Introducing the death-image:

A philosophical investigation into the philosophy of

Gilles Deleuze

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Abstract

The specific aim of this thesis is to develop the work of Gilles Deleuze by introducing a conceptual framework for what I am calling the death-image. This image type adds to the taxonomy of images that Deleuze formulates in Cinema and Cinema 2 and his central concept of faciality, which as an encompassing field of semiotic subjection, is animated in a Thousand Plateaus. In a Western visual media environment, it is argued that the death-image is a product of facialisation and this investigation provides an interpretation of this system in operation. Working with a range of Deleuze’s texts such as Difference and Repetition and Francis Bacon, this work also demonstrates that particular artworks can effectively elude the faciality that is dominant in a concentrated media context.

This research is presented in three parts, firstly, a theoretical framework that critically introduces the ideas and concepts that I work with in Part One. In Part Two I compound Deleuze’s theory in my construction of the death-image in relation to a photograph of Imperial Chinese torture that Georges Bataille published in Tears of Eros. Part Three facilitates a practical application of the death-image to the 9/11 Twin Tower attacks in New York and the U.S. President John F. Kennedy assassination as case studies. This Part incorporates a discussion of the iconic death-image in relation to Logic of Sense and Proust and an examination of artworks that escape facialisation through Deleuze’s concept of the problem. Prominent works, such as Damien Hirst’s Uncertainties of Death series are examined in this respect.

This investigation thus mobilises Deleuze’s theory of facialisation in relation to the image of death, which in a media and art context is situated as the death-image. Through a creative extension of Deleuze’s philosophy, this work develops his ideas in new ways and provides a unique account of his theory in these explicit areas.
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1.0 Introduction

The individual and collective process of dying and death and the media images of dying and death that provide a backdrop to the quotidian are pertinent topics for discussions on life. This is due to the inescapable fact that everyone will at some point die, and this inevitability provides a conundrum in the sense that one can either bring death to the fore, and as Martin Heidegger proposed, make it one’s own,¹ or in some way render it abstract and not of immediate concern. Occupations, such as medical practitioners, police and soldiers aside, it can be argued in a general sense that people in the West, which is the context in which this thesis is written, relate more to the latter perspective. This is due to the point that unless confronted by our own death or the death of a loved one, thoughts of it can be as fleeting as the media images we watch. This proposition is not suggesting that death in this latter respect is minor, as large-scale spectacles, such as the collective deaths witnessed during the 9/11 Twin Towers attack in New York can have an enduring effect on our psyches. As such death is an unavoidable phenomenon that as I contend throughout this thesis, ‘problematises life’, and as with any problem it provides a point of departure and scope for analysis.

Allowing for the aforementioned exceptions, and in particular contrast to living in war-torn and destitute environments, the phenomenon of death for many people in the West arguably remains abstract. There are many reasons for this, but commentators such as Slavoj Zizek argue that there is a modern cynicism, which in the context of this thesis can be related to the way the modern subject contends with daily media images of death, “Cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still does not renounce it” (29). This thesis engages with this sentiment, as modern subjects are fully aware that large numbers of people die with sometimes brutal and violent deaths. There is also awareness that in a Western media context these deaths are

¹ In his seminal text, Being in Time, Heidegger argues that “Death is not something not yet present-at-hand, nor is it that which is ultimately, still outstanding but which has been reduced to a minimum. Something that stands before us-something impending” (296).
subject to varying degrees of representation, but arguably through a process of compartmentalisation life goes on.

This work directly contends with this sensibility; not through an analysis of ideology and its modern downfall, but with an examination of perception and the affectivity that images of death elicit in a Western media environment. Although the cynical viewer might not believe in ideology anymore, which is an argument deliberated on throughout this investigation, there remain inevitable affects that are removed from cynicism and are produced and mediated by the viewer in particular contexts. This research is particularly significant in respect of its focus on images of death, as Folker Hanusch states in Representing Death, “We actually know relatively little about audience attitudes to, and effects from, news coverage of death” (5). To contextualise and provide scope for this undertaking my work extends on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. The reason for using his concepts in this investigation is that he enables distinct ways of examining how images operate and the power formations that are complicit in this operation.

Deleuze provides a unique account of death, which through a creative extension of his theory I compound with his image framework. In doing so, this thesis extends on the taxonomy of images that he formulates in his cinema books, Cinema and Cinema 2 by introducing a term that I call the death-image. Deleuze’s philosophy can be used to develop a framework for this image type and an understanding of the way images of death operate in spheres of influence, such as mainstream visual media. This media environment, which as introduced below, is a dominant part of Western visual culture. A direct relation can be made with this sphere and the image of death, as, for Deleuze, everything is an image, “Every thing, that is to say every image is indistinguishable from its action and reactions: this is universal variation” (Cinema 58). This sentiment is animated with the production and analysis of the death-image as it operates in visual media, which as this research highlights, necessitates an understanding of the way images of death impact on our daily experience.

The visual in the context of this investigation is not entirely based on the meaning derived from images, but also the experience. This requires a form of visual literacy, as Tony Schirato and Jen Webb argue, “Visual literacy is a complex practice which
requires specific skills in the processes of seeing and reading: the relationship between representation and reality, and the ways in which visual experiences are also moments of communication” (16). This thesis engages this approach with a focus on the experience of images that present and represent death in relation to a Deleuzian framework. This theory enables a way to encapsulate the intensity of experience, which is related to an understanding of affect, and the communication of the visual death-image at particular moments in space and time.

Deleuze’s philosophy facilitates the tools for examining images of death, which although a vast undertaking to measure, can be achieved with the application of a diagrammatic analysis to the generality of the particular image in question. This theoretical and conceptual framework situated as the death-image provides a utility that accounts for beliefs and the nuances that the image of death can have, allowing for the many social, political, economic and cultural disparities that qualify its perception and subsequent affect. As a framework, this image enables a holistic application of Deleuze’s approach to death, and the images that contextualise it. This research questions the way visual images of death operate within spheres of influence, such as mainstream media and identifies that there are certain forces at play in the promulgation and subsequent perception of death-images in a mediated environment. This research responds to the question of how and why does the visual image of death operate within facialised spheres of influence? To contextualise this research focus, an examination of the image of death’s operation in a faciality framework is unpacked in relation to the affects this image type evokes in a media and art context. It is demonstrated that there are forces that actively and reactively secure and disrupt the hegemony of facialisation. This thesis thus mobilises Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of constructing and deconstructing images of death in relation to particular examples of media and art as casestudies.

This thesis is presented in three parts, a theoretical framework for the death-image, the construction of this image type, and its practical application. Specific examples of the image; most notably the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the public assassination of the former U.S. President John F. Kennedy are presented for analysis. Due to their capacity for providing both intensive instances of media affect and iconic examples of Western ‘facialisation’ these events are used in my formulation of the
death-image. Both occurrences operated and to some extent continue to operate as mass scale spectacles across Western media flows that support what Guattari calls in *Machinic Unconscious* “capitalistic facialisation” (82). This text introduces faciality, which as a concept is further developed in *Thousand Plateaus*. As an abstract system of semiotic conditioning it provides a framework for this investigation and it allows for an intricate interrogation of death-images. As a method it is argued that this process remains significant for contemporary mainstream media analysis, as an application of facialisation illustrates the affects of a media that is largely operated by a small number of U.S. based transnational corporations.

A number of commentators have examined media concentration and the homogenising effect this has on individuals and society. Vernon Pavlik outlines in *Media and the Digital Age* that the Western digital media-scape is dominated by six U.S. companies (172) and as Piers Robinson argues in *News Media and War* these conglomerates are strongly influenced by their Government with strategic communications known as ‘perception management’. Furthermore, he argues that regardless of the plethora of information available from the Internet, people continue to use mainstream websites and television for news and in this digital scape there is an “Attempt to dominate the information environment with their preferred frames” (76). This climate, which is related to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of facialisation, is illustrated by former U.S. President George Bush’s senior adviser’s proclamation that, “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we’ll act again, creating other new realities” (Suskind). As a standardising force that secures dominant meaning within a Western media context, this sentiment highlights the complexity of facialisation, as it moves beyond the more general scope of representation. The concept of facialisation frames this research and will be developed as a method that is critically introduced and applied to images of death in a media environment.

