PRUSSIA AND THE SECOND ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1800-1801

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyse the role played by Prussia during the Second Armed Neutrality. In contrast to traditional interpretations of this period, an attempt is made to prove that the Prussian government's actions were not a result of its subordination to France and Russia, but rather that it acted with its own territorial and foreign policy interests in mind.

After an examination of the characters most involved in the formulation of foreign policy, namely the King Friedrich Wilhelm III, his Foreign Minister Haugwitz, and certain members of the Geheimkabinett, there follows an outline of Prussia's foreign policy before 1800, and a summary of Prussia's foreign policy objectives during this period. Before going into Prussia's involvement in the Armed Neutrality, a brief résumé of the circumstances and the foreign policies of the other major participants leading to the formation of the maritime alliance is given. Then an examination is made of Haugwitz's attempts to mediate between Russia and France, the decisions surrounding Prussia's adherence to the association, and the consequent invasion of north Germany. One question is always kept in mind - was Prussia coerced into joining the alliance and taking military action? Prussia, it is reasoned, joined the Armed Neutrality: (i.) not out of enmity towards England, but to win French and Russian sympathy for the forthcoming negotiations over German secularisations; (ii.) out of a desire to defend its own commercial interests; and (iii.) in an attempt to strengthen its position in north Germany by abandoning its isolationist policy. The King considered the alliance useful to his people, but never thought that it posed a threat to England. One of the most important points in this study was to determine when, and why, Prussia decided to invest the electorate of Hanover with its troops. By demonstrating that the decision was made independently of French and Russian exhortations to do so, the study establishes that Prussia was not simply a pawn used to further the interests of powers greater than itself, but that it had its own particular interest in mind: the protection of its maritime trade, and especially the desire to preempt a French invasion of Hanover. The final chapters deal with the failure of the Armed Neutrality, and the Prussian withdrawal from Hanover.

To conclude, an attempt is made to determine what impact this short lived alliance had on future Prussian foreign policy decisions. The study demonstrates that Prussia's role, without being crucial to the outcome of the Armed Neutrality, was certainly a key one.
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INTRODUCTION

This study covers a relatively limited time span, from approximately August 1800 to November 1801, and looks into Prussia's participation in the Second Armed Neutrality. The Armed Neutrality was brought about, to a great extent, by the Russian Tsar Paul I in December 1800, and it came to an abrupt end three months later after he was assassinated, and after the Danish fleet was defeated by the British off Copenhagen. The ostensible purpose of the alliance was to curb Britain's interference in the neutral powers' sea trade. But, in fact, of the four participating powers, only Denmark took the principles involved in the conflict to heart. The others had ulterior motives. What motivated Prussia is the subject of this study.

1 It has also been called the Maritime League or the League of Neutrality, the Confederation of the North, and in French the "convention maritime", the "ligue du nord", the "association maritime", or the "neutralité armée maritime". Here the term "Armed Neutrality" has been adopted, not only to stay in keeping with previous works on the subject, but also to avoid confusion with the separate, but associated, Northern League, about which more later.

2 Russia, Prussia, Denmark and Sweden. The Kingdom of Denmark comprised Denmark, Norway, Schleswig and Holstein. That of Sweden comprised Sweden and Finland.

The subject is not entirely new, but the last work on Prussia's membership of the Armed Neutrality is dated. H. Ulmann was the first to examine it in an article published in 1898, but he concentrated mainly on the Prussian occupation of Hanover. An American historian by the name of Ford enlarged on this theme, and that of Prussian neutrality in general, in 1903. Ford based his work on research in the archives in Berlin, London, Dresden and Hanover, and while not treating the Armed Neutrality as such, the invasion of Hanover is examined in some detail. He adopted a fairly critical attitude towards Prussian foreign policy, and his sympathies are clearly in favour of Hanover. The only work to concentrate on Prussia's role in the Armed Neutrality is an article by a German historian, R. Krauel, written in 1914. His account is good, based on both British and Prussian archival material, pointing out Prussia's peculiar position within the alliance. But as it is an article, it is a summary account, and not a detailed analysis. Since there is no adequate work on the subject, and because of the gaps in the literature on Prussia's foreign policy during this period, there is a need for a re-examination of events, and for further study into the factors that determined and influenced Prussia's relations with other powers.

The Armed Neutrality was the only time between the Treaty of Basle in 1795, and the events leading up to the battle of Jena in 1806, when Prussia played a militarily active role on the European political scene. Even so, a study that limited itself to Prussia's involvement in this short-lived alliance would be of little interest in itself.


Prussia's role was far from decisive. The fate of the alliance was played out elsewhere, in the Baltic Sea and at the court of St Petersburg. What is interesting is why Prussia even played a role at all in an alliance that was essentially maritime. To answer that question, one has to view Prussia's participation in the Armed Neutrality within the wider context of its general foreign policy objectives and, above all, of its own neutrality system.

Prussia's neutrality system has been harshly criticised by most historians. They tend to see in it a weak policy, adhered to by a timorous King, and maintained by untalented ministers. These historians assume that it would have been preferable if Prussia had played a more active, if not openly aggressive role in European affairs, and sided with the allies in a coalition against France. Also, Prussia's participation in the Armed Neutrality is viewed as a result of its subordination to Russia and France, and the resulting occupation of Hanover has been criticised as being contrary to its political interests. One historian even goes so far as to argue that Prussia joined the Armed Neutrality to please the Tsar Paul, and with territorial compensations in mind. One might extrapolate to a certain extent and say that it was also to please Bonaparte, still at war with Britain. These criticisms are not without foundation, since they reflect how contemporaries perceived Prussian policy. But they do not necessarily correspond to reality, since they take neither Prussia's veritable interests, nor its precarious political and geographical situation into consideration. A more subtle view is necessary. The purpose of this dissertation is to consider the matter from a new perspective, and in doing so it hopes to determine the following points: (i.)

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7 There are, of course, exceptions to this historiographical trend. Cf. among others Feldbæk, "Foreign Policy of Paul," 19; Clara Jean Tucker, "The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I," (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1966), 67.

8 Ford, op. cit., 30, 203, 287; Ragsdale, "Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool," 60; Leopold von Ranke ed., Denkwürdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fürsten von Hardenberg, 5 vols., (Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt, 1877), vol. 2, footnote p. 14, in which he writes that Prussia occupied Hanover at the instigation (auf Anstiften) of Paul I; Paul Baillieu, Preußen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807. Diplomatische Correspondenzen, 2 vols., (Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt), vol. 2, 1887, p. xvi, thinks that Friedrich Wilhelm gave into, although reluctantly, French and Russian demands to occupy Hanover. Also L. von Sichart, Geschichte der königlich-hannoverschen Armee, 5 vols., (Hanover: Hahn Hofbuchhandlung, 1866-1898), vol. 4, 691; Feldbæk, Denmark, 9, 124. He writes that Prussia was forced to join the Armed Neutrality.

9 Ford, op. cit., 30; Feldbæk, Denmark, 126-127 and 179. Feldbæk thinks that as a result of pressure from the Tsar, Prussia was forced to provoke a conflict with Britain, in contradistinction to its own territorial interests and ambitions.

10 Krauel, "Die Beteiligung Preußens", 221.
what role did the King and his foreign minister play in formulating foreign policy, and to what extent are their characters and personal inclinations a reflection of the policies adopted? (ii.) was Prussia's participation in the Armed Neutrality consistent with Prussia's neutrality principles, or did Prussia abandon its neutral stance? (iii.) was the consequent invasion of Hanover born out of a willingness to avoid a French incursion into Prussia's 'sphere of influence' and protect its neutrality, or did Prussia buckle under foreign pressure?

There are, of course, many other factors which have to be taken into consideration. Prussia's position within the Armed Neutrality itself was a little odd, as it was the only power not to have any hostile intent towards Britain. In fact, its relations with Britain were probably better than with its treaty associates. The same may be said for the British government. When it learned of the signing of the maritime alliance in January 1801, Britain immediately decided to take measures against three of its adherents, Russia, Denmark and Sweden. It did so by decreeing an embargo on trade with those countries and by seizing their ships in British harbours. The British government did not, however, act that way against Prussia. In fact, it did not do anything. It treated Prussia with relative consideration, even after it invaded Britain's continental possession, the Electorate of Hanover, a couple of months later. It had, of course, its reasons for acting this way, but it is also illustrative of the peculiar position held by Prussia. Because it was a land power, Prussia was capable of cutting off trade and communications between northern Europe and Britain by occupying the Hanseatic trading ports, and in this way threatening Britain's naval and grain supply. Of the five rivers used for trade in north Germany, three, the Vistula, the Oder, and the Ems, were Prussian. The other two, the Elbe, and the Weser, could be controlled by Prussia through an occupation of Hanover. This explains why Prussia was wooed by both sides. It was wooed by Great Britain because this is exactly what it feared, and it was wooed by the northern powers, and to a certain extent by France, because this is exactly what they wanted. Haugwitz, the Prussian foreign minister, took advantage of the situation and played a non-committal, middle-of-the-road game for much of the time, in the hope that he would thereby avoid ruffling feathers, and gain some political advantages. Prussia's motives for joining the Armed Neutrality were not, therefore, economic. Its motives were determined by a desire to maintain its influence in northern Germany, and to obtain advantageous indemnities for the loss of the left bank.

One of the premises of this study is that Prussia's foreign policy up to the Recess of 1803 (Reichsdeputationshauptschluß) was directed towards maintaining an equilibrium between its two more powerful neighbours, France and Russia, with a view to the indemnities and territorial redistributions within Germany that were as yet
to be decided upon. Prussia wanted compensations for the provinces it had lost on the left bank of the Rhine, and which had been virtually signed away at Basle in 1795. France and Russia were to have a decisive influence on the outcome of the Recess, hence Prussia's desire to conciliate the two countries. It was one of the reasons why Prussia's foreign policy makers were more concerned with maintaining a political balance between themselves and their immediate neighbours, rather than warring against France for the sake of some sort of European status quo. This single-minded approach towards compensations strongly influenced Prussia's foreign policy attitudes, shaped its behaviour during the Armed Neutrality, and partly explains why Prussia adhered to the maritime alliance.

A few things should be pointed out concerning methodology. Most of the documents consulted during the writing of this study have been analysed before on previous occasions, and sometimes by some of Germany's most noted historians. The object of the study was not to uncover any new sources, but rather to re-examine and reinterpret existing ones. It was hoped that through a re-reading of the diplomatic correspondence of the principal courts involved, Prussia's role within the alliance would better come to light and that some insight into the court of Berlin's decisions might be gained. The documents themselves have been interpreted, where possible, on two levels. On one level, consideration is taken of the manner in which Prussia's foreign policy was perceived by contemporaries. But as contemporary perceptions were often based on misconceptions and rumours, or were at best formed without a full knowledge of all the factors involved, they cannot give a complete picture of events. It is necessary to distance oneself from them in an attempt to reassess what Prussia's actual motivations and intentions were. On another level then, and given the vantage point of time and the findings of recent research on Denmark and Russia during this same period, the documents are interpreted in the light of hindsight, allowing some suggestions to be made as to what can reasonably be perceived as Prussia's motives.

The documents in question, it should be pointed out, are derived uniquely from the diplomatic correspondence of the time, which to some might seem to condemn any interpretation to a narrow path. But this approach was taken for two reasons, and which to an extent are axiomatic when speaking of Prussia during this period. Firstly, Prussia was essentially an absolutist monarchy, and as such governmental decisions were made entirely within a very closed group of political elite. "Internal factors" and internal governmental policy never really came into consideration during the formulation of foreign policy decisions, and were barely to play a role during the period under study. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, social groups in Prussia other than the aristocracy had little or no influence on the way decisions were
made, nor on the types of decisions that were made. Thus, for example, although certain financial considerations were brought up in conjunction with the decision to adhere to the Armed Neutrality, and they are mentioned where relevant, they seem to have played a secondary role. This at least is the impression received on reading the documents in question. Secondly, and this is a factor that cannot be easily ignored, because there exists very little material from groups outside of the elite circle to work from, it is almost impossible to tell to what degree these groups might have influenced, or played a role in, the decision-making process.

The study concentrates, on the other hand, on the decision-makers, and argues that the character of both the King and his foreign minister were decisive in deciding the course of Prussian history. For many years now, historians have tended to regard Prussian politics during the post-Frederickian period as a reflection of its internal disorganisation and decay. This type of history centres more on institutions rather than on the men at the head of them. Here, a biographical approach has been adopted, to supplement the existing institutional or social approach which seems to have dominated the historiography for this period.

A few other matters relating to the content of the thesis should also be mentioned at this point. The foreign policies of the other major European powers, especially France, Russia and Denmark, are touched upon, but only in so far as they help clarify and explain the international situation on the continent in 1800-1801, and only in so far as they have a bearing on Prussia. Certain events, which have been adequately treated elsewhere, have either been summarised or completely omitted, with directions to sources for further reading. Among those themes briefly mentioned are Denmark's convoy policy and Paul's relations to Britain and the question of Malta, while the Danish occupation of Lübeck and Sweden's role in the alliance have not been gone into at all, the latter for the simple reason that almost all the sources and literature on the subject are in Swedish. Swedish diplomats, contrary to what was customarily practised in European diplomatic circles, did not regularly correspond in French during the period under study, and the court of Stockholm did not oblige its diplomats to do so until 1811. On the other hand, certain subjects, such as the Franco-Russian rapprochement, the Anglo-Danish armistice, and the death of Paul I are treated, it is hoped, from a slightly new perspective, and from the Prussian point of view. It should also be pointed out how much the author regrets that circumstances did not permit him to consult archival material in either Vienna or Moscow. A part from the fact that my familiarity with the Russian language is not adequate, many of the letters from the Russian archives have previously been published and recent research in the foreign policy of Paul I has been thorough enough to perhaps justify this omission. As for the Austrian archives, a source which would have had great bearing on the
analysis of Prussian foreign policy, the only excuse that can be offered is lack of funding. Regretable as it may be, this omission has inevitably led to the formulation of conclusions that do not take Austria into consideration, and any analysis which ignores the Austro-Prussian struggle for predominance in northern Germany is undoubtedly lacking. The fault, however, is all mine.

As a general rule, the study proceeds in chronological order, but this has not always been possible, as various foreign policies were often interrelated in time. All quotes have been placed in the original, but spelling and punctuation have been modernised. Much of the diplomatic correspondence of the time was written in secret code in order to avoid prying eyes. This, of course, did not always succeed as diplomats had various means at their disposal of obtaining codes or deciphered letters, but it is important for the historian to make the distinction between coded and normal letters when evaluating their contents. A piece of information in code was obviously not meant to be read by members of the court from whence the letter originated as it generally contained sensitive assessments of either personnel or particular political constellations. Letters which were coded usually proved to be the most interesting and the most informative, so where quotes or references are taken from them the indication in cipher is to be found in the footnotes. There is no indication next to those sources which were not coded or, to use a contemporary term, were en clair. Russian dates, to simplify matters, have been given in the new style, unless otherwise specified. Lastly, there is an accompanying annex containing the complete correspondence to and from the British ambassador to Berlin, Lord Carysfort, between August 1800 and November 1801.
CHAPTER ONE

THE DECISION-MAKERS

The following does not pretend to be anything like a comprehensive biographical sketch of either the King of Prussia or his foreign minister, something which cannot be dealt with here adequately, but it is an attempt to understand those character traits and personal inclinations which had a bearing on the formulation of foreign policy.

1. The bourgeois King

Friedrich Wilhelm III ascended the Prussian throne on 16 November 1797, at the age of 27, eleven years after the death of his great-uncle, Friedrich the Great. As an absolute monarch, ruling over one of Europe's most powerful countries, and nominal head of one of the largest continental armies, he was the exact opposite of his predecessors in that he was without territorial ambitions. He assumed office at a time when Prussia had been at peace for over two years while most of the other European powers were embroiled in a conflict with France, and was to adhere obstinately to a neutrality system until declaring war against France in 1806.

Virtually ignored by Friedrich II, and not particularly appreciated by his father, Friedrich Wilhelm seems to have had an unhappy childhood but was fortunate enough to conclude a marriage of love to the beautiful Luise of Mecklenburg-Strelitz in 1793. Without charm or any other qualities necessary for life at court, very religious, with solid bourgeois virtues, which greatly contrasted with those of his father, he possessed a rigid conception of his duty and a strict moral code. He participated in the campaigns of 1792-93 in France and in Poland, and it is quite possible that it is here he learnt to abhor the futility of war. As King, religious tolerance was re-established and

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censure of the press was relaxed. The state's finances were gradually restored. By trying to introduce a certain number of reforms, the King attempted to avert any possibility of a revolutionary outburst. In fact, there were a good many committees that met before 1806 to discuss reform, but very little was accomplished.

A timid man, he was also jealous of his authority and was capable of stubbornly refusing to listen to others' advice. He showed a sincere desire to do good for his people and to preserve his country from war, and preferred peace to the glory of combat. And that is probably why, in spite of everything, he maintained his country in a position of neutrality for so long.

While Friedrich Wilhelm III's reign has been the object of numerous studies, particularly in regard to the Prussian reform movement and the Befreiungskrieg, there is a remarkable lack of actual biographical material.² With few exceptions, historians have either ignored him, or only mention him to explain away what they consider to be Prussia's mediocrity during the Napoleonic period. No attempt has as yet been made to understand the King's character in relation to the consequences it may have had on state policy. This is especially true for foreign policy. Most historians argue that the young King, indecisive and unsure of himself, was in no position to pursue a vigorous foreign policy, the accepted formula being a weak King equals a weak policy, and lay the blame for Prussia's lack-lustre performance on the international scene on unfit advisers.³ But, however unfit Friedrich Wilhelm's advisers may or may not have been, the King always had the last say and was, as such, responsible for the direction Prussia's foreign policy took.

Among historians, the most divergent opinions are to be found concerning the nature of the King's character. This is undoubtedly because contemporaries themselves differed in their opinions of him. During the second half of the nineteenth


century, two schools of thought developed taking opposing views on his historical significance.\(^4\) There were those who came to look upon him as being a hindrance to the reform movement which followed Prussia's defeat in 1806, and as someone who obstinately did nothing. Others, admittedly in the minority, looked more favourably upon him, and insisted on the difficulties which prevented him from acting other than he did. The sources they used were essentially the same, and yet their interpretations varied. It would go beyond the bounds of this subject to treat this debate in any depth here, but a few quotations from contemporary sources will help explain Friedrich Wilhelm's foreign policy choices.

Friedrich Wilhelm III is a fairly remarkable character in that, in an age when aggressive territorial expansion was almost considered a norm, he deliberately chose a path of non-intervention. The principles by which he was guided were most certainly commendable, although admittedly not politically ambitious, and may be summed up in the phrase 'peace, neutrality, and the defence of north Germany'.\(^5\) Shortly before ascending the throne he wrote: 'Das größte Glück eines Landes besteht zuverlässig in einem fortdauernden Frieden; die beste Politik ist also diejenige, welche stets diesen Grundsatz insofern vor Augen hat, als unsere Nachbarn uns in Ruhe lassen wollen.'\(^6\) This was written by the Crown Prince at the age of twenty-six, and should accordingly be used with circumspection. But everything suggests that foreign policy, during the first decade of his reign at least, was subordinated to this ideal.\(^7\) Contrary to his father and great-uncle, Friedrich Wilhelm III was more interested in the welfare of his people than in the glory of the nation.

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\(^6\) 'Gedanken über die Regierungskunst,' in Richard Dietrich, Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern, (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1986), 734.

Examples of the King's peaceful character and intentions are numerous. He wrote to his uncle, Prince Henry, to say: 'Tout le monde sait que j'abhorre la guerre et que je ne connais de plus grand bien sur la terre que la conservation de la paix et de la tranquillité comme le seul système propre à la félicité du genre humain; [...]'.

Hardenberg pointed out that 'toute idée de gloire ou d'agrandissement qui pourrait flatter ou décider un autre Prince' was far from the King's mind, and that this was absolutely due to his character. The Russian ambassador remarked that the Prussian foreign policy system seemed to be: '[...] de préférer la paix à tout autre intérêt, résolu, de ne tirer l'épée si ce n'est pas pour la défense de ses propres états et tout au plus de la ligne de neutralité.'

Should the King's political behaviour be attributed to a love of peace or to a reluctance to engage in war? Contemporary accounts of his character are almost always in agreement. Friedrich Wilhelm feared, quite rightly, being dragged into a conflict by committing himself to one or the other belligerent parties through an alliance, as there was a personal reluctance on his part to commit himself to war. This explains his dislike of entering into any kind of new engagements, and the stubbornness with which he maintained those already contracted before his coming to the throne. The Danish ambassador to the court of Berlin, Major von Knoblauch, was told by the Duke of Brunswick that the King disliked alliances, and was most reluctant to enter upon new ones, although some attributed this to a reluctance to take active measures. It seemed an axiom at the court of Berlin that no new alliances were to be formed before the conclusion of a general continental peace. But on the whole, foreign diplomats residing in Berlin, obviously more interested in seeing Prussia adopt a warlike stance, had a tendency to regard Friedrich Wilhelm's motives in an unfavourable light. The former Russian ambassador, Count Nikita Panin, for

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8 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, xlvii, note 2, the King to Prince Henry, 16 October 1798.
9 AAE, Prusse 236, Duroc to Talleyrand, 19 September 1805.
11 Ibid., V, 358, Krüdener to Panin, 8 July 1800.
12 Dropmore Papers, V, 126, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 8 July 1799.
13 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 June 1800, in cipher.
14 Dropmore Papers, V, 153, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 18 July 1799.
15 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 15 November 1800, in cipher.
16 Count Nikita Petrovich (1770-1837), arrived in Berlin to replace Kolychev as ambassador in 1797. He later became Vice-Chancellor of the College of Foreign Affairs, and as such his task was to handle the day to day contacts with the diplomatic corps. There are no detailed biographical studies. An
example, thought that the King opted for a peaceful solution through indolence.\textsuperscript{17} The British diplomat, Thomas Grenville, also spoke of the 'natural indolence of the King's character.'\textsuperscript{18} But others closer to his person describe how conscientious he was in fulfilling his duties.\textsuperscript{19} Timidity and fear of committing an error were also considered to be distinctive traits of the King's character, although one diplomat attributed them to a commendable motive - the King's conviction of the importance and difficulty of the task which duty imposed upon him\textsuperscript{20} - and are used as an argument to explain why Prussia remained neutral for so long.\textsuperscript{21}

In short, the neutrality to which his father submitted as an expedient in 1795 by signing peace with France suited the King's character very well. That he elevated it into a principle was the result of his own personal inclinations and was not in the least due to the advice of his ministers.\textsuperscript{22} His entourage probably followed suit more through indolence than anything else. Although the British ambassador to Berlin, Lord Carysfort, believed that the King, his ministers and his favourites shrank from the very thought of war,\textsuperscript{23} it should be stressed that none of the leading political personalities at court, and for that matter Prussia, had any interest in entering into war against France.

This may help explain why Friedrich Wilhelm was more inclined to pursue a policy of non-intervention and neutrality than one of open aggression, but in outline can be found in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, \textit{The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825}, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 68-80.


\textsuperscript{18} Dropmore Papers, V, 153, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 18 July 1799.

\textsuperscript{19} Anderson, \textit{op. cit.}, 281.

\textsuperscript{20} RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 10 March 1800.


\textsuperscript{22} Seeley, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. I, 195.

\textsuperscript{23} Dropmore Papers, VI, 423, Carysfort to Grenville, 6 January 1801. John Joshua Proby (1751-1828), 1st Earl of Carysfort, Grenville's brother-in-law, arrived in Berlin on 2 August 1800, delivered his credentials to Alvensleben the next day, and left Berlin at the end of October 1801.
examining Prussian foreign policy for the years between 1797 and 1801, it is also important to mention the men that helped shape that policy, those who were closest to the King and had some influence in decision making. One man in particular stands out during these years - Count Christian von Haugwitz, the minister for foreign affairs. Three other men, of lesser significance but who nevertheless had a say in affairs, were members of the King's Geheimkabinett, a loose mixture of private counsellors and court favourites who had close access to the King's person. Those men were the King's adjutant, Major-General Köckritz, the Kabinettsrath Karl Friedrich Beyme, and the King's private secretary Johann Wilhelm Lombard.

2. Haugwitz as Foreign Minister

Count Christian von Haugwitz, after having risen very rapidly in the Prussian bureaucracy, replaced Count Friedrich Wilhelm von der Schulenburg-Kehnert as minister for foreign affairs in December 1792 and was charged with its direction. As soon as he took over a change in Austro-Prussian relations came about which ended in the Second Partition of Poland in February 1793. In April 1794, he

24 Köckritz, Karl Leopold von (1744-1821), General-Adjutant, one of Friedrich Wilhelm III's aide-de-camp, assigned to the King when he reached manhood.

25 Karl Friedrich Beyme (1765-1838). Little biographical research has actually been done. There is an historical tradition which portrays him as a liberal, but Marion W. Gray, Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 76, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1986), 48, thinks he was a representative of the Ancien Régime and an opportunist.

26 Lombard, Johann Wilhelm (1767-1812), is another political figure who was judged severely by his contemporaries. He has found a most able biographer in Hermann Hüffer, Die Kabinetsregierung in Preußen und Johann Wilhelm Lombard: Ein Beitrags zur Geschichte des Preußischen Staates, vornehmlich in den Jahren 1797 bis 1810, (Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt, 1891). Cf. his memoirs, which are a justification of his political behaviour in 1805-1806 in Lombard, Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des années 1805, 1806, et 1807. Dédité aux Prussiens par un ancien compatriote, (Frankfurt: F. Nicolai, 1838).

signed the treaty of The Hague, obtaining subsidies from Britain to continue the war against France. One year later, however, he was advising the King to withdraw from the coalition and to sign a separate peace. He played a role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the treaty of Basle in 1795, indeed he was considered by many contemporaries to be its author, and in the spring of the following year concluded treaties with France and a few north German states, whereby the latter gained admission to Prussia’s neutrality system. Haugwitz seems to have reached the height of his influence around the beginning of 1800, after an internal struggle at court with his colleague in the foreign ministry, Count Alvensleben, that ended in his gaining the dominant position. He was the key to the Prusso-Russian rapprochement and the Peterhof treaty which paved the way to Prussia joining the Second Armed Neutrality one year later. These relative foreign policy successes were overshadowed, however, by his failures, and notably the fact that he was unable to persuade the King to join the Second Coalition in 1798. Again in 1803 he failed to persuade the King to demand the French evacuation of Hanover. After this last disaster, he decided to take an extended leave and resigned in August 1804. But he continued to remain a foreign policy adviser, and was called once again to office for a short time between October 1805 and November 1806. This time, he advised against Prussia’s going to war but his warnings went once again unheeded. Sent on a mission to Vienna to announce to Napoleon that Prussia had acceded to the Third Coalition, Haugwitz refrained from doing so when news of the battle of Austerlitz reached him as a result of which he suspected that Austria would sign a separate peace. He signed the Treaty of Schönbrunn on 15 December 1805 according to which, in return for Hanover, Prussia was to cede Cleves, Ansbach, and Neufchâtel to France. The court of Berlin accepted the treaty but insisted on a number of modifications being made. So Haugwitz was sent off to Paris to negotiate better conditions but was put in the dilemma of having to choose between a more severe treaty or war with France. He ended up signing the Treaty of Paris on 15 February 1806, a virtual alliance with France. According to its terms, Prussia was obliged not only to keep the Electorate of Hanover but to close its


29 Graf Philipp Karl von Alvensleben (1745-1802). He was made Count in January 1800 and head of the Department of Foreign Affairs but had virtually no part in its direction (RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 7 January 1800). Panin said that he had no influence and that he often changed his opinion (Brückner, op. cit., V, 192, Panin to Krüdener, 3 November 1799).

30 Brückner, op. cit., V, 228-229 and 240, Krüdener to Panin, 15 and 28 January 1800.
ports to British shipping, thereby unavoidably implicating Prussia in a war with Britain. These two treaties condemned Haugwitz forever in the eyes of contemporaries and historians alike.

Of all the diplomats Haugwitz dealt with, very few had anything flattering to say of him. He was the 'ministre des ajournements' according to Sieyès, while Krüdener wrote 'il n'a que des demi-volontés.' The French ambassador to Berlin, General Beurnonville, who described him as an irascible and cowardly fellow (homme bilieux et poltron), said of him: 'Quand vous croyez avoir mis le comte de Haugwitz au pied du mur, il trouve encore moyens de vous passer entre les jambes.' The court of Vienna distrusted him. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, disliked and mistrusted Haugwitz no matter which policy he seemed to adhere to, while the Dutch envoy Stamford thought him to be 'un homme faible et qui n'a peu de moyens.'

Others viewed him a little more favourably, and were a little more discerning. Lord Grenville's brother Thomas, for example, insisted that if Prussia decided not to take sides against France and join the Second Coalition, it was not for lack of Haugwitz advising the King to do so. But he also reported that Haugwitz was continually speculating about his own situation and influence and rarely had the courage to pursue a plain and direct line. Thomas further added that he often expressed himself in 'involved and ambiguous terms in order to avoid being positively pledged and committed upon any precise and determinate object,' a trait to be found throughout his career. Panin, although admitting Haugwitz did what he could to persuade the King to join the Second Coalition, thought he could not be relied upon because of the weakness of his character. Lord Elgin, while in residence at Berlin, realised that he was probably the only minister in Berlin capable of forming and carrying through any system of politics. Both the French and Bavarian ambassadors

31 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, 1, 483.
33 AAE, Prusse 226, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 8 March 1800 (23 ventôse VIII).
34 Reported by Baudissin in RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 12 May 1801.
35 Dropmore Papers, IV, 98, and 151.
36 Ibid., IV, 175, Grenville to Elgin, 20 April 1798.
37 Ibid., IV, 409, note from Stamford, 7 December 1798.
38 Ibid., IV, 45, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 9 May 1799.
39 Brückner, op. cit., V, 192, Panin to Krüdener, 3 November 1799. Cf. ibid., II, Panin to Paul, 11 September 1797, 56-57, in which he hoped that the death of Friedrich Wilhelm II would lead to Haugwitz's dismissal.
40 Dropmore Papers, III, 163, Elgin to Grenville, 26 December 1795, and 198, 1 May 1796.
were sympathetic towards him, but they go against the grain. Some of his most severe critics were Prussian. Stein, who was perhaps the least flattering, said of him: 'Er ist gebrandmarkt mit dem Namen eines ränkvollen Verräters seiner täglichen Gesellschafter, eines schamlosen Lügners und eines abgestumpften Wollüstlings. Indeed, opinion against Haugwitz was so strong, both within the court of Berlin and among foreign diplomats, that many would have preferred to have him replaced. At one stage Paul I of Russia even instructed his ambassador in Berlin to work towards his overthrow at court.

Many historians not only see in Haugwitz a staunch supporter of neutrality, and indeed on public occasions he forwarded neutrality as being the best system for Prussia, but regard him in the most critical light. Many contemporaries also thought that he was the only thing standing between the King and Prussia joining an alliance against France. There is enough evidence to suggest, however, that the King and his foreign minister fundamentally disagreed on occasion as to the best policy to be adopted and that Haugwitz was not as rigid in his thinking about neutrality as has been maintained. He counselled the King to join the coalition against France on at least two occasions. But on both occasions, although Haugwitz was almost

41 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 439, 469, and II, 624, 625.
43 Dropmore Papers, IV, 202, 394, De Luc to Grenville, 12 May, 26 November 1798; 359, Vorontsov to Grenville, 4 November 1798; 409, 412, notes from Stamford, December 1798.
44 Tucker, op. cit., 69-70.
45 To many historians he is the mainstay of Prussian neutrality, and responsible for its continued application. Cf. Piers Mackesy, Statesmen at War. The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798-1799, (New York: Longman, 1974), 30; Ford, op. cit., 123, 131, and 141; Hans Haussherr, Friedrich Wilhelm III, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 5, p. 560-561. But this is a misconception, and underestimates the King’s role in the foreign policy decision-making process.
46 Dropmore Papers, IV, 41-42, Mémoire by Haugwitz, December 1797.
47 Cf. Seeley, op. cit., I, 192. There are, of course, exceptions to this historiographical tradition. Cf. Hüffer, op. cit., 94-95; Bailleu, ‘Haugwitz und Hardenberg,’ 271, who wrote that he was not as lacking in courage and determination as the historical tradition would have it.
48 Dropmore Papers, IV, 155, Starhemberg to Grenville, 4 April 1798.
49 Brückner, op. cit., V, 192, Panin to Krüdener, 3 November 1799; Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 265-272, Denkschrift from 15 January 1799, and ‘Haugwitz und Hardenberg,’ 273. For overtures by Haugwitz directed against France, Cf. Dropmore Papers, IV, 322, and 395-396, De Luc to Grenville, 24 September, and 26 November 1798; 346-348, Panin to Vorontsov, 18 October 1798; 418, and
successful in 1799, the King refused to budge from his self-protective system. And it was again Haugwitz who was the motivating force behind Prussia's entry into the Armed Neutrality.

If Haugwitz was obliged to carry out certain foreign policy choices with which he did not always agree, he nevertheless had fairly clear ideas about what Prussia ought to attain, and was certainly more farsighted than his royal master, or any other Prussian statesman in his time. But to implement his objectives (which will be examined later), Haugwitz had to tread his way along a tortuous path that led between the other great powers. This was by no means an easy task and one which he performed with adeptness under the circumstances. His neutrality was nuanced, opportunistic. He never hesitated to express his sympathy for the strongest power, especially if he thought it could be of some use in maintaining Prussia's precarious balance. Also, he had the nasty habit of telling his interlocutor what he wanted to hear. Haugwitz continually modified his language to suit the circumstances. Thus, during the period under study, he told the French ambassador that he had taken the first steps to organise the Armed Neutrality, while he was telling the British ambassador that his aim was to reconcile London and the northern powers. There was nothing new in this game at the court of Berlin. This was a form of Realpolitik before the term was even coined. Haugwitz practised the politics of self-interest in that he never committed himself to following a course that was not in the long run territorially advantageous to Prussia.

It would be fair to say that if Haugwitz pursued his aims with insistence, he never really went about it very systematically. He had a tendency to play a wait-and-see game before deciding, according to circumstances, upon the best course to be

481, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 19 December 1798, and 28 February 1799; 464, intelligence from Berlin, 2 February 1799.

50 Hüffer, op. cit., 95.


52 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 20 December 1800, in cipher; AAE, Prusse 228, Beunonville to Talleyrand, 1 November 1800 (10 brumaire IX): 'Il [Haugwitz] continua à s'exprimer sur cette question de manière à me donner à entendre que c'était lui qui effectivement était le moteur secret de ce qui se prépare, et qui surtout, avait déterminé la Russie.'

53 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 13 November 1800: '[...] with regard to the claims of the neutral powers, if Prussia interfered it would only be with a view to conciliate and reunite those powers with Great Britain.'
followed. This is a criticism often voiced by contemporaries. But given Prussia's precarious position one could argue that it is understandable. Haugwitz virtually had to please all the belligerent parties, and not upset anyone in the process. He realised that if Prussia was to maintain its neutral position and its influence in north Germany, it was necessary to bring about a general peace on the continent. To help this process along, he sometimes offered Prussia's mediation to reconcile the belligerent parties. But Prussia's mediatory efforts, as will be seen in this study, were a hopeless failure. Although Berlin was used at times as a meeting house by countries that had lost diplomatic contact with each other, Prussia was quickly discarded once contact had been re-established. Beunonville summed up Haugwitz's methods succinctly when he wrote:

"(...) la manière de voir, et du langage de M. de Haugwitz vous prouvera que l'ambition du cabinet prussien pour être en apparence lente et méthodique, n'en est pas moins réellement active; que si elle n'est point capable de prendre une marche hardie et prononcée, elle n'en sera pas moins attentive, ni moins prompte, à saisir tous les incidents qui pourront la servir, et qu'elle poursuit l'objet qu'elle a en vue avec fermeté et persévérance, quoique par des chemins couverts et détournés."

Haugwitz sometimes excused himself in front of foreign ambassadors for his inability to move the King by complaining of his timidity, irresolution and indolence. To a certain extent this is true, but sometimes he did so when it best suited him, when he sought a way out of a politically difficult, or embarrassing situation. Nor did he ever flinch from outright falsity, but in his defense one should add that there were very few contemporary politicians and diplomats who did. He would often give opposite and contradicting reports to different ambassadors on the same day and would make

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54 AAE, Prusse 227, Beunonville to Talleyrand, 28 June 1800 (9 messidor VIII): '[...] il a pour objet [...] d'économiser les moyens de la Prusse pour se décider ensuite selon les circonstances.' RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 3 June 1800, in cipher: 'Tous les plans de la cour d'ici étant éventuels et subordonnés aux événements, il n'est pas dans la nature des choses, qu'elle puisse contracter rien d'essentiel et de positif avec aucune puissance étrangère, sans voir au moins d'avance le parti final que prendra la cour de Vienne, surtout à l'égard de l'Allemagne.' Brückner, op. cit., V, 358, Krüdener to Panin, 8 July 1800: '[...] le cabinet prussien n'a dans ce moment d'autre système que d'agir d'après les événements.'

55 AAE, Prusse 229, Beunonville to Talleyrand, 27 June 1801 (8 messidor IX).

56 Cf. Dropmore Papers, V, 212, Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 30 July 1799.

57 Ibid., VI, 423, Carysfort to Grenville, 6 January 1801: '[...] the Minister never boggles at a lie.'
suggestions that seemed significant but which in fact he was in no position to carry out.\textsuperscript{58} He did so, not to deceive, but either to get out of an difficult situation, or because he presumed too much in his relations with the King.

3. The Geheimkabinett

The Prussian monarchy in 1800 was considered to be 'absolutist', a form of enlightened despotism. Friedrich Wilhelm II and his successor increasingly ruled through what is called the cabinet system, made up of private advisers who were responsible before the King only, and not before any kind of representative or governmental body.\textsuperscript{59} Friedrich Wilhelm III inherited this system, among other things, and continued to use it frequently before 1806. During the period under study, three men who were probably the most influential members of what is sometimes called the Kitchen Cabinet stand out, Köckritz, Beyme and Lombard. Within the government proper, rivalry rather than cooperation seems to have been the key word. There were sometimes two, and at one stage even three, foreign ministers, a condition not exactly conducive to a coherent foreign policy.

Friedrich Wilhelm III suffered from a want of confidence which manifested itself in a lack of trust in his ministers. He feared being subjugated by one or another. This resulted in a tendency to work rather with his private counsellors. The ministers sent their reports, propositions and plans to the Cabinet, and tried to have them adopted by those counsellors. Every morning Köckritz would open the mail and, according to whether it concerned military, internal or foreign affairs, would pass it on to either General Kleist, the Kabinettsrath Beyme, or the secretary Lombard. They in turn would then report to the King and consult with him.\textsuperscript{60} Of all the ministers, only Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Schulenburg\textsuperscript{61} (once a week), and his foreign minister

\textsuperscript{58}Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, 454, Krüdener to Panin, 23 September 1800.

\textsuperscript{59}Cf. Hüffer, \textit{op. cit.}, especially pp. 44-93 on the Prussian cabinet.

\textsuperscript{60}Bailleu, 'Haugwitz und Hardenberg,' \textit{Deutsche Rundschau}, 20 (1879), p. 271.

\textsuperscript{61}Schulenburg-Kehnert, Count Friedrich Wilhelm von der (1742-1815), one of Friedrich II's principal collaborators, went into disgrace on Friedrich's death, was recalled into activity by Friedrich Wilhelm II during difficulties with Russia. Named cabinet minister, minister of war and head of foreign affairs in May 1791, as early as the end of 1792 he had to concede to Haugwitz the direction of foreign affairs. He retained, however, important portfolios, including that of head of secret police. Considered an unconditional adherent of the Ancien Régime, his hostility towards France was generally known. When he was head of Foreign Affairs in 1791-92, he helped push the King into war. One of the leaders of those who supported the Coalition, he detested his rival Haugwitz. In 1800 he was named
Count Haugwitz (irregularly), came in contact with the King. When Haugwitz could not see the King, he confided foreign affairs to Lombard.

The members of the cabinet had more frequent and closer contact with the King than government ministers, and as such had greater opportunities to influence the course of affairs. We know, for example, that Lombard was the person most responsible for preventing the King from adhering to the Second Coalition in 1799, and was probably at this stage his most trusted confidant. Köckritz was an inseparable associate, friend, and confidant of the King, never leaving his side during the day and accompanying him to the Opera in the evening. The King relied heavily on him. He would generally attend cabinet meetings without participating verbally, but he would be called upon the next day in order to discuss what had been said. Beyme was Friedrich Wilhelm III's bourgeois favourite, and one of his closest advisers, holding the title 'privy councillor of the cabinet'. Though without the requisite title, he was virtual prime minister in 1800 and was one of the rare people who worked directly with the King. Much of his power consisted in the fact that he was the man everyone had to go through to get to the King. Beyme, however, was


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63Bailleu, 'Haugwitz und Hardenberg,' 271. Although according to Carysfort he was in turn completely dominated by Beyme. (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 1 November 1800).

64Seeley, *op. cit.*, I, 197.


67Thielen, *Hardenberg*, 120, quotes Hardenberg who referred to him as 'de[r] geheime Premierminister Preußens'. Gray, *op. cit.*, 48, also points out that his enemies called him the 'invisible prime minister'. Dehio, 'Reform-Denkschrift Beymes' quotes a from Hardenberg to th Queen, dated 4 July 1806: 'Er [Beyme] ist der Tat nach Premierminister und wird es noch dem Namen nach werden, wenn es so fortgeht.'

68RA, Depecher, Rosenkranz to Bernstorff, 7 January 1800, in cipher.
only occasionally concerned with foreign affairs, even though he would have liked to 
have become more involved.

It would be a mistake however to think that the King let himself be completely 
led by his private advisers. His system was essentially based on mistrust - mistrust 
of his own advisers, and mistrust of foreign powers trying to get the better of him.

4. The decision making-process

Haugwitz's influence over Friedrich Wilhelm III was without a doubt limited. 
The British ambassador to Berlin, Lord Carysfort, believed that Haugwitz had no 
real influence at all and that the King's ear was engrossed by Beyme and Lombard. 
Haugwitz's role was complicated by the fact that he was obliged to share his 
ministerial function with others. As Lord Elgin pointed out: '[...] even in matters 
where the Foreign Department is exclusively concerned, he [Haugwitz] cannot act 
independently of Count Finckenstein, and Baron Alvensleben; hence that degree of 
caution, that wavering, and occasional variations which are to be perceived in every 
plan of this Cabinet.'

According to the Danish ambassador, the King was more inclined to listen to 
Lombard than to Haugwitz. Haugwitz was never in a position to exclusively 
determine foreign policy. Others, and especially the members of the cabinet, seem 
to have possessed more say and more sway. Although Köckritz was a friend of 
Haugwitz, and Lombard a close collaborator (indeed Lombard owed his position to 
Haugwitz), it is impossible to tell how much consultation there was between them, 
and to what extent private advisers influenced foreign policy decisions. During the 
period under study at least, both of these men acted as a kind of intermediary between

69 Bailleu, 'Haugwitz und Hardenberg,' 271.
70 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 15 March 1801: 'The King's natural timidity is 
increased by that of all his generals without exception, by distrust, (well grounded) of the affections of 
the army, and by suspicions, most just, of the abilities, and intentions of his counsellors.'
71 Cf. Dropmore Papers, VI, 175, Grenville to Minto, 25 March 1800, for a note on Carysfort's 
appointment to Berlin.
72 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 25 November 1800, in cipher; Dropmore Papers, 
VI, 415 and 423, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 December 1800 and 6 January 1801.
73 Graf Karl Wilhelm Fink von Finkenstein (1714-1800), was also foreign minister.
74 Dropmore Papers, III, 198, Elgin to Grenville, 1 May 1796.
75 RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 22 April 1800, in cipher: '[...] le comte n'a et n'aura 
jamais une influence sur les décisions de Sa Majesté.'
76 Bailleu, 'Haugwitz und Hardenberg,' 271.
Haugwitz and the King, informing the foreign minister of the King's decisions and of the line of policy he was to adopt. On one occasion at least, Haugwitz was not even informed of the military decisions that the cabinet had decided upon. Thus he was not aware, for example, that orders had been given to occupy the city of Bremen. Köckritz also sometimes acted as intermediary between the King and foreign diplomats. This would suggest that, on one level, foreign policy decisions were made after discussion between the King, Köckritz and Lombard, who was often present, and then carried out without the relevant minister being informed. Other courtiers sometimes held the King's ear. Thomas Grenville complained, for example, that: While I have worked myself into a lather in working upon the foreign secretary, a round and stupid aide-de-camp who scarcely knows one step beyond the daily parade of the King's guards at Potsdam, works daily upon the easy and undistinguishing ear of the King, and in the voice of this mentor is lost all the uncommon exertions which were sincerely made by Haugwitz.

It should not be thought, however, that Friedrich Wilhelm was totally under the sway of his entourage. His personal opinions often differed with those of his ministers and advisers. Contemporaries believed that the 'cupidity' of his entourage was in opposition to the King's character and principles. The King, it should be emphasised, always had the last say, and could refuse to accede to the best intended plans formulated by his ministers.

The personality of the King and his ministers, however, can only partly explain the course of Prussian foreign policy. Friedrich Wilhelm did, after all, inherit a situation left by his father, and the path he chose to follow was influenced to some degree by that situation. Neither the international situation, nor Prussia's internal conditions, were of his making. A review of Prussia and its foreign policy before

77 Cf. RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 7 January 1800, in cipher; GStA Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140 C 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Köckritz to Haugwitz, 30 March, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12 April, 30 July 1801.
78 See infra., chapter VII, 2, c.
79 Cf. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, copy of a letter from Decken to Carysfort, 3 March 1801.
80 Dropmore Papers, V, 50, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 13 May 1799. He was referring to Friedrich Wilhelm Christian von Zastrow (1758-1830), the King's aide-de-camp.
81 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 3 October 1801, in cipher: '[...] le roi n'est pas aussi décidément gouverné par ses entours, qu'on ne le suppose communément, que ses opinions individuelles diffèrent souvent de celles de ses ministres, [...]'.
1800 is necessary, therefore, not only to understand Friedrich Wilhelm's reign but the decisions he made during the Armed Neutrality.
CHAPTER II

THE POLITICS OF ISOLATION

1. Prussia in 1800

a) Its size and population

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Prussian state was a mixture of heteroclite territories stretching across the Holy Roman Empire, from Memel on the Baltic coast, to the Duchy of Cleves on the Rhine. It was a 'federation of states'\(^1\) as administratively diverse as the provinces from which it was made. Between 1740 and 1795, the population and the size of the kingdom virtually doubled through colonisations, conquests, and an increasing birth rate. In 1800, the kingdom of Prussia numbered about 6.2 million subjects.\(^2\) Roughly half of this territory and population were of Polish origin. By comparison, it has been estimated that Great Britain's population was about 15.6 million, the Austrian Empire counted about 27, France about 28, and Russia between 30 and 38 million inhabitants.\(^3\)

If its population was much smaller than the other three great continental powers, its army was comparable in size. Although reduced by Friedrich Wilhelm III, in time of war Prussia was still capable of putting an army of approximately 275,000

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men into the field. In 1806, Prussia put about 150,000 men into the campaign which was to culminate in the battle of Jena. By contrast, Napoleon put about 190,000 men, and the Austrians about 85,000 men into the Ulm campaign. By 1813, Prussia had nearly 300,000 men under arms, about 6 per cent of the population. However, the generals who led it into war during the First Coalition were either old or incapable. Their inefficiency was proven by their performance on the battlefields of Champagne and on the banks of the Rhine during the wars of the First Coalition and by the dismal ineptitude they showed in suppressing the Polish rebellion in 1794. Nevertheless, the army was still considered to be a force to be reckoned with, as may be seen from the considerable diplomatic efforts made by the other great powers to entice Prussia into an alliance. Between 1795 and 1800, France made several alliance propositions to Prussia, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, none of which were seriously taken into consideration by the court of Berlin. In 1799, the English and Russians attempted to entice Prussia into a military campaign directed against the French in Holland.

b) Its trade and shipping

Prussian commerce thrived between 1796 and 1805, aided by the period of peace brought about by its neutrality system. By the end of that time, a commercialisation of agriculture had taken place in which Prussia supplied almost half of Britain’s grain imports. Indeed, Prussia had become the centre of the European grain trade. German and Polish grain was shipped through the ports of Danzig, Königsberg and Elbing, and by 1800 trade from these three ports amounted to almost

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5 *The New Cambridge Modern History*, 14 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957-1970), vol. 9, *War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval, 1793-1830*, 1965, ed. by C. W. Crawley, 66; Rudolf Ibbeken, *Preußen 1807-1813. Staat und Volk als Idee und in Wirklichkeit*, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), 398, says 300,000 were put into the field between 1813 and 1815, and this in spite of the fact that Prussia’s territories were considerably reduced by the Treaty of Tilsit.


one third of the world's grain trade.\(^8\) Although it is difficult to obtain accurate figures on Prussian shipping, I have tried to piece together an approximate picture from various sources.

During the neutrality period which followed the Treaty of Basle, Prussian maritime trade flourished. But it was also a period of constant diplomatic disputes with the belligerent powers, especially Britain and France, whose endeavour to harm one another also detrimentally affected neutral shipping. As far as the Prussian government was concerned, the rule 'free ships, free goods' was practised. Contraband was limited to weapons and munitions. Prussia, which did not have a navy, and which did not want to issue letters of marque to privateers, endeavoured to bring about the application of liberal principles for the security of trade and shipping.\(^9\) This was not done out of any consideration for international law, but out of self-interest. It should be underlined, however, that maritime trade was always considered to be of secondary interest by almost all the Prussian ministers. At the beginning of February 1798, Schulenburg handed over a note to the foreign ministry in which he expressed the opinion that an increase in the amount of shipping for Prussia was dangerous, as Prussia was a land power which did not have the manpower to supply the necessary seamen. He pointed out that the strong increase in the number of Prussian ships since the beginning of the Anglo-French conflict was financed by foreign capital and that not even half of those ships sailing under the Prussian flag were actually Prussian owned. They belonged to other nationalities like the Dutch and French. In 1801, the number of vessels sailing under the Prussian flag was about 1,400, but of these only about 400 were actually owned by Prussian merchantmen.\(^10\) Schulenburg was of the 'old school', so to speak, and followed Friederich II's axiom that a country without a navy could not hope to protect its maritime trade on far away seas in times of war. He suggested, therefore, that Prussia limit itself essentially to the Baltic Sea, and peripherally to Britain, Holland, France, and, if the need arose, to Portugal.

While for the purposes of this study Prussia's conflict with France over neutral shipping rights will not be detailed, it will be useful to outline the disagreements

\(^8\) Jerome Blum, The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 243; Robert M. Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility. The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 77. Textiles, however, and not cereals, were the main export in 1800. They amounted to about 75 per cent of Prussian exports (Crawley, op. cit., 53).

\(^9\) The following summary is based on Krauel, 'Die Haltung Preußens in Fragen des Seekriegsrechts von 1783-1799,' FBPG, 24 (1911), 183-226.

\(^10\) RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 4 August 1801, in cipher.
between Britain and Prussia over the same subject. The Department of Foreign Affairs in Berlin never missed an occasion to complain about British procedures and charged its envoy in London to demand satisfaction or compensation for every case which it thought necessary to raise. The Foreign Office took these complaints with composure, and it was Lord Grenville's policy to hand over such notes to the King's Advocate, John Nicholl. The owners of any neutral ship taken as a prize by the British navy had to go through the British judicial system to recover their property. The process was very lengthy, sometimes lasting one to two years before a judgement was made, more if there was an appeal. Appeals from the Prussian government had no effect on matters.

The actual amount of damage done to Prussian shipping was, although considerably less than that suffered by other neutral sea powers, still important. The following figures give an indication of the number of ships brought into British harbours and reclaimed by the Prussian Consul:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Released</th>
<th>Condemned</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1796/7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Later, when hostilities broke out between Britain and the northern powers, the Prussian ambassador to St. James, Baron Jacobi-Kloest,\(^\text{12}\) reported that more than 100 Prussian vessels were taken as prizes since the start of the war.\(^\text{13}\) The previous number of ships captured by the British had increased yearly totalling, as far as the Consul in London was aware, more than 460 for the period between 1796 and March 1800 and over 600 for the period before February 1801. Many of those captured, however, were fishing vessels. The ships had an average value of 20,000 thalers, cargo not included. English newspapers reported that value of Prussian prizes for the years between 1796 to the middle of 1800 were about one million pounds sterling, or 6 million thalers. The loss of Prussian shipping finally condemned by the British High Courts was valued at 1 million thalers. But other costs incurred by the ships'
Proprietors have to be considered, such as the high cost of lawyers, the cost of storing the freight in dispute, damage to the ships, interest on capital, and high insurance premiums. Beurnonville wrote that the total value of Prussian ships held by the English pending trial at the end of 1800 was estimated at one million ecus. The Prussian figures are much higher than the English. Haugwitz told Reden that the loss of Prussian shipping at the hands of the British was valued at about 10 million ecus. But Reden confided in Helbig, the envoy from Saxony, that he believed this estimate to be exaggerated, and that at least 4 million was made up of foreign property being shipped by Prussian vessels. A few months later, the estimated value had increased to 18 million ecus. These last two figures were undoubtedly greatly exaggerated. On the other hand, Prussian shipping also profited from the actual political conjuncture. Because of the French invasion of Holland, that country had lost its supremacy in the Baltic. It led to a considerable increase in the number of ships under Prussian flag in Russian and English ports. Also the voyage to Holland, France and Spain offered, in spite of the danger of the English blockade and privateers, a tempting chance to win profits, which was successfully used by neutral Prussian shipping.

In spite of the injustice of the English judicial system, the Prussian government was not about to take any counter measures. The English market was, after all, Prussia's best client for the sale of products from the Baltic, and only Britain could satisfy its need in colonial goods. The following list gives an indication of the amount of trade carried on in Prussian ports for the years 1800 and 1801. It lists the number of ships, of all nationalities, clearing and arriving three of the principle Prussian ports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1800</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrived Memel</td>
<td>cleared Memel</td>
<td>542;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Königsberg</td>
<td>684;</td>
<td>Königsberg</td>
<td>664;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danzig</td>
<td>966;</td>
<td>Danzig</td>
<td>949;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>2,217;</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>2,155.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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14 AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 30 December 1800 (9 nivôse IX).
15 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 February 1801 (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, III).
16 StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 13 July 1801, in cipher.
17 StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 10 July 1801, in cipher; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 4 August 1801, in cipher.
18 The figures are taken from Joshua Jepson Oddy, European Commerce, shewing new and secure channels of trade with the continent of Europe [...], (London: W. J. and J. Richardson, 1805), 224, 234 and 259.
For 1801

arrived at Memel, 560; cleared Memel, 567;
Königsberg, 920; Königsberg, 921;
Danzig, 1,217; Danzig, 1,207;
total 2,697; total 2,695.

Of the number of vessels which entered British ports in 1800, 1,901 came from Prussia (including 539 British vessels). Of the number of vessels leaving Britain in 1800, 1,976 sailed for Prussia (including 277 British vessels). Trade continued to increase over the next few years.

The number of Prussian vessels passing through the Danish Sound also provides us with some interesting figures. In 1798 the number amounted to 1,621. In the year 1799 for example, 723 vessels sailed from the North Sea to the Baltic, and 697 in the opposite direction. In comparison, 1,223 British vessels sailed to, and 1,376 from the Baltic. The other two maritime powers had comparable figures to Prussia: Denmark with 727 to and 844 from; Sweden with 783 to and 891 from. Russian trade was insignificant with 6 to and 7 from. The figures are similar for 1800 with 855 Prussian vessels sailing to the Baltic, and 908 sailing to the North Sea. In 1804, the number of Prussian vessels passing the Sound increased to 2,012.

All in all, relations between Prussian and Britain at the end of 1799 were about the same as when Prussia withdrew from the First Coalition in 1795. Prussia constantly held to its principles of neutral maritime trade and protested each time those rights were violated. These little squabbles occasionally led to feelings of ill will between Berlin and London, expressed by an exchange of diplomatic notes. But it did not lead to a marked deterioration of relations. This occurred when Britain’s enemies persuaded Prussia to join them in an alliance whose catch phrase was to fight British maritime despotism.

21 The figures are taken from PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 36.
22 PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 40. Britain, 1,626 to the Baltic, and 1,514 from the Baltic; Denmark, 727 to and 760 from; Sweden, 899 to and 1,042 from.
23 Holborn, *op. cit.*, 267.
c) Its geo-political position

Maritime trade, although of relative importance to Prussia’s economy, was not a decisive factor in the events that are about to be described. Of far more significance was Prussia’s geographical position within Germany and Europe. Prussia was surrounded on all sides by potentially hostile countries, and this factor weighed heavily on the course of Prussian foreign policy during the period under study.

On Prussia’s eastern-most border lay the Russian Empire. The Tsar, Paul I, had only recently resumed diplomatic relations with the court in Berlin, after a rupture of about six months that had been brought about by Prussia’s refusal to adhere to the Second Coalition. Russia’s withdrawal from the coalition and her subsequent rapprochement with Prussia was to play an important role in the development of the Armed Neutrality. On its western-most border lay the French Republic, or more precisely, Belgium and the Netherlands under French domination. Relations with France had remained relatively stable since the Treaty of Basle brought war between the two countries to an end in 1795. Prussia’s policy towards France was pragmatic but cold until the period under study, when Europe’s political constellation changed to such an extent that a rapprochement became desirable. These two powers, Russia and France, exercised much influence, not only on Prussian affairs, but also on Germany.

Between the Duchy of Cleves on the Rhine and Berlin, Prussian territories were intermingled with a number of German states and, in particular, with the Electorate of Hanover. By a quirk in history the Elector of Hanover was also the King of Britain. In principle, the two countries were completely separate, the country being governed by a Regency in the absence of its Elector. Given its geographical position, it was of the highest strategic importance to Prussia. Its fate could not be regarded with indifference by the court of Berlin and, as we shall see, was taken into serious consideration when any foreign policy decisions had to be made. Things were made a little more complicated by the fact that Britain’s enemies had a tendency to

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24 On Russo-Prussian relations before 1800 see Tucker, op. cit.
26 The Geheimrat, or Privy Council, which ruled the country was headed by the Kammerpräsident Graf Karl Rudolph August von Kielmansegg. Other members of the Geheimräte whose signatures appear on the diplomatic documents consulted were: Christian Ludwig August von Arnswaldt; Georg August von Steinberg; Claus von der Decken (1742-1826, not to be confused with Captain von der Decken); and Wilhelm August Rudloff (1747-1823).
regard Hanover as an English continental possession, and as such considered it fair game during a state of war.

To the north of Hanover lay the Kingdom of Denmark. During Friedrich Wilhelm II's reign, relations with Denmark remained essentially the same as they had been under Friedrich II. In order that Prussia continue to conduct her policy of expansion in the east, it was necessary that the north of Germany remain peaceful and quiet. As we shall see, any Danish incursions into the north German area were most unfavourably looked upon.

If we consider Prussia's relations to the other European powers in terms of population and land mass, then it would rank about fifth in the pecking order, behind Russia, France, Austria, and Britain. Nevertheless, Prussia was generally held by contemporaries to be a first-rate power. Although Prussia's reputation in the eyes of the international community had gradually declined since the death of Friedrich II, the size of its army still left it with a broad range of political options. This gave it, in principle, much more influence over the course of European, and in particular German, affairs than comparable medium-sized nations.

2. Prussian Foreign Policy Before 1800

Before treating Prussia's role in the Armed Neutrality, a brief review of Prussia's foreign policy for the years preceding 1800 will help explain its attitudes and motivations during the alliance.

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a) The War of the First Coalition

At about the time the Revolution in France began, the Austrian and French monarchies had been allies since 1756. On the other hand, the two principal German powers, Austria and Prussia, had not been on such friendly terms. On the contrary, these two countries had either been at war with each other, or had at least maintained a hostile stance towards each other since 1740 and the War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian 'antipathy' was the pivot of central European power politics during Friedrich II's reign and continued to be so after his death.\textsuperscript{31} At first then, Prussia looked favourably upon a Revolution that darkened relations between France and its traditional enemy,\textsuperscript{32} and in 1790 the Prussian cabinet minister, Count Ewald von Hertzberg,\textsuperscript{33} took advantage of this situation by concluding an alliance with the Ottoman Empire (Austria was then at war with the Ottoman Empire). The two countries looked like drifting towards war, when Joseph II of Austria died on 20 February 1790.\textsuperscript{34} He was succeeded by Leopold, who adopted a series of conciliatory measures, which included a rapprochement with Prussia. In July 1790, the treaty of Reichenbach was signed, putting an end to Prusso-Austrian hostility. The Prussian King, Friedrich Wilhelm II, who seems to have suffered from an uncontrollable acquisitive urge, then turned his gaze towards France. In September 1790 Lucchesini was sent to Vienna to sound out the possibility of an expedition against France.\textsuperscript{35} When this suggestion was rejected by Leopold, Friedrich turned eastward where his gaze fell upon Poland. But to undertake anything against Poland, Austria had to be either enlisted or neutralised. With this in mind, the King's confidant, Johann Rudolf von Bischoffwerder,\textsuperscript{36} was sent to Vienna on a secret

\textsuperscript{33}Hertzberg, Ewald Friedrich, Count von (1725-1795). The Prusso-Austrian rapprochement that took place during this period led to his elimination from office.
\textsuperscript{35}Although, as Blanning, \textit{op. cit.}, 82, points out that, 'characteristic of the multidirectional quality of Prussian policy,' he was sent at a time when Ephraim was in Paris putting out feelers for an \textit{alliance} with France.
\textsuperscript{36}Bischoffwerder, (also Bischoffswerder) (1741-1803), promoted through the ranks by Friedrich Wilhelm II to General Adjutant, who sent him to Emperor Leopold early in 1791. He came back in
mission in February 1791. This attempt failed too. There was no reason why Austria should stand by and let its traditional enemy satisfy its desire for aggrandizement. But, undaunted, another attempt was made to conclude an alliance with Austria when Bischoffwerder was once again sent to Vienna in June 1791. This time, because of events in France, Leopold was more attentive. A series of agreements followed, which were to end in an alliance being concluded on 7 February 1792. One might say that the basis of Bischoffwerder’s foreign policy, and therefore of Prussia’s, was to come between Austria and Russia to check Russia’s expansionist tendencies in the East. An alliance with Austria was, to many at the court of Berlin, interesting only in the event of war against Russia. Now they were linked to Austria in a possible war against France, for the French Revolution quickly began to come to the foreground in European affairs. Oddly enough, it was France that declared war on the King of Bohemia and Hungary on 20 April 1792, thereby implicating Prussia in the conflict.

Prussia entered the war essentially in the hope of obtaining territorial acquisitions under the thinly disguised veil of assisting the French King. The idea of a rapprochement between Prussia and Austria in view of an intervention in France was aired as early as September 1790 between Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen and the

March with news that nothing was to be expected from the Emperor so long as the representatives of the present Prussian policy remained in power. A few weeks later Hertzberg was dismissed.


Blanning, op. cit., 84-85; Karl A. Roider, Baron Thugut and Austria’s Response to the French Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 91. The Austro-Prussian preliminary agreements were signed on 25 July 1791. They bound both powers to cooperate in future policies towards France. The agreement was transformed into the Declaration of Pillnitz a month later (August 1791), in which Leopold II and Friedrich Wilhelm II invited sovereigns of Europe to join them in a concerted effort to restore the freedom and authority of Louis XVI. What was in effect an empty gesture was transformed by the French into the prelude to a revolutionary crusade.

There was as yet no Austrian Emperor. France did not declare war on Prussia or the other German states in the hope of keeping them neutral (Roider, op. cit., 93). Also, many people in France believed that Prussia, land of the ‘Philosopher-King’ and France’s ally, would not go to war. Sydney Seymour Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France: A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition, 1792-1797, 2 vols., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 66-67. It was not until July of that year, that France, with Friedrich Wilhelm II at the head of his army marching towards the Rhine, declared war against Prussia. For the course of events leading up to the French declaration of war cf. Blanning, op. cit., 69-130.
Austrian envoy Prince Reuß. Even then eventual territorial compensations were mentioned. But Prussia's participation in the First Coalition soon aroused dissatisfaction at home and some scepticism abroad. Certain influential people at the court of Berlin were against war with France, and during its course were to put an increasing amount of pressure on the King to end it. The military were never really enthusiastic about a coalition that made them the allies of their traditional enemy. Public opinion was also more inclined towards sympathy with the French Revolution, and against the war. The Austro-Prussian alliance was considered to be the work of the King and his favourite Bischoffwerder and was very unpopular in Berlin. Some foreign diplomats were sceptical about whether an Austro-Prussian alliance would last and about the wisdom of war that was not only proving to be the ruin of Prussia's army and treasury but which allowed Catherine II of Russia a free hand in Poland.

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42 These people included: the King's uncle, Prince Henry, although his influence was minimal; the Prussian foreign minister, Alvensleben, who had always been against the Austro-Prussian treaty; ditto for Finckenstein, also foreign minister; Haugwitz, initially in favour of the war, began to have second thoughts; Lucchesini, de facto ambassador to Vienna, who had a lot of influence in foreign affairs; the finance ministers Struensee, Werder and Blumenthal.

43 For Prussian public opinion towards the French revolution and the war, see Otto Tschirch, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Meinung in Preußen vom Baseler Frieden bis zum Zusammenbruch des Staates (1795-1806)*, 2 vols., (Weimar: Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1933-34), vol. 1, 10-63, especially 36-37 for the attitude at court concerning the war, and 49-51 for that of the army. Willy Real, 'Der Friede von Basel,' *Baseler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, 50 (1950), pp. 28-29, points to the role the Enlightenment mentality played during this period.


45 At the beginning of Friedrich Wilhelm II's reign the treasury was estimated at 52 million thaler. On his death eleven years later, there was a 55 million thaler debt. The yearly tax collections amounted to between 26 and 27 million thalers and were slightly increased under Friedrich Wilhelm III to 28 million. Friedrich Wilhelm III was able to mitigate the debt somewhat, paying off 22 millions by 1806, and collecting a reserve of 17 million thalers. Cf. H. W. Koch, *A History of Prussia*, (London and New York: Longman, 1978), 156; Behrens, *op. cit.*, 186; Albert Naudé, 'Der preußische Staatsschatz unter König Friedrich Wilhelm II und seine Erhöpfung,' *FBPG*, 5 (1892), pp. 203-256.

The year 1793, although it started out well for the coalition, ended in a series of military reversals on the Rhine and in Flanders. Austro-Prussian bickering was at the heart of these failures. They came to a head in August when the Prussian envoy, the Marquis de Lucchesini, and Count Lehrbach, an Austrian envoy sent on a mission to Prussian headquarters, quarreled over Poland. Shortly thereafter, Friedrich Wilhelm decided to give priority to the East. At the same time that Prussian troops were marching towards Paris, Friedrich Wilhelm II came to an agreement with Catherine of Russia over a new Polish partition. Poland was divided for a second time between Prussia and Russia in January 1793, complicating matters on the western front, and aggravating the mistrust between Prussia and Austria.

By the beginning of 1795, those who favoured peace at the court of Berlin were in the majority. All the same, the King (and he was perhaps the only one at the court of Berlin) favoured the continuation of the war against France. His hatred of the principles of the Revolution, his desire to appear as champion of the Empire's integrity, and his idealised interpretation of the goals the coalition had set itself, made him hesitant to renounce his engagements. But lack of money prevented him from fighting on two fronts, and the King was forced into withdrawing a large part of his forces from the West.

Prussian requests for money from Britain reached London early in October 1793. In reply, the British Prime Minister Pitt proposed that Prussia should be called upon to meet its treaty obligations undertaken by the signing of two previous conventions. The first was the Triple Alliance signed in 1788 between Britain, Holland and Prussia. The second was the Austro-Prussian alliance of 1792. By the terms of both treaties, Prussia was obliged to furnish troops to the number of about 52,000 men. By the same terms, Britain was obliged to underwrite the cost of these

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47 Real, Von Potsdam nach Basel, 122; Roider, op. cit., 176; Gembries, op. cit., 1 25. Haugwitz was also considered to be in favour of the war, at least until the suspension of British subsidies.

48 A treaty was signed with Britain on 14 July 1793. It was intimated both during the negotiations and after the signing of the treaty that subsidies would be necessary to carry on the war. Cf. John M. Sherwig, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 24, 28; Gembries, op. cit., 9-10;

49 Not only was Prussia asking for subsidies but for a British guarantee of its Polish possessions. Cf. Sherwig, op. cit., 28, 35; Dropmore Papers, II, 430-431, Burgess to Grenville, 30 September 1793; Gembries, op. cit., 11, 26; Ward and Gocch, op. cit., 1, 240. The Polish guarantee was inadmissible to the British Cabinet, but the Prussian request for money was taken seriously by London as it was generally reported by British diplomats in Berlin that the treasury had been drained (Dropmore Papers, II, 494, Malmesbury to Pitt, 9 January 1794).
troops. But the request that Prussia meet its 1788 treaty obligations annoyed Friedrich Wilhelm and was played upon by the 'pro-peace' party at court. Friedrich Wilhelm rejected the request and demanded that, since he had done more than enough to meet his obligations, the allies pay for his expenses or he would be forced to reduce the number of troops in the coming spring offensive.

The British Cabinet realised that there was probably little chance of a military victory over France without Prussian support, and so a special mission was entrusted to Lord Malmesbury, who was sent to Berlin to persuade the King to recognise the 1788 treaty. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, was not optimistic about the outcome. But by April 1794, Malmesbury had persuaded Prussia to agree to a treaty and to put 62,400 men into the field for a monthly subsidy of £150,000 and 'preparation money' of £400,000. The only way of keeping Prussia in the war was for Britain to pay. In Berlin, the ministers and cabinet would have preferred an arrangement with France. These people insisted that Prussia's interest lay to the East, not in war with France. As it was, the ensuing delays that occurred in the payment of subsidies only served to fuel the pro-peace party.

In March 1794, shortly before the Prussians agreed to the subsidy treaty, the Poles revolted under Kosciuszko and within a month had driven the Prussians out of Warsaw. This inevitably drew Prussia's attention and resources to the East, and placed a heavy strain on its military capacity. Although Prussia had received approximately £1,200,000 from Britain in subsidy payments, the state of its

50 Sherwig, op. cit., 28-29; Gembries, op. cit., 11-12.
51 Ibid., 30-31 who quotes a report from the British chargé d'affaires saying that no-one at the court of Berlin was in favour of continuing the war.
52 Malmesbury was responsible for the Triple Alliance of 1788. He entered Berlin on 23 December 1793 (Gembries, op. cit., 12). For his mission see Sherwig, op. cit., 32-45.
53 For a description of the negotiations and the resulting subsidy payments see Sherwig, op. cit., 34-53; Gembries, op. cit., 12-14;
54 What is called the Hague subsidy treaty, signed at The Hague on 19 April 1794 by Haugwitz and Malmesbury.
55 Biro, op. cit., 320; Albert Sorel, 'La Paix de Bâle,' RH, 5 (1877), 278-279
56 The reasons for these delays are described in Sherwig, op. cit., 45-50, and his conclusion on 53.
57 The probability that the Polish acquisitions also contributed to the breakdown of the Frederickian state system has never really been studied in depth, but is the basis of William W. Hagen's article, 'The Partitions of Poland and the Crisis of the Old Regime in Prussia, 1772-1806,' Central European History, 9, 2 (1976), pp. 115-128. Elgin, the British minister in Berlin at the time, argued that the partition of Poland took away a lucrative market from Prussia (Gembries, op. cit., 27).
58 Sherwig, op. cit., 365.
finances was catastrophic. This certainly played a role, although probably not a decisive one, in deciding the Prussian cabinet to withdraw from the coalition. Friedrich Wilhelm decided to leave the subsidized forces on the Rhine and to move the rest of his army to the East. The King was torn between Prussia's interests in Poland, and his sense of duty towards his allies.

The military, however, were to take matters into their own hands. Möllendorff, who was commander of the Prussian forces in the west, refused to move his troops into Flanders at the English request (June-July 1794), refused to unite with the Austrians on the Rhine, and was later forced to cross that river by a French offensive (October 1794). The English, angered by the obvious lack of Prussian cooperation and goodwill, refused to continue the payment of subsidies, to which Berlin responded by declaring that it would put an end to the alliance. Möllendorff had in any case been conducting negotiations with the French without his master's

59 Much has been made of the disastrous state of Prussian finances. Aretin, *op. cit.*, 318, writes that: 'Es ist kein Zweifel mehr, daß Preußen seiner finanziellen Lage wegen den Frieden abgeschlossen hat.' Kurt Holzapfel, *La Prusse avant la paix de Bâle. Le torpillage du traité des subsides de La Haye par le «parti prussien de paix», 1794-95,* 54 (1984), pp. 229-239, on the other hand, argues that Prussia did not go to Basle because Britain stopped paying subsidies, but that Britain stopped paying because Prussia signed a treaty at Basle. There is some reason to believe that money was not a decisive factor in the decision to withdraw from the coalition and that lack of finances was used rather as an excuse by the Prussians to extricate themselves from an affair that no longer held any interest. In eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century European politics, lack of money was not usually a factor taken seriously into consideration when it came to questions of prestige and territorial conquest. One should not forget that years later Prussia indebted itself enormously during the Befreiungskrieg.


62 Malmesbury explained to Hardenberg in June 1794 that Britain would suspend payments if the Prussian army did not engage (Gembries, *op. cit.*, 16). Möllendorff said that he would move his army, but nothing was actually done. Pitt informed Jacobi at the end of September 1794 that subsidy payments would be suspended if Möllendorff failed to join forces with those of the Duke of York in Holland (Gembries, *op. cit.*, 16; Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 51).
knowledge. Friedrich Wilhelm did not learn of these negotiations until much later, when increasing pressure from his entourage convinced him to agree to the principle of talks with France in the hope of negotiating peace for the Empire.

b) The Treaty of Basle

Official negotiations between France and Prussia were opened at the Swiss town of Basle in December 1794. The choice of a negotiator at first fell on Count von der Goltz, who hated both Russia and Austria. He was sent to discuss peace terms with the French representative Barthélemy. The King was realistic enough to appreciate the benefits that would be drawn from a cessation of hostilities with France, but his sense of honour made him reluctant to negotiate for peace. He had, after all, just signed a subsidy treaty with Britain. But affairs in Poland made matters pressing. The Austrians and Russians had come to an agreement over the final partition of Poland, leaving Prussia in the cold. If Friedrich Wilhelm was to defy both Catherine the Great and Austria, then wisdom dictated that he have his hands free in the West. Another reason that made itself felt was the fear of an Austro-French peace agreement by which Bavaria would be received in exchange for the loss of the Netherlands.

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63 Mollendorff was motivated by his belief that the Revolution was coming to an end and that Austria was already negotiating with France. See Biro, op. cit., 247 and 266-278 for negotiations preceding Basle.

64 Sorel, 'La Paix de Bâle,' 5 (1877), 303-305, points out that Denmark attempted to pose as mediator for the Empire, and accelerated the King's decision to negotiate with France. How important the King's desire to negotiate peace for the Empire actually was, however, is difficult to determine. It would seem that the King renounced the idea as early as February 1795 (Biro, op. cit., 328; Kaulek, op. cit., vol. 5, 78).

65 Negotiations lasted from 23 January to 6 April 1795. The treaty, one of the most controversial subjects in Prussian history, has been more than adequately treated. The most recent, and probably the best account of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the treaty, is by Real, 'Der Friede von Basel,' with bibliography; cf. his Von Potsdam nach Basel, 117-137; and Biro, op. cit., 312-364.

66 Wilhelm Bernd Graf von der Goltz (1736-1795), took part in the Seven Years War, first diplomatic mission to Petersburg in 1762, and in 1768 to the French court. He returned to Berlin at the outbreak of war with France.

67 The Austro-Russian Convention of 3 January 1795. At first kept secret, Prussia probably knew of its existence.

68 Franz de Paula Freiherr von Thugut (1736-1818), Austrian minister of foreign affairs between 1793 and 1801, was apparently thinking of peace at this stage, and rumours were rife about the minister of
Prussia would then virtually be encircled by unreliable, if not outright hostile powers. There are other reasons why Prussia accepted to go to the negotiating table with France, but the Polish question seems to be the motivating factor. What Friedrich Wilhelm hoped for was a long truce during which he could solve his problems in the east. It is for this reason that the Prussian envoy in Basle asked for an armistice before negotiations were to commence, a request which was refused by the Committee of Public Safety in Paris.

Goltz, already sick and ailing when he arrived in Basle, died on 5 February 1795 of gout and bilious fever, and Hardenberg was sent to replace him. Arriving in March, he was one of the few Prussian ministers who had favoured the alliance with Britain, and wanted to delay negotiations so that Britain would have enough time to win Berlin back. Pitt did in fact make a new and generous subsidy offer, but Prussia signed peace with France before the English had time to make their proposal known.

After four months of discussions, peace was signed on 5 April 1795. The fate of the Prussian provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, and which were at that
time in French hands, were to be decided later at a general peace conference. On 27 May, another agreement was concluded with France establishing a neutrality zone in north Germany. A Demarcation Line was drawn up which roughly followed the river Ems, Yssel and Rhine, and included Frankfurt and all of Franconia. The impracticability of defending such a vast territory soon became apparent, and it was modified and greatly reduced shortly after. It is difficult to say with whom the idea of neutrality originated. Haugwitz later wrote in his Memoirs that it was his enfant chéri, although Möllendorff proposed a line of neutrality as early as February 1795. Hardenberg wrote in his Memoirs that he was one of the first to suggest peace with France, but not a separate peace. He wanted to bring about a general peace. In any event, the Demarcation Line enabled the Prussians to consolidate and maintain hegemony within north Germany. Also, by fixing a Demarcation Line the Prussians hoped that the other Princes of the Empire would follow suit and withdraw from the coalition, thereby isolating Austria, and leaving Prussia in a dominant position in the Reich. At the same time, the King would be free to deal with the Russians and Austrians over the Polish question. The American historian Roider argues that it was an obvious measure against Austria because it permitted the north German states to withdraw their forces from the imperial army and because the region declared neutral was the 'staging area' for Austrian forces. But then nothing obliged Austria to respect the Demarcation Line. To be respected, the Line necessarily had to be defended, and to do so an Observation Army of about 42,000 men from Prussia, Brunswick and Hanover was formed.

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auspices du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1864-1900), vol. 1, 232ff.; Kaulek, op. cit., vol. 5, 164-168. Ragsdale, Détente, 3, writes that Prussia thereby recognised the French Republic and that diplomatic relations were re-established as a result. Sheehan writes, op. cit., 224, that by concluding peace with France, Prussia acknowledged the legitimacy of the Revolutionary government.

75 Comte de Haugwitz, Fragments des mémoires inédits,' 17.
76 Biro, op. cit., 329; Sorel, 'La paix de Bâle,' RH, 7 (1878), 35.
77 Shortly after arriving in Basle, Hardenberg received the order to include an article in the treaty neutralising north Germany (Kaulek, op. cit., vol. 5, 117, 127-128; Sorel, 'La Paix de Bâle,' 7 (1878), 319-320; Biro, op. cit., 343-345). He was undoubtedly acting in accord with his master's desires (Kaulek, op. cit., vol. 5, 149-50). The Demarcation Line and the question of neutrality were to become the most important points in the negotiations.
78 Roider, op. cit., 177-178; Walter Trummel, Der Norddeutsche Neutralitätsverband, 1795-1801, (Hildesheim: Lax, 1913), 49. The Observation Army never reached full strength, however, and its probable number in men was around 33,000.
The reaction of the European diplomatic community to the Treaty of Basle was varied. The King himself was a little taken aback by the rapidity with which the negotiations were concluded. He was at heart displeased with the outcome but was compelled to ratify the treaty. Other members of the Prussian court, like Prince Henry and Möllendorff, welcomed the treaty. Their sentiments were decidedly pro-French, and had always been, like those of most members of the army, against war with France. The Committee of Public Safety was not pleased with the treaty that its representative had signed either, even though the populace welcomed it. Austria cried out treason and paid numerous pamphleteers to express this viewpoint. Relations between the two countries continued to remain strained for many years and contributed to the failure of a general European coalition against France. The official reaction of Britain's political elite was restrained in the hope that such an attitude would prove useful in an eventual rupture between Prussia and France. Privately, Britain's diplomats spoke of 'treachery and corruption' even before the treaty was signed. Since Hanover lay within the Demarcation Line, Britain was obliged to withdraw its forces from the electorate. George III of Britain, who was at the same time Elector of Hanover, had little choice but to accept the treaty, and the Prussian

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79 Reported by Lord Spencer to Lord Grenville in E. Herrmann, ed., *Diplomatischen Correspondenzen aus der Revolutionzeit, 1791-1797*, (Goth: Perthes, 1867), 514; and by Dietrichstein to Thugut (Vivenot-Zeissberg, *Quellen*, V, 192); quoted in Biro, *op. cit.*, 341.

80 Heinrich von Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit von 1789 bis 1800*, 7 vols., (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen, 1898), vol. 3, 376, writes that the King considered a separate peace as being dubious, but that he was so pressed by his ministers, and with such zeal, that he gave in.

81 Biro, *op. cit.*, 354-357.


83 Ford, *op. cit.*, 100-101; Gembries, *op. cit.*, 20-21, note 145, 24, 26, note 179, and 40-42. He points out that the reproach of 'falsehood' was first mentioned around the middle of 1794 and thereafter became a central theme in Britain's judgement on Prussia. 'Perfidy', 'treachery', 'bad faith' or 'unprincipled conduct' were the terms most often used. Cf. Dropmore Papers, II, 653, Malmesbury to Grenville, 23 December 1794; vol. 3, 77, George III to Grenville, 7 June 1797; 307, Starhemberg to Grenville, March-April 1797; 308, Vorontzov to Grenville, 3 April 1797; 325, Starhemberg to Grenville, 11 May 1797. London's criticism of the court of Berlin's politics increased between 1796 and 1799.

84 Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 77; Gembries, *op. cit.*, 22 and note 150.
neutrality system which included Hanover, in spite of opposition from Austria, certain members of his Ministry, and his own personal inclinations. The British Cabinet had little, if any influence, over the course of events in Hanover. The reaction of the German states was mixed. Hanover itself welcomed the introduction of neutrality, since the danger of a French invasion loomed strongly over it between the months of January-February 1795.\textsuperscript{85}

3. The Prussian Neutrality System

In 1797, there was a change of reign and a marked change in attitude towards court life and finances. There was no change, however, as far as foreign policy was concerned. Friedrich Wilhelm II's son resolutely refused to adopt any new treaties or alliances or budge from the neutral policy introduced by his father. It resulted in some advantages, most notably the territorial indemnities that were to compensate Prussia for the loss of its provinces on the left bank. The negotiations concerning German indemnities and secularisations ended in a treaty being signed on 23 May 1802. The lot falling to Prussia was considerable. Prussia had lost about 48 square miles, a population of about 127,000, and an income of about one and a half million florins to the French. On the other hand, she gained the Bishoprics of Hildesheim and Paderborn, the better part of the diocese of Münster with the town itself, Erfurt, properties in Thüringen, Eichsfeld, the Abbeys of Herford, Quedlinburg, Elten, Essen, Verden und Kappenberg, and the towns of Mühlhausen, Nordhausen und Goslar. Altogether over 230 square miles, more than half a million inhabitants, and almost four million florins in income.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{a) The wooing of Prussia}

Over the next few years, France competed with Britain, Russia and Austria in attempting to entice Prussia away from its neutrality system into an offensive alliance. France was probably the most insistent of the European powers in her efforts to woo Prussia. Treaties of alliance were officially offered on at least three occasions: 1792, 1799 and 1805.\textsuperscript{87} The English also made numerous efforts to get Prussia on her side. In August 1796, George Hammond was sent to Berlin offering the Westphalian

\textsuperscript{85}Ford, \textit{op. cit.}, 104.
\textsuperscript{86}Mehring, \textit{op. cit.}, 303.
\textsuperscript{87}After years of futile attempts, Talleyrand was persuaded that the court of Berlin was playing a cold, calculating game. Alexandr S. Trachevski, ed., \textit{Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia Rossi s Frantsiei Obshchestva v epokhu Napoleona I}, 4 vols., (St. Petersburg: Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago, Stasiulevich, 1890-1893), vol. 70, 650, Talleyrand to Bonaparte, n.d., probably beginning of 1800.
provinces, or the Austrian Netherlands, and eventual subsidies to Friedrich Wilhelm II. All Prussia had to agree to was an armed mediation that would ensure France's withdrawal from Belgium and Holland. Hammond began talks with Haugwitz on 17 August 1796, but realised within a week that nothing was to be gained. What he did not know was that Haugwitz had secretly signed a treaty with France on 5 August, only a short time before. Another effort was made shortly before the death of Friedrich Wilhelm II in 1797. The British Foreign Secretary decided to send a Swiss scholar by the name of Jean De Luc to Berlin on the faith of reports from the British ambassador Elgin concerning the Prince Royal's determination to oppose France. It was somehow hoped that the advent of a new King might bring about a change in both men and policy. Elgin, however, had misjudged the Prince Royal's character, and Haugwitz, who handled the negotiations, insisted that Prussia would only go to war if openly attacked by France.

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88 For Hammond's mission and the British offer: Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 79 and 81-82; Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, 1, 266-267; Ephraim Douglas Adams, *The influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 1787-1798*, (Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1904), 42; Gembries, *op. cit.*, 31-32, note 234; Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 79; Baron William Auckland, *The Journal and Correspondence of Lord Auckland*, 4 vols., (London: Bentley, 1861-1862), vol. 3, 368, Eden to Auckland, 9 December 1796. Nobody, including Grenville, believed that the Prussians were prepared to accept the British offer. But both Pitt and Grenville nevertheless thought it necessary to try and hoped that the negotiations might have some effect on France (*Dropmore Papers*, III, 214, Pitt to Grenville, 23 June 1796, and 228-230 Grenville to George III, 31 July 1796). At one stage, Wickham suggested obtaining Prussian assistance by offering Berlin Hanover, arguing that the Cabinet of Berlin held the 'fate of Europe' in its hands (*Dropmore Papers*, III, 224, Wickham to Grenville, 28 July 1796).

89 Biro, *op. cit.*, 615-621. When Grenville learned of the treaty eight months later he called it a 'line of conduct repugnant to every principle of publick honour and good faith' (Gembries, *op. cit.*, 33). It, in part, explained the failure of Hammond's mission.

90 Jean André De Luc (1727-1817) was reader to George III's wife, Queen Charlotte. Born in Switzerland, he went to Britain in 1773. Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 98, suggests that he was probably chosen for Berlin because, 'as a man of travelling science, he would attract little attention'. He was appointed to the chair of Natural History at Göttingen University and with that cover set out for Berlin.

91 Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 97; Mackesy, *Statesmen at War*, 11-12.

92 For Haugwitz's reply to Grenville see *Dropmore Papers*, IV, 41-43; Sherwig, *op. cit.*, 98-99, who writes that Friedrich Wilhelm was so little interested in foreign affairs 'that he asked Count Haugwitz to respond to the British overture.' This is hardly fair. De Luc, who was on an unofficial mission, arrived in Berlin in October. Friedrich Wilhelm III ascended the throne on 16 November. Even if we consider the time it took him to get used to the reigns of power, it was not customary for a monarch to negotiate directly with an envoy, and even less so if that envoy were 'secret'. 
At the beginning of 1799, Berlin became the centre of European diplomacy. Three-power talks were opened between Haugwitz, the Russian ambassador, and the English diplomat Thomas Grenville, who was especially sent to Berlin for the purpose of wooing Prussia. The allies had to compete with the French envoy, the Abbé Sieyès, who was also trying to tempt Prussia into an alliance with France. Haugwitz found himself in a difficult and delicate situation, pressured from both sides, and not wanting to offend anyone. But more importantly, Haugwitz actually considered a rapprochement with the allies and adhering to a coalition against France. At this stage, the war against France was going well for the allies. Suvorov's victories in Italy apparently impressed the Prussian minister, and he initiated talks with Thomas Grenville over Holland. He presented a plan that would drive France out of Holland within six months. Haugwitz pointed out that he was only interested in liberating Holland after which Prussia was to return to its neutrality.

93 For Panin's mission to Berlin see Tucker, op. cit.
94 Thomas Grenville's mission in D. C. Elliot, 'The Grenville Mission to Berlin, 1799,' Huntington Library Quarterly, 18 (1954-55), pp. 129-146; and J. D. Spinney, 'Some Vicissitudes of a V.I.P.,' Blackwood's Magazine, 265 (1949), pp. 301-312 on the difficult voyage to Berlin; Gembries, op. cit., 36-37; Mackesy, Statesmen at War, 51-54 and 61-66; Sherwig, op. cit., 115-116, writes that Pitt's greatest desire at the beginning of 1799 was to form an alliance with Russia and Prussia to free Holland from French rule. It led him to abandon the idea of financially aiding Austria. Grenville made his first attempt to reach Cuxhaven by setting sail from Yarmouth Roads on 21 December 1798 but was forced to turn back because of ice. Another, this time successful attempt was made on 28 January, but he did not arrive in Berlin, after a perilous journey, until 17 February 1799. He stayed until 31 August. Elgin, the nominal British minister in Berlin, had been on leave since August 1798.
95 Sieyès's mission to Berlin has been studied by Marcelle Adler-Bresse, 'Sieyès et le monde allemand,' 2 vols., Lille, Atelier de Reproduction des Thèses, Université de Lille III, 1977. He arrived in Berlin on 5 July 1798 and left on 23 May 1799 to continue talks that had already been initiated by the French ambassador, Caillard. The French were probably suffering from an interpretation inherited from the Ancien Régime in which the Austrians were the traditional enemy, and Prussia the traditional ally, of France. But, as Sieyès was to discover, Berlin no longer considered this to be the case.
96 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 271-272, Denkschrift from Haugwitz, 15 January 1799, in which he suggests an alliance with Russia and Britain. Mackesy's reproach in Statesmen at War, 31, that 'Haugwitz lacked the nerve to choose', and that he 'took refuge in neutrality', does not coincide with available documentary material which show him to be in favour of Prussia's adhering to the coalition, although he faced strong opposition from other Cabinet members.
97 Sherwig, op. cit., 117; Gembries, op. cit., 38-39; Mackesy, Statesmen at War, 103, believes that it was Haugwitz's fear of an arrangement between a victorious Austria and a defeated France, to the detriment of Prussia, that prompted him to reopen talks.
The King, however, never approved of the plan, refusing to lend his consent after France intimated that a withdrawal from Holland could be brought about by unilateral negotiations. Although Haugwitz was working in favour of an alliance with Britain, his influence seems to have been outweighed by the King's aide-de-camp, Köckeritz, and by Lombard, who were both in favour of peace with France. In the end, all Haugwitz could offer was a defensive treaty with Britain and Russia to protect northern Germany against an eventual French aggression, pointing out that such an alliance would probably lead to offensive measures being taken in the near future. The British, however, were expected to subsidise Prussia to maintain her army on a war footing, even though the army might never actually be used in battle. This, of course, was unacceptable to Grenville, who declared that Britain would not use her resources to maintain Prussia's neutrality. Grenville stayed in Berlin throughout the summer in the hope of a change in Prussian policy but finally gave up and left for home in September 1799.

There were, of course, many reasons why Prussia maintained a neutrality policy for so many years, but one reason seems to have been a determining factor - opinion at court was divided, and opposition to the King's neutrality policy was never substantial enough to sway him from that course. Unlike his father, who found himself obliged to come to terms with France in spite of his unwillingness to do so, Friedrich Wilhelm III never really had to contend with a dissatisfied opinion at the elite level. So, what was at first supposed to be a truce destined to give Prussia time to sort things out in Poland soon turned into a relatively rigid isolationist system that was to last a little over a decade.

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98 Sherwig, op. cit., 117-119; Dropmore Papers, V, 141-142, second project of articles by Haugwitz, 10 July 1799; Mackesy, Statesmen at War, 123-125, 150-153, and 164.
99 Haugwitz informed Thomas Grenville and Panin on 22 July that the proposed treaty with Britain and Russia was being dropped and that negotiations were being entered into with France. Cf. also Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 320; Dropmore Papers, V, 174, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 22 July 1799; Brückner, op. cit., 4, 353-360, Panin to Paul, 24 July 1799.
100 Sherwig, op. cit., 113. Cf. Dropmore Papers, IV, 501-503, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 18 March 1799, in which he states that Panin proposed lending money to Prussia to enable it to put troops into the field, and IV, 524-527, notes by De Luc, 31 March 1799.
101 Mackesy, Statesmen at War, 75.
b) Prussia's foreign policy objectives

It does not mean that because Prussia followed a policy of neutrality the cabinet was not ambitious. Haugwitz was always alert to any opportunities that might serve to increase Prussia's territory without incurring the wrath of the other continental powers. What then were Prussia's foreign policy objectives during this period? A few indications can be gleaned from diplomats' reports and from Haugwitz's memoranda. As far as possible, a distinction will be made between Prussia's German objectives on the one hand and European objectives on the other, keeping in mind that they were often interrelated and that both were subordinated to the King's desire to remain neutral.

i. On the German scene

Prussia's foreign policy ambitions were limited and during the neutrality period often did not go beyond the Demarcation Line. Indeed, Haugwitz admitted to Carysfort at one stage that 'Prussia would not concern herself, directly or indirectly, with any object beyond the line of demarcation.' The overall direction which Prussian policy took in Germany was the striving after secular indemnities for the loss of its provinces on the left bank of the Rhine and the maintenance of its influence in the north.

One need only look at Haugwitz's secret instructions to the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Lucchesini, to realise this. Another system was needed in

\[103\] PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 September 1800.

\[104\] Marchese Girolamo Lucchesini (1751-1825) was born in Lucca, became chamberlain to Friedrich II, who recognised his talent for diplomacy. After a mission to Rome in 1787, he was made envoy to Petersburg in 1788 but never made it further than Warsaw, where he was made ambassador the following year. He was one of the inspiring forces behind Friedrich Wilhelm II's diplomacy. Minister at Vienna between 1793 and 1797, interspersed by important missions, he played a major role in the partition of Poland. He was recalled from Vienna at Austrian demand. He was at first kept away from affairs under Friedrich Wilhelm III but was appointed minister to Paris in 1800, where he was to watch over the Franco-Austrian negotiations then being carried on and to look out for Prussian interests. The French asked for his recall a year later (he left Berlin on 17 October, arrived in Paris on 28 October 1800). Bonaparte considered 'que Lucchesini était un intrigant italien, qu'il gâtait les affaires de sa cour' (Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 164, Kolychev to Panin, 24 May 1801). He was to remain in office, however, until the Prussian rupture with France in August 1806. Panin considered him to be a cheat, a rogue, and a double dealer (fourbe). Bailleu, 'Haugwitz und Hardenberg,' 275, thought him to be Prussia's shrewdest and most adroit diplomat abroad (der scharfsinnigste und gewandteste).

See P. Marmottan, 'Lucchesini, ambassadeur de Prusse à Paris, 1800-1801,' \textit{Revue d'histoire...}
Germany, he says, not only one of a Prussian preponderance in north Germany, but a definitive consolidation of the system established at Basle so as not to be exposed to Austria's will. If Austria was to expand in the south, then Prussia had to expand correspondingly in the north. The treaty of Basle imposed a virtual partition of the Empire between the two great German powers, and Prussia's goals, during this period at least, were confined to an avowed and authorized establishment of that system. The dominant concept of his German policy was to keep the peace in the north by using diplomatic methods to assure Prussia's position vis-à-vis the other European powers.

It was Haugwitz, and not the King, who was behind Prussia's indemnity policy. To all intents and purposes, Friedrich Wilhelm III would have rather let the matter drop, and only weakly insisted on an indemnity policy so as not to seem to play too humiliating a role. Haugwitz, on the other hand, used the loss of the left bank as a lever by which Prussia could further its territory in Germany. He had no objections against detaching the left bank of the Rhine as an excuse for aggrandizing Prussia in other parts of Germany.

**ii. On the European scene**

Haugwitz was severely limited in foreign policy options. While realising that there was no possibility of going back on the Treaty of Basle, he found the isolation in which Prussia had cornered itself worrying and, as we have seen with the Second Coalition, attempted unsuccessfully to remedy the situation. The Armed Neutrality diplomatique, 42 (1928), pp. 323-348, 43 (1929), pp. 65-87 and pp. 445-465, 44 (1930), pp. 450-461, for printed letters; Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, for his diplomatic correspondence while in Paris; Hüffer, 'Zwei neue Quellen zur Geschichte Friedrich Wilhelms III. Aus dem Nachlass Johann Wilhelm Lombards und Girolamo Lucchesinis,' (Bonn: Universität Schrifttum, 1882), pp. 1-27; and Lucchesini's tendentious History of the causes and effects of the confederation of the Rhine, from the Italian by J. D. Dwyer, (London: 1821).

105. Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 7-8, instructions for Lucchesini, 14-16 October 1800.
106. Ibid., II, 8.
107. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 1 November 1800, in cipher.
109. Brückner, op. cit., VI, 238, Krüdener to Panin, 12 May 1801; Dropmore Papers, IV, 307, Elgin to Grenville, 12 September 1798.
110. Dropmore Papers, III, 405, George III to Grenville, 23 December 1797.
111. Ibid., IV, 32, De Luc to Grenville, 21 December 1797.
was another attempt to get Prussia out of its isolation. These efforts, however, were always subordinated to the King's neutrality policy.

A résumé of the policy implemented by Haugwitz during the four year period preceding the Armed Neutrality was left to us by the British envoy De Luc, and throws some light on Haugwitz's political attitudes.

 [...] Durant tout ce temps [...] m'avez-vous jamais vu varier un instant sur ces points fondamentaux: 1. Nulle relation plus intime avec les Français, que celle de la paix où nous sommes avec eux, et qu'il convient à la Prusse de maintenir, si elle le peut avec honneur et sûreté; 2. Relations au contraire très intime avec l'Angleterre, tant à cause de ses principes que pour un intérêt commun évident, et par les liaisons de parenté et d'amitié; 3. Défense pour la Prusse, à tout prix, du nord de l'Allemagne, et en particulier de la côte de la mer du Nord, y compris les embouchures des rivières depuis l'Ems; [...] Vous savez que plusieurs fois j'aurais désiré avec vous d'aller plus loin, et que je l'ai tenté; mais que sur ces points je n'ai jamais varié, et que si je n'avais pas cru pouvoir les maintenir je ne serais pas rester dans le ministère. 112

Haugwitz's policy was, first, to maintain peace in north Germany at any price. This implied that, second, Prussia was to remain on good terms not only with Paris, but also with London, Petersburg, and everyone else. 113 Third, the maintenance of relations with France as agreed to at Basle. As long as France did not encroach upon Prussia's sphere of influence in north Germany, as defined by the Demarcation Line, then peace would be kept. 114 In a similar vein, the Danish ambassador, Rosenkrantz, remarked that: 'Le principe du comte de Haugwitz est de ne pas rebutter le gouvernement français, et de ne pas cesser de discutter avec lui tous les objets, qui se présentent, à fin d'être à même de dire son avis dans tous les occasions décisives, qui pourront se présenter dans la suite.' 115 The three points are intimately connected, but above all 'peace at any price' was given priority. Everything was done, or at least this was the impression held by foreign diplomats in Berlin, to avoid developments that

112 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, De Luc to Carysfort, 8 August 1801.
113 Cf. Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 266, Denkschrift by Haugwitz, 15 January 1799; AAE, Prusse 227, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 28 June 1800 (9 messidor VIII) where Haugwitz admitted 'qu'il a pour objet de ménager tout le monde.' This is also described as being the Prussian system by Knoblauch (RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 3 January 1801, in cipher).
114 Cf. Dropmore Papers, IV, 42, Mémoire by Haugwitz, December 1797, and 57, Grenville to De Luc, 14 January 1798.
115 RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 4 March 1800, in cipher.
could eventually lead to hostilities. This was also what Krüdener reported at the end of 1799 when he summarised the Prussian cabinet's system - to subordinate all other interests to peace, and not to draw the sword except in the defense of Prussia, or at most the demarcation line. Even the desire to recover the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, or to obtain sufficient indemnities for their loss, were subordinated to this system. Other objectives were brought up in a conversation with the French ambassador, Beurnonville: Tenir une armée sur un pied respectable, tandis que les troups des autres nations se détruisent mutuellement; grandir son trésor, quand les finances de tous les autres états s'épuisent; remplir ses engagements relativement à la ligne de neutralité, [...].

The best way to judge the accuracy of these statements is to compare them with the policy actually implemented by the Prussian government. They actually coincide. Prussia kept an Observation Army on foot to protect the Demarcation Line, the King was concerned about putting the state's finances back in order, the King took his engagements concerning neutrality seriously, and Haugwitz tried to keep on good terms with everyone.

Two other foreign policy aims should be mentioned. Haugwitz attempted to neutralise, so to speak, both France and Russia so that he could have a free hand in implementing his German indemnification policy. Just as the French tried to play off Austria and Prussia in the hope of establishing their ascendancy over Germany, so the Prussians tried to play off the French and the Russians in the hope of obtaining what they considered to be adequate territorial compensation, and perhaps even ascendancy over north Germany. We will see that by joining Russia in an alliance, Haugwitz hoped to put Prussia in a much better position to forward territorial demands. It is no coincidence that a special Prussian envoy was sent to Petersburg with just this in mind shortly after hostilities broke out between Britain and the Armed Neutrality. The other aim was to try and win some influence over the coming general

116 Cf. StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to the Senate, 10 January 1801: 'Das bisherige Prinzip des hiesigen Hofes, alles möglichst zu vermeiden, was zu einer Verwicklung in Feindseligkeiten führen kann, [...].'
117 Brückner, op. cit., V, Krüdener to Panin, 1 December 1799.
118 General Pierre de Riel (or Ruel) Beurnonville (1752-1821) was named envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Berlin at the beginning of December 1799 (instructions in Bailleu, _Preußen und Frankreich_, I, 514-519). He arrived on 20 January 1800 and remained until his nomination to Madrid in September 1802. He was considered to be a mediocre diplomat (RA, Order, Bernstorff to Rosenkranz, 18 March 1800).
119 AAE, Prusse 226, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 13 February 1801 (24 pluviôse VIII).
120 Mackesy, _Statesmen at War_, 9.
peace whenever the occasion arose.\textsuperscript{121} Haugwitz succeeded in the first but failed in the second.

So much for the outline of Prussia's foreign policy system around 1800. It should help understand Prussia's attitude and position during the negotiations that led to Prussia's entry into the Armed Neutrality. But first it is necessary to outline some of the issues involved which were at the root of all the strife.

\textsuperscript{121} These two reasons were suggested in RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 18 October 1800, in cipher.
CHAPTER III
THE SOURCES OF DISCONTENT

1. Britain and neutral shipping

Britain's military and commercial strength was dependent on her command of the seas. Throughout the eighteenth, and into the early nineteenth centuries, Britain had refused to accept the so-called 'free ship, free goods' principle by which neutral ships could trade with belligerent countries as long as they did not carry contraband. Contraband was seen, by the British at least, as anything that could be used for war. Included in this definition were navy stores; that is, ships' timber, masts, sail cloth, pitch, tar and hemp which could be used to build or repair fighting ships. According to international law, a trade legal in peacetime was legal in wartime except for contraband of war, but trade with overseas colonies with which neutral powers normally had no access in times of peace was considered illegal. This was what neutral powers like Denmark, and to a certain extent Prussia, were doing.¹ Some countries (especially France), which would normally transport cargo themselves in times of peace, but which were prevented from doing so in times of war, had their goods transported by neutral bottoms. This policy was encouraged by the neutral powers' attitude that allowed belligerent powers carry out trading activities under neutral flags. The following example is a good illustration of this kind of behaviour. The French government was having difficulties providing grain to its southern departments, and decided to transport surplus from its northern departments in neutral bottoms from Anvers to Bordeaux. It therefore approached the Prussian government in the hope of coming to an agreement whereby Prussian ships would be used to carry on French coastal trading.² The court of Berlin, however, remained non-committal, was unwilling to come to a formal accord over the protection of Prussian vessels, and

¹ For Danish neutrality policies see the works cited in Feldbaek, ‘The Anglo-Danish convoy conflict,’ note 4, 163.
² GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Beurnonville to Haugwitz, 8 November 1800.
left it up to the individual ship owners to transport grain at their own risk. This type of attitude was particularly advantageous to France and her allies and was seriously undermining the British war effort. Also, despite the fact that Britain and France were at war, trade, both illicit and approved, was carried on between the two countries by neutral bottoms. The Prussian representative in London, Jacobi, got hold of a list of 725 neutral vessels that had obtained permission from the British government in 1800 to sail to ports in France, Holland and Belgium. For the first two and a half months of 1801, 145 vessels had received permission to do so. This 'illicit' trade was apparently known to Bonaparte, and orders issued to stop it did not seem to have any great effect. When an embargo was later placed on the vessels of the three northern powers Russia, Denmark, and Sweden in British harbours, and it became more difficult to procure neutral flags, this trade was in part taken over by American bottoms. The American envoy in London, Rufus King, reported that French merchants, masquerading as Swiss, attended the sales of the East India Company, and had their purchases shipped directly to France.

To counter these attempts at illegal trade, Britain insisted on the right to 'visit and search' neutral merchant ships, whether those ships happened to be under military escort or not. The 'legal' decision that formed the basis of the British attitude towards convoying was made by the King's Advocate, Sir John Nicholl, in the summer of 1799. A convoy had no right to prevent visitation and search by British vessels, he concluded, and any ship that refused to let the British on board was taken as prize and escorted to a British harbour, where the cargo was duly confiscated. Any power that objected to these views and insisted on a different definition of them was virtually considered an enemy by Britain.

It is not in the least surprising then that, as their interests were diametrically opposed, friction arose between the neutral powers and Britain over these issues.

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3 AAE, Prusse 228, Haugwitz to Bernonville, 6 January 1801; GStA, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Bernonville, 6 January 1801.
4 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 10 March 1801, in cipher.
5 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Lucchesini to the court, 27 March 1801.
6 Charles R. King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 6 vols., (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1894-1900) vol. 3, 424-425, Rufus King to the Secretary of State, 10 April 1801.
a) The convoy conflict

One of the main issues involved was the right to convoy. The neutral powers maintained that conflicting parties did not have the right to search their merchant ships when they were convoyed by ships of war. According to international law, a military escort was the neutral government's guarantee that no illicit goods were being transported. An examination of the ships under escort was therefore considered unnecessary. Assurances from the captain of the vessel that there was no contraband on board were to be accepted as proof of the ship's innocence. Great Britain, of course, could not admit of such principles, as it would thereby lose all control over its enemies' trade. Apart from the fact that there were already fundamental differences of opinion as to what constituted contraband, there was no guarantee that the captain or country in question would act in good faith.8

Denmark had always used convoys with great caution.9 The government instructed its commanders to refuse search during the American War of Independence, but this policy was implemented with the thought that the belligerent powers would hesitate to attack a friendly neutral for fear of driving it into the enemy camp.10 At the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars, however, the Danish foreign secretary, A. P. Bemstorff, undoubtedly foreseeing the trouble which such a policy could cause, refused to use convoys altogether and used all his influence to dissuade his court from adopting the measure.11 Given the political situation he considered it too dangerous a risk. When his son, Christian Bemstorff,12 took over foreign affairs in 1797, he too continued the policy of avoiding convoys and refused requests from Danish merchantmen for frigates to be sent to escort East India ships home.

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8 Ibid., 94.
9 Feldbæk, 'The Anglo-Danish convoy conflict,' 163.
10 Feldbæk, Denmark, 24-33 for the following remarks on Denmark's convoy policy.
11 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 88 C, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 9 August 1800, in cipher: 'Ce ministre [A. P. Bemstorff] redisait souvent que les torts faits à quelques particuliers par la marine des puissances belligérantes ne produirait qu'une guerre de plume, mais que la dignité de la cour et l'honneur du pavillon obligaient à entrer en guerre s'il y avait un coup de canon tiré pour la protection du convoi.'
12 Christian Günther Bemstorff (1769-1835) took over the Department of Foreign Affairs from his father in June 1797, with the title Secretary of State, at the age of twenty-eight. Considered to be an able diplomat, he virtually controlled foreign affaires in conjunction with Crown Prince Frederick. He later became Foreign Minister to Prussia from 1818 till his resignation in 1832. For this period see the study by Lawrence J. Baack, Christian Bemstorff and Prussia. Diplomacy and Reform Conservatism, 1818-1832, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980).
Events on the international scene, however, developed in such a way as to favour the use of convoys. Naval warfare during the Revolutionary Wars had increased considerably, as had the proliferation of privateers. European shipping was suffering as a consequence of the belligerents' desire to destroy their opponents economically. As the number of violations on neutral shipping increased, the Danish government's reaction grew sharper, and it finally yielded to merchants' pressure and granted escorts. As Feldbaek points out, trade interests prevailed, and by the summer of 1798, and in spite of Bernstorff's reticence, the Danish Council of State decided to provide convoys to all its important trade routes. It was this policy which eventually led to the formation of the Armed Neutrality in 1800. Very few ships actually took advantage of the possibility of being convoyed, except perhaps in the Mediterranean where Barbary pirates were active. What did come about, however, was the real possibility of a conflict situation developing between Danish and British captains.

b) The Freya affair

The event which acted as a political catalyst occurred on 25 July 1800. A Danish frigate called the Freya, escorting six merchantmen on their way to the Mediterranean, was met by five British ships off Ostend. The frigate's captain, a man named Krabbe, after several hours of negotiations, refused the British permission to search his convoy, and fired on a boat sent out from one of the British ships. An

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13 A few figures exist on the amount of damage wrought to shipping as a result of the Revolutionary Wars. The French Directory issued a decree on 2 March 1797 (29 Nivôse an VI) stating that all ships carrying British goods were to be seized and their cargoes confiscated. Between 1793-1802, 3,575 ships of all nationalities are said to have been seized by the French (Phillips and Reede, op. cit., 216). Denmark suffered most of all with 467 ships taken, then followed Sweden with 218. No mention is made of the number of Prussian ships captured by the French.

14 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 88 C, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 9 August 1800, in cipher: 'Le comte de Bernstorff fils, [...], s'est aussi opposé à la résolution du conseil de Sa Majesté Danoise d'accorder la protection armée du gouvernent au commerce; mais l'intérêt et les instances du commerce y ont prévalu depuis la mort de son père.'

action began that lasted only about a quarter of an hour. Five seamen were killed (including one Dane), and nine were wounded (including five Danes), and ended with the Freya being taken with her convoy into the Downs. 

There was nothing particularly extraordinary about neutral merchant ships being boarded by the British to have their cargoes checked. It had happened previously, causing a certain amount of irritation. Between October 1798 and October 1799, there were eight occasions on which British warships approached Danish convoys, but only on one of these occasions was forced used, and the British commander in question was later disowned by the Admiralty. As a result of these incidents, an exchange of diplomatic notes, and a few heated discussions took place, with Britain refusing to give the neutral powers satisfaction. These quarrels may have left an unpleasant after-taste, but the British government did not at this point force the issue. This was in part due to the military situation on the continent, which was considered to be in a decisive phase. The British government did not want to ruffle feathers unnecessarily, knowing full well that even third-rate powers such as Denmark could have a significant influence on European politics.

The convoy issue, nevertheless, increased discord between Britain and the neutral nations. It was a period during which the governments involved hardened their respective stances and became less willing to compromise. The ‘Freya affair’ served to ignite the powder. The British government chose to regard the affair as a provocation by Denmark. It was at first thought that a maritime league had been formed and that the convoy had been sent out with orders to its commander to resist any attempt at search to bring the issue to a head. On 30 July a cabinet meeting was held during which the incident was discussed. Jacobi reported: 'Le petit nombre et le peu de valeur de ce convoi fait soupçonner ici, que le but de la cour de Copenhague a été d'essayer à cette occasion, jusqu' où l'Angleterre attacherais à son égard ses prétentions de la visite des convois neutres, afin d'accéder avec d'autant plus de fondement aux mesures de la Russie contre les entraves que l'Angleterre se permet [...].

This view later turned out to be erroneous but not soon enough to prevent the news causing considerable alarm amid London merchants. Ships that were ready to

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16 PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 37, copy of a report from Captain Baker of the Nemesis to Admiral Lutwidge, 25 July 1800. The Admiralty informed Grenville on 28 July.
17 Feldbaek, Denmark, 33.
18 Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 191.
19 Feldbaek, Denmark, 15.
20 Cf. Charles King, op. cit., III, 286-289, Rufus King to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1800.
set sail for the Baltic were cancelled until further notice. The price of insurance for ships sailing to the Baltic immediately went up from between 1.5 to 5 per cent in London, and between 5 and 10 per cent in Liverpool.

The whole question became a matter of principle, and Britain was prepared to use force if necessary to have its views on the right to search respected. The government did, however, wish to avoid open conflict with Denmark, not because it was afraid of a struggle, but because it wished to avoid the formation of any kind of northern alliance. It decided, therefore, to send a special envoy to Copenhagen in the person of Lord Whitworth, whose task it was to induce Denmark into accepting Britain's demands over the Freya affair and the convoy principle.

The result was the signing of a convention between Britain and Denmark on 29 August 1800. It contained the following clauses: the Freya and her convoy were to be released immediately, and the cost of repairs was taken over by the British government; Denmark forswore the right to convoy until a definitive convention was signed on the subject; the question of the right to visit and search neutral ships was to be discussed at a later, unspecified date. Ratification of the agreement took place on 21 September between Bernstorff and Whitworth, but as Feldbaek points out, the two signatory parties interpreted the convention in different ways. Whitworth thought he had silenced an advocate of the Armed Neutrality, and that Denmark had suspended its convoy principle for an indefinite period, at least until a further agreement could be reached. Bernstorff, on the other hand, continually stressed to his potential allies, both during the talks and after, that Denmark had not abandoned the convoy principle. Since the convention left the date for further discussion open, Bernstorff thought it would be possible to initiate negotiations with Britain over this principle whenever convenient. Soon after, he appealed to Russia for support in the negotiations he wanted to enter into and instructed the Danish diplomats in Petersburg,

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23 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 173 B, Jacobi to the court, 1 August 1800.
24 For a description of the negotiations see Feldbaek, 'The Anglo-Danish convoy conflict,' 173-180; and a more detailed account in Denmark, 50-66.
25 Copies of the convention are in GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 88 C, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 1 September 1800; The Times, 3 October 1800; Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 413-414.
27 Brückner, op. cit., V, 553-554, d'Oubril to Panin, 30 August 1800; RA, Ordner, Bernstorff to Knoblauch, 2 September 1800.
Stockholm and Berlin to ask for support in the coming discussions.28 Bernstorff had in fact planned to start talks as soon as he could be sure of their support.29 Haugwitz, for his part, answered that he was in future ready to concert not only with Denmark but with the other interested parties.30

Things were left open, so to speak. But the Tsar's reaction to the Freya affair had not, as yet, made itself felt. When news of the Freya affair reached Copenhagen, the Danish government decided to appeal to Russia for help. Orders were sent to its ambassador in Petersburg, Niels Rosenkrantz,31 instructing him to ask the Tsar to head a joint neutral action against Britain and to renew the Armed Neutrality of 1780.32 Paul took the affair seriously and responded quickly. Panin informed Rosenkrantz that Russia would protect neutral commerce if Denmark agreed to participate in an Armed Neutrality.33 Paul further decided to help by placing an embargo on British ships in Russian ports. It was reported that Panin and Rostopchin attempted to prevent the embargo measure (although this would be the first time that they agreed upon anything), and that it was Rosenkrantz who succeeded in persuading Paul to issue the order.34 Panin wrote that the decision was void of all political motive, and was prompted by something that Prince Gagarin said in the presence of the Tsar.35 The embargo was lifted about a week later when news of the resolution of the convoy conflict reached Petersburg.

28 RA, Ordrer, Bernstorff to Knoblauch, 2 September 1800, which also contains an apology for not having informed the Prussian court of the conflict, underlining the excuse that Prussia had always supported the convoy principle in the past.
29 Feldbaek, Denmark, 77.
31 Baron Niels von Rosenkrantz, ambassador to Berlin from April 1796 to June 1800, and then at Petersburg from 22 June 1800 to 2 January 1801. He was Danish Foreign Secretary from 1810 to 1824. He left Berlin on 3 June 1800, arrived at Petersburg on the evening of 22 June, and was presented to the Russian Vice-Chancellor the following evening by his predecessor, Baron Blome. He was later expelled by Paul I.
32 Feldbaek, Denmark, 53-54, and 67; Krael, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 196.
33 Hugh Ragsdale, Russia, Prussia, and Europe in the Policy of Paul I,' Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 31, 1983, 111; Boulay de la Meurthe, 'Correspondance de Tallyrand avec le premier consul pendant la Campagne de Marengo', Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 6, 1892, 279, Bourgoing to Talleyrand, 23 May 1800 (3 prairial VIII).
34 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Lusi to the court, 16 September 1800, in cipher.
35 Brückner, op. cit., V, 443, Panin to Krüdener, 10 September 1800.
2. Russia and the end of the Second Coalition

During the four years that Paul I was Tsar of all the Russias, he initiated many changes in foreign policy, ranging from non-intervention against France, to one of intervention, and finally to open conflict with his former allies. This seemingly inconsistent foreign policy was undoubtedly one of the principal causes leading to his assassination in 1801.\(^{36}\) But as has been suggested by recent research, although the means may have varied, Paul's foreign policy objectives remained essentially the same throughout his reign - namely, the establishment of a European equilibrium that would take Russia's traditional territorial interests into consideration.

a) Russia breaks with its allies

It was the French invasion of Malta and Egypt that persuaded Paul to intervene against France.\(^{37}\) A treaty was signed to that purpose with Britain on 29 December 1798 in St Petersburg between the Russian Chancellor Bezborodko and the British envoy Sir Charles Whitworth.\(^{38}\) Both powers agreed to put pressure on Prussia to join this new Second Coalition, but their diplomatic efforts failed to budge Prussia from its course in neutrality. Russia formally declared war on France in July 1799. Suvorov, the Russian commander, inflicted defeats on the French armies in Italy and, but strained relations with Austria over the goals of the coalition persuaded Paul to gradually withdraw. His disgust with Vienna was common knowledge and was often mentioned in diplomatic dispatches.\(^{39}\) But despite the decision to recall his troops, and to end relations with Austria,\(^{40}\) no doubt was ever attached to the Tsar's 'zeal for the common cause', nor was it ever considered that he had 'the most distant idea of separating himself from his allies.'\(^{41}\) Russia remained a loyal member of the coalition, and Britain's diplomatic efforts were directed at getting the Tsar to participate in further


\(^{37}\) Saul, *op. cit.*, 43, and 52.

\(^{38}\) Martens, F., *op. cit.*, IX (X), 418-425.

\(^{39}\) PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 3 January, 7 January, in cipher, and 10 January 1800, in cipher.

\(^{40}\) PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth reported on 4 February 1800, in cipher, that: '[...] all concert whatever with the Court of Vienna is at an end.'

\(^{41}\) PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 3 January 1800.
military operations against the French. Russia's withdrawal, however, actually did lead to the break up of the Second Coalition.\textsuperscript{42}

If the reasons which led to the Austro-Russian rupture are relatively clear, those that led to a break with Britain are a little more complex. The British ambassador, Lord Whitworth, listed six reasons: the failure of the expedition against Holland; the idea of a good understanding between London and Vienna; the refusal of Paul's Orders of Knighthood by the British monarchy; jealousy of British successes at sea; the intrigues of Count Rostopchin; and the versatility of Paul's character.\textsuperscript{43} Disagreements arose between Britain and Russia after the failure of the joint landing in Holland in the autumn of 1799, but they were not serious enough to cause a rupture.\textsuperscript{44} Although withdrawal from the coalition also affected the British, they were understanding of the situation and sympathised with the Russians' resentment of the Austrians.\textsuperscript{45} At first, then, Paul's disagreement with the Austrians did not affect Anglo-Russian relations, but the British government's continued cooperation with the Austrians soon began to irritate him. The British ambassador in Petersburg, Sir Charles Whitworth, did not really help matters by publicly espousing the cause of the coalition. He was fully aware that his efforts in favour of the coalition were exasperating the Tsar:

\begin{quote}
No one can lament more than I do the fatal tendency of this animosity [towards Austria] and I do my utmost to combat it. Your Lordship can have no idea of the length to which it is carried. Such as that even the measures for furnishing the house of Austria with the means for carrying on the war with vigour are considered as a symptom of approving its views and are consequently looked upon with a jealous eye. Every idea I throw out tending in the most distant degree towards conciliation whether by negotiations with the Court of Vienna or by any other means, serves but to exasperate the more and to draw upon myself the reproach of abetting its exorbitant pretensions.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{43}Dropmore Papers, VI, 286-287, Memoranda by Lord Whitworth, July 1800.

\textsuperscript{44}Cf. Mackesy, Statesmen at War, for the negotiations for a coalition between Britain and Russia and the expedition to Holland.

\textsuperscript{45}Ragsdale, 'Russia, Prussia, and Europe,' 98-99.

\textsuperscript{46}PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 4 February 1800, in cipher.
Paul requested his recall in February 1800 and asked that a new ambassador be sent to Petersburg.\(^{47}\)

Relations between the two courts continued to be cool, but were not as yet hostile. The event which led to a diplomatic rupture occurred when the British ambassador in Stockholm, Mr. Hailes, took leave of his post without making the customary call on his Russian counterpart, Budberg. This was not considered to be an oversight by Paul, but rather a studied insult. It was inconceivable to the Tsar that Hailes could have acted in such a manner without instructions from his court.\(^{48}\) He thus ordered Panin to write a note to Whitworth, already on the point of leaving, telling him to take the whole British diplomatic mission with him, and giving as a reason Hailes' lack of consideration towards the Russian ambassador.\(^{49}\) The British government, still hoping to put the coalition back together, did not reciprocate by expelling the Russian mission. Instead, the cabinet decided to send a consul by the name of Stephen Shairp. It was a sign of the increasing tension between the two courts, however, when Shairp was told that he would not be received.

b) The conflict over Malta

The British government was, in fact, trying in vain to maintain good diplomatic relations with Russia when it committed a gross political error, which seems to have been used by Paul to provoke an open conflict. That error occurred on 5 September 1800 when the British, much to the chagrin of the Tsar, hoisted their flag over the island of Malta.

\(^{47}\) Ragsdale, Détente, 28; and 'Russia, Prussia, and Europe,' 100. Whitworth's withdrawal was demanded by the Tsar on 12 February 1800 (a translation of the Emperor's rescript to Vorontsov concerning the matter is to be found in PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46). Whitworth did not officially learn of this decision until much later, on 2 April (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville). Recent research has revealed that Whitworth played a role in the conspiracy which ended Paul's life. Cf. James Kenney, 'Lord Whitworth and the Conspiracy against Tsar Paul I: The New Evidence of the Kent Archive,' Slavic Review, 36, 1977; and 'The Politics of Assassination,' 137.

\(^{48}\) PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Whitworth to Grenville, 6 June 1800; Ragsdale, 'Russia, Prussia, and Europe,' 100.

\(^{49}\) Brückner, op. cit., V, 161-163, Panin to Vorontsov, 9 April 1800, and Panin to Krüdener, 331-332, 26 May; Bartenev, op. cit., 11, 115-118, Panin to Vorontsov; Dropmore Papers, VI, 261, Pitt to Grenville, 3 July 1800, and 263, Vorontsov to Grenville, 6 July 1800; Ragsdale, 'Russia, Prussia, and Europe,' 100; Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 100. In spite of Panin's and Rostopchin's efforts to deter Paul from this measure, the note was handed over on 6 April. Whitworth and Casamajor left Petersburg on 7 April.
When the Second Coalition was formed, it was agreed that the island should be jointly garrisoned by the British, the Russians, and the Neapolitans. But after taking the island, the British, worried by increasing Russian hostility, changed their minds at the last minute, excluded the other two powers, and raised their flag alone. In Berlin, Krüdener sought a conference with Carysfort and asked him whether the King of Britain considered the convention respecting Malta as binding. Carysfort declined entering into any conversation on the subject and told him that if Paul wanted an explanation on his master's intentions he should send an accredited envoy to London for that purpose.

On 4 November, the Russian Chancellor, Count Rostopchin, addressed a letter to Grenville bringing the capture of Malta to the attention of the British King. But without waiting for a reply, and without consulting his Vice-Chancellor Panin, Paul declared that very same day an embargo on all British ships in Russian ports. Rostopchin wrote to Haugwitz and explained that the embargo had been implemented as a result of the British not conforming to the Convention of St Petersburg.

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50 Carysfort was informed of the fall of Malta in a letter from Paget in the first week of October (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 7 October 1800).
51 Ibid., 21 October 1800, in cipher.
52 Rostopchin, Count Fedor Vasilevich (1765-1826), Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Post Office under Paul I, he was disgraced by him shortly before his assassination.
53 Copies in PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Rostopchin to Grenville, 23 October 1800; Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 419-420, as also the correspondence between Rostopchin and Grenville, 421-428. Panin informed Krüdener on 24 October (Brückner, op. cit., V, 503-504).
54 There is some confusion as to the exact date on which the embargo was laid. Ragsdale, Détente, 77, gives the embargo date as 30 October and cites Paul's order to the Governor of St Petersburg and a report from the British Consul Stephen Shairp. Shairp reported as early as 23 October that he believed the order for an embargo had been sent to Cronstadt (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 48, Alexander Shairp to W. Shairp, 23 October 1800). On 30 October, the Russians started sending British seamen up-country about 10 at a time (ibid., 30 October 1800). But the diplomatic corps in Petersburg was not informed of the embargo by a circular note from Rostopchin until 4 November (Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 420). Saul, op. cit., 148, writes 6 November, and argues that the embargo, 'may only have been intended as a ploy to force British compliance with the Convention of Saint Petersburg.' The Prussian envoy writes that he learnt of the embargo on 4 November, and was officially informed by a note that Panin sent to all the foreign envoys on 6 November (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Lusi to the court, 7 November 1800). News of the embargo reached Berlin on 21 November 1800, on which date Carysfort dispatched a letter informing Grenville (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, 21 November 1800).
So, just as it was Malta which persuaded Paul to act against France, so it was Malta which was the cause of measures initiated against Britain. In all, there were about 180 British vessels that were caught in the Russian net. Their seizure led to a clash between Russian and British ships at Narva, after an attempt was made by seven British vessels to escape the embargo. Two British vessels escaped to sea after sinking a Russian ship, while the Russians burned a third that remained in harbour. Paul retaliated by deporting the crews of all British vessels into the interior of Russia. The seamen were to be sent up country, ten at a time, to 102 different towns. On 18 November about 400 sailors were sent to Voronezh, Tver, and Smolensk. They were to be paid 5 kopecks a day by the Russian government and given a small portion of rye flour and some fruit ('poor allowance for an Englishman'). Winter clothes had to be bought for them. On 21 November another batch of about 50 captains and 500 sailors were sent off. A few Prussian and Swedish ships were also caught up in the embargo, and Prussians who were members of British crews were sent off to the interior, but they were released shortly after. The actual financial harm done to the British was minimal, Grenville estimated that the Russian seizures did not exceed one and a half million pounds, although the loss might have been considerable to those personally concerned, it was not at a national level.

Till that time, the British government had taken all of Russia's actions, however excessive they may have seemed, with a grain of salt. One of the probable reasons for this was the importance of British trade in Russian ports. So here once again, and in an effort to avoid open rupture with Russia, the British countered only by demanding the lifting of the embargo and the resuming of diplomatic relations. Lord Grenville replied to Rostopchin's letter by making it clear that Britain would not

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56 Ibid., Lusi to the court, 7 November 1800. The Times, 9 December 1800, reports that the embargo was laid on British ships in Cronstadt on 5 November, and that there were 103 vessels in port at the time. A further 70 were in the port of Riga (The Times, 28 November 1800).


58 PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Alexander Shairp to W. Shairp, 11, 14, and 18 November; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Lusi to the court, 11 November 1800; Brückner, op. cit., V, 516, Krüdener to Panin, 29 November 1800.

59 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Lusi to the court, 14 and 28 November 1800.

60 Dropmore Papers, VI, 405, Grenville to Carysfort, 9 December 1800.

enter into negotiations with Russia before the embargo was lifted and normal diplomatic relations were resumed,\(^{62}\) but Paul returned the letter unanswered.\(^{63}\) It was only after that blunt rebuff that the British made it clear that war would result if the embargo and subsequent deportation did not cease.\(^{64}\) Paul was letting the Malta crisis slip into war with Britain, and it had a drastic effect on Paul's view of the Armed Neutrality.\(^{65}\) It was, in fact, around this time that the initiative changed hands.\(^{66}\) Whereas before, Sweden and Denmark were asking Paul to intervene in their favour, now Paul was intimidating them into taking action against Britain. That very same month, both the Swedes and the Danes had urged Paul to take measures against British shipping. Now that he had done so, he expected them to do the same.\(^{67}\) So he told his allies to prepare for war.

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\(^{62}\) Piggott and Omond, *op. cit.* 423-424, Grenville to Rostopchin, 5 December 1800.

\(^{63}\) Cf. Piggott and Omond, *op. cit.* 425-428 for an impression of Paul's attitude towards Britain.


\(^{65}\) Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?', 59.

\(^{66}\) *Ibid.*.

\(^{67}\) Feldbaek, *Denmark*, 90-91, 100-101 and 256. Feldbaek believes that Paul was in conflict with Britain over Malta, and that the Armed Neutrality was nothing more than a façade 'for the intervention of Russia, as a great power, in European politics'. Ragsdale also writes that the documents point to the pursuance of a vendetta against Britain because of Malta (Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool,' 60).
CHAPTER IV

THE RUSSIAN REALIGNMENT

1. The Russo-Prussian rapprochement

While tension between London and Petersburg intensified, Russia's relations with France, and especially with Prussia, were improving. As already mentioned, Paul's political aims during this period remained essentially the same as throughout the Second Coalition. Only now, Paul was seeking new allies to fulfil these aims. The countries he turned to were Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia. Prussia especially assumed an important position in Paul's foreign policy plans. But this importance waxed and waned with the changes in the international political climate. Prussia's primary utility, in Paul's eyes, was to counterbalance what he considered to be Austria's untoward expansionist appetite. When Paul considered Austria's position in Germany to be a threat to his interests, Prussia's importance in his diplomatic scheme increased. On the other hand, when Paul thought that Austria did not pose a problem, his interest in Prussia diminished. Whitworth pointed out after Russia's break with Austria: 'It is but natural to conclude that in proportion as the Court of Vienna loses ground, the relation between this Court and that of Berlin will acquire more strength.' He thought the Prussian cabinet would attempt to gain, or neutralise Russia, to 'recommend' itself to the French government. Using Prussia as a rival power to counter Austria was characteristic of the Russian foreign policy system.

1 Feldbaek, 'The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul,' 19.
2 A Danish-Russian rapprochement took shape during the spring of 1800. The initiative came from Christian Bernstorff. Cf. Feldbaek, Denmark, 40-44.
3 Brückner, op. cit., V, 310, Panin to Krüdener 14 May 1800; Feldbaek, 'The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul,' 33.
4 PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 18 February 1800, in cipher. Panin later wrote: '[...] la Prusse est intéressée à se ménager l'appui de la cour de Russie, et cet intérêt est réciproque, car notre alliance avec elle nous donne un moyen puissant de maintenir un juste équilibre entre les maisons d'Autriche et de Brandenbourg.' (A. L. Narochitskii, et. al., eds., Vneshniaia politika Rossii
Paul's relations to Prussia were a little ambiguous. Although he disliked Prussian neutrality, he had a pronounced liking for Prussian military dress and discipline, and realised Prussia's potential utility. The Prussian refusal to adhere to the Second Coalition incited Paul to recall his ambassador from Berlin in June 1799. All contacts with Berlin ceased, until worsening relations between Russia and the allies led to Baron Krüdener. Paul's original aim in sending Krüdener was to get Prussia to join an alliance, with Russia, Britain, the Porte, Sweden and Denmark, that would have been powerful enough to lay down the law in Europe. The Tsar realised that the rupture which had come about with Austria necessitated the resumption of relations with Prussia and that if he was to maintain some sort of influence in European affairs, it would be better to have an ally on the continent. Panin wrote Krüdener at the beginning of November that the Tsar, unhappy with Austria, desired a rapprochement with Prussia. In his original plan, even though he had doubts as to its eventual
success, Panin proposed a confederation, in which Prussia was to be the cornerstone. Panin was perfectly aware that the league contemplated by Paul was not about to occur without Prussia's adhesion.11

a) Initial approaches

Krüdener arrived in November 1799, although he was not accredited and did not receive his credentials until April 1800. It might seem a little strange that Petersburg decided to send a diplomat to Berlin without giving him any official credentials, but the example was not without precedent. Thomas Grenville had been in a similar position when he arrived in Berlin with a simple letter of introduction. A letter from Panin suggests the reason why the Russian court behaved this way. Since there had been a 'misunderstanding' between the two courts, it was safer to wait and see how Berlin was going to react to the Russian overtures before sending any credentials.12 So he was at first welcomed in the capacity of a simple 'Russian tourist'. His official reception at court was put off as late as possible and when it occurred was anything but a success.13 The King's manner was apparently cold, and

VI, 265. Panin gives a sketch of the principle personalities at the court of Berlin, where he was posted as minister plenipotentiary between August 1797 and June 1799. His portraits are far from flattering.


12 Brückner, op. cit., V, 226, Panin to Krüdener, n.d., but probably end of December 1799. The dispatch of Krüdener's credentials was even further retarded by several other events: the tergiversations surrounding the nomination of a new Prussian ambassador for Petersburg (ibid., V, 233, Panin to Krüdener, 19 January 1800); Paul waiting to see how Berlin would react to his accepting the dignity of Grand Master of the order of St Jean (ibid., V, 210, Krüdener to Panin, 1 December 1799, and 243-244, Panin to Krüdener, 29 January, and 246, 31 January 1800. For a reason I have not been able to discern, Haugwitz was either reluctant or slow to recognise Paul's new title, and did not do so until January 1800); Panin waiting for the Tsar's reaction to the Prussian treaty proposal (ibid., V, 272, Panin to Krüdener, 11 March 1800). The expedition of the courier carrying the credentials was continually postponed. The excuses used in the circumstances hardly seem legitimate: Panin fell sick; then Rostopchin fell ill; then a few 'doubtful' points had to be cleared up, which awaited the Tsar's orders (ibid., V, 276, Panin to Krüdener, 14 March 1800). They were eventually sent from Petersburg on 8 April (ibid., V, 291, Panin to Krüdener, 8 April 1800). Krüdener presented them to Alvensleben on 28 April (RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 29 April 1800).

13 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 June 1800, in cipher; Brückner, op. cit., V, 215, Krüdener to Panin, 7 December 1799; Boulay de la Meurthe, op. cit., 269-270, Beurmonville to
Krüdener in return was far from tactful. In the same breath, he proposed the renewal of the treaty of 1792, and a secret convention (armed mediation) to force peace on land and on sea. This was going too far and was more than the King bargained for. He refused to participate in such a scheme, arguing that it could involve Prussia in a war. Ostensibly Krüdener was sent to renew diplomatic relations, which indeed was considered necessary by the court of Petersburg, but this was not the only reason. He was also instructed to obtain an alliance with Prussia: a) to oppose the house of Austria; and b) to establish a defensive league in the north of Europe in the likelihood that Russia was to withdraw from the coalition.

In his first meetings with Haugwitz, Krüdener hinted that Prussia should abandon its isolationist policy so as not to have to suffer peace conditions being imposed on the continent by France. Other matters, such as the fate of Holland and the House of Orange, the Prussian provinces on the left bank, the conservation of Germany, and the equilibrium of Europe were also to be discussed. Haugwitz’s reply came a few days later. The King was in perfect agreement with Petersburg on those points. The only problem, and one which was going to prove insurmountable, was that he differed as to the means of obtaining them. These were the first steps in a rapprochement with Russia that Haugwitz was disposed to accelerate, not only as a means of curbing what he considered to be Austria’s avidity, but also because he feared a reunion between the two imperial courts. The King was likewise inclined but far more reticent than his foreign minister, for fear of getting too deeply involved in something that might eventually lead to war.

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Talleyrand, 13 May 1800 (23 floréal VIII). He had to wait about two weeks after his arrival before having his first audience with Haugwitz, and did not have his first official audience with the King until 6 May.

14 Martens, F., op. cit., VI, 267.


2. The Peterhof Treaty

a) Negotiations in Berlin

The 1792 Russo-Prussian treaty was due to expire in July of 1800. The initiative leading to the renewal most definitely came from Petersburg, but the same thoughts were going through Haugwitz's mind around this time.

In January of 1800, Krüdener suggested that a concerted effort between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg would enable them to keep Austrian ambitions in Italy in check. But it was not until the beginning of February that Krüdener brought up the subject of a renewal of the treaty during a conference in which he reiterated how important it was for the two courts to come to an agreement on European affairs. Krüdener suggested that it was high time to lay down and settle the bases upon which a renewal of the alliance could be brought about, and asked Haugwitz to communicate a treaty project which he could pass on to his court. In another conference held a few days later, Krüdener observed that given the rapprochement between London and Vienna, and the dangers facing Germany, he could not conceive how Prussia could remain isolated and not seek an alliance with Russia. Haugwitz agreed and gave the impression that he was most eager to conclude a union. In a memoir addressed to the King and dated 26 February 1801, Haugwitz reviewed the history of Russo-Prussian alliances and summarised those reasons for and against the renewal of the treaty with Russia. He pointed out that a rapprochement with Russia was, since the final partition of Poland, more interesting than ever for Prussia, and that if it was limited to a defensive alliance it would undoubtedly be to Prussia's advantage. He argued that Prussia was more exposed to attack from either Austria or France than Russia. He suggested, however, that there was no need to change the body of articles in the present treaty, but that the secret articles should disappear. The negotiations were to take place in Berlin and not in Petersburg. Furthermore, he was to attempt to obtain a treaty of commerce, interrupted in 1797, and assurances on the purchase of Ukrainian horses. The King approved the memoir, and Haugwitz replied that he

20. The order to sound out the Prussian ministry on the arrangements for a renewal emanated from Panin and was dated 8 January (the date was probably Old Style (o.s.)). Brückner, op. cit., V, 244, Krüdener to Panin, 1 February 1800. He was to propose a secret negotiation to be held alongside the public one.


