India and Pakistan: From zero-sum to shared security

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After remaining mired in a mutually conflicting relationship in the post-Cold War era, South Asia is experiencing a spring of optimism not known in the last six decades. Mutual suspicions and conflicts, which had become the hallmark of Indo-Pakistani relations, are giving way to cooperative experiments. Kashmir is being discussed by the two states as an issue, and people are moving with relatively less unease than before. This is in marked contrast to the tensions the two states experienced only very recently. The Kargil crisis (1999) remained confined to Kashmir but it did create fears of a conflict between the two erstwhile enemies. Only three years later, the yearlong mobilization of Indian and Pakistani forces along the international boundary in 2002 raised the spectre of an all-out war between the two nuclear neighbours. The eventual descalation by 2004 reduced the immediacy of a major conflict but the fear of one being sparked at a later stage remains one of the major concerns of the international community. The question arises as to why the two South Asian neighbours maintained a negative relationship for more than five decades instead of focusing on the developmental needs of their citizenry. Have they been guided by a single-minded adherence to a geo-strategic logic of relationships, or do alternative views favouring a culture of solidarity exist within these countries? What role have these alternative views, if present, played in determining the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations? How can these alternative voices be strengthened and how durable/permanent is a new spring of understanding between the two historical adversaries India and Pakistan? What role has the United States

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played in this process? Also, in the new geostrategic environment, does the United States role hold a promise of improving Indo-Pakistani relations?

This chapter attempts to answer these questions by developing a framework for analysing the movement of states along the spectrum that has one end occupied by the logic of “us versus them” (identified as the geostrategic approach) and the other end representing a culture of solidarity. It argues that the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations can best be understood in terms of a multiplicity of views in both states on the appropriate ways of dealing with the “other” across the border. The dominant view remains one of mutually negative perceptions of each other. Created and encouraged by the state and reinforced by societal forces, the images of the “other” as unreliable, hostile and irrational provide the context in which India and Pakistan deal with each other. They also create the conditions in which the geostrategic logic remains prevalent and enables both the state and society to translate all developments in their relationship into a zero-sum game. Alternative moderate views, however, do exist on the nature of the self and the other, and the appropriate ways of dealing with the neighbouring state. While relatively less pronounced, these views focus on the need for a more cooperative relationship between the two major South Asian states. Taking place against a changing regional and international context, the interplay between these different views creates conditions in which Indo-Pakistani relations essentially move between extreme hostility and notions of shared security. A view of solidarity as human-rights empathy remains absent in this context. At best, the approach of shared security can be identified with solidarity as cooperation and security community. Those subscribing to different sets of ideas are influenced by the regional and international environment but these remain the primary determining factors of Indo-Pakistani relations. External actors can and do play a role but have to date been unable to reduce the significance of views held by people within India and Pakistan. The developments in Indo-Pakistani relations after 11 September 2001 provide a recent example of the manner in which opposing views and ideas shape the nature of their interaction. They also highlight the role the United States has played in managing the tensions between the two South Asian neighbours. However, given the role played by domestic debates and views, despite the US role, the relationship is unlikely to move in the direction of a culture of solidarity emanating from a shared belief in the value of human rights as the primary determinant of their interrelationship. At best, the two states are going to explore some areas of shared security – occupying the space of solidarity representing security considerations.

Geopolitics versus solidarity

The starting point for this chapter is a situation where states move along the spectrum of conflictive relationships. The conflicting or realistic view of the nature of conflict in relations between actors in the international system is interest and a need to maximize their gain for one side means a loss for the other with its emphasis on the idea of the status of a value that needs a new end of the spectrum is occupied by conceptualizes the world in the the end of the spectrum elevates cooperative Union.2

The space between the two extremes is occupied by a gradation of acceptance of the extent to which competition is favorably seen on the nature of a relationship between the space they occupy on the spectrum the closer to the solidarity is the closer to the solidarity is adopted at the interstate level a growing security community but this cooperation reflects more than just states may be willing to cooperate if protecting their perceived nations does not exclude the notion of the logic of cooperation space where notions of solidarity encompass the idea of solidarity because they realize the value of cooperation as a value in itself. Assigning space relationships may be difficult. But the (which could also be identified as) along the spectrum can circumvent ship could be placed in this space.
Geopolitics versus solidarity: A framework for analysis

The starting point for this chapter remains a view of international relations where states move along the spectrum of conflicting and cooperative relationships. The conflicting end of the spectrum is identified as the geostrategic or realist view of world politics, which accepts the permanence of conflict in relations between states and, by extension, other actors in the international system. Their respective notions of national interest and a need to maximize this interest at the expense of others guide relations between states inhabiting this end of the spectrum. This induces a tendency to view international relations as a zero-sum game in which gain for one side means a loss for the other. The geostrategic approach, with its emphasis on the ideas of balance of power, is often elevated to the status of a value that needs to be cherished and sought. The other end of the spectrum is occupied by an understanding of world politics that conceptualizes the world in terms other than national interest. This end of the spectrum elevates cooperation to the status of a value that draws inspiration from universally held notions of human rights. The threat or use of force is considered unthinkable with a declared and actual commitment to cooperative mechanisms, as in the case of the European Union.

The space between the two extreme ends of the spectrum is occupied by gradating acceptance of the logic of competition or cooperation. The extent to which competition is favoured over cooperation determines the nature of a relationship between a set of parties. It also establishes the space they occupy on the spectrum. They may, for instance, occupy the space closer to the solidarity end of the spectrum. This would approximate at the interstate level a grouping like ASEAN, which is not a full-blown security community but is a very strong security regime in which cooperation reflects more than simple cost-benefit analysis. Alternatively, states may be willing to cooperate with others as an instrument of protecting their perceived national interest. But this conception of cooperation does not exclude the notion of competition. This selective acceptance of the logic of cooperation and competition may place them in a space where notions of solidarity either are not entertained, or, at best, encompass the idea of solidarity as cooperation. Parties cooperate because they realize the value of cooperation and not because they hold it as a value in itself. Assigning specific titles to each of these sets of relationships may be difficult. But developing a space of shared security (which could also be identified as a space of solidarity as cooperation) along the spectrum can circumvent the problem. Parties in a relationship could be placed in this space if their ideas or actions reflect an
understanding that absolute security needs to be sacrificed for the sake of relative security. This could take the form of agreements and/or understandings that acknowledge limits to their competition or establish areas of cooperation in identified areas.

The apparent simplicity of the spectrum to understand and explain relationships between states or other parties, however, hides an inherent complexity. This complexity is directly linked to the multiplicity of ideas and views held in any given political unit about the appropriate ways of dealing with the other. This diversity is not restricted to decision-making circles but extends to members of the civil society as well. Closely related to the notion of identity, it emanates from differing views in every state or society about the self, the other and the extent to which cooperation with the other is possible and/or feasible. It is also closely related to a reading and re-reading of history with an inherent need to find data to validate the already held views about the self and the other. While operating broadly within a common perceptual context, therefore, groups in a state or society can and do differ on which end of the spectrum or space is most relevant to their interaction with another state or society. The interplay between these different views determines the policies a state may pursue vis-à-vis the other. A predominance of geostrategic concepts, for example, could cause state A to opt for competitive policies toward state B. A shift in this balance may cause the same state to start preferring shared security instead of a geostrategic approach. At the same time, however, the multiplicity also creates conditions in which the debates are not resolved and the state pursues policies that reflect the difference of opinion and power balance among various groups. Effectively, therefore, a state may pursue policies that occupy different spaces along the spectrum of geostrategy and solidarity. They may sign agreements in some areas that reflect a commitment to shared security while simultaneously pursuing competitive policies in other areas.

The shifts along the spectrum and the multiplicity of policies, it is important to point out, are not entirely driven by domestic factors in states party to a relationship. These shifts can be shaped by and interact with regional and global environments. External actors and their agendas may, for instance, support and empower one set of views, thus increasing its chances of being reflected in the state’s policies. At the same time, the same efforts could paradoxically empower totally opposing groups who might interpret the actions of external actors as validation of their own worldview. In other cases, external actors may simply empower certain groups by their inaction and thus alter the domestic balance of views and resulting policies. American policy toward Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979 provides an example of such a complex interplay of factors. By withdrawing from the situation, the United States inadvertently strengthened the ability of the clerical voices felt powerless and had no foreign policy agenda of the Islamic of the Nobel Peace Prize to Shirin the impact of external actors: while modernization of their ideas, the orthodox evidence of western intervention is.

Given this complexity, one cooperation between states or parties along the ground requires an understanding of the needs of parties concerned, as well as their environment. Appreciating these links is the likely nature of relations between competitive policies.

