Challenges to Equal Representation: Female Deputies in the
Indonesian National Parliament

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This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The University
of Western Australia
School of Social Sciences
Political Science and International Relations
2019
Thesis Declaration

I, Ella Syafputri Prihatini, certify that:

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The research involving human data reported in this thesis was assessed and approved by The University of Western Australia Human Research Ethics Committee. Approval #: RA/4/1/8061.
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Signature:

Date: 1 April 2019
Abstract

This dissertation investigates challenges in achieving equal representation in the national parliament in Indonesia where a legislated candidate gender quota has been adopted since 2003. It examines the world’s largest Muslim democracy as a case study by observing (1) the trends and challenges in women’s political nomination, and (2) attitudes toward female politicians and gender quotas. This study contributes to key academic literature on gender quotas and women’s political representation. It finds that women’s electability into parliament cannot be automatically improved by the provision of gender quotas targeting the process of nominating women.

It argues Islamic ideology plays no obvious role in limiting female participation in legislative elections, as Islamist and pluralist parties do a similarly good job at recruiting females and a similarly bad job at putting them first on the list. The study also suggests the open-list PR system is prohibitively expensive and it hurts women candidates more than it does male aspirants because women generally have less access to financial resources.

This research delves into not only what hinders women in winning elective office, but also which women win and what happens once they get into parliament. Incumbency, age, and list position are factors that have statistical significance in predicting women’s electability. Furthermore, women have been assigned to feminine and low-prestige committees more than to masculine and high-prestige committees. The dissertation employs a multi-method approach, conducting both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I draw on in-depth interviews with
legislators, party leaders, and voters to analyse the election outcomes from 1999-2014. I also used a dataset on 47 Asian countries in establishing a comparative perspective on women’s parliamentary representation.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, who have loved and supported me. I also dedicate this work to my lovely husband, Malikus Widyatama. This would be an excellent achievement which marks our tenth wedding anniversary! I also wish my journey will inspire our two gorgeous children, Safiyya and Aqila, to pursue higher education and to shape the world to become a better place for everyone.
Acknowledgements

Did We not expand for you, [O Muhammad], your beast?
And We removed from you your burden,
Which had weighed upon your back,
And raised high for you your repute.
For indeed, with hardship [will be] ease.
Indeed, with hardship [will be] ease.
So when you have finished [your duties], then stand up [for worship].
And to your Lord direct [your] longing.
(Al-Qur’an Chapter 94: Ash-Sharh [The Relief])

My first and my foremost praise is due to Allah, The All Mighty. As every time I experience difficulties, I can only consult with Allah and cite my favourite chapter in the Qur’an; “The Relief”. And thus “For indeed, with hardship [will be] ease. Indeed, with hardship [will be] ease” has been my mantra in embracing the four-year process of writing this dissertation.

This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support from a great number of people. I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Graham Brown and Professor Samina Yasmeen for their assistance and encouragement which allowed me to write and to finish this research. I enjoyed our meetings and discussions about Indonesian politics and women in Islam. Apart from Professor Brown and Yasmeen, I am also indebted to Professor Mark Beeson, Professor Krishna Sen, Professor Lyn Parker, Steven Maras, Jeannette Taylor, Laura Dales, Katie Atwell, and Gail Harper for invaluable advice and academic guidance.

The research project, which was started in 1 April, 2015, has enabled me to meet excellent mentors, extremely kind respondents, and helpful friends. I am deeply grateful for the support I have received from a variety of sources that has enabled me to turn my interest in women’s political empowerment into a rich
compilation of papers presented as the current thesis. I wish to dedicate some words of gratitude to the Australian Government Endeavour Postgraduate Scholarship program for funding this PhD project.

During my fieldwork in Indonesia, I was fortunate to be helped by incredible people. I would like to thank Titi Anggraini, Heroik Pratama, Athiqah Nur Alami, Zul Kumbang, and Indah Permatasari for their invaluable assistance and constructive comments. I would also like to thank ANTARA News Agency and President University for their support in both professional and academic networks. I wish to acknowledge Indonesian female politicians who were very generous with their extensive knowledge and experiences, including Ledia Hanifa, Reni Marlinawati, Nurhayati Ali Assegaf, Nurul Arifin, Nihayatul Wafiroh, Endang Maria, Diah Pitaloka, Erma Suryani Ranik, and Hetifah Sjaifudian. I am also inspired by conversations shared in Maju Perempuan Indonesia (MPI), a WhatsApp group consisting of female politicians and women’s rights activists.

Other postgraduate students and scholars at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (CMSS), Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Leila Ben Mcharek, Amjed Hamed, Flavia Zimmerman, Ke Zhu, Sahar Kia, Ridwan, and Azim Zahir have helped to maintain hospitable environment. Ines Bortolini, Thritty Banja, Caroline Clark, Chloe Czerwiec, Linda Papa, Michael Azariadis, and Joanne Edmondston have been fantastic in helping me through so many queries related to my study. I am also indebted to Faiz Nur Faiqoh and WikiDPR who have been excellent with their research assistance. I thank my workmates in Room 154A; Ezmieralda Melissa, Endah Prihatiningtyastuti, and Brian Pratama for being super supportive with my project. I wish to thank Yudi Putra, Bernhart Farras,
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I would like to thank anonymous journal reviewers who provided their expert input into my papers. I have to admit that I didn't always agree with them. Yet, the process of being challenged produced nothing but better papers. And I will be forever grateful.

Last but not least, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents. No words could possibly describe my gratitude to my mother who has been extremely supportive by constantly keeping me in her prayers. Also to my science-enthusiast husband, Malikus Widyatama, whose love and patience have been of the utmost invaluable support during this research. He attentively listened to my research plans almost every time possible. Our two beautiful daughters; Safiyya Malika and Aqila Azizah. You have always been my biggest motivation in reaching the finishing line. I could never have done this without all of you!
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>Bawaslu</td>
<td><em>Badan Pengawas Pemilu</em> (The Election Supervisory Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDPA</td>
<td>Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td><em>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</em> (the Regional Representatives Council), Indonesia’s Upper House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td><em>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</em> (People’s Representatives Council, Indonesia’s Lower House)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td><em>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</em> (Regional People’s Representatives Council), Indonesia’s regional parliaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td><em>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</em> (Great Indonesia Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerwani</td>
<td><em>Gerakan Wanita Indonesia</em> (Indonesian Women’s Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td><em>Golongan Karya</em> (Functional Groups Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td><em>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</em> (People’s Conscience Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Election Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td><em>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</em> (General Election Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td><em>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</em> (People’s Consultative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NasDem</td>
<td><em>Partai Nasional Demokrat</em> (National Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (revival of the religious scholars), largest traditionalist Muslim organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panwaslu</td>
<td>Panitia Pengawas Pemilu (Election Supervisory Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star and Moon Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Partai Demokrat (Democrats Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilkada</td>
<td>Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Direct Elections of Governors, Mayors, and District Heads)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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Explanatory Notes

This thesis is formatted as a series of published papers and submitted draft paper. Only the introduction and conclusion chapters are not derived from journal articles. To maintain consistency, the work presented here adheres the APA (American Psychological Association) 6th edition referencing style.

The spelling follows the British English convention, using -ise instead of -ize. It also uses the Enhanced Indonesian Spelling System (Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan/EYD), which was introduced in 1972. This system is chosen as it is the standard spelling system used in Indonesia at this time. Therefore, Soeharto is written as Suharto, Soekarno is written as Sukarno, and so on.

All English translations of Indonesian texts included in this thesis were provided by the author.
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### Authorship Declaration: Sole Author Publications

This thesis contains the following sole-authored works that have been published and submitted for publication.

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<td>The entry has been accepted for publication and will be printed as Supplement 19 to be published in 2019. I have used some of the materials in CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT. This article describes the main phases in the development of women’s political participation in modern Indonesian politics as well as problems with participation and gender quotas.</td>
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<td>This article is adopted as CHAPTER 2: DETERMINANTS OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION: INDONESIA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. This</td>
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A chapter examines the relationship between socio-economic development, corruption, the level of democracy, and women's parliamentary representation in contemporary Asia.

Details of the work:
Prihatini, E.S. (Forthcoming) Islam, parties, and women's political nomination in Indonesia. *Politics & Gender*.

Location in thesis:
This paper has been accepted for publication in *Politics & Gender* (per 22 March 2019). This article is adopted as CHAPTER 3: WHO GETS NOMINATED. It argues despite the conventional perception in gender inequality on how religion may attenuate women's political nomination, Islamist and pluralist parties are similar in terms of the share of female candidates and less likely to put them on top of the party tickets.

Details of the work:

Corrigendum to: “Women who win in Indonesia: The impact of age, experience, and list position” [Women’s Studies International Forum 72 (2018) 40-46] Available at:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277539519300135
Location in thesis:

This article is adopted as CHAPTER 4: WOMEN WHO WIN IN INDONESIA. The findings suggest the Indonesian national parliament is far from representing the population in terms of socio-economic class and political kinship. Also, women's electability continues to be strongly associated with experience in political office, age, and list position on the ballot sheets.

Details of the work:

Prihatini, E.S. (Forthcoming) Explaining gender gaps in Indonesian legislative committees. Parliamentary Affairs.

Location in thesis:

This paper has been submitted to the Parliamentary Affairs journal (per 24 February 2019). This article is adopted as CHAPTER 5: COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS. The results show that Indonesian female MPs are sensibly more likely to be placed in feminine and less prestigious committees, and rarely hold committee leadership. This indicates gender bias is an enduring characteristic of post-Suharto parliamentary politics and party ideology is not solely accountable for this disparity in committee allocations.
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Location in thesis:
This article adopted as CHAPTER 6: FEMALE POLITICIANS’ PERSPECTIVE. The findings suggest the open-list PR system is prohibitively expensive and it hurts women candidates more than it does male aspirants because women generally have less access to financial resources.

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Location in thesis:
This article is adopted as CHAPTER 7. POLITICAL PARTIES’ PERSPECTIVE ON QUOTAS. The findings suggest after being adopted more than a decade ago, gender quotas remain the preferable approach to overcoming women’s low parliamentary representation, at least in the Indonesian case. The study also shows the distinction between men and women in explaining the roots of women's under-representation.
Details of the work:


Location in thesis:

This article is adopted as CHAPTER 8. VOTERS’ PERSPECTIVE. The study finds that there is no significant difference in terms of voting behaviour between young and not-so-young Indonesian voters during legislative elections, as both groups are influenced by gender stereotypes about the ability of male and female politicians to represent their constituents.

Signature:

Date: 1 April 2019
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT

Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, is often considered to have achieved a successful transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. Despite some limitations, this transition has been shaping and influencing the socio-political representation of women at both national and local levels. Indonesian women comprise half of the national population and were granted suffrage rights at the time of Independence in 1945. Yet their presence in politics remains insignificant. Women’s share in the national assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) in the post-Suharto era has been meagre and unsteady at less than 20 percent.

To date, Indonesia has had only one female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who ruled the country from July 2001 to October 2004. Her presidential bids since have not been successful. In the last legislative elections, in 2014, only 17.32 percent of Members of Parliament in the DPR were women, and 26.51 percent of senators in the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Councils) were women. On average, women make up 16.14 percent of seats in provincial legislatures and 14 percent in municipality and regional parliaments. In the third round of regional elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah/Pilkada), held on 27 June 2018, women only won 31 out of 338 positions as local heads and deputy leaders (9.2 percent), despite a slight increase in electability. In the spirit of the rise of women in the public sphere, women in villages began to run for political office too. Yet data recorded in 2011 show only 4.33 percent of village heads are female, with the vast majority of these women
living in Central Java. The smallest proportion of village heads who were female were in Bali and West Nusa Tenggara provinces (KKI-PK, 2017).

1.1. Women in Modern Indonesian Politics

The struggle to improve women’s role and status in Indonesia began long before the country’s Independence in 1945. Indonesia’s pre-Independence period witnessed women leaders who were famous for their wisdom and leadership as queens. Women, individually and organisationally, also fought fiercely against colonial rule by the Netherlands and for the establishment of the modern Indonesian state (Oey-Gardiner & Bianpoen, 2000). They were fighting for the betterment of women’s welfare by providing education for girls, refusing polygamy, and ending restrictions on women’s active engagement in the public domain.

The first Indonesian women’s organisation, Putri Mardika, was established in Jakarta in 1912 (Parawansa, 2002). This association was supported by the first independence organisation for men, Budi Utomo. In the two decades to around 1930 women’s organisations grew quickly. This is evident in the fact that 31 women’s organisations participated in the first National Women’s Congress which was held on 22-26 December 1928. The Congress passed a crucial resolution calling for improvements to women’s access to education and women’s divorce rights. This monumental event, 22 December, has been celebrated until now as Mother’s Day in Indonesia. The National Women’s Congress in 1941 supported other political groups in campaigning for Indonesian parliamentary representatives within the Dutch colonial government.
The movement also put pressure on the colonial regime to grant universal education, as educated women were perceived as an important element in the Independence Movement. In every period since Independence, the Indonesian women's movement has encountered different challenges and dynamics. The following section describes three different periods following Independence: the Old Order era (1945-1966), the New Order era (1966-1998), and the Reform era (since 1998).

1.1.1. Old Order Era (1945-1966)

Equal political rights were among the first established citizenship rights in the new Constitution following the Declaration of Independence in 1945, as Chapter X Article 27 states: “Without any exception, all citizens shall have equal position in Law and Government”. This gave women the rights to vote and to stand for election. However, Blackburn (2004) suggests that the push for suffrage in Indonesia originated with Dutch women in the Netherlands East Indies seeking the vote for themselves. This was marked by the establishment of a branch of the Dutch Women's Suffrage Association (VVV) in Batavia in 1908. While standing up for equal access to education for girls, women were also actively engaged in efforts to put colonisation to an end. They demanded various resolutions including Indonesia Berparlemen, a movement which fought for Indonesian representatives in the parliament. By 1938, the Dutch government had allowed a handful of Indonesian women to participate in local assemblies (Gemeenteraad). Emma Puradierda represented Bandung, Sri Umiyati represented Cirebon, Soenaryo Mangunpuspito represented Semarang, and Siti Sundari Sudirman
represented Surabaya (Suwandi, 1993). This development was halted when the Japanese invaded Indonesia in 1942. All female organisations were banned and replaced with one women’s association called “FUYINKAI”. This body was closely supervised by the Japanese military force.

Following Independence, Sukarno led the country and embraced a range of women's political organisations. A couple of women were appointed as cabinet ministers. They oversaw social (1946-1947) and labor (1947-1948) affairs. During the attempted return of the Dutch colonials (1945-1949), women established various groups or militias including the Indonesian Women’s Union of Struggle (Persatuan Perjuangan Wanita Indonesia) (Suryochondro, 1984). Following the end of the revolutionary war, women began to associate themselves with women’s wings of political parties such as the Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Murba) Women’s Union of the Murba Party. However, most women chose not to affiliate with political parties as they perceived politics as only a playing field for men.

The Movement of Conscious Indonesian Women (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar/Gerwis) was established in Semarang on 4 June 1950. In 1954, Gerwis shifted from being a non-aligned organisation to become a part of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI) in an attempt to nationalise their political movement. The name was also changed to the now-famous Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia/Gerwani). This Communist-led institution was supported by educated women with high political aspirations, and was considered the world’s largest women’s
organisation outside of the Communist bloc, with over 1.5 million members (Katjasungkana & Wieringa, 2003).

Women participated in preparing for the first elections in 1955. Like men, most women cast their votes, although voting was not compulsory. This first democratic election in Indonesia elected five women from Gerwani and another five from Muslimat – the women’s wing of the biggest Islamic organisation (Nahdlatul Ulama/NU). A party specialising in education, skills and women’s empowerment, Partai Kebangsaan Indonesia Wanita/Parkiwa (Indonesian Women’s Nationality Party) failed to gather sufficient electoral support in this election. Thus one might argue that women’s political aspirations were closely aligned to certain well-established political parties, rather than to women-only parties with minor influence, such as Parkiwa. The election results also show that women’s low parliamentary representation was caused by a lack of interest from parties and voters in supporting female candidates. Some commentators suggest that only a few women were elected in Indonesia’s first national election as they were heavily perceived as being inexperienced in politics (Ridjal, Margiyani, & Husein, 1993).

During this period, one among other important issues that women raised was polygamy. In 1950, all the women members of parliament joined together to urge the government to draw up a new marriage bill, but it became apparent that the issue of polygamy divided women (Blackburn, 2004). Furthermore, as Blackburn argues, the Old Order expressed no interest at all in reducing men’s rights to polygamy, as Sukarno himself became polygamous. Government Regulation No. 19/1952 provided pensions to the multiple widows of
polygamous civil servants. Wieringa (1992) reports that Gerwani—with support from the PKI—tried to convince the government of the urgency of two of its feminist concerns: the demand for a new marriage law and the demand that women should be allowed to be elected as village heads.


Following the G30S military putsch in 1965 (see Hearman, 2018; McGregor, Melvin, & Pohlman, 2018; Pohlman, 2014; Robinson, 2018; Wieringa, 1992), Major General Suharto took over from Sukarno in 1966. Anti-leftist massacres following the coup attempt killed an estimated one million PKI-affiliated Indonesians, including between 80,000 and 100,000 Balinese (Rhoads, 2012). The impact echoes all the way to today as the identity of the perpetrators of the mass killings remain largely a mystery and have gone unpunished. This dark collective memory hinders Balinese women from participating in politics.

With his authoritarian approach, the former commander of KOSTRAD (the Army’s Strategic Command) constrained political Islam and women’s participation in politics. Sidel (2006) argues that when Suharto restored order, his regime sought to manage religion by suppressing political Islam and promoting a rather safer “cultural” Islam. Thus, critical elements in the women’s movement were eliminated, leaving only organisations that could work in line with the New Order regime’s agendas.

Suharto’s New Order era brought about at least three pivotal impacts on women’s political representation. The first cluster relates to the military’s campaign of sexual slander which led to the disbanding of Gerwani and women’s
subsequent withdrawal from politics (Katjasungkana & Wieringa, 2003; McGregor et al., 2018; Parker, 2003; Rhoads, 2012; Wieringa, 2002). Sexual slander here refers to false accusations against women to cause damage and harm. Rhoads (2012) argues that the sexual slander campaign against Gerwani was so effective that any sign of political participation by women would make them susceptible to accusations of being a Gerwani member or enthusiast. The myth of the castration of the generals (as part of the military putsch) was widely accepted through the campaign of mass murders and manipulation of the media and government information. The myth was accepted “because it was built on the fear of women’s political agency which was sexualized” (Katjasungkana & Wieringa, 2003, p. 64). The foundation of Suharto’s New Order state was partly supported by the idea that in order to restore political and social stability, women must return to their “proper” place in society (Pohlman, 2017). Suharto used propaganda about atrocities allegedly committed by Gerwani to justify restored male domination of political life and the state ideology provided no room for women as individuals (Oey-Gardiner, 2002; Wieringa, 2011). Instead, women had to return to the role predestined by their kodrat (inherent feminine nature) which is to clean, cook, and bear children.

Suharto’s authoritarian regime was so powerful that it was able to intervene in the activities of all political agents. This brings us to the second substantial impact of the New Order regime on women’s political participation. As the national leader, Suharto exercised strong control over Indonesian women by labelling himself as “Bapak Pembangunan” (the “Father of Development”). Women were to focus on their roles as wives and mothers (ibu). Their concern
with the well-being of others (family, company or the state) was linked to the “mother” concept, where women act without demanding power or prestige in return. Unlike the image of “Bapak”, who earns authority and prestige, “Ibu” here only acts to protect and support others. This ideology was first discussed by Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1987) and later borrowed by Suryakusuma (1996), with the term “state ibuism”.

One way to instill State ideology in the affairs of women’s roles is the establishment of women’s organisations with structures covering national and local levels. In its attempt to impose a repressive order on the nation, the New Order banned women’s mass organisations and established three large official organisations: (1) elite women, the wives of civil servants, were organised into chapters of Dharma Wanita; (2) women in villages were incorporated within Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga or the Family Welfare Movement; and (3) there was Dharma Pertiwi for the wives of the military (Parawansa, 2002; Robinson, 2008). Put simply, these organisations were designed to allow women to further their husband's careers and to support government propaganda on development.

However, as Rahayu (2004) contends, women’s groups and NGOs began to flourish after the establishment of Yayasan Annisa Swasti (Yasanti) in Yogyakarta in 1982. Their programs dealt with female labor and peasants. Two years after that, Kalyanamitra was formed in Jakarta, providing critical analysis on women’s issues. Dozens of women’s organisations/NGOs were established, such as Solidaritas Perempuan (Jakarta), Asosiasi Perempuan untuk Keadilan (Jakarta), and Rifka Annisa (Yogyakarta). At the end of the New Order era, there
were at least twenty different women’s organisations and NGOs in Jakarta alone, working on issues from domestic violence to electing more women to the parliament (Rinaldo, 2002). This rise was partly supported by Suharto’s

The final impact was Suharto’s depoliticisation of Islam by discouraging the practice of Islamic politics, including by continuing the ban on the Islamic political party Masyumi (Hefner, 2000). In 1973, Suharto launched a policy to amalgamate political parties. The four existing Islamic political parties were merged into a single party called the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP). Suharto promoted the established confederation of functional groups, also known as Golongan Karya/Golkar (Kurniawati, 2015). During this era, political participation was limited to voting at the elections held every five years from 1971 onwards. The Islam-based political forces, as well as the nationalists, became political minorities in all elections during the New Order regime due to electoral injustice: every government official was obliged to ensure the victory of Golkar (Haris, 2004). Nonetheless, in the 1980s, leading Muslim intellectuals began to explore ideas about democracy, human rights and pluralism, arguing that such ideas were fully compatible with Islam. The discourse of women’s rights and gender equality soon spread to Muslim women’s organisations (Brenner, 2011).

1.1.3. Reform Era (1998–current)
The Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s hit the Indonesian economy hard. The currency plummeted against the American dollar, resulting in steep inflation and deepening poverty in the country. Women were among the first ones to
demonstrate openly (Budianta, 2006), with Suara Ibu Peduli (Voice of Caring Women) holding a demonstration 23 February 23, 1998 at the heart of the Jakarta CBD—at the roundabout of Hotel Indonesia. Mothers, housewives, academics and activists blamed Suharto (as the “Father” who had failed to provide affordable milk for Indonesian babies). Gadis Arivia, the founder of Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan (Women’s Journal Foundation), elaborated on how the female activists in the SIP demonstration were very aware of the danger of being too blunt in demanding that Suharto step down. As a mother of a toddler herself, Arivia suggests the scarcity of milk following the price hike of 400 percent was the ideal political camouflage in their demonstration, which later triggered wider protests (Arivia, 2018).

The waves of protests started from the end of February 1998 and continued, gaining momentum with wider demonstrations held by students from various universities in Java. When the political situation became critical, four students from the University of Trisakti were shot dead by snipers on 12 May. A day later, racial riots took place in Jakarta and a number of major cities like Solo and Yogyakarta (May 13-15, 1998). It is still not known who was responsible for the Trisakti Tragedy and the May 1998 riots (Galih, 2018).

Students, leaders of community organisations, and political activists continued their protest by occupying the DPR complex in Senayan starting 19 May. Their demands were fundamental: Suharto was to resign immediately; the Army was to act and side with the people; the government must reduce prices in the market; and the repressive measures against the press need to be stopped (Kompas, 1998). The then Vice President, B.J. Habibie, was appointed to replace
Suharto, effective once the resignation speech was delivered in the Presidential Palace on the morning of 21 May (Habibie, 2006).

The Reform era offered political freedom and autonomy (Davies, 2005). The spirit of this new regime was to replace heavily centralised government (Law No. 5/1974 during the New Order Era) with regional governments that are regulated under Law No. 22/1999. This legislation gives considerable authority to regions (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota/kotamadya). The shift was “one of the most radical decentralisation programs attempted anywhere in the world” (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, p. 3). Decentralisation brought a higher hurdle for women to become political leaders: local governance tended to re-empower traditional institutions and values (Katjasungkana, 2008), imposing gender politics which aimed to send women back to the home and family, as well as reinforcing sets of customary laws that profit male leadership (Noerdin & Muchtar, 2007).

In her observation of three Muslim female leaders in Pekalongan, Banyuwangi and Kebumen (Java), Kurniawati Dewi (2015) found that some aspects of Islam, like the idea and norm of Islamic piety (embodied in women wearing the veil), were important in winning local elections. This image of being pious is helping women to define a distinct political brand. Women are also likely to win by generating support from prominent kyai (Islamic preachers who manage pesantren/Islamic boarding schools) and from major Islamic organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. She predicts that more Muslim women will run as political leaders in the future, with support from Islamic organisations. In a national context, Rinaldo (2008, 2013) argues that Islam’s
increasing role in the public sphere facilitates Muslim women to actively participate in the debates surrounding women's political and social rights.

1.2. Problems of Representation and Participation

Despite the long history of women’s activism since the 1920s, women’s political representation currently is meagre. After 11 consecutive legislative elections, the share of women in the DPR only grew 12.26 points, moving from 5.06 percent in 1955 to 17.32 percent in 2014 (Table 1).

Table 1. Women’s share in DPR-RI, 1955-2014, expressed as percentage of total members of parliament. (Source: KPU, 2014).

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<tr>
<td>Women's share (%)</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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A survey of 60 female political activists in Jakarta from three parties (PPP, Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party) in the New Order era concluded that women’s participation in political parties was not based on their educational or economic attainments, but rather on their husband’s involvement in politics (Suyanto, 1995). Similarly, “Those women permitted to take a prominent role in political life under the New Order were members of elite families, usually the wives or daughters of men closely associated with the regime...Yet until very recently it has been difficult for women to play political roles, largely as a result of the military domination of politics” (Blackburn, 2004, pp. 102–103).

In the Reform Era, Indonesian political parties tend to prioritize men over women in running as candidate number one. The prime position on the party ticket is heavily determined by incumbency, since incumbents are perceived as
better vote gatherers, with votes for incumbents higher by 2.67 percentage points than for non-incumbents (Dettman, Pepinsky, & Pierskalla, 2017). In line with previous research (Davies & Idrus, 2011; Fattore, Scotto, & Sitasari, 2010), an analysis of the 2014 elections suggests that certain groups, like women, young people, and the non-Java population, were significantly under-represented, with only 37.34 percent of candidates being women, 5.06 percent of candidates being aged between 20-29 years old, and 26.96 percent of candidates being listed as living outside Java (Prihatini, 2019a). Furthermore, 27 out of 77 electoral districts (35.06 percent) did not elect any women to represent the constituents in the DPR. To put this into a provincial perspective, there are 7 out of 34 provinces (20.6 percent, including Bali and West Nusa Tenggara) without any female legislators.

Women with local government experience are 2.3 times more likely to win an election compared to those without this career path. This reaffirms the importance of certain career paths in predicting nomination results, as the most common route into a political career at the national level is experience built up at the local level (Murray, 2010; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011), and that incumbency has a strong positive correlation with women’s successful nomination (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). Furthermore, the fact that 78.3 percent of elected female MPs are living in Java, signals how Indonesia’s national parliament is heavily Java-centric, and this gap demonstrates the issues of representation and participation with the DPR being less diverse and inclusive than expected.
1.4. Gender Quotas and Continuing Constraints

The push to improve women's share in the political decision-making process has been discussed since the Indonesian Women's Congress in 1938. One opportunity arose in the 1998 Congress, in Yogyakarta, where the discourse of affirmative action in the form of gender quotas was first introduced (Supriyanto, 2013). Following the end of Suharto's authoritarian regime, a coalition of women's organisations and politicians campaigned intensively for affirmative action which would improve women's access to politics. According to Soetjipto (2005), 75 percent of parties which participated in the 1999 elections disapproved of the concept of gender quotas for women. During the Mother's Day celebration in December 2001, and Kartini Day in April 2002, President Megawati Sukarnoputri expressed her disagreement with the quota approach. She argued that women should not be begging when it comes to a space in government—instead they must continue to work harder.

A study on the campaign for gender quotas in Indonesia discovered that female activists had to work hard in pursuit of a quota for women as candidates for the 2004 elections (Siregar, 2005). After continuous lobbying from female activists and politicians in the DPR, the government passed a bill in 2003 which required parties to nominate at least 30 percent female candidates, though without penalty if they failed to do so. This intervention had some level of success, as women enjoyed the highest level of representation in the next general election, 2009, with 102 out of 560 elected MPs being women (18.21 percent). However, in the 2014 elections, despite stronger regulations in gender quotas and an
increase in the number of female candidates, the result was a slight decrease (Hillman, 2017a). These patterns are common in the quota literature, which points to the importance of quota design, implementation and enforcement in ensuring representative outcomes (Dahlerup, 2006a; Kenny & Verge, 2016; Krook, 2009b).

Women's nomination to the DPR has increased over the years, with the peak at just over 40% of candidates in the 2019 elections being women. This was partly due to a stricter electoral regulation released by the General Electoral Commission/KPU in 2013 that required each party to have at least 30 percent of candidates being female or to be disqualified (Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014). Gender quotas are also regulated by Electoral Law No. 8/2012, which stipulates that women should be 30 percent of a party's managing officers at the national level, and one in every three candidates should be female. Yet, the obstacles and challenges for women's electability into parliament cannot be automatically resolved by issuing technical regulations targeting the process of nominating women, as the 2014 elections, in fact, resulted in fewer women being elected compared to the 2009 elections. One possible explanation of women's low political engagement is the negative perception lingering around politics as a "dirty world"; also, increasing religious fundamentalism is heightening a focus on women's domestic responsibilities.

Another explanation lies in the high cost of running for an election. Wealth has become the currency of the game (Winters, 2013), where the cost of getting elected to the DPR has become more expensive over time, as suggested by former PDI-P’s Secretary General, Pramono Anung Wibowo (2013). Wibowo examined
the political communication and campaign costs among DPR members 2009-2014. He found that his respondents spent from as little as IDR300 million (USD23,076) to a massive IDR6 billion (USD461,538), with the average standing at IDR3 billion (USD231,269). These funds are commonly used to pay for food, gifts, transportation, and merchandise during meetings with potential voters (Nugroho, 2016; Shin, 2015; Simandjuntak, 2012). The 2014 parliamentary elections saw the highest level of vote buying in the country’s history and politicians have fallen into a cycle of corruption as they need to repay the costs to run (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015; Mietzner, 2015).

On the other hand, public acceptance of female political leadership remains a huge obstacle for women’s parliamentary representation (Ruedin, 2012). Two national surveys conducted in 1999 and 2005 suggest that nearly 60 percent of Indonesian respondents agree and strongly agree with the statement “men make better political leaders than women” (WVS, 2015). This percentage is the second largest among Southeast Asian countries surveyed, with Malaysia occupying the top spot with 69.6 percent. The interpretation of Islamic teaching also influences voters’ preferences in electing female legislative candidates. A study of young voters suggests that 75 percent of respondents are inclined to elect a male lawmaker as men are perceived as competent leaders based on some Islamic interpretations (Prihatini, 2018a).

1.5. The Questions Posed by This Research

In the last 60 years, scholars have explored factors that contribute to women’s political nomination success and failure (Dahlerup, 2016). Some studies suggest
cultural and ideological barriers strongly affect women’s interest in participating in politics (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995), others suggest institutional and structural obstacles are key in determining women’s electoral performance (Kenny, 2013; Rosen, 2013). However, it is important to highlight that there are still few studies dealing with the role of women in Indonesian political parties (Dewi, 2015; Hillman, 2017b; Rhoads, 2012; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012; Siregar, 2005).

This thesis aims to fill the gap by highlighting the developments following the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women which was held in Beijing in 1995. At this conference, all 189 member states agreed to what is now called the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA). The BDPA committed all of the signatories, including Indonesia, to ensure that women had equal access to, and full participation in, power structures and decision making (Davies & Idrus, 2011). The new wave of democracy in Indonesia, marked by the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 opens a new avenue for electoral reforms which allow more women to pursue political careers. The provision of gender quotas since 2003 requires parties to nominate at least 30% of candidates being female. And yet, women’s share in Indonesian national parliament remains low. This research investigates explanatory factors behind this condition and sets the time frame between the first free and democratic election in 1999 up until 2019. In addressing these objectives, this thesis asks one main question—what hinders equal representation in the Indonesian national parliament?

To answer the main question, this research examines various aspects starting from women’s nomination to gendered committee assignment once
women are elected as legislators. Which women get nominated by parties? Does Islamic ideology—often blamed for women’s low representation in Muslim countries—prevent parties from nominating more women into parliament? How progressive are pluralist compared to Islamist parties in terms of putting women first on party tickets? Have gender quotas failed women in improving their share in parliament? To what extent do institutional aspects, for example the open-list PR electoral system help women’s political nomination? And who are these women who got elected? How important is incumbency and list position? To what extent do female MPs represent their constituents, especially in terms of socio-economic class, political kinship with party elites, and residence?

The main research question also has a qualitative dimension which requires elaboration on perspectives and experiences owned by various actors involved. One way to answer is by exploring female politicians’ experiences in running and in persuading voters to support their nomination. This thesis further investigates parties’ points of view in regards to what impedes them from recruiting and getting women elected. Another pivotal perspective comes from the voters themselves. How do they perceive female candidates in legislative elections and will they support more women over men as their representatives, and why?

1.6. Significance of the Research
Firstly, by scrutinising empirical and interview data, this thesis offers a comprehensive approach in looking into barriers to equal representation in the Indonesian parliament. Both the statistical analysis and contextual depth of the
research allow it to give us fresh understandings of the politics surrounding women's political nomination and what is taking place once women win a parliamentary seat. This research contributes to the conversation by testing general consensus and theories about women's political representation, including supply and demand in political recruitment (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995), cultural and ideological aspects as hurdles to equal representation (Dewi, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a; Schnabel, 2016), the impact of the open-list PR electoral system (Jankowski, 2017; Luhiste, 2015), and modernisation theory (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2010).

Secondly, this research is significant as it examines Indonesia, a country with the largest Muslim population and third biggest democracy in the world. However, women’s parliamentary participation in Indonesia, like numerous other Asian countries, remains under-studied (Joshi & Goehrung, 2018; Yoon & Osawa, 2017). Hence understanding the development and obstacles in improving women’s access to parliament will expand the literature on women's participation in decision-making processes. The findings to some extent reflect similar challenges faced by women in other Asian countries and Muslim societies. Furthermore, policy recommendations discussed in this thesis might also be relevant to other democracies facing similar hindrances to women’s political representation.

