CANTO XVI

A World of Darkness and Disorder

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The opening words of Canto xvi, Buio d’Inferno (Darkness of Hell), challenge the reader’s attention with the plosive force of the initial B and the unexpected backward glance to the tenèbrae of Hell. In contrast to the beauty of the seascape on the shores of Mount Purgatory, illuminated by Venus, “the lovely planet that is patroness of love,” and the four stars seen only by Adam and Eve (Purg. 1, 13–25), the terrace of Wrath plunges us into Erebus, its smoke thicker than any “Darkness of Hell” and darker than “night deprived of every planet” (1–2). The pilgrim is so blinded that Virgil draws even closer to him, offering his shoulder as support in navigating this third terrace. In line 24, Dante learns that the penitent’s spirits are untying the “knot of anger,” unlearning their reactions to “injury received” that led them to “seek out another’s harm” (Purg. xvii, 121–123). We note that Dante, who has already confessed to harboring great pride (Purg. xiii, 136–138), is here obliged to undergo the blindness inflicted on the formerly wrathful (a telling participation in the contrapasso that will be repeated when he has to pass through the wall of fire on the terrace of lust: Purg. xxvii, 16–57).

The Folly of Wrath

In this central episode, the poet illustrates the consequences of “blind anger.” Those who had given way to this sin on earth are enveloped in dense smoke that reflects the way in which wrath had overcome their rational faculties in their earthly lives, thus destroying the “light of reason”
(Monarchia iii, iii, 4). Anger had been condemned by classical writers (Cicero, Seneca) as well as by Christian moralists. Among the latter, Gregory the Great wrote in Moralia, book 5: "When anger covers the mind with the darkness of confusion... the splendor of the Holy Spirit is cast aside... the mind is empty and soon driven to madness." However, the Christian tradition made a fundamental distinction between wrath—a capital vice giving rise to twenty-four sinful offspring (pseudo-Bonaventure, Speculum conscientiae)—and righteous anger (ira per zelum) such as that displayed by Christ when he evicted the merchants from God's Temple (Matt. 21:12–13). God's righteous anger is, in fact, an essential part of his Justice, and its full force will be felt by the wicked at the Last Judgment (Dies irae, "Day of anger"). Wrath, on the other hand, is opposed to justice and to the concord that should reign in civil society. Natural in animals, in people wrath is a sin committed against human nature, which should be guided at all times by reason and the injunction to love one's neighbor, even one's enemies.

Penitent souls recite the Gregorian prayer that beseeches the Lamb of God (Agnes Dei, a symbol of Christ's absolute humility) to grant them mercy and peace. Unlike the disruption and enmity caused by their anger on earth, now they are united in "fullest concord" (21). A voice from the darkness asks the pilgrim who he is, for he sounds like "a man who uses months to measure time" (27). Commentators have questioned the spirit's ability to discern that the pilgrim is still alive, pointing out that the dense, black fog would make his physical body invisible: we may simply note that, along with the fact that his body "pierces through" the smoke (25), the doubt evident in Dante's question—"Master, are those whom I hear, spirits?" (21)—distinguishes him from disembodied souls undergoing purgation. Instead of revealing his identity, Dante highlights that God has bestowed on him the grace of seeing the Court of Heaven in a way quite unknown to modern custom—thus preparing the way for his ancestor's question phrased in Latin (Par. xv, 28–30: "unto whom/ as unto you was Heaven's gate twice opened?"); and setting the record straight after the pilgrim's initial denial ("For I am not Aeneas, am not Paul;/ nor I nor others think myself so worthy" Inf. ii, 32–33). Dante is the new Saint Paul (II Cor. 12:2–4).

Before this affirmation, the pilgrim's captatio benevolentiae refers to the soul's desire to return "fair" to its Creator (31–33). After Marco promises to accompany Virgil and his charge, Dante explains that God's grace has made it possible for him to undertake this journey "in a manner most/unusual...[10] see His court" (41–42). We may note that the early commentators (the Ottimo, Lana, and Benvenuto) merely identify this Marco as a well-known and upstanding courtier. As such, he would have immediately contrasted the heavenly court, characterized by mutual love and harmony, with the earthly courts he had known and which Pier della Vigna stigmatizes as whorehouses of envy (Inf. xiii, 64–66).
O Evil, Where Is Thy Abode?