23. Ibid., 249, Krüdener to Panin, 4 February 1800.

24. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 147, Haugwitz to the King, 26 February 1801.
intended on commencing talks as soon as possible. Friedrich Wilhelm gave his formal consent a few days later, authorising Haugwitz to enter into talks with Krüdener on the basis of the preceding treaty.\(^\text{25}\) Haugwitz was a warm supporter of a Russo-Prussian rapprochement and the renewal of the treaty for the following reasons:

1. It strengthened Prussia's position in Germany, as Prussia would no longer be totally isolated.

2. It would be a guarantee against the possibility of too great an Austrian preponderance in Germany. Also it would probably peeve Austria, and anything that did so was, to the Prussian political mind, invariably good.\(^\text{26}\) The negotiations gave Haugwitz the possibility to concert with Russia over the language to be adopted if Austrian successes against France became too great.\(^\text{27}\) By acting in cooperation with Russia, he hoped to prevent either France or Austria from taking unfair advantage of them when it came to discussing peace.\(^\text{28}\)

3. Seeing that Austria was making some headway in Italy and seemed likely to make even further progress, Haugwitz attempted to persuade the King that it was better to abandon the role of simple spectator Prussia had played since 1795, unacceptable to their own interests and in the long run harmful. Since a treaty with Russia did not signify an immediate taking up of arms, Haugwitz hoped to overcome the King's repugnance towards more active foreign relations\(^\text{29}\) and thereby play a role in any eventual peace negotiations. However, when things started to go badly for Austria in Italy, Haugwitz seems to have adopted a different tactic, to have abandoned any plans concerning Prussian participation in a European peace plan, and limited himself to taking measures in favour of northern Europe.\(^\text{30}\)

4. Another reason may be forwarded which might have influenced the matter. One diplomat suspected that Haugwitz wanted to obtain what for Prussia was a more important and urgently needed treaty of commerce at the cost of an insignificant treaty of alliance.\(^\text{31}\)

The King, however, true to his character, was reluctant to commit himself to anything new and wanted nothing more than a simple renewal of the treaty.\(^\text{32}\) He was

\(^{25}\)GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 147, Haugwitz to the King, 3 March 1800; and the King to Haugwitz, 8 March 1800.

\(^{26}\)These two reasons are suggested by Garlike in PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, 28 April 1800.

\(^{27}\)PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 2 June 1800.

\(^{28}\)RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 22 April 1800, in cipher.

\(^{29}\)RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 29 April 1800, in cipher.

\(^{30}\)RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 20 May 1800.

\(^{31}\)RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 June 1800, in cipher.

\(^{32}\)PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 28 April, 2 June 1800.
apparently still a little upset by the Tsar's brusqueness the preceding autumn, and while pleased about the re-opening of diplomatic relations, showed no hurry to renew the alliance.\textsuperscript{33} It was even reported that he held the renewal of the treaty to be superfluous, and was only inclined to agree, because it had not left the slightest mark on Prussian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{34} But, although he mistrusted Paul, fundamentally disliked Russian intervention in Germany,\textsuperscript{35} and feared the treaty might eventually lead to a Franco-Austrian rapprochement,\textsuperscript{36} he did not think it possible to refuse renewing an alliance that already existed on his ascending the throne.\textsuperscript{37}

Krüdener proceeded with marked caution,\textsuperscript{38} and probably had no more than one or two conversations on the subject with Haugwitz\textsuperscript{39} before a more definite overture was proposed around the beginning of March.\textsuperscript{40} Haugwitz was authorised by the King to enter into talks for the renewal of the Russo-Prussian treaty on 8 March.\textsuperscript{41} Rumours were rife, in Petersburg at least, of a 'perfect understanding' between the two courts, even though the British ambassador asserted that there were no grounds for such reports.\textsuperscript{42}

On hearing of Haugwitz's willingness to renew the alliance,\textsuperscript{43} the Tsar ordered a definitive redaction of the treaty project to be worked out.\textsuperscript{44} Krüdener received the project for the renewal of the Russo-Prussian treaty towards the end of April,\textsuperscript{45} By

\begin{itemize}
\item RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 June 1800, in cipher.
\item HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 24 May 1800, in cipher.
\item PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 2 June 1800.
\item Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 530-531, Oubril to Panin, 22 February 1800.
\item RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 June 1800, in cipher, in which a conversation between the King and the Duke of Brunswick is reported: 'Elle [the King] doit y avoir dit, qu'elle ne peut se refuser décentment à renouveler un traité subsistant à son avènement au trône et datant de longues années, mais qu'en revanche elle se bornerait aussi absolument aux engagements déjà existants.'
\item Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 259-260, Krüdener to Panin, 15 February 1801.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 259-260, Krüdener to Panin, 18 February 1801.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 277, Krüdener to Panin, 17 March 1800.
\item GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 147, Haugwitz to the King, 6 May 1800.
\item PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 25 March 1800.
\item Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 277-278, Krüdener to Panin, 17 March 1800.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 279-280, Panin to Krüdener, 2 April 1800. The project had been drawn up by Panin a month before. Although he would have preferred the treaty to be signed at Berlin, the Tsar decided otherwise.
\item PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 25 April 1800; RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 26 April 1800; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 147, Haugwitz to the King, 5 May 1800 for a discussion of the articles. Haugwitz asked for full powers to negotiate a treaty on 21 April
\end{itemize}
that time, any difficulties that might have impeded the conclusion of a treaty, apart
from a guaranty concerning the transrhenane provinces, were out of the way.\textsuperscript{46}
Except for a few separate articles, the principles of the treaty were essentially the same
as those contained in the 1792 convention, but more importantly, provision was made
for the accession of Sweden, Denmark and the Porte. Articles to be contained in a
secret treaty were to be left for later. A good deal of secrecy surrounded the
negotiations, apparently on Haugwitz's request, to prevent the French and Austrians
from learning of it. Most of the diplomatic corps, however, seemed aware that the
negotiations concerned a simple renewal of the 1792 treaty, and that the King was
determined not to take on any ulterior engagements.\textsuperscript{47}
On 31 May, Haugwitz handed over a draft of a counter-project which, with
minor exceptions, conformed almost word for word with Krüdener's own project, and
that of the treaty of 1792. The Tsar approved of the counter project of the alliance and
the secret convention, although he disagreed with the clause about the supply of
horses.\textsuperscript{48} On receiving this news, Haugwitz responded that he hoped the new
Prussian ambassador, Lusi, would be in Petersburg around the middle of July to sign
the treaty.\textsuperscript{49}

b) Lusi in Petersburg

If negotiations were taken up in Berlin with relative ease, this was not the case
in Petersburg. The Prussian ambassador in Petersburg, General von Groeben, died in
September 1799. His duties were carried out for several months in his stead by the
legation secretary Weguelin. Finding a replacement caused a few difficulties,\textsuperscript{50} but a
decision was finally made in favour of Count Lusi.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46}Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 296, Krüdener to Panin, 26 April 1800.
\textsuperscript{47}RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 22 April 1800, in cipher; Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 328,
Krüdener to Panin, 31 May 1800.
\textsuperscript{48}Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 332, Panin to Krüdener, 9 May 1800, and 333, 14 June 1800.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., V, Krüdener to Panin, 346, 28 June 1800.
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., V, 197-198, Krüdener to Panin, 18 November, and 206, 30 November 1799. Those who
came under consideration were Baron Tauentzien von Wittenberg, who was formerly ambassador at the
court of St Petersburg from 1794 until Paul ascended the throne; Baron Reck; and Lucchesini.
\textsuperscript{51}Graf Spiridon von Lusi, envoy extraordinary, minister plenipotentiary, from 20 July 1800 to 15
August 1802. He was disliked by Panin. For the following account I have drawn from RA,
Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 10 March, 22 March, in cipher, and 29 April, in cipher. Cf.
It was Lombard who influenced the King’s decision concerning a replacement for Petersburg. Haugwitz did not at first want to hear of Lusi, but apparently had to incline. It soon became evident, however, to both Lombard and Haugwitz, that he would not be of much use in Petersburg. Nevertheless, such were the men that surrounded the King that no-one dared tell him a mistake had been made. Haugwitz and Lombard considered Lucchesini for the posting, but he did not want to go to Russia under any circumstances, not even on a temporary basis. The Tsar also made it known through indirect channels, that he preferred to see someone at Petersburg with a little more talent. Even Lusi realised how unfit he was for the task and continually postponed the day he had to leave. Although his appointment was made at the end of December 1799, he did not arrive in Petersburg, after a voyage of 26 days, until 10 July 1800! The excuses used to delay his departure were various: the rigours of the season; then Mme. Lusi fell ill; then it was necessary to wait for Krüdener’s letters of credentials; and finally because of some personal financial difficulties. Rosenkrantz pointed out that as the date of departure approached, Lusi became more and more fearful of his mission. Haugwitz even recommended to Krüdener to press Lusi to depart, and when he did so the Russian envoy almost had the old man in tears. During their conversation, Lusi admitted that the King had insisted he leave on the 1st of May but countered that his health did not permit it. When he did finally arrive at Gatchina, he was received almost immediately by the Tsar. This news caused a great sensation at Berlin, as it was known the Tsar had refused to receive all other foreign envoys. The rapidity with which Paul received Lusi is illustrative of his desire to operate a rapprochement with Prussia. Panin, however, who generally had trouble getting along with the foreign diplomatic corps, and who disliked Lusi

also Brückner, op. cit., V, 220-221, Krüdener to Panin, 13 December 1799. The decision settled on Lusi on the morning of 31 December 1799 (Brückner, V, 222, Krüdener to Panin, 31 December 1799).

52 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Lusi to the court, 11 July 1800.
53 AAE, Prusse 227, 8 April 1800 (18 germinal VIII).
54 RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 29 April 1800, in cipher.
57 GStA, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Weguelin to the court, 11 July 1800.
58 Grimsted, op. cit., 73.
intensely, thought it better to carry out all important negotiations in Berlin.\(^{59}\)

Haugwitz was of the same opinion and told Krüdener that Lusi had not been admitted into the secret negotiations surrounding the Peterhof treaty and warned him that Panin should not confide in him.\(^{60}\) Lusi’s role in the negotiations then was virtually insignificant. His first visit to Panin took place on 11 July. Panin was greatly surprised to learn that Lusi had brought neither full powers nor instructions to put the finishing touches to the alliance treaty, and when Panin asked him why this was the case, Lusi answered that they had expected him to die \textit{en route}\(^{61}\). This, of course, had nothing to do with it, the reason being that Haugwitz was still haggling in Berlin with Krüdener over a separate article whereby Russia would supply Prussia with horses for its cavalry.\(^{62}\)

Haugwitz informed Krüdener on 7 July that he agreed with the proposed draft, and Lusi was given full powers to sign a treaty.\(^{63}\) The treaty was concluded at Peterhof, much more quickly than Haugwitz imagined it would be,\(^{64}\) in Rostopchin’s house on the evening of 28 July 1800 and was signed by Rostopchin, Panin and Lusi.\(^{65}\) It was designed to last for a period of eight years.\(^{66}\) Panin did not mention the treaty and the Russo-Prussian negotiations to the Swedish and Danish ambassadors until almost a month later on 22 August. Both the Swedish and Danish courts were perfectly aware, however, that negotiations had been going on for some time.\(^{67}\)

What purpose did the treaty serve? According to certain members of the Prussian cabinet the Peterhof Treaty, as it came to be known, was to enable Prussia to play an influential role in European politics by acting as mediator between her eastern

\(^{59}\) Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 367, Panin to Krüdener, 22 July 1800. This had been decided before Lusi had even arrived in Petersburg (\textit{Ibid.}, Panin to Krüdener, 8 April 1800).

\(^{60}\) \textit{Ibid.}, V, 374, Krüdener to Panin, 26 July 1800.

\(^{61}\) \textit{Ibid.}, V, 361, Panin to Krüdener, 12 July 1800.

\(^{62}\) \textit{Ibid.}, V, 373, Krüdener to Panin, 26 July 1800.

\(^{63}\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Haugwitz to Krüdener, 7 July 1800, and Haugwitz to Lusi, 7 July 1800.

\(^{64}\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Haugwitz to Lusi, 12 August 1800: ‘J’avoue que l’empressement et la promptitude qu’on a mis à Petersbourg à la conclusion effective de notre traité d’alliance ont surpassé mon attente.’


\(^{66}\) Martens, F., \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 270-280, and for a résumé of Prusso-Russian relations, although a little outdated, before the signing of the treaty, 250-269.

\(^{67}\) Feldbaek, \textit{Denmark}, 70.
and western neighbours. The treaty, however, seems to have had little effective value, and is perhaps conspicuous by its lack of commitment. The two powers were to offer their services in the event that one was attacked by a third party. Although it in no way obliged the Prussians to renounce their neutrality, Paul hoped that this would be the first step toward a more substantial treaty, one that would lead to an association of northern European powers, and would prevent an effective agreement between France and Austria. For Haugwitz it can be considered a diplomatic victory. For the first time since his young master came to the throne, Prussia signed a treaty with another power, however ineffectual it might have been in reality, that was both in accord with its neutrality policy and strengthened its position in Europe. But when all is said and done, because the Russian court was overly cautious in its proceedings, and because the Prussian court was unwilling to commit itself definitely, the only thing they agreed upon was the intention of influencing the course of events in Europe.

c) The secret convention

The Peterhof treaty was inadequate in other ways. It left three important points which were meant to determine the future base of Russo-Prussian relations unanswered. These were: a) what measures the two courts were to adopt to keep Austria within what they considered to be acceptable limits; b) what means were to be used to protect or support the German Empire, the Electorate of Bavaria, and the princes of Italy; and, c) under what presumable cases they would have recourse to arms. It was important for Paul to determine what measures, if any, Friedrich Wilhelm was willing to adopt, in cooperation with Russia, against Austria, and these were the object of the negotiations surrounding the secret convention. The Tsar was prepared to sign such a convention as soon as the King of Prussia made his views concerning Austria clear.

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68 Martens, F., op. cit., VI, 284, writes that the treaty had no practical value but that the Tsar hoped that Prussia would consent to specify its obligations vis-à-vis France in a separate and secret act. Contemporaries also believed that the treaty was of little worth.

69 Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?', 56.

70 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 2 June 1800.

71 Brückner, op. cit., V, 402-404, Krüdener to Panin, 12 August 1800.

72 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, copy of a letter from Panin to Krüdener, 29 July 1800; and in Brückner, op. cit., V, 377-380.

73 Brückner, V, 311-312, Panin to Krüdener, 14 May 1800.

74 Ibid., V, 371, Panin to Krüdener, 25 July 1800.
Krüdener proposed a draft of the secret articles, and a discussion about them ensued on 1 May 1800. There was only one veritable point of dissent. Haugwitz reported that the King absolutely refused to guarantee the Palatine Electorate. No other changes or objections were made, except that Haugwitz insisted on having an article included that allowed Prussia to import horses from the Ukraine. (Paul had banned the export of horses so badly needed by the Prussian cavalry). It was reported by Krüdener that the King attached a high price *(un prix extrême)* to the article, arguing that it would popularise the treaty and fill the army with enthusiasm.\(^75\) Even Haugwitz supposedly put an excessive interest and zeal into the proposition.\(^76\) Although Krüdener doubted that such a proposition would be accepted by his court, and did not hide this opinion from Haugwitz, he nevertheless forwarded it to Petersburg, fearing that a brusque refusal would have a baneful influence on the King’s mind. Panin also thought the answer would be no,\(^77\) and indeed received the Tsar’s negative reply a few days later, arguing that he needed them for his own cavalry.\(^78\)

Another conference was held a few days later during which Krüdener and Haugwitz went over some of the articles of the secret convention. Although the following observations were meant to precede a more formal debate, it is worthwhile noting them.

1. The first article concerned the integrity of the Holy Roman Empire and the establishment of a barrier to assure the security northern Germany. The Prussian cabinet did everything to avoid having its hands tied by this proposition. There are two probable reasons for it doing so. First, to be able to arrange compensations for the loss of its transrhenane provinces, and secondly, to re-establish a certain equilibrium in Germany and to take up the cause of those secular princes seeking compensations.\(^79\) Prussia could not, at one and the same time, hope to gain territorial compensations in the Empire and guarantee its integrity.

2. Haugwitz reiterated once more his refusal to guarantee the Electorate of Bavaria. His reasoning was simple, if not self-defeating. As Friedrich Wilhelm did not want to abandon his system of neutrality, he was not sure he would be able to fulfil any engagements taken towards Bavaria. Even though he realised the danger to Prussia if France ever dominated Swabia or Bavaria, the King considered it all the more reason to conserve Prussia’s strength behind the Demarcation Line.


\(^{79}\) These motives are suggested by the Russian envoy in *Ibid.*, 314, Krüdener to Panin, 17 May 1800.
3. As for the suggestion to invite Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel to take part in the agreement, Haugwitz adhered to it without hesitation.

We see here the Prussian cabinet's desire to remain free of any commitment that might eventually lead to war, all the while hoping that it could strengthen its position through an association with other powers. But when Haugwitz drew up a project and submitted a draft to Kriidener, it met with Panin's total disapproval, and the Russian vice-chancellor worked towards its complete rejection. He sent it back with annotations in the margins with instructions to Kriidener to convince the Prussian foreign minister just how inadequate his draft was, and to bring about the redaction of a new project better adapted to the circumstances. Although he had promised as much, Haugwitz did not come up with a second draft project, and offered as an excuse too much work. Instead he sent a dispatch to Lusi containing some 'preliminary explications'. These, it would seem, sufficed to allow Lusi to sign, on 1 September 1800, a secret convention. It has been pointed out, however, that the wording of the secret articles was vague enough for Prussia to back out at any time it might think necessary.

3. Prussia in Paul's European strategy

In a letter to his ambassador in Petersburg, Haugwitz reiterated the foreign policy aims of the Russian court. Paul was out to prevent French preponderance in Italy, to contain Austria within what he considered to be reasonable limits, to preserve the political existence of the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, to save what was left to be saved in Germany, and to employ a combined Russo-Prussian mediation to bring about a general peace on the continent.

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82 Ibid., 369-370, Panin to Krüdener, 23 July 1800. I assume this to be the counter-project found in GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, n.d., which would have been received some time in August, and which is reproduced in Ragsdale, 'Documents,' 108-109.
83 Brückner, op. cit., 404-405, Krüdener to Panin, 13 August 1800.
84 Martens, F., op. cit., VI, 279-280.
The Prussian court was, on the whole, in agreement with these views. The question of either French or Austrian preponderance in Germany was also a subject which preoccupied Berlin, to such an extent that it was thought wise to concert with Russia on the subject. The only difference between the two courts lay in their views on the means that might have to be employed to bring about these ends. The Prussian government wanted to act as mediator between France and Russia to bring about conditions conducive to peace, while the Russians were more inclined to bring matters to a head by the use of force. It was a fundamental difference which was to prove an insurmountable problem. The following section outlines Russia's efforts to co-opt Prussia into Paul's plan to bring peace about on the continent. Although the two notions of a Northern League and an armed mediation were intimately connected, and have sometimes been confused, it is useful to considered them separately.

First, inextricably bound with Paul's plans to renew the Armed Neutrality was the idea of a Northern League. Paul wanted to associate a Northern League with the Armed Neutrality to bring about a continental peace by use of an armed mediation. At first it was to consist of a simple adherence of the northern powers to the Peterhof Treaty. Other powers were supposed to be invited to join the League after Prussia and Russia had agreed to its terms.

By the month of June, talk had been going on for some time about a so-called northern alliance or league, which was to include the four northern powers. It was reported that Haugwitz agreed with the principle completely. It was to be similar to the Treaty of Teschen, designed to prevent the French and Austrians from carving up Italy and the Holy Roman Empire, and to maintain Paul's idea of a balance of power in Europe.

Second, rumours of an armed mediation had been going around too, but from the very start Haugwitz was against it. Paul I strongly expressed the belief that both Prussia and Russia should be prepared to support their mediation by arms. Although Panin realised that the Prussians did not want to take part in an active

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86 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 2 June 1800.
87 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Ompteda to the King, 17 June 1800, in cipher. Ludwig Karl Georg von Ompteda (1767-1854), Hanoverian diplomat, sent to the court of Berlin in the Summer of 1794, made chargé d'affaires in 1795, negotiating Hanover's entry into the Treaty of Basle. He remained in Berlin till the beginning of 1801.
88 Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool,' 55-56; Feldbaek, 'The Foreign policy of Tsar Paul,' 21. On 29 August, the day after his invitation to form an Armed Neutrality, Panin informed the Danish minister, Rosenkrantz, about the Tsar's plan to form a Northern League.
89 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 2 August 1800, in cipher.
mediation, he officially announced on 15 July that the Tsar would attempt to bring one about. This was the first official mention of an armed mediation. To the Paul's mind, an armed mediation between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg was the only means to counterbalance what he considered to be France's preponderant influence and to thwart Austria's aims. Krüdener was instructed to mention it to Haugwitz as if it were his own idea. If Haugwitz responded favourably, Krüdener was to insinuate that he submit it to the King, and the King in turn was to make a formal overture to the Russian Emperor. It was a tortuous path to follow, and one which Krüdener did on 23 September.

Prussia, however, was not in the least interested in partaking of an armed mediation. Although Krüdener insinuated what consequences a French rejection of the mediation offer would entail, such suggestions were, from the start, shunned by the Prussian government. The Russian envoy had been aware for some time that Prussia would not support his court's principles by arms and that an active concert on the subject of the proposed mediation between the two courts was highly unlikely. The main obstacle was, of course, the King and his neutrality system. Haugwitz answered Krüdener: 'Si j'étais roi, j'en ferais la base de mon système, mais il ne faut pas se faire illusion; on n'y portera jamais le roi; on ne surmontera pas sa répugnance contre tout ce qui pourrait le compromettre avec la France?'

At the beginning of September, Krüdener presented Haugwitz with two new projects (one for a Northern League, and another for an armed mediation), and insisted that he sign one of them. If Krüdener could not persuade Haugwitz to accept the first project, he was to resort to the second, but even before doing so, Krüdener was convinced that all concert between Petersburg and Berlin on the subject was at an end. On receiving these projects, Haugwitz, in the most stormy meeting he had yet had with Krüdener, lost his patience and declared that Prussia would keep to its own neutrality system. He argued that the King would refuse to draw the sword outside

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90 Brückner, op. cit., V, 368-369, Panin to Krüdener, 22 July 1800.
91 Ibid., 453-454, Krüdener to Panin, 23 September 1800.
92 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Haugwitz to Lusi, 4 August 1800, in cipher.
93 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 2 August 1800, in cipher.
94 Brückner, op. cit., V, 454, Krüdener to Panin, 23 September 1800.
95 Panin included them in a dispatch to Krüdener dated 22 August 1800 in Brückner, op. cit., V, 430-431.
96 This, at least, is what he confided to Carysfort in PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 2 September 1800.
of the Demarcation Line, and instructed his ambassador in Petersburg to avoid all such talk in his conversations. At this stage, Prussia was more concerned with mediating peace between France and Russia, to further its own territorial claims, than it was with a League.

During the months of August and of September, Paul mobilised two armies of about 80,000 men each - one in Lithuania under General Pahlen, the other near Volhina under General Kutuzov. Krüdener was directed to say that these armies had been formed with the intention of forcing the conclusion of peace and strongly urged, in language that almost amounted to a menace, that the Prussians form an observation army in Franconia. He wanted Prussia to form an army of 50 to 60,000 men to hold on the border of Bohemia. The armies were supposedly to lend force to an ultimatum for an armed mediation. If this were not possible, then he was to ask that Prussia at least make a show of force on the Bohemian border.

This is what Krüdener proceeded to do, but in trying to force the issue, the Russians only succeeded in putting the Prussian foreign minister into a position where he was obliged categorically to refuse cooperation on those terms. Krüdener suggested that the Russian counter-project include an article stipulating the formation of two Prussian armies - one of 40,000 to be placed in Franconia, and another of 60,000 to be massed in Bohemia. At first, Haugwitz diplomatically told Krüdener

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99 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Lusi to the court 3 September 1800. Copy in Ragsdale, 'Documents on Foreign Policy,' 111. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 11 September 1800. Brückner, op. cit., V, 431-432, Panin to Krüdener, 3 September. Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool,' 55; Kutuzov, I, 808-812. The army in Lithuania was to be composed of 13 cavalry regiments, 25 infantry, 5 chasseurs, 13 battalions of grenadiers, 2 artillery regiments, and 15 regiments of cossacks. The army in Volhina was to be composed of 14 cavalry and 14 infantry regiments, six chasseurs, 4 battalions of grenadiers, 1 regiment and 1 battalion of artillery, and 16 regiments of cossacks (The Times, 27 September 1800). A reserve army of 50,000 men was organised under Count Ivan Saltikov and stationed at Vitebsk (Brückner, op. cit., V, 459, Panin to Krüdener, 27 September 1800).
100 Brückner, op. cit., V, 368, Panin to Krüdener, 22 July 1800; copy of a note verbale from Panin to Lusi in GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, 21 August 1800.
101 Brückner, op. cit., V, 431-432, Panin to Krüdener, 3 September. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 11 and 16 September 1800.
102 Ibid., 455, Krüdener to Panin, 23 September 1800.
103 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, counter-project, not dated.
that he foresaw a lot of difficulties convincing the King. Later, the proposition, as to be expected, was flatly refused by the Prussian government. Haugwitz's confidence in Paul was limited, and he knew that the Tsar's character was not stable enough to enter into an armed mediation that had continental peace as its object. Finally, on 18 September, the court of Berlin officially informed Petersburg that the Russian projects for armed mediation could not be accepted. Haugwitz duly wrote to his ambassador in Petersburg instructing him to refuse to accept the proposition.

This seems to have put an end to any ideas Paul had about mediating peace on the continent. Krüdener was informed by Panin that the Tsar no longer expected anything from the Prussian monarch. Lusi delivered a note verbale about this time declining Russia's propositions concerning a Northern League, and gave as an excuse the King's desire not to digress from his neutrality system. It was delivered to the Tsar, after which Panin declared to Krüdener: 'Il ne peut plus nous rester d'incertitude, il n'est plus d'espérances à fonder sur ses dispositions [...].' Rostopchin then officially informed Haugwitz that the Tsar had decided to suspend the negotiations concerning an armed mediation and to limit himself to the Armed Neutrality of the north. This news left Haugwitz with a sentiment of relief rather than anything else. Haugwitz was far more worried about being excluded from the talks being initiated between the Russian and French governments than some vague scheme to bring about peace on the continent through armed mediation. And so the idea of a Northern League and an armed mediation foundered on the rock of Prussian neutrality.

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104 Brückner, op. cit., V, 439, Krüdener to Panin, 9 September 1800.
105 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Haugwitz to Krüdener, 18 September 1800.
106 He admitted as much to Beurnonville (AAE, Prusse 226, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 13 February 1801 (24 pluviôse VIII)).
107 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Haugwitz to Krüdener, 18 September 1800. The Prussian refusal was supposedly drawn up by Lombard (RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 11 October 1800, in cipher).
109 Brückner, op. cit., V, 469-470, Panin to Krüdener, 11 October 1800.
110 Brückner, op. cit., V, 480, Panin to Krüdener, 15 October 1800.
111 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Rostopchin to Haugwitz, 13 October 1800. Lusi was informed the following day in, ibid., Lusi to the court, 14 October 1800.
113 Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?', 56.
4. Prussia and the Franco-Russian rapprochement

One can discern three phases in the Franco-Russian negotiations, which are reflected by France’s changing position on the continent and its resulting attitude towards Prussia. Firstly, before the Second Italian Campaign France asked Prussia for help in mediating a rapprochement with Russia, which Berlin reluctantly did (January to March 1800). This position was altered as soon as it became apparent that hostilities with Austria would recommence (April to May). Secondly, after the battle of Marengo, Prussia, fearing a Franco-Austrian rapprochement, offered the French its mediation. Bonaparte, however, decided to dispense with Prussia and entered into direct contact with Tsar Paul (July to October 1800). Thirdly, direct negotiations were carried on in Berlin between the French and Russian ambassadors (October to December 1800) that were later continued in Paris.

When Berlin was not being solicited to join one alliance or another, it was used as a meeting house by belligerent powers seeking to re-establish diplomatic contacts. During the First and Second Coalitions, most of the conflicting parties had broken off diplomatic relations with each other, but all of them had representatives at the court of Berlin. Russia under Catherine II, for example, had suspended relations with France on receiving news of Louis XVI’s execution. When the French Directory wanted to sound out Paul I in February 1797 on an eventual resumption of diplomatic relations with Petersburg, they made use of Prussia as an intermediary.

The Prussian court willingly assumed this role of mediator, not only between Russia and France but also between France and Britain, throughout the summer of 1800. Haugwitz had several reasons for doing so. If Prussia were to maintain her neutral position, then it was of vital importance that France be at peace with Europe and especially with Britain. As long as France was at war with Britain, the danger that French troops would invade Hanover and close the Elbe and Weser, with the resulting dire consequences on north German commerce, always loomed threateningly over Prussia. More importantly, if Prussia hoped to gain something from the coming reshaping of Europe, then it was necessary to conciliate France. If the French wanted a rapprochement with Russia, then the Prussian court had an opportunity of playing a role, while remaining on good terms with both powers. It was perhaps even desirable that Prussia not overplay its role and slow the process down a little. Haugwitz feared that if ever France and Russia did resume direct diplomatic relations, and no longer used Prussia as an intermediary (as eventually happened), then it would lose whatever influence it hoped to exercise in the coming peace negotiations.114 It was perhaps Prussia’s biggest fear that cordial relations between her two more powerful neighbours.

114 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 27 December 1800, in cipher.
would lead to an arrangement in Germany disadvantageous to Prussia's interests. 'Une communication directe entre Pétersbourg et Paris, surtout dans un moment où la paix reste à faire encore, serait la chose du monde la plus embarrassante, la Russie aurait sans doute plus d'influence sur les pacifications, que ne pourrait l'avoir la Prusse, qui depuis longtemps n'a pas joui de la confiance du gouvernement français.'

But an understanding between Russia and France brought about by Prussian help would, Haugwitz hoped, not only lead to the satisfaction of Prussia's territorial claims, but to the assertion of its hegemony in north Germany.

a) Paris appeals to Berlin

For Bonaparte, Prussia's role in a rapprochement with Russia was at first both important and necessary. He had already attempted reconciliatory measures at the courts of Vienna and London without any success and was now disposed to let Prussia play a mediatory role in bringing about either a partial or general peace on the continent.

At first Talleyrand tentatively approached the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Daniel Alfons von Sandoz-Rollin, and asked whether the King of Prussia could sound out Petersburg on France's behalf and whether Prussia was willing to become the instrument of a rapprochement between the two powers. Friedrich Wilhelm, who obviously saw the chance to mediate between two great powers, and who was less sceptical about Bonaparte's intentions than his own foreign minister, treated the overture favourably and instructed Haugwitz to convey Talleyrand's remarks to Krüdener. The King told Beurnonville on 27 January 1800: 'Je suis prêt à vous aider à faire la paix.' Haugwitz, on the other hand, thought that 'la situation des affaires est beaucoup trop indécise et trop peu développée encore pour que l'on puisse juger des démarches à faire et s'en promettre le moindre succès', and he later treated Talleyrand's overtures as 'subterfuges et vaines paroles'. He expressed his doubts as to the sincerity of the French proposals and believed that Bonaparte had sent...
Beurnonville merely to give the impression that he was doing everything to bring about peace.\textsuperscript{121} At the same time, Garlike reported that Haugwitz had at first refused to listen to overtures from France,\textsuperscript{122} but later admitted that he had not found compatible with the different interests of Europe.\textsuperscript{123} Although this is not quite correct, it is undoubtedly a reflection of what Haugwitz thought on the matter. Rosenkrantz reported: 'Le défaut de base a d'abord inspiré de la répugnance au ministère Prussien de se faire l'organe pour cette ouverture vague auprès de la cour de Pétersbourg.'\textsuperscript{124}

In any event, Haugwitz, transmitted France's 'conciliatory dispositions' to the Russian envoy but commented that an overture as indefinite (\textit{générale}) as the French had made had little chance of bearing fruit and hoped that his envoy in Paris would later be able to obtain a more formal and detailed peace proposition.\textsuperscript{125} Both Haugwitz and the court of Petersburg were reserved about Bonaparte's advances, in part out of not wanting to upset Austria. It was feared that Vienna might use a Franco-Russian rapprochement as a pretèxt to come to terms with France at the other European powers' expense.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, the Tsar's first reaction was to decline the overtures.\textsuperscript{127}

News of the Prussian King's willingness to act as mediator was well received in Paris, however. For a fleeting moment, the French even hoped that Prussia would concert with France to bring about a conciliation by force.\textsuperscript{128} More concretely, Bonaparte outlined the conditions upon which he considered peace acceptable and again asked for Friedrich Wilhelm's help in reconciling relations with Russia and Bavaria.\textsuperscript{129} When Haugwitz received Bonaparte's peace propositions, he warned the King that he considered them to be incomplete and insidious, designed to compromise the Prussian court with the allied powers. But, as briefly mentioned, these first overtures were far from well received by either the Prussian or the Russian courts.

\textsuperscript{121}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 368, Haugwitz to the King, 31 January 1800.
\textsuperscript{122}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 22 March, in cipher, and 24 March.
\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ibid.}, 30 January and 8 March 1800.
\textsuperscript{124}RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 4 February 1800, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{125}Bailleu, \textit{Preußen und Frankreich}, I, 361-362, Haugwitz to Sandoz, 31 January 1800; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 18 February 1800; RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 8 February 1800, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{126}RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 25 February 1800, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{127}Two letters in Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 254-255, Panin to Krudener, 11 February 1800; Dropmore Papers, VI, 113, Rostopchin to Vorontsov, 1 February 1800.
\textsuperscript{128}Bailleu, \textit{Preußen und Frankreich}, I, 522, Talleyrand to Beurnonville, 15 February 1800 (26 plûviose VIII).
\textsuperscript{129}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 370, Sandoz to the court, 2 and 5 March 1800, 369 and 371, and note 1, Haugwitz to the King, 17 March (and not 7th) 1800.
Paul instructed Krüdener to say that he was not authorized to discuss the subject of peace between France and Russia,\(^\text{130}\) that he did not want to hear of any propositions from the 'Corsican usurper', and to express his surprise that the Prussian King should have condescended to become the advocate of Bonaparte.\(^\text{131}\) This Krüdener did, telling Haugwitz that he had nothing to say in answer to the French proposition,\(^\text{132}\) basing his refusal on the conviction that the consular government was not legitimate and that a rapprochement with France was irreconcilable with Russia's engagements with Britain. The British ambassador was also convinced that any attempts made by the French would be fruitless: '[...] he [Paul] does not show the least disposition to a conciliation with the French government. This is a justice which cannot be refused him.'\(^\text{133}\)

Meanwhile, the French ambassador in Berlin, General Beurnonville, had made several maladroit attempts to initiate discussions. But his remarks were considered so incoherent, and his manner so indiscreet, that he did nothing but complicate matters.\(^\text{134}\) Even worse, Beurnonville attempted to reach the King through indirect channels (that is, either through Lombard, one of the King's aides-de-camp, or Prince Henry) with what he qualified as the basis of a continental peace.\(^\text{135}\) It was exactly this type of behaviour that had estranged his predecessor, the Abbé Sieyès, from the Prussian foreign minister in 1799.

The Russian envoy's behaviour towards Beurnonville remained ambivalent throughout his stay at Berlin. In public Krüdener avoided the French envoy as much as he could, although Beurnonville, who was familiar with Carysfort and the British delegation, could not help but meeting him in society.\(^\text{136}\) On these occasions Krüdener hardly deigned acknowledging his presence.\(^\text{137}\) On the other hand, in private Krüdener usually overwhelmed Beurnonville with demonstrative affection and

\(^{130}\) PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 25 February 1800, in cipher.

\(^{131}\) Bartenev, op. cit., 11, 103, Panin to Vorontsov, 2 March 1800; PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Whitworth to Grenville, 14 March 1800.

\(^{132}\) Brückner, op. cit., V, Panin to Vorontsov, 135-136, 14 March 1800; also in Bartenev, op. cit., 11, 102.

\(^{133}\) PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 18 April 1800, in cipher.

\(^{134}\) Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 368, note 1, Haugwitz to Sandoz, 3 March 1800; Haugwitz to the King, same day. His behaviour was even repudiated by his own foreign minister (Ibid., I, 373, Sandoz to the court, 20 March).

\(^{135}\) RA, Depecher, Rosenkrantz to Bernstorff, 11 February, and Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 June 1801, in cipher.


\(^{137}\) RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 16 August, in cipher, and 11 October 1800, in cipher.
cordiality. Although Haugwitz told Beurnonville that Krüdener behaved in this way because he had received contradictory instructions from Panin and Rostopchin, this explanation is hardly satisfactory.\textsuperscript{138} It is possible that Krüdener followed his personal inclinations by shunning the Frenchman in public, and conformed to his instructions by behaving warmly towards him during their conferences. Despite the fact that his behaviour might seem inconsistent, it reflects the attitudes of Krüdener's superiors, Panin and Rostopchin, towards the French.

One of the reasons why these negotiations were so slow in getting off the ground was that there was a fundamental divergence of interests between the powers concerned. Paul was still a member of the Second Coalition and looked upon France in a hostile light. Bonaparte, on the other hand, was seeking a means of politically isolating Austria. As for Prussia, Haugwitz was sceptical of Bonaparte's real motives and was more worried about getting France to observe strictly the treaty of Basle and to get it to withdraw its troops from the left bank of the Rhine.\textsuperscript{139} So the first overtures did not lead to anything concrete and were in any case left in suspense for a couple of months by the Second Italian Campaign.\textsuperscript{140} It was Bonaparte's victory over the Austrians at Marengo in June 1800 that strengthened his position considerably, reinforcing his authority both within France and abroad.\textsuperscript{141} The battle, in fact, marks a turning point in European bilateral relations. From this point on, relations between Russia and her former allies worsened considerably and eventually ended in a realignment with the northern maritime powers, while Prussia, fearing a Franco-Austrian settlement in Germany, drew closer to France. In any event, Beurnonville was most certainly better treated at court after Marengo.\textsuperscript{142} 'I may venture to say [...] the prevailing sentiment at this moment in the cabinet is that of fear lest the great events which Prussia has always expected to guide in their conclusion, should now take a more rapid course of settlement, than that she may be prepared for, or be permitted to influence.'\textsuperscript{143}

News of the Austrian defeat at Marengo was received with a lot of apprehension and consternation in Berlin and caused as much of a sensation as had the

\textsuperscript{138} AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 21 February 1801 (2 ventôse IX).
\textsuperscript{139} Cf. Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 376, Sandoz to the court, 24 April 1800.
\textsuperscript{140} Boulay de la Meurthe, op. cit., 275, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 15 May 1800 (25 floréal VIII).
\textsuperscript{141} Jean Tulard, Napoléon, ou le mythe du sauveur, (Paris: Fayard, 1977), 145.
\textsuperscript{142} RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 12 July 1800, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{143} PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 5 July 1800, in cipher.
signing of the preliminaries of Léoben in April 1797.\textsuperscript{144} It was also after Marengo that Bonaparte insisted that Talleyrand attempt to make contact again with Russia.\textsuperscript{145}

b) Prussia offers its mediation

Haugwitz, realising that Bonaparte's victory over the Austrians changed things considerably, obviously thought it wiser to show a little more enthusiasm than he had hitherto done and offered Prussia's mediation to bring about either a general or partial peace on the continent. He sent off a dispatch to Paris asking for the precise terms which His Prussian Majesty could recommend to the Tsar.\textsuperscript{146} Haugwitz brought Krüdener the minute of the note on the evening of 30th June, and on seeing it the Russian ambassador insisted that a passage referring to the Tsar be left out. He did not want the French to think that the Russian court was involved.\textsuperscript{147}

After concerting with Krüdener, Haugwitz handed Beumonville another note, expressing the Prussian King's interest in not being excluded from a general pacification. The note was supposedly in reply to France's last invitations, insinuating that the Prussian efforts received the support of the Tsar.\textsuperscript{148} It was designed to offer the mediation of the Prussian government for the re-establishment of peace and

\textsuperscript{144}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 1 July 1800, in cipher; RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 July 1800, in cipher. The preliminary peace of Léoben between France and Austria signed on 18 April 1797 was followed on 17 October 1797 by the peace of Campo-Formio. Austria renounced the right to the Netherlands and in a secret article signed away the left bank of the Rhine to France. Austria retained Venice, Istria and Dalmatia.

\textsuperscript{145}Correspondance de Napoléon, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 6, (4873), Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 4 June 1800 (15 prairial VIII); Boulay de la Meurthe, \textit{op. cit.}, 286, 10 June 1800.

\textsuperscript{146}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 5 July, in cipher, and 6 July 1800, and 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 3 September 1800.

\textsuperscript{147}Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 349-350, Krüdener to Panin, 1 July 1800. Panin approved of this attitude (\textit{Ibid.}, 366, Panin to Krüdener, 22 July 1800). It is for this reason that I must differ with Ragsdale on this point. In his article 'Russia, Prussia and Europe,' 111, he writes that a Russo-Prussian mediation was much discussed at Russian instance. But the initiative seems to have come from Haugwitz.

\textsuperscript{148}Bailleu, \textit{Preußen und Frankreich}, I, 382-383, Haugwitz to Beurnonville, 30 June 1800. Instructions were sent to Sandoz dated 1 July and were received by him on the 10th. He immediately had an interview with Talleyrand, who asked of him an official diplomatic note. Sandoz's note to Talleyrand is dated 12 July and is a résumé of Haugwitz's note dated 30 June. Cf. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 57, Garlike to Grenville, 6 and 10 July 1800.
declared that Friedrich Wilhelm was prepared to become the 'interpreter of a system of pacification.'

Why did Haugwitz propose this mediation? The measure was probably dictated by the fear which prevailed at the court of Berlin that Austria would make a separate peace with France and that the interests of Prussia in Germany would be ignored. As already pointed out, the battle of Marengo had made a strong impression on Berlin, and two months after the battle the fear had not subsided. It was most likely this single factor, more than any other, which decided Haugwitz to offer Prussian mediation to the French. Carysfort commented that the 'object of Prussia in the mediation was [...] merely to obtain some pretence to stipulate a security for her own interests, in the event of negotiations for a general or separate peace, one of which it was thought must be the certain consequence of the battle of Marengo'. And on 27 September he wrote that he had no doubt that the Prussian government was '[...] influenced by the fear of having no means left to be included together with their allies, in the system of a general peace, [...].' Haugwitz was not so much interested in mediating peace, as in making sure Prussia was not excluded from the what seemed a very probable Franco-Austrian peace settlement.

The French reaction, however, was far from favourable. On receiving the Prussian overture, Talleyrand told Sandoz that such an important and complicated proposition necessitated mature consideration and that in consequence a committee was to be named within the Conseil d'Etat to examine the question. This, of course, was nothing more than a delaying tactic. The First Consul was a little annoyed at the fact that Berlin had taken so long to offer its services and at first thought he could dispense with both Prussian and Russian intervention altogether. The Danish legation secretary, Major von Knoblauch, reported that as early as July Beurnonville gave Haugwitz to understand, through the intermediary of the German-Jewish banker, Ephraim, that Prussian mediation was no longer what it could have

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149 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Haugwitz to Lusi, 1 August 1800.
150 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 26 August, 3, 11 and 27 September 1800; Brückner, op. cit., V, 355, Krüdener to Panin, 5 July 1800.
151 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 September 1800.
152 The Prussian note dated 30 June 1800 was received by Sandoz on 10 July and immediately handed over to Talleyrand (Bailleu, *Preußen und Frankreich*, I, 385, note 2).
155 Ludwig Knoblauch replaced Rosenkrantz while waiting for the new Danish ambassador to arrive. He was considered to be an enthusiastic supporter of the French cause. (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 February 1801).
been for France before the opening of the campaign against Austria. At the time, Bonaparte was busy negotiating with the Austrians and obviously did not see the necessity of a Prussian mediation. Towards the end of July, Beurnonville told Haugwitz that it was impossible to reconcile any hopes of mediation. [Beurnonville] en parle actuellement, reported Knoblauch, 'comme d'un chiffon, et ne semble pas croire que son gouvernement y fasse autrement attention.' When the official French response finally did arrive in Berlin it stated that, under the present circumstances, the Prussian King's intervention was no longer indispensable. The main objection raised was that the connection of Russia to the mediation was incompatible as long as that country was not at peace with France. This was a definite rejection, although cushioned in the softest terms, maintaining that the King's intervention was still considered 'extremely valuable' either to help negotiate with the Russians or to carry through the principles adopted by the treaty of Paris (5 August 1796).

So, Prussia's hope of controlling the situation and of obtaining some advantage by mediating between Paris and Petersburg quickly proved to be illusory. On the contrary, Prussian foreign policy was becoming dependent on the state of Franco-Russian relations.

c) The Franco-Russian negotiations

It was after the Franco-Austrian negotiations bogged down that Bonaparte and Talleyrand made another effort to woo Paul. Talleyrand was instructed to write to Panin to propose an exchange of Russian prisoners which were taken during the Italian campaign. As an added bait, although the gesture was hardly generous considering its impracticability, he even offered the island of Malta. Paul authorised

156 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 5 July 1800, in cipher.
157 Ibid., 2 August 1800, in cipher.
158 Ibid., 15 July 1800, in cipher.
160 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 385, Sandoz to the court, 13 July 1800. This was in direct contradiction of what they had attempted to achieve a few months earlier.
161 Ibid., II, xii.
162 Trachevski, op. cit., 70, 1-3, Talleyrand to Panin, 19 July 1800.
163 Correspondance de Napoléon, op. cit., vol. 6, (4965), Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 4 July 1800 (15 messidor VIII); Ragsdale, Détente, 33, 114. Paul was aware that the island was about to fall to the British and regarded the offer as illusory. Talleyrand's letters were sent with a prisoner named Sergeiev, Major in the Dragons (Brückner, op. cit., V, 457-458, Krüdener to Panin, 26 September...
Kruedener to accept the exchange on condition that the soldiers involved take an oath never to serve against France.\footnote{164}

Before this date, Paul only considered re-establishing relations with France after Paris had made it plain that it was sincere about peace on the continent. No negotiations were to take place before a general peace congress or after a general pacification had been brought about.\footnote{165} But Paul responded favourably to Talleyrand’s proposition, flattering himself that Bonaparte had approached Russia out of fear, and instructed Kruedener to accept the proposition to return the Russian prisoners, \textit{sur parole}. He was to refuse, however, if the French government intended to offer them without stipulating any conditions.\footnote{166} Haugwitz informed Beurnonville that Kruedener was authorised to treat with him and arranged a meeting in the French ambassador’s garden for the 14th September.\footnote{167}

Having finally managed to make positive contact, Beurnonville was sent powers to enter into peace negotiations with the Russian envoy with instructions not to inform the Prussian government about matters.\footnote{168} On the Russian side, Rostopchin was ordered to outline the territorial conditions upon which a reconciliation with France would be considered and curtly transmitted them in a letter to Talleyrand dated 8 October.\footnote{169} The conditions by which he was prepared to normalise relations with France were: the return of the island of Malta; the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia; the integrity of the states of the King of Two Sicilies, of the Elector of Bavaria, and of the Duke of Wurttemberg.\footnote{170} Sandoz sent Bonaparte’s reply to these conditions to Berlin.\footnote{171} A more substantial overture was to be carried by

\footnote{164}{Brueckner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 413, Panin to Kruedener, 6 August 1800; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 11 September 1800.}

\footnote{165}{Brueckner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 369, Panin to Kruedener, 22 July 1800, and 414, 18 August 1800.}

\footnote{166}{\textit{Ibid.}, 416-417, Panin to Kruedener, 19 August 1800.}

\footnote{167}{AAE, Prusse 224, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 16 September, 22 October 1800.}

\footnote{168}{Bailleu, \textit{Preussen und Frankreich}, II, xi.}

\footnote{169}{Trachevski, \textit{op. cit.}, 70, 10-11.}

\footnote{170}{Cf. Ragsdale, ‘Was Paul Bonaparte’s Fool?’, 58; \textit{D’ente}, 114, for a commentary on this ‘extraordinary’ document. It remained apparently unknown to the Austrians and British. Brueckner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 439, Panin to Kruedener, 3 September, and 500, Panin to Kruedener, 1 November 1800.}

\footnote{171}{Brueckner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 485, Kruedener to Panin, 21 October 1800.}
Sprengporten,\(^\text{172}\) who was to receive charge of the Russian prisoners and represent Paul's political stance to the French.\(^\text{173}\)

Krüdener and Beurnonville continued the talks throughout the autumn and winter of 1800-1801, although at one stage the Tsar, not pleased at Bonaparte's answer to his conditions, ordered Krüdener to discontinue his conversations with Beurnonville until the Russian demands had been answered and Sprengporten not to continue to Paris. The General had already reached Paris, however, and the orders were attributed to a moment of irritability on the Tsar's part.\(^\text{174}\) At first, Haugwitz had to go to some effort to get the two on speaking terms, and this was by no means an easy task. Haugwitz gave a few dinners to which a select company was invited for the purpose of encouraging a more intimate intercourse between the French, Russian and Spanish envoys,\(^\text{175}\) but Krüdener behaved in such a reserved and distant manner as to make the evenings a complete failure. It was only when the Russian embargo on British ships was applied in November that a marked change in attitude came about.\(^\text{176}\) The number of conferences between the two delegations increased as did their apparent cordiality.

Although Haugwitz did not at first realise it, it was virtually the end of Prussia's mediatory efforts between France and Russia. In spite of his efforts, Prussia was pushed out of the limelight and was obliged to follow the development of Franco-Russian relations from the sidelines. As it turned out, however, the negotiations between the French and Russian envoys in Berlin came to nothing. On the one hand, Beurnonville demanded the quick conclusion of peace before a convention between the two countries could be signed and European affairs could be

\(^{172}\) Swede in Russian service, his first name is variably spelt Georg, Göran or Joram (but fortunately historians agree on the rest) Magnus Sprengporten, Baron and General, went to Russia after his rupture with the court of Sweden, fell into disgrace during the last years of Catherine II, sent to Paris by Paul I to effect the transfer of Russian prisoners and to negotiate with Bonaparte, he was still in Russian service in 1809 and helped with the conquest of Finland of which he was named Governor-General.

\(^{173}\) He left Paul's estate in Gatchina on 10 October. Cf. the instructions to Sprengporten in Trachevski, op. cit., 70, 11-12 in which Paul authorises him to suggest that France and Russia unite to prevent the other powers from increasing their territories.

\(^{174}\) HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1000, Reden to the King, 3 January 1801.

\(^{175}\) PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 16 September 1800; RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 27 September 1800.

\(^{176}\) PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 November 1800.
treated. On the other, Krüdener made the signing of peace conditional on an understanding on European questions being reached.\textsuperscript{177}

As the option of a Prusso-Russian mediation with France had virtually been closed, Haugwitz immediately took up the threads of a direct negotiation with Paris, probably in the hope of still being able to act as mediator between the two courts. Lucchesini was sent to Paris and charged with concluding an agreement with France. Prussia was to cede the left bank to France, and the principle of secularisations in Germany for the indemnity of Prussia and other German princes was admitted. In return, France was to promise that it would evacuate Holland and the right bank of the Rhine, guarantee the independence of Switzerland and Naples, and undertake an engagement to intervene in having Malta restored to Russia.\textsuperscript{178} But the Prussian propositions could not have arrived at a more inappropriate time.\textsuperscript{179} Austrian resistance on the continent was broken at the battle of Hohenlinden (3 December 1800), and Bonaparte had just received Paul's conciliatory letter which promised a rapid agreement with Russia. As a result, Bonaparte was ill-disposed towards the Prussian overtures. He answered the Prussian envoy that the cession of the left bank by Prussia was no longer of any value and that there was no question of evacuating the right bank or of withdrawing from other parts of the Empire before concluding peace with Austria. Most importantly of all, however, Bonaparte declared that nothing could be undertaken with Prussia before it observed the engagements it had signed under the Armed Neutrality by closing the Elbe, and by occupying, or letting the French occupy, Hanover.

Haugwitz's attempts at mediating between France and Russia, although a dismal failure, illustrate Prussia's precarious political situation. Caught between two giants, he tried to manoeuvre his country into an advantageous negotiating position, undoubtedly expecting that by being the principal actor in a reconciliation between the two countries, they would show their appreciation at a later date when it came to a redistribution of German territory. For once, the King was a little more discerning than his foreign minister, and by the time Haugwitz realised the potential advantages Prussia could benefit by, it was too late. With the victory of Marengo, Bonaparte had no further need of Prussian mediation and decided that the best thing he could do was to make direct contact with Paul, by-passing the intermediary. Now that the French option seemed indefinitely closed, the only great power with which Prussia remained on relatively good terms was Russia.

\textsuperscript{177} Bailleu, \textit{Preußen und Frankreich}, II, xii-xiii.

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Ibid.}, II,18-20 and 20-21, two letters from Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 13 January 1801.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Ibid.}, II, xiv, and 21-24, Lucchesini to the court, 25 January 1801.
CHAPTER V

THE ARMED NEUTRALITY REVIVED

Today there is no doubt that the motivating force behind the revival of the Armed Neutrality of 1800 was Paul I.\(^1\) The initial steps, however, were taken by Denmark and Sweden.

The possibility of a maritime league being re-formed was discussed as early as March 1799, shortly after London had ordered the blockade of Dutch ports. In February 1800, the British chargé d'affaires in Copenhagen, Anthony Merry,\(^2\) worried about the improvement he had remarked in Russo-Danish relations, reported that the spirit of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 was being revived.\(^3\) In Berlin, Beuronville reported talk of the Tsar opposing what he called the 'usurpation' of maritime commerce by the British.\(^4\) There were no real grounds to these rumours, however. True, the Danish Foreign Secretary, Bernstorff, believed that Russian support against British attacks on neutral trade was desirable and to this end he approached Petersburg

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\(^{1}\) For some time it was thought that Bonaparte was the spiritual father of the league. Cf. Ulmann, *op. cit.*, 250, who called him: '[...] der geistige Vater des Gedankens der bewaffneten Neutralität'; A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, 2 vols., (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1893), vol. II, 26-37, goes even further by arguing that Bonaparte combined 'the separate powers into one great effort'; also Ernst Wilmanns, 'Die Besetzung Lübecks durch die Dänen im April und Mai 1801;' *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, 14, 274. Some contemporaries thought that this was the case. Carysfort, for example, thought the whole maritime convention was influenced by the French (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 10 February 1801, in cipher). This view has been revised. Cf. Ragsdale, 'Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?,' 56, who writes that the French were not responsible for its formation. Rostopchin wrote that it was Paul himself who had the idea of re-establishing the Armed Neutrality (Bartenev, *op. cit.*, 8, 282, Rostopchin to Vorontsov, 30 June 1801).

\(^{2}\) Anthony Merry was chargé d'affaires at Copenhagen from 25 July 1789 to 3 September 1800.

\(^{3}\) Feldbaek, 'The Anglo-Danish convoy conflict,' 167.

\(^{4}\) AAE, Prusse 226, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 11 March 1800 (20 ventôse VIII).
in May 1800. What Bernstorff did not want at this stage, however, was a renewal of the Armed Neutrality. The purpose behind the Swedish and Danish requests was to force Britain to accept the principles concerning neutral trade and shipping. Merry was warned by Lieutenant-Colonel Fursmann, legation secretary to Petersburg, that British insistence on the right to search ships would foster discontent and would be used by Russia to combat England. Sweden also approached Paul in July in the hope of gaining Russian support in the convoy conflict against England. Rumours were thick throughout Europe during the spring and summer of 1800 that the Armed Neutrality would soon be re-established. In Berlin the Hanoverian ambassador, Franz von Reden, reported that the first move for the alliance originated with Petersburg earlier on in the year. We now know this not to have been the case. By April, the British and Hanoverian ambassadors in Berlin were aware that the creation of an Armed Neutrality was in the offering but were inclined to think that nothing would be decided upon before the end of the year.

1. The Tsar's invitation to renew the Armed Neutrality

As has been seen, when news of the Freya affair reached Copenhagen, the Danish government immediately sent a courier to Petersburg to complain about the British procedure and to ask for help. The Danish appeal arrived at a moment when the Russo-Prussian rapprochement was in full swing. But more important, two things were to occur almost simultaneously, which were to greatly influence the course of events: a) on the 18th of August, the Tsar received a Prussian project, expressing Berlin's readiness to take up arms to maintain the territorial balance in southern Germany; b) and on the very same day, a courier arrived from Berlin with news of

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5 Feldbaek, Denmark, 42-44; and 'The Anglo-Russian rapprochement,' 206.
6 Feldbaek, Denmark, 47.
7 PRO, Denmark 37, Merry to Grenville, 10 May 1800, in cipher; Boulay de la Meurthe, op. cit., Talleyrand to Bonaparte, 5 and 7 June, 279-280; Charles King, op. cit., III, 266-267, Rufus King to the Secretary of State, 5 July 1800.
8 Reden, Franz Ludwig Wilhelm von (1754-1831). He entered the diplomatic service in 1792 and remained there until his death. He represented Hanover in Berlin from 1800 to 1803.
9 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 22 July 1800, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, III.
10 Cf. Feldbaek, Denmark, 69.
11 Brückner, op. cit., V, 391, Krudener to Panin, 5 August 1800; Ragsdale, 'Documents', 107-108; Feldbaek, Denmark, 68.
the signing of the peace preliminaries between France and Austria.\textsuperscript{12} The first piece of news was quite remarkable in that it was the first time in years that Prussia had declared itself prepared to intervene with force on the European scene. Prussia suggested that other powers, namely Denmark, Sweden, Hanover, Saxony and Turkey, be invited to accede to the treaty. It is difficult to tell to what extent Berlin was sincere in its willingness to take up arms against Austria, however, as no other mention of it is to be found. It is possible that Haugwitz was leaving his options open in case Austrian victories in Italy against the French proved too menacing. As for the second piece of news, an understanding between Austria and France would necessarily affect the balance of power in Germany, to which Russia could not remain a passive witness. Peace in Europe was evidently drawing near. Russia, of course, wanted to protect its own interests, and did not want to be left out in the cold when it came to an eventual reorganisation of Germany. A reorientation in foreign policy was called for, and this is what the Tsar set about doing by trying to form a Northern League.

By 22 August, the political decisions concerning the course of events that were to be adopted by the court of Petersburg had been made. The Swedish, Prussian and Danish ambassadors were received that same day to hear the Tsar's reaction to the convoy conflict.\textsuperscript{13} On 28 August 1800, the Tsar issued a declaration inviting the Kings of Prussia, Denmark and Sweden to take measures that would assure the freedom of the seas.\textsuperscript{14} On receiving the invitation, the first thing Haugwitz wanted to

\textsuperscript{12}Bailleau, \textit{Preußen und Frankreich}, I, 387, Sandoz to the court, 31 July 1800. In actual fact, these peace preliminaries, signed in Paris without any authority by an Austrian envoy named St. Julien, were later renounced by the court of Vienna.

\textsuperscript{13}Feldbaek, \textit{Denmark}, 70.

\textsuperscript{14}The invitation is printed in Martens, G., \textit{op. cit.}, VII, 150-153; Scott, \textit{op. cit.} 489-492; Piggott and Omond, \textit{op. cit.} 416-419; Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 44-47. The correct date is 28 August. In London, the British cabinet pretended to ignore the declaration and instead published the fact that the first embargo on British property in Russia had been lifted (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 173 B, Balan to the court, 3 October, in cipher, and 7 October 1800, in cipher). It is difficult to say to what extent Paul's policy was motivated by personal, rather than by economic or political motives. Ulmann, \textit{op. cit.}, 246, thinks that it was personal: 'Es war nur aus der persönlichen Verblendung des Zaren zu verstehen, wenn dieser im August 1800 den Anstoß gegeben hatte zur Erneuerung der Prinzipien, die während des english-amerikanischen Krieges von den Neutralen 1781 angenommen gewesen waren.' Feldbaek and Ragsdale underline the role the Armed Neutrality played in Paul's foreign policy objectives, pointing out it was also an opportunity to get even with Britain for having taken Malta. It has been suggested that the revival of Armed Neutrality made it possible for Russia to intervene once more on the European scene, in an effort to re-establish the European balance of power.
know was how Denmark had reacted to the offer. He was expecting some kind of overture from Copenhagen and, although it was not immediately forthcoming, expressed his willingness to join the other northern powers.

Je désirerais d'être informé si Sa Majesté Impériale s'est portée à une démarche analogue envers la cour de Copenhague, et je vous autorise d'en parler avec franchise au comte de Bernstorff, puisque je suis naturellement intéressé à savoir, sur quel pied le Danemark se propose de suivre la négociation à laquelle la cour de Pétersbourg l'a invité par sa déclaration du 16 août, et s'il est intentionné d'entamer présentement avec l'Angleterre la discussion que l'article de la convention du 29 août a laissé en litige. Je ne suis nullement éloigné de lier partie avec les autres puissances du nord dans cette occurrence, et je vais m'en expliquer incessamment avec l'empereur de Russie.

Although the Freya affair had been temporarily settled between London and Copenhagen, Bernstorff responded positively to Paul's proposals. He received news of the Tsar's proposition from his ambassador in Petersburg on 4 September and approved of it. In September, Paul declared an embargo on all British ships in Russian ports, but this was lifted when news of the temporary resolution of the Freya affair reached Petersburg on 11 September. Surprisingly enough, Paul reacted

(Feldbaek, 'The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul,' 21). It has also been argued that, although the conflict ostensibly concerned the principles of neutrality, Paul's real aim was to exploit events to further Russian interests in the coming general European peace settlement (Feldbaek, 'The Anglo-Russian rapprochement,' 206).

17Both the Swedish and Danish envoys pressed for embargo measures on 3 September. The Tsar was disinclined but seems to have been convinced to do so by the president of the College of Commerce. Prince Gagarin. Orders went out on 6 September. On that day, the British merchants were called together by the military governor of Petersburg and were given a verbal ultimatum. (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, copy of a report, not signed, 9 September 1800). An agent for British shipping, Mr. John Barker, reported to Shairp on Wednesday 10 September that 210 seamen had been put into barracks and detained for three days (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Shairp to Grenville, 1 October 1800). As early as the evening of 11 September, the governor of Petersburg informed Alexander Shairp that, in consequence of the arrangement of the dispute with Denmark, British property was to be released and trade was to proceed as usual. This step was notified the next day at the stock exchange (PRO,
favourably to the news that the convoy conflict had momentarily been resolved but still refused to resume diplomatic relations with England, in spite of British offers to do so.\(^1\)\(^8\)

2. Tension mounts

In the months following the Freya affair, two incidents occurred which increased the tension between Britain and the northern powers.

a) The Barcelona affair

The most notable violation of the neutrals' rights occurred on the 4 September 1800 at the mouth of the river Llobregat in Catalonia. Towards the end of August, two British ships of the line and a frigate arrived off the port of Barcelona, where they proceeded to blockade the port.\(^1\)\(^9\) They were unable to enter the harbour because of the protection afforded by the port's gun batteries and gun boats. On the night of 4 September, however, the British somehow got possession of a Swedish merchant ship, the *Hoffnung*, and forced the captain, a man named Rudbardt, by 'putting a pistol to his breast', to take on board several British sailors. The Swedish ship was then towed by several British longboats into the harbour. Two Spanish frigates were laying there, the *Par* and the *Esmeralda*, each of 22 guns, awaiting a favourable wind to set sail. When the *Esmeralda* noticed that the Swedish vessel was full of men, it approached the ship, and in spite of warnings to keep off, fired a shot which wounded the Swedish pilot. Some fighting ensued which lasted about twenty minutes, after which the British managed to take possession of both the Spanish frigates.

This had nothing to do with Prussia. But the King of Spain sent Friedrich Wilhelm an exposé of the incident, asking for his help in getting the Swedish court to object to their vessels being taken as prize in such a manner. Friedrich Wilhelm then ordered his envoy in Stockholm, Tarrach, to show 'l'intérêt que nous prenons dans cette affaire', as a result of which the King of Sweden decided to forward an answer to the Spanish envoy in Berlin, Huerta. The Swedish government, while hoping that the court of Madrid would let the whole matter drop, also asked Berlin to intervene on its

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\(^1\)\(^8\) Efforts were made through Carysfort in Berlin to resume relations with Russia. Cf. Brückner, *op. cit.*, V, 425-426, Krüdener to Panin, 2 September with Panin's reply, 448-449, 17 September, and 460, Krüdener to Panin, 28 September 1800; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 2 and 27 September, Grenville to Carysfort, 16 September 1800.

\(^1\)\(^9\) The following account is taken from *The Times*, 8 October 1800.
behalf to try and smooth things over at the court of London.\textsuperscript{20} Even before the Swedish ambassador to Berlin, Lars von Engeström, received these instructions, he had already approached Haugwitz on 19 October 1800 and asked him to undertake measures at the court of London to obtain satisfaction.\textsuperscript{21} It became the object of an exchange of notes between Haugwitz and Carysfort.\textsuperscript{22} Jacobi also brought the matter up with Grenville, complaining that the conduct of the British officer in question had been reprehensible.\textsuperscript{23} Grenville expressed surprise at the procedure used by the Prussian ambassador (since it had already been the object of an exchange of diplomatic notes in Berlin) and according to Jacobi cut the conversation off abruptly.\textsuperscript{24} To the British mind it was an indication of the unfriendly disposition of the court of Berlin towards England.\textsuperscript{25} It is just possible, however, that Grenville, seeing that it would be difficult to justify the British captain’s behaviour on any grounds, wanted to avoid the embarrassment of an explanation on the subject.

\textbf{b) The Triton affair and the occupation of Cuxhaven}

Another, far more significant incident occurred at the end of October and the beginning of November involving a ship under Prussian colours. At the end of October, a ship named the \textit{Triton}, sailing out of Emden for Holland (which to the British was an enemy port), and loaded with wood,\textsuperscript{26} linseed and flax,\textsuperscript{27} was seized off the river Texel by the British sloop \textit{Driver}, commanded by Captain James Dunbar. Taken as a prize, Lieutenant Carthen from the \textit{Driver} with about 14 British marines was placed in charge of the ship with orders to set sail for Yarmouth when a storm forced him to take shelter in the neutral port of Cuxhaven, where he laid anchor on 25 October.\textsuperscript{28} Apparently, it was not prohibited for a prize to be taken to a neutral port, as long as it was not sold there. Now, Cuxhaven was in the bailiwick of Ritzebüttel, which came under the administration of Hamburg, and its bailiff, a man named Heise,
enjoined the British captain to make repairs and leave as quickly as he could, and then informed the Senate of Hamburg of the incident. The captain of the *Triton*, however, went to Hamburg to lay a complaint before the Prussian envoy there, demanding that the ship be immediately released since it was carried into a port within the Demarcation Line. The Prussian envoy in Hamburg, von Schultz, (Cuxhaven came under the administration of Hamburg), demanded on 29 October of the Senate of that city that it retain the *Triton* and oblige the British to leave the ship. Lieutenant Carthan was given about six hours notice to comply with the demand, failing which a threatened Prussian army of 20,000 men would march on Hamburg and 2,000 more on Cuxhaven. He kept on putting off a reply in the hope that his superior officer, Captain Dunbar, would arrive, which he did on 12 November.

The Senate of Hamburg met to deliberate upon the affair on Saturday, 8 November. During the meeting, a letter from the Prussian King was read out. The Senate came to the conclusion that it was not in their power to take the ship away from the British and hoped that the two powers would be able to settle the dispute themselves. An estafette was sent to Berlin and another to the Duke of Brunswick asking for his mediation. In the meantime, Schultz sent off a dispatch to Brunswick, telling the Duke that he had received orders from his court, and asking him, as head of the Observation Army, to march his troops into Cuxhaven. Although the Senate of Hamburg protested, it was obliged to fulfil the Prussian demands, bought the ship back off the British captor for the sum of 200,000 marks (about £12,500 sterling), and handed it back to the Prussian captain. Schultz was duly informed, appeared pleased with the turn of events, and sent of letters to the Prussian King and the Duke of Brunswick asking them to countermand their military decisions. The ship set sail for Glückstadt, and from there to its original destination, on 17 November. At the

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29 Hann. 92, XLI, 32, vol. 3, extracts of a letter from the Bailiff of Ritzebüttel to the Geheimräte, 13 November 1800; *The Times*, 8 November 1800.

30 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 4a, the syndic to Meinig, 9 November 1800. Schultz afterwards received a rescript from Berlin approving of his behaviour.

31 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, James Dunbar to Vice-Admiral Dickson, dated Cuxhaven, 12 November 1800. It is probable that either Haugwitz, or the Prussian minister, greatly exaggerated this threat in an effort to impress the British captain.

32 *The Times*, 21 November 1800.

33 *Ibid*.

34 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 4a, the syndic to Meinig, 14 November 1801.

35 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 4a, the syndic to Meinig, 20 November 1801; GSIA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 371, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 21 November 1800. Copy of the agreement signed between commodore Michael Brunswick, and Lieutenant Henry Carthen
same time the Senate turned to London with the demand not to let any future prizes enter Cuxhaven to avoid the danger of a Prussian occupation.

When the Senate of Hamburg learnt that a corps of the Observation Army had been directed to march on Cuxhaven, it approached the Prussian envoy, Schultz, asking him to put a stop to it, and offering the immediate restitution of the Prussian vessel. Schultz sent off two couriers, one to Berlin, the other to the Duke of Brunswick (dated 12 November), asking him to countermand the marching orders. After the invasion itself occurred, they sent a syndic to Berlin by the name of Jakob Albrecht von Sienen. He was instructed to demand the liberation of Ritzebüttel, and if he could not get that, to ask for a reduction of troops. He was also to seek out reliable information about Prussia's intentions in occupying Cuxhaven.

But not even the Senate of Hamburg believed that the affair would end there, as it suspected that Prussia was looking for a means to get at England, and force it to accept the principles of neutral shipping. Rumour had it that Prussian troops would enter Ritzebüttel around the 23 November. Indeed, this course of events did not satisfy Haugwitz, who complained of the manner in which the Magistrature of Hamburg handled the affair. In a first letter to the Senate, he demanded that the vessel be turned over to the Prussian authorities so that the affair could be judged before a court. He considered the releasing of the vessel by the Hamburg authorities to be illegal and to guarantee the further neutrality of the north of Germany decided to send on behalf of the commander of the British sloop James Dunbar, dated 10 November 1800 in PRO, FO 64 Prussia. The ship was given up on the condition that commodore Brunswick was to assume all costs involved, past and future. Also The Times, 4 December 1800.

36 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, the syndic to Meinig, 20 November 1801.
37 August von Schultz, Prussian envoy at the Circle of Lower Saxony and the Hanseatic towns between 1796 and 1804. He was respected at Hamburg (The Times, 21 November 1800).
38 PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 38, copy of a letter from Hamburg, no signature, 14 November 1800.
39 Ibid., 38.
40 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, instructions to Sienen, 8 December 1800. He arrived in Berlin on 14 December (StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to the Senate, 16 December 1800), and took leave from Friedrich Wilhelm on 12 January 1802. Involute 5 contains dispatches from him describing his efforts to get the Prussian court to reduce the number of occupying troops.
41 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol 4a, the syndic to Meinig, 14 November 1801: 'Ist es übrigens wie einige vermuten, und wie selbst die vertrauten Äußerungen des preußischen Herrn Gesandten vermuten lassen, bei dieser ganzen Sache nur darauf abgesehen gewesen, England etwas anzuhaben und es zu mehrerer Mäßigung in seinem Betragen gegen die neutrale Schifffahrt zu zwingen, so [wird] dann der König von Preußen dieser Ausgang der Sache nicht ganz angenehm sein, [...].'
an armed contingent to occupy Cuxhaven. The ostensible reasons given to diplomatic circles in Berlin were the following: a) Prussia could not allow an infringement of its neutrality and the Demarcation Line to take place; b) it was necessary not to give France any cause to complain, otherwise they would easily use an infraction as an excuse to demand the closing of the Elbe and Weser; c) and of course, Prussia could not just sit back and and watch one of its ships taken by the British, when it finally had a chance to do something about it. Haugwitz suggested that the town should be taken by a mixed garrison of Prussian and Hanoverian troops.

On 23 November 1800 Prussian troops of the Schladen regiment commanded by Colonel von Wedel occupied the town of Cuxhaven and the Bailiwick of Ritzebüttel. The town of Stade, situated near the Elbe, was also occupied by 5 battalions. A corps of about 1,800 men set out from Minden on 14 November, and passed through Bremen, to arrive 9 days later. The Regency of Hanover was required to give them free passage, and the troops which were usually stationed there marched out of the port and back to Hamburg. Well before this happened, Haugwitz notified the British envoy of the measures Prussia was about to take - in the name of preserving the Demarcation Line - assuring him that communications between Great

\[\text{\textsuperscript{42}}\text{GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 371, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 21 November 1800.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{43}}\text{HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 32, vol. 3, Reden to the King, 15 November 1800.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{44}}\text{The regiment was commanded by a certain Count Wedel. The occupation was supposedly carried out with Hamburg's approval. Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm's explanation about this affair in a letter to Bonaparte dated July 1803 in Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 180: '[...] cette mesure était non-seulement une violation bien réelle de la neutralité hambourgeoise, mais même un acte d'hostilité contre la ville.' But he goes on to justify the act by arguing: 'Hambourg, malgré les représentations de mon ministre, eut la faiblesse ou l'audace de ne pas vouloir dans son propre port relâcher la propriété de mes sujets. Je leur fis justice moi-même et la ville paya pour ses propres torts et non pour ceux d'une puissance étrangère.' Is it possible that the King did not know that the Prussian vessel had been released before Prussian troops entered Cuxhaven? If we are to accept Friedrich Wilhelm's words at face value, then it would appear that either his ministers did not inform him or that he had a short memory.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{45}}\text{The Times, 2 December 1800.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{46}}\text{The Prussian government informed the Regency of the route their troops were ordered to take, and requested billeting. They were to leave Minden on 14 November. (HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 39f, letter from the Prussian Ministry of War to the Geheimräte, 11 November 1800; and reply from Geheimräte, 13 November 1801). The Times, 11 December 1800. The garrison was reduced by half about ten days later (Hann. 92, XLI, 32, vol. 3, Brunswick to the Geheimräte, 3 December 1801; and Geheimräte to the King, 11 December 1800).}\]
Britain and Cuxhaven would in no way be interfered with. Carysfort made an official reply in the form of a note verbale a few days later, asking the King to suspend operations, 'jusqu'à ce que les deux cours aient pu s'expliquer'. When Carysfort learnt that the Prussian vessel had been restored, he followed this note up two days later with another, in which he expressed his concern that in spite of the fact that the Senate of Hamburg had gone to the trouble of satisfying the King of Prussia's demands, orders had been given to occupy Cuxhaven. Haugwitz replied by assuring Carysfort that the occupation would in no way interfere with commerce and that its purpose was the prevention of further incursions into northern neutral ports and the maintenance of Prussia's neutrality.

The Duke of Brunswick, on hearing of the British offer to restore the captured vessel, took it upon himself to suspend the march on the town. This initiative was countermanded by the King. It had no other effect than to delay proceedings by twenty-four hours. Instead of arriving in Cuxhaven on 22 as planned, Brunswick arrived on 23 November. The day after the Prussian troops arrived, Colonel Wedel issued a declaration stating that the occupation was occasioned by the capture of the Prussian ship, and that the King had no other object than to protect the neutrality of north Germany. There were six British ships of war laying at Cuxhaven at the time. Trade went unhindered. The presence of British warships gave rise to a certain degree of tension, as an incident reported in *The Times* of 11 December clearly

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47 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 13 November 1800: 'What had been done was only in pursuance of the long established system of Prussia, and to preserve intact the line of demarcation.'


49 Dropmore Papers, VI, 381, Carysfort to Grenville, 15 November 1800.


52 Dropmore Papers, VI, 381, Carysfort to Grenville, 15 November 1800. Cf. StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 4a, the syndic to Meinig, 20 November 1801.

53 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 4a, the syndic to Meinig, 25 November 1801; AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 31 November 1800 (8 frimaire IX).

54 Copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, vol. 3; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Sayer to Dickson, 26 November 1800; an English translation is in PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59; Martens, G., *op. cit.*, VII, 165-166; *The Times*, 10 December 1800.

55 *The Times*, 9 December 1800.
indicates. Apparently, the Prussian soldiers deserted frequently and sought refuge on board the British ships. On one of these occasions, a 'guard ship' full of armed Prussians pulled alongside an British man-o-war suspected of harbouring deserters and was asked to deliver them up. The British captain denied the charge and answered that even if they were on board, he knew of no agreement between the two countries which would oblige him to do so. The Prussian officer, displeased with the answer, apparently menaced him, to which the British captain told him to sheer off or he would fire a broadside.

News of the occupation created a sensation in diplomatic circles\(^5\) and provoked a sharp reaction in London. The Prussian position vis-à-vis Britain was, to say the least, unexpectedly aggressive. Knoblauch commented: 'Le langage du comte de Haugwitz au sujet de cette puissance [England] est des plus énergiques, ce qui m'étonne d'autant plus, que jusqu'ici l'on avait toujours peur de la provoquer à prendre quelques mesures violentes contre l'Elbe.'\(^5\) But if Jacobi is to be believed, British public opinion was against the procedure used with the neutral ship. Even people attached to the British ministry expressed disapproval of the policy of pursuing neutral shipping.\(^5\) Grenville, on the other hand, was convinced that the occupation was in some way connected with the Armed Neutrality\(^5\) and considered Prussia's justification of her actions a 'shallow and frivolous' pretence.\(^6\) King George expressed concern over Hamburg's liberty of commerce.\(^6\) Carysfort was told by Haugwitz that the occupation had long been in contemplation by the Prussian court,\(^6\) and at first he also believed it to be connected with a Russian proposal concerning the revival of the Armed Neutrality.\(^6\) Indeed, the taking of Cuxhaven was generally

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\(^5\) Hann. 92, XLI, 32, vol. 3, Reden to the King, 19 November 1800, in cipher.
\(^5\) RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 15 November 1800, in cipher.
\(^5\) PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Grenville to Carysfort, 3 and 9 December 1800: 'The period of the occupation of Cuxhaven coincides so perfectly with the date assigned [...] for the signature of this convention, that it is impossible not to believe the two circumstances to be connected with each other.' GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 173 B, Jacobi to the court, 2 December 1800, in cipher.
\(^6\) PRO, Jackson Papers 353, 43, 2 December 1800, Grenville to Carysfort.
\(^6\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 173 B, Jacobi to the court, 28 November 1800, in cipher, as related by Baron von Lenthe.
\(^6\) PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 19 November 1800, in cipher.
\(^6\) PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 16 November 1800; and Dropmore Papers, VI, 381, Carysfort to Grenville, 15 November 1800; and 390, Carysfort to Grenville, 20 November 1800. A month later Carysfort assured his court in London that no concert over the occupation had taken
regarded as a preparatory measure that was to lead to the Armed Neutrality. The event caused a stir in Copenhagen as well, and according to one observer, considerably augmented the coldness between the two courts, leaving a 'very unpleasant sensation in the minds of some of the principal persons' in Denmark. The Danish government remonstrated strongly with Prussia but, seeing that nothing was to be gained through diplomatic channels, decided to let the matter drop. This was in part due to the fact that it was at first assumed Prussia had acted in connivance with the Emperor Paul.

The Triton affair was in fact a pretext and was used by the Prussian government to put into effect something it had been planning for some time. As mentioned earlier, Haugwitz made no secret of the fact that the occupation of Cuxhaven had been long in contemplation, that surveys had been made, and plans prepared to fortify the town. Apparently engineers had been sent to Cuxhaven to draw up military plans, the Prussian government intending to transform the village into a fortress. But by assuring the international community that the measures with regard Cuxhaven were merely destined to ensure the security of the Demarcation Line, Haugwitz avoided a lot of indiscreet questions that might have otherwise revealed his real motives. Further, by spreading the opinion that the town should be occupied by a mixed Prusso-Hanoverian garrison, he gave this ostensible motive a greater degree of credibility. Lack of sources prevent one from making any positive assertions as to Prussia's real motives, but it is not difficult to conjecture what they might have been. The court of Berlin was probably motivated by two things. First, the desire to maintain its 'supremacy' in north Germany. As it seemed probable that a continental peace was going to be concluded without Prussian intervention, it is likely that...
Prussia wanted to reinforce its position in the north of Germany before such a peace came about.\textsuperscript{70} This view is supported by a letter from Carysfort in which he states that if Austria made peace with France, then Prussia would keep Cuxhaven, and if war was to resume, the execution of the plan was to be suspended.\textsuperscript{71} The occupation took place at a time when the Austrian Cobenzl was in Paris, and the Prussian court was convinced that peace between France and Austria would come about. Second, Carysfort conjectured that the Prussian court hoped to gain a little credit with the Tsar, while at the same time quieting British apprehensions by their assurances of goodwill.\textsuperscript{72} The occupation was suited to pleasing not only the Russians but the French as well. But if Haugwitz was telling the British and Danish envoys that the occupation had nothing to do with the Armed Neutrality,\textsuperscript{73} he was telling the Swedish and French the exact opposite.

So the occupation of Cuxhaven was not a spur-of-the-moment event and had little or nothing to do with the Armed Neutrality. The Danish ambassador, Knoblauch, reported that the plan to take Cuxhaven had been in suspension for almost two years. It was rumoured that the Duke of Brunswick prevented the Prussian government from putting the plan into execution during the Napper Tandy affair,\textsuperscript{74} but that Haugwitz had been waiting for a convenient pretext to do so. With the Armed Neutrality looming on the horizon, his timing was perfect. He frightened the British and reassured his allies by showing them just what Prussia was capable of, and the manner in which it could act, although this was certainly not what Prussia had in mind when it took possession of Cuxhaven.

\textsuperscript{70} PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 20 November 1800; and Dropmore Papers, VI, 402, Carysfort to Grenville, 5 December 1800.
\textsuperscript{71} Dropmore Papers, VI, 384, Carysfort to Grenville, 19 November 1800; HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 32, vol. 3, Reden to the King, 19 November 1800, who saw the move as part of Prussia's expansionist plans.
\textsuperscript{72} Dropmore Papers, VI, 402, Carysfort to Grenville, 5 December 1800.
\textsuperscript{73} According to RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 29 November 1800, in cipher, and 10 January 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{74} RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 6 December 1800, in cipher. James Napper Tandy (1740-1803) was an Irish patriot favourable to the French revolution, participated in an expedition to Ireland in 1799 which failed, fled to Hamburg from whence he was extradited and condemned to death, released after Bonaparte's intervention, and received with honours in France in 1802, where he became brigadier-general in the French army.
3. The Russo-Prussian Neutrality Convention

a) The negotiations

Without a doubt, Prussia played a central role in Paul's notion of the Armed Neutrality, and this simply because of Prussia's geographical position. Since France had conquered Belgium and Holland, British trade had been redirected from southern to northern Europe. British imports and exports from Germany had increased dramatically. Of the five rivers used by Britain for trade with the Continent in 1801, three, the Vistula, the Oder, and the Ems, were Prussian. The other two, the Elbe, and the Weser, could be controlled by Prussia through an occupation of Hanover.

Towards the end of September Panin was charged with drawing up a treaty project for an Armed Neutrality and instructed to discuss the details with the Swedish and Danish ambassadors. It was on the evening of 14 October that Panin read out the draft of a Russian project for Armed Neutrality to Rosenkrantz, Stedingk and Lusi. The project was essentially the same as that of its 1780 predecessor with two new variations: contraband was narrowly defined, and the inviolability of neutral convoys was maintained if the commander gave assurances that he was not carrying contraband.

On 12 October, Haugwitz held his first conference with Krüdener to discuss the convention for an armed neutrality. A few days later, Haugwitz declared himself prepared to contract a treaty with the interested parties, and later in the month the King declared that he agreed to the principle of an alliance between the northern powers and expressed his desire to receive the combined overtures from the courts of Russia and Denmark. Haugwitz pressed ahead, writing to Rostopchin to say that the negotiations could be started as soon as Krüdener received instructions. In the meantime, Lusi sent a Russian project off to his master with the remark that the Tsar was prepared to listen to any suggestions for changes that might be made.

Krüdener first presented Haugwitz with a 'convention pour le rétablissement du système de la neutralité armée' on 4 November. The Prussian minister immediately
retorted that Lusi would soon be sent full powers to sign the proposed convention along with those required to sign a treaty of commerce. An official note was handed Krüdener on 14 November agreeing, with some minor exceptions, to the treaty. Just three days later, Lusi was sent full powers to sign the convention with Russia and the act of accession with Denmark. Haugwitz fully expected to join the Armed Neutrality in the same vein as that of 1780.

The actual treaty itself was agreed upon very quickly. In Petersburg, the Danish envoy met with Rostopchin on three occasions and proposed a couple of modifications, which were immediately accepted. The Prussians and the Swedes also introduced a couple of modifications in the last phase of negotiations. On 16 December, Rosenkrantz and Stedingk signed respective Neutrality Conventions with Russia. Lusi was not present during the signing but was invited to pass by Rostopchin's residence that evening. The Chancellor wanted to inform him that the convention had been signed, and communicate to him the slight changes that had been agreed upon (without his having been previously consulted). Lusi did not dare take it upon himself to sign the convention right away, and therefore Rostopchin proposed a conference for the next day in the presence of the Danish and Swedish ambassadors. During that conference, Stedingk insisted that Lusi sign the treaty to get the thing over

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81Brückner, op. cit., V, 501, Krüdener to Panin, 4 November 1800; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 88 C, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 7 November 1800, who wrote that the last courier from Petersburg had brought the project to Berlin.
82Struensee, Karl August von (1735-1804), Prussian statesman, began service in Denmark, came to Berlin in 1772, named Director of Maritime Trade and appointed to the secret Finance Council in 1782, appointed Minister of Customs and Excise, Commerce and Manufacture in 1791 which he retained until his death.
83Brückner, op. cit., V, 501 and 504, Krüdener to Panin, 4 and 11 November 1800.
84GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Haugwitz to Krüdener, 14 November 1800.
86GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 88 C, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 21 November 1800: '[...] j'ai pris le parti d'y accéder sur les mêmes principes, et d'après le même mode, que la Prusse a suivi lors de la première association, [...]'.
87There was a conference on 13 December with Rosenkrantz and Stedingk (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 16 December 1800).
88Feldbaek, Denmark, 99-100, for more on modifications.
89GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 16 December 1800.
with as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{90} Lusi eventually agreed to do so but nevertheless insisted that the changes be left aside until approved of by his court. So it was that the Russo-Prussian Neutrality Convention was concluded on 18 December 1800.\textsuperscript{91} By the terms of the treaty, any violation of neutral shipping was to be met with energetic diplomatic support and, if necessary, reprisals. This last stipulation was contained in article VI of the treaty and it is important to note as it paved the way for Prussian military intervention in north Germany against British goods, ships, and territory. In return for joining the alliance, Prussia was guarantied the protection of its shipping by the three co-signatory sea powers. Bilateral treaties, between Prussia and Denmark, Prussia and Sweden, Sweden and Denmark, were to follow.

However, the Armed Neutrality was built upon rather weak foundations, not only from a political point of view, but especially from a military one. The three maritime powers knew that they would not be prepared to meet an eventual riposte from Britain until the early summer of 1801. It was this lack of military preparedness which precipitated its downfall. Moreover, the alliance was formed between powers whose interests did not really coincide. The reasons why Denmark and Russia joined the Armed Neutrality have already been briefly outlined, what motivated Prussia to join what was essentially a maritime alliance is the subject of the next section.

b) Why Prussia joined the alliance

It is impossible to declare with any degree of certainty the reasons why Prussia, or rather Haugwitz, decided to join the alliance. However inadequate it may seem, it is possible here only to make suppositions based on a reading of the

\textsuperscript{90} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 19 December 1800.
\textsuperscript{91} Piggott and Omond, \textit{op. cit.} 439-457; Scott, \textit{op. cit.} 677-683; Martens, G., \textit{op. cit.}, II. 406; and Martens, F., \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 294. Christian VII ratified the treaty with Russia on 16 January (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 17 January 1801) but delayed sending the courier carrying the ratification to Petersburg after the removal of Panin because he did not know who to address it to (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 20 January 1801). It was eventually sent with Löwendal at the beginning of February (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 7 February 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XI, 32, III). The Danish government took so long to officially acceded to the treaty, because it wanted to be sure that Prussia had done so beforehand. According to the Danish chargé d'affaires in Berlin, the courier carrying Denmark's consent to Petersburg was sent ten or eleven days after a courier had departed for Berlin for the same purpose. It was apparently Denmark's slowness in agreeing to the convention that led Paul to expel the Danish legation secretary in Petersburg, Lieutenant-Colonel Fursmann (AAE. Prusse 228, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 27 December 1800 (6 nivôse IX)).
diplomatic correspondence, keeping in mind that even those intimately involved in the negotiations did not always have access to all the information.

The incidents mentioned in the previous section, and the numerous infringements against Prussian shipping, may have irritated the Prussian government but certainly were not reason enough to risk war with England. In fact, very few men in the King's entourage were in favour of adhering to the maritime convention. There were only two public advocates at the court of Berlin - Haugwitz and Struensee.\textsuperscript{92} Although Haugwitz protested when Knoblauch suggested that no-one else was in favour of the alliance, and retorted that both Schulenburg and Köckritz approved of the association, the Danish chargé d'affaires very much doubted that this was the case. Struensee was considered to be the leader of the 'French mercantilist' party and as such used every opportunity to attack England.\textsuperscript{93} The other ministers, assuming the probability of war, vigorously fought the idea. One of these was Count Karl von Hoym, minister of the province of Silesia, who was reported to have written a memoir addressed to the King portraying the pernicious results a war with Britain could have on the province. He argued that one year of war with Britain would completely ruin the province and put 70,000 people out of work.\textsuperscript{94} As far as is known, however, he never handed the memoir over. Whether it was through a lack of conviction or a lack of courage is difficult to say. Another memoir was written about a month later, in which the author outlined the various reasons that might lead Prussia to invade Hanover and concluded: 'Die Occupation des Hannover scheint aber, aus welchem Gesichtspunkte man sie auch betrachtet, eine Unternehmung zu sein, deren Ausführung wohl so lange als möglich ausgesetzt bleiben muss.'\textsuperscript{95} It was Haugwitz that persuaded the King to consent to joining the association,\textsuperscript{96} and once the decision was made, the other ministers followed suit. Schulenburg-Kehnert,\textsuperscript{97} for example,

\textsuperscript{92}For Struensee see RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 10 June 1800.
\textsuperscript{93}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 22 July 1800, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, III.
\textsuperscript{94}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 21 February 1801; StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c, fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to Gries, 24 February 1801.
\textsuperscript{95}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11, Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, 24 March 1801, no date, no signature.
\textsuperscript{96}HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69, report from Decken, 26 March 1801, in which he states that the idea to carry out an occupation came from Haugwitz and that the King did not like the idea.
\textsuperscript{97}Schulenburg-Kehnert, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf von der (1742-1815), Prussian cavalry general, considered one of the most enlightened Prussian ministers, ambitious, and most certainly had his eye on Haugwitz's position (Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, V, 192, Panin to Krüdener, 3 November 1799). Cf. Hellwig, \textit{op. cit.}, 78-84.
had been an advocate of conciliation with Britain and an opponent of Haugwitz. But when he realised that a conflict with Britain was unavoidable, he was among the first to propose energetic measures. When later asked by the envoy of Mecklenburg, Lützow, how Prussia could justify an invasion of Hanover after having regarded the electorate as an ally for the past six years, Schulenburg answered: 'Dies verschlage alles gar nichts, man suche seinen Feind wo man ihn habhaft werden könne.' To the King, Schulenburg is reported to have commented that the only way for Prussia to make up the losses that it would incur in a war with Britain was to take Hanover. But this does not explain why Prussia so readily accepted Russia's offer to participate in the Armed Neutrality. The following points may help clarify things.

1. Perhaps the most important reason should be sought outside of the conflict between Britain and the northern powers, in something which was far more important to Prussia than anything to do with maritime trade, namely, in Prussia's relations to its two more powerful neighbours with a view to the secularisation of the German states. It was evident to one and all that the German ecclesiastical states were going to be sacrificed as indemnities to satisfy the secular Princes, and Prussia was looking to make up for the loss of its provinces on the left bank. To gain anything of interest, Haugwitz had to placate the two powers whose influence over the partition of Germany was greatest - France and Russia. These countries were courted not only by Prussia, but by all the German principalities involved, as much out of interest as out of fear. It was accordingly suspected by several diplomats, that when the King of Prussia acceded to the Armed Neutrality, he was acting with indemnities in mind.

So, Prussia joined the Armed Neutrality not so much out of hatred or hostility towards Britain (and the British government also knew this) as out of a desire to win the French and Russian governments' sympathy for the forthcoming negotiations over Prussia's compensations for the loss of the left bank. The Danish Foreign Minister was aware of this when he wrote to his envoy in Berlin: ' [...] il pouvait se flatter d'acquérir quelque influence et de faire valoir ses vues et ses prétentions dans les négociations qui vont débrouiller et fixer les intérêts de l'Allemagne.' The court of Berlin had an urgent need to see peace on the continent come about, it seized every occasion to please not only Paul, but Bonaparte, especially when the measures

98 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 4 April 1801 (14 germinal IX).
99 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 24 February 1801.
100 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 2 March 1801.
101 The British consul at Hamburg was one of these. PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 41, Mitchell to Hawkesbury, 27 February 1801.
concerned in no way compromised it. Carysfort knew this when he reported: '[...]
I must still be apprehensive that the strong desire which exists to maintain a good
understanding and establish a concert with the Emperor of Russia, joined to the fear of
his power, may finally drive him [Haugwitz] to the adoption of measures very
consistent with the policy by which he has long been activated.

2. Another related factor has to be taken into consideration. The court of
Berlin's mediatory efforts between Petersburg and Paris have been summarised. But
it was equally important to Prussia that this rapprochement not be carried too far. The
only reason why Haugwitz agreed to play the role of mediator was, first to please
Paul, and second because he did not think the rapprochement would go very far. It
was not to Prussia's interest that a complete rapprochement between France and
Russia take place because of the very real danger of being left out of a German
settlement. Fear of a rapprochement between France and Russia certainly played a role
in the Prussian government's decision to join the Armed Neutrality. By joining a
league of northern powers, Haugwitz hoped that Prussia would no longer be
completely isolated in its neutrality, that its position in Germany would be
strengthened, that it would no longer be overshadowed by the Franco-Russian
rapprochement, and that it would enable Prussia to lead a more independent foreign
policy vis-à-vis France and Austria. There is no doubt that relations with Russia were
considerably enhanced after Prussia joined the Armed Neutrality.

3. Beurnonville, although not the best source, argued that given the Tsar's
attitude vis-à-vis England, France's victories against Austria, and the Franco-Russian
rapprochement, Prussia was seeking to earn a little credit by joining the association of
its own will, rather than appear tardy and obliged to obey the force of
circumstances. Lombard confided in Beurnonville that Prussia's leaders were
afraid that they would be kept in the background during the coming peace
negotiations.

4. Another reason, which has not been taken into account by historians to
date, was Prussia's readiness to defend what it considered to be its own commercial

104 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 24 January 1801.
105 Cf. SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 14 March 1801: 'L'intimité de la liaison entre
les deux Cours de St. Pétersbourg et de Berlin paraît prendre tous les jours des accroissements.'
106 AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 20 January (30 nivôse IX), 3 February (14
pluviôse), 7 February 1801 (18 pluviôse): 'Il [Lombard] ne me dissimulait pas que si le Roi est obligé
de dévier de son ancien système, ce n'est pas sans peine qu'il s'y détermine, mais il désire beaucoup
qu'on croie que le Roi agit de lui-même, et sans qu'aucune autre considération influe sur sa volonté.'
107 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 7 February 1801 (18 pluviôse IX).
interests. True, Prussia was not touched by sea matters as much as the other powers involved (in particular the right to convoy, since Prussia possessed no warships which could have escorted its merchant ships), and Carysfort reported that the court of Berlin was perfectly indifferent towards the points of maritime law in contention, but the Prussian government certainly had enough reason to complain about British outrages against its shipping. Haugwitz mentions the matter in a letter to Jacobi: '...loin de regarder d'un oeil indifférent ce qui est relatif à la sûreté du commerce neutre et au maintien de ses droits, j'y prendrai toujours faits et cause, pour la raison décisive que les droits de mes propres sujets y sont essentiellement concernés, et que je suis appelé à les défendre et à les protéger.'

The King was determined to defend what he considered to be the rights of his own people, and whether he really wanted to or not, Haugwitz had obviously managed to convince him that the convention was for the good of Prussia. 'Vous savez', Haugwitz told the Swedish ambassador, 'qu'on n'a cessé de proposer au Roi des engagements auxquels il s'est constamment refusé, les croyant dangereux. Il croit celui-ci [the Armed Neutrality] utile à son peuple, et heureux ou malheureux il le soutiendra.' For the last six years Prussia had reason enough to complain about the British navy's arbitrary treatment of its shipping. Haugwitz also complained to Reden how much Prussia had lost in shipping through British privateering. Struensee, who was ordered to write a memoir on the liberty of navigation, recommended that Prussia join the northern powers, and the United States, to force Britain into peace. He often pointed out to the King how much Prussian commerce was suffering at the

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PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 17 and 27 May, 30 June 1801.

GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 26 January 1801. I'm not sure to what extent Haugwitz was being the King's mouthpiece. Knoblauch reported about six months before that 'Haugwitz regarda le commerce maritime comme un objet si mince, qu'il daigne à peine le compter pour quelque chose' (RA, Depcher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 10 June 1800).

SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 3 March 1801.

HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 February 1801, copy in Hann, 92, XLI, 32, III.

AAE, Prusse 227, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 2 September 1800 (15 fructidor VIII). He apparently told Knoblauch that on 20 January 1800 he presented the King with a memoir demonstrating the necessity of reorganising the Armed Neutrality (RA, Depcher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 7 October 1800, in cipher).
hands of the British, and financial considerations always carried weight with the King.

Be this as it may, several indications lead one to believe that Haugwitz seems to have overlooked the seriousness of the situation between Britain and the northern powers. It is almost as if he failed to grasp the full extent of the conflict, and inadvertently walked into a treaty whose consequences were more serious than he had imagined. To complicate matters, Haugwitz believed, as did many other diplomats, that Russia was adapting itself to Prussia's system of neutrality, and once affairs did start to take on hostile proportions, Carysfort automatically inferred that the Prussian cabinet had been led farther than it ever intended to go. Before Prussia signed the convention, Carysfort speculated that the 'desire to gratify the Emperor of Russia, and the belief that it will lead to no serious consequence may at length incline His Prussian Majesty to give way.' The King was undoubtedly convinced that nothing was contained in the articles of the maritime convention that posed a threat to England, and that its sole purpose was to protect neutral commerce from being violated.


114 AAE, Prusse 227, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 2 September 1800 (15 fructidor VIII): 'Les considérations financières sont celles qui ont ici le plus de poids, [...]'.

115 After the second Russian embargo was laid, Reden reported: 'So viel ist gewiß, daß man auch hier England nicht gekannt, und den Ernst dieser Nation erwartet hat.' (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the Geheimräte, 23 December 1800, in cipher).

116 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Russland, 147, Haugwitz to the King, 20 March 1800: 'A l'entendre parler [Baron Krüdener], l'Empereur de Russie ne demande pas mieux que de s'unir au système de neutralité de la Prusse et d'en partager les mesures par lesquelles elle a sû la garantir durant la guerre. Dès les premières conversations que j'avais eues avec le Baron de Krüdener peu après son arrivée ici, j'ai cru m'en apercevoir, [...] que l'Empereur Paul avait en vue une telle réunion avec la Prusse. Maintenant il n'y a plus de doute à cet égard, et il faut même s'attendre à des démarches plus pressantes de la part de la cour de Pétersbourg.' Cf. Dropmore Papers, VI, 219, Garlike to Thomas Grenville, 28 April, and 370, Carysfort to Grenville, 1 November 1800, in which he mentions that Paul had sent a manuscript letter to the court of Berlin approving of the Prussian neutrality system. Boulay de la Meurthe, op. cit., 250, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 26 April 1800 (6 floréal VIII): ' [...] M. de Haugwitz confirme la décision du tsar de se renfermer dans une neutralité absolue, [...]'. Cf. Tucker, op. cit., 267.

117 Dropmore Papers, VI, 423, Carysfort to Grenville, 6 January 1801.

118 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 11 November 1800.
by warring nations.\textsuperscript{119} The Danish foreign secretary was of the opinion that Berlin adhered to the alliance to conciliate Russia and did not think by doing so that relations with Britain would be perturbed.

La cour de Berlin, [in joining the alliance last year], ne s’imagina sans doute pas compromettre par là sa bonne intelligence avec l’Angleterre. Elle crut devoir à la Russie le ménagement de ne pas rejeter un plan, dont elle se flatta peut-être d’éviter l’effet à la faveur du temps et des événements, et elle hésita d’autant moins à s’y prêter, que l’invitation s’en trouva jointe à la proposition d’une médiation armée relativement aux affaires du continent, proposition qui lui parut infiniment plus embarrassante, et qu’il lui importait beaucoup plus d’écarter.\textsuperscript{120}

Also, Haugwitz repeatedly stated to Carysfort that a war between Britain and Russia would put an end to the concert between the northern neutral powers, and it is likely that he sincerely meant this.\textsuperscript{121} Haugwitz persisted in the belief that the Armed Neutrality would collapse either in the event of war or,\textsuperscript{122} as he assured the Prince of Orange, if the dispute concerning Malta were settled.\textsuperscript{123} Carysfort writes of a conversation with Lombard that was reported to him in which the latter expressed the Prussian government’s distress and embarrassment at not seeing any means of getting out of the situation it had got into and that it intended to remain aloof until the solicitations from its allies obliged it to take part.\textsuperscript{124}

In any event the King, given his personal inclinations, certainly did not contemplate going to war over neutral rights, and expressed his ‘surprise and concern’ on hearing of the second Russian embargo on British ships.\textsuperscript{125} The Prussian cabinet even went so far as to try to disassociate itself from Paul’s behaviour, arguing that it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 12 February 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69.
\item \textsuperscript{120}RA, Geheimegistratur, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 11 March 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{121}Dropmore Papers, VI, 424, Carysfort to Grenville, 6 January 1801, although Carysfort thought such utterances dictated by the hope of gaining time so Prussia could carry its own schemes into effect.
\item \textsuperscript{122}Ibid., 425, Carysfort to Grenville, 13 January 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{123}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 February 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{124}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 1 February 1801, in cipher.
\item \textsuperscript{125}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 23 December 1800; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the Geheimräte, 23 December 1800, in cipher: ‘Es gewinnt immer mehr den Anschein, so viel man aus Äußerungen der Geschäftsmänner abnehmen kann, daß der König von Preußen das letzte Verfahren des russischen Kaisers mißbilligt, […]’.
\end{itemize}
had no knowledge of the motives which could have led Paul to take such a measure. Carysfort reported: '[Haugwitz] was now authorised by his master to declare, in the first instance, that he desired a perfect line of separation might be drawn between the measures which have been taken by the Emperor of Russia against His [British] Majesty, in which His Prussian Majesty could not be implicated, and the measures which it was supposed had been in discussion for the security of neutral commerce; [...]'.

And later he wrote: 'The general idea which I think myself justified to form, if perfect reliance is to be placed upon the most prominent parts of Count Haugwitz's conversation, would be that not only this court, but Denmark and Sweden also really intended to draw themselves out of the scheme of armed neutrality, [...].'

Haugwitz was alarmed at what had passed and was prepared to do anything to stop the conflict escalating. The Swedish ambassador tried to convince Carysfort that Haugwitz and the court of Berlin would do 'all in their power to prevent and soften any measures which might be offensive to Great Britain.' The probability of Prussia being involved in a conflict between Russia and Britain produced a cold shower effect in Berlin.

4. Anglo-Prussian relations

a) England's attitude towards Prussia

At the beginning of 1801, Britain found itself in a very difficult position. The battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden had crushed the allied efforts to defeat France, and after the treaty of Lunéville, Bonaparte had virtually no enemy but Great Britain. (Although Britain was allied to the Porte and the Kingdoms of Portugal and Naples, they were far from being the most determined enemies of France). Britain's access to continental trade was greatly restricted and in some places completely cut off. No sooner had she come to terms with France than it seemed certain that war would break out between Britain and the northern powers. This is perhaps one explanation as to why the British government reacted so strongly and so quickly to the maritime convention. Certainly the British were convinced that the rights for which they

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127 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 22 January 1801
128 Dropmore Papers, VI, 395, Carysfort to Grenville, 29 November 1800.
129 Ibid., 396, Carysfort to Grenville, 29 November 1800.
contended were not special privileges but were legitimate claims. They could not allow the doctrine 'free ships, free goods' because they feared it would lead to the end of her maritime power.

Since the signing of the Anglo-Danish Convention, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, had decided to play a wait-and-see game, spiced with a few well-placed threats. He wrote to his envoy in Berlin that, given 'the present state of Prussian politics', it would be safer 'to rest upon our oars, and voir venir'.¹³¹ Carysfort had been insinuating throughout November and December that Britain would go to war over the neutrality issue.¹³² Grenville learnt about the Tsar's invitation to form an Armed Neutrality about the beginning of October but thought it best not to react immediately.¹³³ He had no wish to provoke the neutral powers by taking steps that would irritate them, but he was hardly in a conciliatory mood, rejecting Prussian offers of mediation between Britain and the northern courts.

*It is [...] the King's pleasure that your Lordship should seek an opportunity of referring in your conversations with Count Haugwitz, to this intimation and that you should distinctly apprise him that however desirous His Majesty always is to render the fullest justice to the friendly and pacific intentions of the court of Berlin, yet that the season for amicable negotiation on that subject with Russia is past; that the second embargo now laid in the Russian ports on British vessels is a proof of hostile designs, or rather an act of open hostility which places the two countries in a state of actual war, and which therefore the King is confident the King of Prussia can neither have been a party to, nor can approve; that in such a state of things there can be no community of interest or situation in this respect between the emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, who professes to wish to cultivate in his intercourse with this court not only the relations of peace but those of friendship and confidence; that so long as this embargo subsists no such intervention as the King of Prussia has offered could be likely to produce any*

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¹³¹ Dropmore Papers, VI, 345, Grenville to Carysfort, 9 October 1800.
¹³³ PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Grenville to Carysfort, 10 October 1800.
other effect than that of implicating in a difference of so serious a nature, a power the common friend and ally of both parties.\textsuperscript{134}

London received news of the Russian embargo about the end of November, and decided to make preparations for war even before the existence of a northern alliance was confirmed.\textsuperscript{135} A few days later Grenville received Rostopchin's letter demanding an explanation about Malta. He sent off an answer on 5 December,\textsuperscript{136} not making any reference to Malta, underlining his opposition to an Armed Neutrality. To Denmark and Sweden he sent off letters asking them to state their positions regarding the Armed Neutrality. By the end of December, war was looked upon as inevitable, although public opinion liked to believe that Prussia would remain outside the conflict.\textsuperscript{137}

England's attitude towards Prussia was completely different.\textsuperscript{138} As we have seen, Prussia represented absolutely no danger at sea, but it could harm British trade by closing the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. This was undoubtedly a far greater threat to Great Britain than the combined maritime forces of Denmark, Sweden and Russia. Jacobi insinuated to Grenville that Prussia was capable of closing the northern ports: 'Je lui [Grenville] ai observé d'ailleurs qu'il ne me semblait surtout nullement vraisemblable que les mesures de représailles s'étendent sur la navigation prussienne puisque Votre Majesté était dans une position à s'en ressentir contre l'Angleterre de la manière la plus sensible pour Sa Majesté Britannique comme Electeur d' Hanovre.'\textsuperscript{139} Haugwitz approved of Jacobi's attitude, and confirmed that: '[...]'si contre toute attente il s'avisait de m'offenser, ou par un embargo imposé aux navires prussiens, ou par des saisies hostiles, l'électorat d'Hanovre serait aussitôt ma caution, et me servirait de gage pour le dédommagement de mes sujets.'\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{134}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Grenville to Carysfort, 3 December 1800.
\textsuperscript{136}Copy in PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47; Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 423-424.
\textsuperscript{137}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 30 December 1800, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{138}Cf. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Grenville to Carysfort, 13, 15 and 16 January 1801.
\textsuperscript{139}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 13 January 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{140}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 26 January 1801, in cipher.
Carysfort had also reported on several occasions rumours prevailing at the court that Jacobi had been directed to threaten reprisals on Hanover.\footnote{141 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 30 January, 7 February, in cipher, and 10 February 1801.} The British government treated Prussia with indulgence not only in the hope of preventing Berlin from joining the alliance, but also to prevent any 'misunderstanding' breaking out between the two countries.\footnote{142 This is clear in Grenville's dispatches, FO 64 Prussia, 60, 13 and 15 January 1801.} Carysfort is reported to have told one of his friends: ‘Il faut bien que nous ménagions la cour de Berlin, si nous voulons conserver quelques communications avec le continent et ne pas risquer le pays d' Hanovre.'\footnote{143 AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 27 January 1801 (7 pluviôse IX).}

The interesting thing is that during the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Armed Neutrality, Haugwitz repeatedly assured Carysfort of Prussia's goodwill towards England, of his desire to establish 'an intercourse of unlimited confidence', and of the necessity that Britain maintain its maritime power.\footnote{144 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 58, Carysfort to Grenville, 3, 9 and 27 September 1800; Dropmore Papers, VI, 355, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 October 1800, and 412, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 December 1800.} Haugwitz conveyed this without, however, making any specific declarations nor without engaging himself to any specific conditions. Furthermore, he managed to convince Carysfort for some time that Prussia had nothing to do with any measures countenanced by the northern powers contrary to England's interests and that the northern powers had not even considered any measures that could alarm the British government. 'I sincerely believe this court has uniformly discountenanced every proposal tending to measures of a contrary nature [to England's maritime power] among the northern powers.'\footnote{145 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 8 and 11 November 1800; Dropmore Papers, VI, 375, Carysfort to Grenville, 12 November 1800; and 391, Carysfort to Grenville, 23 November 1800.} The British envoy was persuaded that, in spite of French efforts to re-ignite the former maritime league between the Baltic powers, Paul's volatile character (in private he used the word madness) would deter them from entering into any engagements with him.\footnote{146 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 9 September 1800. Also in 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 6 December 1800: '[...] Haugwitz declared he believed none of the powers had meditated upon this subject any propositions which could give the smallest alarm to His Majesty's government.' Cf. \textit{ibid.}, Carysfort to Grenville, 20 December 1800, and 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 22 January 1801; Dropmore Papers, VI, 355, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 October 1800. These assurances were passed on from Carysfort to Reden, who duly reported them to his superiors in Hanover (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 3 February 1801, in cipher).} And even though he was aware that Haugwitz was having frequent
conversations with Krüdener about plans to assure the navigation of neutral powers, and that Lusi had been sent full powers to negotiate, he remained persuaded that the negotiations would be protracted for some time, that the northern powers would not dare do anything that would bring down upon them the resentment of England, that the maritime project would either be modified to such an extent as to render it ineffective, or that it would be abandoned altogether.  

He never thought that the cabinet of Berlin harboured any hostile intentions towards England, and in this one could say he was right. Even after the treaty had been signed by Prussia, he reported that nothing had as yet been determined in Berlin. He was persuaded that Prussia would not take part in anything directed against England and was convinced that Prussia would do its best to get out of the scrape that seemed to be looming on the horizon. Admittedly, it was difficult for Carysfort to obtain precise information, and he was by no means aided in his task by the secrecy which surrounded the negotiations at the court of Berlin. But Grenville had reiterated his misgivings of Haugwitz often enough to plant the seed of mistrust in Carysfort's mind, and although he doubted Haugwitz's professions of friendship, he continued to behave as though he believed they were sincere.

Even if Carysfort had doubts as to the actual effectiveness of the negotiations going on among the northern courts, the cabinet of London knew better. The British government had suspected for some time that the Prussian cabinet was actually taking part in negotiations with Russia with a view to reviving the Armed Neutrality.

147 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 19 November, in cipher, 6 December, 9 December, in cipher, and 16 December 1800; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 29 November 1800. Cf. Dropmore Papers, VI, 384, Carysfort to Grenville, 19 November 1800.

148 Dropmore Papers, VI, 416, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 December 1800.

149 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 23 December 1800.

150 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 23, 27 and 30 December 1800, in cipher, and 60, 1 January 1800; Dropmore Papers, VI, 421, Carysfort to Grenville, 3 January 1801.

151 Dropmore Papers, VI, 425 and 428, Carysfort to Grenville, 13 and 17 January 1801.

152 Reden also remarked upon the secrecy observed by Haugwitz and Krüdener, and complained that it was difficult to learn whether Prussia had signed the convention or not, in spite of the fact that several people assured him of it (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 13 December 1800, in cipher). The Saxon envoy remarked (StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 8 January 1801, in cipher): 'On a caché soigneusement aux ministres d'Angleterre et d'Hanovre la signature de la convention maritime.'

153 Dropmore Papers, VI, 411, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 December 1800.

154 Grenville was skeptical about Haugwitz's assurances towards Carysfort. Cf. Dropmore Papers, VI, 345, Grenville to Carysfort, 9 October 1800, and 373-374, Grenville to Carysfort, 7 November 1800; Ford, op. cit., 201-202.
only problem was that it was unsure as to what position the court of Berlin would adopt. On instructions received from Grenville, Carysfort made several vain attempts during the months of December-January to discover whether Prussia had made itself a part of the alliance and whether the court of Berlin intended to maintain good relations with London, urging that the question receive a prompt answer. Haugwitz's replies were always evasive, often repeating assurances that Prussia would not enter into any alliance of a hostile nature towards England. This phrasing was vague enough, however, not to preclude the signing of an armed neutrality. Carysfort was 'mortified' to learn, a few days after his first attempt, that Haugwitz had not even brought the matter before the King. He attributed Haugwitz's reluctance to give a precise answer to his questions to one of two things: either Prussia had entered into some agreement hostile to England, or the King was unaware of what had been going on, and his ministers were too embarrassed to lay the matter before him. This latter reason might seem improbable, and yet there is no doubt that Haugwitz hesitated over the manner in which the subject was to be brought before the King. Carysfort's language took on an even sharper tone when he learnt that Sweden had accorded its representative in Petersburg full powers to conclude a treaty. Once more he was instructed to obtain a definite answer from Berlin as to its intentions, but before he received a reply to his note, news of the Russo-Prussian treaty came through. Sweden and Denmark had signed similar treaties two days earlier. Haugwitz's reply to Carysfort's note followed, rebuking him for the means by which he had interrogated Prussia on its foreign policy.

Le comte de Haugwitz m'ayant fait son rapport sur ces audiences, je l'ai autorisé à répondre au ministre de l'Angleterre, que j'avais lieu d'être surpris de me voir interpellé par sa cour sur mes relations politiques avec d'autres puissances amies, tandis que dans le cours de la présente guerre j'ai regardé plus d'une fois d'un oeil confiant et tranquille les liaisons que l'Angleterre a

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155 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 9 December 1800.
156 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 and 30 December 1800; ibid., 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 5 January 1801.
157 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 December 1800, and 60, 10 January 1801.
158 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 30 December 1800.
159 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 1 January 1800.
160 Treaties of accession were signed between Prussia and Sweden in Petersburg on 16 February 1801 and between Prussia and Denmark on 2 April 1801. These treaties specified that Prussian merchant ships would come under the protection of Swedish and Danish warships.
trouvé bon de former de son côté, sans que l'idée me soit venue de lui en demander explications.\textsuperscript{161}

In spite of rumours to that effect, and in spite of reports and warnings from its ambassador in Berlin, the British cabinet was reluctant to believe Prussia could take an interest in a revival of the Armed Neutrality. For a short while, between the first Russian embargo on British ships in September and the occupation of Cuxhaven in November, Grenville even considered Prussian mediation in discussions with Petersburg.\textsuperscript{162} To this purpose he wanted to send his brother Thomas to Berlin once more.\textsuperscript{163} As late as the end of January 1801, *The Times* reported that the King of Prussia would not adhere to the 'Northern Treaty', and would maintain the neutrality of North Germany.\textsuperscript{164} Carysfort first heard rumours of Prussia's accession to the Armed Neutrality around the middle of December 1800\textsuperscript{165} but did not receive confirmation until the following month.\textsuperscript{166} It was not until the middle of February that Carysfort became convinced Prussia would invade Hanover.\textsuperscript{167}

London officially broke off relations with the northern powers on 14 January 1801, when it declared a general embargo on all Russian, Swedish and Danish goods in British harbours and sequestered their ships.\textsuperscript{168} The Swedish and Danish

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\item \textsuperscript{161} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Haugwitz to Lusi, 9 January 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Gembries, *op. cit.*, 45.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Dropmore Papers, VI, 394, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 28 November 1800. Thomas was against the measure.
\item \textsuperscript{164} *The Times*, 24 and 26 January, 9 February 1801. Prussia's actual adhesion to the Armed Neutrality was not announced to the British public until 3 March 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{165} PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 14 December 1800, in cipher. He was told by the Austrian chargé d'affaires.
\item \textsuperscript{166} In spite of Haugwitz's efforts he was unable to prevent the diplomatic corps from hearing of it (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 4 January 1801). Cf. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 10 January 1801, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32 III: 'Es bestätigt sich vollkommen, daß auch Preußen [...] der bewaffnete Neutralität beigetreten ist'; StAH, Cl. I Lit Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to the Senate, 20 January 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{167} PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 10 and 13 February 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 21 February 1801, in cipher.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ulmann, *op. cit.*, 250; Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens'; quotes 15 January incorrectly; Scott, *op. cit.* 558-559; Piggott and Omond, *op. cit.* 468. The embargo was discussed shortly after news of the Russian embargo arrived in London (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 173 B, Jacobi to the court, 2 December 1800). One of the reasons that the British cabinet did not immediately implement
ambassadors were informed on the 15th of the embargo measure and were told that it was because of the Russian embargo placed on British vessels, and the formation of the confederation of the north. After having received the note from Grenville, the Swedish and Danish ambassadors approached Jacobi and asked him to take part in an official protest against the embargo. Jacobi declined, in spite of insistent demands from the Danish ambassador in London, Count Wedel, offering lack of instructions as a pretext. He did, however, promise to speak with Grenville. The Admiralty issued orders to seize the ships of these three powers, all the overseas possessions belonging to Denmark were seized, and a fleet was sent to the Baltic. It was only towards the end of January, however, that Rostopchin received a threat of war from Grenville if the Russian embargo were not lifted. The Tsar, of course, refused to comply, and on 22 January 1801, the two countries were officially at war with each other.

No mention of Prussia was made concerning these sanctions, even though it was known, through the Danish ambassadors, that Berlin had signed the convention. There was some division amongst British officials as to the measures to be taken against Prussia. Sir William Scott, judge of the Admiralty court, wrote a letter to Addington, who was then speaker of the House, informing him of the embargo placed on the ships of Russia, Denmark and Sweden on hearing that they had signed a neutrality convention: There is no certain proof that Prussia has not done the like, and therefore the order does not extend to her subjects; but there is strong reason to suppose that she means to accede to it, and that the same measures must be resorted to against that government. It was decided that the Prussian adhesion to the convention would not be regarded as a hostile act provided it was not accompanied by

an embargo on Russian shipping was that there was so little in British harbours it was hardly worth the effort. When news of the embargo reached Russia it made virtually no impression on the government since it had been expected (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 10 February 1801).


170 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 20 January 1801, in cipher. News of the embargo was brought to Elsinore by a Prussian ship on 24 January (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 24 January 1801). Denmark never retaliated. The Swedish government, however, did by laying an embargo on the only British vessel that it could lay their hands on (PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 40, Drummond to Grenville, 17 February 1801). Also Scott, op. cit. 557-558.

171 Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 426-428.

172 Pellew, op. cit., I, 276.
the use of force. The British government thereby left its Prussian counterpart with a means of avoiding an open conflict if it so wished. Indeed, the whole of British policy throughout the period under study was to give Prussia the opportunity to remain strictly neutral and to prevent a rapprochement with powers whose interests were inimical to England. At this stage, Grenville simply instructed his ambassador in Berlin to get more details, to find out whether Prussia had merely acceded to the principles involved, or whether she intended to employ force against England. And in a private letter he suggested that Carysfort persuade the Prussians that they can do no better than sit still and enrich themselves by the profits of that neutrality of which Denmark has made so abundant an harvest. The foreign minister wrote to Carysfort the day before the embargo measures were decreed informing him nothing would be undertaken against Prussia, 'from a desire on the King's part to try to the very utmost the means of maintaining peace and good understanding with Prussia. He was further instructed to convince the Prussian government that Britain was resolved to maintain its naval policy, while at the same time facilitating the means by which Prussia could stay free of the approaching conflict. The Secretary of State later explained why measures had not been taken against Prussia in a conversation with Jacobi, pointing out that the British government was willing to make a distinction between adhesion to the principles of the northern confederation and the means used to employ those principles. The British government was quite prepared to differentiate between the northern powers on the one hand and Prussia on the other and attempted to facilitate the means by which Prussia could stay free of the approaching conflict. In a conversation with the Hanoverian envoy, Carysfort assured him: ' [...] daß wenn Britain Preußen auch nicht ganz aus der Ligue herausziehen könne, es doch alles mögliche tun und jede Gelegenheit ihm anbieten werde, Preußen in seiner jetzigen neutralen Haltung zu conservieren, [...]. To this end, London was prepared to make a number of political and commercial concessions.

Two examples may be cited. First, Carysfort was doing everything to encourage the continuation of trade. After having received information that there were

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173 For the following see PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Grenville to Carysfort, 13, 16 and 30 January 1801.
174 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 3 and 10 February 1801; ibid., 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 4 July, in cipher, and 4 August 1801, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 68.
175 Dropmore Papers, VI, 424, Grenville to Carysfort, 13 January 1801.
176 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Grenville to Carysfort, 13 January 1801.
177 Ibid., 16 January 1801.
179 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 3 February 1801, in cipher.
large quantities of corn and naval stores ready to be shipped to England, Carysfort took it upon himself to assure that any Prussian ship sailing to a port in Great Britain would be allowed to return safely.\textsuperscript{180} He hoped that the prospect of making large profits would tempt some Prussian captains to risk shipping the supplies that Britain so badly needed. He had spoken to 'people in trade' who told him that if they could be assured of the protection of the British government, they would run the risk of infringing their own government's prohibition.\textsuperscript{181} The British cabinet later approved of the initiative,\textsuperscript{182} and the British Admiralty even tried to hurry through courts cases concerning seized Prussian vessels.\textsuperscript{183} Second, another sign of London's willingness to remain on good terms with Prussia may be seen in Grenville's willingness to 'recognise' the Demarcation Line. But he was not willing to do so until he was sure Prussia intended to remain outside of the coming conflict.\textsuperscript{184} When the British took the island of Heligoland off the mouth of the river Elbe, Prussia was assured that a map had been consulted to make sure it was outside the Demarcation Line,\textsuperscript{185} in spite of the British position concerning the Line, namely that it was never to be officially mentioned, the British government obviously thought it necessary to explain its attitude and actions to the Prussian court.

b) Prussia fears British retaliation

Government members in Berlin were aware that England's conciliatory behaviour did not stem from any sympathy towards Prussia but rather out of fear of an invasion of Hanover.\textsuperscript{186} They were nevertheless afraid that counter measures would be taken against Prussian shipping and took steps to avoid this eventuality.\textsuperscript{187} On 3 February 1801, Jacobi received instructions to warn the 260 odd ships\textsuperscript{188} under
Prussian colours laying in the Thames that they were to set sail for home as quickly as possible.^{189} Fears of British retaliatory measures were not entirely shared, however, either by Jacobi nor by most of the Prussian sea captains.^{190} Nevertheless, Jacobi set about putting his instructions into effect. The consul Fridag was told that as a result of the rumours circulating in the gazettes as to the probability of Prussia coming to loggerheads with England, and because of having received news that the maritime commerce of the northern neutrals, without exception, was in danger, he was to assume that Prussian vessels were not to be spared. Accordingly, Jacobi proposed that he speak to a few ships' captains, telling them that he had received letters from their proprietors saying that, because of the actual conjuncture and the opportunity for lucrative business, it would be better to return to the Baltic.^{191} Jacobi made the same insinuations to six other Prussian captains, whose only reaction was to express unwillingness to leave, thereby incurring a considerable loss of profits.^{192} Only about 50 ships actually took immediate heed of these veiled warnings,^{193} although about 140 were to leave before the occupation of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser took place.^{194} Another 32 were charged and lying in anchor on the Thames, ready to sail for France with the first favourable wind. Till 25 February, about 85 Prussian vessels were to be found in other British ports. By the middle of April about 200 ships had left England.^{195} Haugwitz urged their departure, as it became more and more apparent that a conflict with Britain was unavoidable.^{196}

Jacobi, certainly one of the most capable diplomats in Prussian service, had in any event taken the initiative even before instructions from Berlin arrived. When news of the maritime alliance reached London, a few ships' captains came to him for advice. It was because he knew that certain British politicians were considering an embargo

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^{190}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 16 January 1801, in cipher. Jacobi knew, however, that a few cabinet ministers did not espouse the wind of caution, and as such he could not guarantee that any measures against Prussia would not be taken. Cf. ibid., Jacobi to the court, 7 March 1801, in cipher.
^{193}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 6 March 1801, in cipher.
^{195}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, Jacobi to the court, 21 April 1801. In addition, another 24 Prussian vessels had arrived since 7 April with cargoes of wheat.
^{196}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 16 March, in cipher, and King to Jacobi, 23 March 1801, in cipher. This policy was reversed after the death of Paul (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 15 April 1801, in cipher).
against Prussia that he authorised Fridag to say that, although he knew of no disagreement between Britain and Prussia that would place Prussian shipping in danger, it would be better to stay on one's guard. There was an obvious sign that had to be looked out for. The previous summer, when Britain considered taking action against Denmark, it sent a cutter to the Danish ports to warn the British vessels to leave. The same thing was expected to happen, if similar measures were taken against Prussia. In addition, Jacobi sent out a circular letter to all the Prussian vice-consuls at residence in the British ports, informing them of the measures that had been taken against the other northern powers. Haugwitz sent similar warnings to Prussia's consuls in Hamburg and Russia, asking them to advise Prussian subjects against sending ships or goods to England, and warning them that if they had any property there to get it out as soon as possible.

The British cabinet's decision not to apply embargo measures against Prussia, while causing some surprise, was not regarded with any hostility by the British general public. This was not the case with Prussia's allies, who resented this as some sort of favouritism. Strangely enough, if Berlin's supposed enemy, England, decided against an embargo on Prussian ships, Prussia's ally, Russia, implemented one. News of the British embargo measures reached Petersburg about the middle of February. Paul was very upset to learn that Prussia was not included in the measures taken against the other members of the alliance, and when he learnt that Russian goods were reaching Britain through Prussia, he forbade all trade with that country. Rostopchin informed Lusi that since the British were still able to obtain naval supplies, the export of those goods was prohibited. This was followed by an ukase on 23 February, published in Riga, forbidding all exportation from that port to Prussia by sea or land.

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198 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 13 February 1801.
199 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Jacobi to the court, 7 April 1801, in cipher.
200 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Rostopchin to Lusi, 20 February 1801. There is a copy of a publication by the Imperial College of Commerce prohibiting the export of goods dated Riga, 12 February (old style), in PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, and StAH, Cl. I Lit Pbd. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 6.
201 The ukase is given in Martens, G., op. cit., VII, 220-221, and Supplément, II, 436 dated 23 February 1801. Cf. also Ulmann, op. cit., 252; Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 216-217; Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 485-486; Scott, op. cit. 582-583. Lusi was able to get the embargo extended to other countries, although he does not say why he went to such trouble.
CHAPTER VI
THE DECISION TO USE FORCE

1. The declaration of the 12th of February

It was impossible for the European courts to tell just how Prussia was going to act. The envoy from Dresden remarked: '[...] il est impossible à savoir si la Prusse se résoudra à la guerre',\(^1\) while Knoblauch reported that the court of Stockholm had a lot of doubts as to the line of conduct Prussia would adopt.\(^2\) The special envoy from Hamburg to the court of Berlin, von Sienen, echoed his colleagues' beliefs when he reported that it was generally doubted that Prussia would take sides against Britain.\(^3\) Rostopchin was to remark later that Prussia went further than expected.\(^4\) The envoy from Hanover reported in December that it was not known whether Prussia had joined the alliance or not, and commented:

*Es ist daher unmöglich zu beurteilen, ob diejenigen Recht gehabt, die immer geglaubt haben, daß Preußen ein recht tief [sic] in diese Angelegenheit hineingehen würde, und wenn es auch eine solche Maasregel adoptiere, alles anwenden dürfe, um die neutralen Seemächte zu gemässigteren Grundsätzen zu bewegen, oder aber diejenigen, welche glauben, daß Preußen von dem französischen Einfluß geleitet, zu jedem noch so raschen Project der Art des russischen Kaisers, die Hände bieten werde. Zu dem ersten habe ich bisher gehört, weil ich solches den vielfältigen Äußerungen des Graf Haugwitz nicht allein so angemessen fand, sondern auch dieses Betragen mit der stricten Neutralität dieses Hofes so sehr harmonierte.*\(^5\)

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1. StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 8 February 1801, in cipher.
2. RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 3 March 1801, in cipher.
3. StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to Gries, 7 February 1801.
5. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 9 December 1800, in cipher.
Haugwitz feared that a war between Britain and the northern powers would commence as soon as the season allowed, but even he at first seemed unsure as to what line of conduct Prussia should take in what he called a ticklish affair (affaire épineuse). It was not until Haugwitz handed Carysfort an official declaration that doubts as to their position were cleared up. Although the note had been written as much as a week before and was ready to be delivered, it was not handed to Lord Carysfort until 13 February. It is probable that Prussia, expecting British reprisals, wanted to gain time to alert its merchants in Britain to be on their guard. Carysfort for one expected that the 'impertinent' note would lead to the extension of the embargo to Prussian ships, and would bring about his recall and consequently remarked in a letter to Grenville: 'I think the performance of Haugwitz, [...], is, for a display of ignorance, impudent lying, and gross insolence, without parallel.' One can understand Carysfort reacting so strongly after having believed for so long that Prussia would remain outside of the conflict.

The declaration was issued in answer to two notes from Carysfort dated 27 January and 1 February 1801 which were a justification of the British cabinet's behaviour towards Denmark and Sweden. In themselves they are of no particular

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6 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 2 January 1801, in cipher. Speaking of Carysfort's request as to whether Prussia had entered the Armed Neutrality: 'Il s'agit maintenant de savoir dans quel sens il conviendra de répondre au ministre d'Angleterre, et quelle sera en générale la conduite à tenir dans cette affaire épineuse.'

7 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 13 February 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 February 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, III. Copies in PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60; StaAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5. no. 8, invol. 5; Martens, G., op. cit., VII, 215-219, and Supplément, II, 424ff. and 432. There is an English translation in Scott, op. cit. 578-582. Cf. C. F. von Schmidt-Phiseldek, Versuch einer Darstellung des dänischen Neutralitätssystems während des letzteren Seekrieges, 4 vols., (Copenhagen: Amten and Hartier, 1801-1804), vol. 4, 231-238. Carysfort seems to have known beforehand of the note's contents (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 10 and 13 February 1801). Haugwitz made an allusion about it in a conversation with Ehrenheim five days beforehand (SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 7 February 1801).

8 StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 12 February 1801.

9 Dropmore Papers, VI, 457, Carysfort to Grenville, 28 February 1801.

10 Ibid., VI, 446, Carysfort to Grenville, 13 February 1801.

11 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Haugwitz, 27 January and 1 February 1801. Cf. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 10 February, in cipher, and Reden to the King, 12 February 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69. Although Carysfort had refused to communicate the contents of the note to other members of the diplomatic corps, he made an exception for Reden.
interest, but they might be considered a political error by the British since it left the cabinet of Berlin the uncomfortable alternative of either declaring itself in favour of Britain or the Armed Neutrality. As already mentioned, Carysfort had been trying to find out for weeks just where Prussia stood and whether it had even joined the alliance. Because he had received nothing but evasive replies, he decided to formulate his request in an official note. This left Haugwitz no choice but to answer and literally obliged the cabinet of Berlin to take a position which it undoubtedly would have preferred to avoid. The Danish foreign secretary, for example, believed that it was not enthusiasm for the cause, but rather the international situation, which obliged Berlin to make a declaration so out of keeping with its character.

The note marks a turning point, not only in Anglo-Prussian relations, but also in Prussian foreign policy. Until then, high-ranking officials within the court of Berlin thought that the matter of an armed neutrality would come to nothing. The note, however, energetically emphasised the King's agreement with the principles of neutral sea rights and clearly declared his willingness to observe his treaty obligations towards the other northern powers. As a result, the British government's hope that Prussia would somehow be induced to avoid taking what it considered to be a hostile stance went up in smoke. As well, the note was given more than a fair share of publicity by the Prussian cabinet. Eight days after it was handed over to the British envoy, the Prussian representative in Hamburg arranged for it to be published in the Hamburger Correspondenten.

The note may be interpreted at two levels. First, the relatively strong language used in the note was unusual for Prussia during this period and was designed to make a favourable impression on its northern allies. Bernstorff received notification of the declaration from the Prussian ambassador at Copenhagen, Senfft von Pilsach, who at the same time promised that Prussia would take whatever measures the

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12 Reden for one thought that this alternative should have been avoided (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 10 February 1801).
13 RA, Gehejmergistratur, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 11 March 1801: 'C'est la force des circonstances, ce sont des considérations majeures, dérivées de la situation générale de l'Europe, qui lui ont inspiré cette fermeté, pour laquelle elle a paru sortir de son caractère.'
14 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 17 February 1801, in cipher.
15 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 24 February 1801. Cf. StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to the Senate, 24 February 1801, who expressed concern that Prussia desired a break with Britain.
16 Adam Friedrich Senfft von Pilsach, ambassador to Copenhagen from March 1796 to April 1804.
circumstances required. That Prussia had clearly stated on what side of the fence it stood was undoubtedly a relief to the Danish government, and apparently Bemstorff had not looked as happy in a long time. The Tsar also approved of the note, and the following day instructed his ambassador in Berlin to ask the Prussian King to occupy the Electorate of Hanover. The King of Sweden also marked his pleasure on learning that Prussia had opted for a strong line. The British, however, avoided all official reaction to the note, which was made public in London towards the end of February. Neither Grenville nor Hawkesbury (named in place of Grenville as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs on 14 March 1801), ever brought the matter up with Jacobi. In Hamburg, on the other hand, the note excited a 'very general alarm' where it was feared that not only the city itself, but the Electorate of Hanover was in danger. Second and on another level, it was a warning to Britain that Prussia was serious about its threats to close the Elbe and Weser and was a way of preparing European public opinion that in case of a hostile answer by the British cabinet, Hanover would be immediately occupied. Of course, the occupation of Hanover was not explicitly stipulated by the maritime convention, but as already mentioned, article VI of the treaty signed between Prussia and Russia on 18 December specified that if any power refused to satisfy the neutrals' demands concerning maritime neutrality, both signatories would carry out reprisals against the aggressor nation. As Prussia was not a maritime power, the only means by which it could effectively exercise pressure on Great Britain was by occupying its territorial possessions on the continent.

17 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 21 February 1801, and Bernstorff to Senfft von Pilsach, 21 February 1801; Gehejmregistratur, 20 February 1801, note from Bernstorff; RA, Ordner, Bernstorff to Knoblauch, 17 February 1801 expressing his satisfaction at the exchange of notes between Haugwitz and Carysfort, and transmitted to him by the Prussian envoy. Cf. RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 24 February 1801, in cipher, who wrote that in spite of the declaration, Friedrich Wilhelm seemed to maintain an aversion for his allies.

18 Feldbæk, Denmark, 124.

19 At the same time Haugwitz delivered Carysfort the note, a copy of it was sent to Petersburg with Krüdener's nephew. He returned on 13 March with Paul's reply (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 14 March 1801); GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 26 February 1801; HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Reden to the Geheimräte, 11 March 1801.

20 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Rostophchin to Lusi, 23 February 1801.

21 SRA, B 1 B: 176, Ehrenheim to Engeström, 28 February 1801. Cf. SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 3 March 1801: 'La note donnée le 13 [...] prouve la résolution ferme de Sa Majesté Prussienne d'agir avec vigueur en faveur de la convention maritime;' Engeström to the King, 14 March 1801.

22 PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 40, Vansittart to Grenville, 26 February 1801.
This was an implicit understanding between the northern powers, one which they were urging Prussia to take, and one which Friedrich Wilhelm felt himself obliged to respect.

A few days after Carysfort was handed the note, the Prussian King approached the French envoy and explained his decision: 'Notre démarche vous aura peut-être paru un peu lente; c'est que je ne voulais avoir aucun tort à me reprocher. Chaque état a ses principes et son système, mais puisque l'Angleterre a comblé la mesure, il a bien fallu se décider, et je crois l'avoir fait comme je le devois. Il est temps que cette comédie finisse. Les Anglais ont mis leur perfidie à découvert et le moment est arrivé de les reduire à la raison.\textsuperscript{23}

This partly explains why Prussia's intervention took as long as it did in coming. The King was playing an active, albeit cautious role, on the European scene for the very first time. He was certainly aware that the eyes of Europe's political elites were fixed upon him and as such undoubtedly did not want to do anything for which he would later be reproached. He took his time in deciding that the measures to be adopted were in accord with his own neutral principles, and once he had convinced himself that the British were a 'perfidious nation', and that their incursions on the high seas were detrimental to the interests of his own subjects, he decided to act. The declaration of 13 February set the scene. The King had decided to react upon British violations and to fulfil his treaty obligations if he did not receive a satisfactory answer from the British government. But even at this stage of the game, nothing definitive had as yet been decided upon. The note was an expression of interests, so to say, and not a declaration of war. Everything depended on how London, and for that matter the other northern powers, were going to react.\textsuperscript{24}

2. Diplomatic Manoeuvres

How much pressure was actually put on Prussia to act? The commonly accepted historical interpretation is that, by closing the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, and by invading the Electorate of Hanover, Prussia was following a political course laid down by France and Russia.\textsuperscript{25} Another interpretation, far less prevalent but one

\textsuperscript{23} AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 17 February 1801 (28 pluviôse IX).
\textsuperscript{24} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 13 March 1801: '[...] diese Verhältnisse [between Prussia and Britain] hiesiger Seits noch keine definitive Wendung genommen haben, sondern darüber, bei der noch nicht erfolgten Antwort des englischen Hofes auf die dieselitige letzte Ministerial Note, die seitherige Unentschiedenheit fortwaltet.'
\textsuperscript{25} HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 March 1801, in cipher. Cf. Ranke, op. cit., II, 14, footnote, that Prussia occupied Hanover at the instigation (auf Anstiften) of Paul I; Ford, op. cit.,
which was believed by some contemporaries, was that Prussia only gave the appearance of being forced to invade Hanover to fulfil its goal - territorial expansion.\footnote{HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 March 1801, in cipher; and 1001, Reden to the King, 29 November 1800, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, III: 'Man bemerkt hierbei sehr richtig, daß die bewaffnete Neutralität der Fußschemel zu den preußischen Vergrößerungs Absichten werde, [...]'. Also \textit{ibid.}, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 15 March 1801: 'Die wahre Ursache ist die, daß Graf Haugwitz, Minister Hardenberg und Consorten, auf die russische Unterstützung sich stützend und wohl wissend, daß die Franzosen, ihre Projecte auf den deutschen Norden, [illegible], weil sie diesen gegen England aufgebracht haben, ihren favorit Plan durchsetzen wollen.' Also Freiherr von Massenbach, \textit{Memoirien zur Geschichte des preuss. Staates unter den Regierung Frederick Wilhelm II., und Friedrick Wilhelm III}, 3 vols., (Amsterdam: Kunst- und industrie-comptoir, 1809), vol. 3, 156.} It is true that a lot of diplomatic pressure was exercised upon the Prussian government by France and the northern powers to undertake military measures. In part this was because, as we have seen, they simply were not at all sure how Prussia was going to act when the crunch came. But it is doubtful, without wanting to diminish the effect these diplomatic efforts might have had on the court of Berlin, that Prussia's decision to occupy the electorate was one of a simple submission to this pressure. A government's decision to act is never the result of a single factor, and for this reason it is necessary to look into other reasons that influenced Prussia's political leaders.

