekeepers “might take actions against their interest and in violation of their sovereignty”.

Moreover, the use of force significantly undermines the perceptions of the impartial status of the peacekeepers. Impartiality is one of the most important tools in a peacekeeping operation as it provides credibility for the peacekeepers to mediate a dispute without

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New Demands & Challenges

prejudice. In intra-state conflicts the tendency for peacekeepers to be accused of taking sides is very high. On the other hand, the UN may also lack judgement in terms of maintaining its impartiality during an enforcement operation. For instance, impartiality was not maintained by the UNPROFOR especially in its double-standards response to the violation of the safe areas by the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim Croats: the latter were let off with a warning, while the Bosnian Serbs were punished by NATO air strikes. Thus, the UNPROFOR was perceived as unsuitable to mediate in the dispute. Enforcement makes it extremely difficult for the peacekeeping force to step back into the role of an impartial mediator.

Although the use of force has been authorised in some new peacekeeping operations, the rules of engagement are still unclear. The ability of peacekeepers to recognise the line between offensive and defensive use of military force has also been questioned. In addition there are no hard and fast rules governing when force should be used and how much force peacekeepers should use in the event of an emergency. The use of force at one level may increase rather than decrease the level of resistance of the disputants. This was evident in the high resistance of the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 in response to NATO's strong air power efforts in protecting the UN safe areas. Therefore, to some extent, one could argue that while the use of force in new peacekeeping operations can help to contain the aggression of disputants, it does not necessarily ensure co-operation from the parties. Instead, it can limit the peacekeepers' ability to perform some of their duties. As Adam Roberts states, "the unique combination of peacekeeping and enforcement ... are probably justified, but they do not mean that the alternative commonly proposed, encapsulated in the

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phrase 'lift and strike', would necessarily [work]."^{114}

**Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-building**

In contrast to peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and peacemaking are quite compatible although they are all very different activities with different purposes and objectives. But they all fall under similar category as peaceful conflict management tools, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Peacemaking can be defined as peaceful diplomatic activity that aims to bring hostile parties to agreement. In past emergencies, peacemaking took place prior to the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Fetherston points out that peacekeeping is an adjunct to peacemaking and does not function in its own right^{115}. Indeed, peace must first be made before peacekeepers can be deployed to keep the peace in the field. So, peacemaking basically involves the diplomatic activities of negotiation, seeking consent and also encouraging parties to agree to a cease-fire for the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Peace building can be identified as an extended phase of peacekeeping. It is defined as "efforts to identify and support structures, which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people"^{116}. That is, it aims to prevent a recurrence of civil strife once it has been controlled and involves new roles such as nation-building, the building of civil institutions, and the reintegration and reconstruction of civil societies.

Although these three activities are different the lines dividing them are increasingly blurred. In fact, the UN has taken a broad approach in combining these activities and thus, stretching the original concept of peacekeeping. In his 1992 report the UN Secretary-

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General, Boutros-Ghali asserted the importance of combining peacekeeping with peacemaking and peace building to prevent the greater conflagration of conflicts\textsuperscript{117}. He also asserted that peacekeeping has to be invented and re-invented everyday so as to respond to the new needs and challenges confronting the world\textsuperscript{118}. Similarly, Kofi Annan, the successor to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has noted that "peace-building has assumed an increasingly prominent role in the United Nations repertoire of means to achieve more lasting peace"\textsuperscript{119}. 

Recently, in March 2000 Annan also established an expert-panel, headed by Lakhdar Brahimi a former Algerian Foreign Minister, to conduct a major new study on peacekeeping\textsuperscript{120}. Among other things, the report issued in July 2000, highlighted the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping operation recognition and acknowledgement of the fact that peace-building activities are integral to the success of peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{121}. It also stressed that post-Cold War peace operations “should be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission areas”\textsuperscript{122}. The endeavour would impose further constraints on the UN’s limited resources. However, the importance of effective peacebuilding for managing post-Cold War conflicts is something which cannot be ignored and discredited. Why is this so?

\textsuperscript{118} Boutros Ghali (1993), op. cit., pp. 323-4.
\textsuperscript{120} The panel which was convened under the initiative of Kofi Annan on 7 March 2000 comprised of 10 member team: Algeria (Chairman), the US, Trinidad & Tobago, New Zealand, UK, Germany, Japan, Russian Federation, Zimbabwe and Switzerland. The main aims of this undertaking are to review the UN’s security activities, assess the shortcomings of the existing system, and suggest recommendations for possible implementation. The study focused on various broad areas covering political, strategic, organisational and operational aspects of peacekeeping.
\textsuperscript{121} On 29 December 1998, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement that encouraged the Secretary-General to “explore the possibility of establishing ... peacebuilding structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts...” See The Brahimi Report, UN Doc., 2000.
\textsuperscript{122} The Brahimi Report, UN Doc., 2000.
Fetherston argues that the short-term aims of conflict abatement and settlement only produce 'negative' peace\textsuperscript{123}. It refers to a situation where settlement is reached based on a compromise where the powerful may benefit more than the weak, and the latter may still be discontented with the outcome\textsuperscript{124}. Most traditional peace missions were carried out with the aim of achieving this 'negative' peace which is synonymous with the absence of war\textsuperscript{125}. However, the management of protracted social conflicts cannot be limited to the achievement of 'negative' peace. This is because there is always a risk of resumption of hostilities if parties are not satisfied with the old deals. One example is Angola where the peace process, which started in 1994, was pursued in a climate of pervasive pessimism\textsuperscript{126}. Although a settlement was reached in 1997, the problem re-surfaced a year latter. The UN was faced with the difficulty of re-working old problems and forced to withdraw from Angola in 1999. This shows the limitations of 'negative' peace.

Alternatively, 'positive' peace involves having some kind of vision towards the establishment of long-lasting sustainable peace. As Fetherston notes, 'positive' peace is something quite difficult to define clearly. Unlike 'negative' peace which brings negotiations to a halt through a settlement and does not move beyond that phase, 'positive' peace is a pro-active process and is tied to the process of addressing the fundamental causes of civil conflicts\textsuperscript{127}. It brings a sense of hope and confidence that the actual causes of the distress and civil war will be tackled in the long-run. Of course a short-term settlement is essential for moving in this direction in the first place. The role of UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAG in Namibia are examples of having successfully moved from 'negative' peace to

\textsuperscript{123} Fetherston, (1994) op., cit., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 8.
achieving a resolution. So, if the aims of new peacekeeping operations are more than the mere abatement of conflict, then peace-building activities cannot be ignored. This is because these activities play an important role in the pro-active process of achieving long-term durable peace.

Therefore, it is not overstating the situation to say that UN peacekeeping has become a very demanding and challenging enterprise in the post-Cold War era. Of course the dramatic explosion in peace missions has led to a significant rise in costs. Indeed, the estimated costs of UN peacekeeping operations have risen dramatically from $230.4 million in 1988 to $1.6 billion in 1992. In 1994 it reached its peak of $3.6 billion. Undoubtedly this places enormous pressure on member states, especially on the key financiers who are the major political and economic powers, namely the US, UK, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan.

However, the pressure has been even greater for the peacekeepers who are directly involved in carrying out and implementing peacekeeping. Unlike the states that participate indirectly through the provision of financial and logistical support, the peacekeepers are confronted by new demands and challenges relating to both the troop contribution and conduct of the new peacekeeping operations. Let us examine the two sets of demands and challenges separately.

V. THE NEW DEMANDS RELATING TO TROOP CONTRIBUTION

Most of the decision-makers that authorise, plan and administer peacekeeping missions are UN civil servants. However, direct participation in terms of implementing mandates in the field is mainly the responsibility of the military and civilian personnel drawn from member states and other organised non-governmental groups and the private

139 Peace Research Centre, Canberra: 1993.
128 The figures are cited in Barbara Crossette, "UN Chief Chides Security Council on Military
sector. It must be noted that participation in and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations is a purely voluntary act. Generally, the UN Secretary-General approaches selective countries to make a direct contribution to peace operations. This selection is normally based on a system where member states are identified on a rotational basis. On other occasions, member states may volunteer themselves to participate. In both cases, once a member state has agreed to participate and contribute troops in peacekeeping operations it must then express its consent in writing.

It is also the role of the Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, to choose a Force Commander to head the peace mission. The force commander, who is personally briefed by the UN Chief, is directly responsible to the Secretary-General and the nominated Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) which is mostly filled by UN civil servants and diplomats. The SRSG not only overseas the entire mission but also makes decisions in the field in consultation with the UN Secretary-General. Once a mission has been planned by the military advisor and mission planning team at the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO), the force commanders of each national contingents are briefed. This is then followed by the necessary preparation undertaken by national armies for deploying their troops in the field. On deployment, each national contingent is allocated an area of responsibility for carrying out their peacekeeping duties and implementing the mandate.

While member states may be motivated by their own set of national interests to undertake such responsibilities they are confronted by new demands and challenges in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. One of these relates to the area of troop and personnel contributions. Firstly, the quantitative growth in UN peacekeeping operations in

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129 Interview with UN officials, Military Advisor section, DPKO, UN, New York, March 2000.
130 Interview with UN officials, Military Advisor section, DPKO, UN, New York, March 2000.
131 Interview with UN officials in Mission Planning, DPKO, UN, New York, March 2000.
the post-Cold War era has resulted in an increase in the demand for ground troops. Indeed, between 1988 and 1992 the number of military troops deployed as part of peacekeeping operations increased from a mere 9,570 to 39,634. At its peak in 1994 a total of about 73,393 military troops were deployed in peace missions worldwide. This has been the biggest deployment so far since the end of the Cold War. So dramatic have been the demands for ground troops that UN peacekeeping has been seeking greater participation among its member states. Subsequently, since the end of the Cold War there has been an upsurge in the demand and commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. The number of states participating as troop-contributors has increased from 26 in 1988 to 76 in 1994. As of March 2000, at least 83 member states had participated as troop-contributors in UN peacekeeping operations.

A second demand relates to the type of ground personnel needed in today's peacekeeping operations. In traditional peacekeeping operations, the composition of peacekeeping forces was made up of mainly military troops. However, as new peacekeeping operations embrace broad roles the need for various specialised personnel such as mining unit teams, civilian police and civilian personnel has become necessary. These roles, for example, include the maintenance of law and order (Cambodia and Somalia); election monitoring and supervision (Cambodia, Liberia, Eritrea and East Timor); de-mining (Cambodia); the repatriation of refugees and replacement of displaced populations (Former Yugoslavia, Somalia); military and police training (Haiti); and civil administration (Cambodia and East Timor).

In fact, some of these tasks have been sub-contracted to civilian agencies. For

133 Crossette, op. cit. See also Findlay, ed., op. cit., pp. 2-3
134 Ibid.
135 Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, UN Doc., New York.
136 Some of the new civilian agencies include NGOs (both National and International) such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Governmental Organisations
example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina new support and civilian agencies have been sought to assist the Implementation Force (IFOR) in: identifying the requirements for repairing transport and infrastructure; establishing a campaign on democracy; providing communications expertise and providing assistance in the education campaign\(^{137}\). Hence, more than 350 civilian personnel with either specialist knowledge or expertise in areas such as education, public transport, engineering, public health and communication were recruited to serve in the mission\(^{138}\).

UN peacekeeping operations have become increasingly civilianized not only in terms of the broad and new roles and functions but also in terms of ground personnel\(^{139}\). The number of civilian police and civilian personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations has increased from 35 in 1988 to 4,413 in 1994\(^{140}\). This multiplicity of actors has of course raised some problems with ground co-ordination and civil-military co-operation\(^ {141}\). However, the importance of civilian personnel for conducting peacekeeping operations is something that can no longer be trivialised or neglected and troop-contributors also need to provide this new types of ground personnel.

Thirdly, in some cases ground troops may be needed in different peace operations at the same time because UN peacekeeping operations are frequently launched in various locations simultaneously. For instance during 1992 the demand for troops was extremely

\(^{138}\) Ibid., p. 62.
\(^{140}\) Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, UN. Doc.
high as the UN had created four UN peacekeeping operations at a similar time. These were peace operations in the former Yugoslavia (February 1992, 44,870 troops), Cambodia (March 1992, 25,000 troops), Somalia (April 1992, 28,000 troops) and Mozambique (December 1992, 6,576)\(^{142}\). So, there also exists a need for peacekeepers to make simultaneous troop-commitments in today's peacekeeping operations.

Fourthly, peacekeepers must be willing to deploy their troops and ground personnel in distant locations. During the Cold War most of the deployments were limited to the Middle East, South Asia and the Cyprus. Today this geographical limitation has dissipated. Post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations have been launched world-wide particularly in South and Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central Asia, Central America, Europe, and various parts of the African continent.

A fifth demand relates to the reliability of the troop-contributors for the duration of deployment in the field and the willingness to take risks in dangerous operations. Most of the new peacekeeping operations are launched in hazardous operational environments. Thus, the question arises as to whether troop-contributing states are willing to take the risk and deploy their soldiers in such harsh operational environments. The Brahimi report indicates that peacekeepers today must be willing to take the risk and have the "staying power" in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations\(^{143}\). Unfortunately, there is often a general unwillingness to take this risk as seen in several peace operations such as Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone. In particular, the delay in the deployment of the peacekeeping force in Rwanda was primarily due to hesitation on the part of the member states to place their soldiers in the wake of a genocide. Although 19 governments pledged to keep 31,000 troops on stand-by, it took the UN more than six months to deploy the


authorised strength of 5,000 troops\textsuperscript{144}.

Sometimes peacekeepers may terminate their participation in the middle of an operation. This may be because the level of violence in many protracted social conflicts is so high that peacekeepers are unable to sustain themselves over prolonged periods of time. In Somalia in 1992, for example, the deteriorating ground situation led to the withdrawal of over 16 troop-contributing states including the US, Italy, France, Canada, Belgium, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirate, Turkey and Greece\textsuperscript{145}. In the end, UNOSOM II was only left with the participation of about 10 countries which made up a reduced strength of 15,000 troops (the initial strength was 28,000) with which to carry on peacekeeping duties until the mission was closed down in March 1995\textsuperscript{146}. Therefore, the "staying power" of troop contributors is an important demand in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations.

The question arises as to why troop-contributing states lack 'staying power' or decide to withdraw in the midst of an operation. Perhaps, the answer lies in the fact that troop-contributing states are confronted by some domestic constraints. One domestic constraint is resource availability. Most developing and less developed states are often faced with the serious problem of limited resources which directly limits their capabilities. Countries like Fiji, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Ghana, Nepal, Senegal, Pakistan and Bangladesh which are relatively poor are faced with the serious problem of having the capacity to support themselves logistically. In particular, this could pose as a problem in missions that involves high level of violence where the lack of sufficient 'fire-power' could result in no choice but to withdraw.

The 'staying power' of peacekeepers is also constrained by domestic public pressures. The US offers a classic case where public opinion and attitudes play a significant

\textsuperscript{144} Department of Public Information, UN.
\textsuperscript{145} UN Report on Somalia, UN Doc.
role in shaping its level of involvement in external military assignments. In the US the public is often noted to be extremely sensitive to the loss of human life in external military assignments. For example, the loss of 18 American soldiers on 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu (Somalia) led to public outrage. Citizens even played a direct role by contacting politicians to express their opinion. It is documented that in just one day, Senator John McCain’s office received a total of 402 calls of which 400 pressured for an immediate withdrawal of its military troops\textsuperscript{147}. In response to these domestic pressures Washington decided to pull out of Somalia, despite the fact that it initially led the multinational force to Somalia.

Given the voluntary basis of their participation, member states have the liberty to decide the size of their contribution and also the duration of deployment. Often, the UN Secretary-General must negotiate not only with the disputing parties in the conflict so as to maintain their consent but also with the troop contributing states. Consequently, the UN is faced with a paradox in meeting the dual requirement of securing the willingness of troop contributing states and in fulfilling its fundamental role in maintaining international peace and security.

Perhaps, one reason for the UN being in such a dilemma is because there is no proper legal framework or arrangement under which member states participate in UN peacekeeping. Article 43 of the UN Charter provides the UN with the right to request support in terms of personnel and material assistance from its member states. It states that, "All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces … necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". This clause specifically

\textsuperscript{146} UN Report on Somalia, UN Doc.
\textsuperscript{147} In an opinion poll of 803 citizens, only 27 percent favoured the continuance of the deployment.
calls for the earmarking of national contingents and to be placed on standby for the use and
direction of the Security Council under a collective security arrangement. Thus, the
Military Staff Committee (MSC), which was established to function like a global
'Department of Defence' of the Security Council, is responsible for organising and the
strategic planning of the national armies. It includes a panel of military experts that are
placed under the Security Council to advice and assist the Security Council on all questions
relating to the latter's requirements to act in an event of a breach of peace. The MSC is an
important instrument of the Security Council through which the security of all nations could
be assured.

However, during the Cold War Article 43 or the MSC were neither activated nor
became a practical reality. The already existing division in the Security Council was further
deepened by the opposing views over the magnitude and size of the armed forces of each
Member State. The Soviet Union demanded an equal contribution among all Member
States, while the other four permanent members were satisfied with comparable
contributions relative to the differing size and composition of national armies. Since no
conclusions were reached, Article 43 of the UN Charter never came into effect and the
MSC, for most part, has remained dormant in its function.

However, in recent years efforts have been taken to address the problem of
reliability of troop-contributors. Some analysts have suggested reviving the MSC, which
could constructively serve the maintenance of global peace and security. The UN Standby

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Findlay, op. cit., pp. 94-5.

148 This was an important component of Article 43 of the UN Charter, which provided the Security
Council with the legitimacy to create an international force to avert threat to global peace. One
analyst, however, finds 'Collective Security' to be problematic. A primary reason cited is the
'intrinsic tension in the notion' itself. See Ramesh Thakur et al. ed., A Crisis of Expectations: UN

149 The various roles identified are that the MSC (a) could become a principal staff centre for
preparing or serving arms control negotiations at both bilateral and multilateral levels; (b) provide
military intelligence and monitor arms control treaty compliance; (c) supervise licensing systems; (d)
co-ordinate anti-terrorist operations; (e) co-ordinate anti-drug operations; (f) serve as a military
information centre; (g) supervise a weapons research centre; and (h) engage in military peacekeeping
Arrangement, which involves earmarking troops and placing them in a reserve pool of soldiers for rapid deployment is a major step that has been taken in this direction.

VI. DEMANDS & CHALLENGES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF NEW PEACEKEEPING

UN peacekeepers are confronted by new challenges relating to the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. There exists a need for peacekeepers to develop a fresh peacekeeping outlook in order to operate and carry out the broad functions and duties in new peacekeeping operations. 'Outlook' refers to military thinking and philosophy that guides peacekeepers to conduct peacekeeping today. Some national armies, like the US for example, which have a rigid military outlook have started to acknowledge the need for a re-adjustment of their peacekeeping outlook. It is argued that the root cause for the failure and poor performance of the US military in peace operations is because of the mismatch of the Organization’s military doctrine and culture and the demands and challenges in many of today's operations.

The need for a fresh peacekeeping outlook is crucial for two key reasons. The first relates to the fact that the new peacekeeping functions are mostly non-military based, which
might pose a problem of unfamiliarity for uniformed soldiers. As soldiers they are trained in carrying out military duties and functions. In classical peacekeeping, the issue of familiarity was not a major problem because the mandate was primarily militarily-based. In new peacekeeping, however, the functions are not only multidimensional and complex but also embrace a variety of non-military functions ranging from conducting democratic elections to reintegrating civil societies and providing humanitarian aid to launching public service activities. Given the inevitable role of the military in peacekeeping operations, the need to carry out or assist the civilian agencies in the execution of the civilian functions is unavoidable. Hence, there is a need for military peacekeepers to develop a new outlook which incorporates this dimension.

Secondly, the emergence of unprecedented ground realities and challenges in the ‘rough’ operational environments of post-Cold War conflicts have created the need for a fresh peacekeeping outlook. The fact that the work of the peacekeepers today is increasingly hindered by a myriad of new kinds of ground challenges and realities is something that cannot be ignored. Some of these challenges can hamper the success of new peacekeeping operations. For example, the increasing civilianization of new peacekeeping operations has led to the recruitment of various civilian agencies. However, this has not only created serious co-ordination problems but has also resulted in tensions between the military and other civil-based establishments such as NGOs and IGOs. The causes of tensions have been a result of the diverging backgrounds of and cultural differences between the military and other civilian organizations. The military is generally perceived to be somewhat inflexible and tough, which makes most of the people in civilian organizations uneasy about working with them. Moreover, most of the people from NGOs are staffed


154 For discussion on the different areas and levels that the civil and military need to interact and operate are identified in Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Military-Civilian Humanitarianism: The ‘Age of
by female aid-workers who do not “subscribe to the macho”\textsuperscript{155} culture of the military. In some cases, these tensions may be so severe that the civilian agencies may distance themselves from the main operation and have their own agenda which may pose further security problems for the military peacekeepers. In Somalia, for example, NGOs hired private armies (mercenaries) with a view to establishing a secure environment for carrying out their humanitarian relief work in some of the villages.

One major ground challenge that requires significant attention and which is the focus of this study relates to consent management. Consent is undoubtedly a fundamental ingredient for the success of UN peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{156}. Peacekeeping, in essence is a third-party intervention, cannot occur without the consent of the parties concerned. This has gained significant recognition at various levels ranging from national armies to key decision-makers in the United Nations. The British Army, for instance, defines new peacekeeping as "operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict"\textsuperscript{157}. Similarly, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has asserted that peace is something that cannot be imposed, has strongly stressed the primacy of consent\textsuperscript{158}.

However, the issue is not about the importance of consent in new peacekeeping operations, rather it is more about the management of consent so as to facilitate the implementation of new peacekeeping duties in the 'rough' operational environments of Post-Cold War conflicts. This is because the nature of consent as a whole has changed dramatically. In fact, the definition of consent today has broadened. It can no longer be seen

\textsuperscript{155} Slim, (1996), op. cit., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{157} Cited in Ibid., p. 122.
in the traditional sense of a legal contract or a written agreement. This is because the levels of consent needed for new peacekeeping operations are broader. In the simple border patrol operations of past emergencies states were the main actors and seeking their consent was of primary importance because once consent at the top-level has been granted seeking the co-operation of the armies in the field would not be a major problem. Hence, consent and co-operation in the field took place at a military to military level. The common military culture and outlook was an advantage in carrying out negotiations and seeking co-operative behaviour. In new peacekeeping, on the other hand, military forces are required to interact with and seek co-operation from predominantly non-military parties of varying cultures and outlooks. The conduct of 'new' peacekeeping requires two types of consent.

1. Political Consent

The first is the political consent of leaders, elite of rebel groups and warlords. The consent management process must take the shape of political negotiations with rebel leaders and warlords to securing their co-operation for implementing a peacekeeping mandate, such as demobilisation and demilitarisation. Very often interactions at this political level are challenging and require more elaborate diplomatic activities than in inter-state disputes because there are more actors involved. In civil conflicts where there is no proper functioning government, peacekeepers may need to seek consent and co-operation from multiple warring parties. This is often problematic since chances of at least one faction opposing a settlement to the conflict are high.

Secondly, unlike border disputes peacemaking and diplomatic activities may also have to take place directly in the field (other than in governmental institutions or in a

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158 Ibid., p. 122.
specific area). This is because not all warring faction leaders may be present at the time when negotiations occur. Some factions may be operating in other parts within the country.

Thirdly, military peacekeepers may have difficulty carrying out negotiations with various factions and leaders because of different cultural characteristics and agendas. The negotiations at this level must involve a greater level of flexibility than at the military to military level.

The task of obtaining and maintaining co-operative relations of the major warring parties may be quite a challenge in the 'rough' operational environments, which are always evolving and where subjective elements predominantly shape behaviour and responses to peacekeeping activities. A reluctance to co-operate or a tendency to break cease-fire agreements may be partly due to the changing perceptions of the place of different parties in the environment. Since quarrels and fights are frequently over personal needs and other psycho-social needs such as political identity and power, some parties may not be willing to co-operate until they can see that their co-operation will result in positive outcomes for their cause. Hence, there exists a need for peacekeepers to shape perceptions and attitudes so as to manage consent and facilitate the implementation of new peacekeeping.

2. Community Consent

Peacekeepers may also need to seek the support and co-operation of the local communities in the 'rough' operational environment. Community consent equates "to a general public attitude that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents a quorum of co-operation". Dobbie has argued that "any peacekeeping force must seek to establish a genuine depth of

161 Interview with Military Planning, DPKO, UN, March 2000.
162 Interview with Military Planning, DPKO, UN, March 2000.
164 Dobbie, op. cit., p. 124.
consent [and co-operation] which takes into account the whole community's view\textsuperscript{165}. This is because "community leaders do not always have the best interests of their communities at heart and are not necessarily representative"\textsuperscript{166}. Moreover, the difficulty of achieving the consent of the leaders has often led peacekeepers to strategically turn to civil communities for co-operation. So the local community cannot be excluded in the consent management process.

Community consent is important. The co-operation of the local leaders or factions alone is not sufficient for new peacekeeping operations. Local communities often assist in overcoming some of the immediate obstacles to peacekeeping operations. For example, their help might be needed in the identification of ‘rogue’ elements, such as bandits and looters that can affect the success of an operation\textsuperscript{167}. In the Australia-led mission to East-Timor in 1999, peacekeepers relied heavily on village communities to identify the pro-Jakarta militias in jungle hideouts and distant villages.

The co-operation of the community is also required to enable the conflict management process to move beyond mere political settlement. As peacekeeping operations engage in peace-building activities such as the reintegration of civil society and nation building programs the collaboration with the local community becomes extremely important\textsuperscript{168}. The aim of achieving a long-lasting 'positive' peace cannot be realised without the role of the local community.

Securing co-operation at this level may not always be an easy task, especially in the 'rough' operational environment of post-Cold War conflicts. Community willingness to co-operate may be hampered by a variety of subjective elements such as psychological scars of

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 124.
bitter personal experiences; fear of the warring factions and groups in uniform. These can, in some instances, affect the relationship with military peacekeepers who are also in uniform. Peacekeepers must therefore make a conscious effort to create positive perceptions of their presence in an already heavily militarized atmosphere.

Hence, a fresh peacekeeping outlook is needed, one that is different from the traditional military-oriented approach and one that incorporates the new dimensions and realities in the 'rough' operational environments. At the same time, peacekeepers as part of this new outlook may require suitable responses such as the development of peacekeeping strategies that are well suited to tackle the new needs related to managing consent in the 'rough' operational environments.

VII. WHAT ARE THE SUITABLE STRATEGIES?

Thus, peacekeepers should draw on the 'softer' aspects of military science to manage consent. 'Softer' peacekeeping could be identified as one that involves strategies and field crafts that focus on changing local perceptions and attitudes from negative to positive ones. The use of field strategies in managing conflict is not new. In fact, Sun Tzu, whose work contrasts to Clausewitz's theory on "pure" war, notes that the "supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." Indeed, Sun Tzu was a strong advocate of limited war and argues that success can be achieved through the use of field crafts and strategies which are aimed at influencing the psychology of the opponents. Of course, peacekeeping is not about fighting a war but mediating conflicts through negotiations and third-party

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168 Williams, op. cit., p. 73.
171 Williams, op. cit., p. 72.
interventions. Nevertheless, the use of suitable field strategies becomes important as part of the art of negotiation.

The UN has acknowledged the need for suitable field strategies in peacekeeping operations. In his keynote address at a Ministerial meeting in New York in March 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Anan pointed to the need for an “institutionalisation of politics” strategy, that promotes the emergence of conditions in which peacekeeping operations can withdraw and expect to leave behind a country that will remain peaceful. In pursuing this strategy Anan indicated the need for several forms of “non-coercive leverages” to facilitate consent management and the settlement process in civil conflicts. The first positive incentive is the provision of incentives, such as demobilization packages and support for reintegration process so as to provide alternative and attractive lifestyles to locals and fighting groups that may be reluctant to lay down their arms. Providing food, clothing and in some cases money, education, job training and counselling is thought to be an effective incentive.

A second form of non-coercive leverage is to help local leaders, who are ready and willing to abide by their commitments to new peacekeeping operations. This involves the provision of “enabling resources” such as technical assistance, training, a kind of “crash course” in democratic politicking so that they can transform themselves successfully. A third form of non-coercive leverage is building strong communication between the civil communities and peacekeepers in the mission areas. It is pointed out that in the disrupted civil societies, "power and authority are fractured, [and] we often deal with individuals and communities who do not respect or even recognize the leaders who have made commitments to the international community." The peacekeeping operation

therefore, must be able to communicate with the population directly, explaining why they are in the country, what they expect from them and their leaders, and what the people might expect from the peacekeepers. This two-way communication between peacekeepers and the civil community is fundamental to the long-term success of peacekeeping operations. The strategies outlined above reflect a new awareness of the UN in terms of shaping the conduct of peacekeeping to suit changing ground realities.

It should be noted some national armies, such as the British, have already included some of these 'softer' field strategies in their army field manual. The British Army is one of the few military establishments to have conducted a detailed study on the techniques of consent management and to have published it into a Field Manual form. The manual stresses the need to develop suitable field crafts and strategies to create a favorable operational environment conducive to facilitate new peacekeeping operations. These strategies include negotiation and mediation, liaison, civil affairs, gathering community information and developing community relations. The implementation of some of these strategies will be examined in the case studies. Nevertheless, the following sections examine two of the commonly used strategies in most new peacekeeping operations.

Community Relations

As UN peacekeeping operations increasingly and visibly take place in low-intensity conflicts in densely populated areas such as cities and villages, the need to establish community relations is critical. One form that peacekeeper-civil community relations can take is the formation of an alliance, which is a consent-management technique. It is argued that in a civil conflict it is best to take the sides of the civil community than trying to

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establish neutrality among different political factions\textsuperscript{178}. The latter may be difficult because of the multiplicity of these factions and the chances of being perceived by one of them as less neutral is very high.

Community relations may be developed through a variety of social and cultural activities. For example, the British Army field manual suggests that "community relations occasions should avoid being blatantly manipulative - relaxed informality should normally set the tone". Hence, it can involve a variety of formal activities such as celebrating independence days, local festivals, recreational outings and so on. The main goal of engaging in such activities is to create a positive and conducive environment which allows peacekeepers to carry out their broader objectives such as humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, cease-fire monitoring, electoral supervision, demobilisation\textsuperscript{179}.

Although the development of community relations is a useful strategy, there is a risk of peacekeepers being seen as prejudicing a particular population. Therefore, the development of community relations must occur without jeopardizing the impartiality of peacekeepers and so all sections of the local populations must be included as part of developing community relations.

The establishment of community relations helps the management of consent in the following ways. Firstly, it helps to foster social contact which is important for developing trust and strengthening the place of the peacekeepers in the 'rough' operational environment. The place of the peacekeepers in the conflict management process is extremely important. Indeed, how the parties perceive the presence of the peacekeepers makes a huge difference for the latter to be able to facilitate constructive and positive dialogue between locals and warring parties. The conflict manager (peacekeeper) is an outsider but this manager will

have little effect if parties have little trust and confidence in his presence. Peacekeepers will then be unable to encourage local co-operation.

**Civil Affairs**

The use of civil affairs (CA) is another field strategy that has been gaining significant attention in the literature. Although worded in a variety of ways, namely "Military Civic Action", "Military Civil Affairs", or "Military Civil Operation", the idea of the military being involved in CA is not new. In the past, national militaries have been used for constructive purposes in "home front" civil affairs. Nevertheless, the idea of military peacekeepers contributing to the well-being of the locals and also to the social and economic development of the community at large has gained increasing relevance today.

CA is an important strategy for obtaining and maintaining co-operation in a conflict management process by "winning the hearts and minds" of the locals. It has been integrated into some country's national military doctrines. For example, CA has been reflected in the U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10, which addresses the "civil administration" functions of the US Army units. A section of the new British military manual emphasises the need to engage in civil affairs initiatives when conducting new peacekeeping operations and states that "winning the hearts and minds of the local population by a sustained civil affairs programme can transform the security environment and permit the safe accomplishment of

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181 In Brazil in 1965, the army for many years made a significant contribution in the construction of the country’s highways and railroads. In Guatemala the army has been extensively involved in increasing the literacy level of its citizens by producing textbooks. The primary purpose was both to increase the literacy level and to make people aware of the importance of hygiene. The armed forces in Chile have been trained in agricultural activities and the maintenance of farm machinery. Hugh Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Force, Praeger Publishers, London: 1968, pp.3-6
182 Fishel, (1997) op. cit., p. 4
a wide range of tasks .... [and that] the hearts and minds returns will amply justify such investments”

The strategy of Civil Affairs encourages co-operation through the use of incentives. While CA are part of the broader UN mandate in providing humanitarian assistance at a contingent level, they can include a variety of activities such as establishing micro-credit programmes, rebuilding roads and digging wells, restoring electrical power, providing medical treatment and even repainting temples. CA can take place on a small-scale and can also be a gesture.

Indeed, CA can constitute a crucial and important strategy by providing peacekeepers with an opportunity to interface with the local population, for the central objectives of military peacekeepers is not gaining immediate solutions to the pressing situations but first and foremost building trust that can be utilised over time. As success in securing co-operation is strategically drawn from the art of showing empathy to communal needs, civic action programmes can significantly shape the level of trust and confidence between the local communities and peacekeepers.

CA can be used as a means to communicate the importance of peace to local populations. As representatives of the international community, the UN peacekeepers are entrusted with the crucial and difficult task of ensuring that people understand the value of engaging in non-violent conflict management. Such values cannot be automatically transferred by simply engaging in active interactions and expecting people to understand

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184 The Army manual identifies that 'civil affairs projects may embrace a wide range of activities within local communities including medical and veterinary care, the provision and distribution of water, waste disposal, electrical power...the construction and development of schools'. Ibid.
185 One Canadian peacekeeper notes that "carrying an extra water can in the jeep can save a lucky resident a twenty-mile trip into town, and go a long way toward ingratiating the entire peacekeeping unit with both the natives and their leaders". For more discussion and examples see Keith Elliot Greenberg, 'The Essential Art of Empathy', in Soldiers for Peace: Facts on File, ed., Barbara Benton, Inc, New York: 1996, p. 93-6.
them. However, the provision of benefits and incentives of various forms can help this understanding. This is because CA are tied to the ideas of basic human needs, peace-building and the idea of 'positive' peace. CA brings some level of changes to the quality of life of those caught up in the civil disputes. CA programmes, which are part of a pre-peace building phase, help the conflict mediation process to be perceived as moving towards achieving 'positive' peace and can create a sense of hope and confidence among the locals and civil communities. This message provided by CA can encourage local co-operation and consent for the implementation of new peacekeeping operations.

VIII. PREPARING THE PEACEKEEPERS: THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING FOR IMPLEMENTING 'SOFTER' PEACEKEEPING

As part of the new peacekeeping outlook peacekeepers also need to be trained adequately and suitably for the implementation of the 'softer' field strategies. Fetherston argues, "as a means of dissemination and a precursor to implementation, training could play a key role in the process of bringing about a conceptual (and then actual) shift away [from the old styles into developing new approaches]"\(^{187}\). Hence, without the provision of suitable training on the challenges and complex dimension in the 'rough' operational environments, peacekeepers may not be able to do their job effectively as the implementation of the 'softer' peacekeeping strategies requires learning new kinds of skills.

*Specialised Skills*

In terms of skill requirements, military peacekeepers must have different types of specialised skills depending on the nature of the tasks. Peacekeeping duty is fundamentally different from traditional military operations, hence, the kinds of expertise required today are also vastly different. They could be identified broadly as non-contact and contact skills.

Non-contact skills are normally defined as skills needed to carry out specific military tasks such as patrolling, checking observation posts, disarming, cordon and search operations, movement control, mine awareness, weapons handling, maintaining law and order. Some of these tasks may require analytical, observation and also organisational skills. Peacekeepers also require additional skills to carry out civil affairs programmes. This requires other non-contact specialised non-military skills such as engineering, technical and mechanical skills for constructing bridges, roads and canals.

It has been argued that "a weak peacekeeping force may resort to inappropriate violence, but strong forces with inappropriate [contact] skills may also be a problem." Contact skills are basically effective communicative and interactive skills which makes it possible for peacekeepers to liaise, negotiate, mediate and sustain local co-operation and support. They are a necessity for carrying out all types of functions in a peacekeeping operation. Even in missions that involve aggressive patrolling, that is, controlling space and the movements of disputing parties, contact skills are needed in the conflict management process. Patrolling may be vital to control the escalation of violence and individual incidents but the act of patrolling and restricting movement requires effective communication and negotiating skills.

Contact skills can take the form of verbal or non-verbal messages. In some cases non-verbal cues can have a greater impact because they convey messages easily, quickly

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and with increased comprehension\textsuperscript{192}. Non-verbal cues also give information about intentions and emotional responses. In other words, non-verbal communication is relational. They convey messages about thoughts, which are difficult to find expression in verbal messages. For example, during negotiation it is noted that “much is learned from “feeling your way”, watching the other person’s facial expressions and gestures so that you can adapt your own responses”\textsuperscript{193}.

Civic action programmes may help to create a sense of physical closeness between the military peacekeepers and the local populations, but the affiliation itself depends greatly on how interactions take place at this level. As peacekeepers their most important work is among the people in local communities. Hence, the need to develop contact and interpersonal skills is critical for conducting new peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeepers might also need to be educated in areas of international covenants and conventions and in the conduct of law-enforcement functions, which include: arrest, detention, search crowd control, and maintaining civil order in disrupted societies\textsuperscript{194}. When

\textsuperscript{192} In the process of human communication, one can generally make use of information from their senses through three preferences namely visual, sound and kinaesthetic (touch, taste, smell, feelings). Hence, contacts with people can be established by verbal communication and non-verbal communication. Messages conveyed verbally are important in a negotiation process. Peacekeepers transmit their intentions verbally, which is a common communicative stimuli. This type of communication can be useful in enhancing inter-personal and social relations between the civil and military spheres. This is because it provides an opportunity for the peacekeeper to clearly state their aims and intentions, reinforced by their roles in the theatre. Since language and thought are closely connected, it could in some ways help locals understand the purpose of the peacekeepers, who are there to help. In cross-cultural contexts non-verbal cues can replace verbal messages through gestures and non-verbal expressions. They are dominant in the communication process and are part of the civil society at all times. It is in fact part of our human nature to read and translate some of the non-verbal messages that we receive through our visual or kinaesthetic preferences. The non-verbal communicative cues include greeting local population with a handshake may make a difference in the relationship because it helps the receiver understand the feelings of the peacekeepers. Physical contact cues are arguably an effective form of non-verbal communication because they are very revealing and hence increase comprehension. It is said that ‘touch is a bonding gesture’. It is a form of ‘approach behaviour’ that reinforces the involvement of the peacekeepers in the affairs of the civil communities. Hence, conviction on the part of the locals in co-operating with peacekeepers can be strengthened by such cues. See Stewart L. Tubbs and Sylvia Moss, \textit{Human Communication}, Seventh Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc, New York: 1994, pp. 101-41.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., pp. 101-41.

\textsuperscript{194} Williams, op. cit., p. 74
conducting such tasks, peacekeepers must be aware of the international human rights code of practices and criminal-justice standards\textsuperscript{195}.

**Personal Attributes**

The success of peacekeepers in establishing strong community relations and carrying out civil affairs depends on their ability to mix the acquired skills with a variety of personal attributes. Given that peacekeepers are deployed as third-party mediators they need to possess critical qualities to carry out that role effectively. Boulie suggests that successful mediators are empathetic, non-judgemental, patient, persuasive, optimistic, persistent, trustworthy, intelligent, creative, flexible and that they also have a good sense of humour and common sense\textsuperscript{196}. Empathy in mediation is important for building understanding between the mediator and the parties, that is, "as an instrument, empathy is employed strategically by the negotiator for the better understanding of the wants and needs,... to uncover where there is room to manoeuvre, to help tailor arguments to change minds, and to enhance the ability to influence..."\textsuperscript{197}.

The possession of empathy could benefit the mediator in several ways\textsuperscript{198}. First, it acts as a medium transmitting the message that the mediator understands the parties' and locals' viewpoints. This is important because most reluctance to cooperate stems from a

\textsuperscript{195} There are guidelines set out in the 'Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials', drafted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 34/169 of 1979 and also by the Economic and Social Council in Resolution in 1989/61. The Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in 1990 adopts the principles on the use of firepower by peacekeepers. Ibid., p. 74.

\textsuperscript{196} B. Boulie, *Mediation: Principle, Process, Practice*, Butterworth, London: 1996. Some other authors have described such qualities metaphorically. William E. Simkin and Nicholas A. Fidandis, the authors of *Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining*, BNA Books, New York 1986, claim that effective mediator must have the patience of Job; the sincerity and bulldog characteristics of the English; the wit of the Irish; the physical endurance of a marathon runner; the broken field-dodging abilities of a halfback; the guise of Machiavelli; the personality-probing skills of a good psychiatrist; the hide of a rhinoceros; and the wisdom of Solomon. See also Ibid., p. 8

\textsuperscript{197} Noce, op. cit., p. 283.

\textsuperscript{198} The following benefits are outlined in Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet and Andrew S. Tulumello, 'The Tension Between Empathy and Assertiveness', *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 3
perception that the local feelings and frustrations are not appreciated or respected. Hence, empathy helps to correct misperceptions. Secondly, empathy inspires openness in others and may also be persuasive. Indeed, one of the important strategies required for military peacekeepers is to "walk in the shoes of the native population" and demonstrate their sensitivity to the needs and well being of the locals. This is done not only in response to most pressing needs of the local population but also to build a trust that can be utilised over time.

Other personal attributes are leadership qualities, innovative thinking and confidence. Senior ranking officers should not be too reliant on their superiors for advice. Lieutenant General Carter, who served in Bosnia has said "the most difficult thing for me was to have a crisis and then pick up the phone to call the head ....and tell them what to do". It is noted that "in an environment of uncertainty, confidence [and the ability to make independent decisions] in crisis [situations] may preclude events that have [negative] consequences". Confidence and leadership qualities are crucial, one military officer has argued, especially when military peacekeepers are placed in the difficult situations of taking orders from the 'home' country instead of the central UN command. Generally, national governments generally do not know the ground situation and the developments taking shape so their direct interference can often place senior officers in a difficult situation which can indirectly affect their ability to make a positive impact in local communities. While the officer cannot deny 'home' orders, there is a need to have high level leadership qualities to manage and manipulate situations tactfully and confidently.

199 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 85.
201 Ibid.
202 Interview notes, Training Unit, United Nations, 2000.
203 Interview notes, Training Unit, United Nations, 2000.
204 Interview notes, Training Unit, United Nations, 2000.
The importance of personal attributes for peacekeeping has been acknowledged in several works. Bowling and Hoffman identify several reasons why personal characteristics are so crucial in a conflict management process. First, personal attributes which are seen as "useful metaphors" can have a direct impact on the mediation process and the outcome of the mediation. For example, "the ability of the mediators to reach a genuine resolution is derived not so much from a particular set of words but instead an array of personal qualities" that help to create a favourable environment for the process to take place. Second, "notwithstanding impartiality and neutrality, mediators are inevitably engaged in creating a relationship with the parties", and personal attributes provide an important source of strength in subtly influencing the behaviour of the parties. Indeed, peacekeepers require some form of "personal power" or "force of personality", as opposed to asserting power over another to establish a strong "presence" (not physical but in terms of personal qualities) in the mediation process. Hence, peacekeepers can no longer create a positive influence by merely displaying traditional military "machoness" but must embrace a new personal outlook. Hence, the fact that peacekeepers today require a new personalised outlook which needs to be incorporated into their training curriculum cannot be trivialised.

**Whose responsibility?**

The question arises as to whose responsibility is it to provide the necessary training for the UN peacekeepers. Since peacekeeping is a UN operation this might suggest that the responsibility lies with the Organization. The UN training unit (TU) has, on some occasions, taken on this responsibility. For example, in Sierra Leone, the UN has conducted

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207 Ibid., p. 6.
on-site training and briefing for peacekeepers to establish a common UN training culture\textsuperscript{210}. However, the limited resources have often prevented the UN from taking on the responsibility in full. Mostly, the TU facilitates national training programmes by providing member states with professional and experienced training staff\textsuperscript{211}.

Many aspects of training largely remain under the control of the troop contributing countries and national armies which play a critical role in the provision of specialised training for peacekeepers before deployment\textsuperscript{212}. However, at the national level training can be provided either within an institutionalised framework or on an \textit{ad hoc} basis and it is argued that most "troop-contributing countries have not yet fully adapted their training, equipment or operational mind-set from traditional peacekeeping to new situations"\textsuperscript{213}. For example, in 1994, research conducted on national training programmes concluded that only 13 per cent of the training provided by some national armies focused on contact skills\textsuperscript{214}. In most cases national training is heavily focused on technical and military issues, the organisation of troops, conduct when performing duties, the handling of new military equipment, familiarisation with new types of vehicles and short-range weapons, identifying landmines, and the precautionary measures to be taken with landmines, filling out forms

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., pp. 11 & 13.
\textsuperscript{210} Interviews with Special Assistant to Military Advisor and also training unit, DPKO, UN, New York: March 2000.
\textsuperscript{211} The UN TU has published a Peacekeeping Training Manual, which provides eight training exercise packages, lecture notes and training guides. The TU has also produced six training videos so as to provide visual aid in assisting national training. Currently, the TU has set out goals in producing creative solutions to further facilitate national training programs. These solutions include distance training (this is a research study regarding a correspondence course system which would allow the training unit to disseminate readings and other knowledge-based courses inexpensively via normal mail and where available, electronic mail); publications, involving the revision and translation of official publications; shifting of information by establishing or maintaining contact with external resources. Secretariat Briefing at the 2000 session of the Special Committee on peacekeeping operations. See also UNDIR, op. cit., p. 40.
\textsuperscript{213} UNDIR, op. cit., p. 16.
and other administrative matters\textsuperscript{215}. However valuable this may be, a lack of training on some of the critical areas of developing contact skills could significantly undermine the success of peacekeeping operations.

Currently, some of the institutionalised training programmes that focus on both non-contact and contact skills include the Nordic, Canadian, Italian and Austrian programmes. The Nordic programmes, both at the national and regional levels, offer training on cross-cultural communications and conflict resolution\textsuperscript{216}. The Austrian training programme focuses on peacekeeping, peace building, conflict analysis and conflict transformation strategies and models. It also teaches topics such as mediation and negotiation, confidence building, human rights protection, and intercultural understanding and communication\textsuperscript{217}. The Pearson training Centre in Canada offers a variety of courses for a broad range of participants coming from the military, civil, police, government and non-government agencies. The centre runs programmes in several areas, particularly humanitarian assistance, the media, democratisation and human rights\textsuperscript{218}. Special courses are also offered for military peacekeepers in developing leadership skills for civic action programmes and educating soldiers on personal behaviour and conduct in peacekeeping missions. Although most of these training programmes meet some of the new demands and requirements, one major criticism is the issue of standardisation. It is argued that there is little standardisation in terms of providing specialised training to military peacekeepers across nations.

The selection of military personnel is another area of responsibility for troop-contributors. Peacekeepers not only require skills but they must also possess important personal attributes, which they cannot always acquire through training. Having a selection

\textsuperscript{216} Fetherston, op. cit., (1994), pp. 18 & 19.
\textsuperscript{217} UNIDIR, op. cit., p. 79.
criteria helps to identify soldiers with the ability to demonstrate both requirements, that is specialised skills and personal characteristics. Selecting the right man for the job is crucial for the conduct and success of new peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{219}. Soldiers need to have the right sort of attitude for carrying out 'softer' peacekeeping. Attitudes can be shaped by the factors that motivate soldiers to participate in peacekeeping operations. In a study, three different categories of soldiers were identified: paleomodern, modern and post-modern\textsuperscript{220}. These categories are linked to the factors which motivate peacekeepers to participate in external UN assignments. A paleomodern soldier has traditional motivations such as nationalistic feelings, and the aspirations to strengthen the integrity and image of his or her country at the international level\textsuperscript{221}. A modern soldier is one who has a utilitarian commitment to earn money and to gain an education\textsuperscript{222}.