Thirdly, the variation of methods used in this research, especially the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a configurational analysis, enriches the possible strategies in examining women’s political participation. This thesis presents sufficient evidence to show that the topic of women’s parliamentary
representation can be analysed using a variety of approaches. Lastly, as this thesis is formatted as a series of published and submitted papers, it provides a relatively rapid dissemination of research findings under a rigorous peer-review process. This method, in turn, means most of the sections received the constructive criticism that is fundamental to improving the quality of the research.

1.7. Methodology and Structure

This research employs a multi-method approach to properly assess challenges in creating equal representation in the Indonesian national parliament. A couple of chapters used an elite interview method which relies strongly on interviews with female politicians and party officials. Two chapters used questionnaires and interviews with politicians and young voters to complement the analysis. In other chapters, I have applied statistical analysis with different calculation strategies: descriptive and binary logistic regression analyses. I have also utilised Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) which is very useful in observing less than 50 cases. Further methodological justification is provided in each chapter.

The findings presented in this thesis are the result of a research project that relied on a broad diversity of sources. For the theoretical underpinnings of the argument, secondary literature on the role of parties, gendered political knowledge and preferences, political recruitment, gender quotas, and electoral systems were reviewed and evaluated. Meanwhile, for the empirical part of the analysis, the thesis relies on questionnaires and official statistical data, as well as interviews that were conducted with politicians, party officials, and voters.
This thesis is divided into four sections and nine chapters. The first section provides an introduction (Chapter One) and determinants of female representation within Indonesia in a comparative perspective (Chapter Two). For Chapter 1, I take some material from my entry for the Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures which will be published in mid-2019. I used the QCA method in Chapter Two, highlighting the dynamics of women's low and high representation in 47 Asian national parliaments. This chapter is adapted from my paper published in Contemporary Politics. It is also the first of its kind to examine women's representation in Asian parliaments using QCA.

The second section consists of three chapters that explore trends and challenges in nominating female candidates. Using a unique dataset collected from 2004 to 2019 legislative elections and in-depth interviews with central party officers, faction leaders, and members of parliament, Chapter 3 examines how Islamist and pluralist parties are responding to the provision of candidate gender quotas. It further inspects how parties placing women in the candidates’ lists. This chapter is taken from a paper which was submitted to Politics & Gender, and is currently undergoing a second review following required revisions. The next chapter is a published paper in the journal of Women's Studies and International Forum. It evaluates demographic characteristics of over 6000 legislative candidates who participated in the 2014 general elections and women who win. Chapter Five investigates how the politics of committee assignment has operated in the Indonesian national parliament from 2004 up to 2014. Interviews with sitting parliamentarians are also used to complement the statistical analysis. This section is submitted to the journal of Parliamentary Affairs.
The third section in this thesis also consists of three chapters, and it explores attitudes toward female politicians and gender quotas. In this part, I seek to establish different perspectives coming from lawmakers, party leaders, and voters. By interviewing 28 national female politicians in Indonesia, Chapter Six explores women's experiences in accessing parliament. Their narratives are critically important in understanding what really hinders them from winning an elective office. The findings of this chapter are currently under review for publication with the journal of Women's Studies International Forum.

Chapter Seven delves into politicians' viewpoints in perceiving legislated candidate gender quotas which require a party to nominate at least 30% candidates being female. The analysis derives from a questionnaire which involves more than 100 sitting parliamentarians. This chapter has been published in the Asian Social Science journal and cited in a paper issued by the International Feminist Journal of Politics (N. Choi, 2018). The last chapter in this section covers voters' political knowledge on electoral systems and their preferences in electing female legislative candidates. This experimental study published in the journal of Women’s Studies International Forum involves 234 respondents aged 17 to 24 years old. Lastly, the fourth part of this thesis is a concluding section with only 1 chapter that provides final remarks and prospects for future research.

1.8. Main Findings

The emerging dynamics of women’s parliamentary representation in Indonesia is very complex, and the collection of papers presented in this thesis presents a
mixture of persistent obstacles and potential solutions. While progress has undoubtedly been made, women remain under-represented in the political decision making-process as they only comprise less than 20% of seats in the DPR. Why are far fewer women than men elected as lawmakers in Indonesia?

Using an emerging method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on a dataset of 47 Asian nations, Chapter Two finds the level of women’s presence in legislatures throughout Asia is a result of multiple configurations of conditions beyond simply one or two explanatory variables. In contrast to the expectations of modernisation theory, this chapter suggests that national economic variables do not account effectively for the level of women’s political representation in Asia, including Indonesia. It argues corruption and Muslim domination in the population are not automatically crippling women’s political representation. Also, consistent with previous studies, this chapter suggests the presence of PR electoral systems plays a role as the substitute for, or the complement to, gender quotas, resulting in women’s high representation. In other words, countries without gender quotas can still elect significant number of female lawmakers if they have PR electoral systems.

Chapter Three suggests candidate selection remains hidden from public scrutiny, particularly on how parties formulate their candidates list. This "black box" of political nomination processes (Kenny & Verge, 2016) indicates female candidates being nominated might not have the quality to win the race, yet gender quotas give parties a hefty shove to nominate these women so they can participate in the election. Therefore, the increase of women’s share as candidates since the provision of gender quotas has not been reflected in more
women being elected. Furthermore, Islamist and pluralist parties do a similarly good job at recruiting females and a similarly bad job at putting them first on the list. Ignoring the importance of list position will undermine the effectiveness of gender quotas.

The findings in Chapter Four suggest the current Indonesian national parliament is far from representing all members of the society. Women, the young generation, and people from outer Java continue to be in the minority and poorly represented. Incumbency, age, and list position are factors that have statistical significance in predicting women’s electability. Kinship and political dynasties continue to be determining aspects in women’s political nomination. Thus this study offers a couple of policy recommendations: (1) applying a gender quota of 30% nominating women as the leader on the party’s ticket; and (2) maximising women’s electability at local legislatures, in a hope that they will gain sufficient support if they run at the national level. This part is important because political careers, or paths to power, play a crucial role in creating electoral trust among voters towards female candidates.

Once elected, Indonesian female MPs are more likely to be placed in feminine and less prestigious committees, and rarely hold committee leadership. Chapter Five discusses party ideology, in this case Islam, and finds it is not the key determinant in explaining how parties are allocating female deputies into masculine versus feminine committees. Being in the feminine and less prestigious committees could sometimes be more rewarding for women MPs as legislators can offer significant direct material support to their constituents and thus boost their chance of being re-elected.
Based on women’s experiences in running for parliament, Chapter Six suggests political institutional aspects continue to limit women in winning elected office. The current open-list PR electoral system, which escalates the level of uncertainty in getting elected, triggers the increase of campaign costs which later only benefits the economic elites. Furthermore, the rampant vote-buying practices and problems with electoral integrity are the two biggest obstacles in women’s political nomination. Most respondents in this study did not support culturalist explanations which emphasize a negative relationship between Islam and women’s political leadership. In fact, they claimed they have significant support from Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and male religious figures. Furthermore, the open-list PR system is prohibitively expensive and it hurts women candidates more than it does male aspirants because women generally have less access to financial resources.

Next, in Chapter Seven, it is evident that gender quotas in Indonesia are still widely accepted by legislatures, although there is a gap of about 11 percent between the two sexes. Women are the biggest supporters of quotas as they think quotas are useful in improving the quality of Indonesian democracy. These findings suggest after being adopted more than a decade ago, gender quotas remain the preferred approach to overcoming women’s low parliamentary representation, at least in the Indonesian case. The study also shows the distinction between men and women in explaining the roots of women’s under-representation. Men believe the greatest obstacle to increasing women’s presence in politics stems from the difficulty of parties to attract qualified women to run for elections. Two factors responsible for this are women prioritising
family over a political career and cultural, religious, and social constraints that make women less desirable as leaders. Meanwhile, women consider social values and customs that prefer male leaders are hurting women's political nomination the most. Following that is women's lack of political training, insufficient social capital, and insufficient funds to run campaigns.

Lastly, Chapter Eight demonstrates how Indonesian young adults' knowledge on Electoral Laws and the parliamentary system is not impressive. The findings support previous studies on the gender gap in political knowledge, where male participants show more accuracy than females although the disparity is sometimes insignificant. It also reaffirms that in a less informed society, voters tend to vote for male over female candidates. This choice is strongly based on respondents' political beliefs that men have better leadership qualities than women. Participants, both from male and female groups, in this study also highlighted Islamic teachings as their main driver in supporting male candidates, suggesting that a lawmaker is a leader and a man fits best in this post.
CHAPTER 2. DETERMINANTS OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION: INDONESIA
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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2.1. Abstract
This contribution examines the relationship between socio-economic development, corruption, the level of democracy, and women’s parliamentary representation in contemporary Asia. Previous studies have argued economic development offers women new opportunities and resources to participate in politics. Despite some notable gains in gender equality through this process, prosperous Asian nations perform poorly compared to other world regions in terms of women’s parliamentary representation. Using an emerging method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on a dataset of 47 Asian nations, this research suggests the level of women’s presence in legislatures throughout Asia is a result of multiple configurations of conditions beyond simply one or two explanatory variables. In contrast to the expectations of modernisation theory, this paper finds that national economic variables do not account effectively for the level of women’s political representation in Asia. Furthermore, countries with predominantly Muslim populations can still elect more women if other conditions are supportive.
2.2. Keywords

Women, Asia, representation, gender, parliament, QCA.

2.3. Introduction

The growth of women's parliamentary representation in Asia is far slower than in other regions in the world, moving only 5.3 percentage points from 13.2% in 1995 to 18.5% in 2015 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). Meanwhile, Asia's economic growth within the last 50 years soared from 12% of global GDP in the 1960s to 31% in 2015 (Asian Development Bank, 2016), giving East Asia the biggest reduction (40%) in the Human Development Index gap among developing regions from 1990 to 2014 (UNDP, 2015). These developments seem paradoxical as women in Asia have experienced notable gains in education, health and income (Jayweera, 1997), yet continue to be poorly represented in the political arena. Furthermore, gender inequality in political institutions differs significantly among Asian countries. In nations like Sri Lanka and Thailand, where universal suffrage was granted long ago in the 1930s, women comprise only 5.8% and 6.1% of seats in the national assembly respectively, whilst younger democracies such as Timor-Leste and Taiwan are leading the path to gender parity with nearly 40% of lawmakers being female (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017a). These conditions beg the question of how we can improve the literature on explaining female representation in Asian parliamentary politics.

Drawing upon previous research on women's legislative representation in Asia (Ayaz & Fleschenberg, 2009; Iwanaga, 2008; Joshi & Kingma, 2013; Tan, 2016a), this study contributes to the scholarly literature in two ways. Firstly, it shows that there are multiple different paths leading to the percentage of
women's representation in national assemblies (equifinality), with each unique model covering a different group of countries. Through using a relatively new comparative qualitative analysis (QCA) method (see Krook 2010c), the study allowed for a more comprehensive configurational analysis of the determinants of women's parliamentary representation in the national parliaments of 47 Asian countries. Secondly, this contribution notes that typical assessment on the average effect of a couple of variables on the outcome of women's parliamentary representation is not a satisfactory explanation. Rather, only combinations of different conditions can fully account for variations in gender disparity in parliaments.

As it aims to demonstrate an alternative approach in investigating women's representation in legislative bodies, this paper is departing from Stockemer's (2011) observation on African parliaments which analyses the plausible impacts of democracy and corruption on the number of female deputies. His work utilised commonly-used indicators, such as type of electoral system, quotas and a country's economic status, as well as the state's political culture. Using regression analysis, he added a country's degree of democracy and its level of corruption 'to test the correlation' (Stockemer, 2011, p. 701) between the seven variables and the proportion of women in the lower house in 44 African states. His work corroborates previous studies by concluding that the electoral system and quotas are positively and significantly related to higher women's representation.

The current paper attempts to expand the discussion by offering for the first time a cross-national comparison of the conditions that have driven women's
share of representation in Asian national assemblies. With the aid of QCA, as a complement to regression analysis, this paper argues that the level of women’s parliamentary representation is a result of the interaction among socio-political conditions. The seven explanatory conditions, replicated from Stockemer’s work, combined differently in various Asian countries and created multiple paths towards women’s high (and low) parliamentary representation. The results show gender quotas and PR electoral systems alone are not ‘the silver bullet’ in ending gender disparity.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The literature review identifies different conditions that have been hypothesised as determinants of women’s representation in legislative bodies. Next, the analytical methods of the research are presented, along with the operationalisation of data sets. The third section discusses the results of the empirical analysis, establishing multiple paths to explain the number of female Members of Parliament (MPs) in the national parliaments of different Asian nations. A discussion and conclusion are presented in the final section, including implications for further studies on gender disparity in contemporary Asian legislatures.

2.4. Literature Review

In the last 60 years, a process of engendering parliamentary politics has taken place with vast variations in speed and results between regions and among countries (Dahlerup, 2016). Male-dominated political assemblies are often criticised as being uninclusive (Dahlerup, 2011; Sawer, 2002), and women’s presence in parliament is not only crucial in assuring equality but it also brings
vital attention to issues that disproportionately affect women (Krook & Norris, 2014).

Throughout Asia, women’s political rights are linked to their country’s independence. Yet, in countries like Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, it took an average of 15 years after independence for female representation in parliament to emerge. The literature on Asia stresses that ‘institutions matter’ as socio-political structures and institutions severely obstruct women’s engagement in politics, where “guns, goons, gold and patriarchy” are common characteristics, combined with a parochial political culture (Fleschenberg, 2009, p. xv). Others also argue that the lack of a political culture supportive of women’s political engagement is strongly prevalent in many societies in Asia (Iwanaga, 2008).

A growing body of literature also suggests that many of the women in parliament in Asia are from dynastic families. Chandra (2016) proposes an institutionalist theory of the relationship between dynastic and democratic politics by arguing ‘dynastic politics is a systematic product of modern democratic institutions: state and party’ (p. 5). Women in India benefit from dynasticism partly because there are greater barriers to their participating in party politics than in social movements and community organisations. Basu (2016) further argues dynasticism is associated with greater representation of lower caste and Muslim women, two minority groups in Indian politics.

By observing the demographic characteristics of over 4,000 MPs in Asian parliaments, Joshi and Kingma (2013) argue Muslim and agrarian countries have more women in parliament than non-Muslim and urbanised countries. They
conclude although cultural/ideological factors may be important, in the long run electoral and political institutions ‘act as filters that can hasten or obstruct the impact of cultural, technological and socio-economic forces’ (p. 368). Particularly in regard to the impact of electoral rules and gender quota strategies on gender equality in Asian parliaments, Tan (2016) suggests the results are dependent on their implementation, enforcement, and interactions with the broader socio-political context.

In the following section seven variables, namely Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, electoral system types, gender quotas, the share of Muslims in the population, the female-male ratio in the workforce, the degree of democracy, and perceptions of corruption are briefly reviewed.

2.4.1. Socio-economic Development

The bulk of research on women in parliament has focused on three explanatory clusters of socio-economic development, cultural and ideological factors, and political institutions (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Krook, 2010a; Norris, 1985; Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Oakes & Almquist, 1993; Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007). The first approach in explaining women’s participation rates focuses on how modernisation changes women’s political and economic roles (Inglehart, Norris, & Welzel, 2002). Socio-economic development is often suggested to stimulate the supply of highly qualified women for political positions as it can bring about a decline in traditional values as well as fertility rates (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Paxton, 1997) and enables women to attain higher education and to participate in the workforce (Togeby, 1994).
In Asia, an increase in GDP per capita generally leads to an improvement in men’s and women’s basic quality of life (Lee & Park, 2011). Over the years, gender inequality has declined in primary school enrolment and labour participation, as well as political leadership (True, Niner, Parashar, & George, 2012). At the time of writing, more than 12 women have headed governments in Asia, including some who have governed Muslim-majority countries, yet most have done relatively little to enhance women’s overall access to politics (Fleschenberg, 2008; Jalalzai, 2004). A key obstacle for women accessing top positions in governing bodies is the substantial gap in tertiary-level education (Haque, 2003; Joshi & Och, 2014). A similar pattern can be found in American politics where political elites are highly educated and the increased number of women in some professional areas, such as law, leads to more female state legislators (Arceneaux, 2001; Norrander & Wilcox, 2014). Jayweera (1997) argues that economic development and improved women’s social status in Asia has little to no impact when it comes to gender equality. By observing countries with nearly universal education like South Korea, and countries with very low female literacy such as Pakistan and Nepal, she claims there is no significant difference in terms of women’s political participation. Thus, this study attempts to draw a clear line between women’s social status and political representation by highlighting the performance of countries observed. A wealthy nation such as Qatar has no female lawmaker and this condition is shared with Yemen, listed here as one of the poorest in the region. On the other hand, Taiwan and Timor-Leste – also sitting on two opposite extremes in terms of material wealth – have the highest women’s representation. This raises a question about how a country’s
material wealth—here measured by GDP per capita—plays a role in women’s political representation.

2.4.2. Cultural and Ideological Conditions

The next explanation considers cultural and ideological conditions such as attitudes toward female politicians and religious beliefs. In their seminal study, Inglehart and Norris (2003a) argue that “culture matters” (p. 144) where countries with egalitarian values are significantly associated with women being successfully elected to office. In order to measure egalitarian attitudes toward the division of sex roles, scholars utilised female-to-male labour force participation rates to demonstrate the level support for gender equality in paid jobs (Ruedin, 2012; Stockemer, 2011; Stockemer & Sundström, 2016). However, scholars disagree on the significance of the number of women in the labour force affecting their political representation. Some studies find no evidence to support the correlation between women’s workforce participation and their representation in parliament (Viterna, Fallon, & Beckfield, 2006; Yoon, 2001), while others claim a strong positive association (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008).

Inglehart and Norris (2003a) also suggest religiosity continues to exert a strong influence on social norms related to the division of sex roles in the public sphere. Attitudes towards women vary among adherents of different religions but, in particular Muslim-dominant societies, are commonly characterised by fewer female MPs (Norris, 2009; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). On the other hand, an empirical study by Ross (2008) which includes the percentage of Muslim population, women’s labour force participation and women’s seats in parliament,
suggests Islam is not a good explanation of any gender inequality. Similarly, a study by Seguino (2011) using an expanded set of the World Values Survey (WVS) demonstrates while religiosity has a strong (negative) impact on gender equality attitudes, no major religion—including Islam—emerges as resulting in distinctively strong inequitable gender attitudes (Braunstein, 2014). These inconsistencies in the literature offer a venue for further investigation on determining the actual impact of religion and women’s economic participation on political representation.

2.4.3. Political Institutions

The last cluster, political institutions, also known as the demand-side of politics, includes electoral systems, the role of political parties, and the provision of gender quotas. Most scholars argue that countries with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems (Ballington, 1998; Luhiste, 2015; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Paxton, 1997; Schmidt, 2009) and gender quotas have a significantly higher proportion of women in parliament (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Krook & Messing-Mathie, 2013; Tinker, 2004). Under PR party-list electoral systems, the disparity between a party's share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats can be reduced (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis, 2005), and with larger district magnitudes than other systems (Norris, 2004a) women are more likely to win. Once listed as candidates, women's position in the ballot structure is critical, as under the open-list system their chance of winning is subject to their position on the candidate list (Paxton et al., 2007) while with
the closed-list system it is the political party that will decide who will get the seat. Rosen (2013) claims that PR systems are significantly related to increasing women's parliamentary representation and the effect is larger in developed countries.

Most Asian democracies have experienced numerous electoral system reforms and have implemented at least one type of gender quota such as reserved seats, legal candidate quotas or political party quotas. For example, as a result of the continuous efforts by the Chinese women’s movement between the 1920s and 1940s, Taiwan was the first country in Asia that reserved 10% of seats in parliament for women in the early 1950s (Huang, 2015). The quotas allow equally or better-qualified women to have a place in politics, thus enhancing political competition due to the number of reserved seats being increased (Huang, 2016). Unquestionably, political institutions are widely varied among Asian democracies (Hellmann, 2014). In the right conditions, the provision of gender quotas and PR electoral systems afford women descriptive numerical political representation (Bhavnani, 2009; Joshi, 2013; Manganaro & Alozie, 2015; Nanes, 2015).

2.4.4. Democracy

Existing literature shows conflicting evidence about the relationship between democracy and women’s representation in national assemblies. Some scholars argue that the level of democracy—as measured by Freedom House—is not significant in determining women’s share in parliaments and cabinets (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Paxton, 1997; Paxton, Hughes, & Painter, 2010;
Reynolds, 1999), while others imply that long-term democracy and the number of female MPs are strongly related to greater gender equality (Beer, 2009; Tremblay, 2007). Donnelly (1999) argues that democracy provides all citizens with equal rights that should guarantee fairer political representation among women and minority groups, yet Welzel et al. (2002) found no evidence of direct causality between democracy and representation of women and minority groups. Instead, a study by Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna (2012) on 118 developing countries post-1975 suggests it is the democratisation process rather than a nation’s level of democracy that matters for explaining women’s presence in legislative bodies. Their results indicate that democratisation has a significant curvilinear effect on women’s presence in parliament where immediately after democratic openings, the number of female MPs drops but then gradually increases in following elections. The upward trajectory is linked to a nation’s electoral experience and increases in democratic freedoms.

This contradictory relationship between democracy and women’s participation cuts across regions. In Africa, democratic countries have fewer female deputies than non-democratic nations (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Stockemer, 2011), suggesting that transitions to democracy have not necessarily had a positive impact on women’s representation (Viterna et al., 2006). In the context of Asia, a Communist country with a lower democracy level such as China has more female MPs than democratic nations like Japan and South Korea (True et al., 2012). Countries that granted women the right to vote and to stand for election since 1918, like Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, have fewer female MPs than the United Arab Emirates that only granted universal suffrage in 2006 (WomenSuffrage.org,
This empirical evidence casts doubt on the assumption that higher levels of aggregate democracy will bring more women into national assemblies.

2.4.5. Corruption

The next aspect, corruption, was coined by scholars at the World Bank (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001; Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 2001). Their studies find higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption. Similarly, a report released by Transparency International (2015) asserts countries with better gender equality have witnessed lower levels of corruption over time. Nevertheless, corruption is a complex and multidimensional issue that is conceptually hard to comprehend and extremely difficult to quantify empirically (Kis-Katos & Schulze, 2013). One study on the causes of corruption did not find any link between levels of democracy and perceived corruption (Treisman, 2000). Esarey and Chirillo (2013) assert that a gender gap in corruption is subject to institutional context, where women will be less tolerant of corruption and less likely to engage in it compared to men if corruption has become a stigmatised crime. Yet, if corrupt practices are perceived as the norm in governance and receives support from political institutions, then a gender gap in corruption perception will not exist.

Corruption deters women from political engagement or from running for political office since it often leads to creating favourable conditions for men who already dominate the contest (Sundström & Wängnerud, 2016) to win an election (Bjarnegård, 2013). Campbell and Saha’s (2013) observation on Asia and the Pacific reveals that only when democracy has reached a point of maturity may it
result in a lower level of corruption. A recent study on Indonesia found that despite stricter gender quota laws, women’s performance at the polling stations is seriously damaged by rampant practices of corruption and lack of political support (Prihatini, 2018b; Rhoads, 2012). This reiterates Htun’s (2005) conclusion that if state institutions suffer from problems of corruption, it will be difficult to implement new policies such as quota laws to achieve gender parity.

2.5. Data and Methods
This study compares 47 countries in Asia by analysing women’s share in a single or lower house of parliament at a single point in time. The data was collected from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) website (www.IPU.org) as of 1 December 2016. The country selection is based on prior research and the availability of comparable socio-economic status, level of democracy and perception of corruption data. Thus territories like North Korea, Hong Kong and the State of Palestine were excluded from the analysis.

2.5.1. Outcome Variable
Women’s share in parliament (WIP) refers to the percentage of lawmakers serving in a single or lower house of parliament who are women. IPU’s website is the main source for the data; women’s level of representation in parliament ranges from 0 to 38.5% among the countries analysed in this paper. Abbreviations in capital letters indicate the presence of a condition, while small letters indicate the absence of a condition, for instance, WIP denotes a high share
of women's representation, and wip shows a low level of female parliamentary representation.

2.5.2. Explanatory Conditions

This paper considers seven conditions which shape women’s parliamentary representation in Asian countries: GDP per capita; perceptions of corruption; the level of democracy; type of electoral system; provision of gender quotas; the proportion of Muslims in the country; and the female-male ratio in the workforce.

Gross domestic product per capita (GDP) is gross domestic product divided by population. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Here, GDP per capita (current prices in U.S. dollars) is set as the degree of membership for a nation’s individual material wealth among the observed group. The data was obtained from the International Monetary Fund Database (2016).

Muslim population (M) is calculated as the percentage of Muslims in a country. The data was obtained from the Pew Research Center (2011) and the range is from 0.1 to 99.7%. This analysis follows prior studies which use Pew’s data as a source of information (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a; Kang, 2009). A study by Joshi and Kingma (2013) captures the connection between significant Muslim populations and high levels of women’s parliamentary representation in Asia.

The female-male ratio in the workforce (L), operates as the ratio of female to male's percentage participating in paid jobs. It is assumed that increased levels of female economic activity will result in demand for equal representation between the genders (Hughes & Paxton, 2008; Matland, 1998). Data for this
variable was collected from UNDP’s Human Development Report (2013).

A proportional representation (PR) electoral system is coded in a crisp set with its presence scored as 1 and countries applying majoritarian, mixed/semi-proportional systems are coded with 0. Data on electoral systems was collected from the database ‘Electoral System Design’ provided by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/IDEA (2016).

Gender quotas (Q) is operationalised as the presence of any kind of gender quota policies aimed at improving women’s political nomination at all stages. Using the Quota Project database (2017) developed by International IDEA, Stockholm University and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the presence of a gender quota was coded as 1 and the absence scored as 0. Especially for Taiwan, information regarding gender quota was collected from Huang’s (2015) work.

Levels of democracy (D) is calculated from the aggregate democracy scores in 2016 published by Freedom House (2016). The scores were composed of numerical ratings and descriptive texts for each country on political rights, civil liberties and freedom, rating scores, on a scale of 0 (worst) to 100 (best). All cases sit in the range except Syria which has a lower score than 0 (−1).

Perceptions of corruption (C) is measured by using Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2015) where a country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The lower-ranked countries are plagued by untrustworthy and poorly functioning public institutions, including the police and judiciary, while those ranked higher tend to have higher degrees of press freedom and stronger standards of integrity for public officials.
2.5.3. Analysis: Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

Since existing literature shows conflicting evidence about the relationship between economic development, democracy, corruption and political representation, combinations of conditions seem to be important in determining both the high and low representation of women in Asian parliaments. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is an analytic technique which combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies and serves to bridge the gap between case-oriented and variable-oriented research (Ragin, 2008). In case-oriented research, the method involves less than 50 cases and in-depth observation which examines various variables to compare or to contrast individual cases. On the other hand, variable-oriented research focuses on survey-type methods where researchers examine one or two independent variables to explain variations in larger datasets. QCA enables researchers to “examine similarities and differences across many cases while preserving the integrity of cases as complex configurations” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 38). QCA uses the logic of set relations to address causal complexity where outcomes do not arise from a single cause but rather a combination of conditions. Given that it is based on Boolean, rather than linear, algebra, it is not constrained by degrees-of-freedom and may apply to small-N comparative case studies with samples of 5 to 50 cases, such as the present one.

In studies on women’s political participation, observation on the combination of conditions that influence the number of female deputies remains a route less travelled. Up to the present time, Krook (2010c) and Lilliefeldt (2012) are the only two political scientists that use the QCA technique to assess how
combinations of different factors can produce similar outcomes (Ciccia, 2016). Matland (2012) asserts Liliefeldt’s work that uses fsQCA for nominal and ordinal dependent variables is not only appropriate but also able to offer distinct solutions in contrast to conventional statistical modelling.

As a relatively new, thus rarely used, method fsQCA has been critiqued by some for being too fuzzy in terms of set benchmarks and the crossover point in determining membership levels of each particular case (Stockemer, 2013, 2016). A responding paper by Buche, Buche, and Siewert (2016) offers a good explanation of two misconceptions about set-theoretical perspective and various steps of the fsQCA, including the calibration process and the interpretation of results. In a broader sense, Beers (2016) argues most scholars in social sciences continue to use multiple regression or null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), despite various studies pointing to its weaknesses: sensitivity to sample size and the p-values thresholds (i.e. .05). He argues QCA as a complementary method should encourage researchers to establish the relationship between factors by studying them as configurations rather than individual effects.

In accordance with standards of good practice needed to enhance the quality of QCA application (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010) this paper utilised a double method by applying multiple regression analysis and fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The multiple regression analysis results (see Appendix 1) show that out of seven variables tested, only the provision of gender quotas (P-value: 0.000245) and PR electoral system (P-value: 0.054738) offers a positive and significant effect on women’s share in legislatures. It is expected that if a country is imposing a gender quota and applying a PR electoral system, then
women’s share in parliament will increase by 10.16 and 6% respectively. However, this approach aims only to capture the correlation of the suggested factors and women’s representation. The conclusion has rather limited capacity to build up a comprehensive explanation as to why some countries with gender quotas are performing poorer than those without any quota arrangements. Thus, by operating fsQCA, this investigation aims to complement and seek further configurational analysis for paths that are useful in explaining the variety of gender inequality in Asian parliaments.

2.5.4. Calibration of Fuzzy Sets
Cases and conditions in this study are calibrated using Boolean algebra and operated with the fsQCA 3.0 software (Ragin & Davey, 2016). FsQCA assumes most relationships are asymmetrical rather than symmetrical (high values for X associated with high values for Y). The method focuses on testing for configuration (causal pathway) effects and recognises that variability in data is important to determine the levels of membership in a set. The first step to operate the analysis is to transform raw data into membership scores. Fuzzy sets represent a fine-grained degree of membership in the set, where a fuzzy set score of 0.05 is for full non-membership, a score of 0.5 is the crossover point, and a score of 0.95 is for full membership in the set. Fuzzy sets do not simply turn a variable into a continuous variable, but rather are used to determine the degree of membership in a set (Emmenegger, 2011).

Based on theory, empirical knowledge and previous studies on women in parliament, this study entails both fuzzy and crisp sets. Where there is no 0.5 level
of membership specified, the set is then crisp (1 = full membership, 0 = full non-membership). The example for this is the proportional representation variable, where only countries with such a system is coded with 1 (full membership), while cases like Japan with mixed electoral systems are coded with 0 (full non-membership). See Appendix 2 for the full set of raw and fuzzy set scores with predictor conditions. Thus, the calibration is based on a log function, where the construction is based on being able to observe a small share of cases with low scores—as well as high scores. In calibrating conditions/factors using fsQCA software, the full membership and full non-membership anchors were set using data only from cases observed (see Legewie (2017)). For example, women’s share in parliament in this study is set to have the maximum full membership score of 38.5%, despite the fact that there are many countries in the world which have a higher ratio (such as Rwanda).

2.5.4.1. Solutions

There are two key concepts related to QCA: coverage and consistency. Coverage, scored from 0 to 1, refers to how much of the outcome is explained by each solution or by the entire solution. The total solution coverage is the proportion of the membership in the outcome variable that can be explained by the complete solution. Raw coverage means the proportion of the membership in the outcome that can be explained by each causal pathway in the solution. It also includes cases that are covered by more than one solution. In comparison, unique coverage refers to the proportion of cases in the sample that is only covered by one solution. Consistency, also measured from 0 to 1, refers to the degree to which
membership in the solution is a subset of membership in the outcome (Ragin, 2009). If the consistency of a solution is low, it should be considered less relevant than other solutions with higher consistency. However, low configuration coverage does not imply less relevance as in cases where a path occurs through multiple causal configurations, a single configuration can have low coverage yet remain useful to explain an outcome. The key here is to find the balance between coverage and consistency, with a solution consistency score of 0.8 considered meaningful and 0.9 as highly significant. The QCA algorithm enables the specification of criteria used to exclude and code configurations so that logically irrelevant paths are excluded from the solution.

2.6. Results

2.6.1. Testing for Necessary Conditions

Following Schneider and Wagemann (2010), the analysis starts with testing which conditions are necessary to explain the desired outcome. A necessary condition is a cause that must be present for the outcome to occur, every or most of the time. The presence of a necessary condition does not mean that the outcome will occur, but the absence of a necessary condition denotes that the outcome will not happen every or most of the time. Necessary conditions are assessed by consistency and coverage; where consistency measures the strength of necessity relationship with a score of 1.0 implying that whenever the outcome is present, the necessary condition is also present, while coverage gauges empirical relevance or importance (Ragin, 2008).
The following table shows the analysis of the necessary conditions for the outcomes both ‘high level of female representation’ (WIP) and ‘low level of female representation’ (wip). All consistency scores except low GDP (g) are below 0.90 (Table 2). This indicates that low GDP is a condition that will always appear in solution formulas in both women’s high and low share in legislatures. This finding supports complexity theory in highlighting that (1) several, not one, of many possible paths lead to the same outcomes (equifinality); and (2) relationships between variables can be non-linear so that the same condition can produce different effects (Wu, Yeh, Huan, & Woodside, 2014).

Table 2. Analysis of necessary conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions tested</th>
<th>WIP</th>
<th>wip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High GDP (G)</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low GDP (g)</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim majority (M)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim minority (m)</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High female labour force participation (L)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low female labour force participation (l)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of PR electoral systems (P)</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-presence of PR electoral systems (p)</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of gender quotas (Q)</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-presence of gender quotas (q)</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High democracy aggregate scores (D)</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low democracy aggregate scores (d)</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very clean (C)</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very corrupt (c)</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. FsQCA coverage and consistency for high representation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Paths</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Raw</td>
<td>Unique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>g<em>M</em>l<em>Q</em>d</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>g<em>L</em>p<em>Q</em>c</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>Laos, Nepal, Vietnam, China, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>g<em>M</em>L<em>Q</em>c</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>g<em>L</em>P<em>q</em>d*c</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>m<em>L</em>p<em>Q</em>D*C</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Taiwan, Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>g<em>m</em>l<em>P</em>Q*D+C</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>1 Timor Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>g<em>m</em>L<em>P</em>q*D+C</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.955 Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage 0.748
Solution consistency 0.831

2.6.2. Outcome Variable: Membership in the Set of Countries with High Women’s Parliamentary Representation

Table 3 reports calculations from the intermediate solution for a high share of women in parliament (WIP) with consistency cut-off set to 0.9. The intermediate solution makes use of ‘easy counterfactuals’; counterfactuals that are ‘easy’ in that the researcher has a strong expectation about how a condition contributes to the outcome (Vis, 2012). The asterisk symbol (*) means ‘the combination of’ the associated conditions. As the overall consistency level is 0.831, the configurations demonstrate a convincing solution formula here explaining nearly 75% of all cases with membership scores above 0.5 in terms of women’s high representation.