As a method faciality is not used regularly in media studies, and this is particularly evident in relation to death, but it has been utilised in a diverse set of fields. For instance, it has been applied to pedagogical settings and the power formations that construct subjectivity within the school assemblage, (Thompson and Bell “Mired in the Shadows”) and the appropriation of myth-systems and art as a potential new
semiotic for faciality that enables the possibility for new regimes of being (Sullivan “Art Encounters”). In the context of its undoing or dismantling faciality has also been used in the meditation of new forms of recognition and continuity within post-colonial studies (Bignall “Dismantling the Face”). Theorists, such as Ronald Bouge, Simon O'Sullivan, and Simone Bignall, whose interpretations of faciality are discussed among others throughout this thesis, appropriate the faciality system for their respective fields of research. Working with the concept, they undertake a process of discerning instances where facialisation forms and as Bignall states, “Causes semantic events to be captured and represented by the two semiotic orders of signifier and subject” (395). This process is developed as a formula for the production of modern subjectivity in a visual media environment.

As introduced, this thesis also incorporates examples of visual art into its framework, as a way to demonstrate that this practice can facilitate and work with images of death, which to varying degrees escape the facialisation that is evident in a visual media environment. Certain artworks provide examples of images that contrast and challenge the subjectified ways we perceive death-images. Specific artists and their works, such as Francis Bacon and Andy Warhol, who Deleuze examines in Francis Bacon and Difference and Repetition respectively, are related to the works of artists such as Max Ernst, Marcel Duchamp, and more contemporaneously Damian Hirst. These artists have been selected for the nuanced way they appropriate death in their practice and an analysis of particular artworks will further animate the tension that exists within the contextualisation of the death-image and the wider understanding of death in a media environment. The criteria for this selection will become more explicit in Part Three, but for this introduction, just as 9/11 and the Kennedy assassination provide examples of iconic death-images, these artists also produce iconic images of death, which arguably challenge dominant media flows and the subsequent perceptions they inform, albeit for a more limited and at times specialised audience. This practice is related to the ‘genius’ artist in section 7.4 who animates taste in art and in the process facilitates a melee between the faculties. In the context of this thesis this process deconstructs facialised images of death. These case studies, which in Part Three will illustrate the death-image in practice, have in relation to 9/11 and the Kennedy assassination been selected in part for the iconic appropriation of death in their work.
Along with the general philosophy of Bacon’s practice, Warhol’s *Death and Disaster* series and Hirst’s *Uncertainties of Death* are examples of particular images that challenge the facialised *death-image*. It is argued that these works provide a relevant way to explain the nuances of this new image type, and this emphasis is also informed in Part Two by an analysis of a photograph that Georges Bataille published in his text *Tears of Eros*. This photographic image, which depicts a horrific scene of Chinese capital punishment, is used to construct a prototype for the *death-image*. Although this image largely exists outside of Western mainstream media flows its graphically explicit nature facilitates a frame for formulating a new image of death that accounts for both the theoretical nature of facialisation and the contrasting process of de-facialisation. This occurrence which Deleuze and Guattari argue in their introduction to the concept can lead to creative flight, as the strata of facialised meaning is dismantled (*Thousand Plateaus* 190). The *lingchi* image is positioned as a composite of perceptual manifestations that function as an action, an affect, and also as a virtual image, which as an abstract sphere is not contained by facialised subjectivity. The virtual and its relation to the image is introduced and critically outlined during this analysis.

In constructing a new image type this investigation also importantly augments Deleuze’s account of death in relation to such concepts as facialisation, which apart from his earlier work in *Difference and Repetition* can be extended upon in relation to the problem. For instance, in this text Deleuze significantly positions death as ‘the problem’ that provides a source for other problems to form. He argues that death bestows the “State of free differences when they are no longer subject to the form imposed on them by an ‘I’ or an ego” (138). This process of breaking free from the ego is an integral facet of Deleuze’s work on difference and as argued his and Guattari’s later concept of faciality. For example, faciality operates through the subjectification of the ego, creating identities where they would otherwise not exist while the problem exists outside of this formation. The problem is the generative aspect of life that creates, as Leen De Bolle states in *Deleuze and Psychoanalysis* “The problematic is the positive texture of life” (11). It is argued that the productive nature of the problem challenges the hegemony of dominant images that facialise and subsequently stratify death in a visual media environment.
I contend that the problem is used to illustrate the generative aspects of life on both the physical and ontological level. It is used in a two-fold manner to animate the generative forces that preside outside of facial encompassment and also to pose questions relating to this process and beyond. As De Bolle argues “The problematic concerns all of the great questions of life and death, love and hate, pleasure and pain, sexual differences and so on” (12). The multifaceted nature of the problem is thus used as a way of examining the facialisation system while also providing an embodiment of Deleuze’s work in relation to the image and death. As such this research focus warrants a detailed study that aims to provide further clarity to Deleuze’s philosophy in this specific area. It enables a composite of his work, which can be applied to representations that operate through and within facialisation. It is demonstrated that problematic generation is a type of death that not only challenges faciality, but ultimately comes before, between, and after its strata.

To provide further insight into this phenomenon the work of Adrian Parr, and in particular, *Deleuze and Memorial* is examined as she argues that death enables the disjunctive synthesis that breaks with habit, and taken to the extreme, without this break life would end. This understanding qualifies Brett Adkins analysis of Deleuze and death in *Desire and Death*, as for him, “Deleuze and Guattari are arguing that the passage from one state of intensity to another is the experience of death” (186). This thesis argues that as an intensive framework the *death-image* can disrupt habit, but importantly, through processes of facialisation this image type produces generalities, as the continuous repetition of similar images, such as those promulgated during the 9/11 news coverage is on one level parasitical to habit. Not to the extent that human life ends through this repetition, but that the mass scale disjunction that occurred on the day of the attacks and its aftermath was eventually curtailed and brought back into the faciality fold. This reversion or reterritorialisation, a concept introduced in Part One, illustrates the complexity of the *death-image*, as it can significantly produce the disjunction, which to the levels witnessed during 9/11 and historical semiotic events, such as the Kennedy assassination, produced mass scale hysteria. A central concern here is the way that this dissipation in intensity occurs, such as the shift from paroxysm to more contained responses, which develop through the duration of time. This process occurs within time, which in the context of this thesis is the transition evident over a course of repeated images.
As outlined, repeated images are developed from Deleuze’s work on cinema, which provides a pure semiotics of intelligible content (Cinema x). Images can be externally related to cinema, as they illustrate our own agency and challenge the many images of thought that make up the world (Huygens). As argued in Part One, Deleuze’s images are primarily presented as the movement-image that accounts for an ontology of transition that oscillates between the perception, affection, and action images, and in relation to pure instances of time, the time-image, which as a crystal works on its own virtual level of direct time as a false movement. This image contrasts the represented time that is evident in the movement-image, which can still work with an indeterminate center.

For Deleuze, the movement-image’s mobility operates in a concrete duration. This equates to the point that movement exceeds or refrains from being captured by instances that he opposes as subject to abstract time (Cinema 2). This abstraction is the process of adding and dividing time in relation to the image, which regardless of this division contains its own motion and duration. The cinema image has instants as immobile sections, but these points are subsumed by the mediation of the stills that transition at rapid speed. This process allows for instant identification and the confluence of the moving image as a mobile section. The death-image can operate as a moving image in the way it is facilitated by film, and also as a photographic and digital image. As argued in Part Two, this is one of the reasons why the death-image moves beyond Deleuze’s taxonomy in the way it accounts for an image of death and its singularity.

Along with Deleuze’s use of sense in his taxonomy, the images are also composed of meanings that can be derived from directorial intent. In relation to the death-image, it is argued that the image of death retains the basic aspects of the movement-image, such as producing an affection, but this process has been extended with an awareness that just as there are directorial determinations in the cinema, there are also political and the closely related economic considerations that can be accounted for as products of facialisation. This process works in conjunction with the appropriation of death as death-images. The image of death as an assemblage can provide further insights into this image type in relation to the perception of death on an epistemological and
ontological level, and this process provides further nuances to the recognition and encounter of death as an image.