Finally, post-modern motivations are based on the desire for adventure and to gain some personal experience\textsuperscript{223}. A further survey of Italian peacekeepers in Somalia found that soldiers with paleomodern motivations constituted about 14\% of the total Italian contingent, those with modern motivations comprised 33\% and those with post-modern motivations about 53\%\textsuperscript{224}. Hence, it was concluded that a new generation of postmoderns who are willing to participate in peacekeeping for personal adventure was emerging. However, the post-modern Italian soldiers who participated in the peacekeeping operation in Somalia appeared to have the most negative attitudes. In fact, Italian soldiers demonstrated a general lack of discipline and poorer personal conduct, and have been accused of torturing civilians

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} UNIDIR, op. cit., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., pp. 471-73.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., pp. 471-3.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., pp. 471-73.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p. 481
and engaging in illegal activities such as black marketeering\textsuperscript{225}. So, the need for a rigid selection process must be taken seriously.

Generally, however, there are no standard selection criteria for troop-contributors to apply, although the United Nations has published an instruction manual for member states entitled \textit{Guidelines for Troop-Contributors}. However, the guidelines cover broad areas such as the composition and capabilities of a force, equipment performance requirements, instructions on the movement of troops and material, reimbursement procedures and other instructions, and say very little about the criteria for the selection of military personnel\textsuperscript{226}. Rather, the guidelines set out criteria for recruiting civilian specialists and military observers, such as age, physical health requirements, language skills, proficiency in map reading, working experience in a particular occupation, driver's license, and experience in using automatic data processing\textsuperscript{227}.

In fact, troop-contributing nations seldom take some of these basic criteria seriously. A recent study of peacekeeping forces in Cambodia, for example, showed that some members of the UN civilian police "spoke neither of the two languages specified - English or French - still less Khmer, while others lacked the six years of community policing experience and driver's license that the UN had stipulated as minimum requirements"\textsuperscript{228}. On the other hand, there are some countries like Finland, Denmark and Norway which have taken a step further from the basic criteria and had adopted a rigorous selection process for military peacekeepers. Finland has outlined some additional conditions that soldiers must meet to be considered for overseas deployment in UN peacekeeping operations. These criteria require that soldiers must be between 20 and 35 years old; have received above average marks for the conscription service tests; have a good citizen

\textsuperscript{225} Williams, op. cit., p. 51
\textsuperscript{226} UNIDIR, op. cit., pp. 45-47.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., pp. 45-47.
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., p. 47.
reputation; be fit in terms of both physical and mental health; have proven language skills; and to have successfully completed pre-deployment training. Norway and Denmark have also moved away from their traditional recruitment process based on volunteers to establishing a well-trained standby force. The old volunteer process has been considered unreliable for the new and growing demands of present day peacekeeping operations.

IX. SUMMARY

In summary, it can be argued that the responsibilities for peacekeepers and troop-contributing nations in peacekeeping are much varied and demanding in the post-Cold War era than in the past emergencies. This is mainly because of the changed situation and nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of predominantly protracted social conflicts, with distinct features and characteristics, has led to an expansion of peacekeeping in terms of both quantity and quality. The changing nature of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has created new demands and challenges for peacekeepers.

This chapter has identified and examined the demands and challenges relating to both troop contribution and the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. Troop-contributors are confronted by the need to meet the growing demand for ground forces and be prepared to take risks and sustain their commitment in dangerous and hostile operational environments. Peacekeepers also need a fresh peacekeeping outlook to tackle the unprecedented ground challenges and realities such as the issue of consent management, which actually involves shaping local perceptions and attitudes so as to encourage co-

229 Ibid., p. 47.
operative behaviour and positive reactions to new peacekeeping operations. As part of this outlook peacekeepers need to have suitable responses, such as the development of ‘softer’ peacekeeping strategies. At the same time, it must be noted that the successful implementation of these strategies requires soldiers to be well trained and prepared, which is predominantly the responsibility of the troop contributing nations.

The study now turns to assessing how some third world troop-contributing countries of South Asia have responded to the new sets of demands and challenges in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations.
India is not a novice to participating in external peace operations. In fact, its participation can be traced back to just after the end of World War 2 when Indian armies were used by allied forces to reoccupy and pacify colonies taken over by the Japanese. Although there might be some doubts as to whether this was part of a UN peace mission, it was one of the first external operations to which India made some contribution. Technically, India's involvement in peacekeeping began in the late 1940s when New Delhi made representation in the first UN observer mission to Palestine. Following this, Indian soldiers became part of the first UN peacekeeping force deployed in the Gaza in 1956. Since then India has been consistently participating in UN peace missions. In fact, India has been singled out among the many third world peacekeepers as having one of the longest and most consistent records of participation in UN peacekeeping operations\(^1\). As of December 2000 the country has participated in 36 UN peace missions worldwide (see Appendix 2) with a record of at least

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50,000 Indian soldiers having donned the blue helmet in pursuit of global peace and security.

In addition to its participation in UN peace missions India has also demonstrated a capacity to launch its own peacekeeping operation. This can be seen in the late 1980s when the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) was created and deployed in Sri Lanka to manage the ethnic conflict and to contain the aggression and violence of the Tamil Tigers who had been fighting for a separate state in the North. However, India’s experience in Sri Lanka was perceived more as an intervention reflecting a departure from the traditional parameters of peacekeeping and solving nothing.

Notwithstanding this, India has continued to make active representation in extra-regional peace operations under the aegis of the UN flag. In fact, in the post-Cold War era India has taken a pro-active approach to UN peacekeeping operations as part of its new foreign policy orientations in a newly emerging global context. As part of this pro-active approach India’s commitment to UN peacekeeping has reached a new level. What explains this new level of commitment to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations? What are the sources of motivation? How does it participate and what is its contribution as part of its increased commitment to UN peacekeeping operations? These are some of the central questions that this chapter aims to answer.

The chapter argues that India is politically motivated to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the key sources of India’s motivation are related to its ambitions for ‘great power’ recognition in a highly competitive and unpredictable global system. Hence, the need for India to enhance its international identity and image has meant

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an increased presence within the UN with the long-term view of being considered as a favourable candidate for a permanent seat on the Security Council. While this new commitment is reflected in its consistency and size of participation, India’s pro-active approach can be also seen in the way it responds to the new demands and challenges in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. To date India has been making large and simultaneous troop commitments in more operations than in the past. Along with this India’s willingness to take risks and sustain its commitment in hazardous operations has demonstrated its reliability as a troop-contributor. Therefore, it is argued in this chapter that India can be identified as one of the major UN peacekeepers.

India has been also making qualitative contribution in terms of responding actively and suitably to the new ground challenges and realities such as consent management in the ‘rough’ operational environments of intra-state conflicts. This can be seen in its development of a new peacekeeping outlook that takes a 'softer' community-oriented approach to post-Cold War peace operations. To this end the chapter aims to trace the place of India’s UN peacekeeping commitment in the context of its foreign policy both during and after the Cold War. Also, it examines the sources of motivation for its pro-active approach and assesses India’s responses to the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations.

I. THE CONTEXT: INDIA’S WORLDVIEW

Since independence India has been playing an active peacekeeping role at various levels both within and outside the UN. This activism has been part of its overall foreign policy orientation, which has largely been shaped by its worldview. This is not something unique to India, but what makes it interesting and worth noting is the way India perceives itself in

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the post-second world war international system. India's desire for global recognition and 'great power' status in world affairs is no secret. Indian leaders from the outset have always sought "to corner a leading role for India in the international arena". In fact, this desire was expressed even before its independence, as early as 1946. Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister, in a historic policy statement expressed the growing desire of India to seek a place in the "diplomatic sun" and also its desire to play a leading role on the world stage.

Traditionally, great powers are recognised on the basis that they are economically and militarily strong and powerful and have the capacity to exert their influence across the globe. However, economic and military powers are not the only prerequisites for seeking 'great power' recognition. In fact, India was seeking such recognition despite the fact that it was weak both economically and militarily in the post-independence period. As Nand Lal states, "India as it emerged as an independent [country was] economically backward, with a high rate of population growth. [Its] economic and military resources in the nineteen forties and fifties were meagre..."

According to Nossal, there are also other variants all of which bear a profound influence on a country's foreign policy and behaviour. These are – location (relating to the size of land and natural resources); capability (that is the size of the country's population, its level of urbanisation, development and wealth); alignment in international politics; and power (that is having the capacity to make decisions for itself to achieve its own political goals). Hedley Bull argues that one basic criterion that defines 'great powers' is to be recognised by others as having certain "special rights and duties" in the international

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6 Ibid., p. 30
In other words, "great powers ... assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole".

India's self-perception as a 'great power' has been formulated mostly along these lines, particularly in terms of its size, physical capability, alignment policy and the perception of having a special duty to fulfil in the international system. Indeed, India's desire to fit into a 'great power' identity has been based on its perception of being a dominant power at the regional level. India not only covers 72% of the sub-continent but has a large population and abundant natural resources such as irrigated land, coal, petroleum, iron ore, bauxite, manganese and uranium. To a large extent these features have shaped India's vision of emerging as one of the dominant regional powers. As K. Subramanyam, an Indian strategists, writes: "India with its population, size, resources and industrial output will be a dominant country in the region, just as the US, Soviet Union, and China happen to be in their respective areas." Hence, it can be argued that India's image of being a regional power has partly shaped its views about its role at the global level.

India's non-alignment policy in the post-war international system further shaped its outlook and self-perception. Arguably, the Cold War facilitated the process of creating a non-aligned bloc. During the Cold War, the international system was not only deeply divided between conflicting ideologies, but also accommodated the superpowers' advancement of their political interests. The Cold War politics became increasingly characterised by a competition for global influence, a race for conventional and nuclear

10 Ibid., p. 196.
armaments, and the militarisation of the hegemonial patron-client state relationships. Thus, the superpowers endorsed their supremacy over 'new nations'. India was "determined not to be dominated in any way" by these Superpowers. At the same time it viewed the Cold War model as unsuitable for India to pursue its own foreign policy goals and objectives. Given its military and economic weakness, India realised that there was no way in which it could express its opinion nor realise its own global ambitions in such a framework unless the "world power-base [was] broadened to accommodate Indian opinion [and views]".

It was within this global context that India pursued an independent foreign policy through the non-aligned movement (NAM). Of course, at its inauguration in Belgrade in 1961, India justified the creation of the NAM based on the need to "create collective moral pressure" on the Superpowers in fulfilling their global responsibilities. Given its global power aspirations it is hard to believe that such an interest has been its sole motive for the creation of the NAM. Indeed, it has been argued that India was also very concerned with its own recognition as an equal to the superpowers. In fact, for most part of the Cold War era India increasingly viewed itself as a 'third' force in a global system which was deeply divided between the East and the West.

It is not the intention here to assess how non-aligned India was during the Cold War. However, it must be noted that the reality was somewhat different from the rhetoric. It is not wrong to say that even as a non-aligned country India increasingly aligned itself with the Soviet Union through which it 'meddled' and shaped some aspects of the global affairs. Although the creation of the new non-aligned model was crucial for India to stand

14 Ibid., p. 325.
15 Ibid., p. 325.
independent from the two superpowers, it still needed sufficient leverage to influence decisions within the UN Security Council. It also sought the Soviet Union to support India predominantly against China and Pakistan. Therefore, it was within this context that India not only signed a 20-year Friendship Treaty in 1971 with the Soviet Union but also became very dependent on the USSR for economic and military aid.

Despite these apparent contradictions, for India it was important to achieve status as a 'great power' and to raise its identity as a recognised third force. Unlike other states, such as, the US, France and Britain that had been ‘great powers’ historically, India had to earn this recognition by competing and proving its credibility in the international system.

Hence, India, despite its limited means, sought to play a major role in world affairs through the United Nations. As a third force India saw itself as a voice and a voice for some of the oppressed and colonised Asian-African states. It played a leading role in shaping issues in many areas, such as, decolonisation, racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa, and also contributed to international peace and security in the early years of the UN. In fact it was so active that by 1953 the members of the global Organisation recognised India's role and involvement and the leader of the Indian delegation, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, was elected President of the UN General Assembly.

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17 Ibid., p. 325.
18 Ibid., p. 325.
20 Reddy, op. cit., p. 36.
21 There is the view that in the early post-independence years, India lacked a well-organised body of diplomatic personnel and a "suitable machinery for strategy formulation" to mobilise support or counter manoeuvres within the UN Secretariat. It is only in the early 1970s that these issues gained significant attention in New Delhi. For a discussion on the role and participation of India's Permanent Mission to the UN, see C.S.R. Murthy, *India's Participation in the United Nations: Patterns and Problems*, *India Quarterly*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, Oct-Dec. 1983.
India also aimed to further demonstrate its credibility by taking on global security responsibilities. Indeed, it played an important and active role in peace missions, even outside the United Nations. One example relates to India's role in the Korean War. India did not participate in the Korean War because it insisted on resolving the matter diplomatically and viewed the military action "less and less as a vital demonstration of Collective Security, and more and more as an American [intervention] ... and to resettle one of the greatest stakes in the great power rivalry".23

Despite the strong criticism of US military action, later India participated in the Korean crisis. However, its involvement came only in the aftermath of the war when it decided to take on the responsibility of managing the repatriation of the prisoners of war. India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea and also established the Custodial Force of India (CFI) to care for the repatriated prisoners. It contributed 231 officers, 203 Junior Commissioned Officers and 5,696 other-ranked personnel as part of its CFI which functioned for approximately seven months until March 1954.24

It was also in 1954 that India served as Chairman of the International Commission set up under the agreement reached at the Geneva conference for resolving the protracted conflicts in Indo-China. India volunteered to mediate the conflicts by submitting a six-point proposal which set the stage for the establishment of three International Commissions for Supervision and Control in each of the countries: Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos.25 Due to its strong non-alignment policy India was subsequently seen as suitable to serve in each of these Commissions launched in Indo-China.26 Moreover, India also contributed 7,000 ground troops in Vietnam for supervising and implementing the cease-fire agreements. As

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23 See Dayal Shiv, India's Role in the Korean Question - A Study in the Settlement of International Disputes under the UN, S. Chand & Co. New Delhi: 1959. See also B.S., Steinberg, 'The Korean War: A Case Study in Indian Neutralism', Orbis, Winter 1965, p. 958.
25 Lal, op. cit., p. 50.
part of this assertive role in world affairs India also began to participate actively in UN peacekeeping operations.

II. UN PEACEKEEPING DURING THE COLD WAR – THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

India has participated in UN peace missions since the evolution of the activity. To many historians the life history of UN peacekeeping begins in 1956, when the first major peacekeeping force, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), was officially created and deployed in the Sinai. However, some are convinced that the small-scale and adhoc UN peace missions preceding the UNEF (or the nascent period as discussed in chapter one) had prepared the ground for UN peacekeeping to take shape and evolve.

If one subscribes to the view that UN peacekeeping started before 1956 then India's participation could be traced as far back as 1947, also the year the country's long colonial history ended. Although India did not achieve independence until August 1947, it had already participated in an earlier UN peace mission. From May to August 1947, British-India served as a member on the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)27. The members of the UNSCOP were mandated "to prepare a report on the question of Palestine," and were also granted "the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine... [and] submit proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine"28. This fact finding commission was part of the preparatory stage for the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), an observer mission launched in 1948.

Since India’s small scale and brief involvement in the late 1940s it has been consistently participating in UN peace missions. In fact, India’s participation in UN peace missions during the Cold War has been disproportionately large. Graph 2.1 shows India’s overall level of activity during the Cold War. India has participated in a range of capacities in 12 out of the 19 peace missions launched between 1948 – 1989. Its level of activity was the highest during the period 1956 to 1966, which Wiseman calls the assertive period of UN peacekeeping. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, it marks the creation and deployment of the UNEF, the first major UN peacekeeping operation to the Sinai. Secondly, it is the period in which the UN launched the greatest number of peace missions, that is, a total of eight

Graph 2.1: India’s Participation in UN Peace Missions During the Cold War (1948 - 1989)

Source: The Indian Government (UN Desk, Ministry of Defence) and the Indian Army military document; The Blue Helmet, UN, third edition, New York: 1996; Department of Public Information, UN, New York.

Ibid. See also Appendix 1 for the various peace operations launched during this period.
peace missions of which three were peacekeeping operations. India participated in seven missions.

**India’s Role in the UN Peacekeeping Mission to Sinai**

India's troop commitment in peacekeeping operations began in the Sinai in 1956. In fact, it not only emerged as one of the largest troop contributors, but also played a major role in the creation of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). This was possible due to the way the operation as a whole was established. The decision to create the UNEF came about in the wake of an Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt following President Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The attack caused uproar within the international community. The Afro-Asian countries and other non-aligned states condemned the attack not only as a total disregard by two major powers of the principles of the UN Charter, but also as a terrible assault of two colonial powers on a weak non-aligned state. Clearly, something had to be done to avoid further escalation of the conflict and also to prevent it from spilling over into other Arab nations.

According to the UN Charter the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security lies with the Security Council. However, during the Cold War this role could not be fully realised, largely because of the deep divisions between the permanent members of the Security Council. Following Israel's attack on Egypt the US and the Soviet Union produced a draft resolution which not only criticised Israel's violation of its armistice agreement with Egypt but also sought to address appropriate responses. However, this agreement could not be realised because both France and Great Britain, which had also launched an attack on Egypt, vetoed the resolution. Therefore, the US was hesitant to move

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31 Lal, op. cit., p. 128.
further on the question of British and French aggression against Egypt and the Soviet Union was reluctant to act on its own.32

Due to this inactivity by the Security Council the members of the Council adopted a resolution which called for an Emergency Session of the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution."33 This resulted in a transfer of power from the Security Council to the General Assembly which then became responsible for the creation and deployment of a peacekeeping force. This is the first and only operation which was exclusively launched by the General Assembly and also made it possible for other Member States to become involved in the decision-making process of UN peacekeeping. India played a major role in the General Assembly in the creation of the UNEF.

Firstly, India was heavily involved in bringing pressure to bear on the belligerent parties to agree to a cease-fire so that the situation could be resolved amicably. Thus, following the transfer of power to the General Assembly a draft resolution was adopted on 2 November 1956 which called for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice line.34 India's part was to mobilise greater international support against the naked attack on the weak and non-aligned Egypt. It drafted a second resolution with the support and endorsement of some nineteen Asian-African countries highlighting the fact that the belligerents had still not complied with the 2nd November draft resolution and so should be pressured to do so quickly.35 It also requested that the Secretary-General report on the status of compliance in less than twelve hours. This effort was significant as it placed

33 Lal, op. cit., p. 128.
34 The draft resolution "(1) urges as a matter of priority that all parties ... agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area; (2) urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly, to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of armistice agreements; and (3) recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution; ..." See General assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1), 2 November 1956. See also Indra Narayan Tewary, The Peacekeeping Power of the United Nations General Assembly, S. Chand & Co. New Delhi: 1974.
more burden on Great Britain and France to respond to the rapidly growing world pressure to accept an early and immediate cease-fire.

India next turned to the establishment of the UN peacekeeping force, which was to be deployed once parties had agreed to a cease-fire. Given that the responsibility now lay with the General Assembly, India played a constructive role in establishing this force. In fact, India was at the forefront of the decision-making process. As Rana says, the low involvement of the superpowers in the crisis led to so much "manoeuvrability that Indian diplomats worked out a sui generis role"\textsuperscript{36} in the General Assembly. Indeed, individual personalities like Arthur Lal and Mr. Menon, who were India's representatives to the UN, played an active role in the decision-making process. Arthur Lal, who was seen as one of the major architects of the UNEF, worked very closely with the Canadian delegation which initiated the setting up of a peacekeeping force\textsuperscript{37}. During the debate in the General Assembly, Canada initiated a draft resolution which called on "the Secretary-General to submit to [the General Assembly, within forty-eight hours] ... a plan for setting up with the consent of the nations concerned, of an Emergency International United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with "all the terms" of the resolution of 2 November"\textsuperscript{38}. India had a role to play in formulating this resolution. In fact, India's representative, Arthur Lal, suggested the inclusion of the word "all" before the phrase "the terms"\textsuperscript{39}. This was a precautionary measure to rule out the possibility of parties becoming selective in complying with the terms.

\textsuperscript{35} Lal, op. cit., p. 130.
\textsuperscript{37} Rikhye, op. cit., p. 305
\textsuperscript{38} Lal, op. cit., p. 131.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 131.
Mr. Menon, who led the Indian delegation, in various accounts took the liberty of interpreting some of the key functions and powers of the proposed peacekeeping force on behalf of the Secretary-General. He asserted that,

"The Emergency Force would be set up in the context of the withdrawal of the Franco-British forces from Egypt and on the basis of the call to Israel to withdraw behind the armistice lines; secondly, that that Force would not in any sense be a successor to the invading Franco-British forces, or would in any sense take over its functions, thirdly, that it would be understood that the Force might have to function through Egyptian territory and, therefore, that the Egyptian Government must consent to its establishment; fourthly, that the Force would be a temporary one for the emergency ...the Force must be of a balanced composition"\(^{40}\).

India was particularly concerned with the composition of the peacekeeping force. It wanted the aggressors to be excluded from the composition of this force. As Nand Lal states: India "wanted a categorical assurance that the forces of the aggressors [on the ground] would not be converted into the forces of the United Nations"\(^{41}\). This was also taken seriously as the General Assembly agreed to the idea of establishing a force that would be impartial to the parties. Hence, the major powers in the Security Council did not have any direct role in the provision of ground forces.

In terms of field level participation and contribution, India emerged as one of the ten countries that provided ground troops as part of the UNEF. Quantitatively, India's troop contribution was very significant. Initially, the size of its contribution was second to that of Canada. However, this changed when Canada reduced its size following Egypt's

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\(^{41}\) Lal, op. cit., p. 131.
disapproval of Canadian presence on its soil\textsuperscript{42}. This was partly due to the historical ties between Canada and Britain. However, India played an influential role in convincing Egypt to accept Canadian troops. Relations between Egypt and India had been largely very cordial. Previously, Nehru had very close relations with Nasser, and the fact the two countries were members of the non-aligned movement further sweetened their relations\textsuperscript{43}. To some extent India used this strong link to influence Egypt to reconsider its decision to accept Canadians as part of the UNEF. However, although in the end Egypt accepted Canadian participation and contribution, by this time, Canada had reduced its troop size.

Hence, India emerged as the largest force comprising 11 infantry battalions, 393 officers, and 409 junior commissioned officers (JCO). In total, India contributed 12393 troops. A number of Indian officers also held various high-ranking field appointments. Lt. Col. Shevak Antia was appointed Chief of Logistics before assuming the role of Chief of Operations. Two of India's most decorated officers, Lieut. General PS Gyani and Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, were appointed as force commanders of the UNEF from December 1959 - January 1964 and from January 1966 - June 1967 respectively.

In the field the nature of the tasks and functions were relatively straightforward and primarily military. A major role involved overseeing the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. This assignment had two phases. The first phase came in December 1956 when three Indian Para Battalions were deployed in the establishment of a buffer zone south of El Chap\textsuperscript{44}. The buffer zone was placed under the command of Lt. Col. Onkar Deva who was also responsible for the evacuation of Anglo-French troops from the Suez Canal. This evacuation exercise began on 14 December and was completed within ten days with the full ground co-operation of the local authorities who assisted in maintaining

\textsuperscript{43} Srivastava (1994), op. cit., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{44} Thapliyal U.P. 'Soldiers of Peace', \textit{Sainik Samachar}, Vol. 36 No. 1, January 1989, p. 28.
peaceful conditions in the buffer zone to facilitate the exercise. With the overall co-operation of the belligerents, Indian forces successfully took control of Port Said and Port Faud in the Suez Canal Zone.

The second phase took place in the 43-km long Gaza Strip and involved overseeing the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The task was a difficult because the Israelis were initially reluctant to allow the UNEF on their side of the line of control. Hence, prior to moving into Gaza Indian forces were instructed to concentrate their position at EL Arish, the Egyptian side. On 6 March 1957 the Israelis agreed to allow the UNEF to enter the Gaza Strip.

Another major function of the Indian contingent in the Gaza Strip, especially along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL), was to guard and protect the UN establishments. The Indian force was given the responsibility of covering an eight-mile area on which it established 27 observation posts to watch the ADL. The nature of the task, nevertheless, was less exciting to the point that one Indian officer remarked, "keeping watch throughout the day and patrolling at night [basically] summarise[d] the life of these lonely soldiers living under the canvas in isolation." India undertook its peacekeeping role in the field for eleven years until May 1967, when President Nasser served quit orders to the UNEF.

The Congo Operation

India’s second large-scale troop commitment arose in the early 1960s. The establishment of the UN operation in the Congo, also labelled in French as "Operation des Nations Unies au Congo" (ONUC, 1960 -1964), was indicative of the UN’s operation and management of conflicts that were primarily internal in nature. The ONUC was one of the first peacekeeping operations that was established on a large scale in an internal setting.

45 Ibid., p. 28.
46 Ibid., p. 28.
India's active role in the Congo operation can be seen as a reflection of its strong stand against colonialism. The Congo, which had been a Belgian colony for 78 years, gained its sovereignty on 30 June 1960. However, this did not occur without incident as the country immediately lapsed into a civil war as various warring factions fought for political power. Although having formally ended their administration in the Congo, the Belgian forces were also supporting some of the secessionist movements.

One particular trouble spot was in the breakaway province of Katanga, headed by Moise Tshombe. The involvement of Belgian troops in instigating and supporting the internal dissension was seen as a violation of the Treaty of Friendship that had been signed between the Republic of Congo and Belgium, and had led to the declaration of Independence. Hence, on 12 July 1960 the Congo's President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba approached the UN for assistance and requested the presence of an international force.

As a third force in the international system and as a spokesman for the Asian-African countries, India strongly criticised the presence of the Belgian forces in the Congo. India further demonstrated its commitment by expressing its support for the UN's role in the Congo. Its field participation in the Congo occurred prior to the establishment and deployment of the peacekeeping force, the ONUC, which was only deployed in August 1960. However, early in July 1960 the UN had urgently requested medical teams to be sent to the Congo as part of a humanitarian mission. India responded to this request by deploying a 250-strong military medical team to establish a 400-bed hospital. It also contributed 1000 tons of wheat to help those in the civil war suffering from starvation. India bore two % of the total cost of the peacekeeping operation which amounted to more than $4 million. So, India can also be seen as an active provider of logistical assistance.

47 Ibid., p. 60.
Nevertheless, from the beginning of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo until early 1961, India’s role was limited to the provision of logistical units. There are some contradictory views regarding this limited participation. According to Indian sources, India was not requested to send armed troops as part of the ONUC to suppress the secession in Katanga. Indeed, Nehru asserted that "some countries have been called to send their armed forces to the Congo under the UN colours. We are not one of them". On the other hand, Alan James notes that India initially declined to participate as part of the ONUC. Following Kasavubu and Lumumba’s request for a UN presence, the two leaders had some difference of opinion and personality clash. This not only resulted in Kasavubu dismissing Prime Minister Lumumba, but also in the UN siding with Kasavubu. At this point India was unhappy with the way the UN was handling the Congo crisis and feared the possibility of Indian unpopularity resulting from extensive involvement and which might affect the larger ethnic-Indian communities living elsewhere in Africa.

It was not until early 1961 that India consented to participate and contribute troops. Its voluntary troop contribution came at the request of the UN and also at the most crucial moment when the deteriorating situation in the Congo had caused some of the troop contributors to withdraw. The secession in Katanga had not only gained intensity but had also resulted in the murder of the Prime Minister Lumumba and his colleagues. Subsequently, several participating states including, Italy, Sudan, Indonesia, UAR and Morocco withdrew their troops from the operation. The shortfall in ground troops significantly weakened the mission which was already on the verge of collapse. Hence, on 3

51 For discussion on the partiality of the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis, see Ibid., p. 46
52 Ibid., p. 49.
March 1961 India announced its willingness to dispatch ground forces as a "reinforcement force"\(^\text{53}\).

At this time India made it clear to the UN that it was not sending troops to replace the other national forces. India was keen to be part of the ONUC, but concomitantly it did not want to be seen as antagonising other troop contributors who had just withdrawn their ground forces. These concerns stemmed from how India viewed the use of its military for external assignments. According to, Indar Jit Rikhye, a former Indian military commander, the Indian military had a threefold role: to defend India against external threats, to provide aid to civil power, and to assist the United Nations\(^\text{54}\). However, New Delhi was very cautious about how its military would be used. In line with its non-aligned policy, India was not willing to place its military on any stand-by arrangement where it could be used to fight the proxy wars of the Superpowers. It is in this context that India laid out three conditions for the deployment of its ground forces\(^\text{55}\). Firstly, it "did not wish Indian forces to fight troops of other Member-States, apart from the Congolese armed units and Belgian and other military and para-military personnel and other mercenaries". Secondly, India "did not wish Indian armed forces to be used for suppression of popular movements or in any way in support of parties or factions that were challenging the United Nations authority. Nor did the Indian government wish that the Indian brigade should be broken up and mixed with other armed contingents, but that at command level it would remain under its own officers".

India's troop contribution to the Congo was undoubtedly relatively large. It dispatched two infantry brigades, aircraft personnel, staff personnel, supply units, Signal Company, dispatch teams and postal units. By February 1963 the Indian contingent

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\(^{53}\) Lal, op. cit., p. 64.

\(^{54}\) Rikhye, op. cit., p. 304.

comprised 28.3% of the total 19,798 UN military personnel serving in the Congo\textsuperscript{56}. This was more than one-quarter of the total UN force. India also dispatched a flight of six Canberra aircraft from Number 5 Squadron of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to facilitate the mission in the Congo. The ground forces were mandated to carry out some new functions. In addition, to the traditional military tasks of monitoring cease-fire and patrolling, ensuring the withdrawal of Belgian forces and securing the removal of foreign military personnel, the ground forces also had the responsibility of policing and maintaining law and order in the Congolese civil society.

However, this became a very challenging task for India which was attempting to keep in line with the traditional concept of peacekeeping drawn from past experience. The challenges arose when its presence in the field was highly "detested"\textsuperscript{57} by the Congolese authorities. In fact, India's presence was criticised as being an "invasion"\textsuperscript{58}. This is because India was perceived as friendly to Ghana, which was regarded as an enemy by some authorities\textsuperscript{59}. Hence, India was seen to lack credibility in playing a neutral role. India's Rajeshwar Dayal briefly served as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in the Congo from September 1960 for approximately eight months. In May 1961 he resigned due to allegations made against him by Congolese authorities which accused him of partisanship\textsuperscript{60}. The growing rejection of the Indian presence also resulted in violent demonstrations against the Indian forces. Consequently, India suffered 36 fatalities and 124 casualties. Nevertheless, India continued to operate until the mission drew to a close in June 1964.

\textsuperscript{56} Thapliyal, op. cit., pp. 30-1.
\textsuperscript{57} James, (1994) op. cit., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{58} Lai, op. cit., p. 66. See also Alan James, 'The Congo Controversies', \textit{International Peacekeeping}, Vol. 1 No. 1 Spring 1994, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 66.
\textsuperscript{60} Bullion., (1997) op. cit., p. 101
Cyprus

While India withdrew from the Congo, it consented to participate in another peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. However, this involvement was minimal. India did not contribute troops as part of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Instead, it dispatched several high-ranking officers to head the mission. In January 1964 Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani, who was commanding an observer mission elsewhere, was transferred and appointed as the personal representative of the UN Secretary-General and was later appointed as the Force Commander of the UNFICYP. In June 1964 another Indian officer, General KS Thimayya, replaced Gyani and filled that role until his death on 18 December 1965. India had another opportunity to head the mission in Cyprus in December 1969, when Lieut. Gen. Dewan Prem Chand, who had earlier served in the Congo, took over until December 1976. The fact that three Indian force commanders served in a single UN peacekeeping operation is of some significance. In addition, India also provided material assistance in the form of logistical and financial contributions to the UNFICYP. India contributed 15000 lbs of medical supplies and also donated US$120000 to the Cyprus mission. Given India's limited economic growth at that time, its ability to provide material assistance is also very significant.

The reasons for India's minimal involvement in the peacekeeping operation to Cyprus are due to two reasons. Firstly, its growing security concerns and needs at home. The early 1960s was a tumultuous period for India as it experienced a series of internal and external security challenges. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 were some of the external challenges. India also faced serious internal unrest in

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62 Rikhye, op. cit., p. 318.
Nagaland and Goa\textsuperscript{64}. Hence, India's priorities changed with regard to involvement in external peace missions. The second reason for India's minimal participation in Cyprus was because of resource constraints. By late 1950s, India was already heavily committed to the UN peacekeeping operation in the Sinai and the large-scale participation in the Congo had placed a heavy financial burden on India.

**Observer Missions**

India's active participation in some of the UN peacekeeping operations can be contrasted to its small-scale involvement in several observer missions. Most of the observer missions were launched amid some of the ongoing peacekeeping operations. For example, while India was serving as part of the first peacekeeping force in the Sinai, it also made active representation in the peace observer mission in Lebanon in 1958. The nature of the conflict in Lebanon was primarily internal. An armed rebellion broke out following President Camille's announcement of constitution change which would enable him to be re-elected for a second term. Some Lebanese rebel groups were relying on arms supply from Syria to resist the government. Therefore, the Lebanese Government sought the assistance of the UN. It alleged that other Arab nations were interfering in the internal strife by adding fuel to the conflict. The UAR (United Arab Republic) subsequently denied the charges as "untrue, unspecified and vague"\textsuperscript{65}.

Nevertheless, although the internal tensions within Lebanon were escalating, the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was not mandated to arbitrate or mediate in the conflict\textsuperscript{66}. Instead the unarmed blue helmets were deployed to simply observe and ascertain whether any illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanese border was taking place. India participated in the UNOGIL in different capacities. It was one of the three

\textsuperscript{64} Bullion, (1997), op. cit., p. 101  
\textsuperscript{65} Lal, op. cit., pp. 51-2.
nations in the civilian three-member observer group. India’s Rajeshwar Dayal and the representatives from Ecuador and Norway served as the executive authority. India was also one of the 20 nations which collectively deployed 71 observers as part of the UNOGIL.

In 1962, India participated in the UN peace mission to West Irian to oversee the withdrawal of Dutch forces. India dispatched peace observers as part of the UN Security Force (UNSF). One of India’s key military officers, Indar Jit Rikhye, was sent to observe the cease-fire between the Dutch and Indonesian forces. In 1963, India participated in another small-scale observer mission to Yemen. The country was torn apart by a civil war supported by external parties. Two warring groups, the Sallal faction and the Badr faction, were competing for power with the help and external support of both the UAR (Egypt and Syria) and Saudi Arabia respectively. Following the agreement of the various external parties for a military disengagement, the UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) was established at the initiative of the UN Secretary-General, U Thant. India deployed some military observers as part of the UNYOM on the 20-km border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia to monitor the ground developments and compliance of the external players to the military disengagement agreement. India’s Major General P. S. Gyani and Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye commanded the mission at different time periods.

In 1965 India also participated in some distant missions. This includes its deployment of military observers as part of the UN team to the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965 to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between rival parties. An Indian representative also served as the Secretary-General’s Military Advisor to the DOMREP.

For most of the Cold War era India was a very active participant in UN peace missions. Indeed, India can be seen as a traditional peacekeeper not only in that it played a

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66 Ibid., pp. 52.
67 Ibid., p. 52.
pioneering role in UN peacekeeping, but also with consistently high level of participation. Since the UNEF, India has actively contributed to requests for ground forces. It has made large troop-commitments to two of the three peacekeeping operations and has also made small-scale military personnel contributions in several observer missions. Moreover, the nature of its role has generally been clearly defined and predominantly militarily based. These traditional peacekeeping experiences can be compared to its present-day involvement, where India's level of commitment has increased in response to the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. To demonstrate this, let us first examine India's new foreign policy context.

III. THE EMERGING GLOBAL CONTEXT & POST-COLD WAR UN PEACEKEEPING

India's new level of commitment to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations has taken shape against the backdrop of a newly emerging global context for its foreign policy. For India the major international developments at the beginning of the 1990s triggered the need for new approaches to global relations and for realising its global and 'great power' ambitions\(^68\).

The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War not only brought about the collapse of the old World Order, but also resulted in the emergence of new realities. Firstly, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 had important implications for India. India's Cold War non-alignment policy was synonymous with a pro-Soviet policy\(^69\). However, the fall of Communism and the break up of the Soviet Union brought an end to the intimacy of the Indo-Soviet relations. In 1991 when a new agreement was drafted


to replace the 20-year-old Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Russia made no mention about providing political or material support for India's security concerns\textsuperscript{70}. Moreover, India also lost the privilege of buying Soviet-supplied military equipment at concession prices\textsuperscript{71}. Instead, it was forced to purchase them at market prices.

One could argue that the nature of Indo-Russia relations have seen some improvements in the late 1990s, in particular under the Putin administration. This can be seen in the visit by Putin to India in October 2000. During this visit Russia and India signed a new strategic and defence partnership to co-operatively work on establishing regional and international peace and security. Putin also agreed to give an aircraft carrier as a gift and also signed more than a dozen agreements for manufacturing SU 30 tanks with India\textsuperscript{72}. Moreover, Russia has also consented to help India build two nuclear power plants in the Southern State of Tamil Nadu, each worth 2.6 billion\textsuperscript{73}.

Notwithstanding these later developments, the lukewarm India-Russia relations in the early 1990s cannot be ignored. The deterioration in New Delhi-Moscow relations in the early 1990s also meant that the Soviet "card" could not be used as a strategy for India to exert influence in decision-making circles within the UN Security Council. As Dixit notes, India could no longer rely on its once close ally to influence and offset the Western interests dominating the Security Council decision-making\textsuperscript{74}. This became a major concern, especially in situations where the Security Council made decisions unacceptable to India on issues such as Kashmir, non-proliferation, security or disarmament. Hence, India initiated a process of reassessing its place and role in the rapidly changing international environment following the end of the Cold War in 1990.

\textsuperscript{70} Samina Yasmeen, 'Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy', \textit{Survival}, Vol. 36 No. 2, Summer 1994, p.117.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 117.
\textsuperscript{72} World News Connection, (Dow Jones interactive), 11 October, 2000.
\textsuperscript{73} India agrees $3 billion arms deal with Russia', \textit{Jane's Defence Weekly}, 11 October, 2000.
Indeed, the "dismantling of the Cold War and its concomitant processes of the relaxation of tensions between the two Superpowers and their respective allies"\(^{75}\) also significantly changed power configurations in the international system. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union has not only heightened the place of the US as the sole superpower, but has also made it possible for some old powers, such as Germany and Japan, to re-emerge and dominate the global system economically and politically. Some realists are of the view that the rise of Pax Germania and Pax Nippon can outpace Pax Americana economically, although politically the latter will still emerge as the dominant power\(^{76}\). Nevertheless, from India's point of view the new power configuration has changed into one where some of these advanced capitalist powers "have acquired almost complete hegemony"\(^{77}\). This hegemonic control and domination means that India faces tougher competition for global recognition.

Moreover, India's non-alignment movement in the Cold War era also lost its relevance in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War the NAM provided the basis for India to pursue policies independent of the two superpowers and to some extent assert itself in the international system. However, the end of the Cold War and the changing international system has led some scholars to question the usefulness of NAM today\(^{78}\). However, Muni is of the view that the old policy is still useful. That is, NAM may still be of


\(^{75}\) S.D. Muni, op. cit., p. 864.


\(^{78}\) Ibid., pp. 79-80. See also Ratish Kumar, 'Evolving A New Conceptual Framework for India's Foreign Policy', *South Asian Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol. 30 No. 2, July-Dec. 1995. See also Interview notes with an academic Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi: January 1998.
limited use to Third world countries in exerting influence in international economic fora, though it has little political influence today.\textsuperscript{79}

Another reality that has been confronting New Delhi since the end of the Cold War is the rapid growth and expansion of China. China has been making considerable economic progress with an average growth rate of 7 – 7.5 \% per year during the 10\textsuperscript{th} five-year plan period.\textsuperscript{80} A further increase of up to 8 \% is expected by the end of 2000.\textsuperscript{81} China has also been emerging as one of the top markets for Information Technology (IT). Moreover, Japan, China and Korea have signed what has been called as the "e-ASEAN agreement", which entails the establishment of a joint partnership to promote trade and investment in IT with a view to bridging the "digital-divide" within ASEAN.\textsuperscript{82} China's economic boom has not gone unnoticed. So rapid is China's growth that the US has strongly supported its entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China's access to the WTO is expected to further increase its economic relations at a multilateral level.

It is against this backdrop that India began to re-orientate its foreign policy. It can be argued that India has adopted a 'proactive' approach to world politics in the post-Cold War era. That is, it has been making significant efforts to reinforce its global identity and strengthen its place in the new multi-polar international system. This aggressive posture can be seen in three areas: the economy, the military relating to India's nuclear programme and the affairs of the UN.

Indeed, the change in India's foreign policy outlook began first with the cleaning up of its domestic problems. Given the link between the domestic realm and the foreign political life of a country, India took major steps to build its national power in order to

\textsuperscript{79} Muni, op. cit., p. 869.
\textsuperscript{80} 'China's Economy Sees a Bright Future' AsiaPort Daily News, (China), 23 November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{81} 'China's economy set to grow by 8 \% in 2000', Agence-France Presse, 21 November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{82} This deal was signed during the 2000 ASEAN Summit. Japan, China and South Korea agree to Strengthen three-way trade investment', Associated Press, See Dow Jones interactive (internet access), 24 November, 2000.
compete in a rapidly changing global system. This began with the restructuring and liberalisation of India's economy in 1991. Major steps were taken in the Indian Ministries of Finance and External Affairs and government bureaucracies to adjust to the functioning of the new economic reforms and programs.\(^{83}\) India also sought the assistance of major external economic powers. Indeed, in 1991 following the end of the Cold War Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's first visit was to Germany to establish a new economic partnership. In the mid-1990s India lobbied hard to become a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the "two major trading blocs whose member states generate half of the world's trade.\(^{84}\)

In terms of economic growth, India has been emerging as a major attraction for foreign investors. To date, it is one of the ten emerging markets and is also increasingly perceived as one of the world's leaders in IT.\(^{85}\) India's growth rate has increased from 3.5% in the mid-1980s to 4.5% in the mid-1990s.\(^{86}\) In 1999 India's GDP growth was at 6%.\(^{87}\) By 2020 India is expected to emerge as the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power.\(^{88}\) To some extent India's growing economic strength demonstrates its ability to accommodate itself to a changing global environment.\(^{89}\)

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\(^{85}\) See Bimal Jalan, op. cit.; and see also 'US Expert Lauds India's IT Policy', *Indian Express* (Bombay), 3 August, 2000.


\(^{88}\) Bhabani Sen Gupta, op. cit., p. 131.

\(^{89}\) Some authors have been pessimistic about India and its growth. There exist some views that India is still troubled by its internal weakness. In spite of some of its economic advancements and growth, it is said that there is "no assurance that [India] will "succeed" along a number of dimensions - strategic, economic, and social". In fact, India is identified to be suffering from a "paradoxical appearance". In other words, although it may be seen as a "pivotal" state, it is still yet to be truly one because of its internal weakness. See Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, *India*, in *The Pivotal States: A New Framework For UN Policy in the developing World*, eds., Robert Chase, Emily Hill,
As part of its ‘proactive’ approach India has also begun to take efforts to demonstrate its military, particularly nuclear power. Its military defence budget has increased from $5.6bn in 1995 to $10.7bn in 1999\(^{90}\). India has also pursued a vigorous nuclear policy in the post-Cold War era\(^{91}\). In May 1998, India emerged as the sixth nation to test a nuclear device, thus demonstrating its capacity to become a potential nuclear power. Some relate that test to India’s China-Pakistan policy. It is argued that India’s nuclear programme is aimed to build a minimal but credible nuclear deterrent against the “two hand-in-glove” nuclear adversaries, China and Pakistan\(^{92}\). India is wary of China’s nuclear missile advancements and also the latter’s supply of missiles to Pakistan. Of course, the post-Cold War era has been witnessing some striking progress in the Sino-Indian relations\(^{93}\). However, as Chellaney notes, India’s decade-long policy of rapprochement with Beijing since 1988 has only enabled China “both to engage and to contain India, with engagement serving as a front for accelerated containment”\(^{94}\). Thus, these security concerns do present an impetus for India’s nuclear programme.


\(^{92}\) Brahma Chellaney, ‘India’s Nuclear Planning, Force Structure, Doctrine and Arms Control Posture, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, pp. 57-8. The author argues that India is still a ‘soft’ state in terms of its nuclear policy. It is suggested that security does not come by conducting nuclear tests and demonstrating the capacity to have a nuclear bomb, but New Delhi should take a hard stand in terms of developing a more rigid and policy and a national will to punish potential aggressors. At the same time, he concludes by asserting the need for India to build on its economic capacity because if it wants to pursue a more ambitious nuclear programme, then it must be prepared to withstand international economic pressures, which may come in the form of sanctions.

\(^{93}\) This can be seen in the setting up of a Joint Working Group to seek a peaceful and expeditious settlement to their border disputes. The two countries have in fact moved a step forward in terms of exchanging maps of the disputed areas with a view to seeking a resolution. Moreover, India, in recognition of China’s economic growth, has established economic partnerships in various sectors. Information technology is one area that represents this new development. Press Trust of India, (New Delhi), 14 November, 2000.

\(^{94}\) Chellaney, op. cit., p. 57.
Notwithstanding this, India's nuclear tests in 1998 have been also triggered by the need to reinforce and strengthen its place in the international system. Indeed, the changing global power configuration has significantly reduced India's influence in the international system and has instilled in Indians a sense of isolation and neglect. This sense of neglect has only sharpened India's global ambition and need for recognition as a great power. Indeed, there is a view that India's detonation of its nuclear bomb in May 1998 was part of its strategy to project its image as national power with the capabilities of a great nation and also to generate appropriate global power status in the new and competitive multi-polar international system. India's nuclear ambitions have been a major irritant in the steadily warming Indo-US relations since the end of the Cold War. In fact, India's May 1998 tests resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions against India. However, despite these repercussions New Delhi has been determined not to discontinue its nuclear program. From India's point of view it is seen as an important "currency of power" in the newly emerging uncertain global order. Nevertheless, the point here is that we can see India's 'aggressive' posture in the new global context, which is demonstrated in the area of its military-nuclear build-up.

A third area relates to India's role and participation in the affairs of the UN. Since the end of the Cold War we find an expansion of India's UN agenda, making active representation in numerous areas. This can be seen as part of its 'pro-active' UN agenda. In his statement to the Security Council former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao reiterated India's support to the United Nations pointing out that its role "has been complete and consistent [and] it has had no fluctuations." He also pledged India's increased desire to

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96 Ibid., p. 36.
work as part of the collective will of the wider international community. In 1998 Vajpayee reiterated India's support for a "revitalised and effective UN, one that was more responsive to the concerns of the vast majority of member states and better equipped to meet the challenges of the 21st century."

Indeed, as part of its pro-active UN agenda, India has been actively participating in UN deliberations on areas such as environmental management, human rights, sustainable development, population and women, and disarmament. For example, India led a high-powered delegation to the Rio de Janeiro "Earth Summit" where it played an active role in discussions and meetings ensuring that the "summit safeguarded the ecological and economic interests of the developing countries." India has also participated and represented the interests of many non-aligned countries in the UN conference on Population and Sustainable Development and on Women. However, India was not successful in influencing some of the policies and outcomes in this conference due to the lack of "political cohesion among the NAM" on policies relating to women and population.