2.6.3. Outcome Variable: Membership in the Set of Countries with Low Women’s Parliamentary Representation

The following table (Table 4) shows there are eight pathways leading to
membership in the set of countries with low women's parliamentary representation (wip). The overall solution covers 73% of all cases with consistency level at 0.852. In examining the analysis results for high and low representation, it is evident that there are multiple configurations that can be used in explaining gender disparity in Asian parliaments. Further interpretation for fsQCA analysis is elaborated in the following section.

### Table 4. FsQCA coverage and consistency for low representation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Paths</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Raw</td>
<td>Unique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>g<em>M</em>L<em>Q</em>c</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>g<em>M</em>p<em>q</em>d*c</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>Syria, Yemen, Tajikistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Maldives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>g<em>m</em>L<em>q</em>d*c</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>Myanmar, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>g<em>m</em>l<em>q</em>D*c</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>Sri Lanka, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>g<em>l</em>p<em>q</em>D*c</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>Sri Lanka, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>M<em>l</em>p<em>q</em>d*C</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>g<em>M</em>l<em>P</em>Q*d</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>g<em>m</em>L<em>q</em>D*C</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>Georgia, Bhutan, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solution consistency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.7. Discussion and Conclusion

As a case-oriented method, revisiting the cases is a crucial analytical step in conducting fsQCA (Emmenegger, Kvist, & Skaaning, 2013). The analysis results shed light on the combinations of conditions that lead to the level of female representation in Asian parliaments. In cases of both high and low representation, low GDP (g) appears in almost all recipes; 6 out of 7 paths for WIP and 7 out of 8 for wip. This can mean two things; firstly, wealth among cases in this study is very unevenly distributed as only two countries (Qatar and
Singapore) surpass the crossover point here set at US$38,587.99 of GDP. Secondly, it shows a country’s material wealth alone is not a useful tool in explaining the variety of levels of women’s representation as women’s share in parliament has no correlation with GDP. This finding supports the prior work of Jayweera (1997) which stipulates economic development has little impact on reducing gender disparity in Asian politics.

With regard to the impact of cultural/ideological aspect, here the study used religion and specifically by measuring the proportion of Muslims (M); pathways for high representation depict five countries with Muslim-majority populations and four countries with insignificant Islam adherents. The results show that religion alone is not a solid determinant, but rather it is the combination of effective causal conditions that is important in affecting women’s share in parliament. Muslim societies with a significant number of female MPs all have a reserved seat policy as a form of gender quota: Afghanistan (27% of seats reserved for women), Saudi Arabia (20%), Iraq (25%), Pakistan (17%), and Bangladesh (14.3%). The reserved seat policy in Afghanistan was mainly driven by the top-down efforts of the United Nations, while in Iraq it emerged mainly from the bottom-up mobilisation of women’s groups (Krook, O’Brien, & Swip, 2010). Another condition shared among these countries is a low level of democracy, and this situation is salient in a post-conflict situation such as in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In non-Muslim societies, women’s share in parliament is also supported by the provision of gender quotas in combination with a high level of democracy. The best example of this path is Timor-Leste, where women comprise 38.5% of
seats in the state legislature. Its constitution requires one out of every three candidates on the list to be a woman, and the country is also applying proportional representation (PR) electoral systems – which are more likely to support female candidates (Rosen, 2013). Another example is the People’s Action Party (PAP) of Singapore which has adhered to an informal quota to nominate at least 20% female candidates in the last three elections. Also, Taiwan has legislated candidate gender quotas at the national level and reserved seats of 25% at the local level. The only non-Muslim country in this group without a quota is Israel, but it has PR electoral systems and the country is regarded as having high transparency.

On the other hand, Muslim societies perform poorly in electing female legislators when their level of democracy is considerably low and they are applying neither gender quotas nor PR electoral systems. Countries falling into this group include Syria, Yemen, Tajikistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Maldives, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Malaysia. However, it is also noteworthy to highlight that there are Muslim countries with gender quotas, yet who continue to experience severe gender disparity in parliament. Countries in this particular group include Kyrgyz (19.2%), Uzbekistan (16%), Indonesia (17.1%) and Jordan (15.4%). The first three are those with legislated candidate gender quotas, while the last employs 12% reserved parliamentary seats. This finding offers a venue for future research in examining types of quotas that bring different results in different environments. In cases like Indonesia (see: Prihatini, 2018a) and Timor-Leste, where both apply legislated candidate quotas of 30% being women, the outcome is very much different where women’s share in parliament between
these two countries is 20 percentage points apart. This begs a question about voters’ behaviour in supporting women’s nomination and the importance of a party’s political will in promoting women. Thus this study offers no support to a revised modernisation theory which claims Islam impedes women’s representation because its religious leaders are perceived to have embraced traditional views regarding women’s rights (Inglehart & Norris, 2003b).

The next condition observed as part of cultural/ideological barriers to women’s political participation is the female-male ratio in the labour force (L). The fsQCA analysis shows that women’s significant economic activism appears in five out of seven solutions that lead to high representation. Countries like Laos, Nepal, Vietnam, China, Philippines, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Taiwan, Singapore and Israel all have high female labour force participation, indicating the level of support for gender equality in paid jobs. Yet, the fact that Myanmar, a country with more women than men earning income from working, scores only 0.19 of membership in women’s high representation raises a question about what is missing from the link between participating in paid jobs and political representation. Why does having more women in the labour force not always guarantee women’s presence in politics? Other countries like Georgia, Bhutan, Japan, Russia, Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan and Indonesia share a significant female-male ratio in the labour force, yet women continue to be under-represented in the political arena. These findings partly support previous work (Viterna et al., 2006; Yoon, 2001) as women’s participation in paid labour alone is not a sufficient condition for a causal relationship with political representation.

From here, another possible option to observe in future research is
looking into the public’s acceptance towards woman’s role as a political leader. Serial surveys by World Value Survey (WVS) wave 5 (2005–2009) and 6 (2010–2014) reveal that among Asian countries being observed, only China, Japan and Taiwan show less than 50% of respondents agreeing to the statement ‘men make better political leaders than women’. The level of agreement to the survey question mirrors actual women’s share in national assemblies, where Qatar and Yemen with zero female legislators give the highest percentage of agreement, 85.4% and 83.3% respectively (WVS, 2018). On the other hand, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea show the biggest disagreement with nearly 70% of respondents in Taiwan stating they disagree or strongly disagree.

In terms of political institutions, PR electoral systems (P) and gender quotas (Q), this study argues the presence of PR electoral systems plays a role as the substitute for, or the complement to, gender quotas, resulting in women’s high representation. In other words, countries without gender quotas can still elect significant number of female lawmakers if they have PR electoral systems, for example Kazakhstan, Cambodia and Israel. In the case of Timor-Leste, PR electoral systems and gender quotas are both present, along with a high level of democracy. Therefore, it can be said that countries wishing to promote women’s parliamentary representation need to improve their democracy level while at the same time applying gender quotas and PR electoral systems.

In looking at the causal relationship between PR electoral systems, gender quotas, and women’s low representation, the analysis shows six out of eight paths are those with the absence of gender quotas. More than 56% of countries having low representation are those not applying gender quotas and PR electoral
systems. This provides empirical evidence that political institutional settings are a significant pathway in improving women’s share in parliament. It also supports key literature on gender quotas in suggesting that such an approach is not only attractive but also effective in facilitating female aspirants to pursue their political endeavours (Dahlerup, 2008; Rosen, 2017). Nonetheless, fsQCA results demonstrate gender quotas and PR electoral systems alone are not the silver bullet in ending gender disparity. Women in countries applying gender quotas (Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia), PR electoral systems (Sri Lanka and Turkey), and having both in place (Jordan) are also experiencing under-representation. This only shows the complexity of the challenge, where there is no one-fits-all path due to different environments.

Level of democracy (D) and perception of corruption (C) alone cannot lead to women’s legislative representation. In fact, countries with a relatively low level of democracy can still elect more women into parliament with other conditions, namely gender quotas, PR electoral systems, or both, being present. Nonetheless, it is important to note that nearly 60% of cases with high representation do have a significant membership score in the subset of a democratic state. Cases with poor public sector performance and rampant corruption practices also dominate the configurations for high representation, again, in combination with the presence of gender quotas and/or PR electoral systems. An excellent example of this pattern is Timor-Leste, a newly established country with rampant corruption practices, low GDP, and low female economic activism, yet utilising PR electoral systems and a legislated gender quota with a significant level of democracy (aggregate score of 65).
When highly corrupt countries have a significant female presence in their national parliament, it begs the question about a plausible explanation(s) for such a result. One possible reason lies in electoral accountability, which Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017) define as voters’ ability to identify corrupt officials and punish them at the ballot box. By observing 76 democratic-leaning countries from 1990 to 2010, they argue that electing more women to parliament might reduce perceived corruption in countries with already high levels of electoral accountability. “Where electoral accountability is high, corruption is a risky behaviour; where electoral accountability is low, corruption is less risky” (p. 2). Future study may benefit from considering the relationship between this aspect and women’s electability and women’s parliamentary representation.

Paths leading to low representation are dominated by the presence of c (five out of eight), which describes countries with rampant corruption practices and poorly functioning public institutions. The findings support Rhoads’ (2012) study which stipulates women’s political nomination efforts are seriously damaged by the practice of rampant corruption. Aside from having a corrupt environment, these countries with low representation also share the absence of gender quotas, and low GDP per capita. However, other paths leading to low representation reveal some interesting suggestions, where highly democratic and transparent societies have a very low women’s presence in national parliament when gender quotas are absent. These countries are Georgia, Bhutan and Japan with a solution consistency score at 0.95. Less democratic states with a high perception of corruption cases also result in low representation when gender quota and PR electoral systems are absent (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman
and Malaysia). These low and high representation solutions suggest democracy and corruption are two important conditions, but these are not the main factors in explaining women's share in Asian parliaments. Particularly, in looking at Japan which has the highest score in terms of democracy and is the second most transparent country among all cases observed, it is evident that having these qualities is not sufficient in supporting female candidates in winning legislative elections.

The results presented in this study have the potential to expand the discussion around political representation by unpacking different routes that lead to women's high and low share in Asian national assemblies. In general, the findings demonstrate the opportunity to improve the research on women's political participation by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study started with a conventional statistical regression analysis that is variable-oriented and relies on correlation analysis in making comparisons across cases (see results in Appendix 1). It is later complemented by fsQCA, which is based on set theory and is case-oriented in comparing between cases. This integration offers a more comprehensive understanding in observing the social scientific phenomena. It supports some key literature in the field, including the importance of political institutional settings which enable women to be nominated and elected (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Krook & Messing-Mathie, 2013; Tinker, 2004). The findings also suggest that in combination with other conditions, one factor alone is not sufficient in producing an outcome. In other words, the presence of a condition is not a guarantee that a certain outcome will always be achieved.
Nonetheless, as it analyses only seven explanatory factors influencing women’s parliamentary representation, which have been examined in previous studies, this paper has a couple of limitations. First, there is always a possibility that the analysis overlooks other aspects which are not suggested in prior works but which may offer an important causal impact on the desired outcomes. Thus it is essential to identify and analyse new leading conditions in further research. Second, as solutions for both high and low representation only covers 75% and 73% of cases observed respectively, it shows the results are unable to explain the complete set of countries. Some nations are left unexplained due to the limitation of fsQCA 3.0 software which utilises Boolean algebra. This limitation can be addressed by looking into a more simple solution which aims to develop a high coverage with rather low raw consistency. Finally, as a cross-sectional study, the data here were collected on a whole population and at a single point in time. Thus future investigation will benefit from a longitudinal approach as well as more in-depth comparative case studies drawing on interviews and field research.
SECTION 2: FEMALE POLITICIANS IN INDONESIA: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
CHAPTER 3. WHO GETS NOMINATED

This paper has been accepted for publication in Politics & Gender (per 22 March 2019). The title of the paper: Islam, Parties, and Women’s Political Nomination in Indonesia.

3.1. Abstract

This paper questions earlier research on the role of Islam as a barrier to women’s political nominations by assessing and comparing parties’ efforts to meet institutionally required gender quotas in Indonesia. With the provision of 30% candidate gender quotas implemented since the 2004 elections, how have parties responded to this? Do Islamist and pluralist parties differ systematically in this regard? More specifically, does religious ideology impact how parties go about meeting quotas, recruiting female candidates, and getting them elected? Or are all parties facing the same challenges when it comes to getting women into parliament? Using a unique dataset collected from 2004 to 2019 legislative elections and in-depth interviews with central party officers, faction leaders, and members of parliament, this article aims to unpack the above questions. The results indicate Islamic ideology plays no obvious role in limiting female participation in legislative elections as Islamist and pluralist parties are both as successful at the percentage of their nominees being women. Both groups are also similarly terrible at putting female candidates first on the list. More importantly, Indonesia’s open-list PR system is prohibitively expensive and this hurts women
candidates more than it does male candidates, because women generally have less access to the capital necessary for purchasing the top position on party lists.

3.2. Keywords

Political parties, Islam, women’s nomination, Indonesia.

3.3. Introduction

A burgeoning body of research suggests party-level variables such as (formal and informal) recruitment rules and party ideology influence the variation in the share of women in parliament (Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2015; Bjarnegård & Zetterberg, 2017; Caul, 1999; Cheng & Tavits, 2011; Erzeel & Celis, 2016; Kenny & Verge, 2016; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). Others suggest the gender composition of party gatekeepers—those responsible for candidate recruitment—determines women’s interest in running (Cheng & Tavits, 2011). However, it remains obscure how parties select their candidates as recruitment practices are largely a private affair (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Kenny, 2013) and “parties do not like the odours of the electoral kitchen to spread to the outside world” (Duverger, 1954, p. 354).

Candidate selection reflects and defines the character of a party and its internal power struggles (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Inglehart and Norris (2003a, p. 71) contend “Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality”. In other words, parties with Islam as their ideology are less likely to support women’s political participation. However, Tajali (2015, 2017) finds in many Muslim-majority countries, increasing numbers of Islamist parties have been recruiting and nominating women to
parliament, sometimes even in higher proportions than their secular and more liberal counterparts. Albeit, these dynamics in which Islamist parties are shaping women’s political nomination to legislatures remain an understudied topic.

This article seeks to fill the gap by revisiting the “black box” of candidate selection (Kenny & Verge, 2016) and investigating the central question of how Islamist and secular parties are nominating female candidates. It is the first analysis to use data from Indonesia, home to the largest Muslim population in the world, to empirically investigate the trends and obstacles faced by parties in promoting women’s parliamentary representation. As discussed by Gallagher and Marsh (1988, p. 6), the ideal research method for explaining the dynamics of the candidate selection process would probably be to conduct in-depth interviews with all those involved; “central party officers, deputies, selected candidates, unsuccessful aspirants, local party elites, and ordinary branch members and so on”. Yet, given limited time and resources, this approach is rarely realistic. Hence, in this study, I observed only the first three key components; central party officers, deputies, and selected candidates\(^1\). The series of interviews, all conducted in Jakarta, can be grouped into two; (1) with legislators and selected candidates, and (2) with central party officers.

In the first tranche of interviews, a total of 20 deputies and selected candidates participated following an open invitation which was distributed in January 2016. The interviews were conducted between February to July 2016. Respondents were asked to reflect upon questions like, but not limited to, “What

\(^1\) All interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, and the author translates the data into English.
makes you decided to run for parliament?” and “How strongly do you think the party is supporting your candidacy?”. The second tranche of interviews was with central party officers and faction leaders, and held between June and August 2018. Respondents in this batch were purposefully selected and invited, as they represent the seven parliamentary parties who have participated in the last three general elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) and are going to run in the 2019 elections; PPP, PKS, PKB, PAN, Golkar, PDI-P, and PD².

Following the party classification provided by previous studies (see Mujani & Liddle (2009) and Aspinall et al. (2018)), this paper agglomerates seven parliamentary parties into three groups; (1) the Islamist parties group which consists of PPP and PKS, (2) PKB and PAN which are parties based on Islamic social organisations³, and (3) pluralist⁴ parties which include Golkar, PDI-P, and PD. Each party is represented by the head of the campaign team and the head of

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³ The roots of the inclusive Islamic parties lie in Indonesian Islamic mass organisations. PKB is culturally and historically linked to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, with its main support base centred in NU communities in East and Central Java, while PAN’s base of support is among urban Muhammadiyah members (Hwang 2010). During the Suharto administration, PPP was recognised as the party for NU members as PPP was the only party with Islam as its ideology. In post-Suharto times, the majority of NU members in PPP moved to PKB, but some chose to stay in PPP as a strategy to win a parliamentary seat (see: Siregar (2007)).

⁴ The word “pluralist” here refers to party’s ideology that is not based on Islam but on Pancasila (the official state ideology). Aspinal et al. (2018) asked respondents about the degree to which their party was based on Pancasila—which was scored at 1, or on Islam, which was scored at 10. By this measure, the most Islamic party in the view of its own members is PPP, with an average score of 7.22, while the most Pancasila-oriented is PDI-P, at 1.82. Meanwhile, PKS average score is 5.53 making it the second most Islamic party in the view of its members. It is important to note that only PPP and PKS scores more than 5.0 and the average position of all parties (at 3.27) is tilted toward Pancasila rather than Islam.
the women's organisation within the party or head of faction. In this round, I've asked interviewees to elaborate in answering questions such as “How did your party nominate women for DPR?”, “How do Islamic teachings affect the recruitment system and campaign strategies for female candidates in your party?”, and “What are the key impediments faced by your party in nominating women into parliament?”. As a complement to the qualitative approach, this paper examines the statistical data trends from seven major parties in terms of female candidates' nomination and women's position on the candidates list. The trends also cover the 2019 elections. I have calculated the trends using raw data available from the Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU) website (www.kpu.go.id).

The findings suggest that Islamic ideology plays no obvious role in limiting female participation in legislative elections, because Islamist and pluralist parties do a similarly good job at recruiting females and a similarly bad job at putting them first on the list. Furthermore, potential female aspirants are difficult to recruit for all parties in the context of the open-list PR system, where costs have sky-rocketed and it is harder for women to raise the necessary capital because of a host of other structural inequalities experienced by women. Confirming a common assumption in the literature surrounding the importance of an institutional approach, the Indonesian case demonstrates that although the provision of gender quotas in the open-list PR electoral system has resulted in more women being nominated, this does not automatically translate into a significant improvement in women’s electability.
3.4. Female Politicians and the Indonesian Party System

Two main Islamist parties in Indonesia are the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera/PKS). The former is a party established in 1973 as a merger of four Islamist parties; the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU), the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia/PSII), the Union of Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah/Perti), and Parmusi. The merger was part of Suharto’s plan to simplify the party system in Indonesia during the New Order era. PPP has a special branch for women called the United Development Women or Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan/WPP.

PKS, on the other hand, was first created as the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan/PK) in the wake of the Reformasi era in 1998. This party was declared by veterans of Tarbiyah groups and calls itself a da’wa party—a party of Islamic propagation. In Arabic, tarbiyah means “education”, but it can also mean religious studies (often arranged for students of secular universities or colleges) and building an Islamic society through a transformative process (Machmudi, 2006; Permata & Kailani, 2010). To accommodate female cadres, PKS has a special department labelled “women and family resilience”.

The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/PKB) is the official party affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation which has an approximate membership of 50 million Indonesians (Fionna & Arifianto 2015). Founded in 1998 by Abdurrahman Wahid, the former NU chairman who went on to become Indonesia’s first democratically elected President. PKB’s vote share has declined since the 1999 parliamentary election,
from 12.6% in 1999 to 4.9% in 2009 and recovered to 9.04% in 2014. PKB has *Perempuan Bangsa* (National Women)—in addition to Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslimat NU) and Fatayat NU—as a party wing organisation overseeing women's issues.

Next in this group is the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*/PAN). Although it lists Pancasila as its ideology, PAN is officially affiliated with the Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second largest Islamic organisation which claims approximately 30 million members. Founded in 1998 by Amien Rais, the former Muhammadiyah chairman who was a leading opposition figure under Suharto, its vote share has been stable around 6-7%. A party wing specially dedicated for women is called National Mandate Women (*Perempuan Amanat Nasional*/PUAN).

Pluralist parties including PDI-P, Golkar, and PD have each been the winners of legislative elections in post-Suharto times. PDI-P became the party with the most votes in 1999 and 2014, while Golkar won in the 2004 elections, and PD dominated votes in 2009. The PDI-P has been the only party led by a woman since 1993. Its current chairman is also former president Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri. PDI-P became the ruling party in 2001 when Megawati succeeded the impeached President Wahid. She lost her re-election bid in 2004 and the party has been in opposition until 2014 when Joko Widodo secured the top job in the country. PDI-P has a Department of Women’s Empowerment Affairs (*Departemen Urusan Pemberdayaan Perempuan*/DUPP), which can be utilised for the process of recruiting female cadres for electoral purposes.
Golkar, once a political machine used by Suharto to stay in power, remains one of the best organised parties in Indonesia thanks to its extensive network built under the New Order regime (1966–1998) (Tomsa, 2008). Like many parties in Indonesia, Golkar has also established a women's department. The department is known as Golkar Party Women's Union (Kesatuan Perempuan Partai Golkar/KPPG) and its recommendations on potential female aspirants are used to develop the party list.

The last pluralist party, Partai Demokrat/PD, known for its slogan Nasionalis Religius (Nationalist Religious), was created in 2001. The chairman is Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who is also the first directly elected president in Indonesia from 2004 until 2014. SBY's strong personal grip and leaning towards dynastic politics have resulted in the absence of an obvious successor. Perempuan Demokrat or Democrat Women is the name of the party's wing which is specifically concerned with women's issues.

In the last three elections since 2004, the seven parties observed in this study have experienced unsteady development in minimising gender disparity in parliament. The following table displays parliamentary seats and women's share by parties. An Islamist party, PPP, in the latest election achieved a new record of women's representation with slightly more than one in every four elected deputies being female. This was closely followed by PKB and PD, each with around 21% of the party's seats occupied by women. The number of PPP female legislators has grown five-fold compared to the results in 2004. In contrast, another Islamist party (PKS) has displayed a rather poor performance in promoting gender equality, having only one woman elected to the DPR.
Table 5. Parliamentary seats won and women’s share by party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2004 Total seats</th>
<th>Women’s share (%)</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Women’s share (%)</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Women’s share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3 (5.17)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5 (13.16)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10 (25.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3 (6.67)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3 (5.26)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1 (2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7 (13.46)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7 (25)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1 (21.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7 (13.46)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7 (15.22)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9 (18.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>18 (14.06)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>18 (16.98)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>16 (17.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>12 (11.01)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>17 (18.08)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>21 (19.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6 (10.53)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>35 (23.49)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13 (21.31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison with the Islamist parties, both the parties based on Islamic social organisations and the pluralist parties show a more stable attainment as women’s share in their parliamentary seats always surpass the 10 percentage point bar. This data indicates Islamist parties have been less successful in getting women elected into parliament. Women’s low electability is in line with the general failure suffered by Islamist parties. Lines of reasoning involve the historical pattern of religious pluralism with a large majority of moderate Muslim voters (Liddle & Mujani, 2007; Mujani & Liddle, 2004, 2009), internal conflicts among parties and Islamic social organisations (Miichi, 2015), the idea that Islamic piety does not entail support for political Islam (Pepinsky, Liddle, & Mujani, 2012), and the state’s domination of the provision of social welfare facilities making Islamic social organisations less important (Hicks, 2012). The literature on Indonesia’s society and politics says that Islam has a growing influence on socio-political life. Islamic symbols and practices are being integrated into mainstream politics by all parties, and are no longer the monopoly of Islamist parties. These developments explain why Islamist parties do not do as well comparatively as one might expect in a majority Muslim country.
Also, some scholars have argued Indonesian politics are dominated by a “cartel” of parties characterised by their common desire to gain power, rather than by ideological or policy differentiation (Ambardi, 2008; Buehler, 2012; N. Choi, 2007; Tomsa, 2018). Differences between Islamist and secular parties have become blurred and “the political influence of traditional religious authority has been decreasing” (Miichi, 2015, p. 131). PKS, as the biggest Islamist party in Indonesia, has been showing a strategic behavioral moderation approach in national and local politics since 2004 and joining the catch-all party bandwagon (Buehler, 2012; Tanuwidjaja, 2012; Tomsa, 2012).

A survey of 508 randomly selected members of Indonesian provincial legislatures (DPRD) corroborates these assertions by concluding that parties are showing ideological convergence across a range of issue areas (Aspinall, Fossati, Muhtadi, & Warburton, 2018). When it comes to women’s political emancipation, most parties claim to be emancipatory, including the Islamist parties. This finding offers some support to Seguino (2011) who argues no single religion stands out as more gender inequitable than others. It also supports Schnabel’s (2016) work which claims the biggest distinction is not between any of the three largest faiths—Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism—but the more non-religious people there are in a country, the more gender equal that country tends to be.

3.5. Women in Indonesia’s Parliament: Trends Over Time

Women constitute half of the national population in Indonesia, and all parties in Indonesia have a women’s department (sayap) which can be utilised for the process of recruiting female cadres for electoral purposes. Besides these internal
pools of potential female politicians, recruitment of female aspirants can also be done through various networks of women’s Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and professional organisations. However, Puspitasari (2018) finds most political parties in Indonesia are not being transparent in terms of inviting and selecting potential candidates. By observing sixteen national participating parties in the 2019 elections, her study suggests only PD and the Indonesian Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Indonesia/PSI) provide open recruitment registrations online along with detailed registration and selection guidelines. Most parties only promote their chairperson’s activities and rhetoric, with very little information on policy debates or electoral strategies made public.

A candidate gender quota policy in Indonesia has been implemented since the 2004 elections where parties need to consider women’s representation with a minimum of 30%. This institutional requirement was first constituted in Law No. 12, 2003, on General Elections which was enacted in preparation for the 2004 election. Article 65 states, “Every political party in the election may propose candidates for members of the national, provincial and local parliaments for each electoral district with consideration for at least 30% of women’s representation”. Law No. 2, 2008, on Political Parties required parties to appoint women to at least 30 percent of its national managerial positions and a similar share for the party’s regional boards as a prerequisite to contest in elections.

Furthermore, Law No. 8 of 2008 on General Elections stipulated the 30 percent for female candidates is compulsory, despite no clear sanctions being mentioned. The zipper requirement (where in each three candidates there should be at least one female nominee) was also introduced in the 2009 elections. Thus,
Law No. 8/2012 on General Elections stated parties must nominate candidates with at least 30 percent being female using the zipper system or be disqualified from running. The latter institutional requirement was stipulated by the Indonesian Election Commission (KPU) as its Regulation No. 7/2013. Numerous women’s rights activists from Islamic organisations and NGOs had been lobbying the parliament to pass the quota as an institutional intervention on the basis of equality of opportunity (Bylesjo & Seda, 2006; Siregar, 2005; Soetjipto, 2005). Female sitting lawmakers were also very active in persuading their colleagues by arguing that unlike men, women had a later start in the political arena, therefore the quota was expected to redress these differences in a short time.

For the 2019 elections, candidate gender quotas continue to be one of the key requirements for parties to participate in the race. Respondents in this study claim that all parties adhere to quota requirements because they have become binding laws and a prerequisite for parties to be able to participate in elections. “The gender quota is not seen as something that is contrary to Islamic teachings, instead PPP and PKS have urged that the quota provisions be used as the basis for election regulations,” said Sahfan Badri Sampurno, a former PKS national election manager. Similarly, lawmakers from PAN and PKB suggest the provision of gender quotas is not in discord with Islam. Interviewees representing Golkar, PDI-P, and PD are also claiming the same narratives. Melchias Mekeng, the Chairman of the Golkar Party faction at the House of Representatives (DPR) said, “For us, the gender quota is good, because we really want women to participate in politics. The problem is that not many women are interested in running, as we can only nominate 37% (of women) this year”.
As this paper aims to explain how political party ideology (i.e. Islam) might affect women’s political nomination in Indonesia, the following graphic depicts the share of female candidates by party since 2004 (Fig. 1). From the Islamist parties group, it is evident that the PPP has been consistently improving the proportion of women nominees. Compared to the 2004 elections, women’s share has almost doubled this year reaching slightly over 42% and making PPP with the biggest proportion of female candidates among all parties. This development is very promising as in the 2004 and 2009 elections this party only assigned less than 30% of female candidates.

Figure 1. Female candidates’ nomination by party.

(Sources: KPU (2014) and Prihatini (2018d). The data tabulated by author).

The Chairman of the PPP faction at the DPR, Reni Marlinawati, claims her party has been at the forefront in women’s representation by being the first party to achieve a minimum of 30% of women sitting as party’s national managers. “The gender quotas policy imposed on party management structures and on electoral candidates has never evoked a tough debate in the PPP since the party
is fully encouraging women’s participation in politics”. She further says the PPP has three recruitment sources of viable female candidates through: (1) the Chairperson of the PPP Women’s Empowerment Department; (2) female party officers; and (3) external resources by which any women who has the credibility and capacity to run for office are welcome to represent the PPP.

Like most parties in Indonesia, the recruitment mechanism in the PPP is heavily centralised via what is known as *Lajnah Penetapan Calon* (LPC) or the Candidate Appointment Committee which consists of seven members, two of whom are females. Respondents suggest the nomination hike in 2014 was partly because of the composition of the LPC and the fact that the party’s national election manager at that time was a woman—the PPP was the only party with a female national campaign manager in 2014. This finding lends support to Cheng and Tavits (2011) who suggest that gender party gatekeepers play a crucial role in either encouraging or discouraging women candidates to run for office.

Meanwhile, PKS, has been very steady in ensuring a better candidates’ gender ratio as the proportion of women is always close to or slightly above 40%. On average, women’s nomination from PKS has been the highest in four consecutive elections (38.99%). One possible explanation for this is because PKS is a cadre party and is much better organised than most other Indonesian parties (Mujani & Liddle, 2009). In addition to that, since 2010, PKS has amended the party’s organisational statutes to accommodate non-Muslims so they can run for office and take up leadership positions within the party (Tomsa, 2012).

“We never had an issue with finding female candidates, really. As a cadre party, we have enough stock. And these women will not be resistant as to which
electoral district they will be placed or in whatever ballot position,” said Sahfan Badri Sampurno. He further argues the entire legislative candidates are trained and selected by an institution called *Lembaga Penjaringan Penokohan Kader* (LPPK) or Cadres Characterisation and Recruitment Institute. This is an ad hoc entity which works under the direct leadership of the Head of the Shura council, and this institute selects cadres based on their competencies for both legislative and regional head elections. The candidate nomination process in PKS consists of two directions; bottom-up and top-down. The first approach capitalises on the small groups of party members called *Unit Pembinaan Kader* (UPK) or the Cadres Development Unit where cadres with high potential can be detected and promoted as legislative candidates. The latter method comes from party officials who can nominate national Muslim figures if they are keen to run for PKS.

Next, in the second cluster of observed parties, those based on Islamic social organisations, PKB and PAN, display a similar trend as their share of female candidates experienced a significant drop in 2009 before bouncing back in the following elections. Both parties had been fulfilling the suggested candidate gender quota minimum of 30% for women since 2004. And the average women’s nomination from PKB is 36.87%, while PAN stands at 35.10%.

“This year we have received 620 applicants, while we only need 575. The first filter for our selection process is their CVs, and we invite them to meet us; some directly meeting with the Chairman, and others with the National Campaign Team (*Komite Pemenangan Pemilu Nasional*/KPPN),” said the Chairwoman of PAN for Women’s Empowerment Department, Euis F. Fatayati.
She further argues, “In 2004, it was still easy to invite women to run for office. At that time, we had the closed-list electoral system, where list position determined electability. Things were getting difficult in 2009 because all that mattered was garnering the most votes. Those who failed twice in their bids felt discouraged, hence it became harder for us to nominate female aspirants”.

On the other hand, secular parties are showing a gradual growth in promoting women into political office. Unlike PKB and PAN, parties in this third group have never reduced the percentage of female candidates. The sharpest hike in women’s share as candidates for PDI-P and PD took place in 2009, meanwhile Golkar experienced the jump in 2014. The average percentage of women candidates from this group is around 33 to 34%.

“We have internal guidelines in recruiting legislative candidates. Through Party Regulation No. 025A, we only allow two persons from a family (i.e. husband and wife) to run for PDI-P, and they cannot be aiming for the same level of parliament,” said Head of the PDI-P Campaign Team, Bambang DH. He suggests these rules are set to ensure equal opportunity for anyone who wishes to represent the party in the race.

Golkar has been recruiting female aspirants from its women's organisation called *Kesatuan Perempuan Partai Golkar/KPPG* (Women's Association of Golkar). “It is assumed that if they are active in KPPG, they have political intentions. We also promote female figures in the regions, who might not be active in KPPG but are probables to represent Golkar,” said Melchias Mekeng.

These findings surrounding internal mechanisms in recruiting, selecting, and nominating female candidates indicate parties have adopted the affirmative
action policy designed through electoral laws and regulations. These institutional requirements have been embedded and have become a necessity for parties to compete. But do all politicians share the same view about gender quotas? Prihatini (2018b) suggests legislators share different perceptions on gender quotas, where men are more negative and less supportive compared to female MPs. Thus, while female respondents are very eager to use strategies to nominate more women running as candidate #1, the vast majority of male deputies disagree that such an approach will equalise the playing field between men and women in electoral politics.

3.6. List Positions and Witness Fee

Many scholars highlight the importance of the ballot position effect as electoral success will be heavily influenced by name order on the list (Jankowski, 2016; Lutz, 2010; van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). In fact, research on Indonesian elections demonstrates the crucial aspect of women being nominated as candidate #1 (Dettman et al., 2017; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012; Siregar, 2006; Soetjipto & Adelina, 2012). For every additional lower rank in the nomination list in the 2014 elections, the odds of winning for women is reduced by 63.5% and lower list position creates a bigger disadvantage for women than men (Prihatini, 2019a).

The following graph (Fig. 2) exhibits women’s share as candidate #1 by parties since 2004. The tabulation is obtained by dividing the number of women sitting on the top of the party tickets with the total number of electoral districts5.