Marco tells the pilgrim that he was a “Lombard” (46). In Dante’s time, “Lombardy” could signify a region covering not only present-day Lombardy but also large tracts of the Veneto and Emilia. Marco may have been active at the court of Gherardo da Camino, the de facto ruler of Treviso from 1283 to 1306. Marco claims that during his life on earth he cherished the ideals of virtuous living that are now utterly neglected. His reply to Dante’s second question indicates that, whereas motion in Hell is circular, here the way up is straight. Penitent souls have requested prayers from relatives on earth; Marco is the first soul to ask the pilgrim to pray for him when he reaches his heavenly goal. After promising to do so, Dante says that he is literally bursting (scoppio, 53) with a doubt—first sparked by Guido del Duca’s words in Purgatorio xiv, 22–126, describing the corruption rampant in the entire Arno Valley and in Romagna—now made doubly acute by Marco’s extension of this evil to the whole world. The pilgrim assures Marco that he is well aware that the contemporary world is devoid of all virtue and full of every kind of evil doing. But what is the cause? Some say that the fault is in the stars, others, that it lies within human nature itself.

Marco’s explanation is given in thirteen terzine (67–105), followed by a corollary of eight terzine (106–129). His analysis has been dismissed by some as that of a radical Gibelline. Nicolae Iicescu (1988, 14) went so far as to accuse him of “garrulity.” This accusation is quickly dismissed, for in fewer than three hundred and fifty words (67–114), Dante’s Marco cover the main themes of the whole poem: the importance of free will; God’s justice in rewarding and punishing humankind; the creation of the human soul and its attraction to everything that reminds it of its origin in the source of all happiness and good; the need for laws and a supreme temporal guide; the complementary roles of Church and Empire; the catastrophe that has ensued since “each has eclipsed the other” (109) by combining temporal power with spiritual authority. At the very center of his poem (in its fiftieth canto), the poet expressed this urgent message, one intended “to profit the world which/lives badly” that has gone astray (Purg. xxxi, 103–104). Critics who assert that in Purgatorio Dante set intellectual traps for his readers by making penitent souls express falsehood or half-truths should take into account that such a game would violate an essential law of Purgatory—the souls are no longer capable of sinning (Purg. xi, 19–24, xxvi, 131–132)—while it would defeat the very purpose expressed in the pilgrim’s entreaty to Marco: “But I beseech you to define the cause, / that seeing it, / I may show it to others” (62–63; my emphasis).

The hapax “Oh!” (Ohi [64]; with its long drawn-out closed vowel o, possibly echoing the first wail of the infant, latinized as hœ in DVE 1, iv, 4) introduces the (temporarily) blind Marco’s aphorism that the world is blind and that the pilgrim must come from this blind world. The first falsehood he demolishes is astral determinism: the idea that all human actions are
conditioned by the heavens (one of the thirteen propositions condemned by the bishop of Paris on December 10, 1270). This idea would destroy free will and the justice inherent in rewarding good and punishing evil (70–72). It is true that the heavens do exert an influence on human beings and their inclinations (cf. S. Th. II. ii. 95.5)—a belief perhaps not unlike the concepts of heredity and DNA in modern science. Nevertheless, we are endowed with the light of reason, which can distinguish between good and evil, as well as free will, which is capable of overcoming all negative influences and circumstances. Two references to free will (libero arbitrio, 70 and libero vole, 76) in the space of six verses indicate its importance as God’s “greatest gift” to both angelic and human beings:

The greatest gift the magnanimity
of God, as He created, gave, the gift
most suited to His goodness, gift that He
most prizes, was the freedom of will.

(Par. v. 19–24)

Such repetition also points to an essential palinode on Dante’s part. In a sonnet addressed to Cino da Pistoia, “Io sono stato con Amore insieme,” possibly written around 1305, the poet asserts that the will and human reason are never free in love’s arena (9–11). Only a few years later, he rejected the concept of love’s omnipotence in his condemnation of Francesca da Rimini (Inf. v, 73–142). Critics who are fond of highlighting episodes in the Comedy where its author recants his former beliefs rarely pinpoint this radical volte-face in the Comedy’s central canto, soon to be reinforced in Purgatorio xviii, 55–75, and whose importance in the entire structure of the sacred poem could hardly be exaggerated.