This thesis argues that although an abstract time might be added to the death-image in relation to the immobile image, this abstract time is nonetheless subject to its own concrete duration that can be captured by the percepts and affects of the image in its own right. This process can also be related to painting, and other forms of visual art, which is a notion I examine in more detail in the proceeding sections. Even if one follows Henri Bergson, who is a theorist that informs Deleuze’s cinema books, and his later belief in Creative Evolution that the cinema image is a cinematographic illusion in the pejorative sense, this illusion is superceded by the encounter with death, which provides its own duration. Moving on from Deleuze’s base images, the death-image and even more so, the problem can thus be treated as assemblages and as content, which can be subject to expected and new connections and flows.

This thesis also moves beyond Deleuze’s time-image and expands on his notion that “We are born in a crystal, but the crystal retains only death, and life must come out of it, after trying itself out” (Cinema 2 86). This statement relates to my discussion that for Deleuze death is life in its pure sense as a form of experimentation that among other factors relates to zero intensity as a problem that, “Occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming” (Difference and Repetition 330). Ensuing from this notion death refrains from models, such as the Freudian death drive, which as argued in the proceeding thesis positions it as a category that can be arrived at, and on the contrary, is life itself. Just as the time-image refers to time as its genesis, death refers only to life in its pure form, which is the facility of the problem that in this context is wide reaching as there are movements of intensity in every becoming, which relates to my discussion in Chapter 3, and the potential for variances within an encounter.

The more shocking (or joyous) an image becomes, the more concrete the production of intensity, life, and subsequently death becomes. This particular aspect of the problem and the death-image can be related to the affection image, but as discussed in Parts One and Two, it expands on the two-pole sensible nerve and motor tendency affection system that Deleuze outlines in Cinema. For instance, there may be
particular movements and evident transitions between the close-up face of wonder and admiration as a quality and the power-desire of hate, but questions remain on the particular shifts that are evident in facialised objects, such as the planes hitting the World Trade Towers or the car that sped Kennedy away after he was shot. As discussed in section 6.2, the localised assemblages that work within the globalised Euclidean grid that encompasses the still image or photograph can also be discerned in more detail through a particular situational analysis. This type of analysis opens the image to the many nuances of expression as subjective and collective assemblages of enunciation, which moves the death-image beyond the scope of the movement and time-images.

Expanding on Deleuze’s taxonomy and following his appropriation of Bergson’s ‘everything is an image’ postulation, the image can be directly related to one’s own image of thought and actions. As Deleuze argues in his cinema books, everyone is a combination of the perception, affection and action image, and this thesis argues that we are also composites of death-images, which can be discerned in our own intensity, thoughts on death, and by considering this facet in our external environments. To varying degrees, the images we view externally and internally as mental images work on our brain screens, which correlate with cinema screens and as discussed faciality. It is shown that this system works as a screen with black holes that draw the viewer in through degrees of semiotic subjection. In this sense, the image is a form of representation and can operate strategically in relation to Guattari’s facialisation.

The image can also remain free and open to its own intrinsic determinations in the context of death. The death-image refers to images that operate on the former principle by representing death, which is arguably one of the most powerful forms of strategic image representation and intrinsic determinations in relation to one’s own mediation with life. For example, the crucifixion death-image mediates Christian thoughts on death and the afterlife. This external image induces and supports the internal image of life and death as an image of thought that as argued, affects intensity. This level also remains open to interpretation and competing narratives, but the struggle for meaning is supported by capitalist and models such as religious facialisation, which does not necessarily equate to what people think, even though this might be the case, but as argued it facilitates what people think about.
The latter level, as the problem escapes this process is particularly significant in relation to death, as the confusion, and to some extent, the neutralisation of the faculties enabled by this encounter, produce specific problems that create more questions than answers. Granted there is an element of recognition involved in the way that to varying degrees one is aware of death, but this notion of death is multifaceted and open to difference, as Colebrook argues in *Meaning of Life* “Deleuze and Guattari place death within the differential intensity that is life once life is thought beyond the figure of the bounded organism” (150). Death facilitates a difference machine that as the last problematic provides an indication of death as ‘the problem’, which is an affirmation of life as an open question. Free from its confines as an abstract principle or model in relation to the many accounts of death, in its pure sense as a problem, death is life itself as one indivisible duration or whole.

As with the *death-image*, the problem can be discerned in the virtual relations of our environments, and also within our own meditations. When one perceives this impression it works directly onto the nervous system, as it largely bypasses the orderly processing of the brain, and this transition is an indication of ‘the problem’ as the last problematic. In this context, the problem is the creative difference machine that enables life to form. Death as a strategic image representation and as a problem is discussed in relation the iconic images of 9/11 and Kennedy’s assassination, and specific case studies in visual art.

This thesis therefore accounts for the *death-image* in its most violent form, as both its visual representation of death and the shifts in intensity that eventuate through its affectivity. Violent *death-images* provide instances of action and repulsion, which are positioned throughout this work as the act of death itself. It is argued that along with recognising meaning from a representation of death, to varying degrees, one can also view this phenomenon as having a problematic nature, and subject to processes of de-facialisation. This process which Deleuze and Guattari argue in their development of the concept can lead to a creative flight, as the strata of meaning is dismantled (*Thousand Plateaus* 190). This displacement of death in the form of a ‘chaotic’ image challenges the principle of coordinated development and its associated image of thought, which for Deleuze is a conceptual image that constrains new ways of thinking. In the context of de-facialisation in the form of an image, death is removed
from coordinates, such as faciality, and as such provides an indication of the
difference that exists outside of its organisation.

By extending Deleuze’s theory to images of death it is demonstrated in Part Two that
the death-image can have an affect and percept that retains its own meaning. In
addition, this expression has the capacity to be repeated and used for mediated ends
while also having the potential for new appropriations. The former instance can be
thought of as using death-images for political purposes, such as strategic
representation, and the latter as images that precipitate a more capricious agency. This
thesis thus argues for a politics of the image and the awareness that although the
image of death is varied in content it effectively produces a problematic context for a
proceeding analysis of its representation and affectivity. This research focus adds new
knowledge to Deleuze's work on the image, which he formulates throughout his
oeuvre and, in particular, his cinema books. This investigation probes these texts and
their contextualisation of images while also moving beyond their scope and
acclimating new ideas and concepts in relation to a Deleuzian framework. This is
achieved by further compounding his theory with studies that contend with the image
and a theoretical understanding of death. In this respect, Felicity Colman argues in
Deleuze and Cinema that the image can explore the affect of civilisation rather than
recording it and in his article “Empire of the Living Dead” William Bogard posits the
use value of the promulgated dead body (189).

On a more theoretical level, the work of Patricia Pisters in The Neuro-image is
referenced to highlight the relationship between Deleuze’s synthesis of time and his
image taxonomy, which is a process directly related to the death-image. Damian
Sutton’s work in Photography is also appropriated in the sense that a still image can
operate along respective spheres to the moving image, which is a notion that provides
further layers to my image production. To construct this image type as a conduit of
facialisation, this thesis thus positions the media and art image that represents death as
a potential space of conflict between stratifying forces. It proceeds with an analysis of
specific images as case studies and subsequently enables a way of examining
alternative images of death that operate through visual communication, which in this
context is illustrated with the concept and method of faciality. In doing this, I
demonstrate the value of procuring a death-image concept that once developed can be
readily applied to facialised frameworks that form the perception of death in the explicit areas highlighted by this work. It is also argued that there are certain contingencies at play in this process, such as particular artworks that actively disrupt and subsequently challenge the stratifying nature of facialisation.