Indo-Pakistani relations: Muhammad Ali Jinnah

Since their independence in August 1947, Pakistan and India have fought three major wars, in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan has been characterized by negativity and a state of close to armed conflict on numerous occasions, in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2002. This is characterized by a sense of mistrust of the political system and the role of traditional institutions that impede a relationship with Pakistan. Encouraged by the state’s lack of recognition and the presence of folk and scholarly myths about earlier conflicts, Pakistan’s society generally view the other as an enemy and incapable of rational thinking. The extremely low levels of cooperative thinking, which exist both in the state and in society, can broadly be categorized as communal.

Essentially, the differences between states are rooted in differing notions of nationalism. For Pakistan a debate has existed on the question of the future of Islam in Pakistan since 1947. For some, it is an Islamic solution for Muslims of the subcontinent, while for others, it is a state for the major part of its citizenry without being over-inclusive. Differences notwithstanding, a sense of community and the desire for a greater influence in regional and international affairs have been the long-term driving forces.
strengthened the ability of the clergy to shape events in Iran. Moderate voices felt powerless and had no option but to accept the revolutionary foreign policy agenda of the Islamic regime. More recently, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Shirin Ebadi in 2003 indicates the mixed impact of external actors: while moderate factions in Iran treat it as a vindication of their ideas, the orthodox clergy perceives and portrays it as evidence of Western intervention in their Islamic country.

Given this complexity, one could argue that analysing relations between states or parties along the geostrategic and solidarity spectrum requires an understanding of the multiplicity of views within the states and parties concerned, as well as their interaction with the international environment. Appreciating these linkages could also assist us in predicting the likely nature of relations between states engaged in cooperative or competitive policies.

Indo-Pakistani relations: Multiplicity of views

Since their independence in August 1947, Indo-Pakistani relations have been characterized by negativity and mutual hostility. The two states have fought three major wars, in 1948, 1965 and 1971. They have come close to armed conflict on numerous other occasions, including the crises in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2002. These historical experiences have engendered a sense of mistrust of the other. They have also created a perceptual blockage that impedes a real understanding of the neighbouring state. Encouraged by the state structures and reinforced by the media and educational institutions, views have emerged that form part of the folk and scholarly myths about each other. Both Indian and Pakistani societies generally view the other as manipulative, aggressive, unreliable and incapable of rational thinking. Instead of being questioned, the extremely low levels of cooperative interaction between the two countries perpetuates these myths and forms the milieu in which opinions and views develop about the appropriate approaches to deal with the other. These views, which exist both in the decision-making circles and the civil society, can broadly be categorized as orthodox and moderate.

Essentially, the differences between the orthodox and moderate views stem from differing notions of the identity of the self and the other. In Pakistan a debate has existed on the nature of the state created in August 1947. For some, it is an Islamic state destined to provide optimal conditions for Muslims of the subcontinent to realize their true potential as Muslims. For others, it is a state for Muslims that reflects the aspirations of its citizenry without being overly prescriptive in religious terms. These differences notwithstanding, a sense exists among some groups at the
elite and societal levels (which could be identified as the orthodox) in Pakistan about the distinctive Islamic character of their state. This stands in marked contrast to the perceived Hindu character of India. Drawing upon the conflicting stands taken by the All India Congress and the Muslim League, this characterization ignores the fact that India has the second largest number of Muslims in the world. Pakistan is seen and portrayed as the logical home for Muslims in the subcontinent. At the same time, continuation of the logic of the freedom struggle in a post-colonial state gives rise to a claim to equality not matched by reality. The orthodox groups expect Pakistan to be treated as an equal to India despite the apparent power imbalance between the two states. Indian refusal to accede to such religiously derived claims to equality is interpreted by these groups as evidence of Indian unconditional hostility. They argue that India has not accepted the reality of Pakistan and is determined to undo the partition of 1947. Its refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, the decisive role played by India in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and India’s build-up of conventional and nuclear arms are some of the examples presented by these groups to prove their claims of Indian hostility. These acts, in their opinion, stem from irrationality and or immorality inherent in the Indian psyche. Negotiations with India to contain threats from the east are, therefore, viewed as futile, as the Indian leaders are seen as being motivated by the need to “undo Pakistan” and not by any kind of cost-benefit analysis. Their prescriptions for dealing with the situation, therefore, range from being selectively offensive to developing strong defensive capabilities that would dissuade India from threatening Pakistan. For some, this translates into forming alliances or partnerships that would secure continued supply of conventional weapons for Pakistan and establish a balance of power vis-à-vis India. Such prescriptions relate to a perception that India is consistently acquiring defence capabilities that would tilt the balance against Pakistan and open more avenues for New Delhi to threaten its neighbour. While alliances with external patrons are not seen as a guarantee of obtaining a perfect balance, these groups still consider infusion of additional military capability as a means of deterring Indian threat. For others, the idea of a balance also involves developing nuclear capability that matches the Indian nuclear programme in proportionate, if not absolute, terms; they do not suggest that Pakistan needs to acquire exactly the same number of nuclear weapons and missiles as India but favour developing a capability that would clearly communicate to New Delhi that Pakistan retains the ability and will to inflict damage on India if it chooses to do so. Still others favour exploiting the Indian government’s inability to deal with domestic situations. By relying on non-conventional means and support-ing insurgencies within India, they aim to weaken the objective of keeping New Delhi’s focus on Islamic countries in Pakistan share the same perception. The logic for this support, belief in Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic state during the Zia-ul-Haq regime and the United States, these groups have a different understanding of the nature of the Islamic state. common themes, including the concept of an overarching national identity, anti-Muslim western state power, and the responsibility to counter the Christian, Jewish and Hindu aided government. It involves taking a stand against regional or globally. Within the region, the moderates maintain a military balance of power and counter-terror activities. The moderates in Pakistan appear through a different prism. Instead of two states at centre stage, these groups argue that policies on the basis of a dispassionate power in various spheres, including religious identity and credit with others, not only the religious and political identity of the states are not restricted to a plays a critical role. The moderates see Pakistan as a state that always understood Pakistan’s security is seen as having complicated the situation. How have they related to each other? This is the inequality between India and Pakistan. Foreign policies pose a threat to Pakistan. If carefully designed policies could ensure and establish a correct if not complete resolution, these moderates feel...
ing insurgencies within India, they aim to bleed India, with the ultimate objective of keeping New Delhi's aggressive ambitions under control.

Islamists in Pakistan share the prescriptions suggested by the orthodox groups. The logic for this support, however, is embedded in their strong belief in Pakistan's identity as an Islamic state. Having gained strength during the Zia-ul-Haq regime and the Afghan jihad supported by the United States, these groups have proliferated with differing views on the exact nature of the Islamic state. Nevertheless, they agree on certain common themes, including the categorization of the world in terms of Ummah, anti-Muslim western states and friendly non-Muslim states. Pakistan, as an Islamic state, is placed in a central position in this schema with the responsibility of countering the threats posed by alliances among the Christian, Jewish and Hindu adversaries. Translated into actual terms, it involves taking a stand against US, Israeli and Indian policies either regionally or globally. Within the regional context, it requires Pakistan to maintain a military balance of power vis-à-vis India in the arenas of both conventional and nuclear arms. More specifically, the Islamist view accords the Kashmir issue a central place in Indo-Pakistani relations. The resolution of the dispute is presumed to lead to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan as an Islamic state. To this end, they favour supporting and actively engaging in insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir so as to force New Delhi into submission and negotiations.

The moderates in Pakistan approach the Indo-Pakistani relationship through a different prism. Instead of placing religious identities of the two states at centre stage, these groups emphasize the need to develop policies on the basis of a dispassionate analysis of the existing balance of power in various spheres. In other words, the state is partly divested of its religious identity and credited with realist notions of national interest and balance of power. The state is also credited with rationality and the ability to engage in mutually beneficial interactions. Interestingly, the moderates do not restrict these notions of rationality to Pakistan. These attributes are extended to India as well, which leads them to question the idea of unconditional Indian hostility. They argue that Indian behaviour indicates its acceptance of Pakistan as a reality but that its leadership has not always understood Pakistan's security needs. Such lack of understanding is seen as having complicated the context in which the two neighbours have related to each other. These groups also implicitly acknowledge the inequality between India and Pakistan and that Indian defence and foreign policies pose a threat to Pakistan. However, they maintain that carefully designed policies could enable Pakistan to neutralize this threat and establish a correct if not cordial relationship with its neighbour. Hence, while these moderates favour forming alliances with external
patrons, including both China and the United States, they do not see these linkages as replacing the need to engage India in a cooperative relationship with Pakistan. Instead, they favour exploring areas in which India and Pakistan can arrive at some understandings that are mutually beneficial to both parties. In other words, moderates argue in favour of striving for shared security in areas where a clear need exists and is appreciated by both neighbours. Although the focus remains predominantly in the military arena, the moderates also emphasize the need to establish understanding in areas of “low” politics, as well.