With the oxymoron “On greater power and a better nature / you, who are free, depend” (79–80, italics mine), Marco expresses the Christian paradox that human beings are in fact most free when they are subject to God, who directly creates the human soul (cf. Purg. xxv, 67–75). Thus, the cause of the world’s evil state lies “in you . . . . , in you it’s to be sought” (83). The repetition “in voi è la cagione, in voi si cheggia” hammers home the essential truth that men and women are responsible for the corruption of a world gone astray. Marco describes the human soul as issuing straight from the hand of God, who loves it even before it comes into being. Created as a tabula rasa, the soul—laughing and weeping like a little girl—knows nothing, except that, having its origin in the source of all happiness, it instinctively turns to whatever seems to offer pleasure and joy (cf. T.S. Eliot’s poem, “Animula”). From this theological disquisition (amplified in Purg. xxv, 37–78), the poet makes an astonishing conceptual leap to the consequences of the soul’s attraction to false or secondary goods, where it will remain entangled “unless there’s guide or bridle to rule its love” (93).
propositions condemned by the Church. Such an idea would destroy free will and the notion that man is free and that he is responsible for his actions and good and evil. Not unlike the concepts of the Middle Ages, we are endowed with free will and moral freedom. As we grow in wisdom, we develop the ability to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. Unbridled Immorality

No better example of the indissoluble link between Dante's theology and his political thought could be found than in this passage. The metaphor of the "bride," signifying the laws that must be applied by the emperor, has already appeared in Purgatorio vii, 11, and it will return at the end of Monarchia, where Dante reiterates his belief that greed for earthly things would destroy humanity, if they "like horses, carried away by their bestiality, were not held in check and guided 'by bit and bridle'" (Mon. iii, xv, 9; cf. Ps. xxx, 9). The laws exist, thanks to Justinian's divinely inspired work on the Corpus juris civilis (Purg. vii, 88—9, Par. vii, 22—4); but there is no one to apply them, since the shepherd of Christ's flock has usurped the emperor's role. As the divinely appointed executor of the law (executor legis), the emperor is the ruler who can "discern at least the tower of the true city" (95—96). Some commentators insist that "the true city" is the ideal city on earth. This is unlikely for two reasons. The first is that the emperor's mission is to guide humanity to a state of earthly happiness, symbolized by the Earthly Paradise (Mon. iii, xv, 7)—which is precisely Virgil's role as herald of the Empire in the Comedy. If the "true city" were only the Earthly Paradise, then it would be insufficient for the ideal emperor to discern only its loftiest feature from a distance. The medieval reader inevitably associated the phrase la vera città with Augustine's City of God: that city was partly found on earth but not in any civic state. Dante's readers have, moreover, been given an essential clue as recently as in Canto xiii, 94—96, when Sapia answers the pilgrim's question with a salutary reminder:

"My brother, each of us is citizen of one true city: what you meant to say was one who lived in Italy as pilgrim."

"Pilgrim" is the Augustinian term for one who belongs to the City of God during his or her time on earth; but Sapia's statement that "each of us is citizen of one true city" reminds Dante that the penitent souls are no longer members of an earthly commonwealth but are citizens of the true city, "that Rome in which Christ is Roman" (Purg. xxxiii, 102—103). It is the tower of this city (perhaps symbolizing Divine Justice) that the emperor must keep in his sights in order to fulfill his mission on earth. Merely to discern the tower of the ideal community to be established on earth would not enable him to guide humanity to terrestrial happiness. Rather, the verb discernere implies understanding as well as vision (cf. 131: e or discerno, "I understand"); it points to the fact that the emperor must bear in mind that "earthly happiness is in some measure quodammodo directed to immortal happiness" (Mon. iii, xv, 17).

The divine formula of two guides and two complementary but distinct goals has been obliterated. There is no one to execute justice in the temporal
sphere—or, as Beatrice will tell the pilgrim in the heaven of the fixed stars (Par. xxvii, 139), everything on earth is in confusion and error because no one governs the world: "therefore, the family of humans strays." Here, in 98–99, the message is conveyed by reference to the law that allowed the Jews to eat the flesh only of ruminants with a cloven hoof (Lev. 11:3–8, Deut. 14:7–8). Scholastic theologians offered various allegorical interpretations of this non-Christian precept. Dante's son Pietro asserted that the cloven hoof (which the pope does not possess) must be interpreted as indicating the ability to distinguish between temporal and spiritual matters. Benvenuto stated that the pope in 1300, Boniface VIII, although an expert in canon law, confounded the spiritual and temporal realms. As a consequence, everyone follows the terrible example set by their spiritual leader: seeing him lust after temporal power and wealth, they naturally give way to their greed "and seek no further" (102).