This understanding is further expounded in relation to a schizoanalysis framework. As Philip Roberts argues in his essay “Signatures of the Invisible,” “If the systems of visual culture that we are attempting to open Deleuze’s thinking towards might form a contagious set of ideas, then we shall need to consider how the formation and circulation of these ideas might be articulated by a schizoanalysis of visual culture” (153). In conjunction with faciality, schizoanalysis is a form of analysis that Deleuze and Guattari formulate in texts such as Anti-Oedipus. As a ‘meta-method’ or a ‘meta-modelling’ system it supports this exploration by providing a way to situate unique events as they occur in space and time. It allows for an analysis that accounts for collective and subjective productions that warrant a singular understanding. In problematic contexts schizoanalysis examines how and why the general is subject to the fluidity of enunciation and semiotics, as “Schizos lose their sense of the face, of landscape and of language and its dominant significations all the time” (Thousand Plateaus 188). As a product of subjective and collective productions, the facialised media image of death can then be disassembled and in doing so used to highlight its constitution. As demonstrated throughout this paper schizoanalysis can be applied to the central organising systems of faciality, which produce generalities that invest in the basic life force that is desire. This exposition aims to do this by identifying the generality and specificity of death-images in particular contexts.

For Deleuze, desire is the force that drives us to go out into the world and create, but as Ian Buchanan argues this freedom is antagonistic to the powers at be, as:

Desiring-production is that aspect of desire which if it were to pass into social production and reproduction would sow the seeds of disorder and revolution as it does every time a little piece of it manages to elude the coding society imposes on it so as to contain it. (Anti-Oedipus Reader 45)

It is argued that the process of containment can result from the many media images of death that elicit doubt, restrain, and sadness, which eventuate with the reactive
demarcation of desire. Specific aspects of the media support and execute these affects with the consistent promulgation of death-images. As a way to further animate an understanding of faciality in practice, schizoanalysis provides the means to navigate this milieu and investigate the arbitration between desire, and the production of the facialised image of death. It is argued that through such facets as death-images the desire that makes us affirmatively do is homogenised and put to work by the order of social production and as such our power to act in new ways is diminished. The facialised death-image is thus a codified yield of social production that as this investigation demonstrates, works to contain desire.

Deleuze’s theory is therefore used to examine the expediency of death-images that operate within specific case studies. As outlined, I am mobilising his theory as a way of constructing and deconstructing facialised images of death. This investigation initially introduces Deleuze’s conception of images as part of a theoretical framework in Part One. Along with developing a critical analysis of death in relation to Deleuze’s work that continues throughout this thesis, this initial foci provide specific chapters on faciality, the taxonomy of images, desire, ethics and schizoanalysis in this consecutive order. This framework is then applied to practical instances; such as Bataille’s lingchi image in Part Two, which introduces a prototype for the death-image construction. This analysis continues with an application of this image type to practical case studies in Part Three. As outlined these studies are selected for their iconic value and subsequent capacity for facialisation, and it is argued that the Kennedy assassination and 9/11 images are pertinent in this regard. It is demonstrated that images of death operate in visual media as a type of social production. These images contain desire and subsequently produce reactive subjectivities, which for Deleuze and Guattari diminish the potential to act and think in new ways (Anti-Oedipus 89).

This thesis concludes with a schizoanalysis that incorporates particular examples of visual art, as a means of escaping the facialised death-image. It is demonstrated that types of visual art attempt to do this by dismantling and ultimately breaking free from the generality of the image and in doing so, experiment with de-facialisation, as a problematic form. This understanding and practice requires a politics of the image in its own right. It is illustrated that particular artworks effectively elude the death-image, and its role as a facialised sphere of influence. This undertaking facilitates a
schizoanalysis of specific mainstream media examples and subsequently provides a way of conceptualising the many images of death that operate within this sphere. This thesis, therefore, formulates a theoretical framework for analysis that introduces the death-image, as an additional component to Deleuze's taxonomy of images, his understanding of death, and specific philosophy in this area. This image type provides further clarity to the notion of faciality in relation to a schizoanalysis of death in particular examples of media and visual art. This analysis is then applied to practical instances in both spheres, and it is argued that certain artworks enable a way of reaching Deleuze’s core understanding of death as a generative process that ultimately eludes the face.

At the commencement of this work it is important to further elucidate on the methodological approach that has been undertaken in this investigation. Deleuze's theory, which I have thus far introduced aspects of is wide reaching and covers a range of studies. His writing evolves in many directions and his concepts connect to different theorists and ideas. To work with his concepts, and as this thesis aims to do, ‘create new ones’, it is therefore important to understand these relations and the context in which they were created. For example, Ian Buchanan argues in Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema for a holistic approach in the application of Deleuze's concepts, “The idea of taking Deleuze ‘as a whole’ is of course consistent with his own way of doing philosophy” (4). As outlined this thesis undertakes this endeavour with an application of faciality and schizoanalysis to a conceptual framework for the image. These concepts can be viewed as methods for analysing images of death in a media and art context and are developed in relation to Deleuze’s wider philosophy, which is a process that will add further depth to his theory in this area. Part One’s theoretical framework facilitates this aim and is developed with a practical application of his ideas over the course of this thesis.

Viewing Deleuze's philosophy as a complete but albeit dynamic and evolving work is a common sentiment among commentators, such as Buchanan, Graham Jones and Jon Roffe. Along with Buchanan, Jones and Roffe in Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage advocate for a holistic approach when engaging with Deleuze’s work and recommend that due diligence be made to appropriately locate and contextualise his ideas. This effort is not only necessary for the level of academic writing required for a rigorous
thesis, but also important for understanding Deleuze’s ideas and working at a distance from commentators in cultural studies and beyond who whimsically borrow and misconstrue his theory. Both commentators argue that, “This approach tends to characterise the piecemeal appropriations of Deleuze’s concepts within an interdisciplinary field, such as cultural studies, where specific notions can be borrowed with little concern for their original context or their relationship to the writer’s oeuvre more broadly” (Jones and Roffé 2). Part One of this investigation therefore introduces and contextualises the ideas I work with by situating them within Deleuze’s wider oeuvre. I examine his primary texts and develop concepts in a considered manner, providing a theoretical platform to inform the proceeding parts of this thesis and my work on the death-image. This investigation also facilitates a way of engaging with Deleuze’s theory, providing an initial context for constructing concepts and looking at how these ideas can develop faciality and schizoanalysis as methods for interrogating images of death.

It is also important to touch on Deleuze’s collaboration with Guattari who is one of the most important connections throughout his career, having a distinct impact on his thought and subsequent work. It is worth mentioning their philosophical engagement in the introduction, as the proceeding chapters are primarily focused on the theoretical nature of Deleuze’s ideas and does not dwell on the history of the writer’s partnership. Significant events that impacted on their relationship, such as the May 1968 student protests in France are not discussed, but I briefly mention their professional relationship as it provides an important connection and subsequent context for Deleuze’s work. Deleuze’s ideas in Difference and Repetition and, in particular, the chapter “Image of Thought” provides a philosophical frame of reference for his collaboration with Guattari:

It is therefore the third chapter which now seems to me the most necessary and the most concrete, and which serves to introduce subsequent books up to and including the research undertaken with Guattari where we invoke a vegetal model of thought: the rhizome in opposition to the tree, the rhizome–though instead of an arborescent thought. (Difference and Repetition 4)

Eric Alliez’s Guattari-effect where he inverts the typical positioning of Deleuze with the hyphen Guattari–Deleuze and Francois Dosse’s book Intersecting Lives illustrate
the central importance of Guattari’s thinking to their collaborative works - a contribution that is frequently subsumed by the weight of Deleuze’s oeuvre and intellectual reputation. Guattari provided Deleuze with many prototypes for concepts, such as *schizooanalysis* and *desiring machines*, which as outlined are important ideas for this thesis.