A similar division of opinion exists across the border in India. As in Pakistan, the variations are related to differing notions of identity and their meaning for relations with the “other”. Traditionally, for a vast majority of Indians, secularism has been the defining feature of their polity. The demands made by the Indian National Congress prior to 1947 and the policies pursued by New Delhi since independence are believed to vindicate this sense of identity. Added to the notion of secularism is the concept of Indian destiny as a great nation. Its size, diversity, history and secularist tradition are seen as the indicators of this destiny. By virtue of these attributes, India is viewed as a state capable and deserving of playing a major role at regional and international levels. For the orthodox groups in India, Pakistan is perceived to be the antithesis of this identity. Drawing upon the experiences of the independence struggle and the statements made by some sections in Pakistan, the orthodox groups consider Pakistan’s essence to be determined and perpetuated by an unwavering adherence to the notions of “Two Nation Theory”. Pakistan’s claim that it was created for Muslims in the subcontinent is seen as an expression of its identity as a theocratic state, which is unlikely to adjust to a secular state next door. Irrationality and unconditional hostility are seen as the natural consequences of Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Pakistan is seen not as a normal state that knows and accepts its limits but as a theocratic one that fails to appreciate that India is the larger power in the region. Islam, quite interestingly, is seen as having induced this irrational insistence upon equality among Pakistani leadership. Islamabad’s search for allies, including the US and China, is viewed as corroborating evidence of Pakistan’s commitment to threatening India. The prescriptions for dealing with this threat focus primarily on taking a strong military stand so as to convince Pakistan of the futility of threatening India. Intimidation with the option of using military means at its disposal is considered to be the best strategy for containing Pakistani aggression and irrationality.

In a mirror image of Pakistan, Hindu fundamentalist groups in India share the prescriptions suggested for dealing with the neighbouring state. However, they have a different conception of the Indian identity. For them, India is a Hindu state. This in nature. Hinduism is seen as the true relevance to all aspects of the lives portrayed as the religion of the invading traditions for some time. The creation of this process. Its Islamic identity is the subcontinent is seen as a identity. Any statements in favour of and perceived as evidence of a Muslim.

The moderates in India question the orthodox and Hindu fundamentalists. To de-link Pakistan’s present identity struggle. While conceiving of this, discount the predetermined role of foreign policy merely because of the seen as a weaker neighbour, which of democratization. This is seen as a consequence of the history of animosity between the two states. Pakistan’s status is seen by them as conferring additional demonstrate benevolence toward the not intimidation is seen as the be weaker Pakistan.

The multiplicity of prescriptions, and Pakistan has created a situation ship across time is determined by the that orthodox elements have been for a major part of their post-colonialsentimentally remained tense, negative as reflected in the armed and near-arm expression in the arena of economic action. Groups convinced of the viabilty, for instance, opposed the favoured Nation status. Similarly, an Indian and Pakistani cultures have Indian cultural domination. This has
For them, India is a Hindu state. The idea is not purely religious but civil in nature. Hinduism is seen as the true reality of the subcontinent with its relevance to all aspects of the lives of its inhabitants. Islam, in contrast, is portrayed as the religion of the invaders who succeeded in imposing their traditions for some time. The creation of Pakistan is seen as a continuation of this process. Its Islamic identity and claims of representing Muslims of the subcontinent is seen as directly threatening India's Hindu identity. Any statements in favour of Indian Muslims are seen in this light and perceived as evidence of a Muslim threat to India.

The moderates in India question the validity of prescriptions by orthodox and Hindu fundamentalists. To some extent this reflects a tendency to de-link Pakistan's present identity from the experiences of the freedom struggle. While conceiving of Indian identity in secular terms, they discount the predetermined role of Islam in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy merely because of the independence experience. Pakistan is seen as a weaker neighbour, which has been unable to follow the path of democratization. This is seen as having introduced structural weaknesses in the society, giving rise to negative tendencies and insecurities in Pakistan. However, Pakistan is not viewed as unconditionally hostile. Instead, while unable to accept its subordinate status, Pakistan is seen as a neighbour that can be engaged in a cooperative relationship. Given the history of animosity between the two states, the moderates shy away from identifying a culture of solidarity as a realizable goal in the foreseeable future. But they do acknowledge and stress the need to explore areas in which shared security concerns can lead to some agreements between the two states. India's status as a great regional and global power is seen by them as conferring additional responsibility upon New Delhi to demonstrate benevolence toward the lesser equals. Shared security and not intimidation is seen as the best way of dealing with a relatively weaker Pakistan.

The multiplicity of prescriptions on dealing with the "other" in India and Pakistan has created a situation where the nature of their relationship across time is determined by the relative ascendancy of views. Given that orthodox elements have been relatively predominant in both states for a major part of their post-colonial existence, their relationship has essentially remained tense, negative and conflict-ridden. Apart from being reflected in the armed and near-armed conflicts, this negativity has found expression in the arena of economic, social, cultural and diplomatic interaction. Groups convinced of the Indian threat to Pakistan's economic viability, for instance, opposed the proposal of according India Most Favored Nation status. Similarly, any suggestions of similarity between Indian and Pakistani cultures have been questioned by those afraid of Indian cultural domination. This has been the case despite the fact that the
two states do share some common cultural traits. On occasion, Indo-Pakistani sport links have also been hostage to the ascendancy of orthodox groups in the two states who have refused to allow even cricket matches to be played on each other's soil. The same is true of the treatment accorded to the diplomatic staff of the two neighbours. The negativity in their relationship is expressed through harassing, targeting and expelling diplomats from the "other side" without genuine grievances.

The moderate views, however, have also been relevant in shaping the relationship. While not always in a position to dictate the logic of the relationship, they have at least succeeded in limiting the extent of hostility between the two countries. This has been evident both during times of war and peace. The Indus Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, for instance, was one of the earliest examples of moderates determining the nature of their relationship in the arena of sharing water resources. Similarly, the agreement to accept Soviet mediation during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war would not have come about without some moderate elements arguing in favour of limiting the costs of war. The same logic prevailed in the post-1971-war days when the necessity of limiting the costs to Pakistan led the two sides to sign the Simla Agreement (1972) and play down the need to resolve the Kashmir issue in line with UN resolutions. More importantly, moderates in India and Pakistan have caused the two states to sign a number of agreements to limit the possibility of future conflict. In 1988 they formally agreed not to attack each other's nuclear installations and, as part of the agreement, have consistently exchanged the lists of their nuclear facilities. The process has not stopped even during the periods of high tension between the two neighbours. Following the heightened tensions between the two sides in 1990, they have also signed agreements in 1991 to respect each other's airspace, provide advance notifications of air exercises and follow agreed procedure for military flights within 5 to 10 kilometres. They have also agreed to provide advance notification of certain military exercises as a means of avoiding conflict.

The Lahore Declaration signed in February 1999 was one of the best examples of the role played by moderates in promoting the agenda of shared security. Signed in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests of the two sides in May 1998 and the concern expressed both domestically and internationally about the possibility of a nuclear exchange, India and Pakistan agreed to "take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict". They undertook to provide each other with advance notification in respect to ballistic missile flight tests, expressed their commit-
mitment to undertaking national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control and decided “to identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism”[13]. The declaration was significant not simply for the areas it covered but also for the fact that the initiative was taken by the two parties without direct pressure from external actors, particularly the US. This is not to suggest that the concerns expressed by the international community and the fears of an inadvertent nuclear war between the two new nuclear states may not have played a role in the willingness of the two states to sign the declaration. But significantly, the two sides did not wait for an incident like the Cuban missile crisis to appreciate the need for negotiations on nuclear issues. Also, the invitation for the visit and the willingness of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to visit Pakistan was initiated and secured through the moderate factions in the two countries, without external involvement. Equally importantly, recognizing the concern among some sections in Pakistan that India had not accepted Pakistan’s reality, the Indian Prime Minister visited Minar-e-Pakistan, the site where the Pakistan Muslim League passed the resolution for the country’s creation in March 1940. One could see here the signs of an emerging appreciation of the need for new policies of shared security.

Given the unequal coexistence of orthodox and moderate approaches, one could argue that some scope for cooperation and/or shared security has always existed in Indo-Pakistani relations. This has been the case despite the predominance of orthodox views and their impact upon how the two neighbours have related to each other. The manner in which these views have been presented and the language used, however, has evolved over a period of time. As the conception of what is of value has changed, the issue areas in which orthodoxy and moderation have interacted has also undergone a change. Such shifts have been apparent in areas of nuclear policy and Kashmir.