The conclusion is evident: it is the bad example set and that evil way that "have made the world wicked and not nature that is corrupt in you" (103–104, my own literal translation). Mario Agrimi (1966, 22) claims that Dante emphasizes free will and human choice so much that he "does not seem to take account of original sin"; his analysis contrasts with the "Christian pessimism" of medieval thinkers, who for the most part accepted Augustine's view of human nature. Such an approach is misleading. Augustine did not view human nature as totally corrupt. Rather, he referred to original sin as a malady (In Psalmos 118, sermon 3; De peccatum originale langui naturae dictur"), even as Aquinas referred to it as a deep wound (vulnerto) inflicted on human nature. Here, at the heart of his poem, Dante expresses his conviction that the world has gone astray because it is no longer guided by the two supreme authorities specifically designed by God to counteract the effects of original sin (Mon. iii, iv, 15: "remedia contra infirmitatem peccati"). To point out that the poet does not have Marco Lombardo refer to Grace would be equally beside the point. It is interesting to note that in his Latin treatise, when Dante refers to the effects of original sin, he not only describes human nature as "corrupt" (natura . . . depravata, Mon. ii, xi, 2), but he states that, if Christ had not made satisfaction for that sin, we should all be the "children of wrath" (cf. Ephesians 2:3).

A Two-sun Eclipse

The chapter from the third book of Monarchia quoted above refutes the hierocratic interpretation of God's creation of the two great luminaries (Gen. 1:16–18) by denying that the sun was intended to symbolize the papacy or that the moon was meant to indicate the Empire (as the hierocrats claimed). Such a "lie" (mendacium: Mon. iii, iv, 17) had overturned the traditional Gelasian principle of coexistence between the two supreme powers. The
struggle between the papacy and Frederick II was followed by ideological warfare between Boniface VIII and the king of France. It was claimed that the pope possessed “a plentitude of power” and was thus “lord of all things temporal and spiritual.” It was his privilege to ratify or depose any king or emperor, and he could transfer the imperial authority to whomever he chose (translatio imperii). In lines 106–108, Dante reaffirms the dualist principle with a scientific absurdity (declared in Ep. vi, ii, 8): “Rome, which made the world good, used to have two suns” that illuminated both the world’s path and the one leading to God. Here, as Francesco da Buti was the first to point out, the poet (who referred to Henry VII as “our sun” in Ep. vii, ii, 7) “said ‘suns,’ in order not to make one lesser than the other.” It is perhaps idle to speculate on the golden age envisaged by Dante. In Convivio iv, v, 8, he asserted that at the time of the Incarnation the world had reached a state of perfection in universal peace that had never been—and could never again be—equalled. In the Comedy, a moment of ideal cooperation between the two supreme authorities was enjoyed when Justinian was converted to orthodoxy by Pope Agapetus I (Par. vi, 13–24).

What is certain is that one sun has extinguished the other (109–114). The “crook” symbolizing the spiritual authority is now joined to the “sword.” As a result, the supreme powers no longer respect each other’s jurisdiction, and the results are obvious for all to see, “for every plant is known by what it seeds” (114; Matt. 7:16 and 20). Just as in Inferno xvi, 67–75, Dante bewails the absence of all virtue and nobility in Florence (and its idealized golden age will be celebrated in Par. xvi), so here (115–120) Marco laments the disappearance in the whole of northern and northeastern Italy of valore e cortesia, i.e., courtly qualities and virtues that flourished until Frederick II’s authority was undermined by the papacy. Nowadays, the region is a haven for criminals and evildoers. Just as the fates of Sodom (Gen. 18:24–32) lies behind Ciacco’s claim that there are only two just citizens left in Florence (Inf. vi, 73), so too does Marco declare that in this region there are now only three good men who decry the present and who long to pass on to a better life (121–123). Dante probably set his eyes on Currado da Palazzo (a native of Brescia) when the latter was podestà of Florence in 1276. “The good Gherardo” (124), lord of Treviso from 1283 until his death in 1306, was celebrated for his hospitality to poets. In Convivio iv, xiv, 12, Dante asserted that Gherardo da Camino’s exemplary virtues and nobility of spirit would have been universally recognized, even if he was the grandson of the “basest peasant.” Guido da Castello (praised in Conv. iv, xvi, 6) was expelled from Reggio Emilia; Dante may well have encountered him at the court of Cangrande della Scala during his stay in Verona. We are told that Guido is better described as “the candid [or more literally, ‘simple’] Lombard” (126), provided we understand the epithet “simple” (semplice) to indicate (as in French: francamente) his honesty and probity—a true oxymoron, since the French attributed duplicity to all Lombards (Italian bankers or moneylenders).
Into the Smoke