5 For the 2019 elections, the number of districts has increased to 80, from 77 in the previous election. Total seats for the DPR has also increased from 560 to 575 in 2019, following the establishment of a new province (North Kalimantan) and additional seats for a couple of provinces (i.e. Nusa Tenggara Barat/NTB and West Kalimantan).
Islamist parties show a contrasting track record in assigning women as the leader on the ballot paper. In the last three elections, the PPP has been increasing the number of women running as candidate #1, and the peak was reached in 2014 where 22 out of 77 districts were led by female aspirants. PKS, on the contrary, has been reducing women’s share as candidate #1 since 2004. For 2019, six women are sitting on the top of the name order, making this a new record for the PKS. However, compared with other parties observed, women in the PKS are far less likely to receive the advantage of running with the most winnable list position. This finding raises a contradictory impression as the PKS has been promoting more women aspirants than any other party, and yet the PKS has assigned only a handful of female candidates to be leader on the name order.

**Figure 2. Women’s share as candidate #1 by party in 2004-2019 elections.**

(Sources: KPU (2014) and Prihatini (2018d). The data tabulated by author).

“In the PKS, we have *Pemira* where we test one’s electability internally. Those who had been working closely in the party structure would receive the strongest support from cadres, and hence are usually placed in list positions 1-2-
3," said Sahfan Badri Sampurno. This approach reaffirms the importance of career paths as a cadre for candidacy in PKS, hence future research can further examine why women’s internal electability is not as high as men’s.

“List position in the PKB is a matter of negotiation. I have told the party that I will only run if they assign me as candidate #1 or #2, and they’ve approved it by giving me the second spot. Two incumbents were assigned to #1 and #3, and both of them didn’t get elected,” said a female MP who claims 70% of her campaign expenses was paid by the party. Another female legislator from PKB gave another insight. She explains all potential candidates’ electabilities were surveyed by a political consultancy company. Accordingly, the list position was formulated based on the survey.

In the 2019 election, just over 40% of all candidates will be women. Exceeding the 30% benchmark by 10 points may look like a remarkable achievement, but experience from previous elections suggests that it is highly unlikely for most of these candidates to actually get elected. One key impediment for electoral success is that male candidates continue to enjoy the advantage of running as candidate #1, while women are mainly slotted in at number 3 and 6, following the so-called zipper system (see Table 6 below).
Table 6. Distribution of list position in the 2014 and 2019 elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List position</th>
<th>2014 % Female candidates</th>
<th>2019 % Female candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.15</td>
<td>18.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.38</td>
<td>30.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>68.69</td>
<td>66.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.91</td>
<td>26.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>33.45</td>
<td>37.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>63.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.97</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>40.18</td>
<td>42.16</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>53.47</td>
<td>48.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>14.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: KPU (2014) and Prihatini (2018d). The data tabulated by author).

In line with previous studies (Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2015; Dettman et al., 2017; Puspitasari, 2018; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012), this study finds list position formulation, similar to the recruitment and selection process, is far from public scrutiny. This “black box” of political nomination processes indicates female candidates being nominated might not have the quality to win the race, yet parties still need to nominate these women so they can participate in the election. Women candidates might be more likely than men to be “sacrificial lambs” who serve as party standard bearers in districts where their party has little chance of winning (Thomas & Bodet, 2013). Therefore, the increase of women’s share as candidates since the provision of gender quotas has not been reflected in more women getting elected.

More particularly in the case of PKS, the party has been nominating so many female candidates but few of them are elected. This result indicates the problem seems to be with the PKS electorate, and not so much with the party leadership. PKS executive Ledia Hanifa Amaliah disagrees with the claim that PKS potentially treats women candidates more like “sacrificial lambs” than other
parties, yet she admits male cadres are often more successful in garnering electoral support, and thus the party tends to put more men on the top position on party tickets.

Respondents only disclose generic mechanisms in what determines party list position, this includes loyalty, activism, and dedication to the party. “Candidate #1 should be the ‘magnet’. He or she must have something special. Aside from popularity, their quality needs to be top-notch too,” said Bambang DH. Meanwhile, Melani Leimena Suharli from PD describes, “We are giving incumbency our highest priority. An incumbent will be appointed as candidate #1, but if the incumbent is a male then the female gets the second spot if not the third.”

Despite the obscurity, it has now become public knowledge that parties are asking for some sort of dowry money (mahar) from legislative candidates. This contribution is to pay what is called a “witness fee”, where parties need to hire a witness for each of 809,500 polling stations spread throughout the country. If one witness is rewarded with an honorarium of IDR 100,000 (USD 7), parties need to fork out up to IDR 80 billion (USD 5.66 million). Hence, those who are interested in the top position are required to pay a significant contribution to the party. While the amount of money is different for each party, the PPP, for example, has set IDR 500 million (USD35,400) as the price tag for the top spot on the party ticket (BBC News Indonesia, 2018; Firmanto, 2018).

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*Witness fees have been the responsibility of parties, but recently, some parties through their legislators are urging the state to finance this expenses which has hit the amount of 3.9 trillion rupiah (USD 276.5 million), see: Liputan6.com (2018).
Stephen Sherlock rightly suggests favourable position on the party list on the ballot paper is “a commodity to be bought and sold in order to boost the party's election campaign coffers” (2012, p. 563). And thus, as can be expected, this “commercialisation of electoral politics” has resulted in a surge in the number of wealthy entrepreneurs who are running for parliament and hindered party cadres to occupy the top seat on ballot papers (Tomsa, 2010). Interestingly, Lena Maryana Mukti, an incumbent representing PPP, admitted that she did not object to the conditions of witness fee contributions imposed by her party. "I think that is the reality faced by all parties and legislative candidates, because they need their own witness, as the potential for fraud is just extraordinary. Witnesses are needed so that the votes are not stolen by other parties or other candidates," said Lena.

Most respondents in this study share similar observations with regard to rampant vote calculation fraud starting from the lowest to the highest level. This poor accountability and integrity of the officers in the field7 has become one of the most difficult challenges for legislative candidates as explained by a female lawmaker representing Golkar. “I experienced it in 2014. If you don’t have our own witness (to closely monitor the process), it is very likely that you will get sabotaged. I didn't sleep for days until I was certain that my votes would not get rigged.”

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7The Election Supervisory Agency or Bawaslu is formed based on the order of Law No. 22 of 2007 concerning election administration. Previously, Bawaslu was an ad-hoc institution, namely the Election Supervisory Committee or Panwaslu. Since 2003, Panwaslu has become independent from the structure of the General Election Commission or KPU. The main authority of Bawaslu is to oversee the implementation of the stages of the election. It is also responsible for accepting complaints and handling cases of administrative violations, election crimes, and upholding ethical codes.
Likewise, Ledia Hanifa Amaliah said, “I was approached by some men who claimed to be working for Panwaslu, and they were offering their ‘help’ in securing my votes up to the national level. In return, they were asking for a significant amount of money. Every time they came to me, I always rejected their proposal”. She further claims the PKS has its own supervisory system supported by cadres and collectively funded by legislators. As an incumbent, Ledia admits that she has been contributing regularly to her party for election and non-election purposes.

This trouble with electoral fraud is a serious threat to Indonesian democracy and more specifically to women’s political representation, as it impedes people’s interest in running for office. The component of hiring witnesses at the polling stations adds to the cost of the campaign which is already immensely expensive (Anung, 2013). If parties set an exorbitant price for running as candidate #1, whereby nearly 70% of those elected are sitting on the top of the list (Wardani, 2013), then it is fair to predict that only women with strong capital resources will dominate the race. These ever-increasing campaign costs are dampening both the public’s euphoria and women’s interest in participating as legislative candidates, and further discussion on this matter is explored in the following section.

3.7. Challenges of Getting Women into Parliament

Women’s interest in running for office (supply) and institutional requirements placed upon parties to nominate female candidates (demand) partly explain the electoral dynamics which result in gender disparity in parliament (Lovenduski,
This interactive process of supply and demand, even in the UK, is obscure, “a matter of largely unregulated internal party rules, informal processes and hidden power relationships” (Lovenduski, 2016, p. 518). Still, most interviewees in this study complain about the difficulty of attracting viable women who wish to run for office, some complaints are implicit while others are straightforwardly stated.

Golkar national campaign manager Andi Sinulingga argues, “… women are demanding a 30% quota, urging for affirmative action so that more women can participate in politics. But the reality we have is far from this. Women’s interest in running is just low and not as great as it should be to meet their demands for a minimum gender quota of 30 percent”. In his account, Golkar is encountering this obstacle persistently, “hence I would say those women who are demanding gender quotas are not truly representing women, because apparently women’s political participation is far lower than 30%. The party is continuously told to nominate female candidates, and yet it turns out viable and winnable women are very rare”.

A study observing the demographic characteristics of over 6000 legislative candidates who participated in the 2014 general elections suggests women, the young generation, and people from outer Java continue to be in the minority and poorly represented (Prihatini, 2019a). Female candidates’ electoral success is strongly associated with experience in political office, age, and list position on the ballot sheets. Kinship and political dynasty continue to be determining aspects in women’s political nomination, as almost half of the elected
women in the 2014 elections come from a political dynasty, where these women are married, or blood-related to male political leaders.

One female professional-turned-politician from Golkar concedes her decision to participate in politics was influenced by the level of support from the party leader. “I think it remains essential for parties to promote women’s interests by helping them in their first steps. For my first candidacy, I received financial support from the party of around IDR 50 million (USD 3,600). It was not much, but it helped me to print banners and stickers,” she said. A similar experience comes from a PKB lawmaker who argues her party reduces hesitation from the supply side, by offering financial support to women with a strong electability. “I wasn’t from a rich family, while campaign costs were notoriously expensive. So, I’ve sold my house and everything. Luckily, my party leader provided a soft loan so I can finance my campaign,” she explains.

These experiences from Golkar and PKB confirm that the party’s recruitment policies can greatly influence the level of women’s interest in running for parliament. Political parties play a crucial role in inviting potential women to become candidates, and this is what might create a big difference in the supply-demand explanation. As the key gatekeepers of elected positions (Kenny, 2013; Luhiste, 2015), parties are shaping the supply of women candidates as their gender regime molds candidate recruitment (Verge, 2015). In other words, the demand for a party to nominate women creates its own supply of aspirants.

However, by comparing women’s nomination since 2004, Lena Maryana Mukti from PPP asserts women’s interest in running for office is now at its lowest,
“Almost all parties had difficulties in recruiting candidates due to high-cost campaigns and elections. And the fact that women have limitations in accessing capital, this hinders them from pursuing a political career”. Reni Marlinawati echoed this view by asserting that “people are very aware about how rampant money politics practices were in the previous elections, that MPs were being arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK), one of which was related to regional election funds. I think all of these are deterring women from running for office”.

PKB senior politician Ida Fauziyah who once chaired the Women’s Caucus at the House of Representatives (DPR) suggests both men and women are facing similar challenges, but the most serious obstacle is what she calls “voters’ pragmatism”. As men, in general, have a better access to capital, voters’ pragmatism becomes a huge stumbling block for women. The voters’ demand for patronage and the damaging impacts are vividly discussed in various studies (Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015; Shin, 2015). The deterrence effect of exploding campaign costs, which often leads to corruption, is obvious and should no longer be ignored (Sundström & Wångnerud, 2016). While the supply and demand explanation is helpful in explaining women's political nomination in Indonesia, political integrity issues (including electoral counting fraud and the expensive campaign costs) are also pivotal in explicating the dynamics for candidates' recruitment.
3.8. Conclusions

The findings of this study clearly show that all parties, regardless of their ideology, in Indonesia have responded to the provision of gender quotas by compliantly fulfilling the provisions of the female nomination of at least 30 percent. Thus, the trend of women’s nomination for legislative elections since 2004 has increased to an average of 40% by 2019. In the last elections, PPP’s gender ratio in parliament grew five-fold compared to the results in 2004. On the contrary, another Islamist party PKS has been displaying a rather poor performance in promoting gender equality, having only one woman elected to the DPR.

This study has demonstrated that Islam, as a party’s ideology, is not more gender inequitable (Seguino, 2011) as Islamist parties tend to nominate more women compared to pluralist ones. One possible explanation for this phenomena is that gender quotas, designed through electoral laws and regulations, have been embedded and have become a necessity for parties to compete. However, parties’ insincerity towards women’s political advancement can be seen from the list position where men continue to dominate the prime spots and run as candidate #1 or #2. Being nominated as candidate #1 or #2 is crucial for women’s electability, because nearly 70% of elected MPs are from this list position. Ignoring the importance of list position will undermine the effectiveness of gender quotas.

Furthermore, while women's nomination by parties is not strongly influenced by a party’s religious ideology, their success in the polling stations is more likely affected by the overall party's performance in garnering electoral
support. Women running for PPP and PKS had a rather low electability and this result is in line with the general failure suffered by political Islam as Islamic piety and symbols are no longer the monopoly of Islamist parties. The fact that PKS nominates so many female candidates but gets few of them elected indicates the problem seems to be with the PKS electorate, and not so much with the party leadership.

Recruitment and selection processes are hidden from public scrutiny (Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2015; Dettman et al., 2017; Puspitasari, 2018; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). This “black box” of political nomination processes (Kenny & Verge, 2016) indicates female candidates being nominated might not have the qualities to win the race, yet gender quotas gave parties a hefty shove to nominate these women so they can participate in the election. Therefore, the increase of women’s share as candidates since the provision of gender quotas has not been reflected in more women being elected (Franceschet, Krook, & Piscopo, 2012; Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, & Zetterberg, 2019; Prihatini, 2019a).

Lastly, while the supply and demand explanation (Lovenduski, 2016; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995) is helpful in explaining women’s political nomination in Indonesia, political integrity issues (including electoral counting fraud and expensive campaign costs) are also pivotal in explicating the dynamics for candidates recruitment. This study highlights the urgency for Indonesia to mitigate the rampant corruption practices in electoral settings (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015) as these issues have become a real threat to the democracy, and more specifically to women’s political representation (Bjarnegård, Yoon, & Zetterberg, 2018).
Some caveats to this study needs to be acknowledged. One of the limitations is that the study is heavily reliant on admissions from party elites. Future research should consider analysing parties’ written documents, witnessing nomination meetings or discussions within the party, and interviewing candidates who have participated in the election but lost in their bids. Despite its limitations, this study helps us to understand how Islamist and pluralist parties are promoting gender equality in Asian settings. And more research is needed to observe how Islamist parties in other Muslim countries are responding to gender quota or similar institutional approaches which aim for better women’s participation in politics.
CHAPTER 4: WOMEN WHO WIN

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4.1. Abstract

Indonesian women make up more than half of the national population, yet their representation in the national parliament has been unsteady and low. This condition continues despite a series of electoral reforms, including the implementation of gender quotas and open-list proportional representation systems. By observing the demographic characteristics of over 6000 legislative candidates who participated in the 2014 general elections, this paper highlights how three groups, namely women, young people, and the outer-Java population, are heavily under-represented from the nomination stage. Furthermore, the elected female lawmakers still do not represent the vast majority of women in Indonesia, especially the different socio-economic classes and political kinships. The findings derived from a multi-level approach suggest women’s electability continues to be strongly associated with experience in political office, age, and list position on the ballot sheets. The trend shows younger women running as candidate #1 have a stronger viability in getting elected. The chance is also higher for those with existing political careers. The effects of socio-economic development on women’s electability, however, offer no clear connection.
4.2. Keywords
Women, Indonesia, parliament, incumbency, list position.

4.3. Introduction
Parliament is designed to represent all members of the society, yet, women continue to be poorly represented in almost every country in the world, including Indonesia. Women’s share in Indonesia’s national legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) has been unsteady and low, although they make up more than half of the population. The most recent legislative elections in 2014 witnessed only 97 out of 2467 female candidates being elected (3.93%), making women’s share in the DPR one percent lower than in the previous period which was standing at 18.03% (KPU, 2014). Interestingly, these developments occur amidst a stronger push for the implementation of legislated candidate gender quotas (Hillman, 2017a; Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014). Thus, it begs a question about why only a few women are successful in this political race. Some suggest the explanation lies in the political party’s role to be genuinely responsible for nominating electable female candidates (Maharddhika, 2017; Soetjipto & Adelina, 2012). Others argue the high cost of running a campaign is a major obstacle for women to participate in national politics (Nugroho, 2016; Rhoads, 2012).

While numerous studies are available on women’s representation in the Indonesian national parliament (Bylesjo & Seda, 2006; Davies & Idrus, 2011; Fattore et al., 2010; Hillman, 2017a; Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014; Siregar, 2006) and the impact of list position in electing women (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012), far less
research has systematically examined the demographic of candidates and the odds ratio of winning an election based on candidates’ internal and external factors. By analysing the dataset from the 2014 elections, the present paper contributes to the conversation of women’s parliamentary representation in Indonesia in two ways. Firstly, the analysis suggests the DPR is far from representing Indonesian population diversity, especially women, young cohorts, and people in outer Java. Secondly, it provides a logistic regression analysis of the determinants of women’s electoral success in the 2014 elections. The results show that age, professional background, and list position significantly affect how female candidates fare at the polling stations. The evidence presented here suggests that, contrary to assumptions made in existing literature, voters’ socio-economic status has no correlation with electing women deputies.

This discussion of electing women to Indonesian parliament proceeds in four steps. The first section outlines the literature surrounding aspects which influence electoral outcomes: voters’ socio-economic status, institutional settings such as district magnitude and turnout, and candidates’ internal characteristics (i.e. incumbency and age). The second part focuses on the data and methods: descriptive and binary logistic regression analyses. The third highlights the distribution of candidates and elected MPs compared to the national population to measure the representativeness of the national parliament. It also discusses the odds ratio of female candidates in winning an election by looking at the impact of candidates’ internal and external factors. The final section draws conclusions from the case of electing female deputies in the world’s third largest democracy.
4.4. Literature Review

Women's political representation in Indonesia has been steady and meagre, since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998 (see Table 7). As a means to improving women’s parliamentary representation, quotas have become a part of the Indonesian electoral landscape, succeeding an international trend where rapid growth took place in the vast majority of democracies (Dahlerup, 2006b; Rosen, 2017). The government passed a bill in 2003 which requires parties to nominate at least 30% female candidates (W. Siregar, 2005). This intervention had some level of success, as the highest gender ratio took place in 2009 with 102 out of 560 elected MPs being women. However, in the 2014 elections, despite stronger regulations in gender quotas and an increase in the number of female candidates, the result was a slight decrease (Hillman, 2017b). These patterns are common in the quota literature, which points to the importance of quota design, implementation and enforcement in ensuring representative outcomes (Dahlerup, 2006a; Kenny & Verge, 2016; Krook, 2009b).

Table 7. Women’s share in Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR-RI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's share in DPR-RI</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>17.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To explain these dynamics of electing women into parliament, the current paper explores women’s electoral success from the nomination stage to the election results. A growing body of research suggests female candidates’
performance at the polling stations depends on voters’ socio-economic status, institutional aspects, and candidates’ internal and external factors. The following section provides elaboration on each of these variables.

4.4.1. Voters’ Socio-economic Status

Socio-economic factors are often suggested as stimulating the supply of highly qualified women for political positions as economic development brings about a decline in traditional values as well as fertility rates (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Paxton, 1997) and enables women to attain higher education and to participate in the workforce (Togeby, 1994). In their seminal book *Rising tide*, Inglehart and Norris (2003a) argue countries with different levels of societal modernisation show contrasting egalitarian levels, in particular when looking at male and female roles in politics. Agrarian nations are considered as the most traditional and sex roles are deeply divided. In contrast, post-industrial societies are the most egalitarian in their beliefs about the roles of men and women, thus accepting women as much as they accept men being political leaders.

Modernisation, a transition process from an agrarian to a post-industrial society, should lead to a higher representation of women in elected positions (Inglehart et al., 2002). Economic development, as Rosen (2013) argues, should foster the election of women in two ways. First there is supply of competent female candidates to be chosen for elected office. For example, in highly educated geographical units, women are professionally active in two pools from which candidates and elected representatives are chosen: lawyers and teachers (Hill,
In addition, with higher development there should also be higher demand for the inclusion of women in positions of power. In particular, women who take on important professional and associational positions also strive for political representation.

Jayweera (1997) argues that economic development and improved women's status has little impact when it comes to gender equality in Asia. This argument received support as, in Indonesia, women's share in decision making process (i.e. parliament) remains a stumbling block for equal representation despite a significant increase in GDP per capita (World Bank, 2018) and that gender inequality has declined in primary school enrolment and labor participation (World Economic Forum, 2017). This paper aims to test the connection between voters' socio-economic status and electing women into parliament. Do regions with higher class status tend to vote more women than poorer areas? Independent variables for this aspect include consumption per capita per month, poverty rate, life expectancy, years of schooling, and Human Development Index (HDI).

4.4.2. District Magnitudes

The literature on political institutional variables (i.e. closed lists, district magnitude, gender quotas, and placement mandates) are widely thought to facilitate the election of women in list PR systems (Schmidt, 2009). Studies suggest countries with party-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems (Ballington, 1998; Luhiste, 2015; M. Tremblay, 2005) and gender quotas have a significantly higher proportion of women in parliament (Dahlerup &
Gender quotas in Indonesia were first introduced in Indonesia with Law No. 31 of 2002 on Political Parties. It encourages parties to have at least 30 percent of a party’s board being women. The Indonesian Election Commission’s (KPU) Regulation No. 7/2013 and Law No. 8/2012 on General Elections stated parties must nominate candidates with at least 30 percent being female using the zipper system (one female in each three nominees) or be disqualified to run. However, gender quotas, clearly, has yet delivered expected outcomes as the increase in the number of female candidates is accompanied by a decline in women’s electoral performance (Górecki & Kukołowicz, 2014).

Scholars also suggest with larger district magnitudes than other systems (Norris, 2004a) women are more likely to win. Once listed as candidates, women’s position in the ballot structure is critical as under the open-list system their chances of winning is subject to their number on the aspirants’ list (Paxton et al., 2007). The number of seats per district, also known as district magnitudes, under PR systems encourage the nomination and election of more female candidates (Kostadinova, 2007; Matland, 1998). This positive effect is taking place in Singapore, where multi-member seats have facilitated the inclusion of not only minority ethnic groups, but also women (Tan, 2014).

Indonesia had 77 electoral districts for the 2014 legislative elections. The number of seats assigned to a district, ranging from three to 10, is determined by population. A study by Choi (2010) suggests from 1999 to 2009 Indonesia’s electoral reform reduced district magnitude. According to the institutional literature on party systems, when district magnitude decreases, the seat-winning
threshold increases, thus supposedly creating a smaller number of political parties per district. Yet, the effective number of political parties in Indonesia increased overtime. This paper observes the impact of different district magnitudes on women’s political nomination; whether women are more likely to be elected in electorates with more seats. In addition to that, this paper also looks into the correlation between turnout (in percentage) and women’s electability. Is higher turnout translated into more women being elected as deputies?

4.4.3. Candidates’ Internal Characteristics

Recruitment to legislative office is one of the core functions of political systems, yet the selection of candidates often takes place far away from public scrutiny (Lundell, 2004; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). In their book *Candidate selection in comparative perspective*, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) suggest the quality of candidates selected determines the quality the deputies elected and sometimes also of a country’s politics. Candidates’ nomination reflect political parties’ priorities and strategies in winning legislative elections, thus, it is important to observe who are being nominated and where they are listed on the party tickets.

Literature on political elites has long examined social backgrounds, paths to power, and political ambition among representatives (Schwindt-Bayer, 2011), yet very little of it focuses on developing countries, especially Asia (Joshi & Och, 2014). In this study, candidates’ internal characteristics being observed include incumbency, age, professional background, education, marital status, and province of residence. An incumbency advantage seems widespread in legislative elections, where parties nominate more women in district with
incumbent females and female candidates perform better at the presence of an incumbent female (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). Another study on Indonesia asserts incumbency offers a consistent advantage to candidates for legislative elections, male and female, as incumbents are better positioned to distribute resources to build up their network (Dettman et al., 2017).

In many countries elected MPs are dominated by rather wealthy and educated middle-aged to senior men of the dominant ethnicity. According to Norris (1997, p. 6), “legislatures world-wide include more of the affluent than the less well-off, more men than women, more middle-aged than young, and more white-collar professionals than blue-collar workers”. An experimental study on Indonesia suggests young voters share a similar preference with older groups when it comes to electing female deputies (Prihatini, 2018a). Aside from the lack of women, representation of age groups in national parliaments also raises an issue. Stockemer and Sundstrom (2018) argue political institutions matter and giving candidates the right to stand in elections as early as possible (i.e. at the age of 18) will increase the percentage of young deputies elected. To check the conformity of this body of literature with the Indonesian context, this paper examines whether candidates’ characteristics explain overall and female candidates’ electoral success.

4.5. Data and Methods

In order to investigate the impact of candidates’ internal and external factors on the success of female legislative aspirants, the study examines the 2014 general elections using data gathered from Indonesia’s Electoral
Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU) and previous observation which looked at the relationship between incumbency and list position (Dettman et al., 2017).

For a descriptive analysis on the distribution of age, religion, marital status, education attainment, province of residence, and professional background among the 2014 legislative elections candidates by gender compared with the national population, the source of the data is Badan Pusat Statistik/Statistics Indonesia National Population Census (2010). The current study is using: (1) simple descriptive statistics analysis to map out the demographic features of candidates and elected MPs compared with the national population, and (2) binary logistic regression to test the odds ratio of certain factors in determining overall and female candidates’ electability.

4.5.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable here is election outcomes. Specifically, for the logistic analysis, this paper applied a dichotomous variable that indicates if the female candidate won the election (“1” for elected and “0” for not elected).

4.5.2. Independent Variables

Independent variables of interest in this paper can be grouped into two aspects: voters’ socio-economic status in each electoral district and candidates’ internal characteristics. The first group includes monthly consumption per capita, poverty rate, life expectancy, Human Development Index (HMI), years of
schooling, and the proportion of Muslim population. Data for this cluster of variables are as of 2010 collected at municipality (Kabupaten) level and acquired from the National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/BAPPENAS) (2015) database which is available online. Thus, the author equally weighted each variable by distributing the values according to the population at an electoral district level. This method enables the analysis to be conducted at the electorates’ level where candidates were competing in getting most votes.

As mentioned earlier, the process of modernisation drives cultural change that encourages the rise of women in public life (Inglehart et al., 2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). In other words, it is expected that female candidates will be more likely to gain sufficient support in electorates where voters are more educated and economically wealthier. Furthermore, in their seminal book, Inglehart and Norris (2003a) suggest ideological barriers, especially Islam, deters women from being successful in their political nomination. Therefore, it is expected that women should win more seats in non-Muslim dominated electorates such as Bali and Papua.

The second group of independent variables deals with candidates’ internal characteristics which include age, incumbency status, list position in the ballot sheets, and professional background. A study by Shair-Rosenfield (2012) suggests incumbency is a powerful predictor of the likelihood of female election in Indonesia. Others corroborate the findings by suggesting that incumbency offers a consistent advantage to both male and female legislative candidates (Dettman et al., 2017). In short, those women who are elected are very likely to
have had the experience of sitting as lawmakers. Thus, it is expected that women are more likely to win if they are older, as they have gained experience in terms of representing their constituents. Lastly, as a growing body of research puts forward the importance of ballot position where candidates first on the list get a more positive evaluation and as a consequence more votes (Lutz, 2010; Miller & Krosnick, 1998), this study examines the impact of list position on women’s electoral success.

4.6. Findings and Discussions

The first stage of the examination is uses a simple descriptive analysis looking at the distribution of various aspects among the 2014 legislative elections candidates. The data is divided by gender, comparing the observed groups (whole candidates and elected) with the national population. The second stage focuses on analysing the likelihood of a female candidate in being elected based on external factors—in this case voters’ socio-economic status—and internal factors which include age, education attainment, list position, and career backgrounds. The analysis was run using the IBM SPSS Statistics Version 25 software and the raw data is available in the e-supplementary section.

4.6.1. Descriptive Analysis

In line with previous research (Davies & Idrus, 2011; Fattore et al., 2010), the descriptive analysis results suggest that some groups are heavily under-represented in parliament: women, young people, and the outer-Java population.
This under-representation is taking place from the nomination stage, with only 37.34% of candidates being women, 5.06% of candidates being aged between 20-29 years old, and 26.96% of candidates being listed as living outside Java. The election results demonstrate wider gaps exist where women win only 17.32% of seats, the young adults group is represented by less than 2%, and more than 75% of MPs reside in Java. Those who are aged around 40-49 and 50-59 years old are the two extremely over-represented citizens, as their share in the parliament is more than three times higher compared to the actual populace.

The next important finding from this analysis highlights the fact that the parliament represents Islam and Christian/Protestantism adherents by 5% lower and 3% higher than the national population respectively. The married group is also extremely over-represented with more than 32 points larger than the actual mass, leaving the single category with only 2% of representation, even though they make up nearly 32% of today’s total Indonesia population. Furthermore, nearly 90% of legislators are university graduates.

This finding is particularly interesting as the actual population holding a higher education degree in Indonesia is slightly over 5%. In other words, lawmakers are the elites in terms of education attainment, which hardly represents the commoners in the society. One explanation for this situation lies in the fact that a minimum standard to be eligible to run in a legislative election, according to the Legislative Elections Law No.8/2012, is graduation from senior high school.
Table 8. Candidates and elected MPs characteristics based on gender compared with national population. (Source: Dettman et al. (2017), Badan Pusat Statistik (2010), and author’s tabulation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>National population</th>
<th>Total candidates</th>
<th>Male MPs</th>
<th>Female MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>20-29 yo</td>
<td>17.34</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-39 yo</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>9.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>81.64</td>
<td>82.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>57.48</td>
<td>73.04</td>
<td>75.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From all of the features above, this paper argues that the majority of elected MPs in Indonesia are Muslim married men in their 40s to 60s, who graduated from university, and are living in Java. However, it is also important to note that women are better than men in terms of representing the younger population (Table 8). Around 4% of female MPs are in the 20-29 years old set and 24% of them fit in the 30-39 years old group. On the other hand, only 1.3% and 9% of male MPs are in the 20-29 and 30-39 years old cohort respectively.

In order to reduce this under-representation of certain groups in the population—women, young adults, and outer-Java residents—one strategy would be to improve the nomination from these streams. For example, as young adults—people ranging from 17 to 25 years old—comprise almost 30% of all eligible voters in the country, it is crucial to nominate more candidates belonging to these cohorts. If the number of candidates increased, the likelihood of under-30 candidates being elected might reach a new high.

However, it is also interesting to note that the 2017 Elections Law stipulates that legislative candidates need to be at least 21 years old, even though the right to vote is set at 17 years old. This gap continues to spark debates.
relating to political institutional barriers which limit youth (those who are below 30 years old) participating actively in national politics as lawmakers, not just voters (Fernandes, Muhtadi, Prihatini, & Ahmad, 2018).

Similarly, a strategy in overcoming regional representation inequality could be to ensure that only candidates who live in the electorates will get a party’s nomination. The relationship between candidates and their electorates is very important as part of democratic election goals is to ensure representatives are representing the society who vote for them. The fact that Java is significantly over-represented sheds some light on how the decentralisation process has failed to encourage local politicians to participate in national politics.

Figure 3. Career paths: Indonesia’s 2014 legislative elections candidates and elected MPs. (Source: (Dettman et al., 2017) and author’s tabulation)

In terms of occupational backgrounds, Fig. 1 displays the dominance of the private sector where more than half of the candidates belong to this group. The second largest is the education sector, which includes teachers and professors. Following that are bureaucrats and those who have experience in
sitting as members of parliament. A much lower share comes from those with experience working in NGOs, law firms, and mass media. One important note from the data is the fact that political cadres or at least those who identify their professional career tracks as party members, are extremely rare (1.8%).

This situation highlights how political parties are far from successful in building up membership and further nurturing cadres. More importantly, it re-emphasises a very weak relationship between running for an elective office and being affiliated to a party. This finding echoes how ineffective the parties actually are in terms of recruiting, training, selecting, and nominating candidates for elections as observed in a study by Haris (2005).

Thus it should not come as a surprise that when gender quota legislation is enforced, the most common complaint from parties is on how hard it is to find a qualified and electable woman to run (Fadil, 2013; Firdaus, 2013; Prihatini, 2018b). This paper argues that with a lack of genuine political training and regeneration in addition to low formal membership, political parties will continue to face difficulties in recruiting and nominating women into parliament.

4.6.2. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis

As the paper aims to predict factors which affect one's electoral success in the 2014 legislative elections, it begins by analysing the full set of data which consists of 6606 candidates (males and females) running for 560 seats distributed in 77 electoral districts nationwide. The second section will discuss the analysis predicting only female candidates’ electability.
4.6.2.1. All Candidates

Using binary logistic regression, the dependent variable has only two features, where candidates who were elected are coded as 1 and those who were not elected coded as 0 (see details in Appendix 4). This model explains roughly 33% of the variation in the outcome and correctly classifies the outcome for 92.4% of the cases. Table 9 provides the regression coefficient (B), the (Sig.) values p < 0.1 and p < 0.05 which indicate the accuracy of the model, and the all-important Odds Ratio (Exp (B)) for each variable category.

The model displays a highly significant overall effect of nomination aspects and career paths in predicting candidates’ electability. The B coefficients for all cases are significant except for gender, indicating that male and female candidates are equally likely to be elected. The Exp(B) column (the Odds Ratio) suggests that the incumbents are nearly 4.5 times more likely to be re-elected than those who have never sat as a member of the DPR before. The second biggest predictor, with a rather weaker accuracy (p<0.1), is a career path as a minister, where those with a previous appointment as a cabinet minister are 3.3 times more likely to win a seat in the national parliament. Subsequently, professional background as a legislator, which includes in the national DPR and Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD (Regional Representatives Council), and local assemblies in the country; provincial and municipality/city is important. Those who had gained experience as a sitting parliamentarian were 2.4 times (or 86.5%) more likely to win in the 2014 elections. Another positive odds ratio is from the variable of local government where people with years of experience
working at local agencies are 78% (or 2.2 times) more likely to be elected than those without this qualification.

Table 9. Logistic regression odds ratio (winning): all candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Logistic Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List position in the ballot sheet</td>
<td>-0.523</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.593**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (by 2014)</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.977**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>1.488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.429**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>.715**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.177**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>3.304*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.376**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; n = 6,606; Nagelkerke R Square .327; percentage correct 92.4.

On the other hand, a statistically significant negative coefficient score is predicted for bureaucrats, where candidates with this type of background are 33.5% less likely to win an election compared to those who do not subscribe to this particular group. Age is also an important factor as the probability of getting elected is lower for an older candidate. For an additional year in age, the odds of winning is lower by 2.4%.