Their collaborative process entailed Guattari sending ideas to Deleuze who as a trained academic produced a coherent and finished product. Demonstrating this relationship, Deleuze referred to Guattari as the diamond miner and himself as the polisher (*Intersecting Lives* 7). This thesis, however, primarily uses Deleuze’s name to acknowledge their collaborative ideas, and in *Deleuze, Marx and Politics* Nicholas Thoburn succinctly acknowledges this omission in his own writing on the theorists:

> Whilst there is difference and variation in themes and styles between Deleuze’s and Guattari’s works, and between each and their collective work, this book draws on their individual and collective works as part of a single oeuvre, which, for convenience, I often signify with the name ‘Deleuze’ (as in the book title). Guattari (1998: 1923) discusses the problems with, and motives for, the frequent elision of his name from what he elsewhere calls the ‘deleuzoguattarian’ project (Guattari 1980a: 234), but suggests that ‘Deleuze’ has become an acceptable common noun for it. (150)

Following Guattari’s and Thoburn’s lead, the name ‘Deleuze’ will provide a suitable common noun for their singular and collaborative works. Section 2.3’s introduction to Guattari’s specific notion of capitalist faciality, Chapter 5’s focus on schizoanalysis, and my reference to Guattari’s book, *Machinic Unconscious* will, however, refer to Guattari as the author, and developer of his own, but ultimately interrelated ideas.
PART ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Death and unintended faces

As explained in the Introduction, Part One outlines a theoretical framework that is applied to practical case studies of death-images in Parts Two and Three. In doing so this thesis mobilises Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of constructing and deconstructing images of death in relation to particular examples of media and art. Adrian Parr’s *Deleuze and Memorial Culture* provides a departure for this exploration in the way she examines the 9/11 attacks, and how the trauma of this major media event becomes a product of social investment. Parr does not refer to faciality in her analysis, but she provides an account of desire and its limitations in a public remembrance and related death context. To do this, she utilises Deleuze’s notion of desire as an innate force that undergoes a series of imposed determinations. For Deleuze, desire is a positive flow of energy that is put to work by society and its governing body capitalism, which as a sovereign entity is fundamentally engrained in the very fabric of life (*Anti-Oedipus* 74). In this sense desire is immediately social and realised through our undertakings in the world.

As such it becomes a form of desire-production, which as a composite of capitalism is inherently linked to social-production, and as outlined in *Anti-Oedipus*, “This culture is not the movement of ideology: on the contrary, it forcibly injects production into desire, and conversely, it forcibly converts desire into social production and reproduction” (159). Deleuze divides desire-production into three modes, the connective, disjunctive and conjunctive synthesis, which is Parr’s method for interpreting memorial culture. As Parr outlines “The connective synthesis is the productive dimension of libidinal energies, affects, and forces; the disjunctive synthesis refers to breaks occurring in the flow of these energies and their subsequent recording; and finally the conjunctive synthesis of consumption produces a subject or subjectivity” (5). Using this method she investigates a variety of traumatic events, such as the Vietnam War, which I discuss below, and 9/11, which as outlined provides a case study for my death-image application in Part Three.
Parr positions 9/11 and its media repetition as an illegitimate example of desire-production and argues that “The repetitive news coverage of 9/11 produces a command to never forget” (79). In Part Three it is argued that the repeated 9/11 images also elicit a reduction of affectiveness, which contrasts this assertion, but conducive to this thesis Parr positions the act of forcible memory as that of the Oedipalised subject, which is a phenomenon that Deleuze illustrates in Anti-Oedipus (14). Parr describes the way the Oedipalised subject’s desire for the father is forbidden and directed to more socially accepted objects. This process displaces paternal desire for an image of identity that is promoted by parents. It is thus mediated and put to work by society as desire qua social-production.

In this sense, the positive desire that makes us go out to the world and create, is from an early age instrumentally directed to the needs of a productive and cohesive society, which although potentially beneficial in its functioning (take bureaucracies for example) is negative as people do not act on their individual desire. With respect to 9/11, its memory, therefore, closes off alternative productions of desire, as “Memory dominates sociality (desiring production) with an image of acceptable and normative identity, closing off new narrative possibilities” (Deleuze and Memorial Culture 139). This notion of controlling narratives in relation to the memory of immense death spectacles such as 9/11 is examined in Part Three, but for the current discussion, it is important to understand that desire is controlled by facial death-images. Certain manifestations of death operate on and through desiring production, closing down alternative narratives in favour of those deemed appropriate by the facialised networks that operate through dominant media flows.

While identifying the nature of facial productions, such as the unfolding 9/11 news coverage, Parr posits an active understanding of death. Her positive interpretation directly relates to Deleuze’s syntheses as the connective synthesis provides the connections that form to make something rather than nothing. This process can be viewed as dynamic connections that undergo disjunctions, which are deaths in their own right:
Death work is not especially human because the human being is the effect of the particular connections made by the connective synthesis and the disjunctions that force those connections to break with habit and reproduction (death). In his view, death is the qualitative differentiation that the disjunctive synthesis produces. (Parr 87)

This understanding of death as a qualitative differentiating of life is an important facet within the construction of the death-image, as it provides a problem in the sense that if death is the intrinsic basis of life then how does its representation impact on this process? For instance, does the death-image operate as just another image among images or is there something unique about this image type. On one level it can arguably intensify an affect or even elicit a paroxysm, which was apparent for viewers of 9/11 and the Kennedy assassination. On the other hand, a problem is evident in the way this affect operates within the conduits of facialisation, which are central concerns of this thesis. That is responding to the question of how and why the visual image of death operates within facialised spheres of influence.

In Desire and Death, Adkin’s provides an account of death in relation to Deleuze’s theory on the topic. In doing so, he closes his book with a commentary on a major influence to Deleuze’s work, Friedrich Nietzsche, whose ideas are examined in detail in Chapter 4. It is demonstrated that Nietzsche does not dwell on death in its representational form, as the image of life ending or ended, but argues for life itself to take prominence. Adkins uses the following quote from Nietzsche in Gay Science to illustrate this belief “It makes me happy that men do not want at all to think the thought of death” (Nietzsche quoted by Adkins 206). This thesis positions the facialised thought of death as the death-image, which for a productive life should not be privileged, as Adkins argues, “We are not constituted by death but by desire, and it is only by misconstruing desire that we have organised life around a lack” (207). The death-image plays a significant role in this respect, as it elicits a command in the sense that Parr’s highlights. The paranoia that death is waiting for at times unsuspecting victims is arguably the subtext of the command. The U.S. supported War on Terror, which is examined in more detail below, is evident in this respect as it continues to create a climate of fear that directly impacts on the productive nature of desire. It is clear that mass representations of death, such as the repetition of 9/11 death-images contain competing narratives, such as the power and death of U.S. hegemony, but on a deeper level they also contain desire, which are notions that will
become clearer over the course of this thesis and my investigation into the visual image of death in a facialised context.

In “Deleuzian Approaches to the Corpse” Gregory Meniscal examines the hierarchically selective nature of memorial culture and a series of images that challenge dominant representations of death. Conducive to Parr’s argument that memorials silence competing narratives as expressions of desire he argues that, “Memorial culture places the corpse in an arborescent hierarchy of values” (101). He positions the face of the corpse, in particular photographic instances or what I am calling the death-face, as a way to deconstruct these systems of signification and subjectification. As argued, the death-image is immediately produced and caught within the laws of facialisation, which is an understanding that complexifies representation. Minissale illustrates this point and the determination of the perceiver to fixate meaning on the image regardless of its condition or whether it is even alive or dead, “While the face reveals otherness, gender, race and age, the faceless corpse suggests it could be anyone, me, you, or all of us. In this sense, the absence of the face reveals to us our will to impose faciality even upon the faceless” (115). As a stratifying force, the perceiver imposes a face onto the image, which quickly engulfs it as a territory. As Minissale, whose article I return to in Parts Two and Three argues, this process highlights the powerful nature of faciality, as it quickly encompasses the face, body and its surrounding environment.

As outlined the concept of facialisation is a central focus for this investigation, as it provides an understanding of the stratifying forces at work in the way we perceive the world, and consequently the images of death that are part of it. As a framework, facialisation extends on the semiotic of a physical face to encompass a wider sensibility on the way images of thought are measured and formed, or as Peta Malins argues in “Ethico-Aesthetics” it elicits, “The production of a stratified identity through the representation of a particular, recognisable ‘face’” (171). The face as an encompassing entity quickly moves beyond its actual surface and “Performs the facialisation of the whole body and all its surroundings and objects, and the landscapification of all worlds and milieus” (Thousand Plateaus 181). As such, the notion of faciality encapsulates a set of possibilities and determinations within the field of human experience. In the context of this thesis, the way one approaches death
is subject to this process of facialisation and the stratifying forces that impact on desire as production. Facialisation encapsulates the way the world, life and death are viewed in the Western context of this thesis, which has direct implications for the social production of the death-image.