During the first two decades of their existence, hawks and moderates had mainly focused on a conventional balance of power: the issues being dealt with included the advisability of acquiring or not acquiring new and/or more capable weapons. In the early 1970s, however, as India conducted its first nuclear test, the debates expanded to encompass the role and relevance of nuclear weapons in determining the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations. On the Indian side, moderates and hawks argued over the advantages and disadvantages of going openly nuclear: while hawks remained mostly in favour of acquiring nuclear capability, moderates cautioned against it. Across the border in Pakistan, initially the debate on the need to acquire or not to acquire nuclear weapons to balance Indian capability remained rather limited. Taking place against the background of the Pakistani defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war
and the separation of East Pakistan, moderates were reticent to question Pakistan's right to go nuclear. From the 1980s onwards, however, the debate on nuclear policy in Pakistan began taking shape with a small group arguing against the need to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time, orthodox and moderate groups in both India and Pakistan began to discuss the pros and cons of a declared or ambiguous versus a declared nuclear capability. By the 1990s, therefore, moderates in Pakistan and India were cautioning against conducting nuclear tests but orthodox groups were supporting a policy of moving away from an ambiguous to a declared nuclear capability through tests. After India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in May 1998, the nature of debates in the nuclear area once again changed. Orthodox and moderate groups in the two states began to discuss questions such as the relevance of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence, the need to acquire a more sophisticated counterforce capability and the command structures needed to avoid inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. As moderates in India favoured the idea of a minimum nuclear deterrence, those across the border began to suggest ideas of nuclear sufficiency. Instead of trying to keep pace with Indian nuclear and missile capability, they argued, Pakistan's interests would be better served by acquiring sufficient number of nuclear weapons and missiles so as to make its policy of First Use credible. Meanwhile, they also favoured negotiating with India to avoid accidental nuclear conflict in the region. That India and Pakistan signed the Lahore Declaration in 1999 was evidence that, despite the presence of orthodox ideas, moderate views prevailed in the region, at least on the nuclear and missile issues.

The influence of moderate elements emphasizing shared security was also apparent, though to a very limited degree, on the Kashmir issue in the 1990s. The historical positions of the two sides remained dominant during this decade: Islamabad argued for resolving the Kashmir issue in line with UN resolutions on the assumption that a plebiscite would deliver the whole princely state to Pakistan. Meanwhile, an alliance between Islamists and the orthodoxy also enabled intelligence agencies to promote and support jihadi elements that infiltrated into the Indian part of Kashmir with a view to its "liberation". India retorted by identifying Kashmir as an integral part of the Union and even laid claims to the rest of Kashmir under direct or indirect Pakistani control. Despite the evidence that the insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir stemmed from the failure of the Centre to deal with problems in the state, the orthodox groups viewed it as purely a function of Pakistani infiltration.

By the mid-1990s, the entrenched positions were mildly criticized by moderate elements in both countries: those in Pakistan began to question the value of disproportionate emphasis on more pressing issues like the border. The logic of strengthening the argument for a creative solution to the Kashmir issue, the Kashmiri youth with the Centre attract a lot of attention in the two manner in which they dealt with the issue most apparent during the Agrawal and Prime Minister Vajpayee accordingly suggested by Pakistan indicated that the conflict to UN resolutions. Although the subtext of orthogonal elements from the episode did reflect the nature in shifting the debate on Kashmir to:

Continued relevance of multiple views

The multiplicity of views about the prescriptions have continued in the new world. This multiplicity, however, differs from views: different groups in India and Pakistan and the issue areas considered significance of these ideas and images.

This change is often most noticed by both societies. They have developed a series of perspicacity factors to refine the archetypal basis of their prescriptions in Pakistan remains a treacle with a strict Theory. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism was presented as a vindication of this character a central place in this conception of Pakistan's domestic and the past the Pakistani military was perceived as Islamization of the society is seen as an armed forces as well. The Pakistani i
the value of disproportionate emphasis on the Kashmir issue to the exclusion of more pressing issues like poverty and economic fragility of the state. The logic of strengthening Pakistan internally guided them into arguing for more creative solutions to the Kashmir problem. Across the border, Indian moderates also began acknowledging the domestic sources of insurgency in Kashmir, including the disillusionment among the Kashmiri youth with the Centre’s policies. While these views did not attract a lot of attention in the two states, they did partially influence the manner in which they dealt with the Kashmir issue. This influence was most apparent during the Agra Summit between President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee in July 2001. The draft agreement suggested by Pakistan indicated that it was prepared to shelve references to UN resolutions. Although the summit did not succeed, due to the reluctance of orthodox elements from both sides to make substantive concessions, the episode did reflect the limited success of moderate elements in shifting the debate on Kashmir toward the area of shared security.

Continued relevance of multiplicity

The multiplicity of views about the “other” and the attendant policy prescriptions have continued in the new millennium. The manifestation of this multiplicity, however, differs from the past. The language used by different groups in India and Pakistan to describe each other’s identity and the issue areas considered significant have altered to reflect the time-specificity of these ideas and images.

This change is often most noticeable among the hawkish elements in both societies. They have developed a set of ideas that are remarkably reminiscent of the views held by the orthodox historians of the Cold War. They draw upon a series of social, structural, institutional and personality factors to refine the archetype of the “other” that has formed the basis of their prescriptions in the past. For the orthodox in India, Pakistan remains a theocracy with a strong commitment to the Two Nation Theory. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism since the early 1980s is presented as a vindication of this characterization. The military is placed in a central place in this conception of Pakistani polity. Given the historical imbalance in favour of the armed forces, it is credited with shaping and implementing Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy. However, while in the past the Pakistani military was portrayed as a secular institution, the Islamization of the society is seen as having altered the nature of the armed forces as well. The Pakistani military is considered and portrayed
as an “Islamized” force that has acquired an additional religious justification for its anti-Indian policies. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is accorded a special place in this scenario. It is seen as supporting and actively aiding Islamists in the military and the larger society. Just as orthodox historians of the Cold War have identified Stalin as the main culprit, the Indian orthodox extends this place to Pervez Musharraf. As the architect of the Kargil incursions, he is presented as a dangerous enemy who would undermine any understanding aimed at securing shared security for the two states. His handling of the Agra summit and particularly the fact that his meeting with Indian editors was telecast without prior notice or agreement has earned him the attribute of being cunning, unreliable and shifty. Effectively, therefore, Pakistan is viewed as a state and society that continues to be hostile and negative toward India.

The Pakistani orthodox view mirrors the ideas held by their Indian counterparts. India is divested of a secular identity and instead is portrayed as an essentially Hindu society.15 The social reality is perceived as determining the nature of the polity. India, in other words, is seen as continuing the trends set by the Hindu Ashoka Empire with a strong emphasis on expansionism. Since 1998, the Bharata Janata Party (BJP) has been accorded a special place in this understanding of Indian society and state. As a party committed to promoting Hindu interests due to its strong connection to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the BJP is seen as the vehicle for promoting Indian/Hindu hegemony in the region. It is also considered a natural expression of an aggressive and expansionist religion.16 The credit of promoting the agenda of a Hindu society is given to vocal anti-Pakistani groups. During the BJP rule, for instance, former Indian Deputy Prime Minister (and future party president) L. K. Advani was often presented as the main hawk who was determined to undermine Pakistan as part of his larger agenda. He was portrayed as an opportunist and an arch manipulator who could successfully exploit domestic situations to promote the agenda of his party. The imagery drew its vindication from the experience of the Agra Summit (2001). It was consistently argued that Pakistan made a number of concessions with the aim of improving relations with India. In marked departure to the past, the Pakistani draft did not mention the relevance of UN resolutions to resolving the Kashmir issue.17 But the chances of the Summit leading to some concrete results were undermined by Advani at the last minute, due to his refusal to endorse the nearly agreed-upon draft document. The communal massacre in Gujarat (2002) and the re-election of Narendra Modi in December 2002 were also presented as evidence of the cross-regional lines of control established by the hawks in India.18 That Pakistani President Musharraf was targeted in this election campaign was presented as a further evidence of Indian Hindus mobilizing domestic support by pre-
senting Pakistan in a bad light. Essentially, irrespective of the time period, for orthodox groups in Pakistan the fault continues to lie with India and not with Pakistan.

As in the past, the mutually negative perceptions of each other have been reinforced in the new millennium by the state and media. But another element has been added to the list, with the active use of films and satellite technology to present the other in a negative light. On the Indian side, a number of films have been produced that portray Pakistan as an aggressive, irrational and cunning enemy. In some cases, the production has been assisted by active participation by the Indian armed forces. On Pakistan’s side, the absence of a vibrant film industry has made it difficult to produce similar movies targeted against India. Instead, they have relied on a strong television industry that produces plays highlighting Indian complicity and connivance. As a result, the myth of the enemy across the border continues to exist among the masses of the two neighbouring states. As before, however, this mythology coexists with moderate views on both sides of the border.