Comparatively, the likelihood of being elected is also significantly reduced by 52.3% for lower positions on the ballot sheet. In other words, list position is a very strong predictor in winning elections, despite the fact that under the open-list PR system, any candidate could secure a victory. This finding provides support to the literature on the importance of the candidates’ name-order in general for both sexes (Dettman et al., 2017; Lutz, 2010; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012; van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016).
4.6.2.2. Female Candidates

To better understand the relationship between voter socio-economic status, female candidate characteristics, and women's electability, this section extends the analysis using binary logistic regression on two sets of independent variables; (1) voters’ social status (i.e. consumption, education), and (2) candidates' personal characteristics. The analysis results for the first variable’s group suggest that female electability is not clearly associated with voters’ socio-economic status.

Unlike Inglehart and Norris’ (2003a) proposition which asserts more women will be elected by voters with higher socio-economic class, this study argues voters’ traits have an insignificant impact on determining the number of women elected (see Appendix 5). It is also evident to suggest that Islam as an ideology is not a powerful explanatory factor in predicting women’s electoral success. The fact that some electorates (i.e. Bali) where the Muslim population is significantly low did not elect any female legislator indicates Islam is not a critical barrier to women's nomination. A study on female leaders in local politics even argues Islamic parties are playing a strong positive influence in helping women to gain voters’ support (Dewi, 2015).

Another important finding from the analysis is that district magnitude, or the number of seats in each electoral constituency, has no key effect on electing women deputies. The number of females elected in constituencies made up of only three seats, like Riau Islands and North Moluccas, are the same as constituencies with 10 seats, such as East Java 1 and West Java 2. Unlike a study
by Tan (2014) on Singapore, this paper maintains bigger district magnitude does not always facilitate the inclusion of women.

Meanwhile, the second model which includes candidate political quality and internal characteristics, such as career paths, list position in the ballot sheet, age, and incumbency, offers a more statistically significant explanation for women’s electoral success. The solution explains 31% of the variation in the outcome and correctly classifies for 96.1% of all cases (Table 10).

Table 10. Logistic regression odds ratio (winning): female candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Logistic Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List position in the ballot sheet</td>
<td>-0.635</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.530**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (by 2014)</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>.968**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>1.228</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>3.414**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.591</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>.554*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>0.825</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>2.282*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.189**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; n = 6,606; Nagelkerke R Square .308; percentage correct 96.1.

Similar to the full sample, this sub-population analysis of female candidates presents a strong significant overall effect of candidate name-order, age, and incumbency on electability (full report see Appendix 6). The odds ratio suggests that the incumbents are 3.4 times more likely to win a seat than those who never served as a national MP. This odds ratio is lower than the full population analysis, indicating women are not benefiting from the incumbency factor as much as men.

Looking further into the political backgrounds of the elected female MPs (Figure 4), only 34% are incumbent. This number is slightly higher than in the
previous election in 2009, which witnessed nearly 80% of elected women being newcomers (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). Also, almost half of the elected women in the 2014 elections come from a political dynasty, where these women are married, or blood-related to male political leaders. The connection with male political leaders is often perceived as a significant advantage for women running in elections (Pai, 2012), and in particular exhibits the country’s crisis of political oligarchy (Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014).

Figure 4. Elected female MPs: Incumbency and political kinship/political dynasty.

Women who have worked as lawmakers at any level of parliament are 3.2 times more likely to be elected compared to those with no experience in elective office. The ratio is nearly 0.8 higher than the whole sample analysis, suggesting more women are successful in furthering their political career from being a member of local parliaments (city/municipality and provincial) to becoming a member of the DPR. Similarly, women with local government experience are 2.3 times more likely to win an election compared to those without this career path. The ratio here is only 0.1 higher than in the previous analysis. This study lends support to the importance of certain career paths in predicting the nomination
results, as the most common route into a political career at the national level is experience built up at the local level (Murray, 2010; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011).

Furthermore, the finding stipulates women’s chance in winning is severely hurt by a low position on the party’s ticket. For every additional lower rank in the nomination list, the odds of winning is reduced by 63.5 percent. From the elected women sub-population, 47% were running as candidate number one, 22% as second on the list, and 15% were competing from the third position. Therefore, it is evident to argue that lower list position creates a bigger disadvantage for women than men. This finding corroborates previous studies by Shair-Rosenfield (2012) and Dettman et al. (2017) which highlight the significance of ballot position in affecting election results.

In Indonesia, the Election Law only regulates the composition of 30 percent of women in every three candidates. The desire to increase women’s representation in parliament is suggests having a 30 percent quota for women being nominated as candidate number one. Yet, this idea only receives strong support from female MPs, whilst being utterly unpopular among male parliamentarians (Prihatini, 2018b).

The next predictor is age, where each additional year makes the odds of winning 3.2% lower. Compared to the whole population, the impact of an additional year in age is stronger for women. Women lawmakers are younger than men, as the mean age among female MPs is 44.64 years old, while for males it is 49.72 years old. The following graphic shows the trend line between age and votes among elected female deputies. It suggests younger cohorts secured more
votes than older MPs, where three women under 45 years old received over 200,000 votes.

Figure 5. Elected female MPs in 2014 elections: age and votes.

Another important note from the findings is that female candidates with experience as teachers or university professors are 59.1% less likely to be elected than those without this qualification. With a lower accuracy (p < 0.1), it is interesting to note that this factor only exists in the female candidates group calculation. Therefore, the current study contends female electability is not benefiting from a career in the “talking professions”, which is often the common profession among female MPs in other countries like the UK (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995).
Coming back to the question of how representative the national parliament is. Figure 6 exhibits the distribution of the elected female MPs in terms of their residential status. Nearly 53% of them live in the capital city of Jakarta. Taking the context into a more general population as an island, 78.3% of female MPs are living in Java. This finding reaffirms how Indonesia’s national parliament is heavily Java-centric, as politicians tend to reside in a province which is central to power. As the result shows Jakartanians are the dominant actors representing electorates in outer Jakarta, one could argue that the DPR is far from representing the national population. This gap is troubling as elected legislators are not living in the electorates they are representing, thus constituents could find it rather difficult to contact their deputies in the parliament. More importantly, these gaps display how the DPR is weak in terms of diversity and inclusion than expected.

4.7. Conclusions

This research has important implications for women and politics in Indonesia. Focusing on a quantitative perspective, by looking at political nomination and
electoral success, this study has analytically assessed the demographic structures of candidates and elected MPs. The findings suggest the current Indonesian national parliament is far from representing all members of the society. Women, the young generation, and people from outer Java continue to be in the minority and poorly represented. Female candidates’ electoral success is strongly associated with experience in political office, age, and list position in the ballot sheets. Kinship and political dynasty continue to be determining aspects in women’s political nomination.

A couple of policy implications to improve women’s share in parliament can be derived from this study. One particular intervention would be by applying a gender quota of 30% nominating women as the leader on the party’s ticket. Despite strong criticism from male MPs, the opportunities are still open for the call to be realised. The second possible strategy is by electing more women at local legislatures, in a hope that they will gain sufficient support if they run at the national level. This part is important because political careers, or paths to power, play a crucial role in creating electoral trust among voters towards female candidates. Lastly, to ensure a better geographical representation, Electoral Laws might need to regulate how parties should put a priority on nominating local candidates rather than people from outside the electorates.

While providing some solid results, this study has limitations; ideally, the lack of data on nomination and electability over time since the end of Suharto’s New Order regime (1999 onwards). Unfortunately, historical data is not available for all years of legislative elections. Therefore, the study only covers the 2014 elections and compares the findings with the 2009 elections where
relevant. Future research should expand the discussion by explaining the ways in which female candidates are being nominated by different parties, using a more qualitative perspective. More study is also needed into explaining the effects of dynastic ties on female representation in the Indonesian national parliament. How exactly do these links to powerful families increase the chances of women being elected? Could comparative analysis looking at the local and the national parliaments offer some explanations as to how local parliaments are serving as springboards for the national parliament? Do women experience different levels of difficulty in entering local parliaments compared to parliaments of bigger magnitude such as national legislative elections? Nevertheless, this study is a step forward in predicting women’s electability in a democratising society such as Indonesia.
CHAPTER 5: COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

This paper has been submitted and currently under review with the journal of Parliamentary Affairs (per 23 February 2019). The title of the paper is:

Explaining Gender Gaps in Indonesian Legislative Committees

5.1. Abstract

Parliamentary committees are central in most modern legislatures in the world as key decisions are often made at this level. Consequently, women’s substantial representation in parliament is frequently measured by the appointment of women in powerful and prestigious committees. However, there is relatively little knowledge about how the politics of committee assignment operates, especially in Asian democracies, home to the majority of the world’s women. In this article, the Indonesian case is used to explore two issues, which are the gendered division of committees and the impact of Islam as a party ideology in assigning women into committees. Using a quantitative approach, this paper examines a unique dataset of committee assignments in Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR) from 2004 to 2014. Interviews with sitting parliamentarians are also used to complement the statistical analysis. The results show that gender bias is an enduring characteristic of Post-Suharto parliamentary politics and Islam as a party ideology is not solely accountable for this disparity in committee allocations.
5.2. Keywords
Committee assignment, women, Indonesia, Asia, party ideology.

5.2. Introduction

Women’s representation in national legislatures is as high as it has ever been with the world average sitting at 24.1% as of 1 December 2018 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018). The development of literature on women’s parliamentary participation has achieved significant growth over the years (O’Brien & Piscopo, 2018). However, studies on the committee allocations and gender gaps within committees remain in their infancy (Murray & Sénac, 2018). Prior studies available on committee assignments are dominated by the Western context (Hansen, 2010; Mickler, 2018; Pansardi & Vercesi, 2017), with far less research has systematically studied the patterns in Asian parliaments (Joshi & Goehrung, 2018; Yoon & Osawa, 2017).

Combining the insights of quantitative and qualitative analysis, this current paper use Indonesia as a case study. It is important to observe the dynamics in the Indonesian Lower House (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) as Indonesia is home to the world’s biggest Muslim population and its democracy is still at a transitional stage (Sherlock, 2010). In the last two decades, following the general trend in many countries and the provision of legislated gender quotas, women’s share in the DPR has increased, moving from 11.4% in 1999 to 17.32% in 2014 (Prihatini, 2018a).

This study argues female MPs are over-represented in “feminine” and low prestige committees (see: Krook and O’Brien, 2010) for committees
classification), indicating gender bias continues to shape the characteristics of Post-Suharto parliamentary politics. Based on the information obtained from respondents, this allocation is not always due to discrimination or marginalisation (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, & Taylor-Robinson, 2005). Instead, feminine and low prestige committees are often more favourable among lawmakers who are eyeing re-election. One possible explanation for this strategy is similar to Aspinall’s (2014) assertion about parliament and patronage. Feminine and low prestige committees often have more direct effect on people’s welfare, hence being in these committees enables MPs to provide stronger patronage to their constituents.

Furthermore, the results suggest a party’s ideology is less useful in explaining the patterns of women’s committee assignments, as the composition of committees in secular parties resembles that of Islamist parties. Thus parties identifying Islamic values as their campaign materials may still allocate a significant number of women to masculine committees, and in multiple occasions they too appoint female deputies as faction or committee leaders.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. The first part reviews the literature on gender in legislative committees. The second section locates the research context which is the DPR in the last three consecutive periods; 2004, 2009, and 2014. Two research hypotheses are elaborated in the following part; gendered division of committee and party ideology. Next is data and methods, followed by a discussion of the findings. Finally, this paper provides key conclusions and directions for future research in understanding gender in Indonesian legislative committees.
5.3. Literature Review

Parliamentary committees are established for various reasons, with some of the most important purposes tend to reflect key institutional tasks, such as lawmaking, budgeting, and administrative oversight (Mattson & Strøm, 1995). Committee assignments are vital for the parties as they wish to maintain substantial power over numerous issues formulated at this level, while on the other hand, members want committee assignments that allow them to deliver benefits to their constituency which will further facilitates their reelection (Riera & Cantu, 2018).

Cases of gender gaps in committee allocations are well-documented in the United States (Bolzendahl, 2014; Frisch & Kelly, 2003), Europe (Baekgaard & Kjaer, 2012; Hansen, 2010; Mickler, 2018; Pansardi & Vercesi, 2017) and Latin America (Funk, Morales, & Taylor-Robinson, 2017; Heath et al., 2005; Kerevel & Atkeson, 2013). Research on the Asian context, however, is still in its infancy (Joshi & Goehrung, 2018; Yoon & Osawa, 2017).

The growing body of literature on gender in legislative committees suggests women are much more likely to be placed on feminine and less prestigious committees (Bolzendahl, 2014; Franceschet, 2011; Pansardi & Vercesi, 2017), and only a small percentage of women serve in leadership roles (Heath et al., 2005). These disparities are occurring partly because some committees are considered more valuable, more prestigious and more powerful than others (Hansen, 2010; Kerevel & Atkeson, 2013). And thus as committees and ministerial portfolios are connected in most modern parliaments, scholars have been measuring committees based on the level of prestige/power and the
Committees that deal with the budget, foreign affairs and defence are considered as important and often associated with men's interests and strengths (Franceschet, 2011). Meanwhile committees associated with women include social affairs, education, culture and equality issues (Baekgaard & Kjaer, 2012; Krook & O'Brien, 2012). Bolzendahl (2018) contends a reliance on gender stereotypes enable internal mechanisms that “push” women to be invested in committees that oversee health care, education and family issues.

However, this salience of gender and the use of gendered frames by parties in allocating MPs can sometimes be a reflection of personal preferences. Based on national surveys of state legislators in the United States, Carroll (2008) finds female state legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to seek and obtain positions on committees dealing with education, health and human services. Also, in the case of Danish councillors, men and women sit on different committees largely because they prefer different committees, where men are more concentrated in technical and women are more concentrated in areas to do with children (Baekgaard & Kjaer, 2012).

Aside from MPs’ personal preferences, committee assignments might also be influenced by party ideology (Childs & Krook, 2009) in promoting women's political representation, suggesting that left-wing parties are more likely to appoint women into masculine and prestigious committees compared to conservative parties (Santana & Aguilar, 2018). Further as an ideology, religion
often shapes cultural norms and gendered behaviours which continue to corroborate gender inequality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a).

5.4. Case Study: Indonesia's National Assembly

The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 has opened a new era of democracy, known as Reformasi, in which all political leaders/representatives are being freely and directly elected by their constituents. Since 2004, the Indonesian legislature has been characterised by a Lower House, the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), and an advisory party-less body, the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) (Sherlock, 2005). In 2014, the DPR was composed of 560 Members, 97 of whom were women. These MPs are represented 77 multi-member constituencies ranging from three to 10 seats in each electorate. On the other hand, the DPD is said to be an assembly for the regions because its constituencies are the provinces and because its Members are elected as individual non-party candidates. The voting system is by single non-transferable vote (SNTV), which means that the candidates with the four highest numbers of votes are elected to represent the province. The amended 1945 Constitution gives the power to make laws and to oversee the executive government to the DPR (Juwono & Eckardt, 2008; Schneier, 2008). Meanwhile, the DPD’s role in law-making is limited to certain areas of policy and no Bill is actually required to pass through it in order to be passed, making DPD hardly influential (Rich, 2011). Therefore, this article focuses on the committees in the DPR.
During the 32 years of Suharto’s administration, the DPR was nothing more than a rubber stamp, a place to reward loyal supporters and buy off potential critics (Sherlock, 2012). Thus, parliament’s role in drafting and reviewing legislation or in scrutinising executive policy decisions was minimal or non-existent. The number of committees\(^8\) in the DPR has been growing from nine in 1999 to 11 since 2004, and each consist of 35—55 members. Schneier (2008, p. 203) notes the size of committee is “balancing party ratios roughly in proportion to those of the plenary and allocating chairmanships through negotiations among the leaders of the dominant parties”. A study published by the Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry/\(KPP-PA\) and Indonesian elections watchdog Association for Elections and Democracy/\(Perludem\) (2017) suggests little is known about how parties are allocating deputies onto committees, aside from the assignment being determined centrally by the party elites.

In his observation on the 2014 elections, Edward Aspinall argues open-lists provide legislators with an incentive to develop a personal vote which shifts their attention away from nationally important but electorally unrewarding tasks of policy development. “Some of those who survived now express a desire to abandon DPR commissions that offer no means of providing patronage to constituents (the foreign-relations commission, for example) in order to join others (such as infrastructure and agriculture) that do” (2014, pp. 108–109).

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\(^8\)Some scholars use “Commission” as a more direct and literal translation from the original wording in Bahasa Indonesia “Komisi”, yet the author has used the other common translation “Committee” as a widely-used term in the literature of gender and politics.
Table 11. Women's parliamentary representation in Indonesia, 1955-2014.
(Source: KPU (2014)

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s share (%)</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>17.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The literature on Indonesia’s parliament suggests women’s share has been unsteady and meagre with less than 20% despite the provision of legislated gender quotas since 2004 (Hillman, 2017b). Table 11 displays the growth of women’s parliamentary representation in the DPR since the country’s first general election held in 1955 up to the most current in 2014. The Indonesian experience resonates numerous democracies in the world with regards to the improvement of women’s participation as lawmakers. Yet, the pace has been slow compared to neighbouring Asian countries (Prihatini, 2018c). Scholars argue women’s electability has been severely affected by low list position on party tickets (Prihatini, 2019a), lack of experience in political career (Dettman et al., 2017), and money politics practices (Rhoads, 2012). The latter aspect has been one of the biggest stumbling block in achieving electoral integrity and democratisation, as politics in Indonesia nowadays is “... driven increasingly by the logic of money politics” (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 258) and the power of oligarchs in Indonesia is especially dominant and distorting in multiple cases (Winters, 2013).

5.5. Research Hypotheses

Indonesia’s performance in the UNDP Gender Inequality Index is ranked 104 with a score of 0.453 (the lower the score the more gender equal is the society),
depicting strong gender disparities (UNDP, 2017). Gender inequalities manifest themselves in the labour market as women, on average, are paid 42% less than men, even when differences in education levels are taken into consideration (Cameron, Suarez, & Rowell, 2018). Over the past 25 years, female labour force participation has been stagnant, with a participation rate of 51%. Also the proportion of women in the population with some secondary education is 10% lower than men. Samarakoon and Parinduri (2015, p. 439) suggest while education reduces Indonesian women’s fertility, increases contraceptive use, and promotes reproductive health practices, “there is no evidence that education improves women’s decision-making authority (except on savings), women’s assets ownership (except that of household appliances and jewellery), or community participation (except visiting the community weighing post)”. They conclude education may be insufficient to change deeply-rooted societal attitudes especially in transforming the gender relations in political and economical spheres.

Scholars have found that social attitudes towards women affect both the supply and the demand sides of women’s political participation (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). On the supply side, certain social attitudes might restrain women’s decisions to run for office, while on the demand side, they may have an effect on voters’ support for female politicians (Lovenduski, 2016). Similarly, Valdini (2012) reports that cultural gender norms that suggest women are best in traditional roles, not as leaders, will have a negative effect on the nomination of women candidates.
5.5.1. The Division of Committee

Research suggest women are concentrated in “soft” committees, dealing with domestic and social issues, while men dominate “hard” committees, such as economics and foreign affairs (Baekgaard & Kjaer, 2012; Heath et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Bolzendahl (2014) suggests this distribution of committee membership (and leadership) does not only represent gender division of labour but simultaneously creates them. As committees provide resources that help representatives win re-election, scholars argue that marginalising women on social issues committees appears to be a strategy used by male politicians to hoard scarce political resources (Heath et al., 2005; Riera & Cantu, 2018). In Indonesia, where socio-economic gender inequalities are striking, one may expect that political parties would allocate female deputies in a way that reflects traditional gender differences. This expectation brings us to the first hypothesis:

H1: Women legislators are more likely to be assigned to “feminine” and less prestigious committees in the DPR.

5.5.2. Party Ideology: Islam

Previous studies indicate the importance of party ideology in promoting women’s political representation, suggesting that the left-wing parties are generally considered as more concerned with issues like equality than the conservative ones (Santana & Aguilar, 2018). However, Mietzner (2008) and Aspinall et al. (2018) have demonstrated that such a dichotomy is not applicable in Indonesia as parties share a common desire to distribute power, rather than to fight over it. Instead, as Mujani and Liddle (2009) assert, parties can be distinguished by how
they view the role of Islam in public and political life. Religions are shaping cultural norms, social rules and behaviours which later result in the rigidity of gender roles and attitudes (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a). Islam, in particular, has been identified as significantly more patriarchal than other dominant religions on such measures (Seguino, 2011). This leads to the second hypothesis:

**H2:** Islamist or Islamic social organisation-based parties are less likely to designate female MPs to “masculine” and high prestigious committees compared to secular parties.

5.6. Data and Methods

The author created a unique data set to test the effects of gender on committee allocations in the DPR during Reformasi. To provide a complete and consistent observation, this paper only includes seven major parties that have participated in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections and are going to run in the 2019 elections; PPP, PKS, PKB, PAN, Golkar, PDI-P, and PD. Following the party classification provided by previous studies (see Mujani & Liddle (2009) and Aspinall et al. (2018)), this paper agglomerates seven parliamentary parties into three groups; (1) Islamist parties group which consists of PPP and PKS, (2) PKB and PAN as parties based on Islamic social organisations, and (3) pluralist parties which include Golkar, PDI-P, and PD.

All data are supplied by the Secretariat of DPR-RI, and for the latest sitting arrangements of the 2014-2019 parliament, the author employs the information
available on the DPR’s official website (www.dpr.go.id). Further this study complements the quantitative analysis with interviews with 10 Indonesian deputies, conducted in 2016 and 2018, using a snowballing technique. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, this paper provides only their sex and Islamist-secular party ideology.

5.7. Findings and Discussions

To test the above-mentioned hypotheses, this paper distinguishes committees in the DPR as masculine-neutral-feminine committees and as high-medium-low prestige committees adopting Krook and O'Brien’s (2012) categorisation of cabinet ministers by policy area (see Table 12). This choice is supported by the fact that Indonesian committees are mirrors of ministerial areas. The “gender” of a committee is defined on the basis of the traditional and symbolic association of its field of competence to one gender or the other, while the “prestige” of a committee is defined on the basis of its access to financial resources and visibility (Krook & O'Brien, 2012).

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9The interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia and the author translated the data into English for coding and analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Scope of duties</th>
<th>Government department and/or state/government agencies</th>
<th>Gender type</th>
<th>Prestige type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Defense, Foreign and Information Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Indonesian National Military, State Minister for Communications and Information, National Defense Board (DKN), State Intelligence Agency (BIN), State Coding Institute (LEMSANEG), National Information Board (LIN), Antara National News Office, National Resilience Institute (LKN), Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI)</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Home Affairs, Regional Autonomy, Administrative Reforms and Agrarian Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs, State Minister for Administrative Reforms, State Secretary, Cabinet Secretary, State Administration Board (LAIY), State Civil Servant Agency (BKN), National Land Agency (BPN), National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (ANRI), General Elections Commission (KPU)</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Law and Legislation, Human Rights, and Security Affairs</td>
<td>The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Supreme Court, national Police of the Republic of Indonesia, Commission for the Eradication of Corruption (KPK), National Ombudsman Commission, National Law Commission, National Commission of Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM), Secretary General of Supreme Court, Secretary General of Constitution Court, Secretary General of People’s Consultative Assembly, Secretary General of Regional Representatives Council, Center for Financial Reporting and Transaction Analysis (PPATK), Agency for National Law Development (BPHN)</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Agricultural, Plantations, Forestry, Maritime, Fisheries,</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries,</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Communications, Telecommunications, Public Works, Public Housing Affairs, Acceleration of Development of Disadvantaged Regions</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Communications, State Minister for Public Housing, State Minister for Accelerated Development of Disadvantaged Regions, Meteorology and Geophysics Agency (EFJG)</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Trade, Industrial, Investment, Cooperatives and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises, and State-Owned Enterprises Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Trade, State Minister for Cooperatives and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises, State Minister for the Empowerment of State-owned Enterprises, Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), National Standardisation Board (BSN), National Consumer Protection Agency (BPKN), Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU)</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Energy, Mineral Resources, Research and Technology, Environmental Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, State Minister for the Environment, State Minister for Research and Technology, Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), National Research Board, Indonesian Academy of Science (LIPI), Nuclear Power Institute (BATAN), Nuclear Power Supervisory Agency (BAPETAW), National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL), National Aeronautics and Aerospace Institute (LAPAN), Supervisory Board for Oil and Gas Downstream Activities, Implementation Agency for Oil and Gas Upstream Activities Controlling</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Religious, Social, and Women's Empowerment Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs, State Minister for Women's Empowerment, Commission for Indonesian Children Protection (KPAI), Women National Commission</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Demography, Health, Manpower and Transmigration Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, National Family Planning Board</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Out of 11 committees in the DPR, three committees (VIII—X) fit into the feminine gender type as they are dealing with social and women’s affairs, health, education, tourism, and cultural issues. Meanwhile, the masculine and high prestige committees are those I—III and XI, overseeing defence, foreign affairs, regional autonomy, human rights, and finance. The only neutral gender type is committee VII which handles issues related to energy and environmental affairs.

5.7.1. The Gendered Division of Committee

Figure 7 displays the trend of how parties are allocated female MPs to committees in the DPR between 2004 and 2014. It is evident that women’s presence in feminine committees is strikingly strong. In 2004, almost one in every five female legislators was working in Committee VIII. A similar ratio occurred in 2009 and 2014 where women were densely engaged in Committee IX. Further assignment of women to Committee X has grown substantially in the last three periods.
On the other hand, women’s share in masculine committees is, in general, lower compared to the feminine group of committees. Aside from this common trend, it is interesting to note that women’s presence in Committee III that deals with law, human rights and security affairs, used to be significant in 2004, but it diminished over the next two consecutive terms. Conversely, more and more women are being assigned to Committee V which oversees the Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Communications, and State Minister of Public Housing. The graph also depicts a stagnation in terms of women’s share in the neutral gender commission that supervises the executives in energy, research and environmental affairs.

Figure 7. Distribution of female legislators by committee 2004-2014.

Data about women’s appointments to Indonesian parliamentary committees thus confirm the division of labour hypothesis: women have been assigned to feminine and low-prestige committees more than to masculine and high-prestige committees. These findings indicate parties in Indonesia are
applying gender norms as to how women should contribute in parliament, and that is by handling “soft” or feminine issues rather than legislating “hard” and masculine affairs (see Figure 8).

However, contrary to Heath and other’s (2005) assertion on how this gendered committee assignment is a strategy used by male politicians to control scarce political resources, it is in fact these feminine committees which are offering substantial incentives for lawmakers who wish to retain their seats. According to a female MP representing PKB, the feminine and low prestige committees provide ample opportunities for parliamentarians to do work visits to their constituencies and bring along with them material assistance, such as social assistance funds (Bantuan Sosial/Bansos) and programs for Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).

She uses an analogy for the two kinds of committees in the DPR; mata air (water springs) and air mata (tears). The earlier refers to committees with various programs which directly affect people’s welfare, such as health, education, manpower and tourism. While the latter are committees that have minimum direct interaction with the community, because their programs are in the nature of state governance and barely provide material assistance to the constituents.

Similarly, an interviewee from Golkar illustrates the compelling difference between working for a feminine committee and a masculine one. She concedes while sitting on the so-called low prestige committee, she has done 61 work visits in a year to oversee the implementation of various programs: “We are giving out different social security cards and get to meet the people more frequently.
Meanwhile, working in the so-called high prestige committee only gets you like what? 10 work visits in a year?”

“I am often being asked by my constituents, ‘Why don’t you bring us social assistance funds?’ I explain that my committee is not overseeing such programs. I am dealing with bureaucracy reform and elections, thus I can only promote and explain developments related to bureaucracy reform and electoral issues during my work visits,” said another respondent from PKB.

In this study, female MPs suggest that committee assignment is a matter of functionality. “We can see in the Committee IX, for example, there are lots of MPs who are also medical doctors. Parties put them there because it is perceived that someone with a medical degree would know better about how to deal with health issues, or family planning, etc.,” claims an interviewee who herself is a dentist.

Figure 8. Popularity of terms in the title of committees where women are most over-represented.
These accounts offer some support to Aspinall’s (2014) earlier findings which stipulate that some MPs are very keen to be in the feminine and low prestige committees, because it means they can provide patronage to their respective constituents. “At times, there was like 10 MPs who are asking the party to assign them to Committee IX, but of course we can only take three-four following the proportion of the party seats in the parliament. This is where track record and career path become very important, because the head of faction and party leader will decide which MPs should go to the desired committee based on their resumés,” said a respondent representing PPP.

The interviews provide substantial insights into another important question which is who makes the decision about committee allocation? Can MPs choose their committees by themselves or do the party elites do that for them? Informants in this article suggest the internal party mechanism, which consists of head of faction in the DPR and the party chairperson, are the two key decision makers. Deputies can ask for a certain committee that they prefer, but the final decision will be made by the party elites mentioned.

“We can support our request by providing a letter of recommendation from a relevant NGO, noting that we have been very attuned to the issues, hence we are ready to represent the party on that particular committee,” said a female legislator from Partai Demokrat (Democrats Party/PD). She further argues that, in general, parties are more interested in assigning MPs with appropriate knowledge to the committees. However, if a legislator is being sworn in as a substitute for another MP, this new lawmaker might not really have a sufficient track record in dealing with issues encountered in the respective committee.
5.7.2. Party Ideology

In the following table, women’s committee assignments by party from 2004 to 2014 show a couple of interesting findings. The first is related to how a well-established party which once dominated electoral politics during Suharto’s regime, Golkar, has always been assigning most female MPs to feminine committees (VIII, IX, and X). As a winning party in the 2004 elections, Golkar has the opportunity to allocate women to all committees in the DPR. But the fact that the party sent nearly half the female MPs to committees VIII and IX, while committees that oversee agricultural, forestry, and finance affairs had no female representation, indicates how gender norms are playing a substantial role in appointments.

Secondly, other parties fitting in the secular group display a slightly different pattern to Golkar. In 2004, PDI-P assigned nearly one-third of female MPs to a masculine committee (III) that deals with law reform, human rights and security affairs. This allocation of female deputies to Committee III set the highest record ever achieved, since other parties in any given term have allocated less than 12% women. Also in 2004, Partai Demokrat (Democrats Party/PD) appointed one-third of their female MPs to participate a masculine medium prestige committee (IV) which supervises agricultural, forestry and maritime matters. However, the overall data suggests that secular parties tend to allocate more women to feminine committees, with nearly half of them occupying committees VII, IX, and X.
Table 13. Women's committee assignments by party (in percentage).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>XI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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Note: The percentage for each party is obtained by dividing the number of women in each committee with the total of female deputies in the same party.

The findings indicate a party's ideology seems to be less useful in explaining the pattern of women’s committee assignments, as an Islamist party, PKS, resembles Golkar's composition. Hence, one could argue that despite having a profound difference in their views on the role of Islam in public lives and politics, it turns out both parties assume that women's best position in parliament is taking care of feminine rather than masculine issues. However, it is also important to note that the vast majority of female MPs from PPP (another Islamist party) were assigned to masculine committees. Further, the party has not sent any female representative to Committee VIII since 2004. Correspondingly,
Islamic social organisation-based parties (PKB and PAN) display a strong record of appointing female deputies to masculine committees like I, II, IV and V.

Female MPs are capable of developing their political career in masculine environment committees and becoming leaders in the parliament. For example, in the current sittings, four female politicians are serving as deputy chairs of Committee II, III, IX and X. They representing PKB, PD, PPP and Golkar, respectively. Earlier in this term, Meutya Hafid of Golkar served as deputy chair of Committee I. Ida Fauziyah of PKB and Reni Marlinawati of PPP are leading their parties’ faction in the House.

In 2009, Ida Fauziyah of PKB and Ribka Tjiptaning of PDI-P were the chairs of committees VIII and IX. Two female MPs from PD served as deputy chairs of committees IX and XI. Another PD female politician, Melanie Suherli, served as the House deputy speaker. Lastly in the 2004—2009 period, Ribka Tjiptaning of PDI-P was the chair of Committee IX, Khofifah Indar Parawansa of PKB chaired Committee VII and led the faction at the House (later replaced by Ida Fauziyah as faction leader). Also in 2004, Yoyoh Yusroh of PKS served as deputy chair of Committee VIII, along with Zul Hizwar of PBR (*Partai Bintang Reformasi*, Reform Star Party).

These trends indicate that Islam is not always synonymous with patriarchy as is often suggested in the literature of gender and politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2003a). And thus because the findings do not clearly distinguish the religious from the secular parties in terms of women's committee assignments, this paper argues that the party ideology hypothesis cannot be unquestionably confirmed. In fact, this opens a venue for future research in examining female
MPs’ backgrounds and its correlation with the type of committees they are being appointed to.

Figure 9. Percentage of women representing electorates in Java by committee.

To shed some light to as what kind of background these women are coming from, Figure 9 depicts the percentage of women representing electorates in Java. It is evident that feminine committees are consistently being dominated by female MPs from Java where the percentage of this group has always been higher than 50%. On the other hand, women MPs whose constituencies are in outer Java are more likely to be found in Committee V overseeing communications, public works and the acceleration of development of disadvantaged regions.

5.8. Conclusions

Drawing upon studies on gender in legislative committees which mainly focus on the Western societies (Baekgaard & Kjaer, 2012; Bolzendahl, 2014), this paper
aims to examine the dynamics in Indonesia, an Asian democracy also home to the world’s biggest Muslim population. It aims to examine the extent of gendered division of committees and the impact of Islam as a party ideology. By observing the composition of committees in the last three consecutive elections and using interviews with sitting parliamentarians, this paper has shown that gender bias is an enduring characteristic of Post-Suharto parliamentary politics. Like in so many countries in the world (Bolzendahl, 2018), Indonesian female MPs are sensibly more likely to be placed in feminine and less prestigious committees, and rarely hold committee leadership. It is worth noting, however, that a minority of women have been appointed as party’s faction or committee leaders for more than one term.

Furthermore, the findings in this study suggest that party ideology, in this case Islam, is not the key determinant in explaining how parties are allocating female deputies into masculine versus feminine committees. It also finds little support to Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson (2005) assertion of women being marginalised by overseeing only feminine issues. In fact, in a parliament where the bond between parliament and patronage is so strong like in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2014; Sherlock, 2012), being in the feminine and less prestigious committees is more rewarding as legislators can offer significant direct material supports to their constituents and thus boost their chance of re-elected.