In its wider context facialisation positions the face as an overriding codification that facilitates the images of visual culture. Images of death are significant in this respect, as they exist within capitalistic flows or as a component of Guattari’s capitalistic facialisation. As argued this thesis posits that mainstream media networks, capture and facialise desire through the promulgation of death-images. As outlined the dominant media networks mediate this perception, as O’Sullivan argues in “Pragmatics”:

The mass media presents events in such a way to produce a climate - or landscape - of anxiety (always the fear of rupture, of interruption, of “death” (however this latter is figured). This is particularly the case with so-called news programs, which select, isolate and exaggerate apparent threats and in doing so contribute to the alienation of contemporary life (we become spectators on a fearful world). (311)

An example of this climate, which has been introduced, is the War on Terror. Although this meme is used less frequently today, the strategic facialisation of the terrorist and the death-images of their brutalised victims continue. As argued the broadcasted images of death facialise political and subsequently social landscapes, which as discussed is what Deleuze refers to as processes of landscapification (Thousand Plateaus 181).

The face of the now deceased Osama Bin Laden, whose death-face was censored by the U.S. Government has been replaced with the image of more current terror groups, such as the Islamic State (IS), and the ongoing demonisation of the largely virtual Iran. It is argued that dominant media agendas such as the representation of terror not only affects religious and ethnic conflict through division and alienation, but also desire and its connection to the world. O’Sullivan argues that the real threat for systems of control ironically lies with the faceless, as this group operates outside of facialised coordinates (311). Facialisation, which in the following section is critically introduced in more detail, is thus a coercive network, but working within or outside-
within its frame is the potential for perceptual disruption and subsequent agency. As is argued, the facialised image is fraught with danger, and this is particularly the case with the political nature of images that strategically represent death.

In his book *Discipline and Punish* Michel Foucault argues that there is a long history of *death-images* used for political purposes. The initial forms of public torture and execution, such as the barbaric killing of the regicide Robert-François Damiens who attempted to assassinate King Louis of France in 1757 is important for this analysis, as these spectacles risked having an opposing effect on the spectators of the execution. The crowds could sympathise with the condemned prisoner, and in turn, this freedom of expression interfered with the control of sovereign power at the time. As such Foucault argues that this non-directed sentiment was problematic for authorities, as along with the ensuing chaos that the drunken crowds enacted on execution day there was a risk they would reject the spectacle, “This was why these disadvantages became a political danger - the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power” (12). This point of Foucault’s analysis, which proceeds to examine the way punishment evolves from the public spectacle of execution is important, as it highlights the potential for images of death to have an unintended affect on viewers, or as argued, remain open to processes of de-facialisation. What was initially conceived as a way of sustaining the ruling image of omnipotent sovereign power soon proved to be counterproductive. The image of thought that restricted the desire of the monarch’s subjects or as Buchanan’s argues in *Anti-Oedipus Reader*, the aspect of desire that escape its social production is hazardous for the codifications of power and the wider cohesion of society itself.

In a modern media context, this process has correlations with the spectacle of the Vietnam War. As Daniel C. Halin argues in *Uncensored War* this was the first major U.S. conflict to be graphically televised across North America, and, “The view that, for better or for worse, television turned the American public against the war is accepted so widely across the American political spectrum that it probably comes as close as anything to being conventional wisdom about a war that still splits the American public” (105). Thomas Rid highlights this view in *War and Media* and that high-ranking military officers believed the broadcasted images of death such as dead
soldiers and civilians lost the war for them (53). Both Halin and Rid argue that this shift in perception is a more nuanced issue than its media promulgation, but agree that the uncensored nature of the televised war had a decisive affect on public opinion.

In a media context, the influence of the war on its American audience is significant, as it demonstrates the power of unmediated images of death to elicit opposing affects on viewers, and in doing so challenge dominant facialised systems and landscapes. What could have been an edited and abstracted show of American hard military power became a show of inhumanity and horror, which the American public viewed on a daily basis. This process opened up new sensibilities, such as the American public questioning the image of the U.S. and subsequently their own subjectivity within its conceptual parameters. The *death-image* can thus operate as a facialised image in the sense of hegemonic codification and its process of assigning identity, but this image of thought is precarious and open to processes of de-facialisation or as this section’s title implies, ‘unintended faces’. The facialisation of landscapes, and in the context of this thesis, images of death as *death-images*, is therefore, a precarious phenomenon open to sudden and unexpected shifts in perception. To further understand facialisation and its distinction from more overt systems of representation a more detailed analysis of its theoretical framework and its relation to the media is required.

2.1 The formation of the face

As outlined this thesis relates faciality and the process of facialisation to Deleuze’s work on the image and my formulation of the *death-image*. In this context, I am investigating the facialised image of death as it operates within spheres of influence. As argued, this surface extends beyond the body and Deleuze advances the concept in his chapter “Year Zero: Faciality” in *Thousand Plateaus*. As the name of the chapter suggests, the year zero warrants the beginning of faciality, which he qualifies as a new semiotic system (175). For Deleuze, prior to the dominance of the face as a mixed semiotic surface, the body held more significance, and he uses the example of ‘primitive’ societies to demonstrate this. He argues that in these societies primitives
value the body as part of a body-head system, which describes the way people in these societies operate through the body and not the face, “considering primitive societies, we see that there is very little that operates through the face: their semiotic is nonsignifying, nonsubjective, essentially collective, polyvocal, and corporeal, playing on very diverse forms and substances. This polyvocality operates through bodies, their volumes, their internal cavities, their variable exterior connections and coordinates (territorialities)” (196). In this type of society, the body (and the head as its extension or part) provides meaning collectively, as the face is not distinguished and organised as a signifying and subjectifying entity. Deleuze argues that the conception of the face, as a pivotal surface, develops when it is semiotically separated and distinct from the body:

The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code - when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the Face. (176)

Rather than the body providing the codifying system for the head, which in this context has no particularity, the face becomes a new complex organisational system. It organises the body within its wider facialisation capacity, and Western perception distinguishes from that of the primitive. For Deleuze, the face is thus more than a feature of the head in the sense that it quickly moves beyond its frame, which as discussed in Chapter 2, subjects its surroundings to processes of landscapification. It is argued that the over coding nature of the face provides an insight into the wider workings of hegemony and on a more micro level the way desire is structured through social production.

For Deleuze, the promulgation of the iconic face of Christ marks this inception as a paradigmatic shift, facilitating the overriding configuration of the face as a dominant system (178). Christ’s face elicits and measures normativity, which for Deleuze is the face of the white European man. He posits that this exclusivity does not enable an, ‘us or them’ mentality, as this type of facialisation enables a system of deviation from an ideal type. As an image of thought, the normative white male face secures the dominant image that all faces and concepts deviate from. The face as a mixed semiotic surface provides a platform from which subjectivities can be produced and
recognised. As a distinct entity removed from the ‘polyvocal’ corporeality of the body, the onset of the face as an over coding system thus creates a new organisation of power. For Deleuze, the face functions as an abstract machine which in this context they call a faciality machine, as this system provides the virtual framework of machinic connections that enable the face as an image of thought to function.

The face, therefore, has an incorporeal function and as such operates as an abstract machine. In this sense, the face is not only a product of connections, which are incorporeal, but this surface provides an expression of its virtual connections. These connections are the conduits of the abstract machine and in the context of this thesis, it is argued that this machine type organises images of death. The abstract machine can be viewed as the machinic connections that produce the death-image, as Deleuze argues in Thousand Plateaus, “Abstract machines consist of unformed matters and nonformal functions” (511). These formations operate within an assemblage, “The plane of consistency is a plane of continuous variation; each abstract machine can be considered a “plateau” of variation that places variables of content and expression in continuity” (532). A theoretical framework for the assemblage is introduced in section 5.1, but for the current analysis, the content and expression are its territorial components with the former acting as part of the pragmatic system and the latter as part of the semiotic (Thousand Plateaus 526). In other words, across the constituting plane that generates problems and ideas, abstract machines secure and facilitate forms, such as the perception of death-images for varying periods of time.