Of course Prussia could not contribute to the alliance in the same manner as the other northern powers. In the convention between Russia, Denmark and Sweden there was question of a common fleet. Each country was to supply a certain amount of ships of the line and frigates for the defence of the alliance. Prussia, however, was not only unable to help its allies at sea, but its merchant ships would have to depend upon the protection of its allies' warships. But it was obvious that the northern powers would not long be contented with Prussia's diplomatic manoeuvres and would claim a more active participation. The first suggestion made was that Prussia contribute sums of money to its allies. Panin asked Lusi in what manner Prussia intended contributing to the maintenance of the system and hinted that the payment of a sum of money would be acceptable.\footnote{GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Lusi to the court, 21 October 1800.} Rostopchin brought the subject up of Prussian involvement again much later without however specifying what he expected.\footnote{GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Lussi to the court, 6 December 1800, in cipher.} Lusi had not, in any case, received instructions on this matter and preferred to remain silent. In the same manner, Krüdener suggested in a talk with Haugwitz that it would be
considered appropriate if Prussia were to support its allies with a pecuniary contribution destined to build and maintain warships. Haugwitz's first reaction was surprise, then he refused such a participation. As things turned out, Prussia was to support its allies in a totally different direction.

a) Pressure from Paul I

Russian suggestions that Prussia contribute in some manner were, in fact, made at the insistence of the King of Sweden. There is some evidence to suggest that Paul I, while succeeding in obtaining the co-operation of the King of Prussia in the Armed Neutrality, did not have a clear idea about what way he could be useful. Before concluding the alliance, Rostopchin did not insist on any kind of participation at all at this stage, and was even content to let the whole matter drop, if Sweden and Denmark raised no objections. This attitude is understandable if we consider that Paul and his ministers never really believed that Britain would actually go to war over the question of neutrality, or of Malta. Also, it would appear that the alliance was so badly organised that no-one thought of using Prussia's military potential in the event of a crisis developing.

It was Haugwitz, and not the Russians, who initially suggested how Prussia could contribute to the alliance. Rather than furnish money, which the King's parsimonious spirit would not have objected to anyway, Haugwitz intimated that Prussia could dispose of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Lusi was instructed to tell Rostopchin, if ever he was to bring the subject up again, that Prussia would contribute to the alliance by putting her weight into the balance on the continent. The fact that Prussian troops had just taken Cuxhaven was meant to convince the international community that there would be no dallying around when the occasion arose. 'L'exemple de Cuxhaven', wrote Haugwitz, 'peut les convaincre que je ne

29 Brückner, op. cit., V, 513-514, Krüdener to Panin, 21 November 1800.
30 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Lusi to the court, 6 December, in cipher.
31 There is enough evidence to suggest this. Bartenev, op. cit., 30, 181, Rogerson to Vorontsov: 'Pour le célèbre traité du Nord je crois qu'il ne doutait pas que les Anglais le prendraient si fortement à cœur.' On the continent, the general opinion prevailed that Britain would not venture to proceed to hostilities (PRO, FO 22 Denmark, 41, Vansittart to Grenville, 26 February 1801, and Mitchell to Hawkesbury, 27 February 1801). Paul even seemed willing to compromise over Malta rather than go to war with Britain. Besides, both Paul and Rostopchin seemed confident that the Russian embargo would force Britain to give in on the Malta question. (Bartenvev, op. cit., 30, 181-182; Feldbaek, 'Anglo-Russian Rapprochement,' 207 and 209; and Denmark, 111 and 115).
32 Brückner, op. cit., V, 513, Krüdener to Panin, 21 November 1800.
resterai pas en arrière dans l'occasion, et elles doivent me savoir un gré infini de l'avoir donné dès à présent, puisque cet acte de vigueur a été regardé en Angleterre et ailleurs comme une prélude de la nouvelle neutralité armée.\textsuperscript{33} These utterances should not be taken too literally, however, and were probably designed to reassure the Russian court more than anything else. We now know that although the invasion of Cuxhaven and the Armed Neutrality were not related, Haugwitz used the circumstance to show just what Prussia was capable of, and the manner in which it could act. This practical demonstration, coupled with the suggestions that Lusi was instructed to make concerning the closing of Germany's northern rivers, must have caused some echo in Petersburg.

The suggestion was, to all intents and purposes, taken up by Paul around the end of January 1801. It was then that Rostopchin told Lusi the Tsar hoped Prussia would close the mouths of the Elbe and Weser if Britain ever took hostile measures against the Armed Neutrality.\textsuperscript{34} Krüdener was to give Haugwitz a letter from Rostopchin making the same suggestion.\textsuperscript{35} It was the first suggestion of the type made by the Russian Emperor and clearly indicates the manner in which he expected the Prussian court to act. Very quickly, however, Russian suggestions became more demanding and more pressing.

The Russian proposition was received in Berlin a couple of weeks later, and by that time the Prussian cabinet, as we shall shortly see, had already decided on what measures it could eventually take. Around the middle of February Rostopchin upped the ante, so to speak, by suggesting that Prussia send troops to occupy the town of Hamburg.\textsuperscript{36} The same suggestion was made a little more insistently around the middle of March, after the Russians had received information that the British had a lot of property stored there. The argument used to justify the proposed aggression was that such an action could determine the British to make peace earlier, or at the least it could serve as compensation in the event they had to wage war.\textsuperscript{37}

In the last week of February, the Tsar proposed, for the first time, the occupation of Hanover as a measure which would perhaps end the affair with Britain a little sooner. Count Rostopchin told Lusi he had received a hand-written note from the

\textsuperscript{33}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Haugwitz to Lusi, 22 December, in cipher.

\textsuperscript{34}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 30 January 1801: 'Le Comte de Rostopchin a reçu l'ordre de l'Empereur son maître, que Sa Majesté Impériale avait lieu d'espérer, qu'en cas de mesures hostiles du côté de l'Angleterre par rapport à la neutralité armée, elle voudra bien lui fermer les ports de l'Elbe et du Weser.'

\textsuperscript{35}SRA, Borussica, 151, copy of letter from Rosotpcchin to Haugwitz, 14 January 1801.

\textsuperscript{36}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 17 February 1801.

\textsuperscript{37}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Lusi to the court, 13 March 1801.
Emperor saying: 'Proposez en même temps par le Comte Lusi et Krüdener au roi de Prusse l'occupation de l'électorat de Hanovre comme un mesure qui pourra faire finir plutôt les vilénies du cabinet de Londres.' As early as February 1800, the Russian ambassador in London was instructed to threaten the British government with the invasion of the Electorate of Hanover if its demands on the question of maritime rights were not met. Shortly after, the matter of closing the mouths of the Elbe and Weser was brought up once again, this time in more emphatic terms. 'Le dessein du roi d'occuper d'abord Hambourg et Stade, et de fermer les embouchures de l'Elbe et du Weser, est d'une importance majeure, surtout si cette démarche se fait en même temps que le séquestrera sera mis sur les possessions de Sa Majesté Britannique en Allemagne, [...].'  

On 2 March 1801, Haugwitz received a joint note from the Russian and Swedish ambassadors in Berlin calling on Prussia to close the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, arguing that Prussia was obliged to do so out of duty towards the alliance, and complaining that it had taken so long to implement measures against Britain. In Berlin both Krüdener and Engeström separately informed Knoblauch of the measure they were about to take but did not invite the Danish ambassador to participate, knowing that he would need orders from his court to do so. The Saxon envoy reported that Engeström was the 'moteur principale' behind this note and that

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38 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Rostopchin to Lusi, 23 February 1801.
39 Bartenev, op. cit., 11, 392 for instructions.
40 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Rostopchin to Lusi, 26 February 1801. At the same time, the Emperor declared that he was impatient to hear overtures from the court of Berlin concerning an indemnity plan. Cf. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Haugwitz to King, 28 February, relating an interview with Krüdener in which he assured the Prussian foreign minister that Paul, 'était fermement décidé, et se ferait un plaisir particulier de prendre à coeur vos intérêts, [...] dans les négociations actuelles; qu'il favorisera de tout son pouvoir les prétentions de vos indemnités, et qu'il venait de munir encore pour cet effet le sieur Kolychev d'instructions réitérées et précises.' Lusi received similar assurances (GStA, Merseburg, 149 A, Rep. 11 Rußland, 26 February). Cf. Ulmann, op. cit., 251-252; Ford, op. cit., 212; Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 216-217; Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 485-486; Scott, op. cit. 582-583.
41 SRA, B 1 B: 176, Ehrenheim to Engeström, 20 February 1801; Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 3 March 1801. A copy of the combined Russo-Swedish note is in RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 3 March 1801. The note is also mentioned in Beunonville's dispatch to Talleyrand, AAE, Prusse 228, 7 March 1801 (16 ventôse IX); in Caryfort's dispatch to Hawkesbury, PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, 7 March 1801, in cipher; in HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimrätte, 7 March 1801, in cipher; and in StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to Gries, 7 March 1801.
Kriidener had been dragged along (entraîné). Since we know that Kriidener had received orders from his court concerning the note, we can only assume that he was reluctant to carry them out. As the measure was undertaken by Engeström with a view to get Prussia to close the Elbe immediately, and as Beumonville was also adding his little extra bit, it was becoming more and more difficult for Prussia to keep putting the measure off.

This is what Haugwitz tried to do. He answered that it was necessary to wait for Great Britain's answer to the note he had handed Carysfort on 13 February. When the same ambassadors renewed their request a week later, arguing that Britain's continued capture of neutral vessels was a virtual answer to the Prussian note, he replied that to assure the defense of the river entrances, he would have to concur with Copenhagen, and that he was expecting to receive Denmark's plans shortly. When Kriidener insisted on the occupation of the town of Hamburg, Haugwitz also replied that such a measure implied concerting with Copenhagen, 'Sa Majesté ne pouvant risquer de traverser les mesures d'une puissance voisine.'

More conferences followed. Around the middle of March, Kriidener took Haugwitz aside again and insisted on how important it was that Prussia take measures against Britain. Haugwitz replied he had just been informed that Copenhagen had finished organising the defence of the Elbe, that he was shortly expecting an official communication, and that Prussia would in any case move by the 23rd at the latest. On March 16, the French, Russian and Swedish ambassadors all had conferences with Haugwitz. On 26 March, Kriidener presented Paul's indemnity plan, which assigned Hanover to Prussia instead of the Franconian bishoprics that Prussia had

42 StAD, report from Helbig, 8 March 1801, in cipher.
43 SRA, B 1 B: 176, Ehrenheim to Engeström, 20 February 1801.
44 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 3 March 1801, in cipher.
45 AAE, Prusse 228, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 14 March 1801 (23 ventôse IX); RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 March 1801, in cipher. Beuronville also asked for the closure of the Elbe and Weser in conjunction with the Russian and Swedish ministers.
46 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 14 March 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 March 1801.
47 AAE, Prusse 228, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 14 March 1801 (23 ventôse IX); PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 14 March 1801; RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 March 1801, in cipher.
48 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 17 March 1801, in cipher. The details of the conference are unknown, but one can safely assume that it concerned the most pressing matter to hand.
desired. Two days later he was to accord Lübeck to Sweden, and the Duke-Bishop of Lübeck was to receive Bremen. Finally, on 23 March Paul sent off two rescripts, signed in his own hand. One was to his ambassador in Berlin instructing him to insist that Prussia decide within twenty-four hours to occupy Hanover and to leave Berlin if he received a negative reply. The other was to Kolychev in Paris, charging him to invite the First Consul to enter Hanover, in view of the court of Berlin's indecision. For the moment, these important points will be left and examined in detail further on.

b) Pressure from Bonaparte

France was also putting pressure on Prussia to take possession of Hanover, but for different reasons, and had been doing so for a longer period of time. The idea of treating Hanover as an British possession, thereby making it open to retaliation from Britain's enemies, was certainly not new in 1801. As early as 1794-1795, the French, in their attempts to separate Prussia from the coalition, came up with the idea of a Prussian invasion of Hanover as compensation for the loss of the left bank. Although the French persistently urged the idea on the Prussian cabinet throughout the years up to 1801, and although some high-ranking Prussians also thought the sequestration of Hanover advisable, neither of the Friedrich Wilhelms ever entertained the thought of appropriating the electorate as a form of indemnity. In the present context, the idea of an occupation of Hanover in retaliation against Britain seems to have first been mentioned in September 1800 in Paris when Bonaparte stormed and steamed against the Prussian envoy, and in Berlin later that month when the French ambassador announced 'in a peremptory and threatening tone'

49 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 27 March 1801; HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69, Reden to the King, 31 March and 7 April 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 29 March 1801.

50 Copies of the note are to be found in Trachevski, op. cit., 672. Haugwitz writes that the note was dated 22 March (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 20 April, in cipher).

51 The Duke of Brunswick was one of these. Cf. Dropmore Papers, III, 407, Elgin to Grenville, 27 December 1797.

52 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, I, 390, from Sandoz-Rollin, 4 September 1800. On hearing that the British had laid siege to Copenhagen (the news was greatly exaggerated), the First Consul supposedly lost all reserve and declared: 'Pourquoi le roi de Prusse ne réprimerait-il pas [Britain] des violations si manifestes du droit des nations par l'occupation de l'électorat de Hanovre? On ne peut atteindre et contenir cette puissance que de cette manière. C'est en Hanovre seul qu'il faut chercher à l'humilier et à la punir.'
Bonaparte’s determination to march into the electorate to support Denmark against Britain if Prussia did not take possession of it for that purpose.  

A month later, the French again suggested that if Britain did not respect Prussian shipping, there was no reason why Prussia should object to it occupying Hanover. As the conflict between Great Britain and the northern powers intensified, Bonaparte became more insistent that the Prussian King should either close the Elbe to the British or let the French occupy Hanover and use it as a kind of hostage to guarantee the neutral powers’ liberty of commerce. It was obvious that Napoleon was looking to embroil Prussia with Britain. Bonaparte went even further when he suggested in a letter to the Tsar that Sprengporten and his Russian troops, together with a French division, should occupy Hanover until a general peace. By March Bonaparte was getting impatient. As far as he was concerned, as soon as the Diet in Ratisbon had ratified the Peace of Lunéville, the neutrality of north Germany would cease to exist. But because war with Britain was still being waged, it would be up to either the Prussian King or Bonaparte to occupy the electorate. Bonaparte expressed his impatience to both Kolychev and Lucchesini, complaining that Prussia had not budged despite assurances that it would, and declaring that if they did not decide rapidly, nothing would prevent him from taking the electorate himself. In Berlin, rumour had it that Augereau had been summoned to Paris to receive instructions to occupy Hanover and that the French envoy had threatened that if Prussia did not

53 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 27 September 1800, in cipher. The Hanoverian envoy in Berlin knew of these remarks and saw both Haugwitz and Krüdener about them. Haugwitz replied that the King would defend the Line of Demarcation (Brückner, op. cit., V, 502, Krüdener to Panin, 4 November 1800).

54 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 9-10, Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 21 October 1800. These instructions were passed on to the French envoy in Berlin, Beurnonville, on 28 October.


56 Cf. Correspondance de Napoléon, op. cit., vol. 6, (5311), Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 20 January 1801 (30 nivôse IX) in which he expressed his hope that Russia would push Prussia into a conflict.

57 Correspondance de Napoléon, op. cit., vol. 7, (5417), Bonaparte to Paul I, 27 February 1801 (8 ventôse IX).

58 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 31, Lucchesini to the court, 10 March 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich 89, fasc. 373, Lucchesini to the court, 13 March 1801, in cipher.


60 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Grenville, 7 March 1801, in cipher; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 7 March 1801, in cipher.
occupy Hanover, then Augereau's army would. Bonaparte obviously could not understand why Prussia was taking so long to react and as a result suspected that there was some sort of collusion between Berlin and London. When news arrived in Paris that Prussia had not been included in the British embargo measures, these doubts were accentuated and prompted him to tell Lucchesini that if Prussia did not occupy Hanover it would most certainly harm the negotiations over indemnities. The fact that Prussia was not included in the British embargo measures did not help. The Danish envoy in Paris was, for reasons that are unclear, played the devil's advocate and seems to have contributed to fomenting suspicion in Bonaparte's mind.

Now Haugwitz obviously played upon and exaggerated the French threat to justify his decision to invade Hanover. He stated to Captain Decken on 15 March, for example, that he had received a dispatch from Lucchesini reporting Bonaparte's threat to send Augereau into Hanover if Prussia did not occupy it. But while De Luc may have taken Haugwitz's concern about a French invasion at face value, Carysfort and Reden were a little more difficult to convince. The British envoy thought the 'Augereau Army' to be a political artifice, and while he did not doubt that the French had put pressure on Berlin to invade Hanover, he thought the Russians to be more responsible for the decision.

61 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 17 March 1801; RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 17 March 1801, in cipher.
62 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Lucchesini to the court, 22, 25, 30 January 1801, in cipher, and 13 March 1801, in cipher; Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 6 February 1801.
63 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich 89, fasc. 373, Lucchesini to the court, 13 March 1801, in cipher.
64 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Lucchesini to the court, 17 March, and fasc. 374, 2 April 1801; Marmottan, op. cit., 72-73, Lucchesini to the court, 25 January 1801.
65 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1004, Decken to the Hanover ministry, 15 March 1801: 'Er (Haugwitz) hat so eben die Nachricht von Lucchesini aus Paris erhalten, daß die Herrn von Augereau die Bestimmung habe, sogleich das Hannover zu besetzen, wenn die Preußen dies nicht tun würden. Der König von Preußen sehe sich daher genötigt sofort seine Truppen ins Hannover zu lassen.'
66 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 15 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92. XL1, 67: 'Der große Wert aber den der Graf Haugwitz auf die französische Anforderung gegen den Herrn De Luc gelegt, möchte wohl bei genauerer Beleuchtung sehr verschwinden. Offenbar hat Graf Haugwitz weder an Lord Carysfort noch an mich diese Äußerungen gelangen lassen, weil er wohl wußte, daß wir seine Absichten sehr leicht penetrieren würden.'
67 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1004, Decken to the Hanover ministry, 15 March 1801: 'Lord Carysfort ist zwar sehr versichert, daß die Franzosen den König von Preußen sehr zusetzen das Hanover zu besetzen; er glaubt aber daß der Schritt von ... [illegible] De Luc die Nachricht gebracht hat mehr durch die
So, throughout February and March, Haugwitz was under relatively strong pressure from Carysfort to maintain a passive role, while the French, Russian and Danish ambassadors were doing their utmost to get Prussia to act against Britain. It is difficult to determine to what extent these diplomatic manoeuvres influenced the Prussian decision to order troops into Hanover. In all likelihood, it was only one among many factors that decided Prussia to invade Hanover. More worrying to Haugwitz than the insistence of foreign ambassadors was the Franco-Russian rapprochement which was being carried out and the resulting consequences it could have on European and especially German affairs.

3. The decision to invade north Germany

After daggers were drawn between Britain and the northern powers, the invasion of Hanover was considered inevitable. This, at least, was the general opinion after the handing over of the Prussian note dated 12 February. Even the Regency of Hanover admitted the likelihood of such an eventuality, if not by Prussia, then by France, or even Russia. One of the members of the Hanoverian chancellery in London, Mr. Best, approached Jacobi to sound him on the probable direction events would take on the continent if the north German ports were closed to Britain: 'Il y a mille probabilités, a-t-il [Best] dit, qu'un parti si contraire aux intérêts de la Prusse ne sera jamais adopté, mais je sens a-t-il ajouté que la fougue de l'Empereur Paul pourrait aller jusqu'au point que la Prusse permit le passage des troupes Russes pour aller occuper l'électorat.' Although it shows little understanding of Prussia's position, it clearly demonstrates Hanoverian fears. The most important thing at this point and which will help decide whether Prussia led an independent foreign policy or whether the invasion of north Germany was an act of submission is the date the Prussian cabinet actually decided to send its troops into north Germany.

a) Prussia temporises

As far as can be determined, the decision to act against the Hanseatic towns, and eventually Hanover, was taken at the beginning of February shortly after Lord

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68 Hann. 92, XLI, 67, the Geheimräte to Reden, 24 March 1801, in cipher; and copy of a letter from Prince Adolphus, not dated, but certainly end of March.
Carysfort handed over a note informing the Prussian cabinet that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Russia.\(^{70}\) The decision was relayed to Lucchesini in Paris.

\[\text{On va répondre incessament au ministre d'Angleterre, en déclarant l'accession formelle du roi à la dite convention maritime et en demandant que la cour britannique fasse cesser sans délai toutes ses mesures hostiles contre les puissances du nord en haine de cette association, faute de quoi Sa Majesté ne pourrait se dispenser de prendre les siennes en conséquence, pour l'accomplissement des obligations contractées envers elles. Les suites de cette réponse sont à prévoir. Mais le roi, sans l'attendre, est décidé à aller en avant, du moment où l'Angleterre, comme il n'y aucune doute, réalise ses mesures contre les cours du nord. Nous nous mettrons en possession des embouchures de l'Elbe et du Weser, et même du pays de Hanovre, et dès ce moment on prépare tout en silence pour cet effet. Il faut pour le présent encore en garder le plus grand secret et c'est de quoi je dois vous prier aussi, parce qu'il s'agit de prévenir auparavant en toute diligence le baron de Jacobi, afin qu'il ait le temps d'avertir nos vaisseaux qui se trouvent en Angleterre de partir sans délai.}\(^{71}\)

Carysfort was going to receive a reply to his note asking the British to cease all hostile measures, failing which the Prussian King would be required to fulfil the obligations contracted by him.\(^{72}\) Also worth noting is that Haugwitz wrote to Schultz in Hamburg, asking him, with the greatest secrecy possible, to report on the quality and position of British property in Hamburg, Cuxhaven, Bremen and Lübeck.\(^{73}\) It would be safe to assume that the request was not made out of idle curiosity. The first rumours of troop movements started to circulate in Berlin towards the end of February.\(^{74}\) The son of George III, Adolphus Prince of Cambridge, when he stopped off in Brunswick on his way to Berlin on a mission to avert an invasion, was informed by the Duke that he had received notification from both Haugwitz and and the king's aide-de-camp, Colonel Zastrow concerning the occupation of Hanover.\(^{75}\) Judging by this conversation, the court of Berlin must have already thought things through since it

\(^{70}\)PRO, Prussia 64, 60, Carysfort to Haugwitz, 1 February 1801.
\(^{71}\)GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 3 February 1801, in cipher.
\(^{72}\)This of course refers to the note dated 13 February.
\(^{73}\)GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 30 January 1801.
\(^{74}\)HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 21 February, in cipher, 24 February, in cipher, and 28 February 1801, in cipher.
\(^{75}\)HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Prince Adolphus to the Geheimrätte, 25 February 1801.
planned to billet troops along the Elbe, to leave the civil government intact, and to send a Prussian governor to Hanover. By the beginning of March, the diplomatic community in Berlin was talking of an invasion of Hanover as an inevitability. By the middle of March, it was generally believed that all the orders necessary to carry out the occupation had been given, and that they would be carried out within a fortnight.

But if the decision to act had been reached by the beginning of March, if not earlier, why did the Prussian government take so long in putting these orders into effect? It seems almost as though Haugwitz was paving the way for an invasion and preparing the British and Hanoverian courts for the event by telling them weeks in advance of what Prussia intended doing. But this is an assumption for which there is no proof. The key word at the time was temporise, and this is what Haugwitz, for several reasons, set out to do.

1. Haugwitz was playing for time. He did so in the hope that he would thereby gain two things. First, it was believed that an invasion of Hanover would bring about a hostile British reaction in the form of an embargo on Prussian shipping, and Haugwitz needed time to warn Prussian captains in British harbours to be on their guard and to take the necessary precautions. He wrote to Jacobi in London that as he did not know how the British government was going to react to the Prussian declaration of 13 February, it was necessary to take precautions to save Prussian vessels. In Paris Lucchesini was informed of what was happening but was instructed to keep matters a secret so that Jacobi could have enough time to warn the Prussian merchant ships in British harbours to get away. It was nevertheless suggested to Lucchesini that he inform Bonaparte and Talleyrand of the King's decision to fulfil scrupulously the engagements contracted by the Armed Neutrality, asking them to keep it quiet, not out of concern for Prussian shipping, which was not likely to worry them too much, but for fear of being thwarted by the British before they had time to carry things out. This is also why Haugwitz delayed handing over the Prussian declaration of 13 February.

_J'observe_, wrote Haugwitz, _que la nécessité de laisser aux vaisseaux prussiens qui se trouvent dans les ports anglais le temps de les quitter, a fait différer de quelques jours, tant la remise de la réponse au lord Carysfort, que l'expédition_

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76 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 3 March 1801, in cipher: 'Le comte de Schullenbourg, et plusieurs personnes des plus marquantes, avec lesquelles je m'entretiais à la cour, me parlent de l'occupation de Hanovre comme d'une mesure absolument arrêtée.'

77 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 20 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69; Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Prince Adolphus to the Geheimrätte, 21 March 1801.

des ordres relatifs aux mesures pour l'occupation des ports de l'Elbe et du Weser. Par cette même raison, il faudra aussi de notre côté, garder encore pendant une huitaine de jours, le secret sur les mesures.\(^79\)

Second, Haugwitz was reluctant to undertake any aggressive measures against Britain and certainly did not want to be the first of the neutral allied powers to do so\(^80\) (as his allies were urging him). He was waiting to see how things would develop in the hope that an open conflict could after all be avoided and that an Anglo-Russian rapprochement would come about.\(^81\) As long as hostilities had not commenced, there was always the possibility that something might turn up. If the Prussian government was the first to act against Britain, it ran the risk of incurring the reproach of acting too hastily, and of putting itself in an embarrassing diplomatic position.

**Tout est donc prêt de mon côté, et déjà mes troupes s'ébranlent et, si l'effet n'a pas encore suivi mes déclarations c'est qu'il m'a paru que, pour ne pas s'exposer à la récrimination du reproche d'une démarche précipitée, analogue à celle dont la cour de Londres s'est rendue coupable, il convenait de lui laisser le temps strictement nécessaire pour prendre en considération la note du 13 février, et se déterminer en conséquence.**\(^82\)

The international situation was too uncertain, and if a conflict could be avoided then all the better. This does not mean, however, that Haugwitz was about to leave his allies in the lurch. He wanted rather to remain master of both the measures he was going to undertake and of the timing involved.\(^83\) Also, there had recently been a change in government in Britain, and the court of Berlin was waiting to see how the new government would react to the crisis (although Friedrich Wilhelm did not really expect any great change to come about).\(^84\)

2. If Haugwitz was reluctant to undertake any hostile measures, the King was even more so. It was reported that the King's entourage hardly dare speak to him

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\(^79\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 6 February 1801.

\(^80\) This was also Zastrow's view (StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 12 March 1801, in cipher).

\(^81\) AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 10 March 1801 (19 ventôse IX): 'Ces lenteur du gouvernement prussien pourrait donner à croire, citoyen Ministre, qu'on ne serait pas fâché ici de voir survoir des incidents qui donnassent jour à des pourparlers et qui dispensent ce cabinet d'en venir à des voies de fait auxquelles il ne se porte qu'avec peine.'

\(^82\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, instructions to Le Coq, 13 March 1801.

\(^83\) RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 February 1801, in cipher.

\(^84\) AAE, Prusse 228, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 3 March 1801 (12 ventôse IX); RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 3 March 1801, in cipher.
about the matter and that the signing of the order to occupy Hanover brought tears to
the King's eyes. Beurnonville was of the opinion that hostile measures were
adopted with extreme repugnance but that it was done in order to please France and
Russia. As we saw, Friedrich had resisted the idea of a Northern League, which
implied some sort of military intervention. Convincing him that the invasion of
Hanover was a military necessity must have been no easy task. Even before the
conflict broke out, Friedrich Wilhelm supposedly reprimanded Haugwitz for putting
him in a position that could compromise his neutrality. If measures had to be taken
against Hanover, they would be done unwillingly. The King passed a personal
message on to Carysfort to show the reluctance with which he, 'under the terrors of
France and Russia,' engaged in measures he abhorred, and his determination not to go
a step further than he had to. To all closely concerned with the affair, it was obvious
that there was a difference of opinion between the King and Haugwitz over the
occupation of Hanover.

3. The Prussian court was waiting for the British to answer its 12 February
declaration and did not intend on putting into operation any military measures
beforehand.

4. Haugwitz feared the uncertainty of things in Russia, and the hastiness and
petulance which were characteristic of the Tsar.
5. Haugwitz was hoping that the northern powers would call for Prussia's mediation in a rapprochement with Britain.94

6. Before taking the Elbe and Weser, however, it was necessary to be sure of Denmark's stance. Both countries knew that a successful closure of these rivers could only be accomplished through a joint effort. Haugwitz continually refused to close the Elbe and Weser without having come to a prior agreement with Denmark.95 Hamburg, which supposedly contained large stocks of British goods, was to be included in this move.

Whatever the reasons for Prussia not taking immediate steps against Britain, Haugwitz hardly waited to learn what the French or Russians thought before coming to a decision. On the other hand, knowledge of their views strengthened his conviction of the necessity to act.96

b) Marching orders

The organisation and strengthening of the Duke of Brunswick's army with a view to closing the entrances of the Elbe and Weser started around the end of February, and although the troops were taken from the Demarcation Army, it was initially renamed the Army of the Duke of Brunswick.97 Everything was carried out as discreetly as possible, and no public declarations were made. On 17 March, Engeström gave Haugwitz a copy of a letter from Britain's new foreign minister, Lord Hawkesbury, in reply to Sweden's formal adhesion to the alliance. After having read it, Haugwitz considered military steps necessary, and consequently the next day orders went out to regiments of the Demarcation Army, the regiment of the Magdeburgische Inspection, and the regiment of Prince von Braunschweig in Prenzlow to move off as quickly as possible in view to closing the Elbe and Weser. On the morning of 20th Haugwitz was in continual conference with Zastrow, as a result of which a second lot of orders went out that evening to regiments in Silesia and Pomerania.98 The Duke of Brunswick was ordered to concentrate immediately the troops of the Observation Army and proceed to the mouths of the rivers Weser, Elbe and Ems.99

94 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 February 1801, in cipher.
95 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 and 17 March 1801, in cipher.
96 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 16 March 1801, in cipher.
97 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 24 February 1801.
98 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 20 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69; SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 21 March 1801.
99 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 21 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69.
reported to Struensee the next day that: 'Die Besetzung der Mündungen der Elbe und Weser und zugleich also auch des Gebiets der Reichsständen Hamburg und Bremen wird nunmehr ohne weiteren Aufschub bewerkstelligt. Die letzteren Befehle dazu sind gestern abgefordert worden, und die Truppen rücken vorwärts.' He was informed of the King's desire to have as much consideration for trade as possible and gave his approval of a memoir on the subject that Struensee handed over a few days earlier.

As yet, no mention of Hanover was made. When Prince Adolphus heard the first rumours of marching orders, he went to the King to ask for an explanation. He was at first assured that nothing had been arranged and that the rumours had been spread to reassure the French and Russians. This, however, was belied when the King admitted that orders had been given to Brunswick to assemble his troops around Petershagen as quickly as possible. 'Obwohl der König es bestimmt nicht sagt', wrote Prince Adolphus, 'so bin ich doch überzeugt, daß dieses Corps bestimmt ist, das Hannover auf den ersten Wink zu besetzen.' Haugwitz was telling some diplomats that the King was obliged to send his troops into Hanover immediately, while to others he is reported to have said (on Tuesday 16 March) 'in zehn Tagen würde wahrscheinlich der coup ausgeführt sein.' A few days later the King told Prince Adolphus, that because of the French threat to Hanover: 'Er sehe sich daher in die Notwendigkeit gesetzt, gegen Ende der künftigen Woche hierüber etwas zu verfügen.'

On the evening of 25 March, Carysfort was summoned by Haugwitz and drily informed that, as no answer had been returned to his note, and as Britain had continued hostilities against Denmark and Sweden, the King was forced to support his allies by ordering the occupation of the sea coasts and the ports commanding the Elbe and Weser. The order was already supposed to have been given and the troops on their way.

100 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Struensee, 21 March 1801.
101 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, note from Struensee, 18 March 1801, in which he suggests a few points on how to spare Hamburg.
102 Petershagen is in the province of Minden, not far from the border with Hanover.
103 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Adolphus to the Geheimräte, 3 March 1801.
104 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1004, Decken to the Hanoverian ministry, 15 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 67.
105 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 20 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69.
106 PRO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 26 and 27 March 1801; cf. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, King to Jacobi, 23 March 1801, incipher; Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Haugwitz to Lusi, 23 March 1801. Krüdener was informed of the King's resolve, but no mention of Hanover was made at this stage. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Haugwitz to Krüdener,
The Duke of Brunswick arrived in Potsdam the very next day to concert with the King about the measures to be taken. As commander of the Demarcation Army, he at first accepted, with reticence, to take command of the forces destined to occupy Hanover. When he realised, however, or so rumour had it, that the Prussian government did not intend on restoring Hanover to Britain, he turned down the command. The decision to refuse Friedrich Wilhelm’s offer is understandable considering that George III was also head of the house of Brunswick. The king was loath to allow Brunswick to command of the army for the same reason. Prince Henry confided to Beurnonville that Brunswick ‘aurait bien pu accepter, si le Roi en lui faisant hommage de ce commandement, n’avait intéressé sa délicatesse à défendre de s’en charger. On lui a offert d’une main, dit le Prince, et on a repris de l’autre.’ But Brunswick was never in any case keen on the whole idea.

All of this is relatively straightforward, but the orders to invade Hanover, on the other hand, pose somewhat of a problem, since the date cannot be determined with an absolute degree of assurance. The only thing that can be affirmed with certainty is that the order went out on or before 30 March. This assertion is based on the following extract of a letter from Haugwitz: ‘Je continue à presser l’exécution des mesures qui doivent s’en suivre de mon côté, et je passe maintenant sans délai à l’occupation des états électoraux de Sa Majesté Britannique.’ Schulenburg was

23 March 1801 (copy in Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1); Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 23 March 1801; Krauel, ‘Die Beteiligung Preußens,’ 221-226.


108 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 28 March 1801 (7 germinal IX).

109 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69, report from Decken, 26 March 1801; StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 31 March 1801, in cipher, with the remark: ‘Il me paraît que cette hypothèse n’est pas entièrement destituée de vraisemblance.’

110 StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 12 March 1801, in cipher.

111 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 4 April 1801 (14 germinal IX).

112 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Prince Adolphus to the Geheimräte, 25 February 1801.

113 There is some disagreement as to when actual marching orders were given. Jany, op. cit., III, 385, writes that the order to invade Hanover went out on 23 March; Ford, op. cit., 233, thinks that orders were issued before the Council of War held in Potsdam on 23 March, and quotes a letter from Haugwitz to Lusi (GStA, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A), but no mention of Hanover is made in this letter. Also Ulmann, op. cit., 256, while Krauel, ‘Die Beteiligung Preußens,’ 223, writes 26 March.

informed on 30 March of the King's decision to occupy Hanover,\textsuperscript{115} and Reden was informed by Haugwitz the next day that the King had decided to occupy Hanover.\textsuperscript{116} Two events in particular need to be examined and clarified.

First, a so-called territorial 'ultimatum' was drawn up in Petersburg on 13 March by Paul outlining the compensations Prussia was to receive in Germany, and according to which Prussia was to receive the Electorate of Hanover, and Denmark was to have Hamburg.\textsuperscript{117} It was received on 26 March by Krüdener,\textsuperscript{118} who that same afternoon went to inform Haugwitz of the Tsar's letter, as a result of which, it is argued, Prussia was forced to provoke a conflict with Britain.\textsuperscript{119} The 'ultimatum' was made up of seven articles, the fourth article stating that Prussia should receive Hanover. But at the very most, however, all this 'ultimatum' seems to have accomplished was to speed up things. Speaking of the Tsar's letter, the envoy from Hanover suggested this and later spoke of the Tsar's plans for the division of Germany as perhaps influencing Prussia to take measures against Hanover: 'Aus einer sehr zuverlässigen Quelle weiss ich aber nunmehr fast gewiß, daß der verstorbene russische Kaiser, [...] einen Teilungsplan von Deutschland arrangiert hatte, der vielleicht von Preußen unter der Hand angegeben, diese Macht zu den letzten starken

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\item[115] GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Haugwitz to Schulenburg, 31 March 1801. Ulmann, \textit{op. cit.}, 258 writes the ultimatum was dated 11 March; For a copy of the 'ultimatum' see Feldbaek, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul}, 33-34.
\item[116] HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1007, Reden to the King, 31 March 1801.
\item[117] GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Petersburg, I, 69, not dated. Trachevski, \textit{op. cit.}, 70, 672, contains a copy of the letter from the vice-chancellor to Kolychev, dated 13 March. Cf. Ford, \textit{op. cit.}, 231-235; Feldbaek, \textit{Denmark}, 116. The Danish representative in Petersburg passed on a copy (in Feldbaek, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul}, 33-34). In this extract we see that Paul already planned to allow Denmark to take Hamburg. Reden mentioned a rumour whereby Russia was to take a considerable portion of Prussian Poland, for which the whole of north Germany was to devolve upon Prussia (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 21 February 1801, in cipher).
\item[118] And not the 25th has has been incorrectly argued in Ulmann, \textit{op. cit.}, 258-259; Ford, \textit{op. cit.}, 231; and Feldbaek, \textit{Denmark}, 126. This mistake is undoubtedly based on a letter in Bailleu, \textit{Preußen und Frankreich}, II, 42, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 24 May 1801, in which he states that Krüdener handed over a note on 25 March (4 Prairial IX), but as this was reported months after the event, there was probably an error in dates. Cf. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 27 March 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 28 March 1801, who quote 26 March.
\item[119] Feldbaek, \textit{Denmark}, 126-127.
\item[120] HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 31 March 1801, in cipher: ' [...] welches denn auch die nunmehr eintretende mesures sehr beschleunigt haben soll.'
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Schritten gegen Hannover angetrieben hat.¹²¹ There is no documentary evidence, however, that proves this 'ultimatum' played a decisive role in the Prussian decision to occupy Hanover, and there is certainly nothing to indicate that Friedrich Wilhelm accepted Paul's indemnity plan as final. On the contrary, the King expressed on numerous occasions his desire not to keep Hanover as an indemnity, and Haugwitz's reply to the 'ultimatum' a few days later, while not categorically refusing the electorate, adds one small but important modification - the Tsar was to publicly declare that if Britain did not accede to the principles of the maritime association, nor return Malta, Russia would invite Prussia, under its guarantee, to keep Hanover. Haugwitz was obviously keeping his options open, and the fact that Colonel Le Coq was sent on a special mission to Petersbourg to discuss a Prussian indemnity plan leads one to believe that the court of Berlin was far from finding the 'ultimatum' acceptable.

Second, mention is often made of Krüdener demanding on behalf of his master that Prussia occupy Hanover and that a reply to this demand be given within 24 hours. He was also to threaten Prussia with an army of 80,000 Russians, which was already supposedly on the march.¹²² At the same time, Kolychev in Paris was ordered to ask the First Consul, in view of Prussia's hesitancy, to occupy Hanover. In case of refusal, Krüdener was to leave Berlin. But the order was issued by Paul on 23 March, the day before he was assassinated.¹²³ If this is so, it could not possibly have reached Berlin before 30 March, as a courier normally took about 12 days to reach Berlin from Petersburg at that time of the year. And so too this second 'ultimatum', which probably arrived in Berlin about 4 April, could not have played any role whatsoever in Prussia's decision to invade Hanover. The best evidence Ford found of military movements against Prussia is in a memoir by Lützow in which he states that a strong army was already on the march to force Prussia to occupy Hanover.¹²⁴ But, as

¹²¹ HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69, Reden to the King, 7 April 1801.
¹²² Cf. Ford, op. cit., 232; Ulmann, op. cit., 258-259; Ragsdale, 'Continental System,' 81; Feldbaek, 'Foreign Policy of Paul,' 34.
¹²³ Trachevski, op. cit., 70, note from Kurakin, 23 March 1801, 672. Feldbaek, 'Foreign Policy of Paul,' 34; Ragsdale, op. cit., 80-81; Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 222-223. Rostopchin later wrote that these demands were to be followed by a declaration of war (Bartenev, op. cit., 8, 288). This seems to be confirmed by the order issued by the Senate of Petersburg on 14 March 1801 lifting the export ban, and in which it is stated that declarations of war against France and Prussia had been drawn up by Paul, but that they were not going to be sent (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61).
¹²⁴ Ford, op. cit., 232. Copy in HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, pro memoria from Lützow, dated June 1801; and Han. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 2. Cf. Trachevski, op. cit., 70, 672. But this order does not mention the Russian army. Mention of the Russian threat may also be found in Massenbach, op. cit., III, 156; E. von Lenthe, op. cit., 156.
Alexander told Lützow, orders recalling the army were issued two hours after Paul's death. There is no reason to doubt the veracity of Lützow's report, but as no other mention of a Russian army on the march has been found in any other document, one can only conclude that this fact was unknown in Berlin, and that it therefore could not have influenced in any way the Prussian decision to invade Hanover.

To contemporaries the dispatches from Petersburg were the immediate cause of the resolutions taken at Potsdam to occupy Hanover. But, as the documentary evidence demonstrates, the decision to take military measures concerning the closure of the Elbe and Weser was taken well before the arrival of Paul's 'ultimatum', and that measures had been considered against Hanover throughout the month of March, so that once again, at the very most, it could have only precipitated matters, and shaken the cabinet into moving a little faster than it intended in occupying Hanover. But if the traditional arguments used to explain Prussia's invasion of Hanover do not satisfactorily explain Prussian motives, and at best only partly explain the decision, other reasons played a more decisive role.

c) Why Prussia took military measures

Haugwitz was perfectly aware of French designs on Britain's continental possessions, and as control of Hanover by any other power was totally unacceptable to Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm must have been persuaded by Haugwitz of the necessity of averting this calamity by making the first move. He admits as much in a letter to the Duke of Brunswick: 'La rupture survenue entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, le ressentiment personnel de l'Empereur contre celle-ci et le rapprochement progressif qui en résulte entre ce monarque et le gouvernement français, [...] me paraît démontré qu'à moins de prendre les devants, le roi verra dans peu les armées françaises occuper les ports de l'Elbe et du Weser et le Hanovre.'

This document has been used on a previous occasion to demonstrate Prussia's 'fear' of Russia and France and, by extension, of the 'weakness' of its policy.

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125 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 8 April 1801.
126 Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 25, 8 February 1801. I was unable to find a copy of this letter in Merseburg, but as Bailleu is a reliable source, its (former) existence cannot be doubted.
127 Ford, op. cit., 208, while acknowledging the measure to be the result of political necessity, writes: 'The Prussian state has seldom, if ever, made a clearer confession of weakness than Haugwitz's letter to the Duke of Brunswick [...].'
Many contemporaries also thought that it was fear that motivated the court,\footnote{128} and it is true that the language held in Berlin itself was as if the court was at the mercy of France and Russia.\footnote{129} It would be preferable, however, to present the matter from another point of view by arguing that, under the political circumstances, Prussia took the only course it could. There are two major considerations:

1. First, by invading north Germany, Prussia was killing two birds with one stone. a) As a member of the Armed Neutrality, the closing of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, and the occupation of the Electorate of Hanover was expected of Prussia. b) By doing so, Prussia was placating not only the Russian Tsar, but also the French government, thereby paving the way towards a favourable acceptance of its indemnity plans. Shortly before Prussia marched into Hanover, Haugwitz wrote Lucchesini about how important it was to get French approval for Prussia’s demand to occupy the Franconian provinces.\footnote{130} The French diplomat La Forest\footnote{131} insinuated to Lucchesini that if the King of Prussia did not invade Hanover, it could damage the negotiations on the indemnities.\footnote{132}

2. Another reason probably carried more weight. Caught between two, potentially hostile, armies (the French and Russian), the Prussian government had no choice but to act before they did in its stead. Knoblauch reported a conversation with Krüdener who, irritated by Prussia’s procrastinating said that, if the Prussians did not want to act themselves, the Russians or French would do it for them. This was most

\footnotetext{128}{Dropmore Papers, VI, 428, Carysfort to Grenville, 17 January 1801; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 59, Carysfort to Grenville, 21 and 24 January 1801, in cipher, and 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 26 March 1801.}

\footnotetext{129}{HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 17 February 1801: ‘Bei dieser Gelegenheit muß ich bemerklich machen, daß man jetzt hier die Sprache führt, als wenn man den größten Unannehmlichkeiten abseiten der Franzosen und Russen ausgesetzt sei, daß man nicht schon lange diese Veränderungen herbei geführt’; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1004, précis from von der Decken, 24 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 67; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 4 March 1801; Dropmore Papers, VI, 459-460, Carysfort to Grenville, 4 March 1801.}

\footnotetext{130}{GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 16 March, incipher, and 20 March 1801, in cipher. It was because the Prussian cabinet feared Austrian designs on Franconia that Haugwitz thought it important to stave them off by coming to a quick agreement with France and Russia over a Prussian occupation.}

\footnotetext{131}{Count Antoine René Charles Mathurin de La Forest (1768-1833) was a career diplomat who helped negotiate the treaty of Lunéville. He was sent to Berlin as ambassador in 1805.}

\footnotetext{132}{GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Lucchesini to the court, 13 March 1801, in cipher.}
certainly taken into consideration.\textsuperscript{133} As such, the invasion of Hanover is an act that falls within the logic of Prussia's neutrality policy. It was not a submission to either French or Russian pressure, nor a disavowal of the fundamentals of neutrality, as some would suggest,\textsuperscript{134} but rather an affirmation of its desire to maintain its hegemony in north Germany.

This view was espoused by other diplomats. On 8 February 1801, the Prussian envoy in Hamburg, Schultz had a long conversation with the British envoy, during which he pointed out the embarrassing situation in which the Prussian government found itself, pressed by Russia on the one hand, and by France on the other. Convinced that if Prussia did not move then France would, he argued that Prussia could hardly be expected to abandon its predominant influence.\textsuperscript{135} Georg Helbig, Dresden's representative in Berlin, reported the following conversation with Colonel Zastrow:\textsuperscript{136} "Il [Zastrow] m'a dit, que tant que l'Angleterre persistait à garder l'île de Malte, ou à ne pas imaginer d'autre moyen pour adoucir le courroux de Paul I, la Prusse serait obligé de s'emparer du pays de Hanovre, tant pour ménager cet empereur, que pour remplir ses engagements, pris par la convention de neutralité.\textsuperscript{137}

Haugwitz confided a similar reasoning about a week later when Helbig asked the Prussian foreign minister if orders had been given to occupy Hanover. Haugwitz replied that they would be put into effect within eight days: '[...]' que voulez-vous que nous fassions. Si nous tardons encore, nous risquons que les Français nous previennent.\textsuperscript{138} Even the French were convinced that Prussia sent its troops into Hanover not so much as a measure taken against Britain, but rather with a view to protect the electorate from their own forces. Or such, in any case, was the account prevailing in Hamburg.\textsuperscript{139} It was even believed that a secret understanding existed between Berlin and London over Hanover.\textsuperscript{140}

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\textsuperscript{133}RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 7 March 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{135}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd (sic) to the officer commanding the British ships at the mouth of the Elbe, 13 February 1801.
\textsuperscript{136}Zastrow had less influence than Köckritz, but was considered more subtle and capable (fin et adroit) (Brückner, op. cit., V, 192, Panin to Krüdener, 3 November 1799).
\textsuperscript{137}StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 12 March 1801.
\textsuperscript{138}StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 19 March 1801.
\textsuperscript{139}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 5 June 1801.
\textsuperscript{140}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 28 April 1801; Narochitskii, op. cit., I, 80-81, Alexander to Razumovsky, 22 September 1801.\normalsize
Such thinking certainly played a role in Prussia's decision to invade north Germany, but other reasons have to be taken into account. Carysfort for one, while perfectly aware of the French danger to his master's German states, and while inclined to think that the Prussian occupation had averted that danger, did not believe that this had led to Prussia's decision.\textsuperscript{141} It should be emphasised that Friedrich Wilhelm's motives for invading the electorate were somewhat different from those of his foreign minister. One reason that has perhaps to date not been appreciated enough was that he undertook military measures, however much it might have disgusted him, because of his treaty obligations. This factor should not be underestimated. On adhering to the maritime convention, the king had committed himself to undertaking repressions against any power that violated neutral maritime rights. When three of the signatory powers, Denmark, Sweden and Russia had repeatedly declared that they had no hostile intentions against Great Britain, but were simply attempting to protect their property, Friedrich Wilhelm could hardly stand by indifferently and watch an embargo being laid against his allies. Thus the king undoubtedly felt a moral duty to act after having given his word that he would. He also considered that he was acting for the good of his subjects.\textsuperscript{142} He later justified his decision to invade Hanover by saying it was a means of taking his revenge on Britain, 'que les seules véritables motifs qui l’ont fait adopter, sont la nécessité de mettre un terme aux atteintes portées par l’Angleterre au commerce général et au celui de la Prusse en particulier, et l’importance d’un tel gage pour faire reconnaître les principes de la convention maritime.'\textsuperscript{143} Finally, the King too was convinced he was acting to prevent a Russian or French invasion of the electorate.\textsuperscript{144} It was obvious to one and all that it was in Prussia's own interests not to let two potentially hostile armies, such as the French and Russian, so close to its own borders.

But not everyone at the court of Berlin was of the opinion that military action should be taken. The more war with Britain seemed likely, the more opposition within public opinion, especially within commercial circles, seemed to increase. Haugwitz did not deny that the plan to close the north German ports met with opposition from people within finance, commerce, and the Department of

\textsuperscript{141} PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 3 May, 30 June 1801.

\textsuperscript{142} SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 21 March 1801.

\textsuperscript{143} AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 6 June 1801 (17 prairial IX).

\textsuperscript{144} HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 20 March 1801; Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Prince Adolphus to the Geheimräte, Berlin, 21 March: 'Der König sagte ferner: Bonaparte habe ihm bestimmt erklärt, daß die Franzosen nach Erfolg der Ratification des Friedens das Hannover besetzten würden, wenn die Preußen es nicht tätten.' E. von Lenthe, \textit{op. cit.}, 155, in which he states that he had no doubt that the Prussian King acted on this possibility.
Manufacture, even though they had initially been in favour of adhering to an Armed Neutrality. Knoblauch remarked: 'Le Roi est accablé de lettres et de mémoires, soit pour détourner Sa Majesté de l'idée de prendre des mesures effectives, considérées comme funeste pour l'industrie du pays et pour la caisse royale, soit pour donner à la ligue elle-même une autre direction, et plus de moyens pour faire tête à l'Angleterre.' Public opinion, however, was the factor least likely to influence the King's decision.

145 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 7 March, in cipher, and 10 March 1801, in cipher. The French, Russian and Swedish ministers supposed Schulenburg to be at the head of this opposition and against the Russian alliance.

146 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 24 February 1801, in cipher.
CHAPTER VII

PRUSSIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION

1. The Electorate of Hanover

  a) Prusso-Hanoverian relations

  The Regency of Hanover did not passively stand by all this time and wait for the Prussians to walk into their country. Diplomatic efforts were made to stave off a disaster.

  i. Reden in Berlin

  Reden, who was relatively well informed of what was going on in Berlin, had absolutely no reason to doubt that if Prussia broke with Britain, Berlin would have recourse against Hanover.

  Es ist nur eine Stimme in Publico, und selbst bei allen gut unterrichteten Leuten, daß im Fall es zum Bruch zwischen England und Preußen kommen sollte, und man feindselige Maßregeln gegen Preußen ergreifen würde, alsdann höchst wahrscheinlich par la voie des représailles Eurer Königlichen Majestäts deutsche Staaten von den Preußen in Besitz genommen werden, und wenigstens bis zum Frieden als Unterpfand in preußischen Händen verbleiben würden.¹

  It was generally known that the Tsar was encouraging the King of Prussia to take such a step.² Reden hoped, however, that Prussia would not go so far as to do

¹HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimrätte, two letters dated 3 February, one in cipher, and two letters dated 10 February, both in cipher.
²HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 22 November 1800, in cipher, and 1003, 10 February 1801, in cipher (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32, III), Reden to the Geheimrätte, 14 March, in cipher, and 15 March 1801 (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 67).
so. True, he was counting on Friedrich Wilhelm's personal aversion towards an invasion, on the general fear of getting too deeply involved with the Tsar, and on the fear that such a step would eventually lead to a long-term war with Britain. Reden was not entirely wrong about these things. These fears were very real but, as we have seen, they were overshadowed by other considerations.

On 11 February, Reden saw Haugwitz and asked him outright whether the Tsar intended on confounding the Electorate of Hanover with the Kingdom of Britain. Haugwitz answered that Russia had not as yet shown any intention of doing so and that in any case Prussia would not allow Russian troops to march into Hanover. A far greater danger, he continued, came from France, which had on three occasions in the recent past offered to occupy the electorate. Haugwitz also told him that it was more than ever necessary to hold on to the old neutrality system.

Reden saw Haugwitz again on the morning of the 13th, and handed him a note dated 12 February. Haugwitz received him coldly, undoubtedly because the date coincided with the Prussian note handed the British envoy, something about which Reden was not yet aware. The Hanoverian note was a somewhat desperate last bid attempt made by the Regency to stave off a Prussian invasion. Essentially it called for an agreement with Prussia to conserve the neutrality of north Germany and the liberty of its commerce. It was also prepared to admit the court of Copenhagen into such an agreement. It was further suggested that even Great Britain would acquiesce and be prepared to recognise the Demarcation Line to guarantee shipping on the Elbe and Weser.

Hanover's intentions were evident. By reinforcing Prussia's north German neutrality policy it hoped to prevent being implicated in any conflict between Britain and the northern powers. But it came too late. After reading the note through, Haugwitz informed Reden that he had just handed over a note to Carysfort, the answer
to which would soon show whether Britain intended on getting involved in a war with Prussia. Haugwitz further pointed out how difficult it had been over the last six years to protect Hanover from the French and how the Russians were now holding the same kind of language as they. He told Reden frankly that it was no longer possible to protect Hanover under the old system of neutrality and that any distinction between Great Britain and the Hanoverian dominions was a metaphysical one which would hardly be observed by Britain’s enemies. Furthermore, Prussia had suffered ‘immense losses’ at the hands of the English and had a right to take indemnities where they could be found.

Similar diplomatic moves were made by Julius von Lenthe, the Hanoverian ambassador in London. He sounded Jacobi on a proposition he intended to present on behalf of the King of Britain and asked if Friedrich Wilhelm would be willing to maintain the Demarcation Line in the event war broke out in the north of Germany. He had apparently already spoken to Grenville on this matter and had obtained his approval, but Jacobi simply answered that if Britain persisted in its pretensions, nothing would prevent his master from fulfilling his treaty obligations.

Haugwitz was right when he pointed out that any distinction made between Hanover and Great Britain was a nicety which its enemies were not likely to pay much attention to. The Regency of course did not have the slightest objection to entering into an agreement with Prussia for maintaining the neutrality of the Elbe and Weser. It was a belated attempt to undermine the ground upon which Prussia’s talk of occupying the electorate was based, and although it apparently caused a sensation and some embarrassment at the court of Berlin, it was not enough to deter Prussia from taking steps that, for reasons already gone into, it deemed necessary to take. In the end, it had no effect whatsoever, and Haugwitz never even bothered to answer Reden in writing.

6. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 February 1801: ‘Im Krieg mit England dürfte es schwer werden diese feine distinction der Vereinigung zweier so ganz verschiedener Staaten und Staatsinteressen in einer Person so genau anzunehmen. Die Franzosen behaupten auch, daß sie solche nicht begreifen könnten, und nennen sie daher une distinction metaphysique.’


8. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 17 February 1801: ‘Alle Personen im Cabinet, die in Publico viel von dieser Note gesprochen, schildern sie als ein Meisterwerk der richtigen Grundsätze, und der guten Darstellung derselben, auch weiß ich zuverlässig, daß der König sowohl wie der Minister Haugwitz nicht wenig frappiert, über die Einreichung gewesen sind.’

9. The foreign diplomatic corps assured Reden that he had thereby embarrassed the court of Berlin (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 17 February 1801).

10. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 24 February 1801.
Reden, and for that matter the Regency, were in an extremely difficult situation, over which they were to have virtually no influence. The fate of Hanover was being decided in Berlin and Petersburg, and whatever diplomatic manoeuvres Reden and Lenthe may have undertaken were to no purpose. Reden warned his royal master of the oncoming invasion on several occasions, a fact which could no longer be doubted, but no steps were or could be taken to avoid the inevitable. When the invasion of Hanover did occur, Reden immediately lost all diplomatic status but was allowed to stay on in Berlin in a private capacity.

ii. Prince Adolphus and Captain Decken

Another notable attempt to stave off the invasion was made by the Prince of Cambridge and Captain Decken, who set off from Hanover for Berlin where they arrived in the night of 28 February-1 March, a voyage which was not considered to be very auspicious. Immediately after their arrival, Friedrich Wilhelm spoke in private to Captain Decken and expressed 'the difficulties and embarrassments of his situation', his inability to resist both France and Russia, which were forcing him to act against his own inclinations, and his hope that Britain would allow him to submit to measures 'which nothing but a necessity too strong for him to oppose could make him take.' The King was nevertheless under the impression, or at least hoped that such

11 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 21 February, in cipher, 24 February, in cipher, and 2 March 1801.
12 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimräte, 17 February 1801. Even before that he had difficulty being received by his peers. He complained that Krüdener had avoided speaking with him for the past six to eight weeks.
13 Adolphus Friedrich, Duke of Cambridge, Prince of Great Britain (1774-1850), George III's youngest and seventh son, was sent to Göttingen University to study the German language and customs at the age of 16.
15 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 1 March 1801. The Prince supposedly came incognito under the name of Count Nordheim, but there was no secret about his identity. (SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 3 March 1801).
16 SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 28 February 1801.
17 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 4 March 1801; Dropmore Papers, VI, 459-460, Carysfort to Grenville, 4 March 1801. The King authorised Decken to communicate their conversation to Carysfort, and to deliver a message.
was the case, that a conflict between Russia and Britain could yet be avoided, if Britain were to modify its position with regard to Malta.

Prince Adolphus realised relatively quickly, however, that his presence could be of no possible use and prepared to return to London. Even though he was convinced of the King's sincerity in regards to Hanover, he came away without a very good appreciation of events. 'Ich bin überzeugt', he wrote, 'daß der König von Preußen für sein Person alles, was in seinem Vermögen steht, tun wird, das Hannover zu shonen (sic). Auf der anderen Seite ist die Lage der Dinge jetzt noch so verwickelt, daß sich über das künftige Schicksal von Hannover nichts sagen läßt, und vermutlich wird dieser Zustand noch mehrere Monate dauern.18

b) The invasion

Command of the Prussian troops was given to Lieutenant-General von Kleist on 29 March. He was to move to the region between the lower Elbe and Weser with 13 battalions, 15 squadrons, 2 foot batteries, 1 mounted battery, while Major-General von Blücher was to take position near Emden and Leer with 5 battalions, 5 squadrons and 1 foot battery.19 In all, about 20,000 men were to take part in the operation.20 The Prussian army met with no opposition. Indeed, the government in Hanover was warned that if the Prussian troops encountered any, the country would be treated as if it were an enemy.21 Schulenburg was sent to Hanover to act as governor,22 where he arrived on the morning of 2 April, handed over a declaration from the King justifying Prussia's actions, along with another declaration from Haugwitz, and demanded that his government's conditions be met.23 The declaration from Haugwitz loosely

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18 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Adolphus to the Geheimräte, 10 March 1801.
20 Sichart, op. cit., IV, 721.
21 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1007, Reden to the King, 31 March 1801.
22 Schulenburg left Berlin on 31 March (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 1 April 1801). He left Hanover about the 14 April (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Schulenburg to the King, 11 April 1801). Dohm, appointed to replace him, arrived on 15 April, but finding no-one there, immediately left for Bremen where Kleist was stationed (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Dohm to the King, 16 April 1801; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 15 April 1801).
23 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Kielmansegg to Lenthe, 7 April 1801. Copies of the King's declaration, signed Haugwitz, dated 30 March 1801 are in Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61; and HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67. Copies of Haugwitz's declaration dated 30 March are in Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1; and
interpreted events leading to the formation of the Armed Neutrality and, placing all the blame on Britain, stated that the Prussian King had decided to take possession of Britain's German possessions as part of Prussia's treaty obligations towards its northern allies. The Hanoverian troops that had been a part of the Demarcation Army were to be demobilised, and the officers were to swear in writing not to serve against the Prussian King. That part of the Hanoverian army that was not demobilised was ordered to towns between the right bank of the Leine, the left bank of the Aller, the Luhe, and the Elbe. Finally, the electorate was to undertake to supply the Prussian troops at its own expense. One can imagine how the population reacted to this kind of imperious behaviour.

That very same morning, the Hanoverian Geheimräte, the Field Marshall Baron von Wallmoden-Gimborn, Prince Adolphus, and his adjutant Captain Decken met to deliberate. The two declarations were first read out, and those present were then informed by the President of the Hanoverian Cabinet, Kielmansegg, that Schulenburg had received strict orders to leave Hanover within two hours if he did not receive an unconditional acceptance of his demands. It was decided that, in view of the fact that an effective resistance could not in any case be put up, an effort would be made to avoid further hardships and to prevent an 'hostile occupation' of the country. A note was prepared and delivered to Schulenburg agreeing to the Prussian conditions, and was accompanied by a vaguely worded rescript asking for the Prussian King's 'protection'. Schulenburg was not entirely happy with either these notes, however, pointing out that his master's demands had to be totally complied with and that the Hanoverian officers and troops were expected to obey Prussian orders. Kielmansegg had Schulenburg's reply read out to a gathering of Hanoverian ministers, and after some concern was raised as to whether their troops could eventually be used against the King of Great Britain, Captain Decken was sent to Schulenburg to clear matters up. Schulenburg, in the presence of Massenbach, gave a sufficiently reassuring explanation, after which the ministry of Hanover decided to conclude the

HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67. Reden remarked that Prussia's expansionist views were so evident in the manifesto that no further comment was necessary (HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69, Reden to the King, 7 April 1801).


Copies in HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, the Ministry of Hanover to Schulenburg, 2 April 1801; Sichart, op. cit., IV, 700-702.

HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Schulenburg to the Ministry of Hanover, 3 April 1801.

HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Précis from Captain von der Decken, 3 April 1801.
deliberations, agree with the Prussian conditions, and had Schulenburg notified. A Convention was signed between the Prussian government and Hanover on 3 April 1801. The supply of provisions which was to commence on 1 May. An officer set out for Minden charged with accepting the fortress of Hamlin, which was taken on 9 April. Field Marshal Wallmoden-Grimborn sent out an order instructing his officers not to offer any resistance.

c) London's reaction

The news that Prussia had taken possession of the Electorate of Hanover was not unexpected in London. We have seen how Friedrich Wilhelm used the services of Captain Decken to communicate Prussia's position to the English ambassador and the action that was likely to ensue. Also Haugwitz, worried about keeping on good terms with Britain, had Carysfort informed privately of the steps Prussia was obliged to take to prevent the French from invading Hanover, stressing that the occupation was to be essentially military and provisional, and that no changes whatsoever were to be made in the administration of the electorate.

Carysfort's dispatches gave his government ample warning of imminent danger, but London did not take any concrete measures to prevent an eventual invasion. In fact, it would seem that the government had, at this stage, no intention of mixing the kingdom's affairs with those of the electorate and chose rather to ignore the fact that Prussian troops had even entered Hanover. Baron von Lenthe remarked to

28 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, the Ministry of Hanover to Schulenburg, 3 April 1801, with copy of minutes.
29 Martens, G., op. cit., VII, 351-352. The full text is to be found in Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1. The declaration reached Berlin on 6 April (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 B, Haugwitz to Lusi, 6 April 1801).
30 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Schulenburg to the Ministry of Hanover, 3 April 1801. A clerk from the War Office by the name of von Rohr was to be sent to Hanover to make the necessary arrangements. Cf. HStA, Hann. 92, LXI, 68, vol. 1, document from von Rohr, 6 April 1801.
31 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Schulenburg to the Ministry of Hanover, 3 April 1801; and the Ministry to Schulenburg, 4 April 1801.
32 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Schulenburg to the King, 11 April 1801.
33 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Wallmoden-Grimborn to the King, 8 April 1801 with copy of order.
34 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 14, 15 and 24 March 1801. In the last dispatch he stated that it was clearly impossible to prevent the invasion.
Jacobi that 'la conservation du pays d'Hanovre n'intéressait nullement le ministère britannique et ne lui ferait jamais changer ses plans'.\textsuperscript{36} This appears to have been the rule amongst Britain's political leaders.\textsuperscript{37} When the actual invasion of Hanover and Prussia's motives for doing so were published, the British cabinet met to decide what to do under the circumstances. The cabinet agreed to follow the constitution according to which the King's continental possessions could in no way influence the British government's politics.\textsuperscript{38} For his part, Carysfort suggested that, since it was impracticable to defend the electorate against an invasion, it would be just as well to give credit to the Prussia cabinet's professions of good faith towards Britain and avoid all open conflict.\textsuperscript{39} Jacobi was convinced that Britain would avoid an open rupture\textsuperscript{40} and was reinforced in his conviction when several merchants approached Pitt to ask if under the actual circumstances it would be wise to use Prussian vessels to ship cargoes to Hamburg, and he replied in a manner to reassure them. Lord Hawkesbury also apparently let it be known that there was nothing to fear from using Prussian vessels.\textsuperscript{41}

2. The Hanse Towns

Shortly before the occupation of Hanover was carried out, Prussia occupied Bremen and intended occupying Hamburg in conjunction with Denmark. But things did not really go as expected.

a) Hamburg

On 23 March Haugwitz held his first meeting with the new Danish ambassador, Baudissin. The Russian, Swedish and French ambassadors had awaited his arrival with an incredible eagerness (empressement incroyable), assuming that he

\textsuperscript{36}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, Jacobi to the court, 10 April 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{37}Cf. also John Russell, \textit{Memorials and Correspondence of Charles James Fox}, 3 vols., (London: Richard Bentley, 1853-54), vol. 3, 336-337, Fox to Lauderdale, 17 April 1801: 'The Hanover business leads to an odd question enough, concerning how far in a negotiation the interests of Great Britain and the Electorate are to be considered as united or distinct. To be sure, in this instance, Hanover has suffered on account of her being under the same Sovereign as Great Britain, but yet she is not in any way an ally of ours, and much less a part of us'.
\textsuperscript{38}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Jacobi to the court, 12 May 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{39}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 24 March 1801.
\textsuperscript{40}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 6 March 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{41}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 A, Jacobi to the court, 10 March, in cipher, 17 March 1801, in cipher.
would bring the necessary instructions to concert with Prussia, but nothing about the occupation of Hamburg was mentioned. The fact of the matter is, although Bernstorff recognized the importance of coming to an agreement with Berlin before taking measures against Britain, Baudissin was instructed not to bring up the subject of Hamburg unless the Prussians did so first. He fully expected Prussia to occupy Hanover but wanted Hamburg to be occupied by Danish troops. If Prussia insisted on a joint occupation he was ready to give in if the overall command was Danish.

On 18 February, the Prussian envoy in Hamburg convened the Masters of all merchant ships bearing the Prussian flag, both in Hamburg and Altona, and directed them to proceed to sea. In the eyes of the public at Hamburg, few people doubted that their town would soon swell with unwelcome guests. Berlin never considered annexing the town, knowing only too well how important the trade of Hamburg and its banking were for Prussia. As such the Prussian government decided not to send any troops into the town itself but rather to only take possession of its gates. In that way it hoped that its banking credit would not be affected. So when Prussia sent out orders to occupy Hamburg on 20 March, it decided to adopt a few 'soothing' measures and made assurances about respecting private property (especially the banks), the maintenance of the town's civil administration, and the continuation of trade.

On 22 March, Struensee notified the agent of Hamburg in Berlin that the King intended sending a corps of troops into the Circle of Lower Saxony to shut the ports to British trade, as a result of which Hamburg was to be occupied. The Senate of Hamburg received this news two days later, and even though expected, it still caused a great sensation. The Senate was 'extraordinarily shocked' but decided that the only thing it could do was to remonstrate strongly. It also turned towards London to

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42 RA, Depecher, Knoblauch to Bernstorff, 14 March, in cipher, and 17 March 1801, in cipher.
43 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senff von Pilsach to the court, 14 March 1801.
44 RA, Gehejmeregistratur, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 11 March 1801.
45 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Grenville, 20 February 1801.
46 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 10 March 1801.
47 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, note from Struensee, 18 March, and Haugwitz to Struensee, 21 March, and Struensee to Haugwitz, 22 1801.
48 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Struensee to Haugwitz, 22 March 1801; PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 25 March 1801; confirmed by a letter from Carysfort to Crawfurd, 28 March.
49 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, the Senate to Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 March 1801, and extract from the Allgemeine Zeitung, dated 3 April; PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd
protect their trading interests and in the hope of avoiding English reprisals. But these diplomatic efforts were nullified by the sudden and apparently unexpected invasion of the town by Danish troops.

Bernstorff had insisted that Prussia undertake immediate measures against Britain, and that Hamburg be occupied in reprisal.

*Vous insisterez,* Bernstorff instructed, *avec vivacité sur l'exécution immédiate des mesures, que les procédés du gouvernement anglais ne permettent plus de différer. Vous déclarerez que nous ne saurions plus longtemps nous dispenser d'user de représailles et vous ne tarderez plus à provoquer une explication sur l'occupation de la ville de Hambourg, [...]*. La cour de Berlin paraissant croire cette mesure indispensable, nous nous y prêterons sans répugnance, et nous souhaitons que l'exécution s'en effectue promptement.51

But as things turned out, both countries were to act independently of each other. On 24 March, Prince Carl of Hesse, Field Marshal and commander of the Danish forces in north Germany, was ordered to occupy Hamburg as soon as the Prussian troops meant for that purpose had arrived.52 Prince Carl, however, overstepped the mark and, without waiting for the arrival of the Prussians, marched into Hamburg on 29 March with 12,000 men.53 He did not actually receive the order until 1 April. A few explanations suggested by contemporaries help explain the Danish prince's somewhat impetuous behaviour. Senfft von Pilsach suggested that, as the Prince of Hesse was authorised to open dispatches addressed to the court of Denmark, he might have read the Russian dispatch assigning Hamburg to Denmark and that this decided him to march on the town without waiting for his sovereign's orders.54 The British envoy thought that the Danes undertook the operation so
suddenly in the hope of capturing by surprise British property in the town.\textsuperscript{55} One of the Syndics of Hamburg, Johann Gries,\textsuperscript{56} was under the impression that the Danish Prince had acted in the belief that Prussian troops were close by. Knowing the courts of Copenhagen and Berlin were in discussion over a common occupation, Prince Carl simply anticipated any direct order or official order, perhaps out of mistrust of Prussia.\textsuperscript{57}

In any event, the day before Prince Carl marched into Hamburg, he issued a manifesto justifying his action on the grounds of Britain's arbitrary attitude towards the neutral sea powers.\textsuperscript{58} It was a measure that was totally unexpected, was received with great surprise, and occasioned speculation about the relations between Prussia and Denmark. To the people of Hamburg, it seemed extraordinary that the court of Copenhagen should have ventured upon such a measure without the concurrence of Prussia. It seemed equally extraordinary that Prussia would have consented to see Hamburg occupied by any troops other than her own.

On receiving the Danish manifesto, the Bürgermeister convoked an extraordinary meeting of the Senate, during which it was decided to send a deputation to the Prince of Hesse.\textsuperscript{59} That afternoon (28 March), and at the request of the Senate of Hamburg, Schultz set off for the Prince's headquarters at Pinneberg "to make the strongest representations to him against this measure."\textsuperscript{60} He was accompanied by a Senator and a Syndic from the town's Magistrature. Since the Prussians had already notified the Senate of Hamburg of their intention to occupy the town, they were to ask the Prince to delay his march until they informed the court of Berlin of this new incident. The citizens of Hamburg were more suspicious of Denmark than of any other power and would have preferred to see Prussians, rather than Danes, in their town. They felt humiliation at being invaded by a power which they despised, a sentiment which was not at all expressed on receiving a similar notification from the

\textsuperscript{55}\textsuperscript{\textregistered}\textsuperscript{\textcopyright}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 28 March, 1 April 1801.

\textsuperscript{56}Johann Michael Gries (1772-1827), elected one of the four syndici of Hamburg in 1800, he was an influential member of the Senate and an able diplomat.

\textsuperscript{57}StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 30 March 1801.

\textsuperscript{58}Copy in StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3. Cf. StAB, 2-G.6.B.28.1.a., Post to Gröning, 30 March 1801.

\textsuperscript{59}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 1 April 1801.

\textsuperscript{60}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 28 March 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 29 March 1801.
Prussians. To the people of Hamburg, Prussia was most definitely the lesser of the two evils.

The Senate's efforts, however, were to no avail. Unable to stop or delay the Prince's march, it endeavoured to stipulate certain conditions for the safety of the town's property. These were also refused. The Prince confined himself to general professions of his government's intentions to respect the rights of the town but informed the Senate that if he arrived to find the town's gates closed, he would use force to enter. He managed to convince the Prussian envoy that his government had been concerted over the measure. Schultz returned to Hamburg "mortified to the quick at being allowed by his court from a total want of instruction to make so silly a figure."

The deputation also returned to the town that same evening at about eight o'clock. They were awaited by the Legislative Body (formed conjointly from the Senate and the College of Burghers). The news they received was not at all to their liking:

It was I understand a scene of real distress, some of them being affected even to tears at an event not only fatal to the independence on which they have been used to pride themselves, but striking at their most essential interests. The majority twice voted for defending the town, unequal as they felt the contest to be. The Senate, however, who saw the inutility of resistance and that it could only occasion useless calamities and who in the event, as at present, of a difference of opinion with the Burghers have the power of sending them back three times to reconsider their opinion, remonstrated with them on the rashness of their counsels, on the impossibility of a successful resistance, on the numerous train of calamities it would inevitably bring on the town and sent them back the third time. They at last gave way and it was determined to open the gates to the Danish troops.

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61 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 28 March, 1 April 1801.

62 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 29 March 1801; PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 1 April 1801. Cf. StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 31 March 1801, where Gries reports that Schultz assured him that the steps carried out by the Danes were done with the prior knowledge of his court.

63 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 1 April 1801. Cf. StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, two reports from the Bürgermeister, signed 3am and 8am on 29 March 1801.
The Prince of Hesse arrived the next day with his advanced guard at about seven o'clock in the morning. His troops took possession of the gates and ramparts, but the Prince had sense enough not enter the interior of the town itself. Even though the townspeople were very irritated by this incursion, the event passed without any disturbances. Once in Hamburg, the Danish Prince demanded of the Senate that it forbid all commercial activity with the British, place an embargo on their ships and seize their property. When Haugwitz heard about this, he was upset that Prince Carl had implemented measures without consulting Berlin, something which aroused Prussia's suspicions of Denmark's motives and strained relations between the two countries. He instructed Senfft von Pilsach to insist that Bernstorff concert with Haugwitz before undertaking anything concerning Hamburg, and Haugwitz had no intention of agreeing to the Prince of Hesse's sequester. Neither did the Senate of Hamburg have any intention of complying with the prohibition on trade with Britain and hesitated whether it should seize the goods themselves, or decline and leave it to the Prince of Hesse to name a commission for that purpose. But in the end they decided to take it into their own hands and thereby soften any undesirable effects, by naming a commission consisting of two Senators, two members of the Council of Sixty, and a Dane appointed on the Prince of Hesse's insistence, who were to investigate and sequester all British property. The first session was held on 8 April during which it was decided, because the radical change in circumstances brought about by the death of Paul pointed towards a lifting of the sequester, to suspend proceedings indefinitely. They met for the last time on 10 April.

Much to the Prince's chagrin, when the Danes arrived in the town there were virtually no British vessels or property left. The British government, as soon as it had laid an embargo on Danish and Swedish vessels, had written to its representative in

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64 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 1 April 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 1 April 1801.
65 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 6 April 1801; and Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 4 April 1801.
66 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 1 April 1801: 'Was das Verbot der Handlung mit England betrifft, so werden wir uns gewiss nicht darauf einlassen [...].'
67 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurder Hawkesbury, 4 April 1801; StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 3 April 1801.
68 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurder Hawkesbury, 7 April 1801; StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 8 April 1801.
Hamburg, Crawfurd, ordering him to remove, as discreetly as possible, all shipping and property from Altona and Glückstadt. There were not in any case very many British vessels left in Hamburg when these instructions arrived (about ten in all). Crawfurd's warnings to British merchants over the last few months had had its effect, and they had already taken precautions to protect their property in the event of the town falling into the hands of Prussia.

How did Prussia react to the occupation? The Danish ambassador to Berlin received the letter from Bernstorff which clearly assumes a joint occupation of Hamburg. On 26 March he handed over a note informing the Prussian cabinet of the rupture in relations between Denmark and Britain and of his government's intention to take retaliatory measures. But, instead of mentioning Bernstorff's instructions concerning a joint occupation of Hamburg, he chose to deliver a note in which he stated that Denmark intended to occupy the town alone. Haugwitz accepted the note and assured the Danish ambassador that the Prussian government had not even thought about occupying the town of Hamburg. He went on to say that the execution of such a measure should be left to the Danish troops. This language is quite remarkable considering how sensitive a subject the Electorate of Hanover was for the Prussian government, and all the more so since we know that none of it was true. What was intended to be a joint Prusso-Danish declaration concerning the occupation of Hamburg had already been drafted by Schulenburg. Haugwitz probably suspected that the Danes had received Russia's authorization to occupy Hamburg, and this helps explain why there was at first no official protest from the court of Berlin. But Haugwitz nevertheless made it perfectly clear that if Denmark occupied Hamburg, then Prussia was going to take Hanover, and furthermore demanded the promulgation of a

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69 Crawfurd was the British minister plenipotentiary to Hamburg. He was considered to be a ruthless but able diplomat, having organised a spy ring in the Electorate of Hanover.

70 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Grenville to Crawfurd, 15 January 1801, and Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 10 March.

71 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawford to Grenville, 23 January 1801.

72 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawford to Hawkesbury, 10 March 1801.

73 RA, Order, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 24 March 1801, in cipher.

74 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Baudissin to Haugwitz, 26 March 1801; copy in RA, Depecher.

75 RA Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 29 March 1801; Baudissin to Haugwitz, 26 and 31 March. Feldbaek, Denmark, 265, n. 142, supposes that Baudissin acted in this way because he knew about the Tsar's ultimatum, and therefore delivered a note with Bernstorff's preferred form of occupation.

76 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 31 March 1801.
joint proclamation from the Prince of Hesse and the Prussian envoy, Schultz, on a common agreement concerning all future commercial and political affairs in Hamburg. Senfft von Pilsach was ordered to present these requests in Copenhagen, and to point out to Bernstorff that his court could not dispense with consulting Prussia on all future political and mercantile matters concerning Hamburg. Schultz was to make a similar protest. However, the Prince of Hesse refused to have anything to do with a common declaration, arguing that, given his position and rank, he could not possibly put his name to a document signed by a mere envoy. But as Haugwitz pointed out, this was no more than a pretext since the Prince was not obliged to sign personally and could have had his name substituted. Surprisingly enough, not only did Haugwitz not push the matter any further, but he backed down by saying that the proposition had never in any case been forwarded by him. This could be interpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of the Prussian government, but news of Paul's death had already reached Haugwitz's ears, and he did not expect Prusso-Danish cooperation to continue much longer.

Other members of the court, and especially the military, reacted more strongly. The people of Hamburg suspected that Denmark intended on annexing their city and Lübeck. Struensee was of the opinion that under no circumstances could Hamburg become a Danish dependency. Beyme thought that it was better for Hamburg to remain an independent town, but if it eventually came to an annexation, better Prussia than Denmark. The King hesitated as to what course to take until Köckritz reminded him that his honour was at stake. Köckritz, unhappy about the way Haugwitz had handled the affair, persuaded the King to send a corps of Prussian troops into the "Vorstadt" and to occupy at least one of the town gates.

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77 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 1 April 1801, with a Prussian draft of proclamation and Haugwitz's note to Baudissin dated 2 April.
78 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 3 April 1801.
79 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 2 and 4 April 1801.
80 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 7 April 1801.
81 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 17 April 1801.
82 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 11 April 1801.
83 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 17 and 24 April 1801.
84 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 7 April 1801.
85 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Köckritz to Haugwitz, 12 April 1801.
How did the Senate of Hamburg react to the invasion? There was not much, under the circumstances, it could do. It sent off letters to the German Emperor asking for his intervention, to Russia and France, and to Hawkesbury explaining that the measures adopted with a view to hindering trade with Britain arose from the "necessity of the moment" and not from any hostile disposition. They did not of course neglect Prussia. Their envoy in Berlin was instructed to appeal to the King, Haugwitz and Struensee for Prussia's assistance, and after the death of Paul and the Anglo-Danish convention, the mayor of Hamburg addressed a petition to Friedrich Wilhelm pleading for his intercession to free them of the invader. The Senate also addressed a letter to Crawfurd, asking him to intervene on its behalf with George III to bring about an evacuation of the town. All these appeals, however, had little or no effect.

Whatever measures the Danes intended implementing against British shipping, they were not entertained very long. After merchants from Stettin and Magdeburg complained that trade between Hamburg and Britain was being hindered, a special order was sent to Schultz instructing him to verify, and if he found their complaints to be justified, to seek an audience with Prince Carl and insist that orders be given for any hindrance to be lifted. The conference with Schultz, which took place in the presence of the English envoy, centred on the immediate cessation of all the measures taken for the sequestration of British property and the reestablishment of the freedom of commerce. An agreement was reached later. Only three weeks after having

86 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Hawkesbury to the Bürgermeister and Senate, n.d., but April 1801. According to this letter the Senate addressed him on the 25 and 31 March, but copies of these letters were not found.

87 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 31 March 1801; and Sienen to Haugwitz, 3 April 1801; invol. 6, Sienen to Friedrich Wilhelm, 30 March 1801.

88 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, the Bürgermeister to Haugwitz, asking for his intercession, and the Bürgermeister to Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 April 1801.

89 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, letter to Crawfurd, 15 April 1801.

90 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, letter from the merchants of Magdeburg to the King, 21 April 1801.

91 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 27 April 1801.

92 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 24 and 27 April 1801; Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to Haugwitz, 8 and 12 May, and Haugwitz to Schultz, 15 May 1801; Rep. 11 Dänemark, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 4 May 1801; PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 29 April 1801.

93 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 15 May 1801. The correspondence between Prince Carl and the English envoy was to be
taken the town, the Prussian and Danish courts decided to reopen the rivers of north Germany and not to hinder Britain's commerce any further.\textsuperscript{94} Even before that date, more than 30 ships had sailed from Hamburg, and another 70 were ready to sail.\textsuperscript{95} Prince Carl simply signed all the necessary papers that were asked of him, and some even sailed without papers.\textsuperscript{96} Complete freedom of trade was allowed on 7 May,\textsuperscript{97} but the Senate did not succeed in getting the sequestration order on British goods lifted until 10 June.\textsuperscript{98} Although no steps were ever taken to put sequestration into effect, it was considered important to obtain a formal revocation.\textsuperscript{99}

b) The Duchy of Lauenburg

Schulenburg told von der Decken on 3 April that Prussia had to move into the Duchy because of the Danes.\textsuperscript{100} Earlier on, Baudissin had intimated to the Prussian government that it would be desirable if Danish troops occupied the territory north of the Elbe.\textsuperscript{101} This would have included the Duchy of Lauenburg.\textsuperscript{102} But Haugwitz rejected the proposition, referring to the agreement between Petersburg and Berlin whereby the territory of Hanover was to be occupied by the Prussians.\textsuperscript{103} On this point Haugwitz was adamant, even more so since Copenhagen had just signed a convention with Britain and had no valid reason for wanting to occupy the Duchy. He informed Senfft von Pilsach that if the Prince of Hesse had once again anticipated his orders and entered the Duchy of Lauenburg, Berlin expected him to withdraw at the

\textsuperscript{94}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 22 April 1801.
\textsuperscript{95}StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 24 April 1801.
\textsuperscript{96}StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 5 May 1801.
\textsuperscript{97}StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 8 May 1801.
\textsuperscript{98}StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 12 June 1801.
\textsuperscript{99}PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 9 June 1801.
\textsuperscript{100}HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, précis from Captain von der Decken, 3 April 1801; Sichart, op. cit., III, 703.
\textsuperscript{101}RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 1 April 1801.
\textsuperscript{102}In contemporary documents it is sometimes called the Duchy of Saxe-Lauenburg.
\textsuperscript{103}RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 1 April 1801.
approach of Prussian troops. Haugwitz officially expressed the wish that Denmark not occupy Lauenburg on 11 April in a conference with Baudissin. By this time Baudissin had already received news of Prince Carl's retreat from Lauenburg and decided to comply with Haugwitz's demand.

As with Hamburg, Prince Carl decided to take things into his own hands and sent a conseiller d'état by the name of Eyben to negotiate with the Regency of Hanover over the matter. The Regency in turn sent a note to Schulenburg asking for Prussian assistance and protection and declaring that after having submitted to their authority, it would never consent to receive a Danish garrison in one of its towns. Schulenburg was not able to reply immediately, not being really aware of the situation, but sent to Berlin for instructions. The Danish Prince tried to justify his intended actions to the Prussian envoy by arguing that he had received orders to do so because, "[...], Preußen in Copenhagen habe erklären lassen, daß es auf dem rechten Elbufer keine Occupation machen wolle, sondern diese Seite ganz an Dänemark überlasse." This, however, was an outright lie, and the Prince stubbornly adhered to his plan to occupy Lauenburg. The Regency of Hanover also sent Prince Carl a letter, pointing out that the electorate fell under the protection of the King of Prussia and that as such they desired the duchy to remain free of Danish troops.

Prince Frederik von Hesse, Prince Carl's son, appeared before the fortress of Ratzeburg on the morning of 7 April and summoned it to surrender. On their own

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104 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 6 April 1801. in cipher; Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 7 April 1801; and copy in Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166.
105 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 11 April 1801.
106 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 5 April 1801.
107 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Geheimräte to Schulenburg, two letters dated 7 April 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 13 April 1801.
108 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Schulenburg to the Geheimräte, two letters dated 7 April 1801.
109 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 5 April 1801.
110 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Geheimräte to Prince Carl, 8 April 1801.
111 Crawfurd reported that Danish troops entered the Duchy of Lauenburg on the 2nd April (PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, 21, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 4 April 1801), but this is incorrect. Danish troops would have set out on 6th (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schulenburg, 10 April 1801). Cf. extract from a letter from Schultz, Hamburg, 8 April 1801 in HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67. About 2,000 Danish troops arrived around 11 o'clock on the morning of 7th (HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. I, the government of Razteburg to the Regency, 8
initiative, the Hanoverian company quartered in the town refused the Danes admittance, referring to the convention drawn up between Hanover and Prussia on 3 April.\(^{112}\) It was later that they received a dispatch from Field Marshal Wallmoden-Gimborn ordering them to keep the town from falling into Danish hands.\(^{113}\) On meeting this unexpected resistance, Prince Frederik decided to send off an officer to his father asking for further instructions. The officer entered the Prince's headquarters on the night of 7 April, at about the same time that a courier arrived from Bernstorff with a letter for Prince Carl specifically telling him not to occupy Lauenburg as it was not agreeable to the court of Berlin. The next day, the officer returned to Ratzeburg with orders to withdraw, which Prince Frederik accordingly did.\(^{114}\)

The Danish attempt to occupy Lauenburg was completely inadmissible to Prussia. Schultz received a letter from Schulenburg mentioning his surprise at the Danish attempt to take Lauenburg, and saying that he had given orders for a detachment of Prussian troops to occupy it and, if necessary, to drive out the Danish troops by force.\(^{115}\) If the occupation of Hanover south of the Elbe was already contrary to Danish interests, the occupation of Lauenburg north of the Elbe just about resulted in a panic in Copenhagen. It was thought that if Prussia ever succeeded in annexing Hanover permanently, then Denmark would be a Prussian province within ten years.\(^{116}\)

c) Bremen

At the same time as orders were issued to march into Hanover, precautionary measures were taken to assure that trade was cut off between Bremen and Great Britain. The Senate of Bremen, fearing that measures would be taken against the town,\(^{117}\) (rumours about the occupation of Hamburg were received on 26 March)\(^{118}\)

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\(^{112}\) HStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 10 April 1801.

\(^{113}\) HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 67, Wallmoden-Gimborn to Düring, not dated, but probably around 8 April 1801. Cf. the protocol in \textit{ibid.}, taken in the house of a certain Herr von Hake, 7 April 1801, which describes the negotiations between the Danes and the representatives of the town garrison.

\(^{114}\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 13 April 1801.

\(^{115}\) These details to be found in PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 11 April 1801.

\(^{116}\) Feldbaek, \textit{Denmark}, 176.

\(^{117}\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 4, Dohm to the King, 27 March 1801.
had in vain protested by submitting a petition to both Friedrich Wilhelm and the Duke of Brunswick as commanding general, arguing that it would be harmful not only for Bremen's trade, but also for Prussian industry, if Britain were ever to blockade the mouth of the Weser. The Senate also remonstrated with the Prussian commander in the field, General Kleist, and with Christian von Dohm, but equally to no avail, in the hope that the town would be spared an occupation.

On 12 April a battalion of the Prussian Tscharmer regiment, consisting of about 800 troops in all, marched into the town. The event occurred without incident, but unlike the occupation of Hamburg, Prussian troops took up billeting inside the town itself, although limiting themselves to the Neustadt around the left bank of the river. Kleist arrived on the 14 April, with an entourage of about 40 people, to set up headquarters for the whole of north German operations. To alleviate the costs of billeting for the poorer residents, an allowance in money was paid. But despite this, as Dohm reports, conditions must have been hard for both the soldiers and particularly for the townspeople, because they had to live in such close quarters, and because they were expected to feed their lodgers. Up to 20 soldiers at a time were
billeted in some of the larger farms just outside the town.\textsuperscript{126} Trade suffered inevitably as well.\textsuperscript{127}

In Berlin, when Bremen's chargé d'affaires, Woltmann, was admitted to an audience with Haugwitz and announced that a Prussian battalion had taken the Imperial town, the Prussian foreign minister was visibly surprised (sichtbar überrascht), declared that he knew nothing of the matter and that he had not known it would occur.\textsuperscript{128} According to Haugwitz, it was a purely military matter, whose decision depended upon General von Kleist. Woltmann had no reason to doubt his word, and as no document has been found that contradicts this, it raises the question of just how much Haugwitz was informed about cabinet decisions, and how much freedom commanders had in the field.

The Senate of Bremen, in much the same manner as Hamburg, nevertheless insisted that Prussia evacuate the town, and did so on at least two occasions.\textsuperscript{129} Weight was lent the request by the fact that Hamburg and Lübeck had already been evacuated by the Danes at this stage. The Prussian answer to these demands went along the lines that, due to the "allgemeine politische Kombinationen" an evacuation was not advisable, but that orders would be given for an evacuation to take place as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{130} There was in fact no longer any military reason for the continued occupation of the town, and Haugwitz recommended to the King that he order his troops to withdraw.\textsuperscript{131} In fact, it is probable that Friedrich Wilhelm acted on Haugwitz's recommendation and that it would have otherwise been unlikely that an

\textsuperscript{126} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 4, Dohm to the King, 21 May 1801.

\textsuperscript{127} StAB, 2-G.6.B.28.I.a., Post to Gröning, 6 June 1801. On ships entering Bremen and receipts from tonnage dues, see Phillips, \textit{op. cit.}, 314. While trade may have suffered during the occupation, in general it seems to have increased over the year in question.

\textsuperscript{128} StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 18 April 1801.

\textsuperscript{129} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 4, Dohm to the King, 21 May, with copy of note from the Senate to Dohm, 20 May, the Senate to the King, 30 May 1801; StAB, 2-G.6.B.28.I.a., Post to Gröning, 25 May 1801; 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 25 May 1801. Woltmann asked for an audience with Haugwitz, having received instructions dated 21 May.

\textsuperscript{130} StAB, 2-G.6.B.28.I.a., Post to Gröning, 21 June 1801; 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 16 and 20 June 1801.

\textsuperscript{131} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 4, Haugwitz to the King, 19 June, and King's reply accepting the recommendation, 22 June 1801. Cf. StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 30 May and 27 June 1801.
evacuation took place so soon.\textsuperscript{132} Kleist was sent orders to evacuate Bremen on 3 July,\textsuperscript{133} which he proceeded to do the very next day.\textsuperscript{134} Prussian headquarters were then shifted to the town of Hoya.

One last thing, the town and Duchy of Oldenburg were also occupied by Prince Louis' regiment,\textsuperscript{135} although this measure was not considered as necessary as the occupation of the Hanse town.\textsuperscript{136} Unfortunately, the documents that have been consulted reveal little about the motives for such an action, but it appears that it was done in conjunction with the occupation of Bremen and with the aim of closing the mouth of the Weser. On the 8 May, Dohm was instructed to inform Kleist about the evacuation of the Duchy, and on 11 May a cabinet order went out to that effect.\textsuperscript{137} The Duchy itself was evacuated on 21 May.\textsuperscript{138}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} This, in any case, was Woltmann's opinion. StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 14 July 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{133} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 4, Haugwitz to the Senate, and Haugwitz to Kleist, 3 July 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{134} StAB, 2-G.6.B.28.I.a., Post to Gröning, 4 July 1801; StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 11 July 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Friedrich Ludwig Christian (1772-1806), Prince of Prussia, son of Ferdinand, Friedrich II's youngest brother. He was a constant rival of Friedrich Wilhelm.
\item \textsuperscript{136} StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 25 April 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{137} StAB, 2-G.6.B.28.I.a., Post to Gröning, 18 May 1801; 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 12 and 23 May 1801. Both Friedrich Wilhelm and Haugwitz are reported to have promised the Duke of Oldenburg on 10 May that a rapid evacuation of his territory would follow.
\item \textsuperscript{138} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 4, Dohm to the King, 21 May 1801.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE END OF THE ALLIANCE

1. The Collapse of the Armed Neutrality

Two things were to occur to bring about a rapid end to the Armed Neutrality. After making a brave stand against British naval forces, Denmark was defeated at the battle of Copenhagen, and the motivating force behind the alliance, Tsar Paul, was brutally assassinated during a palace revolution. Both events were to lead to the conclusion of separate conventions with Britain.

a) The Anglo-Danish armistice

On Thursday morning, 12 March 1801, an English fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, left Yarmouth Roads with a fair wind bound for the Baltic. London was perfectly aware that unity of purpose was sadly lacking among the northern powers, that the Russian and Swedish fleets were in bad condition, and that they could not be put on a war footing very quickly. The only fleet that could cause any worry was the Danish. Just as London hoped to separate Berlin from the Armed Neutrality by showing them preferential treatment, so it intended on separating Denmark by quickly putting it out of action. On 21 March, Parker anchored outside the Sound. A special envoy was sent into Copenhagen in an attempt to detach Denmark from her allies but returned on 23 March without any success. A little more than a week later, on the morning of 2 April, the English, led by Nelson, attacked the defences before Copenhagen.

1 R. C. Anderson, op. cit., 303. For details of the events leading up to the battle of Copenhagen: Dudley Pope, The Great Gamble, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972); Feldbaek, Denmark, 139-151; Ragsdale, Détente, 93-100;

2 Dropmore Papers, op. cit., VII, 7-8, Grenville to Carysfort, 21 April 1801.

3 For the battle itself, one may consult the above works, and also Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, ed., The Dispatches and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, 7 vols., (London: Colburn, 1845-1846), vol. 4, 299-316; R. C. Anderson, op. cit., 304-309; T. Sturges Jackson, ed., Logs of the Great
After having broken through the Danish defense lines, Nelson suggested that hostilities be suspended and negotiations over an armistice be entered into.\(^4\) This was done on 3 April. Since the Swedish squadron was nowhere in sight, in spite of repeated promises and rumours,\(^5\) and no help was to be expected from the Russian fleet, ice-bound in the port of Reval,\(^6\) Denmark agreed to enter into talks. They ended on 9 April in a fourteen-week truce that stipulated that Denmark's participation in the Armed Neutrality would be suspended during this period.\(^7\) Denmark was thus temporarily detached from, but had not left, the Armed Neutrality. Russia and Sweden remained to be dealt with, so Parker left Copenhagen for the Baltic on 12 April.

Although Bernstorff reassured his allies that Denmark's resolution to maintain its engagements remained unshaken,\(^8\) he did not confide the details of the negotiations to the Danish ambassadors abroad. Senfft von Pilsach and Baron Lagerbielke, the Swedish ambassador in Copenhagen, were kept in total ignorance. Bernstorff only gave an account of the negotiations to the French and Russian ambassadors. In fact, wanting his allies to receive an explanation from him directly, Bernstorff forbade the diplomatic corps sending any couriers without the express permission of the Foreign Affairs Department. An explanation was slow in coming though, since Bernstorff fell victim to a bout of measles that prevented him from seeing the foreign diplomats through most of the month of April. It was his brother, Joachim Bernstorff, as Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who briefed the Russian, Swedish and French ambassadors on the evening of 9 April about the armistice.\(^9\) The Prussian

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\(^4\) The negotiations leading up to the armistice, cf., Feldbaek, Denmark, 155-165.

\(^5\) Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 3 April 1801.

\(^6\) Both the Swedish and Danish envoys, Stedingk and Löwendal, pleaded with Panin to have the fleets at Reval and Cronstadt set sail as soon as possible, but the ice had not as yet broken (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 B, Lusi to the court, 14 April 1801).

\(^7\) Grenville thought the conclusion of an armistice with Copenhagen while Hamburg remained occupied to be unjustified (Dropmore Papers, op. cit., VII, 8, Grenville to Carysfort, 21 April 1801).

\(^8\) RA, Ordner, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 4 April 1801.

\(^9\) Feldbaek, Denmark, 167.
envoy was officially informed by Baron Otto Blome. The Danish envoys abroad were sent accounts on 10 April.

b) Paul I's death and the Anglo-Russian Sea Convention

One day before the signing of the Anglo-Danish Convention, and this was also a decisive factor, news of the death of Paul I reached Copenhagen. The news, as in most European courts, caused a sensation, and the reaction, especially with those who had laid their bets on Paul, was one of shock, even though relations between Petersburg and its allies had been strained.

10 Christian Bemstorff fell ill with a case of measles on the morning of 8 April. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 9 and 11 April 1801.
11 RA, Ordner, J. Bernstorff to Baudissin, 10 April 1801.
13 Paul was in the habit of expelling diplomats with whom he was dissatisfied, and of recalling Russian ambassadors from countries which had displeased him. He had done so with, as seen above, Whitworth in April 1800. He also expelled the French minister Dumouriez on 15 April, although Dumouriez was apparently convinced that Rostopchin, and not the Tsar, was the cause of his dismissal (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 46, Whitworth to Grenville, 2 April 1800). The Austrian envoy, Cobenzl, was not expelled, but was forbidden access to the court. (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Whitworth to Grenville, 14 March 1800). The Austrian chargé d'affaires, Klüpfel, was ordered to retire (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 173 A, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 30 June 1800, in cipher). The envoy of the King of Sardinia, Balbe, was ordered to leave the capital within two hours, in spite of the fact that he was ill (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1001, Reden to the King, 16 December 1800), and the consul general of the Roman Emperor was told that he would no longer be recognised, but that he could stay on as a merchant (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 В, Lusi to the court, 28 November 1800). Paul recalled Vorontsov from London on the pretext that at that moment there were no important objects of negotiation between the two courts. (Vorontsov communicated the order to Grenville on 8 May 1800. He was replaced by the chargé d'affaires Lizakevich. Cf. Aspinall, *op. cit.*, III, 341; PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Whitworth to Grenville, 3 May 1800). He also Kolychev from Vienna, probably Lizakevich from Copenhagen although official excuses were given later, and was about to recall Kruidener from Berlin before being assassinated. Rosenkrantz's expulsion stirred up the most reaction. Helbig, the Saxon envoy in Berlin, suggests another reason for Rosenkrantz's disfavour and relates a conversation which took place between the Danish minister and Paul: 'M. de Rosenkrantz parla de ses principes assez vivement, au point même, qu'il eut la hardiesse de dire un jour son sentiment à l'Empereur. Ce prince, l'ayant rencontré dans la rue, l'aborda. - "Comment", dit-il, "vont les affaires?" - "Très mal, Sire, car nous allons être attaqués." - "Je m'y attends, mais je
News of Paul's death arrived in Berlin on 4 April, 24 hours after the signing of the convention with Hanover. The King appeared to be greatly grieved at his death and immediately had second thoughts about what he had undertaken. He certainly did not hide how dissatisfied he was with the turn of events. So dissatisfied, in fact, that he ordered his entourage not to bring up the subject of the invasion in court. Haugwitz, as can well be imagined, was not very pleased with how things turned out either, although he expected that the event would bring about peace. Indeed, this was the general opinion prevailing at the court. Nevertheless, Paul's death put Prussia in a difficult position. Many at court thought Prussia had gone too far to back down. To make matters worse, about a week after news of Paul's death reached Berlin, reports of a convention being signed at Copenhagen started coming in. The court of Berlin was worried that the full weight of the burden which it had taken upon itself, in the knowledge that Russia was there to help and support her, would now fall on its shoulders, and all those who had been opposed to the invasion of Hanover now started to work feverishly to get the measure revoked.

14 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 20 April 1801, in cipher, in which Haugwitz wrote that news of Paul's death arrived a few hours after Paul's 'ultimatum'. Cf., PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 4 April 1801; StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 4 April 1801, who both write that news arrived on the 4th.

15 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 11 April 1801 (21 germinal IX).

16 StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 5 April 1801, in cipher.

17 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 8 April 1801.

18 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 12 April 1801.

19 StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 9 April 1801.

20 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 15 April 1801. Baudissin writes that Haugwitz was informed on 13th April of the armistice (RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 21 April 1801, in cipher).

21 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 16 April 1801 (26 germinal IX).
One historian has asserted that with Paul's death, Russia's allies hoped that there would be a change in Russia's anti-English policy. This statement has to be qualified. The end of hostilities and the Russian overture towards Britain was welcomed by almost everybody, but in the belief that the new Tsar would continue to adhere to the principles of maritime neutrality. Haugwitz obviously realised which way the wind was turning and welcomed Alexander's conciliatory attitude. He even informed Lusi that if Prussia had taken so long to carry out the measures that its allies expected of it, it was in the hope of seeing a rapprochement take place.

J'ai toujours été dans l'idée qu'il ne fallait pas négliger les voyes de la négociation entre puissances qui sont faites pour s'entendre, et je m'en suis expliqué dans ce sens a plus d'une reprise envers les cours de Petersburg et de Londres. Bien plus, et je ne ferais aucune difficulté d'en faire l'aveu à Sa Majesté Impériale, c'est l'espérance quelques fois renaissante d'un rapprochement, qui a dicté ma grande modération dans l'emploi des mesures eventuelles auxquelles je m'étais engagé.

There is probably a grain of truth in this avowal, Haugwitz having preferred a peaceful settlement rather than open conflict with Britain. He realised that as a result of the invasion Prussia was more or less politically isolated. In an effort to justify its military intervention, Haugwitz entered upon some clumsy diplomatic acrobatics, which led not only to a radical change in foreign policy, but also to a change in the manner in which former policy was interpreted. After the Anglo-Danish Convention, great indifference for the cause of the Armed Neutrality was affected by Berlin, and all the blame for the conflict was placed upon the deceased Tsar. Prussia had been most reluctantly forced into invading Hanover by the Tsar, and Friedrich Wilhelm had never entertained the idea of permanently keeping the electorate. Prussia hoped to

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22Krauel, 'Die Beteiligung Preußens,' 227: 'Man hoffte auf eine Änderung der anti-englischen Politik, zu welcher der Zar seine Bundesgenossen gezwungen hatte.'

23Cf., StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 30 May 1801: 'Graf Haugwitz versicherte nochmals, daß die nordische Mächte die eigentliche Grundsätze der bewaffneten Neutralität wider England streng behaupten würden, [...].' 

24GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 B, Haugwitz to Lusi, 13 April 1801.

25He admitted as much to Helbig (StAD, 216, 26 April 1801, in cipher). Beurnonville reports a similar impression in AAE, Prusse 229, 9 May 1801 (19 floréal IX), and remarked that it was distressing (affligeant) to Haugwitz since Prussia's isolation was due to the measures undertaken at his insistence.

26PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 3 May 1801.
make a merit out of the occupation by emphasizing how it had preserved Hanover from a French invasion. But as Carysfort pointed out, while a French invasion of Hanover may have been averted by Prussia's temporary occupation, the measure was not motivated by this reasoning. Also, Haugwitz was at pains to point out that trade with Britain had not actually been cut off, that those measures designed to do so had in any case been deliberately deferred, and that orders would be immediately given for the resumption of trade. Haugwitz had no qualms about pointing out the embarrassment in which Prussia found itself as to the best means of taking back their steps, and hoped that the court of London would make allowances for them. Undeniably, Prussia never implemented blockade measures that prevented the British from conducting trade with Germany, and those few measures that were introduced, were half-heartedly enforced. To be fair, however, it should be pointed out that even if these measures were not strictly applied, the effect on British commerce was the same from the moment that the closing of the north German ports was officially

27 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 19 April 1801, 3 and 17 May; AAE, Prusse 229, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 28 April 1801 (8 floréal IX). Reden for one considered this to be nothing more than a pretext to stay in Hanover (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 2 May 1801).

28 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 3 May 1801. Even so, he was convinced that the evacuation of Prussia would be the signal for the French to enter (Dropmore Papers, op. cit., VII, 13, Carysfort to Grenville, 4 May 1801).

29 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 19 April 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 17 April 1801, in cipher: 'Elle [the military occupation] n'implique nullement la clôture effective des rivières, car loin d'en être déjà venu à l'exécution de cette dernière mesure, je l'ai encore suspendue à dessein jusqu'ici sans couper la communication de la Grande Bretagne [...], et sans interrompre son commerce avec mes états.' The same argument used by Jacobi to the court, 22 May 1801, in cipher. Cf., Dropmore Papers, op. cit., VII, 13, Carysfort to Grenville, 4 May 1801.

30 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 3 May 1801.

31 Charles Pater reported at the beginning of December 1800, the arrival of a convoy of English vessels from Hamburg, to which the Prussian garrison made no opposition (AAE, Allemagne, 701, Pater to Talleyrand, 8 December 1800 (17 frimaire IX)). English vessels were still arriving at the beginning of March, although admittedly only three arrived. (AAE, Allemagne 702, Pater to Talleyrand, 6 and 13 March 1801, (15 and 22 ventôse IX)). Cf. Ford, op. cit., 262, note 1, in which he states that an order went out to the Prussian generals dated 23 April 1801 to let all commerce go undisturbed. This order is to be found in Rep. XI, 140 C. 1. Cf. also GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 B, Haugwitz to Lusi, 17 April 1801; Brückner, op. cit., VI, 262-263, Krüdener to Panin, 23 June 1801.
announced. Not one British ship entered the Sound during the first four months of 1801, and the town of Bremen complained that the military occupation of the town brought about an almost total interruption of shipping.

Because of the unstable international scene, Haugwitz decided that it was better to bide his time for a while and see how relations between Petersburg and London developed. Although the King ordered that Prussian troops on the occupied coasts should be alerted to a possible English attack, Haugwitz and Struensee thought it unnecessary and were more concerned with getting the King to take energetic measures against Denmark to evacuate Hamburg.

Prussia was not involved in the Anglo-Russian negotiations, and Lord St Helens gave to understand that an agreement between Britain and Prussia would have to be conducted on separate terms. At first, the Prussian government believed that it would be invited to take part in the negotiation, along with Denmark and Sweden. It considered a concerted action as necessary and had no intention of letting Russia negotiate on its behalf. But when the talks between Panin and St Helens began, without Lusi being officially notified of either their content or of their course, the Prussian government complained about this lack of consideration, and instructed its ambassador in Petersburg to keep his distance. The same instructions were given to Le Coq. When the Convention was finally signed between Panin and St Helens, it was kept from Lusi for several days. He only learnt of its content through the Swedish ambassador, General Stedingk. On 25 June, Panin felt bound, although late in the game, to inform officially the Prussian ambassador of this new development. He apologised for not being able to allow Prussia to participate in the negotiations because St Helens had strictly refused and could not be moved in spite of all his efforts to get him to change his mind. This, as documents bear out, was not true, and even Lusi did not accept the excuse. He pointed out that it was Russia's duty as an allied power, and out of respect of the conditions laid down by the Armed Neutrality, not to sign anything that would change the conditions of that treaty.

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32 Ragsdale, Détente, 87.
33 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1, Dohm to the King, 16 May 1801.
34 Cf., GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 17 April 1801.
35 This does not seem to bear out Feldbaek's remark that the Prussians were treated with more outward consideration (Feldbaek, The Anglo-Russian rapprochement,' 224).
News of the Anglo-Russian convention reached Berlin on 30 June.36 Haugwitz, however, was less concerned by a change of foreign policy in relation to the Armed Neutrality, as by a possible change in Russian policy in Germany and its effect on Prussian territorial demands. He had been able to count on Paul, more or less, in his demands for compensation, but it was feared that the young Alexander would not immediately begin to play a role in European politics until he got settled into government. Prussia would then have to rely on its own forces or enter into closer relations with France. In a private letter addressed to Jacobi on 15 April 1801, Haugwitz extolled what he called Prussia’s restraint in its dealings with Britain, so that now it was not obliged to beat a hasty retreat. His government’s position was also facilitated by the fact that Britain had not adopted an official stance concerning Prussia’s occupation of the electorate.

Nevertheless, when Carysfort and Krüdener separately notified Haugwitz of the convention and Krüdener, as instructed, suggested that Prussia accede to it or accept Russian mediation in negotiations with Britain,37 Haugwitz’s displeasure was keen, and he complained bitterly of Russia’s procedure.38 News of the Anglo-Russian convention reached Berlin shortly before a dispatch from Jacobi in London arrived carrying an English note demanding Prussia’s evacuation of Hanover.39 After a conference with Carysfort,40 Haugwitz wrote Lusi pretending to ignore the existence of the Anglo-Russian convention, asking him to declare that Prussia, still faithful to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, hoped that the new Tsar would not undertake anything without consulting his allies beforehand.41 In this way he hoped to express, in a rather indirect and ineffective manner, his displeasure with the Russian court at not having respected its engagements. Haugwitz reacted to the convention between Russia and Britain by behaving as though it could have no possible influence on Prussian

36 RA, Depecher, Selby to Bernstorff, 30 June 1801, in cipher; SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to Ehrenheim, 1 July 1801.
37 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 11 July 1801, in cipher; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 11 July 1801, in cipher. According to Reden, when Carysfort came to officially inform Haugwitz of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian convention on Sunday 5 July, he denied having any knowledge of it.
38 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 4 July 1801 (15 messidor IX); RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Benstorff, 1 August 1801, in cipher.
39 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 4 July 1801 (15 messidor IX); Brückner, op. cit., VI, 265, Krüdener to Panin, 7 July 1801.
40 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 11 July 1801, in cipher.
41 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 4 July 1801 (15 messidor IX).
policy and as something that should be considered independently of Prussian state interests.\(^{42}\)

It was obvious that the convention spelt the end of the Armed Neutrality. Prussia sent declarations to the courts of Sweden and Denmark to that effect, pointing out that both northern powers would be obliged to accede to the agreement. Prussia wanted to settle separately with Britain\(^{43}\) but was waiting for English suggestions to do so. No mention was made of Hanover at this stage, but as there was no longer anything holding Prussia to its former allies, it began to look askance upon Denmark’s presence in north Germany.

2. Prussia clashes with Denmark

The first signs of tension came soon after Denmark signed an armistice with Britain and occurred, as has been briefly mentioned, over Lauenburg. On 21 April, a meeting was held in Potsdam to decide what measures were to be adopted to suit the change of circumstances.\(^{44}\) It was decided that, regardless of the Armed Neutrality, Prussia should suspend the measures taken to close the Elbe and Weser.\(^{45}\) Haugwitz wrote to inform Lucchesini that given Alexander’s desire to enter into friendly relations with Britain and the Danish armistice, he was obliged in consequence to modify the Prussian policy.\(^{46}\) There was no longer any point in continuing to block the Elbe and Weser and, as such, Denmark’s presence in north Germany, and especially the occupation of Hamburg, was considered inappropriate (unzweckmässig). The Prussian court’s first concern was to see that all Danish troops within its ‘sphere of influence’ were withdrawn, as it was thought that a prolonged Danish presence in north Germany would only harm Prussia’s prestige. Another motive which led Haugwitz to demand Denmark’s evacuation, and which he avowed in a conversation with Beurnonville, was his desire to see the navigation of the Elbe restored. Now that the conflict was virtually over, he had no intention of missing out on the benefits of trade.

\[\text{II [Haugwitz] déclare que la Baltique était tout à fait livrée aux Anglais par suite des dispositions de l'Empereur Alexandre, et de l'armistice de}\]

\(^{42}\) HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 11 July 1801, in cipher.  
\(^{43}\) Haugwitz insinuated to Carysfort that he was ready to negotiate a treaty similar to the Anglo-Russian convention (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 16 July 1801).  
\(^{44}\) RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 21 April 1801, in cipher.  
\(^{45}\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 24 April 1801.  
\(^{46}\) GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 17 April 1801, in cipher; and Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 17 April 1801.
l'Angleterre avec le Danemark, la Prusse ne doit pas seule renoncer aux avantages d'un commerce nécessaire pour elle; qu'elle ne doit pas non plus, dans l'état présent des choses, laisser plus longtemps une ville amie et libre soumise à des réquisitions onéreuse et occupée par des troupes étrangères dont la présence prolongée peut porter coup à son crédit [...].

On receiving news of the conclusion of the Anglo-Danish armistice, Haugwitz sent off a courier to Copenhagen to say that this necessarily led to a sort of stagnation of the maritime association and that under these conditions the measures implemented by Prussia had to undergo certain modifications. The Prussian envoy in Copenhagen was instructed to inform verbally the Danish Ministry that not only was the further occupation of Hamburg considered superfluous, but that Denmark had denied the right to such an occupation by having signed a truce with Britain. If the Danish troops were not withdrawn, a Prussian corps would be sent to Hamburg, although reluctantly, to take possession of the city.

Senfft von Pilsach delivered his instructions to a sick and suffering Bernstorff. The Danish ambassador thought the demand unjust, especially since Prussia continued to occupy Hanover. Since the count seemed to show the greatest reluctance to withdraw the Danish troops, Senfft von Pilsach thought it necessary to mention that Prussia would use force if need be. The Danish Crown Prince reacted strongly to the Prussian demand, was incensed by the brusque and insulting manner in which the declaration was delivered, and at first wanted to meet force with force. Bernstorff convinced him, however, to adopt a more moderate approach, pointing out that a military stance against Prussia was out of the question. One of the reasons why Denmark occupied Hamburg was to stop it from falling into Prussian hands. Now they had no choice but to accept Prussian assurances that Hamburg would remain

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47 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 12 May 1801 (22 floréal IX). Beurnonville, in fact, had gone to see Haugwitz on the 11th to complain of the manner in which Prussia was behaving towards Britain, and had received this cold answer in reply (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 12 May 1801).

48 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 23 and 27 April 1801; Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, Haugwitz to Schultz, 24 April 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 9 May 1801; AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 29 April 1801 (9 floréal IX); StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, Brückner, op. cit., VI, 230, Krüdener to Panin, 28 April 1801.

49 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, 89 A, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 28 April 1801, in cipher. Although I am not at all sure which Bernstorff it was, since by this time both of them were suffering from measeles, and one of them had gout to boot.

50 RA, Ordner, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 1 May 1801.
independent and neutral.\textsuperscript{51} Accordingly, Baudissin was instructed to say that, although the Danish government saw no reason why it should evacuate Hamburg before being certain about its relations with London, the King agreed to do so. He was also to ask for assurances that Prussia would continue to defend Denmark's interests as a member of the Armed Neutrality.\textsuperscript{52} At the same time, he was ordered to inform the Prince of Hesse to evacuate Hamburg. Baudissin received this dispatch on 5 May, and went to see Haugwitz the next morning. The Danish ambassador personally thought that the Prussian demand was an attempt either to keep Hanover or the result of its embarrassment vis-à-vis Britain and its desire to curry favour with that country.\textsuperscript{53}

In Hamburg the Prussian ambassador was also requested to inform the Danish troops of Berlin's decision.\textsuperscript{54} Schultz, who received his instructions on 26 April, communicated their contents to the Prince of Hesse on the following day. Prince Carl was, of course, dissatisfied by the tone adopted by Prussia.

When the Danish government complained about the manner in which Senfft von Pilsach had delivered his instructions, Haugwitz not only proffered his apologies, but almost completely disavowed his ambassador's declarations and promised a written reply on the subject.\textsuperscript{55} After having Senfft von Pilsach's note read to him by the Danish ambassador in Berlin, Haugwitz exclaimed, 'où Mr de Senfft a-t-il péché tout cela?' and complained how difficult it was to find people capable of faithfully transmitting his instructions.\textsuperscript{56} These apologies, however, were nothing more than sugar coating on a bitter pill, and in spite of the fact that Haugwitz insisted on the King's desire to continue to fulfil his treaty engagements, Prussia's demands remained the same and were reiterated in an official note dated 8th May.\textsuperscript{57} Haugwitz asked that

\textsuperscript{51}Feldbaek, Denmark, 178.

\textsuperscript{52}RA, Ordrer, Bernstorff to Baudissin, 1 May 1801.

\textsuperscript{53}Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 234-235, Krüdener to Panin, 5 May 1801. Baudissin and Beurnonville also thought the measure was undertaken to gratify Britain (RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 12 May 1801, in cipher).

\textsuperscript{54}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 24 April 1801; copy in Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166. Cf., StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 28 April 1801.

\textsuperscript{55}RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 6 May 1801.

\textsuperscript{56}RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 9 May 1801.

\textsuperscript{57}RA, Depecher, Haugwitz to Baudissin, 8 May 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Schultz, 8 May 1801, copy in Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166, in which Schultz was authorised to threaten the use of force; StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 12 May 1801. On the same day, the Prince of Hesse was obliged to come to an
the Prince of Hesse carry out the necessary preparations prior to withdrawing his troops. Bemstorff had in fact no other choice but to accept the Prussian demands, and after some hesitation, decided that it was better not to press things any further.  

The Prince of Hesse, however, was reluctant to withdraw, and approached the Russian chargé d'affaires in Hamburg, Fursmann, to ask him if Berlin had acted in concert with his court. He argued that he could see no reason why he should withdraw, as long as Berlin did not appear disposed to evacuate Hanover. The Prince of Hesse received orders to leave the city about 15 May, in consequence of which Hamburg was finally evacuated on Saturday 23 May, without any 'excesses' being committed. Before doing so, he delivered a declaration to the Senate which basically stated that a change in politics had rendered the continued occupation of Hamburg unnecessary. The Danish troops, however, only withdrew to within a couple of miles of the city and continued to remain there under the command of Prince Friederik until the end of August. But both the Senate and the town's people were so happy at seeing the Danish troops leave their city that they offered the Prince

arrangement with the English envoy, whereby all shipping on the lower Elbe was allowed free passage. A convention to that effect was signed between Crawfurd and the Prince of Hesse (PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Cockburn to Hammond, 8 May 1801; Piggott and Omond, op. cit. 496-497).  

58 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, Senfft von Pilsach to the court, 2 May 1801, with copy of notes exchanged between Pilsach and Bemstorff.  

59 RA, Ordner, Bemstorff to Baudissin, 16 May 1801, in cipher.  

60 Brückner, op. cit., VI, 242, Krüdener to Panin, 16 May 1801.  

61 PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 15 May 1801.  

62 StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 23 May 1801.  

63 StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to Gries, 22 and 29 May 1801; PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 22 May 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 26 May 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Dänemark, Haugwitz to Senfft von Pilsach, 25 May 1801, and Baudissin to Haugwitz, 22 May 1801.  

64 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C. 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, copy of Hamburger Correspondenien, 20 May 1801; also mentioned in PRO, FO 33 Hamburg, Crawfurd to Hawkesbury, 26 May 1801; and Brückner, op. cit., VI, 344, Fursmann to Panin, 22 May 1801.  

65 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C. 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 1 June 1801.  

66 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C. 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Schultz to the King, 5 August 1801; StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 1 September 1801.
of Hesse some money and thanked the Prussian government for its efforts in bringing the withdrawal about.\(^67\)

Now that Prussia had virtually succeeded in getting Denmark out of north Germany, it remained to be seen what to do with the other territories occupied by Prussian troops. Kleist evacuated Bremen at the end of June, but Prussia was in no hurry to evacuate either Ritzbüttel, Hamburg, or Hanover. The Senate of Hamburg had, of course, heard the rumours circulating in Berlin about a possible French invasion of Hanover,\(^68\) and some of its members at least took the threats seriously, to the point of wanting Prussia to remain in Cuxhaven until the danger of a French threat was over. Although this view was not held by most of its members, they nevertheless decided to instruct their envoy in Berlin to cease demanding the evacuation of their territory.\(^69\) Also, the Danish army was still near, and this fact must have influenced their decision. Cuxhaven was not evacuated until 7 November.\(^70\) Hanover was a little more complicated, as its fate depended on a number of factors.

\(^67\) StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Bürgermeister to Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 May 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Bürgermeister to the King, 3 June, and Haugwitz to Schultz, 9 June 1801 (copy in Rep. 81 Hamburg, 166); Brückner, op. cit., VI, 344 and 345, Fursmann to Panin, 22 May and 5 June.

\(^68\) StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 9, 10 and 19 June 1801.

\(^69\) StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 10 July, and 1 September 1801. Cf. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 13 September 1801, in cipher, in which he relates Sienens's apprehension about a Prussian withdrawal.

\(^70\) StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Gries to Sienen, 6 November 1801.
CHAPTER IX

THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM HANOVER

1. Haugwitz's indemnity plans

Haugwitz's hope of fulfilling Prussia's ambitious territorial demands was, as already suggested, one of the reasons that influenced his decision to invade Hanover. Although he never intended to confound the Armed Neutrality with affairs in the Holy Roman Empire, he knew perfectly well that the decisions taken concerning north Germany would greatly influence the French government's dispositions with regard to secularisations. He hoped to establish a closer rapport between Prussia, France and Russia so as to come to an agreement on the fate of Germany. What Prussia hoped to gain as indemnities were, essentially, the bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg. They were considered necessary to cover the north of Germany from an eventual aggression from the south. There are two notes from Haugwitz to the Russian court during this period which help determine what Prussia's attitude towards Hanover and secularisations was.

The first was a note handed to Krüdener on 2 March 1801 presenting Prussia's indemnity demands. Paul received Prussia's wishes on 13 March. They included the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg, a large part of the bishopric of Eichstadt, the towns of Nürnberg, Weussenberg, Windsheim, Rothenburg, Schwabisch Hall, Schweinfurth, and the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Osnabruck, Eichfeldt, including the town of Erfurt. Most of these were in the Franconian circle.

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1 GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 6 February 1801, in cipher.
2 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 20 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69.
3 GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 A, Haugwitz to the King, 2 March 1801. See also Trachevski, op. cit., 70, 672; Ford, op. cit., 232; Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 26-35; Brückner, op. cit., V, 428 and 215-225; Ulmann, op. cit., 256.
The second note was a reply to Paul's 'ultimatum' and was handed to Krüdener on 30 March. Haugwitz did not categorically refuse Hanover as an indemnity but added one small modification. The Tsar was to declare publicly that if Britain did not give in to the principles of the maritime association, nor yield the possession of Malta, Russia would invite Prussia, under its guarantee, to keep Hanover as an indemnity for its losses. The King of Prussia was to make a similar declaration and set a date before which the English government was to reply. Silence on the part Britain was to be considered a refusal. If it proved impossible to keep Hanover as an indemnity, Haugwitz most certainly intended on using the electorate as a trump card in the negotiations to obtain other indemnities. If this failed, he could always fall back on his last option, which he was not likely to give up so readily, namely the bishoprics and towns of Franconia. This leads one to believe that Hanover was seriously considered as an indemnity but poses the question to what extent?

a) Hanover, another Prussian province?

The idea of occupying Hanover on a permanent basis was not new at Berlin, and the Prussians had not waited for suggestions from Bonaparte or Paul before thinking of it themselves (although their logic and resolve was certainly strengthened by them). Those who thought a permanent annexation of Hanover necessary for Prussia's security in north Germany included Haugwitz, Lombard, Hardenberg, Beyme, Köckritz, Prince Henry, and Brunswick. They were not, however, in

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4 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 81 Petersburg, 169, copy of counter-project handed to Krüdener, 30 March 1801; and Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 373, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 30 March 1801, in cipher.
5 If Prussia could not keep Hanover, then she would have been satisfied with Würzburg and Bamberg (AAE, Prusse 229, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 7 July 1801 (18 messidor IX)).
6 Brückner, op. cit., VI, 258-259, Krüdener to Panin, 19 June 1801.
7 Hardenberg is said to have spoken about it to one of his friends, saying that Prussia will keep Hanover if possible and if other powers do not intervene (reported by Heßbig, StAD, 216, 31 March 1801, in cipher). Baudissin wrote (RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 24 October 1801, in cipher): '[...] de tous les ministres prussiens consultés relativement à l'affaire d'Hanovre, le Baron de Hardenberg a été celui, qui s'est prononcé le plus fortement pour la réunion de l'électorat à la monarchie prussienne, et en faveur des mesures violentes, qu'on a cru se trouver dans la nécessité de prendre contre sa patrie.'
8 The Prince told Beuronville: 'Si j'étais roi de Prusse, demain je serais l'allié de la France et l'Hanovre serait mon domaine.' (AAE, Prusse 229, Beuronville to Talleyrand, 30 June 1801 (11 messidor IX)).
favour of war, but rather of obtaining the territory through peaceful, diplomatic means. Between the months of March and June 1801 those in favour of keeping Hanover on a permanent basis seem to have increased in number at the court. The idea was to remain fairly alive as long as the government believed it could count on Russia. So, even though the King assured the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Carysfort that he had no ulterior aims in occupying Hanover, that it was simply a result of his alliance with the northern powers, and that he had no intention of keeping the electorate, this was certainly not the case for most of his ministers.¹⁰

On the other hand, there were those, especially the military, who were in favour of a temporary occupation and exploitation of the province. The public in general seems to have adhered to this policy or at least believed that the occupation would only be for a short length of time.¹¹ So did the finance minister Schulenburg. As for the King, he expressed his discontent with the predicament brought about by the invasion on several occasions.¹² When, for example, General Duroc stopped in Berlin on his way to Petersburg and congratulated Friedrich Wilhelm on his successful invasion of the electorate, the King showed his displeasure, and soon broke off the conversation,¹³ put out by what he considered to be Prussia's embarrassing position.¹⁴ Haugwitz then played for time in the hope that something would turn up that would allow him to keep the electorate. He hoped to gain something from the confusion which seemed to reign for the moment in Russia, perhaps from the new Tsar's inability to turn his attention towards Germany,¹⁵ and was encouraged in the belief that Hanover could be kept as an indemnity by several factors:

⁹ RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Benrstorff, 7 October 1801, in cipher: 'On assure [...] que le Duc de Brunswick régnant a mis à profit les manoeuvres à Potsdam pour faire des représentations au roi sur la continuation de l'occupation du pays d'Hanovre.'

¹⁰ PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 17 May 1801: 'Whatever may have been the seeming intention of some members of the Prussian ministry respecting Hanover, the King, I am fully persuaded, has never entertained the idea of appropriating it to himself, and the sentiments of the cabinet on this subject I believe to be now in unison with His Majesty's.'

¹¹ HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 2 March 1801, where he comments that the public at large believed in the practicability of a temporary occupation and exploitation of the electorate, rather than in its union to Prussia; and HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 17 April 1801, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 67.

¹² Cf. StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 5 April 1801, in cipher.

¹³ HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 12 May 1801.

¹⁴ Brückner, op. cit., VI, 280, Krüdener to Panin, 28 July 1801.

¹⁵ Cf. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 2 May 1801; Ford, op. cit., 247.
1. The King himself was at first tempted by the idea of Hanover as an indemnity, and agreed to the principle on 23 May.

2. Paul I suggested that Prussia keep Hanover as an indemnity in March, and although he was now dead the new Tsar had not pronounced himself on Hanover.

3. France was at first eager for Prussia to take the province as an indemnity for the loss of the left bank.\(^\text{16}\)

4. Neither Britain or Austria had ever officially reacted to the Prussian incursion, (nor for that matter had any other power).\(^\text{17}\) Indeed it was believed that Prussia would use Austria's expansionist intentions to get its own ideas accepted.\(^\text{18}\)

5. Later, as circumstances on the continent changed, Prussia's greatest fear and ostensible reason for remaining in the electorate, was that France threatened to occupy it. Talleyrand dispatched a few suggestions to Beurnonville concerning a Franco-Prussian treaty and which called for Hanover being handed over to the French.\(^\text{19}\) The French were dubious of Prussia's motives concerning Hanover and suspected the cabinet of playing a double game.\(^\text{20}\) But at this stage Haugwitz preferred Bonaparte being discontent than falling out with Russia and Britain.\(^\text{21}\) Lucchesini succinctly summed up the French point of view:

Selon ce premier magistrat de la République française [Talleyrand], V. M. devrait s'attacher au plan de faire servir l'électorat de Hanovre, avec quelques enclavures à sa convenance, d'objet d'indemnité et de moyen d'agrandissement pour la monarchie prussienne. Il croit 1º que c'est un grand point de l'avoir déjà occupé et de pouvoir s'y raffermir par l'entrée de

\(^{16}\) Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 40, Talleyrand to Beurnonville, 2 May 1801.

\(^{17}\) HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 19 May 1801, in cipher.

\(^{18}\) HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 2 May 1801.

\(^{19}\) Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 52. Lucchesini later reported (ibid., II, 58-59, 9 September 1801) that Bonaparte was so intent on occupying Hanover because: (i.) he needed contributions which were no longer coming in from Italy, Holland and Switzerland; (ii.) the loss of Egypt, the probability that no descent would be made on Britain, and the dissolution of Maritime League.

\(^{20}\) Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 44-45, Lucchesini's report dated 25 May 1801. The Prussian ambassador reported that French public opinion considered the occupation of Hanover to have been carried out in concert with Britain, and that they had remained there to impede the French from taking the Electorate over.

\(^{21}\) For Haugwitz's reasons on his refusal of Bonaparte's treaty suggestion cf. Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 53-55, 21 August 1801. Haugwitz's reply to Beurnonville is related in his report dated 24 August, ibid., 55-57. Haugwitz was expecting Bonaparte to take military measures against Prussia as a result of this refusal. Cf. Carysfort's dispatch dated 8 August 1801.
nouvelles troupes. 2° Il suppose que l'ensemble de cette acquisition donnerait une augmentation plus réelle de forces et plus considérable de puissance et de considération à la Prusse que toutes les autres. 3° Il prétend que l'électorat de Hanovre, appartenant à la maison qui porte la couronne d'Angleterre, a été et sera toujours ou motif ou prétexte ou moyen de guerres étrangères à la constitution de l'Empire; que par conséquent l'Allemagne et la moitié de l'Europe gagnerait infiniment en repos, si l'on arrachait à une maison vouée à la politique anti-continentale de l'Angleterre une possession qui donne à celle-ci une prise dangereuse sur le continent [...].

Talleyrand also authorised Beunonville to intimate that it was up to the Prussian government to make the temporary occupation of Hanover definitive.\[22\]

It seemed likely to many contemporaries that Prussia would keep Hanover. It had been suspected of wanting to annex Hanover for some time and, of course, the British were worried about the possibility.\[24\] Helbig was convinced that Prussia would not give up its conquest, and that it would eventually become a Prussian province.\[25\] Reden, was equally convinced that Prussia intended to keep Hanover, and thought that the dissolution of the Observation Army was part of a vast plan by the Prussian ministry. His colleague in London, von Lenthe, expressed his concern that Prussia would keep Hanover, although he was convinced that the idea revolted the King.\[26\] The Danish envoy did not hide from his French counterpart his government's worries about Prussia appropriating the electorate.\[27\] In addition, the Danish government could hardly be pleased about the prospects of a considerably enlarged Prussia. Several diplomats remarked that the Prussian cabinet would continue the occupation in the hope of realising its annexation, or again it was maintained that the occupation would continue because Prussia expected a war with France.\[28\]

\[22\]Bailleu, *Preußen und Frankreich*, II, 39, Lucchesini to the court, 24 April 1801.

\[23\]Bailleu, *Preußen und Frankreich*, II, 40, Talleyrand to Beunonville, 2 May 1801 (12 Fléorial IX): '[…] il pourrait ne tenir qu'à lui [the Prussian government] de rendre définitive l'occupation provisoire qu'il vient de faire de l'électorat de Hanovre [...]'.

\[24\]GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, Jacobi to the court, 1 May 1801, in cipher; Aspinal, Correspondence of George III, II, 403-404, 14 September 1795, Duke of York to George III.

\[25\]StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 31 March, 3 July, 6 Juin, in cipher, 13 July, in cipher, 30 July 1801, in cipher.

\[26\]HStA, Han. 9 f B, 523, Lenthe to St Helens, 4 May 1801; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, Jacobi to the court, 1 May 1801, in cipher.

\[27\]AAE, Prusse 229, Beunonville to Talleyrand, 11 August 1801 (23 thermidor IX).

\[28\]HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 19 May 1801, in cipher.
thought that the King neither would nor could evacuate the electorate (diese Äußerung ist sehr allgemein) and that nothing prevented him from uniting the province to his kingdom. Although the King felt repugnance for the idea, it was hoped that he could be brought around. In May, in answer to the French proposals, Haugwitz reportedly told Beurnonville: 'L’arrangement dont il s’agit convient parfaitement au Roi, à la Prusse, mais l’exécution présente des difficultés [...]'. There were, indeed, many difficulties that had to be overcome. Once France reconciled itself with Britain, where did that leave Prussia? With an electorate that it might be forced to return to Britain? But if France found a means by which Prussia could keep Hanover without having to fear war, all the better. Haugwitz reported to Beurnonville: ‘Sa Majesté se croirait le propriétaire imperturbable du pays d’Hanovre, si dans le même temps que la France avait voulu lui proposer cette acquisition, la Russie eut persévéré dans l’offre qu’elle lui en avait fait faire antérieurement.’ Then there was Austria, which would probably use the Prussian acquisition of Hanover as a pretext to get its hands on Bavaria.

More importantly, however, than these factors was that, after the death of Paul, Prussia was virtually isolated on the international scene. Indeed, relations with virtually all the major European powers were strained because of the occupation of Hanover. To keep possession of the electorate, Haugwitz had to be able to count on at least one of the other three great continental powers, and this simply was not the case. This made the keeping of Hanover extremely problematical. The only power willing to lend support, for obvious reasons, was France, but the situation between France and Britain was far too uncertain to be able to rely on that country. Bernstorff, who by the way suspected that some sort of secret agreement had been worked out between Britain and Prussia over Hanover, pointed out the difficulties involved:

Toute la marche de cette cour, tant qu’elle m’ait connue, me fait croire, que depuis la mort de Paul 1er elle n’a plus songé à étendre les limites des états

29 Ibid.: ‘[...] weil die Preussen einem Krieg mit Frankreich entgegensehen.
30 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 19 May 1801 (29 floréal IX), 6 June 1801 (17 prairial IX).
31 AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 27 June 1801 (8 messidor IX).
32 Brückner, op. cit., VI, 248, Krüdener to Panin, 30 May 1801.
33 RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 25 July 1801, in cipher: ‘[...] la continuation de la guerre entre la France et l’Angleterre pouvant amener encore des événements et des chances impossibles à prévoir, on n’osait absolument point se permettre de prendre une résolution partielle sur un objet, qui exigéait le consentement de plus d’une puissance pour pouvoir s’effectuer.’
prussiens aux dépens de l'électorat occupé par ses troupes. Ce n'est pas sans doute qu'elle ne regarde cet arrondissement comme plus avantageux qu'aucun autre dédommagement à sa convoitise, mais elle redoute les difficultés que ce projet rencontrerait de plus d'un côté, et il est dans son caractère, de renoncer aux avantages, qu'elle ne peut poursuivre qu'au risque de compromettre sa tranquillité et son système essentiellement pacifique.  

France also suspected some sort of connivance between London and Berlin, especially after Prussia ordered Denmark to retire from Hanover while itself remaining and re-opening commerce. London, on the other hand suspected Haugwitz of having come to an understanding with France. France's mistrust seems to have increased as a result of Prussia's refusal to withdraw from the electorate to make way for French troops.

So, in spite of these difficulties, did the Prussian cabinet ever seriously consider keeping Hanover as an indemnity for the loss of its transrhenane possessions? Undoubtedly yes, but only on condition that the principle powers concerned agreed to it. Haugwitz was pragmatical about the affair. There was no point in keeping Hanover if either Russia, France or Britain were opposed to it. It would infallibly lead to war. Haugwitz's strategy then was simple - keep hold of Hanover as long as possible, or at least drag out the evacuation as long as possible, all the while reassuring Britain on the fate of the electorate, and all the while hoping that something would turn up. Haugwitz assured Carysfort, although hardly in
explicit or in what the British considered satisfactory terms, as to Prussia's intentions on numerous occasions. He knew only too well to what degree Russo-British relations had changed since the death of Paul and as such had decided to bide his time and not to provoke a reaction on the matter. At the same time, it will be remembered, he favoured the re-establishment of trade with Britain and pressed Denmark to evacuate Hamburg. Haugwitz refused to discuss the resumption of relations with Great Britain until he knew what Russia was going to do and held everything in suspense, waiting for the outcome of the Anglo-Russian negotiations.

The turning point came around the beginning of July, when news of the Anglo-Russian convention and English demands to evacuate Hanover reached Berlin at about the same time. It must have become clear to Haugwitz that Prussia's position in Hanover was untenable and that he would most probably be obliged to evacuate. That is why more effort was placed, from that time on, in obtaining suitable indemnities through acceptable secularisations. Furthermore, as opposition to a Prussian occupation within the European community mounted, Friedrich Wilhelm's reaction was to withdraw his troops as soon as possible. The prevailing opinion at Berlin, 'founded upon the language held by persons connected with the government', was that the King did not intend on keeping Hanover. But before going into the

41Cf. PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 3, 17 May, 6, 23 June, 8, 16, 22 July, 8, 15 August, 1, 13 September 1801.
42Even Reden could not deny that that the court of Berlin had undertaken steps that were favourable to the English (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 8 May, and to the King, 12 May 1801).
43PRO, FO Prussia 64, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 3, 17 May, 16, 23 June, 8 July 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 27 June 1801, in cipher; GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 4 April, and Lucchesini to the court, 13 April 1801, in cipher. Haugwitz confided to Helbig (StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 3 July 1801) that the evacuation of Hanover would depend uniquely on the arrangements that Britain came to with the other northern powers.
44There seemed little hope that the new Tsar would ever agree to let Prussia retain Hanover. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 4 May 1801, in cipher: '[...] il est bien décidé que jamais ce cabinet [Petersburg] n'entra dans l'idée, inadmissible en effet à tant d'égards, de faire du pays d'Hanovre l'objet de mon indemnisation.'
45This is Beunonville's reasoning (AAE, Prusse 229, 4 July 1801 (15 messidor IX)).
46StAD, 216, report from Helbig, 3 July 1801: '[...] le Roi était porté à faire tirer ces troupes de [Hanover] le plutôt possible.'
47PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 28 April 1801.
demands made by the European courts to get Prussia to pull out of the electorate, it is necessary to look at Haugwitz's efforts to get his indemnity plan accepted in Petersburg.

b) Le Coq's mission to Petersburg

It was to hurry the arrangements over indemnities that Haugwitz sent a special envoy, Colonel Le Coq, to Petersburg in March 1801. The object of his mission was twofold. Ostensibly, he was to concert with Russia over the eventual closing of the Baltic but, in fact, Haugwitz used the Armed Neutrality as a pretext in the hope of getting the Tsar to agree to Prussia's demands for territorial compensation in Germany. Le Coq was to divert any difficulties that might arise over the King's views on indemnities. The territories demanded by the Prussian government were designed to round off Prussia's land in Franconia, thereby presenting a respectable barrier in northern Germany against an eventual French, or even Austrian attack. At the same time, Le Coq was to get the Tsar to agree to an immediate Prussian occupation of the Bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg. Indeed this was the pivotal point of his charge.