Future studies, moreover, may focus on differences between male and female MPs’ backgrounds in respective committees. Have they been appointed with a minimum mismatch in regard to their professional capacity and the
committee’s scope of authority? These questions are highly valuable as currently little is known about how legislators, especially female MPs, are improving their expertise as lawmakers whilst substantively representing the people’s interest. This article may constitute a first step towards examining gender in Indonesian legislative committees.
SECTION 3: ATTITUDES TOWARD FEMALE POLITICIANS AND GENDER

QUOTAS
CHAPTER 6. FEMALE POLITICIANS' PERSPECTIVE

This chapter is a published paper and cited as follow:


6.1. Abstract

This article explores the conformity between women's experience in standing for a legislative election and the literature on women's parliamentary representation, using Indonesian female politicians as a case study. By interviewing 28 national female politicians in Indonesia, the analysis reveals that the strongest agreement was given to the cultural/ideological explanation. It also confirms that open-list proportional representation (PR) electoral system and gender quota offer a greater opportunity for women to win an elective office. However, as elaborated in the discussion section, the rampant practices of money politics and vote counting fraud can be a stumbling block to all candidates if not properly addressed. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the subjective experience of female MPs is important and needs to be acknowledged in order to comprehend what is really harming women’s political nomination.

6.2. Keywords

Indonesia, women’s representation, corruption, election, parliament.
6.3. Introduction

As of 2017, women, on global average, only comprise 23.4 percent of parliamentary seats in Single or Lower House (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017b). Like many other countries in Asia, Indonesia is experiencing a gradual growth in terms of women’s political representation. After 12 consecutive legislative elections, the share of women in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), only grew 13.52 points, moving from 3.8 percent by 1955 to 17.3 percent in 2014 (BPS, 2016). The pace seems to be far left behind compared to the country’s economic development measured by GDP per capita that soared from US$53.5 by 1967 to US$3,499 in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a).

Extensive political reforms since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 offer a greater opportunity for women to run for elective office (Davies, 2005). Sets of electoral reforms (i.e. open list Proportional Representation/PR electoral systems) and the provision of 30% candidate gender quotas since 2004 elections were all aimed at improving women’s electability. In the 2014 general elections, there were 77 electoral districts each with 3-10 seats, accumulating a total of 560 seats for DPR. As a bicameral democracy, Indonesia also has an upper house known as the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD) that equals to the Senate in the US political system. This chamber consists of 4 senators from each province, or in total of 132 seats. Unlike for the DPR, those who wish to join DPD does not need political parties’ nomination.

In the 2014 elections, 12 national parties were competing for legislative seats in three different levels of government; national (DPR), provincial (DPRD Provinsi), and municipality (DPRD Kota). The number of female candidates
running for DPR comprise more than the required ratio which is 30%. Some parties even nominate almost 40% of candidates being women (Prihatini, 2018d). Yet, only limited number of female legislators elected. So what factors responsible for this continuing political under-representation? By observing women’s passages to Indonesian national parliament, this paper attempts to answer the question above and contribute to the scholarly literature in three ways. Firstly, it provides a qualitative analysis of the determinants of women’s parliamentary representation by interviewing 28 current and one former female Members of Parliaments (MPs). The study shows that there are different paths to power, yet financial support is pivotal for women to secure a political campaign in a country with open list PR electoral systems, particularly with limited public funding for political parties. Secondly, the study aims to establish conformity between the literature on women’s political representation and the actual experiences faced by female politicians. It underlines that Indonesian female politicians view themselves as the agent of change and some factors raised in the literature are irrelevant. Lastly, the paper highlights a couple of recommendations on how to improve women’s political representation, drawing upon respondents’ reflections on their political endeavour.

The article proceeds as follows. First, it discusses key literature that identifies three main explanations on women’s share in legislative bodies and female candidates’ performance in Indonesia’s 2014 elections. Second, the paper presents the sampling approach and demography of respondents. Subsequent segment deliberates key findings from the interviews, establishing various thoughts on conforming respondents’ personal experiences to what the available
theories are suggesting. The final part offers conclusions and suggestions for further research, emphasising how the Indonesian context can contribute to the wider discussion of women’s political representation.

6.4. Theoretical Framework

What hinders women in accessing national parliament? Over the past 60 years or so, political scientists have been trying to address this question (Dahlerup, 2016) with some suggestion that women’s under-representation in the political arena is due to the lack of supply of and demand for female candidates (Lawless & Fox, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). In their study observing women in the US, Fox and Lawless (2004) suggest that women are less likely than men to think they are qualified to run for office, they are also less likely than men to express an interest to stand for an election. This highlights the importance to investigate what motivates women who actually join a political race, and the types of people or organisation that provide substantial support to their nomination. A growing body of literature suggests that many of the women in Asian national parliaments are coming from dynastic families (Basu, 2016; Baturo & Gray, 2018; Derichs, Fleschenberg, & Hüstebeck, 2006). Chandra (2016) argues an institutionalist theory of the relationship between dynastic and democratic politics by arguing “dynastic politics is a systematic product of modern democratic institutions: state and party” (p. 5). Women in India, for example, benefit from dynasticism partly because there are greater barriers to their participating in party politics than in social movements and community organisations.

In Indonesian politics, wealth has become the currency of the game
(Winters, 2013), where the price to get elected into DPR becomes more expensive over time as suggested by former PDI-P’s Secretary General, Pramono Anung (2013). In his PhD thesis observing political communication and *campaign costs* among DPR members in 2009—2014, Anung, who currently serves as Cabinet Secretary, asserts his respondents spent from as little as 300 million IDR (23,076 USD) to 6 billion IDR (461,538 USD), with the average stands at 3 billion IDR (231,269 USD). These expenses are required to pay for foods, gifts, transportation money, and merchandises during meetings with potential voters. He also predicted that in the 2014 elections, due to the fierce competition amongst candidates and inflation, the cost that each contender needed to bear is around 4.5 billion IDR, equivalent to 346,153 USD (Sihaloho, 2013). The 2014 parliamentary elections saw the highest levels of vote buying in the country’s history and politicians fell into the cycle of corruption as they needed to repay the costs to run (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015; Mietzner, 2015).

In general, an extensive body of academic research characterised barriers for women’s legislative representation into three broad explanations; socio-economic, political institutions, and cultural/ideological. The first explanation focuses on how the process of modernisation, which covers *socio-economic aspects*, promotes cultural change that leads to greater numerical women’s representation (Inglehart et al., 2002). With a certain threshold of equal access to education and to the labor force, women’s political empowerment is more likely to become a reality (Matland, 1998). Also known as the supply-side argument, this explanation suggests with more women attaining tertiary education and participating in paid jobs, it will eventually reduce traditional values in perceiving
female leadership (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999). On the other hand, some scholars observed how voters’ low socio-economic status is shaping the election results as voters’ pragmatism nurtures patronage from wealthy candidates (Aspinall, 2014; Shin, 2015). The analysis is often linked to the cost of running a political campaign.

The next feature of explanation is political institutional settings, ranging from electoral systems to gender quota. The literature on gender and political recruitment (Krook, 2010b; Luhiste, 2015; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995) highlights the importance of political institution aspects in observing women in parliament. In Indonesia, electoral gender quotas targeting a minimum of 30 percent female candidates are used, yet in 2014, the approach was, in fact, resulting in a drop in women’s representation (from 18.03 percent in 2009 to 17.32 percent in 2014). This development is common in the quota literature (Dahlerup, 2007; Krook, 2009a) which points to the importance of quota design, implementation, and enforcement of ensuring expected outcomes. Furthermore, Luhiste’s study (2015) demonstrates the change in electoral rules toward open-list voting which may have a negative effect on women’s likelihood of being elected.

The last explanation deals with cultural or ideological barriers that often harm women’s political nomination (Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003; Seguino, 2011). In their seminal work, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003a) suggest cultural attitudes and values are central to the number of female deputies. The similar conclusion was drawn by Ruedin (2012) who argues that cultural factors determine public attitudes toward women as political leaders.
While there has been a growth in the literature regarding Asian women’s stories in accessing national parliament (Bano, 2009; Prihatini, 2018c; Rai, 2012), no studies have yet systematically attempted to investigate how Indonesian female politicians are reflecting these explanations of women’s low descriptive political representation. This existing gap brings to the importance of the current study as it serves two core purposes; (1) to test the conformity of the literature with the rise of women’s representation in non-Arab Muslim societies, in this case, Indonesia (Fattore et al., 2010) and (2) to examine the matter from the perspective of women’s own experience. The second objective is vital as this paper provides an alternative approach to traditional social science inquiries which are dominated by men’s perspectives (Harding, 1987).

As the world’s third largest democracy, Indonesia’s development in overcoming gender disparity in legislative bodies is imperative (Hillman, 2017a). On April 9th, 2014 world’s biggest and most complicated legislative elections were held in Indonesia (KPU, 2014). With over 185 million registered in-country voters and another two million living overseas, the political competition was a fierce battlefield for more than 207,500 nominees trying to win 19,699 contested seats in four governmental layers; the House of Representatives/DPR (national), Senate/DPD (national), provincial, and city/municipality levels. Specifically, for the DPR, 6,607 candidates were running for 560 available seats that were distributed into 77 electoral districts in 34 provinces. Aside from the massive scale of the elections, it is crucial to observe the progress of Indonesian women in accessing national parliament. The following graph shows that in three most recent elections, more and more women stand for DPR election, yet the number
of seats they won in 2014 was slightly decreased.

Table 14. Women’s performances in legislative elections. (Source: author’s calculation based on data from KPU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Female candidates (%)</th>
<th>Seats (%)</th>
<th>Winning rates (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32.32</td>
<td>11.09</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>34.59</td>
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<td>2.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>37.34</td>
<td>17.32</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesia’s 2014 elections marked the biggest share women had ever achieved as contenders (37.34%) and this was partly due to a stricter electoral regulation released by the Electoral Commission/KPU in 2013 that requires each party to have at least 30 percent candidates being female or otherwise disqualified (Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014). Gender quotas are also regulated by Electoral Law No. 8/2012 which stipulates that women should be 30 percent of party’s managing officers at the national level, and one in every three candidates should be female. Yet, obstacles and challenges for women’s electability into parliament cannot be automatically resolved by issuing technical regulations targeting the process of nominating women, as the 2014 elections were, in fact, resulting in fewer women getting elected. In order to unpack women’s experiences and views on their political bids to win a parliamentary seat, this research is using a qualitative approach that focuses on direct interviews. Research method and data analysis are briefly discussed in the next section.

6.5. Data and Method

This study draws on one-on-one interviews with 28 Indonesian current and
former female national MPs. The interviewees were responding to key open-ended questions such as: (1) what factors hinder women entering parliament?, (2) how did you get successful (and unsuccessful) in 2014 elections?, (3) is gender quota policy significantly helps women in winning the votes?, and (4) in order to improve the level of democracy, do you think it is urgent to reform the current electoral and political financing regimes? The full list of questions that guide the interview can be found in the Appendix 7. All meetings were held in Jakarta between February and March 2016. Respondents fall into three broad categories based on the result of their political bids in the 2014 elections: win (25), lost but sworn in eventually to replace elected MPs who occupy other positions in the administration (2) and lost (1). The initial contact with research participants was mostly made through/via email. By using snowballing-effect approach, one interview led to another with the help from respondents and journalists who provided an informal introduction of the project to prospective MPs. Consent forms were obtained from all participants before the research session began. They also agreed to have all the conversations audio-recorded, yet, considering the sensitivity of the information given to this study, the names and the details of respondents remained anonymous. Following the interviews, a thematic analysis was conducted. The information was grouped into themes according to the literature review; motivation, campaign costs, socio-economic, political institutions, cultural/ideological, and parliament as a gendered organisation.

\[10\] Interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. Quotations are author’s own translation.
Table 15 displays the distribution of interviewees based on their party affiliation, age, religion, electoral districts, and professional backgrounds. This study covers all ten parties in the parliament and the informants are representing 23 out of 77 electoral districts (29.87 percent). Female politicians from Golkar are dominating the conversation, where 7 out of 28 respondents (25 percent) are affiliated to the party once closely attached to Suharto's authoritarian regime (1967—1998). The next biggest cluster is legislators from the winning party in the 2014 elections, PDI-P (17.86 percent). At the time the interviews were conducted, Hanura as well as PKS, had only one female MP and therefore the coverage of this study for those parties is 100 percent.

Table 15. Research participants’ demographic distribution. (Source: author’s own calculation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Professional background</th>
<th>Electoral districts (island)</th>
<th>Incumbency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Islam 24</td>
<td>20's: 1 30's: 10 40's: 8 50's: 5 60's: 3 70's: 1</td>
<td>Business: 5 Teacher: 2 Journalist: 1 Politician: 1 NGO: 4 Activist: 1 Model: 1 Actress: 3 Lawyer: 1 Doctor/dentist: 2</td>
<td>Java: 21 Maluku: 1 Sumatra: 2 Kalimantan: 2 Riau: 1</td>
<td>Incumbent 14</td>
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<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Non-Islam 4</td>
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<td>New 14</td>
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<td>NasDem</td>
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31 The names of some political parties have been abbreviated; Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Demokrat (PD), Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem), Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS).
6.6. Results and Discussions

6.6.1. Motivation

Most of the women interviewed suggest political parties play a crucial role in the process of nominating women as “the gatekeepers” (Kunovich & Paxton, 2005) who select and promote certain women to stand for an elected office. Yet, as it is required to have 30 percent of candidates being female, political parties are actively seeking women to become nominees. In some cases, if the supply is well too rare, parties paid some women to let their names and details displayed on the ballot paper. For those who are already in the parliament, they claim that political parties are relying on them to retain the seats. One informant, coded as P19, said she was thinking about retiring after serving the national assembly for more than two periods but her party denied that wish and put her 3rd on the candidates’ list. Another interviewee (P7) asserts her party has urged her to rerun and to secure the same electoral district.

Half of the research participants had been representatives for at least one period, and 4 out of 28 (14.28 percent) had their prior political career serving local parliaments (provincial or municipal/city levels). The election results suggest that incumbency effect plays no significant role in women’s nomination as only 38 percent of female legislators got re-elected (Prihatini, 2019a). This figure resonates the overall share in parliament, where only 40 percent of seats were won by incumbents, despite the fact that nearly 90 percent of MPs tried to retain their seats (Wardi, 2014). Previously, in the 2009 elections, the retention rate was even smaller; 27.32 percent, yet women’s share hit the biggest; 18.03 percent. These findings confirm Schwindt-Bayer’s study (2005) which argues
lower retention rate tends to increase women’s chance in winning elected office.

Thus, a couple of respondents with experience in local parliaments said that they were told by party key officials to step up and participate in the national election in order to let other politicians take over their seats. This internal party policy is not always perceived as a genuine gesture aiming at promoting women’s presence in national politics. One respondent (P6) said her party tried to cast her out of local politics and put her 5th on the nominee’s list. A similar experience was mentioned by P18 who decided to join a newly established party and claimed the move as “being strategic”, since in the new party she was given a key position as the election winning team leader.

For those who have no experience in winning an elective office (nine respondents), motivations for engaging in politics vary, with the majority stating their strong drive to bring out better national policies. As a former public notary, P1 said her desire to join politics was strongly influenced by the overlapping of regulations and she wished to fix the chaos right from the source; parliament. Others, like P2, P9, and P24, were also moved by issue-based motivations, namely education, social injustice, wealth redistribution, and women’s representation. Some respondents (P17 and P26) gave no specific motive in their political engagement, other than claiming that they had been approached by a party leader to join the election in an effort to fulfil the 30 percent gender quota.

In this study, six respondents fall into the category of a political dynasty, who either had a direct family connection or strong linkage with the party leader or are the daughter or the wife of a former or a current local head of government. These respondents identified their family and party leaders as people that
bolstered their nomination to their professional networks. When asked about views on the political dynasty, most respondents said the practice is not harming the quality of democracy by citing that it is part of human rights where everyone gets the same opportunity to run a political campaign regardless their family’s status. Three respondents went further by claiming the current gender ratio was made possible by the presence of women from the family of the party and political leaders.

Family provides (positive) advice, motivation, and facilities. It is fairer if a woman without a family relationship with party leader can perform well in the election, but the fact is kinship does make things easier.

(P14)

6.6.2. Campaign Cost

A former female legislator who is also Golkar’s deputy secretary general, Nurul Arifin, was once quoted as saying that the 2014 elections “were like a civil war in Syria. The money is like the sword that clears out his own brother” (Firdaus, 2014). The electoral rules in 2014 return to open-list PR system where triumph is determined only by the biggest number of votes. Thus, the uncertainty in getting elected is looming as each contender needs to persuade the constituents directly in order to secure their chance to win. The interviews provide support to Arifin’s statement and Anung’s prediction as most of the respondents suggest the cost to run is a key impediment for women. And as women are very likely to depend on their husband or father in obtaining financial support to run, political oligarchy dominates women’s share in the 2014 elections (Puskapol FISIP UI,
Of those who are keen to mention their total campaign expenses, 12 respondents claim they have spent less than 1 billion rupiah (IDR) or equal to 77,000 USD and six interviewees mentioned their campaign bills soared to more than 1 billion IDR. One respondent claims her nomination cost her nearly 7 billion IDR (538,471 USD) and she further argues that for ordinary Indonesian women to be able to stand and to win this expensive election is simply almost impossible. Meanwhile, a couple of respondents suggest one needs to prepare at least 2 billion IDR (153,846 USD) in order to sufficiently finance their political bid.

However, on the other hand, this study also discovers one female elected MP who only spent a fracture of the costs mentioned by other respondents. She spent 250 million IDR (19,230 USD) and was highly dependent on daily interactions with her grassroots connections such as peasants, mothers and motorbike taxi drivers in securing her campaign. She admits how frustrating it really was to see voters had become so pragmatic that any candidate who wishes to gather people during election period needs to pay at least 50,000 IDR (3.85 USD) to each participant. A similar concern was raised by P9, a former senator—a member of Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD)—who has a strong Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) background. She experienced how money and political connections play an instrumental impact in getting votes. She overcome this obstacle by creating name cards and a video that is recorded in a DVD format. In that video, she promoted herself as a successful senator who wished to continue representing the region in DPR. She admitted the campaign cost her 700 million IDR (53,846 USD) although she only focussed on 5 out of 14 municipalities.
Another newcomer to DPR mentioned the cost to run was 400 million IDR (30,769 USD) and it was already overwhelmingly expensive to her. She received an interest-free loan from the party’s chairman as much as 200 million IDR, in addition to spending all family’s savings and borrowing from her relatives ranging from 10 million to 30 million IDR (769-2,307 USD). Financial support from party leader was also received by another interviewee who called the money “a stimulus” which contributed only 5 percent to her actual campaign costs that exceeded 1 billion IDR.

From 2014 to the time when this article was being written, two female MPs have been sent to prison for being convicted of taking bribes and later fired from their respective parties; PDI-P and Hanura. One of them claimed further bribe ration for lawmakers is well-scheduled “like a conveyor belt”, where everyone will eventually get their turn (Sabrina, 2016). She also complains about her salary as a representative that is insufficient with many constituents demanding for development projects for their region, and 80 percent of her monthly official income needs to be transferred to the party as a regular contribution (Tayubi, 2016). One respondent in this research is currently facing court proceedings as she was allegedly involved in a corruption scandal that costs the nation up to 2.3 trillion IDR. These developments re-emphasise the vicious cycle of corruption (Mietzner, 2015) which will haunt politicians as they spent so much money to get elected. And once they are serving as people’s representatives, they are also obligated to help in financing the party. The following section explores Indonesian women’s views on each factor mentioned
in the literature of female parliamentary under-representation.

6.6.3. Socio-economic Factors

Political scientists often try to establish a link between economic development in general, women’s social status in particular, and women’s political representation (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008; Matland, 1998; Togeby, 1994). In Indonesia, women’s share in the labor force has increased significantly following the country’s massive economic expansions. The World Bank recorded back in 1971, only 36.98 percent women aged over 15 years old participated in the paid labor, the figure has soared to 50.47 by 2014 (World Bank, 2017b). In education, women’s net secondary school enrolment was 12.22 percent in 1972 and it rose sharply to 74.68 percent by 2014. Meanwhile, in parliament, female’s share only gained 10 points from 7.17 percent in 1971 to 17.32 percent in 2014. This raises a question about the relevance of women’s social status on parliamentary representation.

This study shows the majority of respondents (57%) agree that women’s weak political engagement was due to the lack of economic activism and low education attainment. Some respondents suggest more women will be interested in running if only they are more educated, more politically literate and more financially independent. The aspect of supply of qualified and competent women as candidates for parliamentary elections is crucial to be observed, as it still takes women to run to increase numerical descriptive representation (Lawless & Fox, 2010). And as evident from this study, female politicians suggest women’s interest in joining politics is indeed lower compared to that of men’s. One
explanation to women’s low political engagement is the negative perceptions lingering in politics as a “dirty world” as well as domestic responsibilities.

One interviewee claims people without good education tend to be more ignorant of politics (P16) as they are more interested in filling their empty stomach than pursuing an expensive political race. Yet, another research participant (P2) suggests that it is the middle-class, who has a deeper political apathy and choose not to vote in parliamentary elections, that let politicians who bombarded voters with money and gifts got elected.

Economic development is also considered an important achievement before a clean and transparent election can be held, as 12 interviewees (43 percent) explicitly claim low-income voters tend to ask for money and gifts in return for their votes. An MP representing a rural district in Central Java argues pragmatic voters seem to be the main drive for corruption in Indonesia as they always pose a question “wani piro” which basically means “how much do you dare to pay?” towards every candidate. A couple of respondents admitted that since all candidates are practically doing money politics—handing out money and gifts at public meetings, they advised electorates to accept all the money and the prize and regard it as a sustenance from the rich. On the other hand, an interviewee suggests that the participation of women in politics has no positive correlation with the level of women’s education as she highlights some Western advanced economies with much higher education level perform no better than African nations. P14 further argues improving the socio-economic status of women does not automatically result in higher interest in a political career, since various professions are more appealing to them.
By joining politics, one must be ready to have enemies, political enemies. We also face numerous risks, like a huge financial loss if not elected. So, basically, these risks impede women's interest in politics. More educated women tend to have a better option than (joining) politics. (P14)

6.6.4. Political Institution Aspects

The electoral system in Indonesia’s Reform Era has been reformed from a closed-list PR system in 1999 legislative elections to an open-list since 2004. In this study, female politicians reflect their views and experiences on the open-list PR electoral systems and gender quota. Interviewee coded as P10 argues closed-list erodes ordinary, non-political dynasty women to get elected since the best list positions (number 1 to 3 on the ballot paper) are very much likely allocated to those with strong ties with party leaders. Under the open-list PR electoral systems, women can win regardless of the order in the candidate list. An opposite view was mentioned by P4 and P15 who associate open-list PR systems with the more expensive cost to win the competition as the uncertainty in getting elected is looming, and the results will only benefit those with strong economic capacities.

It's just too hard. I still have no idea which (electoral) system is best in helping women to win elections. I have heard that with the closed-list system, some parties will give the top position on the list to those who pay more to the party. (P15)
The following density plot graph shows female candidates were hardly allocated into top list positions. The vast majority of them (50.95%) sit in the last position in every three sequences. Most respondents agree that one’s position on the list is crucial as it is easier for voters to assume that those on the top is the most prominent candidate, despite this might not always be the case. However, the fact that it is very rare to find women listed as number one on the list, it re-emphasises the importance of examining how gender makes parties and how parties make gender, especially in determining the sequence of legislative candidates on the list (Kenny & Verge, 2016).

Figure 10. List position by gender for the 2014 elections. (Source: Formappi (2013)).

The 2014 results show that nearly half (47.42 percent) of elected women were listed as candidates number one, and more than 10 percent of female deputies were those listed as candidates number 6 or above. This number has increased dramatically as in the 2009 elections, 95 percent of elected women were listed as candidates number 1 to 3, leaving only 5 percent of seats for those
with list positions number 4 and the rest. These findings share some support to the idea that an open-list system creates a promising opportunity for all female candidates. Nevertheless, since gender quotas change the most common de facto situation, where men only compete with men (Dahlerup, 2007), the design needs to ensure that women are going to be genuinely promoted to get elected.

One respondent suggests the most viable solution for improving women’s descriptive representation is combining closed-list with a reserved seat, where the party can promote women by appointing them to number one on the candidate list for at least one-third of all electoral districts. This strategy is relevant to Indonesia’s electoral context where 10 parties are competing in all 77 electoral districts which have 3 to 10 seats each. Small-size electoral district means the competition is fiercer, thus political parties tend to focus on their winnable seats rather than trying to win in all electoral districts.

This research also seeks to shed a light on the rampant practices of vote counting fraud. All respondents in the study claimed that they had experienced troubling vote tabulation. The common practice is manipulative reporting from the tally at polling stations to the upper levels, and this reduces their votes with an average of 1,000 to 3,000. This aspect is strongly linked to the quality and the integrity of elections. The same trouble brought people’s extra caution to the results of 2014 presidential election--known as the tightest and most polarised presidential election in Indonesia’s democratic era (Thornley, 2014). A couple of crowdsourcing websites, like KawalPemilu.org, emerged as an alternative to
serve public’s interest to reliable online votes tabulation\textsuperscript{12}. This innovation might offer a promising solution to overcome vote counting fraud which might harm women’s political nomination. By having a wider public scrutinising the process of vote’s tabulation, it is expected that the practice of vote counting fraud can be minimised. Voters need to support this approach by reporting the results from each polling stations and send the pictures to a website like KawalPemilu.org. Thus, the digital data would play a strong role as an evident and it helps to maintain the overall electoral integrity.

6.6.5. Cultural and Ideological Barriers

The last explanatory factor for women’s low representation in parliament lies in aspects of cultural, ideological, and religious beliefs that are still strongly in favour of male candidates. As many as 19 respondents (68 percent) in this research agree that many women in Indonesia experience obstacles in pursuing public office because they have to get permission and financial support from their husband or father.

Often, in cases where only a few women stand for elections, it is not because they are incompetent, but rather they must first obtain their husband's blessing. If there is no permission given by the husband or the father, then do not even think about it. Because even if she got

\textsuperscript{12}The website administrator stated that data on this site comes from C1 forms scanned and published by the KPU (General Election Commission) and digitised with the help of independent netizen volunteers.
elected, the situation surely will not be comfortable. (P7)

The findings reaffirm Ruedin's study (2012) that public acceptance toward female political leadership remains a huge obstacle for women's parliamentary representation. Two national surveys conducted in 1999 and 2005 suggest that nearly 60 percent of Indonesian respondents agree and strongly agree with the statement “men make better political leaders than women” (WVS, 2015). This percentage is the second biggest among other Southeast Asian countries surveyed, with Malaysia occupying the top spot with 69.6 percent.

In some places, candidates must also be astute at assessing voter preferences. One interviewee shared her frustration in dealing with constituents who demanded her to perform as flawless as she possibly could. Her image as a young beautiful actress does help her win constituents, with predominantly voters in rural settings or of a certain ethnicity, are more inclined to vote for public figures, actress or singer. She claims voters tend to take legislative elections as a mere beauty contest, where one must always put the biggest smile to everyone.

They prefer a candidate with the same ethnic background. Luckily I share the same ethnicity with them. Thus, they tend to choose the one who is beautiful or handsome, well known, and always looks good with a friendly smile. I have to smile all day during meetings with constituents, who are continuously asking for money and gifts. But once I got in the car, I just broke down, I screamed feeling extremely annoyed. (P10)
Constituents might vote for a candidate who lives in the electoral district or at least owning a property in the area. This brings a tangible advantage for female candidates who are considered as a local. P22 claims being a local enables her to argue that she will also be accessible and responsible. Nonetheless, the fact that 55.4 percent of elected MPs reside in the country's capital city of Jakarta, which only has 21 seats in DPR (3.75 percent), raises a question about representatives' genuine accessibility to their electorates.

Another key aspect often suggested by gender and political scientists is the role of religion. Scholars like Norris and Inglehart (2003) argue religion, especially Islam, has exerted a decisive impact on the cultural perception of the appropriate division of labor between men and women, which later also limits opportunities for women outside their home, including in politics. This study shows an inconclusive correlation between religion and women's success in parliamentary elections. The fact that Muslim-dominated districts did elect women into parliament poses a reasonable doubt to a claim that Islam adherents are not keen to support women participating in politics. In fact, some respondents claimed they gained a lot of electoral support from pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), women's Islamic Koran study group, and other Islamic organisations.

6.7. Conclusions
This essay has contributed to the discussion of women’s political representation in world's third-largest democracy, Indonesia, by identifying female politicians' perspective on factors that hinder their electoral success. The findings suggest political institutional aspects continue to limit women in winning elected office.
The current open-list PR electoral system, which escalates the level of uncertainty in getting elected, triggers the increase of campaign costs which later only benefits the economic elites. Furthermore, the rampant vote-buying practices and problems with electoral integrity are the two biggest obstacles in women’s political nomination. Thus, future research could further investigates these issues of corruption and the amount of money required to run and to win an election. Are corruption practices gendered in any forms and magnitude? Do men and women share the same challenges in dealing with corruption and low electoral integrity?

The analysis also suggests the provision of candidate gender quotas need to be further improved in terms of design and implementation (Kang & Tripp, 2018; Tripp, 2016). One possible solution is to ensure that the quota is not 30 percent of all candidates being female, but women should be appointed as candidate number one in at least one-third of electoral districts. On the other hand, most respondents in this study did not support culturalist explanations emphasising a negative relationship between Islam and women’s political leadership. In fact, they claimed they have significant support from Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and male religious figures.

Another important takeaways from this study is that female legislators perceived voters tend to think politics is not a women’s business, and without blessings from their closest men; husband and/or father, it is very difficult for women to engage in political contest. The “green light” from husband and/or father equals to financial support, and in political dynasty this means a smooth process of knocking people’s doors seeking for substantial endorsement. While these
findings cannot be generalised as the views of all female representatives in Indonesia, the respondents interviewed represent 28 percent of the current population (27 out of 97 female MPs), thus it is very likely that these views will be found in other instances and other countries.
CHAPTER 7. POLITICAL PARTIES’ PERSPECTIVE

This chapter is a published paper and cited as follow:


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7.1. Abstract

As a strategy to improve women’s share in Indonesian parliament, gender quotas were introduced in 2002 and first implemented in the 2004 elections. Despite vast research on the influence of gender quotas in nominating women into parliament, little is known about male and female politicians’ acceptance and perception of gender quotas. This paper seeks to explore how distinct are male and female MPs in perceiving gender quotas and in explaining the roots of women’s political under-representation. Using a questionnaire involving 104 representatives (54 male and 50 female), the study suggests a significant gender gap occurs not only in perceptions related to quotas’ positive-discrimination legitimacy and efficiency but also in explanations that hinder women’s electoral success and which strategies might work best in overcoming the disparity. These distinctions matter because they offer insights as to the dynamics explaining why gender quotas are not resulting in a notable increase in women’ parliamentary representation.
7.2. Keywords

Women’s representation, gender quota, parliament, legislative elections, Indonesia.

7.3. Introduction

Following the introduction in Latin America and Africa since the 1990s, gender quotas are now in operation in 130 democracies with the average level of representation for women in countries with quotas standing at 23.5 percent (International IDEA, 2018). Most scholars divide quotas into three basic types: reserved seats, legislative quotas, and party quotas (Bush, 2011; Krook, 2009b; Norris, 2004b). Reserved seats are a fixed number of seats set aside for women in national legislatures. Legislative quotas require parties to nominate a certain percentage of candidates being women. This can be a small or a large portion but commonly 30 percent—also known as the “critical mass” promoted by the United Nations to be necessary for women to make a significant impact on the political decision-making process (2005). These two modes are legal quotas which can be applied to the local or national level, and often are adopted in developing countries where equal access to political resources is limited for women (Chen, 2010). Lastly, party quotas refer to voluntary quotas that political parties adopt internally to promote female legislatures. This approach is widely used in European countries and recently applied by the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore (Tan, 2016b).

Gender quotas are applied by a couple of Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia—the world’s third largest democracy. With the fall of
Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, a new wave of democracy offers a huge window of opportunity for activists to pursue advocacy in women’s rights, including political representation (Eddyono et al., 2016; Soetjipto, 2005). A 30 percent legal candidate quota was introduced in 2002 and implemented for the first time in the 2004 elections. However, after more than a decade, women’s share in parliament is unsteady and far from the expected “critical mass” of 30 percent despite parties nominating more women to run (Bessell, 2010; Hillman, 2017a, 2017b; Noor, 2014; Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). This begs the question about what is missing from the discussion of improving the proportion of women as representatives. This paper aims to unravel the question by exploring lawmakers’ perceptions around gender quotas and the roots of women’s under-representation in politics. Data collected from the questionnaire indicate there is a gap between the two sexes in perceiving quotas and factors that hinder women from engaging parliamentary politics.

Drawing upon previous research (see Meier (2008)) this article contributes in two ways to the scholarly literature. Firstly, it is the first ever to map the differences between male and female parliamentarians in terms of gender quotas and women’s low political representation. While the adoption of quotas was successfully implemented in three elections, the investigation into the perception of quotas reveals a cleavage between the two sexes. Secondly, this research reaffirms that political parties, as the gatekeepers, play a great role in selecting and nominating women for parliament.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The literature review elaborates women’s representation and the provision of gender quotas in
Indonesia. Subsequently, the analytical methods are presented, along with the demographic details on participants. The next sections deliberate results of the analysis: legitimacy and efficiency of quotas; explanations of women's under-representation; and strategies to improve women's presence in politics. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented in the final section.

7.4. Women's Representation and Gender Quota in Indonesia

As world's third largest democracy, Indonesia's experience in improving women's representation in legislative bodies is imperative (Hillman, 2017a). Women comprise slightly over 50 percent of the Indonesian population, yet their seats in the National People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) is only 17.1 percent (see Table 16). A series of gender mainstreaming policy interventions aiming at increasing women's share in decision-making process was first introduced in 1984 by ratifying CEDAW (Davies, 2005; Siregar, 2005).