Moderate voices in India at the turn of the new millennium have generally argued for the need to come to terms with Pakistan and engage it in a mutually cooperative relationship. This prescription is partly related to the perception of Pakistan as a failing state, or a state with structural weakness. The enormity of economic, political and law and order problems in Pakistan is seen as raising the chances of its implosion from within. Such a possibility is considered dangerous for an India that is emerging as a global power. A policy of encouraging Pakistan’s viable existence is seen as increasing the chances of controlling a possible instability in India’s neighbourhood. Given that the idea of India as a global power is closely tied to its economic development, the prescriptions of a moderate policy also emanate from a neo-liberal understanding of world politics. At one level, cooperative relationship with Pakistan is viewed as providing additional markets for Indian goods and services. At another level, it is seen as contributing to the image of South Asia as a safe environment for foreign investment, which is, in turn, considered essential for maintaining the pace of India’s economic growth.

In Pakistan, moderates have shifted the emphasis from the “other” to the “self”. Pakistan’s identification as a failing state since the mid-1990s has provided the context in which they have refined their arguments for cooperation and shared security with India. As the country has suffered economically due to a set of political, social and institutional factors, they have highlighted the need to create a favourable regional environment to assist with domestic reconstruction. To this end, they argue the need to accept the reality of power balance in South Asia. Unlike in the past when they made only implied references to relative equality, they
are becoming more vocal in accepting that India is a regional power. Such an acceptance, they argue, would not undermine Pakistan’s status as a significant actor at the international level. Rather, it would create conditions that would enable Pakistan to realize its true destiny as a state for Muslims. Such renegotiated emphasis on the self has resulted in suggestions of a different approach to resolving the Kashmir issue. Instead of adhering to the demand that the issue be resolved in line with the UN resolutions, moderates have argued for more flexible and creative strategies that take into account the interests of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. Moderates are also reassessing the place of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s security policy. The idea of sufficiency that emerged soon after the nuclear tests of May 1998 is still being floated by the moderates: instead of matching Indian nuclear and missile capability in quantitative terms, they prefer to acquire weapons that would credibly deter an Indian attack on Pakistan. Equally important, moderates in Pakistan are also increasingly stressing the need to cooperate with India on issues including AIDS, drug trafficking, poverty, environmental problems and human trafficking. To this end, they have consistently stressed the need for greater people-to-people interaction. Such interaction, they argue, would break the traditionally held mythology of “enemy across the border”. Effectively, therefore, Pakistani moderate voices have been drawing attention to the enlarged space where the two states could explore ideas about shared security. While these ideas draw inspiration from universal conceptions of human rights as the basis of solidarity, they nonetheless remain focused on the value of such cooperation from the perspective of long-term security.

Interplay of multiplicity post–11 September 2001

The developments in Indo-Pakistani relations after 11 September 2001 have been shaped by these differing views on cooperation and competition. But these debates and views have also been influenced by changes in the regional environment, particularly the US presence in the region after the terrorist attacks on American soil. This interplay can best be understood in terms of changes in American policy toward South Asia since the end of the Cold War. After relying on Pakistan to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan in the 1980s, Washington ended its special relationship with Islamabad in October 1990. Not only was Pakistan denied American military assistance but Washington also came close to identifying it as a state supporting terrorism. Meanwhile, against the background of economic liberalization in a changed global environment, the US began to establish a close military and economic relationship with India. This Indo-centric policy suffered from isolation from the regional context and implementing its policy: concerns about the possible nuclear capability often attracted Western and analysts. The level and nature of nuclear weapon tests in two South Asian states could engage the nuclear war, Washington adopted a policy: it imposed sanctions on Pakistan. Meanwhile, however, the US persisted while ignoring Pakistan.

The Kargil crisis (1999) forced policy. Fearful that incursions by the conventional conflict with the posited the US government became active in Clinton acted as a facilitator between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz. That India implicitly accepted the future American policy towards South Asia in March 2000 portrayed America was to establish and sustemerging global actor. Pakistan, of a failing state with little or no support.

The terrorist attacks on the US in 2001. After ignoring Pakistan for more a “war on terrorism”. In South-west close nexus between Islamabad and the ISI and the Islamic to provide the necessary information to Afghanistan. President Musharraf was aware of the costs involved in the war on terrorism.

Orthodox groups on both sides in strategic terms in the wake of the were perceived as vindicating the Pakistan’s support for insurgency in level, therefore, parallels were drawn state victims of terrorism. At the the same time, the US policy was guided by the ortho
Indo-centric policy suffered from a major flaw: it generally treated India in isolation from the regional context in which New Delhi was formulating and implementing its policies. The nuclear issue was the only exception: concerns about the possibility of Pakistan and India acquiring nuclear capability often attracted attention from American policymakers and analysts. The level and nature of this interest increased after India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. Concerned that the two South Asian states could engage in an unplanned, inadvertent nuclear war, Washington adopted a two-pronged policy toward India and Pakistan: it imposed sanctions on the two states but at the same time attempted to "educate" them about dealing with their nuclear capability. Meanwhile, however, the US persisted with its policy of engaging India while ignoring Pakistan.

The Kargil crisis (1999) forced Washington to reassess its South Asia policy. Fearful that incursions by the Pakistani military could trigger a conventional conflict with the possibility of escalation into a nuclear war, the US government became actively involved in the region. President Bill Clinton acted as a facilitator between the two states and put pressure on Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw troops from Kargil. That India implicitly accepted such an American role set the scene for future American policy towards the region. President Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 2000 provided an outline of this new policy: America was to establish and sustain a close relationship with India, the emerging global actor. Pakistan, on the other hand, was to be managed as a failing state with little or no support from Washington.

The terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 altered this outlook. After ignoring Pakistan for more than a decade, Washington declared a "war on terrorism". In South-west Asia, it needed Pakistan due to the close nexus between Islamabad and the Taliban regime. Given the links between the ISI and the Islamic regime, Pakistan was in the best position to provide the necessary information for American reprisal attacks on Afghanistan. President Musharraf, who took power in October 1999, was aware of the costs involved in not cooperating with the Bush administration. In a 180-degree shift in Islamabad's foreign policy, Pakistan joined hands with Washington and emerged as the "front-line state" in the American war on terrorism.

Orthodox groups on both sides perceived a shift in US policy in geo-strategic terms in the wake of the terrorist attacks. In India, the attacks were perceived as vindicating the stand taken by New Delhi against Pakistan's support for insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir. At one level, therefore, parallels were drawn between America and India as state victims of terrorism. At the same time, however, the notion of India as a global power guided the orthodox groups to suggest that the attacks
had created opportunities for New Delhi and Washington to cooperate in combating terrorism. Specifically, it was seen as opening up space for Indo-US cooperation against Pakistan as a state that had supported terrorism. The influence of such a reading of the situation and associated prescriptions was apparent in the Indian government’s decision to hand over incriminating evidence to American authorities against both Osama bin Laden and the details of training camps in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. New Delhi also offered the US government the use of its defence bases and refuelling facilities for mounting air attacks against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Effectively, the Indian orthodoxy viewed the situation in zero-sum terms.

Across the border, orthodox groups adopted a similar approach. Aware of the pressure Pakistan had come under as a result of its support for the Taliban with an attendant need to revise its Afghan policy, orthodox groups saw the terrorist attacks as containing the possibility of strengthening Pakistan vis-à-vis India. Instead of simply joining the US war on terrorism, they wanted to extract maximum benefit from the situation by asking for US support against India. However, given that President Pervez Musharraf had already acquiesced in providing logistical support to American forces, the orthodoxy shifted their emphasis to limiting any possible gain that may accrue to India through US counter-terrorism activity. Having already alienated the Islamists, President Musharraf could hardly ignore such suggestions. While emphasizing moderation, therefore, he demanded that India and Israel be kept out of any operation in Afghanistan. He also asked that the Northern Alliance not be engaged in the operations due to its traditional links to New Delhi. The language used in the process catered to the orthodox sensibilities: India was asked to “lay off”.

The orthodox groups gained more ascendancy in India after the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. The attack was seen as targeting the symbol of Indian democracy as well as an evidence of Pakistan’s persistent role in undermining Indian unity and security. The language of counter-terrorism provided the context in which orthodox groups promoted their agenda in India. It was argued that the US retaliatory attacks against the Taliban across a long distance provided the blueprint for Indian response to Pakistani terrorism. Instead of accepting the situation, it was argued, India could also launch attacks across the border on terrorist training camps in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The Indian government communicated this intention within days of the attack on the Indian Parliament in the form of a number of retaliatory actions. It blamed Pakistan for creating the conditions in which the attacks on the symbol of Indian democracy could take place. As a state support-

ing terrorism, Pakistan was thereby also asked to hand over 20 criminals. The train links between Indian cities had remained in operation and stopped. The Indian airspace was denied to US forces, which was asked to close its official offices. Troops were mobilized along the border in response to the threats identified.