On his journey, Le Coq learnt of Paul's death but, as it in no way changed the object of his mission, continued on to the Russian capital where he arrived on 3 April. Three days later, Le Coq had a first conference with Panin where he unfolded the two objects of his mission. He handed Panin a note outlining his court's position concerning indemnities and its intention of occupying the bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg as soon as the French had evacuated Franconia after the ratification of the Diet at Ratisbon. Panin's only reaction was to express surprise that he was not

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48 Karl Christian Erdemann von Le Coq sent on a special mission from 10 April 1801, having left Berlin on 16th March (StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5, Sienen to Gries, 17 March; SRA, Borussica, 151, Engeström to the King, 17 March) and left Petersburg on 3 August 1801. Carysfort thought it probable that Le Coq was sent to Petersburg because of the apparent Franco-Austrian rapprochement (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 60, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 1 March 1801). Documents on this mission may be found in Rep. XI, Rußland, 149 D, March 1801-January 1802.


50 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Le Coq to the court, 7 April 1801; copy in Brückner, op. cit., VI, 215-221, and a second note, same date, 221-223. Cf. also ibid., 267-269, Krüdener to Panin, 11 July.
charged with a more general plan of indemnities,\textsuperscript{51} and annoyance at what he considered to be Prussia’s excessive demands and by the haste it showed in wanting to occupy the coveted territories.\textsuperscript{52} Reports started to circulate soon after of a general cooling of Russo-Prussian relations.\textsuperscript{53}

The silence that the Russian court observed towards Le Coq on the subject of his mission proved how much their views differed.\textsuperscript{54} It is likely that Panin was awaiting the arrival of Lord St Helens, and the outcome of the coming negotiations, before declaring himself on Hanover.\textsuperscript{55} This seems to be borne out by the fact that, a couple of weeks after the signing of the Anglo-Russian convention, Panin approached Le Coq to say that the turn of affairs was such that it would be possible to commence discussions on indemnities in Germany.\textsuperscript{56} Le Coq’s mission, then, was a failure, since he was not able to get the Russian court to agree to the occupation of the Franconian Bishoprics.\textsuperscript{57} Panin did not answer the two Prussian notes until the end of April, and then avoided all talk of occupation, and instead insisted on waiting for a general indemnity plan from Haugwitz.\textsuperscript{58} Panin’s answer convinced Haugwitz that nothing was to be expected from Russia and that any hopes he might have had for aggrandisement were dashed.\textsuperscript{59} The reply was so unsatisfactory it caused Le Coq to ask for his leave.\textsuperscript{60} Haugwitz had not met with any better success in getting the

\textsuperscript{51} The fact that Haugwitz formulated Prussia’s indemnity demands without taking the other secular princes into account was a political blunder which aroused their mistrust (\textit{Ibid.}, 249, Krüdener to Panin, 30 May 1801).
\textsuperscript{53} Trachevski, \textit{op. cit.}, 70, 160, Duroc to Talleyrand, 29 May 1801, (9 Prairial an IX), who speaks of Panin wanting to arrange matters in Germany, without the cabinet of Berlin. The cooling of relations lasted until spring.
\textsuperscript{54} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Le Coq to the court, 24 April 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{55} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Haugwitz to Le Coq, 18 May 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{56} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Le Coq to the court, 3 July 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{57} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Le Coq to the court, 8 May 1801: ‘C’est en vain que je m’efforçai à faire sentir la nécessité de l’occupation des évêchés de Franconie; le comte de Panin vient toujours à celle d’un plan général qu’il attend de Votre Majesté; […]’
\textsuperscript{58} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, copy of a note signed Kurakin and Panin, 24 April 1801.
\textsuperscript{59} Brückner, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 247, Krüdener to Panin, 30 May 1801.
\textsuperscript{60} GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Le Coq to the court, 8 May 1801. The request was refused by Haugwitz (\textit{Ibid.}, Haugwitz to Le Coq, 22 May 1801, in cipher).
French to agree to his indemnity plan,\textsuperscript{61} and to make matters worse, complaints about the Prussian occupation were now becoming more vociferous.

2. Pressure is put on Prussia to withdraw from Hanover

One can discern two phases in the events leading up to the evacuation of Hanover. At first, Prussia linked the withdrawal of the electorate to the Armed Neutrality and made it dependant on the conclusion of differences between Britain and the northern powers. But by the beginning of September 1801, the King had completely abandoned this idea and expected the resolution of the problem to stem from an English initiative.\textsuperscript{62} Either Britain would allow Prussian troops to stay, or it would formally demand their withdrawal. During this second phase, Friedrich Wilhelm and his foreign minister constantly justified the continued Prussian presence in Hanover by pointing to the likelihood of a French invasion consequent to a withdrawal of their troops. Whereas before the battle of Copenhagen Prussia had taken action against Britain, it was now taking action to protect the interests of that country. These contradictory statements did not, of course, go unnoticed by contemporaries, and undoubtedly strengthened the sentiment that Prussia was intent on annexing the country.

a) Britain insists on an evacuation

After the Battle of Copenhagen, Carysfort wrote to his court asking for instructions on what steps to take concerning Hanover.\textsuperscript{63} The British cabinet had made it clear that, while declaring it had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the electorate, it would be quite impossible to come to an understanding with Prussia so long as its motives concerning Hanover remained equivocal.\textsuperscript{64} This was actually the first time that Hanover was mentioned in dispatches to the British ambassador in Berlin and the first time in well over a century that the English cabinet decided to make Hanover an issue.\textsuperscript{65} Now that Britain had virtually eliminated its maritime rivals, it was prepared to adopt a more aggressive attitude over Hanover. But the British position was a relatively weak one, and nothing like a 'leave or else' threat

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Haugwitz to Le Coq, 5 June 1801, in cipher.
\item \textsuperscript{62}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 1 September 1801, in cipher (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69).
\item \textsuperscript{63}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 28 April 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{64}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Hawkesbury to Carysfort, 8 May and 18 July 1801.
\item \textsuperscript{65}Cf. Ford \textit{op. cit.}, 248.
\end{itemize}
was ever proffered. On the contrary, the cabinet decided to tread softly for fear of throwing Prussia into the arms of France.66

Carysfort touched upon the subject during a conference with Haugwitz on 17 May, but the Prussian minister had decided not to undertake anything until the results of Lord St Helens' negotiation were known.67 He told Carysfort that he was only waiting for a communication from Petersburg before putting an end to the occupation.68 Later, Haugwitz used the argument that since the invasion occurred in connection with the Armed Neutrality, nothing could be undertaken without first consulting Prussia's allies and that he was awaiting their overtures on the matter.69 In the meantime, and to prevent the British from making any propositions which could embarrass Prussia, Jacobi was ordered to avoid all talk of the subject until further notice.70

Other instances were to follow in which Carysfort exhorted that Prussia restore Hanover,71 but at this stage, he was not in all that much of a hurry to see the Prussians out of the electorate, thinking it was preferable to leave them there, rather than risk seeing the French fill the void.72 A few other high ranking British officials also considered that the occupation of Hanover by Prussia was the lesser of two evils, the alternative being a French invasion.73 Prince Adolphus wrote to George III convinced

66PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Hawkesbury to Carysfort, 18 July 1801; SRA, Borussica, 151, report from Engeström, 11 July 1801, in which he points out Prussia's advantageous position.

67GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 18 May 1801, in cipher. According to Haugwitz, Carysfort was less tactful, but also a little embarrassed.

68PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 17 May 1801.


71HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 6 June 1801, in cipher.

72AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 4 August 1801 (16 thermidor IX). It is possible that Krüdener put those ideas into his head in a conversation reported in RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 27 June 1801, in cipher: 'Il [Krüdener] lui [Carysfort] fit envisager l'occupation du pays d'Hanovre comme le seul moyen d'assurer le repos du nord de l'Allemagne, [...] remarquant enfin que l'occupation des états de Sa Majesté Britannique en Allemagne par des troupes prussiennes était préférable à une invasion des Français, [...].' Nothing, however, is to be found in Carysfort's correspondence relating to this matter.

73This fear was certainly prevalent in London. GStA, Rep. 11 England, 175 C, Balan to the court, 27 September, in cipher, 13 October 1801, in cipher. In September he wrote: 'Une personne qui est en relation avec l'administration m'a dit aujourd'hui qu'on avait tout sujet de craindre que les états
that the Prussian troops would leave the electorate within a short time, as soon as Friedrich Wilhelm was sure of the intentions of the new Russian Emperor and of the French, and argued: '[...]' supposing the latter were to attack the electorate, it is certainly better that an army should be in the country ready to act in conjunction with your own troops than that the enemy should march into it and pillage any part of it before they met with proper resistance.'

Most high ranking British officials, however, thought differently. Even so, no official demands were made upon Prussia to evacuate the electorate. Carysfort confined himself to insisting upon a 'satisfactory explanation', to which Haugwitz invariably answered the same. If George III desired a Prussian withdrawal from Hanover, then his government would comply, as soon as the issues which compelled it to invade the electorate in the first place were cleared up. Each time he said this, however, he never failed to mention that a French army would most certainly fill the void left by Prussia.

The Prussian cabinet's preoccupations with such an eventuality were probably sincere. It was generally known that France was dissatisfied with Prussia's attitude towards Britain, but even more worrying were the reports Haugwitz had received from Frankfurt and Paris of French troop movements along the Rhine. Lucchesini had supposedly learnt from a reliable source that '[...] si, par quelque motif que ce pût être, Votre Majesté eut souscrit à l'évacuation de ces possessions allemandes de Sa Majesté Britannique, elles auraient été immédiatement occupées par des troupes françaises, dont les corps étaient déjà choisis par des ordres secrets du Premier Consul au Ministre de la Guerre.' On 17 August Beuronville came to see Haugwitz to officially inform him that as Bonaparte had given up all hope of coming to terms with Britain, he was to propose a four-point program that was to serve as a basis for discussions between France and Prussia. The first of these points was that Prussia

electoraux de Sa Majesté Britannique ne fussent envahis par les Français, et que la manière dont le député d'Hanovre vient d'être renvoyé de Paris, n'augurait rien de bon pour cette ville.'

74 Aspinall, op. cit., III, 524.
75 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 8, 16, 22, 25 July, and 5 August 1801, in cipher. Cf. GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 375, Lucchesini to the court, 17 July 1801, in cipher; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 14 July (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69) and 1006, Reden to the King, 3 September 1801 (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69).
76 StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.l, report from Woltmann, 6 May 1801: 'Das ganze Verfahren der preußische Regierung gegen England macht einen üblichen Eindruck auf die französische.'
77 GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 1 June, 8 June, in cipher, and 22 June 1801, in cipher.
78 GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 375, Lucchesini to the court, 9 September 1801.
was to evacuate Hanover and that France was to take possession of the electorate. Of course, Haugwitz refused, and the King found the idea so repugnant it strengthened his resolve to continue the occupation. It was generally believed, not only by the Prussians, that a French invasion of Hanover lay within Bonaparte’s plans. As long as he had hoped to keep Russia from Britain, or to keep possession of Egypt, an invasion of Hanover was probably not a real consideration. But now that these two plans had failed, and that the invasion project against Britain had been made even more improbable by the return of the Baltic fleet, it was thought that an invasion of the electorate had once again become a consideration. In any event, Haugwitz most certainly exaggerated the danger and possibly played not only upon Carysfort’s fears, but those of his royal master as well.

The situation for Prussia, however, was becoming more and more difficult. Prussia had virtually been abandoned by its allies. Krüdener, the Russian ambassador, was conferring daily with Carysfort. Bonaparte was still threatening with a French invasion. The Regency in Hanover started to become more vociferous.

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79 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 3 September 1801 (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69); PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 27 August 1801; Bailleu, *Preußen und Frankreich*, II, 52-53, Talleyrand to Beurnonville, 8 August 1801 (20 thermidor IX). See also copy of minutes of conversation between De Luc and Haugwitz dated (beginning) September 1801. The four points were: ‘i. que les troupes prussiennes évacuent le pays d’Hanovre, et que la Russie consente que la France prenne possession de cet Electorat, de ses places fortes et de ses possessions militaires; ii. que la Prusse occupe les Duchés de Bamberg et de Wurzbourg pour ses indemnités; iii. que l’électeur de Bavière occupe la ville d’Augsbourg et la partie de la Souabe dans laquelle on chercherait les indemnités pour la maison palatine, qui devraient être définies par des conventions ultérieures; iv. que le Grand Duché de Toscane prenne possession de l’Archévêché de Salzbourg, de Bergtolsgarden et du territoire de l’Evêché de Nassau, non compris la ville.’

80 For his reasons cf. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 3 September 1801.

81 HStA, Han. 9 f B, 525, Memoir from Reden, 11 August 1801.

82 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 3 September 1801. Cf. Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, Geheimrätte to the King, (date illegible, but most certainly June 1801), in which the Regency repeated rumours of a coming French incursion on north Germany. Instructions were sent to Reden in Berlin to find out how Prussia reacted to these rumours (*ibid.*, 21 June 1801), and to Schwartzkopf in Frankfurt to find out what he could (*ibid.*, 20 June 1801).

83 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 12 September 1801, in cipher.

84 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimrätte, 4 July 1801, in cipher. He told Reden that Carysfort had reserves about Prussia leaving the electorate (HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 14 July 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69).
and declared that they would cease to supply Prussian troops on 21 August. Haugwitz tried to stave off British demands for withdrawal by offering a compromise. In talks with Carysfort he suggested that, to ward off an eventual French invasion, Prussian troops should remain in Hanover and Britain should take over the maintenance of those troops in Hanover. He stipulated that any arrangement agreed to between the two courts should be kept a strict secret and mentioned a sum of £30,000 per month, which Carysfort considered a 'most preposterous expectation', but one which he thought possible to accord if Prussia entered into a defensive agreement with Britain. For a while, Carysfort toyed with the idea of concluding a convention with the Prussian government to protect the electorate, and a number of reasons made him propose such a step. a) He was convinced that France would close the mouths of the Elbe and Weser and occupy and plunder the electorate as soon as the Prussians withdrew. b) He was concerned that the strain of supporting an occupation army would prove too much for the electorate's limited resources, thereby creating a danger for Britain itself. c) He believed that a formal renunciation of any intentions by Prussia to acquire Hanover and the payment of subsidies for its defence would be the best means of protecting the country from Prussia's acquisitive projects. d) And finally, a formal engagement from Prussia would bind her closer to Britain. Based on these ideas, Carysfort drew up a draft of a convention which was presented to Haugwitz on Monday 3 August with the following points:

1. Prussia was to renounce all demands with regard to the maritime convention;
2. Prussia was to return the electorate to its rightful sovereign, without posing any conditions;
3. Prussia was to continue to occupy the electorate, but where possible with a reduced contingent, to avoid the pressures of billeting;
4. Hanover was to be financed by a monthly sum of £30,000 sterling for three months as of 1 of August;
5. This subsidy would not be paid directly to Prussia, but rather to the Regency of Hanover;

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85 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 8 August 1801, in cipher (copy in HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69); Han. 9 f B, 525, memoir from Reden, 11 August 1801.
86 Brückner, op. cit., VI, 273-274 and 276, Kridener to Panin, 18 July and 21 July 1801.
87 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 16 July 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 14 July 1801 (copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69).
6. At the end of this period, Prussia was to withdraw completely from the electorate.\textsuperscript{88}

This initiative was carried out without the knowledge or consent of London. Carysfort justified his actions by arguing: '[...] it seems to me agreeable to the spirit of my instructions not to discourage any overtures which have even a remote tendency to engage Prussia in some concert against France, particularly if it could be brought to it, and it is upon this principle that I have been led to go so far.'\textsuperscript{89} Remote was the operative word. Haugwitz returned a week later and expressed what he called the King's repugnance at putting anything into writing. The King was hurt that his verbal assurances about not wanting to keep Hanover had not been accepted.\textsuperscript{90} This put a virtual end to all discussion over the projected alliance. Carysfort quite rightly suspected that the real reason for the Prussian government's reluctance to enter upon any agreement was their fear of being used by Britain against France.\textsuperscript{91} The King had just burnt his fingers over the Armed Neutrality and was surely not prepared to risk entering upon another agreement when it was perfectly obvious that Britain harboured ulterior motives. A defensive alliance with Britain was a sure means of dragging Prussia into a war against France.\textsuperscript{92}

In London, Haugwitz's proposal to have Prussian troops subsidised by Britain never received any serious consideration. Hawkesbury declared it 'totally inadmissible' and argued that Parliament would never agree to it.\textsuperscript{93} Indeed, on the whole it was a rather cheeky proposition made by Haugwitz in that Britain was asked to advance considerable sums of money to keep the Prussian army in a state of preparedness on what was after all British soil and to ward off a danger that might never eventuate. Hawkesbury would only consider subsidising Prussia if Hanover were attacked by France and if Prussia were ready to join a defensive alliance. But

\begin{footnotes}
\item[88] HStA, Han. 9 f B, 525, Memoir from Reden, 11 August 1801; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 5 August 1801, in cipher.
\item[89] PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 5 August 1801, in cipher.
\item[90] Cf. HStA, Han. 9 f B, 525, Memoir from Reden, 11 August 1801: 'Sein Wort müsse uns vollkommen eben so genügen, als wie alle Papiere, ja auch besser'; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 29 September 1801, in cipher: 'Daß dieser Minister [Hawkesbury] in die wohlmeinenden Absichten seines [Haugwitz's] Königs und des Cabinets so wenig Zutrauen setzte, sei dem König sehr empfindlich.'
\item[91] PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 22 and 28 July 1801.
\item[92] PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 22 September 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the Geheimräte, 8 October 1801, in cipher.
\item[93] PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Hawkesbury to Carysfort, 22 September 1801; HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the Geheimräte, 8 October 1801, in cipher.
\end{footnotes}
London's negative reply did not reach Berlin until the beginning of October.\textsuperscript{94} Haugwitz had complained bitterly about the delay on previous occasions,\textsuperscript{95} but strangely enough, when Carysfort notified Haugwitz of his government's refusal, he was extraordinarily embarrassed, even saddened, by the English decision.\textsuperscript{96} At the same time, Carysfort informed him that he would support Hanoverian initiatives to bring about either the evacuation of the electorate or any other move that would relieve the burden of occupation.

The turning point came after the signing of the peace preliminaries between Britain and France on 1 October 1801. There was no longer any real reason why Prussia should continue to occupy Hanover.\textsuperscript{97} The King was undoubtedly aware of this, and enough pressure was put on him at this stage to decide him to evacuate the electorate. Carysfort was finally instructed to demand Prussia's withdrawal, and in case Haugwitz could not give a definite reply, the demand was to be repeated in concert with the Russian ambassador.\textsuperscript{98} This time, Haugwitz did not raise any objections. On the contrary, he informed Carysfort that given the renewal of peaceful relations between France and Britain, the King had decided upon the withdrawal of his troops, and that the necessary orders would be given the following day, the 24 October.\textsuperscript{99}

b) Alexander supports Britain

As far as the Russians were concerned, neither Alexander, nor Panin, really had time at first to take much interest in Hanover. Panin declared to Lusi on a couple of occasions during and after the negotiations with St Helens that Hanover was an

\textsuperscript{94}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 8 October 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{95}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 29 September 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{96}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 8 October 1801, in cipher: ‘Graf Haugwitz schien außerordentlich darüber betreten, ja, traurig zu sein, daß Eure Königliche Majestät das Anliegen wegen Zahlung von Subsidien so ganz abgelehnt.’
\textsuperscript{97}HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 4 July 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{98}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Hawkesbury to Carysfort, 16 October 1801.
\textsuperscript{99}PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 23 October 1801; and copy of a note from Haugwitz to Carysfort, 25 October; GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 376, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 26 October, 2 November 1801; HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 2, Hammond to Lenthe, 6 November 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 27 October 1801, in cipher. Baudissin remarked that the various Prussian corps which had been used to occupy the Electorate were returning to their garrisons.
affair of the Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{100} It was to please Britain\textsuperscript{101} that Alexander finally instructed his ambassadors in Berlin and Paris to demand the evacuation of the electorate.\textsuperscript{102}

St Helens, who was at this time negotiating what was to become the Anglo-Russian convention, was instructed by Hawkesbury to ask the Russian court for a declaration concerning Hanover. It was believed that Prussia would evacuate the electorate if Russia took a strong stance.\textsuperscript{103} Indeed, St Helens was instructed to say that an understanding with Prussia was not possible so long as the Hanover question remained unresolved. He pointed out that the Russian government would no longer be able to tolerate a Prussian army in Hanover, which was true, and now that Russian foreign policy had changed directions, it could hardly allow Prussian aggrandizement in Germany. But it seems the Russian government had already decided to take up the cause of Hanover of its own accord even before St Helens came to make his request. The probable reason for doing so:

\textit{The truth is that Count Panin, as well as all the other members of this government are thoroughly aware of the mischievous consequences that must result to this Empire from any material aggrandizement of so powerful a neighbour as Prussia; and it therefore should seem probable that they would hazard any extremity, rather than that power should be permitted to retain quiet possession, even of a part of its present usurpations.}\textsuperscript{104}

In Berlin, Krüdener received instructions to convey the desire that his new master wished to see Hanover restored.\textsuperscript{105} Anxious to be of service to the new regime, he apparently outdid Carysfort in his zeal. This was, in actual fact, the resumption of Russia's normal policy concerning north Germany. Also, Alexander

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\textsuperscript{100}GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 B, Lusi to the court, 26 June, 14 July 1801. \\
\textsuperscript{101}Le Coq was convinced that the court of Petersburg considered the evacuation of Hanover as necessary to satisfy Britain (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Rußland, 149 D, Le Coq to the court, 22 May 1801). This is confirmed by the instructions received by Vorontsov on 5 July 1801 (Bartenev, \textit{op. cit.}, 10, 268-269). \\
\textsuperscript{102}Trachevski, \textit{op. cit.}, 70, 210, Instructions to Morkov, 9 July 1801; Narоchnitskii, \textit{op. cit.}, I, 54-56, Alexander to Morkov, 18 July 1801. \\
\textsuperscript{103}PRO, FO 65 Russia, 48, Hawkesbury to St Helens, 9 June 1801. \\
\textsuperscript{104}PRO, FO 65 Russia, 48, St Helens to Hawkesbury, 1 July 1801. \\
\textsuperscript{105}Cf. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 14 July 1801, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 69. 
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sent Friedrich Wilhelm a letter, and Panin assured St Helens that the Emperor was 'firmly resolved to persist in his efforts to obtain the restitution of the Electorate of Hanover.'

c) Hanoverian efforts to force a Prussian withdrawal

Diplomatic efforts were made, although somewhat belatedly, in London, Berlin and Hanover to get Prussia to withdraw. At the beginning of May, Lenthe in London handed over a memoir to St Helens shortly before his departure for Petersburg asking him to incite the Russians to accelerate Prussia's withdrawal from Hanover. In Berlin at about the same time, Reden wrote a letter to Panin in an effort to get Petersburg interested in his country's fate (before sending it Carysfort and Garlike read it through, and were so touched by Reden's plea that they were brought to tears), and asked Carysfort to intercede on his behalf in the hope of influencing Krüdener. He actually had a conversation with Krüdener on the 15th, during which he was told that he would have to await orders from Petersburg before changing his language concerning Hanover, but Krüdener accused Reden of being impatient and

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106 Part of the letter is in Martens G., Supplément, II, 461. Bailleu points out, however, that no copy of such a letter was ever to be found in the archives in Berlin. Panin exaggerated the contents of this letter in reporting it to St Helens, saying that Alexander had urged Friedrich Wilhelm in the strongest terms to withdraw from Hanover (PRO, FO 65 Russia, 48, St Helens to Hawkesbury, 24 July 1801).

107 PRO, FO 65 Russia, 48, St Helens to Hawkesbury, 29 July 1801.

108 HStA, Han. 9 f B, 523, Memoir from Lenthe, 4 May 1801; copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 67, with St Helens' reply. Cf. Han. 9 f B, 523, Lenthe to St Helens, 4 May 1801, in which Lenthe points out what he believed to be Prussia's intention of keeping Hanover, and the danger that would represent to the rest of north Germany.

109 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 8 May 1801, with copy of memoire to Panin dated 7 May 1801 (copies in Hann. 92, XLI, 68). Cf. Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, Kielmansegg to Lenthe, 17 May 1801; and the Regency's reply to Reden, 17 May 1801.

110 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, Geheimräte to Reden, 10 May 1801: 'Der Herr Abgesandte wird [...] alles anwenden, um bei dem Baron Krüdener teils selbst, teils durch Lord Carysfort die Disposition und das Interesse des russischen Kaisers für Seiner Majestät deutsche Lande und Verhältnisse zu cultivieren und dringend zu befördern, damit die preussische Zudringlichkeit [...] zurückgenommen und repariert werde.' HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 16 May 1801, in cipher.

111 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the Geheimräte, 19 May 1801, in cipher.
unthankful, reasoning that the King of Prussia had, after all, saved Hanover from the French.

On 17 June, Lenthe handed Jacobi a note addressed to the Prussian King in which he stated that, since the conditions which had induced Prussia to occupy Hanover no longer existed, he demanded that the King withdraw his troops. In spite of instructions to the contrary, Jacobi could not resist getting involved, and refused to accept the note without certain modifications. Haugwitz would have preferred him to avoid the subject by pleading lack of instructions and to have simply accepted Lenthe's note without any fuss and berated him for getting even slightly involved in a discussion on Hanover, reiterating his warning to him. As for the Hanoverian note, Haugwitz had no intention of replying, arguing that any differences between the electorate and Prussia were to be treated directly with Britain.

A similar note was handed the Prussian commissioner in Hanover, von Dohm, on 14 June. It pointed out that since the river trade had been re-opened, and that Hanover was occupied in connection with the closure of those rivers, it was impossible that Prussian troops continue to remain, demanded that they withdraw, and stated that all supplies would cease. Dohm answered that the occupation would continue until Prussia and the northern powers had come to an understanding with

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112 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, note from Lenthe, 17 June 1801 (copy in GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 1); and Geheimräte to Reden, 2 and 5 July 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 7 July 1801; Sichart, op. cit., IV, 717-718.
113 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Jacobi to the court, 19, 23 June 1801, both in cipher.
114 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 B, Haugwitz to Jacobi, 6 July 1801, in cipher.
115 Similarly, after Jacobi left London, the chargé d'affaires Balan was instructed to avoid any conversations, but to try and gather information by indirect means (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 C, Haugwitz to Balan, 4 September 1801, in cipher).
116 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 England, 175 C, Haugwitz to Balan, 4 September 1801, in cipher; Brückner, op. cit., VI, 289, Krüdener to Panin, 15 September 1801.
117 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Dohm to the King, 22 June 1801, with copy of note signed Rudloff; HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, note to Dohm, 14 June 1801; Kielmansegg to Lenthe, 14 June 1801. Reden, who recieved a copy of this note, was to pass it on to Haugwitz (Geheimräte to Reden, 12 June 1801). The Prussian government took the affair badly, and as it not recognise the existence of Hanover, replied that there was nothing to discuss (StAB, 2-B.11.a.2.c.2.I, report from Woltmann, 27 June 1801). Copy in RA, Depecher, and mentioned by Baudissin to Bernstorff, 23 June 1801, in cipher, who called it 'une démarche aussi déplacée que hors de propos', and 7 July 1801; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 20 June 1801.
Britain over the problems at hand. He was handed another note on 18 July, demanding that, since Russia and Britain had signed a convention, Prussia evacuate Hanover, and stating that supplies would be stopped.

Reden delivered another note in Berlin in June, this time asking for and receiving the support of the British envoy. The result seems to have been the opposite of what had been hoped for. Haugwitz told Reden that as he was not officially considered to hold a ministerial capacity, it was only with Carysfort that he could discuss matters concerning Hanover, and that he should take back his note. It was argued that the procedure used by Reden was highly irregular since he did not have a 'public character', then Haugwitz went on to detail the advantages of the occupation to Hanover, pointing out that the delay with which Prussia went about the occupation had brought upon them the anger of Tsar Paul, and that at the moment they were put in a disagreeable position vis-à-vis France. Finally, he warned Reden that if Prussia was compelled to withdraw, and their fears of a French invasion of the electorate actually came true, not to expect any assistance from the Prussian army. The next day, Carysfort had a conference with Haugwitz on the subject, repeating everything that Reden had said. Haugwitz simply replied that he was not authorised to treat the subject with the British ambassador and that since the occupation had taken place in concert with the other members of the maritime association, a concert would equally have to be gone into to effect a withdrawal.

Hanover's diplomatic efforts then were to no avail, so a different approach was tried by the Regency to pressure Prussia into leaving their territory. The turning point came in June when it became clear to the Regency that, in spite of their its demands, and in spite of the changed international situation, Prussia was not about to leave the electorate so soon. To thwart Prussian designs, the Regency decided to stop

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117 GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 3, Haugwitz to Dohm, 30 June 1801; and Dohm to the Geheimräte, 6 July 1801. Sichart, op. cit., 4, 718.
118 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, Geheimräte to Dohm, 18 July 1801; and his reply in ibid., Dohm to the Geheimräte, 21 July 1801.
119 Reden saw Haugwitz on 19 June, but without obtaining official recognition of his capacity as envoy. HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 20 June 1801; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 20 June 1801.
120 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 20 June 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 23 June 1801, in cipher. This occurred on the Saturday 20th and Sunday 21st.
121 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1008, Reden to the King, 23 June 1801, in cipher; PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 23 June 1801.
122 HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, Kielmansegg to Lenthe, 14 June 1801.
delivery of supplies to the Prussian troops. The earliest suggestions were made at the beginning of July, when the Prussian commissioner in Hoya was informed that supplies would cease within three weeks. Without wanting to go into the details concerning the negotiations surrounding the provisioning of Prussian troops, and the correspondence that ensued between the Regency on the one hand, and Dohm, Kleist, and the Prussian commissioner Heise on the other, suffice it to say that the Regency attempted on at least three occasions to discontinue supplies, once in July after the Anglo-Russian convention, again in August, and again in October after the Anglo-French peace preliminaries. On both occasions Hanover was forced to relent. On 20 July, a new agreement was signed between the Hanoverian commissaire fournisseur, Krellinger, and the Prussian commissioner, Heise, agreeing to continue supplies until about the middle of August, after which date supplies were meant to cease.

The Regency’s attempts to force Prussia off its lands by threatening to stop supplies left the court of Berlin the choice between either evacuating the electorate or using force to maintain troop supplies. In response to this threat, Kleist was sent orders to provide for his own supplies, and from that moment on, Kleist took matters into his own hands. He answered the Hanoverian commissary that the prolongation did not at all suffice and that it was absolutely necessary to renew the contract for two more months. Krellinger, on refusing the proposition, was simply arrested, and after lengthy negotiations, the contract was renewed and augmented by 25,000 ecus per month, with a new article stipulating that if the weekly supplies were not furnished in advance, the Prussian army would see itself obliged to forage.

The Regency accordingly informed Kleist and Dohm that they agreed to prolong the contract until the end of the month of August, and that in the meantime, if
it did not receive any positive orders from London to discontinue supplies, it would continue doing so until normal relations were re-established between Britain and Prussia or until the Prussian troops were withdrawn.\textsuperscript{128} It was a face-saving way of acceding to Kleist's demands, but tact was not one of the general's character traits. He haughtily replied that the members of the Regency were to consider themselves the subjects of the King of Prussia, provisionally charged with government for as long as it pleased him, and that any future lack of respect would be summarily dealt with by imprisonment in the fortress of Hamlin. It was rumoured that although the King was surprised on learning of what had been undertaken in his name, he approved when his entourage managed to convince him it was the only means of restraining the Regency.\textsuperscript{129}

To a certain extent the court of Berlin had attained its goal. It was able to keep possession of Hanover, tell the French that it had nothing to do with the Anglo-Russian convention, and deal separately with the court of London without abandoning a vital negotiating lever.\textsuperscript{130} But this success was short lived. Soon after news of the Peace Preliminaries between Britain and France reached Berlin, Reden handed over another note asking for Prussia's evacuation.\textsuperscript{131} The circumstances were dictated by the fact that the contracts concerning the supply of the Prussian army and signed by Kleist in August were due to expire.\textsuperscript{132} The Regency declared itself unwilling to renew them and was prepared to accept the consequences of such a step (namely, foraging). The note apparently received the support of Carysfort. It was about this time that rumours concerning the evacuation of Hanover started to circulate.

3. Prussia withdraws

And indeed, the conditions under which Prussia thought it necessary to occupy Hanover had changed. A state of war no longer existed between Britain and the northern powers, conventions had been signed in Petersburg and Copenhagen, the Russian embargo on English ships had been lifted, the mouths of the Elbe and Weser

\textsuperscript{128} RA, Depecher, Selby to Bernstorff, 29 August 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{129} RA, Depecher, Selby to Bernstorff, 1 September 1801; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 4 and 8 August 1801.
\textsuperscript{130} RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 1 August 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{131} The note was delivered on 16th October. GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 2, Reden to Haugwitz, 16 October 1801; copy in HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006; RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 17 October 1801, in cipher.
\textsuperscript{132} RA, Depecher, Baudissin to Bernstorff, 24 October 1801, in cipher.
had been re-opened, Hamburg and Lübeck had been evacuated by Denmark, and Prussia had withdrawn its troops from Bremen and Oldenburg.

Why then did Prussia remain in possession of the electorate for so long? The most obvious answer is that Prussia had more to gain by staying than by leaving. As long as Prussia remained in possession of the electorate it could reap the benefit of a number of advantages. First, a considerable part of her army was provided for through an agreement with the electoral régime. Second, it served as a precious surety that could later be used to assure the Prussian cabinet advantageous conditions leading to a definitive arrangement with Britain and at the same time could serve as a guarantee that Britain respect the Prussian flag during those negotiations, although this was not taken full advantage of by Haugwitz. Third, as long as Prussian troops were stationed in the electorate, there was little chance of the French forces moving in. One must not forget that Haugwitz was playing a wait-and-see game, hoping that something would turn up that would allow Prussia to keep Hanover.

But, as has been pointed out, it was still a little difficult for Prussia to justify the continued occupation of Hanover after the armistice between Britain and France had been signed. After the dissolution of the Armed Neutrality, Prussia's occupation of the electorate was no longer credible. In fact, it had created a general feeling of mistrust in most of the European courts. The danger of a French occupation had been denied not only by the short-sighted Hanoverian ministers, but also by the cabinet in London. Carysfort's dispatches mention the Prussian fear of a French invasion and say that it was not entirely ungrounded. Indeed, his concern about a French invasion was such that he asked Reden if it were possible for his government to keep supplying Prussian troops a little longer. But to many, the occupation was

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133 Haugwitz estimated that the Regency of Hanover contributed about 600,000 French livres per month to the upkeep of the occupation force (GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 374, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 1 June 1801), while the Regency itself estimated that it would cost them the yearly sum of 1,862,565 Reichsthaler (HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 1, Kielmansegg to Lenthe, 26 April 1801). E. von Lenthe, op. cit., 159, estimated that the occupation cost his country over 6,000 thalers per day.

134 Haugwitz repeated this reasoning on several occasions. AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 29 April 1801 (9 floréal IX), 12 May 1801 (22 floréal IX), 2 June 1801 (13 prairial IX); GStA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Frankreich, 89, fasc. 375, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 24 August, and fasc. 376, Haugwitz to Lucchesini, 26 October 1801.

135 PRO, FO 64 Prussia, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 8 April, 23 and 30 June 1801; Hawkesbury to Carysfort, 18 July 1801.

136 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1006, Reden to the King, 12 September 1801, in cipher.
considered to be part of Prussia's expansionist plans. The Russian government thought so and accused the government in Berlin of greed and covetousness.\footnote{Panin's reproach is reported by Duroc in AAE, Prusse 229, Beurnonville to Talleyrand, 3 June 1801 (14 prairial IX).}

Less than two weeks after news reached Berlin of the Anglo-French peace preliminaries, orders went out to Kleist to evacuate Hanover.\footnote{News of the preliminaries reached Berlin on 10 October (HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 2, Reden to the Geheimräte, 10 October 1801). Kleist received his orders on 26 October (\textit{ibid.}, Heise to the Geheimräte, 26 October 1801).} The decision must have been taken some time before 25 October.\footnote{GSTA, Merseburg, Rep. 11 Braunschweig-Lüneburg, 140, C, 1, con. 48, fasc. 2, Haugwitz to Schultz, 25 October 1801, and extract from newspaper article announcing the decision to withdraw.} Kleist, after having occupied the electorate for seven months, effectively commenced its evacuation on 6 November.\footnote{HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 2, Kleist to the Gehimräte, 5 November 1801, although the evacuation of the towns of Hamlin and Stade occurred on the 5th; Wallmoden-Grimborn to the King, 7 November 1801; Geheimräte to the King, 12 November 1801; Geheimräte to Kleist, 12 November; Geheimräte to Reden, 12 November. A withdrawal plan was drawn up that was to last from 5 November to 1 December. During that time Kleist expected the Regency to continue to supply his troops. They, of course, refused and Kleist did not insist.} It signified the end of the Second Armed Neutrality. The withdrawal from the electorate at this stage was most certainly a tactical error. Haugwitz not only lost a good opportunity to negotiate more favourable conditions for neutral, and especially Prussian shipping, but also for a commercial treaty.

4. Prussia's attempts to obtain a commercial treaty

The last phase was to last several more months. Haugwitz would have preferred to settle any differences with Britain in a separate treaty in much the same way as Denmark and Russia. But as the two countries were never officially at war, and as diplomatic relations had never been interrupted, it is doubtful that the British cabinet ever really considered a separate treaty with Prussia as being either desirable or necessary. According to Carysfort's reports, the Prussian ministers did not attach any great importance to a general recognition of neutral sea rights, they merely wanted to protect Prussian trade and saw a commercial treaty as a concession that would facilitate the evacuation of Hanover. Struensee spoke with Carysfort about the possibility of a commercial treaty at the beginning of September and even drew up a treaty draft. A further meeting was held at the end of October to discuss the points laid down.
But when Carysfort left Berlin in November, the chargé d'affaires Casamajor remained without instructions as to how to continue the talks. The British cabinet failed to show any further interest in the matter, even though Casamajor insistently reported that Struensee expressed the desire to open negotiations, pointing out that he asked repeatedly if instructions had not arrived from London. The last meeting concerning this matter was held as late as April 1802 between the chargé d'affaires, Struensee, and Haugwitz without anything concrete coming out of it.
CONCLUSION

In examining Prussia's foreign policy during the Second Armed Neutrality one is led to formulate a number of conclusions that differ from traditional interpretations. All of the previous works written on the subject assume that Prussia joined the alliance, and consequently took military action, as a result of Friedrich Wilhelm's inability to withstand diplomatic threats and pressure from either France or Russia. One event especially has received most of the attention - the invasion of Hanover in April 1801 - and is seen as proof of the Prussian government's ultimate weakness, and as violating its own neutrality system. But one need only take into consideration Prussia's own foreign policy interests during this period to see that this interpretation of events is incorrect. During the three years preceding Prussia's entry in the Armed Neutrality, Friedrich Wilhelm insisted on maintaining his father's neutrality system in spite of repeated attempts from all the major European powers to get him to commit himself either for or against France. The real reason for Prussia's lack of active involvement on the European scene lay not in the King's inclination for peace, although this undoubtedly played a decisive role in the years leading up to 1805, but in the fact that Prussia had no dispute with France, and could in no way further its interests, territorial or otherwise, by heeding foreign pleas for help. On the contrary, more was to be gained by maintaining relatively good relations with France, whose influence in German affairs was considerable. If Prussian foreign policy appears at times inconsistent and perhaps vacillating, this is due more to the methods used by Haugwitz (his duplicity and the need to please everyone without committing Prussian resources) than to the actual aims he pursued.

A number of factors hampered the implementation of what surely could have been a more adequate foreign policy. First and foremost remains the King's reluctance to abandon his neutral principles. Second, a factor which is closely connected with the first, the character of Friedrich Wilhelm made the pursuit of a more ambitious foreign policy nigh impossible. Third, a more active foreign policy inevitably meant an imbroglio with France, and this was fundamentally contrary to Prussia's territorial ambitions which called for the maintenance of stable relations with the Consulate.
When Haugwitz decided to accept Paul I's offer to adhere to the Armed Neutrality, he saw this as a means of gaining support to enhance Prussia's position in northern Germany. He hoped to use Russia in the same manner Paul hoped to use Prussia to further his foreign policy objectives. Despite the difficulties caused by British incursions into Prussian shipping, economic considerations were of secondary importance. The problem was that both Haugwitz and Friedrich Wilhelm underestimated the seriousness of the Anglo-Russian conflict and inadvertently found themselves drawn deeper into affairs than they had ever expected. But Friedrich Wilhelm, renowned as he was for his acute sense of duty, felt bound to uphold his end of the treaty by initiating measures against Britain.

The French threat must also be considered. The probability of France ever invading the electorate of Hanover is of far less importance than the belief that the threat actually existed. The cabinet of Berlin considered it a real possibility and so moved to forestall it. By doing so, Prussia not only placated Russia, but also France. And to this extent, by avoiding foreign military intervention in north Germany, and thereby protecting its own integrity, Prussia's participation in the Armed Neutrality falls within the logic and framework of its neutrality principles.

In summary, the Prussian government's motives for adhering to the Armed Neutrality are several. There was undoubtedly a desire to avoid any dissension with France and Russia;¹ fear of a French occupation of Hanover; and fear of losing the fruit of six years of peace brought about by the neutrality system.² Another explanation should be sought in Prussia's desire to keep northern Germany within its sphere of influence. Haugwitz, moreover, realised that a general peace on the continent was not far off, and that it was imperative to placate the great powers which were to decide the future secularization of Germany. The decision to invade Hanover was made not only to forestall a French invasion, but also to satisfy both the French and Russian desire to see Britain's continental possessions expropriated. Finally, a factor which has to date been totally disregarded, the King was simply carrying out the engagements contracted by the Armed Neutrality. This is certainly one of the keys to understanding Prussia's behaviour during this period. In the last resort, it was not the threat of military intervention, nor the enormous diplomatic pressure exercised upon the Prussian court, that induced Friedrich Wilhelm to act. He was never wont to be swayed by threats, but he was a man who scrupulously fulfilled what he considered to be his duties. It is true that Prussia could have undertaken military actions sooner, but to protect Prussian shipping from a feared British reprisal, measures were put off until it was thought safe enough to implement them. It was, of course, the death of Paul I

²Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 25.
that made it necessary for Prussia to reconsider its foreign policy, because after his
death Prussia, like Denmark, suddenly found itself politically isolated.

Paradoxically, Prussia's attempts to extricate itself from the difficult position
brought about by the collapse of the Armed Neutrality lasted longer than the
negotiations leading up to, and its involvement in the alliance. While Berlin could
congratulate itself for acting in such a way so as not to have greatly compromised itself
with either of the belligerent parties, the effects of Prussia's involvement in the alliance
were, in the long run, damaging. Throughout the course of events Prussia had
maintained an ambiguous stance, arguing to its allies on the one hand that it had
invaded Hanover in fulfilment of its treaty obligations, and to Britain on the other that
it had taken its German possessions to protect them from the French. But the
European powers were not convinced that Prussia had occupied the electorate to
forestall a French invasion, and its statesmen had a tendency to either regard Prussia as
the tool of France and Russia, or they assumed that Prussia was deviously using this
as a cover to fulfil its expansionist dreams. More than a few contemporaries
considered Prussia's participation in the Armed Neutrality as a pretext to further its
territorial ambitions. It was thought, for example, that Haugwitz and Hardenberg
were counting on Russian support to carry out their favourite plan, namely the
annexation of Hanover. Panin expressed this opinion after Paul's death. From a
diplomatic point of view then things were bad. Berlin had fallen out, although
admittedly not seriously, with Copenhagen over Hamburg and the continued
occupation of Hanover. The Danes were very suspicious of Prussia's motives for
marching into Hanover, and especially Lauenburg, and their suspicions were
amplified by the general belief that Prussia occupied the electorate at the behest of Paul
I and by the observation that it continued to do so for no valid reason after the signing
of peace preliminaries between Britain and France. Relations with Russia, which were
never excessively good during Paul's lifetime, cooled during the first part of
Alexander I's reign, the Russians more than ever wary of Prussia's expansionist
tendencies. And although the embargo measures taken against British shipping were

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3 Carysfort later expressed his doubts about it privately, although in public declarations he conceded
the Prussian fears (PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 8 July 1801).
4 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the King, 14 March 1801, in cipher, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 32,
III.
6 HStA, Cal. Br. 24, 1003, Reden to the Geheimrätte, 15 March 1801, copy in Hann. 92, XLI, 67.
7 RA, Ordner, J. Bemstorff to Baudissin, 14 April 1801, in cipher: 'Il ne peut que nous faire de la peine
que la cour de Berlin mette autant de promptitude à l'exécution de cette mesure, qu'elle a mis de lenteur
à entrer dans les explications, que nous lui avions longtemps et iterativement demandées'.
never rigidly enforced, relations with Britain had still suffered a blow. Practically speaking, Prussia was obliged to turn more and more towards France to see its indemnity plans in Germany fulfilled, eventually leading to the conclusion of a secret agreement on 23 May 1802.

Some historians believe that the worst consequence brought about by the Armed Neutrality was the precedent set by Prussia’s occupation of Hanover, arguing that it paved the way for a French occupation in 1803. Carysfort argued that Prussia, in treating Hanover as a British possession, had supplied France with a pretext that it had hitherto been lacking, and Friedrich Wilhelm himself later argued the same thing. But this argument is spurious. France did not need the example of Prussia to invade a country where its own interests were concerned. The French invasion of Hanover in 1803 is seen as the ultimate humiliation for Prussia, because Friedrich Wilhelm did not lift a finger to prevent hostile troops moving into the heart of north Germany and cutting Prussian territory in two. One explanation is that the Prussian occupation of Hanover in 1801, and the annoying problems which arose as a result of it, probably left the King with a bitter aftertaste in his mouth and an aversion to further intervention in Europe, thereby enhancing his somewhat obsessive desire to remain outside of the mainstream of European politics. Although one of the reasons why Haugwitz joined the alliance in the first place was to get Prussia out of its total isolation, the end result had the opposite effect. Prussia’s foreign relations were worse off after the Armed Neutrality than before.

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8Ford, op. cit., 268; Ulmann, op. cit., 268; Krauel, op. cit., 244.
9PRO, FO 64 Prussia, 61, Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 8 July 1801.
10Bailleu, Preußen und Frankreich, II, 160: ‘On cherche son ennemi partout où on le trouve, et la Russie et la Prusse en avaient donné l’exemple, lorsque celle-ci, à l’instigation de la première, fit occuper l’électorat pour une querelle qui ne regardait que l’Angleterre [...].’
ABBREVIATIONS

Below will be found the meaning of abbreviations used in the footnotes and in the bibliography.

AAE Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris
ADB Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie
con. convolute
fasc. fascicule
fol. folio
FBPG Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte
GStA Geheimes Preußisches Staatsarchiv, Merseburg
HStA Hannover
HZ Historische Zeitschrift
ibid. ibidem, in the same place
invol. involute
NdsJbLG Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte
op. cit. opere citato, in the work cited
PRO Public Record Office, London
RA Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen
SRA Rikssarkivet, Stockholm
StAD Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden
StAB Staatsarchiv Bremen
StAH Staatsarchiv Hamburg
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APPENDICES
1. Introduction

The primary purpose of this collection of documents is to make life easier for future historians who may, for whatever reason, wish to consult Carysfort's dispatches for this period. The publication of documents facilitates historians' work enormously because it means that they do not have to go to the archives, often at great expense, to consult them in person. This argument is valid, of course, only when the compiler of the documents is reliable and has taken pains to reproduce them with exactitude. Hopefully, this has been accomplished here.

The papers contained here embrace a period of sixteen months, from August 1800 to November 1801. Lord Carysfort was sent to Berlin to replace Lord Elgin at the behest of his brother-in-law, Lord Grenville. Considering this was Carysfort's first diplomatic mission abroad, he carried out his task with considerable adroitness. His stay in the Prussian capital is of great interest because it roughly coincides with Prussia's involvement in the Armed Neutrality and as such his dispatches offer a valuable insight into the events that took place in Berlin leading up to the formation of the alliance, the invasion of Hanover, and Prussian attempts to placate British interests. The correspondence contains the official exchange of letters between the British ambassador to Berlin and the Secretary of State in London, at first Lord Grenville and then Viscount Hawkesbury, from February 1801 on and should be supplemented with those letters already published in the *Dropmore Papers*, volumes 6 and 7, containing the private correspondence between Carysfort and Grenville which continued even after Grenville was dismissed from office. There are also a number of letters between Carysfort and other diplomats resident at the court of Berlin, notably from Haugwitz and Alvensleben, which help explain the Prussian viewpoint.

These documents are of interest for a number of reasons. First, Carysfort tells us as much as he knows about what is going on inside Paul I's Russia which at the time was almost void of all foreign diplomats with the exception of the Prussian ambassador, Count Lusi, renowned for his ineptitude. Second, Prussian diplomatic manoeuvres concerning the Armed Neutrality, the invasion of Hanover, Bremen and Hamburg are outlined in detail. Third, valuable information is to be had concerning Prussia's relations with other European powers involved in the alliance against Britain, especially those with the Kingdom of Denmark. And yet it is important not to place too much emphasis on the
accuracy and validity of all of Carysfort's observations and opinions. A reading of Carysfort's letters can only present one side of events, no matter how competent and able a diplomat he might have been. Not all the information was available to him, he sometimes reported rumours as though they were reality, and events were sometimes misinterpreted. Carysfort certainly did not understand, for example, the seriousness with which Prussia took matters concerning the Armed Neutrality and was totally unsuspecting that negotiations had led to the signing of a treaty between Prussia and Russia. But this was hardly his fault as the secrecy surrounding the negotiations prevented him from obtaining exact information. When he did learn of Prussia's involvement a few months later, it came as somewhat of a shock. But whatever the shortcomings of the man and these letters might be, they are indispensable to an understanding of Prussian foreign policy in 1800-1801.

2. Biographical Sketch of Lord Carysfort

John Joshua Proby, first Earl of Carysfort was born on 12 August 1751, the only son of the first Baron of Carysfort and Elizabeth Allen. He was educated at Westminster School and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he graduated with an M.A. in 1770. He succeeded his father as the second baron of Carysfort on 18 October 1772, and accordingly took his seat in the Irish House of Lords in October of the following year, where he soon became known as a prominent debater. He was a supporter of the lord-lieutenant's policy in Ireland, as a result of which he was appointed Earl of Carysfort in August 1789, and in the following February was elected to the British House of Commons. After his first wife died, he married Lord Grenville's sister, Elizabeth, in 1787.

On 24 May 1800, he was appointed envoy-extraordinary and minister-plenipotentiary to the court of Berlin, where he remained until October 1801. (An ambassador, it should be pointed out, was commonly referred to as a minister at that time, which of course had nothing to do with a ministerial or cabinet position). On his return to Britain, he took up a seat in the House of Lords, was sworn in as a member of the privy

council on 12 February 1806 during the Ministry of all the Talents, and was appointed joint postmaster-general on 20 February 1806. He resigned from these offices the following year but remained active in the House of Lords until 1819. He died in London on 7 April 1828 at the age of 76.

To conclude, a few details about methodology are in order. All of the documents which are reproduced here issue from the Public Records Office, London, unless otherwise stated. The spelling and punctuation have been modernised and, where it was thought necessary, there are explanatory notes so as to make them more readily understandable to those unfamiliar with the period. Unavoidably, certain pieces of information are to be found both in the dissertation and in the notes accompanying these documents. The order of letters has been changed in places so as to follow consecutive dates.
1. The following documents, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the Public Records Office, Foreign Office, Prussia 64, vol. 58, letters and papers from the Earl of Carysfort at Berlin to the Secretary of State with drafts to his Lordship, 2 August to 31 October 1800.

no number

Instructions to Lord Carysfort, no date

Instructions for our right trustworthy and well beloved cousin and councillor John Joshua Earl of Carysfort Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick. & & & & & & & a: & & a: & & a: whom we have appointed to be our envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to our good brother the King of Prussia. Given at our court at St James the [sic] day of [sic] 1800 in the fortieth year of our reign.

1. Whereas we have thought fit to appoint you to reside in quality of our envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the court of Berlin, you are forthwith to repair to that city, and being arrived there, you will demand and audience of the King and Queen of Prussia, and present to them respectively our letters of credence, which you will receive with these our instructions, accompanying the same with suitable compliments in our name, and with the strongest assurances of our constant friendship and regard.

2. You will make it your business to discover any overtures that may be made, or any steps that may be taken, for extending the duration, or altering the terms of any treaty,

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2 He arrived in Berlin on 2 August 1800, and delivered his credentials to Alvensleben the next day. He left Berlin at the end of October 1801.

3 Friedrich Wilhelm III (1770-1840), eldest son of Friedrich Wilhelm II and grand-son of Friedrich the Great. He ascended the throne on 16 November 1797, at the age of 27.

4 Although not mentioned in the original document, Carysfort's instructions were probably dated around the end of July.
or other engagements now subsisting, for renewing former alliances, or for forming new connections between the King of Prussia and any of the courts of Europe, and you will from time to time transmit to our principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the most accurate copies you can obtain of such treaties or other engagements which have been lately, or which may hereafter, during your mission, be concluded between that court and any other power.

3. You are, during your residence at Berlin, to maintain a good correspondence with the ministers of other Princes and states in amity and alliance with us.

4. Whereas our royal predecessor King Charles the Second, did, by his orders in council, bearing date the twenty sixth day of August 1668 direct that his ambassador should not for the future give the hand in their own houses to envoys, in pursuance of what is practised by the ambassadors of other Princes, and did therefore not think it reasonable that his envoys should pretend to be treated differently from the treatment he had directed his ambassador to give to the envoys of other Princes. We do accordingly, in pursuance of the said order in council, hereby direct you not to insist to have the hand from any other ambassador in his own house, who may happen to be at the court when you reside.

5. You will use your best endeavours to procure us as exact an account as possible, of the countries under the dominion of the King of Prussia, particularly as to the state of their defence, accompanied with accurate descriptions of their fortifications, and also as to the number and condition of the Prussian forces, and the means of augmenting them upon occasion.

6. You are likewise to inform yourself of the ordinary expenses of government, of the particulars, the amount, and the state of the revenue, and of the resources which the King of Prussia may have of levying any, and what extraordinary supplies.

7. You are further to procure an account of the population of the King of Prussia's dominions, and of the extent and nature of the commerce and manufactures carried on in the different parts of them, and in so doing, you are to pursue the method pointed out in the circular dispatch of our principle Secretary of State, dated the twenty seventh day of April 1773, written by our command for the purpose of obtaining regular

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5 Grenville, William Wyndham, 1st Baron of (1759-1834), British statesman, Pitt's first cousin, called at the beginning of the Revolution to the Cabinet as Home Secretary, then Foreign Secretary from April 1791 until February 1801. Cf. A. D. Harvey, Lord Grenville 1759-1834: A Bibliography, (London: Meckler, 1989).

6 Charles II (1630-1685), King of England, Scotland and Ireland (1660).
accounts of the state of the commerce of our subjects in foreign parts, and of the increase and decrease of the same.

8. You will from time to time impart to us all such intelligence as you can procure on the several points prescribed to you in these instructions, or on any other which may relate to our service, or to the advantage of our kingdoms, but you will send your accounts of the dominions, forces, revenue, expenses, and resources of His Prussian Majesty, and of the population and commerce of his subjects, in separate letters confined to these matters only, and addressed to our principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

9. You shall protect and countenance on all occasions our subjects trading to or residing in any part of the dominions of the King of Prussia, or who may have any suits or pretensions depending there, and procure for them good and speedy justice together with every possible advantage and indulgence. Yet for our honour and your own credit, you must not engage yourself in any frivolous or ill-grounded complaint, but such as may deserve the interposition of our name for maintaining the rights of our subjects.

10. You shall constantly correspond with our ministers residing in foreign courts for your mutual information and assistance. You will be careful to give the most accurate and early information of every public measure which may in any shape affect our interests. But you are on no account to communicate with your private friends on public affairs.

11. On your arrival at Berlin, you will receive from our chargé d'affaires at that court the whole of the official correspondence in his custody. You are to consider the instructions contained therein, as the rule of your conduct, as far as the present circumstances will admit, and you shall also, at the expiration of your mission, either deliver to your successor, or transmit to the office of our aforesaid Secretary of State, the originals of the official correspondence.

12. At your return, we shall expect from you a narrative in writing of whatever may have happened at Berlin worthy of our notice, together with such observations on the situations and views of that court as your knowledge of it shall have enabled you to make.

13. Whereas by an act passed in the twenty second year of our reign for regulating the payments out of our civil list revenues, it is amongst other things enacted that receipts from our ministers, commissioners and consuls in foreign parts shall be filed in our exchequer for all sums of money which shall be issued and paid to our principle Secretary or Secretaries of State for foreign secret service, and which shall be sent or given by such Secretary or Secretaries of State to any of our said ministers, commissioners, or consuls respectively for the said purpose, and that in order to discharge and acquit such ministers, commissioners and consuls, who will thereupon stand charged at our exchequer with the sums so received by them for that purpose, an oath according to the form in the said act
prescribed should be taken by them within one year their arrival in Great-Britain. We, to
the intent that the provisions in the said act should be strictly observed, have directed an
extract thereof to be delivered to you with these instructions, and we do hereby strictly
require and command that you should punctually conform yourself thereto upon all
occasions which may arise during your employment abroad.

14. You shall follow and observe such further instructions and directions as you
shall from time to time receive from us by our said principle Secretary of State, with
whom you are constantly to correspond, and by him inform us of all occurrences of
moment which shall come to your knowledge during the course of your residence at
Berlin. And in order that our said instructions may be transmitted to you with greater
security, and also for the better conduct of your correspondence, as well with our said
Secretary of State, as with our ministers residing in foreign parts, with respect to such
matters as may require particular caution and secrecy, we have ordered all the ciphers and
deciphers both French and English, which were entrusted to our late minister at the court
of Berlin to be delivered to you.

no. 1
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 2 August 1800

My Lord,
[cipher]

Though the short time I have been here has not admitted of my waiting upon the
Prussian ministers, in order to obtain an audience of the king to present my credentials, I
have thought it incumbent upon me to communicate to your Lordship the substance of a
conversation with Baron Krüdener the Russian minister at this court who did me the
honour of making me a visit this morning.\(^7\) Mr. Garlike\(^8\) has already informed your
Lordship of the steps which have been taken by the Prussian ministers preparatory to the
offer of mediation to the belligerent powers, of the communication which has been made
from hence to the court of Petersburg upon that subject, and of the answer which is said to

\(^7\) Krüdener, Baron Burkhard Alexis Constance (Aleksei Ivanovich) (1744-1802), Russian diplomat,
ambassador to Berlin where he arrived in December 1799. He was decidedly anti-French and pro-English.
A very difficult person to get on with, his temper was supposedly as bad as his master's.

\(^8\) Garlike, Benjamin, British diplomat, legation secretary and chargé d'affaires in the absence of an
ambassador at Berlin from June 1798 till 2 August 1800. He was later to leave Berlin for Petersburg (8
May 1801) where he was appointed chargé d'affaires.
have been received, of the opinion of the emperor that the mediating powers should prepare to support their mediation by arms has been strongly expressed by the Russian minister, and I find persons of good judgement impressed with the persuasion not only of the expediency, but of the probability of engaging Russia again to take an active part in the contest. The Russian minister began his conversation with observing that it was not to be considered as in any degree authorised or official. It was merely private conversation flowing from the liberal confidence which he thought it became the ministers of two such powers as England and Russia, to repose in each other. He expressed himself with less reserve than I could have expected on a first interview, and affected always to speak as if he considered the ultimate end of Russia and Great Britain as the same. The emperor, he said, was always influenced by the same motives of restoring and preserving the just balance of Europe. He would therefore not concern himself but to effectuate a general peace. He was faithful to his original opposition to the exorbitant pretensions and destructive principles of the French Republic, but was willing to make the experiment, whether, under its present form, the government of France would offer, or consent to, such terms as might be consistent with the general welfare and security. In speaking of the disposition of the several powers, he expressed great distrust of Austria, and stated his reasons for considering the armistice and the mission of Count St Julien to Paris, as the beginning of a negotiation for separate peace. As to Prussia he entertained no doubt of the good principles and correct intentions of that court, but it had unfortunately manifested but too plainly that it would not support them by arms. From hence it seems probable that no active concert is likely to take place between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg, on the subject of the proposed mediation. But, if Baron Krüdener may be supposed acquainted at all with the sentiments of the latter, there is certainly some appearance that the allies might again obtain its cooperation in support of the common cause.

9 Paul I of Russia proposed an armed mediation between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg to bring about peace on the continent and to counterbalance what he considered to be France and Austria's preponderant influence.

10 St Julien, Joseph Guyard, General and Count. He set off to deliver a letter from the Emperor of Austria to Bonaparte and of his own accord opened talks with Talleyrand in Paris on 22 July 1800. Six days later he concluded a settlement that he took back to Vienna. Disowned by his court for having exceeded his instructions, he was imprisoned for his efforts.

11 Haugwitz officially refused participation in the proposed mediation on 18 September 1800. Lack of Prussian co-operation brought Russia's efforts to form an armed mediation to an end.
I inclose two letters received today. I am entirely ignorant of the writers, but, if they are worthy of credit, it should seem that a much more intimate correspondence than has been hitherto suspected, has for some time existed between Berlin and Paris.

no. 2
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 5 August 1800

My Lord,

I visited Count Alvensleben and Count Haugwitz on Sunday morning, and delivered to the former the copy of my credentials, but have not yet obtained an audience of the king, nor do I think it probable that I shall for some days, as I understand that His Majesty is gone to a small residence near Potsdam, about eighteen miles from this capital, and does not return till the end of the week.

Mr. Bohm, a gentleman attached to the Prussian mission in France, who has been here a few days, as it is said on his private affairs, received orders, immediately after the arrival of the Prussian courier to hold himself in readiness to return to Paris, and on Sunday morning began his journey.

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12 Alvensleben, Philipp Karl, Baron then Count (1745-1802), Prussian statesman and diplomat. He was sent on a mission to the United Provinces in 1788 where he signed a convention with Malmesbury. He was then ambassador to London from 1788 to 1790, appointed minister in 1791, and Cabinet Minister in 1801.

13 Haugwitz, Christian August Heinrich Kurt, Count von (1752-1832), Prussian statesman. He was named Prussian ambassador to Vienna in 1791, was recalled in 1792 when he replaced Schulenburg as minister and was soon given charge of foreign affairs. He concluded a subsidy treaty with Malmesbury at The Hague in 1794, directed the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Basle in 1795 which set Prussia on a course of neutrality that was to last over a decade. In the spring of 1796 he signed treaties with France, Hanover and other German states in order to consolidate the neutral Demarcation Line. He recommended joining the Second Coalition in 1799 and was the motivating force behind Prusia's adhesion to the Second Armed Neutrality. He took an extended leave after the French invasion of Hanover in 1803, unhappy with Prussia's position vis-à-vis France, and resigned in August 1804. Recalled in 1805 and sent to Vienna to negotiate with Napoleon, he decided to sign the Treaty of Schönbrunn and later the Treaty of Paris, which condemned him forever in the eyes of German historians.

14 3 August.

15 Potsdam, a town in the Province of Brandenburg about 26 kilometers south-east of Berlin, site of several royal residences.
The probability of Austria's continuing the war, of which the first account of the battle of Marengo\textsuperscript{16} had made the Prussian cabinet despair, has perhaps restored them to some degree of confidence in their own position, and when by making a display of the concurrence of Russia, they will have proved that Prussia is not entirely insulated, they may think their end has been sufficiently answered and their systematic indecision make them wish the matter would rest there. I shall be careful in the meantime not to diminish by manifesting too much anxiety upon this subject, the impression of the just and perfect confidence of His Majesty in the power and resources of his kingdoms, and the zeal and loyalty of his people.\textsuperscript{17} The declarations made by his commands, and the repeated overtures for peace upon terms consistent with the security of the just rights of his crown, and the common liberties of Europe will furnish a sufficient answer to any insinuation that the continuance of the war can be imputed to a different cause than the insatiable ambition and destructive principles of the rulers of France.

Intelligence has been received here that the French have stopped the communication by the post between Frankfurt, and the dominions of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.\textsuperscript{18} The Landgrave had remonstrated, but without effect to the French commanders, but I do not find that he has made any direct application for the interference of this court. The army under General Augereau\textsuperscript{19} after passing the Rhine has enacted a heavy contribution from the town and neighbourhood of Wetzlar.\textsuperscript{20}

[cipher]

Nothing further will probably transpire on the subject of the proposed mediation till it shall be known what effect the knowledge of the disposition of Russia may produce

\textsuperscript{16}A battle fought on 14 June 1800 between Bonaparte and the Austrian General Melas, ending in a French victory brought about by the unexpected appearance of Desaix on the battlefield.

\textsuperscript{17}George III, King of Great Britain (1738-1820), ascended the throne in 1760. He suffered from bouts of a recurrent disabling illness, but which was probably not madness as has so often been claimed, and which caused periodic crises. He withdrew from public affairs completely in 1811, leaving his son to become Regent.

\textsuperscript{18}Wilhelm IX (1743-1821), Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, later Elector as Wilhelm I (1803). He was considered one of the most notorious Princes in German history, took part in the First Coalition against France, concluded peace at Basle, and later a convention with Prussia in 1797.

\textsuperscript{19}Augereau, Pierre François Charles (1757-1816), French general, later Duke of Castiglione and Marshal. He was commander of the Batavian Army in Germany from July 1800 to March 1801 and then took command of the Batavian Army at The Hague from April to October 1801.

\textsuperscript{20}Wetzlar is a German town in Hessen on the river Lahn, approximately 50 kilometers north of Frankfurt.
upon the French government. I believe your Lordship is in possession of all that can be known upon the subject, and with the great assistance I derive from the information, ability and activity of Mr. Garlike I may confidently promise that you will have early notice of every material occurrence.

The Austrian chargé d'affaires\(^{21}\) confirms to me that the conferences which have taken place at Carlsbad\(^{22}\) between M. Kolychev\(^{23}\) and Count Cobenzl\(^{24}\) have excited good hopes of a better understanding between the court of Petersburg and that of Vienna.

no. 3
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 9 August 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

In a conversation which took place this morning between the Russian minister and me I asked him whether, in consequence of the approbation of his conduct and specific proposition for pacification either general or separate had been made from hence to Paris. He assured me, there had not, but that France has been desired to propose a basis. Baron Krüdener seems to have no expectation from this measure but that the answer of the French rulers will be such as to put beyond a doubt their aversion of all terms of peace which may be consistent with the general safety, and in this event he thought nothing remained but for the three great powers, England, Russia, and Austria to lay aside all jealousies, to draw a veil over the past and to concert with each other to make a vigorous

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\(^{21}\)Hudelist, Joseph von (1759-1818), Austrian diplomat. He was sent to Berlin as legation secretary in 1798, appointed chargé d'affaires in March 1799 after the death of the Austrian ambassador, the Prince of Reuss, and remained legation secretary until April 1801 and the arrival of Stadion.

\(^{22}\)Today Karlovy in Tschecoslovakia.

\(^{23}\)Kolychev, Stepan Alekseevich (1746-1805), Russian diplomat and statesman. Under the reign of Paul I he was sent on missions to The Hague, Berlin, Paris and Vienna. He later became vice-chancellor under Alexander I.

\(^{24}\)Cobenzl, Graf Ludwig von (1753-1809), Austrian statesman. He signed the Treaty of Campo-Formio in 1797, was then sent to the Congress of Rastatt, and later succeeded Thugut as foreign minister from January 1801 to December 1805 with the titles of conference minister and vice-chancellor. On 15 October 1800, he left Vienna for Lunéville where he signed a treaty on 9 February 1801. He then went to Paris where he stayed until 9 September 1801, and arrived in Vienna on 18 September to take over the reigns of his office.
exertion of all their forces against the common enemy. He expressed at the same time the strongest jealousy of Austria and of the intention of that cabinet to make a separate peace, but alleged no reason for this suspicion but a paragraph dated from Milan in the Berlin paper too trivial to deserve the smallest notice. Of Prussia he spoke as if nothing vigorous and effective could in any conjuncture be expected from thence. He informed me that Count Haugwitz declared himself fully satisfied with the conduct and declarations of Russia but the language of Baron Krüdener to others besides me (as I am assured from undoubted authority) is of very different tenor and strongly expressive of this disappointment. Upon this point therefore I think there can be no continued concert between these powers. Prussia I am convinced has already answered the only end she really had in view, and will rest satisfied with the evasive and dilatory answer she will probably receive.

Though I might not from the slight view and character and manners of the Russian minister here, be inclined to attach importance to everything he says, yet reflecting that His Majesty has not for some time had any minister resident at Petersburg, that the conversation of Baron Krüdener must be in some measure influenced by his opinion of the prevailing disposition of his sovereign, and that not only the character of Count Panin is established but that both General Stamford and the Austrian chargé d'affaires entertains some expectations of a favourable change in the conduct of Russia, I think it my duty to be thus particular in my communications to your Lordship of whatever may have the remotest tendency to throw light upon the councils of that country.

I had an appointment this morning for an interview with Count Haugwitz, in which my object would have been to learn from him whether any project was now on foot, and if so whether Prussia would give any countenance to it in order to form an alliance amongst the northern powers upon the principles of the Armed Neutrality of

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25 Panin, Nikita Petrovich (1770-1837), Russian statesman. He was a member of the College of Foreign Affairs from 1796 on. Panin was a supporter of the Second Coalition, was critical of the Paul I's rapprochement with France, and was to become one of the leaders of the conspiracy which ended in Paul's assassination. He was disgraced by Alexander at the end of 1801. There are no biographical works on him. An outline can be found in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 68-80.

26 Stamford, Heinrich Wilhelm von (1740-1807). Of French origin, he went into Dutch service in 1785, and was sent to Berlin as agent for the House of Orange by the court of London.
1780, directed against Great Britain. But late last night I received notice that the King of Prussia had fixed this morning to give me an audience at Charlottenburg. I have however written to Count Haugwitz to desire that he will see me before His Majesty's departure for Silesia which is fixed for Monday next, and in the meantime I beg leave to assure your Lordship that I have made it my business to make all the inquiry I could upon this important subject, and that I can find no reason to suppose that such an alliance has yet been formed, nor do I believe it probable that a negotiation for that purpose is on foot with Prussia at this moment, or that she would concur in it.

The king begins his journey on the 14th instant, Count Haugwitz goes into Silesia on Monday and Count Alvensleben will also leave town to go to his country seat immediately on the king's departure. M. Renfner accompanies Count Haugwitz and M. Lombard will precede His Prussian Majesty.

no. 4

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 9 August 1800

My Lord,

I am to acquaint your Lordship that a heavy duty, amounting nearly to a prohibition, has been composed upon the exportation of corn from the ports of Danzig and Königsberg, as well as from the other ports of Prussia, in consequence of which a representation has been sent to the king by the principal merchants of Danzig including the House of Messrs. Gibsone and company, in order to obtain a liberation from the duty, for the corn contracted to be exported to England, prior to the publication of the duty, and


28 Charlottenburg Palace, at the time about 5 kilometers from Berlin, was the habitual residence of Friedrich Wilhelm III.

29 11 August.

30 Lombard, Johann Wilhelm (1767-1812), Prussian statesman. He started out as secretary in 1786 under Friedrich II, was appointed to the Kabinettsrath by Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1800, largely on Haugwitz's recommendation and primarily to deal with foreign affairs. His influence began to increase from the summer of 1799 on, when he swayed the King against adhering to the Second Coalition. He has found a biographer in Hermann Hüffer,
application has been made to His Majesty's mission to second this request. The minister Struensee\textsuperscript{31} to whose department this business properly belongs is out of town, but Mr. Garlike has had an opportunity of sounding Count Alvensleben upon the subject. But he is not allowed to entertain the slightest hope, that any remission will be granted. The duty however will not attach upon any corn actually shipped for England, under the permission formerly granted for that purpose. I thought it best not to press this point any further, as I found by Mr. Garlike's report that the Prussian court is irritated by a refusal to give up some Prussian subjects, as notified in your Lordship's answer to M. de Jacobi\textsuperscript{32} on that claim. The king has written a very strong note to his ministers upon the subject. It was read to Mr. Garlike, and was to this effect: 'Que le Roi aurait désiré de donner l'exemple de bons procédés, mais que la conduite du gouvernement anglais dans cette occasion avait été choquante'. It may be in consequence of an unwillingness in his ministers at this moment to speak to the King of Prussia again on the subject, that the Irishman whom the King of Prussia had consented to discharge has been sent into Poland. I have thought it most prudent to postpone renewing the application for his release that the present irritation may subside and that your Lordship may if you think fit to order me to state the transaction in its proper light, remove the unfavourable impression which has been made upon the king's mind.

I have received the letter of which the inclosed is a copy. I conceive I have no authority, even if I knew the writer, to give the appointment he wants, and if I had I should certainly not use it without your Lordship's directions, but your Lordship may think the facts he mentions, not unworthy of attention, especially as I learned from the officers of several of His Majesty's ships at Cuxhaven\textsuperscript{33} that the mouth of the Ems\textsuperscript{34} is

\textsuperscript{31} Struensee, Karl August von (1735-1804), Prussian statesman. He began service in Denmark, came to Berlin in 1772, named Director of Maritime Trade and appointed to the secret Finance Council in 1782, and was finally appointed Minister of Excise, Customs, Commerce and Manufacture in 1791 which he retained until his death.

\textsuperscript{32} Jacobi-Klöst, Constans Philipp Wilhelm (1745-1817), Prussian diplomat. Ambassador to the court of Vienna (1790-1792), and minister plenipotentiary to the court of Great Britain, with a number of breaks, from 1792 to 1816. He was also the second Prussian representative at the Congress of Rastadt (1797-1799).

\textsuperscript{33} Cuxhaven is a port on the left bank of the mouth of the Elbe, a dependant of the town of Hamburg, and was important to Britain as communications to and from Germany usually passed through there.

\textsuperscript{34} The river Ems is in Germany and today runs along the border between Germany and Holland, finding an outlet in the Bay of Dollart.
becoming a place of frequent resort for privateers, and it is a station suited for annoying
the trade of His Majesty's subjects.

I have just received intelligence that the treaty which has been for some time past
negotiating between this country and Russia, has been signed at Petersburg, by the
ministers of the two powers, and contains a reciprocal guarantee of this dominion.\(^{35}\)
Count Lusi\(^{36}\) had been admitted to the presence of the emperor on his arrival at
Petersburg.

I expect to see Count Haugwitz tomorrow, after which I hope to be able to give
your Lordship fuller information on this and on other important objects.

no. 5
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 13 August 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

I have had the honour of delivering His Majesty's letters to the King and Queen of
Prussia.\(^{37}\) The King of Prussia expressed in the strongest terms, and in the most cordial

\(^{35}\) The Peterhof Treaty was concluded at Rostopchin's house on the evening of 28 July 1800 and was
conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères*, 15 vols., (St. Petersburg: Imprimerie du Ministère
des Voies de Communication, 1874-1909) vol. 6, 270-280.

\(^{36}\) Lusi, Spiridion Count von (1741-1815), Prussian diplomat, who entered Prussian service in 1777. He
was ambassador to London (1781-1788), made lieutenant-general in 1798, then ambassador to Petersburg.
Although this last appointment was made at the end of December 1799, he did not arrive in Petersburg
until 10 July 1800. Considered incompetent by both contemporaries and historians alike, he nevertheless
remained in Petersburg till recalled on his own request on 1 September 1802.

\(^{37}\) Luise von Mecklenburg (1776-1810), born in Hanover, daughter of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Strelitz. She married the future King Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1793, and died at the age of thirty-three. In
part because of her premature death, but also because of her fervent patriotism, she became somewhat of a
legend and has inspired a much lengthier bibliography than her husband. Cf. Marcel Dunan, *Napoléon et
571; and Albert-Emile Sorel, *Louise de Prusse*, (Paris: Grasset, 1937), for bibliographies. The best works
to date are by Paul Baillieu (ed.), *Briefwechsel König Wilhelms III. und der Königin Luise mit Kaiser
Alexander I*, (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1900); and *Königen Luise. Ein Lebensbild*, (Berlin: Gieseck & Devrient,
1908), which is the standard biography, although it has nothing to say about Luise's political influence or
manner his affection for His Majesty and his earnest desire to maintain the treaty and increase as far as possible the reciprocal confidence and friendship by which the two courts have been so long connected.

Your Lordship has already been informed that I requested an interview with Count Haugwitz, for the purpose of obtaining more correct information concerning the correspondence of this court with France on the subject of peace as well as the project supposed to have been entertained of a league between the powers of the north, for the purpose of maintaining, by force, the unlimited freedom of navigation against Great Britain. As to the first point, Count Haugwitz confirmed what I had heard before, that no specific terms had been proposed by Prussia but that, in answer to the wish of France, long since expressed, the king had at length desired the rulers of that country to specify the basis they would propose for a general peace. He was not without expectation of receiving such an answer as might lead to the accomplishment of an object so interesting to humanity, upon terms consistent with the interests of all the belligerent powers, and the security of Europe, because it appeared that the First Consul would find in such a measure the best security for the continuance of his own power. He could not deny that the present government did not appear to have any more solid foundation than those by which it was preceded, but he thought that no conclusive arguments could be drawn from thence against treating for peace because a sufficient guaranty for the interests of the several powers might be found in the terms of the treaty itself, and then the possible fluctuations in the government of France would not concern them materially. I must here interrupt my narrative, to observe to your Lordship that this was said in explanation, and in consequence of my having remarked that the expressions he first used implied a guarantee of the existing government of France, and were not consistent with his former declaration that no specific terms had been proposed from hence. It was the more necessary to call for this explanation as it has been expressly said that the guaranty both of Russia and Prussia had been actually offered to the First Consul. Count Haugwitz continued, if France should refuse to propose any basis, or should offer inadmissible terms, the position of affairs would no otherwise be affected by what has been done, than as the bad disposition of her government would then be demonstrated. He took occasion from hence to express personal weaknesses. Also Karl Griewank (ed.), Briefwechsel der Königin Luise mit ihrem Gemahl Friedrich Wilhelm III., 1793-1810, (Leipzig: Koehler, 1929); Königin Luise: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1924); Königin Luise: Ein Leben in Briefen, (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1943). More modern, but without adding anything new, is Merete van Taack, Königin Luise: Eine Biographie, (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1978).
his regret that the British cabinet had not so far met the overtures of the French government as to draw a declaration of specific terms of pacification. He was afraid that now a great part of Europe attributed the continuance of the war to the obstinacy of Great Britain. The Emperor of Russia though he was still opposed to the ambition and revolutionary principles of France had recently declared his willingness to treat for a general peace, and if Prussia had corresponded with France alone, it was not from predilection, but because the other belligerent powers had made no communication whatever of their wishes and sentiments. France could not be ignorant that all the powers of Europe were, in principle, leagued against her though they had pursued the same object by different means. The forces which Prussia could command were sufficiently known and there could be no doubt of their being rigorously exerted whenever its interests should be threatened with imminent danger, or when the favourable moment for action should arrive. The contending powers must be exhausted by the efforts they are making, and the preponderance of Prussia will be proportionally increased. When I desired him to reflect on the danger to which the north of Germany would be exposed, if Austria should at any time make a separate peace, he did not attempt to deny it. When the first communication between this court and France took place after the battle of Marengo, the treaty with England, he observed, by which the court of Vienna became bound not to make a separate peace was not known, but he could not doubt, after that solemn engagement, of the firmness and determination of Austria, notwithstanding the mystery in which the mission of Count St Julien and the subsequent journey of M. Duroc, the aide-de-camp of General Bonaparte, to Vienna, were still involved, and notwithstanding the report that preliminaries had been actually signed at Paris.

It would be superfluous to state in detail all that would be said on my part, either to lead the conversation of Count Haugwitz or, in answer to any of his observations. The reply to what was said concerning the conduct and intentions of his government has been anticipated in a former dispatch, but I thought it advisable to point to the unreasoning means which His Majesty possesses for continuing the war and to the little prospect that any impression can be made on his dominions. Even in the event of a separate peace with Austria by which France should retain all her conquests on the continent of Europe, it is only against the north of Germany that the forces and intrigues of France can be directed.

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38 Duroc, Michel (1772-1813), Bonaparte’s aide-de-camp, later Grand Marshal of the Palace, Duke of Frioul. He carried out a number of diplomatic missions, notably to Berlin and Petersburg. In this instance, he was sent on a mission to negotiate with the court of Vienna, but got no further than the Austrian border as he was unable to obtain the passports necessary to continue his journey.
with any probability of success. I was careful at the same time to repel the insinuation thrown out against Austria, by adding not only the convention but the subsequent measures of His Majesty's government which demonstrated his perfect confidence in the magnanimity and integrity if his ally. Count Haugwitz assured me that the treaty concluded with Russia is simply to renew the Treaty of 1792, including a reciprocal guaranty of the Lordship of Jever and of the Prussian transrhenane provinces. As to the Northern League, he declared in the strongest terms that Prussia had not been engaged in or countenanced any such measure. He trusted, he said, that the close relation which subsisted between the two courts and the confidence and good will uniformly manifested by His Prussian Majesty to Great Britain made it impossible that he should be exposed to any suspicion on that head. He knew of no such concert having taken place among the northern powers, and was surprised that the report could have gained credit. I thought it right however to enlarge upon the certain and immediate ruin to Denmark in particular, which must be the consequence of her forcing hostilities from Great Britain and the utter improbability that Great Britain could at any time but especially in the present state of her maritime power, give way to claims not only inconsistent with the true principles of the law of nations, but striking at the foundations of her greatness and security. Nor did I omit to dwell on the little interest Prussia can have, at any time or in any manner, in supporting those claims but particularly now when Great Britain is making so glorious a

39 In 1792, Prussia concluded an eight year treaty with Russia, of which the Peterhof Treaty was a renewal.
40 Jever, Lordship. After the male line of the ruling House died out, Catherine II of Russia inherited the country in 1793. It remained in the Russian House until Alexander I gave it to Duke Peter of Oldenburg in 1818.
41 The Prussian transrhenane provinces of the duchies of Cleves and Geldern were nominally signed away at the Treaty of Basle in 1795.
42 The Northern League, which is obviously being referred to here should not be confused with the Armed Neutrality. They were two distinct, but closely associated plans. Paul wanted to associate a Northern League with the Armed Neutrality to bring about a continental peace by use of an armed mediation. At first, the Northern League was to consist of a simple adherence of the northern powers to the Peterhof Treaty. By the month of June, talk had been going on for some time about a league, which was to include the four northern powers. It was reported that Haugwitz agreed with the principle completely. It was to be similar to the Treaty of Teschen, designed to prevent the French and Austrians from carving up Italy and the the Holy Roman Empire, and to maintain Paul's idea of a balance of power in Europe. The idea fell through when Prussia refused to have anything to do with an armed mediation that called for the mobilisation of its troops on the Bohemian border.
stand in the cause of all civilized nations, and in the support of those principles which Prussia has repeatedly and strongly avowed, because I have no doubt upon my own mind that some steps have been taken to effect such a league amongst the powers of the north, though the court of Berlin has not encouraged it, and because it is still probable that M. Rosenkrantz's \(^{43}\) mission to Petersburg is connected with this object.

I must also remark to your Lordship that notwithstanding the conversation I have reported, I have reason to think the disposition of the Russian minister here most unfriendly to Great Britain. But a communication has been recently made to General Stamford, and without the knowledge of Baron Krüdener, by which it appears that the situation of Count Panin is by no means such as he wishes. He has had some grounds to hope for a more favourable turn.

[end of cipher]

The king and queen proceed upon their journey into Silesia on the 15th instant.

no. 6
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 16 August 1800

My Lord,

Since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, the only intelligence which has come to my knowledge is that this court has been informed by an estafette from M. Sandoz,\(^ {44}\) that it has been notified to him by the government of France, that the Prussian offer of mediation has been communicated to the court of Vienna. This is to be understood as having taken place before M. Bohm, who is supposed to have carried the first intelligence of the sentiments of the court of Petersburg, could have arrived.

It is reported that Mr. de Beurnonville\(^ {45}\) has said in a conversation that in order to settle terms of peace between France and His Majesty, or between France and the King of

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43 Rosenkrantz, Niels, Baron, Danish diplomat at the court of Berlin from 1 April 1796 till leaving for Petersburg on Tuesday 3 June 1800 (ostensibly to bring about a renewal of the expired 1782 treaty of commerce between Denmark and Russia). He arrived in Petersburg on 22 June, was presented the next evening to Russian Vice-Chancellor, and stayed until his expulsion on 1 January 1801.

44 Sandoz-Rollin, Daniel Alphonse von (1740-1809), Prussian diplomat. He was sent as minister plenipotentiary to Madrid in 1784, and then to Paris from December 1795 to November 1800. The Prussian court was not pleased with the way he handled things in Paris and recalled him.

45 Beurnonville, Pierre Riel, Count then Marquis, Marshal of France (1752-1821). Minister of War in 1793, minister plenipotentiary to Berlin (1800-1801), then ambassador to Madrid. Member of the
Hungary and Bohemia, there is no occasion for the intervention of any other power, and that it can be desirable to call in the aid of Prussia, only in regard to the arrangements to be made with the Princes of the Empire.

[cipher]

It must be remembered that Prussia herself has points to discuss with France immediately concerning her own interests and territories, as well as the protection she owes to her allies and to the German Empire. It is said that the reference to Vienna has given disgust to this court. It is also certain that the Russian minister continues to express himself in terms of dissatisfaction at the conduct of Prussia subsequent to the arrival here of the answer to the communication made to him of the proposed mediation.

The terms of the secret communication made to General Stamford and mentioned in a former dispatch were these: 'Tell General Stamford that I cannot do all I wish but I do what I can, and that he must not despair.'

It seems not improbable that the disappointment there is every reason to believe Monsieur Krüdener has experienced in regard to the Prussian minister's project of mediation may make him better inclined here to second the views of Count Panin.

no. 7
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 19 August 1800

My Lord,

It is asserted here and generally believed that M. Duroc is only gone to the headquarters of Moreau. The opinion therefore that a negotiation for a separate peace between Austria and France is in forwardness, loses ground. On the other hand the idea I have in former dispatches mentioned to your Lordship of a better understanding between the Imperial courts, is entertained with increasing confidence. M. de Krüdener has of late had more frequent intercourse with General Stamford, and continues to express his disappointment of the conduct of the Prussian cabinet, of whose absolute want of all energy and decision, he strongly complains. Unless therefore it should be brought into life by the desire of Great Britain or Austria, the Prussian mediation will soon be provisionary government in 1814, he rallied to the Bourbons under Louis XVIII. He was not considered to be a very able diplomat.

Moreau, Jean Victor Marie (1763-1813), French general. He was named commander of the Army of the Rhine, for the second time, from September 1800 to May 1801. Victor of the battle of Hohenlinden in December 1800. Duroc did indeed visit Moreau on his return to Paris.
forgotten, but the Emperor of Russia having been deceived in the expectation he had been taught to form from the court of Prussia, it might be more easy to lead him into some co-operation with His Majesty and his allies.

I can find no reason to believe that any concert has yet taken place between the northern courts for supporting their claims to an unlimited freedom of navigation, and the views of Paul⁴⁷ the first having been turned more immediately to the situation of the continent, and to the danger with which all nations are threatened from France, it appears less probable that M. de Rosenkrantz will be able to obtain any assistance from that quarter.

no. 1

Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 August 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatches no. 1 to no. 4 inclusive have been received, and laid before the king.

The principal object for your Lordship's attention in the present moment is, as you have rightly judged, that of the negotiations between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg for a joint mediation between the belligerent powers. There is every reason to believe that the adoption of any active or vigorous measures for this purpose is much less in the contemplation of the Prussian government than it possibly is in that of the Emperor of Russia. But as the desire of maintaining an apparent union with Russia may perhaps induce the court of Berlin to go farther than if it acted solely from its own cautious and temporising system of policy it becomes extremely important that His Majesty's government should as early as possible be apprised of all the steps taken on this subject, and particularly of every circumstance which may indicate what are the terms of peace, or what the general basis of negotiation, which it may be in the contemplation of the two courts to recommend or to support.

Much benefit may in this view be derived from the disposition which M. de Krüdener has manifested to converse confidentially with your Lordship on these subjects. Your language respecting them should continue to be such as it has hitherto been. His Majesty certainly does not need the aid of any mediation for the security of his own interests, and those of his people - these being already amply provided for by the exertions which he has been enabled to make, and by the success which providence has blessed those efforts.

But he cannot be different to the situation of affairs on the continent, nor can he deem any maritime peace, on whatever terms concluded, sufficiently secure, if by the conditions of that by which the state of the continent shall be regulated, France should there acquire that decisive predominance at which she unquestionably aims.

In this respect his interests are the same with those of the great continental powers, and particularly with those of Prussia, whose security would be more, (and more directly), endangered than that of Great Britain, by suffering France to retain a predominant influence in Holland, and to acquire the Netherlands and the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine.

In this situation of common interest, and under the circumstances of friendship and good understanding which subsist between the two courts it is natural for His Majesty to expect that some communication should be made to him by Prussia of the measures which are in view for these objects, and it is proper that your Lordship without manifesting any anxiety or impatience on the subject should nevertheless take an opportunity to remark to Count Haugwitz that the degree of weight which His Majesty on his part might be disposed to give to the interposition of Prussia in any discussions respecting peace would very much depend on the extent of previous communications which he may have received from that court respecting its views and intended measures.

Your Lordship has judged perfectly right in thinking that during the present interruption of direct communication with the court of Petersburg, you should transmit every particular which you can learn respecting the disposition of that court.

From some circumstances which have lately come to my knowledge I am induced to believe that affairs are likely to assume a more favourable appearance there. But this is still subject to much uncertainty, especially so long as we remain unapprised of the effect which the discussions with the court of Copenhagen may produce on the irritable temper of the Emperor of Russia.
Mr. Flint who will be the bearer of this dispatch is going to join Mr. Wickham,\(^{48}\) to whose mission he will be attached as his secretary. He will deliver to your Lordship under flying seal the dispatches with which he is charged for Mr. Wickham, and as it is very important that both that gentleman and Lord Minto\(^ {49}\) should be apprised of the latest steps which have been taken at Berlin on the subject of the mediation your Lordship will have the goodness to converse fully and confidentially on that subject, and on every other at all connected with Mr. Wickham's instructions, with Mr. Flint, in whose discretion you may safely rely.

**Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 August 1800**

Separate

My Lord,

Mr. Garlike having transmitted to me a proposition which had been made, through General Stamford, by a person in France, offering to communicate interesting intelligence relative to that country, on condition of his receiving one hundred louis per month. I have to signify to your Lordship His Majesty's pleasure that you accept this offer, and that you take the necessary measures for remitting to the person in question the first monthly some of one hundred louis, which he has desired may be paid to him in advance.

**no. 2**

**Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 August 1800**

My Lord,

Your Lordship's letter no. 3 in which you speak of the personal impressions which have been given to the King of Prussia respecting an answer returned by this government to some demand made in His Prussian Majesty's name could not but excite the greatest surprise. Being perfectly certain of the attention with which I had

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\(^{48}\) Wickham, William, British diplomat. Sent on a special mission to Vienna to negotiate with Austria, he arrived there on 19 December 1800, handed over his credentials on 9 February 1801, and left on 13 June 1801.

\(^{49}\) Minto, Elliot (Murray-Kynynmound) Gilbert, 1st Earl of (1751-1814), British diplomat. He was sent by Grenville to replace Lord Morton Eden in Vienna in 1799 in the hope that a stronger minister would be able to influence Austrian councils. His first audience was held on 7 August 1799 and his last on 16 September 1800.
endeavoured to give effect to His Majesty's invariable dispositions for cultivating and improving the friendships between the two courts, I was at first at a loss to imagine what the transaction was to which the communication made to your Lordship through Mr. Garlike could relate, and although I am now satisfied that it can be no other than that which is contained in the inclosed papers yet my first sensations of surprise and concern are rather increased than diminished by observing that the enemies of this country have so near an access to His Prussian Majesty and have unhappily so much weight with him, as to have persuaded His Majesty personally to feel and to describe as a want of liberal proceeding on the part of this court, an answer which, as your Lordship will see, is in its terms unquestionably not only conciliatory, but obliging, and which in its substance is conformable to the general usage of all countries and is justified by very pressing reasons of convenience, I might almost say, of necessity.

That the subjects of a neutral power taken in arms, and in the service of an enemy are to be considered individually as subjects of that enemy, and as such treated as prisoners of war, is a point too evident to be disputed. If it were otherwise, their act must be ascribed to their own country, and the peace between Great Britain and Prussia would be violated every time a Prussian subject were found on a French privateer, a state in which certainly no friend to the present good understanding between the two countries would wish to place them.

In the present war, and indeed in every war that can take place between this country and France, it is highly important to us that this principle should not only be maintained in discussion, but should be strictly adhered to in practice. The number of French seamen is in all wars limited by many local circumstances. But if, by any claim of right, or even by practice grounded on a spirit of accommodation, neutral subjects in the service of France were, when under pretext of enlisting in the service of their own country, or on any other ground sure of being liberated from their imprisonment as soon as taken, the seas would be covered with privateers, sailing under French commissions and navigated by persons of that description. The consequences of which at the same time that they would be ruinous to the commerce of Great Britain would certainly not be indifferent to that of Prussia.

In addition to this consideration which from obvious motives of delicacy it was not thought necessary to bring forward in the answer returned to Baron Jacobi, no one is better able than your Lordship to testify from your own observation of the state of our depots for prisoners of war that the inconvenience spoken of in that answer is not fictitious or imaginary but would lead to the greatest and most serious evils. Under the mild practice of this country towards its prisoners of war, the difficulty of exercising a
sufficient control over them in their confinement is already so great, as to occasion constant increases in the neighbourhood of all those depots. And it cannot be necessary to use any arguments to show how much that difficulty would be increased by admitting into those prisons the recruiting officers of a foreign power enabled to hold out to all the individuals there who may think proper to represent themselves as Prussians, the option of quitting their confinement at any moment they may choose.

I have indeed here dwelt on this subject more at large than it can appear to require. The right of His Majesty to refuse the permission asked, is unquestionable - and it might have been sufficient to rely on this principle but I was anxious to enable your Lordship to prove beyond the power of contradiction that there is not the slightest foundation for the impression which has by some misrepresentation been excited in the King of Prussia's mind on this occasion, and that the conduct of His Majesty's government has in this, as in every other instance, been perfectly consonant to the many ties of friendship and connection subsisting between the two sovereigns.

Your Lordship is at liberty to read this dispatch to Count Haugwitz, and you will particularly express to him the earnest desire of His Majesty's government to receive a satisfactory answer to this friendly explanation of a point which so little required to be explained.

no. 3
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 August 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship's representations have already anticipated the instructions which I had received His Majesty's commands to transmit to your Lordship on the subject of the duty imposed in the Prussian dominions on the export of corn.

It is however His Majesty's pleasure that you should renew as by His Majesty's express command those representations in so far as they relate to corn actually purchased for exportation by British merchants on the faith of the permission expressly granted on His Majesty's application by the court of Berlin.

To impose under these circumstances a prohibitory duty on the export of the corn so purchased is such a manifest breach of that openness and good faith which ought to characterize all the proceedings of a government towards its allies and neighbours, that His Majesty is confident, it is only necessary for him to direct the particulars to be accurately brought under the knowledge of the King of Prussia in order to obtain for his subjects that redress to which on every principle of equity they are so clearly entitled.
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 August 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship is probably apprised of the circumstances of the capture of a Danish frigate, in consequence of her forcible resistance to the exercise of the right of visiting the ships under her convoy.

No account has yet been received of the arrival at Elsinore, either of Lord Whitworth, whom His Majesty has thought proper to charge with his demand of the satisfaction due to His Majesty on this occasion from the court of Copenhagen, or of the squadron of ships which His Majesty has ordered thither for the proclamation of the navigation and commerce of his subjects in the Baltic, under circumstances of such apparent hostility on the part of Denmark.

It is very evident from what has already occurred in consequence of this event, that no concert or treaty has yet been agreed upon, among the northern powers, for restricting those rights of maritime war, the exercise of which is indisputable to the maintenance of our naval power.

50 This is what came to be known as the 'Freya affair'. On 25 July 1800, a Danish frigate, the Freya, escorting six merchant ships on their way to the Mediterranean, was met by a squadron of five British ships off Ostend. The Danish Captain Krabbe, refused the English permission to search his convoy, and after several hours of negotiations fired on a boat sent out from one of the English ships. Fighting began that ended with the loss of men on both sides and the Freya being taken with her convoy into the Downs. 51 Elsinore, or Helsingør, a Danish port in the north-east of the island of Sjaelland on the Sound. Here vessels paid for the right to enter the Sound until 1857.

52 Whitworth, Lord Charles (1752-1825), British diplomat, envoy-extraordinary and minister-pleni potentiary, first to Poland (June 1785), then the following year to Petersburg, a post which he was to hold until expelled by Paul I in April 1800. After the Freya incident he was sent on a special mission to Copenhagen to present the Danish government with British demands. His instructions are dated 2 August 1800. He arrived in Copenhagen on 11 August, and after some negotiating signed a convention with Denmark on 29 August. Vice-Admiral Dickson was ordered to accompany him with a squadron of ships in order to lend weight to his demands. He returned to England on 27 September, after which he was made a privy concillor (5 November). Whitworth was probably involved in the plot to assassinate Paul. Cf. Kenny, James J. Jr., 'Lord Whitworth and the Conspiracy against Tsar Paul I: The New Evidence of the Kent Archive,' Slavic Review, 36 (1977), pp. 205-219; and Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee (ed.), op. cit., vol. 21, pp. 163-166.
But it is naturally to be supposed that no endeavour will be omitted on this occasion by the court of Copenhagen, to interest Russia and Prussia in her cause. His Majesty therefore relies upon your Lordship's vigilance to discover the steps which may be taken at Berlin on this subject, and also upon your attention to use such language upon the subject as may be most effectual to counteract any such project.

This, as it is judged here, may be best done by a very firm though temperate language calculated to impress the Prussian government with the conviction that Great Britain is sensible that in such a contest, not only her interests but her safety is at issue, and that as the point now in question can never be yielded by this country but with its existence, so this concession can never be required from us but by those who wish to annihilate our naval power, and to place in the hands of France the same preponderance by sea which she is endeavouring to acquire by land.

no. 8
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 23 August 1800

My Lord,

During the absence of the court, and all the cabinet ministers, I shall be obliged to state reports in circulation, though it may be impossible for me to ascertain or contradict them from authority. It has been said that the court of Denmark has made a declaration to that of Prussia, on the subject of the present dispute with Great Britain. This is denied by the Danish chargé d'affaires, but if there should appear to be any probable foundation for the rumour I shall lose no time in applying by letter to Count Haugwitz. I continue to be persuaded that no actual concert between the northern powers exists, and I entertain sanguine hopes that the answer of Prussia to the courier dispatched from Copenhagen to Petersburg, on the first news of the capture of the frigate, will be such as to convince the court of Denmark of the prudence and necessity of desisting from her irregular pretensions, and giving to His Majesty whatever satisfaction he may require. The mission of Lord Whitworth is generally considered as a proof of moderation, nor do any of those with whom I have conversed, seem to expect that His Majesty will relinquish the exercise of a right, essential to the interests of his crown, and founded upon the law of nations.

I believe the last communication with Paris on the subject of peace or mediation, was that mentioned in a former dispatch to have been received by express from M. de Sandoz. The language of the French minister here is said to be that peace will be concluded, or the war recommenced by the 15th of next month. This does not indicate any disposition to a general pacification, and though it is commonly understood that the
Count de St Julien had no commission to treat of peace, and that Duroc is not gone to Vienna, a suspicion still seems to prevail here that Austria will enter into a separate negotiation. But I have not learnt any facts on which it can be grounded, and it probably proceeds only from the general fear of the consequences of such an event to the rest of Europe.

no. 9
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 26 August 1800
By private conveyance to Hamburg

My Lord,

I have been informed that M. de Rosenkrantz has written to this place, that Russia was on the point of resuming a diplomatic intercourse with Great Britain.

M. de Beurnonville has receive dispatches from Paris which are said to be to the same effect, as what was before received by the Prussian minister from M. de Sandoz.

It seems to be the prevailing opinion that Austria will make a separate peace, those who judge most favourably of the situation doubting whether she possesses the means of continuing the war. Bonaparte holds out great temptations on the side of Italy. At the same time, the Prussian system of neutrality, joined to the ancient jealousy of Austria, may induce the court of Berlin to lead Bavaria to withdraw from the alliance. Duroc, it is true has proceeded no farther than the headquarters of General Kray, but his purpose is supposed to be to treat of peace, and it must be known in the Palatinate as well as here, that he is the bearer of a letter from Bonaparte to the emperor, and that Count Lehrbach has been sent from Vienna to receive it. The fullest information upon this subject has probably already reached your Lordship from Lord Minto, and you may also

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53 Hamburg, a free imperial city on the right bank of the Elbe, over 200 kilometers north-west of Berlin.

54 Kray, Paul, Baron de Krajowa, Hungarian general (1735-1804). He was appointed Grand Master of the Artillery in the Austrian forces and replaced Archduke Charles as commander of the Army of Germany in 1800.

55 The Palatinate was a state in the Holy Roman Empire.

56 Francis I (1768-1835), Austrian emperor who succeeded Leopold II in 1792 as Francis II, Emperor of Germany, a title which was dropped in 1806 when Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire.

57 Lehrbach, Konrad Ludwig Count, Austrian diplomat. Ambassador to Sweden then to various German courts, he was considered a diplomatic specialist in matters relating to the Holy Roman Empire. He received the honorific title of minister of state in 1800.
have heard from Hamburg, that the Elector is apprehensive, that designs are entertained by Austria against his dominions, in consequence of which he is in close correspondence with the court of Berlin. It is unfortunate that both the cabinet ministers and the Bavarian envoy should be absent, so that my means of pushing enquiries upon this point are very much curtailed, but M. Hudelist tells me that in consequence of Baron Posch's\(^{58}\) having about two months ago communicated this idea to his court, M. Hudelist had been ordered by the court of Vienna to give the strongest assurances possible to the Prussian Ministry, that the apprehensions of the Elector were destitute of all foundation. Conceiving that it must be His Majesty's first object to secure the co-operation of all his allies, I enclose my answer to a letter I have received from M. Drake,\(^{59}\) in which this subject is mentioned, and which is such as I thought best calculated to assure him in allaying the fears of the Elector, and your Lordship may be assured that on all occasions I express the fullest reliance on the firmness and resources of Austria.

It is very much to be wished that the engagements of that power with His Majesty, and a consciousness of the strength of Great Britain, as well as the wisdom and energy of His Majesty's councils, may lead to the conclusion of a general peace upon safe and honourable terms. But as the general tenor of the conduct of the Consulate, pointing always to particular arrangements, not to a general peace, and the apparent instability of that government, and the present advantageous position of its armies, (making it probable that Austria may be compelled to accept the terms which will be offered), render the accomplishment of so desirable an object very uncertain, and as His Majesty's ministers must of course, in case it should fail, turn their thoughts to the possibility of Austria making terms for herself and to the remaining chances of obtaining aid and co-operation from any continental powers, I think it my duty to state the view of that subject which presents itself from this station, though the information which has reached us here is too scanty and imperfect to warrant any confident opinion. It appears then that to establish any new and effectual concert against France, Russia must again be brought into the field, and means must be found to establish such an apparent influence over the councils of that country, as may remove the distrust which the character of its sovereign must inspire. It is to be hoped that the difference which has arisen with the Danish court will not throw any new obstacles in the way, and your Lordship will have observed that

\(^{58}\)Posch, Joseph Maria (1762-circa 1824), Bavarian diplomat. He represented the Duke of Zweibrücken in Berlin from 1790-1799, and then he was Bavarian envoy, also in Berlin, from 1799-1802.

\(^{59}\)Drake, Francis, British diplomat, ambassador to the Bavarian court. He presented his letters of credit on 11 July 1800 and left on 27 April 1804.
all the intelligence which has reached us here tends to indicate a disposition in the Russian court to resume some concert with the allies. M. de Krüdener's aversion from Great Britain is no secret, and the attention he has shown to me can be attributed only to the instructions he has received. What has been done by Russia in conjunction with the court of Berlin, was dictated in all probability by the fear which prevailed after the battle of Marengo, that Austria would immediately make a separate peace, in which the general interests of Europe would not be at all considered. This fear has not yet subsided, and joined with the expressions of dissatisfaction at the want of vigour in the Prussian councils, and of the alarm of the spreading of French principles, and the dangers to all nations from the preponderance of the French power, makes it probable that, if a general peace should not take place, or if Austria should make a separate peace, in both cases the desire of Russia to act vigorously against France would receive fresh animation. Prussia has I am persuaded dispositions the most friendly to His Majesty. The establishment of the French influence and dominion in the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, in the Low Countries, and in Holland, must always be seen by the court of Berlin, and its allies with uneasiness. If the character of the present Emperor of Russia is not an insurmountable bar to any co-operation or confidence, it is from that power alone that such a support can be derived as assisted by the arms and subsidies of Great Britain would in any circumstances overcome the reluctance of Prussia to engage in war. I am therefore of opinion that it is of the highest importance to His Majesty's service to have a resident minister at Petersburg, who may avail himself of every occasion to give those impressions which may best promote the objects which His Majesty has in view. I am sensible that in making this observation, I may appear to have passed the limits of my province, but as it arises naturally out of what I have occasion to remark here, I trust that it will be attributed, not to any improper presumption, but to the zeal with which I am desirous to fulfill the trust which His Majesty has been pleased to repose in me.

no. 5
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 29 August 1800
Most secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship, under flying seal, the dispatch with its inclosure which I have this day written to Lord Minto.

60The British mission was expelled from Petersburg on 7 April 1800.
Although it is intended by this mode to put your Lordship in possession of the information therein contained, it is not meant that you should make any use of it at the court at which you reside. It being desirable that the first communications of the intention of the court of Vienna to treat for a general peace with France in conjunction with His Majesty, should be received at Berlin from Vienna and not from London.

Your Lordship will of course omit no further opportunity to inform Lord Minto of the state of affairs at Berlin, particularly as to every thing that can influence the approaching negotiation.

no. 10
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 30 August 1800

[cipher]

I mentioned in my last dispatch that some farther communication had been made from Paris on the subject of the Prussian mediation. I am informed that it is dated on the 8th of this month, it cannot therefore apply to the official notification of the Emperor of Russia's sentiments, of which M. Bohm is supposed to have been the bearer, as that gentleman did not reach Paris before the 10th. And I have no certain intelligence whether it was made through M. Sandoz only, or also by the French minister here.

Your Lordship must be sensible that in the absence of the whole Prussian ministry it may not be possible to obtain precise information as to the terms and extent of the French answer, but it is reported to be much of the same nature as I have already stated.

That it states the necessity of waiting the result of the measures pending with Austria, and appears to limit the idea of Prussian interference to the affairs of the Empire, as distinct from those of the emperor as King of Hungary and Bohemia, and with a view to those Princes of Germany who have shown their attachment to France and obtained its protection. But the most material part of it, which is reported from a quarter likely to be well informed, is that General Bonaparte affects to consider the reconciliation of Russia with his government to be nearer than ever. True it is he has actually notified his intention of releasing, without exchange or condition, all the Russian prisoners in his possession.61 Unless all we have heard, as to the purport of the declaration of the sentiments of Russia, is unfounded, the notification of this intention has been prematurely made, and it is possible that it may not be carried into effect.

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61 Bonaparte offered to release all Russian prisoners taken during the Italian campaign.
I have as yet no reason to think that the court of Petersburg has any inclination to the French alliance or that the views of the Prussian ministry have been directed to that object, but it is plain that the Consul has thought his purpose of making both powers instrumental to the arrangement of the affairs of Germany, and to his ambitious views, to have been nearly effected, and has acted in consequence. Under this persuasion I feel anxious for some elucidation of the conduct and intentions of Russia, and must lament that I am to announce to your Lordship that Count Haugwitz is not expected at Berlin till some day after the king's return from Silesia, that is, not till the 9th or 10th of next month.

I inclose a paper from Paris, the original of which I hope has reached you long since. It seems to me important and may throw some light on topics mentioned in this letter. I have had it transcribed for Lord Minto.

no. 11
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 2 September 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

The Russian minister here was with me yesterday, and having enlarged upon the necessity of a vigorous concert of all the powers against France (striking out however Prussia of whose absolute nullity he is now fully convinced, from the account), he lamented the disunions which had given such advantages to the common enemy and expressed his earnest wish to contribute if possible to the restoration of that harmony and co-operation between the courts of London and of St Petersburg which had been so unhappily interrupted. He then requested me to make his sentiments in this respect known to your Lordship and asked whether he might acquaint Count Panin that I had the same desire to assist in renewing the good understanding between the two courts. I answered that I believed Count Panin could not doubt but that my mind was strongly impressed with the danger which threatened all governments from the ambitious and destructive principles of France, I must be anxious for such a real concert producing vigorous exertions as could but repel that common danger. I thought indeed that it ought to supersede every partial consideration and engross the attention of all the cabinets of Europe, that remembering with gratitude the kindness I had experienced during my residence in Russia, it must give me peculiar pleasure when a sense of common interest should move closely to connect the two nations and that I could have no objection to his declaring to Count Panin my private sentiments which I should communicate to him without reserve if he were present. As to His Majesty's sentiments in the present posture of affairs, or the particular measures he
may be inclined to pursue it did not much become me to form a conjecture, but that His Majesty's conduct from the commencement of the war had been so firm and uniform, the principles by which he is actuated so fully declared and his regard for the Emperor of Russia proved on so many occasions that I thought Count Panin could feel no uneasiness on that subject.

[end of cipher]

M. de Krüdener seems now to consider the Prussian project of negotiation as nugatory, and all concert between the courts of Berlin and St Petersburg, in order to effect a peace as completely at an end. He has repeated his assurances, that the language he has been instructed to use, invariably, has been that his sovereign would only concur in a general pacification, and upon such terms as should give security to all the powers and restore the balance of Europe. He has received no account of the unconditional release of all the Russian prisoners said to be intended by France, nor does he think that the emperor would be inclined to accept of it.

A Russian courier arrived here two days ago to notify to this court, the death of the Princess Marie Alexandra, daughter of the Grand Duke Alexander in the twelfth year of her age.62

The king and Queen of Prussia are expected to return to Charlottenburg tomorrow. Count Haugwitz it is said will remain behind some days.

no. 12
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 3 September 1800

In consequence of reports which reached me this morning, I applied to Count Alvensleben to know if any intelligence had been received here, that hostilities were to be immediately resumed in Germany, and I learn from him that this court is officially informed, that on the 26th of last month, notice was given to the Austrian officer commanding in that quarter, by General Augereau, that hostilities would be resumed on the 8th instant. I know that General Beurnonville declares that he has no knowledge of

62 Alexander, Grand Duke (1777-1825) who was to succeed his father Paul I on 24 March 1801. He was married to Luise of Baden (1779-1826) who became Elizabeth Alexievna on her marriage. On 29 May 1799, the Grand Duchess Elizabeth gave birth to a girl baptized Maria Alexandrovna. The baby girl tragically died 14 months later from convulsions. Cf. Alan Palmer, Alexander I. Tsar of War and Peace, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), 39.
this event, and that the letters he has received by this night's post from Paris, render it improbable, but Count Alvensleben assures me that the fact is unquestionable.

I was preparing to forward this information to your Lordship, when Mr. Flint arrived, with your Lordship's dispatches no. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and also your dispatches under flying seal to Mr. Wickham. It is a great satisfaction to me, to find that I have not been mistaken, as to the language that it was fit for me to hold, in regard to the proposed mediation, and in the attention to be paid to whatever might throw light upon the conduct, and intentions of the court of Russia. The rupture of the armistice will probably have completely ended all idea of mediation from hence, which I considered before as absolutely nugatory, and I am inclined to hope, that the efforts of what has passed, upon the court of Russia, will be favourable to His Majesty's interests and the common cause. I cannot but believe that the Russian emperor is as much as ever averse from all connection with France, or acquiescence in its destructive projects, and that not having been seconded by this court in an attempt to procure a general peace, he will be the most inclined to unite himself with Great Britain and Austria. It seems to me probable that M. de Krüdener does not expect that his master will support the Danes, and his conversation with me reported in my last dispatch, is a decisive proof, that he thinks he has good ground to believe, at least that it will be an acceptable service to the court of Petersburg, to promote a renewal of the good understanding with His Majesty, if not that some progress has been already made towards so desirable a conclusion. I am fully aware of the wisdom and sound policy of His Majesty's views in regard to Bavaria, and the Low Countries, and I trust that what I thought it my duty to say, before I was so fully informed as I now am of the views of His Majesty's government, in my answer (a copy of which I transmitted to your Lordship to Mr. Drake's letter), is not inconsistent with the spirit of your Lordship's dispatch to Mr. Wickham.

I have not failed to communicate to Lord Minto every information in my power, which could throw the smallest light, on the proposed mediation, the dispositions of Russia, and on the dispositions and views of the French rulers, which I have always thought I saw reason to believe to a general or indeed to any peace.

In the conversation I had with Count Haugwitz I received an impression of the most favorable disposition towards Great Britain. On the subject of the supposed league of the northern powers, he expressed himself in stronger terms than I used in my dispatch to your Lordship, declaring that Prussia, so far from wishing to reduce or to limit the naval power of Great Britain, rejoiced in its increase, considering it as the great bulwark of the common liberty of Europe. All accounts have concurred to persuade me that the idea of the northern league has been always discountenanced by Prussia, and I have every
reason to believe that no representation or communication whatever has been made by the court of Denmark to His Prussian Majesty, on the subject of the dispute with Great Britain.

The object of Prussia in the mediation was I believe merely to obtain some pretence to stipulate a security for her own interests, in the event of negotiations for a general or separate peace, one of which it was thought must be the certain consequence of the battle of Marengo. But Count Haugwitz appears to concur with His Majesty's ministers as to the importance of preserving the left bank of the Rhine, and the liberation of the Low Countries, and of Holland. I cannot however allow myself to indulge a hope that any posture of affairs will impel this court to act with vigour and decision. Nothing undoubtedly is more likely to produce that effect, than the common interest it so visibly has in what regards Bavaria, the Low Countries, and the left bank of the Rhine, with this country and with Russia, and I shall pay the greatest attention to what your Lordship says of the importance to be attached to everything which may tend to an union upon any point, of the three great continental powers against France. The danger most to be apprehended seems to be, that the rulers of France may work upon the jealousy of Prussia against Austria, and hold out the possibility of coming to some agreement with them as to the arrangement of Germany, and particularly as to what concerns Bavaria. I shall endeavour as far as possible to obviate this, and omit no opportunity to insinuate in argument to the Prussian government the expediency or rather absolute necessity of immediately coming to such an understanding with Austria, as may enable the two courts to agree upon terms for the arrangement of Germany, which being not only beneficial to them respectively, but just to the other parties concerned, and consistent with the general balance of Europe, may obtain the concurrence and support of Russia and Great Britain.

I am disposed to think this court would have communicated with His Majesty without reserve, if any basis, or terms of peace, had been either proposed by France, or suggested from hence, and that its silence was the effect of its indecision alone.

The king returned to Charlottenburg yesterday, but Count Haugwitz is not expected before Saturday.63 I am sorry to remark to your Lordship that it seems an opinion very prevalent here that Austria has not made the full use of the interval afforded by the armistice for preparing and increasing the means of resistance.

I shall pay immediate attention to the instructions I have received from your Lordship concerning the duties paid on the exportation of corn from the Prussian ports, and I shall communicate as soon as possible to this ministry your Lordship's dispatch on

63 6 September.
the subject of the permission desired to recruit for His Prussian Majesty's service among the prisoners of war in England. The language I have uniformly held on the subject of the Danish pretensions has been in strict conformity with the instructions I have now received from your Lordship.

no. 13
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 6 September 1800

My Lord,

The Russian courier who arrived here some days ago, and who was mentioned in my last dispatch, brought a letter from the emperor to the King of Prussia. It is an answer to one from the king, written after the first notification of the emperor's approbation of the Prussian offer of mediation. The emperor's letter is said to contain assurances of the satisfaction he should have in concerting with Prussia the most efficacious measures for effecting a general pacification, upon terms consistent with the general safety of Europe.

Count Haugwitz is not yet returned to town, but as far as it is possible to form any conjecture, as to the disposition of the court of Berlin, there is no reason to expect that it tends to a conduct more vigorous and decisive than has been hitherto pursued. Count Alvensleben however, with whom I had a conference yesterday, turned the conversation, but in a very vague manner, and merely as from man to man, upon the possibility of some arrangement of the general interests of Europe, in which he seemed to think a principle difficulty would be found in obtaining the consent of Austria, to a proper provision for the King of Sardinia, in order to enable him to maintain himself as an independent power, and asked if England could be induced in any case to restore the Cape of Good Hope.

Your Lordship will readily suppose that I attach no particular importance to this conversation, though the dearth of other materials has induced me to mention it.

64 Copy in GStA M, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 A, Friedrich Wilhelm to Paul, 3 August 1800.
65 Charles-Emmanuel IV (1751-1819), King of Sardinia. He came to the throne in 1796 on the death of his father Victor-Amadeus III (1726-1796), but was ousted by the French in 1798. He abdicated in 1802 in favour of his brother Victor-Emmanuel I (1759-1824).
66 The Cape of Good Hope was a Dutch possession. In 1795 the exiled Prince of Orange authorised the British to send a garrison to the Cape to prevent it from falling into French hands. They administered the region from September 1795 till February 1803 when, in accordance with the Peace of Amiens, it was handed over to the Batavian Republic. A British expeditionary force took the colony again in 1805 with the resumption of war.
The purpose of my interview with Count Alvensleben was to communicate your Lordship's dispatch no. 2, and to make the representation directed in your dispatch no. 3, on the subject of the corn, purchased for exportation by British merchants.

As to the first I have no doubt I shall speedily receive a satisfactory answer, and I trust that as to the second point, upon which I delivered an official note to Count Alvensleben, His Majesty's just expectation will not be disappointed.

It is confirmed that notice has been given by the French generals, of the approaching renewal of hostilities, but it is very much thought that the acceptance of an ultimatum, proposed by France to the court of Vienna, will prevent it.

I have just learnt that the Austrian chargé d'affaires has received private letters of the 30th ultimo from Vienna, by which it appears that the public there were not informed of and did not expect the cessation of the armistice.

no. 6
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 8 September 1800
Most Secret

My Lord,

Herewith I transmit to your Lordship, under flying seal, a dispatch, with its inclosures, which I have this day written to Lord Minto. Your Lordship will however understand that, as the utmost secrecy has been observed in this country on the communication with France to which this dispatch refers, the information contained in it is intended, solely for your information, and not for the purpose of being made known, in the present stage of the business, to the court at which you reside.

Separate

My Lord,

Having represented to the Prince of Orange, your Lordship's great anxiety that, on account of the service which might result from it to the common cause, General Stamford would remain some time longer at Berlin, I have the satisfaction to inform you that His Serene Highness has been pleased to write to that gentleman the inclosed letter, in which he urges him in the strongest terms to accede to your wishes in this respect. On delivering the Prince of Orange's letter, your Lordship will add that you have the king's

67Frederick William, Prince of Orange-Nassau (1772-1843), King of the Netherlands under the name Frederick I (1815-1843)
special commands, to signify to General Stamford, His Majesty's particular and earnest desire that he will receive, as a small testimony of His Majesty's favourable opinion of him, and to enable him to defray those expenses, which his residence at Berlin must render unavoidable, an allowance at the rate of £1,200 per annum, during the period of his remaining at Berlin.

Your Lordship will be pleased to advance this sum to the General at such times, and in such proportions that may be most agreeable to him, and for your reimbursement you will draw upon this office, at thirty days after sights, accompanying your drafts with receipts in the usual form for secret service money.

no. 14
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 9 September 1800

I have this morning seen Count Haugwitz, and though my hopes of being able to give your Lordship satisfactory accounts of the disposition of this court have never been sanguine, I must own I have been disappointed upon this occasion, for I thought it scarcely possible that the events which have been passing should not have made a deeper impression, and that a danger so visible and so near, as that to which Prussia is exposed, should not produce the slightest exertion to avert it. Count Haugwitz admitted that the answer received from Paris, to the Prussian offer of mediation, was such as to leave him no expectation of any effect whatever from it, yet he would not allow that it amounted to a refusal, because the French government refused itself, upon the ground of negotiations already entered upon with Austria, and drawing near to a successful conclusion. The offer of Prussia could not therefore be considered as refused, till those negotiations should be absolutely at an end which, till hostilities should be recommenced, he could not believe to be the case. As he repeatedly declared, and in the strongest manner his master's desire of establishing an intercourse of unlimited confidence with the court of St James, and his sense of their common interest, and as I was strongly impressed with the vast importance, as stated by your Lordship, of uniting the three great continental powers, in concert upon

68 After Bonaparte's victory over the Austrians at the battle of Marengo, Haugwitz thought it wise to offer Prussia's mediation to bring about either a general or partial peace on the continent. The French reaction, however, was far from favourable, as Bonaparte was busy trying to negotiate with the Austrians. The final answer came stating that the Prussian mediation was no longer indispensable (Paul Bailleu, *Preußen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807. Diplomatische Correspondenzen*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1881) vol. I, 389-390, Talleyrand to Sandoz, 7 August 1800). Cf. chapter 4.4.b of this thesis.
some point against France, I went as far as I would with any degree of prudence, to invite and tempt him to some specific declaration. But it was all to no purpose, and the utmost I can give your Lordship to expect from hence is that Prussia will be ready to concert with His Majesty the terms of general peace upon which she will offer her mediation. But she will not enter into any concert upon that subject, by which she might find herself engaged to inforce specific conditions, nor will she propose any terms whatever to the belligerent powers. Should France renew her desire of the mediation of Prussia it will be immediately made known to Great Britain. Nor will any steps whatever be taken by this court in consequence of such an application without being previously communicated to His Majesty.

I shall not trouble your Lordship with a repetition of the arguments which were adduced by Count Haugwitz to justify the system he pursues. Even the separate peace of Austria, which might leave France in possession of all her conquests upon the continent, he would consider only as an armistice, not affecting materially the real state of the war, or altering the situation of Prussia. Such was the peace of Campo Formio, from which no inconvenience has resulted to the court of Berlin, and he judges of the future by the past. On one point only did he avow a decided principle, governing the policy and actions of the king. Not only he looks without jealousy at the maritime power of England, but he considers it as of the highest importance to Europe, that it should be maintained, and I sincerely believe this court has uniformly discountenanced every proposal tending to measures of a contrary nature among the powers of the north.

Count Haugwitz informed me that the intended journey of Louis Bonaparte to Berlin has been announced to him. He expects him soon. The ostensible purpose of his journey is to be present at the manoeuvres of Potsdam.

I transmit to your Lordship the copy of a note verbale and confidentielle, which I have delivered to Count Haugwitz. It appeared necessary to me to counteract in some degree the unfavourable impressions which are given by the agents of France, as to the

69The Treaty of Campo Formio was signed on 17 October 1797, following the preliminaries of Leoben. Austria ceded Belgium to France, and in a secret clause agreed to the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.

70Louis (1778-1846), Bonaparte's third brother. His aide-de-camp during the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, he married Joshephine's daughter Hortense de Beauharnais in 1802. He held the rank of brigade-major at this time. Louis was to stop in Berlin on his way to Russia as ambassador but Paul I was assassinated before he arrived.
Au moment où les hostilités sont sur le point d'être reprises dans la haute Allemagne, et que les ennemis de la bonne cause que le Roi mon maître a soutenue avec tant de fermeté et de gloire, répandent avec une industrie infatigable que la continuation de la guerre ne doit s'attribuer, qu'à l'ambition et aux intrigues de l'Angleterre, je croirais manquer à mon devoir si je ne m'empressais pas de démontrer au gouvernement prussien la fausseté et l'absurdité de cette assertion hardie. Sa Majesté Prussienne qui a cédé enfin aux instances réitérées qui lui ont été faites par le gouvernement français même, d'interposer sa médiation pour effectuer la paix sait bien que l'Angleterre n'y a pas opposé le moindre obstacle. Est-ce donc par amour de la paix que la France n'a pas profité de cette médiation après l'avoir demandée, qu'elle n'a proposé aucune base pour une traité de paix générale, ou que ne voulant pas en proposer une elle-même, elle n'a pas demandé au Roi de Prusse que Sa Majesté en fit, au lieu d'elle?

La France peut-être n'a pas voulu de l'intervention de la Prusse, mais si l'Angleterre a jugé que les circonstances ne lui permettaient pas de faire, ni de prêter l'oreille à des propositions vagues de paix, ou de demander la médiation de ses armes s'ensuie qu'elle est l'ennemie de la paix?

Lui a-t-on jamais proposé des conditions raisonnables? Qu'a-t-elle mis en avant des prétentions qui marquaient son ambition et son désir de s'agrandir aux dépens d'autres puissances? L'Angleterre il est vrai a opposé jusqu'ici et continuera d'opposer de forts obstacles aux projets de la France, une fermeté inébranlable, la fidélité envers ses alliés, la sainte observation des ses traités, un soin généreux du bien de toutes les nations. Ce sont là les armes avec lesquelles S. M. Britannique combat, non le retour de la paix, mais l'ambition gigantesque et les entreprises injustes de la France.

Mais, dira-t-on, la bataille de Marengo a changé les circonstances et les vues du gouvernement français. Quelle est donc cette paix dont ils voulaient il y a quelques mois que la Prusse devint la médiatrice? Aurait-elle pu se concilier avec la justice, la sûreté de ses voisins, avec l'équilibre et la liberté de l'Europe? Auraient-ils osé la proposer à la Prusse si elle avait vu un autre but? Cette paix aurait-elle été déshonorante ou désavantageuse pour la France? Non assurément. S'ils veulent la justice et le repos de l'Europe pourquoi ne pas saisir l'occasion d'en donner une preuve éclatante? La bataille...
de Marengo a-t-elle changé la nature des choses? ou le bruit de leur victoire a-t-il étouffé la voie de la justice et de la modération? De grands succès peuvent les avoir mis dans le cas de se passer d'un médiateur, mais s'ils ne proposent pas dans la crise actuelle des conditions de paix raisonnable, c.à.d. telles qui pourront assurer le repos et l'indépendance de l'Europe entière, et qui portent en elles mêmes la garantie de leur exécution, n'est-il pas clair qu'ils font la guerre non pour réduire, comme ils disent, leur ennemis à la raison, mais pour s'agrandir aux dépens du repos et du bonheur du monde? Et qu'est-ce qu'on objecte à l'Angleterre? Et comment a-t-elle fait échouer le projet de paix du gouvernement français? La France est-elle la seule puissance contre laquelle il n'est pas permis de se défendre? Est-il injuste de faire des alliances pour la repousser ou mettre des bornes à ses conquêtes? Et les ayant faites est-ce un crime d'y rester fidèle? L'Angleterre et l'Autriche se sont engagés réciproquement à s'entre secourir et à ne pas faire de paix séparée. Cet engagement est-il contraire à l'usage ou au droits des gens? Est-ce qu'il en résulte qu'il soit impossible de conclure une paix raisonnable et solide? Et comment cette convention pourrait-elle l'entraver ou y mettre un obstacle? Mais, répandra-t-on peut-être, l'Europe entière soupire après la paix et la France ne combat aujourd'hui que pour la conquérir. C'est l'Angleterre qui nourrit et anime la guerre. Si c'est là le véritable objet des efforts de la France, qu'elle le prouve en se bornant à des limites qui peuvent subsister avec la sûreté de l'Europe, qu'elle rétablisse la liberté de tant de peuples qu'elle a subjugués, qu'elle accorde à l'Allemagne une frontière qui lui assurera son repos, qu'elle ne retienne plus les clefs de l'Italie. Mais toutes ces contrées que la France a conquises, est-ce pour se les approprier que l'Angleterre voudrait les dégager de leurs mains? Non. Certainement. Elle ne demande pas une seule ville un seul arpent de terre. Mais elle conseille, elle implore les nations de l'Europe de se concerter ensemble, sur un arrangement compatible avec les intérêts de chaque puissance, et qui rétablirait la paix sur une base juste et en même temps durable. Elle leur promet à cet effet l'appui de toutes ses forces mais elle ne demande rien pour elle. Elle a combattu pour la liberté de l'Europe dans la guerre de la succession de l'Espagne.71 Dans la guerre de 1756,72 c'est elle encore qui a concouru à donner un puissant appui aux princes de l'empire. Dans la guerre actuelle attaquée sans prétexte après avoir dissimulé, pour éviter l'effusion de sang, les affronts les plus atroces, une suite de victoires qui n'a pas été interrompue lui a donné une

71 The War of the Spanish Succession between 1701 and 1714 in which France and Spain fought against Britain, Austria and the United Provinces.
72 1756 was the start of the Seven Years War in which Britain, allied with Prussia, fought against Austria, Russia, France, Sweden and Spain.
supériorité surprenante sur la mer, et lui a valu la conquête de toutes les colonies françaises dans les deux Indes.73 Dans des circonstances si avantageuses, elle a manifesté son désir de la paix, elle s'est offerte à racheter les pertes des ses alliés aux dépens de ses propres conquêtes. Le seul équivalent qu'elle en a demandé a été la sûreté et la liberté de l'Europe. Et pour toute réponse son ambassadeur a reçu ordre du Directoire de quitter Paris dans 24 heures.74 Toujours fidèle aux mêmes principes, elle les soutient avec fermeté et vigueur, mais elle a combattu en dernier lieu, non seulement pour la liberté de l'Europe, mais en vertu d'un des devoirs les plus sacrés des souverains, celui de défendre les lois de tout gouvernement légitime, le bonheur des peuples, le droit des gens, la sainte religion. Que la France soit donc juste, qu'elle soit d'autant plus modérée, qu'elle jouissait déjà avant ces temps désastreux d'une étendue d'état et de puissance qui la rendait le plus formidable empire de l'Europe, qu'elle cesse d'exciter dans tous les pays l'esprit destructeur de tout gouvernement et de toute morale. Alors on pourra croire que son gouvernement repose sur une base légitime et solide, et les véritables obstacles à une paix équitable et générale se trouveront levés.

Les liaisons étroites qui subsistent depuis si longtemps entre la Prusse et la Grande Bretagne, la droiture et la modération qui distinguent Sa Majesté Prussienne le mettent à même de connaître mieux que personne la pureté et l'élévation des sentiments et de la conduite de Sa Majesté Britannique. Les intérêts réciproques aussi bien que des liens de famille attachent le Roi mon maître à Sa Majesté Prussienne. Ce sont les mêmes vues, les mêmes principes. C'est le bien public, et non leur avantage particulier, que ces deux souverains ont toujours poursuivi, quoique par des voies différentes. Le Roi de la Grande Bretagne a été forcé d'entrer en guerre pour se défendre de l'attaque de l'ennemi. Sa Majesté Prussienne a pu jusqu'ici garantir son propre pays et celui de ses alliés des maux qui ont désolé le reste de l'Europe, sans prendre les armes, et les peuples voyant que les forces de la Prusse sont encore entières ne perdent pas tout espoir dans la crise la plus terrible qui ait jamais menacé le monde.

C'est d'après ces considérations que j'ai cru devoir adresser cette note au ministère prussien, pour être mise sous les yeux du Roi, étant persuadé que le meilleur moyen de cimentier la bonne intelligence, et de resserrer les noeuds de l'amitié et de la confiance entre les deux cours, doit être celui de mettre dans le plus grand jour la droiture, le

73 Britain took possession of the French colonies in the Antibes - Martinique, Tabago, Sainte-Lucie, and Guadeloupe - along with five towns in India.
74 The British mission was required to leave Paris in August 1792.
désintéressement et l'amour du bien public qui distinguent toutes les démarches du Roi
mon maître.

no. 15
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 10 September 1800

My Lord,

If there remains any possibility of producing a change in the system of the
Prussian ministry it must be attempted indirectly through the medium of the Elector of
Saxony\footnote{Friedrich-August III (1750-1827), Elector of Saxony. He inherited the title in 1763 at the age of 13,
took over the reigns of government in 1768, remained neutral until 1806 when as an ally of Prussia his
troops fought at Jena. He assumed the title of King of Saxony as Friedrich-August I on 11 December
1806.} and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. They are certainly under great alarm and
are of opinion that their safety would be best obtained by a vigorous resistance to France.
Strong expressions of this sentiment apparently flowing from a conviction of what their
interest requires and not from the suggestion of any foreign power might have some
influence on the King of Prussia by making him apprehend that his connections with those
powers might be weakened if he should refuse to consult their inclination. I have
mentioned this idea to Lord Minto and to Mr Wickham as I think the Elector of Bavaria\footnote{Maximillien-Joseph (1756-1825), Elector later King of Bavaria. The son of a French general, he
became Elector of Bavaria and Elector Palatine on 16 February 1799. Bavarian troops fought against the
French (1799-1800), but after the battle of Hohenlinden, Maximillien-Joseph signed a treaty with
Bonaparte (August 1801) which guaranteed Bavarian territory and promised compensations for the loss of
territories on the left bank of the Rhine.} would be the best and most natural channel through which to work upon Saxony.

A resident of Austria, a person of natural consequence and in the confidence of his
sovereign might prevent the loss of many favourable opportunities by pressing, in concert
with His Majesty's minister, upon the notice of the Prussian government those topics
which would be most proper to exact the attention of the King of the common danger and
the necessity of active resistance. Count Haugwitz repeatedly insisted on the non-
appointment of a minister as a proof of real disinclination in the court of Vienna to enter
into any concert with Prussia.
no. 16  
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 13 September 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatch by the messenger Wiffin was received yesterday, together with the enclosures under flying seal for Lord Minto. You may depend on my strictly observing His Majesty's orders, and that I shall continue punctually to transmit to Lord Minto every information that can possibly be of use to him.

M. de Krüdener informed me that he had strongly urged the Prussian ministry immediately to form a strong army of observation in Franconia, but found them very much averse to that measure. M. de Krüdener received a courier yesterday from Petersburg, but I have not yet been able to learn the subject of his dispatches.

M. de Hudelist informs me he has advices from Vienna that the emperor left that place on the 6th to join the army, and received from the inhabitants the warmest testimonies of their loyalty and affection. General Alvinczy\(^\text{77}\) is to command the forces levying in Hungary, and the Archduke Charles\(^\text{78}\) is assembling forces in his government of Bohemia.

no. 17  
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 11 September 1800

My Lord,

Since the arrival of the Prussian courier mentioned in my last, one from Count Lusi at Petersburg has brought dispatches to this court. Baron Krüdener has informed me

\(^{77}\) Alvinczy de Berberek, Joseph von (1735-1810). Austrian soldier, defeated Dumouriez at Neerwinden, defeated by Bonaparte at Arcola and Rivoli, later made Field Marshal and served as Governor of Hungary from 1798 on.

\(^{78}\) Charles (Karl Ludwig) (1771-1847), Archduke of Austria, Duke of Teschen, third son of Leopold II, Austrian Field Marshal (1805) and Generalissimo (1806). He was considered one of the best Austrian generals if not Bonaparte's best opponent. He fought at the battles of Jemappes, Neerwinden, Wattignies and Fleurus, and successfully commanded against Jourdan and Moreau. He gave up his military career for a while after the failure of the Second Coalition, became first Governor of Bohemia, and Minister of War from 1801 to 1805.
of the intelligence he has received which is of such importance that I have thought it necessary to send it to your Lordship by a special messenger, as far as Cuxhaven.\footnote{Port at the mouth of the Elbe on the left bank, belonging to the town of Hamburg.}

The Emperor of Russia has assembled two armies, each consisting of 80,000 men, one in Lithuania, under General Pahlen,\footnote{Pahlen, Count Peter Alesievich (1745-1826), Russian statesman, President and member of the College of Foreign Affairs (1800-1801).} and the other under General Kutuzov\footnote{Also spelt Kutusov or Koutousov, Mikhail Hilarionovich Golenischev (1745-1813), Russian field marshal.} at Wladimir upon the Bug. He has directed M. de Krüdener to say that these troops are destined to enforce the conclusion of a peace consistent with the general interests of Europe, and the known principles of His Imperial Majesty, and to make the strongest insistence to the court of Berlin to put an army in readiness immediately for the same purpose.

M. de Krüdener tells me his remonstrances appear to have no effect at all upon the apathy of this cabinet. He acknowledged to me that he employed upon this occasion, language which at a less important crisis, and addressed to less torpid ears, might be deemed too strong, and I hear from other quarters that it amounted to a menace.

Count Haugwitz said it was so well known that Prussia possessed the means of making her mediation respected, that the king would not consent to incur for no purpose the great expense which must attend the demonstration required by Russia.

M. de Krüdener informed me farther that the Elector of Saxony is so strongly impressed with the impending danger, that he is making preparations for defence and actually drawing together from troops to cover his frontier. He then expressed his regret, that while England was making such stupendous exertions in the common cause, she did not make a little farther advance in order to assemble in Germany, not a few thousand men, who must necessarily be attached to and depend upon the forces of other powers, but an army which might be at her own disposal, and act with all the vigour and consistency which distinguish His Majesty's councils, that he was confident the state of Germany, at this moment, afforded the means of doing it, and that not only the Elector of Bavaria, but Saxony and Hesse might contribute to carry such a plan into effect. I answered generally, that it was impossible to doubt His Majesty's inclination to exert all the powers and resources of his kingdom in support of the great cause in which he is engaged, and that there could be as little doubt of the wisdom with which he would discern, and improve every opportunity that might present itself. But that the greatest
obstacle which opposed itself to His Majesty's endeavours, and the whole foundation of
the successful progress of the French, was the unhappy disunion of those powers who
nevertheless were perfectly agreed, both as to the principles which ought to be supported,
and the urgency of the occasion, which calls for vigorous and decisive action. M. de
Krüdener replied to this, that he had already done all he could to promote that union, of
which he felt so strongly the necessity, and he was full of hope and expectation that he
should shortly receive such instructions from his court, as would enable him to address
himself more particularly to me upon that subject. He had transmitted a copy of the note,
delivered by me to Count Haugwitz, to St Petersburg, where he was sure that it would be
highly approved, and the communication to him, considered by the emperor as a mark of
confidence with which he would be gratified. In the meantime he strongly urged me to
make it public.

I think myself warranted in the conjecture that the court of Berlin, has in
consequence of the desire of France, recommended to the emperor to make a separate
peace, but M. de Krüdener has assured me that His Imperial Master is firmly determined
upon that point and will not accept of any pacification which does not include those with
whom he is allied, and provide for the general interests of Europe.