Table 16. Percentage of female MPs in Indonesia period 1987-2019. (Source: KPU (2014))

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<th>Period</th>
<th>% female MPs</th>
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<tr>
<td>1987-1992</td>
<td>11.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-1997</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>11.4</td>
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<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>18.04</td>
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<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>17.32</td>
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Many scholars are trying to explain the slow growth of women’s representation with some suggesting political parties—as gatekeepers (Caul, 1999; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995)—are not working hard in nurturing and nominating female cadres (Budiatri, 2012; Fionna, 2013; Soetjipto & Adelina, 2012). The fact that few women run as candidate number one or two, while nearly 80 percent of elected candidates are those listed on these top positions (Formappi, 2014), highlights the issue with how genuine are political parties in promoting women into politics. Another important aspect relates to voters’ insufficient support of female nominees as observed by IFES in 2010. More than half of respondents say they will elect a male rather than a female candidate (Sharma, Serpe, & Suryandari, 2011). Conversely, only 14 percent of respondents offer support for female nominees. The gap between male and female respondents is also striking, where 62 percent of male respondents are in favour of male candidates while 47 percent of female participants prefer male candidates, leaving support for female nominees at 21 percent from female respondents.

Women’s low representation in Indonesia is taking place at all levels of government. The 2014 elections resulted in women’s share in the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD) sitting at 26.5 percent, 16.14 percent in local provincial parliaments and 14 percent in local municipality/city levels (KPU, 2014). It is evident to say women’s electability is smaller in a more local assembly. The issue of parliamentary representation has become a subject of international attention in the 1990s leading to the Beijing Platform for Action being adopted by 189 countries at the UN’s Fourth World
Conference for Women in 1995 (Siregar, 2005). Some strategies include adopting gender quotas, which are divided into three basic types: reserved seats, legislative quotas, and party quotas.

The rapid diffusion of gender quotas has been labelled as the “fast track” to equal representation for women (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005), which is also trendy (Dahlerup, 2008) and contagious (Meier, 2004). Tripp and Kang (2008) used cross-national analysis to show quotas are the strongest predictor of the percentage of women in parliament. Data collected by the IPU since 1997 demonstrates whilst there is an increase in numbers of women in national parliaments, the growth has been relatively slow (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017c). In January 1997 the world average for women’s share in Single house or lower house was 11.7 percent, and by January 2017 the figure has increased to 23.4 percent. The top performers are Nordic countries (41.7%) followed by the Americas (28.3%) and Europe without Nordic nations (26.4%). Thus, the impact of quotas is not universal (Chen, 2010; Franceschet et al., 2012; Millard, 2014; Verge & Fuente, 2014) and the Indonesian case as discussed below shows gender quotas alone is not a guarantee to improve women’s presence in parliamentary politics.

Gender quotas, also known as a positive-discrimination approach, were first introduced in Indonesia with Law No. 31 of 2002 on Political Parties. It encourages parties to have at least 30 percent of party’s board being women. Following that, Law No. 12 of 2003 on General Elections was applied for the 2004 Elections. It stipulates women had to fill at least 30 percent of the slots on the candidates’ party list. Article 65(1) states “Every political party that participates
in an election may propose Member of Parliament candidates at the national, provincial, and regency/municipality level or in each electoral district, considering at least 30 percent women’s representation”.

A further amendment to the Law on Political Parties in 2008 (Law No.2) required parties to appoint women to at least 30 percent of its national managerial positions and a similar share for party’s regional boards as a prerequisite to contest in elections. Furthermore, Law No. 8 of 2008 on General Elections stipulated the 30 percent for female candidates is compulsory, although no clear sanctions were mentioned. The zipper requirement (where in each three candidates there should be at least a female nominee) was also introduced in the 2009 Elections and the result has been very significant. A stiffer requirement in the 2014 Elections was brought by the Indonesian Election Commission (KPU) as its Regulation No. 7/2013 and Law No. 8/2012 on General Elections stated parties must nominate candidates with at least 30 percent being female using the zipper system (one female in each three nominees) or being disqualified to run. These sets of electoral candidate quotas should have a positive effect to women’s general electability (Rosen, 2017).

Nonetheless, gender quotas in Indonesia so far have not delivered expected outcomes. Some argue institutional factors like the open-list PR system is the main culprit as the cost of campaigning has soared over the years and this significantly hampers the nomination of women who have limited access to material capital (Anung, 2013; Hillman, 2017b). This paper aims to expand the conversation by investigating male and female MPs’ perceptions of legal gender quotas; the legitimacy of this positive discrimination; and its efficiency in
improving women's electability. The next section elaborates on the roots of women's low political representation: what actually hinders women in building a political career? Do men share a similar view with women on factors explaining women's under-representation? The following section discusses how men and women think about which solution is appropriate to pursue.

7.5. Data and Methods

This paper draws on nine months of survey administered with help from WikiDPR, an organisation which aims to improve the connection between the public with the parliamentarians in the DPR (Hatherell, 2015). The full list of questions that guide the interview can be found in the Appendix 8. The invitation to this study was distributed by WikiDPR volunteers in March 2017, with an expectation to obtain data from 100 MPs with a balanced distribution between the sexes. In fact, it turns out up to the specified deadline, December 2017, the team managed to gather 104 respondents or equals to 18.57 percent of the DPR population, representing diverse socio-political backgrounds as described further in the following section.

7.5.1. Participants

The sample in this survey consists of 54 male and 50 female representatives coming from all 10 parties in the parliament. The following table displays the distribution of respondents according to their party affiliation. Members from

I am indebted to the volunteers: Akmal Permatasari, Elva Cindra, Rizky Hanifah, Dita Anggraeni Yusup, Muhammad Jovi Maulana, and Faiz Nur Faiqoh.
PDI-P are the dominant group in this study (17.31%), followed by Golkar (15.38%) and PAN (11.54%). Some parties are represented with an equal sex distribution (Gerindra, NasDem, PDI-P, and PPP), while others are either male dominated (PD, Hanura, PKS) or female dominated (Golkar, PKB, PAN).

The range of age in this study is 29 to 79 with the median and the mean standing at 53 and 51.53 years old respectively. It resembles the actual range in DPR, as both the youngest and the eldest MPs participated in this survey. In terms of electoral district coverage, participants in this study represent 63 out of 77 electoral districts nationwide. In other words, the coverage level is 81.82 percent. The sample here also covers all 11 Commissions in the parliament, with most respondents working in Commission 8 (14.4%), followed by Commission 5 (13.46%), and Commission 2 and 10 (each with 12.5%). The scope of Commission 8 includes religious, social, and women’s empowerment affairs, while Commission 5 deals with communications, telecommunications, public works, public housing, and rural and disadvantaged areas (DPR-RI, 2018). The scope of Commission 2 covers home affairs, regional autonomy, administrative reforms, and elections, while Commission 10 looks after education, youth, sports, and tourism, art and cultural affairs. The distribution of participants on their Commission sittings is unequal as Commission 3, which deals with law and legislations, human rights and security affairs is poorly represented (1.92%). Similarly, Commission 4 (agricultural, plantations, forestry, maritime, fisheries, and food affairs) and Commission 11 (finance, National Development Planning Board, banking, and non-bank financial institutions affairs) each only comprise 3.85 percent of the overall sample.
Table 17. The distribution of respondents according to their party affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NasDem</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.5.2. Questionnaire

Once the invitation to participate in this study was accepted by a legislator, volunteers of WikiDPR continued the process by arranging a face-to-face meeting to fill in the questionnaire I had prepared in Bahasa Indonesia. All meetings were audio-recorded with consent from the participants, some of which I analyse and report here under pseudonyms (M1, M2, W1, W2, etc.). The questionnaire itself has both open and closed questions. The open questions are designed to explore respondents’ individual perceptions on issues related to the provision of candidate gender quotas, factors that contribute to women’s low representation in politics, and strategies to overcome the current situation. The questions were also mapping background information on the respondent including sex, party affiliation, age, and Commission. Meanwhile, the closed-list questions, here formed as a list of statements, are designed to quantify participants’ responses. The findings suggest support for gender quotas in Indonesia is not shared at the same level among parliamentarians, and that sex proved to be the major factor shaping the response pattern. Throughout the
analysis discussed in the rest of this paper, it is evident that the gender gap occurring is taking place in various aspects. The rest of this paper discusses where and how men and women do exactly differ in their perception of quotas and women's political participation.

7.6. Quotas: Legitimacy and Efficiency

The vast majority of women, 74 percent, disagree with a statement that legislated gender quotas are no longer needed as they will only reinforce the difference between men and women. Women are basically more in favour of keeping the quotas as compared to 63 percent of men. Whereas, interestingly, 22 percent of men support the idea of abolishing this positive-discrimination approach, while only 10 percent of female respondents share the same position. As Table 18 shows, most women and men considered quotas to be strongly legitimate as they fit into the principle of equality and justice as prescribed in the State’s Constitution of 1945. Only a small minority of women (2%) and men (11%) express an opposite view on this subject.

The perception of legitimacy is consistent with the response pattern on a statement suggesting quotas are a useful tool in improving the quality of democracy in Indonesia. This statement received women’s strongest approval rate compared to any other statements in this topic, with nearly 4 in every 5 female respondents think quotas are good for Indonesian democracy. Men also consider quotas as a means of increasing the state of democracy (63%), yet nearly 20 percent of men consider the approach’s impact might not be that significant in creating a stronger democracy in Indonesia.
Table 18. Perception of the legitimacy and efficiency of candidate gender quotas in Indonesian legislative elections (N = 104, M = 54, W = 50).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (%)</td>
<td>W (%)</td>
<td>M (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas are no longer needed to be applied because they will only reinforce the difference between men and women</td>
<td>62.96</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas have a strong legitimacy in accordance with the principle of equality provided for in the 1945 Constitution</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women candidates are increasingly taken seriously in the elections after quotas are implemented, making women more likely to win</td>
<td>20.37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas are the tools to improve the quality of Indonesian democracy</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties nominate female candidates merely to be eligible to compete in the elections</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sharpest gender gap occurs in statements related to quotas' efficiency in determining women's political nomination success. Most women in this survey think that female candidates are gaining their momentum from the provision of gender quotas, making them more likely to win a seat in DPR (66%). With more women now running for elections, the chance of being elected is bigger. Furthermore, most women also believe that political parties nominate female candidates simply because they need to do it to be eligible to compete in the elections. In short, as many as 36 percent of female respondents think that parties are not genuine in promoting women into politics.

On the other hand, men also think gender quotas are helping women in terms of improving their electability in legislative elections (46%), although one in every five male respondents are not convinced about how quotas do actually affect women's electoral performance. The majority of men do not share the same view as their female colleagues regarding how genuine political parties are
in supporting women’s parliamentary representation. Nearly 54 percent of men think that parties are being genuine in nominating women, and only 26 percent consider it the other way around.

Even though men and women share the same view when it comes to the need for gender quotas and the legitimacy of such intervention, attitudes among male respondents are more divided than women’s. The percentage of men agreeing to end the provision of gender quotas is higher than the share of women who do not share the dominant female view. A similar path is taking place in all discussions of quotas’ legitimacy, and efficiency, where more men than women disagree that quotas are in line with the principle of equality. Men also outnumbered women in showing disagreement in regards to the impact of quotas on women’s electoral performance and on improving the level of democracy, and on how parties are not being genuine in nominating female candidates. It is evident to say women are more in favour of quotas because they think quotas are good for the country’s democracy and useful in improving their electability. Meanwhile, men continue to support gender quotas because the intervention is strongly legitimate in line with the concept of equality as stated in the Constitution.

7.7. The Under-representation of Women in Politics: Possible Explanations

Research participants were also confronted with statements on possible explanations for women’s under-representation in politics (for details, see Table 19). A majority of both sexes share the opinion that few women are actively engaged in politics because they are prioritising families; husband and children
over political careers. However, it is important to note the share of women preferring a neutral response is significant and the deviation between the agreeing and the neutral group is only six percent. Some female participants in this study place a distance between themselves and the vast majority of Indonesian women by arguing their children are all grown-ups, making more time available for them to join politics.

Most men (42.6%) and women (52%) in this study also think that female politicians are few due to insufficient political training, social capita, and campaign financial support in securing their political nomination. While most men are convinced of this explanation, 37 percent of them disagree and another 20 percent choose to be neutral. This different perception by men indicates men are more divided than women when it comes to the external factors relating to three types of capital, social, political, and financial, which are required by either male or female politicians to triumph.

Table 19. Possible explanations for women’s under-representation in politics

(N = 104, M = 54, W = 50).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women prioritise families, not political careers</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>57.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are poorly trained in the political world and have minimal social</td>
<td>37.04</td>
<td>20.37</td>
<td>42.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital and financial capital for campaigning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women see the world of politics as a world of men and a masculine,</td>
<td>38.89</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“dirty world” full of corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are hampered by various obstacles in culture, religion, and</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>12.96</td>
<td>57.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>customs that prefer men as leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties find it difficult to get female candidates that have</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>59.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the potential to win in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, men and women think the latter’s low political representation is not caused by the lack of female politician as role models. Despite both groups being dominated by this view, there is also a significant number of men (39%) arguing that women need more exemplary female politicians as party leaders or legislators. As of today, only one party is led by a woman and her position is heavily influenced by the fact that she is the daughter of Indonesia’s first president.

The main distinction in perception between men and women lies in the fact that the latter think women see the world of politics as a men’s world, which is often heavily associated with corruption and full of “dirty intrigues” (40%). Men do not believe this is the case, as the majority in this group (39%) show disagreement. Women also disagree with this explanation at a similar rate as men (38%), leaving the distance between the two opposing groups among women participants at a close gap. This finding suggests men and women are divided internally on this issue as the support for either to agree or to reject the explanation is not exceeding the crossover point of 50 percent.

Another external factor observed here is the influence of culture, religion, and customs which often put women at disadvantage compared to men. Both sexes agreed that women’s political nominations are at risk when voters hold strong to a perception that men are better leaders than women. In fact, female respondents gave their biggest agreement rate to this variable (54%), suggesting women’s under-representation is more of a cultural issue where women need to
get key approval from their husbands, fathers, and other male figures in their closest circle of influence. Men share this position with a slightly higher percentage, indicating a mutual understanding between the two observed groups when it comes to how cultural factors are shaping women’s presence in politics.

According to 59 percent of men, women are simply under-represented due to their insufficient contact with party leaders. This in turn means political parties find it difficult to recruit high quality female candidates who would run for legislative elections. This view is shared by women, yet with a lower percentage (44%) as more women than men believe that parties could easily find women with good qualities and prospects for winning a political race.

7.8. Strategies to Improve Women’s Presence in Politics
In the last section of the questionnaire, respondents were questioned on possible strategies to improve women’s presence in the political domain. While 60 percent of women surveyed consider a more vociferous campaign for voters to choose female candidates is needed, only 37 percent of men share the same view. Nearly 30 percent of men think this strategy is not the solution, as some respondents mentioned the approach might create an unfair impression in terms of treating female and male legislative candidates.

All groups in this study are in favour of increasing women’s political representation by improving the candidates’ selection process (see Table 20). They consider the best strategy would be to make parties more transparent in their methods of inviting and selecting potential female candidates, both from
internal and external sources. As Table 19 shows, the vast majority of men (74%) and women (82%) seem convinced the selection process is the key to elect more women into parliament. No women reject this approach, and only less than four percent of men disagree with it, indicating the solution received the strongest support from both sexes.

These findings are in line with the causal factor of women's low political representation discussed earlier. Men think women are few in politics partly because parties are facing difficulties in nominating female candidates, thus the pipeline in electing women needs to be fixed by making the recruitment process more open and transparent to a wider public. A study by Perludem suggests to overcome the shortage of female candidates, parties are nominating any women for the sake of the 30 percent quotas and to avoid being disqualified to run (Wulandari & Agustyati, 2014). Hence, the quality and the electability of female candidates are highly questionable. These practices also raise concerns around parties' responsibility to cultivate qualified female cadres until their being nominated as candidates in the elections. One option to overcome this cadre shortage is by making parties obliged to have at least 30 percent party managers being women at all levels; national and regional. However, the 2017 Electoral Law Article 173 clause 2 stipulates the 30 percent gender quotas for party managers only apply for the national level. At the provincial level, an average of 30 percent of party managers being women can only be seen in 25 out of 34 provinces (74.58%). The percentage is even lower for the municipality/city level where 30 percent quotas have only been fulfilled in 333 out of 514 regions (64.87%) (Maharddhika, 2017).
Table 20. Possible solutions to reduce women’s under-representation in politics
(N = 104, M = 54, W = 50).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More vociferous campaigns for voters to choose more women candidates</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The election of women as legislative candidates should be more transparent, through an open recruitment mechanism by political parties</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding financial support to women’s political organisations</td>
<td>37.04</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties provide special financial support to female candidates who have the potential to win but are constrained by lack of funds</td>
<td>35.18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give women candidates serial number 1 or 2 more often</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another strategy which involves political parties is providing special financial support for highly winnable female candidates who yet face funding constraints. While only six percent of women disagree with this strategy, more than one-third of men think this is not a way forward. Men, again, perceived it as discrimination although more men agree this is one possible solution to ending the political participation gender gap. Some women from PKB and Golkar in this study claimed they have received some grants from the party to help them with campaign costs. While the money is not to cover all expenses, this gesture has lent strong support to how political parties do wish female candidates well in their political race. These women mentioned the importance of the survey consultant whose recommendation becomes one of the most crucial considerations for party leaders to donate funds for female candidates who are likely to win. However, a couple of female and male respondents argue money is not everything and there are other ways for parties to show their support. One option is by having party leaders attending mass gatherings where candidates
are addressing their audience. The presence of a party leader is believed to be more important than material assistance.

Furthermore, men think the opposite of their female colleagues when it comes to the idea of government offering financial support to women’s political organisations. The latter think this is a promising move (56%), while the former suggest women in general will not benefit from such funds. In general, men are strongly divided by this issue, where those who prefer the neutral and supporting views each comprise one-third of the group population respectively. It is also crucial to note 40 percent of women are neutral towards this idea. This indicates adding money to women’s organisations so as to promote women’s political activism is not widely accepted by MPs in this study.

Women think that list position is very influential in electing females into parliament. The fact that the majority of elected legislatures are those who were at the top of the party’s candidates list (Prihatini, 2018d), makes it highly reasonable to push parties to nominate women as candidate number one in more electoral districts. Only six percent of women do not consider this path as a promising strategy and 18 percent give a neutral response, showing women are keen about this solution. However, men do not share this position since the majority (39%) choose to prefer a neutral stance and more than one-third show disagreement with the solution. Some men argue that under the current open-list PR systems, anyone can get elected at whichever number on the list (M4, M16).

7.9. Conclusions

The current paper has shown that gender quotas in Indonesia are still widely accepted by legislatures, although there is a gender gap of about 11 percent
between the two sexes. Women are the biggest supporters of quotas as they think quotas are useful in improving the quality of Indonesian democracy and the implementation is not reinforcing the difference between men and women. Women also believe quotas had helped their electability over the years, although men, conversely, are not as convinced. Men are heavily divided in this regard, as 20 percent of them think quotas have no impact at all on women’s chance in winning an elected office. They suggest there are various obstacles in nominating women into parliament and quotas alone cannot solve these issues.

Both men and women are convinced that gender quotas have a strong legitimacy which is rooted deeply in the principle of equality as set forth in the 1945 Constitution. These findings suggest after being adopted more than a decade ago, gender quotas remain the preferable approach to overcoming women’s low parliamentary representation, at least in the Indonesian case. However, the efficiency of this affirmative action is affected by several other factors, including political parties, cultural barriers and women’s internal preferences.

Men and women differ significantly in their perception of parties’ genuine interest in fulfilling quotas. Women consider quotas are only being fulfilled as a prerequisite for a party to run; that parties are not genuine in promoting women into parliament. This can be partly explained by observing how few women are being nominated as candidate number one in the candidates list. This explains why 76 percent of women think parties should put more women as candidate number 1 or 2 to promote an increase in female’s share in parliament.
This study also shows the distinction between men and women in explaining the roots of women’s under-representation. Men believe the greatest obstacle in increasing women’s presence in politics stems from the difficulty of parties to attract qualified women to run for elections. Two factors responsible for this are women prioritising family over a political career and cultural, religious, and social constraints that make women less desirable as leaders. Meanwhile, women consider social values and customs that prefer male leaders are hurting women’s political nomination the most. Following that is women’s lack of political training, insufficient social capital, and insufficient funds to run campaigns. Neither men nor women think the latter need to have more role models who can become their inspiration for pursuing a political career.

This Indonesian case illustrates the importance of observing the dynamics of men and women’s perspectives on issues related to gender quotas; the roots of women’s under-representation; and strategies to overcome this disparity. It is evident to suggest both sexes agree parties need to be more transparent in their recruitment methods and that where possible they should provide financial assistance for women with substantial opportunity to win.

Future studies might benefit from these findings by expanding the research questions on how gender quotas can be implemented, not only as the rule of the game but also as part of the solution. One of the possible examinations would be whether Indonesia should have quotas that require all parties to have 30 percent of their officials being women at all levels. In this way, quotas would no longer be perceived as a requirement for parties to compete, where parties are sporadically filling the quotas without paying attention to the quality of
women being nominated, and the question of how to improve parties’ performance in nurturing female cadres would become more relevant.
CHAPTER 8. VOTERS’ PERSPECTIVE

This chapter is a published paper and cited as follow:


8.1. Abstract

While there are numerous studies available on general elections and young voters in Indonesia, far less research has systematically studied the particular connection between young voters and electing female representative. This contribution deals with Indonesian young voters (17–24 years old) by investigating (a) their shared political knowledge on electoral systems and (b) their preferences in electing female legislators. Using data from 234 respondents with various backgrounds, it argues that the vast majority of Indonesian youth are relatively less-informed with regards to the country's political and electoral systems. This paper demonstrates the gender gap exists in both political knowledge and preferences. It also suggests that young electorates offer a massive support to male over female candidates as nearly 75% of respondents are more inclined to elect a male parliamentarian. The study finds that there is no significant difference in terms of voting behaviour between young and non-young Indonesian voters during legislative elections, as both groups are influenced by gender stereotypes about the ability of male and female politicians to represent the constituents.
8.2. Keywords
Young voters, political knowledge, women's representation, Indonesia.

8.3. Introduction
Indonesian young adults, people ranging from 17 to 25 years old, comprised almost 30% of the total voters in the List of Final Voters compiled by Indonesia's General Election Commission/KPU (Rahmawati, 2014). Having been exposed to a more politically open electoral system following the fall of Suharto's regime, the group, also known as Generation Y, tends to be change-seeking, better informed, mobile, savvy and connected (Chen & Syailendra, 2014). However, a study by Kompas (2014) suggests young adults in Indonesia are also politically apathetic and less nationalistic where more than 53% considered not casting their vote in the 2014 elections.

While there are various studies available on general elections in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015; Mujani & Liddle, 2010; Simandjuntak, 2012), Indonesian young voters (Chen & Syailendra, 2014; Rahmawati, 2014), and the success of women's political nominations to elective office (Bessell, 2010; Hillman, 2017a; Noor, 2014; Prihatini, 2018b; Puskapol FISIP UI, 2014; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012), far less research has systematically studied the particular relationship between young voters and electing female representatives. By using an online questionnaire and in-depth interviews, this paper seeks to examine and elucidate Indonesian young adults' political knowledge and their support for female legislative candidates. The present article makes a significant contribution to the conversation around Indonesian
young voters concerning their political knowledge and political preferences in improving women’s representation in parliamentary politics. Substantively, this will be the first of its kind to bridge the two literatures on young voters’ political knowledge and women’s representation.

This study argues that Indonesian young voters’ capacity to participate in democracy and to shape the society in future may be limited as respondents display a relatively low accuracy in political knowledge, here measured by seven key questions related to political and electoral systems. It also finds a gender gap in political knowledge among male and female participants, although the difference is not too significant. Regarding political preferences in electing a legislative candidate, the vast majority of respondents in this study offer support to male aspirants. They judge men as being more suitable to work as lawmakers by citing some religious justification and based on the assumption that men can work outside the house with a higher degree of freedom compared to women. Most respondents were applying gender stereotypes rather than actual political knowledge in comparing male and female politicians’ capabilities in representing constituents. Conversely, participants who prefer female candidates assert more women need to be in parliament to produce better policies and to ensure women’s and children’s interests are well served.

This article is divided into four sections. The first part reviews the literature on political knowledge, gender stereotypes and women’s representation. It also stresses the significance of the current contribution. The second section explores the data and the mixed-methods adopted for this research; online questionnaire and in-depth interview. The following part
explains the results of this investigation and situates them within the current literature. Finally, the concluding section summaries the main findings, highlights the limitations of the study, and offers avenues for further research.

8.4. Theoretical Background

8.4.1. Young Voters’ Political Knowledge

Political information is often associated as a synonym for political knowledge, yet knowledge is something beyond information (Grönlund & Milner, 2006). For information to become knowledge, a person needs to process it, to distinguish correct from incorrect information (Sartori, 1987). In their seminal book, Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue political knowledge is “a critical and distinct facilitator” of good citizenship where a well-informed citizen will be more likely to be attentive to politics and to feel efficacious (p. 6). Various studies conducted in Western societies have shown a strong link between insufficient political knowledge and less interest in voting among young adults (Goerres, 2007; McAllister, 2016; Stockemer & Rocher, 2017). A similar condition exists in Indonesia, where nearly 30% of eligible voters did not cast their vote in the 2009 elections and some argue that the more critical youth were among this figure (Yasih, 2014).

A growing body of literature suggests that the distribution of political knowledge is unequally distributed, where female young adults are less politically interested and informed than males (Banwart, 2007; Dow, 2009; Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Pereira, Fraile, & Rubal, 2014; Verba, Burns, &
The uneven distribution of knowledge raises many normative concerns as women, with lower levels of knowledge and interest than men, may be less well represented in the democratic system (Atkeson, 2003; Fraile, 2014; Fraile & Gomez, 2017). Burns (2007) highlights four major explanations for the knowledge gap: (1) resource disparities between women and men, especially in regard to income, education and the control of money at home; (2) marriage, motherhood and homemaking responsibilities (Verba et al., 1997), (3) childhood socialisation; and (4) perspectives on gender roles where women’s political interests might be suppressed by ideologies of motherhood stating that women are simply not suitable for the political arena.

A study by Sanbonmatsu (2003b) on political knowledge and gender stereotypes suggests that political knowledge leads to voter stereotypes about politicians’ issue positions, while beliefs about women’s emotional suitability for politics plays a crucial role in voters supporting candidates based on their gender. Political gender stereotyping, “the gender-based ascription of different traits, behaviours, or political beliefs to male and female politicians” (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a, p. 120), can often be a shortcut and cue for less knowledgeable voters with more traditional societal views in choosing how to cast their vote (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; McDermott, 1998). To sum up, support for male or female candidates “can be explained by voters’ gender and by gender stereotypes about traits, beliefs, and issue competency” (Sanbonmatsu, 2002, p. 31).
8.4.2. Women's Representation

Globally, women only comprised 23.5% of national single or lower houses (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017c) with the best performers located in Nordic countries (42%) and the worst in the Pacific region (15.4%). Despite a series of gender mainstreaming policy interventions aiming at improving women's political nominations (Davies, 2005; Prihatini, 2016; W. Siregar, 2006), women’s share in the Indonesian national parliament continues to be under-represented (see Table 21). Regulations set by the government to promote gender equality in legislative bodies was first introduced in 1984 by ratifying CEDAW, and under Abdurrahman Wahid's administration Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming was launched as a strategy to absorb both men’s and women's experiences, aspirations and needs, to create more inclusive development plans.

Table 21. Women's share in Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR).

(Source: KPU (2014))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's share in DPR-RI (%)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>17.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scholars are puzzled by the slow growth of women's legislative representation with some arguing political parties—as gatekeepers (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995)—are not genuine enough in nominating women into parliament (Budiatri, 2012; Soetjipto & Adelina, 2012). This is evident from the fact that few parties put female candidates as candidate number one and two on the list, where 79.1% of such candidates are elected (Formappi, 2014). Thus a
study on seven parties participated in the last three general elections shows that there is no party has ever nominated more than 30% of women as leader in the list of candidates (Prihatini, 2018d). In the 2014 elections, PPP nominated women as candidate number one in 28.57% of electoral districts. This is the highest percentage ever achieved among all parties observed and the result shows that 90% of elected female lawmakers from PPP were those placed on top of the list.

However, it is also crucial to note Indonesian voters tend to support male over female candidates. A survey published by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems/IFES suggests 54% of respondents say if they had a choice between a female candidate and a male candidate they would support the male candidate and only 14% would offer support for the female candidate (Sharma et al., 2011). The gap is even wider across genders, where 62% of men say they would support a male candidate and merely 6% would elect a female candidate. From the female respondents group, 47% would support a male politician and 21% would elect a female candidate. From the whole sample, those who support a female candidate most said intelligence is the main quality influencing their preference to vote for women (35%), followed by a perception that women are less corrupt than men (26%) and then women's experience in politics (20%).

8.5. Data and Methods

Due to insufficient availability of official research by government or non-government bodies on Indonesian young voters related to general political knowledge and political gender stereotyping, this article offers an experimental
study by investigating a sample of Indonesian young adults. Here, two methods were applied; (1) online questionnaire and (2) in-depth interview.

The first method enables the researcher to gain hundreds of responses in less time than offline questionnaires and to reach participants outside the researcher's area (Wright, 2005). The second approach facilitates the researcher in further investigating respondents' answers by posing open questions which require them to explain their preferences in electing legislative candidates. The two methods are complementary and useful in quantifying participants' responses to research questions.

8.5.1. Online Questionnaire

Using Google Forms, an online questionnaire in Bahasa Indonesia was designed (see Appendix 9). The survey consists of six sections; (1) Introduction and respondent's details, (2) Indonesian electoral system, (3) The utilisation of social media, (4) Political party preferences, (5) Preferences in electing legislators, and (6) Circle of influence. The link to the questionnaire was distributed to the researcher's network through email, Facebook and WhatsApp. By using the snowball sampling technique, the online questionnaire received responses from 234 respondents.
Table 22. Demographic characteristics of research participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic characteristics of participants</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Java</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Java</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKI Jakarta</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>32.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever cast a vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>79.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study covers 23 out of 34 provinces in Indonesia (68%); with the vast majority of participants being residents of Western Java province (23.9%). The others live in Lampung (9.8%), Eastern Java (9.4%), Central Java (9.4%), Bali (8.55%) and DKI Jakarta (6.84%). The participants were between 17 up to 24 years old, with the average age of 21.36 years (SD = 1.7). Further, the demographic characteristics of participants is summarised in Table 22.

The link to the online questionnaire was made available during October–November 2017. After receiving a total of 234 responses, the researcher closed access to the forms and started to code the data into a meaningful analysis.
8.5.2. In-depth Interviews

The second method used in this study is in-depth interview. It provides the best opportunity to get a “window” on reality from the view of a participant and to allow them to tell their story as they wish, identifying the issues that are important to them (Bouma & Ling, 2004, p. 177). The interviews were conducted via emails and direct messages during November–December 2017. The participants were invited to answer some follow-up open questions relating to their earlier answers. Out of 234 respondents from the first method, only 23 participants agreed and responded to the invitation for an in-depth interview. This represents a response rate of 10% and here the interviewees are considered a sample of accidental sampling, as the researcher is “using what is immediately available” (Bouma & Ling, 2004, p. 115). The results of the online questionnaire and in-depth interviews are presented in the following section.

8.6. Findings and Discussion

8.6.1. Knowledge on Political and Electoral Systems

In the first section of the online questionnaire, participants were asked to answer seven questions related to Indonesian political and electoral systems. Table 23 shows the frequencies for correct and incorrect answers as a measurement of political knowledge for the full sample and for male and female respondents. Taking the results for the full sample, it is evident that respondents display relatively high levels of awareness of the political system (80.77%). The politics of Indonesia takes place in a framework of a presidential representative
democratic republic, whereby the president since 2004 is directly elected by the people every five years and serves both as head of state and head of government. Executive power is exercised by the government, while legislative power is vested in both the government and the two Houses (House of Representatives/DPR and House of Regions/DPD). The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature, this system is also known as “trias politica” principle. Indonesia also subscribes to a multi-party system where many parties compete in General Elections.

Table 23. Frequencies for gender relevance in regard to knowledge of the political and electoral systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Political system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>80.77</td>
<td><strong>80.95</strong></td>
<td>78.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>19.23</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>21.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The party winning the 2014 elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>83.33</td>
<td><strong>84.76</strong></td>
<td>81.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>15.24</td>
<td>18.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Number of parties in DPR RI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td><strong>58.91</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Year of the latest Election Bill passed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>32.05</td>
<td><strong>34.28</strong></td>
<td>30.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>67.95</td>
<td>65.72</td>
<td>69.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Number of legislators in DPR RI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>41.88</td>
<td><strong>42.86</strong></td>
<td>41.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>58.12</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td>58.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Number of parliaments in national level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td><strong>33.33</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 All legislative candidates (DPR and DPD) must be nominated by political party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td><strong>52.38</strong></td>
<td>36.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>47.62</td>
<td>63.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bold indicates the highest score for each questions group.
Following the Asian financial crisis in May 1998, Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime which had ruled the country for 32 years was replaced by a new reform era which brought massive changes into the national sphere (Anwar, 2010). Indonesia has experienced four successful and democratic elections in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. Along with this wave of democratisation, political parties sprang up like mushrooms in the rainy season. As many as 48 parties participated in the 1999 elections, whereas before Indonesia only knew three national parties, namely PPP, PDI and a ruling party under Suharto, Golkar.

The second question where respondents also display a high level of awareness is related to naming the winning party in the latest elections of 2014. Over 83% participants correctly mentioned PDI-Perjuangan (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*/Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), a party led by a former president, Megawati Soekarnoputri. Only a few respondents (11.96%) answered *Partai Demokrat* (PD), which actually was the winner of the 2009 Legislative Elections. PDI-P, priorly known as PDI, participated in every election and triumphed both in the 1999 and 2014 General Elections, while Golkar was listed as champion in the 2004 elections with 21.6% of total votes (Aspinall, 2010).

Most respondents (58.1%) in this study also managed to provide the correct answer for the number of parties in the DPR. In the 2014 elections, 12 national parties—and 3 local Aceh parties eligible only to compete in the province of Aceh—participated. However, due to the requirement to meet the 3.5% parliamentary threshold, two parties failed to send a representative to the DPR.
These two parties are *Partai Bulan Bintang/PBB* (1.46%) and *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia/PKPI* (0.91%) (Rakhmatulloh, 2014).

Article 414 of the 2017 Election Law stipulates the parliamentary threshold for the 2019 elections is set at 4% of the total valid national vote. This means political parties that do not get at least 4% of the vote will not be entitled to have a seat in parliament. The new provision will affect the portion of both established and emerging parties, and some predict the number of parties in parliament might be reduced to only eight or nine (Lestari, 2014).