As part of this trend and pro-active UN agenda, India's commitment to UN peacekeeping operations has moved to a new level. In 1992 the Narasimha Rao regime reaffirmed India's commitment to UN peacekeeping operations by asserting that it "will pro-actively support UN peace ventures in the future." In 1997 in his address to the UN General Assembly, Former Prime Minister I. K. Gujral said that "as a country which places very great store on the UN's capacity to contribute to international peace and security [and peacekeeping activities], .... India has vital interests in the UN."
India's new level of commitment can be demonstrated in its actual participation in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations (see Appendix 2). Its level of participation has increased significantly in line with the overall growth in the number of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. This is shown in Graph 2.2 which compares India’s Cold War era participation (1948-89) with its post-Cold War participation (1990-99). India has participated in 22 peace missions in 15 different locations. India’s highest level of participation has been in the early 1990s. In fact the period 1990-94 has been also one of the most active and assertive eras of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. India


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104 Address by Prime Minister I.K. Gujral to the 52nd Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 20 September 1997.
participated in different capacities in 12 out of the 18 new UN peace missions established during that time. Of the 18 new missions seven were UN peacekeeping operations and India made large troop-commitments in five of them (compared with two during the Cold War). Some of the UN peacekeeping operations in which it participated in the early 1990s were in Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Mozambique.

Since the mid-1990s India has participated in a number of UN peacekeeping operations. These have been in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone. India has also made high-level troop contributions in some old peacekeeping operations that have been functioning since their launch during the Cold War. This can be seen in 1999 when India deployed a large Indian infantry battalion as part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (first established in 1978). In addition, India has participated in recent peacekeeping operations launched in some of the old trouble-spots such as the Congo, where it has contributed military observers and troops to the UN Organisation Mission in the Congo (MONUC), which has been established to implement the Lusaka agreement signed in July 1999.

However, there is an ongoing debate among some scholars about India's pro-active participation in post-Cold War UN peace missions. Some are critical of India's stance. According to the Indian defence analyst, Srivastava, India "must adopt a well defined policy for involving itself (in UN peacekeeping) keeping in mind of its internal, external and global defence tasks". It is argued that although India, like the US, UK and Australia, should participate in UN missions abroad wherever they serve its national interest, it is important for it to exercise some reserve so as not to over-stretch its military defence and reassess its priorities and needs at home vis-à-vis its global ambitions.

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On the other hand, former military leaders like Indar Jit Rikhye think that India should move away from its "inward approach" and see itself as part of the greater international effort and participation\textsuperscript{107}. He argues that India has the capacity to simultaneously deal with both its internal matters and to pursue its external goals. In fact, India has demonstrated this capacity when, despite its military confrontations with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965, it maintained its troop commitment to the missions in the Sinai and the Congo. Moreover, India has the capability and capacity to contribute because it has the third largest military force in the world and these forces should be put to good use maintaining international peace and security. Therefore, a pro-active role is supported, and perhaps a further increase in its level of participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

**IV. SOURCES OF MOTIVATION**

What then explains India's new level of commitment to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations? What motivates India to participate pro-actively in UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era? Generally, it is argued that India is inspired by an idealism rooted in the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence and the vision for a peaceful world\textsuperscript{108}. This chapter argues that India's idealism is far outweighed by its political interests as the key motivational forces for its active participation and contribution in UN peacekeeping.

1. *International Image*

International image could be a primary source of motivation for India's active participation in UN peacekeeping operations. It is argued that India's participation in Sierra Leone in

\textsuperscript{107} Dinesh Kumar, 'Former Major-General Favours India's Role in UN Missions', *Times of India* (New Delhi), 22 September, 1994.

\textsuperscript{108} The concept of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakham' is one which views the world as one family. Hence, threats averting peace in any part of the world is of concern for India, primarily due to its subscription to the one world peace concept. See M.S.N., Menon, *Indian Thought Akin To UN Ideals*, *India Perspectives*, New Delhi, September 1996.
1999, for example, was mainly motivated by the desire to reinforce its global image and 'great' power identity\(^{109}\). Indeed, India aims to strengthen its image with a view to enhancing the recognition of its political status in the international system. As argued earlier, 'great power' recognition is also linked to the fulfilment of global responsibility such as maintenance of international peace and security. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations helps to shape its image positively by demonstrating India's 'good international citizenship' and its commitment to global responsibilities.

While international image-building could have motivated India's new level of commitment to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations, India is also sensitive to the kind of image that is projected through its participation in UN peace operations. Being one of the traditional peacekeepers, India is keen not only to maintain its long-standing record of participation but also to lead peace operations. Although such appointments may be a rare opportunity, the idea of leading peace operations is closely linked to strengthening global image. Hence, appointments in peace missions matter greatly to India. For example, in Sierra Leone (2000) India announced its decision to withdraw from the UN peacekeeping operation. This decision came after the Nigerian military's demands to dismiss the mission's Force Commander, India's General Jetley. The bickering between Gen. Jetley and his Nigerian deputy, General Mohammed Garba caused a long-standing stalemate. This problem began following the major crisis in May 2000 when Foday Sankoh's warring faction, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) captured 500 UN peacekeepers and held them hostage. Nigeria blamed India's incompetence for the debacle. India's Gen. Jetley, who had unflattering opinions about the Nigerian high command, accused his deputy of having secret connections with the RUF. He sent a secret memorandum allegedly "accusing Nigeria of deliberately seeking to sabotage the peace mission and colluding with rebels in illegal

\(^{109}\) 'Keeping the Peace: Sierra Leone is A Test of India's Great Power Aspirations', \textit{India Today}, 19 June, 2000. See also 'India has no strategic Interest in Sierra Leone', \textit{The Hindu}, 18 August, 2000.
diamond deals". The memo, which was published in a British newspaper, infuriated Nigeria. The friction between the two commanders worsened to the point that the Nigerian deputy made derogatory remarks about Gen. Jetley and demanded his resignation. Kofi Annan had to intervene directly because the clash between the two commanders was affecting the UNAMSIL's ability to control the violence in certain parts of Sierra Leone. Human rights groups were also critical of the ability of the UNAMSIL to control a new wave of violence coming from RUF. Hence, Annan re-called the two commanders to New York and attempted to reconcile their differences. Despite several attempts, the differences between the two commanders could not be reconciled and Annan was left with no option but to fire one of his commanders.

There are several reasons why the choice was India's Gen. Jetley. Firstly, the UN could not antagonise Nigeria, given that it was the largest contingent in Sierra Leone, although the difference in troop contribution between India and Nigeria was only 75 soldiers. The dismissal of the Nigerian commander would have affected the participation of other African peacekeepers. Of the 13 troop contributing states, almost three-quarters were from the region itself and since the West has remained totally uncommitted to the UNAMSIL, the UN could not risk loosing the African peacekeepers. Secondly, before the arrival of the UN peacekeepers Nigeria had led a West African peace force that fought against the RUF during the nine years civil war in Sierra Leone. This experience would be an advantage for the UNAMSIL if Nigeria stayed on since it is more familiar with the conflict, the ground situations and the region.

110 India Pulls out of UN Force in Sierra Leone', Times of India, (New Delhi), 22 September 2000.
111 'UN 'allies' at each other's throats in Sierra Leone: Split between India and Nigeria over Command of Peacekeeping Force', National Post (New Delhi), 12 September, 2000.
112 India and Nigeria contributed 3,151 and 3,226 troops respectively. Department of Public Information, UN, New York.
So, as of December 2000, India was replaced by Kenya as the Force Commander of the UNAMSIL. However, the UN indicated that it still wanted the Indian contingent to serve as part of the UNAMSIL. India was determined to remove troops. Several reasons have been advanced for this withdrawal. India has defended its withdrawal by saying it wanted to maintain good relations with Nigeria. At the same time, it asserts that it make room for the routine rotation which gives other member states a chance to participate\(^{115}\). Another argument put forth by New Delhi is that the UN has sought to mandate the UNAMSIL under Chapter VII of the UN Charter because the ground situation has been deteriorating so rapidly that there might be a possibility by the UN to enforce peace in Sierra Leone\(^{116}\). This would conflict with India's policies on peacekeeping. However, it should be noted that India did not take such factors into consideration when it willingly participated in the UN peace-enforcement operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) or had independently launched an operation of a similar kind in Sri Lanka during 1987-89.

Finally, India's decision to withdraw from Sierra Leone might be seen as nothing more than a 'face-saving' measure. The dismissal of General Jetley meant that India lost its opportunity to lead the UNAMSIL. This may perhaps, be a major blow for a country which has been participating in UN peacekeeping operations since the 1950s. The dismissal may have left a black mark in its peacekeeping history and may even be detrimental to India given its desire to impress the international community and to realise its greater global ambitions. So, India pre-empted the dismissal by indicating its desire to withdraw from the mission and therefore, safe face. The Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, Salim Ahmed, requested India to reconsider its decision to withdraw\(^{117}\). However,

\(^{115}\) *Times of India* (New Delhi), 22 September, 2000.

\(^{116}\) *Times of India* (New Delhi), 22 September, 2000.

India was determined to withdraw from Sierra Leone rather than going on record as having been downgraded from commanding the mission to an ordinary peacekeeper.

Therefore, maintaining its international image might be proposed as fundamental determinant in India's peacekeeping role. Not only does India see its role as an ordinary peacekeeper but it also values highly any leadership role that it is assigned.

2. Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council

Secondly, India is motivated by the political goal of being considered as a favoured candidate for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The former Foreign Secretary, Dixit, openly stated that "by being active in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf conflict international situation, [India] could consolidate and improve [its] claim to a permanent membership of the Security Council"\textsuperscript{118}. India has served as a non-permanent member six times in the last five decades. It has been elected on a two-year basis at each sitting. At the same time, India has defended its claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council on the grounds of having a fair geographical distribution.

India aims to demonstrate its credibility through its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, India has been operating in a new global system where the defining qualities of a 'great power' have changed. From India's point of view, "'great powers' are made not just by their material capacities but also by their dispositions, that is, by their willingness to articulate a vision for a preferred world and to accept the burdens of shaping that vision"\textsuperscript{119}. At some level, India's strong support for UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era demonstrates its willingness to share the global burden and responsibility in creating a safe, secure and peaceful environment.

\textsuperscript{118} J.N. Dixit, 'Proactive Approach: India's UN Agenda', \textit{Indian Express}, (New Delhi), 18 October, 1994.
At the same time, India has become more vigorous in UN peacekeeping because it has been confronting competition from other nations that have similar global ambitions. Germany and Japan, which are major contenders for a permanent seat in the Security Council have also been showing signs of increasing interest in UN peace missions. The two countries have changed their domestic laws to allow greater involvement in the international activity of UN peacekeeping\textsuperscript{120}. Since this constitutional amendment, Germany has participated actively in various peace missions. In April 1992, Germany assigned approximately 150 Federal Armed Physicians and paramedics and 75 Federal Border Guard officials to Cambodia\textsuperscript{121}. Between 1992-93, Berlin also provided support to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) by dispatching 655 German Air Force flights which transported approximately 6,000 tons of humanitarian relief supplies to Mogadishu.

Under a new law known as the Law on Co-operation in UN peacekeeping Operations, Japan has also deployed military troops in external UN peace missions\textsuperscript{122}. For example, Japan contributed 600 military troops to the Cambodian mission of 1992 and 53 military personnel to the Mozambique peace operation in 1993. These numbers are relatively small. Moreover, there are still some reservations held by these countries as to the kinds of roles they can perform in the field. Due to constitutional restrictions, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) contingent in Cambodia were assigned in less dangerous areas which required less demanding roles\textsuperscript{123}. Nonetheless, efforts have been made by these


\textsuperscript{121} Ehrhart, Ibid., pp. 36-9.

\textsuperscript{122} Takahara, op. cit., pp. 52 & 53-6.

powers to demonstrate their willingness to fulfil global responsibilities and to increase their level activity and presence within the international community. Hence, from India's point of view it has to compete with such countries which are also more economically advanced and this presents it with a greater need to prove its international credibility.

3. Strengthening Bilateral/Multilateral Relations

A third source of motivation for India's increased level of participation in post-Cold War UN peace missions could be that it provides opportunities to improve relations with other countries at bilateral or multilateral levels. It is important for India to mobilise international support for its nomination as a suitable candidate in the UN Security Council. As one Indian scholar notes, there is a "blend between the larger goal of peacekeeping and India's narrower goal of improving bilateral and multilateral relations" \(^{124}\). This can be seen in the recent establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) by the US and India to expand their co-operation in peacekeeping and other activities of the UN. The two parties have agreed to "deepen mutual understanding and co-operation" \(^{125}\) and enhance the effectiveness of the UN's military interventions in various conflict zones. The Indo-US JWG, which marks India's first institutionalised bilateral dialogue, aims to focus on various issues such as logistical support, training preparation and command structure.

4. Leverage to Demand UN non-interference in Kashmir

Another plausible explanation for India's pro-active support for the UN is related to its hopes that the UN will not interfere in its own domestic affairs, particularly the Kashmir issue. Indeed, Kashmir has been one of the major problems that continues to haunt the


\(^{125}\) Interview with academic, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
security environment of South Asia. It is one of the first regions where the UN experimented with peacekeeping by deploying observers to monitor the cease-fire agreements between India and Pakistan (1948). However, India, which is keen to resolve the matter bilaterally with Pakistan, has shown little support for such a presence on its soil. It has consented to the UN presence only because the UN wants it to do so.

Thus, India's support for the UN peacekeeping would place it in a position to demand less interference by the UN in its domestic affairs. Indeed, the former Foreign Secretary Dixit believes that “[India’s] [pro]active support to the UN, especially to the permanent members of the Security Council in [UN peacekeeping], will enable [it] to demand a quid pro quo that the UN should not interfere in matters of vital interest to [India] like Jammu and Kashmir”\textsuperscript{126}. So, while India participates actively in peace missions abroad, its reluctance to host an observer mission on its own soil only suggests that India has adopted a double standard.

\textbf{V. INDIA’S RESPONSES TO DEMANDS RELATING TO TROOP CONTRIBUTION}

As a peacekeeper India is confronted by new demands and challenges as a result of the quantitative growth in UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era. These demands and challenges are mainly related to its troop and personnel contribution. Indeed, one of the major strengths of India's participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been its ability to provide manpower support. As shown earlier, during the Cold War India made active and high-level troop commitments to several peacekeeping operations. However, currently the demands have changed. They have intensified and grown due to the rise in the number of peacekeeping operations launched in various parts of the world and India’s response has

\textsuperscript{125} C. Raja Mohan, "Indo-US agree to step up co-operation on Peacekeeping", \textit{The Hindu}, (New Delhi) 2 November, 2000.
been very positive. To this end it is argued that India qualifies as a major peacekeeper on the following grounds.

In terms of the size of manpower support India has, undoubtedly, been one of the biggest troop contributors to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, India has been commended for its capacity to make large troop contributions. Canadian Major General Lewis W. Mackenzie who has led nine UN peacekeeping operations rated India's troop-contributing capacity as very high and also praised its ability to participate in more than one peacekeeping operation at any one time\textsuperscript{127}. Such praise from Canada is profound, not only because Canada is a traditional peacekeeper but also because peacekeeping was initially proposed by Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson in 1956. In the light of its historical role in peacekeeping, Canada's praise of India's contribution becomes very significant.

India has on several occasions outnumbered the troop contribution of some of the major powers and even other traditional peacekeepers. Consider some of the following examples. In 1994 India emerged as the third largest troop contributor in the world. Its share represented 7.93\% of the 75000 troops deployed that year\textsuperscript{128}. This was much higher than some of the major powers such as the US (1.34\%), UK (5.11\%), Russia (2.02\%), and also other G7 countries, for instance, Canada (3.5\%) and Italy (1.12\%)\textsuperscript{129}. In 1998 the total number of UN troops was 14,347. Of this, India's share amounted to 6.41\%. This was bigger than the contribution of some of the old peacekeepers like Canada (2.07\%), and the

\textsuperscript{126} J.N. Dixit, 'Proactive Approach: India's UN Agenda', \textit{Indian Express}, (New Delhi), 18 October, 1994.
\textsuperscript{127} Cited in 'Indian Role in UN Operations Vital', \textit{Times of India} (New Delhi), 27 January, 1993.
\textsuperscript{128} Bullion,(1997) op. cit., p. 98.
Scandinavian countries such as Norway (1.07 %), Sweden (1.46 %) and Finland (5.49 %) as well as the Netherlands (1.18 %)\textsuperscript{130}.

India has also made large troop-commitments to recent peacekeeping operations. For example, India's participation in Sierra Leone in 1999 was one of the biggest in terms of troop size and reinforces the consistency in its willingness to support peacekeeping operations. In fact, the UNAMSIL has been one of the largest peacekeeping operations undertaken by India in the late 1990s. Of the 13 participating states that have been providing a total of 13000 military troops, the Indian contingent (3151) in Sierra Leone was the second largest following Nigeria (3226)\textsuperscript{131}. Hence, as of October 2000 India was ranked as the second largest troop contributor to UN peace missions worldwide\textsuperscript{132}.

Secondly, in most cases India has had no reservations as to where it deployed its troops under the auspices of the UN. In fact, India, to some extent, can be said to have developed a policy to go wherever the UN flag goes\textsuperscript{133}. The former Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, supported the idea of participating in distant locations by stating that "the international peacekeeping forces should be selected from regions and areas far removed from where they are to be sent for undertaking credible operations"\textsuperscript{134}. As shown in Appendix 2, India has been engaged in various UN peace missions in 15 locations worldwide. It has provided military observers in Iraq/Kuwait (1991), El Salvador (1991), in the second mission to Angola (1991), Liberia (1993), and the Congo (1999). Also it has made large troop commitments to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (1992), Mozambique (1992), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994), the third mission in Angola (1995), Lebanon (1998) and Sierra Leone (1998). This also represents a change

\textsuperscript{130} These figures were calculated based on the information given by the Department of Information, United Nations, New York.
\textsuperscript{131} 'India Pulls out its troops out of Sierra Leone', Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 September 2000.
\textsuperscript{132} Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York.
from its past involvement, which was heavily concentrated in the Middle East. The change has in fact taken place in line with the overall geographical expansion of UN peace missions in the post-Cold War era.

However, India has also expressed reservations against some specific peace missions and consequently has declined to support those missions. For example, in 1992 India refused to be part of the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). A primary reason for this was the heavy political involvement of the major powers and European states and also external players like the NATO. Dixit, India's former foreign Secretary has asserted that, "in our judgement, first of all the European powers had a pernicious finger in the Yugoslav pie. To go and command a force which would have been subject to contradictory political influence, European politics and the involvement of NATO ... we thought it was not good for India."

Moreover, India has always worked on the premise that it will assign its military for external use provided it functions under the auspices of the United Nations. This explains why India was hesitant to participate as part of the UNPROFOR. Nevertheless, India sent its top-ranking officer, Lieut. Gen. Satish Nambiar to head the mission as the force commander of the UNPROFOR.

Another example of India's reservations relates to its initial hesitation to participate in the UN operation in Somalia. India was not part of the first phase of the operation led by the US in 1992 to enforce peace with a view to creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief aid. New Delhi declined to deploy ground troops as part of this US-led Unified International Task Force (UNITAF) for two reasons. Firstly, India was critical of the initial deployment of UNITAF because it had not met the condition of

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135 Interview with former Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, India, January 1998.
136 Rikhye, op. cit., p. 304.
"request and consent"\(^{137}\) by the host government. Secondly, India "does not subscribe to the 'Lead Nation' concept"\(^{138}\). Although India is willing to assist in the settlement of global conflicts, at the same time, it aims to steer a middle path as part of its non-alignment.

India's decision to contribute ground troops came about in 1993 following the take over of the UNITAF by the UN, which also marks the second phase of the operation (UNOSOM II). The decision to deploy Indian ground troops came after much deliberation and debate based on a ground survey and study by two Indian delegates who had visited Somalia early in 1993. The team constituted representatives, one each from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Affairs, and an ex-ambassador who headed the mission\(^{139}\).

Following this visit, the Indian government was convinced that it was not possible to seek the consent of the host-state since there was no functioning government in Somalia. Only then did New Delhi consented to contribute ground troops, but as part of the UNOSOM II.

A more recent example of India's reservations to peacekeeping relates to the UN peace mission in East Timor. In spite of UN requests, India declined to participate as part of the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)\(^{140}\). This is mainly due to its reluctance to support peace missions designed to serve the cause of ethnic separatism, which is also an issue in the tension between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and in other areas, particularly Punjab and Assam.

Although the above examples show that India, to some extent, maintains some kind of selectivity in its participation, this has not weakened its overall level of activity in post-Cold War UN peace missions.


\(^{138}\) Ibid. Although New Delhi declined to contribute troops, its participation came in other forms. India contributed a naval task force, under the command of Commodore Sampat Pillai. The force comprised of three Indian Naval Ships (INS) namely INS Deepak, Kuthar and Cheetah to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance by sea. The Indian Army, op. cit., p. 79 & 81.

\(^{139}\) Sharma, (Lieut. Gen.) op. cit., p. 41.

\(^{140}\) India May Sit out on Peacekeeping in East Timor', \textit{Inter Press Service} (New Delhi), 10 September, 1999.
A third basis on which India can be regarded as a major peacekeeper is its capacity to make multiple troop-commitments at any one time. Given that the UN launches peace missions when the need arises, there has been an increasing overlap of demands for ground forces. India has made simultaneous troop commitments in various UN peacekeeping operations. For example, during the period 1992 to 1994 India made large troop commitments to Cambodia (1,373), Mozambique (940), Somalia (5,000), Rwanda (800).

Fourthly, India has also been catering to the demand for new types of ground personnel to carry out peace missions. Many of the new peacekeeping operations have largely civilian-based functions and duties. Hence, there is a need for specialised personnel to carry out various functions and India has responded positively to these demands. It has incorporated civilian elements in its troop commitments. For example, in Cambodia in 1992 India was one of the 80 peacekeepers who contributed a total of 21000 troops to execute the new peacekeeping roles. It contributed two infantry battalions (1 Assam and 4 JAK Rifles), 1373 troops, a field ambulance unit and military observers. In addition, India also contributed civilian personnel such as electoral supervisors, police monitors and civilian staff officers. India also contributed de-mining training units to provide instruction to other national contingents. India's capacity to contribute large troop commitments and a variety of manpower support shows its willingness to respond actively to the new demands of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era.

A fifth criterion is related to the issue of reliability. Peacekeepers must be prepared to take risks and to have the capacity to sustain their troop commitment over prolonged periods in most of today's hostile operational environments. India demonstrated this ability in many of the peace missions launched during the Cold War. In the Sinai India deployed its troops for 11 years from 1956. India has responded similarly to many of the post-Cold War peace missions, that is, it has deployed its troops until the mission ends.
Nevertheless, what makes India's present contribution significant is its 'staying power' in the present-day operational environments that are harsh and dangerous. As shown earlier, in traditional peacekeeping operations peacekeepers were deployed in a relatively calm and predictable environment. Today, we find peacekeepers being deployed thinly across an entire territory where there are no clear cease-fire lines and no peace to 'keep'. In such environments, peacekeepers can be exposed to high levels of danger and even possible attack from heavily armed and un-identified belligerents. In spite of these risks, India has maintained its commitment until the end. In Somalia, for example, India demonstrated its staying power and the capacity to sustain its commitment in harsh and heavily militarised operational environments.

Indeed, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) can be regarded as one of the most dangerous and risky operations undertaken in the post-Cold War era. In fact, some national contingents, particularly the US and Pakistani contingents, became targets of General Aideed and his warring factions. The June 5th and October 3rd incidents of 1993 resulted in the loss of 24 Pakistani lives and 18 American lives in Central Mogadishu.

India suffered severe setbacks in Somalia. Within four months of deployment, in April 1993 India had already suffered 7 casualties. Ten days later on 1 September, three Indian doctors were also killed in a rifle grenade explosion in Baidoa. The loss of ten Indian jawans in Baidoa led to a great uproar in the Indian parliament. The Opposition in the Rajya Sabha tabled a motion for the immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia.

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143 Several Opposition leaders and MPs wanted the Indian participation in Somalia to be reviewed. It was demanded in the Indian parliament that 'Indian troops should be sent only when national interests are involved, that national consensus be taken before sending troops on foreign soil and that troops be sent only after the need for national security has been met'. Ibid. See also, 'Opposition Seeks Forces' Withdrawal', Times of India (New Delhi), 24 August, 1994.
However, the Indian government continued its active involvement in Somalia based on the premise that it was their onus to fulfil their responsibility to the international community at large. As expressed in the *Tribune*, "the killing of the soldiers should not provoke the Indian peacekeepers to follow the US example. The virtue of patience in such difficult situations cannot be over-emphasised". It is also noted that the cry of "American life in danger" is heard once too often which only makes the peacekeepers become more vulnerable when operating in such volatile operational theatres. In the *Hindu* it was pointed out that "what contributed anarchy to the operation [in Somalia] was the American over-reaction to events on the ground. In contrast, Third World soldiers through their low profile are proving successful in helping to bring life back in Somalia". One Indian defence analyst and correspondent of the *Asian Age* (New Delhi) viewed India's willingness to continue its role in Somalia as largely stemming from the confidence gained from their involvement in the Indian peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka (1987 - 1990). Although the experience of the IPKF in Sri Lanka has been described as an 'ill-fated' one, it is argued that the operation "taught valuable lessons that were subsequently utilised in Somalia".

Therefore, India was also one of the few troop-contributing nations to have retained its original strength as part of the UNOSOM II. The deteriorating security situation in Somalia led to several withdrawals by many troop-contributing states. During 1993 Belgium (950 troops), France (1100 troops), Sweden (150 medical officers) and the US

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145 'Mission Distorted', *Hindu* (New Delhi), 21 March, 1994. It must be noted that the discussion related to the weak involvement of the US in Somalia should not be used as a basis for discrediting the role of the US in UN peacekeeping operations in general. In fact, the US has provided significant troop contributions in Somalia as part of UNITAF, and also in Bosnia and Kosovo as part of the Nato forces. In addition, the US has also provided invaluable logistics assistance such as airlift, support and communication units, training facilities in a number of peacekeeping operations, often at no cost to the UN. This could be seen in its contributions to the recent peace missions to Sierra Leone and East Timor.
146 P. Sawhney, 'Despite Reverses, Delhi Still Wants to Police Somali', *Asian Age* (New Delhi), 8 September, 1994, p. 9.
(1400 military logistics personnel and 1350 troops) decided to withdraw from Somalia. This brought the UNOSOM II force level down to 22000\textsuperscript{149}. In March 1994 Italy, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates also withdrew their contingents.

Due to the massive withdrawals the Security Council agreed to reduce UNOSOM II force level to 15,000 before the operation was to be closed down in November 1994\textsuperscript{150}. India, along with Egypt, Zimbabwe, Malaysia and Nigeria, continued until the mission was drawn to a close.

Thus, the idea of contributing troops on a large scale does not compare to having the capacity and sustainability to remain over a prolonged period, especially in the hazardous situations of many contemporary missions. This makes India’s troop contribution in Somalia significant.

On the other hand, India’s early withdrawal from Sierra Leone (2000) reflects its lack of ‘staying power’ after all. Its decision to withdraw came at a time when the violence in Sierra Leone was becoming rampant. At one point the UNAMSIL was coming under intense threat as the rebel groups captured UN peacekeepers and held them hostage. Subsequently, the UN was mobilising greater support from member states to attempt to rescue the hostages and contain the increasing violent activities. India’s decision to suddenly withdraw from UNAMSIL might lead to suggest that it was probably taking a precautionary measure to avoid the risk of its troops being captured by Foday Sankoh’s rebels. However, as shown earlier India’s withdrawal from Sierra Leone has been driven primarily by political factors rather than the unwillingness to take risks in the operation.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
VI. ADJUSTING TO DEMANDS & CHALLENGES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF NEW PEACEKEEPING

India's participation in UN peacekeeping operations is also significant for its responses to the demands relating to the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. India has participated in many new peacekeeping operations which have complex and multifunctional mandates. India has carried out broad and non-military duties and tasks such as election supervision and monitoring (Cambodia, Angola & Mozambique), the provision of humanitarian aid and security (Somalia, Rwanda and Mozambique), policing (Sierra Leone, Angola & Congo), the resettlement of displaced populations (Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina), de-mining (Lebanon & Cambodia), civil administration and nation building (Cambodia & Angola).

However, as argued in chapter one the implementation and execution of these broad roles and functions are often hampered by the difficulty of managing consent in the 'rough' operational environments of post-Cold War conflicts. In these 'rough' operational environments local behaviour and responses are difficult to manage because the underlying causes of many of the protracted social conflicts are shaped by personal and subjective elements. Hence, the task of shaping local behaviour has been a major priority. There exists a need for military peacekeepers to develop suitable philosophies and strategies to manage consent and facilitate the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. The remainder of this chapter will investigate how India has responded to the new ground challenges and realities in new peacekeeping operations.

The Military’s Peacekeeping Philosophy & Outlook

History and pragmatism have shaped the Indian military peacekeeping philosophy and way of thinking. Given its long-standing record of carrying out peacekeeping one can argue that the military thinking has been strongly shaped by its experiences in traditional
peacekeeping operations. Although the nature of the post-Cold War peacekeeping has changed in terms of roles and duties, the military views that seeking consent, maintaining impartiality, and the use of peaceful techniques are fundamental to its success\textsuperscript{152}. Indeed, these fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping have guided much of their thinking and practice\textsuperscript{153}.

However, the military is well aware that traditional approaches are much "harder to apply in situations of volatility [and especially in 'rough' operational environments of post-Cold War conflicts]"\textsuperscript{154}. Indeed, the operational environment today no longer carries images of the past. As peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in many low-intensity conflicts the need to interact and interface with local populations and civilians has become a reality. More importantly, peacekeepers need to focus on the subjective aspects of the civil conflicts. Accordingly, the Indian military sees that peacekeeping operations should be community-oriented\textsuperscript{155}. That is, the emphasis must be on building community consent and establishing good civil-military working relations which can be utilised over time. Subsequently, the Indian military claims that "popular support, building a framework of confidence, trust and co-operation, and patiently conducting negotiations are all activities foundational to the success of new peacekeeping operations"\textsuperscript{156}.

Although military and civilian rule is traditionally separated in India, the Indian military has been playing a major role in the state-building activities of its own country\textsuperscript{157}. Whether this has had an impact in shaping the Indian military's peacekeeping philosophy is

\textsuperscript{151} India - Military Doctrine For Wider Peacekeeping, Unpublished manuscript. United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, 1996.
\textsuperscript{152} India - Military Doctrine For Wider Peacekeeping, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 101. Interview with military officers, New Delhi, 1998.
\textsuperscript{155} Interview with military commander in Defence Department. New Delhi, 1998.
\textsuperscript{156} India - Military Doctrine For Wider Peacekeeping, op. cit.
unclear. However, it is clear that the military is increasingly flexible to fit into civilian-oriented activities – a major advantage in the new peacekeeping operations. The military is also of the view that its presence in the field must be perceived positively to enable it to manage community consent. It is noted that as peacekeepers, "our presence in the field must be perceived by the locals and civil communities in such a way that it restores faith and confidence in the operation". It is in line with this overall thinking that the military has become very cautious of the excessive use of force and also critical of the use of 'Rambo' style of many peacekeeping operations. The Indian military views force as not only a means, as opposed to an end, but also as a means with little use in peacekeeping operations. As one Indian military officer notes "muscular might doesn't have to be on the use of trigger alone". Rather, peace and security in peacekeeping operations can also be achieved through mutual understanding and cultural exchanges.

Perhaps, the Indian lesson had been learnt from its bitter and messy peacekeeping experience in Sri Lanka in 1988. One major reason for the failure of the Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka was not only the departure from the traditional peacekeeping principles of consent and impartiality, but also the concept of establishing peace through the use of force which may be attributed to India being more concerned about establishing its hegemony in the region than in establishing peace. Nevertheless, those ill-fated experiences have been important for the Indian military to assess its own peacekeeping outlook and the kind of approach it should take.

As part of its new peacekeeping philosophy the Indian military contingent has also taken some serious efforts to re-think the way it prepares its soldiers for peacekeeping.


158 Interviews with military officers who served in peacekeeping operations in Angola and Somalia.
operations. Firstly, the Indian military has developed a rigid selection process in line with its current doctrine and philosophy for deploying soldiers that are suitable and fit for peacekeeping. The Indian Army, in particular, has developed an uncompromising selection process for choosing its high-profile contingents\textsuperscript{162}. The selection criteria stress that "for success in trials of combat a soldier must be proficient in military skills and be aggressive. The same soldiers, to be good peacekeepers, need attitudinal reorientation as also many other attributes like tact, patience, compassion, impartiality, quiet assertion, etc\textsuperscript{163}. The Indian military has also applied these standards to high ranking military officers who take up field appointments. For example, Brigadier Mano Bhaghat, who served as a force commander for the Indian contingent in Somalia, was sent for psychiatric tests prior to his field appointment to test his ability to command in harsh environments and his leadership qualities\textsuperscript{164}.

The second effort made in the preparation of peacekeepers relates to the provision of suitable training. Former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali has praised India, for its training standards. He has noted that "Indian troops, by virtue of their superior training [have] a high standard of discipline and sense of responsibility"\textsuperscript{165}. The need for new and diverse types of skills to manage the different challenges and realities on the ground is a critical part of training. India has been ensuring that troops are well and suitably trained for some of the major non-combat areas. Indeed, military and defence analysts like Srivastava argue that in addition to combat training for self-defence, Indian soldiers need to be equally trained in conflict management and conflict resolution techniques along with humanitarian

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{163} The Indian Army, op. cit., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{164} Interview with military officer, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations, New York, March 2000.
\textsuperscript{165} The Indian Army, op. cit., p. 75.
functions under combat conditions. The Indian army currently provides a range of training courses on the art of observation, handling conflict situations without the use of arms for de-escalation, language skills and cross-cultural communication.

The Indian Military Academy has incorporated some of these aspects into its training curriculum. It provides courses on developing leadership traits that are needed to operate in both combat and also peacekeeping operations. Soldiers have also received training in specialised skills such as engineering and civil administration in order to carry out civil affairs projects as part of their overall peacekeeping roles.

Nevertheless, there are also pressures within India to enhance and strengthen its training programs even further, particularly for non-combat conflict de-escalation techniques. Former military officer, Major-Gen. Dipanker Banerjee (ret.) suggests that India should develop a nucleus of highly trained professionals who have taken part in various peacekeeping operations and share their experiences for the production of training manuals designed to serve the purpose of establishing a comprehensive training curriculum. International peacekeeping seminars and conferences have been organised by New Delhi and the Military with a view to providing an opportunity for the exchange of views and to realising this goal.

VII. THE PRACTICE OF 'SOFTER' PEACEKEEPING

It is against the background of the post-Cold War thinking and philosophy that India has been taken the ‘softer’ approach to new peacekeeping operations. No previous research has

167 Ibid., p. 59.
168 Interview with military officer, New Delhi, January 1998.
169 India has been the host of a couple of international seminars and training workshops on UN peacekeeping. In January 1996, India organised the third UN Peacekeeping Training Workshop as part of its overall aim to enhance peacekeeping skills and national and UN training programs for peacekeepers. 17 countries of the Asia-Pacific region attended the workshop. In March 1999, New Delhi hosted another international seminar on UN peacekeeping, which focused on capacity building for post-Cold War missions. The Indian Army, op. cit.
focused on how India actually conducts its peacekeeping operations in the changed operational environments of post-Cold War conflicts. However, it must be noted that the aim is not to compare India's peacekeeping style with that of other national contingents nor to make any judgements that Indian soldiers are better peacekeepers than others, but rather to demonstrate that India has been participating and contributing in line with the new demands and challenges.

India has been a major practitioner of 'softer' peacekeeping in many of today's peace missions. In fact, there is a pattern of the use of such strategies in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. For example, in the UN operation in Angola Indian soldiers, as part of the UNAVEM III, developed strong community relations through the civil affairs projects. One of the aims of the Indian peacekeepers in Angola was to change the "war-minded" attitudes of the locals. The strategy used to deter the locals from engaging in further violent activities was by providing opportunities for alternative lifestyles. Hence, one of the efforts taken by the Indian contingent has been the launching of micro-credit programmes such as the establishment and running of a vocational training camp for Angolans. The training was provided by the Indian military. The local men were trained in several skilled areas such as carpentry. This, in some ways was expected to provide employment opportunities for local men who have been largely pre-occupied with fighting.

In Rwanda, Indian peacekeepers also employed 'softer' peacekeeping strategies with a view to increasing their level of interface with the local communities. The Indian contingent engaged itself vigorously in some of the self-initiated community work such as building roads, digging tubewells for fresh water, building schools and establishing places of worship. These efforts gained the admiration of the force commander, Canadian General Tousignant. He expressed his appreciation of India's role in Rwanda: "You brought to UNAMIR, to the United Nations, to Rwanda a sense of pride ... You came in and you
demonstrated what it is to be a good soldier and you brought respectability to the mission. You brought also a sense of professionalism in everything that we have to do for the Rwandese. ...You are probably one of the best soldiers in the world at this time". Another comment was made by the Canadian Force Commander in Rwanda, who even compared the capabilities of India to other mature participants like Canada. He pointed out that:

"when Canada brags that it probably has the best kit in the world, it does not have your determination....[Indian] basic infantry skills, traditions and ethos – gentlemen, I have been in 75 countries around the world – it is something that is disappearing and yet in India you have maintained that high and unique standard that is an inspiration to a career soldier...your type of kindness is disappearing in the global village. But you have it and you have taught me and you have taught an awful lot of people that we must do some soul searching and see where we are going. We learnt from you and it has been a very unique privilege for me to serve with the finest".

The Case of Somalia

One detailed example considered here relates to India's peacekeeping experience in the Somalia operation which has generally been described as one of the most difficult and challenging missions the UN has carried out in the post-Cold War era. To most policy makers at the UN and also to other participating states, the UN peace operation in Somalia was a debacle and a failure. However, to India its role in Somalia was a grand success, particularly due to its 'softer' peacekeeping strategies and the use of suitable field craft. The aim is not to assess India's success but rather to examine how it has employed some of the 'softer' field strategies. To do this, it is crucial to place the Somalia conflict and peacekeeping operation in some perspective.

170 Interview with military officer, India, (New Delhi), January 1998.
171 The Indian Army, op. cit.
172 Ibid.
In 1991, following the collapse of President Siad Barre's government, Somalia was ravaged by civil war. The population became embroiled in internecine wars between the two key warring factions - one supporting the Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting General Mohamed Farah Aideed, the Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC). Aideed was a former supporter of Barre's government, but his growing desire for the Presidency led him to directly cause the downfall of Barre and his regime. However, while Aideed was pursuing Barre in the South, Ali Mahdi was appointed as the new interim president. Consequently, intense fighting broke out between the two factions and other clans which either formed alliances with one of the major factional groups or operated independently in various parts of the country. It is estimated that there were about 30 warring factions fighting over territories in Somalia.

In 1992 widespread famine and drought hit Somalia. The natural disaster took the lives of 500,000 Somalis who died of starvation, hunger and malnutrition. These images, which constantly dominated the international media, stimulated a need to respond on humanitarian grounds. As early as late 1991 a group of Non-Governmental Organisations and the International Commission on Red Cross (ICRC) were providing relief aid to the thousands of local population caught between an intense civil war and widespread famine. The UN's involvement came about only in April 1992, when the Security Council decided to deploy unarmed but uniformed military observers as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). This was partly aimed to seek consent of key warring parties for the deployment of a peacekeeping security force to facilitate the provision and delivery of humanitarian relief aid to local populations.


Initially, the UNOSOM was seen to be making some progress. Some of the key disputants had agreed to accommodate the peacekeeping force in Mogadishu which resulted in the growth of the UNOSOM. Within two weeks since 12 August 1992 its strength increased rapidly from 500 to 3500 peacekeepers. However, the aid efforts were not achieving the expected results. The clan fighting fuelled by deep-rooted hatred gained intensity and penetrated deeper into the country. The political chaos, constant looting and widespread bandits severely constrained any effort to provide humanitarian assistance in some of the distant villages within the country. Hence, in December 1992 the UN Security Council, under resolution 794, authorised the establishment of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to enforce peace for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. The scope of the peace-enforcement mandate was later widened with a view to giving the ground forces extensive powers to uphold law and order.

The US, which took the lead as part of the international efforts unilaterally spearheaded Operation Restore Hope as part of the UNITAF. One of the principal mandates of the UNITAF was to create a secure environment which would enable the safe delivery of humanitarian convoys and the distribution of relief supplies in areas beset by intense fighting between clans and warring parties. Although the UNITAF was a multilateral operation, the American forces have been criticised for acting unilaterally175. In fact, the top UN officials were increasingly annoyed with the operation becoming more of an “American show, particularly in the military sphere where the US operated under a separate command and refused to discuss military tactics with other peacekeeping countries”176.

Contrary to mainstream view that the US-led mission in Somalia was a complete failure, the UN reports indicate that the intervention had a positive impact on the security

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176 Ibid.
environment in Somalia. However, the UN saw this as being insufficient for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance\textsuperscript{177}. In fact, President Bush and Boutros Boutros-Ghali differed in their views over what constituted a secure operational environment\textsuperscript{178}. Bush saw the presence of military troops purely as a security force for the provision of food and medical supplies to famine zones. That is, the UNITAF would be used only to disable or disarm weaponry threatening the humanitarian activities. On the other hand, Boutros-Ghali wanted the UNITAF to ensure that the heavy weapons of all organised factions in Somalia had been ceased and brought under international control. Later in March 1993, following the public clash between the two leaders, the UN Secretary-General submitted his recommendation for effecting the take over of the operation by the UN. The Security Council not only authorised the transition which marked the renaming of the mission to the UNOSOM II, but also endowed it with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, although the main actors of the operation had changed, the UNOSOM II was still largely under the control and direction of the US. Some of the key influential policy makers advising the American Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) T. Howe were from the US State Department\textsuperscript{179}.

Despite the transition the UNOSOM II witnessed nothing more than failures. The failure of the UNITAF to eliminate the weaponry and completely disarm all warring factions not only allowed the viscous cycle of violence to aggravate but also resulted in the UNOSOM II confronting greater resistance and challenge from the warlords. Indeed, the Somalia mission is noted for the tragedy of June 5\textsuperscript{th}, when 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed and killed during the inspection of an ammunition dump which belonged to Mogadishu Warlord General Farah Aideed. Apparently, the UN headquarters had informed


\textsuperscript{178} Patman, op. cit., pp. 88-95.
Aideed of the time and date of the inspection without realising that the rebel leader had already aroused the feelings of his followers against UNOSOM II. This resulted in an unexpected showdown when the Aideed forces fired on Pakistani soldiers during the weapons inspection. While the killing of the Pakistani peacekeepers shocked the world, the UN was heavily criticised for the lack of logistical support and failure to provide sufficient fire-power. Moreover, instead of providing cover for the UN peacekeepers during the ambush some national contingents were waiting for instructions from their respective national governments.

The June 5th incident led to a change in the goals of the peace mission. The UNOSOM II rapidly transformed into “Operation Revenge” for seeking justice for the killing of the UN peacekeepers. Indeed, the peacekeeping operation had turned out to be a personal vendetta. The SRSG Howe even announced a reward worth $25,000 to $50,000 for Aideed’s head. The targeting of Aideed meant a loss of the impartiality and credibility of the peacekeeping force which transformed the UN peacekeepers to be increasingly seen as the new “warlords” in Somalia. Meanwhile, US Army Rangers were deployed to track and hunt Aideed. Although the US-led strikes culminated in a full-blown ground assault, Aideed was reported to have slipped away minutes before the raid started. Some reports indicate that the US surveillance network has more than once caught Italian UN peacekeepers warning Aideed about the US plans to launch an attack against him.

Consequently, the loss was greater for the UNOSOM II than for Aideed and his forces. The “revenge mission” resulted in the further ambush of 18 American soldiers in

179 Ibid.
Central Mogadishu. Some of the dead bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. This demeaning and horrendous act, which was shown on television worldwide, led to a public outcry in the US and domestic pressure for withdrawal. Subsequently, the UNOSOM II not only became further embroiled in a deep-heated violent conflict with Aideed and his forces but was also increasingly seen to have moved away from its primary task of maintaining law and order to waging a bloody battle with the disputants. In fact, instead of re-shaping the conflict management process the UNOSOM II created conditions that dug Somalia deeper into the morass of civil conflict.

The internal fighting in Somalia was highly militarised in that violence was widespread and rampant. A report released by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) indicates that one out of three Somalians lived under the control of the warring groups. That is, approximately 88% of the 10 million people lived in areas where conflict was taking place. Most of the fighting took place in populated areas such as in villages and small towns. Also the warring factions and fighting groups were generally well armed. They were using small arms which were quite sophisticated and technologically advanced. Some of their weapons included short-range rockets, AK-47s and hand grenades. Hence, the ability to cause destruction and damage was high. Moreover, these weapons often fell into the hands of child soldiers as the majority of the fighters in Somalia were aged between 14 to 16 years. For these soldiers, "the only language they have learnt is blood," and they had neither the wisdom nor any understanding of the consequences of carrying a rifle. In

182 It is also reported that following the US raid on Aideed, the Italian Force Commander General Bruno Loi was relieved from his duty by Kofi Annan.
186 Ibid.
fact, some developed a sense of pride because their possession of weapons gave them some level of authority and control.

The fighting was also taking place at the local community level. In fact, the "clan warfare [in Somalia] as practised by warlord-backed militias has created a virtual dragnet that [had] swept up civilians along side the combatants". In some cases, civilians supported the factions because of their frustration of being deprived of basic needs such as food, shelter and medical assistance. These frustrations then shaped their negative perceptions and attitudes. In other cases, the local civilians were dragged into fighting for no apparent reason. The ICRC report on Somalia notes that "because the war is a tribal war the civilians themselves are the fighters and most of them do not know what they are fighting for. They do not know the objectives for the fights. The [real] fighters are the looters and killers; people who don't want development, unity and peace. Other people fight in the war, yet they don't know as to why they are fighting." So, the civil communities were transformed into heavily militarised and violent warzones. Indeed, these violent activities escalated to such a level that they were uncontrollable and became a major obstruction for the conduct of peacekeeping-humanitarian operations. The political chaos, constant looting and widespread banditry severely constrained any effort to provide humanitarian assistance to the local population that had been suffering as a result of the civil war and widespread starvation.

Meanwhile, the impact of the violent conflict and the growing use of force in the peacekeeping operation on the local populations was severe. The growing level of violence and the numerous massacres had a major psychological impact on the local populations. The hostilities were so intense and severe that widespread devastation resulted. The ICRC

187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
reported that out of a population of 10 million, almost 50000 people were massacred\(^{189}\). Moreover, the use of terror tactics such as rape, extortion and physical brutality were routine in Somalia and it has been estimated that approximately 65% of the local population had one immediate family member subjected to the terror tactics and approximately 39% of the population knew someone who had gone through one of these horrors of war\(^{190}\). Women were the worst victims having undergone severe physical abuse and torture. Some incidents include: the rape of a nine-year old girl; a woman, eight month pregnant, gang-raped by 17 men who then killed the unborn child; and a women shot in the head when she resisted gang rape. Hence, people, especially women, were living under constant fear and psychological distress.

The painful experience of being physically abused by male uniformed military rebels may make uniformed military peacekeepers unpopular even though they are there to help. Recent research by Medica's psychological-team indicated that raped women mostly feel uncomfortable and unable to have any sort of relationship with men\(^{191}\). The research indicated that even women who had not suffered direct physical abuse from men tend to alienate themselves from the "masculine culture that seemed to be particularly implicated in the barbarism"\(^{192}\).