The fact that all three were leading Guelfs (although some doubt remains about Guido’s political allegiance) is further proof that the rabid Ghibellinism attributed to Marco is the result of prejudice in scholars who object to his denunciation of the papacy’s political interference and its hostility toward emperors. Despite the uncertainties surrounding the Commedia’s chronology, it is most likely that *Purgatorio* was composed during at least part of the fateful period (1310–1313) that witnessed Henry’s descent into Italy and the failure of his imperial mission. Whatever the chronology may be, it is indisputable that the description of the Church as *la Chiesa di Roma* (127) is unique in Dante’s writings. It is a forceful reminder that the papal seat was no longer in Rome but in shameful exile at Avignon (cf. *Purg.*, xxiii, 148–160). The evil tree of the French monarchy that casts its shadow over the whole of Christendom (*Purg.* xx, 43–4) has deprived Rome of both her lights (cf. *Ep.* xi, x, 20: “Romam urbem, nunc utroque lumine destitutam”). In 1300, however, and under Boniface VIII, the Church had already seized “two powers” and “into the filth (nel fango) it falls and fouls itself and its burden (la somat) (129)—imagery that will be used again by the poet when he makes Pope Adrian V declare (*Purg.* xix, 103–105) that he had quickly learned how difficult it was to keep “the great mantle” (a metonymy for the papal office) “from the mire” (dal fango), so that all other burdens (*tutte l’altra somo*) seemed mere feathers.

Dante declares that he is convinced by Marco’s sound reasoning, that he now understands why the priestly functions of Levi’s sons precluded them from any right to inherit land (*Num.* 18:20–32). However, he asks about the identity of this Gherardo, praised for his nobility in such “savage” times (135). Marco, recognizing by his speech that the pilgrim is a Tuscan, reacts sharply: “Either your speech deceives me or would tempt me [to anger]” (136), for Gherardo da Camino was well-known in Tuscany (and specifically in Florence for his connections with the Donati family). Marco adds for good measure that Gherardo was the father of Gaia. We know almost nothing about her, except that she married a relative, Tolberto da Camino, and died in August 1311. The Ottimo, Lana, and Benvenuto state that Gaia was notorious for her love affairs; others claim that she was virtuous. It seems likely that the poet is bent on illustrating the world’s degradation by citing the example of a daughter whose life stands in utter contrast to her father’s nobility. The canto is brought to an end by the reappearance of rays of light that begin to penetrate the smoke, as well as the angel guarding the exit of the terrace, who will greet the formerly wrathful with a reference to Matthew 5:9 “Blessed are the peacemakers,” adapted by the qualification “those who are free of evil anger” (*Purg.* xvii, 69). Marco turns back into the smoke, putting an end to this crucial encounter.
Postscript