The findings from the online questionnaire suggest most respondents were unsuccessful in their ability to correctly answer four out of seven questions. These four questions were meant to test participants’ most up-to-date knowledge regarding electoral systems and modes of political nomination.

In a question about the latest Electoral Law, only 32.05% of respondents correctly said the most updated Bill was recently passed in 2017. Most respondents (44.44%) chose 2014 as their answer, while others suggested 2016 (14.53%) and 2015 (8.97%). The 2017 Electoral Law contains a couple of important changes relating to parliamentary and presidential thresholds, as well as to the number of seats in the DPR (Amindoni, 2017). The presidential threshold of 20–25% requires that a political party or coalition of political parties wishing to nominate a president and a vice president should have at least 20% of the seats of the House or 25% of the national legislative votes in the previous election.

The next question where respondents also have low accuracy is related to the number of legislators in the DPR. Only 41.88% of the sample managed to
provide the correct answer and around 4.3% said they don't know. Indonesia has 77 electoral districts distributed into 34 provinces using a proportional representation (PR) system, where each district has 3 to 10 seats. In the last two elections (2009 and 2014), there were in total 560 seats for the DPR. In the 2019 elections, the number will be increased to 575, and these additional seats will be distributed into nine provinces (Waskita, 2017): the new province of North Kalimantan (3 seats); Riau, Lampung, West Kalimantan and Papua (each with additional 2 seats); and North Sumatra, Islands of Riau, Southeast Sulawesi, and West Sulawesi (all with 1 additional seat).

Respondents in this study were asked about the number of parliaments or chambers at the national level. The result shows only 28.3% answered correctly. This is surprisingly low as it might indicate Indonesian young people are not aware of the structure of the national legislative body (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR) which consists of two chambers; the House of Representatives (DPR) and the House of Regions (DPD). According to (DPR-RI, 2014) Law on the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), Regional Representatives Council (DPD) and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD)—collectively known as MD3 Laws—unlike the DPR, the DPD has no direct law-making power and has limited functions. This finding is further supported by the fact that, in the last question, less than 44% of respondents answered correctly to a question about the requirement for a candidate to have a political party's nomination, and as high as 13.2% of respondents said they don't know the answer. According to the current Electoral Law (DPR-RI, 2017) (Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2017 tentang Pemilihan
Umum (DPR-RI, 2017), those who wish to run for the DPR need to be nominated by a party, but those who wish to run for the DPD do not share the same requirement. Responses to this question shed some light on the level of knowledge regarding the electoral system and political nominations. It is evident to say participants in this study are not familiar with the selection process conducted by political parties.

Table 24. Respondents' preference in electing legislative candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“If I have to elect a candidate between a male and a female, I prefer to support…”</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male candidate</td>
<td>74.40%</td>
<td>88.81%</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female candidate</td>
<td>25.60%</td>
<td>15.24%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bold indicates the highest score for each question group.

In addition to the full sample results, it is also crucial to discuss the gap between male and female respondents in providing correct answers. The percentage of correct answers given by males outnumbered female respondents in five out of seven questions (71.4%). The gender gap in providing correct responses varies from 1.77% to 15.95%, where the biggest difference occurs in a question related to a party’s political nomination for DPR and DPD candidates. In this question, 52.38% of male participants provide the correct response while the figure is only 36.43% for female respondents. The result suggests future study might benefit from further investigating questions detailing the electoral system, highlighting the political nomination and candidate selection process. Meanwhile, the smallest gap occurred on questions related to number of parties in the DPR (1.77%) and the number of legislators in the DPR (1.78%), which
suggests general knowledge on parliament and political systems is relatively shared at similar levels.

8.6.2. Electing Female Representatives

In the subsequent section of the online questionnaire, respondents were asked to cast their preferences in electing a member of parliament. The question seeks to quantify respondents' inclination when faced with legislative candidates with opposing genders. As evident from Table 24, the full sample primarily favours a male over female candidate (74.4%). Another key finding from this question is the fact that male participants offer greater support (88.81%) than female (66.67%). This staggering gender gap indicates female candidates receive small support from male respondents, with the support level as low as 15.24%. Comparatively, female respondents' support towards female legislative candidates is more than double that towards male participants (33.33%).

These findings suggest the importance of further asking respondents about their judgements in supporting male and female legislative candidates. The in-depth interview sessions served this purpose as the researcher could examine respondents' grounds for gender preference in electing a lawmaker. Respondents' answers were later coded and analysed based on sub-groups of male and female, both for supporting men and women candidates. Participants' names were coded into a sequence of P1 to P25; their support for female contestants was coded as 1, while those supporting male candidate were given 0.

Respondents who offer support to female legislative candidates mentioned the importance of gender equality. A male informant, coded here as
P3, argues that women are under-represented in Indonesian politics, and this only can be changed by electing more women into parliament. Another participant suggests women’s political participation will bring benefits to women’s and children’s interests, “I hold strong to an idea that the participation of women in politics will bring out a better political atmosphere and further advance the welfare of women and children” (P1, female).

A similar rationale was given by another female respondent (P4) who highlights gender mainstreaming as the key to development of policies. She claims male politicians are often just too naive in looking at poverty, and treat the issue as gender neutral where the evidence shows that girls are more likely than boys to become school dropouts.

Another female candidate supporter (P5) reasoned women are better than men in organising and managing planned projects. Her arguments are also developed from the fact that the perpetrators of embezzlement are mostly male politicians, indicating women are less corrupt compared to the opposite sex.

The interviews also suggest justifications for supporting a woman candidate are more attached to issues of gender inequality rather than acknowledging female politicians’ better qualities than men. Only one out of five respondents in this camp asserts directly that women are better than men in serving the role as a lawmaker. This state of rationale is opposed to the second group; a collection of respondents who express support for male candidates. For those who support male contestants, female candidates are less appealing to them as gender stereotypes which they hold strong suggesting women are less
professional than men and their desire to join politics is influenced by the fact that they are part of a political dynasty at both local and national levels.

Twenty respondents (5 women and 15 men) who support male candidates participated in the interviews, and they were coded as P6 to P25. From the analysis it is evident the most common word that emerged was “leadership” (or “leader”), suggesting that this quality to lead or to govern is exclusively owned by men. The word was used by 12 respondents, including all five female informants in this group, “I prefer male candidates because I think men have better logical ability to lead than women, and on top of that there is a verse in the Quran which states ‘Men are in charge of women, because God has made some excel (faddala) some of the others’” (P8, female).

A similar argument was put forward by female respondents (P13 and P19) who claim their political preference in electing a candidate is much influenced by religious beliefs. Still, among female participants in this group, only one suggests women are unsuitable to run for parliament because their obligation to serve the family is bigger than to serve the country.

These interviews with a small group of Indonesian female young voters indicate a couple of important points related to their perspectives in looking at women’s participation in politics. Firstly, it is evident that their political considerations are heavily affected by religious and cultural norms, and perceptions around women’s duties, both civic and domestic. Secondly, their assumptions about male and female politicians’ capabilities are not based on specific measurement or method. This invites future research to develop a further investigation about how these political judgements are actually
developing among the young adults of Indonesia. It is also interesting to compare the girls and boys groups.

Male respondents who support male candidates in this research highlight men's role as leaders, and argue how certain capacities benefit men in winning an election. Two most common qualities mentioned by male participants in this particular group are assertiveness and perseverance, both claimed to be male candidates' strongest selling point.

I believe that men as leaders are more rational and can think clearly, to make decisions more objectively. This need not mean women are not capable (of doing the same) but male leaders tend to be more assertive and persevere more in pursuing constituents' interests. (P18)

Another respondent (P12) using his personal experience criticises a female candidate's banners that read “the wife of the Regent of City X”. He suggests this practice of politics of identity only shows the female candidate is taking advantage of being married or related to a local regional leader, and reaffirms that her own capacity as a politician is highly questionable.

In addition to strong positive qualities, male candidates are also more attractive due to a higher degree of freedom in engaging in politics, where women are limited because they have domestic responsibilities at home.

I consider male politicians to be more optimal in using their time in defending constituents' interests. While conversely, women politicians may be more likely to have more family responsibilities, thus time to pursue constituents' best interests will be significantly reduced. (P10)
These findings suggest respondents are not aware of the actual performance of men and women representatives in parliamentary debates. As a case study of the Special Committee on Human Trafficking bill has shown, female MPs often outperformed their male colleagues (Budiatri, 2011). The performance assessment consisted of three aspects—the frequency of attendance at the session, the liveliness of speech, and the quality of speaking in the session—and women representatives outperformed men in all aspects.

This less-informed situation is often unavoidable since voters have little access to DPR live-sessions, and the public's knowledge is primarily sourced from mass media coverage. The results presented here confirm the findings of previous studies on political knowledge and gender stereotypes (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993b; McDermott, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2003b) where less knowledgeable individuals tend to employ the heuristic of candidate appearance (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001).

8.7. Conclusions

This paper has demonstrated some key findings to contribute to the literature of Indonesian young voters, more specifically on their political knowledge and preferences in electing female parliamentarians. It is evident that Indonesian young adults' knowledge on Electoral Laws and the parliamentary system is not impressive, and this begs a question about how they would vote in general elections. Thus, the findings support previous studies on the gender gap in political knowledge, where male participants show more accuracy than
females (Fraile & Gomez, 2017; Pereira et al., 2014; Verba et al., 1997) although the disparity is sometimes insignificant.

With regard to gender stereotyping as a cue in electing legislative candidates, this current study reaffirms that in a less informed society, voters tend to vote for male over female candidates. This choice is strongly based on respondents’ political beliefs that men have better leadership qualities than women. Participants, both from male and female groups, in this study also highlighted Islamic teachings as their main driver in supporting male candidates, suggesting that a lawmaker is a leader and man fits best in this post.

As an experimental study, this article has several limitations that should be considered for future research. The first limitation lies in the approach of obtaining respondents, which is the snowball sampling technique. This method has resulted in a sample bias as most of the respondents are those from certain university and friendship networks. As a consequence, future research might consider a more inclusive and randomised approach to gathering a representative sample that can be applicable to the generalised Indonesian youth population.

The other limitation is situated in the questions testing respondents’ political knowledge. Future investigation should apply a more thorough set of questions related to gender-related political knowledge and to whether women voters would support a goal of improving women’s share in parliament if they knew the extent of women’s descriptive under-representation (Sanbonmatsu, 2003a).
SECTION 4: CONCLUSIONS
Women’s political representation is an important aspect in democracy. In fact, some scholars claim there cannot be democracy without women since political equality is central to normative theories of democracy (Fallon, Swiss, & Viterna, 2012; Paxton, Hughes, & Painter, 2010; Tremblay, 2007; Viterna, Fallon, & Beckfield, 2006). But how do democracies in the world fare in electing female representatives? The Inter-Parliamentary Union notes, on the basis of information provided by National Parliaments on 1 December 2018, female lawmakers comprise 24.1% of the world average (2019). Furthermore, Lower Houses in Asian countries, home to more than half of women in the world, only have 19.7% of seats held by women.

What hinders gender equal representation in parliament? A bulk of research on women in parliament has focused on three explanatory clusters of socio-economic development, cultural and ideological factors, and political institutions (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Krook, 2010; Norris, 1985; Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Oakes & Almquist, 1993; Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007). In this study, I delve into challenges in achieving equal representation in the national parliament in Indonesia where a legislated candidate gender quota has been adopted since 2003. It examines the world’s largest Muslim democracy as a case study by observing (1) the trends and challenges in women’s political nomination, and (2) attitudes toward female politicians and gender quotas.

By focusing on the legislative elections from 1999 to 2019, this thesis has sought to investigate various perspectives in explaining persistent obstacles that
hinder women accessing the parliament in Indonesia. At the same time, this thesis explores the conformity between the Indonesian experience and the literature on women's parliamentary representation.

I chose Indonesia as the focus of this study for several reasons. First, Indonesia is the world's biggest Muslim population which is often labelled as 'moderate Islam'. It is also the third largest democracy, second only to India and the United States. These magnitudes exemplify the importance of understanding any development taking place in Indonesia as it makes an important contribution to the comparative literature. Second, as the country returned to democracy in 1999 following three decades of authoritarian rule, the Indonesian case provides an excellent example of how open and direct democracy could in fact reinforce gender inequality in politics, partly caused by a poor electoral integrity. Lastly, while many researchers have studied the representation of women in Indonesian politics (see for instance Blackburn, 2004; Dewi, 2015; Shair-Rosenfield, 2012; Siregar, 2005) there are very few who have empirically conducted multi-method analyses (qualitative and quantitative) on various actors involved in the dynamics of electing female legislators. Thus, my research aims to fill this gap and to provide new insights into the contemporary discourses existing in gendered political representation in Indonesia.

This thesis is divided into four sections and nine chapters. In the first section, which consists of two chapters, I provide the context of the study. Chapter One discusses a detailed overview of women's political participation in modern Indonesia since Independence in 1945. In this chapter, I demonstrate how women continue to be under-represented. The chapter also introduces a couple
of main challenges in achieving gender equality: (1) representation and participation; and (2) electoral reforms and gender quotas. The introduction of Electoral Law and Political Party Law, that stipulates the requirement to nominate at least 30% of candidates being women, has fostered the increased number of female candidates.

Following the introductory chapter, Chapter Two investigates gender disparity in contemporary Asian parliaments. I seek to explain different paths that lead to women’s high and low share in national assemblies using a configurational approach. Central to this idea of configurational method is the combination and interaction between variables, complementing the conventional regression analysis. The findings suggest women’s low representation in Indonesian parliaments is a result of the combination of low GDP, lack of transparency in the public sector, the dominantly Muslim population, a high female-to-male labour force participation rate, and the presence of gender quotas. Indonesia shares the path with Kyrgyz and Uzbekistan.

In the second section, I discuss trends and challenges in nominating female candidates and assigning female MPs into committees. In Chapter Three, I created a unique dataset of candidate lists from 2004 to 2019, combined with in-depth interviews with key actors: central party officers, faction leaders, and members of parliament. Both data provide an excellent tool for assessing and comparing Islamist and pluralist parties’ efforts to meet institutionally required gender quotas in the democratic period. The chapter indicates that Islamic ideology plays no obvious role in limiting female participation in legislative elections. It also finds high-quality female candidates are hard to recruit for all
parties in the context of the open-list PR system, where costs have skyrocketed and it is harder for women to raise the necessary capital because of a host of other structural inequalities for women.

Chapter Four focuses on a quantitative perspective, by looking at political nomination and electoral success, and analytically assesses the demographic structures of candidates and elected MPs in the 2014 legislative elections. The findings suggest female candidates’ electoral success is strongly associated with experience in political office, age, and list position on the ballot sheets. Kinship and political dynasties continue to be determining aspects in women’s political nomination.

In the next chapter, Chapter Five, I examine the composition of committees in the last three consecutive elections and interviews with sitting parliamentarians. Female MPs are more likely to be placed in feminine and less prestigious committees, and rarely hold committee leadership. The results suggest Islam as an ideology has an insignificant impact on how parties are allocating female deputies to masculine and feminine committees. Unlike a previous assertion (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, & Taylor-Robinson, 2005) which contends women are being marginalised by overseeing only feminine issues, being in the feminine and less prestigious committees is more politically rewarding as legislators can offer significant direct material support to their constituents and thus boost their chance of being re-elected.

The third section examines politicians’ and voters’ perceptions of women’s parliamentary representation and the provision of gender quotas. I present data from my interviews with female politicians in Chapter Six,
highlighting that the subjective experience of female MPs is important and needs to be acknowledged in order to comprehend what is really harming women’s political nomination. They suggest cultural/ideological explanations are key hurdles in winning an elective office. The rampant practices of money politics and vote counting fraud can also be serious barriers to all candidates if not properly addressed.

Chapter Seven illustrates the importance of observing the dynamics of men’s and women’s perspectives on issues related to gender quotas; the roots of women’s under-representation; and strategies to overcome this disparity. Gender quotas in Indonesia are still widely accepted by legislatures, although there is a gender gap of about 11% between the two sexes. Men and women agree parties need to be more transparent in their recruitment methods and that where possible they should provide financial assistance for women who have a substantial opportunity to win.

Voters’ political preferences in supporting female candidates is discussed in Chapter Eight. This chapter offers an experimental analysis by measuring Indonesian young voters’ political knowledge of the electoral system. The findings confirm previous studies that show that the level of political knowledge is unequally distributed, where female young adults are less politically interested and informed than males. Most respondents applied gender stereotypes rather than actual political knowledge in comparing male and female politicians’ capabilities in representing constituents. Young Indonesians surveyed in this study replicate the older cohorts in terms of low support for women’s political
nomination. Finally, the fourth section provides conclusions and suggestions for future research.

This thesis argues that women’s under-representation is not a result of one or two factors. In fact, it is multifaceted and requires a comprehensive approach in looking at the complexity of the interplay between the three main explanatory clusters. In a broader sense, the findings presented in this thesis show that the electoral institutional approach (i.e. gender quotas and the “zipper system” in the ballot sheets) has not been very successful in enabling more women to be elected to national parliament. The institutional affirmative action policy offers a bigger opportunity for women to participate, however, reflecting on the stagnation taking place in Indonesia, it is evident to argue that more is needed to be done.

While arguing cultural and ideological barriers among electorates do matter, this thesis has also shown that a party’s ideology is not so much of a hindrance to women’s nomination. The statistical data shows that Islamist and pluralist parties do a similarly good job at recruiting females and a similarly bad job at putting them first on the list. My data also shows that electoral integrity remains the biggest stumbling block, affecting women’s interest in pursuing a political career. Considering this, the thesis argues the open-list PR system is prohibitively expensive and it hurts women candidates more than it does male aspirants because women generally have less access to financial resources.

The study also has a couple of limitations that need to be acknowledged. The first relates to the scope of the study which focuses on Indonesia. While it offers important and comprehensive findings, the scope somehow inhibits the
analysis and contribution to the wider discussion. Therefore, future studies should consider comparing Indonesia with other countries and other Muslim societies around the world in their progress in achieving equal representation in parliament. Future research could also demonstrate the value of the study of gender, religion, and politics more broadly by engaging in a more critical way with debates on open-list PR systems.

The second limitation pertains to the unique and original empirical contribution. Some of the chapters presented are based on experimental surveys, due to the unavailability of data from the government or other formal institutions. However, in the future, a national survey involving voters and legislators would be revealing. Thus, the potential contribution to wider debates about how different electoral systems may help or hinder women’s representation in parliament is indeed very promising and open for scholars to investigate further.


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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis results for the full sample, percentage of women in 47 Asian Single/Lower House of Representatives.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1 Economic development</th>
<th>Model 2 Economic development + Democracy + Corruption</th>
<th>Model 3 Economic development + Democracy + Corruption + Political institutions</th>
<th>Model 4 Economic development + Democracy + Corruption + Political institutions + Cultural values</th>
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<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>P-value</td>
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Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05.
## Appendix 2. The full set of raw and fuzzy set scores with seven explanatory conditions.

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<td>(G)</td>
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Appendix 3. Distribution of age, religion, marital status, education attainment, province of residence, professional background and incumbency among the 2014 legislative elections candidates by gender compared with the national population (Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2010a) and author's tabulation).

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<td>3.62</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
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<td>1.29</td>
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<td>10.22</td>
<td>8.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher education (including Diploma's, Bachelor's and Postgraduate degrees)</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>81.64</td>
<td>86.6</td>
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<td>87.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than elementary or not recorded</td>
<td>28.52</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of residence</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>Sumatera</td>
<td>Kalimantan</td>
<td>Sulawesi</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<td>7.22</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional background</th>
<th>Bureaucrat</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Local government</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>21.51</td>
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<td>9.95</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>56.39</td>
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<td>14.46</td>
<td>10.89</td>
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<td>1.78</td>
<td>16.43</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>56.43</td>
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<td>18.34</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>21.07</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>13.09</td>
<td>17.88</td>
<td>59.19</td>
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<td>11.45</td>
<td>20.95</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>18.14</td>
<td>46.22</td>
<td>57.67</td>
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<td>8.55</td>
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<td>8.25</td>
<td>16.49</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>42.27</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbency</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>7.14</th>
<th>39.82</th>
<th>9.06</th>
<th>41.04</th>
<th>3.93</th>
<th>34.02</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Incumbent</td>
<td>92.85</td>
<td>60.18</td>
<td>90.94</td>
<td>58.96</td>
<td>96.07</td>
<td>65.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4. Full report on binary logistic regression analysis predicting all candidates (male and female) in getting elected (coded as 1) and not elected (coded as 0).

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unweighted Cases</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected Cases</td>
<td>6285</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6606</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselected Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6606</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Internal Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Categorical Variables Codings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Parameter coding (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5820</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3964</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2321</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Outcome</th>
<th>Predicted Outcome</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5744</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 0</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.362</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>2759.606</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.094</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Variables not in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 0 Variables</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>1.651</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List position in the ballot sheet</td>
<td>512.540</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (by 2014)</td>
<td>12.349</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency(1)</td>
<td>924.583</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>1.652</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat (not minister or deputy minister)</td>
<td>1.409</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrity</td>
<td>1.422</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society and NGO</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: teacher or professor</td>
<td>.612</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive: the president or president’s personal staff</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence: active in independence movement prior to 1949</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International: did something abroad</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law: lawyer</td>
<td>2.168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government: any position in local government (not local arms of a bureaucracy)</td>
<td>27.638</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media: TV anchors, newspaper editor, columnist, etc.</td>
<td>.902</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical: a doctor</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military: military OR police</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister: an actual Ministerial position</td>
<td>33.889</td>
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<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament: a sitting parliamentarian</td>
<td>478.519</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party: an official position for a political party</td>
<td>5.315</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector: any private business position, includes consulting, accountancy, but not law</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector: any publicly held business position</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious: any religious position, or position in a religious organisation</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports: sports person</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.759</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>1.120</td>
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</table>

**Overall Statistics**

|            | 1253.184 | 26 | .000 |

**Block 1: Method = Enter**
### Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Step</td>
<td>984.244</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Block</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
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### Model Summary

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<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2703.398&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.327</td>
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</table>

<sup>a</sup> Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found.

### Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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### Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

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<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Expected</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>627.005</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>624.331</td>
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<td>4.669</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>620.860</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>618</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>611</td>
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</table>

### Classification Table<sup>a</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> The cut value is .500
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
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<td>.033</td>
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<td>.856</td>
<td>1.020</td>
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<td>1.260</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.593</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>.634</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (by 2014)</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.977</td>
<td>.966</td>
<td>.988</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>4.429</td>
<td>3.373</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>.679</td>
<td>.932</td>
<td>.532</td>
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<td>.466</td>
<td>1.973</td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>12.251</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat (not minister or deputy minister)</td>
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<td>.153</td>
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<td>.028</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>1.265</td>
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<tr>
<td>Celebrity</td>
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<td>.388</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>3.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society and NGO</td>
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<td>.172</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.844</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td>.690</td>
<td>1.354</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
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<td>.475</td>
<td>.125</td>
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<td>.724</td>
<td>.846</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>2.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education: teacher or professor</td>
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<td>1.792</td>
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<td>.181</td>
<td>.839</td>
<td>.649</td>
<td>1.085</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive: the president or president's personal staff</td>
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<td>.529</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>2.347</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>23.377</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence: active in independence movement prior to 1949</td>
<td>- 17.086</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International: did something abroad</td>
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<td>.083</td>
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<td>.773</td>
<td>.892</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>1.943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law: lawyer</td>
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<td>.212</td>
<td>1.154</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.796</td>
<td>.525</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government: any position in local government (not local arms of a bureaucracy)</td>
<td>.778</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>25.515</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.177</td>
<td>1.610</td>
<td>2.944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media: TV anchors, newspaper editor, columnist, etc.</td>
<td>-.176</td>
<td>.238</td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.838</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>1.336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical: a doctor</td>
<td>-.232</td>
<td>.356</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.516</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>1.595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military: military OR police</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>.617</td>
<td>2.224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister: an actual Ministerial position</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td>.628</td>
<td>3.625</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>3.304</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>11.310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament: a sitting parliamentarian</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>46.675</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.376</td>
<td>1.853</td>
<td>3.045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party: an official position for a political party</td>
<td>-.332</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>1.340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>z-value</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>95% CI Low</td>
<td>95% CI High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector: any private business position, includes consulting,</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accountancy, but not law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector: any publicly held business position</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.360</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.708</td>
<td>.565</td>
<td>2.317</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious: any religious position, or position in a religious</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>.267</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td>.612</td>
<td>2.323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports: sports person</td>
<td>-17.457</td>
<td>40192.970</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>-.187</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>1.674</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.829</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 5. Predicting female candidates' electability from voters' socio-economic status.

Logistic Regression

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Processing Summary</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unweighted Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Cases</td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselected Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Internal Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not elected</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
<td>Not elected</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not elected</td>
<td>2370</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0 Constant</td>
<td>-3.196</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>951.802</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables not in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables not in the Equation</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0 Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly consumption per capita (in thousands of rupiah)</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate (in percentage)</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (in years)</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Human Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Index (in percentage)</th>
<th>.638</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>.424</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling (in years)</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim population (in percentage)</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout (in percentage)</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of seats in the electoral district</td>
<td>1.114</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overall Statistics

| Overall Statistics | 4.185 | 8 | .840 |

---

#### Block 1: Method = Enter

**Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block</td>
<td>4.311</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>4.311</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>813.617ᵃ</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ᵃ. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

**Hosmer and Lemeshow Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.296</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Outcome = Not elected</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Outcome = Elected</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>238.770</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>254.071</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>239.412</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>234.045</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>233.486</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>238.112</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>246.244</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>221.591</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>235.386</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228.883</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Classification Tableᵃ**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Not elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Not elected</td>
<td>2370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ᵃ. The cut value is .500
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Monthly consumption per capita (in thousands of rupiah)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I.for EXP(B)</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty rate (in percentage)</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.671</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.924</td>
<td>1.052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life expectancy (in years)</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>1.040</td>
<td>.895</td>
<td>1.209</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Development Index (in percentage)</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>.768</td>
<td>1.307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Years of schooling (in years)</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.275</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>1.081</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>1.852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim population (in percentage)</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.794</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>1.797</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>6.527</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turnout (in percentage)</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.862</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>.976</td>
<td>1.071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of seats in the electoral district</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.716</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>.947</td>
<td>.835</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.798</td>
<td>4.034</td>
<td>3.736</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Variable(s) entered on step 1: Monthly consumption per capita (in thousands of rupiah), Poverty rate (in percentage), Life expectancy (in years), Human Development Index (in percentage), Years of schooling (in years), Muslim population (in percentage), Turnout (in percentage), Number of seats in the electoral district.
Appendix 6. Full report on binary logistic regression analysis predicting female candidates in getting elected (coded as 1) and not elected (coded as 0).

Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>565.641</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>68.325</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome = Not elected</th>
<th>Outcome = Elected</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>229.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>229.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>229.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>228.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>228.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>223.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>221.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>214.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>177.167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classification Table a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not elected</td>
<td>2199</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1 a</th>
<th>List position in the ballot sheet</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List position in the ballot sheet</td>
<td>-6.35</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>52.335</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>.629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age by 2014</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>6.760</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td>.945</td>
<td>.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency(1)</td>
<td>1.228</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>12.089</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>3.414</td>
<td>1.709</td>
<td>6.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador(1)</td>
<td>-18.814</td>
<td>25804.915</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>t-Statistic</td>
<td>p-Value</td>
<td>Confidence Interval</td>
<td>95% CI Lower</td>
<td>95% CI Upper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat (not minister or deputy minister) (1)</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>1.932</td>
<td>.473</td>
<td>1.985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrity (1)</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>1.604</td>
<td>.678</td>
<td>1.156</td>
<td>2.947</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society and NGO (1)</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>.735</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>1.828</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative (1)</td>
<td>-0.390</td>
<td>19.342</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.998</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: teacher or professor (1)</td>
<td>-0.591</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>3.495</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>2.267</td>
<td>10.598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive: the president or president’s personal staff (1)</td>
<td>-0.555</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>3.495</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>2.267</td>
<td>10.598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International: did something abroad (1)</td>
<td>-0.555</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>3.495</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>2.267</td>
<td>10.598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law: lawyer (1)</td>
<td>-0.555</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>3.495</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>2.267</td>
<td>10.598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government: any position in local government (not local arms of a bureaucracy) (1)</td>
<td>0.825</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>3.320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>2.282</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>5.541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media: TV anchors, newspaper editor, columnist, etc. (1)</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>1.439</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>3.851</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical: a doctor (1)</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>1.340</td>
<td>1.575</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>4.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military: military or police (1)</td>
<td>-0.458</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>1.465</td>
<td>1.580</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>5.397</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament: a sitting parliamentarian (1)</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>1.465</td>
<td>1.580</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>5.397</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party: an official position for a political party (1)</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>1.688</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>1.763</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector: any private business position, includes consulting, accountancy, but not law (1)</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>1.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector: any publicly held business position (1)</td>
<td>-0.458</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>1.465</td>
<td>1.580</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>5.397</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious: any religious position, or position in a religious organisation (1)</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>1.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified (1)</td>
<td>-0.390</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>1.325</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>1.472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>1.836</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7. List of questions to guide the interview.

1. **General details of respondents’ background**
   - Reason(s) for joining politics (esp. parliamentary politics)
   - Marital status
   - Family commitments (children, spouse)
   - Political party (years joining in the party, position held, political values)

2. **Opinions on female political activism**
   - Which stage is it now? – Merely spectator, active participant, or actively engaged?
   - What factors involved here?
   - Are women less interested in politics than men? Is political education lacking?

3. **Perceptions on women’s descriptive representation in Indonesian parliament**
   - Satisfaction level, is the parliament truly representing the people? What needs to be done?

4. **Roots of women’s under-representation in parliamentary politics in 1995-2015**
   - What factors hinder women entering politics? (if more than 1 factor, kindly provide the list and the order of these predicaments)
   - Do you think higher socio-economic development will bring more women into parliament?
   - Is gender quota policy significantly helps women in winning the votes?
o What about cultural barriers, do you think you got the advantage of being a woman?

o How did you get elected or re-elected in 2014? (campaign strategies, financial support—how much did it cost you to finally win, political party support)

o If you lose in 2014 Elections, what factors do you think to hold responsible?

5. **Views toward a claim that Indonesian parliament is a gendered organisation, that is dominated by men and unsuitable environment for women**

   o Is parliament “another boys’ club”? Has this changed over time?

   o A seat in parliament is often considered as a property that brings sizeable financial and social benefits, do you agree with this claim?

   o In order to improve the level democracy, do you think it is very urgent to reform the electoral and political financing regime?

6. **Other information or thoughts that worth further elaboration(s) on this topic?**
Appendix 8: Questionnaire (English translation of the survey forms by author)

1. Name
2. Gender
3. Date of birth
4. Political party
5. Electoral district
6. Commission
7. Structural position in the party
8. Contact (mobile and email)
9. What do you think of the candidate gender quota policies applied in Indonesian legislative elections?
10. Give your opinion on the following statements regarding the provision of gender quotas in Indonesian legislative elections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quotas are no longer needed to be applied because it will only reinforce the difference between men and women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas have a strong legitimacy in accordance with the principle of equality provided for in the 1945 Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women candidates are increasingly taken seriously in the elections after the quotas are implemented, making women more likely to win</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas are the tools to improve the quality of Indonesian democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties nominate female candidates merely to be eligible to compete in the elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Women continue to be under-represented in Indonesian politics. Please elaborate on the possible causes using your personal observations.
12. Give your opinion on the reasons why women have not done much in politics:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women prioritise families, not political careers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are poorly trained on the political world and minimal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social capital, financial capital for campaigning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women see the world of politics as a world of men and masculine, &quot;dirty world&quot; full of corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are hampered by various obstacles in culture, religion, and customs that prefer men as leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties find it difficult to get female candidates that have the potential to win in legislative elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient role models or examples of female politicians who become inspiration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. What strategies do you think to be effective in increasing women’s representation in the House of Representatives/DPR?

14. Give your opinion: would you agree on this strategy to increase the number of women’s share in the DPR?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More vociferous campaigns for voters to choose more women candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The election of women as legislative candidates should be more transparent, through an open recruitment mechanism by political parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding financial support to women’s political organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties provide special financial support to female candidates who have the potential to win but are constrained by funds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give women candidates serial number 1 or 2 more often</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 9: Online questionnaire forms

Section 1 of 5

Email address:

Sex:

Female

Male

Age:

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

I have a KTP/ID card and registered as a resident of the province:

West Java

Banten

DKI Jakarta

Central Java

East Java

DI Yogyakarta

Bali
South Kalimantan
Lampung
South Sumatra
North Sumatra
NTB
NTT
East Kalimantan
South Sulawesi
(Other)....................

Have you ever used the right to vote in the Election?

Yes, I have
No, I haven't

**Section 2 of 5**

The Indonesian system of government embraces the system:

Presidential
Parliamentary
(Other)....................

Indonesia has how many parliaments at the national level?

One
Two
Three

Currently, the number of DPR-RI members is:

540
Most recent election law in Indonesia passed in what year?

- 2014
- 2015
- 2016
- 2017

Currently, how many parties are in the House of Representatives?

- 10
- 11
- 12

Which party won the 2014 election? ............

Section 3 of 5

If tomorrow is an election day, I will vote for a political party (write only one):

........................................................

"I chose a political party based on the party’s chairman."

- 1 Very strongly agree
- 2 Strongly agree
- 3 Agree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

"I chose a political party based on the party's track record that I think is good."

1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

"I choose a political party based on a particular ideology, such as an Islamic party or a nationalist party."

1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

"A man is more qualified than a woman to serve as Chairman of the party."

1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

"I'm more interested in the new party than the old party."
Section 4 of 5

"Candidates for DPR and DPD must all be nominated by political party." (Select one)

Right
Wrong
Do not know

"I prefer choosing candidates who ..." (may choose more than one):

I've met face-to-face (face to face)
I often see the banner / sticker
Famous (artist or cleric or public figure)
Already experienced in board
(Other) ......

When faced with the choice of male and female candidates, then I would prefer:

A male
A female

"I choose a candidate who is also nominated by the party that I support".

1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

"A president should have a military background."
1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

Section 5 of 5

"I choose caleg and presidential candidates with what the family chooses (parents, older brother, and sister)."
1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree

"My choice of legislative candidates and presidential candidates is influenced by friends."
"I feel the MPs (DPR / DPD) are really fighting for my interests."

1 Very strongly agree
2 Strongly agree
3 Agree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
6 Very strongly disagree