This unpopularity could be further aggravated when, in some cases, peacekeepers themselves are guilty of committing atrocities. Apparently, there was also a low level of trust among locals due to the misconduct and ill-disciplined behaviour of some UN peacekeepers. The Canadian peacekeepers have been accused of the brutal act of torturing

\(^{189}\) R. Sharma, (lieut. Gen.) op. cit., p. 40.

\(^{190}\) International Committee of Red Cross, People On War, Country Report (Somalia), Geneva: 1999.


\(^{192}\) Ibid.
and killing a young Somali boy\textsuperscript{193}. Belgian soldiers have been documented as burning a Somali child and the Italians have reportedly been photographed torturing a Somali man with electrodes. Although the governments of the respective countries have taken the appropriate action and court marshalled the soldiers, this series of incidents significantly tainted the overall image of the peacekeepers and clearly affected the way locals react to them.

It was against this backdrop of growing mistrust and psychological distress that the Indian contingent was required to carry out peacekeeping duties as part of the UNOSOM II. The Indian military contingent was responsible of an area covering 1,75,000 km in Southern Somalia, in Baidoa. In fact, it was the largest area covering almost 70\% of the total UNOSOM II area (See map 2A). The areas that came under the responsibility of the Indian contingent were the Bay, Bakool and Lower Juba region, and also the towns of Baidoa and Kismayu. Although the focus in most literature has been on Central Mogadishu which was the major area of violent activities and fighting between Aideed's forces and other rebel groups, the area under the control of the Indian contingent was also highly volatile. In fact, it was an earlier battleground for various warring factions including the Darods, Raheinwein and the Ogadens tribes of Jess, Morgan and Aideed.

Nevertheless, the Indian contingent had a very different agenda in its area of responsibility. While the UN and the international community as a whole was pursuing greater use of force by coercing co-operation in Somalia, the Indian army adopted a peacekeeping style that relied less on force and more on seeking and fostering local community support\textsuperscript{194}. The Indian contingent focused intensely on adopting a 'softer' people-centred approach with a view to addressing some of the subjective aspects of the

conflict in Somalia. The main aim was to alter negative perceptions and create a favourable environment which would enable them to encourage co-operative behaviour among locals and warring parties. They employed 'softer' field tactics which were used strategically to enhance their place as peacekeepers in the 'rough' operational environment.

Map 2A – The UNOSOM II Deployment in Somalia, (As of November 1993)


\[^{194}\] Apparently, the Commonwealth and European armies are also reported to have adopted such approaches. See Charles Dobbie, “A Concept for post-Cold War Peacekeeping”, *Survival*, Vol. 36,
1. Community Relations

One of the main objectives of the Indian contingent was to secure local trust in Somalia. So, one of the strategies used by Indian peacekeepers was to build community relations with the locals. This is not an easy task, especially because in some cases locals had reacted negatively to the presence of peacekeepers. For example, some Australian peacekeepers that served under the US command in Baidoa (prior to the arrival of Indian troops) had reportedly been scoffed at and provoked by locals195.

The Indian military contingent was aware of these sentiments and aimed to tackle them by fostering social contacts with locals and also with warring parties through cultural exchanges. Organising a number of social events brought this about. One unique effort of Indian peacekeepers was the revival of a popular local singing group called “Allardi”196. The Indian contingent also brought the Sappers band from India which worked with the singing group in entertaining the locals with patriotic local songs. Indian movies were also regularly screened in a "make-shift theatre"197 that ran on diesel generators. Another effort was the re-building of mosques in Oddur and Wajid which had been damaged in the 1992-93 stages of the civil war.

These efforts helped to strengthen the local trust in the Indian soldiers at both the political and community levels. At the community level, the locals praised Indian troops for their remarkable role in converting a war-torn area into one of peace and hope. As some of the village elders from the Bay and Bakool regions stated: "we admire the Indians for their human touch. Prior to their arrival, we used to have constant internal clan fights. But they taught us how to love each other. Love and harmony will be in our mind to remember the

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Indians"\(^{198}\). In Somalia Indian soldiers were even seen as family members. One village civilian elder in Baidoa claimed that "the Indian soldiers are like my sons and sons-in-law. They are free to live here, even marry our daughters"\(^{199}\). The Indian contingent also secured strong positive relations with some warring factions and warlords. One leader of the dominant Rahanweyu clan in Baidao region expressed concerns about the withdrawal of Indian soldiers as "India is more understandable to the locals" in some villages\(^{200}\).

Photo 2B – Indian soldiers drilling a borewell for the supply of water.


2. Civil Affairs

Another strategy used in Somalia was a civil affairs programme. The philosophy behind this strategy was to "win over the populace with a minimum show of force and large doses of human kindness"\(^{201}\). The Indian troops focused significantly on the issue of developing and prioritising the needs of the locals with a view to enhancing their ground presence and building strong and trusting community relations. Hence, the soldiers provided assistance in the country's agricultural activities. The contingent helped with the cultivation and harvest of sugarcane, maize and sorghum - the main crops of Somalia\(^{202}\). Indian veterinary surgeons were also brought in to treat livestock which were considered critical for the local economy.

One of the biggest problems encountered by the locals was the severe water shortage as most of the wells had either dried up or had been poisoned during the civil war. Therefore, a rig was brought in from India for digging tubewells for irrigation and other
drinking purposes (See photo 2B). Another task that the Indian troops took upon themselves was to attend to the hundreds of orphans who were left homeless as a result of the civil war. An orphanage, “Bonkay Orphanage”, was established, administered and run by the Indian force (See photo 2C). The Indian brigade also set up a major hospital which treated an average of 400 patients a day. As India had also sent female medical teams more and more Somali women were willing to come for treatment. Efforts were also taken in setting up vocational training centres and schools as part of India’s nation-building program in Somalia. All these efforts contributed to the humanitarian aspects of the UNOSOM II and enabled the peacekeepers to interface with the local populations.

3. Psychological Approaches

A further strategy used by Indian peacekeepers in Somalia was the psychological approach. This was employed when engaging in basic negotiations and direct military confrontations in the field. The following relates to the Indian experience in a military situation in Somalia. The Indian military contingent was quite successful at controlling the level of violence in the area of its deployment, that is, in Baidoa (South of Mogadishu). However, instead of reacting immediately in the event of an attack, a major tactic used by the Indian forces was a ‘wait and watch’ approach. In other words, the Indian officers did not return fire once the first shot was heard from the factions. Instead of exchanging fire the Indian troops took time to study the situation and to identify the parties that started the shooting.

This transformation from a peacekeeper’s role to ‘peace-waiters’ role may have been a somewhat puzzling approach. However, it is rooted in the Indian military's

peacekeeping philosophy that "security does not come only by rifles and bullets". As Brigadier Bhaghat asserted "[the Indian soldiers in Somalia] have come to assist them, not to suppress them further. Muscular might doesn't have to be on the use of the trigger alone. If you have to use force to begin with, then what are you left with?".

However, India's peace-waiting approach has raised some doubts among sceptics. Consequently, Western countries have described Indian forces in Somalia as being "inert and inexperienced". Yet from the Indian military's point of view, it is one of working psychologically. It is argued that the 'peace-waiter' role in a military confrontation sends out a message that peacekeepers are not fighters and a signal that there is no point in resolving the matter through the use of force. Indeed, the Indian approach of 'holding the fire' and 'wait and watch' approach has been a deliberate attempt to erase the fear in Somali minds of "shots and death". Moreover, Brigadier Bhaghat, the commanding officer for the Indian contingent argues that the 'hold the fire' approach is more commendable than the 'pull the trigger' policy commonly practised by the West.

The peace-waiting approach is risky. However, peacekeeping involves taking that risk rather than exposing one's vulnerability. Indeed, Berdal has argued that one reason why the American forces always become targets in peacekeeping operations is because warring factions are aware of the over-sensationalisation of American lives and that US leaders are weak-willed whenever there is a potential threat to their soldiers in external assignments. Hence, targeting them leaves Americans with no choice but to respond to public pressure.

206 Hari Charan Chhabra, 'Indian troops in Somalia Competent and humane', Sentinel, (New Delhi) 22 March.
which may demand a withdrawal from the mission. This was the case in Somalia where the loss of 18 American soldiers in the October 5th incident led to major public outcry and consequently an embarrassing withdrawal.

Photo 2D – Indian officers negotiating with local warring leaders


The peace-waiting approach may not be suitable in some situations, that is, there may be a need to react immediately. For example, in one incident, heavily armed factions attacked and ambushed an Irish convoy escorted by the Indian contingent near Baidoa. Indian troops immediately retaliated and destroyed three vehicles, killing nine militias and capturing a dozen others. By not engaging in retaliation would have meant that the Indians soldiers were placing the lives of the Irish soldiers at risk. However, it has been noted after the attack the Indian troops quickly called in the clan leaders to explain their course of

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action\textsuperscript{214}. This shows the use of tact and diplomacy at the clan level and is part of its overall strategy to reinforce its impartiality and maintain the co-operation of the factions (See photo 2D).

In response, the locals appreciated the effort taken by the Indians to respect their presence. It is reported that even some of the warring factions indicated that the "Indian troops are doing well in their noble task, particularly in fighting the banditry which is a threat to the lives and properties of the people"\textsuperscript{215}. One of the local chiefs in Baidoa noted that "unlike the other UN forces that tried to bypass our authority, the Indian's acknowledged our role", and this helped locals to develop a sense of trust and respect for the Indian military presence\textsuperscript{216}.

In fact, the Indian peacekeeping approach and the 'softer' strategies also gained the admiration of General Farah Aideed himself. He wrote to the Indian force Commander expressing his gratitude by stating that: "On behalf of the Somali National Alliance, the Somali people and on my own behalf, I would like to congratulate and praise you and the Indian troops under your command for your good start in restoring peace and your impartiality"\textsuperscript{217}. Photograph 2E captures the smooth and friendly dealings of Brigadier Bhaghat, the Indian force commander, with General Aideed who had been branded by the West as the "enemy".

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} Hari Charan Chhabra, 'Indian Peacekeeping in Somalia', \textit{World Focus}, Vol. 15 No. 10, 1994, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{217} 'Aideed Praises Indian Troops', \textit{Hindu} (New Delhi), 21 January, 1994.
From India's point of view its peacekeeping experience in Somalia was different from the dominant war-fighting experiences of most of the national contingents, including Pakistan. India's contribution in Somalia gained the appreciation of the Canadian Force Commander of the UNOSOM II:

"You brought a sense of respectability, from the turning point of the Mission's conception when we were basically in disarray, trying to melt ourselves together, trying to build a force with a military ethos, looking a little bit disorganised...the Indian soldiers came in and demonstrated what it is to be a good soldier and you brought respectability to the Mission."218

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The UN has also acknowledged India's significant contributions in Somalia. In fact, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, following the completion of the Somalia operation appointed the Indian force commander Brigadier Mano Bhaghat as the Deputy military advisor in the United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, New York (1996-2000). One UN official has noted that Bhaghat was hired in recognition of his remarkable skills and leadership, and also to seek his field expertise at the higher level of military planning and decision-making in the DPKO within the UN Secretariat. However, the question arises as to how often representatives from third world countries have the chance to participate actively at this level.

VIII. SUMMARY

In summary, this chapter has argued that the nature of India's participation in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations has changed. It can be seen that India has taken a more assertive and pro-active peacekeeping approach as part of the new foreign policy context in the post-Cold War era. India's political interests, such as realising its global power ambitions, which means enhancing its international image, have been a major source of motivation to participate actively and respond to the new needs emerging in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations.

Indeed, India has emerged as a major peacekeeper not only in terms of its capacity to making large and multiple troop-commitments simultaneously, but also in terms of its reliability and endurance in harsh operational environments. In addition to meeting these requirements India has also made a qualitative contribution in managing ground realities.

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219 Interview notes, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, March 2001. The SRSG for Somalia, Mr. James Victor Gbeho commented on the "excellent performance and superb role played by the Indian contingent in the peacekeeping efforts of UNOSOM II". In a letter to the Indian government, he praised the Indian force commander for his "mature guidance and exemplary leadership" Somalis miss the Soldiers of Peace from India', Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 January, 1995. See also Somalis miss the Soldiers of Peace from India', Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 January, 1995.
and challenges in the face of conducting post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. This can be seen in the way the Indian military developed a new peacekeeping outlook and employed ‘softer’ strategies for managing consent and favourably shaping the operational environment.

While India’s innovative and active responses to the challenges of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations further help to shape its global image positively, its uncompromising behaviour in some peace operations may project otherwise. For example, India’s abrupt withdrawal from Sierra Leone in 2000 is a case to note. The withdrawal came at a time when India was reduced from being a force commander of the UNAMSIL to an ordinary peacekeeper. The Secretary-General of both the UN and the OAU strongly requested India to reconsider its decision since the UNAMSIL was already suffering from severe shortage of ground forces. However, India was determined to end its participation. Although as a sovereign state India has the right to make such decisions in line with its national interest, the uncompromising behaviour however casts some doubts about its role as a responsible and ‘good international citizen’. This could in turn affect India’s image negatively. Perhaps there is a need for India to rethink about ways of not damaging its own image in the process of building it.
Pakistan – ‘Back Into the Boots’ in the Post-Cold War Era

Pakistan has been participating in external peace operations since the 1960s. Up to December 2000 Pakistan has participated in 30 UN peace missions abroad and in total has contributed approximately 20,000 troops and other ground personnel (see Appendix 3). However, a major part of its participation and contribution has only been made in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War Pakistan’s participation in external peace missions had been rather limited, brief and highly irregular. It had participated in only four of the 18 peace missions established in the 41 years of the UN’s history in peacekeeping between 1948 and 1989. However, since the end of the Cold War Pakistan has made a greater contribution. Indeed, UN peacekeeping has gained increasing relevance as part of Pakistan’s new foreign policy outlook which has taken shape against the backdrop of its growing regional security concerns and isolation in the post-Cold War era¹. This chapter is concerned with the following key questions: What explains the change in Pakistan’s commitment to UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era? What are the key motivational

forces behind its increased commitment to UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era? Does Pakistan respond to the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations? If yes, what is its contribution?

The assertion that Pakistan is mainly motivated by economic benefits and the income earned through its participation in UN peacekeeping is not uncommon, especially given Pakistan's chronic economic situation. However, this chapter aims to show that the key sources of motivation are more related more to Pakistan's geo-political interests than to tangible economic benefits. The political interests include Pakistan's need to enhance its deteriorating international image, its need to strengthen its place within the UN for greater support on the Kashmir issue and other institutional interests.

While these sources of motivation account for Pakistan's new commitment to UN peacekeeping, the degree of its commitment can be seen in the active and assertive way that it responds to the new demands and challenges in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. In fact, its responses are positive and in line with the new needs of post-Cold War peace operations. As a troop-contributor Pakistan can be viewed as major peacekeeper in current UN peacekeeping operations. It meets some of the important standards established in Chapter One, that is, the capacity to make large, multiple and simultaneous troop-commitments, the willingness to take risks and the determination to sustain commitment in harsh operational environments in spite of severe setbacks in the field. Pakistan's active contribution can be also seen in the way it conducts and manages new peacekeeping operations today. Pakistan has responded to the new ground challenges, such as the management of consent in the rough operational environments of intra-state conflicts. It is one of the major practitioners of 'softer' peacekeeping, with a view to shaping local perceptions and attitudes, and creating favourable environment to facilitate the conduct and implementation of new peacekeeping operations.
To this end the chapter aims to trace the place of UN peacekeeping in the changing foreign policy contexts. It then examines the sources of motivations and assesses Pakistan’s responses and contribution to the new demands of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations.

I. PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT DURING THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War, Pakistan’s commitment to making voluntary contribution in external UN peacekeeping operations was relatively low. The likely reason was that its priorities were directed mainly towards managing its own security concerns. During the Cold War period Pakistan was preoccupied with forging bilateral ties and seeking political and military support at both the regional and global levels to offset the perceived Indian threat in the region.

Indeed, since independence Pakistan has been preoccupied with its national security concerns, particularly related to managing and ‘balancing’ what is seen as a threat from neighbouring India on its eastern borders. Pakistan’s sense of insecurity stems from several realities: the relative size of India; geographic proximity; India’s technological superiority and conventional military strength; and India’s growing aspirations for leadership and hegemony in South Asia. In spite of these realities Pakistan’s security policies have been guided by its need for equality vis-à-vis India. This self-perception is based on a claim that as an Islamic state and as the custodian of the sub-continent’s Islamic history, Pakistan has the right to be treated as equal to the predominantly Hindu India. During the 1947-71 period this need for equality was closely linked to the fact that the Eastern and Western

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wings of Pakistan represented the majority of Muslims in British-India. In fact, even after the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 the Pakistani government constantly alluded to the “Two-Nations” theory as a way of equalising India’s claims for regional hegemony and global ambitions. In fact, Pakistan did not give up its claim to equality despite the fact that the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war proved the two-nation theory to be unfounded.

Simultaneously, Pakistan saw the need to express its equality in some concrete form, that is, in the form of military capabilities. Consequently, Pakistan sought external patrons for the acquisition of military weapons and capabilities to deter the Indian threat; prevent New Delhi from imposing its views on Pakistan; and pursue policies that might affect Pakistan’s vital national interests. These external patrons varied but the US and China were the two major powers from which Pakistan had sought support.

Relations with the US started as early as the early 1950s when the US was seeking partnerships and alliances to support its containment policy against China and the Soviet Union. Following India’s reluctance to cooperate with the US, Washington developed an interest in Pakistan. From the latter’s point of view this alliance was crucial to offset the Indian threat in the region. Hence, during the 1950s Pakistan enjoyed a strong sense of security through its close relations with the US. Pakistan received military and economic assistance worth $1.3 billion and the total foreign economic assistance provided by the US amounted to 68.4% in the 1950s. The Pakistani army also received military training and modern equipment that helped to address the quantitative imbalance with India.

issue of equality as the basis for Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb and the May 1998 nuclear tests.  
5 Ibid., p. 44.
7 Indians, however, are of the view that the creation of Bangladesh resulted in falsifying the two-nation theory. For more discussion on Pakistan’s two-nation theory see Ibid., pp. 401-11.
9 Rizvi, op. cit., p.87.
However, this strong alliance with the US was not long lasting. By the late 1950s the change in the geo-strategic environment resulted in Washington altering its posture. The growing Chinese threat on India's borders pushed New Delhi to look towards the US for support and military aid. Washington was keen to embrace this new relationship as part of its overall containment policy against China.

Hence, in the 1960s Islamabad diversified its bilateral relationships and began looking for new partners. It was in this context that Pakistan first took up the option of renewing its relations with the hitherto ignored China. Indeed, in the early 1960s Pakistan ignored its relations with China. Previously, in line with their pro-US stand Pakistani leaders had made several anti-Chinese statements, for example, in May 1960 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Manzoor Qadir stated in a television interview that "expansionist tendencies were more noticeable in China than in Russia." Moreover, Pakistan's close alliance with the US had forced Beijing to pursue a 'cautious' policy towards Islamabad. Beijing feared that any indication of closeness with Pakistan could place its border negotiations with India in jeopardy. This resulted in China taking a neutral stand on the Kashmir issue. This stand was also most probably "motivated by the assumption that by not siding with India on the Kashmir issue - a dispute which Islamabad used as a yardstick to measure the 'friendliness' of other countries - Beijing could prevent Pakistan from further aligning itself with the United States". Moreover, it is possible that China did not want to complicate matters since parts of the undemarcated Sino-Indian border also included areas of Kashmir. However, by mid-1959 the issue arose relating to the demarcation of the Sino-

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Indian borders in the Aksai Chin area and the area leading up to the MacMahon Line, and the two countries were openly disagreeing with one another. In fact, in August and October 1959 the Indian and Chinese armed forces clashed over these border issues.

These events created fears in Islamabad of facing a similar dispute with China over parts of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. It was in this pretext that the Pakistan Government approached China “for a peaceful settlement of the border question by demarcating the northern borders.” In February 1962 China pointed out that it was prepared to reach an agreement with Pakistan “on the location and alignment...actually existing between the two countries.” Despite this agreement Beijing’s policy in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir remained neutral. It is stated that “with regard to the Kashmir dispute, it has been the consistent position of the Chinese Government to be impartial and to wish that India and Pakistan will reach a peaceful settlement”. However, this policy gradually changed as Beijing’s threat perceptions began to grow. In fact, the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 reinforced this perception as both Washington and the Soviet Union were not only openly supporting New Delhi on the Sino-Indian border dispute but were also supplying military assistance to India.

This development led to China changing its South Asia policy from one of being “neutral” to a “Pakistan-centric” policy. From Pakistan’s point of view this was crucial as it could now balance the perceived Indian threat in the region. Indeed, by 1963 Sino-Pakistan relations reached new heights. This was marked by the signing of four major treaties on commercial trade, border, air transport and barter trade agreements in 1963. China also altered its impartial position and began to openly support Pakistan on the

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14 Ibid., pp. 323-4.
15 Ibid., p. 324.
17 Yasmeen, op. cit., p. 325.
18 Rizvi, op. cit., p. 141
Kashmir issue. In 1964 the Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai visited Pakistan and the two countries issued a joint communique calling for a solution to the Kashmir dispute “in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan”\(^\text{19}\). Later on China also supported Pakistan on the Rann of Kutch affair (April 1965) and the second Indo-Pakistan war over the Kashmir issue (September 1965). At that time China extended full and unreserved support to Pakistan by supplying weapons and military equipment\(^\text{20}\).

From the late 1950s Pakistan also used its Islamic identity to re-establish and strengthen its place in the Muslim world. However, Pakistan’s ability to mobilise support in the Arab world under the banner of Muslim unity was partly hampered by its own actions in the early 1950s. Its close association and alignment with the US raised suspicion in the Arab world of Pakistan’s commitment to Muslim unity. Moreover, Pakistan was taking a pro-Western stand which was critical of President Nasser’s 1956 policy on the Suez Canal\(^\text{21}\). This was partly due to the fact that Egypt supported the India-led non-aligned movement which Pakistan did not. Nevertheless, the differences in opinion created a distance between Pakistan and Egypt which also influenced the views of other Arab countries.

Another factor that slowed relations between Pakistan and the Arab world was Pakistan’s continued membership to the Baghdad Pact initially signed between the Western countries, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Arab League with a view to co-operating on maintaining peace and security in the region\(^\text{22}\). Pakistan saw the Pact as an opportunity to forge closer ties with Muslim countries\(^\text{23}\). However, the Arab nations including Egypt and Saudi Arabia criticised the Pact as part of Western Imperialist policy and Iraq’s initial

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\(^{20}\) Rizvi, op. cit., p. 141.


\(^{22}\) Burke & Ziring, op. cit., p. 170.
membership was interpreted as splitting Arab solidarity. Following Iraq's withdrawal of its membership in 1958 the Baghdad Pact was then renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the headquarters were shifted to Ankara. However, Pakistan continued its membership which resulted in some tensions between Islamabad and Riyadh. In spite of being urged to drop its membership and "return to the right path", Islamabad remained a member of the Pact and this was interpreted by Saudi Arabia as a "stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states".

These factors limited Pakistan's ability to manoeuvre and develop new ties with Muslim countries in the Arab world. Hence, Pakistan initially focused on strengthening its ties with non-Arab neighbours, particularly Iran and Turkey, through the Regional Co-operation for Development (RDC). In Asia, Pakistan also forged new ties with President Sukarno of Indonesia which is said to have been experiencing some bitterness in its bilateral relations with India during that time.

Pakistan's relations with Arab countries took a new direction from the late 1960s onwards. The initial difficulties in establishing ties with Arab countries in the Middle East gradually disappeared in the light of new geo-strategic developments that began to shape sentiments in the Muslim world. Indeed, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 which resulted in the break-up of the Islamic state of Pakistan and in the creation of Bangladesh led to some fear in the Muslim world of the possibility of facing similar situations in their countries. So, Pakistan's experience created a sense of insecurity among Muslims, who then called for harmonisation and unity in the Muslim world. There was also a move to establish "an all-

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23 Ibid., p. 171.
25 Ibid., p. 204.
26 Thornton, op. cit., p. 175.
27 Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 72-3.
embracing Islamic platform\textsuperscript{28} which would provide an important forum for Muslim countries.

Against this backdrop Pakistan's relations with the Arab countries started to take a new turn. In May 1972 the President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) visited Islamabad to strengthen relations with Pakistan. Later that year Zulfikar Ali Bhutto undertook a major diplomatic visit to fourteen Middle-Eastern and African Muslim countries: Abu Dhabi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Turkey. In 1974 Pakistan became the Chair of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which reinforced Pakistan's growing presence in the Muslim world.

Meanwhile, the 1970s also saw Washington's renewed interest in an old ally when Nixon openly "described Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity as having 'critical importance' for peace in Asia and that it was 'the cornerstone of American foreign policy'"\textsuperscript{29}. Pakistan's new alliance in the Muslim international community may well have been a contributing factor to Washington's renewed interest. The geo-strategic importance of Pakistan and its growing relations with the Muslim world could facilitate the enhancement of an American presence in the oil rich Gulf region. However, relations between the US and Pakistan began to waiver, especially in the third-quarter of the 1970s when the Carter administration became wary of Pakistan's ambitious nuclear programme which came about following India's first nuclear test in 1974. Washington was critical of the French construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan\textsuperscript{30}. Now under the military rule of General Zia, Pakistan claimed the construction followed the guidelines for International safeguards and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency\textsuperscript{31}.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 73.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 88
\textsuperscript{30} Burke & Ziring, op. cit., pp. 440-1
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 440-1
However, by April 1977 the US had suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan unless Islamabad was willing to adhere to Washington’s demands regarding its nuclear policy.

Nevertheless, it was not until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which marked the beginning of what Cohen calls the "second Cold War"\textsuperscript{32}, that the intimacy between the US and Pakistan was revived. Indeed, the US dominated Pakistan's foreign policy throughout the 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a major turn in the Pakistan-US relations. At that time, the primary goal of the US was to ensure the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan, and in this end Pakistan became an important strategic asset in facilitating the supply of weapons to Afghan resistance groups. As part of this alliance, Pakistan received enormous economic and military assistance from the US justified by the claim that Pakistan was under a Soviet threat. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the US provided economic and military aid worth $3.2 billion to Islamabad for a period of six years\textsuperscript{33}. Later in 1986 another aid package worth $4.02 billion was agreed upon. This included the purchase of F-16 fighter aircraft and other military weapons. The US aid to Pakistan continued until the late 1980s when new geo-strategic developments, particularly the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan following the Geneva talks in 1988, were beginning to take shape.

Therefore, the old security context is one largely characterised by Pakistan's preoccupation with forging bilateral relations both at the regional and global level as part of its strategy to balance and offset the perceived Indian threat in the region. This was at the heart of Pakistan's national security interest and hence, guided and shaped its foreign policy outlook accordingly. It is within this security context that Pakistan's participation in UN peacekeeping must be examined.

\textsuperscript{32} Cohen, (1999) op. cit., p. 192

\textsuperscript{33} Yasmeen, (1994), op. cit., p. 115.
II. PAKISTAN AS A HOST STATE

Pakistan initially entered into the world of UN peacekeeping not as a donor state, but as a host for a number of peace missions. In fact, Pakistan's early support for UN peacekeeping can be said to have evolved from its own regional security concerns. Three UN peace observer missions were launched in Pakistan: the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, 1949 to the present); the UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM, September 1965 - March 1966); and the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan & Pakistan (UNGOMAP, May 1988 - March, 1990).

The story of the UNMOGIP goes back as far as August 1947. It was established following conflict between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. According to the Independence Act of 1947 the accession of both the territories was left to the two nations. However, this became a matter of dispute and the failure to reach a settlement soon led to an escalation of the conflict between India and Pakistan. In January 1948 at the request of India, the Security Council intervened by establishing a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the matter and to look into the possibility of peacefully ending the conflict and resolving the dispute. The UNCIP adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire and a UN plebiscite following the truce agreement between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan agreed to this resolution and a cease-fire came into effect following the signing of the Karachi Agreement by India and Pakistan in January 1949.

This was followed by the creation of the UNMOGIP in July 1949 and the deployment of a neutral observer force to supervise and monitor the cease-fire along the established lines of control. Two outposts were established one on each side. The UNMOGIP was stationed at Srinagar in the summer and at Rawalpindi in the winter. The UNMOGIP, which initially began as a team of 32 observers increased to 65 in the
subsequent months\textsuperscript{34}. The observers were drawn from the US, Canada, Belgium, Mexico, Norway, Chile, Denmark and Sweden. In the mid-1950s this force saw a slight change with the withdrawal of the US military observers. Given its newly formed alliance with Pakistan the US was no longer viewed as an impartial peace-observer and was requested by India to withdraw from the mission\textsuperscript{35}.

The 1960s were a period of instability for the UNMOGIP due to several major developments in the relationship between India and Pakistan, and also within Kashmir. In 1965 India and Pakistan entered into a second round of conflict which took place in two phases. The first phase resulted from conflicting claims over the Rann of Kutch at the southern end of the international boundary. The Rann of Kutch is a flood-basin which leads into the Arabian Sea and which separates the Indian State of Gujurat from the Pakistan Province of Sindh. India claimed the territory on the northern edge of the Rann while Pakistan maintained that the boundary ran along the 24\textsuperscript{th} parallel\textsuperscript{36} which overlaps part of the Indian territory. The failure to reach an agreement on these conflicting claims led to another confrontation between the two countries. Pakistani military forces established outposts and maintained a strong presence in the areas claimed by Pakistan. In April 1965 India tried to enforce its claim by obstructing the Pakistani forces to carry out their patrol. India then threatened a general war and declared that "the army will decide its own strategy and deploy its manpower and equipment in the way it deems fit"\textsuperscript{37}. As a result Pakistani forces were kept on high alert during this time.

Meanwhile, the UN feared that if left un-checked this dispute could affect the stability of the UNMOGIP and further aggravate the already existing tensions in the disputed territory. Following the cease-fire agreement initiated by Prime Minister Harold

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 23-5.
\textsuperscript{36} Abdul Sattar, op. cit., pp. 89-90
Wilson and the British High Commission in Islamabad and New Delhi, the UN reacted quickly and with the consent of the two parties set up an interim mission, the UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) which functioned for a period of ten months until it was absorbed by the UNMOGIP. The UNIPOM was mandated to supervise the cease-fire along the India-Pakistan borders outside the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The second phase of the conflict resulted from developments within Kashmir. As host for the UNMOGIP Pakistan was generally supportive of the UN presence. Its support was linked to its commitment to holding a UN plebiscite and seeking a resolution for the Kashmir dispute. However, in the mid-1960s Pakistan's acts created some trouble for the UNMOGIP. Following the Rann of Kutch conflict, tensions were mounting within the Indian-controlled Kashmir. This was partly a result of India's arrest of the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah who had earlier visited Pakistan and China to mobilise greater support for a plebiscite in the Indian-Controlled part of Kashmir. The arrest resulted in a series of demonstrations which were orchestrated by two major groups: the Plebiscite Front (supporters of Sheikh Abdullah) and the Awami Action Committee (supporters of Kashmir's merger with Pakistan). They were demanding not only the release of their leader but also the plebiscite. The movement gradually became more aggressive to a point when a clandestine radio station, which identified itself as the "Voice of Kashmir" (Sade-e-Kashmir), announced that the Kashmiri freedom fighters would wage war against Indian imperialism.

Pakistan saw this as an opportunity to attack India and it supported the Kashmiri freedom fighters. Pakistan provided military and economic aid to the anti-Indian guerrillas.

37 Ibid., pp. 89-90
with a view to inciting and helping the Kashmiris to rebel against Indian authority. Pakistan also sent trained guerrillas into Indian-controlled Kashmir under the code name “Operation Gibraltar”\(^{41}\). The President Ayub Khan initially rejected this action on the grounds that it would trigger a chain of reactions leading to a general war\(^{42}\). Despite this, he proceeded with the plan partly because of the belief among Pakistani policy-makers that, “if Pakistan did not act then, India’s burgeoning military expansion would aggravate the power disparity so as to exclude an initiative later”\(^{43}\).

Moreover, the decision to proceed with sending troops to support the Kashmiri freedom fighters was prompted by several developments in Pakistan’s geo-strategic environment: (i) India was receiving significant aid from the US, Israel and the Soviet Union following the Sino-Indian border war of 1962; (ii) the Soviet’s pro-India approach to the Kashmir issue resulted in vetoing any resolutions calling for a UN plebiscite; (iii) and the Indian assertion that Kashmir had become an integral part of the Indian Union and its refusal to discuss the dispute\(^{44}\). Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters destabilised the presence of the UNMOGIP as the Azad Kashmir forces (Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir) were crossing the cease-fire line and entering Indian-controlled territory. This eventually resulted in Indian attacking Lahore (the second largest city in Pakistan) on 6 September 1965. The conflict lasted for 17 days.

However, trouble developed again in the early 1970s when India clashed with Pakistan for a third time. This time it was over the break up of Pakistan. India supported the Bengali freedom fighters in the East in a liberation war against Pakistan. Following this war a new cease-fire came into effect and in July 1972, following the Simla talks, India and

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\(^{40}\) Burke and Ziring, op. cit., p. 327.


\(^{42}\) Abdul Sattar, op. cit., p. 89.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 89.

Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. The new agreement follows the same course as the cease-fire line established by the Karachi Agreement in 1949, but with some minor alterations. However, India's position was that the mandate of the UNMOGIP had lapsed because it related specifically to the 1949 cease-fire agreement. In other words, from India's point of view the mandate and presence of the UNMOGIP was no longer valid. Conversely, Pakistan rejected India's position and continues to this day to recognise the 1949 Karachi Agreement.

Indeed, since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war over Bangladesh, the support of the two nations for the UNMOGIP have varied. The differences stem from the underlying disagreements between the two countries over the mandate and functions of the UNMOGIP. As noted above, India no longer supports nor recognises the presence of the UNMOGIP but consents to that presence only "because the UN wants it". This is because it has rejected all UN-implemented attempts and seeks a bilateral settlement. In contrast, Pakistan wants the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution passed in 1949. The 1949 resolution had two major functions: to monitor the cease-fire and hold a UN plebiscite. Pakistan has been calling on the UN to play a more active role in the Kashmir issue than simply maintaining its presence as a mere observer. Indeed, Pakistan has been calling for the full implementation of the 1949 UN resolution which includes the transformation of the cease-fire agreement into a truce and the arrangement of a plebiscite and the Kashmiris' right to self-determination.

In the late 1980s Pakistan also hosted the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). For almost ten years the Afghan-backed Soviet forces and the US-Pakistan sponsored Mujahideen were locked in a protracted conflict. This finally ended following the signing of the UN sponsored Geneva Accords in 1988. Some say that this was

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45 Rikhye, op. cit., p. 27.
46 Ibid., p. 27.
a Soviet initiative due to its reluctance to bear the costs of sponsoring further
counterinsurgency attacks against the Mujahideen as it was coming under enormous
pressures to devote more resources to domestic economic needs. Given these internal
pressures the USSR finally agreed to withdraw its troops. However, another source notes
that although the Soviet Union was willing to draft a timetable for phased and complete
withdrawal it was not willing to do so until there was an assurance that Pakistan would stop
interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Indeed, although the signing of the Geneva Accords was a positive step in the
Afghan-Pakistan relations, in reality the two accused each other of violations of the
agreement throughout the withdrawal operation. Pakistan lodged complaints to the UN that
the USSR-backed Afghan forces had violated Pakistan’s airspace, committed cross-border
firings and also facilitated an internal dissension against the government in Islamabad.
Afghanistan, on the other hand, accused Pakistan of supporting the military actions against
Kabul; engaging in propaganda activities hostile to the government; carrying materials and
weaponry across the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan; and providing military assistance
to the Mujahideen and directly involving its military in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union
threatened to slow down its withdrawal if Pakistan continued to support insurgent activities
across the border. In response, the US backed Pakistan by pointing out that Washington
would continue to supply arms to the freedom fighters.

47 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, Westview
Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies, ed. By Coral Bell, Canberra Studies in World
Affairs No. 21, Canberra: 1986, p. 35.
Apparently, in September 1984, there were a series of bombings and air raids launched against
Pakistan by Soviet-directed Afghan units over the Pakistani frontier town of Parachinar which cost at
least 100 lives. See Burke and Ziring, op. cit., p. 457. See also Yasmeen, (1986), op. cit., pp. 46-8.
The UNGOMAP took steps to monitor and investigate the accusations on both sides and the UN established several outposts on both sides to carry out the task of investigating and monitoring ground developments. In Pakistan they were set up in Peshawar and Quetta, and in Afghanistan in Kabul, Kunduz and Shindand. In an effort to deny the allegations Pakistan also requested the UN increase the size of its observer presence and establish more check-points on both sides.

The Soviet withdrawal was finally completed in February 1989. However, this did not result in the closing down of the UNGOMAP although it had already reached the end of its commitment. The UN, with the consent of the parties, requested an extension of the mandate. This was because one component of the mandate was to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees who had taken asylum both in Pakistan and Iran during the war and had not returned to Afghanistan during the stipulated time period. The Security Council extended the mandate for another 12 months, which was to be insufficient time to complete the mission. Although the UNGOMAP's mandate finally ended on 15 March 1990, Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary-General, saw the need to maintain a UN presence on the borders. Hence, under the initiative of the Secretary-General two UN headquarters offices were established with the consent of the two governments. These offices, one each in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as several sub-offices were established for the purpose of maintaining a continued assessment of the security situation on both sides of the border and also to monitor the relationships between the two countries.

Therefore, one could argue that during the Cold War Pakistan was at the receiving end of UN peacekeeping operations. At the same time, however, it also participated in external peace missions.

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51 The Boston Globe, 12 April 1989.
52 The Blue Helmet, op. cit., pp. 664-6.
III. PAKISTAN AS A UN PEACEKEEPER DURING THE COLD WAR

For most of the Cold War era Pakistan maintained a very low profile in external peace missions. Its participation in overseas assignments was extremely limited and inconsistent (see graph 3.1). Pakistan participated in only four peace missions during the Cold War. Three were during the assertive period of UN peacekeeping (1956-66).

Pakistan's participation in UN peace missions began in 1956 when the first official peacekeeping force, the UNEF, was created and established in the Sinai. Pakistan served as one of the members of the Advisory Committee established to advise the Secretary-General on matters concerning the composition of the UNEF and also the nature of its operation. Pakistan had also expressed its willingness to participate and contribute troops as part of the UNEF in the Gaza Strip. However, Egypt, which was the host nation for the UNEF, refused Pakistan's offer. As a host nation Egypt had the right to raise any concerns regarding the composition and nature of the operation. This was to ensure that partial forces are not included in the force. Egypt had several reasons for refusing to accept Pakistan's offer. Firstly, Egypt was concerned about Pakistan's desire to take a leadership role in a task which was intended to promote harmony and unity in the Arab world. Nasser saw Pakistani leadership as detrimental to his concept of Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism, and a threat to his own leadership in the Arab world.

Secondly, Pakistan, an ally of the US, had also been critical of Egypt's overall behaviour and its nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956. The Suez Canal was equally important to Pakistan as 56% of its exports and 49% of its imports passed through the Canal. Pakistan shared the Western view that Egypt lacked the technical and managerial

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54 Burke & Ziring, op. cit., p. 182.
55 Rizvi, op. cit., p. 72.
56 Burke & Ziring, op. cit., p. 182.
capacity to run the canal on its own if it was nationalised\textsuperscript{57}. Although Pakistan did not question Egypt's right to nationalise a "commercial concern", the Pakistan Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq Chowdhury raised the question as the extent to which the exercise of that right affected other countries, as many nations were "vitally concerned with the maintenance of the freedom of navigation in the Canal"\textsuperscript{58}. Pakistan's stance now augmented Egypt's concerns about Pakistan's ability to carry out its job as a UN peacekeeper impartially.

At the same time, India too had played a role in influencing Egypt's reservations against Pakistan's representation in the UNEF. Given its growing bitter and strained

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 182-5.
relations with Pakistan over Kashmir, India was also not keen to have Pakistan’s troops in the UNEF\textsuperscript{59}. India had been forging good relations with Egypt as part of the non-aligned movement. In fact, Nehru and Nasser had a strong personal and diplomatic rapport. These relations were further strengthened when India condemned Israel’s attack on Egypt. India now apparently used its good relations to influence Egypt’s attitude to Pakistan’s offer. As a result, Pakistan did not contribute troops to the Sinai peacekeeping operation.

Pakistan’s first visible contribution was to the 1960 peacekeeping operation in the Congo. The termination of colonial rule in 1960 marked a new era of statehood for the Congo. However, the transition to establishing an independent democratic government was not smooth. In fact, the Congo entered into a civil war as numerous political and tribal factions fought for political power, which caused the secession of certain provinces. In one such province, Katanga, faction leaders were demanding separate rule and autonomy. The former Belgian colonists who amid their departure intervened by supporting and assisting certain factions further aggravated the break-up of and the civil war in the Congo.

Pakistan was not only critical of the interference of the Belgian forces for aggravating tensions in the Congo but also supported the UN efforts to manage the conflict. Following the Congolese President, Joseph Kasavubu’s request for a UN intervention a peacekeeping force, the ONUC, was established to supervise the withdrawal of the Belgium forces and also to maintain law and order in the country. Pakistan did not deploy troops as part of ONUC. Instead, its participation came in the form of provision of logistics support elements and staff personnel. It contributed 400 logistics personnel who were drawn from four independent Pakistan Army Supply Corps (ACS)\textsuperscript{60}. Pakistan’s logistics personnel were entrusted with the responsibility of transporting weapons, equipment, stores and rations.

\textsuperscript{58} Government of Pakistan, \textit{Handout}, dated 14 August 1956, Cited in Ibid., p. 185.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{50 Years of Peacekeeping}, Pakistan Army In Service of Peace, Military Document, Rawalpindi,
throughout the Congo and also provide assistance for inland movement of peacekeeping forces.

While serving in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, Pakistan made another troop commitment to the UN peace mission in West Irian (1962). In fact, Pakistan was the only country that contributed a large infantry contingent to West Irian. The response came when the UN was in desperate need of ground forces. The UNSF, which was mandated to oversee the withdrawal of Dutch troops and also the handing over of the former Dutch colony to Indonesia, was facing some difficulty in mobilising sufficient support for ground forces. The UN had urgently requested 1000 men who were to be assigned as part of the Temporary Executive Authority to maintain law and order in West Irian. However, it had certain reservations about the choice of peacekeepers. The UN only wanted politically neutral countries to provide the ground forces. Therefore, given the urgency for deployment the UN turned towards some countries in the region, for example, Malaya. However, Malaya had already deployed a large contingent to the Congo and declined to make its services available to the UN in West Irian. The UN was in the difficult situation of having to implement the mandate before the security environment in West Irian deteriorated any further. So, Pakistan contributed an infantry contingent of 1500 troops which made up the entire ground forces of the UNSF. Moreover, Pakistan also contributed additional 110 members drawn from the Pakistani Navy who manned nine vessels used for transporting the security forces and for patrolling duties. Pakistan's Gen. Said Uddin Khan was appointed as the force commander of the UNSF.

Pakistan's decision to make a large troop commitment to West Irian can be seen as part of its strategy to strengthen its relations with one of the biggest Islamic nations in Asia,
Indonesia. Initially, in the early 1950s Indonesian-Indian relations were friendly. This can be seen in Nehru’s visit to Jakarta in 1950 when Sukarno publicly called Nehru his ‘father’. Moreover, Indonesia like India had also adopted secularism, non-alignment and socialism as the main pillars of its foreign policy. However, the late 1950s saw some rising tensions between New Delhi and Jakarta over several issues. For example, Jakarta was annoyed by New Delhi’s push for a conference of non-aligned countries instead of following up on the Bandung meeting in 1954 which had proposed an Asian-African Conference. Secondly, the China factor also shaped India’s relations with Indonesia. When Sino-Indian relations were deteriorating in the early 1960s Sukarno was beginning to express admiration for China as “a truly anti-imperialist, progressive power”. This coincided with Pakistan also beginning to develop its links with China. In other words, the China factor in some way influenced both Indonesia and Pakistan policies in the same direction.

It was in this context that Pakistan decided to pledge its support for one of South East Asia’s biggest Muslim nations, Indonesia. Hence, Pakistan served uninterrupted in the UNSF until the mission was drawn to a close in April 1963. This was the only outstandingly large troop commitment by Pakistan during the Cold War era. It was also the first mission Pakistan took charge of single-handedly and it ensured the smooth withdrawal of Dutch troops without any clashes with the Indonesian army. Consequently, the Pakistani army won the admiration of President Sukarno who claimed that “it was because of Pakistani troops that Indonesia and Pakistan came so close together, they were Pakistan's best ambassadors”.

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65 *Statesman*, 9 June 1950.
66 Burke & Ziring, op. cit., p. 67.
68 Ibid., p. 307.
69 *50 Years of Peacekeeping*, op. cit.
In 1964, Pakistan deployed unarmed soldiers as part of the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) to monitor the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Pakistan's role and functions in the Yemen were limited to observing, certifying and reporting on the adherence of respective governments to the disengagement agreement. This agreement called on Saudi Arabia to end activities in support of the royalist in Yemen and on Egypt to withdraw its troops which had been supporting revolutionary factions.

For almost 25 years following its involvement in Yemen (1964-89), Pakistan remained inactive in UN peace missions abroad (see graph 3.1). Perhaps this because of its pre-occupation with its own national security concerns on either side of its borders. On the eastern frontier, Pakistan's rising tensions with India has dominated much of the regional dispute in South Asia. One of the major stumbling blocks in Indo-Pakistan relations was (and still is) the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan have fought two wars over the disputed territory since their independence in 1948. The second of these in the 1960s coincided with an increase in UN peacekeeping activities. However, as discussed earlier in part two of this chapter, Pakistan was preoccupied with developments taking place in Kashmir following India's assertion that Kashmir had become an integral part of the Indian union. Pakistan was also frustrated with India's refusal to discuss the issue of Kashmir any further which resulted in Pakistan supporting the anti-India movements in the Indian-controlled Kashmir. This eventually led to a direct military confrontation with Indian forces in September 1965.

Within five years of 1965 war Pakistan was confronted by yet another threat to its national security. This time it was in East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh. The genesis of the conflict and the eventual break-up of Pakistan are often traced back to the geographical, social and political differences that existed between the East and West wings.

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70 *The Blue Helmet*, op. cit., p. 125.
at the time of independence. While 'United Pakistan' often alluded to the two-nation concept with respect to asserting its equality with India, little attention was paid to the concerns and discontentment that were building up in East Pakistan. The East Wing had been neglected in almost every respect. The bureaucratic-elite that ruled 'United Pakistan', pursued policies that denied the East Wing due share of power and resources. The economic surplus of the East Wing was redirected to the industrial and economic growth of West Pakistan. The cultural identities of the East Pakistanis were also negated. These factors widened the already existing rift between the two wings. In fact, by the mid-1960s the Awami League of East Pakistan which drew its support from the rising East Pakistani entrepreneurial class, students, government officials, openly began to demand a restructuring of the political system.

The situation worsened in the early 1970s when Pakistani forces were sent to East Pakistan to contain the continuing protests and demonstrations against the Central government by Bengali freedom fighters. Soon after the military crackdown the Indian Government held an emergency meeting of its political Affairs Committee to discuss the possibility of Indian intervention in support of the Bangladesh freedom fighters. Hence, on 31 March 1971 the two Houses of the Indian Parliament adopted a unanimous resolution which demanded the immediate cessation of "the use of force and the massacre of defenceless people". This was followed by India's support for the Bengali separatists.