The offer of releasing the Russian prisoners was made through M. de Bourgoing at Hamburg to the Russian minister Mouraviev, and Baron Krüdener is now authorized to accept it on condition that they should not serve against France during the war.

I have been told but cannot absolutely vouch for the truth of it, that M. de
Krüdener has asked from Count Haugwitz for a communication of the note received from
France, concerning the mediation, and received for answer, that it had been sent to St
Petersburg.

Conceiving that it must be a great consequence that Lord Minto should have the
earliest intelligence of the steps taken by Russia I have forwarded it to him by special
messenger.

Since I began this dispatch I have seen General Stamford, who has had a
conversation with Count Haugwitz on the conduct of the Russian court. The light in
which Count Haugwitz chooses to represent it is as an invitation to Prussia to concur
eventually even with France in measures hostile to the court of Vienna. Your Lordship
will judge both from the general tenor of M. de Krüdener's communication to me, as well
as from the character of Count Panin whether this is probable. To me it seems that the

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82 Bourgoing, Jean François de, French diplomat at the court of Spain, then chargé d'affaires at Hamburg.
83 Mouraviev, Russian diplomat, envoy to Hamburg.
Russian government in this instance has acted hitherto with consistency and good sense. The battle of Marengo, and what immediately followed, seemed to lean to a speedy and separate peace between France and Austria, and it was generally thought that the latter would offer terms of great advantage to the emperor, in order to be at liberty to pursue her ambitious views against other powers. To prevent this, Russia was induced to consent to overtures for a general peace, in which the interests and independence of Europe might be secured, and she declared from the first her opinion of the necessity of supporting by a powerful armament, the proposed mediation of the court of Berlin. General Stamford concurs in opinion with me that the most probable result of this matter, supposing the war with France to continue, will be a renewed intercourse and concert between the Imperial courts and His Majesty against France. He also thinks from Count Haugwitz's manner that Baron Krüdener had assumed a very peremptory and menacing tone. General Stamford seized this occasion of remonstrating with all the energy and good sense, by which he is so much distinguished against the feeble system of the Prussian court, and exposed its consequences in a manner in which Count Haugwitz seemed to feel, and which drew from him the expression of a desire to communicate on these subjects with the Duke of Brunswick, with which he desired General Stamford to make the Duke acquainted.

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 14 September 1800
Separate and Secret

My Lord,

I have received a letter from Mr. Drake brought to me by the Chevalier de Bray, who is going to reside in London as minister from the Elector of Bavaria. The chevalier is charged by Baron de Montgelas with a commission to endeavour through the hereditary

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84 Brunswick, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, reigning Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg (1735-1806) and also a Prussian general. He assumed his ducal title in 1780 and commanded the Austro-Prussian forces which invaded France. He was mortally wounded at the battle of Auerstädt.
85 Bray, François Gabriel de (1765-1832), Bavarian diplomat of French origin. He passed definitively into Bavarian service in 1799, was named ambassador to Petersburg, then London and later to Berlin. He had his first audience in London on 15 October 1800 and his last on 15 May 1801.
86 Montgelas, Maximilien Joseph Count von (1759-1838), Bavarian statesman and prime minister from 1799-1817.
Princess of Tour and Taxis\textsuperscript{87} to work upon the King of Prussia's mind and to impress him with sentiments more favourable to the views and wishes of the allies. The chevalier has orders to explain himself fully to me, and I shall be able to send your Lordship details upon the subject of his mission here by the next post. He desires that the real object of it may be kept a profound secret, both here, and in London, as it is at Hamburg the elector himself, Mr. Drake adds, not being acquainted with it.

no. 18
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 16 September 1800

My Lord,

In addition to my last dispatch, I have only to remark, that I can give no positive and precise information, as to the number of which the two Russian armies, assembled under Pahlen and Kutuzov, actually consist, but I believe them to be considerable. To the movement of some Saxon troops to the frontiers I am not inclined to attach any consequence. They consist of only four or five thousand men, and compose the cordon, which ever since the elector has adopted the neutrality of Prussia, has been kept on foot. I have heard nothing to contradict the opinion I have already given your Lordship of the real and professed object of the measures adopted by Russia. They must I think ultimately assist the views of His Majesty and his allies, and I trust I have not been mistaken in endeavouring to give as early as possible an impression to that government, that the true cause of the continuance of the war is to be found, only in the persevering ambition and destructive prospects of France, and not in the conduct of and principles of His Majesty, and his allies.

The Prussian ministers still complain to the friends of Great Britain, of the reserve of Austria, and that His Majesty's government does not open to them with full confidence, the whole extent of its plans and views. They either do not, or will not see, that if Austria should be driven to make a separate peace, the inaction of Prussia will have been the principle cause, and that a decided and vigorous support of the common interest is the only chance they have of securing, at a general peace, the conditions they may think important for Europe and for themselves.

\textsuperscript{87}Theresa, Hereditary Princess of Tour and Taxis, sister of the Queen of Prussia. She was used in a secret scheme to try and influence the King of Prussia to look upon England in a more friendly light (cf. J. B. Fortescue, Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. Forstecue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore (Dropmore Papers), 10 vols., (London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1892-1927), vol. 6, 322, 325).
I must, (at the same time declare it continues to be my opinion that the intentions of the Prussian cabinet are friendly to His Majesty, and that they are fully convinced of the great importance of the naval power of Great Britain to the safety and repose of Europe), acquaint your Lordship that on Sunday last Count Haugwitz gave a dinner to a select company for the purpose, as it is generally believed, of effecting a more intimate intercourse, between the Russian envoy, and those of France and Spain. But the behaviour of M. de Krüdener was, I am informed, so reserved and distant, as to render that design, if it was ever entertained, completely abortive. There are accounts from Petersburg that the emperor is making great exertions to arm, both by sea and land.

no. 7
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 16 September 1800

My Lord,

Your several dispatches to no. 12 inclusive have been received and laid before the king.
[cipher]

I have the satisfaction to inform you that the king has been graciously pleased entirely to approve of the language which (as stated in your Lordship's dispatch no. 11) you held to M. Krüdener in answer to his observation respecting the present interruption of harmony and good understanding between the courts of London and St Petersburg. And I have to signify to your Lordship His Majesty's pleasure that in the event of M. de Krüdener endeavouring to resume the conversation with you on this subject, you should state to him explicitly that you are authorized by your court, to express the king's sincere desire for a renewal of that friendly intercourse and connection with Russia, which in all former periods have been so beneficial both to that court and to Great Britain, and which in the present crisis might contribute so essentially to the security and tranquility of Europe.

88 14 September.
My Lord,

From the conversation of a gentleman very lately arrived from Petersburg, who has had sufficient opportunities of judging of the temper of the court, I think I may safely affirm that the emperor's aversion from France continues as strong as at the first, and that he is desirous once more of bringing his troops into action against her if she should persist in those ambitions and destructive prospects which threaten the total distinction of the liberty of Europe. As the peculiar temper of Paul I makes it highly probable that the present distress of Austria may incline him to assume the character of her protector, if the court of Vienna should condescend, in order to obtain so powerful an ally, to make some sacrifice to his vanity, his troops now assembled on the Bug might soon be destined to act in conjunction with the Austrians. The emperor's resentment against Great Britain having I believe no foundation but his jealousy of some supposed partiality in His Majesty's government to Austria, when they thought they should have adopted his resentment, it may be still more easy for His Majesty to resume a friendly and cordial intercourse with that prince.

But as it is evident to all Europe, the emperor himself excepted, that even the consent of Austria is not enough to bring his troops again into action, but that pecuniary means which he cannot command are necessary. His warlike preparations will only draw upon him contempt and ridicule, unless Great Britain should think it worth her while to furnish supplies. It does not become me to state any opinion upon this point, but as until His Majesty has a minister immediately accredited to the court of Petersburg, overtures and communications of great importance may be made to his ministers at other courts, I may be allowed to ask your Lordship whether, if M. de Kriidener should open the subject to me, I am to give him any encouragement. I am the rather induced to take this liberty, because it appears to me (and I think it will have been seen by your Lordship in the same light) that M. de Krüdener's conversation with me, which I have already reported, in which he suggested the expediency of England's raising and paying a large army in Germany, was intended to try the ground upon this particular point.

No formal answer has yet been given by this court to the Russian declaration, and it is probable their silence will continue till after the manoeuvres at Potsdam. I have already informed your Lordship of the desire expressed by Count Haugwitz to confer with the Duke of Brunswick on this subject. General Stamford was to meet His Serene Highness at Brandenburg. I am told that M. de Krüdener has been instructed to make
some propositions here, respecting our late transactions with Denmark, and that this step, as well as the declaration concerning the armies assembled in Poland, is made in conjunction with Sweden. I intend immediately to ask Count Haugwitz if this report is true, and what is the nature and extent of the proposition. I had on Wednesday last desired him to give me an audience, but have not yet obtained the appointment of any time for it. My object in asking it was to be enabled to give your Lordship more certain and precise information, as to the Emperor of Russia's declaration, and the effect produced by it, upon this cabinet, and also to feel their pulse in regard to the Netherlands and Holland. I met Count Haugwitz after he had received my application. He told me that he was very desirous of conversing at large with me upon several points of great importance, and in a day or two should be able to fix a time. The same reasons which have postponed the answer to the Russian declaration have also probably postponed this interview. In the meantime it appears that this court fully expects, notwithstanding the extension of the armistice, the continuance of the war.

I inclose an answer delivered to me on Thursday to my note of the 10th September. What Count Haugwitz himself said to me, of the manner in which the King of Prussia received the note, and what I am told he has said of it to others, would not warrant my putting an unfavourable interpretation on that part of it, which immediately applies to the conduct and views of His Majesty. But in my judgement, it apparently indicates a very strong prepossession against the British government, as far as concerns the war, though I hope and trust that prepossession will have been somewhat weakened, and that a ground has been laid for removing it altogether. The concluding part of this answer, if it had any relation to my note, might be considered, strictly, as pointing against France, but I conceive it rather to glance at the conduct of Russia, in regard to, and in consequence of the offer of the mediation of the court of Berlin.

I have received this morning from the consul at Memel, the intelligence of which I inclose a copy, and M. de Krüdener has just been with me in consequence of a note I wrote to him on the subject. I hear from him that whatever orders were given by the emperor, were previous to any knowledge of the convention concluded with Denmark,

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89 17 September.
90 18 September.
91 Memel was an important Prussian trading port on the Baltic near the Russian border.
92 The first Anglo-Danish Convention was signed on the morning of 29 August 1800 after having been negotiated by Whitworth for the British and Bernstorff for the Danes. The convention contained the following points: the question of the right to visit and search neutral ships was left to a later date; the
and, as appears indeed from the dates, immediately after the first dispatches from the court of Denmark were received. He does not think that an embargo has been laid or that there has been any actual interruption of the commerce of the British subjects. In regard to the northern alliance, the court of Petersburg has certainly declared, that she will make common cause with Denmark, and with Sweden, and M. de Krüdener has been instructed to apply to the Prussian court, to interpose, as he states it, its good offices with the court of London. But he does not think the emperor is disposed to countenance any supply of naval stores to the enemy or even to exclude in all cases the visiting of ships under convoy. He will not admit that what has happened is likely to lead to any further misunderstanding, or to prolong the separation of the two courts, but rather hopes it may bring on an explanation which will reunite them. This conversation is so entirely confidential, that I should not feel myself justified in relating, if it was of less importance to the interests of His Majesty.

I inclose copies of the notes which I have delivered to Count Alvensleben on the subject of the duties imposed on the exportation of corn from the British ports. I have not received any answer.

Copy of a note from Carysfort to Alvensleben, Berlin, 5 September 1800

Sa Majesté Prussienne a permis, par une note officielle remise à Mr. Garlike le 6 mars dernier, la libre sortie du froment des ports de la Prusse et l'Ost Frise, et des sujets anglais ont, en conséquence fait des achats considérables de ce grain, qui ont été en partie transportés en Angleterre, mais dont partie est restée dans les ports prussiens, en attendant l'arrivée des vaisseaux.

Il a été depuis mis un impôt, prohibitoire [sic] en effet, sur la sortie des grains, et les agents de Sa Majesté Prussienne ont cru que cet impôt devait se porter non seulement sur le commerce des grains qui se ferait postérieurement à la publication de l'édit de Sa Majesté, mais encore sur le froment qui a été acheté, sur la foi de la permission spéciale de Sa Majesté Prussienne, et expressément pour être exporté par les sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique.

*Freya* and its convoy were to be released; and the Danish king promised to suspend all convoys until the question of the right to visit neutral ships was decided.

93 On hearing of the *Freya* affair, Paul ordered an embargo to be laid on British ships on 6 September but withdrew the order a few days later on 11 September when news of the Anglo-Danish Convention reached Petersburg.
Cette interprétation de la volonté de Sa Majesté Prussienne causerait la ruine entière
de bien des particuliers, qui non seulement n'ayant pas été avertis, n'ont pu se soustraire
au risque, mais qui l'ont encouru, en suite de la confiance qu'ils ont reposée sur
l'assurance qui leur a été donné par leur propre gouvernement fondée sur la permission
accordée à la prière de Sa Majesté Britannique, par un Roi son voisin et son ami, dont
l'amour de la justice est reconnu par tout le monde.

Le Roi a été très sensible à la preuve que Sa Majesté Prussienne a bien voulu lui
donner de son amitié, et ne doute nullement que les grains qui auront été achetés par des
sujets britanniques, pour être exportés selon cette permission, seront censés être exempts
des nouveaux droits, et qu'on en permettra la sortie, dès qu'il aura été prouvé que
l'acquisition en a été faite antérieurement par des sujets de Sa Majesté, et pour leur compte,
sur la foi, et selon la teneur de la dite permission de Sa Majesté Prussienne.

Le Comte de Carysfort a l'honneur par ordre de sa cour, de soumettre au ministère
prussien cet exposé des faits et de marquer la juste attente de Sa Majesté Britannique. Il se
repose avec une confiance entière sur l'équité qui en tout temps a caractérisé le
gouvernement prussien et sur l'amitié particulière que Sa Majesté Prussienne a toujours
témoinnée pour Sa Majesté Britannique et dont elle a donné dans l'instance, dont il a été
parlé, une preuve éclatante.

Copy of a note from Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 16 September 1800

Le Ministre d'Etat et de cabinet soussigné a mis sous les yeux de Son Auguste
Maître la note verbale et confidentielle que Milord Carysfort, Envoyé Extraordinaire et
Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne lui a fait l'honneur de
lui remettre en date du 10 septembre. Le Roi n'a pu qu'envisager cette communication
obligeante comme une preuve de la bonne amitié et de l'heureuse intelligence qui
subsistent entre les deux cours, et il y a été sensible. Tout en déplorant les maux infinis
que prépare encore à l'humanité la continuation de la guerre Sa Majesté doit respecter les
principes qui y déterminent Sa Majesté Britannique, et elle est très éloignée d'apporter un
jugement équivoque, qui serait incompatible avec la loyauté d'un monarque, auquel elle a
voué de tout temps, la plus haute estime. Le Roi ne cesse de s'intéresser vivement à la
conciliation des querelles sanglantes qui déchirent l'Europe. Il n'a pas tenu à lui de
contribuer à les aplanir par des voies de modération et de douceur, et il ne lui reste qu'à
regretter que ses bonnes intentions n'aient pas été secondées.
Copy of a note from Carysfort to Alvensleben, Berlin, 20 September 1800

Le soussigné envoyé extraordinaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande Bretagne, a eu l'honneur par ordre de son maître, de remettre à Son Excellence le Comte d'Alvensleben, Ministre d'Etat et de cabinet, une note en date du 5 septembre relativement à la sortie des ports de la Prusse et de l'Ost Frise, du froment qui a été acheté, afin d'être exporté par des sujets anglais, selon la permission expresse de Sa Majesté Prussienne, accordée à la prière de Sa Majesté Britannique au mois de mars dernier, et avant la publication de l'édit de Sa Majesté Prussienne, pour mettre un impôt, en effet prohibitoire [sic], sur la sortie des grains.

Le soussigné a maintenant l'honneur de rappeler au ministère de Sa Majesté Prussienne que non seulement des frais considérables sont causés nécessairement aux sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique, par la détention des vaisseaux destinés au transport du froment qu'ils ont acheté, mais encore que la saison la plus convenable pour la navigation de la Mer Baltique, sera bientôt passée. C'est pourquoi il croit de son devoir de solliciter une réponse à la note qu'il a remise, ne doutant nullement que Sa Majesté Prussienne accordera aux instances de Sa Majesté Britannique ce qui est non seulement conforme à l'amitié qui unit les deux cours, mais encore à la bonté et à la justice qui distinguent en toutes occasions Sa Majesté Prussienne.

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 22 September 1800

My Lord,

As M. de Krüdener is sending an estafette to Hamburg, I take the opportunity of informing your Lordship, that this court has received information that hostilities were to recommence in Germany on the 19th instant.

I learn with great satisfaction that the Russian government has recalled the hasty measure affecting the commerce of His Majesty's subjects, with the rumour of which your Lordship was made acquainted by my last dispatch. As it was founded, by their own acknowledgements, upon misconception which could not have taken place if a minister accredited by His Majesty had been resident at Petersbourg, I trust that it may contribute more speedily to restore a regular and amicable intercourse between the two courts, which in the present crisis appears to be of peculiar importance.

Your Lordship will, I trust, excuse my taking the liberty earnestly to recommend that the terms proposed by the French to Austria, the pretended preliminaries signed by
Count St Julien and the project and counter-project for the naval armistice, which place in so strong a light, the moderation, and desire of peace which have governed His Majesty's councils, may be made public as soon as possible. It may have a great effect upon the public mind, and even contribute, if any thing can, to rouse this court to measures of more activity.

It is with the greatest concern I inform your Lordship that the King of Prussia was thrown from his horse this morning during the manoeuvres near Potsdam, and it is said has been very much hurt. But as His Majesty remounted his horse and continued to give his orders to the end of the day, I trust I shall be able in my next dispatch to assure your Lordship of his being perfectly recovered.

no. 21
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 23 September 1800

My Lord,

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that His Prussian Majesty has had a good night, that he gave the parole this morning, and would have appeared upon the parade, but that he was dissuaded from it by his physician, so that I trust there is not the least reason to believe that the accident he met with will be attended with any bad consequences.

Your Lordship's dispatch no. 7 which I received by the messenger Silvester, containing His Majesty's gracious approbation of the language held by me to M. de Kriidener, must be an additional incentive to me, to use my utmost exertions in his service. The events which have taken place since the period concur to prove how important it is to restore, if possible, harmony and good correspondence between the two courts. The difficulties which must attend the attempt are so obvious that it cannot be necessary to recapitulate them. I sincerely hope that the measure taken by the Emperor of Russia upon the first account of the appearance of His Majesty's fleet in the Sound, but which he has since recalled, will not prevent it. I have reason to think this precipitate step was occasioned entirely by the exaggerated and partial representations, made by Count Bernstorff's order, of the conduct of His Majesty's government, and that it ought not to

94 Bernstorff, Christian Günther (1769-1835), Danish statesman and diplomat. He took over the Department of Foreign Affairs as Secretary of State (1797-1810) at the death of his father and eventually adopted a convoy policy that led Denmark into war with Britain.
be considered as indicating of a disposition, averse from the resuming ancient habits of friendly intercourse with the court of St James.

**Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 23 September 1800**

Private

My Lord,

I must acquaint your Lordship that it was found impossible to open the box, containing the dispatch of the 16th instant, with the key, and that I was therefore under the necessity of breaking the lock. To what cause it must be attributed I cannot tell. The key opened with case the box which arrived some days ago directed to Lord Minto. It was inserted into the lock of this box (directed to Mr. Wickham) and the wards seemed perfectly to correspond.

**Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 26 September 1800**

My Lord,

I have the honour herewith to transmit for your Lordship's information, my dispatches of this day, together with their inclosures, to Lord Minto under flying-seal to Mr. Wickham. They contain everything that has passed between the king's servants and M. Otto on the subject of a naval armistice since the date of my last dispatches to Lord Minto which were forwarded under flying-seal through Berlin.

The importance and urgency of that subject requires that they should be forwarded to Mr. Wickham, and by him to Vienna with as little delay as possible, and you will be good enough to accompany them with such informations you may think useful to either of those ministers.

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Otto, Louis Guillaume (1754-1817), French diplomat of German origin. He accompanied Sièyes to Berlin in 1798 as legation secretary and was chargé d'affaires ad interim between May and December 1799. He was transferred to London in February 1800.
My Lord,

Though without expectation that the court of Berlin could be brought to act, upon any point, in concert with the other great continental powers against France, I wished to try whether they were sufficiently attached to any principles of general policy, or of a balance among the powers of Europe in general, or of Germany in particular, to fix a term beyond which they would not acquiesce under French domination, or to any object beyond the line of demarcation in the defence of which they would take an interest. That they had not always been blind to the connection of their own immediate interests with the common good, and that at the moment they make their offer of mediation to France, they were influenced by the fear of having no means left to be included together with their allies, in the system of a general peace, I have little doubt. But the course of events since that moment, and the near approach, and increasing magnitude of the danger, might either have roused some latent sparks of vigour, or by inducing despair of the future, have immersed them more deeply in apathy and inactivity. Your Lordship having at the same time opened to me the views and wishes of His Majesty's government on the subject of the Netherlands, it seemed expedient to discover at a distance, what sort of interest was felt by Prussia, as to the fate of Bavaria, and whether either for the sake of the House of Orange, or the value of Holland and the Netherlands to Prussia herself, or the prospect of obtaining the consent of other powers to any acquisition she might be desirous of making, she could be brought to give assistance in any way for rescuing those countries out of the hands of France. I have already informed your Lordship that it is some time since I first endeavoured to have a conference with Count Haugwitz upon these subjects. His former language as well as what I had heard of his conversation with others, and the apparent disposition of Russia, made me think that I saw a remote probability that some sensation had been produced in the Prussian cabinet more favorable to the common cause. The news which I received yesterday morning from Mr. Wickham of a new armistice, and the cession of Ulm, Ingolstadt and Philippsburg, which also reached the Prussian ministers at the same time in a letter from General Moreau to the resident of this court in Bavaria, not

96 This is probably the forty-five day armistice agreed to between Austria and France at the Convention of Hohenlinden on 25 September 1800 and which was paid for by Austria with a renewal of separate peace negotiations and the handing over to France of the fortresses of Ulm, Philippsburg and Ingolstadt. Ulm and Philippsburg are towns in Baden-Württemberg, and Ingolstadt is in Bavaria on the river Danube.
only made the attempt I had in view more necessary, but was of such a nature as to put it out of their power to conceal, except from themselves, the full extent of their submission to France, for their was no alternative but to abandon entirely and forever, all the countries possessed by the arms of France, or without a moments loss of time to concert with the remaining powers of Europe the means of common defence. But though I have consumed much of your Lordship's time in stating the objects I had in view, the relation of my conversation with Count Haugwitz will be very short. He saved me the trouble of feeling my way, by declaring at once without the least reserve, that Prussia would not concern herself, directly or indirectly with any object beyond the line of demarcation. To the conduct of Austria he applied terms of reprobation and contempt. The cession of the fortresses was the final abandonment of Bavaria and Swabia, and of all the Princes who had depended on the protection of Austria, and left the Austrian territory itself exposed to perpetual danger. The cession of Ingolstadt in particular, the property of the Elector of Bavaria, was an act of perfidy. When I offered to show the danger to Prussia herself, he said we were perfectly agreed in principle that France was to be dreaded. We differed only upon a military question, the best mode of defence. Prussia was to be considered as the fortress of Europe, opposing an inexpugnable barrier to the progress of France. The King of Prussia, with his allies could bring into the field 300,000 men and he was sure of the support of Russia, upon the principles of whose sovereign he could perfectly rely. Upon my observing that the objects for which Austria had contended, were such as he himself admitted to have been of high value, not to Austria only, but to all Europe, and that the forces which had already been brought to act against France, and over which she had triumphed were superior to those which he had enumerated as making the security of Prussia, he answered that France had employed one means to defeat Austria, which could not be used successfully against Prussia. By applying to the cupidity of the court of Vienna, France had been always able to divert her from the steady pursuit of her plans, and to deprive her of the confidence and good will of Europe. But such expediencies would always fail with Prussia. It had been lately tried on occasion of the capture, by His Majesty's ships of the Danish frigate. She had then been told that if she would take a part against England, she might seize upon Hanover, and France would guarantee to her the possession. This was repeated by Count Haugwitz several times. He then renewed the assurances of the favorable disposition of his master towards Great Britain, and of the readiness with which the King of Prussia would recommend to the French government in their manner, which might be most agreeable to the king, such measures, as in His Majesty's opinion, might best conduce to lay a foundation for peace, the great object which was not to be doubted, he had sincerely and constantly in view. Though I here
repeated what was said by Count Haugwitz upon this point, it would be superfluous to state my reply as it was exactly the same as what I have formerly used, which I have had the satisfaction to find conformable to your Lordship's opinion.

I have the honour to inclose a note received from Count Alvensleben on the subject of the prohibitory duty on the exportation of corn, which makes me nearly despair of being able to obtain for His Majesty's subjects the relief to which they are entitled. I also inclose to your Lordship a letter received from Embden relating to some transaction in the Ems, the same I presume, which Count Haugwitz tells me has been the subject of a representation to the British government through Baron Jacobi.

[cipher]

I have reasons to think that Prussia still continues to promote a reconciliation between Russia and France. I understand a formal answer has been at length given to the Emperor of Russia, the purport which I have anticipated in former dispatches. It remains to be seen what will be the ulterior determination of Russia. It does not seem probable that the emperor will quietly see the progress of the French and the dismemberment of the German Empire, and I have good authority to hope that the answer of Count Panin to the dispatch, in which Monsieur Krüdener will report his conversation with me, may show a disposition in the emperor to meet His Majesty's desire of reestablishing harmony and good understanding between the two courts. The great difficulty of bringing this matter to the point His Majesty may require seems to lie in the length of time consumed in the ordinary communication with Petersburg, whether the inconvenience can be diminished by any previous arrangement the wish of His Majesty will determine.

I cannot refrain from repeating to your Lordship the apparent necessity of endeavouring if possible to give a favourable turn to the current of the public opinion as the conduct of Great Britain, and also as to the true point of view in which to consider the superiority of her trade and maritime power - it is not easy to conceive how strong the current sets against us at the moment upon both these subjects but particularly upon the last, Great Britain evidently giving more alarm and jealousy to Europe than France, nor would it be easy to point out a single power not impressed with this sentiment in a very great degree.

Since this dispatch was written I have received intelligence from a very respectable quarter that Bonaparte has announced to Prussia in a peremptory and threatening tone his determination of marching an army into the Electorate of Hanover to support Denmark if Prussia would not take possession of it for that purpose. I understand that this was expressed not merely with a view to assist the Danes upon the late occasion but to afford them permanent assistance.
Copy of a note from Alvensleben to Carysfort, Berlin, 23 September 1800

Aussitôt après avoir reçu la note de Milord Comte de Carysfort, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, datée du 5 de ce mois et relative à l'exportation du froment acheté par des sujets Britanniques dans les ports de la Prusse et de l'Ost Frise, le ministère du cabinet s'est occupée sérieusement de cette affaire et ne peut que témoigner à monsieur l'envoyé sur sa note ultérieure du 20 concernant le même objet, le regret le plus sincère de se voir hors d'état de répondre pleinement à ses espérances.

Le nouvel impôt, dont Milord Comte de Carysfort sollicite l'exemption en faveur des sujets Britanniques susmentionnés a été mis indistinctement par un ordre exprès du Roi sur tout le froment qui s'exporte des Etats de Sa Majesté.

La perception de cet impôt a dû naturellement avoir lieu du moment que les négociants des villes de commerce prussiennes en ont été averti et la question si les grains ont été achetés par les négociants britanniques avant la publication de l'impôt ne saurait influer sur la décision à porter. Le seul point essentiel est de savoir, si la déclaration de l'achat de ces grains a déjà été fait précédemment à ce terme devant les bureaux des assises et péages, et s'ils ont déjà payé les anciens droits usités. Dans ce dernier cas seulement l'exemption du nouvel impôt pourrait avoir lieu, et il est clair qu'en permettant d'autres exceptions, on provoquerait toutes sortes de fraudes et d'entreprises illicites, et l'on ferait manquer le but proposé. D'après cela les négociants anglais n'ont aucun sujet de se plaindre d'une mesure, qui, outre qu'elle se fonde sur des principes unanimement reçus dans tous les pays, s'étend également sur tous les étrangers et sur les propres sujets du Roi.

Le ministère de Sa Majesté croit donc pouvoir se flatter que Milord Comte de Carysfort ne refusera point son assentiment à la justesse des raisons qui s'opposent à sa demande, et lui réitère l'expression du regret qu'il éprouve de ne pouvoir y déférer.

no. 23
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 30 September 1800

My Lord,

The news of the armistice and of the cession of the three fortresses is confirmed on all sides. Intelligence was received by the government here that preliminaries of peace had been actually signed between the French and the Austrians, but I have authentic information to the contrary. It is understood however that Count Lehrbach goes to Paris,
to open a negotiation. The Elector of Bavaria has implored in the strongest manner the assistance of the Emperor of Russia.

Your Lordship has already been informed that Count Haugwitz had invited the Russian minister to his house, to prepare the way for a more friendly correspondence between Russia and France. M. de Krüdener is reported to have said to M. de Beurnonville, that it behoved the French to make such propositions for a general peace to the emperor as he could support or that he might feel himself called upon again to employ his arms against them. And it is thought that M. de Beurnonville has sent a special messenger to Paris, to obtain fresh instructions on this conversation.

The Portuguese envoy\textsuperscript{97} has received a dispatch from his government, inclosing one for M. d'Aranjo,\textsuperscript{98} which is ordered to be transmitted with the utmost dispatch. It is stated to be of great and pressing importance. M. Añadia has sent a confidential person in search of M. d'Aranjo. The dispatch is dated the 10th of August.

I am this moment informed that there appears in the Petersburg gazette, an order or proclamation, addressed by the emperor to his army, in which he speaks of the possibility of their being employed against England. This is probably one of the effects produced by the first impression received in Russia of the transaction with Denmark.

\textsuperscript{[cipher]}

The occurrences of every day place in a stronger light the expediency of the restoration if possible of a communication with the Russian government.

How far His Majesty may think it expedient, in consequence of the invitation thrown out by Count Haugwitz, or from personal regard for the King of Prussia, to make any demonstration of confidence to him, it does not become me to conjecture. It might perhaps be useful to counteract the false impression which the enemies of Great Britain are labouring to give.

The report of the Russian proclamation was brought to me by a person who had it in a conversation with Count Haugwitz. The march of the Russian troops to whom this order has been addressed is without exception towards the Austrian frontier which is not easily connected with any purpose of hostility towards England.

\textsuperscript{97} Añadia, Viscount, Portugese diplomat, ambassador to Berlin from May 1791 to April 1801.

\textsuperscript{98} Aranjo, Antonio Azevedo de, Portugese diplomat, ambassador at The Hague from August 1790 to August 1802.
My Lord,

I must correct an error in my last dispatch concerning an error in the march of the Russian troops, which are ordered to move towards Courland and Livonia,⁹⁹ and not as I was told at first towards the southern frontier of Poland.

Your Lordship may have heard the report that a corps of the troops of Mayence¹⁰⁰ crossed in their retreat the territory of the Duke of Weimar.¹⁰¹ The news reached His Highness at Potsdam, and he applied immediately to the Prussian government, disclaiming all knowledge of the intervention of the officers commanding those troops, and desiring the intervention of His Prussian Majesty, to avert from him the indignation of the French government. The Duke of Weimar has been told that his first application ought to be to the Elector of Saxony. That Prince, whose fears have been roused by the approach of the French army has, I am told from good authority, made a strong representation to the Prussian court, of the necessity of assembling, without loss of time, a powerful army of observation, offering at the same time to contribute his full quota, both of men and money. The Prussian court has answered, that it sees no reason for departing from the conduct it has hitherto pursued, which has afforded complete protection to all the states within the line of demarcation. The answer made by the Prussian cabinet to the suggestion from other quarters of the expediency of assembling such a force from Franconia, is to this effect: that it would only weaken the means of resisting the danger when it may approach nearer, as the expense attending it would be equal to that of a campaign.

General Augereau has levied new contributions in that part of Germany, occupied by the Army under his command; particularly upon the territories of the Prince of Nassau.¹⁰²

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⁹⁹ Livonia, an historical region covering the north of Latvia and the south-east of Estonia. Courland is another region in Latvia, annexed to Russia by Catherine II.

¹⁰⁰ Mayence, a German fortress town on the left bank of the river Rhine, capital of the archbishopric-electorate of the same name, taken by the French in 1797 and annexed after Lunéville.

¹⁰¹ Karl August, Grand Duke of Saxony-Weimar (1757-1828). After fighting against the French in the First Coalition he signed a neutrality treaty in August 1796.

¹⁰² Probably Prince William V of Orange-Nassau.
A person of credit, who has just left Count Haugwitz, informs me, that this court has received accounts of the resignation of Baron Thugut.\textsuperscript{103} Count Lehrbach is named as his successor. Count Haugwitz has also received a report of the surrender of Malta to His Majesty’s arms,\textsuperscript{104} to which he gives credit.

no. 25
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 7 October 1800

My Lord,

I am informed from good authority that in consequence of the conclusion of a new armistice and of the cession of the three fortresses, Baron de Posch, by order of his master, delivered to Count Haugwitz, an official note in which he sets forth the peculiar situation to which the elector finds himself reduced, and announces his intention to send a minister to Paris, for the purpose of watching the progress of the negotiation which is to begin between France and Austria. He calls upon Prussia in virtue, not only of the friendship which the king has always professed for his master, but also of the 11th article of the Treaty of Basle,\textsuperscript{105} to interfere for his protection, and to prevent not only his ruin but the dismemberment of the Empire. He reminds the king of the advice which at different times he has given to the elector, and of the attention paid by the elector to that advice, and declares that he places all his hopes on the assistance of Prussia and Russia.

The note has produced an official answer from Count Haugwitz, full of professions and friendship towards the Elector of Bavaria, approving of his resolution to send a minister to the French government, assuring him that M. de Sandoz laboured continually to render the dispositions of France as favourable as possible to the elector, and that when the Prussian court should be informed of the name of the minister fixed upon the elector, M. de Sandoz should be farther instructed more expressly to declare the King of Prussia’s attachment to the interests of His Serene Highness, and His Majesty’s desire that the French government would favourably receive his overture of peace.

\textsuperscript{103}Thugut, Johann Amadeus Franz de Paula Baron (1736-1818), Austrian statesman. One of the most resolute adversaries of revolutionary France, named Foreign Minister on 13 July 1794, he stayed there until the 1st January 1801. He was succeeded by Cobenzl. He has found a biographer in Roider.

\textsuperscript{104}Bonaparte captured the island en route to Egypt in June 1798. A series of operations by a combined British-Neapolitan force finally led to the island’s capitulation on 5 September 1800.

\textsuperscript{105}The Treaty of Basle was signed on 5 April 1795 ending in the withdrawal of Prussia from the First Coalition.
I am also enabled to give your Lordship more precise information in regard to the transactions with Russia. It was originally proposed to annex to the renewal of the ancient treaty of 1792 a secret convention, the project of which was at length furnished by Prussia, and consisted of nothing more than a declaration of the conformity of the principles and views of the two courts, and an engagement to concert together when negotiations should be entered upon for a general peace. The declaration of Russia in consequence of the Prussian offer of mediation, after the battle of Marengo, announced the opinion of that court, that the mediation of one court, and the pacific overtures of the other should, to give any hope of obtaining a solid benefit, be supported by warlike preparations corresponding with the magnitude of the objects. In pursuance of this principle, and in consequence of the first intimation of the reception of the Prussian offer of mediation, Russia proceeded to arm, and at the same time that the communication was made to this court respecting the corps assembled in Volhynia and Lithuania, and that an equal exertion was required from Prussia, a counter project for a secret convention was proposed by which the latter court would have contributed specific engagements, and at the same time the principal conditions to which Russia thought the interest of Europe and her faith to the allies would allow her to adhere were set forth, and this in various points of view to meet possible conjunctures. This communication was made first by the cabinet of Petersburg to Count Lusi, and through him to this court, and the answer of the Prussian court has been given through the same channel, but a copy has been delivered to M. de Krüdener. This answer is introduced by many compliments to the magnanimity and wisdom of the emperor, and much self-congratulation upon the similarity of the views and principles of the two courts, and the concert happily established between them. The King of Prussia is then made to express his high admiration of the energy with which the emperor has prepared to support his principles, and his views for the general good, and satisfaction at the display which at this actual moment had been made by His Imperial Majesty of the forces which he is ready to bring into action. The king's determined adherence to the system he has hitherto pursued is then set forth, and justified by an enumeration of the advantages which have resulted from it, and particularly the preservation of all the princes in the north of Germany, to whom the protection of Prussia has been extended. By this system a limit has on one side been placed to the progress of France and nothing remained for the king to desire, but to secure the advantages already derived from his plan, by establishing a perfect good understanding and concert with Russia, by which not only the barrier which had effectually prevented the progress of France in the north of Germany was rendered inexpugnable, but a foundation was laid for reducing her power, and contracting her frontier, whenever a favourable opportunity should spring from the course
of events. That the situation, political as well as geographical, of the two crowns occasioned and justified the shade of difference which appeared in their conduct. Prussia was actually at peace with France, and whenever that power having completed the destruction of the south, should turn her arms to the north of Europe, Prussia was the first exposed to the attack. These circumstances dictated to her a greater degree of caution, and circumspection than was necessary to the court of Russia, already in a state of war, and farther removed from danger, that the king however had not neglected those measures which were requisite to secure his objects, and maintain the dignity of his crown, and though he would not waste the means, which when the moment of action should arrive, would give vigour and effect to military operations, in vain demonstration the forces of Prussia were not only entire but ready to take the field. Through the course of this paper there are the strangest indications of jealousy and dislike of Austria, whose ambition is represented as little less alarming than the destructive projects and principles of France, and as an argument in favour of the Prussian system of avoiding all demonstrations tending to warlike interference, the danger is urged of precipitating Austria into peace and connection with France so as to have to contend with their joint forces. The emperor is finally exhorted to persevere in the course he has begun, and assured that M. de Sandoz is instructed to press upon the French government those plans of pacification which may be most in conformity with the sentiments of His Imperial Majesty. But the Prussian court declines to adopt the amended project of a convention between the two powers, which she conceives to be, in substance unnecessary, because of the real and acknowledged conformity of their views, and in terms not applicable to the particular situation of Prussia and the system she has invariably pursued.

I am informed from another quarter, and am inclined to give credit to the fact, that in order to be prepared against all possible contingencies, and as a final answer to the propositions made on the part of Russia, the king has named all the regiments which are to compose the army which in case of necessity would take the field, and also the whole staff and commissariat.

The Spanish envoy has delivered a note to this court in consequence of the capture made in the port of Barcelona by some of His Majesty's officers, to effect which they took a temporary possession of a neutral vessel. The court of Spain calls upon the neutral powers, immediately to resent this supposed invasion of their neutral rights, and to prevent the recurrence of similar outrages. If they should neglect to assert themselves

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106 On 4 September 1800 at the mouth of the river Llobregat in Catalonia, two Spanish frigates were captured by the British who used a Swedish merchant ship, the Hoffnung, as a decoy.
upon this occasion, His Catholic Majesty declares that he shall find it necessary, though with great regret, to take measures, which may expose their subjects to unpleasant consequences.

The post of Sunday brought me a letter from Mr. Paget in which he informs me that he had just been acquainted that La Valette, and the other forts in the island of Malta had surrendered to the arms of His Majesty, and the allies on the 5th September. I beg leave to congratulate your Lordship upon an event which in the present crisis must be considered as an advantage of the utmost importance.

M. d’Añadia informs me that the letter for M. d’Aranjo, which from its being accompanied with a direction to forward it to him with the utmost dispatch, and from the recollection of the situation formerly held by that gentleman was conjectured to be of great importance, contained only a notification of his recall, and an order to return home as soon as possible.

no. 9
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 10 October 1800
Secret and Confidential

My Lord,

Your dispatches to no. 22 inclusive have been severally received and laid before the king.

It does not appear to His Majesty's servants under the present circumstances, that sufficient advantage could be derived to the king's service, or to the cause to which he is engaged against France to render it advisable to him to take any further direct measures for courting a renewal of that intercourse of friendship and good understanding with the Emperor of Russia which has been interrupted by the most unwarrantable conduct of that sovereign towards His Majesty.

This opinion has been considerably strengthened by the very hostile sentiments contained in the declaration of the court of Petersburg, a copy of which I now transmit confidentially, and for your information alone.

I have therefore to instruct your Lordship in your communications with the Russian minister at Berlin, to be cautious not to give him room to suppose His Majesty

107 5 October.
108 Paget, Arthur, British diplomat, ambassador to Naples. He arrived on 20 March 1800 and left on 16 June 1801.
desirous of making further advances towards the re-establishment of the intimate union and concert which before subsisted between the two countries, until some proof shall be given of a corresponding disposition on the part of His Imperial Majesty.

If anything more shall be said to you on the subject by M. de Krüdener you will confine yourself to the expression of those general sentiments which have been stated in my former dispatches. But you will regret the strong appearances which result from the late conduct of the emperor, of a disposition wholly alienated from His Majesty and the cause which he supports.

The dispatches to Lord Minto of which the messenger Courvois is bearer are sent to your Lordship under flying-seal that you may be put in possession, as well of every thing that has passed between M. Otto and the king's government on the subject of naval armistice since my last dispatches to Lord Minto sent through Berlin by the messenger Donaldson as of the sentiments of His Majesty's servants on the present posture of affairs.

I need hardly add that the importance of the subjects of these dispatches require as much expedition as possible in forwarding them to their destination.

no. 10
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 10 October 1800

My Lord,

His Majesty has learnt with very sensible concern the accident which the King of Prussia met with at the late reviews at Potsdam, and your Lordship is directed to express particularly to M. de Haugwitz the lively interest which the King takes in His Prussian Majesty's speedy and entire re-establishment.

no. 26
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 11 October 1800

My Lord,

I have learnt from good authority, that on the 26th ultimo, M. de Musquizy having been endeavouring to prepare M. Bonaparte, for the answer he was to hear from

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109 Muzquiz, Ignacio Marquis of, Spanish diplomat, minister to Berlin (1797 to 1799), then to Paris where he presented his credentials on 23 September 1799 and left in March 1801.
the Prince Regent of Portugal,\textsuperscript{110} and to soften the resentment it might excite, was interrupted by the First Consul, who told him he was already prepared to expect a rough answer from the Prince Regent, but that Portugal had nothing to apprehend, for that he was determined that negotiations should proceed with England, and that he would make great concessions to prevent their being interrupted. Your Lordship will certainly know whether these expressions have been dictated by any real desire of peace or are circulated only to prejudice the public mind against the British government.

A Russian courier arrived here on Friday\textsuperscript{111} on his way to the court of the Elector of Bavaria.

\[\text{[cipher]}\]

I have no reason to doubt the intelligence contained in my last dispatch that the king himself has formed the skeleton of an army to be assembled in case of necessity in Franconia, but my expressions were too strong, if they have led your Lordship to think that the generals who are to command have been named. The force is said to be sixty thousand men, but it has not been stated to me from the same authority. It is said that the King of Prussia has notified to M. de Lucchesini\textsuperscript{112} that he has fixed upon him to be the minister at any congress that may be held for a general peace, but I am just informed that this nomination was made at the time of the Prussian offer of mediation, and that M. Lucchesini has only been told that it is still probable that he may be wanted.

Intelligence has been conveyed to me through a channel on which I can rely, that it has been determined to assume, in a note which is to be given to the French government to urge the conclusion of a general peace, a firmer tone than usual, and I am assured from the same quarter that the present system of this court is to draw nearer to Great Britain, and that I shall certainly find proofs of it in any intercourse I may have with the Prussian ministry. When I observed that I saw no proofs of such a disposition in the answer given to my note I was told that it was meant that I should, and my first conversation will

\textsuperscript{110} Prince Regent John (or Joao) of Portugal (1767-1826). Although actually regent in 1791, he did not decide to carry the title until eight years later in 1799. On the death of his mother in 1816 he took the title of King John VI.

\textsuperscript{111} 10 October.

\textsuperscript{112} Lucchesini, Girolamo, Marquis (1751-1825), Prussian diplomat of Italian origin. He was chamberlain and librarian to Friedrich Wilhelm II, then ambassador to Warsaw (1788-17989), and Vienna (1793-1797). Sent on Haugwitz's suggestion as envoy extraordinary to Paris in November 1800 to protect Prussia's interests in the territorial settlement of Germany, he remained there until September 1806.
probably convince me that I have been mistaken if I had put any other interpretation upon it.

Since I began this dispatch I have been made acquainted with the result of a conference between the king and his ministers at Potsdam. It has been such as to diminish the expectation which began to be entertained that His Majesty might be inclined to measures of greater vigour. A note has however been prepared, and approved by the king, expressed in very strong terms, requiring that Prussia should be admitted to send a minister to any congress that may be held for peace, and it has been determined to deliver it to the French government. It has been farther declared that the court of Berlin will concert with Russia, but this declaration is so vague and points to such a distant period that the Russian minister is more than ever dissatisfied and is persuaded that no effectual assistance can in any event be obtained from hence.

no. 27
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 12 October 1800
By estafette

My Lord,

[cipher]

Since I wrote to your Lordship yesterday, I have seen Count Haugwitz and found his language exactly what I had been taught to expect. He mentioned his master's intention of immediately sending a minister to Paris to observe what was passing there. He wished to know whether the British government were disposed to concert with Prussia upon the approaching negotiation. Prussia had no views that could clash with those of Great Britain, no jealousy which could keep it at a distance - much as a concert upon that point was to be desired, he should see without apprehension Great Britain making an arrangement for the restoration of the Stadtholder without the intervention of Prussia, so fully convinced he was that they had in that respect an identity of interests. As the rulers of France he believed were not sincerely desirous of peace, would it not be wise in the British government at once to offer to restore all its conquests on condition that France should do the same - it might be done with safety, for the French government would not consent. But if this was thought too much, why would not Great Britain confide to

113 William V of Orange-Nassau (1748-1806), Stadtholder of the Netherlands. He fled from the French in January 1795, married the niece of Frederick the Great, Wilhemine von Preußen, and sought emigration to England.
Prussia those objects she thought essential to retain. Prussia would without hesitation bring forward whatever conditions of peace His Majesty might think proper to propose. When I asked him if France had made any communication to this court on the subject of peace, he said that she had not, and then told me in confidence that the last time His Prussian Majesty had conversed with him that Prince had expressed a degree of surprise and regret that he had received no confidential communication from His Majesty to whom he was united by so many ties.

I am now to acquaint your Lordship that Monsieur Lucchesini is to proceed to Paris directly.

[end of cipher]

M. de Beurnonville received intelligence yesterday of the signature of a treaty of peace between France and America.114

no. 28
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 14 October 1800

My Lord,

The departure of M. de Lucchesini is said to be fixed for Friday next.115 A brother of M. Lombard is to accompany him.116

Your Lordship has been informed, that a courier had brought to M. de Beurnonville the news of the capitulation of Malta, and of the conclusion of peace between France and America. The courier, who is said to be a servant of M. de Talleyrand,117 came on horseback, and made the journey from Paris, in six days and a half. This extraordinary expedition makes it suspected that he brought something of greater consequence than what may relate to the release of the Russian prisoners, which is avowed as the purpose of his journey. When M. de Beurnonville, some time since, dispatched his aide-de-camp to Paris, he was supposed to have stated to his government,

114 The Convention of Mortefontaine, signed 30 September 1800, negociated by Joseph Bonaparte, Fleurieu and Roederer for France, Ellsworth, Davie and Van Murray for the United States, and which brought to an end a state of partial hostility which existed between the two countries.

115 17 October.

116 Lombard's youngest brother, Peter (1775-1806). He entered the foreign ministry in 1796 and was assigned to Lucchesini as attaché in Paris where he stayed until December 1802.

117 Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles Maurice, (1754-1838), French statesman and diplomat. He became minister of foreign affairs under the Directory (1797-1799), and then under Napoleon (1799-1807).
the necessity of giving satisfaction to Russia, as to the views of France, and respecting the allies of Russia, and particularly, the kings of Naples\(^{118}\) and Sardinia, the Duke of Württemberg,\(^{119}\) and the Elector of Bavaria. From the conversations I have heard, it may be conjectured that he has not bought any thing very decisive or satisfactory upon these points, but I shall of course make it my business to obtain for your Lordship more precise information upon this point, as soon as possible. It may in the meantime be proper to acquaint you that the Turkish chargé d'affaires\(^{120}\) dispatches today a special messenger to Constantinople, and that it is conjectured to be in consequence of the arrival of the French courier. It seems more probably to be owing to some communication from this court, in consequence of the determination to send M. de Lucchesini to Paris. I shall endeavour to get some insight into this matter, and in the meantime I shall make Lord Elgin\(^{121}\) and Lord Minto acquainted with the fact as it has come to my knowledge.

The American secretary of legation has no direct account of the treaty concluded with France, Mr. Adams\(^{122}\) being still absent, and the letters from thence being still addressed to him, but it is understood to be simply a conclusion of peace, and not to include either a renewal of the Treaty of 1780, or any other treaty of commerce.

\(^{118}\) Ferdinand IV (1751-1825), who became Ferdinand I, King of the Two Sicilies in 1815. Driven out by the French in 1798, he escaped to Sicily. He returned in 1801 and was tolerated by Napoleon until 1806.

\(^{119}\) Friedrich Wilhelm Karl (1754-1816), Duke (1797), Elector (1803), and King (1806) of Württemberg. He fled to Vienna after the occupation of his country by the French in 1796 but came back in December 1797 after the death of his father. He fled again to Vienna in 1800 and returned in May 1801 after the Treaty of Lunéville.

\(^{120}\) Muhammed Es'ad Efendi, Turkish diplomat, chargé d'affaires at Berlin from 21 June 1800 until his death on 28 April 1804.

\(^{121}\) Thomas Bruce, 7th Earl of Elgin (1766-1841), British soldier and diplomat, minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to Berlin, and later to the Turkish court at Constantinople from 1799 to 1803.

\(^{122}\) Adams, John Quincy (1767-1848), American statesman and diplomat. The son of John Adams (second President of the United States, 1797-1801), ambassador at the Hague in 1794. He was transferred to Berlin in 1797 where he remained until 1801 when he retired from the diplomatic service. He went to Paris to sign the treaty of Mortefontaine.
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 14 October 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

The Earl of Elgin, His Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, having informed me that in consequence of the departure of the English mission from St Petersburg, he has no means of information on which he can rely, for being made acquainted with the proceedings and the systems of the court of Russia either on the general politics of Europe, or in respect to Turkey, and judging it may be of essential use to His Majesty's service that this should be supplied from the king's minister at Berlin, I have His Majesty's commands to direct your Lordship occasionally to inform Lord Elgin through the channel of His Majesty's minister at Vienna, of whatever comes to your knowledge on those subjects, together with whatever other information you should think advantageous to His Majesty's interests at the Porte.

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 17 October 1800

Separate By private conveyance

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that General Stamford having received His Majesty's allowance of £70 per month to the end of March last, as will have appeared on the statement made by Mr. Garlike, I have this day drawn on your Lordship for the six following months of that allowance to September inclusive, amounting at the rate of £70 per month to £420. As General Stamford will arrive here today, I shall conform myself in future to your Lordship's new Instructions, and make payments to him at the rate of £1,200 per annum, from the 1st instant.

I inclose a receipt for the above sum of £420.

It may be proper to remark here, on M. de Palu's account that M. Garlike's first payment to that gentleman of the sum of one hundred pounds, included the month between the tenth of July, and the tenth of August. That sum has been repaid by your Lordship and I inclose M. Garlike's receipt. The second payment to M. de la Palu was made by me. It has also been drawn for, and I inclose my receipt. This brings his amount

123 I have not been able to find out who this person was.
to the 10th of September. And I have to add that M. de la Palu having desired to have the full value in foreign coin of the advances made to him, the difference in exchange against England has occasioned on their two sums an extra charge of £19.6.6 which with the banker's charge make up the sum I last drew for on M. de la Palu's account £121.2.0.

no. 12
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 17 October 1800.

My Lord,

I transmit to your Lordship the copy of a memorial addressed to me by M. de Jacobi, and of my answer thereto, together with some other papers relating to the same business.

On the perusal of these papers your Lordship will at once perceive, that no other motive than that of a strong desire to comply with the wishes of the King of Prussia, in a point which was so strongly stated by M. de Jacobi, as interesting to the welfare of His Prussian Majesty's dominions, could have induced the king to agree to a measure, which affords to his inveterate and implacable enemies the means of realising a part of their resources which could no otherwise have been rendered available. And the extent of this concession on His Majesty's part will be the more readily perceived, when it is considered, that it is an exception from those established principles of maritime law, which the extraordinary circumstances of the present moment require His Majesty to watch over with a very peculiar attention and jealousy.

It must be considered as a matter of no small surprise, as well as regret, that at the very moment of receiving so strong and unusual a proof of the king's desire to gratify His Prussian Majesty's wishes, a refusal should have been given at Berlin to a demand, so manifestly founded in justice and good faith as that which your Lordship was directed to urge in behalf of those British merchants, who have purchased corn for exportation from the Prussian ports on the faith of an express and formal assurance given by His Prussian Majesty's government.

The king is therefore pleased to direct that your Lordship should address yourself directly to Count Haugwitz on this subject - that you should represent how little the conduct of the court of Berlin on this occasion corresponds with that observed by His Majesty - that you should state the obvious circumstances which render the subject of those letters more particularly interesting to this government, and that you should urge in the strongest manner a re-consideration of the answer which you should have hitherto received on this subject.
I observe that your Lordship is aware that the season presses and I have therefore no doubt that you will enable yourself to transmit to me without delay for His Majesty's information the final decision on this application.

no. 29
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 18 October 1800

My Lord,

A courier arrived from Paris to M. de Beurnonville some days since, and a conference, and exchange of visits has since taken place between him and the Russian minister. The subject of the conference, as I have been told by M. de Krüdener, was the release of the Russian prisoners which France gives up, together with all the colours and military trophies, taken in the several actions, without any condition. M. de Krüdener's reply was to this effect, that he had only been authorised to accept them on condition of their not serving till exchanged, and could therefore only communicate the offer to his government, but I hear it is said by the French mission that the offer is accepted.

It is also conjectured that objects of greater consequence than the release of the prisoners have been in question, but I have heard nothing which induces me to embrace that opinion.

[cipher]

M. Lucchesini began his journey yesterday, his instructions\textsuperscript{124} certainly direct him to urge a general peace and also to keep in view the relations subsisting between Great Britain and Prussia, and the desire of his master to strengthen and improve them - but those who have good opportunity to observe and are qualified to judge of the real disposition of this court have no expectation that any effect will be produced by this mission - the king and the ministers are still wedded to the system of inaction, and M. de Lucchesini will be effectually restrained from enforcing any measures which can lead to Prussia's throwing off her neutrality.

The Austrian chargé d'affaires at the same time that he announces to me the great military preparations making by the emperor and offer of the command of the army with unlimited powers to Archduke Charles, tells me he has reason to expect the speedy cooperation of the Russian forces, but I have heard nothing to this effect from any other quarter.

I am informed by a person of credit who has it from Count Haugwitz that some time since the court of Berlin required through its minister at Paris to be admitted to the congress which was expected to be held at Lunéville and received a peremptory refusal - this circumstance probably occasioned the mission of M. de Lucchesini.

no. 30
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 21 October 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

General Stamford returned here from Brunswick on Saturday last, and has communicated to me the intelligence which I transmit to your Lordship.

The Duke of Brunswick in answer to some communications from this court, has written to Colonel Zastrow to declare his opinion, that in the present circumstances of the contest, the only means of opposing an effectual barrier to France and restoring the balance of Europe would be to make a partition of what remains of the German Empire to Austria and Prussia, he stated in this letter, that this partition was in substance established at the Peace of Basle and that the proposition is on that account liable to objections, his plan would leave the several princes in possession of their territories with the civil government and the revenues, except what would be requisite for keeping up a military force, the disposition of which, together with all the powers of peace and war would be vested in the superior states, it includes also the exchange of the Margraviates in Franconia for Lusatia.

Not only the departure from all the rules of right and justice, but the utter improbability that the consent of the powers of the north could be obtained to such a plan, as well as the impossibility of effecting it without their consent, was urged by General Stamford, and the Duke appeared at last to come over to his opinion, that it would be necessary, in order to obtain anything further for the general good or the particular benefit of Prussia, to be prepared for war and to concert with Great Britain and Austria, and, if possible, with Russia - the objections which appeared to the Duke against arming, were

125 Lunéville is a town in the French department of the Meurthe and was the scene of negotiations between France and Austria that were to lead to the peace treaty of the same name.
126 18 October.
127 Zastrow, Friedrich Wilhelm Christian von (1752-1830), Prussian soldier, Colonel later Major-General (January 1801), aide-de-camp to Friedrich Wilhelm II, and then to his son.
the temper of the country, but principally the expense with which any preparations might be attended. If, however, a concert with Great Britain could be established, he thought this last objection might be removed. The Duke read this letter to General Stamford.

Your Lordship will no doubt remark those passages in the paper I transmitted to your Lordship relative to French affaires, a copy of which I presume is already in your possession, and I am to inform your Lordship that Count Haugwitz told the Bavarian minister at the time when the French finally declined admitting Prussia to any share in the approaching negotiations, they professed their willingness to second her views in other respects, and the pleasure it would give them if they should find that the disposition of England was equally favorable to the interests of the court of Berlin. Your Lordship will also recollect that the sending of M. de Lucchesini to Paris was a very sudden resolution, and followed almost immediately the arrival of the last courier to the French minister here. Louis Bonaparte is expected here daily.

Monsieur Krüdener was with me today to desire to know whether His Majesty would consider himself as bound by the convention, (a copy of which he brought in his hand), formerly concluded respecting Malta. I declined entering into any conversation on the subject, and told him I presumed if the emperor wished any explanation of His Majesty's intentions he would send a minister accredited for that purpose to London.

no. 31
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 25 October 1800

My Lord,
[cipher]

Mr. Lucchesini it is said had orders at his departure from Potsdam to go to Brunswick in order to confer with the Duke.

I learn from General Stamford that he has made Count Haugwitz acquainted with the conversation I reported to your Lordship in my last dispatch. The Prussian minister expressed the same sentiments as the Duke of Brunswick respecting the expediency of such a plan as he had mentioned, and added that the opposition most to be expected was from France, for that he had no doubt that the concurrence of Russia might be obtained.

Before I received His Majesty's command signified in your Lordship's last dispatch, I had sent by the messenger Courvoisier a letter to be forwarded from Vienna to Lord Elgin and as I have regularly and constantly transmitted to Lord Minto all the material intelligence which reached me here, I trust that Lord Elgin cannot remain ignorant of any circumstance which was important for him to know. I shall correspond regularly with him
in future but I may again be under the necessity of begging Lord Minto to forward to him constantly the letters I write him rather than detain the messenger who may be charged with important dispatches from His Majesty's minister at Vienna, or for Mr. Wickham.

no. 32
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 28 October 1800

My Lord,

In obedience to His Majesty's commands, signified to me in your Lordship's dispatch of the 17th instant, which I received on Sunday,\textsuperscript{128} and conceiving that the season of the year, and the importance of the subject admitted of no delay, I waited upon M. d'Alvensleben immediately upon his return from Potsdam yesterday, and communicated to him His Majesty's just expectations, that his subjects should be allowed the full benefit of the permission to export wheat from the ports of Prussia and Ost Frise, formerly granted by the Prussian government. I enforced as strongly as I was able, all the topics recommended by your Lordship, and shall deliver a note upon the subject this evening in which they will be repeated. I thought it best previously to talk with Count Alvensleben, that I might learn, and be enabled to obviate the objections likely to arise on the part of the Prussian government. Count Alvensleben professed a great desire to meet His Majesty's wishes, as far as possible, and promised me that the matter should be reconsidered, and the answer returned without delay. He wished however to have a statement from me in writing. The copy of my note upon this occasion shall be transmitted to your Lordship by the next post.

I must observe however that on receiving the answer I transmitted to your Lordship, I wrote to the consul at Königsberg,\textsuperscript{129} and to Mr. Hay, a merchant who had written to me an account of his particular case, to desire they would inform me whether they were satisfied with what was offered by the Prussian ministers, and if not, that they would specify what further measures would be necessary for their relief and security, but I have not heard from them since. The result of the best information I have been able to obtain is, that according to the established law and usage, immediately upon making the contract for the corn, a declaration ought to be made of the particulars before the proper officers, and that this transaction, upon which a duty is paid to the state, being necessary to give validity to the contract, it is considered uniformly as the evidence of its existence.

\textsuperscript{128}26 October.

\textsuperscript{129}Königsberg, today Kaliningrad, what was once a Prussian town about 110 kilometers from Danzig.
If this is correct, it may be a question, whether the Prussian government have not already done all that can strictly be required of them. Your Lordship will see however that I have strongly insisted upon the equity of the case, where foreign merchants are concerned, though the strict forms may not have been complied with.

As the object of the Prussian government seems to be merely draw some revenue to the state, and Count Alvensleben expressed no apprehension that any scarcity was likely to be felt here, it is possible they may be convinced their end would be better obtained by substituting a small duty on exportation, in the place of that which now operates as a possibility. If they should adopt a liberal policy in this respect, it may be the means of obtaining a supply for the wants of His Majesty's dominions, more immediately available than any other, to a large extent.

no. 33
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 28 October 1800

My Lord,
[cipher]

No direct communication has been made to me by Count Haugwitz of the transactions between this court and that of St Petersburg relative to the affair with Denmark, nor have the reports which I have collected from other quarters been sufficiently precise to enable me to form any opinion upon the subject on which I should wish to reply. In general I understand the court of Berlin professed an adherence to the same principles by which it had long been governed, declined taking the lead on account of its not having so great and immediate an interest in the question as the Baltic powers, but declared a disposition to concur in any arrangement which those powers might concert amongst themselves. The Danish chargé d'affaires here appeared to consider the language and conduct of the court of St Petersburg on this occasion not to warrant the placing an absolute reliance upon its determination and support.

It is said to be the language of the French mission here, that Prussia has received assurances that France will make no arrangement with Austria concerning the Empire without the intervention of Prussia.
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 28 October 1800
Separate

My Lord,

It having appeared in several instances, in the course of the last winter, that while the navigation of the Elbe was impeded by the ice, the river Weser was open, the Postmasters General have directed the two packets to be stationed in the latter river for the purpose of being employed occasionally when there may be no packet at Cuxhaven, or when other packets may be blocked up by ice in the Elbe, or may be prevented by contrary winds from getting out of Cuxhaven.

Notwithstanding this arrangement the messengers and couriers who may be on their return to this country are to be directed to proceed invariably in the first instance to Cuxhaven previously to their going to Bremerlehe - even if they should have reason to apprehend that there may be obstacles to a passage from a former place - it being desirable that both services should be conducted under the responsibility of the agent at Cuxhaven.
2. The following documents, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the Public Records Office, Foreign Office, Prussia 64, vol. 59, letters and papers from the Earl of Carysfort at Berlin to the Secretary of State with drafts to his Lordship, 1 November to 30 December 1800.

no. 34  
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 1 November 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

It has long been a matter of regret to me that I have not been able to obtain satisfactory information concerning the [...] [sic] which, from the appearances which I have stated to your Lordship at different times, there was reason to think had taken place between Russia and France. The ostensible ground of the conferences between M. de Krüdener and the French minister has always been the release of the Russian prisoners, but suspicions have been frequently hinted to me that other more important objects were in view.

The intelligence I have now to report is important and will probably throw a light upon all that has passed. On Thursday last (the 30th of October) General Sprengporten\textsuperscript{130} arrived with his suite. He goes to Brussels\textsuperscript{131} to receive the prisoners, but his business does not end here. He is to form them into two regiments, in order to their being

\textsuperscript{130} Sprengporten (Joram-Magnus), (dates unknown but probably 1750-1815), Swedish general of Finnish origin. He entered Swedish service very young but fled to Russia after an involvement in a plot against the King. Paul sent him on a mission to Paris to recuperate Russian prisoners of war. He arrived in Paris on 18 December 1800 and left before the 1 January 1801.

\textsuperscript{131} The capital of the Austrian Netherlands, it then became the principal town of the French department of Dyle after its annexation.
employed immediately. Their destination is Malta, and General Sprengporten is to command as the military governor of that island. This intelligence has been received by the Bavarian minister here from the chargé d'affaires of that court at St Petersburg, it came by post and was not in cypher. I am just informed through the same channel that General Sprengporten waits here for passports from Paris, and even for the result of the last conferences of Baron Krüdener with the French minister. It is natural to suppose that the surrender of Malta to His Majesty's arms, of which he was not apprised when he left St Petersburg, has made new arrangements and instructions necessary. I am informed that the French government had made an offer of the island to the emperor.\textsuperscript{132}

Your Lordship has been informed already of General Stamford's conversation with the Duke of Brunswick and with Count Haugwitz. That minister told him that His Serene Highness's plan was what perfectly accorded with his sentiments, that he had for some years seen the utter impossibility of maintaining the present constitution of Germany but that though he was ensured of the entire concurrence of Russia he was as certain that any change upon the principles stated by the Duke of Brunswick would be strongly and steadily opposed by France. The Treaty of Basle has certainly operated a virtual partition of the Empire between the two great powers, and the views of Prussia, for the present at least, are probably confined to an avowed and authorised establishment of the system then introduced. In the opinion of General Stamford the Duke of Brunswick is at present much more informed and consulted upon the affairs of this court than he chooses to be thought, the general had opportunities of being fully satisfied that reports were regularly made to him and that his advice was called for and given. The dangerous situation of Prussia in case of Austria's making a separate peace was strongly stated by General Stamford both to the Duke of Brunswick and to Count Haugwitz, and they admitted (the Duke in particular) that the continuance of the French war against England would inevitably lead to an attack on the north of Germany, and that it was expedient and even necessary for her own safety that Prussia should put herself in a posture for war, but he was convinced that the country could not supply the expense. The idea suggested by General Stamford was specifically that, whenever the Austrians should make a separate peace, which is considered here as inevitable, Prussia must, not only as their interests are connected but as subsidies will be necessary to put her army in motion, concert with Great Britain such arrangements in Germany as His Majesty can agree to, that the concurrence of Russia should if possible be

\textsuperscript{132}The French government, in an attempt to please the Tsar, offered him the island of Malta which the French still possessed at this stage. \textit{Correspondance de Napoléon Ier,} 32 vols., (Paris: Plon, 1858-1870), vol. 6, (4965), Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 4 July 1800 (15 messidor VIII)
obtained, and reasonable terms of peace being offered to France, the three powers should on her refusal jointly make war upon her. General Stamford is under the persuasion that the Duke of Brunswick fully adopted this plan, and that it is in the contemplation of this that the Prussian ministers came to me yesterday, to express that opinion and to desire me to be prepared upon this idea against the moment of Austria's making a separate peace. M. de Lucchesini, there is reason to think, entertains at present similar views though his appointment was made without the previous knowledge of the Duke of Brunswick.

M. Lombard who is entirely directed by M. Beyme has, it is supposed, been the immediate cause of M. de Lucchesini's nomination. The latter is known to be personally liked by the king and converses more freely and frequently with him than with any of his other ministers. It seemed therefore so probable that he would be employed that Beyme and Lombard thought it desirable to connect themselves with him and be the ostensible instruments of his advancement. M. de Lucchesini wished it as he saw it was the readiest and most certain means of having access to the king, therefore the politics of these allies are probably at the present moment not the same. Beyme is certainly in the interest of France and Lombard, an indolent man and devoted to pleasure, absolutely governed by him. There is reason to believe that M. de Lucchesini has a better way of thinking and it remains to be seen whether they will be able to make him their tool, or his superior abilities will establish an interest with the king which will reduce them to their natural level. These conjectures are what I have heard as most probable. Though the principal facts have already been laid before your Lordship, as the pointed manner in which my attention was called to them indicates something more like a probability of the assistance to be derived from hence in case of a separate peace with Austria and France than I have before stated, I think it expedient to make this recapitulation.

I have seen Baron Krüdener and he has told me that the destination of General Sprengporten is Malta and that he waits here till the determination of the British cabinet shall be known.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the note mentioned in my dispatch no. 32 on the subject of corn.

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133 Beyme, Karl Friedrich (1765-1838), Prussian statesman. He entered government as member of the cabinet at the beginning of 1798 and later became minister for foreign affairs in 1806. Little biographical research has actually been done. There is an historical tradition which portrays him as a liberal.
Copy of a note from Carysfort to Alvensleben, Berlin, 29 October 1800

Le soussigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, ayant communiqué à sa cour la réponse de son excellence M. le Comte d'Alvensleben, à la note que le soussigné a eu l'honneur de lui remettre le 5 du mois passé, relative à la sortie des ports de la Prusse et de l'Ost Frise, du froment acheté par des sujets Britanniques, a reçu ordre de s'adresser de nouveau à S. E. dans l'espoir que cette réponse pourra être revue, et que par la suite d'une plus mûre considération la demande qu'il a faite pourra être finalement accordée.

L'amitié et la bonne intelligence, qui ont toujours heureusement régné entre les deux cours, sont de sûrs garants au gouvernement britannique, que loin de vouloir, quand les prix des vivres dans la Grande Bretagne a haussé à un point dont il n'y a point d'exemple, retiré les secours qu'il avait accordés, Sa Majesté Prussienne sera plutôt disposée à y ajouter, surtout si cela pouvait se faire non seulement sans risque, mais encore au grand profit de ses propres sujets.

Mais le Roi ne saurait croire qu'au moment même où il vient de donner la preuve la moins équivoque de son attachement pour le Roi de Prusse, et de l'intérêt qu'il prend au bonheur et à la prospérité des sujets prussiens, le cabinet de Berlin se décide à refuser aux sujets britanniques les droits qu'ils ont acquis de l'aveu, et comme un effet de la bonté spéciale de S. M. Prussienne.

On ne peut pas disconvenir que dans tous les temps l'Angleterre a mis la plus grande importance à la conservation de ces lois maritimes qui paraissent essentielles à sa sûreté. La nature et les circonstances de la guerre actuelle et le caractère de l'ennemi, qui lui est opposé, imposent sur le Roi, comme un devoir indispensable, d'y veiller à présent, avec un soin et une jalousie extraordinaire.

Sa Majesté néanmoins n'a pas hésité de se prêter à la première demande qui a été faite, pour donner toutes les facilités possibles au voyages d'un vaisseau prussien à l'Amérique Espagnole, pour en rapporter des espèces, quoiqu'il soit clair qu'il ne s'agissait de rien moins que de mettre à la disposition de son ennemi irréconciliable un moyen de plus pour continuer la guerre, en réalisant une somme d'argent très considérable dont il n'aurait pu se prévaloir par aucune autre voie.

Le soussigné a donc l'honneur de remontrer à Son Excellence que ce n'est pas une exemption générale des nouveaux droits qu'il a sollicitée en faveur des sujets britanniques, mais qu'il réclame seulement pour eux, l'effet d'une grâce qui leur a déjà été accordée.

Le ministère prussien ne les aura pas invités en leur offrant la libre sortie du froment, à placer leurs capitaux sur l'achat du produit du pays, pour renvoyer ensuite leurs
vaisseaux sans cargaison, après qu'ils auront encouru tous les frais et tout le risque du voyage, encore moins, après que le pays aura profité du haut prix qui a résulté de la permission d'une libre sortie, les obliger par des impôts excessifs à le revendre à pure perte, à ceux mêmes de qui ils l'ont acheté.

De pareils procédés révolteraient assurément le gouvernement prussien dont la loyauté et la justice sont reconnues; et il ne peut échapper à sa pénétration, que quoique les spéculations de commerce roulent nécessairement sur la possibilité d'un accroissement de prix qui dépend d'événements et de circonstances qui doivent en quelques sorte être prévus, elles ne peuvent jamais embrasser des impôts purement arbitraires.

La marche ordinaire du commerce avec l'étranger ne permet pas que, dans tous les cas, les denrées soient immédiatement chargées sur les vaisseaux ou même enlevées des magasins de ceux qui les auront vendues. Les négociants étrangers peuvent rarement avoir des magasins à eux dans le pays et leurs vaisseaux ne partent pas des ports éloignés avant d'avoir leur cargaison assurée.

Mais la propriété a changé de mains, du moment de la date du contrat, puisqu'il est reconnu que dès lors le premier propriétaire ne peut plus disposer des effets. Et la crainte que, par un abus, l'exemption qui devrait être bornée au froment acheté avant la publication des nouveaux droits, pourrait s'étendre à celui qui aurait été acheté depuis, paraître peu raisonnable, si l'on fait attention que dans le premier cas, il faudrait combiner avec les preuves de l'achat dans les pays, des circonstances qui ne peuvent pas être préparées pour l'occasion, telles que la commission donnée par le négociant Britannique, le temps de l'arrivée, le tonnage, et les papiers des vaisseaux.

D'après cet exposé le soussigné ose se flatter que le ministère prussien verra sous un point de vue plus favorable la demande qu'il a eu l'honneur de faire par ordre de sa cour, et permettre aux sujets britanniques de faire sortir des ports susmentionnés sans payer les nouveaux droits, le froment qu'ils ont acheté antérieurement à leur publication, pour être transporté selon la teneur de la permission accordée par Sa Majesté Prussienne dans le mois de mars dernier.
no. 35
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 4 November, 1800

My Lord,

Louis Bonaparte arrived here last Sunday night. I do not find that he is accompanied by any person known as a man of business, and it is said that he has no companion to treat on any political affairs. He had an interview with M. de Lucchesini at Frankfurt. M. de Hudelist told me on Saturday, that in consequence of hostilities committed by the French in Italy, M. de Cobenzl had proceeded no further than the headquarters of the Austrian Duke's army. But all accounts from other quarters, as well as the several newspapers agree that he has proceeded into France, and has the start of M. de Lucchesini.

[cipher]

I have the satisfaction to know that Lord Minto was apprised of Monsieur Lucchesini's appointment some days before the Austrian government could have had any information of it. M. Lucchesini did not pass by Brunswick.

General Stamford has had the goodness to draw up an account of what passed between him and the Duke of Brunswick - which I shall have the honour to transmit to your Lordship by the first safe opportunity.

no. 13
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 4 November 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatches to no. 30 inclusive together with the separate dispatch of the 10th October have been received and laid before the king.

The shortness of the time since the arrival together of six Hamburg mails will not allow of my having the honour to write to you at length till the next mail, by which occasion your Lordship may expect to receive His Majesty's commands on the respective subjects to which your late dispatches relate.

I herewith send to your Lordship copies of some intermediate communications between the king's government and M. Otto, which had accidentally been omitted to be sent to Lord Minto previously to the transmission of those sent by the messenger

134 2 November.
135 1 November.
Donaldson and which were sent under flying seal to your Lordship. They are no otherwise material than as they complete the series of correspondence on the subject of naval armistice.

no. 14
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 7 November 1800

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's dispatches no. 31 to 33 inclusive.

His Majesty learnt with great satisfaction that there has appeared in the language held to you by the Prussian minister a greater desire than before to cultivate friendship with this country. His Majesty entirely approves of your Lordship's holding in return such a language as may correspond with those sentiments.

The best proof which could be given of their sincerity would be found in measures tending to do away the false and injurious impressions which have been entertained at Petersburg respecting the conduct of this country, and in endeavouring to maintain, in concert with His Majesty, the tranquility of the north which there is now so much reason to apprehend may be disturbed in the spring by the measures of Russia.

As the fact of the delivery of the Russian memorial respecting the Armed Neutrality is now no longer secret it may be proper that you should question M. de Haugwitz on the subject, and particularly learn from him what answer has been returned by Prussia on the subject. Your Lordship will be at no loss to make this enquiry in a manner perfectly consistent with the king's dignity, and expressive of his invariable resolution to maintain those rights the temperate exercise of which is essential to our maritime strength.

With a view to the object suggested by your Lordship of counteracting the false impressions which our enemies are everywhere labouring to create as to our conduct and views, His Majesty is pleased to direct that your Lordship should make an official communication to M. Haugwitz of the whole correspondence with M. Otto accompanied by a note in which you will simply express the king's confidence that His Prussian Majesty will see in those papers fresh and striking proofs of His Majesty's uniform desire for the restoration of peace, and of his concern for the interests of the continental powers.

Your Lordship will add verbally that it is on the footing of the last three papers that the matter now rests. That the king has recently expressed by a letter from me to Count Cobenzl at Paris the continuance of His Majesty's disposition to take part in a general negotiation if the French government shall think proper to send the necessary passports in
that purpose. But that His Majesty has declared his intention to abide by his reciprocal engagements with the emperor, by which each party is restrained from treating separately, and that M. de Cobenzl's letter to me, written out from Lunéville for Paris, contains the most explicit assurances to the same effect.

In this state the matter now rests, and the next letter I may receive from M. Cobenzl will probably contain the final decision of the French government in this respect, which however judging by what has passed in Tuscany does not seem likely to be in favour of peace. It will not have escaped the observation of the Prussian government that the occupation of that country is on the part of the French a violation of three several conventions of armistice and that even the pretence assigned for it had ceased three days before the measure took place, by the proclamation of General Sommariva for disbanding the Tuscans who had armed themselves.

With respect to the question stated to your Lordship by Count Haugwitz whether His Majesty was disposed to concert with the King of Prussia upon the approaching negotiation, you will observe that if the negotiation now takes place at all for general peace, the scene of the negotiation will probably be at Paris - a circumstance to which His Majesty would see no reason to object. That His Majesty treating conjointly with Austria agreeably to treaty would certainly hold himself bound to observe towards that power not the letter only but the spirit of his engagements. But that his so doing would by no means be inconsistent with M. Grenville's maintaining with M. de Lucchesini such a perfect intercourse as would be consistent with the existing relations between Great Britain and Prussia, and conducive to the interests of both in many points where their interests are the same.

With respect to any present communication of His Majesty's views your Lordship will remark that such explanation is evidently impracticable because until the question of joint or separate negotiation be determined no plan of pacification for this country can be formed if it being evident that the terms of maritime peace may in one case be intimately combined with that of the continent, while in the other case they would be wholly distinct from it.

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136 Sommariva, Hannibal Marquis (1755-1829), Austrian soldier, Major-General. He was ordered to Florence in January 1800 to take over military affairs and was later named Governor-General of Tuscany. On 14 October, he was obliged to leave Florence at the head of his troops and eventually joined the main army in January of the following year.
It is the more material to press this observation on the attention of the Prussian government, because it tends directly to prove to Prussia how much her own interest is concerned in the establishment of general rather than separate negotiations.

In return for these explanations it will be natural that your Lordship should ask and receive some information respecting the plans of peace which are avowed to have been in discussion between Russia and Prussia - particularly as they affect this country, and as they relate to Holland and the Netherlands.

no. 36
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 8 November 1800
By private opportunity

My Lord,

I have inclosed to your Lordship a letter I have received from General Stamford, in which he has given at length the plan which he traced out in conversation with the Duke of Brunswick, and described the impression which it appeared to make upon His Highness. Your Lordship will observe this material difference between my former statement and the general's letter, that the former rested upon the supposition that Austria should previously make a separate peace, whereas the latter involves the possibility of establishing, by the intervention of Great Britain, some concert between the courts of Berlin and Vienna. The Duke of Brunswick's idea of a partition, which was adopted by Count Haugwitz, is founded upon that hypothesis. The apparent impossibility of carrying that idea into execution in its full extent, at the present moment, makes me conclude that it is only meant to insinuate that Prussia might, in order to obtain a more decided and authorised influence in the north, consent to some large addition to the power and dominions of Austria. Whether in the event of such an agreement having taken place between the two courts, it would be possible to induce that of Berlin to take measures of such vigour as those detailed in General Stamford's letter, is much more questionable. If the Duke of Brunswick's opinion is not decided, the Prussian cabinet will not act, and General Stamford seems to think that independent of every other consideration, the dearth of able officers will deter that prince, when the crisis arrives, from recommending war. His Highness is not of a character to take upon himself a heavy responsibility and expose his reputation to danger, and the support of Russia will also probably be thought an indispensable requisite to the taking any resolutions.

The copy of a letter written by order of Count Panin to M. de Krudener and communicated to me this day, will throw some light upon this part of the subject. In
addition to this I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that the emperor had refused to receive the Austrian ambassador. M. de Krüdener, though he has no official information of it, has very little doubt of the fact.

Louis Bonaparte is accompanied only by two officers, who seem about the same age with himself. He does not pretend to any public character, but he has been to Potsdam where he dined with the king. Count Haugwitz, I am told, went there on the same day, and it has been remarked as a circumstance deserving attention that a courier arrived here the night before last directly from Paris, after having travelled with the greatest expedition. That there has been and continues some negotiation concerning an indemnification to Prussia, for her transrhenane provinces, is not doubted, and I have also reason to believe that a treaty of commerce is on foot. Young and insignificant as Louis Bonaparte appears to be, it is hardly possible that his journey is unconnected with any political end, and the cupidty, by which it is manifest from the Duke of Brunswick’s conversation, the Prussian court is actuated, may be a powerful instrument in the hands of France.

But though I see some grounds to conjecture danger arising from hence, I am in possession of no facts, which can lead me to think there is any plan actually on foot for forming a league against Great Britain. Great apprehension, may no doubt, be justly entertained for the future consequences of the jealousy which the arts of France have been too successfully employed to excite throughout the continent against Great Britain, and the apparent coldness between the courts of London and Petersburg will stimulate France to court by every means in her power the alliance of the Russian emperor, and the ancient maritime league between the powers of the Baltic, seems to offer a foundation to build upon, but the character of the emperor will probably deter the other courts from engaging with him, in a measure by which they will be placed in the greatest and most immediate danger.

Copy of a letter from Stamford to Carysfort, Berlin, 4 November 1800

My Lord,

Vous m'avez demandé le précis d'un des derniers entretiens que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir, avec M. le Duc de Brunswick, et dont j'ai déjà eu celui de vous parler de vive voix. Je vais satisfaire à cette demande le plus brièvement qu'il me sera possible. Cet

137 Fürstenberg, Joachim Egon, Landgrave of. Austrian diplomat. He was sent on a special mission to Russia to explain the Ancona affair. He arrived in Petersburg on 3 March 1800 but was refused an audience.
entretien mena ce Prince à discuter avec moi le parti qu'avait à prendre la Prusse dans les conjonctures actuelles, où il devenait probable que l'Autriche en reviendrait à faire une paix séparée avec la France. Le duc convint que, dans le cas où cet événement aurait lieu, il y aurait à parier, l'Angleterre restant seule en guerre, que la Prusse s'y verrait fortement entraînée. Il convint également, que la Prusse ne pouvait pas pour cette raison, assez se hâter de se mettre en mesure, pour ne pas être surprise par un événement de cette nature; mais la mesure même paraissait l'embarrasser infiniment, parce qu'il ne s'en présentait apparentemment aucune à son esprit, qui ne la semblait trop vigoureuse. Pour fixer néanmoins ses idées sur cet objet, j'observais que la situation générale des affaires en Europe semblait tracer impérieusement à la Prusse la marche qu'elle avait à suivre; qu'elle ne pouvait à mon avis rien faire qui fût approprié davantage aux circonstances que de mettre incessamment sur pied de guerre une armée de soixante mille hommes prêt à marcher sur le premier ordre; d'offrir en même temps sa médiation pour une paix générale au gouvernement français, en lui déclarant sans détour, que son projet de ne vouloir traiter que de paix partielles, loin de prouver un désir sincère d'en venir à une pacification générale, semblait au contraire démontrer son dessein de perpétuer la guerre; que tel ou tel Etat pouvait, à la vérité, trouver son intérêt particulier, et une sûreté momentanée dans une paix séparée mais que, d'un autre côté, de cet intérêt et cette sûreté partiels ne pouvaient résulter rien d'avantageux pour le rétablissement d'un repos universel, solide et durable; enfin qu'il s'agissait pour l'intérêt et la sûreté de la Prusse en particulier, de n'être pas tenue plus longtemps en suspens, sur ce que doivent devenir la République d'Hollande et tant de provinces que la France a démembrées de l'Empire Germanique. J'ajoute à tout cela, que je ne doutais nullement que la Prusse ne trouvât la Russie et les autres puissances du nord disposées à se joindre à la France, et à concourir aux mesures qui seraient jugées les plus propres à se faire écouter.

Le duc, après avoir réfléchi pendant quelques instants à toutes ces idées, reprit la parole pour me dire qu'il doutait de la possibilité d'engager la Prusse à une démarche aussi vigoureuse et énergique; qu'il sentait à la vérité, combien elle était enfin devenue urgente, mais qu'il prévoyait aussi que ce serait peine perdue que de la proposer, vue que la seule défense qu'exigerait la mesure de mettre une armée sur pied de guerre, serait une considération plus que suffisante pour en détourner le roi; à moins que l'Angleterre ne voulût concourir aux frais d'un pareil armement, chose à laquelle il croyait qu'on ne la trouverait point disposée, puisqu'elle s'était déjà précédemment refusé à une mesure tout à fait pareille. Je pris la liberté de lui observer que les circonstances, à l'époque dont il parlait n'étaient pas absolument les mêmes qu'elles sont aujourd'hui; qu'il était vrai que Sa Majesté Prussienne avait paru désirer alors de faire concourir l'Angleterre aux frais d'un
armement qu'elle se proposait de faire, mais qui au fond n'aurait eu d'autre objet que celui
d'assurer la sûreté individuelle de la Prusse, qui se trouvait d'autant moins exposée que
l'Angleterre et ses alliés étaient sur le point d'ouvrir la campagne, et de pousser la guerre
avec vigueur contre la France: qu'il s'agirait de mettre aujourd'hui sur pied une armée, non
pour la condamner à l'inactivité, mais pour la faire entrer en lice, aussitôt que l'exigerait le
casus foederis, qui aurait été bien expressément et bien clairement stipulé dans un traité
solennel. Ici finit cet entretien.

Je ne vous en aurais parlé Milord, ne fût-ce que je me suis convaincu, ainsi que j'ai
eu l'honneur de vous le dire de vive voix, que le duc, tout en assurant qu'il ne se mêle
point de la politique de la cour de Berlin, s'en mêle et y influe plus que jamais; d'où
j'infère que ce qu'il en dit ne saurait être regardé comme indifférent, quoique ses paroles
soient souvent de très faux interprètes de ses pensées.

no. 37
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 8 November 1800

My Lord,

Since my dispatch to your Lordship of this date, the translation of an article from
the Petersburg gazette has been communicated to me, of which I have the honour to
inclose a copy. The court of Vienna will in all probability have previously learnt the ill-
success of the nomination in question, since an article in the Vienna gazette stated some
days ago that Prince Amisphorg's departure for Petersburg did not appear so near as
had been supposed.

no. 38
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 11 November 1800

My Lord,

There is strong reason to believe that the French are endeavouring with the utmost
industry, to engage the northern courts in a maritime league against Great Britain. It is a
point which has been particularly laboured here, and earnestly pressed upon the court of
Berlin by the Russian ministry, but hitherto I believe without effect. The clamours
however which resound on every side against Great Britain and the unfavourable
impression which they seem to have made upon the public mind, joined to the desire of

138 I have not been able to find out who this person was.
gratifying the Emperor of Russia, and the belief that it will lead to no serious consequence may at length incline His Prussian Majesty to give way. But as scarce a day passes without some new proof of the emperor's extravagance, this effect may be prevented, by an early persuasion of the firm determination of His Majesty, to maintain the just rights of his crown. While the affair with Denmark was in suspense I had opportunities of insinuating this, and I hope not without some effect. I shall now endeavour to do the same when the course of any conversation leads to it, as the existing circumstances seem likely to give a momentary weight to the representations of Russia and France.

I hear from various quarters, and from persons of credit, that Portugal is negotiating a peace with France. Your Lordship will recollect that special orders were sent to M. d'Aranjo. They were said to be only his letters of recall, and the Vicomte d'Añadía desired I would without loss of time obtain positive information whether the carriage of M. d'Aranjo would be allowed to pass through England, duty free. The last post brought me the answer, but upon my communicating it to M. d'Añadía, he told me that M. d'Aranjo's journey would not take place as yet; for that he was gone to Brussels, and would proceed from thence to Amsterdam, where some time would be necessary for the arrangement of his private affairs.

General Sprengporten has a numerous staff, and will be followed by a considerable number of officers, who are intended to replace those whose fidelity may have been tainted during their captivity in France. It is said the troops will winter in the Lordship of Jever.

no. 39
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 13 November 1800

My Lord,

I had this afternoon a conversation with Count Haugwitz, the substance of which Lord Frederick Bentinck's arrival from Vienna gives me an opportunity of communicating to your Lordship. He began with saying that he had been very desirous of seeing me for some days in order to communicate to me the steps which the blundering magistrates of Hamburg had made it necessary for the King of Prussia to take. He said

140 I have not been able to find out who this person was.
they had totally mistaken the nature of the business, but that he hoped it was superfluous for him to assure me that there was nothing intended hostile or unfriendly to Great Britain. What had been done was only in pursuance of the long established system of Prussia, and to preserve intact the line of demarcation. Orders had been given to the Duke of Brunswick, to detach a body of troops to occupy Cuxhaven. It was incumbent on the king, as the head and protector of the neutrality of the north of Germany, to take possession, as a military station of this place, but the officers to whom the execution of this service was entrusted and who would remain in command had the fullest and most positive orders to give every facility and security possible to the communications, through that port, of the continent, and Great Britain.141

As I was not sufficiently informed of the circumstances which have been the immediate occasion of this resolution of the Prussian cabinet, to know how far it may affect the rights and honour of His Majesty's crown, I contented myself with saying that when the rumours first reached me, I felt persuaded that I might rely upon the assurances I had repeatedly received from His Excellency of the desire of the court of Berlin to cultivate a good understanding with Great Britain, that I had uniformly represented to your Lordship, that the Prussian government, far from looking upon the maritime power of Great Britain with a jealous eye, considered it as a principle support of Europe against the increasing preponderance of France. He interrupted me to say, that such was the light in which the subject had been always considered by the king his master, and that I could not express it too strongly in my correspondence with your Lordship. I then observed that, resting upon the faith of these assurances, I had paid not the least regard to the reports which pervaded, that the league which had been so much talked of as likely to be formed against the maritime rights of Great Britain, had at length received countenance from the Prussian court. He replied, that considering the desire which Great Britain must have to connect more closely with herself, the powers of the north, the principles by which the King of Prussia was governed, his known friendship and connection with His Majesty, and the conformity of the interests and views of Prussia and Great Britain, he flattered himself that if any discussion should take place upon the subject, His Majesty would not be displeased, or think it contrary to his interest, that Prussia should be the channel through which it should proceed. To this I answered that I was not aware that there exists

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141 A British squadron took a Prussian ship, the *Triton*, as prize and was taking it to an English port when a storm obliged them to take shelter in the port of Cuxhaven. The *Triton* affair was used as a pretext by the Prussian government to invade the town of Cuxhaven in the Bailiwick of Ritzebüttel, then belonging to Hamburg. Troops of the Schladen regiment moved into the town on 23 November 1800.
any subject of discussion; that the maritime code of Great Britain was supported by the authority of the best and most esteemed writers, upon the law of nations; that the reputation of the British court of Admiralty had always been unimpeached, and that particular attention had been given to put it upon the most respectful footing; that it was the system of His Majesty's government to show every degree of favour to the commerce of neutral powers, that was consistent with what His Majesty owed to the safety of his dominions, and that Prussia herself had lately received, upon the application in favour of the Sicilian merchants, the most unequivocal proof of His Majesty's liberality, that what had been called, during the American War, the Armed Neutrality, dispassionately considered, must be looked upon as having been a real war against Great Britain; that the principal powers engaged in it, when they made war on each other disregarded all the principles they had professed to consider as sacred, and that it might be fairly assumed, that no belligerent power would ever subscribe to them, till it was reduced to the same situation as France was at this moment, the not being able to carry out any commerce or procure any naval stores, but under cover of neutral navigation; that the system had been completely abandoned by Russia, both in the note delivered by Baron de Krüdener to the Danish court, and in her convention with Great Britain and that not only the nature of the contest, in which Great Britain was engaged, which was the cause of all sovereigns, ought to prevent its renewal, but in the present situation of her maritime forces, it could not be attempted, without the greatest and most evident danger, to some of the powers most active in promoting it. Count Haugwitz then suddenly turned the conversation to the negotiation at Paris, and the reception of Count Cobenzl, and notwithstanding the importance of the subject, the want of time must be my excuse for abridging this part of my report, but I can assure your Lordship that the Prussian minister expressed in strong terms his conviction of the absolute necessity of a previous concert between Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, in order to effect a solid peace, and his wish that Great Britain might be the channel through which the first advances to such a concert might be made. He declared the readiness of Prussia to promote the views of Austria, but seemed to make some reserve about Bavaria, of which as my intention was only to sound his inclinations I did not desire any particular explanation. I told him that I had seen and heard so many instances of the rooted jealousy and want of liberality in the two courts towards each other, that though I might be warranted to conclude from what I have heard that the dispositions of Austria, as well as the circumstances of Europe were favourable, I could not indulge any hopes, and was glad not to be engaged in a business, in which I saw so little probability of success. To which he answered: 'Ecoutez Milord, non seulement je souhaitez que vous y travaillez, mais je vous y invite.' Our conversation then concluded
with a renewal on his part, of assurances that in the affair of Cuxhaven, the intentions of
the court of Berlin were in no degree unfriendly to Great Britain, and that with regard to
the claims of the neutral powers, if Prussia interfered it would only be with a view to
conciliate and reunite those powers with Great Britain. Upon this latter point I own I
entertain no great apprehensions. Prussia will not I think hazard an interruption of her
present good intelligence with His Majesty, by whose means principally she hopes to have
admission into the negotiations, for the arrangement of a general peace, and the increasing
extravagance of the Emperor of Russia must make Sweden and Denmark cautious not to
trust too far his support.

Lord Minto's dispatches will have informed your Lordship of the dispositions of
the Austrian court, and as those of Prussia appear to correspond, as much as could be
expected, if His Majesty should think proper, something may speedily be effected for this
object. I shall in the meantime endeavour by all the means in my power to cultivate every
disposition in the Prussian court to be on good terms with His Majesty.

no. 40
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 16 November 1800

My Lord,
I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's dispatch no. 14 and shall pay
immediate attention to His Majesty's commands.

I have inclosed the copy of a letter I wrote to M. Glennie, in consequence of the
information I had received from him, that the commanding officer of His Majesty's ships
at Cuxhaven was in doubt as to the line of conduct it was fit for him to pursue, when the
Prussian troops should enter the town. As the destruction of the place could be of no
advantage to His Majesty's service, I thought the best advice I could give him would be
that which would leave not the smallest pretext for the violence meditated by the Prussian
government. I learn today, that before I wrote that letter, the Prussian ship had been
actually restored. As I was solicitous to prevent the bad effects which the impression of
an immediate rupture between Great Britain and Prussia might produce both in England
and upon the continent, I delivered the note of which I inclose a copy, in the hope of
obtaining an immediate and express declaration from the Prussian government of its
disposition to remain on good terms with His Majesty. Count Haugwitz, very soon after

142 Glennie, James, British diplomat, legation secretary and chargé d'affaires for the Hanse Towns in
Hamburg from December 1799 to December 1800.
he had received it, wrote to put off an appointment he had given me for this evening till
twelve o'clock tomorrow, and immediately set off for Potsdam. I am not without hopes
that the march of the troops may yet be stopped, but if that should happen, I shall still be
of opinion that the intention has long been in contemplation, and is connected with some
other object, most probably with the proposal of Russia, for again calling into effect the
former league for the protection of neutral commerce. I have some occasion to think that
Sweden is inclined to cultivate, at this moment, a better understanding with His Majesty,
and shall be very glad, if I am enabled to state to your Lordship shortly, some substantial
grounds for this opinion. But it seems in general, as if the violent step which is threatened
by Prussia, in regard to Cuxhaven, will be seen with some jealously by both Sweden and
Denmark. If any favour could be shown to them without touching the essential principles
of the maritime code of Great Britain, nothing would be so likely to defeat the hostile
intentions of Russia, or to turn the side of public prejudice, though so unreasonably,
against the British government.

Copy of a verbal note from Carysfort to Haugwitz, Berlin, 16 November
1800

Dès l'instant que le Comte de Carysfort Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre
Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, eut appris que Sa Majesté Prussienne se
disposait à faire entrer un détachement de ses troupes dans Cuxhaven et que la raison que
le public se plaisait à donner à cette démarche était le refus qu'avait fait le gouvernement de
Hambourg de faire relâcher un bâtiment, qui après avoir été pris par un vaisseau de guerre
de Sa Majesté Britannique, avait été obligé, pour éviter les dangers de la mer, d'entrer
dans le susdit port; a cru de son devoir de demander une audience à Son Excellence M. le
Comte de Haugwitz Ministre d'Etat et de cabinet à fin de s'informer de cette affaire.

Il a reçu de Son Excellence l'assurance que les intentions de Sa Majesté Prussienne
n'était nullement hostiles ou contraires aux intérêts de la Grande Bretagne, mais que
l'occupation qu'elle avait ordonnée, avait pour but principal de maintenir l'autorité de Sa
Majesté en qualité de chef et protecteur de la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne, ce qu'elle
était de l'aveu et du consentement de la ville de Hambourg même. Lord Carysfort n'étant
pas exactement informé des circonstances dans lesquelles le vaisseau dont il était question
se trouvait, a remis à une autre occasion les observations qu'il eut voulu soumettre à Son
Excellence. Il a maintenant lieu de croire que ce bâtiment chargé de contrebande a été pris
par un des vaisseaux de guerres de Sa Majesté Britannique, comme il entrait dans le Texil,
c'est-à-dire un port appartenant aux ennemies de Sa Majesté et qu'il a été rendu aussitôt que l'officier qui en était chargé a pu demander les ordres de ses supérieures.

Pour ce qui est de l'occupation de la ville de Cuxhaven par les troupes prussiennes, qui doit être fondé sur les conventions particulières entre Sa Majesté Prussienne et le Sénat de Hambourg, il ne se croit pas appelé à prendre part dans cette discussion, mais il se sent autorisé à réclamer en faveur des sujets et des vaisseaux du roi son maître, tous les droits auxquels ils peuvent justement prétendre dans un port neutre appartenant à un république dont les liaisons avec les Etats de Sa Majesté sont très anciennes et généralement connues. Aucune convention faite entre la ville de Hambourg et Sa Majesté Prussienne ne pouvant infirmer ni altérer ces droits.

D'après ces considérations il ose espérer que Sa Majesté Prussienne pourra suspendre encore l'occupation de Cuxhaven jusqu'à ce que les deux cours aient pu s'expliquer, surtout puisque cette occupation dans les circonstances actuelles pourrait donner lieu à des esprits mal disposés à attribuer à Sa Majesté Prussienne des vues non moins opposées aux sentiments de justice et de modération qui caractérisent toutes ses démarches, qu'à l'amitié et la bonne harmonie entre elle et Sa Majesté Britannique.

Au reste il n'échappera pas à la sagesse et à l'humanité de Sa Majesté que l'entrée d'un corps nombreux de troupes, dans un village très pauvre, et n'ayant qu'un territoire de très petite étendue, augmenterait probablement la misère de ses habitants et que la ville de Hambourg ayant toujours possédé cette place indispensable à la conservation de la navigation de l'Elbe, tout ce qui pourrait troubler cette possession, déranger les anciens usages et porter les pilotes qui y demeurent actuellement à chercher asile ailleurs, porterait un coup des plus sensibles au commerce de tous les pays du nord, de l'Allemagne et entre autres à celui des Etats mêmes de Sa Majesté Prussienne.

no. 15
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 18 November 1800

My Lord,

Your dispatch no. 34 and 35 have been received and laid before the king.

I have the honour herewith to inclose copies of a letter from M. Nepean of 3rd November, and its inclosures together with the subsequent correspondence that has taken place here on the subject of it.

In communicating these papers to your Lordship, I have the king's commands to direct you, before any complaint is made on his part to the court of Berlin, relative to the capture of the *Rose* hired armed cutter, to endeavour to ascertain to what extent the Dutch
government has at any period previous to the present war recognised in the King of Prussia the exclusive right of the river Ems, and to this end your Lordship is instructed to enter without loss of time into an amicable discussion with M. de Haugwitz on the subject.

If the Prussian government can produce sufficient proof that such recognition has really been made on the part of the Dutch government in derogation of the usual law of nations with respect to powers occupying different banks of a river, His Majesty will have no scruple to conform himself to it, but if the claim of the King of Prussia rests only on the assertion of such right not acknowledged by the Dutch, or not so acknowledged previous to the present war, it does not seem reasonable that His Majesty should be bound by it, or should deprive himself of the means which that river affords of attacking and annoying his enemy whose possessions occupy one bank of that river.

If the authority of Prussia extends only to a part of the course of the river, the impracticability of drawing with accuracy a sea-line of demarcation between that country and Holland is so evident that it cannot be expected that it should, in practice, be very strictly adhered to by the ships of either of the belligerent parties, and on this determination of the right in question the Prussian cabinet will no doubt see the propriety of withdrawing those complaints against some of the British cruisers which have been forward here by M. de Jacobi.

That the Dutch government, at the present moment, consider the Ems or at least one of its navigations still to belong of right to that country, the inclosed papers furnish one of the many instances which may be brought forward, and it cannot be expected that whilst the king’s enemies use Delfzylt as a port from whence they make depredations upon, and interrupt the trade of this country in the river Ems itself, His Majesty should deny himself the means of retaliation.

If therefore on the event of the enquiry of which I have already spoken, His Majesty should recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of His Prussian Majesty in the Ems, it would become necessary that His Majesty should make a formal complaint to the Prussian government of the violation of the neutrality of that river in the capture by two of the enemy’s gunboats, of the Rose hired armed cutter, as detailed in the inclosed papers, and to urge the Prussian government to demand of the Dutch Republic the restitution of that vessel and her crew.

In your Lordship’s communication with M. Haugwitz you will be careful to distinguish between the supposed sovereignty of the King of Prussia over the river Ems, and any line of neutral demarcation such as Prussia has frequently been desirous of

143 A town in Holland on the bay of Dollart in the province of Groningen across from the town of Emden.
establishing on the coast of East Friesland, and which has uniformly been, and must continue to be disallowed on the part of His Majesty, who is no party to any treaty of neutrality between Prussia and France.

no. 41
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 19 November 1800

My Lord,

Since I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 7th instant I have had an opportunity of conversing with Count Haugwitz upon most of the points to which it relates, and I am inclined to hope that the openness and liberality which distinguishes His Majesty's conduct towards the court of Berlin has made such an impression as may tend to give a bias to its measures more favourable to His Majesty's service.

I questioned Count Haugwitz repeatedly and closely as to the answer returned to the Russian memorial, and was uniformly told that no answer had been returned, the convention made with Denmark having made it unnecessary. That this statement does not deserve to be implicitly relied on is evident, as it is highly improbable that such a communication from a friendly power should meet with no notice whatever, and Count Haugwitz does not deny that he had frequent conversations with the Russian minister and that the Prussian cabinet has been engaged in the discussion of a plan for assuring the navigation of the neutral powers.

What he said upon this subject was accompanied by the professions he has so often made that the object of Prussia was no other than to conciliate and prevent misunderstanding and discord among the powers with whom she is connected both by friendship and reciprocal interest, and he expressed his intention of resuming shortly, at a moment of more leisure, the conversation upon this subject. I am told from other quarters, that the pressing solicitations of the Russian minister have procured the promise that the answer of this court to his last representations shall not any longer be delayed.

I also questioned Count Haugwitz as to the specific plan for a general peace which had been in discussion between the courts of Berlin and St Petersburg and received in this instance also an evasive answer namely, that the different situations of the two courts (Russia though she had withdrawn from the war not yet being at peace with France) had hitherto prevented a discussion of specific terms for peace.
I inclose to your Lordship another note which I delivered yesterday on the subject of Cuxhaven. I have as yet received no official answer though I have reason to believe it is not intended to persist in establishing a post at that place. I must at the same time apprise your Lordship that Count Haugwitz admits that it has been long in contemplation and that surveys have been made, and plans prepared to fortify it. The pretence is the facility with which the French might penetrate into Holland.

I have the honour to inclose the copy of a note, which the circumstances of my having received no answer to my note verbale of the 16th induced me to deliver yesterday to the Prussian minister.

Copy of a Note from Carysfort to Haugwitz, Berlin, 18 November 1800

Le soussigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, se croit obligé de s'adresser encore à Son Excellence le Comte de Haugwitz Ministre d'Etat et de cabinet au sujet de l'intention de Sa Majesté Prussienne, de prendre une possession militaire de Cuxhaven. Quand le soussigné a eu l'honneur de remettre à Son Excellence sa note verbale en date du 16, on ne savait pas encore avec certitude que le vaisseau prussien amené dans ce port, avait été restitué. Ce fait étant maintenant constaté aussi bien que le zèle que le gouvernement de Hambourg a mis à remplir les volontés du roi, la surprise et la consternation qui ont été excitées dès le moment qu'on a appris les ordres qui avait été donnés pour la marche d'un détachement de troupes, s'accroîtraient au dernier point, si l'on apprenait que nonobstant une satisfaction complète donnée à Sa Majesté Prussienne, sur tous les points dont elle a cru avoir à se plaindre, elle ne persistait pas moins dans sa résolution de faire occuper Cuxhaven par ses troupes. En effet, il paraît au premier coup d'œil, que cette occupation serait si propre à donner les plus vives et les plus justes alarmes aux nations commerçantes, qui y sont intéressées, qu'on croit pouvoir attendre de la justice et de la modération de Sa Majesté Prussienne que, pour cette raison seule (sans parler des interprétations que la malveillance chercherait à donner à cette mesure) elle se déterminera à n'y point donner suite.

Le soussigné néanmoins ne croirait pas avoir fait son devoir s'il négligeait de représenter à Son Excellence les vives inquiétudes qui résultent nécessairement de l'incertitude où l'on reste encore à cet égard, les assurances réitérées que le soussigné a reçues de Son Excellence de l'amitié et de la bienveillance de Sa Majesté Prussienne envers le Roi de la Grande Bretagne ne lui permettent pas de croire qu'aucune mésintelligence puisse naître entre les deux cours, mais il ne peut se cacher que les ennemis du bien de
l'humanité et du repos public chercheront à profiter de l'alarme qui est généralement répandue, pour semer la discorde parmi les puissances qui devraient toutes se réunir pour rétablir et maintenir cet équilibre duquel doit dépendre la sûreté et l'indépendance de l'Europe entière.

no. 42
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 20 November 1800

My Lord,

I have this moment received the answer from the Prussian government to my notes of the 16th and 18th, which I have the honour to inclose. Your Lordship will see by the papers accompanying it, the date of the requisition made to the Regency of Hanover, and the number of troops originally intended to occupy Ritzebüttel and Cuxhaven, as well as the time which was allotted for performing their march. I was this morning informed by the Baron de Reden,144 His Majesty's minister for the electorate, that a notification had been sent on the 15th instant from the Regency of Minden145 to supersede their first requisition and countermand the order given for the troops. Count Haugwitz yesterday told the Baron de Reden and other persons who dined and passed the evening at his house, that the place would be occupied by the same number only of Prussian soldiers as had been usually maintained there by the city of Hamburg. Some communication might naturally have been expected upon this subject from the Prussian government to His Majesty's minister resident here, as the immediate occasion for the measure determined by the Prussian court was found in the supposed misconduct of British subjects. None however has taken place, nor has it been intimated to me, that M. de Jacobi has been ordered to take any steps upon it in London. What may be the real motive and end of the establishment of a post at Cuxhaven it is difficult to conjecture, and not less so, what prevented the answer I now transmit from being given directly. The court of Berlin may have been influenced entirely by the desire of making a precedent to support and confirm its supremacy in the north of Germany, and may have thought such a step the more necessary on account of the probability that the peace of Austria may be made without the intervention of Prussia, but the great exertions which are making by Russia to excite the

144 Reden, Franz Ludwig Wilhelm (1754-1831), Hanoverian diplomat. He entered the diplomatic service in 1792. His first mission was to accompany von Beulwitz to Vienna for the crowning of Francis II, and was subsequently sent to Rastadt as sub-delegate, then to Berlin as minister (1800-1803).
145 Minden, Prussian town and province in Westphalia, on the Weser, roughly 300 km West of Berlin.
powers of the north to renew the maritime league of 1780, furnish a great additional
ground for jealousy. It is however beyond a doubt that this step has occasioned great and
general surprise and alarm, and it seems probable that Denmark will use it with peculiar
uneasiness. I must therefore flatter myself that it must ultimately produce some benefit to
His Majesty, by weakening the connection between the neutral powers.

There seems great reason to think that Russia and France are drawing nearer to
each other. The particular views of Prussia, and the degree in which she may already be
engaged to second the designs of one or both those powers, I shall use my best endeavour
to penetrate. It has been repeated to me but I cannot vouch for the truth, that Prussia has
day delivered to the Russian minister a counter-project upon this point.

The Bavarian and Saxon ministers have delivered each of them a note to this court.
M. de Posch informs me that his master has signified his determination to adhere to his
engagements with his allies. The Saxon note is for the purpose of stating the necessity of
providing means of security upon the renewal of hostilities between Austria and France.

Copy of a note from Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 20 November 1800

Le Ministre d'Etat et de Cabinet soussigné se trouve autorisé, par les ordres du roi
to calmer entièrement les inquiétudes et les appréhensions que Milord Carysfort, Envoyé
Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique lui a témoignées,
dans les deux notes du 16, et du 18 novembre. Le vaisseau Prussien, le Triton a été
rendu, il est vrai, à son propriétaire, mais le mode de la relaxation a été tout aussi irrégulier
que les procédés qu'il avait essayés précédemment, et en examinant dans toutes ses
circonstances, l'incident dont il a eu à se plaindre, on retrouve partout une infraction
manifeste des principes de la neutralité du Nord de l'Allemagne. C'est cette considération
majeure, jointe au refus déloyal du magistrat de Hambourg, qui a dicté au roi la résolution
de faire occuper militairement le port de Cuxhaven et le baillage de Ritzebüttel. La mesure
en a été exécutée, aussitôt que prise, et elle n'est plus dans le cas d'être révoquée,
liable de ce qui s'est passé imposant à Sa Majesté la nécessité de veiller efficacement
au maintien de la neutralité qu'elle a garantie à ses co-états.

Le roi ne saurait s'imaginer que Sa Majesté Britannique, après avoir participé, aux
avantages et aux bénéfices de cette même heureuse neutralité, puisse concevoir la moindre
alarme, en voyant entrer une garnison prussienne dans le port que l'Angleterre a choisi
pour son point de communication avec le Nord de l'Allemagne. Placé de cette manière
sous la garantie immédiate du roi, il en sera d'autant plus à l'abri de toute espèce d'atteinte,
et les troupes de Sa Majesté n'auront d'autre devoir à y remplir que d'y faire respecter les
lois du bon ordre et de l'équité. On peut s'en rapporter avec confiance aux sages dispositions du Duc Régnant de Brunswick, qui est chargé du commandement de la ligne de démarcation.

S'il fallait cependant encore, à cet égard, des assurances plus particulières, le roi se ferait un plaisir de les donner, par la présente à Sa Majesté Britannique, et de lui déclarer, en termes exprès et positifs, que l'ordre actuel des choses ne dérangera en rien la liberté du commerce, et de la navigation dans le port de Cuxhaven, ni surtout aussi la continuation de la correspondance de l'Angleterre, l'officier commandant les troupes du roi, en garnison dans le bailliage de Ritzebüttel, se fera au contraire, un devoir d'y apporter, de son côté, toutes les facilités imaginables.

En général la démarche à laquelle le roi a été entraîné par la nécessité, n'admet aucune interprétation équivoque. Elle n'a d'autre but que le maintien du système dont il est l'auteur, et le défenseur, et ce but ne sera point outrepassé. Sa façon de penser et d'agir lui a concilié la confiance de l'Europe entière et ne se démentira jamais, et quoiqu'il ne soit point à prévoir que les autres puissances soient tentées de se méprendre sur la pureté de ses vues, dans l'occurrence présente, Sa Majesté se réserve cependant de s'en expliquer ultérieurement et d'une manière convenable avec qui il appartiendra.

no. 43
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 21 November 1800

My Lord,

It is with great concern that I have to inform your Lordship that intelligence has been received here, that a very few days after the date of Count Rostopchin's letter to your Lordship on the subject of Malta, the emperor, on hearing that the standard of the order had not been hoisted when the place was taken, ordered an embargo to be laid on all

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146 Rostopchin, Feodor Vasilevich Count (1763-1826), Russian statesman and Paul I's aide-de-camp. He was appointed minister of foreign affairs in 1798 until remained at that post until Paul's assassination. He was made a count in 1799. Cf. the article on Rostopchin by J.M.P. McErlean in The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, (Academic International Press, 1983), vol. 31.

147 Rostopchin wrote to Grenville on the subject of Malta. A copy of the letter is to be found in PRO, FO 65 Russia, 47, Rostopchin to Grenville, 23 October 1800.
the British ships in his harbours, which has accordingly taken place.\textsuperscript{148} Baron Krüdener says he has strong hopes that this violent step will have been retracted, but he declined giving me any answer when I asked him upon what that hope was founded. I think it necessary to add that Baron Krüdener has of late frequently expressed that he was inclined to change his former opinion that none but a general peace ought to be made with France, and to think that the separate peace with Austria would in the present circumstances of Europe be a desirable event. He repeated this in the conversation I have just had with him.

no. 44

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 23 November 1800

My Lord,

I have nothing to add to what I have so lately written to your Lordship, but what relates to the remarkable change in the language of M. de Krüdener, on the subject of peace with France, and the notice which has been universally attracted, not only by the frequent conferences between that minister, and M. de Beurnonville, but the apparent cordiality between the Russians, lately arrived from Petersburg, and the French at this court. My knowledge of this fact I must derive from others, as I have not made a part of those societies where they have met, but I have no doubt of the truth of the report.

What is mentioned by Mr. Wickham, of a secret agent of Russia at Paris, combined with what has been passing here, leaves little doubt that propositions of reconciliation have been passing directly between the two governments. How far they may be connected with the project said to have been in discussion towards the close of the reign of Catherine the second, and to have been treated here, between the minister of Russia, and M. de Caillard,\textsuperscript{149} whose nephew is the secretary of legation here at present, your Lordship will judge, but on the supposition that their nature is the same, it is almost certain that they will not have been communicated to this court, and nothing seems more likely to prevent its being drawn into the support of such designs, than insinuations of the probable concurrence of Austria in an arrangement of the affairs of Germany upon principles not entirely different from those suggested by the Duke of Brunswick. As Lord

\textsuperscript{148} The second Russian embargo on British ships occurred when Paul learnt of the fall of Malta. News of the British taking the island reached Petersburg around 14 October and at the beginning of November Paul reacted by laying an embargo.

\textsuperscript{149} Caillard, Antoine Bernard, named minister plenipotentiary to Berlin on 11 July 1795, was recalled on 25 May 1798.
Minto appears very desirous this ground should be tried, I shall venture to pursue the idea as far as I can, without instructions from your Lordship. If this court has any real inclination to draw nearer to Austria, they will instruct their minister at Vienna, and Lord Minto, who must be earlier informed as to His Majesty's sentiments, upon this subject, may then open a negotiation if circumstances should justify or require it.

The Elector of Saxony has directed a note be presented here, setting forth the various circumstances, which in consequence of a renewal of hostilities, would require the intervention of the troops to prevent any infringement of the line of demarcation, and the apparent necessity of concerting more effectual means of defence, not only against that danger, but that which might possibly arise from the position of the belligerent powers.

I have obtained the copy of the note presented by the court of Bavaria, to the Prussian and Russian ministers resident here.

The Danish chargé d'affaires has received instructions to announce the recall of Baron Rosenkrantz from this court, and his nomination to that of Petersburg.

no. 45
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 25 November 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

The reception which Monsieur Lucchesini met with at Paris and the probability of the renewal of the war seems to make an impression upon Count Haugwitz favourable to a more intimate connection with Austria. He has desired to speak with General Stamford upon that subject and has for that purpose asked him to dine with him this day. It is more certain however that the king's ear is engrossed by Beyme and Lombard, persons who through their motives may not be evil, are known favourites of the French interest, and as Count Haugwitz has no real influence, I see no ground on which to build any expectation. Notwithstanding the assurances of this minister that nothing has passed on the subject of the Russian memorial since the conclusion of the convention with Denmark, and his strong professions of the friendship of his master towards His Majesty, yet it is generally believed here, that within these few days full powers have been sent to Monsieur Lusi to treat upon this subject of the northern maritime league in concert with the ministers of the other powers of the Baltic at Petersburg.150

150 Full powers were sent to Lusi on 17 November 1800 (GStA, Rep. 11 Rußland, 148 B, Haugwitz to Lusi).
I thought it necessary in touching upon that part of your dispatch no. 14 which points out as the best means of proving the sincerity of such professions, the pursuing measures tending to remove the false impressions received at Petersburg respecting the conduct of Great Britain, to express, in the strongest terms I could find, my opinion of the hostile League of 1780, and my firm conviction of the unalterable determination of His Majesty not to suffer the smallest invasion of those rights which are essential to the dignity of his crown, and the security of his people. Convinced that if the courts of Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm were timely and fully possessed with this idea it would entirely prevent or render insignificant the projected Northern League, I have always endeavoured to inculcate it, but the example of what passed in the American War makes them confident that Great Britain will again dissemble, and very strong evidence to the contrary must be placed before them, to withstand the violence with which they are and will be solicited by the Emperor of Russia.

[end of cipher]

I have made repeated personal applications to Count Alvensleben for an answer on the subject of the corn but hitherto without effect.

M. Louis Bonaparte left Berlin I believe this morning, and will return here after having visited Silesia, and proceeded from thence through Königsberg and Danzig.

no. 16

Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 25 November 1800

My Lord,

The Marquis de Circello\textsuperscript{151} having communicated to me for His Majesty's information a letter from the Duke de Serracapriola\textsuperscript{152} relative to the appointment of a British minister to reside at the court of St Petersburg, I have the honour herewith to inclose to your Lordship, copy of a minute of answer which has been made by me to the above overture.

His Majesty's intention in directing one to transmit this paper to your Lordship is, that it should serve as a guide to the language you are to hold in the event of M. de

\textsuperscript{151} Circello Tommaso, Somma Marquis di, Sicilian diplomat, ambassador at the court of St James from 1794 to June 1801.

\textsuperscript{152} Duke de Serracapriola, Antonio Maresca, Sicilian diplomat, ambassador at the court of St Petersburg where he arrived in September 1783 and remained until May of 1808.
Krüdener, in consequence of instructions from this court, communicating with you on the subject to which it is related.

The system of concert and union which so happily subsisted between Great Britain and Russia having been broken through by the most unwarrantable and hostile conduct of the Emperor of Russia towards this country, His Majesty directs that your Lordship should not give room to suppose he is solicitous for a renewal of friendship and confidential intercourse with His Imperial Majesty.

But any overture to that effect on the part of the court of St Peters burg being made to you through Monsieur de Krüdener, your Lordship is at liberty to express the king's readiness to concur with the Emperor of Russia in such measures as may be best adapted for the re-establishment of their former relations of friendship and good understanding from which such important benefit had been derived to all Europe in checking the ambitious projects of the revolutionary government of France, and for this purpose the king will make no difficulty to nominate a minister to reside and take charge of his affairs at the court of St Petersburg whenever His Imperial Majesty shall in like manner appoint a minister of similar rank to reside in England. But as the communication between the two governments must be reciprocal His Majesty cannot with a due regard to his own dignity consent to the appointment of any minister to the court of Russia without the assurance that such minister will be treated with all the attention due to His Majesty's representative and that His Imperial Majesty will on his part nominate at the same time one of equal rank to reside here.

As Monsieur de Krüdener may endeavour to bring into these discussions subjects which will more properly come under consideration of the two courts whenever the appointment of their respective ministers shall take place, your Lordship is directed to confine yourself simply to the general expression of those sentiments of the king's desire for a return of confidential intercourse with the Emperor of Russia which are stated in the enclosed paper.

By this opportunity I send to Vienna for the government of Lord Minto's conduct in case any overture should be made to him by the Russian minister there on the subject now in question, instructions similar to those I have the honour to convey to your Lordship in this dispatch.
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 29 November 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

Though I had such information as amounted to a moral certainty that full powers had been sent to Count Lusi yet as I know through the same channel that his instructions require him not to make use of them but with great caution and reserve and in particular to go hand in hand with the courts of Denmark and Sweden, I resolved in speaking with Count Haugwitz to dissemble the knowledge of the fact, and to affect full reliance on the frequent professions of the friendship of His Prussian Majesty and his incessant endeavours to conciliate, in order to have it in my power to use with less reserve and with greater effect the strong language I stated in my last dispatch, and I mention this again to your Lordship because every hour brings to my mind additional conviction that the assuming at this juncture a firm and even lofty tone is the best means the British government can employ not only to prevent or break any measures that may have been concerted or meditated against His Majesty's interests, rights and dignity, but to operate a chance that any of the powers of the north may take a share in the vindication of the rights of sovereigns and the principles of society against France.

The special mission sent by the King of Sweden[^153] to England must before now have reached London[^154], and your Lordship will obtain such insight into the views and principles of that court as will make any conjecture of mine or any information upon that object I can transmit to you from hence of little value, but I think it right to mention to your Lordship that the Swedish minister here[^155], who as you know is not likely to use any such language from personal prepossession against France, always connects of late with the expression of his wish for the renewal of the correspondence between the two courts the necessity of the union of all the sovereigns of Europe for their common preservation,

[^153]: Gustavus IV Adolphus (1778-1837). Called to the throne under the Regency of his uncle in 1792 and after the assassination of his father. Deposed in 1809 by that same uncle, Charles XIII (and who was to adopt Napoleon's marshal Bernadotte), because of his eccentricities.

[^154]: Ehrensward, Carl August, Baron, Swedish diplomat, was sent on a special mission to London. He had his first audience on 17 December 1800 and his last on 27 March 1801.

[^155]: Engeström, Lars von, Swedish diplomat at Berlin from April 1798 to November 1803.
and expressed last night that in his opinion this principle was the only motive of the journey of the Swedish Majesty who is probably now at Petersburg.\footnote{The Swedish king arrived suddenly in Petersburg, and supposedly incognito, on 11 December 1800. His purpose was to ensure the formation of the Armed Neutrality through direct negotiations with the Tsar. They signed an agreement on 17 December, without consulting either the diplomats or ministers concerned.}

Preparations have been made for the reception of the Emperor of Russia at Grodno,\footnote{A Russian town situated near the Niemen, today in Poland.} and orders given at the posts for his journey. The arrival of the King of Sweden will probably prevent it for the present, it is however pretty certain that Louis Bonaparte is gone to Danzig and that his object is to be admitted to the presence [sic].

Having received accounts from good authority of a note delivered by the Prussian minister at Stockholm, on the subject of the affair at Barcelona in terms of animosity against Great Britain, the existing circumstances made me think it expedient to take some notice of so wanton an instance of a disposition in every point of view unfriendly to His Majesty, I therefore desired to see Count Haugwitz that he might obviate the bad impression such a report was calculated to give. At first he showed some impatience and ill humour but upon my observing that I did not come with complaint but satisfied with the many assurances I had received from him I wished to have his special authority for contradicting an injurious report, I then received his answer, contained in the annexed dispatch and I drew up a report of it in the form your Lordship sees it, and at the same time sent it to him for his correction and approbation. I have just received an answer and transmit it to your Lordship which as I cannot doubt of the account which I have received and from the Swedish minister's answer, of which I have heard, that the note in question was really of a highly offensive nature, to me exceedingly curious, and makes me not regret the step I have taken.

[end of cipher]

I have the honour to inclose a note I have received from this government on the subject of corn, as also a paper on French affairs. The former paper according to the best judgment I can form is satisfactory. I have sent copies to the consuls at the several ports. A letter I have received from Mr. Drusina makes me think that the first answer given by the Prussian Ministry was found sufficient for the purposes of the merchants at Memel.

I have obeyed His Majesty's commands by desiring to know from Count Haugwitz the intent of his Prussian claims on the river Ems, and have taken measures for
learning how far those claims were formerly acknowledged by the States General of the United Provinces.

Copy of a note from Alvensleben to Carysfort, Berlin, 25 November 1800

Sur la nouvelle note, remise le 29 octobre par Milord Comte de Carysfort, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le roi de la Grande Bretagne, au sujet de la libre sortie du froment, acheté par des sujet Britanniques, des ports de la Prusse et de l'Ost Frise, le ministère du cabinet après avoir itérativement pris cette affaire en considération, s'empresse de communiquer le résultat de sa recherche à monsieur l'envoyé, étant persuadé d'avance que ce dernier ne pourra qu'y acquiescer.

La première note remise par le ministère à Milord Comte de Carysfort confirme simplement la permission accordée aux négociants anglais d'exporter le froment hors des états du roi, mais ne contient point l'assurance de ne jamais soumettre le froment à ses droits de sortie plus forts que les précédents.

Le roi n'ayant donc eu nullement les mains liées à cet égard, a pu sans contredit faire usage d'un droit que personne ne conteste aux souverains, et assujettir à une plus forte imposition la sortie d'une denrée aussi importante. Il ne s'est point déterminé à cette mesure par une spéculation de finance, dans la vue de profiter de l'embarras des négociants étrangers et des habitants mêmes du pays.

L'unique motif, vraiment paternel, qui l'a guidé a été le besoin de ses propres sujets, et la nécessité de leur assurer une provision suffisante du grain en question, qui devenait tous les jours plus rare, et dont l'exportation, suivant les principes d'une bonne économie, a dû par conséquent être restreinte par des impôts.

D'après cet exposé Milord Comte de Carysfort se convaincra lui-même, que la révocation du nouveau droit, mis sur la sortie du froment, ne saurait avoir lieu. D'ailleurs le gouvernement Prussien a déjà déféré à la demande de la cour de Londres en permettant la libre sortie du froment renfermé, lors de la publication du nouvel impôt, dans les magasins des négociants de Danzig, Elbing, Königsberg et Memel. En vertu de cette permission les sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique peuvent encore à l'heure qu'il est exporter sans payer le droit de sortie tout le froment dont ils ont fait l'achat antérieurement à la publication du nouvel impôt, et qui a été effectivement déposer pour leur compte, dans les dits magasins.

Voilà tout ce que le gouvernement Prussien est en état d'accorder et le ministère du cabinet se flatte d'autant plus que Milord Comte de Carysfort n'exigera pas davantage, qu'il serait facile de citer des exemples où le gouvernement Britannique lui a pareillement
My Lord,

Though the knowledge I had of a note presented by the Prussian minister at Stockholm, concerning the affair said to have happened at Barcelona, was not official, and though the relations between the two courts and the repeated assurances of Count Haugwitz as to the friendly dispositions of this court, but above all the high character of His Prussian Majesty, which would neither assume the fact upon the relation of one party only, nor doubt the justice of the king, convinced me that its contents must be very different from the report I had heard. Yet reflecting that even a momentary doubt, arising from misrepresentation, might be injurious to both countries, I thought it best to avail myself of the liberty allowed me by Count Haugwitz, to converse with him freely upon all matters in which the interests of our respective sovereigns may be at all concerned, to ask him what account of it I might give your Lordship. I was told by that minister, that though upon the representation of the court of Spain it was thought fit to declare, that the rights of neutral nations were not indifferent to His Prussian Majesty, the note in question expressing His Majesty’s readiness to interpose his goodness contained nothing inconsistent with friendship and good harmony between the two courts.

Separate

My Lord,

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship my receipt for the sum of one hundred and eleven pounds nineteen shillings, which I have disbursed on His Majesty’s service, and for which I drew on your Lordship by bill, dated the eighth day of November, payable to the order of Mr. Francis Richard of this place.

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158 Tarrach, Franz Friedrich Ludwig Gottlieb von, Prussian diplomat, ambassador at Stockholm from 1796 to 1805.
no. 48
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 30 November 1800

My Lord,

The letter from Count Haugwitz no. 1 which I have the honour to inclose is an answer from that minister to a communication which I had made to him of the contents of my dispatch no. 47 and which I intended should accompany that dispatch.

I have just received the letter, which is marked no. 2 in return to a private note I had been induced to write to Count Haugwitz in consequence of an ill-grounded apprehension expressed to me, that the Russian consul at Memel might succeed in his efforts to obtain the detention in that port, of an English merchant ship, which has escaped from the embargo at Narva. 159

I am assured on good authority, that the King of Sweden's journey to Petersburg has been undertaken in consequence of an invitation from the Emperor of Russia.

no. 1
Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 29 November 1800

En vous remerciant beaucoup, Milord, de la communication franche et amicale que vous venez de me faire, en me faisant parvenir l'esquisse d'un rapport à votre cour sur l'affaire de Barcelone, je m'empresse de vous témoigner que j'applaudis entièrement à son contenu, et c'est avec une satisfaction particulière que je vous renouvelle l'assurance, que le roi, toujours animé par les mêmes sentiments qu'il a votés de tous temps à S. M. Britannique, désirera bien sincèrement et de les entretenir et d'en donner à votre cour toutes les preuves qui dépendront de lui. Permettez, Milord, que j'y joigne encore l'expression de ma haute considération.

159 After the fall of Malta, Paul declared an embargo on British goods and seized all the British vessels then in harbour. Their seizure led to a clash between Russian and British ships at Narva, after an attempt was made by seven British vessels to escape the embargo. Two British vessels escaped to sea after sinking a Russian ship, while the Russians burned a third that remained in harbour. Paul retaliated by deporting the crews to the interior.
Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 30 November 1800

J'ai bien reçu le billet que Vous m'avez adressé ce matin et je m'empresse Milord de vous témoigner combien j'ai été sensible à son contenu. Vos réflexions sont très juste et j'y applaudis d'autant plus qu'elles se fondent sur les principes de roi auquel je m'attendais d'avance que vous pariez Milord de rendre la justice qui leur est du.

Il est très vrai qu'un vaisseau anglais sorti du port de Narva est entré dans celui de Memel. On a fait des tentatives pour l'arrêter dans ce port, mais dès que j'en ai été prévenu, je me suis hâté de faire expédier les ordres nécessaires pour empêcher qu'on ne mette la moindre entrave à laisser pleine liberté au capitaine du dit vaisseau de suivre ses propres dispositions. J'ai l'honneur de vous renouveler mes assurances de ma haute considération.

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 2 December 1800

My Lord,

I have not been able to obtain any precise and certain information concerning the immediate occasion and object of the King of Sweden's journey to Petersburg. Some Russians whom I have conversed with affect to lament it, as if they thought his intention was to inflame the emperor's hostility to Great Britain.

It is reported today, and gains credit, that the emperor is to join the army, and that the Archduke Charles left Prague on the 24th ultimo to take the command. The Austrian headquarters had already advanced to Ried.

(A contagion and fatal disorder has manifested itself among the horned cattle. It has been imported into this neighbourhood from south Prussia, upon the estate of Count Bruhl, and has also appeared in the New Mark of Brandenburg.)

Your Lordship will have an opportunity of penetrating into the real disposition of the Swedish cabinet, when Monsieur Ehrensward arrives in London. I have reason to believe that this court is not, as I had heard, to go hand in hand with Sweden and Denmark, but is to take no steps without the latter. This seems to favour the opinion that Sweden is most disposed to go to violent lengths; for I am persuaded that the court of
Berlin, whose interest is very little concerned, will, if possible, preserve the peace of the north, and Denmark must be sensible of its danger.

no. 17
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 2 December 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship's several dispatches to no. 39 inclusive have been received and laid before the king.

I have the honour to herewith inclose copies of a letter and of its inclosure from Mr. Napean to Mr. Fisher on the subject to which my dispatch no. 15 relates.

Your Lordship will see in them fresh grounds for the necessity of bringing the court of Prussia, without loss of time, to some final understanding on the question respecting their claim of territorial jurisdiction over the river Ems. I have only farther to remark to your Lordship, that this question is in no way connected with the line of neutral demarcation to the conventions respecting which His Majesty has never been a party - and still less with the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 which His Majesty will never recognise.

Your Lordship will be careful, in all your discussions on the subject, to keep these points perfectly distinct.

no. 18
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 3 December 1800
Most secret

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatches to no. 41 inclusive have been received and laid before the king.

There are in the different letters from your Lordship, to which I have now to reply, two objects more particularly deserving of attention under the present circumstances. These are the increasing probability of the actual existence of a northern league for the enforcing the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, and the overtures made by your Lordship on the part of the Prussian government for His Majesty's intervention in establishing a concert between the courts of Vienna and Berlin on the grounds explained by the Duke of Brunswick to General Stamford.
With respect to the first of these, your Lordship has certainly judge right in considering the occupation of Cuxhaven by the Prussian troops as a measure connected with this plan, and His Majesty's government has received undoubted proof that it is so represented by the Prussian ministers themselves, notwithstanding the shallow and frivolous pretences stated to your Lordship on the subject by Count Haugwitz.

The note verbale which your Lordship transmitted to the Prussian minister has completely anticipated all the instructions which I had it in command to convey to you on this occasion, and no further step appears necessary to be taken on His Majesty's part till I shall have received from your Lordship the answer to that note.

It is however by no means His Majesty's wish that your Lordship should conceal from the court of Berlin the strong and very unfavorable impression which that step has produced here. And although the king judges it proper that in the present moment no language should be held on the subject such as might bring matters to an immediate issue, and decidedly put an end to the apparent good-understanding between the two courts, yet you are to use no expression from which it can be understood that the matter will be suffered to rest where it now does, or that His Majesty means to acquiesce as a matter of course in a measure which is in itself so injurious to the interests of this country, and which affords so strong an indication of views of further hostility.

Your Lordship's language though perfectly friendly is therefore to be guarded as always to reserve to His Majesty the full liberty to react with respect to this subject in such a manner as the occasion may call for, and to regulate his conduct in this respect by the nature of the answers which you may receive to the note which you sent to Count Haugwitz.

With respect to the insinuation made to your Lordship by that minister that the King of Prussia was disposed as a mark of his friendship towards His Majesty to interpose his intervention for preventing a rupture between this country and the northern powers on the grounds of dispute respecting the principles of maritime law, the tendency of such a communication is too evident to be mistaken by anyone, particularly when it is recollected that the court of St Petersburg in its proposals for the formation of a league against this country expressed the wish that when such a confederacy should have been formed the peremptory demands to be made to His Majesty by the power concerned should pass through the channel of the court of Berlin. And that although the existence and nature of these proposals have now for some months been matter of notoriety in all the courts of Europe, no communication respecting them has ever been made to your Lordship by the Prussian government.
It is therefore the king's pleasure that your Lordship should seek an opportunity of referring in your conversations with Count Haugwitz, to this intimation and that you should distinctly apprize him that however desirous His Majesty always is to render the fullest justice to the friendly and pacific intentions of the court of Berlin, yet that the season for amicable negotiation on that subject with Russia is past; that the second embargo now laid in the Russian ports on British vessels is a proof of hostile designs, or rather an act of open hostility which places the two countries in a state of actual war, and which therefore the king is confident the King of Prussia can neither have been a party to, nor can approve; that in such a state of things there can be no community of interest or situation in this respect between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, who professes to wish to cultivate in his intercourse with this court not only the relations of peace but those of friendship and confidence; that so long as this embargo subsists no such intervention as the King of Prussia has offered could be likely to produce any other effect than that of implicating in a difference of so serious a nature, a power the common friend and ally of both parties.

With respect to the attempt itself of renewing the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, your Lordship cannot hold a language more consonant to His Majesty's views and intentions than that which you have already made use of to Count Haugwitz. The rights of this country are grounded on such principles of justice and reason as cannot be shaken. The maintenance of those rights is necessary to our existence as a naval power, and any endeavour to enforce by arms a contrary system, may be productive unquestionably of some temporary embarrassment to this kingdom but must totally annihilate the foreign commerce, and consequently the domestic industry of all those countries who shall engage in such a confederacy.

This is the language which your Lordship is on all occasions to hold openly and without reserve. Nothing is more important than to convince the cabinet of Berlin that the object of such a confederacy will not be attained by a struggle, in which, Great Britain contending for her existence will exert her utmost efforts, and the effects of which both its continuance, and still more in its success, if that were to be looked to as a probable case, must be in the highest degree injurious to all the interests of Prussia.

The claims of Great Britain never will be relinquished in her part till her naval power be annihilated, and consequently the same preponderance left to France by sea as she has been suffered to acquire by land. And when that shall happen it is not difficult to collect even from the transactions of the present war, what degree of advantage or security neutral nations will have acquired for carrying on their commerce.
These discussions, however temperate and even amicable the tone may be which in compliance with His Majesty's intentions your Lordship will adopt, must in all probability place the two courts towards each other in a situation very little favourable to such a negotiation as that which Count Haugwitz has proposed to your Lordship to conduct, for re-establishing a concert with the court of Vienna. Nor is His Majesty's government by any means inclined to engage under the present circumstances in a plan of so extensive, and in many respects questionable a nature as that which the Duke of Brunswick appears to have conceived.

In so singular a situation as that in which the feeble and irresolute councils of the continental powers have plunged all Europe it is impossible to say what line it may ultimately be necessary to adopt for re-establishing that security which is now shaken to its foundations. But much remains to be done before the way can be prepared for such a system as the Duke of Brunswick has recommended, if indeed the whole proposal be not thrown out for the purpose rather of laying the ground work of some other plan, that with a view to the actual adoption of this.

It would be useless to waste your Lordship's time in dwelling on many of the obvious objections to such a plan. But it is particularly necessary to consider the great impracticability of obtaining the acquiescence either of Russia or of France in it, except at the price of such concessions to be extorted from this country as the king is by no means disposed to yield, even as the ground of arrangements much more satisfactory to him. And even in addition to this, supposing the measure in itself unobjectionable, and easy of execution, it is not difficult to perceive how much danger might in many cases result from it to the interests of this country.

If such a system were already agreed on between Austria and Prussia, and the king's acquiescence were then asked in measures which under such circumstances it might be difficult for him to prevent, otherwise than by allying himself with Russia or France, it might then become a question what line of conduct it might be fit for His Majesty to pursue. But he sees no motive of sufficient force to induce him to make himself an active instrument in the first formation of such a system.

It was necessary that I should enter fully into this explanation in writing to your Lordship on the subject. But it is by no means intended that you should be equally explicit with the Prussian government, which has in the present moment less than ever, any claim to confidential communications as to the views and intentions of His Majesty's government.

Your Lordship will therefore confine yourself to general assurances of the king's desire of seeing a better understanding established between the courts of Vienna and Berlin.
for the purpose of confining France within such limits as the safety of Europe requires, and to professions of the king's readiness to make himself the channel of communicating to Austria any proposals tending to this object.

These assurances and offers may be couched in such terms as by no means to give the impression of any hostile views on His Majesty's part towards the interests of Prussia. But so as to avoid making His Majesty a party in forwarding any such plan as has been proposed to your Lordship.

As connected with the subject of this dispatch I herewith inclose to your Lordship copies of a letter from Count Rostopchin to me together with the answer which I have by the king's commands returned to it.