Pakistan’s response to the Indian moves within the decision-making pro-Taliban policy, moderates, left them cautious not to undermine the benefits obtained by being branded a “terrorist state” by an influential US government. The move also followed the international pressure from the United States to prevent Pakistan from being a base for Al Qaeda in South-west Asia. Musharraf had declared that Pakistan’s steps to control terrorist groups are in line with the speech on 12 January 2002, that President Musharraf, Pakistan declare that the foundation of the future of the country be used for terrorist activities against India, and that this move be made as part of a “national commitment to the future of the country”. The outcome of strong behind-the-scenes efforts failed to elicit a positive response from India.

The ascendancy of orthodox views and tactics led the Indian government to label Musharraf as merely cosmetic “puppet”. New Delhi argued that all Musharraf’s moves depended upon the US and India, and the cessation of infiltration has a performance on the second criteria of an armed conflict, such a precondition justifying a counter-terrorist operation. Meanwhile, New Delhi also pointed to Pakistan’s “death of national identity”. His counter-
ing terrorism, Pakistan was threatened with retribution unless it ceased the infiltration of terrorists across the Line of Control (LOC). It was also asked to hand over 20 criminals wanted by New Delhi. Before the year was over, the Indian government recalled its High Commissioner in Pakistan and stopped land surface contacts between the two countries. The train links between Indian and Pakistan – Samjhota Express, which had remained in operation even during the Kargil crisis – were stopped. Indian airspace was closed to Pakistan International Airlines, which was asked to close its offices in India. More importantly, Indian troops were mobilized along the international border, indicating an Indian resolve to translate its threats into actions.

Pakistan’s response to the Indian moves was shaped by the balance of power within the decision-making circles. Having made the break with its pro-Taliban policy, moderates, led by President Musharraf, were keen to retain the support of the orthodox groups. At the same time, they were cautious not to undermine the emerging relationship with Washington by being branded a “terrorist state”. Therefore, Islamabad sought evidence from New Delhi to substantiate its claims that groups supported by Pakistan had perpetrated the attacks. Meanwhile, Pakistani troops also moved along the international border. Soon, however, faced with pressure from the United States, which wanted to continue its operations against Al Qaeda in South-west Asia, the Pakistani government initiated steps to control terrorist groups operating from Pakistan. In a major speech on 12 January 2002, President Musharraf banned terrorist organizations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. He also declared that the Pakistani government would not permit its territory to be used for terrorist activities against any state. The moves, which were ostensibly made as part of a “national security agenda” but were in reality the outcome of strong behind-the-scenes pressure from Washington, failed to elicit a positive response from New Delhi.

The ascendancy of orthodox views combined with anger against the attacks led the Indian government to brand the steps taken by President Musharraf as merely cosmetic in nature and for “domestic consumption”. New Delhi argued that any judgement on the sincerity of Musharraf’s moves depended upon the handing over of the named criminals and the cessation of infiltration across the LOC. Given that Pakistan’s performance on the second criteria could not take place until the onset of spring, such a precondition justified maintaining troops along the international border. Meanwhile, New Delhi maintained pressure against Pakistan. The Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, identified Pakistan as a state pursuing “a path of compulsive and perpetual hostility as part of its national identity”. His counterpart in the Ministry of Defence, George
Fernandes, stated that India would give Pakistan time but would not wait indefinitely. At the same time, leaders of Shiv Sena issued statements endorsing the idea of attacks across the LOC and extending full support to the Indian Prime Minister “in all his efforts against Pakistan”.

The emphasis on retribution through pre-emption was questioned by moderate voices in India. They argued that cessation of cross-border terrorism was a qualitative change that required longer periods for accurate measurement. Instead of maintaining troops along the border, therefore, they suggested extending the time period in which the sincerity of President Musharraf’s commitment could be judged. Some analysts also portrayed Musharraf as a reformed moderate who had realized the need to change Pakistan’s policy toward India. Instead of branding him as unreliable, therefore, suggestions were made to give him some credit for his changed priorities and outlook. These voices, however, were unable to tilt the balance in favour of a moderate response from India. The Indian orthodoxy was convinced that in the new age of counter-terrorism and acceptance of retribution for terrorism, New Delhi could count on American support against Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir. Importantly, they viewed the new situation as opening up the space for them to “deal with the Pakistani problem” on a permanent basis. Hence, Indian forces remained poised along the international border. Pakistan was consistently reminded of Indian resolve to retaliate if Islamabad did not cease cross-border terrorism. Such communications did not make a distinction between Islamabad’s willingness and ability to control militants (jihadi elements) as part of their Kashmir strategy for years. The relevance of this distinction became apparent with the terrorist attack on a military camp in Kaluchak on 14 May 2002. Instead of entertaining the possibility that the Pakistani government had not actively supported the attack, New Delhi blamed Islamabad for the massacre of mostly children and women at Kaluchak. On 17 May, the Indian Parliament authorized the federal government to take action against Pakistan’s support for terrorism. Pakistan’s High Commissioner, Jehangir Qazi, was expelled from India. Soon Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee was talking of a “decisive battle” with Pakistan. A number of analysts began making statements that appeared to justify a possible “significant” Indian punitive attack across the LOC to demonstrate the limits of Indian patience. These references, it needs to be pointed out, drew inspiration from the still-emerging Bush Doctrine with its emphasis on pre-emption and unilaterally by powerful (and primary) actors. They reflected a view in New Delhi that in a changed geostrategic environment, India retained the right to use force against Pakistan either pre-emptively or in retaliation against Islamabad’s support for Islamic militant organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

That the Indian government became apparent through a series of attacks across the LOC in Pakistan’s Neelum Valley. The paramilitaries were placed under the command of the Corps Commander. At the same time, five Indian Navy Task Force in the Bay of Bengal took up position with the continued presence of a Russian warship indicated an Indian intention to push the conflict beyond the Kashmir Valley. These messages were interpreted as evidence of Indian unconditionality. It had compromised its Afghan policy. But the idea of freedom fighters without even a minimal build-up of tension, for them, was beyond the post–11 September reality. Faced with such a situation, India’s government felt the need to demonstrate its resolve and to place pressure on Pakistan to address the issue of terrorist attacks across the LOC. Foreign policy by outside actors this January 2002 were beginning to show that a “soft” approach was not feasible and that Pakistan was not going to be appeased by a proxy approach. The United States, Europe, and others had expressed concerns about the situation and the threat it posed to the stability of the region. Prime Minister Vajpayee had already indicated that India would not allow itself to be intimidated by Pakistan’s actions. It was clear that India was not going to back down and was prepared to take whatever action was necessary to ensure its security.
That the Indian government was seriously considering such an attack became apparent through a series of steps taken by New Delhi in the next few days. The paramilitary forces in Kashmir and the coast guard were placed under the command of the army and the navy respectively. At the same time, five Indian warships were moved from the Eastern Fleet in the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea. These moves, coupled with the continued presence of Indian troops along the Indo-Pakistani boundary indicated an Indian willingness to accept the broadening of the conflict beyond the Kashmiri theatre.\textsuperscript{40}

These messages were interpreted by the orthodox groups in Pakistan as evidence of Indian unconditional hostility. They argued that Pakistan had compromised its Afghan policy and clamped down on the Kashmiri freedom fighters without evoking a positive response from India. The build-up of tension, for them, was evidence that New Delhi was using the post-11 September emphasis on counter-terrorism to subjugate Pakistan. Faced with such a situation, they reiterated their prescription of taking a tough stand against Indian "bullying". Moderates led by President Musharraf were forced to address these concerns due to the emerging reality on the ground after the snow began to melt in Kashmir. The number of terrorist attacks across the LOC had begun to increase. So had the observations by outside actors that the training camps dismantled after 12 January 2002 were beginning to reappear. It was becoming increasingly apparent that a "soft" approach by President Musharraf would increase the likelihood of the orthodoxy supporting the Islamists in Pakistan. Fearing the implications of such an alliance for Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy, Islamabad opted for taking a tough stand. Taking into account these views, the Pakistani government announced on 24 May that it would be conducting a series of missile tests during the next four days.\textsuperscript{41} It also came to use language that reflected an orthodox reading of the Indian identity. In his nationally televised speech on 27 May 2002, President Musharraf identified the Indian government as tyrannical and repressive in nature. Indian Christians and Muslims were urged to shake off this "tyranny" and "repression". He also referred to the struggle in Kashmir as a fight for freedom.\textsuperscript{42} However, the Pakistani government's action also indicated a reluctance to let the situation escalate into an inadvertent conflict. Prior to testing the missiles, for instance, the Indian government was notified of the tests in line with the understanding contained in the Lahore Declaration. President Musharraf's 27 May speech also identified the Kashmiri situation as a "freedom struggle" but was coupled with the denial of any role in insurgency. The subtext was one of asking the Indian government not to blame the Pakistani government for actions of Islamic groups that were not necessarily under Islamabad's control.
The US role: A facilitator