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75 Ibid., pp. 110-11.

which manifested in sending armed forces across international boundaries to support the break-up of 'United Pakistan'.

Thus, until the mid-1970s Pakistan was preoccupied with negotiating an arrangement with Bangladesh and also in dealing with the after-effects of the war which involved the repatriation of the 93,000 prisoners who were incarcerated during the 1971 conflict. Although a meeting between Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi six months after the war resulted in the signing of the Simla agreement, Pakistan's full and open acknowledgement of Bangladesh's independence was still dependent on the issue of repatriation of POWs\textsuperscript{77}. Pakistan raised the matter in the International Court of Justice which did not produce positive results, and it was only in August 1973 following Bhutto's signal to New Delhi that recognition was possible that the repatriation process began\textsuperscript{78}. However, Pakistan had yet to make its recognition of Bangladesh official and until it did, India held captive 195 soldiers accused of war crimes. Later, in February 1974 the Pakistan Government made official its acceptance and recognition of Bangladesh and the 195 soldiers were released. The fact that Pakistan was preoccupied with its own affairs relating to the break-up of 'United Pakistan' clearly explains its limited involvement in external peace operations.

In fact, this trend continued. Five years later Pakistan was pre-occupied with another security problem on its Western frontier. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 posed significant security problems for Pakistan. During this time, which marked the beginning of another phase of the Cold War, Pakistan became the 'front-line' for the US to mount a military campaign against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The refugee camps established on Pakistan's borders were also used as guerrilla training centres and the Pakistani Government became a conduit for the supply of weapons to guerrillas fighting

\textsuperscript{77} For discussion on the contents of the Simla Accords see Burke & Ziring, op. cit., pp. 419-21.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 421.
inside Afghanistan\textsuperscript{79}. Thus, Pakistan's intense involvement in the situation did not permit it to participate in external missions. However, this inaction coincided with UN peacekeeping being dormant for almost 10 years from 1978 (see Appendix 1).

In the late 1980s the UN peacekeeping started to experience a renewal in its level of activity. Graph 3.1 shows that the period 1980-89 saw the creation of six new peace operations which were launched in the late 1980s (see Appendix 1). However, Pakistan still did not make any external contributions to peacekeeping operations. This is due to the fact that intense fighting continued even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Najibullah army clashed with the Mujahideen over the eastern Afghan City of Jalalabad which also shares border trading posts with Pakistan. The clash was so severe that the Afghan army suffered high casualties; at least 1000 troops and many civilians were killed in the conflict. Pakistan came under severe attack within the UN by both the Soviet Union and the Afghan Foreign Minister, Abdul Wakil, for its continued support of the Mujahideen and also for violating the Geneva accords signed in 1988. The Afghan foreign Minister called Pakistan "the new aggressor" orchestrating the siege of Jalalabad\textsuperscript{80}. Pakistan denied such charges and agreed to permit more UN military checkpoints along the Afghan-Pakistan border where the illegal provision of military aid to Afghani rebels was suspected to have increased. These regional tensions and conflicts which posed a major and direct threat to Pakistan's national security clearly took precedence over Pakistan's involvement in external peace missions.

It was only in 1989 that Pakistan's commitment to UN peacekeeping began to change. It participated as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) which was established and deployed in April 1989 to oversee Namibia's transition to independence. However, Pakistan's contribution was rather small. The UN had authorised strength of 4650

\textsuperscript{79} For more discussion on the various activities carried out in Pakistan's territory see Yasmeen (1986), op. cit., pp. 46-7.
soldiers, 850 officers, 300 military observers, 1700 logistics soldiers and 100 headquarters staff. Pakistan did not make any troop commitments but deployed 20 military observers, civilian police and electoral commissioners as part of the UNTAG.

Pakistan's participation in the UNTAG can be seen as part of its commitment to the process of decolonisation and its support for the independence of colonised states. As an ex-colonial state, Pakistan has a history of actively assisting other colonised states' struggle for independence. It had campaigned actively in the UN for independence and self-determination for a number of African states, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and the Sudan and following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, Pakistan provided technical assistance for its economic development and growth. Pakistan had provided similar assistance to Namibia. In 1976 following its recognition of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) as the representative of the People of Namibia, Pakistan extended a small financial donation (worth 500,000 Pakistani rupees) to assist Namibia in its struggle for the right of self determination and independence. Moreover, in the 1980s "Pakistan also supported the UN sanctions against South Africa and also endorsed the UN-initiated efforts for Namibia's independence". So, when the call came for assistance and support for Namibia's cause Pakistan, although preoccupied with its own security concerns, pledged a small contribution. This can be seen more as a positive gesture rather than real participation in UN peacekeeping.

Nevertheless, Pakistan's involvement in Namibia can be also seen as setting the stage for greater involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. As the Soviet presence in Afghanistan came to an end Pakistan was also realising that Washington's attitude towards Islamabad was gradually changing from one of close alliance

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82 Ibid., p. 14.
to growing distance. More importantly, it was beginning to see the changes in its geo-
strategic environment which created the need to reassess its position in the international
system and to re-orient its foreign policy outlook. An examination of the security context in
which Pakistan now operates and participates in post-Cold War peace operations follows.

IV. THE NEW SECURITY CONTEXT & POST-COLD WAR UN PEACEKEEPING

Since the end of the Cold War Pakistan has been operating in a new security context. Its
security challenges have heightened against the backdrop of its domestic situation and
changing geo-strategic environment. Pakistan's relations with India have remained
unchanged since 1990 and the Kashmir issue continues to be a major stumbling block to
normalisation. It can be argued that the new security context is one that has been
characterised by Pakistan's growing isolation, reflected in the changing nature of its
bilateral relations.

The internal challenges confronting Pakistan are vast and serious in nature. According to Thornton, Pakistan has become more an insecure state at present than it has
was fifty years ago. He point out that this is due to its troublesome domestic situation
which also affect its external relations. Pakistan has a weak political institution and the
1990s saw political leadership constantly shifting between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif, and finally a military coup. Pakistan has also experienced political, constitutional
and social crises which have significantly weakened it politically and economically. For
example, in 1997 the government of Pakistan was confronted with a major constitutional
crisis arising from confrontations between the presidency and the judicial system. Much of
this was due to political corruption, the lack of strong leadership and the lack of
accountability in Pakistan. The weak political institutions obviously provide an opening for
the Army to step in and take control of the situation. This is not new in Pakistan. In a
praetorian state like Pakistan, the army plays an extremely potent and intrusive role in the
civil and political affairs, not because it wants to, but, as Cohen points out, because of the
lack of faith in the civilian leaders’ ability to rule85. Indeed, Pakistan has spent almost half
its 52 years under an authoritarian regime. In October 1999 Pakistan’s democracy was put to
the test once again when a military coup, under the leadership of the Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) General Perwaz Musharaff, overturned the civil government and replaced Nawaz
Sharif.

The point is that Pakistan’s internal troubles are not insignificant. The failure of the
democratic experience and economic problems has often led to Pakistan being described as
a ‘failing state’, if not ‘failed’. For example, Kaplan predicts a deepening conflict within
Pakistan along religious, tribal and ethnic lines. He predicts the institutional meltdown of
Pakistan against the backdrop of globalisation and asserts that “Pakistan in fact could be a
Yugoslavia in the making but with nuclear weapons”86.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s former foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, speaking at a
recent Symposium on Pakistan in Western Australia in October 2000, noted that “the kinds
of images created about Pakistan depends on the kind of lens one puts on”87. He also noted
that the general view held by the Western world about Pakistan is mostly negative. Aziz
holds the view that Pakistan’s present political dilemma and economic crisis is an outcome
of the Cold War situation. While being optimistic about Pakistan’s ability to survive the
present crises, he notes: “it is both sad and ironic that the world powers that initiated and
nurtured the entire operation in Afghanistan suddenly turned their back as soon as the
Russian departed from Afghanistan and left Pakistan alone to handle all economic and

84 Thornton, op.cit., p. 187.
87 Mr. Sartaj Aziz, ‘Gloomy Predictions About Pakistan: Reality or Wishful Thinking?’ paper
presented at Pakistan Symposium, University of Western Australia, Perth, October 2000. Mr Aziz
has held several portfolios, Finance Minister (1990-93) and Foreign Minister (August 1998-October
political consequences of this painful but historic saga. As if to add some icing to this cake, we now have the gloomy predictions, [as asserted by Kaplan] about the future of Pakistan\textsuperscript{88}.

Indeed, the Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Gulf war of 1990-91 have all resulted in new realities which have increased significantly Pakistan's growing isolation in the new geo-strategic environment. The first reality has been a perceived tilt in the balance of power toward Pakistan's adversary and neighbour, India. This tilt has resulted from two major developments: firstly, a change in Washington's pro-Pakistan policies and attitudes and secondly, a renewal in the Indo-US relations.

For most of the post-Cold War era, US-Pakistan relations have generally remained tense and even strained. It must be noted that the US interest in Pakistan is crisis driven. As Cohen puts it, "as far as South Asia is concerned, it took a crisis to build a policy - or at least to rouse U.S. strategic interests"\textsuperscript{89}. Indeed, when Afghanistan became less of an issue in superpower politics following the Soviet withdrawal, the importance of Pakistan as a 'front-line' state for the US also gradually dissipated and the direct outcome of this led to the end of the strong and positive US-Pakistan bilateral relations.

These relations have remained tense over various conflicting issues and policies. One of these issues relates to Pakistan's nuclear programme. The US has stood firm on Pakistan's nuclear programme, an issue that was conveniently ignored throughout the 1980s. So important was Pakistan to the US of that time that, according to Yasmeen, "Washington [even] undermined moves by US congressman to scuttle the aid relationship and forces

\textsuperscript{88} Sartaj Aziz, op. cit., p. 5.
through the Pressler Amendment in 1984\textsuperscript{90}. However, the Pressler Amendment has been revived thus resulting in the suspension of all aid packages including the incomplete F-16 aircraft deal. Unless Islamabad is willing to concede to Washington's demands for 'capping' its nuclear program these sanctions may not be lifted entirely. In response, Pakistan has refused to concede to the US demands. Instead, Islamabad has criticised Washington for the discriminatory nature of the amendment which only targets Pakistan and not India, given that the latter is also actively developing the nuclear bomb.

However, one can argue that from the mid-nineties onwards the US-Pakistan relations have seen some improvements, especially on the issue of the aid ban. Washington reviewed the Pressler Amendment and decided to waive the aid ban. Under the Brown Amendment, Congress approved delivery to Pakistan of US weaponry worth $368 million which included C-3 Orion naval-reconnaissance aircraft and Harpoon antiship missiles and artillery\textsuperscript{91}. However, the issue of the F-16s has remained controversial, although Washington has agreed to reimburse Pakistan and not deliver those aircraft. Despite these slight improvements, Washington still maintains its distance from Pakistan as a number of continue to disrupt the relations. These include the inability of Islamabad to control terrorist activities within its borders; the belief that Pakistan has been harbouring terrorists and supporting the Taliban; nuclear proliferation; and the reluctance to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Moreover, its weak economy, poor economic management and corruption have made Pakistan less and less attractive to the US as an ally. Since the Gulf war Pakistan's economy has plummeted. Saddam Hussain's invasion of Kuwait caused severe economic problems for Pakistan as its oil import bill increased by $1bn at the same time as exports to

the Gulf region fell by 30%\textsuperscript{92}. The war also resulted in the repatriation of 100,000 Pakistani migrant workers from Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq, thus reducing the remittances earned from these migrant workers from $1.8bn in 1989-90 to $700 million in 1990-91\textsuperscript{93}. Since then Pakistan's economy has not seen much improvement. Despite implementing reforms in 1994, inflation was still very high (between 12 to 15\%\) and Pakistan's foreign debt also increased by twofold from 15 billion in 1990 to 35 billion in 2000\textsuperscript{94}. The total number of people living in abject poverty has also doubled from 24 million in 1990 to 48 million in 2000. In addition, Pakistan's total trade deficit soared to US $727 million\textsuperscript{95}.

Arguably, Pakistan's opportunities to receive foreign assistance have been partly diminished by its nuclear programme. For example, in November 2000 the IMF sanctioned monetary assistance worth US$3.5 billion to the present military regime on the provision that Pakistan sign the CTBT and 'roll-back' its nuclear program\textsuperscript{96}. As a consequence, unless Pakistan achieves some results in its economic performance it is possible that Washington will remain less keen to establish strong ties with Islamabad.

In contrast, the US has been aggressively pursuing a policy of engaging with Pakistan's major threat and adversary, India\textsuperscript{97}. Indo-US relations have taken a new turn since India's economic liberalisation in 1991. India has attracted large-scale foreign investment such as IBM and Coca-Cola who were once embittered by India's closed-door economic policies. This investment has made a huge impact on the newly structured Indian economy\textsuperscript{98}. Moreover, India's emergence as a world leader in information technology (IT) has not gone unnoticed by Washington which has been forging close ties with New Delhi as

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 116.
\textsuperscript{94} Inter Press Service, 13 November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{95} Asia Pulse, 13 November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{96} Inter Press Service, 13 November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{97} There is some scepticism as to the extent to which the Americans will support a once pro-Soviet and anti-American India. See Cohen (1999), op. cit., p. 195.
\textsuperscript{98} John Adams, 'India: Much Achieved, much to achieve', in India & Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, eds., Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisberg and Dennis Kux, Woodrow Wilson Centre and
the latter has been producing IT powerhouses staffed by world class computer engineers and funded by foreign investors. The growing economic relations between the two countries are expected to provide an incentive to manage other political issues as lobby groups push the US Congress to pass legislation that might be favourable to India.

However, it might be worth pointing out that at the time of writing the US has continued to support the imposition of sanctions against New Delhi for its nuclear tests in 1998. On the military front, although the US has extended some training facilities to Indian military personnel, it has refused full co-operation with the flying turkey, the Light Combat Aircraft. But one cannot ignore India’s ongoing efforts to renew ties with the US. The Indian government has dropped its traditional opposition to extra-regional naval presence in the Indian Ocean and has conducted joint naval exercises with the US. Moreover, in November 2000 India and the US established a Joint Working Group (JWG) to establish a co-operative partnership in the areas of UN peacekeeping and other UN activities. The JWG, the first institutionalisation of bilateral relations between the two countries, focuses on command structures, logistical support, and training for UN peacekeepers.

The late 1990s witnessed a growth in Indo-Russia relations under the Putin administration. As shown in the preceding chapter this can be seen in Putin’s visit to India in October 2000 which resulted in the two countries signing a new treaty of friendship and defence partnership. In contrast, Putin’s visit to Islamabad at the same time could be seen as nothing more than a positive gesture. Undoubtedly it marks an important turning point in Russia-Pakistan rapprochement. However, given the bitter Cold War experiences between Islamabad and Moscow, it is argued that Pakistan is likely to enjoy the kind of relations that


India currently has with Russia\(^{103}\). Therefore, it is arguable that the significant interest Russia and the US have shown towards India has tilted the balance of power in South Asia in that direction.

What is even more worrying for Pakistan has been the Russian proposal to develop a *troika* relationship between Russia, India and China, although there have been no clear signs of this development. For example, in his national address President Putin expressed a desire for India, China and Russia to be part of the "development of an architecture of a new international relations as a whole, in Asia"\(^{104}\).

This move to establish a network between the three countries comes against a background of the steadily improving Sino-Indian bilateral relations in the post-Cold War era. India and China have made vast improvements since the early nineties in a number of areas. This began with a Joint Working Group to establish peace and tranquillity on the disputed area along the Sino-Indian border. It has seen some further improvement with the first exchange of maps of the middle sector of the disputed area between India and China\(^{105}\). This gesture, an initiative of Beijing, was intended to clarify the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and also to find a speedy resolution to the Sino-India border dispute.

Sino-Indian interests have also merged on several other areas. The two have been exchanging views on the need for the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to consider the interests of developing countries\(^{106}\). China has agreed to send self-funded students to India for IT and English Language training. At the same time both countries have also agreed on greater co-operation in IT partnership and software development. Although some issues,


\(^{104}\) Russia has no objections to joint action with India, China', *ITAR Tass* (Moscow, Dow Jones Interactive), 30 September, 2000. See also 'Putin Stands for Russia-Strategic-India Strategic Co-operation', *Xinhua*, 1 October, 2000.

\(^{105}\) *Press Trust of India*, (New Delhi), November, 2000.
such as China's development of nuclear missiles and India's testing of nuclear bombs, continue to be irritants the general pattern has been overwhelmingly positive.

However, some scepticism has developed about the steadily growing Indo-China relations. It is said that India is being used in the US geo-strategic game to contain the growing Chinese power in Asia\textsuperscript{107}. Although the US has as emerged the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era there are some concerns about China emerging as the "unchallenged leader of Asia"\textsuperscript{108}. Perhaps, Washington's desire to retain global leadership has led to this latest concern and its close relations with India.

Notwithstanding this, the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan has diminished significantly. With the USSR no longer a threat Washington has little political and geo-strategic interests, if any, in Pakistan. As Pakistan is increasingly faced with its own internal problems its attraction to the outside world has been diminishing. Thus, Pakistan has become increasingly isolated while some of its old allies improve links New Delhi. This has heightened Pakistan's security concerns and has consequently forced Pakistan to review its security management strategy and look for new options to deter the perceived Indian threat.

Meanwhile, as argued in chapter one, the UN itself has been also finding new self-expression in the international system since the end of the Cold War. This has been demonstrated by the growth in its membership and the UN's growing level of activity in the maintenance of international peace and security. It has carried out more than 45 peacekeeping operations within the last ten years since 1990.

It is against the backdrop of the growing relevance of the UN that Pakistan has started to re-define its foreign policy. Indeed, Pakistan has been giving greater attention to the UN with a view to identifying itself as part of the larger international community.

\textsuperscript{106} Xinhua, (Beijing), November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{107} 'Columnist Feels US Tilt Toward India is Warranted to Counter Chinese Threat to its Global Supremacy', \textit{World News Connection}, 10 October, 2000.
\textsuperscript{108} 'Columnist Feels US Tilt Toward India is Warranted to Counter Chinese Threat to its Global
Concomitantly, the idea of becoming a good international citizen has gained popularity in various governments’ foreign policies. In one of her speeches, the former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto pointed out that "[Pakistan] is proving that [it is] willing to commit [its] prestige, energy, resources and above all the lives of its citizens to fulfil its international responsibilities". Thus, in 1995 Islamabad extended full support to the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace endorsing the ideas for strengthening the UN’s peace and security apparatus. In his statement, former Defence Minister Aftab Shahban Mirani reinforced Pakistan’s "unwavering support for an active role by the UN for the preservation of international peace and security". The continuity of this new attitude can also be seen in the present military regime. Musharraf reiterated that "[Pakistan] places [its] firm belief in the indispensable role of the UN for the achievement of an environment of peace and security which would benefit the socio-economic development of the human race". What we see here is a series of pledges which to some extent are indicative of Pakistan’s growing desire to be part of the UN and the wider international community.

The growing emphasis on the UN and the international community as a whole has also led to Pakistan developing an active peacekeeping policy as part of its foreign policy agenda. Indeed, Islamabad has been taking a new and active approach to UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. This new activism has been in line with Islamabad’s identification of UN peacekeeping as a "top priority" in its foreign policy since the early nineties. Islamabad has also pledged to increase participation and troop contribution in the international peacekeeping exercise. In 1995 the Pakistan Foreign Office asserted that

111 The Muslim, (Karachi), April, 1994.
Pakistan "will go out to assist the UN in peacekeeping operations to a much greater extent.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Graph 3.2: Pakistan's Participation in UN Peace Missions (1960-1999)}

![Graph showing Pakistan's participation in UN peace missions from 1948-1999](image)

Source: The Inter-Service Public Relations, Rawalpindi, Pakistan; 50 Years of Peacekeeping: Pakistan Army In Service of Peace, Military Document, Rawalpindi, Pakistan: 1995; and the Department of Public Information, UN, New York.

At the inauguration of an international Seminar on peacekeeping operations in 1994, President Farooq Leghari pointed out that "Pakistan not only values peacekeeping operations for the maintenance of general peace and security but has a commitment towards

the role that Pakistan plays"\textsuperscript{115}. On the same occasion the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Abdul Wahid Kakar asserted that "Pakistan's contributions to the United Nations peacekeeping operations will continue in keeping with its time honoured traditions of supporting right over wrong and freedom over oppression"\textsuperscript{116}. Pakistan has also expressed its support directly at the UN. Speaking in the General Assembly's special Political Committee in 1992, Pakistani delegate Mateen-ur-Rehman Murtaza pledged Pakistan's increased support to United Nations activities in the area of peacekeeping around the world\textsuperscript{117}. Therefore, it is clear that Pakistan's commitment to UN peacekeeping has changed in the post-Cold War era.

In line with its new commitment Pakistan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations abroad has also gained significant momentum. Graph 3.2 contrasts Pakistan's participation in UN peace missions during and after the Cold War, and shows a quantum leap in Pakistan's participation in UN peace missions from four during the Cold War to 25 since its involvement in Namibia in 1989. The period 1990 to 1994 has been the most active and assertive era of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping. Within the first four years of the post-Cold War era, the UN launched a total of 18 new peace missions, of which seven were large-scale peacekeeping operations. Pakistan's response during this period has been remarkable. It participated and contributed troops to 13 of the 18 peace missions in 11 locations: Kuwait (1991), El Salvador (1991), Western Sahara (1992), Cambodia (1992), Former Yugoslavia (1992), Somalia (1992), Mozambique (1992), Rwanda (1993), Liberia (1993), Georgia (1993) and Haiti (1993) (see Appendix 3).

Subsequently, from 1995 to 1998 the UN established another 18 new peace missions and Pakistan continued to respond actively in this phase as well. It participated in

\textsuperscript{115} "Pakistan Committed to UN Peace Cause', \textit{The Nation} (Islamabad) May, 1994.
\textsuperscript{116} Mushahid Hussain, 'Pakistan Army and Politics of Peacekeeping', \textit{The Nation} (Islamabad), May, 1994.
\textsuperscript{117} Pakistan Praises UN Peacekeeping Operations', \textit{Frontier Post}, (Peshawar), 15 November, 1992.
10 of the new missions. These included the five UN peace missions in the former Yugoslavia (these were launched in Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prevlaka and Eastern Slavonia); three in Africa (two missions in Angola and one in Sierra Leone); and one in Central America (a new mission to Haiti). Pakistan's active response demonstrates that it has been participating in line with the new quantitative demands for UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era.

V. MOTIVATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION

It could be argued that Pakistan's active participation in external UN peace missions in the post-Cold War era is primarily motivated by financial benefits. However, the question arises as to the extent to which these benefits could help Pakistan recover from its soaring external debts. Although the UN pays a salary of US$988 per month per soldier, the national governments pays its military forces based on its own internal scales and calculations. So at the national level, the foreign exchanges may bring additional revenues to the country's treasury.

However, Pakistan's external debts are bigger than the earnings from participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Despite implementing reforms in 1994 inflation was still very high (between 12 to 15 %), and Pakistan's foreign debt has also increased by twofold from 15 billion in 1990 to 35 billion in 2000.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, Pakistan's total trade deficit soared to US $727 million.\textsuperscript{119} Given Pakistan's deplorable economic situation the earnings from its external participation are too small to suggest that economic benefits are a major determinant.

\textsuperscript{118} Inter Press Service, 13 November, 2000.
\textsuperscript{119} Asia Pulse, 13 November, 2000.
Moreover, the UN still owes Pakistan outstanding payments. In 1997, Pakistan was ranked the ninth state to which the UN owed outstanding debts\textsuperscript{120}. The UN owed Pakistan a total sum of US$45.4 million. This figure increased even further in 2000 to a sum of $50 million. Although financial gains may be as source of attraction, they are too small to suggest that they create a major difference for Pakistan's economy. In fact, doing so may be under-valuing some of its vital national interests.

\textbf{1. International Image-Building}

Indeed, Pakistan is motivated by a range of political and security related interests. Firstly, Pakistan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations helps to re-shape its image in a positive light and create a favourable international impression. To a very large extent Pakistan's international image has been tarnished by its own domestic problems and realities such as its weak political institutions, constantly changing leaderships, constitutional crises, military coup and rule, and a poor and unproductive economy. Moreover, Pakistan has also been placed on the watch list as a potential "terrorist state" for harbouring terrorists. It has been accused for supporting "terrorist movements" in Kashmir and Punjab in India, and there are also allegations that the Arab-based Islamic militants living in parts of Pakistan, in particular Peshawar, have been fuelling tensions against Kabul in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{121}. The inability of the government to control terrorist acts within its borders has significantly affected Pakistan's international image.

Pakistan's weak domestic platform not only portrays the country as a 'failing state', but also sends a very negative message to the outside world impacting heavily on its foreign and bilateral relations. Hence, if Pakistan wants the help of its partners and allies then it needs to re-shape international opinions and make itself attractive to its external friends.

\textsuperscript{120} UN Documents, Department of Finance.  
\textsuperscript{121} Tahir Amin, Pakistan in 1993: Some Dramatic Changes', \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. 34, No. 2, February
Peacekeeping serves an important means for Pakistan to demonstrate its capability and credibility, and also to portray itself as having the potential and capacity, in spite of its internal challenges, to play an active role in global peace and security.

2. UN Support for Kashmir

Secondly, Pakistan's active participation in peacekeeping is politically motivated. Pakistan supports the UN and its peace maintenance role with a view to steering greater international focus and attention on the long-standing Kashmir issue. To do this, Pakistan needs to strengthen its presence within the UN through which multilateral diplomacy can be realised. From Pakistan's point of view the UN provides a forum for developing states to influence the behaviour of major powers whose Security Council resolutions influence Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir dispute. In the General Assembly in 1998, Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff asserted that,

"the United Nations, the major powers and the international community have a responsibility to support and facilitate a solution of the Kashmir issue. We request the UN secretary-general to take appropriate initiatives to implement Security Council resolutions on Kashmir and to ease tension and build confidence. In particular, we urge that UNMOGIP be strengthened and its mandate enhanced. The Security Council should regularly monitor the volatile situation along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir."123.

1994, p. 197.
123 Virtually all Pakistani leaders in international forums make similar statements. UN Doc. UN General Assembly, 23, September, 1998.
Recently, Pakistan has even called on the UN to appoint a Special Representative and a fact-finding team to make spot assessments on India's adherence to the LoC\textsuperscript{124}. Pakistan's support for UN peacekeeping can be seen as part of its effort to be in a position to pressure the UN for an increased role in Kashmir. This can be seen with Pakistan's willingness to play an active role in the recent peacekeeping operation in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This is the second time that Pakistan has deployed troops as part of an international force in Indonesia. The first time, as previously mentioned, was in the 1960s when it assisted with the withdrawal of Dutch forces from Indonesia.

This time Pakistan's support came for the cause of ethnic separatism in the Indonesian-controlled East Timor and for holding a plebiscite. Pakistan strongly supports the UN's plebiscite in East Timor and has extended full support, including the deployment of 1000 troops as part UNTAET in Dili. A major reason for Pakistan's active involvement in East Timor is to gain support for a demand for similar UN resolutions in Kashmir. This is evident in a statement released by the foreign office in Islamabad which reminded the UN that "to deny the Kashmiris the same rights which have been advocated and secured for East Timor is a travesty of justice and democratic beliefs and ideals"\textsuperscript{125}. However, Washington has criticised Islamabad for drawing "facile analogies that don't apply"\textsuperscript{126}. Pakistan rejects this criticism. Hence, by participating in East Timor it sets a precedent which is aimed at giving Pakistan greater leverage to demand a similar remedy for Kashmir.

\textsuperscript{124} Radio Pakistan, BBC Monitoring, 8 October, 2000.
\textsuperscript{125} 'Pakistan urges UN to undertake East Timor-like Process in Kashmir', BBC Worldwide monitoring (Dow Jones Interactive), 13 August, 1999.
\textsuperscript{126} 'Pakistan rejects US view that Kashmir has no Parallels to East Timor', Agence France-Presse, 9
3. The Islamic Factor

Pakistan's Islamic identity and the desire to increase its presence and political status in the Muslim world have also been a major source of motivation for its new activism in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. This can be shown by Islamabad's decision to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the shocking brutality of the Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims created a major outcry not only in the international community but also in the Muslim world. Emotions ran so high in many Muslim countries that some responded almost instantaneously to the peacekeeping operation. A number of Muslim states namely, Iran, Palestine, Morocco, Malaysia, Egypt together decided to send nearly 17,000 troops as part of the UNPROFOR\textsuperscript{127}. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) also established a joint-working network with the UN and the European Union to bring peace to troubled Bosnia.

Against this backdrop of overwhelming involvement by the larger Muslim community, Nawaz Sharif wrote a letter to the OIC Secretary-General Hamid al Gabid, expressing Pakistan's desire to work in concert with Muslim countries\textsuperscript{128}. In 1993 Pakistan joined Iran and Tunisia in forming the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia. This later resulted in Tehran and Islamabad combining their efforts to find a solution to the Bosnian humanitarian crisis. In 1995 Pakistan's General Waheed Kakar visited Tehran to help develop strategies to assist the Bosnian Muslims who were increasingly the targets of Serbian aggression\textsuperscript{129}.

Firstly, Pakistan's participation in Bosnia was largely motivated by the Muslim cause. Nawaz Sharif asserted that "since Bosnia-Herzegovina is a member of the OIC, there is a special responsibility of the Muslim countries to take urgent special measures to help

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\textsuperscript{127} 'Army Contingent ready to take up UN-assigned Role in Bosnia', News 11 January, 1994.

\textsuperscript{128} 'Nawaz offers Pak Troops for Bosnia', \textit{The News}, (Rawalpindi) 7 October, 1993

\textsuperscript{129} 'General Waheed in Tehran on way to Bosnia', \textit{The News} (Rawalpindi) 29 August, 1995.
the Bosnians in a grave situation which is fast generating into a genocide aimed at exterminating the entire Muslim population of Bosnia. The Pakistan government's decision to participate in Bosnia-Herzegovina also received the full backing of the military. In fact, the Pakistani army not only reiterated its support for Bosnia but also indicated that it "seeks to limit its peacekeeping involvement to areas confined to the Muslim World".

Secondly, Pakistan saw the assignment as an opportunity to increase its presence within the OIC and the Muslim world. The desire to seek closer relations with the Muslim countries had always been a dominant feature of Pakistan's foreign policy, but the Cold War had made it difficult for Pakistan to fully realise this objective because of its strong alignment with the West. Pakistan's image in the Muslim world was also affected by its unclear position during the Gulf war. On one hand, Islamabad openly condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and joined the US-led coalition. It deployed 11,000 troops as part of the multinational force in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Mizra Aslam Beg, has been documented as openly supporting Iraq. To some extent these divergent voices affected Pakistan's image in the Muslim world. For example, Syria and Egypt changed their attitude towards providing concessions and write-offs for Pakistan's massive debts. Hence, the need to re-shape its image and strengthen its place in the Muslim world can be said to have strongly motivated Pakistan's participation in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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4. Institutional Interests

A fourth source of motivation is that peacekeeping also serves institutional interests at different levels, both civilian and military. At the civilian level, peacekeeping may be viewed as a means of keeping the military occupied in external assignments and away from meddling in the domestic affairs.

The interference of the military in the democratic life of Pakistan is not something new. Regardless of the regime the military has always remained very active and forceful in the political decision-making processes and formulation of Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies. This heavy involvement of the military in politics has been, according to Cohen, based on the Army's own historical and doctrinal ethos which maintains that its role is not only limited to the protection of Pakistan from external invasion but also to ensuring that "Pakistan society itself modernises and yet remains pure and truly Islamic". Quite apart from this, however, is disillusionment with civilian rule which has repeatedly failed to perform its duty to the state and which has often led the military to interfere and take on additional domestic responsibilities. Consequently, the military has developed a 'taste' for political power.

Thus, although in theory the army has acknowledged the supremacy of the "civilian" rule in reality it has frequently put itself at the centre of Pakistan's domestic and foreign affairs. At the same time there has been a sense of envy and a "grudging admiration" among most Pakistani senior politicians of India's situation where civil rule maintains a firm control over the military. In Pakistan such control is beyond imagination, but the military's excessive involvement in the domestic affairs can be reduced by re-

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134 Ibid., pp. 204-5.
135 Cohen, (1998), op. cit., p. 131
136 Ibid., p. 108.
137 Ibid., p. 124.
138 Ibid., p. 106.
directing its focus and efforts to outside activities such as peacekeeping. In other words, to keep the military busy in its own profession indirectly serves civil institutional interests. This may be one explanation for the Pakistan’s extensive military commitment in overseas missions.

At the same time, the military, given its high-level involvement in foreign policy making, may have its own motives for supporting UN peacekeeping operations. These motives could vary between tangible and intangible benefits. Firstly, the financial remuneration is a source of motivation for all ranks of the military. The UN pays each soldier a minimum salary of US$988 per month. The salary varies depending on the ranks and field appointments of officers. Thus these foreign earnings may be a major source of attraction for soldiers. Moreover, within the Army Officer Corps the external assignments are seen as prestigious and as a boost to personal image and identity. Furthermore, participation in peacekeeping provides the opportunity to interact with other national militaries and to get exposed to new skills such as weapons handling and learning to drive new kinds of land transportation vehicles and so on. So, there are strong grounds for participation in UN peacekeeping operations at the level of the individual Pakistani soldiers.

VI. PAKISTAN’S RESPONSES TO DEMANDS RELATING TO TROOP-CONTRIBUTION

One area that demonstrates Pakistan’s activism in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping is related to its troop contribution. Arguably, Pakistan can be identified as one of the biggest and most reliable troop-contributors in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. Pakistan qualifies as a major peacekeeper on the following grounds.

Firstly, the size of Pakistan’s troop contribution in UN peacekeeping operations has been very high and impressive. At its peak in 1994 Pakistan emerged as the single largest troop contributor to UN peace missions worldwide. A total of 68,480 UN military troops
were deployed worldwide in 1994. Of this 10.94% were Pakistanis\textsuperscript{139}. The fact that Pakistan responded so actively at a time when the overall demand for ground forces was at its peak made it a very significant and active troop contributor. Moreover, Pakistan's overall troop-contribution was also larger than the contribution of some of the major powers, such as the US (1.34%); UK (5.11%); France (8.53%) and even other traditional peacekeepers like Canada (3.5%)\textsuperscript{140}. Pakistan's troop contribution in specific missions has been also very high. For example, in Somalia Pakistan contributed 7900 troops (28.21%), emerging as the single largest troop contributor followed by India, France and the UK. Despite the severe setback in the mission, Pakistan actively continued to support and deploy more troops in Somalia. Compared with its contribution during the Cold War, Pakistan has made huge troop commitments to post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994) Pakistan deployed 3,000 troops as part of the UNPROFOR. In the recent peacekeeping operation in East Timor, Pakistan is one of the 45 personnel contributors. At least 1000 of the 7116 military personnel are Pakistanis\textsuperscript{141}. Hence, Pakistan's troop contribution to UN peace missions has been very significant and responsive to the growing demands for ground forces.

Secondly, Pakistan has contributed troops unreservedly and unselectively in various peacekeeping operations. It has deployed its troops as part of the UN peacekeeping forces worldwide. As shown in Appendix 3, since the end of the Cold War Pakistan has engaged in a number of UN peace missions providing military forces in:

- the Middle-east, (Iraq-Kuwait);
- Asia (Cambodia and East Timor);
- Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo and Somalia);

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 553.
\textsuperscript{141} Department of Public Information, UN, New York.
• Europe (Georgia, Macedonia, Prevlaka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia); and
• the Americas (Haiti).

Thirdly, Pakistan has also made simultaneous troop commitments. As several peacekeeping operations have been established simultaneously the UN had multiple needs arising in different trouble spots and Pakistan has committed troops to various operations simultaneously. During the period 1992-1994 Pakistan contributed at least 1000 troops in each of the following peacekeeping operations: Cambodia (1992-1993), Somalia (1992-1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994-1996), and Haiti (1993-1996). This demonstrates Pakistan’s activism in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations.

Fourthly, Pakistan has responded to the need for specialised ground personnel to carry out new peacekeeping operations. This can be shown with reference to Pakistan’s participation in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. The Cambodia operation was established in two phases. The first phase, called the UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), involved the deployment of an observer team to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. Pakistan deployed 17 unarmed military personnel as part of the UNAMIC. In 1992, the UNAMIC was absorbed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which marked the second phase of the peace mission. The demand for manpower was greater for the UNTAC and Pakistan responded accordingly deploying an infantry contingent of 1006 troops. This amounted to approximately 6.47% of the total military contingent deployed as part of the UNTAC. In addition, Pakistan contributed civilian police to maintain law and order in Cambodian society and also civil administrators to assist in the organisation and conduct of the democratic elections. It also dispatched 37 personnel as part of the mine clearance team to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations and also to assist in the provision of mine-clearance training for military troops.

So, although military troops have been the major strength of Pakistan’s voluntary contribution to UN peace missions, it has also deployed a variety personnel such as civilian
police, de-mining instructors, electoral commissions, logistics and other civilian units in order to provide the kinds of expertise needed in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. This shows a change in the nature of its participation: a change which responds to the new demands of today's peace missions.

Finally, Pakistan can be considered a reliable troop-contributor. It has demonstrated 'staying power' and a willingness to take risks in hostile and harsh operational environments. The following section provides a detailed case study of Pakistan's involvement in Somalia. It demonstrates Pakistan's continued participation in spite of severe setbacks in Somalia and strong domestic pressure to withdraw.

The Case of Somalia: Pakistan as a Reliable Peacekeeper

Pakistan's decision to participate in the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia came as early as April 1992. It consented to deploy unarmed peace observers as part of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Pakistan's Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen was appointed as the chief military observer to head the UNOSOM, which was mandated to monitor the cease-fire agreement between the key warring parties. However, due to the growing humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the UNOSOM mandate was expanded to provide protection to the delivery of relief aid. In response to the UN's request for armed peacekeepers, in August 1992 Pakistan deployed 500 soldiers so as to launch the humanitarian campaign in Mogadishu.

The deteriorating security environment in Somalia made it difficult to implement the humanitarian mandate. Hence, the Security Council, under resolution 794 authorised the establishment of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to enforce peace for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance within the country. Following the take over of the UNOSOM by the UNITAF in December 1992, Pakistan not only expressed its willingness to work under the US-command but also instantaneously committed additional 250
In subsequent months Pakistan’s troop strength gradually rose in response to the US request for more ground forces. For example, in late December 1992 Nawaz Sharif received a personal phone call from President Bush requesting more troops. Islamabad responded very positively by contributing additional 880 troops and justified its actions on the grounds that it was a strong supporter of the UN and its cause for global peace and security. Islamabad also justified its actions on the grounds that Pakistan was committed to support Somalia, a Muslim country. There is no doubt that Pakistan and Somalia share historical relationships and special cultural and religious bonds as Muslim nations.

However, beyond these justifications Pakistan’s underlying motives were apparent. Arguably, Pakistan’s readiness to be part of the US-led multinational force and subsequently to increase the size of its troop contribution can be singled out, beyond doubt, as part of Islamabad’s “aggressive diplomacy” to re-establish strategic co-operation with the US and persuade Washington to re-consider some outstanding issues, namely the lifting of the aid ban and also the unsettled business of the F-16 aircraft deal. However, it is also argued that “the logic of [Pakistan’s] augmented presence in Somalia lies in the absence of a well-defined and articulated foreign policy which exposes the country to dangerous and chancy ad hocism, to narrow institutional interests, and to outdated instincts of dependency, and an unrealistic craving for the return of an unreliable though occasionally armful (sic) ally.”

Pakistan’s desire to re-establish its relationship with the US was so strong that it gave in to Washington’s requests for more troops even after the loss of 24 Pakistani soldiers in the 5 June tragedy. This unfortunate incident happened when the Pakistani contingent was asked to carry out a weapons inspection check and subsequently, to neutralise the

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142 *50 Years of Peacekeeping*, op. cit.
146 Interview with academic community, Pakistan (Islamabad), November, 1997.
ammunition dump belonging to Mogadishu warlord, Aideed. The UN headquarters had informed Aideed of the time and date of the inspection, without realising that he had already aroused the feelings of his followers against the peacekeepers, who were to be deployed to carry out the check\textsuperscript{147}. This resulted in an unexpected showdown when the Aideed forces fired on Pakistani soldiers during the weapons inspection.

Islamabad criticised the delay of some contingents, namely the Italian force, in providing cover for the Pakistani troops during the ambush. The Italian contingent, although operating under the auspices of the UN, had waited for instructions from Rome before it offered help to the Pakistani troops\textsuperscript{148}. Pakistan also criticised the UN for the lack of logistical support, according to Shaharyar Khan, Pakistan’s foreign minister, and Pakistani troops in Somalia "did not have sufficient fire power or equipment to defend themselves against the attack"\textsuperscript{149}.

However, the 5 June tragedy did not motivate Islamabad to terminate its participation in the Somalia operation. In fact, Pakistan became more active and joined forces with the US in hunting Aideed in revenge for killing the peacekeepers. Pakistani troops, therefore, became involved in heavy fighting with Aideed’s forces. In fact, the fighting was so uncontrolled that, at one point Pakistani troops opened fire on a Somali crowd which was being used as human shield by Aideed’s forces. The incident, in which 20 civilians lost their lives, led to a major investigation and the Pakistani troops were criticised for lack of discipline\textsuperscript{150}. The Clinton administration defended Pakistan on this matter and

\textsuperscript{147} 50 Years of Peacekeeping, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{148} "TO expresses concern over delay in helping Pak troops in Somalia', The News, (Rawalpindi), 10 June 1993.
\textsuperscript{149} Nasir Malik, 'Pakistan Demands better equipment for UN forces', Dawn (Karachi), 7 June, 1993. See also 'An Outrage', The News, (Islamabad), 8 June, 1993.
\textsuperscript{150} Washington Post, Editorial, June, 1993.
prevented the matter from escalating. The Secretary for State Albright termed Pakistan troops' actions as "understandable"\textsuperscript{151}.

However, policy-makers in Islamabad came under enormous pressure and were severely criticised for taking the American line which had turned the mission from a humanitarian-peacekeeping operation to one of taking revenge against Aideed on the pretext of a quest for social justice. Senator Prof. Khurshid Ahmad Naib Ameer of the Jamaat-I-Islami Party criticised Pakistan for not limiting itself to a humanitarian role. He said, "Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the UAE, and even India, have taken that position. It is however unfortunate that American and Pakistani troops are the only major troops which are presently engaged in fighting, and there too, Pakistani forces were suffering major loses"\textsuperscript{152}. He also accused Nawaz Sharif's government of being "part of the US objective of imposing imperialist hegemony on the world and also subverting "committed Muslims" like Farah Aideed"\textsuperscript{153}. The party also warned that Pakistan's policy in Somalia might go against a number of Muslim states and cause a rift in the Islamic bloc.

Despite this domestic backlash and the possible impact on Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world, Islamabad was determined to carry on with the mission in Somalia. In a press conference following the killing of the Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu Pakistan's foreign Minister Shaharyar Khan rejected the option of a withdrawal. He said, "we remained committed to UN peacekeeping efforts. We were the first country to enter Somalia wearing UN blue helmet and we believe in UN's peacekeeping role. We believe

\textsuperscript{151} Dawn, (Karachi), June 1993.
\textsuperscript{152} Senator Demands Withdrawal of Pak troops from Somalia', The News (Rawalpindi), September 1993.
\textsuperscript{153} Khaled Ahmed, 'Pakistan Must Avoid International Isolation', Frontier Post, (Peshawar), 26 June, 1993.
this role must be played effectively\textsuperscript{154}. Moreover, the Pakistan Army which has had a long tradition of interfering in the country's political affairs also supported this claim\textsuperscript{155}.

Meanwhile, Islamabad's stance on the peacekeeping operation in Somalia, to some extent, won the admiration and interest of the US. This consequently resulted in the visit by top US officials, in particular the US President's Special Envoy and co-ordinator for Somalia, Ambassador James Dobbins, Rear Admiral Charles Abdoll and Ambassador Walter Statdler of the US State Department to Pakistan in December 1993\textsuperscript{156}. The main theme of this visit was to discuss the prevailing situation in Somalia and matters pertaining to the provision of more Pakistani troops. Consequently, in December 1993, Pakistan offered additional 2500 troops to join the 5000 Pakistani soldiers already deployed in Somalia.

However, Pakistan's decision to commit more troops and respond positively and actively to the request of the US raised further concerns at home, especially when the US decided to withdraw its troops by early 1994. The loss of 18 American soldiers in the October incident led to a major domestic public outcry and pressures for withdrawal in the US. This also triggered other troop contributing nations to withdraw. By March 1994 Italy, Belgium, France, Sweden, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates had withdrawn their contingents. This caused greater pressure within Pakistan as the government came under attack for mis-using its soldiers in external missions. The Pakistani press published articles indicating that Pakistan had merely fallen into 'America's peacekeeping trap' and that it has given in to the treatment of its soldiers as cannon fodder or "America's footsoldiers"\textsuperscript{157}.

Despite such domestic pressures Islamabad and the military continued in Somalia

\textsuperscript{154} *Dawn* (Karachi), 10, June, 1993.
\textsuperscript{155} *Dawn* (Karachi), 10, June, 1993.
\textsuperscript{156} The News (Rawalpindi), 1, December, 1993.
\textsuperscript{157} Shahwar Junaid, 'America's Peacekeeping Trap', *The News* (Rawalpindi), 4 August, 1994.
until the UN announced its decision to end the operation. By November 1994 the UNOSOM II force level dropped from 28,000 to 15,000. Along with Egypt, Zimbabwe, Malaysia, and Nigeria, Pakistan was one of the few countries that continued to carry out a peacekeeping role until March 1995. The key point to be made is that despite the severe setbacks and the domestic pressures, Pakistan not only increased its troop commitments over time, but also continued to participate until the completion of the mission. Of course, Pakistan’s high level and active participation in Somalia is couched in terms of its aggressive diplomacy to re-establish its relations with Washington. However, one cannot ignore that Pakistan has been a reliable peacekeeper and that it has participated in line with the demands and challenges in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations.

VII. ADJUSTING TO DEMANDS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Apart from its active troop contribution, the one other aspect of Pakistan’s participation and contribution that has become very significant is the way it has responded to the demands and challenges of new peacekeeping operations. Pakistan has carried out a range of military-civilian duties: election monitoring (Cambodia, East Timor & Haiti); the delivery and supply of humanitarian aid (Somalia & Bosnia-Herzegovina); the repatriation of refugees (Haiti & Cambodia); policing & maintaining law and order (Congo & Bosnia-Herzegovina); civil administration (Cambodia); and nation-building activities and the reintegration of civil societies (East Timor).

However, the conduct and implementation of these new and multifaceted roles have become challenging because of the new types of ground challenges and realities. One of the challenges that this study focuses on is the issue of consent management in new peacekeeping. As argued in chapter one, the management of consent is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the nature of consent has changed. Secondly, consent is largely sought in
new and 'rough' operational environments where subjective elements such as attitudes, perceptions, socio-psychological factors play a major role in shaping local behaviour and reactions to all the active parties, including peacekeepers\textsuperscript{158}. Hence, an important priority in new peacekeeping operations is to change negative perceptions into positive ones, so as to create a favourable operational environment.

The remainder of this chapter examines the extent to which Pakistani peacekeepers have responded to these demands and challenges related to the qualitative aspect of post-Cold War peace missions. It addresses the following key issues: Pakistan military's peacekeeping philosophy and outlook, and the extent to which the Pakistani military employs 'softer' peacekeeping strategies.