The centrality of this episode in the economy and structure of the Comedy has been stressed. Charles Singleton pointed to a pattern of seven cantos ("the poet's numbers") extending from Purgatorio xiv to xx, with Virgil's discourse on love in Purgatorio xvii at its center. This was extended by Joan Ferrante to include cantos xi to xxi. Moreover, Singleton's significant line numbers (139, 145=10, 151=7) also "occur in a similar pattern in the Antepurgatory, centered on the political Canto vi and its fierce attack on Italy and Florence" (Ferrante 1993, 154). An interest in numerology was evident in certain areas of medieval literature, and the diligent reader may delve into its mysteries even in translations. Readers will also notice the frequency of the verbs "to see" and "to discern" on the terrace of the blind. Imagery, too, is accessible in any faithful translation. What cannot be appreciated is the rhythm and verbal music of the original. That is why it is so important to read the Italian text, once translation has provided a necessary understanding of the narrative. Dante, supreme craftsman that he was, had to accept the exigencies of the triune form—terza rima—that he invented and exploited to the full and that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced in English translations. The rhyme sequence used only once in the Comedy scoppioppo-accoppioppo (53, 55, 57), introduced with "l'esploide" (scoppio), surprises the reader with the sound of rhymes produced by a particular combination of velar and double plosive consonants, rhymes that are exceptional in the second cantica (cf. Inf. xxiii, 8, 10, 12: accoppioppo-scoppio-doppio). Even more surprising is the "infernal" trio cozzo-sozzo-mozzo (11, 13, 15). Words placed in the rhyming position are always given prominence: thus, paragleggia (87: the simple soul "sporting" playfully like a young girl) resounds with the echo of God's love that leads to its creation (85: vagheggia), while the rhyme fanciullastrastulla (86, 90) reinforces the ingenuous nature of the newly created soul. As a craftsman, the poet makes discreet but effective use of chiasmus: for example, Lombardo fu, a fu 'chiamato Marco (46), and ché nel ciel uno, e un qua già la pone (69). Strong caesura sets off and highlights the importance of free will in lume v'è dato a bene e a malizia, / e libero voler (75–76). Enjambment gives added emphasis to the concept of free will in Se così fosse, in voi fora distrutto libero arbitrio (70–71). Alliteration and assonance abound: fummo fendù (25); se mi secondì (33); vuo chi' vegga (41); ti pregò / che per me preghi (50–51); non natura (105); vegno vosco (141). We find repetition (more specifically, polyproton), for example, in Marco's entreaty, set out in courtly style: l' ti pregò / che per me preghi quando si sarai" (50–51). The pilgrim’s answer is equally "courteous": Per fede mi ti lego / di far ciò che mi chiedi (52–53). Other examples of repetitio are fora ... non fora" (70–71); in voi ... in voi (83); convene ... convene (94–95); L'un l'altro ... l'un con l'altro ... l'un l'altro (109, 110, 112). Finally, we should note that an Italian ear will be jolted by the "unnatural" stress on rimproverò in 135, required by its placement as the fourth syllable of
an a minore hendecasyllabic line—and put to good effect by the poet in stressing that the rimprivero ("reproach") of an age of darkness and corruption is true (vero) and just.

To conclude, readers will surely concur with Edward Peters's judgment (1961, 64) of this central episode in Dante's "sacred poem": "The topic of earthly beatitude is now linked to the problem of human individuation and freedom in a remarkable discourse on political anthropology that has no equal anywhere else in medieval political thought."

NOTES

1. The polyvalence of the word nodo is characteristic of Dante's language in the Commedia. Of the ten occurrences, the one that has sparked most debate is in Purgatorio xiv, 55, while its most dramatic use is found in the description of the climactic moment of the pilgrim's vision of God's creation: Paradiso xxxiii, 91. In the context of Purgatorio xvi, it may echo Isaiah 51:8 (and cf. Purg. xii, 125).

2. The meaning of line 63 ("ché nel cielo uno, e un qua giù la pone") is deduced from Marco's reply; however, no commentator—to my knowledge—has noted the strange deictic qua giù ("below"). Certainly, the Mountain of Purgatory is still on earth (cf. the Hollanders' translation "the earth"), but "down here" is hardly a straightforward pointer to "la volontà degli uomini" (Sapegno, Bosco-Roggio, Chiavacci Lenodardi, et al.). Cf. Hugh Capet's "Carlo vene in Italia" (Purg. xx, 67), which implies a strange perspective for a soul high up on the Mountain in the southern hemisphere. As Lino Pertile observes, "[S]olo il soggetto parlante sa con precisione a che cosa si vuol riferire quando dice 'qui'" ("Only the speaker in the text knows precisely what is being referred to when he says 'here'"). "Qui in Inferno: deictici e cultura popolare," Italian Quarterly 37 (2000): 57–67.

3. The theme of degeneracy is already present in Convivio ii, 8, where Dante observes that "'Courteous' and honesty are one and the same and because in courts in former times the virtues and fine customs were practiced—just as today the opposite is done—that word was derived from the courts, and 'courtesy' was equivalent to courtly behavior. If that word were to be derived from courts nowadays, it would signify nothing but turpitude."

BIBLIOGRAPHY