These implied preferences for moderation notwithstanding, India and Pakistan might not have come back from the brink of an armed conflict if it were not for active US facilitation. The United States was motivated by a number of interests in South-west and South Asia. In addition to its traditional interest in preventing a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, Washington was also committed to establishing a strategic partnership with New Delhi in a new international environment. At the same time, the logic of counter-terrorism dictated that it maintain and deepen the relationship with Pakistan for a variety of reasons. Having replaced the Taliban with an Afghan regime led by Hamid Karzai, the United States still needed Pakistan’s support for providing the most efficient transit routes to proceed with Afghan reconstruction. At the same time, Washington needed Pakistan’s help in targeting members of Al Qaeda who had fled into the tribal areas bordering Pakistan as well as into Pakistani cities. Without Pakistan’s active help, locating and/or arresting Islamic militants would have been difficult. Equally significant, America wanted to contain Islamic militancy in Pakistan by supporting a series of programmes aimed at improving the educational institutions. These multiple interests are not necessarily overlapping or complementary. For instance, while the logic of retaining Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism required that Washington support Islamabad in its emerging conflict with India, the need to build upon the emerging strong strategic relations pointed towards supporting Indian criticism of Pakistan’s role in the Kashmir insurgency. At the same time, preventing a nuclear war in the region required cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan. Faced with such a situation, Washington devised a policy of urging both parties to reduce the level of tension. Initially it put pressure on Pakistan to respond to Indian concerns that Islamabad was supporting the insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir. Through a series of high-level missions, Washington successfully convinced Musharraf to announce his government’s opposition to supporting terrorism in January 2002.

Once the tensions mounted in mid-2002, the US government modified its strategy. Aware of the limits of President Musharraf’s government’s ability to completely eradicate cross-border infiltration, it started counselling both sides into moderation. A number of senior American officials visited India and Pakistan during these months of heightened tensions. The list included, among others, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld and the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. They continued to insist that Pakistan take all necessary measures to prevent Islamic militants from crossing into the Indian part of Kashmir as well as ensure that training camps on the Pakistani side of the border were dismantled. India to respond favourably to this in order to reduce tension. It is important rather than promoting not making a single significant issue a major concern during mid-2002.

Interestingly also, Washington went out of its way to networking suggesting ideas. The complex interests created a situation where the exploited American concerns to gain it allowed. instance, used a language of caution to Washington. The references to Pakistan in a subtle attempt to draw pressure from 11 September 2001 and the 9-11, 2001. The ultimate aim appeared to be to have a hawkish Indian stand on Pakistan. Pakistani groups also identified elements in Washington as a means of securing America’s support in the region. As Indian suggestions of “deterrence in Kashmir” increased in March 2002, Washington communicated to the Americans that it would attract an equal and similar response. Indian fears of a nuclear war were real for a time; the Pakistani government shifted its focus to the border with an implied inability to stop the infiltration into Pakistan. It was by the American pressure on the Indian government to cool the situation of possibility of a nuclear war that appeared to have strengthened the hand also induced some willingness among the value of playing a zero-sum game.

The first indication of the model appeared with New Delhi’s admission of of 16 October 2002 to withdraw troops along the Line of Control. This decision was taken while maintaining the military tension, Pakistan reciprocated by taking a concerted effort to de-escalate, however, it took six months. As the Bush adminis
stani side of the border were dismantled. At the same time, they urged India to respond favourably to the steps taken by President Musharraf in order to reduce tension. It is important to point out that crisis management rather than promoting notions of shared security was America’s main concern during mid-2002.

Interestingly also, Washington was not always the dominant facilitator suggesting ideas. The complex interplay between local and external influences created a situation where groups within India and Pakistan exploited American concerns to gain some advantage. Indian hawks, for instance, used a language of counter-terrorism similar to that used by Washington. The references to pre-emption also followed the American lead in a subtle attempt to draw parallels between the American experience of 11 September 2001 and the Indian experience of 13 December 2001. The ultimate aim appeared to secure Washington’s support for a hawkish Indian stand on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Across the border, Pakistani groups also identified elements considered important by Washington as a means of securing American support for Islamabad’s peaceful overtures. As Indian suggestions of a pre-emptive strike against “training camps in Kashmir” increased in May and June 2002, moderates in Islamabad communicated to the American government that an Indian attack would attract an equal and similar response. Such messages played on American fears of a nuclear war in South Asia. At the same time, the Pakistani government shifted its forces from the western to the eastern border with an implied inability to prevent Taliban and Al-Qaeda from infiltrating into Pakistan. It was basically an indirect way of increasing American pressure on the Indian government for reconciliation. The success of such ideas was apparent at the height of tensions in 2002 when the United States issued a travel advisory cautioning its citizens against visiting India and Pakistan. Given the impact of such an advisory on US–Indian economic links, Indian businessmen put pressure on their own government to cool the situation on the Pakistan border. These steps appear to have strengthened the hands of moderates in both states. They also induced some willingness among the orthodox elements to reassess the value of playing a zero-sum game in a nuclearized region.

The first indication of the moderate agenda re-gaining some ground appeared with New Delhi’s admission in June 2002 that the level of infiltration by jihadists in the Indian part of Kashmir had partly subsided. A few months later, on 16 October 2002, the Indian government announced its decision to withdraw troops along its international border with Pakistan while maintaining the military presence along the LOC in Kashmir. Pakistan reciprocated by taking a similar decision the next day. The process of de-escalation, however, did not gain momentum in the next six months. As the Bush administration shifted its attention toward
planning and then executing an attack on Iraq, the space was left open for the orthodoxy on both sides of the border. Probably emboldened by the absence of American pressure, they reverted to using the language of animosity and negativity. The trend, however, was more obvious in India, where a number of senior cabinet ministers castigated Pakistan as a terrorist state. The allegation that the Pakistani government was masterminding terrorist activities in the Indian part of Kashmir was repeated frequently, as was the demand that it must cease completely prior to any improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. President Musharraf and the newly elected Jamali regime responded to such characterizations by suggesting negotiations between the two sides. But these offers were made against the perpetuation of the view in some Pakistani decision-making and civil-society sectors that India was committed to exploiting the new environment to its goal of weakening Pakistan. Such views and the tendency to engage in competitive behaviour resulted in India and Pakistan expelling diplomats from across the border in a tit-for-tat manner in February 2003.

The situation changed with the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003. As the invasion proceeded, the US government indicated a resolve to address the South Asian situation as well. There appear to be two explanations for this renewed interest. First, the United States had developed an appreciation of cross-regional linkages among Islamic militants and the possibility of them impacting upon the American presence as an occupying force. But Washington was also motivated by a desire to create a peaceful environment in South Asia that would enable it to focus on restructuring the Middle Eastern scenario. These interests guided the US government to intensify its pressure on both sides to improve their mutual relations. The emphasis shifted from simple crisis management to one of also creating space for shared security concepts. Signs of such a shift were already apparent in July 2002, when the US-funded Seeds for Peace programme arranged for Pakistani and Indian youth to spend time together in America. But, as the invasion in Iraq progressed, American pressure for a change in the South Asian situation increased.

American pressure was reflected in a gradual shift from an orthodox to a moderate approach in India. Prime Minister Vajpayee took the initiative on 18 April by issuing conciliatory statements on the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani government reciprocated and soon diplomatic relations were upgraded with the exchange of High Commissioners. The roads links severed in December were re-established, with the revival of buses linking Delhi and Lahore. More importantly, the Pakistani government extended a public assurance to Washington that there were no training camps operating on the Pakistani side of the LOC. President Musharraf also guaranteed that if there any camps were discovered, they would not be there the next day. In order to translate its claims of sincerity, Pakistan and Indian decision-makers expanded the space for positive interaction.

As before, the orthodoxy on both sides was to perceive people-to-people interaction with one another as a threat. Both sides were unable to reach a positive airspace to each other. They continued to realize the ban on overflight of India over Pakistan. It had affected air travel to South-east Asia and the flights per month to the Middle East. The cost of additional hours required to fly real cost was increased. For India than for Pakistan. Both sides agreed to unilaterally close off its airspace to the French in November 2003, taking some steps towards normalization. The Indian Prime Minister in the SAARC summit held in November 2003 agreed to engage in bilateral talks. Part of the understanding was the idea of a “composite dialogue”. In the past, when Islamabad insisted on its resolution along the lines of the 1972 resolution, it was parallelled by a change of attitude.