\textit{The Military's Peacekeeping Philosophy & Outlook}

There is no doubt that the military's peacekeeping philosophy and outlook has expanded to incorporate some of the new dimensions and ground realities emerging in today's conflicts. In the early 1990s the military drafted a new peacekeeping doctrine guided by its considerable yet brief peacekeeping experiences. For example, Pakistan participated in the peacekeeping operations in the Congo, West Irian, Yemen and Namibia. While these experiences may have provided some guidance to its present thinking, the military is clearly aware of the limitations of the traditional approaches at present. This has been pointed out by a military officer who has asserted that the "old rules are important even for today's missions, but at the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that they may not necessarily respond effectively to the changing nature of conflicts and the new problems of today\textsuperscript{159}.

The military's present philosophy is based on the idea that peacekeeping


\textsuperscript{159} Interview with Pakistan military officer, Office of Military Operations, Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR), Rawalpindi, 1997.
operations should aim to build popular support and consent at the community level of the host country\textsuperscript{160}. The military firmly believes that this should be established through the formation of alliances between peacekeepers and the general public. Although this may not be an easy task, it is identified as fundamental to the success of new peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{161}. Therefore, the military prioritises the need to establish a positive "community spirit" which can be utilised over time for undertaking new peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{162}.

However, it should be noted that in Somalia the Pakistan military took a different approach. Rather than a community-oriented approach they followed the US 'Rambo' style of peacekeeping. Pakistani forces joined the US peacekeepers in tracking down Aideed and his warring factions. This significantly affected the ability of the Pakistani soldiers to implement the peacekeeping mandate in Somalia. As General Abdul Waheed noted this shifting from the general to a particular target was costly to Pakistan\textsuperscript{163}. That is, it resulted in seriously jeopardising Pakistan's security movement in Somalia. Nevertheless, from Pakistan's military point of view the Somali experience has been an important lesson which has reinforced Pakistan's peacekeeping philosophy, that is, to focus on building wider support rather than exclusively targeting single elements\textsuperscript{164}.

In line with its peacekeeping philosophy, Pakistan has also made efforts to reshape its methods of preparing soldiers for peacekeeping operations. Firstly, the military has consciously taken steps to ensure that it deploys suitable military personnel who are able to operate at the community level and build popular support. This is important because of the need for an attitudinal change by soldiers. The Pakistani army has developed a rigid

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview with Pakistan military officer, Office of Military Operations, ISPR, Rawalpindi, 1997.
\item Interview with Pakistan military officer, Office of Military Operations, ISPR, Rawalpindi, 1997.
\item Interview with Pakistan military officer, Office of Military Operations, ISPR, Rawalpindi, 1997.
\item Abdul Waheed, (Gen.), 'UN Dilemma: Peacekeeping or Peace-Enforcement', in Defence Journal, Vol. 20 No. 9-10, 1994, p. 14
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
selection process that places emphasis on personal qualities such as patience, sensitivity to differing cultures and gender, understanding, calm, and self-discipline. Moreover, the Pakistani army has also developed a policy to not deploy its soldiers in more than one external assignment. This ensures that soldiers do not see peacekeeping as a career which could make them less committed in the long term.

One report produced by the military has highlighted general areas of weakness in training. Firstly, Pakistani soldiers need to develop a greater level of initiative. While they work well under instructions there is a tendency for some soldiers to become idle when not given specific directions. Secondly, there is also a need to train soldiers about the social environment in which they will work, particularly the geography, local culture and language. Thirdly, the report indicated the need to develop greater non-contact skills.

The Pakistan government strongly endorses the importance of "peace-time training for troops" which is geared towards developing combat skills. While these skills are important they are not the only skills necessary for carrying out peacekeeping operations. Indeed, there has been an increasing awareness of the need to provide appropriate training for peacekeeping troops. The military not only recognises the general areas of weakness of its soldiers, but has also indicated of the need to tighten some of its training programmes for peacekeeping operations such as procedures for the repatriation of refugees, understanding international laws and codes of conduct regarding military personnel, handling the media, negotiation techniques and language skills.

Immediate and appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that Pakistani soldiers and other personnel are well disciplined in the field. For example, the Pakistan

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166 Interview with Officer at Pakistan Military Headquarters.
military police expelled six police officers who were deployed as part of the UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The police officers drawn from Peshawar were found to be incompetent and also engaging in objectionable activities. The Pakistan police department carried out an inquiry into this behaviour and took the necessary actions. Although incidents such as these tarnish the overall image of Pakistan, it is significant that immediate action was taken at home. In contrast, some countries have taken no actions against their military officers who were expelled by the UN for the ill treatment of civilians in Mozambique, for example Portugal.

It follows from this that there is a growing awareness in the military establishment of the need to make adjustments such as providing suitable training and maintaining high disciplinary standards. The army has established a permanent peacekeeping wing in its armed forces training institution solely for the purpose of preparing and training soldiers for external assignments and duties. It also holds a large contingent of soldiers on stand-by. Therefore, the Pakistan military's peacekeeping thinking and outlook has broadened to incorporate some of the new requirements of present day peace missions.

VIII. THE PRACTICE OF 'SOFTER' PEACEKEEPING

As part of this broad military thinking Pakistan has been using new strategies to manage ground challenges such as consent management in new peacekeeping operations. In fact, Pakistan has often been a major practitioner of 'softer' peacekeeping. For example, in the city of Tuzal in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Pakistan Battalion (PAKBAT), consisting of 3000 troops focused on changing the attitudes of the locals. This was important because

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170 Frontier Post (Peshawar), 20 March 1996.
172 Pak Army has established permanent peacekeeping wing: COAS', The News (Rawalpindi), 9
the local Bosnian Muslims behaved negatively towards some peacekeepers. For example, there have been several incidents where Swedish peacekeepers were scoffed at and humiliated by local Muslim communities. Cultural and religious differences may have triggered that reaction towards the Swedish soldiers.

The Pakistani contingent in Bosnia launched some major civil affairs programmes as part of its overall peacekeeping field strategy to secure community consent and cooperation. Firstly, PAKBAT established two hospitals, called ‘The Healers’ in the towns of Vares and Dardevik, to providing medical assistance to civilians suffering attacks by the Serbian. These two 25-bed hospitals provided assistance to people in a 200km radius. They provided for the increasing need for medical aid in the countryside. However, as many people were unable to travel, the Pakistani Army's mobile medical team was established. Every ten days this team would travel to distant locations to provide treatment. The Pakistani government made a huge contribution by donating more than 1.7 tonnes of medicine to the Mayor of Tuzla. These projects gained the recognition of a London-based humanitarian aid organisation known as the 'Convoy of Mercy' which acknowledged the work of the PAKBAT.

Secondly, PAKBAT established a refugee camp in a school in Tuzla. Following
the invasion of the UN declared 'Safe Havens' of Srebrenica and Zepa by the Serbian forces in July 1995 an influx of over 50,000 refugees arrived in Tuzla. As this was not foreseen by the UN authorities, but the Pakistani contingent "bore the brunt of the crisis for 36 hours single handedly and at their own initiative and expense". The Pakistani contingent took the responsibility of providing temporary accommodation, bedding, food, clothing, water and medical aid from its own resources until further assistance was provided by the UN. Indeed, this initiative was duly acknowledged in a ceremony organised by the Tuzla Red Cross where the peacekeepers were awarded a certificate of merit.

In Haiti, PAKBAT also engaged in civil affairs works such as building schools, installing new water pumps and constructing various recreational facilities for the public. The Pakistani contingent carried out its own food distribution programmes from the rations provided to the Pakistani troops for their own daily consumption. The Pakistan contingent's role in Haiti also received high level praise from various foreign military officers and force commanders. For example, the force commander to Haiti, Brigadier General JR Pierre, commended the Pakistani contingent for its social skills which secured strong relations with the local population. He said, "when you brought me through Cap Haitian, I was quite impressed by friendships the Pakistani troops have struck with the locals and their reaction at their arrival on all sites. It expresses their solidarity to the Haitians and their relentless determination to improve their quality of life. I would have been proud to serve with soldiers of such calibre". The Pakistani contingent also earned the respect and admiration of the former SRSR for Haiti, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister, who said that, "It gives me great pleasure to express my

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180 50 Years of Peacekeeping, op. cit.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
warmest congratulations and sincere admiration for the splendid work you and the officers and men of the Pakistani battalion have done all over the northern part of Haiti. Yours was the most difficult area with a history of militant activities and local feuds. The Americans, before you had probably 4 or 5 times more troops and had difficulty controlling the situation. The Pakistan Battalion's performance was consistently impeccable and earned admiration of everyone, Haitians and foreigners alike.185

The Case of Cambodia

One detailed example of Pakistan's 'softer' strategies is its involvement in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. The Cambodian conflict occurred within a particular historical perspective. Since its independence from France in 1953 Cambodia has experienced continual internal restlessness and power struggles arising from historical animosities. Following independence, Sihanauk, the King of Cambodia abdicated the throne in favour of a role as president of the country. The Sihanauk government administered and ruled Cambodia for almost 17 years until 1970, when a right wing coup led by General Lon Nol ousted Sihanauk. However, Nol's government, which renamed Cambodia the Khmer Republic was not long lived. In 1975 it too was overthrown in a bloody war with the Communist opposition, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), popularly known as the Khmer Rouge186. However, the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown by the Vietnamese during a cross-border conflict in 1978.

The Vietnamese army took control of most of the country except for small pockets still under the control of the Khmer Rouge and two other resistance groups, the Front Uni Nationale Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif,

184 Ibid.
185 50 Years of Peacekeeping: Pakistan Army in Service of Peace, Military Document.
(FUNCINPEC), which was said to be organised and run by Sihanauk and his son Norodom Ranariddh; and the other was the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). By the late 1970s the conflict in Cambodia deteriorated significantly. The violent conflicts resulted in the displacement of thousands of refugees who fled to Thailand and other countries in the region. There were about 350,000 refugees living in concentration camps on the Thai side of the border.

The situation came under review of the UN Security Council in 1979. However, the UN could not instigate any action due to the impasse within the major powers in the Council. Indeed, as argued by Carlyle, the Cambodian conflict was multilayered. At one level the conflict was a dispute between the Khmers and the Vietnamese; but this was also entangled with disputes at the macro-level whereby the Cambodia conflict was viewed as a proxy war between China and the Soviet Union. China, with the support of Thailand supported the Khmer Rouge. It provided weaponry and also backed the Khmer Rouge in the Security Council. The Soviet Union provided military and political support to Vietnam. Therefore, for more than a decade, the UN remained largely inactive as the internal disputes in Cambodia not only deteriorated but also transformed into a major regional conflict.

It was only in the late 1980s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War that the UN started to make progress in addressing the internal conflict in Cambodia. The signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 by the four major parties marked an important turning point in the history and political life of Cambodia. The

189 Ibid., 122-23.
agreement, which provided for the deployment of a peacekeeping force, had a two-tier approach. It addressed the disputes among the major warring parties within Cambodia as well as the international elements of the conflict\textsuperscript{192}.

However, although the Paris accord provided the basis for the establishment of the UNTAC, the UN was slow to deploy the mission. Indeed, following the Paris Conference in April 1991 it took almost a year for the deployment of the UNTAC to occur. Although the UN had deployed unarmed peace observers as part of the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) in December 1991 they were limited to playing a very small role, that is to observe the cease-fire agreements between the warring factions. In fact, the presence of the UNAMIC could be considered futile because it did nothing to prevent violations of the cease-fire agreement\textsuperscript{193}. In fact, the violations to the cease-fire worsened as a low-level civil disorder erupted in Phnom Phen\textsuperscript{194}. Violent clashes among the key warring parties including the Khmer Rouge created fear within the UN that the Paris accords might fall apart. It was at this stage that the UN began to deploy the UNTAC in the face of ongoing violence and civil unrest in Cambodia.

One of the major factors that caused a delay in the UNTAC's deployment was the lack of adequate preparation and limited management and organisational capacity at the headquarters in New York\textsuperscript{195}. As Findlay notes the UN "lacked the experience, resources and qualified personnel to organise a mission [that was considerably] complex, … at short notice". Similarly, Ratner is also critical of the UNTAC for the lack of prompt deployment due to delays caused by poor organisation. For example, delays were caused by the late choice of top personnel, such as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

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\textsuperscript{192} Ratner, op. cit., p. 147.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., p. 167.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., p. 167.
\end{flushright}
The UN had no proper plan with regard to staffing of certain ground personnel such as civil administrators. A second reason for the initial late deployment was that the establishment of the UNTAC took place at a time when the UN was busy and actively serving in a number of peace operations in other areas, such as the verification mission in Haiti (1990); peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia (1991); observer mission in Iraq-Kuwait (1991), verification mission in Angola (1991); observer mission in El Salvador (1991); and the Referendum mission in Western Sahara (1991). Thirdly, the UN was also confronting some financial strains in launching the UNTAC operation. Some of the major powers in the Security Council had pledged to donate some $880 million, but "almost none of the money had arrived"

Nevertheless, the Paris accord assigned the UN to an unprecedented role. As the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, notes "the UN has had some experience in administering colonial territories, but Cambodia provides a new model of multi-faceted UN activity in an independent state". Some of the new roles which were assigned to the Pakistani contingent include: the verification of the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; supervision of the cease-fire and related measures including re-groupment, disarming, and demobilisation; weapons control which included the monitoring and cessation of outside supply; locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies; storing the arms and equipment of control and demobilised forces; provision of assistance to mine clearance units and the development of mine awareness programme; and most importantly, the creation of a secure environment to hold free and fair elections, which was a primary objective of the

196 Ratner, op. cit., p. 167.
198 Ibid., p. 114.
UNTAC. Indeed, the aim in Cambodia was not only to achieve the short-term abatement of conflict but also to establish sustainable and 'positive' peace through peace-building efforts.

Pakistan deployed troops as part of the UNTAC and was assigned to sector three in Preah Vihear\textsuperscript{201} (see Map 3A). For Pakistan the UNTAC was a new experience because the roles and functions were a major departure from any of its earlier experiences in peacekeeping missions. However, the challenge confronting Pakistani peacekeepers was related to carrying out the new tasks in a new and unprecedented operational environment\textsuperscript{202}.

The civil war in Cambodia has been described as a "conflict that pit Khmer against Khmer"\textsuperscript{203}. Indeed, under the Pol-Pot regime the Khmer Rouge committed some of the worst atrocities. So widespread were their violent activities that almost three quarters, that is 64\%, of the Cambodian people lived in areas where fighting occurred\textsuperscript{204}. This era has been often referred to as the "Cambodian Genocide"\textsuperscript{205}. In a recent report released by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it has been indicated that during the long years of war in Cambodia and particularly during the Khmer Rouge regime the civilian population had become not only as "collateral casualties but rather the express targets of a homicidal regime that buried its victims in the 'killing field'"\textsuperscript{206}. Indeed, people were often brutally coerced to adapt to the new life styles imposed on them. Some of the major atrocities included rape, imprisonment, physical brutality, and kidnapping. During the Khmer Rouge occupation 1 - 2 million people died in the 'Killing fields' with thousands

\textsuperscript{201} Preah Vihear is divided into seven districts with Tbeng Meanchey as the seat of the Provincial Governor.
\textsuperscript{202} Interview notes with Pakistan's contingent commander in Cambodia.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., p. 7
One cannot ignore the impact of the conflict on the civilian population. At the community level local populations suffered severe psychological distress and fear as a result of the violence and fighting. Indeed, the brutalities and atrocities of the Khmer Rouge under Pol-Pot against the Cambodian people scarred the minds of the population. The traumatic experience and memories remain vivid, according to one local "everybody

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207 People on War, op. cit., p. 1.
has been damaged psychologically. You can ask: everyone at least one family member or relative. This affected the brains of the Cambodian people a lot" and "the Cambodian people lost their spirit. They are traumatised, have no courage, or confidence". Hence, the operational environment might be described as 'rough' in the sense that the population's ability to respond favourably to peacekeepers was affected by painful experiences and psychological factors.

It was against the backdrop of this 'rough' operational environment that the Pakistan contingent in Cambodia adopted a 'softer' and community-based approach to re-shape the environment positively and obtain the co-operation and consent of the local communities for the implementation of the peacekeeping mandate. The Pakistani contingent deployed in Preah Vihear province was aware of the growing negative sentiment among the locals. Thus, one of its key objectives was to develop ways of making itself popular to enable it to encourage co-operative behaviour among the local communities and populations. The Pakistani contingent used a range of field crafts and community-oriented strategies in order to increase the interaction between the peacekeepers and the local population.

1. Building Community Relations

One of the main strategies that the Pakistani military contingent used was community relations. They realised the importance of projecting themselves positively to the locals and fostering social contacts. Hence, they organised several social events such as fun fairs, cultural festivals, and games and sports activities (See photo 3B). The Pakistan contingent realised that Preah Vihear had a population of well over 87 000 made up of Khmers (97.9%), Chinese (0.8%), Vietnamese (1.2%), Laotians (0.07%) and Thais (0.04%). Given this diversity the contingent was careful to display impartiality in its community relations.

209 People on War, op. cit., p. 14.
210 Interview with Contingent Commander in the UNTAC, Rawalpindi, 1997.
In some districts the social functions included different ethnic communities. This prevented the peacekeepers from being misconstrued as favouring any particular community. The social gatherings not only provided an opportunity for the peacekeepers to interact with the local communities, but also created a suitable environment for the previously hostile ethnic communities to interact with one another in a relaxed social setting.

2. Civil Affairs

Another strategy used by the Pakistani military contingent for obtaining wide community co-operation in Cambodia was the launching of an intense 'hearts and minds' civil affairs programme. The Force Commander of the UNTAC, General Sanderson, argued that 'the 'hearts and minds' activities always form an essential part of a military component's method of operation'\(^{211}\) when managing civil conflicts. It has also been acknowledged elsewhere that civic affairs are more important today due to the need to win the support of the populace, especially in an environment where organised political factions are unwilling to cooperate\(^ {212}\).

Pakistani peacekeepers offered a classic example of the use of such field strategy. The Pakistani commander argued that "the first test in the whole peacekeeping exercise is to develop mutual confidence so that people look at you as someone who is coming to help them"\(^{213}\). It helps to create the right and positive impression which is critical for seeking the support of the local population. Hence, the Pakistani military contingent used its own resources to carry out a series of small scale localised civic action programmes.


\(^{213}\) Interview with Pakistani contingent commander in the UNTAC, Rawalpindi, 1997.
Some of these efforts are described below.

Photo 3B – Musical Chair Games organised by PAKBAT as part of the CA


Photo 3C – Pakistani soldiers assisting the locals in the construction of roads

The Pakistani contingent assisted in digging wells for the provision of clean drinking water and also built roads and bridges (See photo 3C). Medical facilities, which were originally intended to treat its own military personnel, were extended to the locals who were suffering from malaria, leprosy, tuberculosis and malnutrition. In addition to this short-term medical assistance the Pakistani contingent re-established a hospital in Tbeng Meanchey to provide long-term medical treatment\textsuperscript{214}.

There was also a growing demand among the people to learn English. As a result, the Pakistani contingent conducted English language classes in the local schools, while they learnt the Khmer language\textsuperscript{215}. This demonstrates their sensitivity to the Cambodian culture, language and norms. With the help and co-operation of some local NGOs the Pakistan contingent also established micro-credit programmes. It set up vocational training institutes which offered basic instruction in masonry, carpentership and tractor repair to provide the Cambodian people with the opportunity to improve their financial condition.

3. Community Information

Another 'softer' strategy relates to the use of community information. The British army manual identifies community information as an important psychological dimension of new peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{216}. Community information involves the wider dissemination of important messages through public broadcasting, leaflets, information sheets and so on. This is a psychological operation because it is intended to "influence emotions, perceptions motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behaviour of target

\textsuperscript{214} Tariq Mahmud, (Col.), \textit{The Peacekeepers: 2AK in Cambodia}, Pap-Board printers, Rawalpindi: 1993, pp. 96.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., p. 91.
\textsuperscript{216} British Army Field Manual, Vol. 5, Operations Other than war.
This strategy was employed in Cambodia, particularly during the democratic elections.

Indeed, one of the main objectives of the UNTAC was to organise and conduct democratic elections in Cambodia as part of the transitional process. However, as the conduct of elections drew closer the violent activities of the Khmer Rouge increased to a point where they affected the overall security environment. Indeed, fighting and looting were daily events. As Pakistan's force commander described, "some of the frustrated warring factions often resorted to robberies, extortion and even murders. Trigger-happy persons fired indiscriminately under the influence of alcohol and did not hesitate to use even a rocket launcher on another individual for petty things". In fact, a few months prior to the elections the Khmer Rouge massacred 131 ethnic Vietnamese which raised fears among the ethnic groups. The Khmer Rouge intimidated locals to prevent them from participating in the democratic elections. Several outposts, including that of the Pakistani contingent, were attacked by the Khmer Rouge. For example, at dawn on 8 May 1993 150 – 200 guerrillas launched an attack using rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons on the Pakistani contingent in Preah Vihear. PAKBAT retaliated with small arms and medium mortars when the shelling grew more intense. The exchange of fire continued until the NADK commander and another of his soldiers were killed in the attack. PAKBAT suffered two casualties in the incident. The Khmer Rouge also threatened the UNTAC's voter registration teams, destroyed and burnt the registration cards, and forced them to evacuate. All these placed considerable strains on the UNTAC's ability to create a secure environment for the democratic elections.

217 Ibid.
218 Tariq Mahmud, op.cit., p. 77.
219 Ratner, op. cit., p. 179.
220 Interview notes with PAKBAT contingent commander, Rawalpindi, 1998.
221 In April 1993, a Japanese electoral volunteer was killed. Ratner, op. cit., p. 179. See also notes based on interview with PAKBAT contingent commander in the UNTAC. Rawalpindi, 1997.
However, without the popular support of the local communities the UNTAC could not have carried out the democratic elections. One of the biggest challenges was to encourage local participation in the democratic process. This was not an easy task given the severe psychological condition of the local population and the deteriorating security environment. Hence, as part of the UNTAC’s nation-wide campaign the Pakistani contingent developed a public awareness program to educate the locals about the elections. The program involved the distribution of information material to help the locals understand the significance of voting and elections. However, the effectiveness of communicating verbally with the aid of a translator was questioned. Hence, three important measures were undertaken by the Pakistan contingent to overcome this problem.

Firstly, under the initiative of General Sanderson the Pakistan contingent established a local radio station that had the capacity to transmit to distant areas. Sanderson argued that the radio station was intended to "forge an alliance between the UNTAC and local people, which would overcome the distortions created by power struggles between and within the factional leaderships." However, the establishment of the radio station became difficult due to the lack of conviction by the UN of its usefulness. The Security Council was unwilling to commit financial resources and the bureaucratic delays became a major obstacle. It took almost a year for the plan to finally be implemented. Nevertheless, the radio station became an important tool in mobilising greater support and co-operation among the locals.

At the same time, the contingent saw the importance of interacting in smaller groups rather than engaging on a broad community level. It has been argued that given the limited physical space in warzones the inter-personal relationships and communication

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222 Interview with Pakistan contingent commander in the UNTAC. Rawalpindi, 1997.
223 Interview with Pakistan contingent commander in the UNTAC. Rawalpindi, 1997.
224 Sanderson, op. cit., p. 157.
225 Ibid., p. 157.
patterns of smaller groups are undoubtedly stronger and more active\textsuperscript{226}. Hence, the contingent began to work with smaller groups. It used specially prepared videos as part of the UNTAC’s nation-wide campaign to highlight the significance of voting in a free and fair election and the secrecy of their vote. These videos were screened in small gatherings so as to have a greater impact on the locals\textsuperscript{227}. Thirdly, the Pakistani troops organised social events like Peace Walks which were intended to get the locals into the spirit of participating in the democratic process\textsuperscript{228} (See photo 3D).

Photo 3D – Peace Walk organised by PAKBAT before the UNTAC elections.

These field strategies proved to be highly successful when nearly 90\% of the Cambodians in Preah Vihear Province registered to vote. The estimated number of eligible voters was 41,215. Of this, Pakistan was successful in getting 36,984 (89.54\%) to

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{50 Years of Peacekeeping}.
\textsuperscript{228} Tariq, Mahmud, Pakistan’s Role in Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia, \textit{Strategic Perspectives}, (Islamabad), Vol. 12 No. 1\&2, Summer 1994, p. 13.
register\textsuperscript{229}. The high level of enthusiasm was reflected in Preah Vihear when people made the effort to walk 25 kilometres to the polling stations. These efforts did no go unnoticed by the UNTAC's Force Commander. General Sanderson lauded the Pakistani contingent as follows:

"Our comrades from Pakistan spread throughout Preah Vihear, reassuring the UNTAC civilian components and Cambodian alike that the elections would go ahead. Withstanding extreme provocation, and with patience and forbearance, they defended themselves and those for whom they were responsible. With courage and determination, they delivered the electoral process to the people and the Cambodians responded with an overwhelming vote, in turn delivering a clear message that they were there for peace alone"\textsuperscript{230}.

4. Military Negotiations

Negotiations are at the heart of conflict management. How peacekeepers communicate with key leaders in the field and the kind of skills and strategies used in that process are important. As Sanderson notes, initiatives in negotiations are crucial since they help to create a climate of trust between the UNTAC military elements and the parties concerned\textsuperscript{231}. One of the skills that peacekeepers need today, as argued by Fetherston, is to be highly imaginative\textsuperscript{232}. Indeed, military leaders must have the capacity to be innovative and creative in their negotiation techniques in the field.

The role and strategies employed by individuals in carrying out field negotiations also needs mention. The commander of the Pakistani military contingent Col. Tariq Mahmud carried out the major negotiations. His method of face-to-face negotiation with key warring factions is described below.

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{231} Sanderson, op. cit., p. 162.
\textsuperscript{232} Fetherston, (1994), op. cit., p. 18.
One of the functions of the PAKBAT was the maintenance of law and order and the provision of a secure environment for democratic elections. The constant looting in Preah Vihear created significant instability in many parts of the province. Therefore, the Pakistani contingent was expected to establish checkpoints to counter this aggression. It was also supposed to assign its own military force to man the check-posts, but Tariq assigned some of these tasks to local leaders who were themselves partly responsible for the looting and growing violence. Col. Tariq describes his experience as follows:

"Instead of making a UN soldier stand at the check points, of course we had to do that as well, but what I did was that I got hold of the faction leaders of the area and told them that there are two ways of doing things. One is that I place my men to control everything - in that way your position as a faction leader will be compromised. Or I could leave the task to you"233.

At the same time, the local leaders were also warned that they would be held responsible if anything went wrong. The faction leaders were given a day to think about their options and agree to take on the task. They were then briefed on certain procedures and carried out the job with the assistance of Pakistani soldiers. From Tariq's point of view, it was critical for the local leaders to fit into the overall aims of the mission. However, it had to be undertaken in such a way that their positions and authority were not jeopardised. The idea of giving them this responsibility showed respect for their position in their own land and gained their co-operation234. Although such an approach raises serious questions about national contingents acting independently of the central command in the field, it shows that negotiations on the ground, given the urgency and nature of the situation, must sometimes be made at the discretion of the military commander in that area of responsibility.
Therefore, the Pakistani military contingent in line with its peacekeeping philosophy has taken a 'softer' approach to peacekeeping. Indeed, the use of 'softer' strategies in Cambodia was not something exclusive to the Pakistani military contingent. Other national contingents, such as Australia, Canada and the UK also employed some of the softer field strategies\textsuperscript{235}. Thus, Pakistan's 'softer' peacekeeping strategies were not the only contribution to the success of the Cambodian peacekeeping operation nor was the Pakistani contingent more successful than other national contingents. In fact, there are some views that the Pakistani contingent in Cambodia was actually less organised and structured in carrying out the job\textsuperscript{236}. However, this should not obscure the fact that Pakistan's participation in Cambodia responded to the ground challenges and realities of the new peacekeeping functions.

The failure to respond suitably to needs in the field resulted in the failure of the Bulgarian contingent to manage local consent in Cambodia\textsuperscript{237}. There are mixed views about the cause for this failure. The Bulgarian government points to the lack of military training because of the rush for rapid deployment\textsuperscript{238}. Another reason cited has been the Khmer Rouge's "negative attitudes towards East Europeans"\textsuperscript{239}. However, other reports indicate that the failure of the Bulgarian contingent was due to its lack of cultural sensitivity and poor behaviour. The Bulgarians were even labelled 'vulgarians' because of their unruly behaviour and ill treatment of women in bars and restaurants\textsuperscript{240}. Hence, in

\textsuperscript{233} Interview with Pakistan's Contingent Commander of the UNTAC, Rawalpindi, 1997.
\textsuperscript{234} Interview with Pakistan's Contingent Commander of the UNTAC, Rawalpindi, 1997.
\textsuperscript{235} M.J. Kelly (Major), 'Military Civil Affairs: The Need For Dedicated Military Units', in Armies and Nation Building, Past Experience-Future Prospects, by David Homer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra: 1995. 'UK must seek Bigger Peacekeeping Role", Jane's Defence Weekly, July 10, 1993.
\textsuperscript{236} Interview with UN Military Commanders. United Nations, New York: March 2000.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{240} Barbara Crossette, 'When Peacekeepers Turn into Troublemakers', The New York Times, 7 January, 1996.
contrast to the Bulgarian contingent, the participation and contribution of the Pakistani peacekeepers in Cambodia become very significant.

IX. SUMMARY

In summary, the nature of Pakistan’s participation in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations has undergone some major changes against the backdrop of the new security environment and foreign policy context in which it operates. In contrast to its limited involvement during the Cold War, Pakistan’s size of participation in post-Cold War peace operations has increased significantly. Although its participation in peacekeeping operations provided a source of income through foreign exchange earnings, it is naïve to say that the economic benefits are the key source of motivation for Pakistan’s active involvement. This chapter has shown that a combination of interests exist for Pakistan to become actively involved in peacekeeping such as: the enhancement of its international image, so as to reduce its level of isolation in the region; the need to mobilise greater UN support on the Kashmir issue; the need to increase its rapport within the Muslim world; and other institutional factors.

As part of its new commitment to UN peacekeeping, Pakistan’s active UN peacekeeping policy can be seen as responding to the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. Pakistan has emerged as one of the major peacekeepers not only because it simultaneously makes large troop-commitments to multiple peacekeeping operations but also because it has the capacity to sustain its commitment in harsh and complex operational environments. In addition to this, Pakistan has made a qualitative contribution through its practice of ‘softer’ peacekeeping for the management of consent and the implementation of new peacekeeping operations. This can be seen with reference to its participation in various post-Cold War peacekeeping operations such as Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti.
One major area of weakness relates to Pakistan's incapability to support itself logistically in the mission areas. Pakistan is often faced with the problem of lacking the necessary logistical and military equipment. In Somalia and Rwanda Pakistani forces relied heavily on other national contingents for logistical support. In Somalia Pakistan blamed the UN and other national contingents for its lack of sufficient 'fire-power' and its inability to protect its soldiers from being ambushed by Aideed's forces. This over-dependency and shortcoming in logistical support may pose a serious problem for Pakistani peacekeepers to carry out their job effectively in the field, although they may have the necessary skills to engage in 'softer' peacekeeping.
Bangladesh – *The Participation of a Small State*

Bangladesh is a relatively new UN peacekeeper. Its participation in UN peace operations only began in 1988 when Dhaka consented to deploy 31 unarmed military observers as part of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to supervise and monitor the cease-fire between the two nations. Following this in 1989 Bangladesh participated in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia to which it sent a team of 25 military observers.

Since its debut in the late 1980s, Bangladesh has been participating actively in UN peacekeeping operations (see Appendix 4). In fact, in terms of troop-contribution it has occupied one of the top ten positions among the 84 participating-states in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Bangladesh’s frequency of participation in external UN missions is remarkable. Since 1988 Bangladesh has made sizeable troop-commitments in a total of 31 UN peace missions. This is significant when compared with India, which has participated in only slightly more missions (36) and has been participating in UN peace operations for more than fifty years (see Appendix 2). Bangladesh’s frequency of participation is also greater than some other new peacekeepers from the third world.
Countries like Singapore, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe are some of these newcomers. However, their frequency of participation has been very low, participating in six, two and eight peace operations respectively since 1989.

As one of the least developed countries, one might readily claim that Bangladesh has been primarily motivated by economic benefits to participate in peacekeeping. This chapter will argue that this is not necessarily the case. Although the financial remuneration is a source of attraction, it is not the major source of Bangladesh's motivation. The answer lies in Bangladesh's status as a small state. As a small state, characterised by its small size, geographical location in the South Asian sub-continent, low military budget, limited economic and industrial growth and capacity, Bangladesh has developed a strong policy of multilateral diplomacy and participation in international organisations to mobilise external support against regional threats and to attract much needed foreign aid and investment. Its active participation in UN peacekeeping operations can be said to have developed as part of this multilateral diplomacy. Therefore, Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been motivated by the need to enhance its image and to seek high level political recognition with a long-term view to mobilising greater international support for its security concerns and to attracting foreign aid for its internal economic recovery.

As part of Bangladesh's active UN peacekeeping policy it has responded positively to the new demands and needs arising from post-Cold War UN peace operations. Firstly, Bangladesh, like India and Pakistan, is not only a major provider of troops but has also demonstrated its capacity as a reliable peacekeeper. Secondly, Bangladesh's participation is

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1 Humayun Kabir, *Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping*, unpublished manuscript, p. 11.
3 Although these countries differ in terms of economic development and growth, they are identified as third world countries in that they were once colonies of a major power. Some of the missions these countries have participated in are as follows: Singapore (Namibia, Cambodia, Iraq-Kuwait, Angola, Guatemala, and East Timor); Saudi Arabia (Namibia and Somalia I); and Zimbabwe (Angola I & II, Somalia I & II, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Haiti). Department of Public Information, UN, New York.
also significant for its qualitative contribution in terms of managing the unprecedented
ground realities and challenges in the face of conducting new peacekeeping operations. The
Bangladesh military, which focuses on developing suitable and community-oriented 'softer'
strategies, demonstrates its capacity to respond suitably to ground realities.

To this end, the chapter traces the place of UN peacekeeping in Bangladesh’s
foreign policy context. This is then followed by an examination of the major sources of
motivation and an assessment of its responses to the new realities and demands of post-Cold
War UN peacekeeping operations.

I. THE FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT OF A SMALL STATE &
UN PEACEKEEPING

Bangladesh is a small state that has emerged on the international scene following a civil and
national war. The liberation war of 1971 resulted in the creation of Bangladesh (formerly
known as East Pakistan) as a separate state. Nevertheless, as a small state, we need to
investigate how it relates to the outside world and what sort of policies and strategies it
pursues for its survival and existence. Indeed, Bangladesh’s UN peacekeeping policy can be
examined in the context of its overall approach to foreign relations. The following
discussion firstly addresses the concept of a small state and outlines the features that
characterise Bangladesh as such a state. Secondly, it examines Bangladesh’s foreign policy
behaviour and its approach to foreign relations within that context.

Although the concept of small states has been attracting academic attention, wide
divergence exists regarding the precise definition of the term. It must be noted that the term
'small state' is a relative concept and applies largely to the third world. However, one
cannot determine precisely how small a small state is. However, two broad indicators could
be used for identifying and defining small states. The first relates to 'small' in terms of the
basic aggregate variables such as size of territory and population, GNP, productive
capability, resources base, military budget and so on. The second indicator relates to military, economic, technological and industrial capacities. However, some scholars focus on just one of these capacities, military capability and define small states as those that have a relatively low conventional military capability. For example, Maniruzzaman notes that “in determining a state’s war making capacity, one has to look at both its potential war power and its immediate war preparedness. Both the potential war capability and current war preparation of a state are generally measured in quantitative terms...the Gross National Product (GNP) of a state indicates its potential war-making capacity...GNP subsumes all the elements that constitute the potential military power of a state. As to the current war preparedness of a state, the yearly military budget is probably the best indicator.”

Bangladesh can be regarded as a small state based on a number of factors. The size and geographical location of Bangladesh is at the top of the list. As one scholar writes, "the tyranny of geography is the most important factor in the defence-vulnerability of small states." Indeed, Bangladesh is encircled by India with which it shares three borders North, East and West. In fact, India, which occupies 72 percent of the entire sub-continent, has been a major security concern for most South Asian states: Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. The growing hegemonic desires of India have contributed to this concern. India’s desire for regional hegemony is no secret as K. Subramanyam, an Indian

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7 Ibid., p. 14.
strategist, notes that "India with its population, size, resources and industrial output will be a dominant country in the region, just as the US, former Soviet Union and China happen to be in their respective areas"11.

Such ambitions have been a major concern for Bangladesh, given its geographical location and India’s history of occupation and annexation of small territories in the sub-continent12. India’s occupation of Kashmir in 1947-49 and of Junagath and Hyderabad at the same time, its efforts in liberating Goa in 1961-62 and its annexation of Sikkim in 1975, generated growing fears that India might also “swallow up” Bangladesh in the future13. So, the size and geographical location of Bangladesh bears an important consideration in its foreign policy outlook.

Secondly, relative to India, Bangladesh’s defence and military capacities are small. While India has been ranked sixteenth in terms of quantitative war capability worldwide, Bangladesh has been ranked sixty-second14. Indeed, India not only has the fourth largest army in the world but it has also proven its military capability by producing a nuclear bomb. In 1998 it was the sixth state to explode a nuclear bomb. Moreover, India’s defence expenditure is much greater than other South Asian states including Bangladesh. In 1999 India’s defence expenditure was $10.7 billion15. In contrast, Bangladesh spent only $619 million16. Hence, its small military capacity poses another security concern for Bangladesh.

A third concern for Bangladesh is its limited economic growth and development. Internally, Bangladesh is constantly bedevilled by severe domestic problems caused by under-development and economic insecurity. In fact, it is one of the ten poorest countries in the world. It also ranks very low in human resource development, which is measured by indicators such as literacy, health and nutrition. It ranks 147th nation in terms of human development and per capita GNP. More than 46.5% of Bangladesh's 130 million population live below the poverty line.

Self-reliant growth in Bangladesh has almost become a dream. This can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, Bangladesh inherited a poor economy, which was one of the causes for the break up of ‘United Pakistan’. Indeed, while the bureaucratic-military elite that ruled Pakistan since its inception often alluded to the concept of a “two-nations” Pakistan, little attention was paid to the deteriorating economic conditions and limited growth in East Pakistan. However, the ruling bureaucratic elite which predominantly consisted of Punjabi and Urdu speaking migrants from India, was partly responsible for this limited growth because of their inequitable economic policy. This was reflected in public expenditure and the allocation of resources by the central government for both East and West Pakistan. From 1965/66 to 1969/70 the public expenditure for West Pakistan and East Pakistan were at 64 percent and 36 percent respectively. Most of the economic surplus of the East was directed towards West Pakistan. In fact, over 23 years the central government had appropriated more than $2.8 million of East Pakistan’s export surplus.

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earnings. These earnings were used for the industrialisation programme of West Pakistan and also to cover the costs of the two Indo-Pakistan wars over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

Secondly, the liberation war of 1971 had a major impact on Bangladesh’s economy and significantly reduced its capacity for self-reliant growth. The war not only resulted in massive social dislocation of the population but also caused considerable damage to its communication and economic infrastructures. Moreover, the Pakistani bourgeoisie, which controlled and monopolised most of the East Pakistan’s economic resources and through which the central government had diverted the export earnings, began to withdraw their assets and leave Bangladesh. This left Bangladesh with a very limited economic surplus.

Thirdly, Bangladesh is also a country that frequently experiences natural disasters such as cyclones and other natural calamities. This causes serious damage to the infrastructure further eroding its limited capacities.

However, although Bangladesh has a limited capacity for self-reliant growth, it is rich in natural resources and can no longer be seen as a poor country. Gas reserves discovered to date are approximately 10.1 trillion cubic feet and Bangladesh is estimated to have more than 40 million barrels of oil in the Haripur gas field. However, Dhaka has had problems in generating foreign investment and in spite of these resources Bangladesh’s industrial growth declined from 5.3% in 1995 to 3.3% in 1997. Inflation rose sharply within a year from 5.7% in 1997 to 7.4% in 1998. Moreover, Bangladesh’s balance of

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22 Cited in Ibid., p. 21.
payment deficit has increased tremendously. Bangladesh's huge external debt burden has continued to rise from $14.4 billion in 1998 to $15 billion in 2000\textsuperscript{27}.

One major cause has been political uncertainty and weak governance in Bangladesh. The problems of weak political institutions and leadership have characterised Bangladesh's domestic political arena since its liberation from Pakistan\textsuperscript{28}. Political corruption, bureaucratic wrangling, constant bickering between leaders over personal issues, and popular unrest have continued to plague Bangladesh's domestic political life to a point where it is often unclear as to the ability of the civil government to sustain itself and its democratic rule\textsuperscript{29}.

Indeed, democracy in Bangladesh has often come under major threat. The military, which has always remained one of the most well organised and financially stable institutions, has maintained a strong grip on the political life of the country. For almost 15 years two military generals ruled Bangladesh, Major Gen. Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) and Lieut. Gen. Hussain Ershad (1982-1990) and almost half of Bangladesh's foreign policy has been shaped by decisions made by the military\textsuperscript{30}. Although Bangladesh has experienced democratic rule since 1990, the authority of the military in the civil affairs still cannot be underestimated. In 1996 Bangladesh experienced a military coup and came close to a return to military rule. This was caused by a major personal rift between the Army Chief of Staff (COAS) and the President which eventually resulted in the army surrounding the President's residence\textsuperscript{31}. This reinforces the intrusive nature of the military in the civil government in Bangladesh. Thus, like Pakistan, Bangladesh's weak democratic structures

\textsuperscript{27} Bangladesh might find it Difficult to Service Debt', \textit{Xinhua}, 23 April, 2000. See also 'Bangladesh Public Debt Jumps by 152 \%', \textit{Agence-France Press}, 13 April, 2000.
\textsuperscript{28} Vidya Shanker, op. cit., p. 113.
and political uncertainty often make it unattractive to the outside world even though it is endowed with natural resources.

Therefore, Bangladesh is a small state that faces both internal and external challenges. While its geographic location and the overwhelming presence of India are perceived as a serious threat to its national security, the internal challenges of poor human resource development, limited industrial growth, and economic mismanagement all further increase Bangladesh's vulnerability to external threat. These concerns provide the context in which Bangladesh operates and pursues its foreign policy.

It is argued that in international relations, small states are motivated by a "preference for diplomacy and organisations". Bangladesh is no exception to this. It pursues a "forward looking" foreign policy with a view to increasing international support for its internal recovery by way of foreign aid and investment. This forward-looking approach includes two aspects: (1) the diversification of bilateral relations and (2) the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy.

The diversification of Bangladesh's bilateral relations began in the mid-1970s. Until then, Bangladesh had mostly focused on strengthening its bilateral relations with its principal partners, India and the Soviet Union. Indeed, in the early years following its independence relations with India were mostly friendly. This was quite expected since India played a major role in Bangladesh's liberation in 1971. New Delhi was not only critical of the Pakistan Government's moves to send armed soldiers to quell the uprising in East Pakistan but also intervened in the civil war by deploying Indian troops to assist the Bengali

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freedom fighters in liberating Bangladesh³⁴. In addition, India sheltered 3 million refugees displaced as a result of the civil conflict and hosted the government-in-exile³⁵.

Bangladesh's initial links with India developed against a backdrop of growing Indo-Soviet friendship. In August 1971 India and the Soviet Union signed their 20-year Treaty of Friendship to strengthen bilateral links between the two states³⁶. The Indo-Soviet relations had become more pronounced following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to Moscow in September 1971 to seek political and military support for the liberation of Bangladesh³⁷. The Soviet Union also supported India in endorsing the recognition of Bangladesh in the United Nations. From Bangladesh's point of view, this mutual co-operation between India and the Soviet Union was of immense value, particularly in the light of the Soviet support in neutralising objections in the UN Security Council³⁸. This created additional impetus for developing strong relations with India and by extension with the Soviet Union.

Following the war of liberation in 1971 Bangladesh established strong links with both its partners. Two weeks after the Soviet Union's recognition of Bangladesh, President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited Moscow³⁹. He signed a Cultural Pact with Moscow in the light of broadening relations between the two states. Bangladesh signed a number of agreements to promote political, economic and cultural relations with India. Some of these

³⁴ For instance, the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi criticised the military crackdown as "not merely the suppression of a movement, but ... meeting an unarmed people with tanks". See Indira Gandhi, India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements, March to December 1971, Orient Longman, New Delhi: 1972, pp. 9-10.
³⁶ The key provision of this Treaty was contained in Article 9, which stated that "an attack on either party would result in mutual consultation with a view toward eliminating the threat: and not to aid any nation that was at war with the other signatory". Cited in Imtiaz Ahmed, 'The Superpowers Strategy in the Third World: The 1971 South Asian Crisis', in Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's Imperative, ed., Emajuddin Ahamed, University Press Limited, Dhaka: 1984, p. 117.
³⁷ This resulted in the a joint statement issued by India and Soviet Union which stated that "urgent measures should be taken to reach a political solution...paying regard to the wishes...of the people of East Pakistan". See Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan, Second Edition, Vikas Publication, New Delhi: 1974, p. 130.
agreements included: the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation (signed on 19 March 1972); the India-Bangladesh Trade Agreement (28 March 1972); the Land boundary Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (27 August 1974); and the Indo-Bangladesh Cultural Agreement (27 September 1974)\(^40\).

However, these agreements were not successful in completely obliterating suspicions that a giant India may want to absorb Bangladesh\(^41\). In fact, relations between the two countries began to cool as Bangladesh moved towards authoritarianism and military rule in the mid-1970s. The two governments had differences over several issues vital to their respective national interests. The first issue involved the failure to reach a long-term agreement to share the waters of the Ganges and, as a result India's construction of the Farakka Barrage diverted much needed water into the port of Calcutta during the dry months \(^42\). The second issue relates to repatriation of the Chakma refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). These tribal groups had been in a protracted conflict with Dhaka for regional autonomy of the CHT at around the time when Bangladesh was fighting for its liberation from Pakistan\(^43\). Indeed, during the war of liberation in 1971 as many as 5,59,006 Chakmas fled into the neighbouring Indian State of Tripura\(^44\). However, following the war pressures mounted due to these illegal migrants from Bangladesh and their increasing insurgency activities on the borders. It must be noted that some of the issues which aggravated tensions in the mid-1970s continue to be major irritants in the Indo-Bangladesh relations today.

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\(^40\) Shamsul Huq, op. cit., pp. 86-7.
\(^41\) Ibid., p. 88.
\(^42\) For Bangladesh, the Ganges has been very important since its fish stocks provide at least 9 % of the GDP. Moreover, it provides employment to 0.8 million farmers so the waters are also crucial for Bangladesh's agrarian sector. See Ben Crow and Alan Lindquist and David Wilson, *Sharing The Ganges: The Politics and Technology of River Development*, Sage Publications, New Delhi: 1995.
\(^44\) Vidya Shanker, op. cit., p. 138.
Thus, it is against the backdrop of a change in relations with India that Bangladesh started to diversify its bilateral relations to balance the Indo-Bangladesh relations. Therefore, Bangladesh had been active in developing strong economic and political links with other global powers. This led to a steady improvement in Bangladesh’s relations with the US. During the mid-1970s the initial phase was one where the relations developed at a very slow pace. For example, following America’s recognition of Bangladesh’s independence in 1972, Washington announced its “intention to develop friendly bilateral relations and be helpful as Bangladesh faces immense task of relief and rehabilitation”\textsuperscript{45}. This came at a time when the US realised the need to contain the growing Soviet influence in South Asia, including Bangladesh. However, in the early 1970s the domestic and political climate in Bangladesh was less than friendly towards the US. For example, in January 1973 anti-American demonstrations were held in some major cities, such as Dhaka, Chittagong and Rajshahi, against the US bombings in North Vietnam\textsuperscript{46} and there were divisions within the Awami League government over whether to accept the US aid package estimated at $330 million\textsuperscript{47}.