His Majesty in directing these papers to be transmitted to your Lordship desires that, in case the Russian minister at Berlin should seek any further communication with you on the subject to which they relate, your Lordship should conform your language to the sentiments contained in my answer.

no. 50
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 6 December 1800

My Lord,

In consequence of a conversation I have had this morning with Count Haugwitz, I think I may with confidence assure your Lordship, that no treaty has yet been concluded between the Baltic powers, for establishing the security of neutral commerce, and that the matter remains open to discussion. As far as I may be allowed to conjecture, it is probable the discussion will be much protracted, nor do I believe any of the powers likely to enter into it will suffer themselves to be carried so far by the necessity they feel to yield in some degree to the impetuous violence of the Emperor of Russia, as to draw upon themselves the resentment of Great Britain. Count Haugwitz declared he believed none of the powers had meditated upon this subject any propositions, which could give the smallest alarm to His Majesty's government. I took occasion upon this to recapitulate the principle points of maritime law, which are most important to Great Britain, and to state His Majesty's firm determination to maintain the essential rights of his crown, and the danger to which the northern maritime powers must expose themselves, by renewing the unjust attempts of the year 1780. And from the manner in which this was received, and the observations I have daily occasion to make, I think it most probable that the plan will be so modified as to become insignificant, if it should not be totally abandoned. I cannot persuade myself that
the part which will be hereafter taken by Prussia at least in this business, will be such as to occasion any interruption of friendship with His Majesty. I do not find that there is any positive information of the King of Sweden’s having begun his journey for Petersburg. The Swedish minister had received no advice of it this morning, whether it will take place at all.

Count Haugwitz has not furnished me yet with full and precise information concerning the limits of the Prussian claim of jurisdiction in the river Ems, but he has told me what seems to comprehend all that is most essential for your Lordship’s purpose. It extends beyond the line of demarcation traced after the Treaty of Basle, which was fixed in the middle of the river. The farther claim of Prussia is grounded upon an ancient imperial grant to the counts of Ost Friese, but it does not cover the whole of the river. The rights of the Dutch to the navigation of the Delfzylt is admitted, and their jurisdiction according to Count Haugwitz extends a stone’s throw from the shore. I have taken steps to be informed how far the pretensions of Prussia were acknowledged by the ancient government of Holland.

No accounts of the motives of the Austrian army had been received by this government of a later date than the 25th on which day Count Görtz wrote word from Ratisbon, that the corps under General Klenau had crossed the Danube, moving towards Inglostadt, and the main army was advancing rapidly with an intention as it was supposed to bring on a general action.

no number
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 9 December 1800
Separate

My Lord,
[cipher]

In my separate dispatch of the 17th I stated to your Lordship the payments made to Monsieur Palue to the 10th September.

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160 Görtz, Johann Eustach, Baron, Prussian diplomat, minister plenipotentiary at Rastadt from December 1797 to April 1799, when he was replaced by Jacobi-Kloest.

161 Ratisbon is a town in Bavaria about 100 kilometres from Munich.

162 Klenau, Johann Count von (1758-1819), Austrian general who defeated MacDonald at San Giovani.
The allowance for the succeeding month to October 10th has been remitted by means of my bill on your Lordship dated 8th November. I have since caused him to receive a further payment to November 10th and accordingly this day I had the honour to draw on your Lordship for the sum of one hundred pounds sterling, eighteen shillings and sixpence for which I will transmit to your Lordship the usual receipt by the first opportunity.

no. 51
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 9 December 1800

My Lord,
[cipher]

According to the best judgement I am able to form no convention has yet been concluded at St Petersburg between the powers of the Baltic for the protection of their commerce to which Prussia has actually acceded, and I should hope that the whole is as yet only in discussion and consequently, that if any treaty should be concluded it may yet be such as may not affect the essential rights of Great Britain. Your Lordship must be sensible, it is not very easy, circumstanced as I am at present, to obtain precise and complete information, but I hope there is good ground to think, that the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm are not inclined to act in a manner hostile to His Majesty, and that Prussia will endeavour to prevent any hasty and intemperate resolution. His Majesty's justice and moderation are too conspicuous to leave a doubt, that if the most perfect harmony and good understanding between those three courts should not be preserved it will be their own fault. His Majesty's determination to maintain his rights can be as little doubted, and will probably be respected, by every power which professes to assert its own.
[end of cipher]

The name of the new Danish minster announced to this court is Baudissin.¹⁶³

Couriers have certainly been passing between Petersburg and Paris. The specific object of negotiation is not known here but it is carried on between special agents, and I have reason to believe that M. de Krüdener is not engaged in it.

¹⁶³ Baudissin, Karl Ludwig Count (1756-1814), Danish diplomat. He was sent to Berlin (to replace Rosenkrantz) where he presented his credentials on 28 March 1800 until his recall in 1808. He later became Governor of Copenhagen.
I am informed that M. d'Aranjo has been refused a passport to go to Paris.

no. 19
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 9 December 1800

My Lord,

I have again to bring under your Lordship's notice the subject of the right of jurisdiction over the river Ems and adjacent Waddens, on which I had the honour to communicate to you the king's commands in my dispatches nos. 15 and 17. As immediately concerned with this subject, I herewith inclose to your Lordship copies of two representations made to me from the Prussian minister here relative to the detention of six Prussian vessels by His Majesty's sloop Inspector, together with the correspondence that has taken place in consequence of those representations, and the report of the King's Advocate General, upon the circumstances resulting from these captures.

This report contains a very able and candid statement of the matter in discussion, and it is His Majesty's pleasure that the principles therein laid down should be the guide of your Lordship's language in your communication with the Prussian government upon the subject of their claimed right of territorial jurisdiction over the river Ems and neighbouring Waddens.

no. 20
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 9 December 1800

Most secret

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatches from no. 42 to 48 inclusive were received yesterday and this morning.

The king is pleased entirely to approve of the general tenor of the language which you have held on the subject of the projected neutral league, and of the hostile designs of Russia against Great Britain.

I now dispatch this messenger for the purpose of informing your Lordship that intelligence, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted, has been received by His Majesty's government by which it appears that the court of Stockholm early in the last month sent
full powers to its minister at Petersburg to conclude a convention for the purpose of re-establishing the principles of maritime law established in 1780, and that the Swedish government entertained the expectation that the ministers of Prussia and Denmark would at the same period receive similar authority from their respective courts.

The period of the occupation of Cuxhaven coincides so perfectly with the date assigned by this intelligence for the signature of this convention that it is impossible not to believe the two circumstances to be connected with each other. And on the whole the fact as above stated appears to be entitled to the fullest credit.

It is very important that your Lordship should lose no time in taking the most effectual steps to ascertain its truth. And for this purpose His Majesty is pleased to direct that you should ask a conference with Count Haugwitz and that you should speak to him in the most open and unreserved manner on the whole of this subject, and on all the circumstances connected with it.

You will without specifying the particular intelligence above stated, apprize that minister that concurrent informations received from all quarters have left in His Majesty's mind not the smallest doubt that a measure of this nature has actually been in negotiation among the other northern powers and has been proposed by them to Prussia. You will state that His Majesty, both from the nature of the connection subsisting between the two courts, and also from the repeated and positive assurances of friendship which your Lordship has received from the Prussian minister, had every reason to expect that he should have received from the court of Berlin the first notice of a circumstance so important to His Majesty's dignity and to the essential rights and interests of his dominions as the formation of a confederacy which has for its object to overthrow the maritime power of Great Britain, and to place Europe as much in the dependance of France by sea, as it is now by land. You will urge in addition to this all the topic which you have stated on former occasions as to the danger and impolicy of involving the north of Europe in a fresh contest under circumstances such as the present when the French government is pursuing without even the affectation of concealment, all its former projects for the aggrandizement of the French dominions at the expense of every other state in Europe. You will remark particularly on the kindness of those powers who risk their own immediate and certain ruin by provoking such a contest, in which their colonies and commerce must be the first sacrifice. And you will observe how little Prussia has to gain from the success of such a league, how much the prosperity of her dominions will be affected by the struggle and sacrifices which this country is resolved to make and how fatal to the navigation and commerce of the north any events unfavorable to the naval power of Great Britain must unavoidably prove.
You will observe the circumstances which accompanied the occupation of Cuxhaven are independently of all other information of a nature to excite in His Majesty's mind the greatest jealousy of a design on the part of Prussia to ally itself with his enemies in this contest.

There was not the smallest ground for the demand made by Prussia at Hamburg - a demand which the king might equally have justified in making there, or at Copenhagen as often as any British prize has been carried into those ports. But the magistrates having by the purchase of the ship from the English Prize Master and by its restitution to the Prussian Master removed even that pretext the occupation of Cuxhaven can now be considered in no other light than as a measure directed against Great Britain should she persevere in her invariable determination to assert her just rights in opposition to the confederacy forming against her.

You will therefore apprise the Prussian minister in temperate and friendly, but in explicit language that the king can no longer continue in this state of uncertainty with respect to some of the dearest interests of the empire. Much less can he remain indifferent while those powers on whose friendship he thought he had every reason to count are assuming a menacing position against him and adopting measures of hardly disguised hostility. You will therefore state that you are expressly instructed to ask distinctly whether Prussia has by any declaration or treaty made itself party to such a confederation as is openly spoken of in every part of Europe, or whether it is His Prussian Majesty's intention to maintain the former good understanding and friendship with His Majesty on the grounds on which they before subsisted.

In the course of this conversation you will declare in His Majesty's name without the least reserve that the king is resolved to maintain at all hazards the rights of this country, and the system of the maritime tribunals of Europe, previous to the year 1780. You will state that His Majesty does not dissemble from himself that the effects of such a confederacy as is supposed to be formed in the north of Europe, may be productive of temporary embarrassment to his dominions. But that the difficulties attending such a state of things will be at least reciprocal, that it can no more be indifferent to the northern powers than to this country that the communications and commerce of the northern seas should inexperience a total interruption.

That England submitting for a time to those difficulties will do so for the sake of an object in which all her interests, and even her existence is involved while the other powers will expose themselves to a situation at least equally embarrassing and will extend over every part of Europe the calamities of war for the sake of an advantage to all of them trifling and inadequate but to Prussia in particular of so little value as hardly to be
perceived in the balance. The question of convoy which has been made the immediate pretext of this confederacy being wholly indifferent to a power which has not one ship of war belonging to her, and the fraudulent commerce being carried on by neutral ships being a source indeed of some profit to individuals but an object of no national importance whatever to the Prussian dominions. Your Lordship will have the goodness to lose no time in apprizing me of the answer returned to the demand which you are now instructed to make and you will use your utmost endeavours to obtain a precise and distinct an explanation as the subject evidently requires.

no. 52
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 13 December 1800

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that in answer to a communication I had made to M. Drusina at Königsberg of the note of the 23rd November, which I transmitted to your Lordship from this government on the subject of corn, I have just received a letter informing me that the merchants at Königsberg are much satisfied, the occasion of their representation being thereby removed.

no. 53
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 14 December 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

Reports have been communicated to me received by the Austrian chargé d'affaires from Vienna, that a Treaty of Armed Neutrality has been actually signed at Petersburg, and that Monsieur Fursmann, secretary to the Danish mission there, who is daily expected at Berlin, is the bearer of it. I have been prevented by illness from leaving the house for several days past, but if the general opinion is well founded, that the King of

164 The Second Armed Neutrality was signed on 16 December between Russia, Denmark and Sweden. The Prussian envoy was not present during that session.
165 Fursmann, Lieutenant-Colonel Johan Theophilus, Danish diplomat, legation secretary and chargé d'affaires in Petersburg from July 1799 to June 1800.
Sweden's journey has for its object to ascertain what assistance, particularly in money, he can depend upon receiving from the emperor in case Sweden should engage in the league. It is not probable that it is yet concluded. The Danish chargé d'affaires professes to be convinced that it is not, and his opinion that new discussions will arise upon it, and it is certain, that not he only, but the Swedish minister also, betray the greatest alarm at the violent conduct of the emperor, and his apparent hostility towards England.

[end of cipher]

The two last mails are not arrived from England, and I have no letters from your Lordship of a later date than the 25th of last month. I anxiously expect your opinion and farther instructions, upon all that has been reported from here.

As it seems certain that the French have crossed the Inn, and as they appear to have received several checks, both on their right and left, and there is no rumour of their having obtained any new advantage, I flatter myself that the check received by the Archduke John, on the third, may have been already repaired.\footnote{John Baptiste Joseph Fabian Sebastian, Archduke (1782-1859). The son of the Grand Duke of Tuscany (who later became Emperor Leopold II), he commanded an army in Bavaria at the age of 18 and was defeated at Hohenlinden on 3 December 1800. Carysfort's optimism was unfounded. After the battle of Hohenlinden the French continued to advance up the Danube valley through Salzburg and Linz to Steyr.}

It is not without great concern that I announce to your Lordship that the Emperor of Russia has removed Count Panin from the post of Vice Chancellor.\footnote{Panin was dismissed from the post of vice-chancellor on 27 November 1800, ostensibly as a consequence of his opposition to the Tsar's embargo on British shipping. He was replaced by Count Fëdor Vasilievich Rostopchin. Two days after his dismissal he wrote to Krüdener (Alexander G. Brückner, or Brikner), \textit{Materialy dlia zhizneopisaniia grafa Nikity Petrovicha Panina}, 1770-1837, 7 vols., (St. Peterburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, 1888-1892), vol. V, 625-626, 29 November 1800) explaining that it was a dispatch from Lusi which decided his fate. The dispatch contains the following remark: 'Autant que je puis juger des apparences, le comte de Panin n'est pas peu affecté des ordres de l'embargo en général et de ce qui est arrivé au ... [sic], puisqu'à peine il a voulu s'entretienir sur cet objet.'} He retires with the rank of senator, and M. de Kolychev, lately ambassador at Vienna, is appointed to succeed him ad interim. The Chevalier de Balbi,\footnote{Chevalier de Balbi, Sardinian diplomat, was envoy at St Petersburg until he was ordered to leave the town within two hours by Paul.} the Sardinian minister at Petersburg, has also received the emperor's orders to leave the capital, at a very few hours notice, and the Empire in as many days.
The removal of Count Panin must have been known at Dresden, even sooner than here, but I thought it right not to delay still another post, the communication of a piece of intelligence, which in the present state of affairs seems to be of no small importance.

Though the ignorance in which the continent remains as to the manner in which the embargo, and the violent measures committed with it, have been received in England, is sufficiently accounted for by the non-arrival of the mails, it seems to buoy up with false hopes the enemies of Great Britain. A few days, I trust, will bring new proofs of the temper and moderation of His Majesty's government, and at the same time such evidence of his firm determination, as will dissipate entirely the vain expectations which have been formed by the partisans of armed neutrality.

no. 54
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 16 December 1800

My Lord,

Private letters of good authority from Petersburg speak of the apprehensions entertained in that capital, lest England should suspend the payment of the bills of exchange remaining due, as was done by authority of parliament when Holland was occupied by the French. Such a measure would be most severely felt, and to a very great extent, and would give us a pledge of infinitely greater value than the British property which has been seized and detained in Russia under the embargo. It does not however appear as if it was expected this consideration would weigh to any good purpose upon the emperor's mind. The entrance of a British fleet into the Baltic is thought probable, and the execution it might do is dreaded but it is supposed that the emperor relies upon his being able by threats or persuasion, to induce Denmark to refuse the passage of the Sound. Denmark must however reflect that if she should incur His Majesty's resentment the British fleet would be in the Baltic many weeks before that of Russia can leave its harbours. The whole of the emperor's conduct gives proof of his hostile disposition previous to the surrender of Malta, and the opinion gains ground that secret negotiations have been on foot with France with which the Russian minister here has not been made acquainted.

I am told on all sides that the emperor's conduct towards His Majesty is strongly condemned. The public would probably hold a different language in that respect, if there was reason to think Great Britain meant to dissemble for the present the injury she has received. I must observe, that notwithstanding information received from Vienna or
elsewhere in regard to the Treaty of Armed Neutrality, I remain persuaded that it is still in discussion, and presuming that a means of retreat will be left those powers, who may have hastily entered into the plan, it is not probable that any one of them desires, or will venture to risk a rupture with Great Britain. And the violent measures of the emperor may be reasonably expected to occasion its being modified, or even its being totally abandoned.

A vigorous assertion of His Majesty's dignity on the present occasion may have a still more extensive effect, and counteract the impulse, which may be given by the terror inspired from other quarters.

As the accounts from the empire make it evident, not only that the loss of the French has been very considerable, but that they have not advanced, and the Austrians occupy a very strong position, I flatter myself we may hear speedily good news from that quarter.

The Austrian consul has been deprived of his functions at Petersburg, though it does not appear he has been ordered to leave that place.169

no. 21
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 16 December 1800
Most secret

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatches to no. 50 inclusive have been received and laid before the king.

Having already conveyed to your Lordship His Majesty's instructions respecting the insinuations made by the Duke of Brunswick through General Stamford, I have only to apprise your Lordship in the present instance that the recent occurrences are considered by His Majesty as affording additional reasons in favour of the determination already communicated to your Lordship to which you are therefore steadily to adhere.

With respect to the projected confederacy of the northern powers I have no further instructions to transmit to your Lordship in addition to those which you have already received. The king has seen with very great satisfaction the judicious line which your Lordship has adopted on the subject before you could have received those instructions, but which is completely agreeable to them and I have only to desire you to persevere in the same line as being but calculated in His Majesty's opinion to prevent the matter from

169 The Austrian chargé d'affaires at Petersburg, Klüpfel, was ordered to retire.
proceeding to those extremities which are however unavoidable in the project of re-establishing by an armed confederacy the principles first put forward in the year 1780, be persisted in.

The outrage committed by the Emperor of Russia renders all explanation on this subject with the court of Petersburg in the present moment impracticable His Majesty being determined to adhere to the line adopted in the answer to Count Rostopchin's letter and to decline all discussion of any other subject till the embargo be taken off and some satisfaction offered for the indignities to which His Majesty's subjects have been exposed. But the king has judged it proper in the present state of affairs to make to the two courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm a categorical demand for a full explanation of any engagements or negotiations into which they may have entered with any other powers respecting the rights of Great Britain as a belligerent maritime state.

A note to this effect the copy of which I herewith inclose to your Lordship is by this night's mail sent to Mr. Drummond to be delivered by him to Count Bernstorff. And I have received the king's commands that in the first ministerial conference which Baron d'Ehrensward may desire, I should hold to him a similar language, giving him plainly to understand that until this point be satisfactorily explained no other subject of discussion will be entered into here.

In the conversation which passed between us when he delivered to me the copy of his credentials, I put to him several pointed questions on the subject to which I received evasive answers till at length on being further pressed he said that he believed the King of Sweden was at the moment in which he was speaking to me free from any such engagements, but he did not answer for what might hereafter happen. Such an assurance was as your Lordship will doubtless perceive, more calculated to increase than remove the suspicions entertained here on the subject.

I am inclined to believe that the knowledge of these several particulars may be made of use at Berlin in a manner advantageous to the king's service. But of that your Lordship will judge, and His Majesty is pleased to leave it entirely to your discretion whether to communicate them or not.

With respect to the jurisdiction of the Ems your Lordship will perceive from the papers which I have transmitted to you in a former dispatch that it will be necessary that His Majesty's government should be furnished by the Prussian government with a written statement as to the extent of those claims which Prussia makes, and as to the proofs of

170Drummond, William, British diplomat, chargé d'affaires to Copenhagen from September 1800 to March 1801.
there having been admitted by the Dutch government previous to the last revolution in Holland. When this is done His Majesty would propose that a distinct explanation should take place between the two governments on the subject either by the exchange of ministerial notes or by a convention, in the discussion of which also may be included the claim which His Majesty still purposes [sic] to make for the evacuation of Cuxhaven.

no. 22  
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 19 December 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatch no. 51 and separate of the 9th instant have been received and laid before the king.

His Majesty is pleased to direct your Lordship to express to the Prussian government his satisfaction at the answer you have received from M. d'Alvensleben relative to the application made in the king's name in favour of those merchants in the Prussian ports in the Baltic who had purchased large quantities of corn for the supply of the English market, under the faith of the permission granted by the Prussian government, and previous to the promulgation of the edict imposing a heavy duty on the exportation of all kinds of grain.

The case of those merchants was one of such peculiar hardship, that His Majesty could not doubt that he should find for them in the justice and good faith of the Prussian government that redress which it is the object of the note from Monsieur d'Alvensleben of the 25th of November to communicate to your Lordship, and which the king considers perfectly satisfactory.

no. 55  
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 20 December 1800

My Lord,

I have already frequently pressed Count Haugwitz to furnish me with precise information, as to the extent of Prussian claims of jurisdiction, in the Ems, and the nature of the titles upon which it is founded. I have now again desired to see him with a view, not only of bringing him to a point upon this subject, but of renewing those assurances, which cannot be too often or too strongly repeated, of His Majesty's determination to
maintain the integrity of the maritime code, so essential to the honour, and security of his dominions. His Excellency went yesterday to Potsdam, before my letter was delivered to him, and I have not yet received his answer. When I saw him last, his conversation was expressive of the continued friendly dispositions of this court to His Majesty, and I find that the language he holds to others perfectly corresponds with what he has said to me.

It is now certainly known that the Archduke Charles has taken the command of the army. As no accounts have been received of any further actions, conjectures will naturally be formed that a new armistice has taken place, but I have not heard any authority for such an opinion.

no. 56
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 23 December 1800

My Lord,

I have not as yet been able to obtain such information as can be of use to your Lordship of the claims of the ancient Republic of the United Provinces as to the navigation of the river Ems. Count Haugwitz admits that some litigation has occasionally taken place, but he says the right of Prussia has in every instance been finally acknowledged. He displayed a map before me, on which was traced a line running along the middle of the western Ems, and upon objecting to this that it was an arbitrary demarcation in consequence of an agreement with France to which His Majesty was not a party, he repeated that the limits of the Prussian jurisdiction, founded upon an ancient imperial grant to the counts of Ost Frise, reached within a stone's throw of the Dutch coast, and consequently comprehended the whole of the navigation, and therefore no exception could be taken to a line drawn within their acknowledged territory. That if any particular unforeseen inconvenience resulted from that line when it was distinctly stated, it was possible to take some new arrangements more consistent with the interests of all parties.

Though I have not yet been able to obtain any authentic documents from Holland upon this subject, all the Dutch seem to admit that Prussia has always exercised a more extensive jurisdiction in the Ems, than is consistent with the ordinary rule, where the two banks of a river have not the same proprietor.

By a letter I have just received from Danzig, I learn that the master of some English ships who had stopped in that port upon hearing of the embargo, and who had written from them to their employers at Petersburg, had received for answer that they had done right in staying at Danzig, the emperor having appropriated to himself all the British
vessels in his ports, and marched the crews still farther into the country. If this is true, it
doctrine of sending a fleet into the Baltic as soon as possible, not only as
the emperor's hostility is more evident, but as it is expedient to counteract the means with
which the possession of so many transports obtained by this act of violence has furnished
him to influence the conduct of Sweden and Denmark.

Though the hostile conduct of the Emperor of Russia has placed the two countries
in a state of actual war, and therefore, as far as respects that sovereign, less consequence
 attaches to what I have now to say, I think it necessary to mention that I learn from
Count Haugwitz that memorial delivered to the neutral ministers at the court of Petersburg
during the suspense of our affair with Denmark, has been considered by that court itself as
withdrawn, and inapplicable, from the time the Convention of Copenhagen was known,
and that the subsequent communications of the court of Petersburg with this cabinet
concerning the possibility of obtaining farther security for the neutral commerce, had
always distinctly expressed the favourable disposition of the emperor towards Great
Britain as his friend, and ally. This communication is important as it explains the reason at
the same time that it ascertains the fact, of that memorial not having received any specific
answer from hence, and prevents the impression which might result from a suspicion that
the court had maintained an unfriendly silence, and reserve upon that point.

Though the fortuitous coincidence as to time of several circumstances joined to the
avowed and intimate connection between the courts of Berlin and St Petersburg, might
have led even the ministers of the former at foreign courts, to have conjectured a concert
upon certain points which did not in reality exist, I think myself authorized to assure your
Lordship that, in regard to the occupation of Cuxhaven in particular, no such concert did
take place, and that the King of Prussia is desirous not only upon that occasion, but upon
every other, that the neutrality of the north of Germany of which he is the head, and which
he is pledged to support, should be considered as wholly distinct, and separate, from any
consideration of a league for protection of neutral commerce, which may have been in
contemplation among the maritime powers.

With regard to the embargo, and the violent measures connected with it which have
taken place in Russia, it is perhaps superfluous for me to assure your Lordship that His
Prussian Majesty, has seen them with surprise, and concern, and his sentiments upon this
occasion are such as your Lordship inferred from his personal character, as well as the
relations of peace, and amity in which he is happily engaged with His Majesty.

With respect to the renewal of the armed maritime league of 1789, I must repeat
my opinion that nothing has yet been determined on that object. It is certainly true that the
reports, and opinions disseminated by the enemies of Great Britain, and even the ideas
occasionally opened in conversation by those who I do not include in that description, are of a nature even more inadmissible than what was avowed in 1780. But there is a wide difference between such vague discourses, and the deliberate intention, and concert, of states.

The nature and extent of the forces and preparation of Great Britain can be no secret, nor can a doubt be entertained of the certainly ruinous consequences of hostilities with her, to the external commerce of the nations who might engage in such designs. Nor can the dignified moderation, which has been manifested on so many occasions by His Majesty's government, be considered otherwise than as a pledge of the firmness and energy with which His Majesty will defend those rights which are essential to the security as well as greatness of his kingdom, and which even a very slight observer must soon convince himself Great Britain cannot relinquish but with her existence. But I place a stronger reliance upon the upright principles, and friendly disposition of His Prussian Majesty, nor can I persuade myself that the courts of Sweden and Denmark harbour intentions hostile to Great Britain.

Independent of the community of interests in many respects between His Majesty, and those powers, and the general disposition to continue on friendly terms with us, for which I give them credit, they must be too enlightened, and too wise to suffer the sense of a present and partial inconvenience, to prevail against those universal, and most important principles which give to all nations alike both by land, and sea, the same right of war, a right which as it is the only sanction on earth of the law of nations, is the only ground of their security and independence.

P.S. This dispatch from the words through the hostile conduct of the Emperor of Russia to the end, has been communicated to Count Haugwitz with a request that he would make any alterations he might think requisite in what is reported of his conversation, and the sentiments of the Prussian court, I have since received the answer of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.

Copy of the letter from Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 23 December 1800

J'ai lu avec beaucoup d'intérêt Milord, l'esquisse de la dépêche que vous proposez d'adresser à votre cour par la poste d'aujourd'hui, et je ne saurais assez vous exprimer combien j'applaudis à la franchise avec laquelle vous voulez bien en user à mon égard. Elle est sans doute l'effet de votre zèle pour le maintien de l'heureuse harmonie qui
subsiste entre nos deux cours. Mais je la considère en même temps comme une preuve précieuse de la confiance que vous m'accordez, et je dois vous exprimer sous l'un et l'autre de ces rapports toute ma sensibilité.

Quant au contenu de la pièce même vous avez établi Milord, avec autant de précision que de justesse la différence qui subsiste entre les deux parties qui en forment la substance. L'une regarde le compte que vous rendez du dernier entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous, et l'autre contient des observations qui vous appartiennent. En convenant de la précision parfaite du premier, vous vous attendez sans doute, que je m'abstienne de tout jugement à l'égard de l'autre partie, et il ne me reste, par conséquent que de vous prier de recevoir les assurances renouvelées de ma haute considération.

no. 23
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 23 December 1800

My Lord,

In consequence of the hostile conduct of the Emperor of Russia towards such of His Majesty's subjects who compose the crews of the British shipping now forcibly detained in the ports of Russia, the king's servants have judged it expedient to appoint a commissary to reside in that country on His Majesty's part for the purpose of affording whatever assistance and relief those persons may stand in need of, till His Majesty's just demands for their release shall be complied with.

To carry this measure into effect, I have by the king's commands written the inclosed letter to Monsieur de Rostopchin, which your Lordship is directed to seal up and then deliver to Monsieur de Krüdener to be forwarded by him to St Peters burg.

It is sent to your Lordship under flying seal for your own private information only, and not in the view of your making any use of it at the court where you reside.

Separate and Secret

My Lord,

Being of opinion that the intelligence obtained through M. de la Palace is no longer of that moment to justify the expense incurred by it, I think it right to desire your Lordship to discontinue the allowance made to that gentleman after the payment of the money which will become due to him on the 10th of February next. And your Lordship will in
consequence have the goodness to notify this determination without loss of time to M. de la Palace.

no. 57
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 24 December 1800

My Lord,

[cipher]

In addition to the circumstances already known to your Lordship which make it highly probable that a negotiation has for some time been secretly carrying on between the court of Petersburg and the French consul, it deserves attention that all accounts agree, that the Russian army upon the frontiers of Galicia receive great reinforcements, and is in a state to take the field - yet France has not manifested the smallest anxiety as to its possible destination. The situation in which it is placed is equally favourable for operations against Austria and Turkey, and for supporting the Russian establishments on the Black Sea, as it is distant but a few days march from the Dniester and the Bug, the empire may nevertheless be vulnerable at the mouths of these rivers, and in the Crimea, by a power having the command of the sea, and an important diversion, at least, might be made by the bare appearance of a British squadron.

I drew up the latter part of my dispatch no. 66 in the form in which your Lordship sees it, and left a copy with Count Haugwitz, - not only in order to obtain from that minister a more explicit and solemn disavowal of any concert with Russia on the subject of Cuxhaven, and an express disavowal of the embargo, but with the hope of bringing more fully and distinctly under the notice of the King of Prussia himself, the subject of the Armed Neutrality, and in this view I trust your Lordship will think that the warning is given in terms sufficiently strong, and such as cannot be easily mistaken, and in general I may venture to assure your Lordship, that as strong an impression as you could wish of His Majesty's firm determination on this subject, has been received here both by the cabinet and the Public.

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171 The Dniester is a Russian river that flows from the Carpathian mountains through Moldavia into the Black Sea. The Bug, also known as the Zapadny Bug or Western Bug River is a tributary of the Vistula rising in western Ukraine.
no. 58
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 27 December 1800

My Lord,

The assurances contained in your Lordship's dispatches, of the 9th and 16th instant, that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of my humble endeavours in his service have filled me with the most lively gratitude, and the satisfaction of finding that my conduct in the present important crisis has been agreeable to His Majesty is increased by the hopes I still entertain that this court will still preserve the relations of peace, and amity towards His Majesty. As far as general assurances of His Prussian Majesty's disapprobation of the conduct of Russia, and a disavowal of all concert with the court of St Petersburg as to the occupation of Cuxhaven, and of all connection of that measure with the scheme of the renewal of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, your Lordship is already in possession of what must, as to those points, be in a great degree satisfactory. I yesterday had an audience with Count Haugwitz, and opened to him the questions I was directed to ask, respecting the engagements and the intentions of Prussia, concerning specifically the confederation against the maritime rights of Great Britain, which is supposed to have been in negotiation in the north. I signified at the same time, in His Majesty's name, His Majesty's firm determination to maintain those rights at all hazards. I trust all this has been done in the manner most respectful and friendly to His Prussian Majesty, and that such distinctions have been marked between the case of Prussia, and that of other powers as were best calculated to induce His Prussian Majesty to pursue all the measures most likely to preserve the whole of the north of Europe from being involved in the calamities of war. The Prussian government must be sensible, that situated as His Majesty is with respect to Russia, the explanations demanded here are become necessary, but Count Haugwitz would naturally decline giving a precise answer till he had taken the commands of the king his master. It is incumbent however upon me to assure your Lordship, that the language of that minister both before and after the communication I made was perfectly conciliatory, and such as to give reason to expect that the answer to be given, will be analogous and agreeable to those professions of friendship, which have so often been made from this court to His Majesty, and which have been so fully and uniformly returned. I should certainly give as the result of my conversations with Count Haugwitz, that Prussia has not as yet entered into any engagements inconsistent with perfect friendship towards His Majesty. I have more doubt as to the situation of other powers, though I am fully persuaded that they are sincerely desirous of not being
implicated in those hostilities against England into which Russia has been precipitated by the violence of the emperor. I have begged of Count Haugwitz to delay as little as possible the answer I have requested, and have no reason to doubt but that I shall be enabled to transmit it to your Lordship in a very short time.

Louis Bonaparte is said to be now on his return, not having proceeded further than Danzig. I cannot affirm that he has endeavoured in vain to obtain permission to present himself to the Emperor of Russia, but such is the opinion entertained by many.

Indistinct reports have been circulated here of some actions fought it is said on the Prussian territory, between the corps of Klenau and Augereau, to the advantage of the former, but the retreat of the Archduke to the Ems, will have probably prevented there being of any important consequence. It is further said that the citadel of Würtzburg is on the point of capitulating.

no. 59
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 30 December 1800

My Lord,

Your Lordship will readily believe that I am mortified at not being able yet to communicate to you any specific reply to the questions I have been directed to put to the Prussian minister. I saw him on Sunday, \(^{172}\) and learned with great concern that he had not yet laid the subject before the king but on the contrary, desired previously to speak again with me. That no time might be lost, I wrote to him on Monday morning, \(^{173}\) to state the necessity of a speedy answer, but he has not yet fixed a time to see me.

The siege of the citadel of Würzburg\(^{174}\) by the French is raised, in consequence of the advantages obtained at Lauf by the Austrians under General Klenau, against the army of Augereau, an advantage which as it has prevented the enemy from penetrating into the upper Palatinate, and enabled the Archduke Charles to secure his communication with the regiments which have moved from Prague, as well as those from Vienna, will probably have an important effect in favour of the common cause. The Austrians have entered

\(^{172}\) 28 December.
\(^{173}\) 29 December.
\(^{174}\) Würzburg is a town in Bavaria.
Nurenberg, and Forchheim has surrendered to them. Augereau retreats along the Rednitz, and is vigorously pursued.

The court of Berlin has addressed to the court of Vienna a representation upon the violation of the Prussian territory, and has directed its agent in Franconia to declare to Augereau that it will consider him as responsible for what has happened. M. de Lucchesini has been also directed to make remonstrances in Paris.

I have been furnished with the following account of the state of negotiations between France and Petersburg. Some months ago, a letter was written by Talleyrand, and forwarded through the channel of this court to the Russian ministry, expressing in terms highly complimentary, the desire of the French government to be upon good terms with the emperor. To this communication a verbal answer was returned, of which M. de Lucchesini became the bearer. It expressed the emperor's inclination to meet for a general peace, in which the balance of Europe should be consulted, and in which he should expect effectual provision to be made for the restoration and security of the kings of Naples and Sardinia, and of the Duke of Württemberg, and also for the integrity of Bavaria. To this a verbal reply was given, stating some objections to the emperor's plan, which has produced another answer from Russia, expressive I am told, of the emperor's dissatisfaction, and it is added that the courier who brought it, and who passed this capital on the 12th instant, is charged with orders to General Sprengporten not to proceed to Paris upon any invitation. No part of this relation destroys the possibility, or even the probability of a secret negotiation having been on foot, the knowledge of which has been kept from this court, though it furnishes reason to think that it has not hitherto led to any better understanding between the two powers.

I have this morning received through Mr. Elliot, a private letter from Lord Elgin, dated the 23rd November from Constantinople, which only tells me that he has sent his dispatches open for my perusal. I mention this circumstance in order that if they contain anything which requires attention here, your Lordship may direct an extract to be sent to me. Lord Elgin probably thought his courier would necessarily pass through Berlin in his way to England.

175 Nurenberg and Forchheim are towns in Bavaria.
176 The Rednitz is a river in upper Franconia in Bavaria.
177 This is probably the letter in Alexandr S. Trachevskii (ed.), Diplomaticheskia snosheniia Rossi s Frantsiei v epokhu Napoleona I, 4 vols., (St Petersburg: Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschchestva, Stasiulevich, 1890-1893), vol. 70, 1-3, Talleyrand to Panin, 19 July 1800.
The apparent reluctance of Count Haugwitz to give me an answer to the questions which have been put to him can be attributed to only one of two reasons, either that the court of Berlin has already contracted engagements not consistent with the relations of amity with Great Britain, or that the king has not received a full and faithful account of what has been passing hitherto, and his ministers are embarrassed in what manner to make a report to him, which must lead to a full disclosure without being exposed to his resentment. I have strong reasons to believe, that this has been the case. I also know that the language of those who surround the king is to the following effect, that the wisdom of the king's determination to maintain a strictly and perfect neutrality is more than ever apparent. In short I am still inclined to believe, that Prussia is not engaged too far to retract, and avail herself of the opportunity which the precipitate conduct of Russia has afforded her, but I nevertheless am not without some apprehension, that the event may be different from what now appears to be most probable. The solicitude of the court of Copenhagen and the court of Stockholm, and even of the court of Berlin not to be thought parties to the violent measures of the emperor, but on the contrary to express their disapprobation of them, may be ascribed entirely to their sense of the expediency of postponing any open rupture with Great Britain till the season of the year will admit of their collecting the fleets of the three powers, before a British fleet can arrive in the Baltic to prevent their union.

no. 24
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 1 January 1801 (Jackson Papers 353, 43)

My Lord,

The king having in consequence of the union of the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland\(^{178}\) thought proper to make an alteration in the royal stile and titles, I have received the king's commands to inform you that the stile and title appertaining to the Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland will henceforward be expressed.

In the Latin language by the words, 'Georgius Tertius dei Gratia Britanniarum Rex, Fidei Defensor', etc, etc, etc. And in the English language by the words,

\(^{178}\)An Act of the Union was passed in 1801 by which the Irish Parliament was suppressed in return for which they received seats in the Houses of Commons and Lords.
George the Third, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith, etc.

It is His Majesty's pleasure that your Lordship should communicate this alteration to the minister of the court where you reside, in order that they may be apprised of the form in which all letters to His Majesty are hereafter to be adopted.
3. The following documents, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the Public Records Office, Foreign Office, Prussia 64, vol. 60, letters and papers from the Earl of Carysfort at Berlin to the Secretary of State with drafts to his Lordship, 1 January to 31 March 1801.

no. 1
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 1 January 1801

My Lord,

Mr. Fenning, an English merchant, who has had the good fortune to obtain a passport to leave Petersburg, having represented to me in the name of the factory there, that they conceive it to be of the utmost importance to their personal interest and safety, that the bills drawn in Russia and since accepted in London should not be paid, and that it is also most material in a political view as it would place in the hands of His Majesty's government a pledge of such value as to defeat entirely, or rather immediately turn against himself, the violent measures which have been adopted by the Emperor of Russia. I have thought it my duty to lose no time in transmitting this intelligence to your Lordship. Mr Fenning's account of the exertions making by the emperor for manning his fleet, and for the defence of the Livonian, Ingrian and Estonian coasts, makes it probable that there is a fixed intention of continuing the embargo with the utmost rigour, and consequently that there is no prospect of avoiding an open rupture. The vigour which animates the British councils, becoming more and more apparent, the opinion that the northern maritime league will not come to maturity begins to prevail, but I cannot help wishing that the differences subsisting with some of the powers, who were to have been parties in it, may not be entirely compromised till a British fleet appears commanding the Baltic. Some doubt will till then be entertained of the resolution of the British government, but the bare appearance of a fleet will
probably be sufficient to convince Sweden and Denmark, that it is not in the power of the court of Petersburg to protect them against the effects of His Majesty's displeasure.

With regard to the court of Berlin, I have not yet been able to obtain from Count Haugwitz an explicit answer. I continue to have every reason to believe, that whatever may have been the nature of the engagements contracted with the northern powers, Prussia is by no means disposed to have even the appearance of being upon bad terms with Great Britain. My conversation with Count Haugwitz yesterday leads me to believe that the difficulty he labours under at present is not so much that of giving an answer satisfactory to the king, as the mode of bringing the subject before His Prussian Majesty. Upon this point I have thought it most advisable to offer him every facility and have put into his hands confidentially, first, the substance of what I have to ask and represent in terms as strong and open as possible, and then, various ways of turning the matter in the form of verbal communications or official notes, which he may previously make his choice. By this means I trust, if I shall at length obtain an answer respecting the Armed Neutrality which His Majesty may accept as satisfactory, I shall have fulfilled his intentions in every respect. I cannot at the same time but admit that the delay interposed ought to create some doubts, notwithstanding the amicable professions which have hitherto been made, and as the progress of the French makes the situation of Prussia every day more precarious, the moment approaches which the system of this court has always been naturally tending to bring on, when they may be unable to resist the impulse of that power, especially if it should be seconded by Russia.

Of the probability of a connection of that government with France, I cannot further enable your Lordship to judge. An opinion prevails that the emperor has been displeased with the answer and the mode of it which has been made by the consul to some of the Russian communications, but I cannot state any solid grounds for that conjecture. One of the aide-de-camp of General Sprengporten is arrived as courier from Paris, and has proceeded for Petersburg this morning, and Mr. Fenning was informed at Danzig that after the departure of Louis Bonaparte, a messenger had arrived from the emperor to invite him into Russia.

The news from Austria has hitherto been of the most gloomy nature. I understand from M. de Saint-Marsan who arrived here yesterday upon a special

179 Antoine Asinari, Marquis of Saint-Marsan (1761-1828), Italian diplomat and statesman, the King of Sardinia's Minister of War in 1798. When Bonaparte invited a Sardinian diplomat to Paris to
mission from the King of Sardinia that M. de Cobenzl remains at Lunéville and that
hopes are still entertained at Vienna of a joint negotiation. To me I own that this
persuasion, and the continuance of an Austrian minister in France, is to be considered
as a principle source of the deplorable state of discouragement to which the Austrian
army is represented as being reduced, and the proclamation issued at Vienna on the
24th, and signed by Count Lehrbach, is calculated to extinguish totally instead of
exciting the spirit of the people. Lord Minto and M. Jackson inform me that the object
of M. de Saint-Marsan's mission has been fully opened to your Lordship. At the same
time he left Rome it was considered as certain that a general congress would take place,
and his instructions are framed only upon that supposition. He expresses to me his
determination not to proceed to Paris without fresh orders from his sovereign, and
indeed it appears that the events which have been playing since September have taken
away all the grounds on which his negotiation was to have proceeded. Lord Minto in
his letter to me, as well as M. de Saint-Marsan in conversation, seems to have expected
that I should have received some previous instructions from your Lordship upon the
object of his mission. And though I can easily conceive reasons which may have
induced your Lordship not to be desirous that I should either dissuade or encourage it,
I must own that his presence here makes me desirous of knowing something of the
sentiments of His Majesty's government upon the present situation and prospects of the
King of Sardinia. M. de Saint-Marsan informs me that the Emperor of Russia has
lately written to that prince. In this letter he speaks without disguise of his negotiations
with France, and declares his intentions of preserving the integrity of the King of
Sardinia's dominion in Piedmont, advising him to enter into negotiation with
France, and promising his support. M. de Saint-Marsan professes to build very little
upon this foundation, having too much reason to doubt the sincerity of the French, and
not seeing in what manner the emperor would be able to guaranty the execution of any
conditions they might profess to grant. He at the same time is apprehensive that the
separate peace of Austria which it seems likely will at this moment be dictated by
France, will have decided the fate of Piedmont before it is possible for him to open any
negotiation. He tells me that the French government and this court are informed that
his powers do not extend to the entering into any negotiation without the concurrence

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of His Majesty, as well as of the courts of Berlin and Petersburg, and that in waiting to
know the sense of the British government, as well as to receive fresh instructions from
his master, his object will be to learn if possible whether France is disposed to propose
any basis upon which she would consent to open a treaty for the restoration of
Piedmont.

The new proofs of the duplicity and perfidy of the French, who employed the
Prussian minister at Paris to notify to the King of Sardinia the intention of restoring
Piedmont in its integrity some days after they had guaranteed two of its most important
districts to the Cisalpine Republic, of which M. de Saint-Marsan is in possession,
ought to make a deep impression both here and at Petersburg, but it is in vain to expect
that these courts will learn wisdom before it is too late.

January 2. P.S. This dispatch having been delayed twelve hours, I am sorry
to have to add to it that an account has this evening been received by the Prussian
government from Vienna, that the departure of the imperial family from that capital has
been postponed, an armistice having been concluded in consequence of intelligence
received by Moreau of the signature of preliminaries of peace by Count Cobenzl and
the French ministers.

no. 2
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 4 January 1801

My Lord,

I received intimation this morning, that an account had been received last night
of the signature of the Convention of Armed Neutrality at Petersburg on behalf of
Russia, Sweden and Denmark, on the 16th instant, and that M. de Lusi had signified
the accession of Prussia on the 17th. I applied immediately by letter to Count

181 Cisalpine Republic (1797-1802), created by Bonaparte in June 1797 with its capital in Milan.
182 Lusi was not present during the signing of the Armed Neutrality on 16 December between the
Russian, Danish and Swedish representatives but was invited to pass by Rostopchin's residence that
same evening. The Chancellor wanted to inform him that the convention had been signed and
communicate to him the slight changes that had been convened upon (without his having been
previously consulted). Lusi did not dare take it upon himself to sign the convention right away and, as
such, Rostopchin proposed a conference for the next day in the presence of the Danish and Swedish
ambassadors. During the conference, Stedingk insisted that Lusi sign the treaty to get the thing over
Haugwitz to know the truth of the report, and was answered by an appointment to call upon him at eleven o'clock tomorrow. I shall of course reserve my remarks till I am able to report my conversation with him, but I thought it right not to lose a moment in giving your Lordship notice of this important event. The reasoning upon which these powers have proceeded to brave the resentment of Great Britain, I can upon good authority, state to have been of the following nature: Great Britain say they, in 1780, refused as she now does, to acknowledge the principle, and resented the step taken so strongly, that it is impossible to doubt but that it was the immediate and only real cause of the rupture with Holland. They then ask, what was the reason she selected for her attack that power which had the greatest maritime force, and which was also most disposed not only from old connection, but a common interest to continue in friendship with her? And that is their solution of the question. It was because the commerce of the Baltic is absolutely necessary to Great Britain. If the king's yards had sufficient supplies to last even two or three years, the merchants are not in the same case, and deprived of the usual supply from the Baltic and from Norway, the whole merchant fleet of the British dominions must be soon annihilated. In addition to this Great Britain depends upon the corn furnished by Poland and Prussia for subsistence. The war with France is sufficient to employ the whole British force, and the example of the year 1780, enables the King of England to comply with the necessity of the moment, without appearing to have made any new concession. It is not therefore to be doubted that the court of St James will pursue the course which policy dictates, and no sentiment of pride or dignity is called upon to oppose. Such is the wretched nonsense upon which four cabinets have grounded a league, which though it may produce a temporary inconvenience to Great Britain, must be felt by them as the ruin of all their foreign commerce, involving them in a contest, which in its progress must be to them destructive, and from which even if there was a chance of its being successful they could derive no advantage whatever. I must not however conclude without telling your Lordship, that as far as any reliance is to be placed upon the language of the Swede and Dane, the convention has some material differences from that of 1780, which they affect to think will be sufficient to show that their intentions are not hostile, and that it is still open to such discussions as may prevent a rupture.

with as quickly as possible. Lusi eventually agreed to do so but nevertheless insisted that the changes be left aside until approved of by his court. And so it was that the Russo-Prussian Neutrality Convention was concluded on 17 December 1800.
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 5 January 1801

My Lord,

In reporting to your Lordship the very loose and frivolous answer I have at length received from the Prussian minister to the pointed and explicit questions, which in obedience to my instructions I must be solicitous to satisfy your Lordship, that the steps I have taken have been such as must have excited in the mind of any man of common feeling the most serious reflection, and must have convinced the shallowest politician, that His Majesty was no longer to be trifled with. Upon this ground alone, your Lordship, I am sure, would forgive my entering into some detail, but it is also necessary in order to enable His Majesty's ministers to form an estimate of the views and character of the court of Berlin, and determine upon the relations hereafter to be maintained with it. In my dispatch no. 56 your Lordship will find, at that date, that the Prussian ministry had received a strong warning as to the probable consequences of the projected maritime league to all the powers, that might engage in it, and the reason is assigned for the form in which it is drawn up. In the conferences preceding my dispatch of the 27th ult. no. 58, I gave Count Haugwitz in writing, accompanied with the suggestions stated in that dispatch, the memorandum I inclose as the substance of the questions I was to ask, and the declaration I was to make by your Lordship's order. The dispatch itself was drawn with the same view as it is stated in no. 56, and on the 28th I sent the copy of it to the Prussian minister. As I found the answer was delayed, I drew up the inclosed sketch of an official note, and sent it to him. On the 3rd December, in a personal interview, at my own house, I stipulated all I had said before, and as the tenor of his conversation was of a very amicable nature, and he seemed to think the categorical demand I made was harsher than the occasion required, I reminded him that I had hitherto been only consulting him, as to the mode in which I might best communicate to the Prussian government what I was directed to ask, without leading them into any erroneous judgement, as to the light in which His Majesty had seen the project for renewing the Armed Neutrality, or as to his firm and invariable determination to maintain the ancient maritime law of Europe. Count Haugwitz then told me that he perfectly approved and confirmed all that I had said in my dispatch no. 58, which I had communicated, excused himself from giving me an audience the next day as being the festival of the new year, but promised me that he would the next. My dispatch of yesterday no. 2, and the present, contain all that has since passed. Your Lordship, I trust, will think, upon the whole, that the matter has been placed before the
government here with sufficient force, though you will probably be of opinion that it has been done harshly and coarsely. The result however will show, that the nerves to which it has been applied require a stimulus of more than ordinary pungency, and as it has not in this instance produced anger, if any effect should have followed, it may have been salutary. Our conference of this morning was began by Count Haugwitz who observed, that I had pressed him for an answer before it was possible for him to have laid the subject before the king. That he was now authorized by his master to declare, in the first instance, that he desired a perfect line of separation might be drawn between the measures which has [sic] been taken by the Emperor of Russia against His Majesty, in which His Prussian Majesty could not be implicated, and the measures which it was supposed had been in discussion for the security of neutral commerce. As to the first, the King of Prussia had no knowledge of the motives which could have led to them, but from the note delivered at Petersburg at the time the embargo was laid on to all the foreign ministers there, and since published in all the newspapers. Of that note no notice whatever had been taken, and His Prussian Majesty could not but see with the greatest regret the prospect of a rupture between powers who had been from time immemorial so intimately connected, who stood to him exactly in the same relation, not only of amity but of alliance, and whose interests were equally dear to him. He then adverted to the other subject. His Prussian Majesty, he said, could not but observe with surprise and concern that the British government appeared to distrust that friendship and affectation, which he had invariably manifested towards the king and could not but contrast with the anxiety now manifested by Great Britain, that perfect security which he had felt himself when the Treaty of Triple Alliance took place between England, Russia and Austria,\(^\text{183}\) though it was never communicated to him, and though it was generally reported to contain secret articles injurious to him, but knowing the King of England to be a party to it he could not entertain a moments suspicion that anything contrary to the interests of Prussia was intended. He thought himself entitled to the same confidence from His Majesty upon the present occasion, that he could not doubt, but must applaud His Majesty's firm determination to maintain whatever he might deem essential to the honour of his crown, and the safety of his people, and expected that His Majesty would give him credit for similar sentiments. If he engaged in discussing any principles for the greater security of neutral commerce he must be actuated no doubt by a view of what his duty to his people might require, but

\(^{183}\)This is probably a reference to the Second Coalition (1798) between Britain, Austria, Russia, the Ottoman Empire and several minor states.
also, and in the present instance, much more by his desire of preventing any misunderstanding and dissenion between powers reciprocally allied to each other and to him; that he trusted it was impossible his conciliatory disposition could be doubted by His Britannic Majesty; that he claimed the right of judging, when any discussion in which he might be engaged was arrived at that point at which he might think it expedient to make a communication to other powers; that he did not conceive any explanation necessary upon the present occasion and in point of fact there was nothing sufficiently determined to make it possible; that his dispositions towards His Majesty were of perfect friendship, the ties which subsisted between them, as close as those which connected him with Russia. His relations with France were those of peace, with Great Britain of amity and alliance. He had reason to believe the dispositions of the other powers, at the time at least when this business was first set afloat were similar. Count Haugwitz then repeated what I mentioned in a former dispatch as to the withdrawing of the declaration first given by the emperor, as soon as it was known the convention with Denmark was signed, and the expressions of friendship and good will to England, as well as the distinction from France observed in all the subsequent communications with the court of Petersburg; that he could certainly answer only for the disposition of Prussia, but he believed the British government was mistaken in attributing hostile views to Sweden and Denmark; that we ought to suspend our opinion till it could be known what was really in contemplation, and as a proof that it ought not to alarm us he said the measure itself was eagerly pressed by Count Panin, whose attachment to England was not to be doubted.

I then asked them whether as I was to presume that the subject was yet in discussion, there was any probability that no proposition whatever might be made upon it by a concert of the neutral powers. Upon this point he declined giving any assurance, as well as upon the question I put to him next, whether anything had been yet concluded. I asked him whether he would acquaint me with the nature of the plans which had been discussed, and in what they differed from the Convention of 1780. This he also declined alleging as before, that they were not sufficiently defined. It now remained for me to point out the utter want of all resemblance between the Triple Alliance of Russia, Austria and Great Britain, and the league projected in the north. The first was for a known definite object, touching none of the interests, and interfering with none of the views of Prussia, nor could it be doubted that any of the three powers, if Prussia had manifested any uneasiness, would have given her complete satisfaction. The latter related solely to an object in which Great Britain had the greatest and most important interest. It had been openly professed to be founded on
the Convention of 1780 which had been and would always be considered by Great Britain as of the most hostile nature; that though the first declaration of Russia had been softened or withdrawn, it was not denied that the negotiations had been and were still carried on, touching maritime law, and which could not but concern the vital strength of Great Britain; that it was therefore not only reasonable, but just that explanations should be given and as long as they were withdrawn it must be inferred that nothing less offensive than the league of 1780, was in view; that in obeying the orders I had received I trusted he would admit I had never confounded the conduct of principles of His Prussian Majesty with those of the Emperor of Russia; and that everything I had been directed to do and to say since my arrival in this residence had proved the disposition of His Majesty to confide in the friendly intentions of the court of Berlin, but that the refusal of that court to give any explanation whatever upon a matter of such importance was the very reverse of what should be the natural effect and proof of such intentions. That the silence maintained in this respect left no alternative but to consider the plan in agitation as the renewal of that of 1780. In laying before the Prussian government the king's determination to maintain the ancient code, I had obeyed my instructions, and fulfilled my duty. The consequences of an attempt to impose by force upon Great Britain a different system to all the powers who might engage in it were obvious, and it was not necessary to repeat what I had so often said upon that subject, but that feeling myself bound to prevent them if possible, and that any disguise upon such an important matter would be inconsistent with that friendship, I was ordered to cultivate on His Majesty's behalf, with the court of Berlin, I reflected with satisfaction that I had early painted them out in the strongest terms to His Excellency, and that he had been fully apprised not only of the importance attached to this object by Great Britain, but that if her rights should be attacked he could not be surprised if His Majesty should determine not to wait the convenience of his enemy, but repel the aggression, the moment he is assured it is intended. My task was now performed; I should represent in the strongest terms I could, the assurances he had authorised me to repeat of His Prussian Majesty's friendship, and offer up my prayers that the harmony which had so long subsisted between the two crowns might not be interrupted. I thought this was a moment when it might be useful to acquaint him with the step His Majesty had directed to be taken at Copenhagen, and it appeared to make a strong impression.

The present posture of affairs upon the continent was then slightly and briefly touched upon, and I took occasion to inveigh against the madness of those powers, who at such a crisis, instead of resisting the enormous preponderance of France, which
threatened with immediate destruction the independence of them all, could think of forming a league against the only power from whom they could hope for protection or assistance. This was answered by Count Haugwitz with renewed professions of the friendly intentions of Prussia and strong protestations of his convictions that a league of such a nature as I seemed to apprehend, had never been in the contemplation of any of them. He then gave me to understand that he thought the late events might make an impression upon the Emperor of Russia, and operate a change in his conduct, and intimated in speaking of the sentiments of Prussia, that she not only felt the present danger from France, but was seriously occupied with the means of averting it, apparently with a view to lead me into some discussion upon that point, but as I wished him to believe, that though as much determined as ever to resist the exorbitant schemes of France, we should not suffer the particular interests of the continent to divert us for a moment from the assertion of our naval rights, I declined the invitation, and the conversation ended.

I have since been told from good authority that those who are in the service of government deny that Prussia has acceded, and the Russians who admit that a convention has been signed between their court, and those of Stockholm and Copenhagen, declare that Prussia is not a party to it.

The Dane has also been with me. He tells me the note Mr. Drummond was ordered to present to Count Bernstorff was received by that minister on the 29th. I questioned him about the convention, and his answer was that the courier who passed with it had brought him only a single line from M. de Rosenkrantz to say: 'Nous avons signé, mais nous n'avons rien conclu.' The King of Sweden was to leave Petersburg on the 20th ult.

no. 1
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 6 January 1801

My Lord,

Your Lordship's several dispatches to no. 57 inclusive have been received and laid before the king.

I have the honour herewith to inclose to your Lordship copy of a note addressed to me from M. Balan\(^{184}\) the Prussian chargé d'affaires here date 10

\(^{184}\)Balan, Louis, (? -1807), Prussian diplomat, legation secretary and chargé d'affaires to London.
November 1797 together with the copy of an answer I returned to it by the king's commands.

Your Lordship will see by the former of these papers that so long ago as the date at which it was written the cabinet of Berlin having showed some disposition to revive and to bring into practice the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 received from His Majesty's government a firm and explicit declaration of His Majesty's determination not to assent, in any shape, or with any modification whatever to the recognition of those innovations which by that hostile league were attempted to introduced into the law of Europe for the purpose (which at the time was not even disguised) of destroying the naval power of the British Empire. In this answer the court of Berlin completely acquiesced and all the proceedings and discussions which have since that period taken place between the two countries have uniformly been governed by the ancient principles of maritime law without any reference to a scheme long since expressly renounced by those who had been most active in promoting it.

It is impossible therefore for this government without casting the strongest, (and I trust the most undeserved) reflections upon the good faith of the King of Prussia, to believe for a moment that His Prussian Majesty has without any further communication with His Majesty made himself a party to such measures, as must in all fair construction amount to a declaration of war against this country.

Your Lordship will make that use of these communications at the court of Prussia which you may judge to be most for the benefit of the king's service, keeping in view His Majesty's unshaken resolution to persevere in and to support by force of arms the exercise of his just right as a belligerent power, according to the ancient practice and long established laws observed by all the nations of Europe for several centuries before there was any question of the innovations projected in 1780.

no. 2
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 9 January 1801

My Lord,

I have received and laid before the king your Lordship's dispatches to no. 57 inclusive and have great satisfaction in acknowledging the fresh proofs which your Lordship has given of your attention to those points which concern His Majesty's service at this important crisis.

The account of a conclusion of a fresh armistice between the Austrian and the French has had no other effect on His Majesty's councils than to confirm the
determination which His Majesty had before taken to use every effort for maintaining, by exertions adequate to the emergency, the safety, and independence of his Empire against all aggression.

His Majesty is fully sensible that if he were in this moment to relax from any part of his just rights the consequences must immediately be fatal to this country, and would at no remote period become so to all Europe.

As I shall probably have occasion to write to you by a messenger on Tuesday next I add nothing more on this occasion except to signify, the king's pleasure that you should persevere in the same conduct and language which you have hitherto held.

no. 3
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 9 January 1801

My Lord,

This day M. Jacobi came to me by appointment, and began his conversation by informing me that he had orders from his court to make to me a formal declaration of the interest which the King of Prussia takes in the amicable adjustment of the differences between this court and that of Sweden especially with respect to the representations made here by M. d'Ehrensward on the subject of the affair at Barcelona in which it had appeared to His Prussian Majesty that the conduct of the English officer had been extremely reprehensible.

This was as nearly as I can recollect it the purport of his communication, nor was any further explanation given by him of the motives or object of this extraordinary step, except by a repetition of nearly the same expressions, and by a declaration of his ignorance as to all the particulars which I stated to him in reply.

My answer was in substance that I would not fail to report this communication to the king, but that I should not disguise from him that it would probably appear to His Majesty of a very extraordinary nature and very little conformable to the relations subsisting between the two courts. That for five years together the court of Berlin had quietly witnessed the daily violations by the king's enemies of everything that had hitherto been held most sacred in the law of nations and had remained apparently an unconcerned spectator of numberless outrages affecting not only the interests of all neutral powers, but directly and immediately those of Prussia itself, and that His Majesty had yet to learn that any representations had on these occasions been made at

\[185\text{13 January.}\]
Paris by the court of Berlin which in the present instance showed itself so forward as to espouse the prejudices, and adopt the calumnies of His Majesty’s enemies; that during that time a public law had actually been passed by the French government by which all neutral ships and their whole cargoes (those of Prussia as well as of other neutrals) had been made liable to confiscation if there were found on board of them a single article of British manufacture; that this law had suffered to remain in full force and execution for a considerable length of time, and that it had been so far acquiesced in by the neutrals (if I was not mistaken) even Prussian ships, but certainly those of other neutral powers, had frequently been furnished with certificates of the officers of their respective governments which were to exempt them from the operations of this law by supplying them with a proof that they had no British merchandise on board.

That near a hundred neutral ships of every description had been seized by the French General Bonaparte and compelled by him to serve as transports for the conveyance of his troops to Egypt, by which means alone he had been enabled to make himself master by surprise of that valuable province belonging to a neutral power, then at peace with France, and in alliance with Prussia. But that not even the smallest expression of dissatisfaction at the seizure of these neutral ships, or at the conquest of this neutral province had, (as far as the king was informed,) ever been made use of at Paris, on the part of His Prussian Majesty.

That the king had therefore felt the utmost astonishment when after this long acquiescence in the unparalleled outrages of his enemies (of which numberless other instances were in the recollection of everyone) the court of Berlin had suddenly put itself forward both a judge and a party in the affair of Barcelona, in which it can have no interest or concern, either immediate or remote, and even without the form of a previous communication with this government by which the facts might have been ascertained, had taken for granted the assertions of His Majesty's enemies and had gone to the extravagant length of making, in concert with them, representations at Stockholm, tending to instigate that court against the British government.

That your Lordship has, with great propriety, made strong and pointed remonstrances to Count Haugwitz on this occasion, and that the answer which you had received was such as gave His Majesty's government very little reason to expect that a similar step would again be taken by that court on the same subject.

The whole of these circumstances and especially the last, must, I repeated to him, be considered here as a very strong indication of a total indisposition on the part of the court of Berlin to cultivate the existing relations of amity between the two countries, since after what has already past between your Lordship and Count
Haugwitz, the Prussian government could not be ignorant of the impressions which such a step must unavoidably produce.

I think it proper to communicate these particulars to your Lordship, in order that you may regulate your conversation accordingly in any further discussions to which these measures may probably give rise.

In any such discussions you will take occasion to observe, that His Majesty sees with sincere regret this daily accumulation of circumstances so strongly indicating the unfriendly dispositions of the court of Berlin towards him. His Majesty is conscious of not having given, by any part of his conduct, any ground or occasion for such dispositions. And he is still desirous of entering into such friendly explanations, as may lead to the re-establishment of that good understanding between the two courts which has never been interrupted by an act of his. But if the events which are now passing on the continent of Europe shall not even yet have persuaded the Prussian government of the mischiefs which must result from the present endeavours to destroy the naval power of the British Empire, and to transfer to France the same superiority by sea which she now exercises by land, it is not to be hoped that this conviction can be produced by any arguments however conclusive they would unquestionably appear according to any of the ordinary rules of policy and justice.

no. 4
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 10 January 1801

My Lord,

Since I had the honour of writing to your Lordship by the messenger Elsworth, nothing has occurred materially to affect any conclusions to be drawn from what I there stated. As the Prussian minister has evaded giving a direct answer, as to the part which the court has actually taken in the transactions at Petersburg, it is from circumstances only that any opinion can be formed. The notion circulated, and generally received in the public is, that an express declaration has been made by Count Lusi, that the court of Berlin could not be bound by any engagement, which could be considered as leading to hostility with Great Britain. Count Haugwitz, since I saw him on Monday, sent for a gentleman, who has reported their conversation to me, as he tells me with Count Haugwitz's consent. It was merely a repetition of the same general professions of confidence and friendship, towards His Majesty's government, and the same

185 January.
disclaimer of any hostile intention in the discussion which has been set on foot among
the northern powers, the King of Prussia having no object, besides the desire of
conciliation, but to obtain by amicable discussion with His Majesty, all the ease and
security from the lawful commerce of his subjects, which may be consistent with the
rights and security of the British nation.

I was not sorry to have an opportunity of strengthening the impressions I have
been endeavouring to give, and of removing the doubts which still appear to exist as to
His Majesty's invariable determination. I applied myself therefore to convince this
gentleman himself, and he returns to Count Haugwitz with such evidence upon his
mind that the resolution of the British government is not to be shaken, that he cannot
fail to communicate the same opinion to that minister. I took care also to repeat every
topic which might encourage the friendly dispositions of Prussia, if they exist, and
induce her to avail herself of every opinion to retreat if she has proceeded further than
she has really intended. The anxiety thus manifested by Count Haugwitz I think a
favourable prognostic, and I view in the same light the report which begins to circulate,
that Denmark has also made some protestation against being involved in hostilities
against His Majesty. Expressions of Count Haugwitz were repeated, which might be
either a lure to withdraw, or divide attention, or an indirect invitation to some sort of
concert with Great Britain in the event of Austria making a separate peace. Though this
is of little importance at present, I remarked upon it, that although I was certain the
determined and successful opposition of Great Britain to France would suffer no
interruption, I could not persuade myself that His Majesty would concern himself with
the particular interests of any continental powers, till the schemes which had been
formed against him in the north had been abandoned or defeated.

As your Lordship must be furnished with direct accounts from Vienna I forbear
to state the vague reports which I hear of the state of affairs in that quarter. I have just
learnt from Mr. Elliot that General Bellegarde has been defeated in Italy.\footnote{\[cipher\]}

I ought to inform your Lordship that according to your orders, I delivered your
Lordship's letter to Count Rostopchin to be forwarded by M. Krüdener by the earliest
conveyance to Petersburg.

\footnote{Bellegarde, Heinrich Joseph Johannes, Count von (1756-1846), Austrian general, later field
marshal. He was sent to Italy as general of the cavalry to take over command from Melas but, hard
pressed by Brune, he had to withdraw behind the Mincio and Etsch rivers.}
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 10 January 1801

My Lord,

I learn that M. de Saint-Marsan having been strongly pressed to proceed to Paris, has at length determined to give an official note in which he declares he has no instructions to that effect, nor any power to treat, except in a general congress. This step will give him a fortnight's space at least in which he may receive instructions. In the meantime it is certain that the First Consul is extremely urgent for his coming to Paris, expressing himself as highly offended at the King of Sardinia's want of confidence in him, and adding that the king must after all depend on his generosity, no power in Europe being in a situation to force or to influence him.

Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 10 January 1801
Separate

My Lord,
[cipher]

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I have this day drawn on your Lordship, payable to Mr. Richard, of this place, for the sum of £116.18.6 on account of Monsieur de la Palu, and that I shall take the first opportunity of sending the official receipts.

Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 13 January 1801

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatch no. 2 was received here this day, but no. 1 has not been received though all the mails that were due are arrived.

As your Lordship's letter gives me reason to expect to hear again from you in the course of tomorrow or the next day, and as your next reports will contain the account of your conference with Count Haugwitz on the interesting subject of the Convention for the Armed Neutrality I forbear writing at large to your Lordship on the subject (as I had intended to do) by this messenger. But I think it necessary to desire that (if you have not already done it before the receipt of this dispatch) you will apply
yourself to learn as accurately as you can in what light the accession of the court of Berlin to the convention signed by the other powers is to be considered. Whether as a mere accession to the principle there stated as containing the rules which Prussia means hereafter to observe in her conduct towards other powers, or whether as an engagement to employ any means of force to enforce the adoption of those rules of the belligerent powers who shall not already have adopted them as the rule of their conduct?

It is probable that on the result of your Lordship's next dispatch I shall be commanded to desire you to put this question categorically to the Prussian minister, but it would be desirable that you should in the meantime, and in a less official manner endeavour to inform yourself upon it.

no. 5
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 13 January 1801
Most secret

My Lord,

Immediately on receiving the intelligence contained in your Lordship's dispatch no. 2 combined with the avowals of the note delivered to Mr. Drummond by Count Bernstorff on which I inclose you a copy His Majesty's servants determined humbly to recommend to His Majesty that such measures should forthwith be taken against the commerce and colonies of Denmark and Sweden, as are best calculated to weaken those efforts against the just rights of this country which those powers appear to have bound themselves to make in conjunction with a power so decidedly hostile to His Majesty's interest as Russia has shown herself to be. It is however the king's pleasure that you should not on any account make any communication at Berlin of the actual disposition of these measures till you shall receive instructions to that effect, but that you should in the interval endeavour as far as possible to prepare the mind of the Prussian ministers for availing the distinction stated in my other dispatch of this date.

It is intended as soon as I receive your next dispatch or possibly before that time if any considerable interval should elapse, to instruct you to make to Count Haugwitz an official communication of the measures which will then have been actually adopted with respect to the commerce and colonies of Denmark and Sweden.

You will in that case be directed to explain the grounds of that decision to have been the knowledge of the actual signature of an hostile convention against Great Britain agreed to by these powers conjointly with Russia, as the three principal and contracting parties in this confederacy. And you will be to add that from a desire on the
king's part to try to the very utmost the means of maintaining peace and good understanding with Prussia, the ships of that power have not been comprised in the order - the king being still willing to hope that the accession of His Prussian Majesty to that confederacy imports no more than an approbation on his part of the principles there stated, and does not bind him to make common cause with the powers who have leagued themselves together for the purpose of compelling His Majesty to renounce his just opposition to those principles. But that His Majesty trusts that the King of Prussia will feel the propriety of making to His Majesty a fair and distinct avowal of his intentions and engagements in that respect.

These intentions here stated to you may be varied by the tenor of your Lordship’s next dispatches - because you may there have to announce such declarations on the part of Prussia as would no longer leave room for this distinction. But if you shall see the means of leading the Prussian government towards its adoption you will use your best endeavours for that purpose, but doing this as from yourself, and without making any official demand of an explanation to that effect till the instructions for that purpose shall reach you.

I have only to add that if, contrary to the king’s expectations you should see any room to believe that there is immediate danger of His Prussian Majesty’s proceeding to the extremity of laying an embargo on the British trade and property in Hamburg in violation of the neutrality of that port you are to use the most expeditious means of apprising His Majesty’s minister and consul there, of the danger in order that they may as far as possible put His Majesty’s subjects there on their guard. But you will of course endeavour to avoid giving any premature alarm in this respect, the consequence of which might be unnecessarily injurious to the interests of His Majesty’s subjects.

As I am closing this dispatch I have the honour of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch no. 1.

no. 6
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 15 January 1801

My Lord,

As I am anxious not to detain the messenger who goes by Hamburg in order to give notice to the king’s minister and consul there to remove such British ships as may
be in the power of the Danish government at Altona\textsuperscript{188} I shall content myself with apprising your Lordship that an embargo was yesterday ordered by His Majesty in council on all Danish, Swedish and Russian ships in the ports of the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{189}

The answer of Count Bernstorff to Mr. Drummond's note which I transmitted to your Lordship in my last dispatch distinctly avows that the object of the convention is to re-establish in their primitive form the engagements of 1780 and 1781.

As these engagements are and must always be considered by His Majesty as hostile to this country particularly as they bind the contracting parties to maintaining by force the principle of 'free ships making free goods' which is in direct opposition to the existing treaties of this country both with Denmark and Sweden, (in both of which precautions are adapted for the express purpose of preventing the neutral merchants from covering enemy's property), His Majesty could do no less on receiving this avowal than to adopt such provisional measures as may be most effectual to counteract the hostile league thus formed against him.

I shall by tomorrow's mail transmit to you the official note by which this step has been notified to the Danish and Swedish ministers here, together with His Majesty's directions to your Lordship to communicate it to the Prussian government and to enter confidentially with Count Haugwitz, if he shall be willing to lend himself to it, into the discussion of the means which may still be adopted to prevent the necessity of any similar misunderstanding breaking out between His Majesty and the King of Prussia.

If it be true that the court of Berlin has not yet acceded to the league I trust you will be able without much difficulty to induce Count Haugwitz to exert his influence to prevent that step from being now taken.

If the accession has really taken place, two modes of saving the question may yet be adopted - the one founded on the distinction which I have already stated between adopting the principle and agreeing to join in measures of force to compel its adoption by others - and the other resting on the principle, that engagements taken with the court

\textsuperscript{188} Altona was a town in Danish Holstein, a short distance west of Hamburg. With approximately 24,000 inhabitants, it was the second biggest town, after Copenhagen, in the Kingdom of Denmark. Known as a place of refuge for revolutionaries on the run.

\textsuperscript{189} A general embargo on all Russian, Swedish and Danish goods in English harbours was declared on 14 January 1801, and their ships were sequestered. The Danish and Swedish ambassadors were informed the next day.
of Petersburg for the maintenance of a system of neutrality cannot apply to a state of open war such as now exists between His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.

His Majesty relies on your Lordship's zeal and address to avail yourself to the utmost of these ideas, and I have the satisfaction of being able to add that His Majesty very much approves of your language as states in your dispatch no. 3 which appears to have placed the question precisely on the footing which was most advantageous to the interests of this country in this most important crisis.

no. 7
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 15 January 1801
Secret

My Lord,

I have the honour herewith to inclose to your Lordship a letter from Mr. Stephen Shairp late His Majesty's Consul General at St Petersburg to his brother a merchant of the British factory in that city.

I send it under flying seal to your Lordship that by perceiving it you may see the necessity of its being delivered to its address without the subject of it coming in the slightest degree to the knowledge of the Russian government.

I shall therefore request of your Lordship to keep it in your possession till you shall find a safe opportunity of transmitting it to Mr. Alexander Shairp.

no. 8
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 16 January 1801
Secret

My Lord,

I am commanded by His Majesty to desire that immediately on the receipt of this dispatch you will make to the minister of His Prussian Majesty an official communication of the note which by His Majesty's commands I have transmitted to the Danish and Swedish ministers at this court to apprise them that His Majesty has judged it proper to lay an embargo on all Danish, Swedish and Russian vessels in His Majesty's ports.

His Majesty is pleased to leave it to your Lordship's judgement to decide according to circumstances as to the form of making this communication whether
verbally or in writing, and as to the particular expressions of the note with which you may accompany it.

The line of conduct to be followed by your Lordship is to leave open to the court of Berlin, if it shall appear desirous to avail itself of them, the means of avoiding without any loss of dignity those extremities which are become unavoidable as between His Majesty and the three maritime powers of the Baltic.

With this view your Lordship will enter with Count Haugwitz into a full explanation of the grounds of the measure now adopted. You will remark that by the same mail His Majesty received the first account of the actual signature of the convention in question, and the explanation given by the Danish government of its purport and object - in which explanation Count Bernstorff distinctly declares that Denmark has agreed with the other powers of the north, to re-establish, 'sous leur forme primitive', the engagements of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, which engagements not only contain an avowal of an intention to establish a system of maritime law in Europe such as His Majesty justly deems incompatible with the rights and interests of his Empire, but also include positive stipulations of mutual aid in imposing these principles by force on those nations who may not agree in them.

His Majesty has therefore nothing left to him, after this official declaration, but to decide whether he would now submit to the law which these powers thus expressly notify to him, or whether he would take immediate measures for enabling himself to repel this premeditated and avowed aggression.

The resolution adopted by His Majesty has been such as was to have been expected by those powers who have engaged in this league, and such as was conformable to the repeated declarations which your Lordship has made to the Prussian minister His Majesty being as your Lordship so justly stated under no obligation to wait the convenience of his enemies for the purpose of resisting their hostile intentions when thus unequivocally notified to him.

It was however with great satisfaction that His Majesty found himself enabled by the contents of your Lordship's dispatch to confine this measure to the ships of the three powers to whom alone it is hitherto applied. In the information transmitted by your Lordship respecting the actual signature of the convention, it is stated as matter of doubt whether Prussia has yet in any formal manner become a party to it, and at all events it appears probable that if she has concurred in it, she has done so as an accessory only, and not as a principal contracting party.

The future relations between His Majesty and the King of Prussia will therefore still depend upon the conduct and determinations of the latter. It is unnecessary to
multiply assurances that the king has no desire to provoke a contest which can be productive only of evil to both countries. If the other neutral powers could have been contented to remain quiet and to leave matters on the footing on which they have stood during the whole of the present war, and from which they had derived such immense profits, His Majesty had no desire to disturb it. And the more narrowly the sphere of neutrality in the present maritime war is confined in consequence of their present conduct, the greater are the advantages which must result from that neutrality both to Great Britain as the belligerent and to Prussia as the neutral power. In every just view therefore of the policy and interests of the latter, she ought to be desirous rather to avail herself still more studiously of those advantages, than to involve herself in the mutual difficulties of a contest with this country.

If she feels this desire, the means are obviously still within her reach should His Prussian Majesty not have already acceded to this league, or even should his act of accession to it not have been ratified, the present state of actual hostility between His Majesty and all the powers who have concluded the convention as principals affords not a plausible excuse only, but solid and sufficient reason, for a power who desires to remain really neutral, not to involve itself in the system of the already declared enemies of one of the belligerent powers.

Even if the accession has already taken place I have before remarked to your Lordship that the mere declaration on the part of Prussia of an intention to adhere in her own conduct to the principles of the new code would not be regarded by His Majesty as hostile to himself provided it were not accompanied by any engagements binding the King of Prussia to use force himself or to support the other confederates in using force for the purpose of imposing that system on Great Britain which she neither recognises nor can submit to adopt as the rule of her practice.

This therefore is the point to which it is wished that you should ultimately bring the court of Berlin; to declare whether His Majesty already has or intends hereafter to make himself a party to any such design as is now avowed by the court of Denmark in the name of its confederation; that of employing force to compel this country, the first maritime power in Europe, to adopt at the will of others a new code of maritime law, which is equally inconsistent with its rights and its interests. Whatever be the sentiments of the Prussian government with respect to the questions themselves, the intention of giving the law to the British Empire by force respecting matters of such high importance to every British interest cannot exist, unless a system of decided hostility has already been resolved on by Prussia. And it is this intention which His Majesty trusts the King of Prussia will have no difficulty in disavowing.
Your Lordship's language on this occasion will be regulated according to the circumstances which may have occurred in the interval. But the object in view is first to convince the Prussian government what is now indeed already sufficiently proved by the fact that His Majesty is resolved to maintain the ancient system of naval law at all hazards and by all exertions in his power, and in the second place to show them that there is a desire here to facilitate to Prussia the means of keeping itself free from this contest, and of deriving the increased profit which must result from her neutrality under such circumstances.

no. 6
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 17 January 1801

My Lord,

I send inclosed a translation of an article which appeared in the St Petersburg gazette of the 18/29 December, among the official articles; and without any preface or comment. I have thought it right to mention this, as I doubt whether that paper is known in England. The article itself has, if I am not mistaken, appeared in some English newspaper or magazine. What could induce the emperor to order, or permit the insertion, in the gazette of this capital, it is very difficult to conjecture. It is of greater importance that certain intelligence has been received here, that the Danish minister at Petersburg has been ordered to leave it in twenty four hours. No reason has yet been assigned that seems at all probable, for the emperor's displeasure, but the fact is unquestionable.

Symptoms continue to be observed, indicating negotiations pending Russia and France. Frequent couriers pass, and on Thursday one was dispatched from this court to Paris, and another, but whether Russian or Prussian I cannot tell, to Petersburg.

[cipher]

A conference has I believe, very lately taken place between the Russian minister here, and the French minister, but it was said nothing has been agreed upon between them. I do not hear that any preparations are making by Russia against the Turks, and

190 Rosenkrantz was apparently expelled for having expressed doubts about Denmark's involvement in the Armed Neutrality.

191 15 January.
there seems reason to believe that the emperor still feels a great reluctance to any connection with France.

A letter received from Geneva, dated December the ninth, mentions, that from fifteen to twenty thousand men had lately passed that town proceeding by the little Saint Bernard and Mount Cenis,¹⁹² into Italy. It is added amongst them were a large body of cannoneers of the marine department from Brest.

no number
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 17 January 1801
Separate

My Lord,

I have this day had the honour of drawing on your Lordship, payable to Mr. Richard of Berlin, for the sum of one hundred pounds sterling, on His Majesty's service.

no. 9
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 20 January 1801

My Lord,

My dispatches of the 15 inst. nos. 6 and 7 by the messenger Johnstone, and that of the 16th inst. no. 8 by the messenger Hunter senior, have so fully detailed the instructions I have had in command from His Majesty to send to your Lordship, on the important points now at issue between this country and the powers of the Baltic, that at the present moment I have nothing left me to add to those instructions; and, I should not by to-night's mail trouble your Lordship, did I not judge it right to acquaint you, that no letters have been received here from Berlin, since the receipt of your Lordship's dispatches of the 5 inst. by the messenger Elsworth.

¹⁹² The little St Bernard, as opposed to the big, is a pass in the Alps between Italy and Switzerland and probably the same used by Hannibal. Mount Cenis is in the western Alps in France.
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 21 January 1801
Separate and most secret

My Lord,

M. de Lützow, minister at this court from the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, having desired to speak with me, and after receiving the strongest assurances that I was neither authorised nor disposed to discuss the subjects he proposed, and that I knew that His Majesty's determination not to enter into any explication with the emperor, till the embargo should be recalled, persisted in desiring that I would inform your Lordship of the following particulars; that the emperor is prepared to consent that Great Britain shall retain a permanent and effectual possession of the port of Malta, together with the forts that command it, such a possession as may completely answer all the purposes of war, the flag of the order being hoisted, and the civil government, and the island in all other respects belonging to the order. The barrier towns in the Low Countries, which though belonging to Austria, were garrisoned by the Dutch, were mentioned in illustration; the inclination both of the emperor and Rostopchin was, he said, favourable to England, and the correspondence which had taken place with France had not brought the two powers nearer to each other; that the emperor had contracted no engagements with that government; and that his dispositions continued as strongly and unequivocally hostile to it, as they had ever been. I desired to know whether he spoke upon the authority of M. de Krüdener, or any other. He answered that he was himself particularly authorised; that although he was not a subject of the emperor's, it could not escape me how important it was to him, not to incur that prince's displeasure, and that before he engaged in an affair of such delicacy and importance, he had obtained such a power as he had thought necessary for his security, which at some time or other he might communicate to me, but he wished not to be then pressed to produce it. He repeated with great earnestness that if Malta had been but mentioned in your Lordship's answer to Rostopchin, or any private assurance could be now given, that the British government would enter into some discussion on that object, the ancient connection might be revived, and the two nations

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193 Lützow, Rudolf Friedrich August Freiherr von, German diplomat, ambassador of Mecklenburg-Schwerin at the court of Berlin from December 1794, with periods of absence, till his resignation in 1835.
saved from the calamities of war, which would fall indeed with the greatest weight upon Russia, but which we could not but share in some degree.

In order to impress M. de Lützow as strongly as possible with a conviction of its being absolutely and indispensably necessary that the emperor before any discussion whatever could take place, should recall the embargo, I made him advert to various instances in which powers of the first rank had submitted to recall and disavow measures of violence hastily adopted, and suggested various ways in which the emperor might, without wounding his dignity, give the necessary satisfaction to Great Britain, and I have no doubt that he will make this felt by his report at Petersburg. M. de Lützow was also made to apprehend the utter impossibility that Great Britain should consider as friendly, a power engaged in an attempt to impose upon her by force, the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and uniformly asserted that the dissolution of that league would be the certain and immediate effect of the reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia. I understand that something has passed in consequence of your Lordship's letter to Count Rostopchin, that it is of a nature to give additional offence I cannot doubt, and I should not be surprised if I should very shortly receive notification from your Lordship that His Majesty has declared war against the emperor.

In the present posture of affairs I have great doubt whether His Majesty can with safety resort to any other measure, for unless there is good reason to believe the professions of friendship made by the several powers to be sincere, the magnitude and duration of the contest would be augmented, in proportion to the time allowed to the enemy for preparation. Denmark certainly dreads a war with England, but is attached to the principles of the Armed Neutrality and will always endeavour to make use of every opportunity to enforce them. Her dread of the power of Russia, which is become a rooted habit, is also much greater than is reasonable, and makes it doubtful whether, even if the war with Russia was to stand on a ground distinct from the Armed Neutrality, she could resist the solicitation of that power. Prussia is in a situation very similar in this last respect. Her interest indeed should lead her a different way, but her only political motive is fear, and the fear of Russia is perhaps that which now preponderates. To this must be added that whatever may be the King of Prussia's natural inclinations, he is entirely in the hands of persons of bad principles who are devoted to France, that it is through their medium alone that he sees, and hears, and that the empire is as absolute over his ministers as over him. The notion that England cannot subsist without the powers of the Baltic, would be obliterated the moment she declares war against Russia, and the emperor himself with whom all milder means have failed, may by such a vigorous measure be waked from his dream of self importance.
It farther seems probable, that if His Majesty's ministers should be inclined to make use of M. de Lützow's communication in order to divert the emperor from allying himself with France, the state of actual war would rather remove difficulties than increase them, as all the points in question might then come into discussion together.

As to Sweden I still incline to think her object is a subsidy. She must see in Russia her natural enemy, and that her intentions are not generally considered as hostile to us, or our cause, your Lordship will see an additional and strong proof in the letter of which authentic copy accompanies this dispatch.

There is another important consideration resulting from the manifestation of the ascendancy gained by Russia in the north. If he can consolidate the force which now appears enlisted under her banner, she may be as justly formidable to Great Britain as France with all the acquisitions she has made.

I am informed that M. Fursmann the Dane, on his arrival in Russia, after Rosenkrantz's dismissal, received a notification that the emperor was pleased to allow him to repose himself. This is not denied by the Danish chargé d'affaires.

I have repeatedly pressed Count Haugwitz on the affair of the Ems, but he tells me, he was referred to the department which it belongs for the necessary information, which he has not yet received.

Since this dispatch was begun, I have received your Lordship's no. 4 and 5, and as I am to see Count Haugwitz tomorrow at one o'clock, by appointment, I have retained the messenger in hopes of being able to give your Lordship some farther light upon the important subject to which they relate.

As it does not appear by your Lordship's dispatches that my no. 58 and 59 have come to hand I inclose copies of them.

no. 7
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 22 January 1801

My Lord,

I have not time to enter into any detailed account of what passed between Count Haugwitz and me, but must reserve it for the next dispatch. The general idea which I think myself justified to form, if perfect reliance is to be placed upon the most

194 In fact, Sweden's motives for joining the Armed Neutrality were determined more by realpolitik, and prestige. The desire to obtain Norway was the principle determinant in Sweden's foreign policy relations.
prominent parts of Count Haugwitz's conversation, would be that not only this court, 
but Denmark and Sweden also really intended to draw themselves out of the scheme of 
armed neutrality, and as to the probability of Prussia's availing itself of the salvo 
proposed by your Lordship, it will be sufficient to repeat that I took occasion to say I 
could not conceive how it was possible for the four powers to form a league upon this 
subject, in such a manner as that they could act upon it, as everyone of them stood in a 
predicament different from the rest. Prussia had no treaty with us, Sweden had a 
treaty, Denmark had one differing from that of Sweden, and Russia had a treaty 
differing from both. The King of Prussia might fairly say, when we have taken a 
Prussian merchant ship, and refused the satisfaction he asks: You have acted contrary 
to my notions of the law of nations, and I will therefore make war upon you. But 
when we have taken a Swedish ship, because we think we have a right to do so, 
according to the treaty, and the King of Sweden says my interpretation of the treaty is 
different from yours, I see a ground of discussion with Sweden, but I cannot conceive 
why Prussia should go to war with us to enforce a particular interpretation of a treaty to 
which she is not a party, and in which she has no interest. He immediately exclaimed 
that Prussia never could act so unjustly and so absurdly. And yet, I replied, such is the 
obligation which the powers contracted to each other in 1780. You will assume 
always, he said, that it is the Treaty of 1780 that we mean to act upon. Have patience, 
and you will be convinced that nothing is intended against you.

Separate

My Lord,

My separate dispatch of October 17, will have stated to your Lordship the 
payments made to General Stamford to the end of September last. I have this day 
drawn on your Lordship for the three following months of that gentleman's allowance 
making the sum of £300.

My separate letters of December 9, and of the 10th instant will have notified to 
your Lordship the sums drawn and remitted to M. de la Palu from October 10 to 
December 10 inclusive amounting for those two months to £233.17. And for these two 
sums I have the honour to inclose a receipt amounting to £533.17.

I have the honour to inclose a receipt for the sum of one hundred pounds for 
which I drew on your Lordship in favour of Mr. Richard of Berlin on the 17th instant.
no. 10  
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 24 January 1801

My Lord,

Before this messenger can reach your Lordship it is probable that steps will actually have been taken for the execution of the orders which His Majesty has thought proper to give under the present circumstances for the occupation of the island of Heligoland\(^{195}\) as affording the means of material protection to the commerce of his subjects. His Majesty particularly directs that you should on no account give to any person whatever the smallest previous intimation of this design. But when you shall learn that it has actually been carried into effect, and not before, you will desire to converse with Count Haugwitz on the subject.

You will in the first place remark to him that although Great Britain was not a party to the convention for establishing a line of neutral demarcation in Germany and consequently cannot be bound by it, yet that on this occasion in order to avoid giving any ground of uneasiness to His Prussian Majesty the king has been careful to ascertain, before he gave directions for this enterprise that the point of attack was not comprehended within the line of that demarcation.

The first evidence on the subject which was resorted to is indeed of itself conclusive. It is the map transmitted here by His Majesty's minister at Berlin at the time when that line was fixed, and on this map the line is drawn across the mouth of the Elbe from St Clements to Dycksand, and thence to Neuwerk\(^{196}\) leaving Heligoland several leagues to the west.

Next to this, or even of higher authority is the description of the line as it stands in the convention itself in which no mention is made of any place or country to the northward of East Friesland, a province in which Heligoland is certainly not included. In addition to this it appears as your Lordship will find on a reference to Busching the work of the highest authority on these subjects, that this island is not even a part of the German Empire but is included in the Duchy of Schleswig, which belongs to the Kingdom of Denmark and was in 1720 guarantied as such to that crown by almost all the principal powers of Europe.

\(^{195}\)Heligoland, an island in the North Sea belonging to the Kingdom of Denmark.

\(^{196}\)St Clements, today Büsum in Schleswig-Holstein on the North Sea coast; Dycksand, an island at the northern mouth of the Elbe; Neuwerk, an island at the southern mouth of the Elbe which belonged to Hamburg.
I have put your Lordship in possession of these particulars that you may be enabled to meet any cavil on the subject. But the point is so plain that it will probably not be contested by the Prussian minister.

This preliminary being settled, you are next to explain that His Majesty in the occupation of this island has no view in interrupting or disturbing the neutrality of the Elbe so long as his subjects are protected in the equal enjoyment of the benefit of that neutrality. That if the Danes are suffered during the present war, by their possession of Altona and Glückstadt to disturb the British commerce with Hamburg it must be expected that His Majesty's ships will make reprisals, either by the attack of those places themselves, or at least by assuming such a station within the Elbe as shall effectually preclude all navigation to or from those possessions of the king's enemy. But that if on the other hand the court of Berlin shall be able to obtain from Denmark a declaration of abstaining from all hostile measures within the limits of the ports and water of the Elbe, His Majesty on his part will readily consent to bind himself to a similar engagement during the continuance of this war with Denmark.

You will give to these overtures the most conciliating turn, and you will accompany them with assurances of the king's sincere desire to avoid every step that can give any just cause of umbrage to His Prussian Majesty so long as no attempts are made on the part of the court of Berlin to support by any measure of hostility against this country the unjust aggressions and insidious plans of the king's enemies.

no. 11
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 24 January 1801

Your Lordship's dispatches to no. 5 inclusive have been received and laid before the king. I have nothing to add to my late dispatches on the subject of the accession of the King of Prussia to the Armed Neutrality. It appears highly probable that the language held to your Lordship both by Count Haugwitz himself, and by others, speaking to you by his direction, that although this accession has actually taken place, the Prussian government, seeing in how serious a light the matter is considered here, will be desirous to avail itself of the opening which your Lordship has been directed to point out to them, for avoiding those extremities to which the conduct and declarations of the other northern powers have necessarily led. With this view, your Lordship will steadily pursue the course which has been prescribed by my former

197 Glückstadt, a port in Schleswig-Holstein at the mouth of the Elbe.
instructions, but you will carefully avoid saying anything that could create the smallest expectation of your Lordship (His Majesty's) being induced to depart from those ancient and immemorial rights on which he is determined to insist.

His Majesty is pleased to direct that you should make to Count Haugwitz, an official communication of my last two letters to Count Rostopchin, copies of which have been transmitted to your Lordship. You will point out to that minister the spirit of moderation and tolerance which is so conspicuous in both those papers, and you will inform him, that His Majesty anticipates the sentiments with which His Prussian Majesty will learn the unjustifiable and indecent conduct which has been adopted at Petersburg on this occasion. The nature of the conduct is best explained by the inclosed copy of Count Rostopchin's letter to me returning to me that which I had written to him by the king's command.

This letter your Lordship will likewise communicate to the Prussian minister.

To make any comment on the want of all decency and self respect which has been manifested by the court of Petersburg in this transaction would be far beneath His Majesty's dignity. But His Majesty is pleased to command, that you should formally notify to the court of Berlin, that this step taken at Petersburg, combined with the outrages offered to the property and persons of His Majesty's subjects, and also with the signature of that hostile confederacy which the Emperor of Russia has formed for the avowed object of imposing on this country, by force, a new and inadmissible code of maritime law, have at length produced a state of open and actual war between Great Britain and Russia. You will therefore remark, that the Emperor of Russia is no longer to be considered as being in any sense neutral in the present contest, so much indeed the contrary, that without having as yet concluded his peace with France, he is now involved in declared war with Great Britain. You will add, that although His Majesty forbears at present, inconsideration of the existing circumstances of Europe, to make His Prussian Majesty any request for the succours stipulated by the treaty of alliance, yet he considered the casus foederis as in all respects and completely applicable to it, and relies with confidence that he shall experience from his ally, all such marks of friendship and interest, as the circumstances of the new war in which His Majesty is engaged may from time to time appear to require.

198 Rostopchin received a threat of war from Grenville saying that if the Russian embargo and deportation were not halted, Great Britain would declare war on Russia. The Tsar refused to comply as a result of which Russia and Britain were officially at war with each other from 22 January 1801.
My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatches by the messenger Johnson arrived here yesterday. If it is true, as I hear from Hamburg, that an offer made by the emperor to the court of Denmark, to assist them with his troops, and a recommendation of Dumouriez to command in the Danish forces, has not been cordially received. It may account for the expulsion of the Danish mission from Petersburg, but at the same time the proposal may seem a proof of a more determined hostility in the emperor towards Great Britain. I am told it is not doubted at Vienna, that the armies assembled on the Polish frontier are designed to act against the Turks, and it has been intimated to me, that the negotiations of the emperor with France are more advanced than had been thought. Upon this point however no confident opinion can be formed here. The manner in which the emperor has received the news of Sprengporten's journey to Paris, and the substance of the communications which have been made by the couriers, who have been sent by that gentleman, cannot be known, but it is reported that France has fully acceded to the demands made by the emperor, on behalf of his allies. If there is any truth in what has been mentioned from Vienna, it might be considered as an indication of a concert already established with France. But as the inclination of that power to comply with the emperor's wishes cannot have been notified at St Petersburg more than a fortnight or three weeks, it does not appear very probable.

As the communication I shall have to make to the Prussian minister will probably draw forth clearer indications of the intentions of this court, it has become unnecessary for me to enter into any minute details of my last conversation with Count Haugwitz. It is sufficient to say, that as far as reliance may be placed upon what he has uniformly said, not only on that but on former occasions, there is good reason to hope, that either one or both of the salvos proposed by your Lordship will be embraced by the Prussian minister, particularly the latter he has frequently mentioned as being in his

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199 Charles-François Duperrier, called Dumouriez (1739-1823), French officer and secret diplomatic agent under Louis XV, governor of Cherbourg under Louis XVI, marshal, minister of foreign affairs in March 1792, commander of the northern army, victor at Valmy with Kellermann (20 September 1792). He went over to the allied side in April 1793 and was finally given a refuge and a pension in Britain in 1800.
opinion decisive. But though according to the best judgement I am able to form the
Prussian minister will avoid to the last any open rupture, I must still be apprehensive
that the strong desire which exists to maintain a good understanding and establish a
concert with the Emperor of Russia, joined to the fear of his power may finally drive
him to the adoption of measures very consistent with the policy by which he has long
been activated.

The emperor does not allow the passage of couriers, and in order to prevent any
correspondence with foreign parts which shall not pass under the eyes of his ministers,
has availed himself of the pretext of the plague in Africa and Spain, to oblige all who
arrive on his frontiers to perform quarantine. I much fear that I shall be unable to carry
into effect the orders I have received from your Lordship.

Copy of letter from Carysfort to Knoblauch, Berlin, 24 January 1801
(RA, Depecher)

J'ai reçu par un courrier hier au soir, copie de la réponse du comte de
Bernstorff à la note de M. Drummond. L'aveu qu'il se traite d'un renouvellement, ou
plutôt qu'on a renouvelé la ligue de 1780, doit nécessairement mener à une demande
d'explications ultérieures, puisque nous regardons l'objet, et les conditions expresses
de cette ligue comme contraires à la lettre et à l'esprit de vos traités avec nous. Dès que
je suis à même de vous donner des renseignements précis sur l'état actuel de nos
affaires avec le Danemark, je me hâterai de le faire.

no. 12
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 27 January 1801

My Lord,

Having by my last letters acknowledged your Lordship's dispatches to no. 5
inclusive, I have little to add to this mail to what I have already stated to you.

I think it however right to mention to you one circumstance to which I believe I
have not averted in my former dispatches to your Lordship, and of which it is material
that you should avail yourself at Berlin, as I have, in my conversations with Baron
Jacobi, for the purpose of placing in its true light the offensive conduct of the maritime

200 Knoblauch, Ludwig, Danish diplomat, legation secretary and chargé d'affaires at Berlin from 1797
on (date of recall unknown).
powers of the Baltic in renewing the stipulations of the armed neutrality of 1780 - thus binding themselves to impose by force of arms upon this country a system of neutral law which they themselves had already renounced in the most public manner, and in terms the most unequivocal.

I allude particularly to the distinct engagements contained, and notified to all Europe in the convention which was concluded in 1794 between Denmark and Sweden, and by them formally communicated to the court.

By that convention those powers solemnly declared to all Europe that it was their intention to assert those privileges of neutrality only which had previously been recognised by all other sovereigns - to the exclusion of those pretensions which Great Britain never has recognised and which since the beginning of 1793 have been by express treaty renounced by almost every power who had before acceded to them - particularly by Prussia in her convention with this country of July 14th 1793 article 4. 201

With respect to the journey of M. de Saint-Marsan, I have told M. de Fronte, 202 who questioned me as to the part that His Majesty wished his sovereign to take, that the king not being able, after the peace of Austria, to afford His Sardinian Majesty any effectual aid for the recovery of his dominions could have no other wish than that His Sardinian Majesty should avail himself of whatever support can be derived from the good offices of Prussia and Russia.

no. 9
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 27 January 1801

My Lord,

Having considered the important subject of your Lordship's late dispatches, I determined in consequence of the discretionary power His Majesty had been pleased to confide in me, to seek an interview with Count Haugwitz, and stating the general purpose of what I had it in command to say, to collect from his conversation, and under colour of consulting him, whether it would be most advisable to confine myself to observations, merely verbal, or to accompany with an official note the communication of the copy of your Lordship's note to the Swedish and Danish

201 Prussia signed a convention with Britain on July 14 1793.
202 San Martino di Fronte, Count Filipo, Sardinian diplomat, ambassador at the court of St James.
I soon found however that the Prussian minister was predisposed to condemn His Majesty's measures, nor was he inclined even to listen to what I wished to say, to mark the distinctions which had been made by the British government, to separate the case of Prussia from that of the other powers. On the contrary, he condemned in the strongest terms, the precipitation of His Majesty's ministers. He denied the revival of the league of 1780. He denied the existence of any league. The impatience only of the British government had he said, prevented our being assured that the powers entertained no hostile intentions towards Great Britain. In our particular discussions with Russia, Prussia had no concern. We might have made war upon that power, for her conduct in the embargo, and all concert between that power and the other northern courts, relating to neutral commerce, would have ceased of course. But we had now commenced hostilities against those who had neither committed, nor meditated hostility against us. The rash step which had been taken would probably expose the British Kingdom to the reproach of having sought by an attack upon unoffending powers, an indemnification which it was unable to expect from Russia, for the injury sustained by the embargo. He showed no disposition to give any further explanations upon the nature of any engagements contracted, or in contemplation, with the northern courts, but the tenor of his conversation strongly proved that some plan is still in agitation, and that it is intended to pursue it. He mentioned that advice had been recently received of the capture of a Prussian vessel by a British ship of war, and upon my saying that, whether Prussian or not, was a question of fact to be decided by a competent jurisdiction, he replied, not by an English tribunal. And when I remarked that it was a principle which had never been disputed, and was even expressly recognised by the Treaty of Armed Neutrality in 1780, that the legality of prize was to be tried in the admiralty courts of the powers making the capture, he answered that they did not recognise our principles, and added with great emphasis, that this was a pretension to which I might depend upon it they would never submit. Your Lordship will find the following passage in my dispatch no. 56 of last year. 'It is certainly true that the reports and opinions disseminated by the enemies of Great Britain, and even the ideas occasionally opened in conversation, by those whom I do not include in that description, are of a nature even more inadmissible than those of

203 In a joint note to the Danish and Swedish ambassadors in London dated 31 December, Lord Grenville justified the British embargo by stating that it was a response to the formation of the Armed Neutrality.
1780. It alludes to the expression of a similar import, which then dropped from Count Haugwitz, and were taken up by me, but which he did not then insist upon as explicitly, and with such earnestness as at present. He even returned me the copy of the note delivered to Messrs. Ehrensward and Wedel Jarlsberg, which I had put into his hands, saying he wished the communication might be made in writing. It was evident he was already acquainted with the contents, and the whole of his behaviour intimated strongly to my apprehension, that the answer was already concerted, and the line they will follow determined. Under these circumstances your Lordship will not I trust disapprove of my resolution to give in a note, nor of the detail into which I have entered. I have endeavoured to place in as strong a point of view as possible the manifest aggression of Denmark and Sweden, the distinction of their case from that of Prussia, the firm determination of His Majesty, and the means by which the court of Berlin without compromising its dignity may avoid a rupture. Conceiving it to be His Majesty's constant desire to remain if possible upon good terms with Prussia, I have been careful not to assume the appearance of making a categorical demand, but at the same time I have endeavoured to express myself in such a manner as to make it very difficult for this government to conceal or disguise its real intentions. I have also laboured to confine myself, as much as possible, not only to the spirit, but the terms of your Lordship's several instructions.

The appearances I have reported certainly indicate dispositions very unpromising for the continuance of the relations of amity between His Majesty and this court. I am not however even yet convinced, that they will proceed to the length of actual hostilities, but I cannot be very sanguine, and shall spare no pains to observe all the motions of the government.

**Copy of a note from Carysfort to Haugwitz, Berlin, 27 January 1801**

Le soussigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire étant chargé par sa cour de communiquer au ministère de Sa Majesté Prussienne, la note remise, d'après les ordres de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande aux ministres de la Suède et du Danemark à Londres, ne saurait s'acquitter de cette tâche sans exprimer la satisfaction sincère avec laquelle il se voit en même temps autorisé à déclarer combien

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204 Carysfort to Grenville, 23 December 1800.
205 Wedel Jarlsberg, Frederik Anton, Danish diplomat, ambassador at the court of St James from 1789 to 1806.
Sa Majesté est convaincue, que la Prusse n’a jamais pu approuver les démarches qui ont donné lieu à la note susdite. Ces démarches manifestent le dessein de prescrire à l’Empire Britannique une loi sur un objet de la plus haute importance, de lui imposer cette loi par la force, et de former à cet effet, et avant qu’aucune des puissances, qui ont pris part à cette mesure, en ait donné le moindre avertissement à Sa Majesté le Roi, une ligue destinée à faire revivre des prétentions, que la Grande Bretagne a de tout temps regardées comme contraires à ses droits et à ses intérêts, et déclarées telles, toutes les fois que l’occasion s’en présentait, prétentions que la cour de Russie a non seulement abandonnées par le fait, mais qu’elle s’est même engagé à combattre, par un traité actuellement en vigueur, et dont Sa Majesté est en droit de demander l’exécution.

Lorsqu’un vaisseau de guerre que Sa Majesté Danoise a résisté par la force, à l’exercice d’un droit, que le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l’Irlande réclame en vertu des stipulations les plus claires et les plus précises de ses traités avec la cour de Danemark, S. M. s’est bornée à prendre les mesure qu’exigeait la protection du commerce de ses sujets contre tout effet des hostilités que cette conduite de la part d’un officier, portant des ordres de S. M. Danoise semblait annoncer, un arrangement amical a mis fin à ces premiers différends, et le roi s’est flatté d’avoir, non seulement écarté tout sujet de mésintelligence ultérieure, mais fortifié même, et cimenté de nouveau l’amitié entre les deux cours. Dans cet état des choses S. M. a dû apprendre avec autant de surprise que de regret, que la cour de Copenhague était entrée dans des négociations pour ressusciter la ligne hostile contre la Grande Bretagne, qui eut lieu en 1780, et qu’il se faisait même des armements très actifs sans les ports Danois. Dans ces circonstances, le roi devait nécessairement demander des explications à la cour de Danemark. Il a reçu au même moment la nouvelle qu’une convention avait été signée à Pétersbourg, et la réponse du ministère danois, qui ne laissait plus subsister le moindre doute sur la nature et le but de cette convention en ce qu’elle déclarait d’une manière positive:

Que ses négociations avaient pour objet le renouvellement des engagements, qui dans les années 1780 et 1781, furent contractés par les même Puissances.

En ajoutant:

Que Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Russie avait proposé aux puissance du Nord, de rétablir ces engagements sous leur forme primitive. Les engagements en question avaient pour but, de fonder des principes de droit maritime qui n’avaient jamais été reconnus par les tribunaux de l’Europe, et les parties contractantes s’obligaient

206. This refers to the first Anglo-Danish Convention signed on 29 August 1800.
réciproquement à les soutenir par la force, et à les imposer par la force aux autres nations.

Ils étaient, de plus, en contradiction avec les stipulations expresses des traités subsistants, entre les cours de Stockholm et de Copenhague, avec l'Empire Britannique.

La convention qui doit renouveler ces engagements, fut négociée et conclue dans un temps, où la cour de Pétersbourg avait pris les mesures les plus hostiles, contre les personnes et les propriétés des sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique, et où il n'y avait absolument que l'extrême modération du roi, qui pût autoriser encore les autres puissances à ne pas regarder cette cour comme en état de guerre ouverte avec lui. Dans une telle posture des affaires, rien certainement ne pouvait être plus opposé à toute idée de neutralité, rien ne pouvait annoncer plus clairement des dispositions hostiles que de ne pas suspendre, même les nouveaux engagements, jusqu'à ce qu'il fût décidé si la Russie ne serait pas considérée comme une puissance belligérante. On pouvait d'autant plus s'attendre à un ménagement pareil, et la cour de Copenhague surtout devait d'autant plus s'y prêter, que par un article exprès de la ligue de 1780, on avait entendu assurer à la Russie la disposition des ports, et des arsenaux du Danemark et de la Norvège, pour pousser des opérations de guerre au-delà des limites de la Baltique.

Quand le roi a donc été instruit par une des parties contractantes elles-mêmes, que l'objet des négociations qu'on avait entamées à St Pétersbourg, sans en donner la moindre connaissance préalable à Sa Majesté, et qui, d'après les informations parvenues au roi, ont conduit enfin, à une convention actuellement signée, n'était autre que renouveler les engagements anciennement pris, pour imposer à Sa Majesté par la force un code de lois, auquel elle avait déjà refusé son assentiment et quand il a appris de plus, de manière à ne pas pouvoir en douter, que les puissances maritimes de la Baltique, qui avaient contracté ces engagements, s'appliquaient avec la plus grande activité, à des préparatifs de guerre, qu'une de ces puissances s'était même placée en état d'hostilités effectives avec Sa Majesté, il ne lui restait absolument que l'alternative, ou de se soumettre à cette nouvelle loi, ou de prendre les mesures qui pouvaient efficacement arrêter l'effet hostile de la ligue, qui d'après la déclaration de la cour de Danemark elle-même était évidemment dirigée contre elle.

Cependant Sa Majesté n'a pas manqué de faire preuve dans cette occasion de sa justice et de sa bienveillance habituelle, et tout en jugeant nécessaire pour la conservation des droits et des intérêts de son peuple de s'assurer d'un gage contre l'attaque qu'on se prépare à livrer à ses droits, elle a mis la plus grande sollicitude à prévenir les pertes et les souffrances des individus. Bien persuadé que sa conduite
envers les états neutres a toujours été réglée par des lois reconnues, lois dont la base et la sanction ne se trouvaient pas dans des intérêts passagers, ou dans les convenances du moment, mais dans les principes généraux du droit, les lois qui ont été adoptées et suivies par tous les tribunaux maritimes de l'Europe, le roi ne renonce pas encore à l'espoir que les cours de Stockholm et de Copenhague ne voudront point encourir la responsabilité qui doit peser sur les auteurs d'une guerre, qu'elles ne voudront point s'y exposer, surtout pour introduire des innovations, dont l'injustice évidente a déterminé les puissances mêmes qui avaient été les premières à les proposer, à en combattre l'exécution lorsqu'elles se sont trouvées engagées dans une guerres, et qui d'ailleurs sont contraires aux traités qu'elles ont faits avec Sa Majesté.

La démarche, à laquelle le roi vient de se résoudre, a dû être prévue depuis longtemps. Le gouvernement Britannique n'a jamais dissimulé qu'il considérait la ligue de 1780 comme hostile, et ne s'est jamais relâché dans l'attention avec laquelle il a veillé au maintien des droits de sa nation. Il a résisté immédiatement à toute tentative de mettre en activité les principes qu'on voulait établir à l'époque susmentionnée, et le soussigné a pris occasion de dire à S. E. Monsieur le Comte de Haugwitz, dans la première conférence qu'il a eu l'honneur d'avoir avec elle, après son arrivé à Berlin, que Sa Majesté ne se soumettrait jamais à des prétentions inconciliables avec les vrais principes des droit des gens, et attentatoires aux bases de la grandeur et de la sécurité maritime de son empire. Encore au commencement du mois de Novembre, le soussigné a eu l'honneur de prévenir Son Excellence, comme le ministre d'une puissance liée d'amitié intime avec Sa Majesté, à quelles extrémités fâcheuses conduirait inévitablement la tentatives des puissances du nord, de ressusciter ces prétentions. Il n'a jamais cessé de renouveler cette déclaration, toutes les fois que, par ordre de son souverain, il a été l'organe de la satisfaction que donnaient au roi les assurances réitérées de l'amitié de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, et de ces dispositions conciliatoires, de la parfaite sincérité desquelles le roi n'a jamais douté un seul moment. Et Son Excellence M. le Comte de Haugwitz se rappellera facilement de l'époque, où le soussigné, intimement convaincu des intentions amicales du gouvernement Prussien lui a communiqué par ordre de Sa Majesté Britannique la résolution du roi de n'acquiescer à aucune mesure tendant à innover par la force les lois maritimes actuellement en vigueur, mais au contraire de les défendre, à tout événement, et d'en maintenir l'exécution, telle qu'elle a eu lieu dans tous les tribunaux de l'Europe avant l'année 1780.

Si la cour de Danemark n'avait pas annoncé de la manière la moins équivoque, quels étaient le but et la teneur de ses négociations et de ses engagements, la déclaration
de la même cour, que la Prusse est une des puissances intéressées dans ces négociations aurait suffi au roi pour le rassurer et pour lui prouver qu'elles ne pouvaient pas avoir un caractère hostile relativement à son gouvernement, et le roi se tient encore persuadé qu'il peut compter absolument sur l'amitié de Sa Majesté Prussienne. Il est vrai qu'il n'existe aucune analogie, par rapport à la Grande Bretagne et l'Irlande, entre la situation de la Prusse, et celle des autres puissances du nord. Ces dernières puissances sont liées à Sa Majesté par les obligations mutuelles de traités particuliers, très favorables à leurs intérêts, et modifiant et mitigeant plus ou moins la sévérité de la loi générale, tandis qu'il n'existe pas de traité commercial entre Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse et la Grande Bretagne, et que tout doit être réglé parmi eux, d'après les principes généraux du droit et les usages reçus.

Cependant, lorsque Sa Majesté réfléchit à ses propres dispositions, et à son intention invariable de cultiver l'amitié d'un monarque, auquel elle est attachée par tant de liens, elle n'entrevoit pas la possibilité d'un différend qui ne pourrait être terminé promptement et facilement par un discussion amicale. Les assurances réitérées de sentiments analogues de la part de Sa Majesté Prussienne que le soussigné a été autorisé à transmettre à sa cour, confirment cette supposition agréable, et les principes connus, qui ont toujours dirigé Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, ne permettent absolument pas de croire qu'il se soit engagé ou qu'il puisse s'engager à soutenir par la force, et en commun avec des puissances, dont les actions ont manifesté les intentions les plus hostiles contre Sa Majesté Britannique, des principes qui ne peuvent être fondés que sur un prétexte de neutralité. En chargeant le soussigné de faire ces communications, le roi n'a donc eu d'autre motif que celui de donner à Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse une nouvelle preuve de sa confiance et de son estime particulière, et il est pleinement convaincu que Sa Majesté Prussienne aura applaudi à sa ferme résolution de défendre les droits et les intérêts de sa couronne. Quelle que puisse être la façon de penser du gouvernement Prussien par rapport aux nouveaux principes eux-mêmes, ce gouvernement est trop juste et connaît trop bien ce que les souverains doivent à leurs peuples, et ce qu'ils se doivent entre'eux pour avoir pu favoriser un moment l'intention d'employer la force pour déterminer Sa Majesté Britannique à adopter d'après le bon plaisir d'autres puissances un nouveaux code de lois maritimes qu'il croit incompatible avec l'honneur et la sécurité de son empire.
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 29 January 1801

My Lord,

Undoubted intelligence is received that M. de Kolychev, a very few days after his arrival at Petersburg, was ordered by the emperor to proceed in quality of ambassador to Paris. He is attended by a numerous suite, and passes by Dresden, without taking Berlin in his way. My authority states that M. de Haugwitz appears hurt at this circumstance, and complains heavily of the precipitation with which all parties act.

I have good reason to believe that the ratification of the Convention of Petersburg was sent from this court, about the end of last week. This circumstance is in itself of no great importance if any credit is to be given to the reports and appearances, which have indicated that the Prussian minister in the act of accession, had made some reservation to enable his court, at all events to avoid the extremity of a war. But there are many concurrent symptoms of the decisive influence of Russia at this moment over the councils of Prussia, and it is very improbable that the emperor should not insist on her taking part in the war. France when the determination of Great Britain is known, may perhaps doubt whether she will find her interest in measures which give the final blow to all her foreign commerce, and which must end in disabling powers who, while they remained in the predicament of neutrals were a considerable check upon the British Empire, but once engaged in war must soon be totally disabled or subscribe to our terms. But the probability seems on the whole to be strong that Prussia will incur the losses incident to a rupture with His Majesty from the fear of a more urgent and imminent danger on the side of Prussia.

I have the honour to inclose a paper on French affairs.

I am informed that M. de Kolychev is probably now advanced as far as Dresden.

P.S. M. de Rosenkrantz is arrived at this place and I am told imputes the emperor's displeasure to his having expressed some doubts on the policy of engaging Denmark at this moment in the northern league.
no. 13
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 30 January 1801
Most secret

My Lord,

Information having been received that as early as the beginning of this month preparations for defence were already making at Heligoland, the design of attempting a surprise on that place has been abandoned for the present. Your Lordship is to be very careful not to let any idea get out at Berlin of the intention which was entertained in this respect. But it is the king's pleasure that without any reference to Heligoland you should if the state of things at Berlin be such as to admit it, enter on the discussion respecting the neutrality of the Elbe, and make the proposal mentioned in my dispatch on the subject. You will also if necessary give strong assurances that every practicable measure will be taken for ensuring due respect to the neutral flag of Prussia (according to the law of neutrality as always recognized by the British courts of Admiralty) and this both in the Baltic and elsewhere.

no. 11
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 30 January 1801

My Lord,

As my last dispatch called your Lordship's attention to the circumstances attending the appointment and subsequent mission of M. de Kolychev, and as it is undoubtedly of great importance to collect what may have immediately led to this measure, I have thought it my duty to ascertain how far it was probable that the report of M. de Sprengporten might have been the foundation of it. His aide-de-camp Friesenhausen passed through Berlin on the 1st of this month, and I have reason to think that the accounts I received that M. de Kolychev must have reached Dresden some days ago was a mistake. It may therefore be naturally supposed, that the dispatches carried by Friesenhausen, gave the emperor the satisfaction he had asked from the French government, concerning the situation of his allies, the Elector of Bavaria, and the Duke of Wurttemberg, and the Kings of Naples and Sardinia. But as these points had been explicitly opened to the French government, and the emperor's displeasure at the answer he had received had been signified, previous to General Sprengporten's journey to Paris, it is probable that Friesenhausen was the bearer, not
only of an answer satisfactory as to them, but of some farther overture on the part of France.

As your Lordship has direct communication with Denmark, I shall not trouble you with any detail concerning that court. It still continues to be said that the affair of the neutral maritime league is not concluded, and that both Prussia and Denmark have made their signature conditional, but I have no reason to distrust the information I gave your Lordship of the ratification having been sent from hence, nor have I yet been able to obtain another interview with Count Haugwitz, though as I told your Lordship, I wrote to him two days ago, to urge him about the limits of the Ems.

[cipher]

I have some intimation, but not so precise or fully authenticated as to enable me to assure your Lordship of it or to act myself in consequence, that instructions have been sent to Monsieur Jacobi by the last post to insinuate to His Majesty's government the danger to which the Electorate of Hanover will be exposed in case of any rupture with Prussia, and the notion which I find prevails here is, that the exemption of Prussian ships from the embargo is not to be attributed to any principles of moderation or friendship to Prussia, but is merely the effect of fear upon that account.

no. 12
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 1 February 1801

My Lord,

I received intelligence last night, that the arrival of King Louis the 18th at Memel, was hourly expected on the 26th of last month, in consequence of an order sent to that unhappy prince, by the Emperor of Russia, to quit the Russian territory. Of this fact there is no doubt. The consul Drusina expresses his expectation, that he may receive an application from His Most Christian Majesty for assistance, and is at a loss how to act in such a case. As the King of France takes refuge in the Prussian dominions, and waits at Memel until he hears the pleasure of the court of Berlin, it may

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207 Louis XVIII (1755-1824), in exile first at Verona, then at Blanckenburg, a little town in the Harz region in Germany, and then in Russia where Paul placed the chateau of Mittau in Courland at his disposal. After relations between France and Russia improved, Louis was ordered to leave Russian territory on 22 January 1801. He asked Friedrich Wilhelm III permission to stay on Prussian soil, and after consultation with Bonaparte, he was allowed to reside in Warsaw, then part of Prussian territory, until 1802.
yet be presumed, that he will be supplied by the government, with what may be necessary either for his immediate subsistence, or to enable him to pursue his journey. and in the meantime, I may have the honour of receiving such instructions as may enable me to act agreeably to His Majesty's wishes in any conjuncture, which may arise from this event. M. de Kolychev passed through Memel on Friday the 23rd ultimo.

Your Lordship's dispatches no. 10 and 11 are just received. I have not a copy of your second letter to Count Rostopchin. It reached me under flying seal, with directions to peruse, and forward it immediately, but to make no use of it here, for which reason, and because circumstances prevented it from being transcribed, without risking the loss of a present opportunity for forwarding it, I have not been able to deliver it to Count Haugwitz, but have stated the substance in a note with which I have accompanied the other communications in such a manner as will I believe have answered the purpose your Lordship had in view.

Intelligence has been received here of an armistice concluded in Italy, between the French and Austrians. M. Hudelist has not received the particulars, but it is thought the Piave and the Tagliamento are the boundaries assigned to the to armies respectively, and that the Austrians retain Mantua, but have delivered up Ancona. [cipher]

I have not yet received any answer to the note which I delivered with the notification of the embargo, and shall think it best, if no new circumstances should occur, to wait for what your Lordship's dispatches tend to give me reason to expect before I press the Prussian ministry any further.

A conversation with M. Lombard has been just reported to me from a quarter upon which I can perfectly rely, and by which it clearly appears that the Prussian government is under the greatest distress and embarrassment at not seeing means of escaping from the consequences of the measures in which it has been so rashly

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208 The news was a little precipitous since the Treaty of Lunéville was not signed until 9 February 1801.

209 *The Piave is a river near Venice; the Tagliamento is a river in the province of Udine; Mantua is a town in the north of Italy, capital of the province of the same name. It was part of Austrian Lombardy. In 1796 it had about 30,000 inhabitants. It played a predominant role during the first Italian campaign and after the Treaty of Lunéville was integrated into the Cisalpine Republic. Ancona, a fortified town on the Adriatic, was part of the Pontifical states about 168 kilometres from Rome. Taken by the French in 1797, it became capital of the Department of Metauro.*
engaged. Its intention however is to keep aloof till the solicitations of its confederates, which it cannot resist, and which will certainly be strongly urged, obliges it to take a part.

[end of cipher]

P.S. Beurnonville said this evening that a courier who arrived from Paris in the morning had brought him the passports for M. de Kolychev, which he should forward to Leipzig. M. de Krüdener dispatched a messenger today to Petersburg.

**Copy of a note from Carysfort to Haugwitz, Berlin, 1 February 1801**

Le soussigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique a l'honneur, par ordre de Sa Cour, de s'adresser à Son Excellence M. le Comte de Haugwitz Ministre d'Etat et de Cabinet, pour lui communiquer les pièces ci-jointes.

L'esprit de modération et de tolérance qui règne dans la lettre de Lord Grenville au Comte de Rostopchin, en date du 5 décembre n'échappera pas assurément à l'observation de Son Excellence.

Un traité solennel avait donné aux sujets respectifs des deux puissances, une pleine et entière garantie de la liberté du commerce, et même en cas de rupture, il était convenu non seulement qu'un embargo ne serait pas mis sur les vaisseaux, mais que les sujets de part et d'autre jouiraient de l'espace d'un an entier pour retirer leurs effets et arranger leurs affaires dans le pays.

En dépit de ces engagements sacrés, les vaisseaux des sujets Britanniques ont été arrêtés dans les ports de la Russie, et leurs propriétés mises en séquestre, ou vendues, sous divers prétextes d'une manière inusitée et arbitraire. Leurs personnes ont aussi été mises en arrestation, et des matelots Britanniques en grande nombre enlevés par force de leurs vaisseaux, et envoyés, sous garde, et au fort de l'hiver, dans l'intérieur du pays.

C'est ensuite de ces nouvelles violences, que Lord Grenville, Secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires étrangères, a reçu ordre de Sa Majesté, d'adresser au Comte de Rostopchin une seconde lettre, dans laquelle Sa Majesté annonce la nomination d'un commissaire pour veiller à la sûreté et pourvoir aux besoins de ses sujets infortunés, ce qui est usité même entre les puissances qui sont en guerre ouverte. Lord Grenville y réclame aussi, formellement au nom de Sa Majesté l'exécution du traité de 1793. Mais

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210 Leipzig, a town in the Kingdom of Saxony about 170 kilometres south-west of Berlin.
tout en faisant les justes et fortes représentations et les réclamations qu'exigeaient des circonstances pareilles, les dispositions constantes de Sa Majesté de rétablir la bonne intelligence, et de maintenir les anciennes liaisons entre les deux couronnes, ont été énoncées de la manière la plus claire et la plus satisfaisante.

Sa Majesté Britannique connaît d'avance les sentiments qu'éprouvera le roi de Prusse quand il apprendra la manière inouïe et inexcusable dont il a été répondu à Sa Majesté Britannique par la cour de St Pétersbourg. La lettre du Comte Rostopchin au Lord Grenville en date du 20 dec./1 jan. dont le soussigné a ordre de communiquer une copie à S. E. le Comte de Haugwitz, en réponse à celle du 5 décembre mettra S. M. Prussienne à même d'en juger, sans qu'il soit nécessaire au soussigné d'y ajouter aucune remarque.

Le soussigné est ordonné de notifier formellement à la cour de Berlin, que ce procédé de la part de l'empereur des Russies a mis fin à toutes correspondance entre les cours de Londres et de St Pétersbourg, et combiné avec les outrages commis sur les personnes et les propriétés des sujets de Sa Majesté, et avec la signature d'une confédération hostile formée par l'empereur de Russie, pour la fin expresse et avouée d'imposer à l'Empire Britannique, par la force, des innovations dans la loi maritime, auxquelles il a déjà refusé de souscrire, a produit enfin un état de guerre actuelle et ouverte entre la Grande Bretagne et l'Irlande, et la Russie. Il ne sera pas inutile de remarquer que l'empereur des Russies ne peut être regardé comme puissance neutre dans la crise actuelle, étant engagé en guerre avec S. M. Britannique avant même d'avoir conclu sa paix avec la France.

Le soussigné aura rempli la tache qui lui a été assignée dès qu'il aura déclaré au nom du Roi Son Maître que Sa Majesté, réfléchissant sur les circonstances actuelles de l'Europe veut s'abstenir de demander à Sa Majesté Prussienne les secours stipulés par le traité d'alliance entre les deux couronnes, mais qu'elle regarde le casus foederis comme entièrement conforme aux circonstances où elle se trouve et qu'elle ne doute nullement qu'elle ne reçoive de la part de son allié toutes les preuves d'amitié que les événements de cette nouvelle guerre pourront demander. Le soussigné à l'honneur de renouveler à S. E. l'assurance de sa haute considération.
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 3 February 1801

My Lord,

cipher

No notice has yet been taken of this court of the communications I have lately made by His Majesty's commands. I have been solicitous to mark as much as possible, both in public and in private, that the conduct of the court of Petersburg in the affair of the two embargoes and the measures connected with them has, independently of the convention signed at Petersburg, placed the two countries in a state of war, because there seems reason to believe that the cabinet of Berlin hopes to draw from hence the plea on which they may most rely to avoid engaging in open hostility. I had not at any time thought it expedient to disguise that His Majesty would consider the part taken by the emperor in forming that convention as an additional and most serious grievance, and it is plain that the continuance of Prussia's neutrality must remain very problematical whilst she continues to place so high a value upon the emperor's friendship, who will probably not admit of any pleas for disputing his pleasure and whose forces threaten that point of the Prussian dominions which is most vulnerable.

It is fit however that your Lordship be apprized that Count Haugwitz was applied to in consequence of the news that the British ships had been directed to return from Altona by the syndic of Hamburg, as late as the day before yesterday and gave the strongest assurances that the neutrality of the Elbe would be maintained. I am impatient therefore for the communications your Lordship gives me reason to expect as they may lead, before Prussia is forced into some hostilities by the establishment of some arrangement respecting that river and the town of Hamburg which may obviate or prevent the interruption of the British trade.

cipher

I am informed that M. de Løvendal, the new Danish minister to the court of Petersburg, went through this place the day before yesterday on his way to Russia.

Danneskjold-Løvendal, Major-General Count François-Xavier Joseph, Danish diplomat, descendant of an illegitimate line of the Danish Royal House. He was sent to Petersburg on his first diplomatic mission to deliver his country's ratification of the Armed Neutrality. He left Copenhagen on 22 January, arrived in Petersburg on 3 March, exchanged ratifications on 10 March, and stayed as Danish minister until his recall in August 1802.
The Comte de Caraman\textsuperscript{212} is returned to Berlin from Petersburg. He accompanied his Royal Master Louis XVIII from Mittau to Memel. He says that the emperor has declared he will continue the allowance hither made to the king.

no. 14
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 6 February 1801

My Lord,

I have the honour herewith to transmit to your Lordship, a printed copy of the most gracious speech which His Majesty was pleased to deliver on opening the first session of the Parliament of his United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as also the addresses of both Houses to His Majesty - together with the king's answer to the same.

As it is of great moment that your Lordship should be made acquainted as early as possible with His Majesty's sentiments at this important crisis, I have judged it expedient to forward this to you by a messenger.

no. 14
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 7 February 1801

My Lord,

\[\text{[cipher]}\]

I have been of opinion from the first moment I was informed by your Lordship of the exceptions made in favour of Prussia to the embargo laid on in the ports of the United Kingdom, that it was advisable to endeavour to lead the Prussian government into some measure or declaration for maintaining the neutrality of the Elbe, and that it might be managed so as to be felt by the King of Prussia as a mark of His Majesty's attention and regard. I shall lose no time in obeying the king's commands upon that subject though I feel myself in some embarrassment by not having received your Lordship's dispatch no. 12. It will probably reach me by the post of tomorrow, and I am therefore desirous of postponing till the morning the seeking an appointment with Count Haugwitz. The object of this court at this moment is procrastination, but for what end cannot easily be ascertained. I fear they only wait the determination of Russia whose armies are in force on the frontier and whose support is what they chiefly rely

\textsuperscript{212}Comte de Caraman, was part of Louis XVIII's entourage.
on to accomplish their ambitious designs in Germany. The character of the emperor will however certainly strengthen the natural disposition of this court to caution, and I shall use my utmost diligence to avail myself of every favourable circumstance.

I employed an English gentleman of the name of Solly belonging to the House of Isaac Solly and Sons in London to try if there were any means of executing the commission your Lordship charged me with by your dispatch no. 1 and sent him to Danzig for that purpose. His family are well connected and established here and I have reason to think might be of use. I shall not enter into any particulars as I understand they mean to offer their services to government in England and will explain the object they have in view.

I think it my duty to inform your Lordship that I am again informed that Baron Jacobi has received orders to make a strong and harsh representation to your Lordship mentioning reprisals against His Majesty's German dominions. I am further assured that copies are made of my notes (and I presume of the answers that I every moment expect to receive) and sent round to all the courts in the world. This seems to announce an immediate rupture.

Monsieur de Rosenkrantz whom Mr. Garlike has seen, speaks as if he thought that all the powers engaged in the northern convention were too far advanced to retract. [end of cipher]

I know from good authority that the general report of some misunderstanding between the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Sweden was so far true, that the latter hastened his departure to prevent the affront of being sent away, which he escaped very narrowly at last. But though the cause assigned for this in conversation, that the emperor resented some sarcasm of the King of Sweden upon a theatrical representation, receives pretty general credit, I was not sufficiently satisfied with it to communicate it in a dispatch. I now learn that the emperor in the diploma, by which he constituted the king a Commander of Malta, omitted the title of heir of Denmark and Norway, which is one of His Swedish Majesty's titles, but which the emperor has likewise assumed. The diploma was refused, the king set out before the time he has fixed, but all the detachments of the household and kitchen which had been stationed on the road for the King of Sweden's accommodation were recalled.
Carysfort to Grenville, Belin, 10 February 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

I have not yet been able to obtain an interview with Count Haugwitz in order to sound him concerning the neutrality of the Elbe, in the meantime it seems to be the prevailing opinion that this court will support Sweden and Denmark, and it is again confidentially said that Baron Jacobi has been directed to threaten reprisals upon Hanover, and that I am to receive an answer to the same effect. I am told that the Duke of Brunswick urged the court of Berlin strongly to take immediate possession of His Majesty's German dominions as the only means of preventing the French from establishing themselves there.

I must observe to your Lordship that notwithstanding the formal notification I have made to the Prussian minister, as no manifest or proclamation has appeared in England, it seems to be not believed that we are actually at war with Russia, and this persuasion may have taken an effect upon the councils both of this court and those of Stockholm and Copenhagen. From the language I have heard here it might be thought that they are desirous an open rupture should take place so that Russia being at war upon another ground, they may be at liberty to act without it in the business of the maritime convention, but it is not probable that the emperor will at all consider this distinction, and if he should insist upon war I think that Prussia will not have courage enough to refuse.

[end of cipher]

Not withstanding the mission of M. de Kolychev, doubts are still entertained whether an alliance or even a peace will take place between Russia and France. It is said that the emperor insists on the immediate evacuation of that part of Germany on the right of the Rhine, not occupied by the French, and M. de Tiesenhausen, aide-de-camp to General Sprengporten, has just passed through here on his return to Paris. He was thought to have been the bearer of a letter from the First Consul to the emperor, and is now supposed to have brought back the answer to it.
no. 16
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 10 February 1801

My Lord,

I have this moment received intelligence from a person whose veracity I cannot doubt, and who professes to have read the note itself, that the answer of the Prussian government which I have been for some time expecting, and which will probably be delivered to me when I have my audience of Count Haugwitz, if not before, contains an express declaration, that unless the embargo laid upon Swedish and Danish vessels in the British ports be immediately withdrawn, the King of Prussia will consider himself as at war with His Majesty. It is impossible without having seen the context to form a decided judgement from a detached expression as to the import of a state paper. The expression itself may not have been accurately and exactly reported, but I can no longer entertain a doubt, but that the Prussian government has made its option for war. If the note shall appear to be in terms inconsistent with the dignity and independence of His Majesty's crown, it appears to me that I am not bound to transmit it, and that it would be fit that I should return it, but it seems most probable that M. de Jacobi has already received orders to make a similar declaration in London, and that I may in consequence receive His Majesty's orders to leave this court before I am obliged to come to any determination. I shall press by all the means in my power for the Prussian declaration, and in the conduct I may pursue in consequence, my object will be to manage so that I may leave Berlin by the king's order, and not by that of His Prussian Majesty. The compensation which the cabinet of Berlin means to take for the loss of all the foreign commerce of the country, is I fully believe, the Electorate of Hanover, and I must consider it as a corroboration of the many symptoms that such a design has been long in agitation, and is now in forwardness, that the hereditary Prince of Orange a few nights since said it was reported, and in such a manner as to give him serious uneasiness, that the Prussian troops were in motion with a view to take possession of Holland. I have not however heard of any change in the stations of the troops, but they have long occupied all the positions most proper to insure the success of an invasion of the territory belonging to His Majesty.

I have already mentioned to your Lordship in my last dispatch, that I am informed the Duke of Brunswick has strongly urged the King of Prussia to this measure, alleging that no other means remained to prevent its being occupied by the French.
It is necessary to observe that what was said by the Prince of Orange was made under the strictest confidence.

Separate

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have this day drawn for the sum of £116.4 payable to the order of Mr. Richard, at the usual term. I inclose a receipt for this sum, which brings M. de la Palu's account to the 16th ultimo.

no. 17
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 13 February 1801

My Lord,

I have the honour to send your Lordship the note which I have just received from Count Haugwitz. I have already in former dispatches anticipated the contents, and I have so fully explained my notion of the present views and motives of the Prussian government, that with regard to them I have nothing to add. I should rejoice indeed if I could call to mind any circumstance indicatory of a pacific disposition. Your Lordship will observe how little consistent the general tenor of the note itself, appears with those reports of the official language of Count Haugwitz, which I have at several times transmitted to your Lordship, after having submitted them to his inspection, and received under his hand his testimony to their fidelity. The confidential manner in which, with the hope of deriving some advantage from it to His Majesty's service, I have always affected to treat with him, made it natural to expect that if he wished for peace before the cabinet came to determine upon the language to be held at such an important crisis, he should have endeavoured to discover from me by what means without incurring the necessity of a rupture with Great Britain he might manage the temper and resentment of the other northern powers. But since my first notification of the embargo, I have industriously sought occasions to speak with him. The limits in the Ems furnished for some time a topic, which it was the interest of Prussia, in case

213 Although the note was written several days before it was delivered and is dated 12 February, it was handed to Carysfort on 13 February. It was a reply to the two notes that Carysfort previously passed Haugwitz demanding an explanation as to Prussia's position in the Armed Neutrality. It energetically emphasises the King's agreement with the principles of neutral sea rights and clearly declares his willingness to observe his treaty obligations towards the other northern powers.
she remained neutral to discuss. His Majesty's orders to me respecting the Elbe gave me an opportunity, without specifying the object, of again repeatedly inviting him to conversation in which as I told him, I should give him new proofs of His Majesty's friendship and attention to the King of Prussia. But he has always put me off, and this circumstance furnishes a strong presumption that he has hesitated not upon the substance, but only the manner of making the present declaration. I do not however, though I have sedulously enquired, hear as yet of any military preparation.

Baron Reden has just been with me to inform me of his conversation with Count Haugwitz upon his delivering to him a note, which the Regency of Hanover have sent by His Majesty's command.²¹⁴ His report of it seems to leave no doubt of the intentions of Prussia. Count Haugwitz said that Hanover had long received protection, but it was now become a matter of great difficulty if not impossible. Denmark and Russia and France would seek their enemy wherever they could reach him, and upon M. de Reden's remarking that the Hanoverian dominions made no part of the British Empire, and that Prussia herself had received the benefit of the distinction, he answered dryly that it was a metaphysical distinction, which these Frenchmen would not understand, and he must observe besides that Prussian subjects had suffered immense losses by the depredations of the English, and indemnification must be taken for them, where it could be found. Baron Reden urged the loss of trade the whole of this part of Germany would sustain in case of a rupture with England. This he admitted, but said we should be the greatest sufferers, for that he could impose his own terms upon us by famine.

I have nothing else to say to your Lordship, but that there is a mystery involving the journey of M. de Kolychev. It was universally believed here last night that he had not yet passed Custrin²¹⁵ when a person dispatched by M. de Krüdener, for the purpose of giving notice of his approach, sent off an estafette which reached this place yesterday, and in consequence of which M. de Krüdener set out this morning in hope to overtake M. de Kolychev at Leipzig. But I have this moment received a

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²¹⁴ The Electorate of Hanover was governed by a Geheimräte, or Privy Council, which ruled the country in the absence of George III. The Council was headed by the Kammerpräsident Graf Karl Rudolph August von Kielmansegg. Other members of the Geheimräte were: Christian Ludwig August von Arnswaldt; Georg August von von Steinberg; Claus von der Decken (1742-1826, not to be confused with Captain von der Decken); and Wilhelm August Rudloff (1747-1823).

²¹⁵ Custrin was a fortified Prussian town about 72 kilometres east of Berlin.
letter from Mr. Elliot, dated the tenth, in which he tells me M. de Kolychev has given us the slip at Dresden,\(^{216}\) having gone to Leipzig without passing here.

Copy of a letter from Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 12 February 1801

Le Ministre d'Etat & de Cabinet soussigné a rendu compte au Roi des deux notes que Mylord Carysfort, Envoyé extraordinaire & Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne & de l'Irlande, lui a fait l'honneur de lui remettre en date du 27 janvier & 1er février.

Chargé d'y faire une réponse détaillée, il doit témoigner d'abord à Mylord Carysfort, que Sa Majesté n'a pu apprendre qu'avec une peine et un regret infinis les mesures violentes et précipitées auxquelles la Cour de Londres s'est portée contre les puissances maritimes du Nord. L'erreur seule a pu les dicter, et les raisons que l'office du 27 allègue, le prouvent assez. Il y est dit: que l'association maritime a eu pour but de renverser les Traités précédemment conclus avec l'Angleterre, de lui prescrire des loix sur les principes dont la neutralité devait être le simple prétexte, de lui imposer ces loix par la force, & de former pour cet effet une ligne hostile contre-elle.