As Jeffery Bell (2008) argues in his paper “Micropolitics of Desire,” “It is the abstract machine that constitutes an assemblage; it is the abstract machine that is the function that enables an assemblage to have a relationship to those elements that are identifiable and to those nomadic lines of flight that undermine and transform these identifiable elements” (76). In Thousand Plateaus Deleuze outlines this process as:

The two forms [of content and expression] are in reciprocal presupposition, and they can be abstracted from each other only in a very relative way because they are two sides of a single assemblage. We must therefore arrive at something in the assemblage itself that is still more profound than those sides and can account for both of the forms in presupposition, forms of expression or regimes of signs (semiotic systems) and forms of content or regimes of bodies (physical systems). This is what we call the abstract machine, which
constitutes and conjugates all of the assemblage’s cutting edges of deterritorialization. (140-1)

In the moment each component of the assemblage enters into a process of deterritorialisation the abstract machine holds it together. This is a regular occurrence as assemblages are dynamic and frequently interconnect with alternating assemblages in new ways. The abstract machine is the cohesive that holds the assemblage or as is discussed in relation to faciality - the face in place. Furthermore, at any particular event, there are a series of connections that make the event possible. The content as the territory of the event can be viewed as the regulated location in time and space that the event is actualising in. These elements provide the content of the assemblage, which takes on particular expressive meanings depending on the context.

The abstract machine enables these connections, as it provides the virtual machinic framework that sets the elements of content and expression into continuity while facilitating the various instances of deterritorialisation. For Deleuze, the abstract machine constructs the face, as the face does not come preassembled:

Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an abstract machine of faciality, which produces them at the same time as it gives the signifier its white wall and subjectivity its black hole. Thus the black hole/white wall system is, to begin with, not a face but the abstract machine that produces faces according to the changeable combinations of its cogwheels. (Thousand Plateaus 180)

As a composite image, the face of Christ, therefore, produces changeable combinations depending on the context in which it operates (or combinations of the abstract machine’s components). As a dominant image of thought, the virtual Christ is a product of abstract machinic connections that mediate the particular instances of its recognition. For Deleuze, the abstract machine is thus qualitative, as it monitors the appropriateness of the face as it appears, in particular, situations, “The abstract machine of faciality assumes a role of selective response, or choice: given a concrete face, the machine judges whether it passes or not, whether it goes or not, on the basis of the elementary facial units (198). Just as the image of a popular face is promulgated by media flows (which in themselves also conform to a mediated ideal type for particular situations) the abstract machine informs the sensory motor that produces the concept of the face at a given time.
In *Deleuze on Music*, Ronald Bogue identifies two operations that the abstract machine of faciality facilitates in the administration of particular faces. Through the binary system of coding it assigns categories; is it a man or a woman, is it a white man or a black man, and so forth, and the second is a choice of the yes/no type; are you a white man, yes or no? (91-92). These parameters accept or reject particular faces along lines of strata, and as Bogue argues, both operations of the faciality machine create an “All-encompassing network of centrally controlled, self-contained, and interrelated signifiers, and that of assigning subjects their fixed positions within that network” (93). The abstract faciality machine is thus a political system that regulates and directs flows of meaning through a rigid binary structure, which has direct implications for my formulation of the *death-image*.

### 2.2 Faciality machine

In her chapter “Immanuel Kant” Melissa McMahon argues that the world is a constituted field of experience that the subject and object enter as prefigured entities. The subjective positions within perceptual frameworks that one undertakes are already there, as although the face can be dynamic it is ultimately preexisting. This can be viewed as the doubling, folding back or internalisation of the face. This process provides the epistemological strata of meaning and the face, as a constituting entity is a frame that one enters. As argued the face enforces a type of reality, which directly acts upon perception. This system is enabled through an all-encompassing network, which in the context of this thesis is a largely centralised media that produces landscapes of fear of anxiety. *Death-images* are pertinent in this regard, as they compound and facilitate reactive climates, locating a particular reality of death as dominant and bringing it to the fore. Deleuze thus identifies faces as:

Not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralises in advance any expressions or connections unnameable to the appropriate significations. Similarly, the form of subjectivity, whether consciousness or passion, would remain absolutely empty if faces did not form loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality. (p. 124)
Faciality is a way of measuring these zones of frequency and understanding the way in which the face participates in a normative territory, such as the War on Terror or responses to the 9/11 attacks. As Deleuze argues, the face produces a normative procedural process for maintaining appropriate conduct in matters of signification. This system “Has you inscribed in its overall grid. It is clear that in its new role as deviance detector, the faciality machine does not restrict itself to individual cases but operates in just as general a fashion as it did in its first role, the computation of normalities” (Thousand Plateaus 178). The grid of the faciality machine is a way to assess or as Deleuze remarks, compute deviations from the normative frames of our lived experience.

For instance, as argued the faciality machine operates along the two distinct axes of significance and subjectification. For Deleuze, this mixed semiotic can be viewed through the notion of the white wall, where the axis of significance emulates its signs, and black holes as areas on the axis of subjectification that capture them. When a death-image is viewed a process of subjectification occurs, as following McMahon’s line the viewer is drawn into a pre-existing field with specific locations and subjectivities within the image. This meditation is largely involuntary for the initial encounter at least, as the abstract machine computes the variables that make the image recognisable on one level. As Bouge indicates, a spontaneous reaction occurs as the mind processes the sex, ethnicity, age, and so forth of the death-image. As a facialised image, this process is, however, not only specific to an individual or individuals, as the face quickly moves beyond the physicality of the person to encompass a wider landscape of death. In other words, the death-image encapsulates its environment as an image of thought and referring to O’Sullivan’s comments on the War on Terror, I am arguing that this climate of fear is a death-image in its own right. As animated in Chapter 7, this image is produced through the interrelated signifiers of the 9/11 death-image and operates in a virtual machine. This abstract faciality machine computes the variables that make this climate palpable.

For Deleuze, the selective processing of the faciality machine is then one of adherence to an adaptive but ultimately constituted frame. It operates as a system of machinic connections that depending on the specific locality operates as one of exclusion, as the “The black hole/white wall system must already have gridded all of
space and outlined its arborescence or dichotomies for those of signifier and subjectification event to be conceivable. The mixed semiotic of signification and subjectification has an exceptional need to be protected from any intrusion from the outside” (Thousand Plateaus 200). In relation to the contemporary nature of televising conflicts, which I discussed in relation to the Vietnam War, the outside can be film crews and citizen journalists filming and promulgating atrocities, and the subsequent interference of an informed public causing a disruption to the over coding communication of the face.

As Deleuze argues, without this system communications as we know it would not be possible as there would be no ‘normalities’ to judge situations by. This is why he argues that this network needs to be protected from the outside, as without this process, arboreal structures such as the strategic interests behind the normative face at a particular time would become obsolete, rhizomatic, and:

Thus not only must the abstract machine of faciality provide a protective screen and a computing black hole; in addition, the faces it produces draw all kinds of arborescence and dichotomies without which the signifying and the subjective would not be able to make the arborescence and dichotomies function that fall within their purview in language. (Thousand Plateaus 200)

For Deleuze, the face is therefore not only an essential part in the process of signification and subjectification but also as an assemblage of enunciation and the way one enters a network of communication. The face as a political surface poses two problems for Deleuze, “The relation of the face to the abstract machine that produces it, and the relation of the face to the assemblages of power that require that social production” (150). In this context, the former can be viewed as the way the face or concept develops, and the latter as envisaging the power formations that depend on facialised codes for a particular type of social production to continue. This could be citizens of a state retaining beliefs in the facialised image of their nation and subsequently supporting national endeavours such as war and paying for it through their taxes:

*Very specific assemblages of power impose signification and subjectification as their determinate form of expression, in reciprocal presupposition with new contents: there is no signification without a despotic assemblage, no subjectification without an authoritarian assemblage, and no mixture between the two without assemblages of power that act through signifiers and act upon souls and subjects.*
The imposition of signifiance and subjectification is thus the mixed semiotic of the despotic and authoritarian determination\(^2\). These assemblages of power control agency and free movement in general, which is why Deleuze ends his examination of faciality in a *Thousand Plateaus* by looking at ways to dismantle the face or as I have described, processes of de-facialisation. He sets out this contest against the backdrop of facial organisation (which has thus far been the focus of this chapter), as the perceptual conflict “Between a faciality trait that tries to escape the sovereign organisation of the face and the face itself, which clamps back down on the trait, takes hold of it again, blocks its line of flight, and reimposes its organisation upon it” (209). Bouge argues this point as “The unpredictable course that disrupts the coordinates of an organised space” (“Nomadic Flows” 27). The perceptual control of facialisation and its subjectifying configurations can be disrupted, and in attempting to escape the face one must “Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight” (*Thousand Plateaus* 208). In the context of this thesis, this process entails an understanding of the way a *death-image* operates and with this awareness gauging means of escape, which in relation to art is the focus of section 7.4.