Although Mujibur Rahman, the President, welcomed US recognition and assistance to Bangladesh some hard-liners such as Finance Minister Tajuddin Ahmed were opposed to the idea of receiving American aid\textsuperscript{48}. In fact, the President of the National Awami Party, Muzaffar Ahmed, openly declared his intention to work for a close alliance with Bangladesh and the Soviet Union. Although Washington was a major aid donor to Bangladesh, the Soviet Union whose aid contribution was much smaller was documented as


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 69.

\textsuperscript{47} See Ibid., p. 72. See also Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi: 1982, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 11.
being highly welcomed and much talked about in Bangladesh\textsuperscript{49}. These anti-US sentiments had been part of Bangladesh’s reaction to Washington’s support for Pakistan during the war of liberation in 1971\textsuperscript{50}.

It was not until the mid-1970s, when Bangladeshi relations with India started to deteriorate, that Dhaka started to take a more positive and active approach to strengthening ties with the US. In 1974 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited Washington with a view to “realigning... and shifting the emphasis of his own ‘double alignment’ from one superpower to the other...... and recovering the lost political alliance with America”\textsuperscript{51}. Since then the overall trend in the US-Bangla relations has been positive. The need to keep America interested in Bangladesh has become a major priority for Dhaka. Indeed, this has been a priority of both the military and civil governments that have ruled Bangladesh. In the late 1970s Bangladesh under the leadership of military rule Major Gen. Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) maintained US links and also called for increased US investment in Bangladesh\textsuperscript{52}. Although Bangladesh has not been successful in attracting US investment, it has secured an increasing flow of American aid into the country. In the eighties Bangladesh, under the leadership of Lieut. Gen. Ershad (1982-1990), also pursued a strong US policy. In the mid-1980s Ershad visited Washington at the request of President Reagan. Bangladesh also took the US stand and viewed the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as force by a strong state against the weak\textsuperscript{53}.

Bangladesh’s efforts to secure America’s relations have also been a major priority of the civil governments in power since the end of the Cold War. For example, in 1997 the foreign Minister, Abdus Samad Azad, held talks with the US Assistant Secretary of State

\textsuperscript{49} In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration committed about $433 million in assistance. The Soviet share amounted to only $6.8 million. Ishtiaq Hossain, op. cit., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. pp. 64-5.
\textsuperscript{52} Marcus Franda, op. cit., p. 282.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Bangladesh Times}, 27 February 1980. Also cited in Ishtiaq Hossain, op. cit., p. 76.
emphasising Bangladesh’s interest in improving bilateral ties with political and economic relations\textsuperscript{54}. The present government’s policy for deregulating the economy has taken place against the backdrop of the discovery of natural gas reserves of at least 10.2 trillion cubic feet. This has attracted Western companies such as Cairn Energy of Scotland and Royal Dutch Shell\textsuperscript{55}.

The US has also shown some interest in strengthening its links with Dhaka. This can be seen as part of its desire to having a share of Bangladesh’s natural gas reserves. The recent exchange of visits by Clinton to Bangladesh in 1999 and also by Hasina to Washington in October 2000 have moved the relationship between the two countries to a higher level. An important result of these visits has been the US’s identification of Bangladesh as a new "partner in development\textsuperscript{56}. The US Congress has approved $8 million for developing gas plants in Bangladesh\textsuperscript{57}. Also, Washington has written-off some of Dhaka’s debts amounting to more than 1 billion to the US. Although US-Bangladesh ties are likely to advance to even higher levels with the new economic priorities, the strength of those relations greatly depends on how Bangladesh projects itself externally. Some of the stereotypical images of domestic instability, poor economic management and other political issues such as human rights violation and the alleged forced repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar (Burma) have been some irritants in the US-Bangladesh relations.

Another example of the diversification in Bangladesh’s bilateral relations relates to the Sino-Bangla ties. Sino-Bangladesh relations only began to develop in the late 1970s. China, which had strongly supported Pakistan, had opposed the creation of Bangladesh. In fact, it identified the creation of Dhaka as a “temporary difficulty” faced by the Pakistani

\textsuperscript{56} ‘US, Bangladesh now 'partners in development', \textit{The Times of India}, 23 October, 2000.
\textsuperscript{57} ‘US, Bangladesh now 'partners in development', \textit{The Times of India}, 23 October, 2000.
people\textsuperscript{58}. On a number of occasions the Chinese government had demonstrated its reluctance to acknowledge the break-up of 'United Pakistan'. For example, following the war of liberation and the Pakistani Army's surrender in December 1971 the Chinese government documented "some facts of ...Indian bullying and aggression against Pakistan" and asserted that the new government in Dhaka is a "rebellious organisation" and associated the Farrakh Barrage dispute as one existing between India and Pakistan, not between India and Bangladesh\textsuperscript{59}.

Indeed, it was only after the release of the Pakistani prisoners of war and the signing of the Simla Accords between India and Pakistan, which called for Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, that Chinese policy towards Dhaka gradually started to change. Consequently, in the late 1970s the two governments signed agreements on cultural co-operation. The Chinese government also sponsored Bangladeshi students studying in China under the China-Bangladesh Executive Programme\textsuperscript{60}. In July 1980 President Ziaur visited Beijing which resulted in the signing of two agreements, one on economic co-operation and the other on air-links between the two countries. China also provided small aid packages totalling $84.2 million in the 1980s\textsuperscript{61}. Beijing also agreed to provide an interest free loan with repayment spread over ten years.

Sino-Bangla relations have continued steadily since the end of the Cold War. To date the two countries signed agreements to strengthen their military co-operation during the August 2000 visit to Dhaka by a seven-member Chinese military delegation\textsuperscript{62}. On the economic front China announced it would invest in a $353 million dollar urea fertiliser


\textsuperscript{59} Cited in Ibid., pp. 149-50. See also \textit{New China News Agency} (NCNA), 17 December 1971.

\textsuperscript{60} Shumsul Huq, op. cit., pp. 165-69.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. P. 167.

Bangladesh plant in Bangladesh. Some of the other areas in which China has been interested have been telecommunications, paper production and other manufacturing sectors. In return, Bangladesh has supported China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation. Bangladesh has also reiterated its support for China on the Taiwan and Tibet human rights issues.

As part of its “forward looking” approach to foreign relations Bangladesh has also been pursuing strong multilateral diplomacy to generate international support against possible regional and environmental threats and international aid for its internal economic recovery. These processes have taken place at both the regional and global levels. At the regional level, Bangladesh has been working with India on the establishment of a South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) which includes the sub-regional countries: India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. In some ways this can be seen as an extension of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) which was also established under an initiative by Bangladesh in the 1980s.

The idea of establishing a SAGQ came out of a slight improvement in Indo-Bangla relations in the mid-1990s under the Sheikh Hasina’s government. In fact, this was marked by the historic signing of the Water Treaty agreement by India and Bangladesh in 1996. The agreement, which is to be reviewed once every five years, states that India would release 35,000 cusecs of water from the Farakka during the dry periods. A year after signing the Ganges Water Accords, Bangladesh also signed another treaty for the repatriation of its refugees.

Although these developments have marked some positive improvements in the Indo-Bangla relations, Dhaka is still suspicious of India’s underlying motives. Indeed, the idea of forming SAGQ within a larger bloc (SAARC) has been met with mixed reactions

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63 'China to set up $353 million dollar fertiliser factory in Bangladesh', Agence France-Presse, 4 October, 2000.
64 Abdul Kalam, 'SAARC, Sub-Regionalism and Bangladesh Foreign Policy', Regional Studies, (Islamabad), Vol. XV, No. 4 Autumn 1997, p. 3.
within Bangladesh. Some approve because it is in line with SAARC and also provides an opportunity for Bangladesh to work at a closer level with the support of other small states to resolve its water dispute. However, sceptics within the government have only viewed SAGQ as part of India's expansionism in the sub-region. It is argued that SAGQ presents nothing more than a threat to Bangladesh's security in the region. It has been speculated that given India's strength and might, SAGQ merely provides a power base for India to exert greater influence in the domestic affairs of member states. Moreover, SAGQ may result in Bangladesh's foreign policy being geared more towards towing the Indian line than to establishing relations with other major economic powers and Muslim friends including Pakistan. These concerns continue to surface as part of Bangladesh's fear of India's growing dominance and hegemony.

Subsequently, Bangladesh has taken a more active approach to multilateral diplomacy at the international level. One example is its links with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Although Bangladesh is predominantly a Muslim state, it is a secular state as reflected in its title, the People's Republic of Bangladesh compared to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This, however, has not prevented it from identifying itself within the comity of its Islamic counterparts or in joining the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1974. In fact, Bangladesh's desire to enhance its presence within the Muslim international community for support and assistance has led it to play an active role within the OIC. In 1983, Dhaka hosted the 14th Islamic Summit. At the Inaugural address, the President Ershad reinforced Bangladesh's Islamic identity by asserting that: "We in Bangladesh attach the highest importance to our relations with the Islamic world. It is this

65 Bangladesh Times, 19 December, 1996.
66 The Charter states that "The Standing Committee may set up Action Committees combining member states concerned with implementation of projects involving more than two but not all member states". See Ghulam Umar, SAARC: Analytical Survey, (Karachi) Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1988, p. 155.
Islamic legacy which prompted us to involve ourselves fully in the Islamic world; to devote ourselves to strengthening Islamic co-operation and in working for Islamic Unity and solidarity.69

Bangladesh has been also working on strengthening economic links and Islamic markets within the OIC. For example, at the Islamic Summit in 2000 held in Qatar, Bangladesh pledged to further co-operate and strengthen the Islamic common market on the basis of Islamic solidarity70. Bangladesh has jointly proposed increasing intra-trade in the Islamic Development Bank by 3% in 1999-2001. At the 2000 Islamic Summit Bangladesh also nominated itself as a candidate for the post of OIC as the Secretary-General71. This shows the level and extent of Bangladesh’s interest in increasing its presence in the Muslim world and also enhancing its image among its Islamic counterparts.

As part of this pattern of developing multilateral relations Bangladesh has become increasingly involved in the affairs of the United Nations. Following the 1971 crisis Bangladesh was not readily admitted as a member state of the UN. The Soviet Union, which had supported India and provided military and economic support to Bangladesh during the 1971 war, was quick to endorse the creation of Bangladesh72. Conversely, China which had confrontations with India over border issues, supported Pakistan’s reluctance to acknowledge the independence of Bangladesh. Being a permanent member of the Security Council China opposed India’s claims that Bangladesh is now a sovereign and a separate state from Pakistan73. Moreover, the Chinese delegation opposed the Indian, Soviet and

68 Ibid., pp. 36-7.
70 Bangladesh to Press for Islamic Common Market at OIC Summit’, Xinhua, 8 November, 2000.
71 ‘Bangladesh is determined to go ahead with its OIC Candidate’, Turkish Daily News 12 June, 2000.
72 Iftekhar Chaudhry, op. cit., p. 150.
Yugoslavian demand for the admission of Bangladesh in the United Nations\textsuperscript{74}. When Bangladesh advanced its application for admission into the UN, China vetoed it and tabled a draft resolution that the Security Council should defer the application until India adhered to and implemented the UN resolutions relating to the withdrawal of all troops from Bangladesh and also the repatriation of the Pakistani prisoners of war\textsuperscript{75}.

Indeed, Bangladesh did not become a member state of the UN until September 1974. It was its admission as the 136\textsuperscript{th} member state that marked the beginning of an independent foreign policy for Bangladesh. Since that time Bangladesh has been playing an active role in the affairs of the UN. In fact, it was so active that in 1978, within four years of its admission to the UN, Bangladesh became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for two years. During this period it played a major role on various security issues such as Vietnam’s military intervention in Democratic Kampuchea, Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and also in the decolonisation process in Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{76}.

Bangladesh’s strong support for the UN, which reinforces its preference for multilateral diplomacy, can be seen in its membership of various UN agencies such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), and UN Development Programme (UNDP). Bangladesh has also been playing an active role in the work of some of these agencies. For example, in July 1998 Bangladesh took the initiative for submitting several draft resolutions for the restructuring and revitalisation of ECOSOC\textsuperscript{77}. One of the draft resolutions which was adopted by the General Assembly

\textsuperscript{74} Cited in Ibid. p. 164. See also UN Document S/10771, Security Council Supplementary, 27\textsuperscript{th} Year, July, August, September 1972, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{75} For more discussion on the negotiations surrounding these issues among the permanent members, India and Pakistan, see Ibid., pp. 154-67.


called for reduction of the membership of the Committee from 53 to 33 in order to improve its efficiency in policy implementation. Bangladesh also suggested that the new commission should consist of eight members from African states; seven from Asian states; six from Latin American and Caribbean states; four from Eastern Europe; and eight from Western Europe.

Similarly, Bangladesh has been playing an active role in the UNFPA. Dhaka has not only continued to pledge its commitment to developing policies to address the rapidly growing world population, but has also called for collective support for population control at a multilateral level. It asserted in a General Assembly meeting that “although governments had the primary responsibility for drawing up and implementing population policies, the global dimension of population and development called for collective support and in enabling international environment for their implementation”.

Bangladesh has also been lending its unequivocal support to the maintenance of global peace and security such as global disarmament and arms control. Indeed, Bangladesh has been critical of the absence of global norms for the control of illicit small arms transfer, which is a major threat to regional and global security. It has also pledged its support at the UN General Assembly to develop a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and also a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials. Bangladesh has also taken the stand of the global community in deploring the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998. The Bangladeshi ambassador to the UN, Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, reiterated that the ongoing nuclear arms race in South Asia has the potential to “inflict punitive pains on the people of the region”, and the growing nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan may only make it less

80 UN Doc., Press Release, DC/2635, 12 April 1999.
possible to seek a resolution to the Indo-Pakistan rivalry\textsuperscript{82}. Subsequently, Bangladesh supported the General Assembly resolutions which endorsed the need to take practical steps to implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) including the early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by all states in addition to moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions\textsuperscript{83}. The point is that Bangladesh has been playing a positive role in the UN's affairs at various levels, as part of its overall foreign policy.

It is in this context that Bangladesh's UN peacekeeping policy can be examined. It can be argued that both the military and civil governments in Dhaka have supported UN peacekeeping operations. However, it has been towards the end of the period of military rule when Bangladesh actually started to participate in external operations. Indeed, Bangladesh's participation did not come about until the late 1980s. This late entry actually coincides with the renewed level of activity in UN peacekeeping itself. As indicated in chapter one, from the late-seventies onwards the UN did not launch any new peace missions\textsuperscript{84}. For a period of nine years (1979-87) UN peacekeeping remained dormant. The call for third-party intervention came as late as 1988 following the end of the eight year long war between Iran and Iraq. It was at this point that the military regime under Ershad made a commitment by deploying unarmed observers as part of the Iran-Iraq peace mission.

The two civil governments that have ruled Bangladesh since 1990 have expressed strong support for UN peacekeeping operations. In 1995 the Prime Minister Khaled Begum asserted Bangladesh's continuing support for UN's enhanced role in third-party mediation and intervention in international armed conflicts. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York, Khaleda asserted that Bangladesh views it as important to strengthen the UN

\textsuperscript{82} UN Doc. Press Release, DCF/336, 3 June 1998.
\textsuperscript{83} UN Doc. Press Release, GA/9829, 20 November 2000.
\textsuperscript{84} See Appendix 1 for the breakdown of the level of activity of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War.
and its peace maintenance mechanism since it is critical to preserving the security of smaller and weaker states\textsuperscript{85}. Despite the change in government in 1996 with Sheikh Hasina assuming power, Bangladesh has maintained this posture with regards to UN peacekeeping. At the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, Sheikh Hasina not only emphasised Bangladesh's continued support but also stated that Bangladesh would play a more "proactive role" in UN peacekeeping operations in the future\textsuperscript{86}.

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\textbf{Graph 4: Bangladesh's Participation in UN Peace Missions (1988-1999)}
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\textsuperscript{86} UN Doc., Press Release, GA/9751, 6 September 2000.
In line with these policies, Bangladesh has been participating very actively in various UN peace missions since 1988. Graph 4 presents a breakdown of Bangladesh's participation in different time periods. As noted earlier, Bangladesh did not participate in UN peace missions until the late 1980s. This was mainly due to the fact that the UN had not launched any new peace missions since 1978. So, the overall level of activity of UN peacekeeping itself was generally low. It is only at the end of the Cold War in 1990 that we can see a dramatic rise in not only the level of activity in UN peace missions but also Bangladesh's response as well. Indeed, Bangladesh's level of activity was the highest in the period 1990-1994 which also marks the assertive period of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. Bangladesh participated in 15 out of the 18 new peace missions (both observer and peacekeeping operations) launched worldwide. Bangladesh made troop commitments to the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (1992), Rwanda (1992), Mozambique (1992), Somalia (1993), Former Yugoslavia (1993), and Haiti (1993).

Bangladesh has also been maintaining its high level participation in the second half of the 1990s. It has participated in more than three-quarters of the new missions launched since 1995. It has made troop-commitments to UN peacekeeping operations launched in Croatia (1995), Angola (1997), Sierra Leone (1998), the Congo (1999) and East Timor (1999).

II. SOURCES OF MOTIVATION

At one level, Bangladesh views its participation in UN peacekeeping as an act of goodwill. Dhaka's overwhelming willingness to contribute is in consonance with its broad foreign policy objective, which is to cooperate with the international community for the promotion of international peace and security, justice and freedom. It is said that Bangladesh "feels strongly whenever and wherever genocide, ethnic cleansing or religious persecution or any
other types of mass injustice, cruelty and oppressions are perpetrated, threatening regional and global peace and security\textsuperscript{88}. Although altruism has commonly been cited as one of the reasons for participation, it is far outweighed by other vital interests.

Bangladesh’s participation in peacekeeping can be associated with its desperate attempt to build a stable economy. In fact, the domestic economic compulsions and imperatives exert a decisive role in defining the domain and action agenda of Bangladesh’s foreign policy\textsuperscript{89}. Bangladesh suffers from a serious balance of payment deficit due to limited export earnings and poor foreign investment, the country has been facing serious debt problems.

Thus, it is not surprising for one to argue that Bangladesh is primarily motivated by financial gains for its participation in external UN peace missions. The UN allocates US$988 per month per soldier to the national government which then pays its military forces based on internal scales and calculations. At an individual level, the salary is a major attraction for soldiers since it serves as a considerable supplement to their meagre incomes at home. At the national level, the foreign exchanges may bring additional revenues to the country’s treasury.

However, the question arises as to the extent to which Bangladesh actually profits financially from its participation in external peace operations. As of 1996 Bangladesh had received $154 million out of a total reimbursement claim of $194 million for troop contribution, contingent owed equipment and also other forms of compensations\textsuperscript{90}. By 1999 the UN was able to reduce its outstanding debt to Bangladesh from $40.8 million to $15.4

\textsuperscript{87} Humayun Rasheed Choudhry, op. cit., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{88} Humayun Kabir., \textit{Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping}, unpublished manuscript, Bangladesh International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dhaka, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{90} Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, Financial Division, UN, New York.
million. To some extent, these figures could lead to a general conclusion that Bangladesh is actually profiting financially from its participation in UN peace operations.

However, the extent to which these earning could help Bangladesh recover from its huge external debts must also be considered. In fact, the amount earned through its participation in UN peace operations are too small to help Bangladesh recover from its huge external debts. As mentioned earlier in 2000 Bangladesh's external debt burden continued to rise from $14.4 billion in 1998 to $15 billion. It is from this point of view that this study argues that although financial benefits can be viewed as a source of attraction, the external earnings are too small to suggest that economic benefits are a primary determinant for Bangladesh's active participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

1. International Image & Recognition

Bangladesh's major source of motivation stems from a desire to enhance its international image which can in turn help to mobilise international support and attract foreign aid for its economic recovery.

International image can be a factor in attracting foreign aid and investment into the country. According to Baxter, donors have been hesitant to commit economic aid because of the negative perceptions and images such as Bangladesh's inability to absorb and efficiently utilise foreign aid. For example, at the annual Bangladesh Development forum Bangladesh was pledged an aid package worth $1.9 billion for the 1997-1998 fiscal year. Although this was lower than the amount Bangladesh had sought ($2.2 billion), the response came with some warning with regards to Bangladesh's political stability. Indeed,

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91 Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, Financial Division, UN, New York.
92 Bangladesh might find it Difficult to Service Debt, Xinhua, 23 April, 2000. See also ‘Bangladesh Public Debt Jumps by 152 %', Agence-France Press, 13 April, 2000.
the factors that have shaped Bangladesh’s negative image relate to its internal weakness particularly, the weak institutions and political uncertainty which have together contributed to the view that Bangladesh is a poor economic manager and cannot implement policies. As one Western scholar puts it, Bangladesh has a history of "attractive policies and poor implementation". This gap in its performance is due to "an absence of political consensus, a desperate need to overhaul the country’s inefficient bureaucracy, and the continued poor management and loses in public sector enterprises". It has also been noted that "Bangladesh development appeared likely to be substantially undermined by the politics of intolerance, violence and intimidation". This negative image reduces Bangladesh’s capacity to attract international aid and foreign investment.

Hence, Bangladesh's need to change its image abroad and prove its credibility is important. Indeed, in her policy statement issued in 1996 the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, asserted that “one of the prime objectives of our foreign policy will be to enhance the image of the country abroad”. Bangladesh’s positive and active participation in UN peacekeeping operations could help to change these negative images in the following ways. Firstly, its active participation in global UN efforts would enable Bangladesh to demonstrate its ability to contribute for a good cause. This would present Bangladesh as a ‘good’ international citizen and at the same time demonstrate its credibility. Secondly, Bangladesh could increase her acceptability in the comity of nations through its participation in external peace missions. This would help to further shape international opinion.

95 Kochanek, (1997), op. cit., p. 141
96 Ibid., p. 141.
97 Ibid., pp. 139-40.
98 The Morning Sun, (Dhaka), June 25, 1996.
2. Increased Presence within Multilateral Organisations

As a small state, Bangladesh draws its “strength” from its multilateral diplomatic arrangements and organisations\textsuperscript{100}. Thus, another plausible explanation for Bangladesh’s active participation in UN peacekeeping operations is related to the desire to increase its rapport within these multilateral and international organisations such as the United Nations and the OIC for mobilising greater support for its economic cause.

For example, a key reason for increasing its presence within the UN is that the organisation serves “as a political umbrella under which donor Governments, inter-governmental organisations and voluntary agencies could work in co-operation with the Government of Bangladesh”\textsuperscript{101}. Secondly, the UN serves as an international forum for states to express their opinions and concerns. Bangladesh can use such fora to mobilise international support for example, to exert pressure on India regarding its water dispute. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations places Bangladesh in a position that increases its interaction with other nations and with other external agencies that also contribute to the UN’s peace efforts.

Participation in UN peacekeeping operations also provides the opportunity for Bangladesh to increase its presence within other multilateral organisations such as the OIC. Indeed, the OIC itself has increased its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. This can be seen in the OIC’s involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992-1995 where it established a Contact Group in Bosnia in a joint-effort with the UN and the European Union to provide humanitarian aid and security to the thousands of Muslims violated by the Bosnian Serbs\textsuperscript{102}. This Contact Group received the support of majority of the Muslim

\textsuperscript{99} Kabir., op. cit., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{100} Interview with Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office, Dhaka: February 1998.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{The News}, (Rawalpindi), 12 September 1995.
countries, including Bangladesh\textsuperscript{103}. In fact, Bangladesh contributed 1500 ground personnel, including military troops, as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)\textsuperscript{104}.

The fact that multilateral organisations such as the OIC play a role in UN peacekeeping operations is advantageous for small states like Bangladesh because it provides opportunities for strengthening links with its Muslim counterparts within the OIC. The common aims and objectives of peacekeeping help countries, including Bangladesh, to increase their level of interactions and their friendship which can be utilised over time. This also helps Bangladesh to mobilise support from the Muslim world against regional threats and at the same time seek economic assistance.

3. Institutional Interests

A third source of motivation may be related to institutional interests within Bangladesh. Like Pakistan, Bangladesh’s institutional interests include both the civil government and the military. In praetorian states the military plays a major role in foreign policy decision-making. Bangladesh is no exception to this. Indeed, Bangladesh has a history of constant military interference in its democratic process, not to mention being under military rule for 15 years from 1975 to 1990. The mid-1990s almost witnessed another return to military rule when tensions between the president and the military leaders escalated. From the civil government’s point of view, participation in peacekeeping operations could distract the military from domestic and political affairs\textsuperscript{105}. Active participation may keep the military pre-occupied with external duties for quite some time. This may be one determinant for the active support of external peace operations by the civil government which has been in power since 1990.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with former Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office, Dhaka: 1998.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview with former Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office, Dhaka: 1998.
\textsuperscript{105} Interview with officials in the Foreign Affairs, Dhaka, March 1998.
On the other hand, the military may have its own set of interests. It strongly supports the civil government’s participation in external peace operations. For example, the COAS, Lieut. Gen. Mustafizur Rahman, in his address at the international peacekeeping seminar hosted by the Bangladesh Army in Dhaka in 1998 noted that the "Bangladesh Army today is not limited to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and nation building, but it also transcends our national boundary through participation in UN peacekeeping operations". Nevertheless, the military’s active support for UN peacekeeping may be shaped by further interests of its own.

Firstly, it provides exposures to the global military establishment, particularly to the army. It gives the military personnel the opportunity to interact with foreign armies and acquire new military skills. Participation in UN peacekeeping provides an opportunity to be educated in other military and political cultures and, hence, helps to broaden their military outlook. For example, Bangladesh’s participation in the peace operation in Haiti provided the opportunity to acquire new skills and training from the US and British military forces. Two weeks prior to the actual deployment in Port-au-Prince the Bangladesh contingent received training from the US Special Forces and British army. This training took place during a stop over in Puerto Rico at Camp Santiago, during the airlift organised by the US Air Force and AirLift Command. The Bangladesh contingent was trained in managing urban warfare underwent familiarisation with new weapons and was taught to drive US-type four-wheeled land rovers and trucks.

Secondly, participation in overseas assignments also helps to enhance relations between the military leadership of different countries. For example in 1995, via

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108 Interview with Director of military operations, Dhaka, March 1998.
Bangladesh's involvement in the peace mission in Haiti the Army Chief-of-Staff, Lieut. Gen. Abu Saleh Mohammed Nasim, took the opportunity to visit Washington and meet Pentagon officials to mobilise US support for more military aid. In fact, the visit resulted in an increase in military aid from $175,000 to $258,000 under the US International Military Education and Training Programme\textsuperscript{111}. Thirdly, Bangladesh's military has also been motivated by the fact that participation in external assignments enhances its image and identity both locally and overseas\textsuperscript{112}. For individual soldiers the salary earned from participating in external peace missions is a considerable supplement to their incomes at home.

III. BANGLADESH'S RESPONSES TO DEMANDS RELATING TO TROOP-CONTRIBUTION

Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping comes primarily in the form of contributing and deploying front-line troops to carry out day-to-day tasks in the field. Bangladesh, which has a standing army of 137,000 men, has also been responding to the quantitative changes in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. To this end it can be argued that Bangladesh has been a major peacekeeper in post-Cold War peace operations. It qualifies for this role on the following grounds.

Firstly, in terms of making sizeable troop-commitment, Bangladesh's contributions have been considerable. In fact, it has responded positively to the new demands for ground forces in various peace operations including peace observation missions. For example, this can be seen in Bangladesh's troop commitment to the UN observer mission to Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) since 1991. Although this is an observer mission, Bangladesh is one of the three states to have made a large troop-commitment. When the UN requested more troops to

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 62.
make up a force of 3645 in strength, the Government of Bangladesh responded positively by contributing a mechanised infantry battalion of 2522 troops\textsuperscript{113}. This request for more ground troops came about with the expanded UN mandate of the UNIKOM. In 1991, the UNIKOM was mandated to monitoring the withdrawal of the Iraqi armed forces from the demilitarised zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. It was also mandated to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between the two countries\textsuperscript{114}. However, the UNIKOM was also required to observe ground developments and report to the UN on any violation of the DMZ and any hostilities that may arise between the two parties. Hence, the UN deployed an 250-300 unarmed military observers to oversee the mission. These observers were drawn from 32 countries, including Bangladesh\textsuperscript{115}. During the course of the observer mission the UNIKOM observed several violations which included Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarised zone and also the unauthorised retrieval of Iraqi property from Kuwait\textsuperscript{116}.

In 1993 the composition of the UNIKOM changed as its mandate was expanded to include: redressing the small scale violations in the demilitarised zone by the Iraqis; the violations of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait by civilians and civilian police; and the problems arising from the retrieval of Iraqi property and assets on the Kuwait side of the demarcated boundary\textsuperscript{117}. Given the intrusive nature of the mandate, the Secretary-General noted that the UN needed to deploy lightly armed soldiers\textsuperscript{118}. Hence, the expansion of troop numbers including a significant contribution from Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has in fact, outnumbered the troop contribution of some of the major powers and old peacekeepers. For example, in 1994 Bangladesh's share of troop

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Director of military operations, Dhaka, March 1998.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pp. 682-84.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 684.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 684.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 684.
contribution was 5.31% of the total 73,000 military personnel deployed worldwide\textsuperscript{119}. This was greater than the contribution of some of the permanent members of the Security Council, namely the US (1.34%), China (0.09%), UK (5.11%) and Russia (2.02%), and also some of the traditional peacekeepers like Canada (3.5%)\textsuperscript{120}.

In 1996, among the 70 UN-troop contributing states, Bangladesh was ranked as one of the top troop contributors\textsuperscript{121}. It deployed 2104 military personnel in 13 out of the 18 ongoing peace mission. Bangladesh emerged as one of the top ten troop-contributors again in 2000 when with 3103 troops it was the third largest troop-contributing nation following Nigeria and India\textsuperscript{122}.

Secondly, given the numerical growth and geographic expansion of UN peace missions today, troop contributors must be willing to participate unreservedly and unselectively (see Appendix 4). Bangladesh has deployed observers and military contingents in UN peace missions launched worldwide:

- the Middle East: Iran-Iraq border and Iraq-Kuwait border;
- Central and South-east and East Asia: Cambodia, East Timor, and Tajikistan;
- Europe: Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pervlaka, Georgia and Eastern Slavonia; Africa: Namibia, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, Liberia, Chad, Congo and Sierra Leone; and
- the Americas: Haiti.

Hence, in terms of geographic location Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping operations is both widespread and unselective.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 684.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 553.
\textsuperscript{121} Department of Public Information, UN, New York.
\textsuperscript{122} Department of Public Information, UN, New York.
Thirdly, Bangladesh does not limit its contribution to the military alone. It contributed civilian components as part of its troop contribution in response to the need for specialised personnel in new peacekeeping operations. Bangladesh has contributed more than 2200 civilian police and other civilian personnel in various UN peace missions. Bangladesh’s civilian police units have served in Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. In Angola, Bangladesh’s Chief Superintendent, Anwarul Iqbal, served as the Chief Police Commissioner from March 1995 to 1998. Bangladesh has also contributed a mine clearance team. This can be seen in Cambodia, where Bangladesh contributed a mine awareness-training group consisting of 33 personnel. The team was responsible for initiating mine-awareness, and the mine detection and mine-clearance training of civilian populations.

Fourthly, like India and Pakistan, Bangladesh has also made simultaneous troop-contributions. For example, Bangladeshi troops have served in three major UN peacekeeping operations concurrently. These were in Mozambique (February 1993 - December 1994), Somalia (July 1993 - February 1995) and Rwanda (October 1993 - November 1994). The size of its troop contribution in each of these operations was at 2328, 1946, and 854 respectively.

Fifthly, Bangladesh has also demonstrated its capacity to take risks and sustain its commitment over a prolonged period of time in the harsh and hostile operational environments of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. However, this has varied in some operations. For example, Bangladesh’s involvement in Rwanda (1993-1996) was quite brief. Undoubtedly Bangladesh was one of the few countries to respond quickly to the UN’s request for ground troops. In October 1993, Bangladesh contributed a total of 773 military personnel including an infantry battalion and engineers as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda. This is significant especially in the context of the high level of reservations among most member states to participate in Rwanda where genocide and
mass killings were rampant. The Hutu-ran camps which have been clearly identified by the
Security Council as a “threat to peace and Security”. Despite this identification, the Security
Council did nothing to address this threat. The Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali informed
the Council that a strength of 12,000 peacekeepers were required to separate the local
populations and the refugees from the rebels and fighting groups. Another option was to
establish minimal security without engaging in the separation of the local population from
the murderous leaders, and this would require 5,000 men. It is noted that Bangladesh was
the only country to send troops for this lesser option.

While Bangladesh might be credited for making ground troops readily available to
the UNAMIR, it did not stay long in the mission. By November 1994 Bangladesh withdrew
its troops thus reducing the force composition of the UNAMIR and in turn weakening the
UNAMIR’s capacity to respond effectively at a time when violence and mass killing were
intensifying in Rwanda. This may be interpreted as a lack of staying power of the
Bangladesh contingent in Rwanda.

However, it must be noted that the withdrawal was not because the Bangladeshi
contingent was less willing to take risks in the mission but mainly due to lack of logistics
support and sufficient firepower. The Bangladeshi contingent was poorly equipped in
terms of military weapons. In fact, some of the fighting groups in Rwanda were better
equipped than the Bangladeshi contingent. Despite this limitation, Bangladesh made a
second attempt in April 1995 when it deployed a second batch of troops as part of the
UNAMIR. However, even then it only stayed on for not more than three months.

On the other hand, Bangladesh’s participation in the UNPROFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1992-95) gives a different view about its ‘staying power’. This must be

123 William Shawcross, Deliver US From Evil: Warlords & Peacekeepers In A World of Endless
124 Ibid., p. 122.
125 Ibid., pp. 255 & 262.
examined in the overall context of the mission. The UNPROFOR was deployed in 1992 in the face of the break up of the former Yugoslavia and growing Serbian atrocities against ethnic Muslims. The mandate of the UNPROFOR was threefold: first, an incomplete but traditional peacekeeping operation in Croatia; second, a humanitarian operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and third, an observer mission in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{127}

However, the UNPROFOR faced enormous difficulties in carrying out all three mandates, particularly the humanitarian mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UN peacekeepers were increasingly confronted by growing Serbian retaliation and attacks as humanitarian relief convoys and peacekeepers became targets of the Serb attacks.\textsuperscript{128} This prevented the delivery of relief aid to the Bosnian Muslims and also created further instability. The matter grew worse when the UN Security Council instigated a new mission in 1993 declaring six 'safe havens' in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the protection of human lives against the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign. These 'safe havens' were created in six major cities: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Sebrenica and Bihac.\textsuperscript{129} However, the 'safe haven' concept further exacerbated the problem with the need to get Serbian recognition of the safe havens. Serbian atrocities continued and the Serb shelling in one of these towns, namely in Tuzla left at least 70 people dead and many others wounded.\textsuperscript{130}

The Bangladesh contingent was deployed in the city of Bihac at a time when the ground situation was worsening. In fact, it replaced the French contingent which departed because it has difficulty controlling the increased violence.\textsuperscript{131} At one point it became difficult to deliver UN supplies to the city.\textsuperscript{132} The Serb forces had blocked roads making it

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Interview with Director of Military Operations, Dhaka, 1998.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 128.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} 'Yugoslav Crisis: Tragedy Continues with “no sign of abatement”', \textit{UN Chronicle}, Vol. 30 No. 3, September 1993.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} See UN Security Council Resolution, 819 (1993).
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Interview with Military peacekeepers, Dhaka military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} See Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, 'Safe Areas' in Bihac', Document Dated 12 May, 1994.
\end{itemize}
difficult for the delivery of military supplies and other relief aid to reach the city. The Bangladesh contingent suffered severely because of the delay in the delivery of weapons, food rations and other logistical equipment. The Force Commander of the UNPROFOR, Lieutenant General da Lapresle acknowledged Bangladesh contingent’s predicament in Bihac: "BANBAT is struggling in the face of formidable obstacles to carry out perhaps the most difficult, dangerous and vexing mission of all".\(^{133}\)

What made the situation worse for the Bangladeshi contingent was a lack of firepower to defend themselves and carry out their mandate. At one point of time, the Bangladesh contingent could not even respond to intense shelling and sniper shots due to their limited firepower\(^{134}\). As a result 2 soldiers were killed and 14 were injured. The lack of firepower in the Bangladesh contingent brought harsh criticism from some other national commanders. Bangladesh's Director of Military Operations noted the criticism that "Bangladesh cannot even provide its own sticks"\(^{135}\).

Despite the delay in weapons delivery, the Bangladesh contingent continued to operate and function in a harsh and increasingly violent environment. Since UN participation is voluntary, Bangladesh had the option of withdrawing from the mission. But Dhaka was determined to maintain its commitment in Bihac even in the face of limited means to defend itself against the growing risks\(^{136}\). Indeed, Bangladesh maintained its commitment until 1995 when the first phase of the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was completed\(^{137}\). Bangladesh’s willingness to take this risk in Bihac demonstrates its reliability in terms of ‘staying power’ or sustainability in harsh operational environments. In fact,


\(^{134}\) Interview with Military Peacekeepers, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.

\(^{135}\) Interview with Director of Military Operations, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.

\(^{136}\) Interview with Military Peacekeepers, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.

\(^{137}\) Interview with Military Peacekeepers, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.
Bangladesh has also demonstrated its reliability in several other post-Cold War peace operations, such as Somalia (1993-95), Sierra Leone (1999) and East Timor (1999).

IV. ADJUSTING TO DEMANDS & CHALLENGES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF NEW PEACEKEEPING

Bangladesh has also been responding actively and positively to demands related to the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. Bangladeshi military peacekeepers have executed various duties such as: election supervision and monitoring (Cambodia, & Haiti); the provision of humanitarian aid & human security (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina); the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and other displaced populations (Haiti & Mozambique); civil administration & nation-building (Cambodia); and policing (Haiti, Cambodia & East Timor, Sierra Leone).

However, the ability to carry out these roles and functions have been hampered by the difficulty of managing consent in the 'rough' operational environments of post-Cold War conflicts. The remainder of this chapter examines Bangladesh's peacekeeping philosophy and outlook, how the military views its role in new peacekeeping operations today and the extent to which Bangladesh military puts its theory into practice.

The Military's Peacekeeping Philosophy & Outlook

Like India and Pakistan, the Bangladesh military's peacekeeping philosophy focuses on the local community and the importance of the civil population in conducting new peacekeeping operations. Bangladeshi military peacekeepers identify the local population as the “Point of Main Effort”, and the “centre of gravity” of the whole mission. As the Director of Bangladesh’s military operations asserts, the Bangladeshi soldiers operate on the belief that “if one can win over the support and trust of the local population, then
anything and everything is obtainable. Indeed, this belief contrasts Clausewitz’s theory in *On War*, which emphasises technology and the use of military weapons in containing violence and managing wars. Of course, for Clausewitz refers to ‘pure’ war as a state where “there is no logical limit to the application of force”.

Given the high level of violence in operational environments today, most peacekeeping operations are mandated with the use of force under chapter VII of the UN Charter. Some examples include the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and East Timor. However, like India and Pakistan, the Bangladesh military views the use of force in peace missions as not the only means of managing conflicts and there are limitations as to how much one can achieve through the use of force. As indicated in the previous case studies, India and Pakistan’s views about the limited use of force have been shaped by historical experiences and pragmatism. However, for Bangladesh this view may have developed from the fact that Bangladesh is not technologically advance and anyway does not have the modern weaponry of other militarily advanced participating countries including India and Pakistan. Its defence budget averages about 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product and in 1998, its defence expenditure was estimated at US$619 million.

As the Director of the Military Operations in Dhaka stated:

"Resource wise we are limited. Our defence budget is definitely very minimal and we cannot really have all those big equipment and modern technologies. But...in most of the peacekeeping operations of today, the display of the equipment is more of a show of force than its actual utility. You might have a tank but you cannot fire it in a peacekeeping operation [unless the need arises]. Ultimately, it is the infantry soldier and it is his

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138 Interview with Director of Military Operations, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998. See also Wadud (Brigadier), op. cit., p. 59
139 Interview with Director of Military Operations, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.
actions on the ground that make a UN mission successful or unsuccessful." \(^{142}\)

The lack of experience with modern weaponry also makes the Bangladesh peacekeepers less capable when handling equipment lent by other countries. However, despite these limitations, Bangladesh does not see itself as being handicapped in carrying out peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, despite their limited access to high-tech weaponry, Bangladeshi military peacekeepers have survived many of the difficult peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. In Somalia, Bangladesh was one of the countries to have suffered no casualties, compared to some other countries, like the US which incurred high fatalities despite being armed with modern and high tech weaponry\(^{143}\).

From the Bangladesh military's point of view, success in UN peacekeeping operations is not determined by the show of force alone but by developing local trust\(^{144}\). Indeed, the need to interact with the local population and to build strong community relations, to tackle the underlying negative sentiments in civil conflicts has been a key element of the Bangladesh military's peacekeeping philosophy. This can be further demonstrated in the way the Bangladesh military prepares its soldiers for new peacekeeping operations.

The military has given considerable thought to re-structuring its training curriculum and developing new training programmes which cater to modern peacekeeping needs. Soldiers are trained at three different levels or categories.

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\(^{142}\) Interview with Director of Military Operations, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.

\(^{143}\) Bangladesh Army Document. Dhaka.

\(^{144}\) Interview with military officer, Operations Planning Department, Dhaka, 1998.
The first level involves general military training for the development of professional skills. These are basic military training such as physical fitness, weapons training, field crafts, topography, patrolling, checking observation posts, communications and voice procedures. The second category of training relates to specific peacekeeping missions. This involves understanding of the peacekeeping mandate, the background to the mission and the country in which they are to be deployed, the nature and origin of the dispute, the geopolitics including, the culture, customs and traditions and also developing a knowledge of theatre weapons, vehicles and equipment. The third category relates to specialist training such as mine clearance, driving new types of vehicles, and the use of helicopters, and also contact skills.

A significant part of the training also involves the development of personal qualities as it is "the personality of the peacekeeper or the peacemaker, which counts most in his conflict management role." The development of the following qualities has been identified in the training programme: patience, restraint, having the ability to persuade and exert a positive influence, having the right kind of attitude, to be flexible and also reacting quickly to complex situations. The training programmes also include other specialised contact skills including language proficiency, especially for operating in cross-cultural contexts, and negotiation and mediation skills. This training supports the premise that peacekeepers "must be aware of the new demands ... and the need to be able to adapt to them. The success in such a role depends on the individual peacekeeper's personality, power...

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146 Ibid., pp. 28.
of reasoning and friendly persuasion, his common sense and his manner in terms of patience; he needs to be part psychologist and part logician”\(^{149}\).

In addition, the Bangladesh army has developed a rigid selection process for ensuring that its soldiers are suitable for peacekeeping operations. It emphasises two important aspects: attitude and discipline. The military has focused particularly on ensuring that its soldiers have the right attitude for peacekeeping operations. For example, like Pakistan, the Bangladeshi military ensures that troops are not deployed in more than one external assignment\(^{150}\). So, each soldier gets only one opportunity\(^{151}\).

However, opinions on the Bangladeshi soldiers’ capacity to carry out new peacekeeping operations continue to be mixed. In an article in the *New York Times*, entitled “When Peacekeepers Turn into Trouble Makers”, one Western journalist has pointed out that Bangladesh soldiers are highly disciplined and have the right attitude for today’s peacekeeping operations\(^{152}\). The article was in fact, highly critical of the behaviour and lack of discipline of some Western UN peacekeepers and described some European troops as having earned a poor reputation in Cambodia. By contrast, the journalist noted that Bangladeshi soldiers “drawn from a poor and fractious country, are remembered for discipline and humanity”\(^{153}\).

On the other hand, the impressions of foreign military commanders about Bangladeshi soldiers have been less positive. It has been noted that Bangladesh’s soldiers generally lack a sense of innovation and have low level such as the inability to interact with Western counterparts due to language barriers, and the inability to drive vehicles, large

\(^{149}\) Ibid., p. 29.
\(^{150}\) Interviews with military training Department, Dhaka, 1998.
\(^{151}\) Interviews with military training Department, Dhaka, 1998.
\(^{153}\) Ibid., p. 3.
engineer plants and armoured carriers which have a right-hand drive configuration\textsuperscript{154}. In Cambodia, for example, the Bangladesh contingent faced severe problems with a shortage of drivers familiar with new types of vehicles. Some of the troops also lacked skills in driving in rugged terrain\textsuperscript{155}.

Bangladesh had some of its soldiers removed from the mission for lack of discipline\textsuperscript{156}. For example, in Haiti, one soldier was immediately sent home for misbehaving with US service women\textsuperscript{157}. In Kuwait, Bangladeshi soldiers had to be reprimanded for quarrelling among themselves in public\textsuperscript{158}. Bangladeshi troops were also noted for refusing to take orders from the Force Commander in Rwanda. This had been largely due to its limited logistics support in Rwanda (1994). Although Bangladesh was one of the few countries that responded immediately to the UN’s call for ground troops, it lacked adequate logistical support. Not only was it short of trucks but also its engineer company had less than one-third of the equipment to carry out some of its peacekeeping functions such as mine clearance and road repairs\textsuperscript{159}. Consequently, the Bangladesh contingent in Rwanda had its own agenda in terms of carrying out peacekeeping duties in their area of operation, which was not in line with that of the Force Commander of the UNAMIR. Nevertheless, the Bangladeshi troops’ defiance in Rwanda and the other incidents mentioned above show that Bangladeshi soldiers may not always demonstrate professionalism. However, the Bangladesh army and the government have reacted swiftly by taking appropriate disciplinary action against such incidents in the field\textsuperscript{160}.

In spite of these mixed views about the professionalism of Bangladeshi soldiers, one can argue that Bangladesh military's overall peacekeeping outlook and philosophy has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{154} Interview with former UN Military Commanders, March 2000 & February 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Interview with former UN Military Commanders, March 2000 & February 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Interviews with military training Department, Dhaka, 1998.
\item \textsuperscript{157} \textit{Daily Star}, 29 June, 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{158} \textit{Daily Star}, 29 June, 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Shawcross, op. cit., p. 108.
\end{itemize}
been focused on meeting the present day ground challenges of new peacekeeping operations. However, the question arises as to the extent to which the military puts this thinking into practice in the management and conduct of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping.

V. THE PRACTICE OF 'SOFTER' PEACEKEEPING

One can argue that the Bangladesh army has been a major practitioner of 'softer' peacekeeping in terms of managing post-Cold War conflict. In fact, there is a pattern of Bangladesh's military's practice of 'softer' peacekeeping approach in several peace missions, particularly in Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, and Rwanda.

For example, in Somalia the Bangladesh military contingent engaged in several civil affairs projects in order to enhance their interaction with local communities and warring parties. The Bangladeshis launched income-generating projects such as small-scale poultry farms at Dharkanly and Medina, sewing and tailoring schools and also small-scale fish farms. These were carried out with the initiative of the Bangladesh army and with the financial assistance from NGOs. The aim was to cater for the economic needs of the locals, but it also enabled the peacekeepers to keep their area of responsibility free from the outbreak of any major hostility. A similar micro-credit programme was also launched in the peacekeeping operation in Mozambique. The Bangladeshi contingent has focused on establishing small-scale project in agricultural sectors to increase the level of confidence in the peacekeepers and to detract local parties from fighting by providing alternative life

160 Department of Public Information, UN, New York. See also *Daily Star*, 29 June, 1997.
162 Interview with Bangladesh military peacekeeper, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.
styles. A further motivation was to develop an image of the Bangladeshi's as the 'good guys' which would enhance co-operation from the locals\textsuperscript{163}.