Rien de plus étranger à la négociation susdite, que les bases qu'on lui prête. La justice, la modération y présidèrent, et la communication des pièces qui s'y rapportent à celles des puissances en guerre qui ont eu la justice et la patience d'en attendre le moment, va incessamment en faire foi.

Lorsque dans les premiers jours du mois de janvier, le ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique demanda officiellement au soussigné: 'Si les cours du Nord avaient effectivement formé la confédération dont le bruit venoit de se répandre, et si la Prusse y était entrée', le Roi qui aime à respecter les égards que les souverains se doivent, et la liberté qu'a chaque état indépendant, de consulter ses propres intérêts sans en rendre compte à personne, a cru devoir alors suspendre des communications, qui appartenaient à ses alliés comme à lui, et il se contenta de répondre: 'qu'ayant regardé d'un oeil tranquille les liaisons contrôlées précédemment à son insçu par l'Angleterre, il avoit droit d'exiger la même confiance; que si le Roi de la Grande Bretagne se croyait appelé à soutenir les droits et les intérêts de son empire, Sa Majesté ne devait pas moins à ses peuples de veiller par tous ses moyens à la défendre des leurs'.

Cette réponse pouvait suffire il y a peu de semaines. Au point où les choses en sont venues, le Roi se doit à lui-même, de s'expliquer envers la cour de Londres sur

\(^{216}\) Dresden, capital of Saxony.
l'esprit du traité, qu'elle n'attaque peut-être que parce qu'elle le méconnait. Loin de nourrir les vues offensives dont on accuse gratuitement les parties contractantes, elles sont expressément convenues, que leurs mesures ne seraient ni hostile, ni au détriment d'aucun pays, mais uniquement tendantes à la sûreté du commerce et de la navigation de leurs sujets. Elles ont eu l'attention d'adapter leurs nouveaux engagements aux circonstances actuelles. L'équité sévère de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, lui a même fait proposer dans les détails, des modifications, qui seules suffiraient pour prouver l'esprit de l'ensemble. On a stipulé de plus, que le traité ne porterait point préjudice aux traités antérieurement conclus avec telle ou telle des puissances belligérantes.

Enfin on s'est engagé à s'en ouvrir avec celles ci, et on allait constater par la franchise des communications la pureté des motifs et des vues. Mais l'Angleterre n'en a pas laissé le temps aux parties contractantes. Si elle avait attendu leur confidence, elle se serait ménagé les démarches tranchantes qui vont propager le feu de la guerre. D'ailleurs il n'aurait tenu qu'à elle de puiser des informations préalables et satisfaisantes dans sa correspondance avec le Danemark; si, au lieu de s'attacher aux deux passages isolés, que le premier office de Mylord Carysfort extrait de la note du Comte de Bernstorff datée du 31 décembre, on avait écouté à Londres l'assurance solennelle qu'elle renferme:

'qu'il n'y a jamais eu lieu de présumer un instant que le Danemark eut conçu contre la Grande Bretagne des projets hostiles ou incompatibles avec le maintien de la bonne harmonie entre les deux couronnes, et que la cour de Copenhague se félicite de trouver l'occasion de démentir de la manière la plus positive des bruits aussi mal fondés.'

Cette déclaration si claire et si positive était consommante au langage que le soussigné a tenu plus d'une fois à Mylord Carysfort sur le même objet, et on a de la peine à concevoir comment après l'avoir reçue la cour d'Angleterre a pu inférer de l'office du ministère Danois.

'que les engagemens des Puissances contractantes visent à fonder des principes de droit maritime, qui n'ont jamais été reconnus par les tribunaux de l'Europe et dont la direction est hostile contre l'Angleterre.'

L'induction est absolument fausse et la teneur même de la réponse de la cour de Danemark l'autorise tout aussi peu que cet autre reproche non mérité qu'on lui fait:

'd'avoir ressuscité une ligue hostile contre la Grande Bretagne et de s'occuper dans cette vue d'armements très actifs.'
Jamais mesures ne furent plus incontestablement défensives que celles de la cour de Copenhague, et on en méconnaîtra moins encore l'esprit, quand on songera combien, avant de se recouvrir même à celles-là, cette cour a essuyé de la part du gouvernement Britannique des démonstrations menaçantes, lors de l'incident de la frégate Freya.

La conduite arbitraire de l'Angleterre dans cette occasion s'explique naturellement par les prétentions qu'elle a élevées depuis si longtemps, et qu'elle reproduit encore à plusieurs reprises dans les offices de Mylord Carysfort, aux dépens de toutes les puissances maritimes et commerçantes. Le gouvernement Britannique s'est arrogé dans la guerre présente, plus que dans toutes les précédentes, la suprématie des mers, et en se formant à son gré un code naval, qui serait difficile à concilier avec les vrais principes du droit des gens, il exerce sur les autres nations amies et neutres, une juridiction usurpée dont il soutient la légitimité, et qu'il veut faire passer pour un droit imprescriptible, sanctionné par tous les tribunaux de l'Europe. Jamais les souverains n'ont accordé, ou adjugé à l'Angleterre la faculté d'évoquer, et de soumettre leurs sujets à ses loix, et dans les cas malheureusement trop fréquents où l'abus de la force l'a emporté sur l'équité, les puissances neutres ont toujours eu soin de lui adresser les réclamations et les protestations les plus énergiques. L'expérience a prouvé que leurs remontrances ont été la plus part du temps infructueuses, et il n'est pas surprenant qu'après tant de vexations multipliées et réitérées, elles ayent conçu le dessein d'y chercher remède et d'établir pour cet effet un concert bien ordonné qui fixât leurs droits, et qui les mit en règle avec les puissances belligérantes mêmes.

L'association maritime telle qu'elle vient d'être consolidée, devait achever vers ce but salutaire, et le Roi ne fait aucune difficulté de déclarer à Sa Majesté Britannique, qu'il y a retrouvé ses propres principes, et qu'intimement persuadé de sa nécessité et de son utilité, il a formellement accédé à la convention conclue à Petersbourg entre les cours de Russie, de Suède & de Danemark, le 16 décembre de l'année dernière. Sa Majesté se trouve ainsi placée au nombre des parties contractantes, et en cette qualité elle est obligé non seulement de prendre une part directe à tous les événements qui intéressent la cause des neutres, mais aussi de la soutenir en vertu de ses engagements par telles mesures efficaces que l'urgence des cas pourra exiger.

Il est dans les notes de Mylord Carysfort un objet sur lequel Sa Majesté ne se croit ni l'obligation de répondre, ni même le droit d'avoir une opinion. Il existe entre les cours de Pétersbourg et de Londres, des discussions absolument étrangères à la question, que cette dernière confond avec elles. Mais autant l'impartialité la plus irréprochable a dirigé jusqu'à présent la conduite de la Prusse, autant le respect pour des engagements, qui eux-mêmes en sont la preuve, dirigeront à l'avenir les démarches
du Roi. Il doit à des stipulations qui n'eurent rien d'hostiles, que la sûreté de ses sujets lui dicta, tous les moyens que la providence a mis en son pouvoir.

Quelques fâcheuses que soient les extrémités auxquelles l'Angleterre s'est portée, le Roi ne désespère pas encore de la possibilité d'un prompt retour à des dispositions conciliatoires et pacifiques, et il doit s'en remettre aux sentiments de justice qu'il a eu l'avantage de reconnaître à Sa Majesté Britannique en d'autres occasions. Il n'y a que la révocation et la levée plénière de l'embargo, qui puisse remettre les choses à leur place, et c'est à l'Angleterre à juger si elle doit s'y résoudre pour offrir aux puissances neutres le moyen de procéder aux communications, qu'elles se proposaient de lui faire. Mais ces mesures, tant qu'elles subsistent et prises en haine d'un principe commun et d'un engagement qui ne peut plus s'ébranler, la relation hostile qui en est la suite, amène nécessairement le cas du traité et le soussigné a ordre de déclarer au ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique, que le Roi, en donnant ses regrets à des événements qu'il n'eut jamais provoqués, remplira saintement les obligations que les traités lui prescrivent.

Le soussigné en s'acquittant de cet ordre a l'honneur d'assurer Mylord Carysfort de la haute considération.

no. 15

Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 17 February 1801

My Lord,

I have the honour herewith to transmit to your Lordship copies of all the communications which have been made to me upon the subject of the detention in the river Shannon of the ship 'minister von Struensee' under Prussian colours.

Your Lordship will observe from the report of the officer commanding on that station that the grounds of the detention were rested on the strong suspicion of the property being Dutch, which was strengthened by the testimony of part of the ship's crew, and by the charge of concealment of fraudulent papers which, if proved, is an act so little reconcilable with fair neutrality, that no doubt can be entertained, but that His Prussian Majesty will be solicitous from this latter circumstance alone that a full investigation should take place into the truth of the charge in order that if the parties are

217 The river Shannon is the longest river in Ireland, rising in the northwestern county Cavan and flowing in a southerly direction to the Atlantic.
guilty they may be punished, or if innocent, the ship may be released, and assistance afforded to her for the prosecution of her voyage.

Your Lordship will make such communication to the Prussian government of the papers herewith transmitted as you may judge necessary in order to show the early attention paid by His Majesty's government to the representation of Mr. de Jacobi on the subject, and of their disposition to afford to the subjects of His Prussian Majesty every practicable facility towards obtaining an early consideration and decision of the case in question.

Separate and most secret

My Lord,

The subject of your Lordship's dispatch, separate and most secret, of the 21st of January, having been laid before the king, His Majesty has been pleased very much to approve the judicious language which your Lordship held to Monsieur Lützow.

I am commanded by His Majesty to convey to your Lordship His Majesty's pleasure, that you should take an early opportunity to see that gentleman, and to explain to him, that His Majesty can enter into no explanation with the Emperor of Russia on any subsisting grounds of difference unless it be distinctly understood as part of such explanation, that the embargo is to be taken off as a part of the arrangement that is to be entered into, and that the property of His Majesty's subjects is to be restored to them. But that, subject to this condition, which is to be a sine qua non of all arrangement of these matters, the king is ready to treat with the Emperor of Russia through your Lordship, for such an agreement respecting the permanent possession of Malta, as Monsieur de Lützow mentioned to your Lordship, by which the civil government of the order would be restored under the authority of the emperor as Grand Master, but the effective military possession of the ports and fortresses would remain with His Majesty.

It must however be understood that this conciliatory measure cannot be finally acceded to by His Majesty so long as the Emperor of Russia continues to be placed towards His Majesty in the situation of the head of an hostile confederacy, for the purpose of weakening the naval strength of Great Britain by an armed resistance to the exercise of those immemorial rights which are incident to all belligerent states, and the maintenance of which is essential to the maritime power of the British Empire.

It would be easy to prove to a well informed man, that Russia can have no interest in the maintenance of such a system, and that His majesty's determined resistance to it rests on grounds both of indisputable justice, and of absolute necessity.
You will therefore consider yourself as distinctly authorised by this dispatch to declare to Monsieur Lützow, that if satisfaction be given to His Majesty on these two points, that of the embargo, and that of the neutral league, the king would not be unwilling to treat on the basis of establishing the civil government of the order of St John of Jerusalem in the island of Malta under the authority of the Emperor of Russia as Grand Master of that order, His Majesty continuing exclusively to occupy the ports and fortresses of the island a military stations, and upon principles similar to those on which the barrier towns were garrisoned by Austrian/Dutch troops. Provided that sufficient security be also given to His Majesty, that the ports shall be opened to the commerce of His Majesty's subjects in peace, and shall be closed against the armed vessels of his enemies in war. And that as a part of this arrangement, the king would be willing, if it were agreeable to the Emperor of Russia, to revert to the original idea of forming an English Langue [sic] for the purpose of identifying still more his interests at Malta with those of the order under the proposed establishment.

These ideas which you will state to Monsieur to Liützow, as the heads of those explanations into which His Majesty is willing to enter on the conditions above specified. But they are not yet to be considered as distinct proposals made on His Majesty's part, the making any such proposal being a step which cannot now be taken by His Majesty, till some assurance be received that such explanations shall be combined with a due attention to His Majesty's claims respecting both the embargo, and the questions of neutral law.

no. 18
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 17 February 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

Since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, one fact only has come to my knowledge, which can throw light upon the ultimate intentions of this court. Notice has been sent immediately from the Prussian government to the merchants at Stettin to be careful not to engage in commercial speculations with England. Many persons of consideration with whom I have conversed have seemed to think, that the affair of the armed neutrality would go off in smoke, but the tenor of the Prussian minister's note was not then generally known, and they reasoned probably under the

218 Now the Polish town of Szczecin.
impression made by the accustomed cautious policy of this court, and the aversion of
the King of Prussia to war. The ambiguous turn of some expressions in the latter part
of the Prussian answer to my note leads me to suppose it probable, that this cabinet
might build upon the expectation that some satisfactory explanation might be given by
Denmark and Sweden, or by one of those powers previous to the arrival of the
Prussian answer. But upon seeing the convention itself as it appeared in the Hamburg
paper, I am constrained to abandon that opinion.

I have not yet learned that any extraordinary military preparations are begun.

An opinion prevails, which appears to me not destitute of foundation, that the
plan for the ruin of the Turkish Empire is fully approved and seconded both by Prussia
and Sweden, who think they shall find their own security in removing to a greater
distance the seat of the Russian power, and giving a new and permanent direction to its
views.

I trust the British trade has received notice sufficient to prevent any material
loss. I have reason to think the trading part of this country, begun to be much alarmed,
and that the measures taken may bring very early as well as strong representations from
the trading towns. I am told there are very large sums, to the amount of five hundred
thousand pounds, of money now in the hands of persons in England which may be
stopped by proclamation, forbidding any payment to Prussian subsidies. There is
nothing to be feared, but from the stoppage of a present supply of corn - and I am
happy to hear, from what I think good authority, that the Prussian merchants
themselves are taking the most effectual measures, that is, by giving large bribes to
obtain leave for the exportation of it.

no. 19
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 17 February 1801

My Lord,

Your Lordship will have observed, that in the convention as published in the
Hamburg gazette between Sweden and Russia, to which the King of Prussia has now
declared himself to have fully acceded, it is explicitly stated, that it is founded upon the
Russian memorial of the 15th August delivered to the foreign ministers at Petersburg, a
memorial which I have stated in my dispatch no. 56 of last year to have been actually
withdrawn and considered as inapplicable by the court with which it originated. That
dispatch was communicated to Count Haugwitz, who returned his testimony under his
hand of the truth of the statement.
Immediately after the delivery of the Prussian answer to my notes, M. de Krüdener, nephew and conseiller de legation to the minister, set forward as courier to Petersburg. The minister went himself to Leipzig to meet M. de Kolychev, and is already returned.

no. 20
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 20 February 1801

My Lord,

Having received information that there are large quantities of corn ready to be shipped in Prussian bottoms for the British ports which would sail with the first open water, I have mentioned to give an assurance, that if the ships proceeded on their voyage, and delivered their cargoes in any harbour in Great Britain and Ireland, they should be allowed to return freely, notwithstanding any embargo, or even an open rupture. I have also promised that ships of their description shall, if on their voyage to the United Kingdoms they should join any British convoy, receive protection against other belligerent powers.

There are also some large quantities of naval stores intended for England, which it is presumed the prospect of a large profit will tempt the exportation, when the knowledge of such an indulgence, granted in the case of ships laden with corn, shall afford a presumption that ships laden with articles of nearly equal importance may have the same security.

It is with great reluctance that I have ventured to take a step of this nature without waiting for instructions, but as the return of the post may bring such limitations as may be suggested by the wisdom of His Majesty's government, the influx of these commodities which appear to be of the first necessity to His Majesty's dominions, may be stopped before it can proceed to any excess, and any immediate supply of them will probably be of more use to His Majesty's service than the detention of the vessels by which they may be conveyed.

I am informed that Count Hoym, the minister for Silesia, has presented a strong memorial to the king against hostilities with England.²¹⁹ I had before heard that he intended it.

²¹⁹ Hoym, Karl Georg Heinrich (1739-1807), Count, Prussian statesman, minister and governor of Prussian Silesia from 1770-1806. As far as is known, however, this memoir was never handed the king.
There is a rumour of some movement of troops now in garrison in Magdeburg.\textsuperscript{220} A contagious disorder has made great ravages in Saxony, particularly at Wittenberg,\textsuperscript{221} and excited a great alarm. It is possible this movement, if there is any truth in the report, may be occasioned by a design which is talked of to establish a cordon upon that frontier. It is also said that new corps of light troops are forming to be sent to the coast of the Baltic for the avowed purpose of repressing smuggling.

Intelligence was this day received here of the death of Her Royal Highness Philippina Charlotte, Duchess Dowager of Brunswick. Her Royal Highness was born on the 13th March 1716.

\textbf{no. 21}
\textit{Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 21 February 1801}

My Lord,

The hereditary Prince of Orange called upon me yesterday morning, in order to communicate to me the opinion which he had collected in conversation with Count Haugwitz, of the views and motives of the Prussian court. It is in substance that they are influenced by Russia only, and that Count Haugwitz thinks Great Britain might resume her relations and friendship with that empire if she would consent to an arrangement on the affair of Malta. When the Prince of Orange urged the greater difficulty arising from the conclusion of the northern maritime league he received for answer, that were the dispute respecting Malta once settled, that affair would fall to the ground of course.

Various reports are circulated as to Hanover. Russia is said to have urged very strongly that it shall be occupied, and schemes of exchange and partition have been talked of, but not sufficiently authenticated to make it necessary for me to state them in detail.

Count Baudissin, the minister newly appointed by Denmark to this court, is on his way here, and shortly expected. The private accounts from Copenhagen speak of their alarm and distress, but at the same time in such terms as seem to indicate that they have not the means of retreat. M. de Rosenkrantz however, when he mentioned the journey of Count Baudissin, intimated that he came in order to bring about an arrangement.

\textsuperscript{220} A Prussian fortress town on the Elbe, about 120 kilometre west of Berlin.
\textsuperscript{221} Wittenberg, a town in upper Saxony, about 80 kilometres south-west of Berlin.
I am sorry to say I do not believe Count Hoym has had courage to present the memorial on the danger of Silesia, which I formerly mentioned. His opinion however is public, and makes impression.

P.S. I have heard since I wrote this dispatch, that Count Hoym who has left town on his return to Silesia, is to meet as even as he arrives the principle merchants of that country, and has only postponed till he has seen them presenting the memorial.

no. 22
Carysfort to Grenville, Berlin, 24 February 1801

My Lord,
[cipher]
I am informed Count Baudissin was to leave Copenhagen as this day. Three regiments in this garrison have, it is said, received orders to be completed. The time when the men on semestre are usually ordered to join, approaches, and I doubt whether orders have been given beyond what are usually issued for that purpose. But I am told from good authority, that it is intended, as soon as an unfavorable answer shall arrive from England, or as I shall quit Berlin, to take measures for the immediate military occupation of Hanover, for the sequestration of the revenue, and for disarming His Majesty's troops in that country.

I learn that Monsieur Kolychev is not expected to reach Paris sooner than the fifth of next month.

no. 16
Grenville to Carysfort, Downing Street, 20 February 1801
(Jackson Papers 353, 43)

My Lord,
His Majesty having been graciously pleased to accept of my resignation of the office of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and having been pleased to confer the seal of that department on the Right Honble. Lord Hawkesbury, I have

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Hawkesbury, Lord Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool (1770-1828). He was appointed Foreign Secretary in February 1801 which he remained for two years before serving as Home Secretary (1804-1806). Later Secretary for War and the Colonies (1809-1812), and Prime Minister (1812-1827).
to desire that you will henceforward address your dispatches and letters on public business to his Lordship.

no. 23
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 28 February 1801

My Lord,

I have this moment had the honour of receiving the official notification of the resignation of Lord Grenville, and of your Lordship's appointment to be His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I beg leave to offer to your Lordship my congratulations upon this distinguished mark of His Majesty's favour.

Your Lordship may depend upon my utmost diligence in executing to the best of my abilities, the duties of the station in which the king has been pleased to place me, and I trust your Lordship will present in a favorable manner to His Majesty the zeal with which I am devoted to his service.

no. 24
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Belin, 1 March 1801

My Lord,

Immediately on the receipt of Lord Grenville's separate and secret dispatch of the 17th of February, I obeyed His Majesty's commands contained in it, and have put forward the business recommended to my care in such a manner as seemed most likely to produce the effect desired, and I am happy to add that I am not without hopes of success, though I am told that the embargo laid on the ships of the three nations, and the notifications made by His Majesty's command at this court, have probably produced a violent declaration or manifesto from the emperor.

Considerable uneasiness is evidently excited here by the preliminaries concluded between Austria and France, and the strong indications that those powers are connecting their interests. It is probably on this account that Colonel Le Coq, an officer on the staff at Potsdam, is to be immediately dispatched on a special mission to Petersburg to discuss Prussia's role in the Armed Neutrality but in reality to discuss Prussia's territorial demands in Germany. He arrived in Petersburg on 3 April 1801 and remained until August of that year. Documents on this mission may be found in GStA, Rep. XI, Rußland, 149 D.
Petersburg. He is to invite the interference of that court for the arrangements of indemnification which are to be made by the empire within itself. The principal of these, that to the Grand Duke in lieu of Tuscany, is most probably definitively settled between France and Austria, and it is generally agreed that those powers will have agreed upon the rest before the ministers either of Russia or Prussia can be called in.

His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus \(^{224}\) arrived here from Hanover last night. He has been received with all the appearances of kindness and respect at court.

It is not possible to say what may be the effect of His Royal Highness's presence here at this critical time. If it is supposed to have proceeded from an excess of apprehension and solicitude as to the danger which threatens the electorate, it might invite and encourage the ambition of the court of Berlin. But on the other hand, His Royal Highness may avail himself of his intimacy with the King of Prussia, not only to remonstrate with him on the injustice of the design he is supposed to entertain, but to make him sensible that an attempt which would cover the court of Berlin with present dishonour, and could lead to no real and permanent advantage, will rather confirm than weaken His Majesty's determination to maintain the most important rights of his empire. An effect may thus be produced, which could be obtained by no other means, and I draw great expectations from His Royal Highness's judgement, as well as his zeal for His Majesty's service.

It may not be superfluous to remark that the neutrality of the north of Germany and the line of demarcation, having relation only to the existing war in Germany, will vanish at the moment, fixed to be in thirty days from the signature of the treaty, that the peace of Lunéville shall be ratified. This makes it necessary, if any measures are yet to be taken for the neutrality of the Elbe, that they should proceed upon a different principle, and at the same time that it removes an apparent obstacle to the Prussian designs against Hanover, leaves His Majesty at liberty to send succours there, if practicable, or to direct operations against the Danish territory of Holstein.

\(^{224}\) Adolphus Frederick (1774–1850), Prince of England, Duke of Cambridge, Count of Tipperary, Baron of Culloden, youngest son of George III. He was sent to Berlin in the hope of persuading Friedrich Wilhelm to keep out of Hanover.
no. 1
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 20 February 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)

My Lord,

The king having, on the resignation of Lord Grenville, been pleased to appoint me His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, I am to desire that your Lordship will for the future address your letters to me, which I shall not fail to lay regularly before the king, and to transmit to your Lordship such orders and instructions as His Majesty shall think proper to give for your guidance and discretion.

no. 2
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 3 March 1801

My Lord,

I have received your Lordship's letter no. 20 and have great satisfaction in informing you, that the measure you have adopted of giving an assurance that all Prussian ships which shall sail for the British ports with cargoes of provision, or of hemp, and shall deliver their cargo in any harbour of Great Britain and Ireland, shall be protected from our cruisers and shall be allowed to return freely, notwithstanding an embargo or even an open rupture - meets with the most decided approbation of His Majesty's confidential servants. It is not in my power to forward to your Lordship any licence for this purpose as they would not be considered as valid without the sign manual of His Majesty, but you may depend upon the engagements into which you have entered being strictly fulfilled on the arrival of the ships above mentioned in the ports of the United Kingdom, and orders will be sent from the Admiralty to His Majesty's cruisers, to afford them every protection on their passage.

I have the greatest pleasure in being able to inform your Lordship of the favourable account of His Majesty's health. His fever is considerably abated this morning and there is no reason to doubt of his complete and speedy recovery.
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 4 March 1801

My Lord,

I am informed that there is an harbour in the south-east part of the island of Gotland in the Baltic, where a considerable fleet of large ships may ride in safety. It has been accurately sounded, and the plans, as well as that of the Great Belt are on their way to England, in order to be communicated to government. As it is uncertain whether they are to pass through this place or by a more direct communication, I have thought it right to mention this circumstance.

I am told from pretty good authority that M. de Krüdener has within these few days officially required the King of Prussia to sequester the Electorate of Hanover. It is generally supposed that it is not the intention of the emperor that it shall in any case be annexed to the Prussian dominion.

Separate and most secret

My Lord,

Immediately after the arrival of Prince Adolphus, the King of Prussia took an opportunity of speaking in private to Captain Decken, who has the honour of being known to His Prussian Majesty, and is much in his confidence. I forbear to enter into any detail upon the subject of this conversation as I learn from Captain Decken that a report of it has been made to the Regency of Hanover, and to the king, and shall touch only upon those parts of it which have a more immediate relation to the subject of this dispatch. His Prussian Majesty expressed in strong terms the difficulties and embarrassments of his situation, his utter inability to resist the power both of France and Russia impelling him against his inclination, and his hopes that England would leave him the means of deferring measures, which nothing but a necessity too strong for him to oppose could make him take. Captain Decken was then desired by His Majesty to tell me that His Majesty had reason to think the emperor was still disposed to reconciliation with Great Britain, and would consent to modify and reduce his

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225 A Swedish island in the Baltic.
226 The words, 'Extract to the Admiralty', were written in the column beside this paragraph.
227 Decken, Johann Friedrich (1769-1840), Count von der, Hanoverian soldier. He taught the Duke of Cambridge mathematics and history from 1796 on, accompanied him to Berlin in 1801, and carried out a similar diplomatic role in 1803 during the French occupation of Hanover.
demands in regard to Malta within narrower limits than His Majesty's government might suppose. That he most earnestly wished the king let the ground be tried, and that, being once secured on the side of Russia, he should be able to follow the dictates of his inclination and of his friendship for His Majesty. He also authorised Captain Decken to communicate to me the whole of what he had said to him more immediately concerning the Electorate of Hanover.

It was evidently prudent to endeavour, by a suitable answer, to cultivate this disposition in His Prussian Majesty to confidential communication, and after some reflection I determined to make known to him the steps which had been taken through the channel of M. de Lützow, the concessions which His Majesty's wisdom and moderation induced him to make with respect to Malta, and the indispensable conditions annexed of satisfaction as to the embargo, and the maritime league. Captain Decken was therefore desired to acquaint His Prussian Majesty that I was ready to impart the whole as a secret to be locked in his own breast, and that I did not doubt but that the king my master would approve of the confidence I placed in His Majesty's personal honour. Captain Decken received in consequence a rendezvous for a private meeting, and delivered to His Prussian Majesty the account I had prepared in writing of the transaction with M. de Lützow, together with the letter of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. Captain Decken had it also in charge to say from me, that I should always be ready to obey His Prussian Majesty's commands in making any confidential communication or suggestion directly from him to the king, or in giving, on my part, to His Prussian Majesty and information consistent with my duty, so that neither the one nor the other might be known to his ministers, if His Majesty would be graciously pleased to point out through what channel it might be done. I have since received the letter I inclose, written by the King of Prussia's command, from Captain Decken.

I trust I shall not have incurred the king's displeasure by departing in this instance from the ordinary reserve of diplomatic transactions. The risk did not appear to me considerable enough to be weighed against the probable advantages, and I therefore thought it my duty to make the venture. Not only it must be useful to His Majesty's government to know at the present the King of Prussia's personal sentiments, but to have obtained what, considering his own character, and those of the persons who surrounded him, has been always thought a most important desideratum, the certain means of bringing fairly and fully under his consideration any arguments or propositions, which it may be expedient to submit to him. A strong presumption is also obtained that His Prussian Majesty will in future see with his own eyes, and act for himself, that the pernicious influence which has prevailed in his councils may be
gradually expelled, and that when he is relieved from the difficulties and dangers, which press immediately upon him, he will pursue a system more consistent with his own honour, and the common interest.

It now remains for me to state with more precision the line I have followed, in carrying into execution, His Majesty’s commands respecting the negotiation attempted to be set on foot, through M. de Lützow. The matter is gone to Petersburg in the form of a private confidence from me to M. de Lützow, who states as his belief, that whenever it shall be known that anybody is directly authorised by the emperor to enter into engagements for him on the points declared by His Majesty to be conditions sine qua non, I shall be found authorised on the part of His Majesty to agree on the terms specified as to Malta. That part which relates to what is expected by the emperor, is of course left to M. de Lützow to put forward in the manner which he thinks may make it most palatable. The advantages to be reserved for His Majesty, he has taken down in writing from my mouth, and I hope it will be thought that everything of real importance is included. I have inclosed the copy.

In regard to the maritime league, M. de Lützow handed to me a sketch of what he intended to say, which I am convinced he had concerted with M. de Krüdener. I at first objected to the term arrangement, as applied to this subject, because Great Britain neither would, nor could make any substantial concession whatever upon this point, but as he observed truly, that His Majesty had sufficiently declared upon what he was determined to insist, and no arrangement could be made without satisfying him, and as this was to appear not in any ministerial report or declaration, but as M. de Lützow’s relation of a private conversation, I thought it was not worthwhile to urge any alteration, and I still less thought it necessary to object to what is said relating to the other powers, as it is worded cautiously enough, and His Imperial Majesty cannot be expected not even to preserve appearances towards other powers, with whom he has stipulated to make a common cause.

A convention including the subject of the embargo laid on in Petersburg, and Malta only, might be made separately to depend upon the satisfaction to be eventually given upon the maritime league, but it seems on many accounts best to include the whole. In the first place, the effect desired will be the more beneficial the sooner it is produced, and in the next Russia has on the one hand much less interest in maintaining the new principles, than the other powers, and on the other it is urged not only by a fear of the consequences of a rupture with Great Britain, but by the strong temptation of Malta. I trust however that this business will be facilitated by Denmark at least having been detached from the alliance, before any answer can be returned from
Petersburg, as there are many circumstances which induce the belief that she is desirous of entering into immediate and separate explanations with His Majesty.

I have only to add that upon M. de Lützow's proposing, that if anything should happen in the interval, whether in the nature of manifesto, or actual hostility it should not affect the negotiation but be retracted upon the arrangement of all material points, I made no difficulty in agreeing with him.

Copy of a note from Carysfort to the King of Prussia, Berlin, 3 March 1801

Sire,

La confiance que Votre Majesté a daigné me témoigner, en permettant au Capitaine Decken de me communiquer ce que Votre Majesté lui a dit, m'a pénétré de la plus profonde reconnaissance. J'ose l'assurer qu'elle peut compter entièrement sur mon zèle et ma fidélité. Les pièces ci-jointes la mettront à même des espérances que l'on peut encore se former, pour un rapprochement avec la Russie. Il paraît important, surtout, de cacher aux Français la marche de cette affaire, qui y porterait certainement tous les empêchements en leurs pouvoir.

Votre Majesté peut compter que la cour de Londres désire toujours de cultiver la bonne intelligence avec Votre Majesté, qu'elle reconnaît avec douleur l'embarras et les difficultés multipliés dans lesquels, par une suite d'événements, tout à fait extraordinaires et qui ne pouvaient se prévoir, les affaires se trouvent plongées, et qu'en se reposant avec confiance sur l'honneur de Votre Majesté, elle cherchera tous les moyens possibles pour ne pas être obligée, en suite de la note du 13 février, de faire aucune démarche qui pourrait entraîner une rupture immédiate, mais en cas que je me trouvasse malheureusement contraint de m'éloigner de la cour de Votre Majesté, j'ai prié le roi de me permettre de me retirer à Dresde, où je serais à portée, non seulement de conduire à bout la négociation avec la Russie, mais encore de profiter du premier moment que Votre Majesté et mon maître trouveraient favorable pour renouveler leurs anciennes liaisons.
My Lord,

I am directed by His Majesty the King of Prussia to testify to you his best thanks for the proof of confidence which you have given to him, in communicating the papers relative to the negotiations with Russia. He is of opinion, that the whole transaction must be kept secret as much as possible, in order to hinder that the French will not learn it. He begs of you to communicate for the future the papers concerning the Russian negotiation to Colonel Köckritz.

The king wishes that you may have the goodness to tell to your court, that he wishes nothing more than that the differences between Russia and England may be settled in the best way, and that he would do all what is in his power, to contribute to the re-establishment of the harmony which existed formerly between these powers.

Lastly I am directed to testify to you the very high esteem which the king has for you, and of which the king has spoken to me in the highest terms. He was extremely glad to see, that negotiations are already opened between Russia and England.

My Lord,

[cipher]

In a conversation which has been reported to me, the Russian ambassador after expressing himself in terms of comparative moderation concerning Great Britain, complained of the dilatoriness of this court as to the occupation of Hanover, and added, that if they only deferred it three or four weeks, the French would be in possession of it - Augereau having gone to Paris to receive instructions for that purpose. It was observed in answer, that this would be contrary to the tenor of the Treaty of Lunéville which stipulated the evacuation of the empire by the French troops. He replied that the treaty would be complied with, and the troops withdrawn to the left bank of the river Rhine, from whence they would advance to begin a new war against Great Britain.

I am farther informed that accounts (not however official but the best which have reached him through private channels) received by the Austrian chargé d'affaires
as to the arrangements for compensation in the Empire are to this effect, that the equivalent for the Grand Duke of Tuscany\textsuperscript{228} is to be found in Salzburg and Bavaria, and the elector is to be indemnified by the transfer of a proportionable part of the Duchy of Württemberg. The Duke of Württemberg to have with the dignity of Elector His Majesty's German dominions. I do not give either of these reports as deserving implicit credit, but I think they should excite some attention. It is believed that M. de Lucchesini meets with continual mortifications at Paris, and it is even said that he is so much dissatisfied with his situation as to have insinuated, that he should be desirous of his recall.

His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus continues to meet with every public mark of respect and attention from the court. There can be no doubt that His Royal Highness's arrival here must have been very favorable to His Majesty's service, and that his judgement and prudence will improve to the utmost any opportunities which may have presented themselves to him.

I am told that a joint note has been presented to this court by the ministers of Russia and Sweden requiring not merely the assistance stipulated by the Convention of St Petersburg but that Prussia should immediately take measures for shutting the Elbe against the trade of His Majesty's subjects.\textsuperscript{229} It is probable that the report I mentioned in my last dispatch that the Russian minister had officially pressed the Prussian government to the immediate sequestration of Hanover was occasioned by this step, and there is the less doubt of it as it accords perfectly with the conversation I have reported above.

The court of Berlin it is said seeks to defer giving its answer.

\textsuperscript{228} Ferdinand III (1769-1824), Grand Duke of Tuscany, brother of the Emperor Francis. He was driven from his territory by the French in 1799 and dispossessed of his Italian dominions at the Peace of Lunéville in 1801 when his duchy was transformed into the Kingdom of Etruria. He was indemnified by the creation of the Electorate of Salzburg (1803-1805) and was later made Grand Duke of Würzburg (1806-1814).

\textsuperscript{229} On 2 March 1801, Haugwitz received a joint note from the Russian and Swedish ambassadors in Berlin calling on Prussia to close the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, arguing that Prussia was obliged to do so out of duty towards the alliance.
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 6 March 1801 (Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

My Lord,

I am extremely happy to acquaint your Lordship, in addition to the account contained in my last circular letter, that a very material amendment has since taken place in His Majesty's health.

no. 2
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 10 March 1801
Separate and secret

My Lord,

I take advantage of a messenger going to Vienna, to send to your Lordship an account of the mission of Mr. Vansittart\(^2\) to the continent.

A few days before Lord Grenville resigned the seals, an anonymous letter was received,\(^3\) containing a long discussion on the politics and situation of the northern powers the conclusion of which was, that both Denmark and Sweden were seriously alarmed at the views of the Emperor of Russia, and were disposed to enter into a connection with this country, and to settle, to our satisfaction, the great question of maritime law, provided we would afford them security against other powers, but particularly against Russia. Lord Grenville had every reason to believe, from former communications of the same nature, that the author of this paper was Prince Charles of Hesse,\(^4\) the father-in-law of the Prince Royal of Denmark. The truth of this

\(^2\) Vansittart, Nicholas, British diplomat. He was sent on a mission to Denmark in the hope of obtaining a peaceful solution to the conflict. After a short stay at Gottorp Castle where he had conversations with Prince Carl, he proceeded to Copenhagen (arrived on 9 March), had one talk with Bernstorff (14 March), and left a few days later.

\(^3\) Grenville received an anonymous Danish letter around the middle of February (Piggot and Omond. 520-522).

\(^4\) Carl, Prince of Hesse. In fact, the author of the letter was never identified. While the British remained convinced that Prince Carl was the author, he emphatically denied it. Cf. Ole Feldbaek. *Denmark and the Armed Neutrality*, 132-133, 266.
supposition has since been confirmed to me by undeniable evidence. Under these circumstances it was thought expedient to send confidential persons immediately to the residence of Prince Charles of Hesse, in the neighbourhood of Altona, and to direct him if he found sufficient encouragement to proceed to Copenhagen, and to endeavour to conclude a treaty on the principles laid down in the inclosed instructions. The papers themselves will explain to you the views of His Majesty's government on the whole of this subject, and I thought it right you should be apprised of them, that you might know how to regulate your conduct towards the Prussian government. There is no reason to suppose that the court of Berlin are any party to this transaction, or are even acquainted that any such overture has been made. The success of it may be considered as doubtful, but His Majesty has thought it right, as such an opening has been given to him, to make one more attempt to bring the disputes at issue to an amicable conclusion before he has recourse to open hostilities. You will avail yourself of this information, if you should be of opinion that it would answer any good purpose, but the name and character of the person from whom the first overture came must on no account be disclosed. You will perceive by these papers, as by every other instruction you have received, His Majesty's unalterable determination, never to abandon the fundamental question in dispute - the maintenance of those principles of maritime law which he considers as essential to the prosperity and independence of his dominions.

no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 10 March 1801 (Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Separate

My Lord,

I have the greatest satisfaction in being now able to acquaint your Lordship, that His Majesty's health is so much amended in every respect, since my letter by the last mail, that there is no doubt entertained by His Majesty's physicians of his complete and speedy recovery.
no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 13 March 1801 (Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

My Lord,

I have the highest gratification in being now able to announce to your Lordship His Majesty's happy recovery.

no. 3
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 10 March 1801

My Lord,

I inclose to you for your information, the copy of a minute which has been agreed to by the Lords of the Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council for Trade, and I am to desire that you will communicate the contents of it to such merchants or ship owners as may be likely to avail themselves of the indulgence, and that you grant papers or certificates in conformity to it, to any Swedish, Danish, Prussian or Russian ships which may be employed in conveying to any of the ports of His Majesty's United Kingdom, any of the articles specific in the minute of council. But you will at the same time avoid as much as possible giving any unnecessary publicity to this measure.

Private no. 2
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 10 March 1801

My dear Lord,

The news of His Majesty's illness has filled the breasts of his subjects with grief, and apprehension, and it is needless for me to say with what satisfaction I read your Lordship's letter of the 27th which gives such hopes of his speedy recovery.

I must trouble you with some questions and observations on the instructions contained in Lord Grenville's separate and most secret dispatch of the 17th February.

It is there said it is to be made a part sine qua non of the arrangements to be entered into with Russia, that the embargo be taken off, and the property of His Majesty's subjects restored to them. If we come to treat some difficulty will arrive upon this point. The property has been sold, under a commission from the emperor on
pretence of liquidating the debts due to his subjects by the British. I have no doubt that the
emperor's intention in this instance was fair, and he will not be easily persuaded
that the result has been such as to entitle us to compensation, nor would it be easy to
ascertain in a satisfactory manner the amount of the loss. Is this transaction therefore to
stand, and the restoration only of the residue of the property after the liquidation of the
debts, and what may yet remain in kind to be demanded?

A merchant of Riga named Trompously claimed a large sum as due to him from
England, either for insurance, or some alleged false judgement in a prize cause, which
the emperor ordered to be immediately paid by the factory, and a large number of ships
were made over to him for that purpose.

This transaction must no doubt be overhauled if possible, but I am not
sufficiently acquainted with the particulars to attempt it. Mr. Shairp no doubt can give
full information upon it.

In order to make His Majesty's military occupation of the fortresses, and port in
Malta secure I must have such instructions, founded upon a plan recognised as
authentic by His Majesty's government, as may be thought proper in a military point of
view, upon which I am totally unqualified to form a judgement.

I have not been able to get any good map of Malta here, nor indeed would any
be useful by which you were not determined to abide.

The reference to the Barrier Treaty, and the reservation of liberty of commerce
in the ports of the island, and that they shall be shut in time of war against the armed
vessels of the king's enemies, implies that the order may have troops in the island, and
at the ports, if any, which are not comprehended in the fortresses to be occupied by the
British troops. The number should be limited, and bear some proportion to the troops
which the guard of the fortresses may require. M. de Lützow hinted that they should
not exceed three thousand. I beg your instructions on this head also.

What is the specific satisfaction to be required on the question of maritime law,
which is also to be a sine qua non of any arrangement about Malta?

Does Great Britain admit as a general and invariable rule, where there is no
specific rule established by treaty, that enemy's goods found on board a neutral ship,
shall not affect the ship, or the rest of the cargo, and that freight shall be paid to the
neutral for the goods seized?

Would it be admitted that goods of a doubtful nature, before notice given, or
bound to a port, not be considered as a place of warlike preparation, should if the
circumstances of war make it necessary to stop them be always paid for?
Would it be admitted that neutral ships pass freely from port to port in the enemies country carrying on their own trade only, and though they should take in a part loading of the produce of the enemies country, provided it should be bona fide the property of the neutral, and not to be sold or delivered again in the enemy's country?

Might the protection of convoy be allowed in any specific case, and with such precautions as these? That some months notice shall be given, in order that if there should be particular, and occasional objections, representations may be made from court to court.

That the consul should have notice of the time of lading, and of sailing, and should be allowed to verify the lading by inspection, and that the ships should not be entitled to protection without a certificate signed by him.

That the ships shall be exactly described and duplicate lists remain with the commander of the convoy, and with the consul.

That the ships so convoyed being met at sea by ships of war, the officer of the convoy shall produce the list, and point out the ships described, so that none not included in the lists may have the benefit of the convoy, and that the ships shall be visited separately by an officer of each party with an equal number of men on each side, that the consul's certificate for each ship, and the other usual papers, whether required by treaty of custom may be produced.

That the officer commanding the convoy shall give, if required, to the officer of the belligerent power, a certificate under his hand that none of the ships in his convoy has entered, and broke bulk in any port, not specified, and allowed in the certificate, and other papers.

That no convoy shall ever be given to ports of naval, and military preparation, or ports so near them as to admit of speedy, cheap, and safe conveyance of such goods as are of doubtful nature.

It is hardly to be expected that any of the powers unless reduced to extremity should consent to an express, and unqualified disavowal and renunciation of a measure so publicly and solemnly adopted. Some explanation therefore must be resorted to.

What is said above applies more or less to the several articles of the convention, and except what relates to convoy, would not, I believe be substantially different, from what is usual though perhaps not invariably the practise of the British courts.

I would not be understood to recommend any of these points, particularly as to convoys. But while I feel very strongly the expediency of making this matter a part of the agreement about Malta, and coming to as speedy a conclusion as possible, I am
conscious I am very ill qualified to manage it, and I wish to give an idea, of the nature and extent of the instructions which if I am to be employed in it I hope to receive.

Lützow might have an answer from Petersburg in little more than a fortnight from this time.

[own handwriting]

As my eyes are weak, you will, I trust, forgive my having employed my private secretary to transcribe the former part of this letter. As far as relates to the maintaining of the ancient treaties, the 2nd and 3rd articles of the Convention of 1794 between Sweden, and Denmark seem to offer a model sufficient to answer every purpose.

If you delay an answer to Haugwitz's note, or any steps of open hostility against Prussia, till the fleet sails to the Baltic, there is no reason to apprehend that anything further will be done here, before its destination is known. I have good reason to doubt whether any considerable body of troops can be suddenly put in motion, and think it probable some weeks might yet elapse, from the time of receiving accounts that a British fleet is in the Sound, before the army could advance against Hanover. Few regiments have received orders to be in readiness, and even they will not receive their semestriers before the usual time of assembling them for the reviews.

P.S. Prince Adolphus is still here and continues to receive at court every mark of kindness. His Royal Highness's situation will be extremely unpleasant if he should not have quitted Hanover when the Prussian troops enter the country. The rupture with Prussia will probably be open as soon as it is known that a British fleet is sent to the Sound, and I cannot help suggesting to you whether it might not be advisable to station a frigate in the Weser immediately to be in readiness to bring the prince away.

I have received no public letter from your Lordship but that announcing your appointment, and am not quite certain whether what you say about procrastination in your private letter of the 27th ult. may not refer to some dispatch which may not have come to hand.

no. 27
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 11 March 1801

My Lord,

The Emperor of Russia has prohibited the passage of the produce of his country into the Prussian dominions. I have the honour to inclose a copy of the order.

Whether this measure has been dictated by some resentment, or suspicion arising from the exception of Prussian ships from the embargo imposed in England, or
by any distinct consideration, the probable effect of it must be to precipitate the hostile
court of this court towards Great Britain. At the same time, the intelligence
transmitted to your Lordship in my separate and secret dispatch of the 4th, and what I
hear of the real state of the military preparation, makes it probable that notwithstanding
the circumstance above mentioned, and the eager solicitation of the Swedish and
Russian ministers, all the time will be gained that His Majesty's service requires.

I have already stated to your Lordship, my reasons for hoping that you will
already have received complete information of a commodious harbour on the island of
Gotland, a most excellent position for blocking the ports of Sweden, and of Russia,
and also that operations may be carried on through the Great Belt, which would give
the means of cutting off all communication, between the island of Sjælland, and the
mainland, and consequently soon reduce the seat of the Danish government to
extremity.

The hopes of the enemy as far as may be judged from what circulates here,
depend principally upon the opinion that it would be impracticable for His Majesty's fleet, if not to enter the Baltic, at least to pursue operations there, without a sufficient port for occasional shelter and repair. If these hopes should once appear to be illusory, it would probably not be difficult at once to make such terms with the confederate powers, jointly or separately, as should give security to His Majesty in perpetuo, against the execution of their present designs.

If a speedy occupation of a port in the Elbe, such as Glückstadt were practicable, or even the station of a squadron in the Elbe, in a situation manifestly secure against a land attack, it might lead to some immediate agreement for the neutrality of that river, and the safety of Hamburg.

M. de Baudissin the new Danish minister to this court, having been impeded by
the ice in the passage of the belts, will not arrive here till the end of next week.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the direction conveyed to me
in the secret dispatch no. 7 of the 15 January, relative to Mr. Stephen Shairp, have been successfully executed.

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233 The island on which Copenhagen is to be found.
My Lord,

I am told that it has been replied verbally to the instances which I informed your Lordship in a former dispatch had been jointly made by the Russian and Swedish ministers, to engage this court immediately in vigorous offensive measures against His Majesty, that it was necessary to wait for the answer of Great Britain to the note delivered to me by Count Haugwitz. The same ministers on Monday last,234 renewed their application, alleging that England continued to take the ships of the confederated powers, which was a virtual answer to the note, and would be a sufficient justification of the conduct of Prussia. To this it has been answered, that Prussia can take no steps, which would be effectual, without the concurrence of Denmark, and that the minister of this court at Copenhagen has been directed to report the intentions of that government, and the state of its preparations.

No answer has yet been given by this court to the strong instances which are made by the Austrian minister, for a specification of the compensations, which His Prussian Majesty means to claim.

There seems upon the whole, little probability that this country will engage in any open hostility against His Majesty before the event which your Lordship mentions as to be immediately expected has taken place. As soon as it is known here, I shall probably be ordered to retire, and it is a report which gains credit here, that the Russian minister has for some time importunately urged the Prussian government to take that step. At the moment Count Haugwitz's note was delivered to me, the nephew of Baron Krüdener was sent with a copy of it to Petersburg. He returned the night before last, and has brought such assurances of the emperor's satisfaction as are highly pleasing to this cabinet. It is said the emperor has written himself to the king. The emperor's orders prohibiting the carrying by land or sea, the produce of Russia into the Russian territories has been modified, and the export is now allowed, provided it is not intended for England.

If His Majesty's fleet can make themselves masters of the passage of the Sound, they will of course be masters of the Baltic, and it is to be presumed that the court of Copenhagen at least, will be obliged to come immediately into such terms of composition, as His Majesty shall think fit. In this case it seems not impossible, if a

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2349 March.
sufficient body of troops can be spared, that a British army may be formed in that part of His Majesty's dominions which is north of the Elbe. When Denmark is no longer hostile, His Majesty's ships may probably command the Elbe. A body of troops in the position I have mentioned, would be covered, and could preserve its communication. by means of that river, which an enemy could hardly attempt to cross, not only on account of the opposition, which might be made, but as all the boats might be removed from the left bank, and placed in safety, and under the power of His Majesty's forces on the other side. The communications with the fleet in the Baltic would also be perfectly easy and secure. The country of Mecklenburg would supply provisions, which would pass without interruption by sea. An army so placed would cover Hamburg and Lübeck make the advance of a Prussian army to the Weser very hazardous, and occasion a powerful diversion by threatening this capital itself, as the country is entirely open to the very walls, without any impediment but what might arise from the small fort of Dömitz on the Elbe, in the territory of Mecklenburg, and the Havel, an inconsiderable river, which must be crossed at the distance of about ten English miles from hence. The garrisons in Silesia could not in the present posture of affairs be withdrawn, nor probably those on any part of the frontier, Poland must be kept by a considerable force, one third of the Prussian army was composed of foreigners, who will be prone to desert in great numbers, as soon as the approach of an enemy makes it practicable. The natives are not called upon to join for more than two months in the year, and at the times when their labour can be best spared, as they are engaged in the tillage of the country. In addition to this, it is not probable that the Royal Treasury could supply the expense of an army of 60,000 men, in the field for one campaign. Upon these latter considerations which are all of a political nature, it is competent to any man to judge. They indicate the possibility of embarrassing and intimidating this government by threatening with an attack on parts where they appear very vulnerable, and though I am conscious that any remarks or suggestions of mine, in a military point of view must be perfectly contemptible, they make me feel it my duty to endeavour to collect all the facts I can, as to the nature and state of the provinces which are open to invasion from the Elbe and the Baltic, in the hope they may contribute to enable those, whom His Majesty may employ to avail themselves to the utmost of the dominion over that sea, which I trust the British fleet will soon successfully have asserted.

P.S. Her Prussian Majesty has accepted the order of St Catherine of Russia. His Excellency Count Haugwitz has been invested with the Russian orders of St Andrew, of St Anne and of St Alexander Nevski.
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 14 March 1801
Separate and most secret

My Lord,

I have just received by a person, authorised by Count Haugwitz, assurances similar to those which have already been given by His Prussian Majesty, that His Majesty abhors the idea of availing himself to the disastrous circumstances of the times to appropriate to himself the dominions of his friend and ally, and that he is obliged to take the steps he is determined upon, in order to prevent the French, whose army under Augereau is ready to be put in motion. He asserts that his own inclinations as well as those of his master are as fundamentally friendly to Great Britain, as they are personally to the king; that His Prussian Majesty has great confidence in the British administrations; and that this communication, which cannot be made officially is made by a private channel, in order to prevent any impressions, which might be an obstacle to friendly and close connection in future, which is not only the wish, but the ultimate end of the measures now to be pursued. He declares expressly that no change whatever will be made in the administration of the electorate, and that the Prussian occupation will be essentially military and provisional. It follows clearly from hence, that orders have actually been issued for carrying this plan into effect.

March 15

Since I wrote the above His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus has spoken with the King of Prussia and has received from His Majesty assurances that he will take no further step till he hears from the English government, or is absolutely forced to move. He has desired the prince not to precipitate his departure and has repeated the declaration that he abhors the idea of possessing himself of His Majesty's property, or of acting against him.
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 15 March 1801

My dear Lord,

[own handwriting]

My dispatches of this date bring your Lordship the certain intelligence that the electorate will be immediately occupied by Prussian troops. Whether it is done under the immediate instigation, or under the fear of Russia, or of France, is of little consequence. Your Lordship sees what little ground there is to hope that the occupation will be only military, and provisional. I shall be happy to find that our expectations in this respect may be realised. The king’s intentions, I believe to be honourable, but his weakness is extreme. I have given notice at Hamburg, and have taken the liberty of humbly to mention it as my advice to Prince Adolphus, that unless he finds orders of a contrary tendency at Hanover, he should proceed immediately to England. As there is no force capable of defending the country against Prussia, backed by France, and Russia, His Royal Highness by remaining at Hanover would only expose himself to affronts. In this view I have written to the officer commanding any of His Majesty’s ships in the Elbe or Weser to recommend his waiting (if his orders will permit) for His R. H. commands.

By the accounts I have just received from private, but very good authority, of the state of Jacobinism at Petersburg, and the manner in which the emperor is besieged by persons notoriously of that sect, I despair of any success from the attempt I have made. M. de Lützow will probably have an answer in a fortnight, and it may not be absolutely necessary for me to leave this residence before the expiration of that term. The king thinks at present that if he could be backed by Russia he would yet dare to hold up his head against France, and look for support to England. But if the emperor was to turn about, and be again our friend, I much doubt whether Prussia would venture to oppose the will of France. The king’s natural timidity is increased by that of all his generals without exception, by distrust, (well grounded) of the affections of the army, and by suspicions, most just, of the abilities, and intentions of his counsellors.

I have just received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 3rd and 6th which give a consolatory account of the state of His Majesty’s health. Most fervently do I pray for his perfect re-establishment. I am happy to find my conduct respecting the protection to be given to ships sailing from this country with provisions of naval stores, is approved by His Majesty’s confidential servants. I trust your Lordship’s letter to me may not have been opened in the Prussian Post Office. If it has the end may have been
defeated. What I said was upon the assurances of people in trade that if they could be assured of the protection of the British government, they would run the risk ... [illegible] the evading the prohibition of their own. I have satisfaction in adding that I have talked with men in business who think the modification in favour of Prussia of the emperor's prohibition, will be sufficient to render practicable exportation to Great Britain. If His Majesty's fleet can establish themselves in the Baltic, supplies will be had with very little difficulty. It is incredible how much our enemies build here upon the probability of Russia's establishing a concert with the princes possessing Persia, and attacking our East Indian settlement.\textsuperscript{235} It may require some attention in the government of that country to defeat their designs.

no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 17 March 1801
Separate and secret

My Lord,

I have received your Lordship's letter, separate and most secret of the 4th of March, by the messenger Basilico. In the management of the very delicate business to which it refers, you appear to have acted with the greatest prudence and judgement. The personal proof of goodwill and friendly disposition of His Prussian Majesty towards this country is in the highest degree satisfactory, and you are desired to cultivate it by every means in your power, and to give him the strongest assurances of the value His Majesty places upon it.

His Majesty is sincerely desirous that the disputes between this country and Russia may be amicably adjusted, and he will send you, without delay, full powers to conclude a treaty with the court of Petersburg conformable to the principles and conditions stated in your dispatch. It is of essential consequence that the stipulations respecting the maritime league, should be in no respect inconsistent with those principles which His Majesty has so often laid down as the invariable guide of his conduct, and he trusts that the little interest which Russia can really have in this question, will render such an arrangement not very difficult. Although His Majesty is determined to adhere to the substance of the principles of maritime law on which this country has hitherto acted, he is anxious to adopt every practicable measure for preventing the abuse of them. He is aware that considerable abuses have existed in the

\textsuperscript{235} Paul issued orders for an expedition against India on 12 January 1801.
administration of justice in the maritime courts in His Majesty's distant possessions. His Majesty's subjects have been as great sufferers by these abuses as those of any other country. I am happy in being able to inform you, that a plan is at this moment under deliberation for remedying these evils, and for placing the courts in the British colonies on a respectable and independent footing. His Majesty is equally disposed to take every means in his power for rendering the administration of justice in his courts of Admiralty in this country as little dilatory as possible, consistent with the attainment of substantial justice.

You will avail yourself of these ideas whenever an opportunity occurs to you of doing so with effect, and I trust that the manifestation of these dispositions on the part of His Majesty, combined with the consideration of the very small interest which either Russia or Prussia can have in the question, and with the apprehensions which they must now seriously entertain of the increased and increasing power of France, will have the effect of inducing those courts to concede on points of such little value to them, and so essential to the prosperity and security of His Majesty's dominions.

The fleet sailed from Yarmouth Road with a very fair wind on Thursday morning the 12th instant, and there is every reason to believe, that it is at this time off Copenhagen. Mr. Vansittart expected to arrive at Copenhagen on Sunday the 8th. I cannot refrain from hoping that his mission may have been attended with success. At all events it will afford fresh proof to Europe of His Majesty's moderation and disposition to conciliation.

As I agree with your Lordship in the opinion of the advantage which may arise from the unreserved intercourse which has taken place through the intervention of Captain Decken, I commit with confidence to your discretion, any further communications which you may think it advisable to make to His Prussian Majesty.

no. 29
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 17 March 1801

My Lord,
[cipher]

I have received a proposal today from a very respectable commercial person for establishing a correspondence in order to collect in convenient depots supplies of naval stores to be passed forward for England as opportunities present themselves. I must, for obvious reasons, wait for a safe opportunity to transmit the proposal itself to your Lordship, though it seems to me probable that the calls of the public will be answered
by better and surer means. I learn from different persons engaged in and capable of judging, that the relaxation which the emperor has given in favour of Prussia of the ukase prohibiting all exportation is such as leaves no serious difficulty in the way of supplies for England.

There is evidently a difference of opinion in regard to the occupation of the Electorate of Hanover between the king and his minister, from which, however, no result very favourable to Great Britain can be expected. The king may wait in the hope that England and Russia may be reconciled but should that event take place the habit of irresolution and the want of sufficient military preparations would leave in all probability the councils of Prussia too much under the influence of France.

[end of cipher]

It is strongly reported here, and apparently on good grounds, that a note has been presented by the French minister threatening that if Prussia would not occupy the sea line of Hanover, the army of Augereau would do it. It is also said that the Danes have notified to this court, a state of warlike preparation, which will probably appear to this court to be sufficient. This we shall probably not know with certainty before the arrival of M. de Baudissin who is expected here very shortly.

no. 30
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 22 March 1801

My Lord,

I have great satisfaction in being able to communicate to your Lordship indications of a more favourable disposition in the Emperor of Russia, than there has hitherto been reason to expect. It seems well authenticated that M. de Kolychev has no instructions, but to hear and to transmit to Petersburg, the proposals of the French government, and the day before yesterday a courier from Russia brought intelligence here that Prince Kurakin, a person of excellent character, and a relation and friend of Count Panin, has been appointed Chancellor of the Order of St John, in the place of Count Rostopchin. Count Panin himself who since his retreat to Moscow, had been banished still further in to the interior of the country, has been released from that restraint, and is permitted to go where he pleases, without excepting even St Petersburg. Count Pahlen, the Governor of St Petersburg has the Department of the

236 Kurakin, Alexander Borisovich (1759-1829), Count and later Prince. He became a foreign policy adviser to Paul I and was Vice-Chancellor for the first eighteen months of Alexander's reign.
Posts, another office lately held by Rostopchin, and while I am writing I receive undoubted information that the latter has been ordered to retire to his estate, and that the Department of Foreign Affairs, which he also held has been given to Prince Kurakin, with the title of vice-chancellor ad interim.

Troops are certainly put in motion to occupy the mouths of the three rivers, and the Duke of Brunswick is expected at Potsdam on the 26th to receive his final orders. This occupation it is said will not be hostile with respect to the electorate, and the object to be avowed will be only the shutting the port against the trade of England.

I have received your Lordship's dispatches by Watson with the inclosures, and as Mr. Vansittart who wrote to me from Hamburg on the 28th has proceeded to Copenhagen, I trust there is ground to hope that Denmark will avail herself of the presence of His Majesty's fleet as a plea and a protection from coming to an agreement with His Majesty. As the sailing of the fleet is known as Mr. Vansittart's arrival at Copenhagen has long since been announced in the gazettes, and as forty-eight hours only is to be allowed the Danish government to give their answer, it seemed that no detriment could arise to the public service by availing myself of the permission to communicate with the King of Prussia, which His Majesty had given me to apprise him that steps were actually taken towards an arrangement with the court of Denmark, in the hope that a knowledge of that circumstance might still further delay the measures in contemplation either against England or His Majesty's German territories. Procrastination has already been obtained beyond what we had reason to expect, and it is yet possible, not only that the arrival of the fleet in the Sound will be known, but even that an accommodation with Denmark may have taken place before there has been any open rupture with Prussia. This must be considered as principally due to the presence of His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus, which in every point of view appears to my humble judgement to have been of greater importance to His Majesty's service. In the last case stated of an accommodation with Denmark, the plea upon which this court has rested its measures will fall to the ground, and if the liberal disposition shown by His Majesty in regard to Malta produces the effect it is reasonable to expect upon the mind of the emperor, the powers so lately confederated for purposes the most hostile to the British Empire may soon be united in a firm alliance for its support.

It is a great satisfaction for me to observe in the last communications made to me by your Lordship, that His Majesty's government has acted towards Denmark upon principles of arrangement in regard to maritime law, not dissimilar from what I had thought might be expedient, if any discussion should take place with Russia, but
though in the event, which may now be expected in a few days, of M. de Krüdener's being directed to open a negotiation with me on the grounds set forth in Lord Grenville's separate and secret letter of the 17th of last month, I shall not be at a loss as to the general line I am to pursue. I shall hope to receive precise instructions from your Lordship upon all the points I have already taken the liberty to mention to you.

I think it right to mention to your Lordship that M. de Jacobi has sent a memorial to this court, setting forth the mischievous consequences in every point of view, of the hostile measures pursuing by the northern powers against His Majesty, and particularly the advantages which France will immediately derive from it, to draw to herself all the commerce of the continent.

I shall take the best means in my power to make known the minute of council of which your Lordship has sent me a copy, and I trust it will be the means of procuring a considerable extent supplies of great importance to His Majesty's dominions. I saw today a paper mentioned in a former dispatch relative to this subject.

After what I have said concerning M. de Kolychev, I think it necessary to observe that it is thought by many, that M. Oubril secretary of legation to the Russian mission here, who was dispatched to Paris a few days ago, carried instructions to that minister. I think it also proper to observe that the system of procrastination which His Majesty's government has thought proper to observe towards this court, and which, as its expediency must have been confirmed by the secret intelligence I have been able to give of the sentiments of His Prussian Majesty, will probably be persevered in as long as possible, may finally have had the effect, not only of facilitating the passage of supplies of stores and provisions to the United Kingdom, but of preserving His Majesty's German dominions from the unjust invasion with which they have been and still are threatened.

no. 4
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 24 March 1801
Most secret and confidential

My Lord,

I send your Lordship by a messenger the full powers which are necessary for authorising you to conclude a treaty with the Russian government conformably to the instructions you have already received. You will endeavour, in the first instance, to negotiate a treaty on maritime law, similar to that which Mr. Vansittart is instructed to negotiate with the government of Copenhagen, but if you should find the Russian
government unwilling to enter into engagements of this nature, His Majesty will be satisfied with a formal renunciation of the convention signed at St Petersburg on the 16th of December, and will, on this condition, and on that of the embargo being immediately taken off, consent to the terms which have been proposed respecting Malta. If an arrangement to this effect can be rendered more easy by an article being inserted in the treaty - that His Majesty would use all his endeavours to prevent all abuses in the exercise of his rights, and to render the prosecution of justice in all his maritime courts as little dilatory and expensive as possible, there appears to be no objection to such a stipulation.

I think it right to apprise your Lordship, in confidence, that a proposition has been made on the part of His Majesty to the French government to open a negotiation for peace.237

The answer has not yet been received but may be expected in the course of three or four days. You will not fail to avail yourself of the knowledge of this circumstance to press any negotiation which may be depending and to inform me with as little delay as possible of every particular which you are of opinion might, at the present moment, have its influence, either on the conduct of His Majesty, or on that of the French government.

no. 31
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 24 March 1801

My Lord,

I am sorry to say it is plainly impossible to prevent the occupation of the electorate by the Prussian troops. The King of Prussia not only continues to behave with all appearance of regard to His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus, but possesses the same objects, and the same ultimate intentions, as he has done ever since the arrival of His Royal Highness. Count Haugwitz endeavours also to impress with a belief that he acts upon similar principles. The Prussian cabinet seems intent at present upon cementing anew the alliance of the north of Germany, in order to maintain an army of observation upon the line of demarcation. It is easily to be believed that such a project

237 After the fall of Pitt's government on 4 March 1801, and given the difficult situation in which Britain found itself on the continent, the new Prime Minister Addington started peace negotiations which were to end in the signing of peace preliminaries between France and Britain in London on 1 October 1801.
cannot be agreeable to France, and it is possible the court of Berlin may hope to amuse that power by demonstrations of hostility against His Majesty, so as to gain time sufficiently to accomplish the end it has in view. M. de Lucchesini, there is strong reason to believe, has reported a conversation with the First Consul himself, in which he declared to Lucchesini, in the most peremptory terms, that immediate orders should be given to the army of Augereau to enter the Electorate, if Prussia delayed it any longer. He made also a strong declaration against the continuance of a line of demarcation, and an army of observation. As it seems impracticable to defend the electorate against the threatened invasion, it may be as well to appear to give credit to any pretences the Prussian cabinet may choose to allege, and to avoid as long as possible any direct act of hostility on our part which might furnish a colour for the king to disregard the professions he now makes. If His Prussian Majesty is truly sensible to the dangers to which he is exposed from France, and desires upon that account to renew the league of north Germany it is most probable that in case of a reconciliation between the courts of London and St Petersburg, he might be disposed to enter into a defensive alliance with those powers.

A notion begins to circulate here that the emperor upon receiving the news of the preliminaries of Lunéville (in which no provision was made for those points on which he had particularly insisted, and in which the ratification was stipulated to take place in so short a time that his influence must be totally excluded), sent letters of recall to M. de Kolychev. I mention these considerations that if the course of events should justify the conjectures now formed, His Majesty's government may direct what steps should be taken to make the most advantage of it. In case the Danish court should agree to the terms proposed by His Majesty, the idea entertained by Prince Adolphus of collecting the Hanoverian army behind the Elbe in the Duchy of Lauenburg, may, if Prussia should consent to it, have important effects, and serve as a material check on the conduct of that power at the same time it covers Holstein, and preserves a communication with England by the Baltic.

I have transmitted to Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, exact intelligence of the situation of a new light house erected this winter at the entrance of the Neva in the gulf of Finland with the intention of misleading His Majesty's fleet.

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238. The Duchy of Lauenburg on the lower Elbe was actually in. and belonged to, the Electorate of Hanover.
239. Parker, Sir Hyde (1739-1807), British admiral. He served during the American War of Independence, commanded the Royal Navel forces on Jamaica (1796-1800), and was sent in charge of
Exportation of the produce of Russia to the Prussian territories is permitted upon the following conditions; that the Prussian Bürger, making oath, that the commodities are intended to be used or worked up in the manufactures of Prussia, he is to receive a certificate from his own magistrate, on exhibiting which to the emperor's officers in Russia, he will be permitted to export the goods. In consequence of this regulation it is doubted whether new hemp can be had from hence, and it has been suggested to me that it would be expedient to give the same indulgence for ropes that has already been given for provisions, and the articles usually denominated naval stores. I do not know whether any parliamentary prohibition of foreign cordage exists or whether there is any particular objection to this proposal, but seeing no point of greater importance than the supply of the navy, I have ventured to encourage the shipping of cordage on the same conditions as the goods already specified. If I have done wrong it is impossible that more than three or four ships have put to sea with cordage before I can receive your Lordship's direction upon the subject.

P.S. The new lighthouse mentioned above is on the south side of the gulf, 20 versts, or about 15 miles below Krasna Gorka. An old lighthouse on Cock Scar blown down about a year ago has not been rebuilt.

I have confined the encouragement I have held out concerning the cordage to what may be fit for the use of the navy.

Intelligence has been received here that an order has been published at Riga for opening the Russian trade to France.

A person of credit has just informed me that he has private intelligence on which he relies that the Prussian ministry mean to take possession of Hamburg.

no. 32
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 26 March 1801

My Lord,

Count Haugwitz sent for me last night, having previously given me an intimation that he intended it, in order that we might converse confidentially upon the actual state of affairs between the two countries. Instead however of pursuing this intention, he informed me shortly and drily, by command of the king his master, that no answer having been returned to the note of the 13th of February, and England the fleet to attack Copenhagen. His performance during the battle is considered weak and indecisive. Nelson carried the day.
having committed hostilities against Sweden and Denmark, on the open sea, and in the ports of Norway, and a large fleet having put to sea apparently designed to act in the Baltic, His Majesty has found himself obliged to use the means in his power, for the support of his allies, and that his troops were now on their march to occupy the sea coasts and the ports commanding the Elbe and the Weser. I contented myself with observing in reply, that the intentions of Prussia had long been beyond doubt, and that the pretexts now alleged by His Excellency could only tend to confirm an opinion very generally entertained, that the conduct of Prussia was dictated in reality by considerations, wholly extinct from the differences existing between England and the powers of the north.

The ministerial conference being finished, Count Haugwitz took occasion to assure me, that the British government had been greatly mistaken in attributing dispositions unfavourable to Great Britain, to the northern powers, and particularly to Russia, and added that he felt himself warranted in saying, that the emperor was not only still unconnected with France, but entertained a strong personal friendship for His Majesty, and favourable dispositions towards Great Britain. He then claimed merit for Prussia as having prevented the close connection between Russia and France. He would not give me any assurances, as to the continuance of a free correspondence, which he said must depend upon future events, though there was no intention at present of interrupting the course of the packets. I pass the more slightly over the whole of the conversation, as Prince Adolphus transmits a detailed account between Count Haugwitz and Captain Decken, on the affairs of Hanover, and as I remain persuaded that fear is the predominant motive of this court, and that its measures depend almost exclusively at this moment upon the decisions of the Russian emperor.

It gives me heartfelt satisfaction that my conduct has once again been honoured with His Majesty's approbation. The concurrent well authenticated reports of the change which has taken place in the emperor's sentiments give great hopes of favourable issue, and unless some unforeseen accident has prevented or delayed the communication through M. de Lützow, which that gentleman is persuaded cannot have been the case, an answer must in the course of next week be received from Petersburg.

As the Danish court has I fear determined to abide the fortune of war, hostilities have probably ere now commenced by Sir Hyde Parker. When such an event comes to be known here, it is probable unless negotiation with the court of Petersburg shall be actually begun, with an appearance of good success, that I shall be ordered to depart. In that case I shall go to Dresden, and in the letter which I shall write immediately to the King of Prussia, in consequence of your Lordship's separate and most secret dispatch
of the 17th instant, I mean to request from His Prussian Majesty, who has already been informed and approved of my intentions in that respect, the security and facility of my correspondence, till the final result of the business with Russia can be known.

I inclose a list of twenty seven ships, laden with wheat, which I have furnished with passports at Stettin and Danzig, and which I hope will all put to sea. The American consul in Stettin has been active in this business.

no. 33
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 27 March 1801

My Lord,

I take the opportunity of Mr. Warre an English merchant from Petersburg going to Hamburg to send to your Lordship all that I have heard in any degree interesting since I wrote last.

Our expectations of a favourable change in the conduct of Russia were raised very high, by the number of concurrent reports to that effect. I am sorry however to say that the accounts last received do not warrant any sanguine hopes. On the contrary there is reason to believe that the English merchants have experienced new injustice, and that the sale of their property by public auction has been finally determined. I am sorry to add that a letter is said to have been received by M. de Krüdener signed by the new ministers by which it appears M. de Lützow's report has been received, but the emperor is now bent upon refusing everything short of the pretended convention respecting Malta. I have never seen a copy of that paper, nor do I know the conditions it contains. But it seems to me that unless there was reason to believe that the Russian minister here has withheld or disregarded the truth, in order to favour a little longer the politics of this court or of Copenhagen, there is nothing to be expected after a refusal on the part of the emperor to avail himself of the liberal disposition which has been evinced by His Majesty to gratify him in what is supposed to be his favourite object.

Two Russian couriers arrived yesterday and besides what I have already states, it is said they have brought instructions to M. de Krüdener on the subject of the peace of Lunéville.

M. de Krüdener immediately after receiving his dispatches set out for Potsdam to which place the court, and the minister had gone in the morning. The Duke of Brunswick was to be there and the measures to be pursued for the shutting the rivers, and occupying the electorate were to be finally adjusted.
I send your Lordship a farther communication, made from a house in Amsterdam, with a view for establishing a mode for the supply of the navy.

no. 34
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 29 March 1801

My Lord,

Captain de Decken who went to Potsdam on Thursday to confer with the Duke of Brunswick returned here last night. The Duchy of Bremen is to be occupied immediately. The corps destined for that service will not exceed fifteen thousand men, and though the Duke of Brunswick has assisted at the council held to fix the plan of operation, he has declined taking the command himself. Captain de Decken read to me some notes of his conversation with the duke, but there has not been time to transcribe them, and His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus will transmit them to His Majesty, but I send the translation of a note from the duke to Captain Decken, with which I was furnished by the prince. It is needless for me to make any comment upon this new acknowledgment of the miserable weakness of the Prussian government, but the terms made use of by the duke are such as to lead to a suspicion that what M. de Krüdener has communicated from his last dispatches, as to the emperor's intentions, is not very positive or precise, and from what I know of M. de Krüdener's character, I shall not be surprised if I should receive, in case His Majesty's fleet should triumph over the Danes, an invitation from that gentleman to enter into discussion with him upon Malta, on the principles already laid down.

I suspect that as soon as the account arrives of the commencement of hostilities in the Sound, I shall be ordered by His Prussian Majesty to quit this place, in which case I shall proceed directly for England. If M. de Krüdener has, as I am inclined to suspect, authority to treat, he will then be obliged to make advances. The small number of troops intended for the immediate occupation of the Hanoverian territory, and the state and character of the electoral army, makes it probable that they will be able to make at least an honourable capitulation. Those I have talked with think they will not submit to be disarmed, or to take an oath to the King of Prussia, but will insist upon being allowed time to learn the pleasure of their sovereign, and even to have

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240 26 March.
241 Bremen, a free trading city, one of the Hanse towns and capital of the duchy of the same name. Bremen was occupied by Prussian troops on 12 April.
liberty if such should be His Majesty's will to embark and quit the country. This latter idea I have endeavoured to encourage. In the present state of the war they might render important service, and Parliament will probably not hesitate to provide for men who give a conspicuous proof of attachment to their sovereign, and whose country is invaded, because it belongs to His Majesty. As long as they can be kept together, there will exist a powerful means for restoring His Majesty's dominions, and Prussia will not reap the benefit of her injustice, by making so important an addition to her force. If Sir Hyde Parker should prevail against the Danes they might be immediately employed to advantage in the Baltic. But the consent of Prussia to their being withdrawn will probably not be obtained without the conditions of their embarking when and where His Prussian Majesty may direct, and of their not being sent directly against his allies.

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, 31 March 1801
Separate

My Lord,

I had yesterday the honour of drawing on your Lordship for the sum of three hundred pounds, being for three months, to the present date, of the yearly appointments granted by His Majesty's command to General Stamford, as communicated to me in Lord Grenville's separate dispatch of the 8th September of last year. I have remitted this sum to General Stamford, and herewith inclose an official receipt.
4. The following documents, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the Public Records Office, Foreign Office, Prussia 64, vol. 61, letters and papers from the Earl of Carysfort at Berlin to the Secretary of State with drafts to his Lordship, 1 April to 18 November 1801.

no. 35
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 1 April 1801

My Lord,

The occupation of the town of Hamburg by the Danish troops, which has already taken place, makes it impossible for me to correspond with your Lordship by the ordinary mode, I shall therefore take the liberty of retaining the two messengers Basset and Rutt until I have a prospect of some more certain means of communication.²⁴²

My last dispatches will have apprised your Lordship that I entertained considerable doubts as to the real state of affairs between His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, and particularly as to the communications made through M. de Lützow. Your Lordship will not be surprised, that I shall be able to set the whole of a business which has probably been industriously concealed from me, immediately before your eyes. It will be sufficient to say that I cannot look upon a conclusion with the emperor on the terms which have been stated as desperate. It is the wish of M. de Krudener that I should remain until another answer can be obtained from Russia, and what has passed is of a nature to make it very doubtful, whether His Majesty's most liberal intentions with respect to Malta have been yet distinctly and fully made known to the

²⁴²Prince Carl of Hesse, overstepping his orders and without waiting for the arrival of the Prussians, marched into Hamburg on 29 March with 12,000 men. The town itself was not occupied for fear of clashes with the population. The gates of the city were simply occupied.
emperor. M. de Lützow in his last conversation with me stated that the difficulty arose not so much from the substance of what was demanded by His Majesty, as from the emperor's considering Malta as being the property of the order. I was surprised at this objection, as the whole tenor of what had been mentioned, grounded on the Barrier Treaty, went upon the supposition that the property of the island should be recognised as belonging to the order, as the Low Countries undoubtedly were to the House of Austria, and upon my stating this, M. de Lützow said that M. de Krüdener would be delighted at having authority to mention it by a courier he was about to dispatch. The next morning M. de Lützow sent me a draught of his report of our conversation in which it was simply stated that, I had said in conversation with him, that I believed I might be allowed to acknowledge the property of the island to be in the order, provided there should be an English garrison there, in the same manner as in the fortresses of the Low Countries under the Barrier Treaty. I altered this into a recapitulation, almost in the same words of the former communication, observing only in addition, that the Low Countries, the unquestioned and ancient property of the House of Austria, had been reconquered by the arms of his allies England and Holland, and that they had annexed this condition to the restitution. The answer was, they were greatly rejoiced that I had said so much, that M. de Krüdener was dispatching his son to Petersburg, and that they hoped I would wait yet three weeks in which time they expected an answer. The conclusion, perhaps most natural is, that they are waiting the result of the operation of Sir Hyde Parker's fleet. Your Lordship will easily believe with what anxiety I am watching the accounts which arrive. On the 24th, according to accounts in the Hamburg paper, from Elsinore, the fleet was entering the sound with a north-west wind, but the reports now prevailing in town are, that it is returned in the North Sea. upon no better foundation as I believe that there are accounts from Hamburg as late as the 29th in which nothing is said of the fleet.

I presume it will be thought proper, that I should continue within reach at last till the time when M. de Krüdener, the son, may be expected to return. It does not seem to be the intention, or wish of this court to send me away, and I have reason to think that the alarm among the commercial part of the people is so great, that they are very desirous of conniving at the trade which may be carried on, and as no harm can follow from hence to the interests of the United Kingdom, His Majesty's government will probably indulge them as long as possible. M. de Schulenburg set forward

243 Schulenburg-Kenhert, Friedrich Wilhelm Count von der (1742-1815), Prussian minister. He was named minister by Friedrich II in 1771 at the age of 28, made count in 1786 by Friedrich Wilhelm II
yesterday for Hanover, to arrange the capitulation for Hanover. I fear no terms can be obtained for the troops which will enable His Majesty to avail himself of their service.

I inclose a letter from M. de Schickheisen and his correspondent at Amsterdam, (the same person whose communications were transmitted with no. 33), which I should hope might be made some use of. I have signed other passports for ships with corn. The list of them is inclosed.

no. 5
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 3 April 1801
Most secret

My Lord,

[cipher]

I think it right to send a messenger to your Lordship to inform you that it is the opinion of His Majesty's government, that under the existing circumstances, the negotiation which you were authorised to set on foot with the Empire of Russia (if they are not brought to a conclusion) should, so far as represents Malta be for the present suspended. You will avail yourself for this purpose of that which appears to you at the moment, to be the best pretence, and your Lordship will regulate your conduct in such a manner as to leave if possible an opening for the renewal or the continuance of the negotiation, if it should afterwards be thought expedient either to renew or continue it. If the Russian government should be disposed to enter into negotiations on the other point of matter, which can hardly be expected, there is not any objection to your proceeding upon them, and to your using every endeavour for bringing the negotiation on these points to a speedy and successful conclusion.

and voluntarily resigned his posts shortly after. He was recalled in 1790, made General Controller of Finances in 1798 by Friedrich Wilhelm III, and General Post Master in 1800. Dismissed after the Treaty of Tilsit, he later became a general under Jerôme of Westphalia. He was sent to Hanover as governor where he arrived on 2 April.
my Lord,
A courier arrived this morning from St Petersburg, with the important intelligence of the death of the emperor Paul the first, which happened suddenly on the night of the 24th ultimo. His son, the Great Duke Alexander, immediately assumed the reins of government.244

It is reported here, and very generally credited that His Majesty's fleet passed the Sound on the 30th and had begun the attack of Copenhagen, but I have no direct information of this fact.

My dear Lord,
[own handwriting]
A violent rheumatic complaint makes it very difficult for me to write at all. My dispatch contains the most important news of the emperor's death but I cannot forbear recommending to your Lordship to take immediate steps for renewing a ministerial intercourse with the court of Petersburg. There is but too much reason to think that the perfidious politics of this court will throw all possible obstacles in the way of our reconciliation with Russia, and whether their measures have originally proceeded from the mandate of the Emperor Paul, or from the desire of appropriating Hanover to themselves, they are now so far involved that it will be very difficult for them to retreat. Mr. Shairp is gone, and I am not aware of any means remaining to me of opening an intercourse with the Russian ministry, but I am inclined to suggest, as from myself to the Duke of Siera Capriola, to act upon the answer formerly given to him, in which His Majesty's readiness to appoint a minister as soon as he is assured of a corresponding disposition in the emperor is expressed, and to tell him my private opinion, that His Majesty continues in the same disposition, notwithstanding the state of war brought on by the violent measures of the late emperor. It is very doubtful whether I can yet find

means of having my letter conveyed to its destination, nor am I sure that the step will.
on reflection, appear to me prudent but if I should determine to take it your Lordship
may depend on its being done in such a manner as to commit nobody but myself.
Perhaps under the present extraordinary circumstances of Europe, it might not appear
too much in the estimation of His Majesty's ministers, to send a confidential person
directly to Petersburg. The shortest, and surest mode would be from the fleet, for I
cannot but suspect that the Prussian Ministry will counteract us by all the means in their
power.

no. 37
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 8 April 1801

My Lord,

In the evening of the date of my last dispatch to your Lordship, I was enabled
to send a special messenger to Hanover with the account not only of the death of the
emperor, but of the passage of the Sound without loss by His Majesty's fleet. I wish
he may have arrived in time to enable the regency and army in that country to obtain
terms more advantageous than they otherwise could have expected. Notwithstanding
the violence and the indecency of the manifesto, published as I believe at Hanover.
upon the arrival of Count Schulenburg (a translation of which, though it is probable it
has already been transmitted from Hanover, I have inclosed) there are circumstances
which may be thought to indicate that the spirit of hostility towards Great Britain really
felt by the Prussian government, is in fact not so great as might be inferred from its
demonstrations. The destination of the army which was to have been assembled here
the 11th or 12th of this month, and was supposed to be intended to support the
occupation of the electorate, is now known to be in Franconia. Part of the troops are
already in garrison there, and the remainder will not be collected in this neighbourhood
until the 28th. The whole will amount to about 15,000 or 16,000 men. The consul at
Bremen informs me that the Prussian troops were not expected to break up from
Minden before this day, and that letters from thence received on the morning of the 1st
instant at Bremen, say that they had not yet received any orders for marching.
M. von Sienen, one of the syndics of Hamburg, who has been deputed here, tells me that Count Haugwitz professes to disapprove very much the conduct of the Danes at Hamburg notwithstanding the analogy with the conduct of Prussia in the electorate.

In the dispatches from Russia, which are supposed to have been the immediate cause of the resolution taken at Potsdam to occupy the electorate, the emperor is said to have declared his determination not to suffer the indemnification of the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Germany, and to insist that Bo...tolsgarden [illegible], Salzburg and Würzburg shall be given to the Elector of Bavaria. To this plan he acquired not only the acquiescence but the active assistance of Prussia. It was a part of the scheme that a quarter part of His Majesty's German dominions should be given to Prussia, Hamburg and the Duchy of Lauenburg to Denmark, and Lübeck to Sweden. Whatever share the cabinet of Berlin may have had in suggesting these ideas to the emperor, the death of that prince will have made it appear very probable that any of them should be realised, and accordingly Count Haugwitz conveyed to me the day after the news arrived through the channel he usually employs, his expectation that this event would produce the peace of the north, and that I should not even pursue my intention of going to Dresden, that he hoped the news might have reached Copenhagen in time to prevent further hostilities, and that he had sent for M. de Rosenkrantz who was just setting out for that place, to communicate his sentiments to him, and to urge him to use all possible expedition, and particularly to check the proceedings of the Prince of Hesse.

Accounts were received yesterday dated the 26th from Petersburg that the emperor had issued a proclamation to his subjects announcing his accession, and that he should call to his councils those who had possessed the confidence of Catherine the Second, whose example he should make the model of his government. Thus far is official. The reports from Königsberg and other commercial places, (the wishes of the merchants probably outrunning the event), have already taken off the embargo, and opened the trade with England.

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245 Jacob Albrecht von Sienen, syndic from Hamburg. He was sent on a mission to Berlin after Prussian troops occupied the bailiff of Ritzebütel. His instructions are dated 8 December 1800 and are to be found in StAH, Cl. I Lit. Pb. Vol. 8c. fasc. 5, no. 8, invol. 5.

246 Salzburg is an Austrian town situated in the middle of the Alps.

247 Shortly after the accession of Alexander to the throne, most of the anti-English measures were withdrawn. Alexander renounced his claim to Malta, he recalled the troops that had been ordered to India, and most importantly for Prussia, he recalled Paul's ultimatum calling for a Prussian occupation
As the prevailing sentiment in Russia at this moment is most probably the
distress occasioned by the rupture with His Majesty, there is great reason to believe that
the first measures of the new emperor will tend to reconciliation. The ministers of
Denmark and Sweden, as well as of Prussia will certainly urge as strongly as possible
their claim upon the support, and protection of the imperial court. The danger of the
two first is most urgent. The latter has not only been tempted by prospects of great
advantage, but has plunged too far to be able to retreat with honour. And if we are to
give any credit to what has been said of the menace of the First Consul that
consideration must continue to operate, and prolong the Prussian demonstration of
hostility, even after a reconciliation shall have taken place between His Majesty and the
other northern powers.

Reflecting upon this and the circumstances mentioned in my dispatches 34 and
35, I was very anxious when I heard of the emperor's death, to find some certain
means of intimating as soon as possible to the new government the continuance of His
Majesty's pacific dispositions, and I thought that such an intimation, combined with the
intelligence which would be received much about the same time of the entrance of the
fleets into the Baltic, might decide the imperial court, if it should have been wavering, to
engage in negotiations for immediate peace. But on weighing the matter more maturely
I thought all that was necessary had been already done, Mr. Shairp having been
furnished with such an account with what had been transacting here as I thought would
answer the purpose in view, and with the particulars of the intimations given through
M. de Lützow, under pretext of satisfying our suffering countrymen, that all that was
possible had been done for their relief, and with a private instruction to communicate
the whole, as from himself, confidentially, to Count von der Pahlen, or any other of
His Imperial Majesty's cabinet. If the next accounts from Petersburg shall authorise
such a step, being fully sensible of the importance of accelerating a reconciliation with
the northern powers, as it may influence any negotiations with France, I may perhaps
venture upon writing a private letter to the Duke of Serra Capriola, with whom I am
personally acquainted, to engage him to promote the immediate restoration of
ministerial communications.

On the supposition that the emperor's councils should be as favourable to Great
Britain, as can be wished, and that a full reconciliation with Russia, and the other
northern courts takes place, it is expedient to consider what may be the probable views

of Hanover. He went to the Senate and declared the liberty of commerce. The embargo, however,
continued for some time yet.
and conduct of this court, in order that His Majesty's ministers may think of the best means to give it such an impulse and direction as may be most for His Majesty's service.

It is very improbable that it should be found inclined to contract any new engagements either with Great Britain, or the powers of the north which is not merely defensive. A defensive alliance with Russia, with Sweden and Denmark, will I dare say be immediately sought. To this the accession of Great Britain would be wished if the state of active warfare between His Majesty and France, did not induce the apprehension that it might lead to an immediate rupture with that power. But the great and ultimate end of Prussia will be to reunite under her banners all the princes within the line of demarcation, and to perpetuate their confederation. If such a concert could be established between His Majesty and the court of Petersburg, as by their influence with the several princes to make such a confederation depend upon their consent, it is the only way to open the prospect of any active co-operation from this court. It is perhaps but fair to remark that the danger alleged by Prussia of French designs against Hanover is far from being unfounded in probability, and that if any reliance could be placed upon the honour and sincerity of the cabinet of Berlin, the occupation of the Electorate of Hanover by Prussian troops, under pretext of some discussion with His Majesty, might really be useful and give time for contributing a system of effectual opposition to the common enemy.

I should have told your Lordship that the new emperor is said to have sent away M. Kutuzov, the valet de chambre, and favourite of Paul the first, who with his mistress Madame Chevalier were the principal agents of France.\footnote{Mme Chevalier, French actress, born in Lyons, where she entered the theatre as a young girl. She moved to Paris in 1792, to Hamburg in 1795, to Petersburg in 1798, where she formed a liaison with Count Kutuzov, a former Turkish barber who had become Paul's chamberlain and favourite. Kutuzov reportedly had an extraordinary facility for influencing Paul. Cf. Ragsdale, \textit{Détente}, 35-36.}

A gentleman has just called upon me, with the news that a banker in this town has received an estafette this morning from Petersburg, informing him that the embargo has been taken off, and that the emperor has declared his intention, immediately to invite the renewal of a material intercourse with His Majesty. I shall keep this letter open as long as possible in hopes of being able to give the confirmation of intelligence of such importance.

I have not yet received any further accounts of the operations of the fleet.
My Lord,

I have the honour to inclose a memorial I have received from Baron Kirchenberger de Rolle. With this gentleman I have little acquaintance. He arrived here not long since with a view to prevail upon this government to interest itself in the restoration of the government of Switzerland, upon the foundation of the ancient federative system, with some alterations calculated to give greater vigour to the common executive. He is generally considered here as a man of merit and integrity. Of any particular claims he may have upon the British government, I can form no judgement. Your Lordship probably will be furnished with full intelligence upon this head by Mr. Wickham. But de Kirchenberger offers his service to remain here and correspond with the British government in case the present mission should quit Berlin. He might perhaps be made of some use in his situation, in case His Majesty should think proper to give him a pension according to his desire but I have not sufficient knowledge of him to venture giving any advice upon this point.

Unpleasant reports have prevailed here today from Copenhagen. They are founded upon a letter from the Post Master at Hamburg who has received the account he transmits from Altona. They state that the fleet attacked on the 1st. The action continued from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. and then terminated by the retreat of the British, and in consequence of the loss sustained. Admiral Parker is said to have solicited an armistice. Twelve hours have now elapsed, and I do not find there has been any official account. I hear from that this circumstance it begins to be generally discredited.\(^{249}\)

I have this evening been assured that no doubt is entertained here by the mercantile men that the embargo on British property in Russia is actually taken off, but I trust your Lordship will have already received authentic information of this fact. M. de Haugwitz having assured the Austrian chargé d'affaires this morning, that he had information from Hamburg of a Russian courier having actually passed that place on his way to England.

\(^{249}\)On 21 March, the British fleet under Sir Admiral Hyde Parker anchored outside the Sound. A special envoy was sent into Copenhagen in an attempt to detach Denmark from her allies but returned on 23 March without any success. On the morning of 2 April, the English led by Nelson attacked the defences before Copenhagen, and after a heated battle defeated the Danes.
I inclose a farther list of ships to which I have given passports. Consul de Drusina in a letter dated Königsberg the 31st March assures me that the assurances he has been empowered to give produce all the effect that could be expected, so that I trust upon the whole, the supply of corn drawn from their countries, will not have fallen short of what was expected, before the appearance of a rupture.

no. 39
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 12 April 1801

My Lord,

As it seems now beyond doubt that the new emperor, if he has not actually empowered Count Vorontsov\(^{250}\) to resume his functions publicly as his minister at London, has at least directed him to make overtures tending to a reconciliation, and as it is understood that His Imperial Majesty, who has not assumed the title of Grand Master of Malta does not mean to make any claim to that place, the question between the two countries being reduced to the objects of the maritime convention, it is probable that matter will finally be concluded in London. But as I may still have to negotiate on that subject here, I must take the liberty of making some observations concerning it, to avoid all possibility of my acting contrary to His Majesty's intentions.

It is scarcely to be expected, though Denmark and Sweden might find themselves in the end obliged to subscribe to any terms His Majesty's government may dictate, that two such powers as Russia and Prussia, will submit to the indignity of publicly announcing engagements which they have so recently concluded, and have avowed their determination to support. The submission of their allies would probably be an inducement to these powers to persist, and as our attack upon Denmark is supported by no land force, we should not be able, in any probability, to detain even the island of Zeeland against a detachment of the Prussian army. But even supposing it possible to extort from all the members of the confederacy a public renunciation of its principles, it should seem more for the interest of the United Kingdom to enter with them all into an agreement by which through the means of concessions, which would

\(^{250}\)Vorontsov, Semen Romanovich (1744-1832), Russian soldier and diplomat. He was one of the most influential Russian diplomats of his time, and served in various European capitals before being posted to London in 1784 where he was to remain until 1806. He ran into trouble with Paul who dismissed him from his post but granted him permission to stay on in England. He was reinstated after Paul's assassination.
be more in form than in substance, we might obtain from them an express acknowledgement of all the principles it is really important for us to maintain. It is upon this plan that Mr. Vansittart’s instructions were apparently drawn, and I have not the least doubt but that all the powers would readily acquiesce in it, and that it might be so conducted as not only to restore the peace of the north, and unite the principle powers in friendship with us, but also to turn the tide of public opinion in our favour. Your Lordship will be pleased to observe that though I had been directed to proceed, in case a negotiation had been opened with the late emperor, upon the same grounds as Mr. Vansittart, the instructions drawn up for that gentleman cannot be a guide to me, unless I am furnished with the paper, which they refer. But I shall now briefly remark that the most prominent articles of the maritime convention are those which go to establish three positions: 1st, that free bottoms make free goods; 2nd, that neutral ships may trade from port to port in an enemy’s country; and 3rd, that convoys shall protect from search. The first and second of these positions can scarcely be separated. It appears by the treaty between France and Mecklenburg, concluded in 1779 that it has always been the law of that country, that the carrying the goods of an enemy should subject to confiscation the neutral ship and cargo. In the present war it is well known, that doctrine has been carried by France to the most extravagant length. The rule of the British court has always been much milder, so much so, I believe as not only to suffer the neutral ship and cargo to go free but to allow freight upon the enemy’s goods taken out. This however is not generally known or understood. There is therefore in this instance an opportunity of appearing liberal, when we should in fact only be confirming our ancient and established practice. The same reason applies to the trading from port to port. If it is admitted (which I am persuaded it would be) that enemies goods may be seized on board a neutral vessel, with the limitations just stated, it can never be contended that neutrals may carry on the enemy’s coasting trade, and upon this point, and what relates to goods of a doubtful nature, and to blockaded ports such equitable rules prevail in our courts, (as appear particularly from the reports of cases adjudged by Sir William Scott,251 that it cannot be doubted, but that something might be fixed upon all these points in exact conformity to our present practice, which would be received as perfectly reasonable and satisfactory.

I observe in Mr. Vansittart’s instructions that there is a disposition in His Majesty’s government to do something on the point of convoys, and also to lay farther

251 Scott, William Lord Stowell (1745-1836), appointed judge of the High Court of the Admiralty on 26 October 1798.
restrictions on privateers. In both instances anything that has the appearance of a concession would not fail of being well received.

As to naval stores which are not expressly declared contraband, in our treaties with Sweden and Russia, but are considered in the term munitions, or munitions de guerre, as the trade of both those countries consists almost entirely of those articles, which are in many cases fairly to be considered as of a doubtful nature, it might perhaps be reasonable, and what would be expected, that some cases should be specified in which goods of this description, stopped by the ships of war of a belligerent power, should be paid for. I believe this was practised with regard to Sweden in the beginning of the war, but not continued on account of some abuse, and I am convinced that Sweden, if gratified upon this head, would have no other complaint. Perhaps the best mode of proceeding would be, that pointed out by the precedent with Denmark in 1780, namely, to enter into conventions with the several powers, explanatory of the subsisting treaties. A different mode must be followed with Prussia, as we have no treaty of commerce with that crown. Such a full explanation and settlement would be preferable to any other mode, as it would lay the question asleep probably forever. The present difficulty might however be removed in a more compendious way, to which all the powers would probably readily accede, (if it was to be followed, as I suppose any speedy arrangement will be, by restitution of the ships and goods detained under the embargo), by simply adopting the second and third articles of the Convention of March and April 1794, between Denmark and Sweden.

As it appears that His Majesty's government is already occupied in correcting all abuses that may have crept into the subordinate maritime tribunals, and in providing for a more speedy adjudication of prize cases, it may be very proper that something should be mentioned upon these heads, in order to place in the strongest manner, before the eyes of the several powers, the principles of justice which govern His Majesty's conduct.

Such my Lord, are the general ideas which I should keep in view, if I was to find myself called upon to enter into any negotiation upon these important subjects, and I have taken the liberty of entering into this detail that if I should not have taken such a view of them as is consistent with His Majesty's pleasure, I may receive your Lordship's farther directions.

The language held here universally by all the persons connected with government, as well as by the public is, that the emperor's death must bring about the immediate pacification of the north. I am told that there is strong reason to apprehend that new dissensions are growing between France and Austria. If the present
opportunity can be improved to a speedy reconciliation between His Majesty and the powers of the Baltic, it may lead to a general peace, and whatever may be the secret views of the Prussian ministry, I cannot think that there is yet such an understanding between them and France, as to make it probable the latter would take any pains to obtain for them a permanent establishment in His Majesty's German dominions.

no. 40
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 15 April 1801

My Lord,

M. de Jerepzoff arrived here from Petersburg two days ago, being charged with a commission to notify to this court, the death of the late and the accession of the present emperor. There is now no longer any doubt but that the death of Paul the first was inflicted by violent means. Valerien Zubov,\(^2\) brother of the favourite of Catherine the Second, appears to have been at the head of the conspirators. Count von der Pahlen is also named as having been actively concerned. After the emperor had retired to rest on the night of the 24th March, a battalion of guards who were much attached to Zubov, and who had been previously tampered with, being on guard, about ten persons led by Zubov, proceeded towards the imperial apartment. Their passage however was opposed by the sentinel on guard at the door of the emperor's chamber. He was immediately dispatched and the noise of the execution alarmed the emperor, when Zubov entered the room, and seizing him in his bed, tendered him a declaration of abdication for signature, assuring him at the same time that his life should be spared, and that he should be well treated in his confinement. The emperor as first, expressed great indignation, but terrified at the resolute countenance of Zubov he soon signified his compliance. In the act of signing however, observing that Zubov was alone, he suddenly seized him by the collar. Zubov then gave the signal, and the other conspirators entered. The emperor fell on his knees and begged for life, but was told it was now too late. He was then brought down by a blow on the head, with a musket, and strangled with his sash.

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\(^2\) Nicolas, Platon and Valerien Zubov, three brothers of recent nobility. Platon was one of Catherine II's lovers, Nicolas was a senator, and Valerian a general. Their sister was Lord Whitworth's mistress. All actively participated in the plot to kill Paul.
Intelligence has been received, as I am told by the government here this morning that a convention has been signed at Copenhagen,\footnote{On 9 April, a fourteen week armistice was signed at Copenhagen after negotiations between Nelson and Waltersdorff.} which from what has transpired of the conditions, will I hope be perfectly satisfactory to His Majesty. The last Hamburg gazette announced that the Swedish squadron was at sea, but I am just told that it certainly is not in readiness, and that money is absolutely wanting to complete its equipment. There seems however no doubt, but that His Majesty's fleet has proceeded up the Baltic, and orders have in consequence been given here for the march of several companies of flying artillery to the coast. There is at the same time some reason to hope that orders have actually been given to stop the march of the troops, under General Kleist. This report has reached me through three several channels, all of them respectable, and is probably not without foundation. Yet it does not appear that the Prussian government, though it may have seen reason for not advancing, has determined upon retracting what has been already done, since it was only the day before yesterday, that M. Dohm\footnote{Dohm, Christian Wilhelm von (1751-1820), Prussian diplomat, minister to the Lower Rhine-Westphalian Circle. He was sent to the Hildesheimer Congress (1796) and was later third Prussian minister at Rastadt (1798-1799). He was sent to replace Schulenburg in Hanover.} was appointed to replace Count Schulenburg at Hanover. His Majesty's admirals when the fleet arrives upon the Prussian coast, will probably not have received any intimation of the emperor's death, and of the steps which have been already taken favorable to the interests of His Majesty's subjects, but as it is evident that the sailing of the fleet, and the instructions of the admirals must be dated at a period when the conduct and intentions of the late emperor were most evidently and violently hostile towards Great Britain, and that they could not have received fresh orders from London, since the accession of the new emperor was known, it is to be hoped that their appearance, and even an actual attack upon the Russian forces will not prevent a reconciliation.

The Austrian chargé d'affaires has repeated to me tonight, that his court is far from having a good understanding with France upon the affairs of the empire, and that he thinks the breach is becoming wider every day. The compensation designed for the Grand Duke of Tuscany does not amount in value to one third of what has been taken from him. Any estrangement from Austria points to connection with Prussia, and upon the whole it seems probable that unless the new government of Russia manifests a great degree of vigour, and connects itself closely with His Majesty, Prussia actuated by
motives of fear and cupidity combined, will fall more decidedly under the influence of France, though the opinion most prevalent at present is that the court of Berlin will make no further use of its occupation of the Electorate of Hanover, than to obtain His Majesty's acquiescence in the design it meditates to appropriate to itself the Bishopric of Hildesheim.255

P.S. Intelligence is received that the young emperor is safely delivered of a son.

no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 17 April 1801 (Jackson Papers, 353, 44)

My Lord,

I transmit to your Lordship herewith an extraordinary gazette containing an account of the brilliant victory obtained by His Majesty's fleet near Copenhagen on the 2nd instant.

no. 6
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 17 April 1801

My Lord,

Captain Otway arrived on Wednesday last256 with the important and joyful intelligence of the victory gained by Sir Hyde Parker and Lord Nelson.257 This intelligence, combined with that of the emperor Paul, which we received a few hours before cannot fail to produce a most important effect on the politics of Europe, and to afford the greatest advantages to this country, if we shall be under the necessity of preserving in the contest in which we are engaged.

I have gained satisfaction in informing your Lordship that His Majesty has received a letter from the emperor Alexander, announcing the death of his father, and his accession to the throne, and that I have received a letter from Count de Pahlen, in

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255. Hildesheim is a town in Lower Saxony, south-east of Hanover.
256. 15 April.
257. Nelson, Horatio, Viscount and Duke of Bronte (1758-1805), British Admiral. He served in the Indies then took part in diverse operations during the American War of Independence. He played a leading role during the battle of Copenhagen.
the most conciliatory terms and manifesting a most sincere disposition to open a
friendly communication with this country.

Your Lordship will naturally be anxious to know what system of conduct His
Majesty has thought proper to pursue under existing circumstances. His Majesty's
sentiments for the restoration of peace remain unaltered. Instructions have already been
forwarded to Sir Hyde Parker to suspend all hostilities against the Russians, and a
proper person will be sent without delay to Petersburg, to congratulate the emperor on
his accession, and to propose a renewal of the connection between the two countries.
His Majesty is equally desirous that the differences at present subsisting between this
country and Prussia should be amicably adjusted. The only plausible pretence for the
conduct of Prussia, disgraceful as that conduct has been, is fortunately removed, by the
death of the emperor Paul. Your Lordship will not omit to avail yourself of this
circumstance, in your conferences with the Prussian minister. You will speak as it
deserves of His Majesty's moderation, who, notwithstanding the late success of his
arms, and the other changes which have taken place in the state of public affairs, is still
actuated by the same pacific principles, and is desirous of nothing more than that
matters should be placed upon the same footing between the two countries as they were
previous to the convention of the 15th of December last. In the manner in doing this
His Majesty wishes to propose nothing that could wound the dignity of the Prussian
government. Provided the object itself can substantially be obtained he leaves it to your
Lordship to settle with the Prussian minister the mildest way of carrying it into effect. I
ought to observe here that His Majesty does not require of the Prussian government to
acknowledge formally any principles of maritime law which they may consider as
inconsistent with their interest. He only desires that they will renounce the convention
or at least that part of it by which the contracting powers engage to impose their
principles by force on His Majesty and on the other governments of Europe.

If any conversation should arise between you and the Prussian minister on the
subject of the war between this country and France, you will declare that the change of
circumstances, which has recently taken place has made no change whatever in His
Majesty's dispositions, and that he is still desirous of peace with France, provided it
can be obtained on terms consistent with his honour and the essential interests of his
people.

P.S. As the original instructions sent by sea to Sir H. Parker, for suspending
all hostile operations against the Russians, may possibly be detained by contrary
winds, I am to request that your Lordship will lose no time in forwarding to that
officer, by a secure and expeditious conveyance, the inclosed dispatch, which contains a duplicate of the instructions above mentioned.

no. 41
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 19 April 1801

My Lord,

As soon as I received the copy of the convention of armistice which the admiral sent to me by Captain Doyle, as it appeared to me a favourable moment for ascertaining the sentiments of this court, I wrote to Count Haugwitz, and offered to communicate it to him, in case he should not yet have received a copy. A report had prevailed here that as soon as the convention was signed, the fleet had actually sailed into the Baltic, in consequence of which large detachments of artillery were instantly ordered to the coasts. I therefore farther informed His Excellency, that I had learned from Captain Doyle, the fleet remained in the road when he left Copenhagen, and probably could not sail for three or four days after. Count Haugwitz answered by fixing an hour to see me the next day and began informing me that the intended plan of shutting the rivers, and cutting off the trade of England with this part of Europe, would not now be carried into effect; that no measures had actually taken place for that end, except at Hamburg, and that orders would immediately be given for restoring the usual course of trade with that place; that the Danes had taken up some of the buoys, but that they had already been desired to replace them. As it seems doubtful whether the armistice, and the suspension of the co-operation of Denmark extends to Holstein, I thought it best to wait till it might be conjectured from the conduct of the Danes themselves, whether they intend to reestablish the neutrality of the Elbe, before I pressed Count Haugwitz for any further information, but I have no doubt of being able in a very few days to assure your Lordship that the trade may enter the river without risk.

Count Haugwitz told me that Count Panin was arrived at Petersburg, and that he would certainly come into office. He spoke of the friendly disposition of the new Russian government towards His Majesty, and considered the perfect, and speedy reconciliation of all the northern powers with Great Britain as certain. He told me however, that His Prussian Majesty would continue to occupy the Electorate of Hanover, and that he had no doubt but that the two sovereigns would completely understand each other upon that point, but that it was necessary to keep out the French. I remarked of course that as soon as the final arrangement he expected had taken place between Great Britain and the northern powers, all pretext would be wanting for that
occupation. He then reverted to the old distinction between the armed maritime neutrality and the neutrality of the north of Germany, the latter of which he saw strong reasons for maintaining. I reminded him that the manifest to the Regency of Hanover had expressly and formally declared that it existed no longer. I do not take up your Lordship's time with entering into the details of Count Haugwitz's reply. The only point he touched worth remarking was that it could not be looked upon as having expired before the French had withdrawn their armies from the territory of the empire, which they had not yet done, and which they do not seem to be prepared to do. No progress whatever had been made he said in fixing the indemnities to the several Prussian, and Austria had not announced what objects she had in view. Yet the French continued to give assurances that no secret arrangement had been concerted with that power.

no. 42
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 21 April 1801

My Lord,

I yesterday received from M. de Kriidener the communication of the dispatch sent to Count Vorontsov, immediately after the accession of the emperor, and also a dispatch to himself received just before by courier, of which he allowed me to take such extracts as I thought material in order to be transmitted to your Lordship.

In consequence of these communications, and of the earnest request of M. de Kriidener I agreed to write to Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, that he might be apprised of the disposition of the court of St Petersburg, to enter into amicable discussion with His Majesty and act thereupon according to his discretion for His Majesty's service.

There does not appear the least probability that this step should have any other effect than to counteract whatever unfavourable impression may have been made at St Petersburg either by the attack upon Denmark, or by any subsequent direct hostility against Russia herself, for the fleet according to the last intelligence from Copenhagen, sailed from thence on the 13th, and supposing they could not have passed the grounds till the 15th, they must be at Reval258 before my letter can reach the coast.

Count Panin is arrived at Petersburg, and has accepted office, and the dispatch from which the inclosed is an extract appears to have been written the day after he entered upon his ministerial functions.

258 Revel, till 1918 the town of Reval, today Tallin the capital of Estonia.
The dispatch seems to mark a desire that negotiations might be opened here, and using the instructions I have already received from your Lordship, I shall omit nothing that may lead to confidence and improve any friendly disposition, but I cannot but repeat my earnest hope and advise that the business may not be transmitted here. It will not only be subject to more delays than it would meet with at London or at Petersburg, but the principle and intentions of Count Panin, or Count Vorontsov may be relied upon with much more safety than those of M. de Krüdener. The emperor's declaration respecting the order of Malta has probably been laid before your Lordship in London, I have nevertheless thought it best to inclose a copy.

Count Haugwitz in the conference I had with him two days since touched again upon the subject of the limit of the Ems. In turning over the archives of this mission, I find reason to believe that the Prussian claim was always disputed by the States General, and some caution may be necessary before it is submitted to on the part of Great Britain. At any rate I trust your Lordship will keep open this subject and every other, which may at a convenient opportunity be urged as a grievance and ground of complaint and remonstrances at this court, whose captious, interested and tricking policy will not either quit the possession of Hanover, or give reasonable satisfaction in regard to neutral commerce without attempting to make some profit by it.

P.S. I am assured by M. de Krüdener that the emperor has given orders that the British seamen should be brought back and set at liberty.

Carysfort to Hyde Parker, Berlin, 20 April 1801

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose to you extracts from a dispatch to Baron Krüdener the Russian minister at this court signed by the emperor himself, and which has been officially communicated to me.

These extracts and the dispatch to Count Vorontsov to which they allude must, in fairness, be taken together, and will then afford so strong a presumption of very friendly intentions on the part of his Imperial Majesty that I should be without excuse if I was to neglect to put you in possession of this information.

It is also necessary for me to mention that I had already thought it expedient to write to you by the way of Hamburg ad Rostock\(^{259}\) to acquaint you that I had received notice from the Prussian Ministry that it was not intended to pursue the plan of shutting

\(^{259}\) Rostock is a German port on the estuary of the Warnow.
the rivers against Great Britain, and that the trade both of export and import with these countries would continue as free as before, unless a different system should be provoked by any hostilities on the part of Great Britain of which no apprehensions seemed to be at present entertained by this court. In the conference I had with Count Haugwitz on this occasion, I was convinced by the whole tenor of his language that the cabinet of Berlin had a full persuasion of the new government of Russia towards Great Britain, and acted in consequence of that persuasion.

Upon the view of affairs which presents itself here at this moment I cannot but wish that actual hostilities with Russia may not take place, but it is needless for me to say anything on this point, your love of humanity will certainly omit nothing which can be consistent with your instructions, and the necessity of his Majesty's service to spare the effusion of blood.

no. 43
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 25 April 1801

My Lord,

I was in the hopes before now to have informed your Lordship that the navigation of the Elbe was completely open. But I have just learnt that the Danish troops are still at Hamburg, and that the impediments to the trade to and from that place are not removed. My authority however affirms, and I have every reason to put confidence in it, that the Prussian government have interfered to induce the Danish government to withdraw their troops and to open the river, the terms of the convention certainly such as to admit of some dispute, but the fair interpretation of that article which stipulates the suspension of the Convention of Armed Neutrality, as far as relates to the co-operation of Denmark, ought to be decisive against a continuance of the occupation of Hamburg, the only pretext of which was that treaty.260

260 On receiving news of the conclusion of the Anglo-Danish armistice, Haugwitz sent off a courier to Copenhagen to say that this necessarily led to a suspension of the Armed Neutrality and that under these conditions the measures implemented by Prussia had to undergo certain modifications. The Prussian envoy in Copenhagen was instructed to verbally inform the Danish Ministry that not only was the further occupation of Hamburg considered superfluous but that Denmark had denied the right to such an occupation by having signed a truce with Britain. If the Danish troops were not withdrawn, a Prussian corps would be sent to Hamburg, although reluctantly, to take possession of the city.
I have great satisfaction in transmitting by estafette an account received by a private mercantile house in this town, directed to William Ramsay Esq. at the India House from an agent of the company at Constantinople, stating that accounts were received of the complete defeat of the French army on the 21st March by General Abercromby. 2,000 men of the enemy are said to be killed, and only 300 of His Majesty's troops. The French were attacked on their march from Rachmania.

I am informed from respectable authority that there is reason to think the Elector Palatine has determined upon making a journey to Petersburg immediately. It may be needless to observe to your Lordship that there may be reason to believe that prince has engaged deeply in the plans which have been formed His Majesty's enemies against the Electorate of Hanover, and from which the Elector Palatine hoped it might become more easy for him to obtain indemnification for his hopes.

no. 44
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 28 April 1801

My Lord,

I have not yet received any confirmation of the important and joyful news mentioned in my last dispatch but after the strictest enquiring I can find no reason for suspecting that it has been fabricated here or at Vienna, and I have satisfied myself that it is possible and probable that the letter from Mr. Tooke may have reached Vienna through channels to which Lord Elgin could not address himself, several days sooner than the special messenger said to have been forwarded by His Excellency. At the same time it is worth remarking not only that the French seem to be preparing the public to hear even worse news than has yet appeared, but that the forces of General Menou were to rendezvous at Rachmania and his march towards Alexandria was expected to begin the 20th or 21st.

261 Abercromby, General Sir Ralph (1734-1801), British soldier. He took part in the American Revolution, was later sent to command in the Mediterranean in 1800, and landed in Egypt on 8 March 1801 where he was mortally wounded during the second battle of Aboukir.

262 Menou, Jacques-François de Boussay, baron de (1750-1810), French soldier. He transferred to the Army of the Orient in May 1798 where he commanded a division, became Governor of Rosetta and then Alexandria, succeeded Kléber in command of the Army of Egypt in June 1800, but was defeated and surrendered to the British expeditionary force in August 1801.
With regard to the other points I have scarcely anything sufficiently important and authenticated to make the subject of a dispatch, but I think it right to mention that it is still a common opinion founded upon the language held by persons connected with the government that it is certainly not the king's intention to keep the possession of Hanover. Beurnonville, I hear, said yesterday, that his government had apprised him that there was undoubtedly a secret understanding between the cabinet of Berlin and Great Britain, and the French complain of the Danish government for having seized the first moment after they knew of the death of Paul the first to come to an agreement with His Majesty.

I am still unable to assure your Lordship that the Elbe is open, though I am told from several quarters that this court has applied on the subject to that of Copenhagen, a manner which must produce the effect.

[cipher]

It is now a long time since I have heard from England, and I am of course, very anxious to know the sentiments of His Majesty's ministers upon what has been passing. I have thought it most prudent not to take any steps on the affairs of Hanover till I shall have received specific directions. What has privately passed with the king on the subject between His Royal Highness Prince Adolphus and me, may appear a sufficient reason for this reserve, and nothing can be lost by it, till the moment arrives when Great Britain can assert with effect His Majesty's rights. In the meantime, the suspicions of the French government appear to be without foundation as the Prussian Ministry, though they have not persisted in the measure of shutting up the rivers (which the armistice with Denmark and the change in the emperor, must render ineffectual) continue not only to keep possession of Hanover, but to exact from that country the maintenance of an army of 22,000 men.

263 Alexandria is situated about 200 kilometres from Cairo. It was taken by the French on 3 July 1798 and then by the English on 31 August 1801.
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 30 April 1801 (Jackson Papers, 353, 44, gives the date as 1 May)

My Lord,

The king having been graciously pleased to make choice of Lord St Helens to proceed to St Petersburg, in the character of His Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, for the purpose of congratulating the new emperor on his accession to the throne, and for entering into friendly discussions with that court, in order to reestablish the ancient relations of peace and amity between the two countries, I send your Lordship inclosed, for your private information, an extract from the king's instructions to Lord St Helens, which will put you in possession of the sentiments of His Majesty's government on the important points to which they relate.

Lord St Helens intends setting out for St Petersburg early in the ensuing week.

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 3 May 1801

My Lord,

I have not failed to make the Prussian Ministry acquainted with His Majesty's desire that the differences subsisting with Prussia should be amicably adjusted, and I have received in return the most friendly professions on the part of His Prussian Majesty. Great indifference is affected as to the object of the Armed Neutrality. All the blame is thrown on the deceased Emperor of Russia, and as strong a sense as can be desired of the forbearance and moderation of His Majesty, particularly with respect to Prussia is expressed, but Count Haugwitz distinctly avows that he is not prepared to propose or discuss any particular mode for resuming the ancient intercourse of friendship and confidence, till he is in possession of farther advices from Russia. This is no more than I, and I presume your Lordship also must have expected. But I was particularly solicitous to draw from him something more explicit on the subject of Hanover, and he has authorised me to say that a measure so extraordinary is so

264 St Helens, Alleyne Fitzherbert, 1st Baron of (1753-1839), British diplomat. He was appointed to numerous overseas missions and negotiations, his first being in 1777 and his last being to St Petersburg in April 1801 to arrange a treaty between England and Russia. On his return, he was promoted to the peerage of the United Kingdom.
unconnected with every subject but the Convention of Armed Neutrality; that the Prussian cabinet were forced most reluctantly to take this step by the violence of the emperor Paul; that His Prussian Majesty never entertained the most remote idea of appropriating the country to himself, or of finally wresting it from His Majesty, in favour of any other power; and that he had been solicitous only that the occupation should be affected in the manner least burthensome to the country, and least offensive to the king. That it had been a consolation to the King of Prussia to reflect, that this step, so contrary to his own wishes and feelings, had in effect, been of service to His Majesty, as it was no longer a secret that Paul the first had actually invited Bonaparte to send a French army into the electorate. I observed that it was naturally to have been expected, that as the shutting the rivers to the British trade was the only pretext alleged for the occupation of Hanover, the first declaration that it was not the intention of Prussia to preserve in that measure should have been accompanied with orders for withdrawing the troops, and that the occupation, though no longer used as a means of hostility against Great Britain, was by no means innocuous as with respect to the electorate, which was loaded in consequence with an expense it was not able to bear. To this he replied by avowing the embarrassment as to the best mode of measuring back the steps which had been taken, and a confidence drawn from the general tenor of the conduct of His Majesty's government, that these difficulties under which the court of Berlin laboured would be felt in London, and that some allowance would be made for them. As to the expense, he feared it would exceed what had been intended, owing principally to a mistaken notion that the saving by the reduction of the Hanoverian army would have covered the demand to be made by the Prussian troops, but it had turned out that the semestriers were in Hanover upon a different footing from what they were in Prussia, and in the other states in this part of Germany, and were actually entitled to pay during their absence from quarters. But when this was discovered, it was not practicable to form a new plan in the instant, and it seemed more advisable that the expense should be incurred, (especially as there was already reason to believe that the change which had taken place in Russia would make it of very short duration) than that the army should be ruined entirely by discharging the men. I then took notice that although I understood from His Excellency, that the danger of the entry of the French, though it may have been averted, by the temporary occupation of Prussia, was not in fact a motive to that measure. It was impossible not to remark that even admitting its being expedient with a view to the security of the country itself, it would not not be justified upon ground, unless it was to be concerted with the legitimate sovereign. To this he entirely assented.
It is evident that there is much uneasiness here, concerning not only the affairs of the empire, but the intentions of France and Russia, and I have heard it whispered that this court has already had reason to believe that the new government of St Petersburg will not be disposed to maintain so close and intimate a concert as it flattered itself it had established with the Emperor Paul.

It seems very probable that Prussia may revert to the old idea of a provisional defensive alliance with His Majesty and Russia, the principal objection to which on the part of His Majesty, might be the difficulty of finding any security for its being faithfully executed by Prussia.

Count Haugwitz informed me that the last letters from M. de Lucchesini spoke of the French affairs in Egypt, as being in the opinion of the public absolutely separate, and that it was suspected the government was in possession of intelligence more recent and more decisive than they had suffered to appear. The expedition projected against Portugal was also considered as being laid aside.

It is fit that I should apprise your Lordship, that upon the arrival here of M. Hultman,265 who has been sent here to treat upon the claims of indemnification, for the losses sustained by the Prince of Orange, the agent, who has long been resident here, applied to M. de Haugwitz to know in what way M. Hultman was to be introduced, and proposed that it should be done by the Spanish envoy. But M. de Haugwitz directed him to do it himself as chargé d'affaires of the Batavian Republic, and bade him send round his cards with that title. His Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince intends immediately to speak to the king on that subject, and stating to His Majesty the reasons why His Highness has to distrust M. de Haugwitz, to desire that some other minister may conduct the negotiation concerning the indemnification of his family.

Count Stadion,266 the newly appointed envoy from Vienna is daily expected here. Soon after his arrival, whatever plans may be in agitation for the arrangement of compensations in the empire will begin to transpire. Some of the inferior princes, whose interests are more likely to suffer in the making that arrangement, had I believe

265 Hultman, Carel Gerard, Dutch diplomat. He was ambassador at the court of Berlin from April 1801 to September 1803.

266 Stadion-Thannhausen und Warthausen, Count Johann Philipp Karl (1763-1824), Austrian diplomat. He entered the foreign service in 1787, and was ambassador to Stockholm, London, Berlin and Petersburg. He succeeded Cobenzl as foreign minister in 1806 till his resignation in 1809. He was then minister in Berlin from 12 April 1801 till 31 January 1803.
founded sanguine hopes that the Electorate of Hanover, would have offered means of preserving the integrity of their own territories.

Count Haugwitz informed me that he had certain intelligence of a secret convention between France and Spain, by which the latter of those powers binds herself to make over to France some of her American or West Indian possessions, in consideration of the cession of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany to the Duke of Parma.267

P.S. The syndic of Hamburg von Sienen has just informed me that all impediments to the trade of that city, and of the Elbe are completely removed, and that the Danish troops are upon the point of retiring.

Separate

My Lord,

I ought perhaps sooner to have called your Lordship's attention to the subject of this letter, but more important objects have prevented me.

I employed Mr. Gentz268 by Lord Grenville's desire to write upon the negotiation for a naval armistice, and that gentleman having represented that the assistance he had been accustomed to receive from the Prussian government for composing his Journal had been withdrawn, he was desirous of supplying the deficiency by the profits of publishing a translation in London, which might take the place of that formerly conducted by Mallet du Pan,269 and that he would undertake both for the publication, and for the continuance of the Journal, if the government would make up to him all that the profits of the former might fall short of 200 dollars, the sum originally secured to him by the government here. Lord Grenville taking the circumstances into consideration directed me to offer Mr. Gentz £200 a year for continuing his Journal, but to decline having anything to do with the proposed publication in London. Mr. Gentz accepted this proposal and I have upon these two accounts (taking it for granted that he was to be at least reimbursed for the expense of publishing what he had written by the express desire of the British government) advanced £100 and £50. I drew for the first on the 17th of January under the head of

267 Parma was occupied by the French in 1801 and annexed to the Italian Republic in 1802. The Duke was temporarily compensated in Tuscany.
268 Gentz, Friedrich von (1764-1832), German anti-French publicist. He entered the Prussian civil service in 1785 but later transferred to Austrian service in 1802. From 1801 on he was to write Britain's eulogy.
269 Mallet du Pan, Jacques (1749-1801), Swiss journalist and author of anti-revolutionary writings.
secret service money and sent the receipt to the office. I have now drawn for the second, and send the receipt, and shall beg to have your Lordship's farther instructions. If the £100 is taken as a gratuity for the *Considérations sur les dernières négociations entre l'Angleterre et la France*, the latter may be as the first quarter of the annuity of £200.

Mr. Gentz has since this transaction began, published besides the tract above mentioned his treatise of more than 300 pages on the causes, and character of the war against the French Revolution, and is now printing, a detailed and I have reason to believe a very able, and satisfactory answer to the *Etat de la France en l'an 8*.

These steps I have taken, in obedience to your Lordship's letter by Wiffin, and before that time, upon the apparent necessity of the king, to apprise the admiral of the expediency of discontinuing hostilities against Russia, will have been attended, I fear with considerable expense but with no-one I trust that could have been avoided, and that the importance of the occasion does not excuse.

no. 46

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 6 May 1801

My Lord,

The minister of the King of Sardinia has informed me that on the 16th of last month the Marquis de Saint-Marsan, at Paris, was informed by M. de Talleyrand, that his farther stay in the capital could be of no further use, and the affair of His Sardinian Majesty would be much better greeted at Rome, that M. de Saint-Marsan might be furnished with passports for Toulon where he would find the means of going by sea to the place which had been indicated to him. Monsieur de Saint-Marsan represented that he could not quit his present situation without orders from the king. But that if the French government obliged him by force to quit their territory, he must in obedience to his instructions take the route not to Italy but to Germany. In reply to this he was informed that the First Consul continued of opinion, that Monsieur de Saint-Marsan should not remain at Paris, and that he had best go to Rome but that he had nevertheless ordered that he should receive a blank passport, in which he might insert what time, and what destination he thought fit. This message was accompanied by strong expressions of displeasure against His Sardinian Majesty and the Duke of

270. Toulon is a French port on the Mediterranean.
Aoste, particularly on account of greater favour shown in the Sardinian harbours to the English than to the French. Monsieur de Saint-Marsan made the natural answer to this charge that his master was allied with England, and his peace with France not yet concluded, and observed that he had come to Paris by his master's order with the knowledge and at the invitation of the First Consul, not to negotiate, but to furnish information to the Russian minister, through whose channel it was agreed by France, the King of Sardinia's interests should be treated; that he therefore persisted in declaring he could have no business in Rome, and that he could not leave Paris without the king's orders, or unless he should be forced by the French government. This answer he gave on the 25th at the time the last advices from Paris came away.

I relate this to your Lordship at the express desire of the Count of Castel Alfer, who pressed much that it be communicated without delay. But did not appear to me of such importance as to warrant my detaining the messenger, especially as the count, if he really attached much importance to it himself will certainly have taken means for convoying it to your Lordship through Monsieur de Front.

I think it proper to inform your Lordship that the Russian minister here has confirmed the statement of Monsieur Castel Alfer and added, but as his private opinion, a great deal as to the expediency of establishing a concert with Prussia and Austria to settle the affairs of the empire and to obtain for the latter of these powers a firmer establishment in Italy, and to this end he expressed a strong wish that a discussion upon the principle of the Armed Neutrality might be postponed, to which I replied that His Majesty would be perfectly satisfied to renew the relations which existed between him and the confederate powers previous to the signature of the convention at St Petersburg and that those relations would revive the moment they gave assurances to His Majesty that the new object of their confederation was not derogatory from any existing treaties or to impose their principles by force upon any other power. I observed to the Russian minister that any idea of obtaining an extension of territory for Austria on the side of Italy, necessarily involved a war with France. To this he replied, that in the present state of the French power and with the evident views entertained by that government in Italy and against other powers, he could not look to a continuance of peace.

271 Duke of Aoste, son of the King of Sardinia, commander of the Sardinian army during the first Italian campaign.
My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that Lord St Helens left London yesterday for the purpose of embarking on board the Latona frigate at Yarmouth, and of proceeding with all possible dispatch to St Petersburg. You are apprised of my letter of the 1st instant, of the general tenour of his instructions, and cannot fail to have observed by them, His Majesty's disposition to settle the differences which have unfortunately arisen between this country and the northern courts, on conditions moderate and just.

The Baron Jacobi, His Prussian Majesty's minister here, has announced to me, by order of his court, that the rivers of the north of Germany are opened to all British vessels, and that the commerce between the two countries will be suffered to go on as heretofore. He has likewise declared, that the King of Prussia had no hostile views in the occupation of Hanover, that he was driven to it by necessity, and that His Majesty would be convinced of the sincerity of these assertions. Upon this subject it would be very desirable that you should endeavour to bring the Prussian government to some explicit declaration. You will not fail to urge, how impossible it must be to re-establish any sort of good understanding and friendship between the two countries, as long as His Prussian Majesty's conduct is in the least degree equivocal respecting Hanover; that any idea of its being the intention of His Prussian Majesty to annex Hanover to his dominions, must excite the jealousy of the court of Petersburg, and that even the French government (whatever its momentary policy might be) would never look with indifference to such an increase of power and of territory on the part of Prussia; that if all motives of good faith were out of the question, such a conduct would be repugnant to the dictates of sound policy, as the value of the object could never compensate His Prussian Majesty for the consequences which might result from the disgust such a conduct would inspire in every government in Europe, and which might lead them to abandon him to his fate if he should provoke the resentment of the French government. I trust that these considerations will have their full effect upon His Prussian Majesty, and that whether he entertained the design of annexing His Majesty's Electoral dominions to his crown or not, he will perceive that the change of circumstances which has taken place in the north of Europe in the course of the last few weeks, will make a perseverance in that design imprudent, if not impracticable. It is impossible to suppose...
that the events which have occurred in the south of Europe should not have made a deep impression on all the northern powers, and should not have led them to consider that policy as at least problematical, by which they were induced to remain passive spectators of the progress of French power over so large a part of Europe. When they consider the reduced state of the power of Austria and the situation of those parts of Germany which have been the theatre of the war, and losses which they have sustained in consequence of the requisition of the French armies, when they reflect on the spoliation of the King of Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the ignominious terms dictated to the King of Naples, they may be able to form some judgement of what would be the state of north of Europe, if it should ever become subject to French power. Under these circumstances, the security of the northern courts rests at present on the naval power of Great Britain - but might be considered augmented by a strict union and confederacy amongst themselves. Such a confederacy, which had it been general, might have proved the salvation of the whole of Europe, may still, if it is founded on proper principles (though not with the same degree of certainty) become the preservation of the north. In stating this, I am aware that an active confederacy for the purpose of attacking France is, in the present exhausted state of Europe, not practicable and, even if it was, perhaps not desirable. A confederacy of the nature to which I have alluded, could only be defensive in its principle. Its object should be to maintain those governments which were parties to it in their existing state of power and relative strength, against any efforts of external ambition.

It is of considerable importance to know what appear to be the sentiments of the court of Berlin, as to the line of policy which it is their intention to adopt at the present moment. If they are governed by the principles which have hitherto actuated them, they will avoid all open concert with any other powers, for fear of giving umbrage to the French government.

I am desirous of hearing whether you have lately had any opportunity of conversing with the Prussian minister on the subject of maritime law, and whether you think there is any probability in bringing the Prussian government to agree to terms founded on the principles laid down in the instructions to Lord St Helens.
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 9 May 1801
Separate

My Lord,

Mr. Garlike set forward upon the journey yesterday morning, and it is but justice to that gentleman to say that he has exerted himself to the utmost in order to lose no time in obeying His Majesty's commands.

As your Lordship had not given any particular directions for defraying the expense of Mr. Garlike's travelling, and preparations, I searched for precedents of what had been done, upon similar occasions. I found that General Stamford had been furnished with £400 for the same journey, and I had received Lord Grenville's orders to advance Mr. Garlike £300 in case his nomination as secretary of legation to Paris had taken place. I have therefore drawn upon your Lordship and sent a receipt for £300, and have acquainted Mr. Garlike that I would apprise your Lordship that if he found it necessary he would draw for £100 more upon his arrival. The roads are I fear in the worst possible state, and the necessity of a greater number of horses will add to the expense.

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 10 May 1801

My Lord,

Though the Sardinian minister here wishes to have it believed that Monsieur de Saint-Marsan has not been definitively ordered by the French government to leave Paris, I believe all negotiation on the interests of His Sardinian Majesty to have ceased entirely. I am credibly informed that Kolychev and Lucchesini presented a joint memorial reclaiming the effect of the assurances which had been given upon this head to their respective courts, and received a very rough answer, and Count Haugwitz told me last night, that the measures taken by the French for a new organisation of government in Piedmont put it beyond a doubt that they had laid aside all intentions of restoring that country to its legitimate sovereign.

The Danes have not yet evacuated Hamburg, but Count Haugwitz confirmed to me what I had before heard from the syndic von Seinen that this court have required them in a very peremptory manner to do it forthwith. The rivers are understood to be open, but von Seinen tells me that the Prince of Hesse requires that an application shall
in every instance be made to him for a passport, which is however never refused, and this regulation has probably been made with no other view than to draw a little pecuniary profit to individuals. I conjecture from the conversations I have heard that the Danes have formed designs against the independence of Hamburg, and have entertained hopes of being able to place their operations against that town upon a footing distinct from the affair of the maritime. Count Haugwitz told me that it was as important to Prussia, as to England, that the independence and neutrality of Hamburg should be maintained, and that it has been represented to the Danes that they could not persist in their occupation of the place consistently with the convention they had concluded with Admiral Parker.

Monsieur Duroc, aide-de-camp to Bonaparte, arrived here three days ago, on a mission, it is said to St Petersburg, to compliment the emperor. It was natural that he should stay till the review, which took place today, was over, but I have some reason to suspect that he has not yet fixed the time of his departure.

The Comte de Stadion is arrived, but has not yet had his audience at court.

Mr. Casamajor\textsuperscript{272} arrived here early yesterday morning.

The number of troops assembled here and at Potsdam is considerably greater than usual, and more are expected to arrive. There are already I am told 40,000 men.

The corps originally destined for Franconia is on the war establishment, and ready to take the field. I have not been able to ascertain, whether any more of the troops are rendered mobile, but I suspect that a considerable number of them are on that footing.

\textbf{no number}

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 10 May 1801

Separate and most secret

My Lord,

I have the honour to send to your Lordship a copy of a letter written by me to the King of Prussia, (in which I inclosed copies of Count Pahlen's letter to Monsieur

\textsuperscript{272}Casamajor, Justinian, British diplomat, legation secretary and chargé d'affaires. He arrived in Berlin on 9 May 1801 and left in November of the following year.
de Lizakevich and of Sir Hyde Parker's letter to me announcing the suspension of hostilities in the Baltic) and a translation of the answer I received.

The accounts which reached me of the general disapprobation of the conduct of Count Haugwitz in regard to the reception, and introduction of the Batavian agent, the certainty that Count Alvensleben had on that account tendered his resignation, the report of the conversation between Count Schulenburg and the Hereditary Prince of Orange on which the former hinted that the king was displeased in many instances with the conduct of his minister, and the prince's declared intention to speak to the king, made me judge it expedient to try whether His Majesty was still desirous to keep open a channel of correspondence independent of and unknown to his ministers, and it has appeared so far to answer the end, and to be an evidence of his continued distrust of them, that he spoke of it to Mr. Garlike on the parade at Potsdam, and expressed in strong terms his earnest desire that matters might as speedily as possible be accommodated in the north, and his regret at the measures he had been obliged to pursue. It is also a favourable sign, that the answer to my letter was written by Köckritz himself in the German character and language as it affords a presumption that it was not communicated to Lombard.

The Prince of Orange found that the king had never been apprised what had passed concerning the Batavian agent, and His Majesty appeared strongly incensed at the conduct of Count Haugwitz in that respect, but the next morning Lombard waited upon the prince to show him the letter His Majesty had directed to be written to Count Haugwitz in which though the care of the interests of the House of Orange was recommended in the strongest and most earnest manner, the prince did not find the reprobation he expected of what had passed and the affair of the indemnifications, which the prince had hoped would be committed to Count d'Alvensleben, was still left to the management of Haugwitz. It is possible, and perhaps not improbable, that Lombard was directed to take the prince's instructions, and it is to be wished His Highness would not let the matter rest here. But I much doubt whether he will venture to speak again to the king.

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273 Lizakevich, Vasili Grigorevich, Russian diplomat, legation secretary to the court of St James. He took over affairs from Vorontzov when he was dismissed by Paul.

274 Köckritz, Karl Leopold von (177-1821), Prussian soldier. He entered the army in 1762 and was named aide-de-camp in 1797. He became a confidant of Friedrich Wilhelm III.
Copy of a letter from Carysfort to the King of Prussia, Berlin, 6 May 1801

Sire,

J'espère que je ne serai pas censé abuser de la bonté de Votre Majesté, en mettant, avec toute l'humilité possible, à ses pieds, les copies de deux pièces relatives aux affaires sur lesquelles elle a déjà daigné me permettre de lui écrire, et qui m'ont paru pouvoir lui être intéressantes. Elles ne m'étaient pas encore parvenues quand j'ai eu l'honneur il y a quelques jours d'annoncer au Comte de Haugwitz que le roi mon maître désirait que la bonne harmonie put se rétablir entre les deux cours, et qu'il était prêt à reprendre ses anciennes relations avec les puissances confédérées du nord. Il ne prétendait pas leur dicter des lois maritimes, et il s'attendait que de leur côté elles lui donneraient l'assurance qu'elles ne voulaient déroger en rien aux traités qu'il avait avec elles, ni lui imposer par la force des armes l'obligation de souscrire à des principes qu'il n'avait pas reconnus. Tout le reste pourrait se réserver pour des discussions ultérieures et amicales, dans lesquelles l'équité et la modération des souverains respectifs ne laissaient entrevoir aucune difficulté.

J'ose croire que Votre Majesté trouvera dans la lettre de l'Amiral Parker, des nouvelles preuves de l'attention constante et suivie du gouvernement britannique pour éviter autant que possible toute rupture avec la Prusse.

Il est de mon devoir d'informer Votre Majesté que M. Garlike, le secrétaire de la légation anglaise à sa cour, a reçu les ordres du roi de partir incessamment pour St Pétersbourg en qualité de chargé d'affaires, afin d'y préparer avant l'arrivée d'un ministre tout ce qui pourra accélérer la réconciliation, et ramener cet état d'harmonie et d'intelligence parfaite, qui subsistait entre la cour de Russie et celle de St James, avant les événements qui ont causé le départ du Lord Whitworth.

Translation [in French] of a letter from Köckritz to Carysfort dated 7 May 1801

Je dois au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, mon très gracieux souverain, remercier sincèrement Votre Seigneurie pour les communications qu'elle a données à Sa Majesté dans sa lettre en date d'hier, et lui communiquer en même temps que Sa Majesté ne doutait pas, et qu'elle se promettait même que la bonne harmonie qui à sa grande satisfaction avait si longtemps subsisté entre les cours de St James et de Berlin serait ramenée par les principes équitables de la première cour, et que Sa Majesté de son côté
My Lord,

Your Lordship will have perceived by my former dispatches, that I have not been inattentive to the objects, recommended in your secret and confidential dispatch of the 8th of May. As to the points of maritime law, I can safely assure your Lordship that they are in themselves matter of perfect indifference to the Prussian court, which will readily adopt any mode terminating the dissensions which have arisen upon that subject, upon which the court of Petersburg will determine, but would certainly prefer that which would be most expedient. Whatever may have been the seeming intention of some members of the Prussian ministry, respecting Hanover, the king, I am fully persuaded, has never entertained the idea of appropriating it to himself, and the sentiments of the cabinet on this subject, I believe to be now in unison with His Majesty's. There seems strong reason to think, and I have already intimated, that the Prussian court may be desirous of cementing a general defensive alliance in the north of Europe. As no effectual league of that nature may be formed without the concurrence, and subsidies of Great Britain, they must have a general disposition to unite with us, but they will be checked by the fear of drawing upon themselves immediate hostilities from France. There does indeed appear to be some difficulty in adjusting, without departing from the neutral character, a system of mutual defence and guarantee, with a power actually belligerent. The purpose of His Majesty's government might perhaps be answered, if such a guarantee was to be confined to the acknowledged possessions of his crown in Europe before the war, but no pretext will avail against France, unless it is supported by a military force, and preparation of sufficient magnitude. It may therefore be presumed that two points must be secured before Prussia will join in any confederation such as your Lordship mentioned: the first is the approbation of Russia, and the second, the subsidy of Great Britain. Without the former, the force would be thought insufficient, and without the last, the preparation could not be made.