They stressed the need to start from the bottom. The Pakistani relations and referred to Pakistan-India relations stressed the irrelevance of Indian counterparts expressed a dialogue. The number of increased. On the economic front, Pakistan was encouraged to diversify its economy. The Indian providers as a sign of independent market forces were invited to invest in Pakistan. The US government continued to support this process, as it believed that sustained economic growth could help to reduce the magnitude of the problem.
not be there the next day. In other words, Islamabad expressed a willingness to translate its claims of non-interference into an actual policy. Coupled with the relatively consistent and secret contact between senior Pakistani and Indian decision-makers in London, the moves once again expanded the space for positive interaction.

As before, the orthodox on both sides were reluctant to concede the space to moderates. They continued to influence the course of events in areas where it was possible. The negotiations surrounding the access to airspace provided a useful indicator of such a struggle.** While the people-to-people interaction was revived at numerous levels, India and Pakistan were unable to reach an agreement on opening up their respective airspace to each other. This was partly linked to the Pakistani side realizing that the ban on overflights had hurt India more than it had hurt Pakistan. It had affected around 90 flights per month from Pakistan to South-east Asia and the Far East. In contrast, around 120 Indian flights per month to the Middle East and Europe had been affected. The cost of additional hours required to re-route Indian flights, therefore, was higher for India than for Pakistan. Aware of this advantage, Pakistan demanded a categorical assurance from India that it would desist in future from unilaterally closing off its airspace. New Delhi was reluctant to extend such assurance and the process of negotiations faltered. The impasse was broken only when, under US pressure, President Musharraf announced his decision to open Pakistani airspace to Indian carriers in November 2003, taking some of the Pakistani negotiators by surprise.

Thereafter, India and Pakistan moved quickly along the path of normalization. The Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee, agreed to participate in the SAARC summit held in Islamabad from 4 to 6 January 2004. The occasion was used to engage in bilateral negotiations despite the previous reluctance toward using SAARC for such purposes. India and Pakistan agreed to revive bilateral talks in February 2004. The most significant part of the understanding was the concession made by Pakistan to the idea of a “composite dialogue”. The position markedly differed from the past, when Islamabad insisted on the centrality of the Kashmir issue and its resolution along the lines of the UN resolutions. These concessions were paralleled by a change of language used by both governments. They stressed the need to start a new chapter in the history of Indo-Pakistani relations and referred to the needs of the people. Pakistani officials mentioned the irrelevance of weapons in the new millennium, while Indian counterparts expressed a willingness not to blame Pakistan for acts of terrorism. The number of staff in the High Commissions was also increased. On the economic front, Pakistan expressed a desire to purchase diesel from India – a shift from the previous tendency to bypass Indian providers as a sign of independence! At least for the time being, the
moderates appear to be in ascendency. The emphasis appears to be shifting away from geostrategic to accepting the logic of a shared security spectrum.

A triumph for the shared security approach?

The conclusion of a series of agreements between India and Pakistan and the success of the moderates needs to be viewed in perspective. In May 2004, the BJP government lost elections and the Indian National Congress once again returned to power as part of a coalition. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in India and President Musharraf in Pakistan, the two South Asian neighbours continued a process of rapprochement. Despite the emerging positivity in 2004 and the language of shared security, orthodox views persist on both sides of the border. So do groups that perceive the "other" through the prism of religious identity. These groups are unlikely to concede the space to moderates on a permanent basis. The signs of such reluctance are already apparent in some Islamists and orthodox groups in Pakistan questioning the altered approach to resolving the Kashmir issue. Referring to the UN resolutions and their sanctity, they oppose an agreement that would validate Indian claims to the princely state. They also claim that the increased people-to-people contacts since 2004 have not contributed to resolving the Kashmir issue: the issue has merely been sidelined with suggestions that "Kashmir might as well be sacrificed to wolves". The signs of dissatisfaction with a moderate approach increased with the failure of talks in January 2005 between two governments on the proposed Baglihar Dam on River Chenab. As the Pakistani government decided to refer the case to the World Bank for arbitration under the terms of the Indus Water Treaty, critical voices in Pakistan were claiming that the dialogue was designed only to serve Indian interests and that New Delhi did not show any flexibility. Similar misperceptions about the "other" were apparent during the earthquake in Pakistan (October 2005). The response to Indian offers of assistance at the time of need was muted due to the possible strategic advantage India might have acquired by virtue of their presence in the disputed territory of Azad Kashmir.

The ability of the US to drastically alter this relationship will also remain limited. While it can suggest ideas and put pressure on both sides, different American interests and the need to keep both India and Pakistan on its side limit Washington's ability to push for a change beyond a certain limit. At best, Washington could suggest greater cooperation in the area of shared security. However, the internal dynamics between different groups in India and Pakistan will ultimately determine the shape of their relationship with the exclusion of some more agreements on non-proliferation (nuclear and missiles) but a culture of trust would remain a distant future.

Notes

1. During the course of researching The Quest for Peace with Sarfaraz Iqbal. She taught me the most. I hope that eclipses my less than optimistic and restrained view. I have been incorporated in revising this essay.
2. I am grateful to Nicholas Wheeler, whose analysis of actors has proliferated with multiple titles.
6. This section draws heavily upon perspectives and ideas expressed by the author.
7. See, for example, MAH (2002) "Forthcoming," p. 7.
8. These views are expressed with different perspectives and ideas.
9. Based upon personal interviews conducted in January 2003
10. The discussion of Indian views is based upon personal interviews conducted in January 2003 in New Delhi.
11. Personal interviews conducted in January 2003
14. This is despite the fact that a sizable portion of the Pakistani population is Muslim.
16. This identification of a political position taken by orthodox historians of the period by Wiktorowicz (1999) in "The Intellectual Expression of an Expanding" is a critical part of the research.
17. A. G. Noorani (2001) "The RSS and..."
of their relationship with the country across the border. They might conclude some more agreements (for example, in the area of nuclear weapons and missiles) but a culture of solidarity as human-rights empathy would remain a distant future for the two South Asian neighbours.

Notes

1. During the course of researching and writing this paper, I lost my beloved mother, Begum Sarfraz Iqbal. She taught me all I knew in life and accepted my absence when she needed me the most. I hope that her optimism and passion for a peaceful South Asia eclipses my less than optimistic analysis.

2. I am grateful to Nicholas Wheeler and Jean-Marc Coicaud for their comments, which have been incorporated in revising this part of the chapter.

3. Graham T. Allison talked of bureaucratic politics but in a globalized world, the number of actors has proliferated with multiplicity emerging as a feature of civil society as well.


6. This section draws heavily upon personal interviews conducted during 2002 and 2003 by the author.


8. These views are expressed with differing intensity by a number of organized Islamic parties and groups.

9. Based upon personal interviews conducted in Islamabad and Lahore in April and May 2003.

10. The discussion of Indian views is based upon a series of personal interviews conducted in January 2003 in New Delhi.


14. This is despite the fact that a sizeable majority in Pakistan continues to subscribe to liberal Islamic values.

15. MAH, “Fifty-Five Years of Indian Itch”.

16. This identification of a political party to the nature of the society resembles the view taken by orthodox historians of the Cold War who considered the Communist Party to be the natural expression of an exploitative society. Such a view is sometimes substantiated by referring to the research conducted by Indian scholars; one such example is A. G. Noorani (2001) The RSS and the BJP, New Delhi: Leftword Press.

17. Personal interview with a senior Pakistani official, January 2003.
20. See, for example, the ideas presented in South Asia Foundation: Regional Cooperation through Education and Sustainable Development, Beaulieu-sur-Mer, France: Imprimerie, 2002. A former Indian diplomat, Madanjeet Singh, floated the idea of a Foundation.
22. See, for example, reference to the statements made by former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Jehangir Karamat on Indo-Pakistani relations, in Sushant Sareen (2001) “Pakistan Clamors for Resuming Negotiations”, 31 January, article on file with author.
32. See, for example, text of an interview with Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, Press Trust of India, 28 January 2002.
33. Ibid.
36. See, for example, “Cold-Shoulder Peace”, The Hindu, 9 March 2002.
45. George Fernandes talked of Pakistan in terms of a terrorist organization. Vajpayee talked of Pakistan developing into a terrorist nation.

46. The assurance was extended during Richard Armitage's visit to Pakistan in May 2003.

47. Based on information provided by a Pakistani official.


50. See, for example, Kaleem Omar (2005) "Dilly Dallying over Baghiliar Dam", The News, 10 January.