In Cambodia, the Bangladesh battalion engaged in strengthening community relations as part of their strategy to win the confidence and trust of local communities. Therefore, the contingent carried out cultural activities which provided an opportunity to foster social contacts with the locals. These activities included the celebration of religious festivities and other entertainment programmes\textsuperscript{164}. In addition, the Bangladesh military also launched a number civil affairs projects. The contingent established their own water plant using charcoal filters and chlorine for the provision of fresh water. Medical centres were established for the treatment of victims of mine accidents. Some of the medical facilities were also provided in makeshift camps\textsuperscript{165}.

**The Case of Haiti**

A detailed example can be drawn from the Bangladeshi military's peacekeeping experience in Haiti (1994-1996). Some background to the nature of the conflict in Haiti provides a context for the operational environment of the UNMIH. Haiti has been an unstable nation both economically and politically. Once a French colony, the country has been described as one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries of the Americas. Weiss notes that three factors have accounted for this underdevelopment: "the interaction between the growth of the population and soil erosion; the lack of technological progress in agriculture; and the predatory nature of the governments which have ruled the country for more than

\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Bangladesh military peacekeeper, Dhaka Military Cantonment, Dhaka: March 1998.
\textsuperscript{164} Military Report on Cambodia, Dhaka.
\textsuperscript{165} Military Report on Cambodia, Dhaka.
one and a half centuries\textsuperscript{166}. Of these three factors, Weiss concludes that the third factor has been the major contributing factor in the instability that has emerged in Haiti\textsuperscript{167}.

Indeed, Haiti's political life has been plagued by a long history of military coups and ethnic unrest\textsuperscript{168}. It has witnessed 21 constitutions and 41 heads of states since 1804. In 1990, the country appeared to make a new turn in its political life when the December elections endorsed a clear-cut victory for Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The once populist priest won a majority of 67% of the vote\textsuperscript{169}. The elections was identified as "free and fair" by both the Organisation of American States and the UN which had deployed an observer group under General Assembly Resolution 45/2 of October 1990 to monitor and verify the Elections\textsuperscript{170}. On taking office, Aristide, in line with his election mandate immediately decided to address the country's declining economy. In response to Aristide's desperate requests, the IMF and other lending institutions granted a loan worth $511 million\textsuperscript{171}. However, Aristide was condemned by the internal authorities for "cronyism"\textsuperscript{172}. Indeed, although Aristide's policies were targeted at redressing the country's economy, his policies were not welcomed by some political parties. There were condemnations that Aristide had favoured his own men and placing them in top positions.

The trouble grew when Aristide decided to retire senior military officers and suggested that the military might be controlled by civilians. Thus, the military decided to act and take control itself and within eight months of his inauguration as the new President, Aristide was overthrown in a violent military coup led by the Haitian military and its allies in another military faction, the Paramilitary Front for the Advancement and Progress of


\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., pp. 168-9


\textsuperscript{169} Weiss, op. cit., p. 172-3.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., pp. 172-3

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p. 174.
Haiti (FRAPH). Although the political turmoil and military coup in Haiti did not come as a surprise, the international community, including the Organisation of American States, reacted with dismay to the situation. In late 1992 the newly elected Clinton Administration undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to return Aristide but were unsuccessful. In June 1993 the UN imposed sanctions, which included an oil arms and financial embargo. It also demanded the reinstatement of President Aristide by October 1993. However, the military regime refused to comply and even blocked the entry of some UN observers responsible for reporting developments in Port-au-Prince.

During the violent military coup, some of the worst atrocities and violation of human rights were committed. The military regime, also referred to as the "defacto government", used violence to control public uprising and to contain the demonstrations by Aristide supporters. At least 300-500 of those supporters were killed during the military coup. By 1993 the acts of violence and intimidation by the FRAPH had resulted in the killing of at least 3000 Haitians. In fact, the military regime's reign of terror increased with "brutal beatings, torture, disappearance, execution without trial, gang rape, assassination, mutilation and the destruction of property". Within a period of five months from January 1994 human rights activists and Amnesty international reported 296 homicides and 66 rapes.

Reports also indicated that some entire villages were massacred. Violence against women and children was increasing. For example in one shantytown, "some 40 women

172 Ibid., p. 174.
174 Ibid., p. 47.
177 Weiss, op. cit., pp. 174-5.
were reportedly raped, including an 8-year old girl and a 55-year old women. In only one instance was the victim raped by fewer than three men. The brutality was so severe that it led to large numbers of refugees fleeing the country. In 1992 the US coast guard intercepted 35 000 Haitian refugees. By 1994 approximately 60 000 to 100 000 refugees had fled Haiti seeking asylum in Florida and the Dominican Republic.

The continuous repression, terror tactics and brutality have impacted heavily on the local Haitian psychology manifest in widespread fear, terror, anger, hatred and frustration. As a result, the locals were so vulnerable and easily influenced when drawn into group demonstrations, and were incited to carry out the type of mob violence known as "Kouri". Kouri is a mass panic and public stampede for no apparent cause of reason.

These negative sentiments were openly expressed during the arrival of the US peacekeepers in Port-au-Prince. The American forces were met by a huge public outcry and mass demonstrations. It has often been argued that this was due to the negative perceptions based on the poor performance of the US peacekeepers in Somalia as evident in the catch cry: "We are going to turn this into another Somalia."

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182 Bangladesh Military Report on Haiti.
The Bangladeshi peacekeepers that were assigned to function in sector six (see Map 4A) in the capital Port-au-Prince were aware of these negative sentiments. There was no guarantee that the same opposition would not confront them. At the same time, the military realised the importance of the co-operation of the locals and of the population as a whole in order to execute their duties. Hence, the Bangladeshi peacekeepers adopted an approach aimed to reshape the negative attitudes. Most of the peacekeeping efforts and strategies

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were directed at what the Bangladesh military commonly identified as the "center of gravity". The Bangladesh contingent in Haiti subsequently used 'softer' peacekeeping strategies to create a positive impact and to exert a favourable influence.

1. Community Relations

One of the major strategies employed was to enhance community relations and co-operative behaviour. One of the biggest setbacks to effective communication in Haiti was the language barrier which posed some level of difficulty for the Bangladesh contingent (BANCON)\textsuperscript{184}. However, this did not prevent them from expressing themselves and BANCON used other techniques to bridge the gap arising from language and communication barriers. Hence, the Bangladesh contingent promoted sport by initiating the preparation of a soccer ground in Cite Soleil area of Port Au Prince\textsuperscript{185}. It also participated in local cultural events and activities with the view to inter-socialising and mixing with the locals. These actions became very symbolic of the cultural and human sensitivity of BANCON and at the same time strengthened the base for building rapport between the contingent and the local communities\textsuperscript{186}.

2. Civil Affairs

A further field craft used by BANCON was the self-initiated 'civic actions' programmes. This was part of a strategy to win the 'hearts and minds' of the locals. BANCON launched its own civil affairs programme. First, it organised the provision of some eighteen tons of food to various orphanages and refugee camps in Port-au-Prince. The food supplies came from their own supplies and the surplus UN rations provided for the peacekeepers\textsuperscript{187}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Interview with Bangladesh military, Dhaka, 1998.
\item \textsuperscript{185} See Wadud, op. cit., p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Interview with Bangladesh military, Dhaka, 1998.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Interview with Bangladesh military, Dhaka, 1998.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
contingent set up their own distribution points for the delivery of this relief aid which demonstrated their concern for the welfare of the local population. BANCON also assisted with socio-economic development works. Bangladesh army engineers helped to construct bridges and roads at Jacmel\textsuperscript{188}. Another effort was the provision of medical assistance. Given its own limited resources, Bangladesh's medical assistance was small. However, its determination to travel to distant outposts and villages to provide medical facilities was part of the strategy for building a strong positive image for BANCON\textsuperscript{189}.

3. Psychological Approaches

Another strategy was the use of psychological approaches. As it is noted in the Powell doctrine of the US psychological operations manual for operations other than war, there is a need to "establish a dominating physical and psychological presence"\textsuperscript{190}, which deters resistance and aggression. The psychological component is part of fostering a positive police self-image. One can argue that the Bangladesh contingent employed strategies to establish such a psychological presence.

This can be seen in the way BANCON carried out its patrolling duties in Port-au-Prince. The Bangladesh contingent adopted a peculiar patrolling tactic which ensured that the troops had the barrels of their rifles pointed towards the ground at all times instead of pointing at the public\textsuperscript{191}. While patrolling the roads in urban areas, BANCON also took every opportunity to communicate with the local population so as to establish rapport with them. For example, in a patrol composed of 12 soldiers, six would remain alert with the barrels of their guns pointing down and the rest would talk with the locals in a friendly

\textsuperscript{188} Wadud, op. cit., p. 66. 
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{190} Weiss, op. cit., p. 185. See also William W. Mendel, 'The Haiti Contingency', \textit{Military Review}, March-April 1996. 
\textsuperscript{191} Wadud, op. cit., p. 64. Interview with Bangladesh military peacekeeper, Dhaka, 1998.
manner\textsuperscript{192}. This was seen to have two possible effects. First, it would help enhance mutual confidence and trust. Second, the tactic became very useful in gaining social co-operation and support for the elections which were central for the transition from the military rule to democracy in Haiti.

4. Crowd Control Techniques

The BANCON also used 'softer' techniques when managing and controlling crowds in demonstrations. Street fighting and rioting were common in Port Au Prince and BANCON had a heavy responsibility for controlling the civil unrest caused by rioting. Therefore, a number of crowd control operations were introduced by BANCON to maintain stability. BANCON was aware of the vulnerability of the crowd which could easily become agitated, repressed and absorbed into public recriminations. At the same time, the contingent was cautious of not being viewed negatively as a result of its actions in controlling public demonstrations. The co-operation of the public was crucial and how the military peacekeepers were perceived was also crucial to achieving that co-operation.

Hence, the Bangladeshi military resorted to using non-violent 'softer' military tactics. The main idea was to break the crowd into small groups and engage in discussion at the group levels. This was done by not carrying guns but the following equipment: megaphones, red tape, coloured water, tear gas, helmets with masks, road block equipment, crowd control shields, pepper sprays, batons and hand pads\textsuperscript{193}. BANCON kept force to a minimum and only used pepper sprays and batons as a last resort. Unnecessary arrests were also avoided and in extreme cases of violence ringleaders were handed over to the civilian police. Here, we can see an attempt by the Bangladesh army to present itself as a positive

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
force in an environment where misperceptions and negative attitudes were likely to abound and affect local reactions and behaviour.

The above discussion highlights the Bangladeshi military contingent's 'softer' peacekeeping approach in Haiti. One can question the degree of success in Bangladesh's 'softer' strategies in Haiti and the impact of these strategies on the locals. However, data available is limited in this respect. Nonetheless, the above description shows the extent to which Bangladesh has been responding to the new demands and challenges of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. The Bangladesh army's 'softer' peacekeeping in Haiti suggests two things: firstly, that the Bangladesh army has been putting its peacekeeping philosophy and outlook into practice, and secondly, that the military has shown its capacity and ability to respond suitably to the new ground needs that are largely non-military.

VI. SUMMARY

As a small state and a relatively new peacekeeper, Bangladesh pursues an active UN peacekeeping policy as part of its overall 'forward looking' approach to foreign relations. Bangladesh can be said to be motivated by the long-term goals of securing external relations and mobilising foreign aid and support for its internal economic recovery. The need to attract foreign support has led to Bangladesh strengthening its image and increasing its presence in the comity of other states and within the international community at large. Participation in UN peacekeeping helps Bangladesh to realise this as it provides an opportunity to work with the international community and other multilateral organisations for the pursuit of a common goal, the maintenance of peace and security. Bangladesh's active participation and strong commitment is reflected in the way it responds to the new needs and demands arising in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations. Bangladesh qualifies as a major peacekeeper not only on the grounds of its large and multiple troop-
commitments, but also in terms of its reliability. Bangladesh has demonstrated considerable 'staying power' and the willingness to take risks in harsh operational environments.

Although Bangladeshi soldiers lack some professionalism in certain areas, the military has developed a new peacekeeping outlook to fit into the new mode of peacekeeping. Indeed, Bangladesh’s participation is also significant for its qualitative contribution in terms of responding positively to the unprecedented ground realities and challenges in the face of implementing new peacekeeping duties. Bangladesh’s practice of 'softer' peacekeeping in various missions such as Cambodia, Somalia and Haiti, demonstrate its capacity to adapt itself to the new situations and respond to the new needs emerging in the field.

However, like Pakistan, Bangladesh is also faced with the serious problem of lacking the capacity to support itself logistically in UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed not all governments can provide their military with the necessary equipment for operating in UN peacekeeping operations abroad. In fact this is a problem for most third world peacekeepers that lack the resources to support themselves. Although the UN has no standing stock of such equipment, it is responsible for the distribution of logistics support and the provision of such assistance to under-equipped units. However, this involves a whole range of other problems such as delay in the arrival of logistics support to mission areas and lack of standardisation of military equipment. Although Bangladesh has demonstrated its capacity to readily provide troops to UN peace operations, its ability to perform on the ground can be greatly weakened by the lack of adequate logistical support and assistance.

Conclusion: Rethinking South Asian States' Participation in UN Peacekeeping

I. FINDINGS OF PRESENT STUDY

One of the limitations in the literature on peacekeeping is the emphasis given to the participation of third world states in UN peace operations. Most literature tends to associate UN peacekeeping very closely and almost immediately with the contribution of major powers and industrialised countries. Consequently, the emphasis has mostly been on developed states, especially the major powers – European, Canadian and US forces – to the exclusion of third world states.

This thesis has expanded the present scope of the literature by focusing specifically on the participation of South Asian states, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Third world states of South Asia are not amateurs in UN peacekeeping. Admittedly, South Asia is itself one of the longest standing beneficiaries of UN peacekeeping as international forces have been observing cease-fires between India and Pakistan in the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir since 1949. At the same time, some states from this sub-continent have pioneered in UN peacekeeping missions abroad.
The central purpose of this thesis has been to examine the nature of participation of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in UN peacekeeping operations. The study has answered three key questions: What is the place of UN peacekeeping in the context of each of the South Asian state's foreign policy? What factors motivate India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to participate in UN peacekeeping? How strong are these states in their commitment to UN peacekeeping? The major findings of this study are identified as follows.

**UN Peacekeeping and South Asian States' Foreign Policy**

Firstly, the thesis has shown that UN peacekeeping occupies a significant place in the foreign policy agendas of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. India has maintained an active UN peacekeeping policy as part of its worldview and overall approach to foreign affairs. India is not a new peacekeeper as it played an active role in the creation of the first UN peacekeeping mission (the UN Emergency Force) to the Sinai in 1956. India's growing aspiration for 'great' power recognition has led it to attach particular importance to its participation in global affairs, including UN peacekeeping operations. The end of the Cold War has not only resulted in a change in the power configuration of the international system but has also increased the competition between India and other major powers such as Germany, Japan and China in the newly emerging global context. The desire for global recognition has resulted in New Delhi re-examining and re-adjusting its traditional approach to foreign relations. India has become more active in global affairs with a view to asserting its status in the international system. It is in this context that India's commitment to UN peacekeeping has reached a new level. For example, India's participation has increased significantly from 12 peace operations during the Cold War to 24 peace operations in the post-Cold War era.

Although Pakistan is a traditional peacekeeper, it is only since the end of the Cold War that UN peacekeeping has gained a significant place in that country's foreign policy.
During the Cold War Pakistan’s participation was limited and inconsistent. Apart from being a host for three UN peace missions, (the UN Military Observer Group, 1949 to the present; UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission, 1965-1966; UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1988-1990), Pakistan participated in only four external peace operations during the Cold War. Pakistan was preoccupied with seeking alliances and forging bilateral ties to balance the perceived Indian threat in the region. In some ways, the Cold War climate and the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan enabled it to forge close relations with major powers such as the US and China.

Since the late 1980s a series of major global developments such as the end of the Cold War, the Gulf war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have significantly changed the geo-strategic context of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Moreover, Pakistan’s deteriorating domestic situation, which has led to the labelling of Pakistan as a ‘failing state’, has contributed to the country’s growing isolation both in the region and in the global environment. This has led Pakistan to attempt to alter its position in the international system by increasingly aligning with and identifying itself as part of the larger international community and international organisations, such as, the UN. It is in this context that Pakistan’s UN peacekeeping policy has changed in the post-Cold War era. Since its involvement in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992, Pakistan has participated in 28 UN peace operations worldwide.

Bangladesh is another South Asian state that attaches great importance to UN peacekeeping. As a small state, its size, geographical location, history of independence, relations with India, and internal weakness have been the major determinants of Bangladesh’s “forward looking” approach to foreign relations. Bangladesh has not only broadened its bilateral relations but has also become active in multilateral diplomacy with a long-term view to mobilising international support against external threats and also to attract foreign aid and investment for its internal recovery. As part of this emphasis on
multilateralism, Bangladesh has pursued an active UN peacekeeping policy. Although Bangladesh is a relatively new South Asian peacekeeper it has been an active and frequent participant in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. Since its debut in 1988 in the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) mission, Bangladesh has participated in at least 31 peace operations. This is impressive, as it is only five less than India’s total between 1956 and 2001.

Motives to Participate in UN Peacekeeping

Secondly, this study examined the factors that motivate the South Asian states to participate in peacekeeping. Like many other participants, South Asian states provide an idealist explanation for their strong commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. However, the idealistic motivation is far outweighed by incentives based on national interests. Given the weak economies of some of these states, economic benefits might be viewed as a major motivation to participate in peacekeeping operations. The question arises as to the extent to which income earned from participation in external UN peace missions assists South Asian states in financing their external debts and internal financial deficits. This thesis has shown that although South Asian states profit from their participation in UN peacekeeping, the sums earned are too small to make a difference to their economies. Other factors, such as political ambitions, regional security considerations, the enhancement of international image and identity and institutional interests, seem more important.

Although the need to shape international image is a common motivation for the active participation of South Asian states in UN peacekeeping, the underlying rationale for each is different. For India, strengthening its status in the international hierarchy means getting a step closer to realising its ambition to be a ‘great’ power. Pakistan’s aim to make itself more attractive to the international community is shaped by its growing security needs. For Pakistan, it is important to rekindle the strong bilateral relations with the US in
particular, which it has traditionally relied upon, to balance the perceived threat from its main adversary, India. Bangladesh is eager to enhance its status in the international system to attract greater economic assistance and foreign investment.

**South Asian Commitment to Peacekeeping**

Finally, the thesis examined the strength of South Asian states’ commitment to UN peacekeeping which can be seen in their active responses to the new demands and challenges in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. South Asian peacekeepers have an outstanding and impressive record of making large troop commitments to UN peace operations. Their troop contribution continues to outweigh that of a number of other peacekeepers. For example, in December 2000, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh deployed a total of 6,025 military troops, compared to 492 for North America; 1,014 for Scandinavian countries, and 925 for the permanent members of the Security Council\(^1\). Moreover, these commitments have been made simultaneously to operations in different parts of the world.

Although size of manpower matters, more important is the extent to which states are prepared to commit peacekeepers in complex and dangerous operations. The South Asian states have demonstrated their 'staying power' and willingness to take risks in hostile operational environments of intra-state conflicts. This is particularly significant when considering the increased vulnerability of peacekeepers in post-Cold War peace missions. Hence, their preparedness to operate in hazardous situations qualifies the South Asian states as reliable peacekeepers.

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\(^1\) The breakdown of troop contributions for each member state is as follows: South Asia: India (2,121), Pakistan (842), Bangladesh (3,062); North America – Canada (456); Scandinavian Countries: Denmark (245); Norway (26), Sweden (51), Finland (692); permanent members of the Security Council: the US (36), UK (363), France (307), Russia (176), and China (43). Department of Public Information, UN, New York, 2000.
The South Asian states' active contribution can also be seen in the way they tackle challenges in the field such as consent-management for the conduct of new peacekeeping operations. All three South Asian peacekeepers share a similar peacekeeping outlook. They take a community-oriented peacekeeping approach and rely on various consent management techniques drawn from the 'softer' aspects of military science. These include developing community relations, carrying out civil affairs programmes and other psychological approaches aimed at bridging gaps in communication and shaping the overall operational environment favourably.

II. NEW ISSUES

The above discussion raises two new issues on the study of South Asian peacekeepers. Firstly, the common outlook of the South Asian peacekeepers has led to some consideration of the establishment of a regional training institute for peacekeepers in South Asia. The idea of setting up a South Asian regional training institute was proposed by Bangladesh at an International Conference, *South Asian Experience in UN peacekeeping*, held in Dhaka in 1998. The proposed institute would place trained soldiers on stand-by for peacekeeping missions. However, the chances of realising this goal have been limited by division among the South Asian states over the location of this institute. While Pakistan has, to some extent, agreed to the idea of having the institute in Bangladesh, it is not willing to accept India's claims that it should have the prerogative since it is the oldest South Asian peacekeeper. This has caused some deadlock among the South Asian states and the idea of setting up a regional training centre has become temporarily frozen.

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2 This was proposed by Bangladesh at the International seminar on the 'South Asian Peacekeeping Experience' held in Dhaka in February 1998. 'PM Seeks UN help to set up training Institute for Peacekeepers', *The Independent*, (Dhaka), 10 February 1998.

3 Interview with Participants of the South Asian Conference in Dhaka, 1998.
Secondly, some South Asian peacekeepers believe that their national candidates are under-represented in the higher management of peacekeeping within the UN Secretariat\(^4\). The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (SCPO) is an open forum through which Member States discuss matters relating to peacekeeping\(^5\). The Committee normally meets annually and in each session it drafts a report which is then presented to the Secretary-General for implementation\(^6\). It also receives briefings from the Secretariat on major developments and progress made in terms of implementing the recommendations of previous reports. At the 2000 Session of the SCPO India claimed that the UN’s recruitment process of national candidates “is marred by subjectivity and is ad-hoc [in nature]”\(^7\). It also strongly supported the view that troop-contributing nations not only be “consulted, but that [they should] participate in the Council’s decisions [as well]”\(^8\). Pakistan has also raised

\(^{4}\) Geographically, DPKO can be said to be quite representative. The number of countries represented in the department is more than half of the total number of states that participate in peacekeeping operations. In 2000, 69 of the 83 countries that were participating in UN peacekeeping operations were represented in the department. Furthermore, it has recruited candidates from the four major regions broadly identified as Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, which further reinforces the UN’s commitment to the principle of geographic representation. Within Asia, for example, each country has at least one candidate represented in DPKO (see Appendix 5). However, in terms of equity, the appointment pattern has been perceived, particularly among most the third world countries, to be rather one sided. According to the information provided by the DPKO, the western and rich industrialised nations namely Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russia, Sweden, UK and the US continued to occupy two-thirds of the professional posts in DPKO. The representation of India (5) and Pakistan (1), for example, is even smaller than countries like Germany (6) and Japan (6) that have constitutional constraints limiting their contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations (see Appendix 5).

\(^{5}\) The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, also known as the Fourth Committee, was established under the General Assembly Resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965. Since its inception the Special Committee has served as a forum for member states to meet and negotiate peacekeeping issues; to provide an additional conduit for the Organisation to present its case directly to delegations either formally or informally; to give the Secretariat an opportunity to be aware of the major concerns of the contributors; and finally to give member states a chance to feel that they have some direct input into how the peacekeeping tool is designed and used, which might include expressing their displeasure with events or policy Michael G. MacKinnon, A Review of the History and Evaluation of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, UN Doc., Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York: 1999, pp. 4-9.

\(^{6}\) This report is refereed to as ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All their Aspects: Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, UN Document, A/54/87.


concerns about the lack of consideration of its own national candidates at the upper echelons of the UN decision-making system, particularly within the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO). It has constantly criticised the UN for not short-listing its candidates and has claimed that the "UN is discriminatory because it constantly appoints candidates from particular regions of the world that become the main controllers of policy in the decision making process"\(^9\). Bangladesh has the same grievances and has argued that the UN should take a serious look at its recruitment process and policy\(^{10}\).

It is not naïve to assume that states making active and direct contributions in many UN peace missions at the field level would also desire some level of involvement in the UN's decision-making body on peace and security matters. As South Asian states continue to make active contributions to UN peacekeeping operations their expectation of greater acknowledgement in the DPKO also increases. For example, India has been participating actively in UN peacekeeping as part of an "interim measure to retain and enhance [its] role in the UN activities.... and ensure proper high level representation for India in those branches of the UN Secretariat which deal with peace and international security affairs [such as the DPKO]"\(^{11}\). Similarly, Bangladesh has been aiming for high-level field appointments such as force commanders and also positions in the DPKO within the UN Secretariat\(^{12}\).

Although the discussion above captures the South Asian perspective on representation within the UN system and decision-making bodies of the DPKO, it is not intended to provide a case for greater South Asian representation within the UN bureaucracy. Nor does this study suggest that the UN should hire South Asian candidates

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\(^9\) Pakistan for Institutionalised System for Peacekeeping Troops', Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 4 April, 1996.


\(^{11}\) J.N. Dixit, 'Proactive Approach: India's UN Agenda', Indian Express, (New Delhi), 18 October, 1994.
Conclusion

on the basis of their active participation in and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. At the same time, their concerns should neither be ignored nor treated lightly.

III. FUTURE DIRECTION

The emergence of such negative feelings among the South Asian states points to the need for new research on three matters. The first is the issue of recognition. How should the UN recognise the contribution of its member states to UN peace operations? Traditionally, the concept of recognition has been used in a legal sense. Generally, recognition serves as an important criterion of statehood and admission to international organisations. There are two schools of thought which place varying levels of importance on this criterion. The declaratory school claims that political recognition plays only a secondary role. An entity becomes a state by meeting the primary criteria such as having a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. On the other hand, the constitutive school argues that recognition is fundamental to the creation of a state. For example, the UN has played an important role in legally recognising some states through its admission process and the granting of UN membership and by denying the existence of others by means of non-recognition.

However, this traditional notion of recognition is limited because it only focuses on identifying states legally as independent units which operate within the international system. It ignores the fact that, like humans, states seek recognition for their contributions to the system in the form of being included in agenda setting, participating in the discussions of new and old global issues and implementing decisions. When states

14 Ibid., p. 164.
participate and contribute in the name of ‘good international citizenship’, recognition is
generally also sought.\footnote{States seek recognition for contributing to different areas of the UN. For example, Poland has gained significant recognition for initiating and developing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1979. Canada’s leading role in the Ottawa process in December 1996, to place a global ban on production, use and stockpiling of landmine materials has also contributed to the enhancement of its image within the international community. In a similar vein, peacekeepers seek recognition for their participation in the UN’s primary peace maintenance efforts.}

Such recognition can occur in two forms: ‘declared’ or ‘actual’ recognition. Declared recognition refers to praise in the form of written or verbal commendations. Declared recognition could have two effects on peacekeepers. First, it enhances their image and identity in the presence of other peacekeepers. By openly declaring that a country is diligent and competent in its peacekeeping duties not only creates a certain impression but also places that participant on a higher level than others. This not only enhances the country’s image but also in turn increases the country’s level of future participation in peacekeeping. At the same time, declared recognition might reasonably result in peacekeepers having some expectations of rewards and ‘real’ acknowledgement within the UN system. ‘Actual’ recognition comes in the form of ‘deed’. It refers to the act of rewarding and giving some real credit for the contribution of member states. Some of these rewards or ‘real credit’ include consideration for the appointment of national representatives to high level posts within the UN Secretariat; their inclusion in decision-making processes at various levels; and consultation with them on relevant peacekeeping matters.

Arguably, member states which participate in UN peacekeeping operations prefer ‘actual’ recognition. This is because it gives them a feeling of inclusion.\footnote{Giandomenica Picco, The UN at fifty: reforming institutions or individuals? The World Today, Vol. 51 no. 11, November 1995, p. 206.} That is, they ‘belong’ to the UN system as something more than just an ordinary member. This feeling of inclusion may be crucial for the following reasons. First, recognising and including states within the UN system helps to reconcile divergent national interests which have often been
a major obstacle to the effective functioning of peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{17}. The UN must maintain a high level of legitimacy and wide support to encourage member states to participate in UN peacekeeping and contribute towards a common goal. This cannot be achieved without acknowledging and including participants within its system: "fair representation in UN decision-making structures would encourage an open focus on the interdependence of interests and people. This knowledge of interdependence in turn provides a solid basis for reconciliation of conflicting interests"\textsuperscript{18}.

Second, greater participation and contribution from peacekeepers cannot occur unless there is a feeling of inclusion in the UN system. As members of the UN, states have responsibility to support the Organisation in maintaining global peace and security. At the same time, it is crucial that states participating directly in peacekeeping operations must also feel that they have a stake in maintaining stability and in contributing to the UN's cause\textsuperscript{19}. Therefore, there is a need to think about the way peacekeepers should be recognised.

The issue of recognition of course raises another problem. Indeed, a related area that warrants further research is the selection criteria system for recruiting national candidates within the UN Secretariat. It is worth pointing out that currently there are no specific selection criteria for recognising the contribution and participation of its member states in UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, there is no such system for rewarding state contributions in any specific areas of the UN's wide ranging global affairs. The UN uses general selection criteria based on regulations established by the General Assembly. Article 101 of the UN Charter states that Secretariat staff "shall be appointed by the

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 294.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 293.
Secretary-General”. It also identifies two important criteria that must be met in the selection process. First, “the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity” is a “paramount consideration”\(^\text{20}\). Second, the recruitment is subject to the broadest geographical representation.

Notably, member states’ size and level of budgetary contribution predominate in the present system for selecting national candidates. In the early days of the UN, the Fifth Committee (the budgetary committee) of the General Assembly rejected a proposal stating that “geographical distribution within the Secretariat should be based on a quota system related to the financial contribution of each Member”\(^\text{21}\). It then adopted a resolution “requesting the Secretary-General to examine the recruitment policy with a view to improving the geographical distribution of the posts within the Secretariat and to take all practical steps to engage staff members from those countries which are not yet included in the Secretariat”\(^\text{22}\). In 1962 the General Assembly adopted a formula that placed emphasis on membership and population in addition to the budgetary contributions, and also determined the desirable ranges for each country which were meant to guide the Secretary-General in the selection process\(^\text{23}\). Although the basis for the ‘desirable range’ of professional posts for each member state has now been broadened to include size and population, the reality is that a country’s assessed share of the UN regular budget continues to figure as a dominant factor\(^\text{24}\). The share is determined by a formula based on the ‘capacity to pay’, which is shaped by several economic indicators, namely a country’s GDP, population growth and debts, and foreign exchange. For example, the US which is the largest financial contributor (25 per cent), has the biggest range of professional posts (327 to 442) within the UN’s


bureaucracy\textsuperscript{25}. The minimum desirable range, on the other hand, is 2 to 14 for the 70 odd states which make financial contributions slightly at or above the 'floor rate' of 0.001 per cent\textsuperscript{26}.

Given that the present selection criteria are predominantly shaped by budgetary contributions, serious questions about the fairness of the system might be raised. This is particularly important when states which are financially weak contribute actively in other ways. For example, although the financial contribution of third world states is relatively small, they participate actively in other areas of peacekeeping operations by contributing troops and taking on considerable responsibility for implementing peacekeeping mandates in harsh and dangerous operational environments. The present selection criteria do not take into consideration such contributions which suggests the need to rethink about the overall recruitment process. The difference in the way the UN values the support of its major financial contributors vis-à-vis other contributors in UN peacekeeping operations needs some further attention, for without this the UN's fundamental premise of universality and equality is a myth.

A third possible area of research is the extent to which a lack of actual recognition affects the behaviour and commitment of peacekeepers. What are the costs of lack of recognition? How could this affect UN peacekeeping operations? These are questions that should not be treated lightly and thus need further attention.

Member states' commitment to UN peacekeeping operations has always remained unpredictable. As Simons notes, the UN has often been faced with the challenge of

\begin{itemize}
\item Riggs & Plano, op. cit., p. 104.
\item Ibid., p. 104.
\item The new floor rate of 0.001 per cent was established in 2000. Prior to that the lowest rate was 0.01 per cent. In 1996 about 15 states paid above 1 per cent and 117 states were assessed at between 0.01 per cent and 0.05 per cent. These provided a total of 1.67 per cent of the total assessed share. See McDermott, Ibid., pp. 58-59 & 96.
\end{itemize}
ensuring the commitment of the peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{27} The unpredictability of member states in contributing troops to UN peace operations cannot be under-estimated. A lack of actual recognition may further result in a failure to secure their commitment at a moment when they are most needed. This could have serious implications for the capacity of UN peacekeeping to do something in emergencies.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the discontent of certain peacekeepers may also have the potential to indirectly affect the behaviour and commitment of the wider international community. For example, the majority of peacekeepers are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which plays a key role in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, an international forum where member states debate matters related to peacekeeping operations. While members of the NAM can follow their own interests on UN issues, their responses are highly likely to be affected by the experiences and recognition record of other member states.

Another negative consequence is the unwillingness of peacekeepers to share their field experience to assist the development of more effective peacekeeping techniques. Some national governments may be reluctant to share their expertise because of a perception of unequal and discriminatory treatment within the UN. One of the long-term aims of the training unit in the DPKO is to develop a UN military manual to standardise national training programmes as part of developing a common UN culture.\textsuperscript{28} This requires the assistance and input of the major peacekeepers. Their field experiences are vital to broadening the parameters of peacekeeping and in drafting a standard training manual for peacekeepers. However, the unwillingness to share first-hand experiences and information, as a result of the lack of actual recognition, may limit the chances of realising this goal in full and could disadvantage the UN in several ways.

Firstly, some field experiences may not be incorporated into the broader training curriculum if peacekeepers are not given the opportunity to be part of the decision-making process in some substantive form\textsuperscript{29}. Secondly, the UN may lack the capacity to assist national governments in providing suitable training for national military contingents. The net effect is the possibility that UN peacekeepers may not be trained in certain important areas, thus affecting their capacity to respond to the new peacekeeping challenges.

While the lack of sensitivity to peacekeepers' discontentment regarding their limited involvement in the present UN system may have some negative impact on peacekeeping, one cannot expect the UN to readily accommodate the resulting demand for administrative representation. But the emergence of such concerns points to the need for further examination of the questions of whether and how to recognise 'good peacekeepers'.
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[www.un.int/bangladesh/ga/st/55ga](http://www.un.int/bangladesh/ga/st/55ga)
### Appendix 1

**UN Peacekeeping Operations 1948 to Present**
(As of January 2001)

**Peacekeeping during the Cold War**

**Nascent Period: 1948-1955**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Operation/Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon &amp; Syria]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assertive Period: 1956-1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Operation/Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956-67</td>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force [in Egypt &amp; Israel]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-64*</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-*</td>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>DOMREP</td>
<td>Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dormant Period: 1967-72**

**Resurgent Period: 1973-78**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Operation/Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-79</td>
<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force [Egypt &amp; Israel]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-*</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Maintenance Period: 1979-87</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Expansion Period: 1988-1989</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-91</td>
<td>UNIIMOG</td>
<td>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-90</td>
<td>UNGOMAP/OSGAP</td>
<td>United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-92</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group [Namibia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90*</td>
<td>ONUVEN</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Peacekeeping During the Post-Cold War Era</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>‘New’ Assertive Period: 1990-1994</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91*</td>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-*</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-95*</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92*</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

1992-93* UNTAC
United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia

1992-93* UNOSOM I/UNITAF
United Nations Operation in Somalia
Unified Task Force

1992-94* ONUMOZ
United Nations Operation in Mozambique

1993-95* UNOSOM II
United Nations Operation in Somalia

1993-94* UNOMUR
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

1993 – UNOMIG
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

1993-97* UNOMIL
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

1993-96* UNMIH
United Nations Mission in Haiti

1993-96* UNAMIR
United Nations Mission for Rwanda

1994 UNASOG
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group [Chad & Libya]

1994-00 UNMOT
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan


1995-97* UNAVEM III
United Nations Verification Mission

1995-96* UNCRO
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia

1995 –* UNPREDEP
UN Preventive Deployment Force

1995 –* UNMIBH
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Hezegovina

1996-98* UNTAES
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996—*</td>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97*</td>
<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>UN Support Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>UN Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-99*</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-00*</td>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-00*</td>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999—*</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999—*</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999—*</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999—*</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Multidimensional Operations

[Adapted from Fetherston (1994), op. cit., pp. 27-29 with modification]
## Appendix 2

**India’s Participation & Contribution (1948 - 2000)**

### COLD WAR ERA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Duration of Participation</th>
<th>Contribution by India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>UNTCOK</td>
<td>Nov’47 - May’48</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTCOK I, II</td>
<td>May’48 - Oct’49</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit Command</td>
<td>June 1950</td>
<td>Field Ambulance unit: 17 officers, 9 JCOs and 300 other ranks, small surgical unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission</td>
<td>Aug’53 - Mar’54</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Thimayya as Chairman 231 officers, 203 JCOs, 6000 Infantry Brigade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Laos: Medical detachment, 1964-68  
(c) Vietnam: 7000 troops |
| Palestine  | UNSCOP      | May’47 - Aug’47            | Member                 |
| Egypt      | UNEF I      | Nov’56 - Jun’67            | 11 Infantry Battalions (1 per year), 409 JCOs, 1,238 other ranks, and two Force Commanders for UNEF |
| Lebanon    | UNOGIL      | June’58 - Dec’58           | 71 military observers  |
| Congo      | ONUC        | Jul’60 - Jun’64            | 12,000 troops, 2 infantry brigades, 467 officers, 404 JCOs, field hospital, supply unit, signal company, air dispatch team, postal unit |
| Cyprus     | UNFICYP     | Mar-Jun’ 64                | 3 Force Commanders:  
Lieut. Gen. P.s. Gyani  
Gen. K.S Thimayya  
Lieut. Dewan Prem Chand  
$120,000, financial contribution |
<p>|            |             | Jun’64-Dec’65              |                        |
|            |             | Dec’69-Dec’76              |                        |
| West Irian | UNSF        | Oct’62 - Apr’63            | Maj-Gen. Rikhye observed Cease-fire (18 August 1962) |
| Yemen      | UNYOM       | Jan’64 - Sep’64            | 1 observer and 1 military commander |
| Dominican Republic | DOMREP | May’65 - Oct’66 | Military Advisor, Maj Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Duration of Participation</th>
<th>Contribution by India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Namibia</strong></td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Jan'89-Mar'90</td>
<td>Force Commander: Lieut Dewan Prem Chand 20 military observers, 1 force commander, observers, police monitors, and electoral supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr'89-Mar'90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran/Iraq</strong></td>
<td>UNIIMOG</td>
<td>Aug'88 – Feb'91</td>
<td>31 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Angola</strong></td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Jan'89 - Jun'91</td>
<td>30 medical officers and observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central America</strong></td>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>1989 - 1992</td>
<td>12 Military Observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### POST-COLD WAR ERA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Duration of Participation</th>
<th>Contribution by India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIDDLE EAST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>April 1991 - present</td>
<td>15 medical officers and observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1998 -</td>
<td>Infantry battalion and staff officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>Nov'91 - Feb'92</td>
<td>Observers 2 Infantry battalions, 1,373 other ranks, field ambulance unit, observers, electoral supervisors, police monitors, staff officers and mine training teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992 - 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>Oct'99 - present</td>
<td>Director of UNTAET - Lakhan Lal Mehotra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>1996 - present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>1991 -</td>
<td>Military Observers &amp; civilian personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Mission, Force</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Personnel, Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>Mar’93 – Dec’94</td>
<td>940 all ranks, engineer companies, staff personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr’93 – Apr’94</td>
<td>Military observers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June-Dec’94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June-Dec’94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>May’91 - Feb’95</td>
<td>3 medical officers and observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>1995 - 1997</td>
<td>2 infantry battalions, engineer companies, observers and staff officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1997– 99</td>
<td>Observers, Staff officers and 1 Mechanised Troops, Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>Feb’94 – 1997</td>
<td>20 medical officers and observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Apr’ 92 - Mar’93</td>
<td>3 Naval Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>May’93 - Feb’95</td>
<td>I infantry brigade, HQ staff, 5,000 all ranks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Nov’94 - Mar’96</td>
<td>I infantry brigade, 800 other ranks, 8 staff, 18 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>Jul’98</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Dec’99 -</td>
<td>Military Observers &amp; Infantry troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia &amp; Eritrea</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Sep’2000 -</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMERICAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>Jan’92 - Apr’94</td>
<td>7 Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>Mar’95 - Jan’96</td>
<td>120 military personnel, and paramilitary forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>Aug’97 - Nov’97</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>Dec’97 - Mar’00</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3

### Pakistan’s Participation & Contribution (1960 - 2000)

#### COLD WAR ERA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Duration of Participation</th>
<th>Contribution by Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Aug'60 - May'64</td>
<td>Ordnance &amp; Transport units, 400 all ranks, staff personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>Jan'64 - Sep'64</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Apr’89 - Mar’90</td>
<td>20 Military observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### POST-COLD WAR ERA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Duration of Participation</th>
<th>Contribution by Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIDDLE EAST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>April 1991 -</td>
<td>16 Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>Nov’91 – Feb’92</td>
<td>17 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992 - 1993</td>
<td>1006 infantry contingent (2 Azad Kashmir Regiment), 37 personnel as part of mine clearance team, 63 staff personnel, civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>Oct’99</td>
<td>Military troops, Civilian police and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>Oct’94 –</td>
<td>7 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Sep’93 – May’95</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun’94 – Dec’95</td>
<td>2 Infantry Battalion, 3,000 all ranks, civilian police,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct’94 – Dec’95</td>
<td>Pledged $50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNPF</td>
<td>Mar’95 - Jan’96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>May-Dec'94</td>
<td>Civilian police,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Sep'91 -</td>
<td>5 military observers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>1995 - 1998</td>
<td>Military observers and demining instructors,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Jun'97 - Feb'99</td>
<td>Military Troops,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>Sep'93 - 1997</td>
<td>43 Military observers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM/ UNITAF</td>
<td>Aug'92 - Mar'92</td>
<td>Military Observers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sep'92 - Mar'93</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion, 750 all ranks, 1 Brigadier for staff position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry brigade, 7200 all ranks, headquarters staff, 90 staff personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Nov'99 -</td>
<td>Military Liaison officers, troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>July'98 - present</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>UMINH</td>
<td>Jan-Apr'95, Jan'95 - Jun'96, Mar - Nov'95</td>
<td>Military observers, Infantry Unit, 525 all ranks, 199 staff officers and 7 other ranks civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>Aug'97 - Nov'97</td>
<td>Military troops &amp; observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>Jul'91 – Mar'93</td>
<td>SRSG - Iqbal Riza,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 4

### Bangladesh's Participation & Contribution (1988 - 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Duration of Participation</th>
<th>Contribution by Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIDDLE EAST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-Iraq</td>
<td>UNIIMOG</td>
<td>Aug'88 - Feb'91 Nov'90 - Feb'91</td>
<td>31 Military observers Acting Chief Military Observer - Brigadier Gen. S. Anam Khan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>Apr'91 - Nov'93 Dec'93 - Oct'95</td>
<td>48 Military observers, 2,522 troops, medical team, helicopter unit &amp; 2 helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>Nov'91 - Feb'92 Nov'91 - Mar'92</td>
<td>17 Observers, Chief Liaison officer - A.H.S. Atul Karim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992 - 1993 Aug-Sep'93</td>
<td>20 Observers, 7 HQ Staff Personnel, 965 troops, mine awareness team &amp; unit Acting Deputy Inspector Gen: Gen. Shahudul Haque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>Jan'94 -</td>
<td>27 Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>Dec'94 - 2000</td>
<td>21 Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Apr'92 - May'95 Sep'94 - Dec'95</td>
<td>142 military observers 13 HQ staff personnel, 1,239 military troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>May'95 - Jan'96 Apr'95 - Jan'96</td>
<td>Civilian police and Military troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>May'95 - Aug'95</td>
<td>Civilian Police Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>Dec'95 -</td>
<td>3 military observers, Civilian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Slavonia</td>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>January 1996 -</td>
<td>military observers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>Jan'96 –</td>
<td>5 military observers, civilian police</td>
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<td>AFRICA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989 - 90</td>
<td>25 Military Observers, Civilian police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>Dec 1992 - Dec' 94</td>
<td>Civilian police, 56 observers, 84 HQ Staff Personnel, 2,328 military troops (Feb'93 - Dec'94)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Sep'91 -</td>
<td>30 military observers,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>1995 - 1998</td>
<td>20 Military observers; Civilian police; 22 HQ Staff personnel, 413 Military troops</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar'95-'98</td>
<td>Police Commissioner, Chief Superintendent Anwarul Iqbal,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM/ UNITAF</td>
<td>Aug'92 – Mar'93</td>
<td>5 Military Observers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>Jul'93 – Feb'95</td>
<td>21 HQ Staff personnel, 1,946 Military troops, Civilian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Jul'94 - Feb'95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Oct'93 – Jul'95</td>
<td>854 Military Troops, 107 military observers, Civilian police</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Nov'93 – Mar'96</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb - Apr' 94</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda-Rwanda</td>
<td>ONOMUR</td>
<td>June'93 - Sep'94</td>
<td>20 Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar- Sep' 94.</td>
<td>Acting Chief Mil. Observer: Col. Asrarul Haque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>Sep'93 - 1997</td>
<td>42 Military observers, medical staff,</td>
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<td>Oct'93 - 1997</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>May - June 1994</td>
<td>Military Observers,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Nov'99 -</td>
<td>Military Observers &amp; troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>Oct'99 -</td>
<td>Military troops, Civilian police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia/Eritrea</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Jun'2000 –</td>
<td>Military observers and troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMERICAS</td>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>Sep’94 – Apr’95</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct’94 – Jun’96</td>
<td>39 HQ staff personnel, 1901</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar-Nov’95</td>
<td>military troops</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>civilian police</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Geographic Distribution of Professional Posts in DPKO  
(As of 29 February 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Americas (including north, South &amp; the Caribbean)</th>
<th>Europe (including east, west and central Europe)</th>
<th>Africa (including North and South Africa)</th>
<th>Asia (including Middle east, South, South-east and East Asia and the Pacific)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US (29)</td>
<td>France (8)</td>
<td>Ghana (3)</td>
<td>Australia (8)</td>
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<td>Canada (9)</td>
<td>Italy (7)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (3)</td>
<td>Japan (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina (2)</td>
<td>UK (7)</td>
<td>Algeria (2)</td>
<td>India (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (3)</td>
<td>Germany (6)</td>
<td>Kenya (2)</td>
<td>Nepal (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago (1)</td>
<td>Sweden (6)</td>
<td>Rwanda (2)</td>
<td>Korea (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica (1)</td>
<td>Russia (5)</td>
<td>S. Africa (2)</td>
<td>New Zealand (3)</td>
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<td>Benin (1)</td>
<td>Norway (5)</td>
<td>S. Leone (1)</td>
<td>Thailand (3)</td>
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<td>Dominican (1)</td>
<td>Ireland (4)</td>
<td>Senegal (1)</td>
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<td>Uruguay (1)</td>
<td>Denmark (3)</td>
<td>Tanzania (1)</td>
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<td>St. Vincent (1)</td>
<td>Poland (2)</td>
<td>Zaire (1)</td>
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<td>Romania (2)</td>
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<td>Finland (2)</td>
<td>Swaziland (1)</td>
<td>Sri Lanka (2)</td>
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<td>Portugal (1)</td>
<td>Cameroon (1)</td>
<td>Pakistan (1)</td>
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<td>Armenia (1)</td>
<td>Guyana (1)</td>
<td>Indonesia (1)</td>
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<td>Belgium (1)</td>
<td>Ethiopia (1)</td>
<td>Fiji (1)</td>
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<td>Bosnia &amp; H. (1)</td>
<td>Eritrea (1)</td>
<td>Mongolia (1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria (1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yugoslav (1)</td>
<td>Lesotho (1)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Department of Peace-keeping Operations, United Nations)