The information your Lordship possesses as to the disposition of France, may enable you to form a very different judgement, but the opinion which seems prevailing here is against the probability of peace, and strong apprehensions are entertained of a renewal of hostilities upon the continent. I have thought many of the expressions used
by the Prussian ministers indicating of their uneasiness upon this point. And the late measures taken by the chief consul with respect to Piedmont and Naples, and Switzerland, seem to leave little doubt that the means to prosecute his views of aggrandizement and dominion without intermission. Your Lordship will no doubt have remarked that the orders for the new organization of Piedmont must have been given before any account could have reached Paris of the emperor's death. It is a fact, that M. de Kolychev has made the strongest representations on the subject. There has then either been a secret negotiation and understanding with Russia without the knowledge of M. de Kolychev, and for which his mission was only intended as a cover, or the First Consul, conceiving that the north was already so far embroiled with Great Britain as not to be speedily pacified, he determined to brave the emperor's resentment. Upon either of these hypotheses, immediate danger may be apprehended from France, and as the hopes entertained by that power, that the British trade would be excluded from Germany by the forces of Prussia, have been disappointed, it seems highly probable that a measure so connected with the whole system of its hostility to Great Britain, will be attempted by its own. The French armies are moving from the Danube to the Rhine, or are actually assembled in Holland or the Low Countries. The invasion of England and Ireland is apparently attended with too many difficulties, and of Portugal, with too little prospect of advantage, not to be looked on here as mere pretexts. These considerations therefore must have an effect, and might incline the cabinet to measures of more vigour than they have been accustomed to, but it is only by means of Russia, that the resolution of the court of Berlin will be confirmed. If the former power is seriously disposed to put a stop to the progress of France, and desirous to form alliances for that purpose, the accession of Prussia may perhaps be obtained without much difficulty. But certainly, if the emperor remains at a distance, or shows any inclination to draw near to France, Prussia will fall in with the views of the latter, and endeavour to make the concurrence which fear will have extracted from her, turn to her advantage. The defensive confederation therefore, which your Lordship thinks it might be expedient to promote would in my humble opinion be best begun at St Petersburg, but I shall certainly not neglect any opportunity of recommending it here.

If there was no spirit of hostility in any of the northern courts against the maritime superiority of Great Britain, and, if there was a possibility of combining a system of defence without pecuniary supplies from His Majesty, perhaps it would be desirable, that the north should be confederated for defence against France, even without the participation of Great Britain. But when the real weakness of the councils which prevail in most of the northern courts, and their jealousy, however unreasonable
of the power and prosperity of the United Kingdom, is considered, I cannot but think that any thing like the scheme of Quadruple Alliance which was in contemplation this year, and which comprehended conditions of peace, to be dictated to Great Britain and France, and finally degenerated into the Convention of Armed Neutrality, would be attended with immediate danger to His Majesty's interests. These reflections, grounded upon what I observe here, I thought it my duty without delay to submit to your Lordship, in answer to your dispatch of the 8th instant, but I have desired to see M. de Haugwitz and trust I shall very shortly have it in my power to give your Lordship a more certain view of the sentiments and intentions of this court, which are indeed at all times so liable to be warped, and changed by external influence, that it is difficult to find sufficient grounds to plan any reliance upon them.

M. de Saint-Marsan remains at Paris, though no notice whatever has been taken of his last representation.

M. de Kolychev has I am told been informed, that the answer to his note on the subject of Piedmont would be given at St Petersburg.

no. 49
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 17 May 1801

My Lord,

Since I disclosed my dispatch this morning, I have seen Count Haugwitz, and though our conversation has not led to any specific declaration either concerning the period of the evacuation of Hanover or the mode of settling our dispatch with the northern powers, yet he so strongly declares the intention of this court not to retain the possession, that the occupation was a measure to which it was forced, and that it only waits the result of communications with the court of Petersburg to put an end to it, that I cannot think there is now any reason to entertain farther apprehensions as to its ultimate views. Count Haugwitz reverted in this conversation to the utility and necessity of the Prussian occupation of Hanover in order to keep out the French, and added that as soon as our reconciliation with the northern powers, which he considered as assured, and to take place without delay, was concluded, they would enter into explanations and concert with His Majesty upon that point.

I endeavoured to sound him, but without appearing to make any advances on the part of His Majesty's government, upon the idea of a defensive league of the northern powers against the encroachments of France, and I have left him with the impression that he is more inclined to it than I thought was probable, and that some
overture has even been made at St Petersburg to bring it forward. He expressed great 
anxiety to learn the real state of the intercourse between France and Austria. He is 
convinced that Thugut is still the real director of the emperor's councils, and he flatters 
himself that he will form no connection with France, unless the conduct of Russia 
should form him to it. He admits that the court of St Petersburg has under the former 
reign put itself much in the wrong towards that of Vienna, that it ought in good 
conscience and honour to make the first advance but he is alarmed at finding de 
Mouraviev had not begun his journey when the last accounts were received from St 
Petersburg. The British expedition to Egypt seemed also to engage much of his 
attention, and he expressed great apprehensions in case of its ultimate failure. Nor did 
he scruple to declare that though the profession and the personal character of Bonaparte 
had led him to believe that he would govern himself by principles very different from 
his republican predecessors, his own and his agent's declarations, and the acts of his 
government, particularly as to Piedmont, Naples and Portugal left no doubt that he was 
deeply tainted by the Jacobinal spirit.

Messrs. Soll and Gibson of Danzig, having been employed by the admiralty to 
procure provisions for the fleet, write to inform me that according to the ancient laws 
and customs of that place, men of war could not be supplied, and that they were 
apprehensive they should not be allowed to execute the admiral's orders, unless the 
magistrate received directions for that purpose from the superior government. I applied 
in consequence to Count Haugwitz, who immediately consulted with M. de Struensee, 
and has just assured me, that though he conceives the general orders sent to all the 
ports to be fully sufficient, he will, in order to prevent all possible embarrassment, 
send me tomorrow morning a special instruction for the Magistrate of Danzig.

no. 50
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 23 May 1801

My Lord,

Nothing has occurred since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship to 
induce me to change the opinion I then gave that the conduct of this court in regard to 
the differences which the maritime league has occasioned with His Majesty would be 
determined almost exclusively by that of Russia. It is, at any rate certain, and perhaps 
not unreasonable, that the Prussian cabinet will suspend in a great degree its political 
operations, till some estimate can be safely formed of the dispositions of the court of St 
Petersburg. The delay of the journey of M. de Mouraviev, who is destined to
announce the emperor's accession at Vienna has given birth to much speculation, and many persons seem now to think it remarkable that he has made a considerable detour in order to pass three or four days at Berlin. It is however satisfactory to find that the reconciliation of the northern powers with England seems universally considered as certain, and the Danish minister informed me that Count Bernstorff had written to him that his conferences with Lord St Helens which took place at Copenhagen on the 16th instant had been entirely to his satisfaction. I cannot help observing that Count Baudissin had not mentioned to Monsieur de Krüdener that this interview had taken place. It has been strongly reported that Mr. de Kolychev has been recalled, and Monsieur de Markov, who was in office under the reign of Catherine the second, appointed in his room. Monsieur de Mouraviev assures me that this report is at least premature, and he seemed particularly to think that there was not a very strong probability, that the latter part of it would be realised. It is also said and has obtained much credit that Monsieur de Lucchesini is recalled at the request of the First Consul, and the friends of that gentleman all admit that it is not probable that his mission will be of long duration.

The Syndic of Hamburg informed me the evening before last that the Danish troops had neither evacuated the town, nor had any time been assigned for their departure, but I was told last night from very good authority that the court of Copenhagen has consented to withdraw them, and that they will begin their march immediately.

His Prussian Majesty goes to Magdeburg tomorrow to review the troops in that neighbourhood.

no. 51
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 27 May 1801

My Lord,

The messenger Wissin has been detained no longer than was necessary to procure the usual order from the government to furnish him with horses.

I hope that the arrival of Mr. Garlike, or of Lord St Helens, will have decided Lord Nelson to remove the impediments which his appearance at Reval has created to

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275 Markov, Count A. I. (sometimes Morkov), Russian diplomat. When Kolychev repeatedly requested to be relieved of his assignment to Paris, Alexander sent Markov to replace him.

276 Magdeburg is Prussian town on the Elbe about 120 kilometres from Berlin.
the reconciliation which there is every reason to believe is on the point of taking place between His Majesty and the Russian Empire, and I must feel the more anxious for this event, because, where I am placed, every circumstance appears to point out not only its general expediency, but that it is very important to His Majesty's service, it should take place without delay. Accounts of as late date as the 16th and 19th of this month from Switzerland and Amsterdam, give the strongest reason to think that the French government not only intend to establish constitutions in the Dutch and Swiss Republics, which will make them absolutely dependent, but even to annex the territories themselves to France. All the accounts from other quarters concur to show not only continued designs of war, and aggrandizement, but the particular and determined animosity of the First Consul against the British Kingdom, and the slight veil which he now affects to throw over his late transactions in Piedmont, which he qualifies with the term of 'provisory' is intended only to give a momentary check to the progress of our reconciliation with Russia. Under these circumstances any apparent obstacle to negotiation in that quarter, will not only raise the spirit of the people of France, but may have the very worst effects upon the politics of this court, which now, under the impression of a strong determination on the part of Russia to connect her politics with those of Great Britain, keeps a firmer countenance towards France than at any former period, but is too exposed, and has too little confidence in its own strength not to relapse into its ancient habits upon the first symptoms of renewed dissensions. Nor is it possible to suppress the apprehension, (though great reliance is to be placed upon the personal character, and dispositions of the King of Prussia), that if any new pretext or facility should be offered for keeping possession of His Majesty's Electoral dominions, the Prussian government may not be able to resist the temptation of securing so large and so important an accession to the territory of the state over which they preside.

At present reports are not only very prevalent of the great coolness between France and Prussia, but there is a strong and general persuasion here that it will end in war, the prospect of which the army appears to see with great pleasure. The language of the Prussian ministers without exception is now most friendly to Great Britain, and

277 The United Provinces of the Netherlands or Holland was occupied by the French in 1794-1795, forcing the Stadtholder, William V, to flee. From 1798 to 1805 it was known as the Batavian Republic, in actual fact a French vassal state. The French occupied Switzerland in 1798 and proclaimed a Swiss or Helvetic Republics which was later transformed into the Helvetic Confederation (1803).
the applications I have made for facilitating the supply of the fleet have been met with
the greatest zeal and cordiality. The moment therefore appears to be critical, and the
first interview of Lord St Helens and Count Panin will probably determine the system
of this court.

With respect to the Armed Neutrality in particular, the principles contended for
are considered here as of so little real importance, that whatever Russia may agree to on
that head, will be accepted without hesitation. But so much value is attached to the
connection with the other powers, and Russia in particular, that there is little hope,
unless an attack from France was certain, and imminent, and the temptation of a
subsidy from Great Britain held out at the same time, that the court of Berlin will treat
separately upon that point, unless your Lordship should be able to detach Denmark
from the confederacy entirely, in which case it would be considered here as dissolved.

no. 52
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 30 May 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

I mentioned in my last dispatch that Count Stadion was to send a messenger to
Vienna. That minister informed me it was in consequence of a conversation with
Count Haugwitz in which he expressed the desire of this court to concur with His
Imperial Majesty in the arrangement to be made in Germany and in the preservation of
the constitution, and that the view of Prussia would not extend beyond a fair
compensation for actual losses. Count Stadion attributes the manifestation of this
disposition on the part of the court of Berlin to the farther knowledge it has required of
the wishes and intentions of the Emperor of Russia and in this conjecture, I entirely
agree with him. Monsieur Mouraviev had a long conference with Count Haugwitz, at
the desire of the latter, the day before he proceeded on his journey to Vienna. There is
no reason to think, that Monsieur Mouraviev was charged with any mission to this
court, but from the general tenor of his conversation agreeing with the last accounts
received from other quarters, Count Haugwitz found reason to be persuaded, that the
court of Petersburg would not only renew the ancient connection with Great Britain,
but was disposed to support the emperor in maintaining the Germanic constitution, and
the rights of the several princes.
Very slight circumstances sometimes material information, and I think it the more necessary, on account of Count Bernstorff's journey to London,\textsuperscript{278} that your Lordship should be apprised, that although Monsieur Lizakevich sent the intelligence of it to Monsieur Krüdener, the Prussian minister at Copenhagen remarked, that it could no longer be concealed.

I believe I have already told your Lordship I had reason to doubt whether the former confidential intercourse between the Danish and Russian ministers at this court. It seems also worthy of attention that although the messenger who carried letters from Count Pahlen and Mr. Garlike to your lordship brought dispatches to Monsieur Krüdener, he has not received the slightest intimation from his court of what has passed with Lord Nelson at Reval.

I am informed from good authority, that Lord Nelson has presented himself with a division of the squadron in the road of Danzig, and has been received with all the honour and distinction he could desire.

[end of cipher]

It may be also proper that your Lordship should know, that the tone Count Stadion has assumed with me is that which is usual between ministers, whose courts are on to a footing of the most confidential and intimate friendship.

Your Lordship will excuse my not entering into any more details as I have dislocated my left shoulder by a fall downstairs, and though it was immediately replaced, with little pain, I am in some degree disabled.

no. 53
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Charlottenburg, 2 June 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

Your Lordship will recollect what has been formerly said concerning the affairs of the Prince of Orange and the agent sent here by the Batavian government to treat upon the subject of indemnification to His Serene Highness's family. General Stamford has just informed me, that Count Haugwitz having pressed that gentleman, and the Hereditary Prince himself, to enter into a negotiation with Hultman, the agent

\textsuperscript{278} After the rapid collapse of the Armed Neutrality, Bernstorff accepted a British proposal to go to London and negotiate. He arrived in London on 13 June, and left around the end of July. Cf. Feldbaek, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 189-193.
mentioned, it was positively refused, the Hereditary Prince declaring that he could not take a step, which might be construed into an acknowledgment of the usurping government, and General Stamford alleging that he had no authority. Count Haugwitz then offered to transmit the business himself, and desired the Hereditary Prince's instructions as to the proposals he might make to Hultman. To this it was answered that if Hultman was authorized to make any offers and would communicate them to Count Haugwitz, they would be taken into consideration, but that the House of Orange could claim nothing short of their whole rights. Count Haugwitz having replied to this that Hultman was not authorized to propose but to hear, His Serene Highness determined to speak to the king, who very much approved of what His Highness had said, and added that he would give orders to Count Haugwitz to support it. The Hereditary Prince has accordingly received a letter from Count Haugwitz informing His Highness that he was directed to declare to the Batavian agent that His Prussian Majesty required that he should communicate to Count Haugwitz, for His Majesty's information, the indemnification which his employers intended to offer to the House of Orange, but that His Majesty would listen to no proposal which did not include the dignities possessed by the family under the ancient republic.

I have received information from good authority, corroborating what I intimated in my last dispatch, of the motives which have influenced this court to adopt the language I stated in regard to the affairs of Germany. They conceive that the intention of the Russian court is decidedly pronounced to resist with its whole force any change in the constitution of Germany or dismemberment of territory, whether belonging to the empire or to a particular prince, beyond what is absolutely necessary and that M. Kolychev has received orders to make a declaration to that effect at Paris. To this information was added a conjecture, that the regiments which have been placed on the war footing and are connected in this neighbourhood, will now return to their proper quarters. If this conjecture should be real the measures of pretended precaution against France will appear to have been preparations for effecting their own ambitious designs.

Lord Nelson having informed me, that the Emperor of Russia having taken off the embargo upon British ships without any previous stipulation, that the embargo on the ships of the other confederate powers or even on the Russian ships shall be taken off in His Majesty's ports, the pretext which this government wanted for treading back their steps has now presented itself and the opportunity now seems peculiarly favourable for pressing the evacuation of Hanover (which I mean to do so in the strongest terms I can, without committing His Majesty's government) and as I doubt not that I shall be able to bear the motives of the carriage tomorrow, I hope very soon
to be able to communicate to your Lordship something explicit upon the subject and a clearer view than it has been possible hitherto to obtain of the future politics of this court, particularly as to the establishment of a general defensive system in the north, which your Lordship so wisely suggested for the security of Europe.

The court arrived at this residence the day before yesterday, and will continue here the remainder of the summer.

no. 54
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 6 June 1801

My Lord,

M. Beurnonville a few day ago desired a private audience of the King of Prussia. His Majesty received him on Thursday morning. The king was much surprised at the application, and nothing has yet transpired as to the object to which it was directed. I have not learnt that M. Beurnonville had a courier lately from Paris. It is highly probable therefore that this step may have been suggested by the French party here. I know but of one way of counteracting their designs, which is to impress the king with a strong persuasion, that Russia is connecting herself as closely as possible with Great Britain. I have omitted nothing that seemed proper for that purpose, and I trust that, all I have brought forward to that purpose will be speedily confirmed by the complete success of Lord St Helens' embassy. I saw Count Haugwitz on Wednesday. He confessed that no communication whatever had been received by this court upon the subject of the maritime league from Petersburg, nor from Copenhagen, of the object of Count Bernstorff's mission to London.

I could not obtain from Count Haugwitz anything more satisfactory and explicit on the subject of Hanover, than what your Lordship is already apprised of.

Reports have been in circulation of the arrestation of the family of Lubov in St Petersburg, but the Russians do not admit them as true. As His Majesty's government has not a direct communication with that capital, it is necessary for me to dwell upon this point. Though I have little doubt that Mr. Casamajor's assiduity will enable me to

279 4 June.
280 3 June.
supply your Lordship with all the information that arises, I am very much concerned at such a critical time to have been confined by a fit of the gout ever since Wednesday but I hope before many days are past to be again abroad.

no. 9
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 9 June 1801

My Lord,

I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to comply with your request for leave of absence to return to England on your private affairs. You are therefore at liberty to set out from Berlin at whatever time it may best suit your Lordship's convenience - leaving all the ciphers, decipherers, and official correspondence in the care of Mr. Casamajor.

no. 55
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 9 June 1801

My Lord,

It is confidently reported, and is I believe true, that the French have crossed the Rhine in several places. I am told this morning that the different corps amount together to about 20,000 men, and that the avowed object is to support the plans of indemnification in the empire which they have approved. Beurnonville's audience may have been to announce this measure.

[cipher]

I have seen the letter from Count Haugwitz to the Hereditary Prince of Orange which I mentioned in my letter no. 53, and am sorry to say it indicates no intentions favourable to His Highness's interest. The negotiation will probably drop for the present, but it seems evident that the Prussian minister is desirous to acknowledge the Batavian Republic. Some correspondence has taken place between the Hereditary Prince and Count Haugwitz which has not yet been communicated to me. It is asserted by persons with whom I have conversed, that the passage of the Rhine by the French is a measure concerted with Austria. M. Lombard yesterday denied the fact. If it be true, it will certainly have reached your Lordship through France, especially if the government of that country has, as it is affirmed here, delivered a declaration of the subject to Monsieur Cobenzl.

[end of cipher]
I am unfortunately still confined.

no. 56
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 11 June 1801

My Lord,

Since I had the honour of writing last to your Lordship, I have not obtained any material information concerning the principle points to which I then adverted. I have indeed been informed today upon authority not altogether to be slighted, that Beurnonville's audience was on the subject of the Prince of Orange's affairs. This does not however appear very probable. Prussia does not seem at this moment in such a situation as to make it likely that France should court her friendship, by concessions that have not been called for. The First Consul therefore will surely rest upon the secret article of the Treaty of Basle till the court of Berlin manifests more anxiety to promote the interests of the House of Orange than she has hitherto done. As to the reappearance of French troops on the right bank of the Rhine, Count Haugwitz affirmed that the numbers which have crossed the river are too small to give umbrage, and this measure has been occasioned solely by an exaction of tolls on behalf of the Princes of Germany, which the French believe to be irregular and contrary to stipulation.

I must not conclude without transmitting to your Lordship the information communicated to me this morning by the Turkish mission of this place, and which they state as authentic. The dates not being distinctly marked, may occasion some doubt, but it appears not improbable from the context, that it related to a later period than the 23rd, the day on which Mr. M [illegible] left Alexandria. The Grand Vizier's army had it is said taken possession of Cairo, and in conjunction with His Majesty's troops had scoured the whole country, so as to confine the enemy strictly to their position and the walls of Alexandria.

Paschen Oglon had been defeated at Palanka, by Mustapha Bey, son of the Pacha of Belgrade, with the loss of 234 killed and 90 horses taken. This intelligence was received from Belgrade and is dated from thence on the 30th.

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281 Mustapha Pacha (1750-1808), Grand Vizier, commander of the Turkish army in Egypt.
282 Also written Pasvan Oglou. He conquered western Bulgaria, called the Greeks to insurrection, and sought French aid. His domination extended to Bosnia and the left bank of the Danube. He commanded more than 40,000 men, mostly Bosniacs.
My Lord,

[cipher]

Everything at this court remains in suspense, in expectation, as it seems probable, of the decision of Russia, nor does it occur to me that, at the present moment, any motive can be put into action of sufficient force to induce a change of system. The ancient and rooted partiality to France, as well as the general duplicity which has for many years characterised the politics of Berlin, make it necessary to be very cautious in giving credit to those intimations of the sentiments of the government which persons connected with the ministry are permitted occasionally to throw out. But the notion of a coolness between the Prussian and the French governments, and of a great disposition in the former to draw nearer to Great Britain, continues to circulate. Every opening however has been made towards a better understanding, without drawing forth an explanation, and it is impossible not to suspect that the sincerity of the court of Berlin will be put to a severe trial, if the next dispatches from Lord St Helens are as favourable to His Majesty's interests, as I trust they will be.

The continued occupation of Cuxhaven which stands upon a different ground from the occupation of Hanover, suggests a doubt as to the ultimate views of Prussia, as it is whispered (I hope with some foundation) that the Danish government are much disgusted at the conduct of this court, which persists in measures exactly similar to those from which it has exerted all its influence to induce them to depart.

There is not the last [sic] doubt now, that Beumonville's conference with the King of Prussia related to the affairs of the House of Orange, and had particularly for object to induce His Majesty not to insist upon the secret article of the Treaty of Basle, by which the United Provinces were to be an indemnification to the Prince of Orange for his estates within their territory, and to accept of indemnifications for them, as well as for his officers, in Germany. Whether any other subject was touched upon, and whether the king's determination in regard to the Dutch business has been shaken, is not yet known. But what chiefly deserved remark in this transaction is, that the step taken by the French minister, appears to have been suggested here, and in all probability, by persons about the king. It is also evident, whatever may be the king's private sentiments, that Count Haugwitz is very desirous of acknowledging,
provisionally at least, the Batavian Republic - a disposition which can scarcely be accounted for upon any supposition, but a secret inclination to gratify the French.

[end of cipher]

The king has been absent for some time past at his house in the Isle of Peacocks,283 when his stay was prolonged much beyond what was at first given out.

no. 58
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 20 June 1801

My Lord,

The Regency of Hanover having thought fit to deliver to M. Dohm, the Prussian commissioner in that capital, a note requiring the immediate evacuation of the electorate by the troops of His Prussian Majesty, and having directed M. de Reden, the Hanoverian envoy at this court, to deliver to Count Haugwitz a similar note, and at the same time to desire the support and assistance of His Majesty's minister at this court, I thought it my duty to immediately desire a conference with Count Haugwitz, in order to renew the instances I have already repeatedly made. They ought now to have decisive weight as all hostile and compulsory measures between His Majesty and the other members of the northern league are revoked or suspended on both sides. M. de Reden had his conference yesterday and is on the whole pleased with his reception, but could not obtain even an explicit acknowledgement of his ministerial capacity. Count Haugwitz told him it was with me he should treat concerning the evacuation of Hanover. I have however not received as yet any answer to my note requesting he would appoint a time for our conference, but your Lordship may depend upon my exertions to bring this point to such an issue as may fulfill the just expectation of His Majesty.

I do not find the French have yet crossed the Rhine in considerable force, and it is suspected their army on the left bank is neither so numerous, nor as ready for action as has been reputed. The court has for some days again been established at Charlottenburg.

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283 The Isle of Peacocks is just outside of Berlin, on the river Spree. A summer residence was built there.
My Lord,

I attended Count Haugwitz yesterday in consequence of the answer I had received on Saturday night to my proposal of a conference. I need not say that it is with great regret, I still find myself unable to communicate to your Lordship for His Majesty's information, any explicit or satisfactory assurances on the part of the Prussian government concerning His Majesty's Hanoverian dominions. I had no sooner opened the subject than Count Haugwitz endeavoured to put a short period to the conversation by telling me at once that he had not permission from His Majesty to enter into any discussion whatever on this or any other point connected with the maritime league, till he was informed by some authentic, and direct communication, of the sentiments and views of the other confederated powers. From this determination he would not be induced to depart by any considerations I could set before him, nor would he admit the conclusion naturally resulting from the continued usurpation of the electorate, which I put to him in the strongest terms I could find, that it was not only in direct contradiction with the declaration of the Prussian court, both in the note of the 12th of February delivered to me, and in the transactions with the Regency of Hanover, but placed Prussia, with respect to Great Britain, in a situation widely different from that of any other of the confederated powers. They had each of them reciprocated with His Majesty's proofs of returning confidence and friendship, all hostile measures between them and His Majesty had ceased, and the utmost readiness on all sides had been expressed to terminate all differences by amicable negotiations. In this state of things, it could no longer be pretended that Hanover was occupied by a corps of foreign troops, and the country heavily burthened, because Great Britain refused to enter into peaceable discussions, but Prussia must appear standing alone and in contradiction to all that she has hitherto avowed, attempting by measures of force to impose upon His Majesty, principles and laws to which he had not assented. Count Haugwitz reverted to what he had said upon former occasions and alleged, that as the confidence of the British government in the character and principles of the King of Prussia had hitherto induced an acquiescence under the actual state of things, he is justified in expecting that it would be extended a little longer, till the communications

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284. 20 June.
which a very few days must bring from Petersburg should enable His Prussian Majesty
to give the explanations required without departing from his dignity, or consistency.

Repeating then, in strong and positive terms, that the commands of his master
did not permit him to engage ministerially in any discussion or explanation whatever
upon this subject at present, he asked whether he might be allowed, as from man to
man, to enquire whether, in the supposition of the King of Prussia being ready to
withdraw his troops, I really thought it consistent with the interests or the safety of the
electorate, or even of Great Britain, to desire it. I answered that His Excellency could
not be ignorant of my sentiments as to the dangers with which the enormous power and
ambitious spirit of France threatened every independent state, but that whatever interest
the British government could have in preventing the French from establishing
themselves in Hanover, it could not be greater or more urgent than what must press
upon the cabinet of Berlin, for the same end and that I conceived that the electorate
might of course depend upon the support and assistance of Prussia against an attack
from that quarter. He observed upon this, that His British Majesty, powerful as he
undoubtedly was, might without disparagement, be supposed unable to provide
immediately, and effectually by his own troops for the security of his German
dominions, and that when the only ground the Prussian troops had been ordered to
occupy the Hanoverian territory had ceased to exist, which he doubted not would
shortly be the case, it would seem very odd, at the same time that the necessity of his
assistance was acknowledged, to tell His Prussian Majesty that he must not employ the
only means by which assistance could be given. To this I replied that whenever His
Prussian Majesty removed the obstacles which at present prevented a good
understanding, he would be at liberty to concert with His Majesty such measures as
their common interest required; that the necessity of a general harmony and defensive
union among the remaining powers of Europe, was more than ever evident, and must
be recognised even by those whom notions in my opinion very erroneous, of prudent
policy, and a vain hope that the danger would not approve them, had permitted to see
with apparent apathy the subversion of so many states. Count Haugwitz then observed
how much it was to be wished that peace might take place between England and
France, as it had done upon the continent. I said upon this, that whatever reports might
prevail of negotiations between the two countries, as none had been publicly opened,
no sanguine expectations could yet be justified upon that head, and that I was
authorised to repeat what I had said before, that the recent successes of His Majesty's
arms, brilliant as they had been, would not induce him to depart in the smallest degree
from those principles of justice and moderation by which he regulated his conduct. Of
the sincerity of the wishes expressed for peace by the French government, Count Haugwitz had probably better means to judge than I. He declared upon this his conviction that the intentions of the French rulers were not pacific and observed that he was not one of those who could draw a different inference from the unusually moderate terms in which Great Britain was mentioned in the view of the situation of France with respect to all the rest of Europe, which has just been published in the Moniteur. On the contrary he had observed, that a similar language had been always used when any new enterprise was meditated, and that all the measures of France, and recently their repassing of the Rhine upon the most frivolous pretexts, indicated views of ulterior hostility and encroachment. What impression he wished to give me of his sentiments and views is sufficiently evident. It is however to be observed that the replacing upon the peace establishment the regiments which had been drawn from Franconia and Silesia, which I believe has been done, does not accord with apprehensions of imminent hostility from France, and in one part of the conversation Count Haugwitz used expressions, which though he immediately gave them an application to the general concert of mutual defence which has been mentioned, might certainly warrant a suspicion that some attempt may be made to annex conditions to the evacuation of the electorate whenever it shall take place.

The time which has elapsed since the opening of conferences with Lord St Helens and the Russian government induces me to expect from hour to hour intelligence from thence which may enable me to better judge of the most effectual mode of following up the steps which have already been taken for the assertion of His Majesty's rights in the electorate. If there should be any reason to think, which however seems highly improbable, that Austria, with a view to facilitate arrangements in the Empire, may be brought to countenance, or acquiesce in the designs of Prussia on Hanover, your Lordship will certainly have observed it, and have induced that court to abandon notions so contrary to its own interests. Such an idea has been circulated here, but I give it no credit. From a conversation I have had with M. Hudelist, it might indeed appear to be expedient to convince the court of Vienna that there is no probability that Great Britain in the arrangements to be taken with France at a peace, should consent to leave Hanover in the hands of Prussia, in order to retain a larger share of the conquests made by His Majesty's arms in the other quarters of the globe.

I took occasion to observe to Count Haugwitz, that it seemed extraordinary that, at a moment when it was affected to wish for a good understanding with His Majesty, a negotiation should be carried on at Berlin upon a point, in which not only the interests of His Majesty's dominions was concerned, but Prussia was specially
bound by treaty to act in concert with His Majesty, and yet that no communications
should have been made either here or in London to His Majesty's ministers; that
Prussia and England were not only bound to the ancient Republic of the United
Provinces to support the constitution of its government, and particularly to maintain the
office of Hereditary Stadtholder in the Orange family, but also to each other, and that
although it might be perfectly consistent with the faith of the treaties in question to be
stipulated with France, that if the case should happen when it would be clearly
impossible to insist upon the re-establishment of the ancient order, event the
redemption of the family of Orange with the Batavian territory, not only a satisfaction
should be made by whatever government might prevail thence for the private property
of which the family should be deprived, but also that a territorial compensation should
be obtained in Germany by the joint influence of France and Prussia, for the hereditary
offices. But that whether the period was arrived, when the ancient constitution, and the
office of Stadtholder was to be considered as finally abolished, and to be solemnly
renounced by the Prince of Orange, was a point not to be agitated without consulting
that power whose interests might be affected by the decision, and who was under
precise and formal obligations concerning it. Count Haugwitz admitted that the treaties
of guaranty were in force, and declared the satisfaction which the king would derive
from His Majesty's assistance in concerting and promoting the interest of the House of
Orange; that in all that had passed between him and M. Hultman, the Batavian agent, he
had never failed to open every consideration, by stating the first object of the king to be
the re-establishment of a family to which he was bound not only by treaty, but by the
closest ties of relationship, that Hultman was here without any diplomatic character, but
simply as agent from the rulers in Holland to treat with the Prince of Orange upon the
means which yet remained for satisfying His Highness's claims. He then enlarged
upon the common interest of Great Britain and Prussia, to effectuate the independence
of Holland, insinuated that it might be the most certain means of restoring the House of
Orange, not, at the present moment, to bring forward their claims to the Stadtholder,
but to wait for a more favourable crisis, and that Great Britain ought to see in the
revival of a Prussian interest in Holland the means of recovering her own. He assured
me that the French were on this account very jealous of the conduct of Prussia, and by
no means desirous that an authorised and avowed ministerial intercourse, which must
be the consequences of Prussia's acknowledging the Batavian Republic, should take
place between the two governments. He concluded with saying that the matter was for
the present at a stand, as the Hereditary Prince, who is at present at his estates in
Poland was waiting for instructions from his father.
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 30 June 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

My Lord,

I send your Lordship inclosed a gazette extraordinary, containing an account of
the surrender of the important post of Rahmannich to the combined forces of His Majesty and the Grand Signior.285

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 30 June 1801

My Lord,

The convention concluded by Lord St Helens at Petersburg,286 which now expects His Majesty's ratification is of such importance to the present and permanent interests of the British Empire, that I cannot but feel peculiar pleasure in offering to your Lordship my congratulations on so desirable an event. If we could reasonably depend upon the good faith, and good intentions of the Prussian government, I might assure your Lordship that a perfect and immediate good agreement with this court would certainly follow. But though I have reason to believe that no ulterior measures respecting Hanover had been finally determined upon (farther than the endeavouring to prevail upon the Regency to give effect to the present to the threat of withholding all farther subsistence from the Prussian troops) I cannot but be very apprehensive that the cabinet of Berlin will endeavour to found, even upon the admission of Prussia in the convention, some pretence for continuing to occupy the electorate, more especially as there seems reason to believe, that it does not enter into the present system of Russia actively to engage in the affairs of Germany, or of the south of Europe, in opposition to the encroachments of France. The intelligence received from Petersburg will naturally lead, as well as enable me to try the temper of the court upon this most interesting subject, and it seems most prudent for the present to maintain a tone of the most amicable, and conciliatory, that can be consistent with the actual state of affairs. The

285 No details concerning this reference have been found.
286 The convention was concluded on 17 June.
time for speaking a firmer language, and for categorical demands of explanations seems most properly to be, when I shall have received from your Lordship the account of the notification of the convention, and orders to make that event known here officially. That the king's German dominions are really exposed to imminent danger from France, cannot upon a viewing of the political state of Europe which is here presented to us, be reasonably doubted, but I remain fixed in the opinion that unless she can be assured that she will be vigorously seconded by Russia, this country will not obstruct the view, or resist the progress of France. I think farther, that the neutrality of Russia may induce her to seek an alliance with the First Consul, and to make the price of such a condescension, that the electorate shall be yielded to her either as compensation for her own losses, or those of the Prince of Orange. Your Lordship will I presume at any rate, think it expedient to immediately open a negotiation with Prussia in order to a clear understanding, both as to what regards maritime law, and to Hanover, and in that case will probably send the full powers to treat and to conclude, and you will allow me to suggest, that it might be expedient to leave me at liberty either to insist, as a preliminary to negotiation, upon the evacuation of Hanover, or to consent that it may be made a part of the general arrangement. Much will undoubtedly depend upon the opinion entertained by His Majesty's government of the danger of an attack by the French upon the electorate, and upon the best means of preventing it. And it will not escape your Lordship that the Prussian ministers, though they will endeavour to avail themselves of what they know to be the sentiments of Great Britain, attach very little importance themselves to any principles of maritime law, but have a strong desire to find such a pretext as they may think fairly available, to annex Hanover to the master's dominions. I shall not wait your Lordship's answer to penetrate as far as possible into their real views and dispositions which it will now be difficult to conceal.

no. 61
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 30 June 1801

My Lord,

It is with great satisfaction that I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty the Queen of Prussia was early yesterday morning delivered of a son, and that Her Majesty and the young prince continue as well as can be expected.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁷ Karl Friedrich Alexander, Prince of Prussia, (1801-1883).
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 3 July 1801

My Lord,

The consul at Königsberg, Mr. Lewis de Drusina, has drawn upon Mr. Richard of Berlin for the amount in the inclosed bill, and has desired me to direct Mr. Richard to pay it. Though I presume the consul should have corresponded with the office upon this occasion, and that His Majesty’s government would certainly under the circumstances of the case have approved his conduct, and reimbursed him the expense, yet in order to prevent any discredit to him, I mean to do as he has desired me, and it remains with your Lordship to determine whether the money is to be replaced to me, and stand to an account of mine. Mr. de Drusina has also addressed to me a memorial to your Lordship for a compensation for his services, upon the merits of which I cannot presume to give any opinion. But in justice to him, I am bound to say to your Lordship that the consul has on all occasions manifested the utmost zeal for His Majesty’s service, and great diligence and activity in the execution of any business in which I have found it necessary to employ him and in transmitting to me such intelligence, as he thought might be useful. It may also be proper to mention to your Lordship, that there is at Stettin a person of the name of Lenthe 288 who has a commission as His Majesty’s consul at Stettin. He was formerly employed by Lord Elgin, and received the commission as a compensation for services performed and for an office under the Prussian government which he had quitted in order to be at liberty to act under Lord Elgin’s orders. This man is in a state of the greatest distress, and I believe, has no emolument whatever from his office. Your Lordship may perhaps think it right to enquire into the circumstances, and that it may be advisable to give him some different remuneration, than to let him continue in a nominal office when he can be of no use, and when the wretched situation of the man, brings a reproach upon the title he bears.

Inclosed is my receipt for £300 being the amount of the allowance to General Stamford for three months, for which I have drawn upon your Lordship.

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288 Not to be confounded with the Hanoverian envoy in London.
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 3 July 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

My Lord,

I send your Lordship inclosed the speech which by His Majesty’s command the Lord Commissioners delivered yesterday to both Houses of Parliament on the termination of the session.

no. 62
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 8 July 1801

My Lord,

The same messenger who carried the convention signed at Petersburg by Lord St Helens brought orders from Count Panin to Baron de Krüdener to concert with me the steps to be taken relative to the communication at this court. M. de Krüdener was not furnished by that opportunity with a copy of the convention, but was informed that he would receive it by courier in the course of a few days. The result of our conversation was, that I should, not officially but in a confidential manner, communicate the fact to M. de Haugwitz, and open to him the outline of the treaty. This was intended in order to obviate the danger of any unfavourable impression as to the disposition of the two powers towards Prussia, but I was the more readily induced to adopt this mode of proceeding as I foresaw that it would give me an opportunity of speaking with greater freedom and perhaps of engaging M. de Haugwitz to do the same, than would be possible in a conference strictly ministerial. On Saturday289 M. de Krüdener received the convention with orders to communicate in confidentially, together with a letter from the emperor to the King of Prussia, in which as M. de Krüdener informs me, His Imperial Majesty explained the circumstances of the convention. M. de Krüdener’s orders restrained him from communicating the contents of the letter to the Prussian ministers, and he was instructed, verbally to express to the king His Imperial Majesty’s wish that the restoration of Hanover may be effected. On Sunday290 I saw Count Haugwitz. Though he had already been informed by M. de

289 4 July.
290 5 July.
Krüdener that he had seen the convention itself, and that Count Panin had written to him that it was signed, and though, before he saw me, he must have received M. de Krüdener's application for a conference in order to make a communication from his court, he asserts for some time to doubt of the fact. When I informed him of it, and stated the obvious distinctions between the situation of Prussia with relation to England, and that of the other powers, he seemed to acquiesce in what I said, and his language with respect to England was uniformly friendly and cordial. I told him then that though I could not in the nature of things have received His Majesty's commands to communicate the convention, I yet was authorised officially to renew the invitation I had so frequently made to the Prussian government to restore the ancient friendly connection with His Majesty, and as it could no longer be doubted that all hostilities had ceased between His Majesty and the maritime powers of the Baltic, and that it was even morally certain, though not officially announced, that a final agreement had taken place with the court of Petersburg, to which the other powers had been invited to accede, we might proceed immediately to discuss the best mode of completing the reconciliation which we knew to be so much the wish of our respective sovereigns. He again objected to saying anything officially, before he was fully informed of the measures which the other members of the confederation had determined to pursue, but added that he was very desirous to know my sentiments upon the course to be followed in the view of facts of which I was in possession. To this I answered that it was first necessary for me to know whether there was any point upon which Prussia was desirous to enter into discussion, for that I was authorised, even by the language he had held, to presume, that Prussia was very indifferent upon the subject of maritime law, and that I had no idea at present that it would be necessary to do more than simply resume the situation in which the two countries stood previous to the 16th of December 1800 to effect whereby as the Prussian note of the 12th of February and the declarations to the Regency of Hanover related entirely of the measures which had been taken by Great Britain against other powers, and which had not ceased, nothing more would be necessary than to evacuate Hanover. The reply of Count Haugwitz was to this effect; that Prussia was not absolutely indifferent to all the points of maritime law, as the navigation of Prussia was very considerable, and of great importance to the prosperity of the kingdom, which was sufficiently proved by the number of Prussian ships which in the course of the war had been carried into the ports of Great Britain, and that he believed it would be expedient to enter into a convention upon those points. He then passed to the subject of Hanover, and repeatedly declaring, that from the moment the causes alleged in the official papers which had been issued from this court
were at an end, the occupation would cease if His Britannic Majesty desired that it should, and observing that though no answer had been given to the note of the 12th of February, it had been answered sufficiently by the course of events. He desired my opinion upon this point also. I told him I had no difficulty in speaking plainly, and fully upon it, as far at least as I was able to understand the objects of his discourse. Looking only to the avowed, and otherwise ostensible causes and circumstances of the occupation, I must think, that consistently with the declarations of the court of Berlin, it cannot be continued, and that it had also been protracted much beyond the point at which it was expected to cease; that this conduct of Prussia in this respect must naturally give great umbrage to His Majesty, and required immediate and satisfactory explanation; that as to the danger to be feared from the French, which I must conclude to be alluded to by His Excellency, it seemed impossible that Prussia should see with indifference the hostile advance of a French army into the electoral territory. From the moment all measures of hostility between His Majesty and the powers of the Baltic were suspended, and the fact was known to this court, any occupation of the electorate by Prussian troops, unless founded upon a concert for the common defence with the legitimate sovereign, must be hostile, but His Prussian Majesty was at liberty whenever he thought fit, to propose such a defensive concert to the electoral government. Count Haugwitz observed upon this, that the French chose to consider Hanover a British province. I asked if the Diet of Ratisbon, or the King of Prussia himself (notwithstanding his occupation of the electorate, which had furnished the French with a pretext they had wanted before) considered the electorate in that light?; that it was notorious to all Europe, not only that as a member of the Germanic body Hanover was totally distinct from the British Kingdom, and that the constitution of the latter was also an insuperable obstacle to their connection, but that in fact the electoral government had for a great series of years pursued a distinct political system of which Prussia had the full benefit to the moment of the occupation; that the Treaty of Lunéville in which Hanover was included with the rest of the empire, though England was not a party to it, was a clear acknowledgment of this principle by France herself, and that Hanover had under that treaty the same right to expect that she should not be attacked as any other state in the Empire; that there was nothing in the Treaty of Lunéville to prevent the states of Germany from concerting with each other defensives leagues, or renewing the system which had maintained the neutrality of the north of Germany. He said that the French had declared that they considered the line of demarcation as no longer existing, to which I answered that the neutrality, and the line of demarcation had certainly ceased with the state of war to which it related, but that general defensive alliances were
permitted to all nations in peace, and were not necessarily directed against any particular power. He then interposed that if peace could but take place between England and France, all difficulties would be removed. I repeated that His Majesty's just, moderate and pacific intentions could not be doubted, and that as no reverse would induce His Majesty to desert the defence of the rights, and essential interests of his people, so he had sufficiently declared that his desire for peace would not be diminished by success, but that though the enemies intentions were by no means so clearly accentuated, if the event should prove that the French had not yet adopted maxims of justice and moderation, it did not however appear to me that the common interest or the particular advantage of Great Britain called for a renewal of the war upon the continent. But a general concert of the principle powers to preserve what yet remains, might take place notwithstanding the continuance of the war between Great Britain and France, and might probably meet with His Majesty's approbation, and countenance.

I thought it necessary in consequence of some expressions which fell from Count Haugwitz in the present as well as in former conversations, (to guard against any attempt on the part of Prussia to make the evacuation of the electorate depend upon discussions which it would be in her power to protract indefinitely) to state very strongly that though His Majesty desired friendship and good understanding with the King of Prussia, and though I was persuaded that he would readily order his minister to enter into discussion with those of His Prussian Majesty upon whom any points on which His Prussian Majesty might find himself interested, I was morally certain and I was persuaded the cabinet of Berlin must expect, that no amicable discussion could take place while the occupation of Hanover subsisted. I thought it also expedient to state, as my private opinion, and to appeal to Count Haugwitz, whether he may not agree with me, that independent of the grateful and unexampled attachment of His Majesty's British subjects to his person and family, the government of the United Kingdom was bound by every principle of honour and policy to support and vindicate by the exertion of all its power and resources, a people, invaded in such a manner, and upon such pretences as had been alleged in the case of Hanover.

I must now observe to your Lordship, that there is an evident alteration in the tone and manner with which Count Haugwitz speaks upon these subjects, and that several things were dropped in the course of the conversation which seemed to indicate that this court is preparing itself for the immediate evacuation of His Majesty's territory. He admitted more fully and unequivocally that it must follow of course when the causes alleged in the Prussian notes and declarations had evidently ceased, and he
did not attempt to deny, that our agreement with the maritime powers would be their period. He took some pains to convince me, that notwithstanding the supplies extorted from Hanover, the occupation occasioned considerable expense to Prussia, that the king every day referred to him the petitions of the provinces from which the troops had been drawn, to have them restored, in short that the Prussian government not only desired, but had an interest in desiring, that the evacuation might be accelerated as much as possible. He declared that everything was ready for it, but seemed still do doubt whether on mature consideration, the king himself would not wish a pretext might be found to postpone it. But upon my mentioning that it was very improbable that Regency of Hanover should have presented such a memorial as that delivered to M. de Dohm, without His Majesty's express command, he said, certainly, and owned that no doubt could remain of the king's sentiments, as M. de Lenthe had delivered a note at London to Baron de Jacobi in which they were strongly expressed. That note has since been communicated to me by M. de Reden. I think it my duty to second to the utmost of my power the steps which the Hanoverian ministers take by His Majesty's command. I conceive it to be the spirit of the instructions I have formerly received from your Lordship, and I am inclined to think that the object will soon be attained. The apprehensions affected to be entertained of the French are very probably without foundation. But at any rate it is certain that if it really enters into their plans in violation of the peace just concluded with the empire to invade His Majesty's territory, they will not be restrained by any flimsy pretext of a disagreement between His Majesty and the King of Prussia which an hundred circumstances would demonstrate to be a mere pretence, and nothing, I am persuaded but a close connection of Russia with Great Britain, and perhaps with Austria, and a firm determination of the former power in particular, not to suffer France to dispose of the empire at her pleasure, will induce the cabinet of Berlin to engage even in any general defensive league which may be construed as being directed against France.

Since I began this letter, I have learnt from M. de Krüdener what passed at his conference with Count Haugwitz yesterday. No expression of displeasure at the manner in which the business had been conducted by Russia escaped the Prussian minister, who appealed on the contrary to M. de Krüdener, and to Count Panin himself, whether the wish of the King of Prussia had not been uniformly expressed or avoiding a rupture with Great Britain, and when it took place, for promoting the speediest reconciliation between the courts of St Petersburg and London. He declined however giving any opinion upon the convention till he had considered it at leisure, and till he had received the king's commands. M. de Krüdener who thinks, or affects to
think, that the danger from France is imminent, describes in strong colours the embarrassment in which this cabinet is involved, and blames it for not coming to an explanation and concert immediately with His Majesty, but as part of the embarrassment relates, by his account, not only to the danger of the invasion of Hanover but to the danger of the French taking a pretext from the evacuation for curtailing the indemnifications to be allowed to the King of Prussia, it should rather appear that nothing remains for His Majesty but to insist peremptorily, and without further discussion, upon the evacuation of his dominions. M. de Reden will do me the honour to communicate to me the steps he means to take, and as the actual communication of the convention by the court of Petersburg weakens, if it does not wholly take away, one of Count Haugwitz's evasive pleas, I have a fair occasion, as soon as it may be presumed he has consulted the king's pleasure, to call upon him again.

While Count Haugwitz dwelt upon the King of Prussia's disinterestedness at the same time that I professed of my conviction of it, and brought forward the extraordinary forbearance of His Majesty, as a proof of the confidence placed in the personal character of that prince, I took occasion to say that a circumstance of small comparative importance, the occupation of Cuxhaven, was of a nature to excite doubts and jealousies as to the ultimate intentions of Prussia. Count Haugwitz told me, that occupation was on the point of ceasing, and depended entirely upon a private discussion between the senate of Hamburg, and the Prussian government which was now upon the point of being terminated. I since understand this discussion to relate solely to a claim of indemnity by the proprietors of the vessel the *Triton*, which the senate of Hamburg purchased, and restored. I shall make no comment upon the propriety or justice of this proceeding and mention it merely that your Lordship, being apprised of the circumstance, may give me any instructions respecting it, you may think proper. I should also be glad to know whether the affair of the Ems is to be resumed. The ancient Republic of the United Provinces certainly claimed at least a divided sovereignty as high as Delfzylt, and if the Prussians are allowed to protect the whole navigation from the island of B... [illegible] a great part of the trade of the Dutch will be put out of the reach of His Majesty's cruisers.
General Macdonald, the new French envoy to Copenhagen, arrived here two or three days ago with a numerous suite. He has been presented to the King of Prussia, and I have not learnt that the time of his departure is yet fixed.

no. 63
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 10 July 1801

My Lord,

As it is just possible that your Lordship may not have received the intelligence of M. de Saint-Marsan's sudden departure from Paris, I think it necessary to inform you, that the Sardinian minister here has received a letter from that gentleman, in which he mentions, that he was obliged to leave Paris at two hours notice. He is at present I believe at Frankfurt.

no. 64
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 14 July 1801

My Lord,

Since I wrote last to your Lordship, I learn from M. de Castel Alfer that M. de Saint-Marsan did not leave Paris at the time originally fixed for his departure. Some messages ere exchanged between that gentleman and M. de Talleyrand, and it was at last notified to the former that the First Consul had particular reasons which he did not choose to communicate, for desiring him to leave Paris, but that they were not connected with the objects of negotiation between His Sardinian Majesty and the French Republic, which would continue to be treated of with M. de Kolychev, but upon which no decision was to be expected till they could be included in the arrangements of a general peace. M. de Saint-Marsan retires to Frankfurt.

I am told from a respectable quarter, that there is strong ground to believe that the expedition which is preparing in the French ports is particularly directed against Ireland. I have heard from others that the real intention of the First Consul is to make one great effort for the recovery of Egypt.

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291 Macdonald, Etienne Jacque Joseph Alexander (1765-1840), French soldier and diplomat. He was named minister plenipotentiary to Denmark in March 1801 where he stayed till 1802.
The number of French troops collected upon the lower Rhine from Metz to Isel is said to be about 90,000 men. This is stated to me by a person who enquires minutely, and has means of obtaining information, but I do not vouch for the accuracy of the statement.

A belief prevails here that the health of the First Consul rapidly declines.

no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 14 July 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that Captain Blake of the dispatch cutter arrived here Saturday last with the copy of a convention signed at Petersburg the 17 June, by Lord St Helens and Count Panin, on the part of their respective sovereigns, by which all differences between the two courts are adjusted in the most satisfactory manner.

no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 14 July 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

My Lord,

I am to signify to your Lordship His Majesty's pleasure that you burn all the English ciphers and decipheres now in your Lordship's possession except N and O, and that you lose no time in acknowledging the receipt of this dispatch after you shall have done so.

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292 Metz is the principal town of the department of the Moselle.
293 11 July.
Sir,

I trust that Y. R. H. will not doubt, but that every means in my power will be and has been used to obtain the evacuation of His Majesty’s Electoral Dominions by the Prussian troops. It is an object which has already been repeatedly the subject of the instructions I have received from home, and I hope it will appear by my official dispatches that I have anticipated all the directions which could be given, and have never neglected any opportunity which the succession of events presented to renew my remonstrances to the Prussian Ministry. I have generally upon these occasions availed myself of the liberty, which Y. R. H.’s presence at Berlin obtained for me of corresponding immediately with the King of Prussia and have no doubt but that it has had a beneficial effect.

I begin now to entertain more sanguin hopes of speedy success, the tone and language of Count Haugwitz is materially changed and in a private conversation the day before yesterday, he told me, that the evacuation would be ordered as soon as the king his master was convinced, that His Britannic Majesty did not think it necessary for the interest and security of all his dominions that some measures should be concerted between them to prevent an impending danger. He said it was certain the French would enter as soon as the Prussian retired and that he felt the danger to be so real and so urgent that he would fairly own to me, if it depended upon him, he would continue the occupation even against the inclination of the British government, knowing that we must in the end approve of his conduct and find our advantage in it; but that the King of Prussia thought otherwise and should not leave his troops in the electorate, if His Majesty upon reflection wished to have them withdrawn. He gave me at the same time to understand that if our conversation was official, he should still decline giving any answer till the convention with the northern powers should be formally communicated.

In a conference which I have already reported to Lord Hawkesbury and which I solicited with a view to support the Regency of Hanover, I have stated as strongly as possible to Count Haugwitz every consideration which appeared to me likely to have weight and to impress his mind with the opinion that all the influence and force of His Majesty’s Kingdom would, if the occasion should call for it, be exerted to the utmost in support and vindication of His Majesty’s just right as Elector of Brunswick-Lüneburg.
As Mr de Reden had a conference yesterday in consequence of the note delivered by Mr de Lenthe to the Prussian Minister in London and as I calculate upon receiving in the course of this week some instructions from home by the return messenger with the convention with Petersburg, I shall postpone for a few days taking any farther steps, but I have informed Mr de Haugwitz, that he must expect me forthwith to apply for a ministerial conference, in order to urge in the strongest manner that the communications of the convention by the court of Petersburg had completely destroyed the pretext which remained for the occupation of His Majesty's territory. I beg leave to observe that my representations have been restored in no less than six conferences for that express purpose, since I notified that His Majesty had ordered Mr Garlike to proceed to Petersburg.

The difficulties I have experienced from the peculiar want of all liberal and proper spirit and policy in this cabinet, with which Y. R. H. is so well acquainted, have made me frequently wish, that His Majesty's affairs at Berlin were committed to some person of better abilities and more experience in diplomatic affairs, but though I am conscious how fallible my judgement may be, His Majesty may be assured that in industry, vigilance and zeal for his service, I shall yield to none.

no. 65
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 16 July 1801

My Lord,

I avail myself of the opportunity of Mr. Cummins, a merchant from Riga going to London, to make a fuller report of the conversation with Count Haugwitz which I had the honour shortly to mention in my private letter of the 13th, and to subjoin such observations as I did not think it prudent to trust to the common post. What passed between us is not materially different in substance from what I have already reported, but the intentions of the Prussian government are more distinctly expressed, and there is more appearance of a disposition to concert effectual measures for common defence. The point to which I must first call your Lordship's attention is that the conversation was sought entirely by Count Haugwitz, and that nothing could be more clear, and explicit than the declaration he made that it depended upon His Majesty alone whether the occupation of the Electorate of Hanover should be continued. It was this, he said, which would embarrass him in his intended conference with M. de Reden, for if the question was merely relative to the Elector of Hanover, he should not hesitate to say that the retreat of the Prussian troops should be expressed as soon as possible, but
there were some important considerations in which the King of Great Britain and Ireland had a deep concern. Augereau would certainly receive orders to march as soon as it was known at Paris that the Prussians were withdrawn, and it was for His Britannic Majesty to consider whether it would not be expedient, that their occupation, by a concert and understanding between the two sovereigns should be continued, and the electoral dominions and the navigation of the Elbe be placed in the only possible way, under the safeguard of Prussia. A peace between Great Britain and France, he repeated would remove every difficulty, as His Prussian Majesty who had originally adopted the measure much against his inclination had no object in delaying to withdraw his troops but to prevent a danger which, if the war continued, was inevitable by any other means. Count Haugwitz here disclosed, that his own sense of the danger was such, that if it depended on him the occupation of the electorate should be continued even at the risk of the present displeasure of Great Britain, for he was convinced that he should ultimately obtain the thanks of His Britannic Majesty by such a conduct, but that the king his master was determined not to retain possession of the country without His Majesty's express consent. I took occasion at the same time that I stated all the obvious objections to the ideas he threw out, to remark that I did not believe His Majesty's government had any desire in the present circumstances of Europe to see the continental powers engaged in actual war against France, but that if the danger that he had stated existed, it was a strong reason for an immediate defensive concert among the states who were most exposed, and a closer alliance upon the same principle with the powers by whose assistance alone such a system could be effectually maintained. In reply to this he said that Prussia was much less averse from such a system than perhaps I might think, but that it must be a work of time and management, and upon which he must expect some proposal before he could give any opinion.

This conversation, though it was difficult, and he wished it to be secret, he nevertheless desired I would communicate to you, and had chosen to speak in such a confidential manner, because if I had addressed him ministerially, he could not have answered otherwise than he had already done, unless I was authorised to make an official communication on the subject of the convention. He expressed some impatience on this head, and calculated that the time when I might expect a messenger to return through this capital to St Petersbourg with the ratification. He should then have to treat of with me, which I understood to mean a convention of a similar nature to that concluded with Russia. It may be necessary to add, that I made Count Haugwitz remark, that every consideration he had touched upon had been already amply stated to His Majesty's government, and that if they could have operated any change in His
Majesty's sentiments, it was more than probable that I should have long since received new instructions. Upon the whole I conclude, that it is probable the evacuation of the electorate will be obtained, as soon as the convention is ratified, and Denmark and Sweden have acceded, but probably not before. As to the views of this government upon any part of His Majesty's dominions in Germany, sufficient ground seems to have been given by the King of Prussia and his ministers to conclude, that if any design to appropriate them had been entertained it is now at least abandoned. That His Majesty should not only consent to the continuation of the present hostile occupation of his country but even recompense those who are guilty of such a violence by a subsidy, would be a most preposterous expectation, but if the King of Prussia is willing to enter into engagements with His Majesty to employ the troops now in the electorate, and the corps of reserve mentioned by Count Haugwitz, in conjunction with His Majesty's troops, for the protection of the country from every hostile attack, the sum mentioned by Count Haugwitz (£30,000 a month) might be well bestowed for such a purpose, which would not only relieve Hanover from its present burthens, but secure a point of such importance to British commerce as the navigation of the Elbe. This would be effectually done if a defensive system in this part of Germany was to be supported by Russia. But it is that support alone, cordially, and decidedly given, that ... [illegible] so far the balance, at this court, the fear of the French, as to justify the placing any reliance upon its professions. If the French force is, as is said, ready to move, there seems no present means of open resistance. It might therefore be necessary, if such an agreement should take place between the two courts, to keep it secret, and perhaps, even after the accession of Prussia to the principles of the Convention of St Petersburg, the claims of jurisdiction in the Ems might furnish such pretences, as to keep up a suspense as to the real nature of the occupation of Hanover as long enough to concert and combine a system of effectual defence. You will probably return the convention so that the messenger may pass this place early in the next week, and the note given by M. de Lenthe to Jacobi on the 17th ultimo and the measures taken by the Regency of Hanover, make me expect and hope to receive some farther directions for my conduct. I am confident that the solicitations which I shall continue will produce no effect whatsoever, till the ratification of the convention, and the accession of Sweden and Denmark are no longer problematical. As that period approaches, the course which I would naturally pursue would be to deliver an official note which must draw forth a specific answer. This I shall do in the course of a few days, unless any fresh instructions from your Lordship should point out a different course. The general opinion seems to be that the pacific professions occasionally made by the First Consul,
have no other object than to keep the funds from falling as rapidly as they would, if let to themselves, and to amuse the people. All his measures towards Sardinia, Naples, and Portugal, as well as the numerous troops collected on the lower Rhine, and the preparations on the coast, indicate hostility, and find this opinion to prevail, even among those who have been accustomed to judged of him with the greatest partiality. I may perhaps appear to your Lordship more apprehensive than is reasonable of an approaching irruption of the French into the country on the Weser and the Elbe, but I have not on that account remitted (nor is it my intention to do so) my exertions to obtain the immediate and absolute evacuation of the electorate by the Prussian troops. This government have it in their power to resort to the same pleas upon which they have hitherto rested, till our peace with the northern powers is finally made, and mean, whatever the real motive may be, to avail themselves of it as long as possible.

Baron de Krüdener had his audience with Count Haugwitz on Monday and he has desired me to transmit his report by this opportunity.

Mr. Cumming, who has I find been much employed in the purchase of stores for the navy, is of opinion that the market for many articles of principal necessity, might by an advance of £3 or 400,000 be completely forestalled, so as to make it nearly as difficult for the French to procure them after the conclusion of a peace, as it is at present. If this is true, it is a consideration of so much importance that your Lordship will, I am sure, forgive my having mentioned it.

no number
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 16 July 1801

My Lord,

I inclose a receipt for the sum of £50 for which I have drawn on your Lordship. It is the amount of one quarter’s allowance which I have paid to Mr. Gentz.

no. 10
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 18 July 1801

My Lord,

The Hamburg mail which arrived this morning brought me your Lordship’s dispatch no. 62 of the 8th instant.

294 13 July.
I shall lose no time in laying it before the king, and I make no doubt but that the important change which has taken place in the tone and language of the court of Berlin relative to Hanover, will be viewed by His Majesty with sincere satisfaction.

The line of conduct which your Lordship has adopted on this occasion, and the sentiments you expressed in your conference with Count Haugwitz, are entirely conformable to His Majesty's government - and although there is no intention on the part of this country to interfere in the internal concerns of the electorate, no steps can be taken towards adjusting the differences which have arisen between Great Britain and Prussia, so long as His Prussian Majesty continues to menace the king's electoral dominions. As soon as he has explained himself on this point to the satisfaction of the Hanoverian government, and come to an amicable understanding with them, there will I trust be found no serious obstacle to the return of perfect harmony and cordiality between the courts of Berlin and St James.

In the course of your Lordship's interview with Count Haugwitz some hints appear to have been dropped by him intimating that the court of Berlin would be desirous of entering into a convention on the subject of maritime law with this country. Should you observe any serious disposition of this nature in the Prussian cabinet, it is by no means the wish of His Majesty's government to object to such a measure. There are however some points in the convention which has been lately concluded at St Petersburg on which the regulations are more favourable to Russia than Prussia could have any right to expect them to be in her own instance. I have the honour of enclosing to your Lordship a copy of that convention. By the third section of the third article you will perceive that the specification of 'contrabande de guerre' is not founded on the general law and practice of Europe - but is taken from a particular treaty of commerce entered into with Russia in the year 1797. This part of the present convention must be considered therefore as a special departure from the established law of nations in favour of Russia only, and in consideration of the commercial advantages which were secured to us by the treaty above mentioned, and in conformity to this statement, your Lordship will perceive, that under the expectation of Sweden and Denmark acceding to the Convention of the 17th June, an express provision has been made to preclude all possibility of misinterpreting the article in question. With these powers we have existing treaties of commerce in which this subject is differently regulated, and should Prussia, who has no treaty of commerce with us, be admitted to enter into a convention with this country on the subject of maritime law, she could have no pretensions to demand any restriction of the general principles on this point, and the utmost that could be granted to her would be to put her in this respect on the same footing as Denmark.
In your communications with the Prussian government on these points, you will carefully avoid anything that might have the appearance of a menace, as it is of great importance, that in engaging them to comply with the just demands and expectations of His Majesty, you should not risk the complete and ultimate failure of the object we have on view, by cementing more closely their connection with the French government.

no. 66
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 20 July 1801

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship an extract of a letter from Amsterdam which has been communicated to me by a respectable person, and one from Hamburg in which it appears that great apprehensions are entertained there of the approach of the French. It is said that they fear Prussia will not oppose the entry of the French into Hanover, and that Russia has solicited the court of Berlin not to withdraw its troops from the Weser, and that it is even hoped that it may be prevailed upon to make energetic representations to the French government. From the general tenor of it, I conceived it to be founded upon reports derived from hence, rather than from Paris. The letter from Amsterdam is more worthy of attention.

M. de Saint-Marsan, not having written from Frankfurt to M. de Castel Affer as he had promised to do after his arrival, it is conjectured he may have found means to prolong his residence at Paris.

Carysfort to Prince Adolphus, Berlin, 21 July 1801 (copy in HStA, Hann. 92, LXi, 68, vol. 1)

Sir,

Count Haugwitz has given me in a conference I had with him yesterday such full and explicit answers as to his masters intentions respecting Hanover that I trust His Majesty may lay aside all uneasiness upon that point. I beg leave to refer to my public dispatches for the particulars as the time will not admit of my entering into detail. The tone of the Prussian Ministry began to change after the news arrived of the signature of the convention at Petersburg. The overtures and assurances I now transmit were before insinuated in a private conversation. I consider that of which I now transmit the report to be official. It is but justice to add, that the King of Prussia had steadily and
uniformly declared, ever since the death of the emperor, that he never would upon any pretence whatever, possess himself of any part of the electoral territory to the expulsion of the lawful sovereign. I wish I could feel equally certain, that he will join in any effectual measure to protect it against all aggression from any other quarter.

no. 67
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 22 July 1801

My Lord,

I had yesterday by appointment another conference with Count Haugwitz on the subject of the electorate. I was induced to seek it, not only in pursuance of the line I had traced out to myself, but because reports were in circulation which seemed to call for explanation, and of the near approach of the period at which the contract for supplying the Prussian troops in Hanover would cease. I told M. de Haugwitz the reasons of my calling upon him, and he immediately declared without hesitation, and without any reservation, that the King of Prussia would not continue the occupation of the electorate without the consent and approbation of His Majesty; that he admitted the causes originally assigned had ceased; that the time was come when His Majesty had a right to expect from the Prussian declarations, that the troops would be withdrawn; and that orders would be given for that purpose the moment he was assured that His Majesty did not think they might be employed in consequence of an understanding between the courts, to ward off a danger which was impending, and which he owned threatened the interests and security of Prussia as well as those of Great Britain. He admitted that this must be done by an express agreement, and a specific engagement on the part of His Prussian Majesty, who had no object whatever but to preserve the electorate for its legitimate sovereign. Count Haugwitz assured me that his master's determination in this respect was so firmly fixed, that if his ministers were inclined (which they were not) to avail himself of any pretext whatever to obtain or keep possession of any part of the Hanoverian territory, he could never be brought to consent to it. That His Prussian Majesty was led not only by regard for the king, but by a sense of what his own interest required, to protect the electorate, but that he required of his ministers to propose to him such means to that purpose as did not lead necessarily to a war with France. Upon my mentioning the expediency of something with other powers who had a common interest to set bounds to the encroachments of the French, he observed that he was far from denying that such a concert was very desirable, but that it was in the first place to be considered what was the best means of
preventing the blow from being struck before it would be possible to carry such a plan into effect, and in the next place, that when the object was to preserve this part of Europe against France, the opinion and interest of Prussia must in all justice and reason be first attended to, as she was first exposed to danger and it was by her forces principally that the object must be effected. I have now stated to your Lordship what seemed most material, and I trust that combined with my former dispatches, it will put the matter in a clear, and not unsatisfactory light. There is no longer any ground for apprehension, that it is meant to draw pretences grounded on the omission of Prussia in the convention concluded at St Petersburg, from continuing the occupation of His Majesty's territory, and it is expressly and openly declared that the troops shall not remain, unless His Majesty upon a review of the present state of affairs, is desirous ofconcerting measures with the King of Prussia in order to preserve, the country from the French, that the King of Prussia is disposed to enter into specific engagements with His Majesty for that purpose, and that if the present danger can be avoided, the Prussian government seems not to be averse to entering under certain reservations and precautions into defensive engagements with other powers.

If the views of His Majesty should accord in any degree with those expressed by the Prussian ministry, it would certainly be expedient that any agreement to be made in consequence should be kept secret, and being once concluded, it might not be difficult to manage the business in such a manner as for a time at least would keep the French at bay. In the course of a few months, Denmark whose interests would be most immediately affected by the French possessing themselves of the country of the Elbe, and Russia, who has also a great though not so immediate an interest to prevent it, might concert measures with His Majesty for that purpose, and the example and support of those powers might encourage Prussia to accede. It is perhaps not so much to be objected to the ideas thrown out by the Prussian minister that the object is not desirable, and that the means proposed are inadmissible, as that the want of resolution in the Prussian cabinet has been too frequently proved to leave much hope that the French will be restrained in the pursuit of their plans by any fear of incurring its resentment.

As Count Haugwitz dwelt upon the suspicion which hangs over all their transactions with Great Britain, that there was always at bottom a design to draw them into open hostilities against France, I endeavoured to counteract that impression, and from the whole of his conversation, I am inclined to believe, that nothing but the finding itself abandoned and rejected by all the powers is likely at this moment to induce the Prussian cabinet to contract any new or closer connection with France.
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 25 July 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

I am to acquaint your Lordship that Baron Krüdener has just been with me at the desire of Count Haugwitz to appoint a conference for tomorrow, this in consequence of the intelligence received from Hanover of the determination of the electoral government not to continue the supplies to the Prussian troops. Count Haugwitz has taken his master’s orders and I learn from Baron Krüdener that this court will enter into special engagements to defend the electorate and also to withdraw whenever His Majesty pleases and will reduce the amount of the sum which in a former dispatch I stated would be required for the subsidy. I therefore trust there is a great hope that this affair will very shortly be brought to a point that will be perfectly agreeable to His Majesty.

no. 68
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 28 July 1801

My Lord,

Though I have not been able to come to any certain conclusion with the Prussian ministry upon the affairs of Hanover, I think it necessary to inform your Lordship, that Count Haugwitz in his last conversation with M. de Reden confirmed in the strongest terms to him all the satisfactory assurances which he had before given to me, as to the ultimate intentions of the Prussian court, and in the conference I had with him on Sunday,295 he showed great inclination to agree to all the most material propositions which I suggested, and relied indeed upon one objection only, the danger of being drawn into immediate hostilities with France. He declared in the strongest and most solemn manner that Prussia had no concealed, or indirect views whatever in regard to Hanover, and that he had spoken to me without reserve, or equivocation the real sentiments of this government but he owned that he could not help fearing our object was, in reality, to lead them beyond the limits which their interest, and policy prescribed in opposition to France. This impression I endeavoured as much as

295 26 July.
possible to remove, and to convince him that His Majesty’s ministers did not at the present moment either intend, or wish that hostilities should be renewed upon the continent, but only that there should be such a timely concert, and good understanding among the remaining powers of Europe, as might promise security against any farther encroachments of France.

Baron de Reden is to see Count Haugwitz today, and I am rather surprised that I have not yet received an invitation to another conference, but from something he threw out yesterday I am in continual expectation of hearing from him. Nothing has been said by me that could in the least degree weaken the impression which the general tenor of the measures framed by His Majesty’s command must have given of his friendly dispositions towards Prussia, and I should not do justice to the Prussian government if I did not assure your Lordship that I believe these dispositions to be reciprocal.

Count Haugwitz estimates the French forces collected upon the lower Rhine at 150,000 men.

no. 69
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 28 July 1801

My Lord,

I beg leave to return your Lordship many thanks for the clear and explicit directions contained in your dispatch no. 10 which will enable me, I trust, to follow exactly the line which you have traced as most conformable to the general good of His Majesty’s service.

[cipher]

My intention is to procure from the Prussian minister an official avowal that the causes of the original occupation of Hanover have ceased, that any fresh occupation is founded only on an express agreement with His Majesty and that the troops should be withdrawn whenever His Majesty shall think proper, and upon all these heads I hope for success.

With these declarations there can be no risk and as the expense of the troops would be small and cease when His Majesty pleases, it seems worth while to take the chance of keeping the enemy (It is probable that a line has been omitted here)\(^{296}\) and

\(^{296}\)Comment written in the margin.
any concert between his Majesty and the King of Prussia of which the object is to prevent the progress of France may have that important and beneficial consequence.

Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 4 August 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)
Circular

My Lord,

I inclose to your Lordship a gazette extraordinary containing an account of a most brilliant victory obtained by Sir James Saumarez Bart off Trafalgar on the night of the 12th ultimo, and the following day, over a combined French and Spanish fleet of more than double the force of His Majesty's squadron under the command of that gallant officer.297

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 5 August 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

The written engagement which I had hoped I might procure from the Prussian government, subject to His Majesty's approbation and concurrence consists of the following articles: 1st, a declaration that the original occupation of Hanover had ceased and that in future the occupation was to be considered as founded only in the agreement between their Britannic and Prussian Majesties; 2nd, that His Prussian Majesty should maintain a certain body of troops in the Electorate of Hanover for a certain term, but covenant to withdraw them on a requisition to be afterwards made by His Majesty's minister at the court of Berlin; 3rd, His Majesty in return was expected to engage that he would take measures for furnishing the Prussian troops with provisions during the occupation and for a certain time after the requisition made to withdraw them; 4th, if Their Majesties should think that the occupation of the electorate ought to continue, they should before the expiration concert together the measure most proper for effecting the object they had in view.

297 This is not to be confused with the battle of Trafalgar fought by Nelson in 1805. Trafalgar is at the entry of the Straits of Gibraltar.
This project was reduced to writing and delivered to Count Haugwitz last Monday and was framed upon his conversation and what Monsieur de Krüdener had said to me by his desire. Monsieur de Krüdener thought it exactly conformable to what Count Haugwitz had declared himself ready to do and was very much surprised at the delay which took place on the part of the Prussian minister after having manifested so much eagerness to join in such a transaction.

I called upon Count Haugwitz on Sunday but could not see him and have since learnt that M. de Krüdener had an audience on that day. I was appointed however on Monday. It was now distinctly expressed that the king had an invincible repugnance to give anything in writing, the reason alleged for this was a punctilio on the part of His Majesty who was hurt that any farther security should be required than his word voluntarily pledged to Prince Adolphus and the assurance since conveyed to his minister, that he would not possess himself of the king's dominions and that his object was merely to preserve the country for His Majesty in the only way it was possible for him to do so. It is more probable that the real reason is the fear that we might avail ourselves of such a circumstance to commit him with France, a suspicion I find it impossible to eradicate. He would however renew his declaration by his minister Count Haugwitz expressly authorised for that purpose. I told Count Haugwitz that the king's answer to the communication I had already made to your Lordship would probably in the course of a few days make known His Majesty's opinion upon what had been proposed, but His Excellency must be aware that although there could be no doubt of His Majesty's reliance on the honour of the King of Prussia, he might entirely differ with him as to the urgency of the danger from France and as to the means of preventing it. I told him also expressly in answer to a question he put to me that I could only report to His Majesty for his farther directions and that I could not from the least judgement of the determination of the Hanoverian government concerning the provisions which must depend exclusively upon Monsieur Reden's report and his instructions.

Impressed as I am of the importance of Russia to influence the decision of the court and apprehensive at the same time that notwithstanding the offer of mediation for Hanover made to the King of Prussia verbally by Monsieur Krüdener and the part that minister has appeared to take in favour of His Majesty's interests, the court of Petersburg might be warped by the intrigues of France and even of Prussia. I went

298 3 August.
299 2 August.
early this morning to Baron Krüdener and had the satisfaction to find he was extremely
eager to bring the business to a conclusion, and strongly persuaded that the interests of
his court as well as the emperor's friendship for His Majesty were deeply concerned in
it. He went so far as to propose that we should go together to Count Haugwitz which
he conceived himself authorised to do from the offer which had been made by the
emperor's good offices and he hinted at the emperor's guaranty, though they knew he
could not have express authority to offer it. I shall not fail to avail myself of his
assistance so far as it may (besides its tending ultimately to engage His Imperial
Majesty to defend the electorate) contribute to give that impression of the good
understanding of the courts of London and Petersburg which is so important to His
Majesty's interests here, and shall as soon as possible inform your Lordship of the
result.

Your Lordship must have seen from my former dispatch that although it has
been my duty to hear and to transmit to your Lordship, for His Majesty's
consideration, all that the Prussian ministers brought forward, I have not ceased to urge
that the evacuation of the king's territory was the only object of my instructions and
that I had no reason to suppose the idea suggested by Count Haugwitz would be
entertained in England, and the representations I have made have been as strong as
possible without resorting to menace, so that at this moment there seems nothing left
for me to do till I hear again from your Lordship or till the Hanoverian government
refuses the supplies.

It would not become me to form an opinion much less give advice as to the
conduct to be pursued by His Majesty's government in regard to the supplies for the
Prussian troops even in case that danger from France is considered imminent and it is
thought that reliance may be placed on the sincerity and good faith of this court. But it
seems to me agreeable to the spirit of my instructions not to discourage any overtures
which have even a remote tendency to engage Prussia in some concert against France,
particularly if it could be brought to it, and it is upon this principle that I have been led
to go so far. Count Haugwitz again repeated that if His Majesty after the
communication I had been desired to make should again distinctly express it, the
Prussian troops would be ordered to withdraw. Such a declaration so solemnly and so
often expressed must be considered as a step gained and will not be easily eluded. The
whole that has passed amounts plainly to a dereliction of the original ground of
occupation, and it is impossible without evident contradiction to have recourse to the
former dilatory pleas drawn from the arrangements with the northern powers not being
formerly completed or officially notified.
I am told that M. de la Harpe,\textsuperscript{300} formerly preceptor to the emperor, has just passed through this capital, in his way to St Petersburg.

no. 71
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 8 August 1801

My Lord,

Baron de Jacobi came to see me yesterday by order of His Prussian Majesty, who had sent for him to Charlottenburg to give him his commands upon this particular occasion, to tell me in His Majesty's name, and to desire me to make it known to the king, that His Prussian Majesty never had entertained an idea, and abhorred the thought, of usurping His Majesty's electoral dominions upon any pretence whatever; that he had been induced to the steps he had taken by the presence of circumstances which he could not control, and by the conviction that no other measures remained of preserving the territory of Hanover for His Majesty, and that he had at the time given the strongest private assurances to His Royal Majesty's government through me; that his certain knowledge of the intention of the French to invade the electorate when the Prussian troops should be withdrawn was the sole reason of his ordering them to remain; that the king for whom he expressed the strongest friendship, might rely entirely upon his probity and honour, and that he declared distinctly, that though he could not suffer his troops to remain, unless subsistence was furnished to them, he made no conditions whatever, and particularly as to the questions of maritime law and of commerce, upon which objects, he should make no propositions to His Majesty, but should receive as proofs of His Majesty's friendship any extension to Prussian subjects of those securities for their commerce and navigation which other nations have obtained.

I must observe to your Lordship that I understand these expressions to proceed only from a motive of delicacy in His Prussian Majesty, who was desirous of placing in as strong a point of view as possible, that in the continued occupation of the electorate he had no intention or object whatever, but to prevent the entry of the French, and that I have reason to think the Prussian ministry are desirous at a convenient time,

\footnote{La Harpe, Frédéric César de (1754-1838), Swiss tutor. He went to Russia in 1783 to teach the future Tsar Alexander. He remained in Petersburg until 1795. Alexander invited him back to Russia in the summer of 1801.}
of negotiating a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. The encouraging tenor of the dispatch from Lord St Helens no. 15 induced me to call upon M. de Krüdener, whom I found rather piqued at the delay of the King of Prussia's answer to His Imperial Majesty's letter. He showed me the whole of his correspondence with his court from the communication of the convention, and I had the satisfaction to observe in it, not only the clearest proofs of the interest which His Imperial Majesty has taken in the affairs of Hanover, but such repeated assurances both from the king and his minister that the evacuation of the electorate depends upon the king, and that His Prussian Majesty has been induced to continue the occupation with no other end or motive than what has been stated above, that it is both a proof and a pledge of the sincerity of the court of Berlin.

Your Lordship must have many means to judge of the intentions of France which I have not, but it seems here an almost universal opinion that their arms would be turned against the electorate as soon as the Prussian troops are withdrawn. The town of Hamburg under this impression seems to have acquiesced in the occupation of Cuxhaven. I am in hopes that M. de Jacobi will have His Prussian Majesty's permission to repeat to M. de Reden what he has said to me.

Your Lordship will easily conceive that it would have been a great satisfaction to me, if I had been able as I had the strongest reason to expect, to lead the Prussian court to bind itself by a secret convention, but when it is considered that the verbal assurances which have been given, have been repeated in terms equally strong to the Russian minister, and transmitted to his court, and that the declarations of Count Haugwitz are confirmed by a special assurance from the king himself, given both to M. de Krüdener and to me, I trust that all uneasiness upon this subject will be removed from His Majesty's mind.

I am glad to have at the same time a circumstance to mention which corroborates the opinion of the general sincerity of what this court has professed on the subject of Hanover, and removes all suspicion of a latent intention to make use of the present possession of the electorate to obtain the indemnities stipulated by the Treaty of Lunéville. The Prussian court has specified its demands, which I understand from M. de Reden, are confined to the Bishopric of Münster.301 This has been notified to France, and Austria, and also to M. de Reden as His Majesty's minister, accompanied with a request that he would engage the Hanoverian government to direct their minister

301 An episcopal seat occupied by the Archbishop of Cologne until 1801. The Bishop of Münster was also Director of the Circle of Westphalia.
at Ratisbon to act in concert with M. de Göertz in support of His Prussian Majesty's

demands.

The good understanding which appears likely to take place between the courts
of Vienna and St Petersburg seems to make it peculiarly desirable at the moment to
avoid giving any umbrage to Prussia, and on the contrary to make use of each
opportunity to manifest a disposition to friendship and confidence, as there is every
reason to suppose that His Prussian Majesty will not contract any close engagement
with France as long as he can expect to obtain the consent of Austria to his views of
indemnity, supported by the influences and good offices of Great Britain and Russia.
There is also an influence to be drawn of a very favourable nature from the wish
expressed to have the support of Hanover at Ratisbon, for the necessity of a direct and
open concert for the protection of His Majesty's dominions, will be soon induced by
such a public proof of a good understanding between the two courts.

I have nothing to add but what may appear of no great consequence, but which
is not yet entirely to be overlooked, that I have received such assurances and proofs of
M. de Haugwitz's sentiments at present both in regard to Hanover, and to the conduct
of Prussia in the general politics of Europe, that I must give him credit for his sincerity.

I inclose to your Lordship a report which I have received from General
Stamford of the state of the forces and preparations in Holland, which he believes to be
correct.

no. 72
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 8 August 1801

My Lord,

M. de Krüdener having communicated to me a letter from the Count de
Chasteignet, an old officer of rank and distinction in the ancient service of France,
stating that he had the means of giving important information concerning the meditated
invasion of His Majesty's United Kingdom, for which such great preparation is
making along the whole extent of the coast, and wishing to be enabled to come to
Berlin in order to communicate it, I thought it better to engage Mr. Casamajor to go to
Hamburg, as I knew that I could entirely rely upon his judgement and discretion, if the
information given by the count should appear to deserve it, to take the speediest and
most expectant means of conveying it to your Lordship, or to proceed to England
himself, if the circumstances should make it expedient. It has turned out however that
the Comte de Chasteignet's communications were not of such importance as there was
reason to think from the manner in which he had expressed himself to M. de Krüdener, as they consisted entirely of speculations upon the mode of attacking and defending the British Islands, without any authenticated details of the actual state of the enemy’s preparations or of their plan of operations.

no. 73
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 8 August 1801

My Lord,

Since I closed my dispatch no. 71 I have received from His Prussian Majesty himself, the confirmation of what was said to me by his order by Baron de Jacobi. His Majesty concluded in these words: 'J’espère, Monsieur, que vous êtes content de ce que je vous ai fait dire par le Baron de Jacobi, et que Sa Majesté Britannique croira au vrai désir que j’ai de cultiver l’amitié et la bonne intelligence avec elle. Dans les circonstances où nous sommes, il faut agir avec circonspection, et si Sa Majesté trouve à propos, je pense que nous ferons bien de rester encore quelque peu de temps dans le Hanovre.' At my return home I found the inclosed papers from M. Deluc. That gentleman had been sent for by Count Haugwitz, and decided to come down to Charlottenburg to repeat what the count had said to him. I desired to have it in writing. M. Deluc drew up his report, and laid it before Count Haugwitz for his confirmation. Your Lordship will remark a passage corrected by Count Haugwitz himself, in which he states the case of the King of Prussia’s being called upon to employ all his forces in defence of the electorate and the north of Germany.

He has never gone so far in any conversation with me. M. de Krüdener, since I saw him this morning, has seen Count Haugwitz, and repeated to me by his desire the conversation which passed between them, in which the Prussian minister not only confirmed all that had been said by M. de Jacobi, and himself to me, but expressed himself in such terms upon the contingency of an attack from France, in consequence of the protection undertaken of the electorate, that he could scarcely have said more, if he had certain intelligence that the intentions and measures of France were immediately hostile to Prussia. The French have lately drawn almost the whole of their cavalry to the Lower Rhine, and this circumstance among others seems to have excited alarm.

302 Deluc, Queen Charlotte’s reader at the court of Britain. He was sent on a secret mission to the court of Berlin to help form the Second Coalition.
Lord St Helens’ dispatches by the messenger reached me this afternoon. This is not the place where it is possible to penetrate the intentions of the court of St Petersburg, as it is evident they wish to keep Prussia in the dark, and thereupon abstain from a free communication even with their own minister. But it is here reported, and indeed understood, that a convention between France and Russia is on the point of signature, the object of which is said to be simply to put an end to the state of war between the two governments, but it is not intended to comprehend any of the objects which have been in treaty concerning the state of Italy or of Germany. Your Lordship’s correspondence with Vienna will probably throw more light upon this subject. The conversation of Prince Schwarzenberg,\textsuperscript{303} when he passed through here, was proper to show a strong desire in his court to reestablish as speedily as possible a general, and intimate concert with Russia and Great Britain, for their common support against France.

Count Haugwitz has appointed M. de Krüdener and myself to call upon him on Tuesday next,\textsuperscript{304} in order that we may jointly receive his official declarations concerning Hanover.

\textbf{no number}

\textbf{Deluc to Carysfort, Berlin, 8 August 1801}

\textit{Milord,}

Votre Excellence aura appris par le billet que je laissai hier à sa maison en ville, que j’avais trouvé M. le Comte d’Haugwitz trop occupé pour me recevoir, et que j’étais renvoyé à aujourd’hui à l’heure du dîner

D’après notre conversation à Charlottenbourg, je fus chez ce ministre avec l’intention de lui dire franchement, que Votre Excellence ayant désiré, pour fixer les objets dont j’avais entretenu de sa partie, que je les lui donasse par écrit, la crainte d’être inexacte dans une chose qui pouvait être de conséquence, me faisait prendre la liberté de le prier de lire ce que j’avais écrit dans ce but, avant que de le remettre à Votre Excellence. Voilà donc ce que je me propose de faire aujourd’hui. En attendant, et pour ne point perdre de temps après que cet objet sera décidé, je crois devoir rappeler

\textsuperscript{303}Schwarzenberg, Prince Karl Philipp (1771-1820), Austrian soldier, brigadier general (1796). He commanded a division in 1800 and was later charged with a number of diplomatic missions.

\textsuperscript{304}11 August.
ici, Milord, une partie de cette entretien que je n'ai pas cru devoir mettre dans l'écrit à communiquer au ministre, parce que cela le regarde personnellement.

M. d'Haugwitz sentant que tout allait dépendre d'obtenir pour lui une confiance peu commune, attacha beaucoup d'intérêt à mon témoignage sur un point à l'égard duquel je ne puis le lui refuser. 'Il y a bientôt quatre ans, me dit-il, que nous commençames d'être en relations sur ces malheureuses affaires, et il y en a trois qu'il s'est formé une liaison amicale entre nous. Je n'ai pas fait sans doute tout ce que vous auriez désiré, non que je le désaprouvasse, mais parce que cela n'était pas possible, et je vous ai toujours su gré de me parler avec franchise, même en me blâmant. Durant tout ce temps là, nous avons eu de bien fréquents entretiens sur les affaires, et dans des circonstances bien diverses, m'avez-vous jamais vu varier un instant sur ces points fondamentaux. 1. Nulle relation plus intime avec les Français, que celle de la paix où nous sommes avec eux, et qu'il convient à la Prusse de maintenir, si elle le peut avec honneur et sûreté. 2. Relations au contraire très intimes avec l'Angleterre, tant à cause de ses principes que pour un intérêt commun évident, et par les liaisons de parenté et d'amitié. 3. Défense pour la Prusse, à tout prix, du nord de l'Allemagne, et en particulier de la côte de la mer du nord, y compris les embouchures des rivières depuis l'Em, moyennant s'il faut des efforts extraordinaires à la part de la Prusse, un secours de finance à la part de l'Angleterre, vu son intérêt sur cette côte. Vous savez que plusieurs fois j'aurais désiré avec vous d'aller plus loin, et que je l'ai tenté, mais que sur ces points je n'ai jamais varié, et que si je n'avais pas cru pouvoir les maintenir, je ne serais pas rester dans le ministère. Voici l'époque où cela devient d'une grande importance, pensez-vous, qu'après avoir constamment soutenu ce système, je pusse en changer, et que si je n'étais pas sûr qu'il sera soutenu ici, je voulusse en donner l'assurance?' Je lui répondis de bonne foi que non, parce que je ne le crois pas possible. 'Eh, bien, me dit-il, si l'on avait en Angleterre la même persuasion, que pourrait y ajouter un écrit? Ce n'est au fond que du papier, quand les intentions n'y sont pas conformes, et quand elles le sont, qu'est-ce qu'il y ajoute? Je sais que cela serait dans la règle ordinaire, même nécessaire le plus souvent, j'ai cru pouvoir l'obtenir, et c'est ainsi que je m'en suis expliqué avec Milord Carysfort, mais je ne l'ai pas pu. Or il me semble, ajouta-t-il, qu'il est des cas où il faut se contenter de la chose, sans s'arrêter sur mon honneur, que dès qu'on sera convenu du plan entre les deux cours, sur la parole des ministres respectifs, l'exécution sera sûre à la part de la Prusse, comme elle y comptera à celle de l'Angleterre.

Voilà Milord, ce que j'ai cru ajouter ici à l'écrit ci-joint, dont je vais bientôt savoir l'avis de M. d'Haugwitz.
P. S. Je viens de chez M. le Comte d'Haugwitz, qui a acquiescé à tout ce que j'ai rapporté à Votre Excellence dans l'écrit ci-joint, à une phrase près, très importante à la vérité, que j'ai corrigée sous sa dictée, mais dont il m'a dit que Votre Excellence était déjà prévenue par leur dernier entretien. En consentant volontiers à ce que je lui relise cet écrit avec son approbation, le Comte d'Haugwitz m'a chargé de prier Votre Excellence que tout ceci soit absolument un secret entre nous, surtout à Berlin, parce que si l'on en parlait cela pourrait avoir de fâcheuses conséquences.

Carysfort to Prince Adolphus, Berlin, 8 August 1801 (copy in HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 68, vol. 2)

Sir,

His Prussian Majesty has given me through Mr de Jacobi and since confirmed by word of mouth the strongest assurances, that he has no object whatever in continuing to occupy the electorate but to prevent its being seized by the French, and to use the best means in his power to preserve it for His Majesty. I beg leave to refer to my dispatches for particulars it not being possible for me to repeat them to Y. R. H. before the departure of the messenger. The result I think is such as can leave no doubt as to the good intentions of this court, and though the King of Prussia could not be prevailed upon to engage himself by an express convention, he is pledged so deeply by the official declarations of his ministers to the Emperor of Russia as well as to His Majesty to restore and to protect the electorate, that he cannot recede without forfeiting all pretensions to good faith. I must however confess that I think great reliance is to be placed upon the King of Prussia's honour and I have the satisfaction of knowing that on the present occasion His Majesty's personal sentiments and declarations appear to be in perfect unison with those of his ministers, but do not appear to have been communicated to Lombard.

The King of Prussia having expressly disavowed all intentions of keeping the electorate and any part of it for himself, and declared that he will hold it only to protect it against France and with His Majesty's consent, I must own that I cannot help wishing that means might be found to indemnify the electorate for the expense of subsisting the Prussian troops as in any view of the subject it must give additional security to His Majesty's territory, and not only the occasion of the first occupation is of a nature to lay an obligation upon Great Britain in this respect, but the securing the three rivers and the whole coast of the North Sea is of such importance to her most
essential interests, that she would be justified in incurring a much greater expense for such an object.

Nothing has given me so much uneasiness in the course of this business as the fear, that I might fail to answer His Majesty's expectations, but whatever has been the result, I humbly hope it will appear from my dispatches and particularly from the great pains and the unusual modes which have been taken by the Prussian government in order to obtain some confidence for their professions, that I have from the first to the last discontinued every proposition of an immediate and unconditional evacuation, and that therefore no delay has taken place, that it was possible to prevent.

I beg leave to observe to Y. R. H. that Mr de Reden has for some time regularly done business with Count Haugwitz, as His Majesty's minister. It is an encouraging and indeed decisive circumstance, that Prussia has specified the indemnifications she means to claim and in notifying this to Mr de Reden, Count Haugwitz formally solicited him to engage the Hanoverian government to second the pretensions of this court at Ratisbon and direct its minister there to act for that purpose in concert with Mr de Görtz.

no number
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 14 August 1801
Seperate

My Lord,

I inclose to your Lordship herewith, His Majesty's answer to the King of Prussia's letter announcing the birth of a prince, and I have to desire that you will deliver it in the usual form, accompanied by suitable compliments in His Majesty's name.

I also inclose a copy and am, with great truth and regard &c.
My Lord,

[cipher]

In a conference which took place on Tuesday\textsuperscript{305} between Count Haugwitz on the one part and Monsieur Krüdener and myself on the other, the same assurances which I have already transmitted to your Lordship were repeated by the Prussian minister, who appealed to M. Krüdener for his testimony of the uniform friendly disposition of this cabinet to Great Britain and their constant endeavours to prevent and reconcile the difference with Russia.

The occupation of Hanover he asserted had been made with no other view than to preserve the country for its rightful sovereign, and at the same time it took place it was the only chance of effecting that object. At present His Prussian Majesty, who always receives peculiar satisfaction from the reflection that he has been the instrument for a long time of securing the country of Hanover, was ambitious of perfecting that word, and relied on His Majesty's not only placing confidence in his honour but to allow him to pursue those measures which were least obnoxious to danger. Nothing short of absolute impossibility would prevent his defending the electorate against every attack. He then endeavoured to prove at great length that the Prussian cabinet had never varied in any degree from their original opinion of the dangerous tendency of the French revolution and the necessity of resisting by all practicable means the extension of the power and dominions of that people. That the Peace of Basle had been extorted by the necessity of that time but that Prussia had ever since confined herself in her transactions with France to maintaining simply the relations of peace, resisting every invitation to a closer connection. He expatiated upon the common interest of sovereigns which should engage them to union and confidence and recapitulated a variety of proofs that Bonaparte's principles were the same as his Jacobin predecessors, and from late transactions as well as from the distress of the French finances, concluded that the continental peace would not be of long duration.

[end of cipher]

Baron Krüdener informs me that the answer to the emperor's letter has been given, but the contents have not been communicated to him.

\textsuperscript{305}11 August.
There is good reason to believe that the King of Sweden, who professed to be not well satisfied with the convention signed at Petersburg, and seeks to stimulate other powers against it, has determined upon making a journey to Berlin, and is to be expected soon.

no. 75
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 18 August 1801

My Lord,

This residence has not supplied since last I had the honour to write to your Lordship anything particularly worthy of notice.

[cipher]

I hope to be able by the first safe conveyance to send your Lordship, a copy of the King of Prussia's answer to the emperor's letter. I believe however that it contains little or nothing upon which to ground any conjecture of the conduct of this court, though it accepts the offer of the emperor's good offices for a final reconciliation with Great Britain and expresses His Prussian Majesty's satisfaction at Lord St Helens having assigned as a reason for declining to admit Prussia to a share in the convention concluded at St Petersburg, that no rupture had taken place between the courts of Berlin and London.

no. 76
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 22 August 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

I am told that the Hereditary Prince of Baden\textsuperscript{306}, who has been for some time at St Petersburg offered himself to the French government to dispose that court in their favour, and is for that purpose furnished with a great sum of money by Bonaparte, who has also placed at his disposal diamonds, pictures and other works of art to a great amount. My authority says that the court of Vienna has complete information of this fact and has directed Prince Schwarzenberg to communicate it to Count Panin.

[end of cipher]

\textsuperscript{306}Karl Ludwig (1755-1801), hereditary Prince of Baden. He was killed in an accident in December 1801 on his way back from Petersburg where he visited his daughter the Queen of Sweden.
Though these particulars have been mentioned to me by a very respectable person, I cannot give credit. At least I do not think the quarter, from what I know the information to be derived to be perfectly sure.

It is thought that Beurnonville is to have the embassy of Spain, and Lucien Bonaparte to succeed him here.

no. 77
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 27 August 1801
Most secret

My Lord,

Count Haugwitz having desired to see me, I waited upon him yesterday morning, when after receiving the assurances of the King of Prussia's friendship for His Majesty, and his invariable disposition to a concert and good understanding, he informed me that the French minister had recently in consequence of special orders from Paris, dated on the eighth of this month, invited the court of Berlin to evacuate Hanover, notifying at the same time the intention of France immediately to occupy that country, and the expectation of the First Consul that His Prussian Majesty would cause the fortresses, and military positions to be delivered over to the French army. M. de Beurnonville farther pointed out the Bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg as the indemnity for the Prussian territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and called upon His Prussian Majesty to give orders for the immediate occupation of those states. For the better understanding of this transaction, Count Haugwitz informed me that when Prussia acceded to the Treaty of Lunéville, it was with a reservation that the transfer of Prussian possessions beyond the Rhine should not take place without an express act of cession by His Prussian Majesty which was not to be expected till a sufficient compensation, and such as His Majesty should approve, should be secured to him. The consuls had notwithstanding proceeded to require from all the inhabitants of the left bank without exception, an oath of fidelity. Against this the Prussian government had protested, as the King of Prussia's subjects could not be absolved from their allegiance to him, but by his act of cession. The answer returned to the official representation of general Beurnonville by the Prussian minister was to this effect:

307Bamberg, in upper Franconia, was an episcopal seat whose holder was an important Prince of the Empire. Würzburg, in Lower Franconia, was an episcopal seat governed by the Prince-Bishop of the House of Schönborn.
Prussia was not a party to the convention concluded at Petersburg, and that no alteration had as yet taken place in her relations with Great Britain. In regard to the indemnity proposed to His Prussian Majesty, it was a matter to be settled at Ratisbon.

The courts of Berlin and Vienna have I understand, discussed and agreed upon the general principles respecting indemnification and in particular, that the indemnity for Prussia is to be taken in Westphalia, and the French government have been made acquainted with this decision.

The communication thus made by Count Haugwitz is to be considered as a consequence of his assurances already transmitted to your Lordship of the King of Prussia's intention to preserve by the mode he has pointed out, with His Majesty's concurrence, the electoral territories for His Majesty, and is therefore most secret and confidential.

no. 78
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 1 September 1801
Most secret

My Lord,
[cipher]

Count Haugwitz not only repeated to me last Sunday\textsuperscript{308} all the assurances I have already transmitted respecting Hanover - the favourable dispositions of this court towards Great Britain, and the King of Prussia's intention to protect the north of Germany against France, and to act in the general concert with His Majesty - but also to Baron Reden who returned from Hanover yesterday. And I think it necessary to inform your Lordship, that not connected with this, he sent for M. Deluc to communicate to him his apprehension that I did not sufficiently feel either the danger that threatened from France, or the desire of Prussia to establish a concert with His Majesty. He added that the King of Prussia was fully convinced of the views of France and fully determined to oppose them with all his force; that he (Count Haugwitz) had found it very difficult to prevail upon his master not to send back to their quarters the troops which were collected sur le pied de la guerre in the neighbourhood of Berlin, but that the king at length saw the necessity of keeping them together; that the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel could be depended upon and had each a considerable body of troops ready to take the field; that

\textsuperscript{308}30 August.
Prussia could march fifty thousand men immediately and with the Hanoverian army which could be soon brought together again, he did not think that the French could make any impression, provided Great Britain would furnish on her part the succour in her power to enable Prussia to bring into action the remainder of her forces, and even added that it was of the highest importance that I should have instructions and powers against the approaching crisis, that His Prussian Majesty might know how far he might depend on the king's support.

no. 79
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 5 September 1801
Most secret

My Lord,

When M. Deluc made me the communication mentioned in my last dispatch, he informed me that Count Haugwitz had appointed him to come to him the next day. I therefore desired him to put in writing what passed, and upon receiving from him the report no. 1 I sent it to Count Haugwitz, and desired him to tell me whether it was accurate, and whether it was his wish, that I should transmit it to your Lordship, as a confidential communication from him. To this he has not given any direct answer, but I received early this morning the report no. 2 from M. Deluc, and I since find that Count Haugwitz sent for that gentleman, and dictated it to him.

A courier has within these few days arrived from the French government in his way to St Petersburg. General Beurnonville immediately desired a conference with Count Haugwitz, which took place yesterday or the day before.

This court is determined with the consent it is said of the court of Vienna, to ask for the Duchy of Westphalia and some fiefs adjoining, all of them lately belonging to the Elector of Cologne, for the Prince of Orange. It is said, that electorate will be relinquished.

The court is now settled at Potsdam.

P.S. Inclosed is the copy of the King of Prussia's letter to the Emperor of Russia, alluded to in my dispatch to your Lordship no. 75.

309 The Duchy of Westphalia; the Elector of Cologne
Copy of a letter from Carysfort to Beurnonville, Berlin, 8 September 1801
(AAE Prusse, 229)

Lord Carysfort a l'honneur de présenter ses hommages à Monsieur le général Beurnonville et comme il se propose de retourner en Angleterre, au commencement du mois prochain et qu'il désirait épargner à Lady Carysfort et à ses filles le désagrément d'un long voyage de mer, il profite de la complaisance que le général Beurnonville lui a témoignée pour prier le général à l'aider de ses bons offices, pour obtenir du gouvernement français et du gouvernement batave de passer par la Hollande et la Belgique jusqu'à Ostende où il souhaiterait s'embarquer sur un bâtiment qu'il ferait venir de l'Angleterre. Lord Carysfort sent bien que le caractère public dont il est revêtu, doit naturellement apporter quelques obstacles à ce qu'il demande et que les circonstances du moment pourraient rendre ces obstacles insurmontables, mais il ne doute nullement que la politesse et l'humanité française lui en accordent toute l'indulgence compatible avec l'état des affaires publiques.

Lord Carysfort désire passer par la Hollande pour se rendre à Ostende, croyant que c'est le chemin le meilleur aussi bien que le plus court, mais il ne s'écarterait pas de la route et ne s'arrêterait dans aucun endroit qu'au temps qu'il faudrait pour faire reposer les dames. La faible santé de Lady Carysfort ne lui permettrait pas de voyager la nuit.

Lord Carysfort profite avec plaisir de l'occasion de renouveler à Monsieur le général l'assurance de sa considération respectueuse et distinguée.

no. 80
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 12 September 1801

My Lord,
[cipher]
As your Lordship must be already informed from much better authority of the opposition made by the court of Berlin to the holding of a new election for an Elector of Cologne and Bishop of Münster, of the steps which have been taken by the chapters notwithstanding these precedings, and of the emperor having on receiving their requests for that purpose named his commissary to attend the election, I shall enter into no detail upon the subject but just mention, that the declaration which was made in consequence of these transactions by the French agent at Ratisbon, though no more
than was to be expected, seems to excite a considerable sensation, and it is considered
to indicate that they mean to give the law with a high hand in the affairs of the empire.
In the meantime it appears the good understanding and concert between the two great
German courts is less perfect than it was. Count Stadion has not been fully informed
of the steps taking [sic] by his court. He was in particular ignorant of the overtures
which have been made for obtaining the consent of the Elector of Bavaria to the cession
of an important part of that territory to Austria. Count Stadion, in the conference he
had with the Prussian minister, asked him what had passed between him and M.
Beurnonville on the subject of Hanover, and received the same detail as I have already
transmitted, that the French minister makes no secret that the substance of what he said
to Count Haugwitz is as it has been reported, but denies that he had given an official
note upon the subject. This denial is probably occasioned by some confused accounts
which have got abroad of a communication made by Count Haugwitz to M. Reden
which was the only memorandum of the principle points taken down in writing by
Count Haugwitz during his conference with M. Beurnonville. Count Haugwitz
nevertheless asserted to Baron Kridener, Baron Reden and me, that the overtures made
by the French minister were other than verbal.

I understand that the papers of which I annex extracts, which I have received
from good authority, have been officially communicated to the courts of Vienna and
Petersburg.

no number
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 13 September 1801

My Dear Lord,

My share in the transaction respecting Hanover I consider as nearly at an end,
and I must desire, when time permits your Lordship's indulgence, to state the general
view of the subject upon which I have acted. I did not choose to insist in my public
dispatch that I much fear the retreat of the Prussian troops from Hanover will produce
immediate attempts to come to an understanding with France with ... [illegible]. A
passage in my dispatch of the 27th of May will show your Lordship that this is not an
opinion taken up at the present moment.

It would I think not be uninteresting to you to procure, and compare with what
I have written, the reports transmitted to England made by Mr. de Reden of what Count
Haugwitz told him had passed with Beurnonville, and also what Beurnonville said to
Mr. de Reden himself, both of which Mr. de Reden showed me last night.
I thought it might be satisfactory to know from the Prussian minister most consulted on affaires of trade, whether not withstanding the assurances of the king and Count Haugwitz, there was really any point behind of maritime law upon which this government felt itself interested. I am convinced from my conversation with Count Struensee that there is not, and that my successor, if no new consideration takes place with France, will find no difficulty upon that object.

no. 81

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 13 September 1801

My Lord,

Count Haugwitz returned from Freierwalde\textsuperscript{310} yesterday morning, and in the afternoon sent to desire me to call at his house. His object in desiring this interview was to acquaint me that the King of Prussia had received from Prince Ernest of Mecklenburg a copy of a letter written by command of the king to M. d Jacobi by the Baron de Lenthe.\textsuperscript{311} Count [sic] expressed his concern at the contents and his apprehension of its consequences. He described in strong terms the embarrassment in which he found himself, which was augmented by the answer he had so recently given to General Beurnonville. This last difficulty would have been prevented if the British government had returned any answer to the specific overtures he had been directed to make though the danger from the common enemy would have remained the same, and the King of Prussia, (his troops being once withdrawn and his offers of assistance rejected), would not have been again persuaded to advance, till a direct attack should be made upon his own dominions. He anticipated my objections, by stating as strongly as possible the common interest, but that he spoke from a knowledge of the particular view of the subject which he knew his master had taken, and from which it was simply impossible to divert him. He then observed that their had not been time to learn what impression the express declaration of the intentions of the French, which Beurnonville had announced to him would make in England, and asked whether I had received no intimation from home, since he saw me last, by which I could judge of the sentiments of His Majesty’s government. I reminded His Excellency that I had from the first acquainted him that my instructions had been precise to support the Hanoverian

\textsuperscript{310} About 50 kilometres south of Berlin.

\textsuperscript{311} Lenthe, Ernst Ludwig Julius, Hanoverian diplomat. He was ambassador at the Court of St James from 1800 till 1805.
government, and however desirous His Majesty was to cultivate friendship and good understanding with Prussia, and to strengthen the ties which connected the interests of the two countries, I was not authorised to enter into any treaty, or discussion for that purpose, till such explanations had been given and arrangements made with regard to the occupation of Hanover as should be satisfactory to His Majesty's government there: that I had notwithstanding transmitted the overtures, and made the communications which I had received from His Excellency, but to this day I had received no answer whatever, so that I must rest upon former instructions which continued in full force, and which he knew the purport. Count Haugwitz said he was undetermined what to do. He did not think it possible, after the assurances so repeatedly given to the contrary, that the British government should attribute to the King of Prussia, any intention injurious to the king's rights in Hanover, or hostile to the interests of Great Britain, nor could he think they would see with indifference the French in possession of the mouths of the rivers. When he reflected upon the confidence which had been manifested in the intentions of Prussia, at the time her language and measures won a hostile appearance, he was at a loss to account for so much distrust, when all her professions, and measures were friendly, and evidently tending to the most intimate union and conduct. He was therefore inclined to advise the king to wait for a more direct and formal answer from England. But after what he must report of his conversation with me, he doubted of the success, and if the letters from General Kleist gave reason to doubt whether the troops would find subsistence, His Prussian Majesty would certainly give orders for their retreat, in which case it would be in vain to look for any future co-operation from him, for the defence of the electoral territory.

This, my Lord, is the substance of my conversation with the Prussian minister, and the opinion to which I lean is, that in the next dispatch I write to your Lordship upon this subject, I shall probably have to announce that the evacuation has been effected.

M. von Sienen, the syndic from Hamburg, who has resided here as minister for that government since the occupation of Cuxhaven, was with me yesterday to express his apprehension lest the Prussian troops should be withdrawn from the country of Hanover. I declined of course any conversation with him and I am informed that Mr. Dormant minister from Hamburg at Paris, has received orders to quit that capital in twenty-four hours.

[end of cipher]
I learn from Count Stadion that he does not think the proposals made by his court to the Elector of Bavaria are likely to give umbrage to Prussia, though he admits there is a coolness on the subject of the elections for Cologne and Münster. He seems persuaded that Count Saurau\(^{312}\) goes to Russia with full instructions to invite and cultivate the best understanding with that court.

Carysfort to Prince Adolphus, Berlin, 13 September 1801 (copy in HStA, Hann. 92, LXI, 68, vol. 2)

If the circumstances of the times should not admit of His Majesty's German dominions being immediately relieved from their present burthen, I trust there is no longer any reason to suspect the King of Prussia of intending to appropriate the whole, or any part of them to himself, or to doubt that he is really desirous of preserving them for their legitimate sovereign. It is now ten days since Count Haugwitz announced to me officially, that Mr de Beurnonville had, by a special order from Paris, formally called upon the Prussian government to withdraw their troops from the electorate, and to deliver up the fortresses and military possessions to the French. This has been ... [illegible] by His Prussian Majesty, who at length looks forward to his being attacked by France as a probable and not distant event and is determined, as his minister says, to resist with his whole force every attempt to invade the North of Germany. Since this communication was made to me it should appear from many ... [illegible], that the Cabinet of Berlin are seriously alarmed, and think the danger pressing, and Count Haugwitz no longer talks of the friendship of His Prussian Majesty which leads him to protect the Electorate of Hanover for its legitimate sovereign but wishes to learn what support Prussia may expect from the king, if she finds herself obliged to resist by arms the further progress of the French. Bonaparte having appeared from the commencement of the dispute between Great Britain and the northern powers to have built great expectations upon the king able to shut the rivers of Germany against the British trade, it seems by no means improbable that he should now attempt to carry this favourite project into execution by his own forces. But if all apprehension of that nature may be laid aside, a question upon which I am too partially informed to be able to judge, I have very little doubt but that the King of Prussia will act up to his professions and evacuate the electorate upon the reiteration of His Majesty's request.

\(^{312}\)Saurau, Franz Count, Austrian diplomat. He represented the Holy Roman Empire at Petersburg from September 1801 to October 1802.
But little as Y. R. H. knows me to be ... [illegible] to place implicit reliance upon what is said by the Prussian minister, I can hardly bring myself to believe, that the demand above stated has not actually been made by General Beurnonville, or that it has been made without a serious intention on the part of France to follow it up.

Lady C. and I am penetrated with gratitude for Y. R. H. condescending remembrance [...]
no. 11
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 15 September 1801

My Lord,

I send your Lordship inclosed, copy of a letter from Mr. Vansittart to Mr. Hammond,\(^{314}\) relative to the mode of drawing bills by His Majesty's ministers abroad for the public service, and I am to signify to your Lordship His Majesty's pleasure, that you strictly conform upon all occasions to the regulations therein pointed out.

no. 82
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 19 September 1801

My Lord,

Count Haugwitz not being returned from the baths of Freienwalde, I cannot communicate to your Lordship any farther authentic account of the proceedings, and intentions of this court respecting Hanover. It appears from circumstances, though I have no direct information, that the Prussian general has probably come to such an understanding with the Hanoverian government, that the cabinet of Berlin are not yet reduced to the alternative of ordering the immediate retreat of their troops, or of taking provisions by force. It seems thereupon most likely, especially as Mr. de Lenthe's letter seems on reading it over again to leave it open for Prussia to reply and negotiate on the terms and mode in which she will give a continued protection to the electorate, that the evacuation will not take place till something more is said on the part of His Majesty. In the meantime, as far as may be judged from the conversation of the day, the elections for Münster and Cologne create great dissatisfaction here, and it is feared will awaken all the jealousy, and animosity against the court of Vienna which has so frequently injured the public interests. Neither is it possible to disguise, that this misunderstanding has a tendency to bring the court of Prussia nearer to France.

M. de von Sienen does not deny that the resident from his republic has been required to leave Paris. This measure is founded upon an old claim of the French government to be indemnified by the city of Hamburg for some losses sustained by means of a person of the name of Chapeau-Rouge. The residents powers were not

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\(^{314}\) Probably George Hammond (1763-1853), British diplomat, under-secretary at the foreign office in London.
deemed sufficient to settle this business, and this has been made the pretext for his
dismission.

no. 12
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 September 1801
Secret and confidential

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's dispatches of
the 12th and 13th instant. The contents of them have been fully considered by His
Majesty's government. The situation into which Prussia has placed herself with
respect to this country, the character of Count Haugwitz, the personal influence of a
French favourite over the mind of the king, all contribute to create a well founded
distrust of any professions which the King of Prussia or his ministers may make, and
demand something more than mere verbal assurances, before it is possible to found any
system of conduct upon them, on which we could safely rely.

The occupation of Hanover by the Prussian troops under all the circumstances
of the case, the exactions from that country for the purpose of paying them, at the time
when it was professed that the occupation was continued for the mere purpose of
security against France, must prove that the Prussian government, as it is now
constituted, will always find a pretence for injustice and extortion, whenever they
accord with their interest.

At the same time the security of the north of Germany is an object both
politically and commercially considered of great importance to this country, and no
means ought to be neglected for effecting this object to which we can with common
prudence resort. Any idea of subsidizing the King of Prussia to enable him to remain
in a state of preparation on the ground of an apprehension that France will invade the
Electorate of Hanover, or any other part of the north of Germany, is totally
inadmissible. It could never be accepted that the Parliament would accede to such a
proposition, which might have its foundation in a secret understanding between Prussia
and France, and might lead to His Majesty's advancing considerable sums of money,
which might be warranted by no danger, and repaid by no national benefit whatsoever.

If, however, in consequence of the Electorate of Hanover being evacuated by
the Prussian troops, or on any other ground, Hanover, or the north of Germany,
should during the course of the war be attacked by a French army, and the King of
Prussia is willing to enter into any engagement for its defence, by employing his forces
for that purpose, His Majesty's government would be ready to bear a part of the expense which might be incurred, and would recommend it to Parliament to make provision accordingly. You will take the earliest opportunity of discovering whether an arrangement to this effect would be satisfactory to the Prussian government, and you will not fail to make use of all the arguments which will present themselves to you to prove its reasonableness and importance.

Your Lordship will carefully avoid giving any opinion, in your capacity of minister, on the plan of secularisations, and on the arrangements which are to depend upon it. It appears uncertain whether the courts of Vienna and Berlin are agreed upon this subject, and we are as yet uninformed of the opinion of the Emperor of Russia. Under these circumstances it is desirable, that the government of this country should, for the present, remain unpledged, and should avoid taking any part which might effect its interests in any future negotiations with any of the above mentioned powers.

no. 83
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 22 September 1801

My Lord,

I have received no farther communication from the Prussian Ministry respecting the affairs of Hanover, nor has M. de Reden been farther informed of the proceedings of the regency, but from this silence I conclude that some arrangement has taken place between them and Lieutenant-General Kleist. It is still asserted by the persons who have the best means of obtaining such information as the government suffer to transpire, that the French minister has made a direct notion here for the evacuation of the electorate by the Prussians in order to make room for the troops of his own nation. I am led to believe in this intention on the part of France, not so much by any confidence in the sincerity of Count Haugwitz, as by its conformity with the general politics of the consular government, and the persuasion which I find prevails so generally that it would be a blow to Great Britain under which she must be obliged to stoop. I must add that whether it is owing to the terror inspired by France, or to a stupid blindness to their own essential interests, I find nobody inclined to admit what appears to be self evident, that the shutting up the rivers against trade with Great Britain would be fatal to the commercial interest, to the prosperity, and industry of all the north of Europe.

The public of this place expresses the most violent resentment against the court of Vienna for its conduct in the affairs of Cologne and Münster. I am told that Count
Haugwitz has formally communicated to M. de Beurnonville the instructions given in consequence to M. de Görtz. It is impossible not to entertain some apprehension that this government may put such a construction upon the silence of the British government, and the steps taken by M. de Lenthe and the Regency of Hanover, as may furnish it with a pretext for considering itself as wholly disengaged from the promises it has made concerning Hanover. This surmise is however so unsupported, that I am conscious it may bear an aspect of more distrust than I really feel in the good faith of this government upon this particular point. It was reported that troops have been actually ordered to march into the territory of Münster, but this was unfounded, nor does it appear probable that Prussia should take so strong a measure till it has tried farther the mode of negotiation, and sounded the sentiments both of Russia and France, and I am just now assured that it will confine itself to a protestation at Ratisbon, and that in a spirit of conciliation it has at once accredited to the proposition of Austria, for adding the ministers of Saxony and Metz to the deputation of the Diet, which is to regulate the indemnities.

Convinced that in the present situation of Europe, Prussia will not be induced to contract more positive and formal engagements with His Majesty for the security of north Europe, than those which have already been submitted to your Lordship, and that His Majesty's interests cannot be in better hands than Mr. Casamajor, I propose as soon as my preparations for the journey can be finished, to avail myself of His Majesty's gracious permission to return home for my private affairs, unless by any of the three mails which are now due, I should receive such orders from your Lordship as make it necessary for me to stay.

P.S. M. de Krüdener has just been with me to inform me that he had seen Count Haugwitz in his passage through Berlin from Freienwalde to Potsdam. That minister told him that M. de Lucchesini had written, that Bonaparte had expressed great indignation at the answer given by Prussia to his propositions concerning Hanover, and the indemnities, and had ordered General Beurnonville to renew his instances in the strongest manner, particularly as to Hanover. Lucchesini adds that Bonaparte is surrounded by officers who press for an immediate performance of the promise made to the army of a gratification or for employment. If the French are really preparing to turn their arms against the north of Germany, it may perhaps deserve consideration, whether the chicanery of the courts of Stockholm and Copenhagen, the latter in particular, may not be combined with that design. M. de Krüdener told me he had asked Count Haugwitz whether it was possible that this court could be so blind to its
own interest as to consent that the French should enter into any part of Germany, and received an answer in the negative and in the strongest terms.

no. 84
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 26 September 1801

My Lord,

Count Haugwitz remains at Freienwalde, and I have not been able to learn from any other quarter that any change has taken place in regard to the Electorate of Hanover. M. de Jacobi has acknowledged by a letter to Baron de Reden, the receipt of M. de Lenthe's letter, and adds that he shall answer it from Dresden, when he shall stop in his way from Iaepitz. He waits no doubt to receive instructions from this court.

A note has been delivered by the ministry to Hultman, the Batavian agent, in which it is notified by order of the King of Prussia, that he expects that the sum of 22,000,000 of florins shall be paid by the Batavian government to the Prince of Orange, as an indemnity for his private property of which they have possessed themselves. Count Haugwitz has informed the Prince of Orange's ministers, that the reason the negotiation on this point has been suspended is that His Prussian Majesty wished that it should proceed pari-passu with the territorial indemnification to be given in the empire for the hereditary offices, and upon its being objected that impediments would arise from the elections taking place for Münster and Cologne, it was said that Prussia and Austria were perfectly agreed on that matter, at least as far as the indemnity of the Prince of Orange might be concerned. I have however good reason to believe, that no explanation on this point has been given by the court of Vienna, through M. de Stadion. The proposal of the court of Vienna to the Elector Palatine has been communicated to the Prussian cabinet, but it is not yet known whether it has been approved, and it is thought very unlikely, that the court of Vienna should have taken the steps it has, either on this subject, or the elections of Cologne and Münster, without being well assured that it would not find itself exposed in consequence to the resentment of France.

315 Unknown.
My Lord,

It is understood by this public here that this court has agreed to acknowledge the King of Etruria, a circumstance in itself of small importance, and which from the relations which have always existed between Berlin and Madrid, was to be expected.

No particular communication has been made to me as to the intentions of this court respecting Hanover, which will probably only be declared in the answer which M. de Jacobi will be ordered to give to the letter of M. de Lenthe. The same silence has been observed in regard to any farther steps or declarations of France concerning the electorate of the north of Germany, nor have I thought it prudent without farther instructions from home, to seek for any conversation with M. de Haugwitz upon these points.

I dined yesterday in company with the minister Count Schulenburg, who took me aside after dinner, and entered into a very detailed conversation on the general state of public affairs though this conversation has not been official it may be interesting to your Lordship to let you know the complexion of the language which a man of rank and consequence thinks proper to hold. His opinion of the community of interest which subsists between Great Britain and Prussia was strongly and unequivocally expressed, and he seems equally convinced that the state of the remaining powers of Europe depends on their union. He remarked however the little confidence there was or could be place in Austria, and what is of more importance, that it would be vain to expect that Prussia would contract any direct engagement with Great Britain before a peace, unless the north of Germany be attacked, in which case the King of Prussia would never suffer the French to obtain a footing. This was an event he did not consider as probable. The views of France, who must soon acknowledge the folly of a direct attack upon the British Islands, would be turned to Portugal, even though her expectations of extorting wealth from that court be disappointed. He did not think that the consular government would engage in measures which would bring on a contest with Prussia.
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 3 October 1801 [badly damaged]

My Dear Lord,

The season is so far advanced, and the reports of the state of the roads through Westphalia and Flanders, so unfavourable that I have determined to pass with my family from Cuxhaven. I therefore beg the favour of your Lordship to obtain a frigate for me as soon as possible to take me with my wife and daughter from hence to England. In order to save time, I mean to set out this day ... [illegible] of hearing when I reach Hamburg ... [illegible] frigate is arrived in the Elbe. I must own that your Lordship's long silence has laid me under some embarrassment. I trust however that I shall not be thought to have abused His Majesty's indulgence, by availing myself at this time of his leave of absence. If circumstances should hereafter induce ... [illegible] to think of building at all on what has passed here, Mr. Casamajor has the thread of all the transactions, and could it, on any special grounds, be thought necessary I could myself return with the expedition of a messenger.

As to what concerns General Stamford, I desired Lady Carysfort to engage Mme. Stamford to suggest what might be the best mode of assisting the family. She seems to think an assurance of a certain income during the general's life, and part of which should be continued to each of the children after his death. Lady Carysfort mentioned £500 a year during the general's life, and £100 a year to each of the children afterwards. Mme. Stamford said that her husband requested nothing, but that what had been mentioned would make him perfectly easy. The general's delicacy, I can assure your Lordship is not affected, and if ever the court of Berlin should be really disposed to act vigorously upon good principles, his talents, and his character are such, that he would be of great use both here, and at Brunswick.

[illegible] must however still regret your Lordship ... [illegible] to my petition for a frigate, as I shall certainly be able to give your Lordship an answer to it, after communicating with the Prussian ministry, before the period I have mentioned for setting out, and I have no reason to think anything will arise upon it to prevent my availing myself of my leave to come home.

Lombard is not a Frenchman, and I can give your Lordship good reason to think he does not possesses the king's confidence, but of course I shall reserve this till I see you, or till Basilico's return.

Lombard is a Prussian born and bred.
no. 13
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 3 October 1801

My Lord,

I send you inclosed under flying seal a dispatch to Lord St Helens, with its inclosures, which after you have perused them, you will immediately return to Donaldson, in order that no time may be lost by that messenger, in prosecuting his journey to Petersburg.

You will consider the communication of the preliminary articles as intended solely for your private information, and you will not upon any account give the slightest intimation of their contents to any person whatsoever.

no number
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 3 October 1801
Separate

My Lord,
[cipher]

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I propose drawing upon you on Saturday next the tenth instant for the several sums of three hundred pounds, and fifty pounds, at thirty days sight. These sums are the amount of the usual quarterly allowances to General Stamford and Mr. Gentz and are placed as they have always hitherto been, under the head of secret service money.

In regard to Mr. Gentz, I must beg leave to observe to your Lordship, that when he has received the quarter, which will be due in December, he will consider the expectation held out to him by government as having been fulfilled. His answer to the celebrated performance upon the Etat de la France has just appeared, he has taken uncommon pains with it, and it is spoken of in such terms that I have no doubt he thought he had rendered signal service to the cause of His Majesty. As to any further remuneration to him, (if it be thought expedient to secure his future exertion), what would best promote that end I shall beg leave to reserve the opinion I might humbly submit to your Lordship till I have the honour of seeing you.
My Lord,

The negotiations with the Batavian agent M. Hultman, for a compensation to the Prince of Orange for his estates in the territory of the United Provinces having taken a turn which makes it impossible that they should be brought to a speedy conclusion. General Stamford finds himself obliged by his duty to his Serene Highness to postpone the journey to Brunswick which he had mediated, and the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick has for the present dispensed with the attendance of Mme. de Stamford. But as the business upon which the general is now employed will probably be brought to some conclusion in the course of this winter, I think it my duty to state to your Lordship what I have learnt [cipher] concerning the circumstances of his fortune. I fear that whenever the allowance he has received from His Majesty is withheld, he will be reduced to a state of extreme poverty, and in case of the death of his children (a son and a daughter of the age from seven to nine years) will have nothing, and will have no provision but the very trifling income of arising from the situation she holds in the service of the Hereditary Princess of Brunswick. The principle, the zeal, and the disinterested spirit of General Stamford, are so well known to your Lordship, that it would be superfluous to enlarge upon them. I shall only add, that the general is so far from making any claim on His Majesty's government, that he then himself overpaid, and only appeared solicitous to have it understood, that it is the desire of the Prince of Orange, [end of cipher] that he should remain at Berlin during the negotiations for the Prince's indemnities, that has prevented him from proposing to relinquish a situation when he does not feel himself useful.
no. 14
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 13 October 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)

My Lord,

I inclose to you for your information a printed copy of the preliminary articles of peace, the ratifications of which were exchanged, by myself and Mr. Otto on the 10th instant.  

no. 86
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 6 October 1801

My Lord,

[cipher]

As I am not yet able to give your Lordship authentic material information on the subject of your last dispatch, I should not have written today if I had not thought it expedient to remark to your Lordship, that the heartburnings and mistrust between the courts of Vienna and Berlin seem daily to increase. Count Haugwitz does not conceal his discontent, and affirms that it is not merely in the affair of the election of Münster that the court of Vienna has manifested a disposition very unfavourable to mutual confidence and harmony. The French government in the meantime, strongly urges the King of Prussia to take possession of the indemnities which he has claimed, particularly of Münster, and the Duchy of Westphalia, and Count Haugwitz in the course of my conversation with him declared, that however unwilling the cabinet of Berlin was to connect itself with France, it would finally be compelled to do so if the court of Vienna did not adopt a line of conduct more consistent with views of justice and conciliation. It is here very much thought that the Prussian troops will immediately receive orders to march into Münster, but I am not of that opinion, at least Count Haugwitz’s conversation with me leads to a different conclusion, as he said expressly, his answer to the French minister was, that he must wait for the resolution of the Diet. He tells me nevertheless that it was impossible that matters should remain much longer in their present situation, as the equivocal state of the Prussian transrhenane provinces

316 These were the Preliminaries of Amiens signed on 1 October 1801 between Britain and France and ratified on 10 October. Prime Minister Addington had opened negotiations with the French in September. The actual peace treaty was signed on 25 March 1802.
led to very serious discussions with the French government which could not terminate till the King of Prussia was put in possession of his indemnities. Count Stadion has not for a considerable time received any instructions relative to the discussions on foot with this court, and finds himself much embarrassed by this silence of his employers. He communicated to me today two *notes verbales* which had passed between M. de Mouraviev and the Austrian ministry. It is most probable that your Lordship has already seen them, but lest you should not, I will procure copies of them to be sent by Basilico whom I expect to dispatch in two or three days. Beside the points states by M. de Mouraviev relative to the affairs of Germany, and on which the two courts seem pretty well agreed, are, first; to maintain the Germanic Constitution as far as possible; secondly, to limit the indemnities to be granted as strictly as possible to the losses really sustained; thirdly, to apply this principle to the case of Prussia, and in particular, not to suffer that power to establish itself in Hanover, both on account of the wound it would give the Germanic Constitution, and the danger of provoking Great Britain; fourthly, to endeavour to procure a compensation for the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Italy; and fifthly, to provide for the interest of the Elector of Bavaria. The general object of policy proposed and pursued in the Russian note, is to oppose a barrier against France, and it is concluded by an offer on the part of the emperor, to set on foot, by his minister at Berlin, measures for effectuating a good understanding and concert for that purpose between the two imperial courts and that of Prussia, but this proposition the Austrian answer does not expressly accept.

I endeavoured to probe the opinion of the Prussian minister respecting the late alteration in the Austrian administration. He seemed convinced it should be considered as a demonstration of the predominant influence of M. de Thugut, but he added it was a circumstance which created no dissatisfaction here. On the contrary that he knew and respected M. de Thugut's talents and principles, but regretted that the Austrian government should not have been firm and courageous enough to avow the person in whom it confided.

**no. 15**

**Hawkesbury to Carysford, Downing Street, 16 October 1801**

My Lord,

It being highly important that His Majesty's government should be accurately informed of the views and dispositions of the different powers of Europe at the present crisis, I am to desire that your Lordship would transmit to me a full account of the
impression which has been produced at Berlin by the peace between His Majesty and the French Republic, [cipher] and that you should state the effect which you think likely to be produced on the general policy and conduct of the Prussian government.

After the receipt of this dispatch your Lordship will take the earliest opportunity of procuring an interview with Count Haugwitz, in order to learn from him, confidentially, the intentions of his court respecting Hanover. If his assurances do not prove of the most satisfactory nature, and there appears to be still an unwillingness on the part of His Prussian Majesty to take immediate steps for the immediate evacuation of the electorate, your Lordship will in that case make the most unreserved communication to Baron Krüdener of what has passed between you and Count Haugwitz on the subject, and your Lordship will invite him to concert with you an official note, in which the court of Berlin shall be called upon in the name of His Majesty, and of the emperor, to evacuate the Hanoverian dominions. The reasons assigned by the Prussian minister for the occupation of that country having wholly ceased, since the signing of the preliminaries of peace between England and France.

no number
Carysforton Hawkesbury, Berlin, 18 October 1801
Separate

My Lord,

I have the honour to send your Lordship inclosed to receipts for the sums advanced by me for His Majesty's secret service, the one of them hundred, and the other of fifty pounds sterling, of which your Lordship had due notice in my dispatch of October 3rd.

no. 88
Carysforton Hawkesbury, Berlin, 18 October 1801

My Lord,

My conference with Count Haugwitz had no material result. He admitted that in the ratification of the preliminaries Hanover must be evacuated, but avoided any express declaration either as to the time, or manner, and thought it most prudent to wait the arrival of official advices from England, which I had not then received. He talked much of the necessity of union and concert, and of the wish, and interest of Prussia to be on good terms with His Majesty. He hoped that England would not abandon the
House of Orange, whose attachment had been so constant, and unalterable, and adverting to a conversation with me which the minister Struensee had reported to him, expressed a strong wish for a treaty of commerce. At parting, a declaration from me, that I was persuaded the evacuation of Hanover was an indispensable preliminary to that degree of good understanding between the two powers, without which there could be no treaty, induced him to speak more distinctly and fully to that point as not admitting of a doubt. In the course of the conversation, he gave vent to much ill humour against Austria. Count Stadion however tells me since that the arrival of a messenger from Vienna has enabled him to give such explanations as he hopes will be satisfactory. What has been done in Münster, and the naming a commissary to Cologne is justified upon the ground of a distinction taken between the emperor and the King of Bohemia. In the latter capacity, His Imperial Majesty concurs with Prussia at the Diet. In the former, he is obliged officially to take the steps prescribed by the German Constitution. The demands of Prussia, and the situation of the compensations she requires, are in a great measure consented to, though on the whole, they are judged to exceed the first proposition, and Count Stadion is convinced that his court is really disposed to conciliate, and to act in concert with Prussia.

I return to the subject of the former part of this dispatch. Mr. de Reden having received in consequence of the intelligence arrived at Hanover, that the preliminaries were signed, fresh orders respecting the evacuation, desired Count Haugwitz to assign a time for a conference with him. But after some days had elapsed, receiving no answer, he sent a note which he previously communicated to me. As I saw Count Haugwitz last Friday, I told him that the fact of the preliminaries being signed admitted of no doubt, and that thought he must see upon reflection, that the British government, after the solemn assurances given by His Prussian Majesty, that the sole purpose of the occupation was to prevent the invasion of the French, must take it for granted that the troops would be immediately withdrawn, and would be astonished if they should learn that measure was still delayed. To this he replied that the evacuation of the electorate was a thing of course, but that he had received a note from Mr. de Reden which he should be very sorry to be obliged to lay before the king. To this I replied, that I would venture to assure him, if he would point out to Mr. de Reden any expressions in the note, which appeared exceptionable, he would readily alter them, if it could be done without affecting the substance, or even withdraw it altogether, if he was assured the object would be otherwise attained. Count Haugwitz told me upon

317 16 October.
this, that he would send for Mr. de Reden the next morning and immediately after his interview with him, invite me to another conference. Neither Mr. de Reden nor I however have since heard of him. It may be superfluous to say, that Mr. de Reden’s note contained not a syllable with which the King of Prussia could be reasonably offended. I cannot however but be sorry that the Regency of Hanover did not suspend the step they have taken for a few days, because it seems to have lost some of its force by the certainty which the Prussian ministry have, that it cannot have been grounded upon any special orders given by His Majesty, subsequent to the signature of the preliminaries, and it is highly probable that they ground upon this an hope, that the occupation which is greatly to the emolument of their dependants, if not of themselves, may without eventually risking anything like a rupture, be continued for a time.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship copies of the notes alluded to in my last dispatch no. 87.

no. 16
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 22 October 1801
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)

My Lord,

I send your Lordship inclosed, for your information, a gazette extraordinary containing an account of the surrender of the forts and town of Alexandria to His Majesty’s forces on the 2nd of September.

no. 89
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 23 October 1801

My Lord,

Count Haugwitz having intimated a desire that I should defer my departure from hence till after a few days from the return of His Prussian Majesty from Freirnwalde, when all the royal family has been assembled on a visit to the Queen Mother,318 I thought it my duty to comply, and I have now the satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship, that His Excellency informed me this morning of His Prussian Majesty’s command, that the evacuation of the Electorate of Hanover will

318Queen Mother, Friedricke Luise (1751-1805), daughter of Count Ludwig IX of Hesse-Darmstadt, Friedrich Wilhelm II’s second wife and queen from 1786, mother of Friedrich Wilhelm III.
immediately take place, and that the formal notification of it would be made to me by an official note. This communication was attended by the strongest expression of His Prussian Majesty's friendship towards the king, and from Count Haugwitz's conversation I have every reason to believe that the form of the note will be such as will be agreeable to His Majesty.

no number
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 25 October, 1801
Separate

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have drawn today at 40 days after date upon your Lordship for the sum of fifty pounds for His Majesty's secret service.

no. 90
Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Berlin, 25 October 1801

My Lord,

The note which accompanies this dispatch was delivered to me too late for the post and as far as your Lordship was already apprised that it was to be expected, I did not think it requisite to send it either by an estafette or a special messenger. It is not drawn exactly in the manner Count Haugwitz assured me it should, but upon the whole it does not appear liable to any material objection. I must however observe that Count Haugwitz has no authority whatever for stating that I had been urged to make him a notification of the signature and exchange of the preliminaries. He asked me indeed whether I could assure him that the preliminaries had been exchanged. I told him that it had been officially announced to me. He then asked me if I saw any objection to his making that fact the basis of his note. I answered certainly not. I thought it right to mention this circumstance though I am conscious your Lordship can attach no manner of importance to it. As to any future treaty, in order to be well assured of the objects Prussia may have in view in regard to commerce and navigation, I went with Mr. Casamajor to Count Struensee and talked over all the principle points. He expressly relinquished the principle of free ship, free goods. He declared that Prussia would accept any description of contraband that we should propose and he also clearly understood that the liberty of trading to the enemies ports as it stands in the Convention
of Petersburg was not to be interpreted as authorising the carrying on a trade upon the
enemies coasts either of the produce or property of the enemy. To all this he assented.
It was repeated both by him and me to Count Haugwitz who declared his acquiescence
so that upon this subject it does not seem probable that any difficulty will be founded.

Copy of a note from Haugwitz to Carysfort, Berlin, 25 October 1801
(copies in Rep. 11 England, 175 C, and HStA, Hann. 92, XLI, 69)

Le Ministre d'Etat et de Cabinet soussigné s'est empressé d'annoncer à son
auguste maître la notification que Milord Carysfort Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre
Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande a été chargé
de lui faire de la conclusion, et de la ratification des préliminaires de la paix signés à
Londres le 1 d'octobre entre sa cour, et la République Française. Le Roi a reçu avec
une vive satisfaction la nouvelle de cet événement si longtemps désiré, et il se réjouit
d'en présenter ses félicitations à Sa Majesté Britannique.

L'heureux retour de la tranquillité générale venant de changer présentement
l'état des choses qu'avait amené l'occupation de l'électorat de Hanovre, le roi en
conformité de ses principes, se dispose maintenant à en retirer ses troupes, et il a donné
en conséquence à son lieutenant général de Kleist l'ordre de prendre pour cet effet les
arrangements requis.

En décidant cette mesure, Sa Majesté a été bien aise d'apprendre que le
gouvernement Britannique est disposé à régler et à terminer au moyen d'un traité de
commerce, les différences qui se sont élevées dans les derniers temps entre les deux
Etats. Elle prêtera volontiers les mains à cette négociation, et le soussigné se trouve
autorisé dès à présent de l'entamer et de la poursuivre avec le plénipotentiaire que Sa
Majesté Britannique jugera à propos d'y nommer.

C'est par ordre exprès du roi, que le soussigné transmet à Milord Carysfort les
communications contenues dans la présente note, et il a l'honneur de lui réitérer à cette
occasion les assurances de sa haute considération.
Hawkesbury to Carysfort, Downing Street, 3 November 1801
Circular
(Jackson Papers, 353, 44)

My Lord,

I inclose for your Lordship's information, a printed copy of the most gracious speech with which His Majesty was pleased to open the present session of His Imperial Parliament. I also transmitted to your Lordship the unanimous addresses of both Houses, and His Majesty's answers there to.

Carysfort to Hawkesbury, Hill Street, 18 November 1801

My dear Lord,

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I arrived in town last night, and wait your commands to pay my respects to you.

I trust you will allow me to attend you to the levee when I go to pay my duty to His Majesty, which I would be sorry to defer longer than is necessary. I presume there is a levee on Friday, \(^{319}\) but I could manage to get myself dressed for today.

\(^{319}\) 20 November.