**2.3 Guattari’s faciality**

In *Machinic unconscious* Guattari develops the concept of faciality and its relation to what he calls the machinic unconscious. This phenomenon can be thought of as an abstract machine that actualises and mediates particular space-time and subjective coordinates. In qualifying this notion he argues that “The coordinates of existence function like so many space-time and subjective coordinates and are established on the basis of assemblages which are in constant interaction and incessantly engaged in processes of deterritorialisation and singularisation causing them to be decentralised in comparison to one another” (11). The machine predicate is important here, as

\(^2\) The despotic and authoritarian mixed semiotic regimes are developed further in Chapter 6’s examination of the *lingchi* photograph.
“Every machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it” (Anti-Oedipus 39). As argued in the proceeding chapters, an awareness of the singularisation of space-time and subjective coordinates in the form of interconnecting machines and assemblages forms the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, and general conception of a subjectivity that depends on the context as an unfolding situation. An understanding of the interconnecting machines and assemblages provide the meta-modelling diagram from which ephemeral singularisations that have undergone processes of deterritorialisation can be illustrated. As discussed, assemblages that hold meaning together for varying times consistently interact with other assemblages, constructing a transversal world of communication.

For Guattari, this is due to the point that, “The all powerful political and micropolitical forces of the media reside in their capacity of developing a collective facialised consciousness that acts as a counterpoint to the globalisation of anguish” (82). In this sense Guattari argues that in its omnipresent and politically molar state, the media as an organ for the vested interests of capitalism facialises the world as a type of mask, which harbours a more localised coercion. This veneer is thus the smiling face of the Prime Minister, the stern face of the dictator, the newsreader, the doctor, the father, the death-image and so forth. This is because for Guattari, “The primary function of facial capitalistic conscientialisation is to mask the fact that there is nothing inescapable in the mobilisation and sequence of operations that contribute to the processes of semiotic subjection” (83). This belief is important as it illustrates the tentative nature of the fundamental hegemony at the core of facial capitalism. It also highlights the distinction between the unconscious and conscious, as the former can enable a means of escaping this molarity and the latter is the reactive organisation of the face. In this sense, the face is an image that simultaneously overcodes by capturing means of escape as lines of flight, which unbeknown to most people are available anytime.

This sentiment has further implications for my formulation of the death-image, as images of death provide the semiotic subjection that contributes to the facialisation of desire. This framework is largely protected by dominant media flows, as Guattari
argues, “Everything that evokes a non-subjected desire within the dominant faciality is suspicious and threatening from an order founded on the preservation of its limits, the status quo, and the blockage of everything that could be developed outside of the norms of the system” (90). As discussed, this dominant faciality can be racist in nature and what Guattari calls “white capitalistic faciality”, but along with the infinite items it holds within its perceptual framework, it is a dynamic racism that adjusts to new situations “One of the essential tasks of the media consists in continually adjusting facial formulas, calculating them in order to answer for every possible situation” (91). Stretching out to encompass social codes the dominant Western media caters for every possible situation and as argued, death-image. In this sense the media image is also subject to processes of deteritorrialisation, which are particularly evident during intensive media campaigns.

An example of this adjusting is the way U.S. President Barak Obama provided an initial deteritorrialisation of the dominant white European male face, which enabled the desired faciality for that particular facial role. As Deleuze and Guattari argue in Thousand Plateaus “Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall” (178). This potential blockage was approached with caution, due to what Guattari refers to as the deviance of skin tone, which “beyond a certain threshold, will spark mistrust” (Machinic Unconscious 96). Obama’s skin colour, which is the product of a Caucasian mother and black father is viewed as black, and this colouring inevitably sparked mistrust among voters and members of the public in his election campaign (Mendibl).

This deteritorrialisation and subsequent singularisation arguably worked in Obama’s favour as it heralded the ‘much needed change’ to the white neo-liberal Republican party. This shift was, however, ultimately reterritorialised again through an adjustment of facial formulas. Among other faciality traits, the Afro-American face can now be used to not only facialise crime and poverty, but also to facialise traits, such as those harnessed by a powerful President. Guattari posits that, “Signifying coordinates of the normal world are deployed on the basis of calibrated facial
formulas (prototypes of men, women, children etc., normal at such and such a moment of the history, in such and such a country, such and such a social situation etc.)” (93). In the above context this facialisation of dominant history facialises the moment or territory of history when a deterritorialising Afro-American face became the President of the United States.

Capitalism enters this milieu for a number of reasons, but arguably it primarily lies with capital, as financial interests decode and promote new facial formulas. As an immanent system, capitalism has the capacity to adapt to nuanced circumstances, and as Deleuze argues it is “Constantly overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against them once more in a broader form, because its fundamental limit is capital itself” (Deleuze and Negri). Vested interests, which are evident through capital expenditures such as campaign funding illustrate this process. For example, along with large donations from Time Warner, Disney and other prominent media conglomerates, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation donated $US380,558 to Obama’s 2008 Presidential campaign (“Donations by Media Companies”). This funding supports the advertising needed to recalibrate facial formulas, as the media screen provides strategic signifiers complete with points of attraction qua subjectifying black holes. The general facialised world perpetuated by dominant media flows and in particular the faces that are deemed normative have further implications for the death-image.

For instance, are all media death-images facialised? What facial types, ethnicities, genders, ages of victims and so forth are deemed more normal than others and why is this the case? What images of death are overcoded and rejected? An understanding of the way faciality structures consciousness is important here for not only understanding how the unconscious works as a machine, but also in formulating a schizoanalysis that is armed with sufficient complexity to examine the different situations in which death-images occur. Reflecting on O’Sullivan’s postulation and the generalised application of facialised terrorism terminology he argues “As regards to the mass media, little attention is given to the complexities of any given geopolitical situation, or indeed the different “terrorisms” that are invariably grouped together (in legal and popular terms)” (“Pragmatics” 311). Chapter 7 illustrates this
view in relation to Murdoch’s news conglomerate, which is a major player in the promulgation of terrorism as a unified facial image.

For Guattari, the unconscious is, therefore, not a play on representation or using his phrase, ‘a slave to the signifier’, but a machine that can be diagrammatically mapped out. In this sense the *death-image* can to some extent be removed from facialisation, which enlightens the reader to what can be called Guattari’s manifesto:

> Freedom is not created with subjectivity! True “machinic freedom” only starts the moment when annoying or uninteresting things can be made “like themselves” and when, without falling into a generalised and blind automatism, we become able to focus our capacities for life and expression into what moves, what creates, what changes the world and humanity, in other words, into individual or collective choices of desire. (*Machinic Unconscious* 127)

O’Sullivan’s call for mass media complexity directly relates to Guattari’s call for things to be ‘like themselves’, which as a sentiment has implications for the *death-image*. Arguably an important starting point for this action would be freeing death from its contextualisation as a *death-image*, and in doing so establish it as a problem, as that which in the first instance problematises the face as an organisational system.

Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, which is developed further over the proceeding sections and specifically in Chapter 5 is thus one of mapping out the machinic unconscious and looking at ways to remove the constraints put on desire by capitalistic facialisation. Positioned even more succinctly, their philosophy advocates a freedom of choice, which is not a desire for ones’ oppression, but an innate desire free from the facialised grid of options. Throughout the process of experimental machinism and ultimately machinic potential, the aim of Deleuze’s ethics is finding out what the body can do, which is an argument framed within the central aim of this thesis. That is, mobilising Deleuze’s theory of faciality as a way of examining images of death in a media and art context.
3.0 Taxonomy of images

To formulate a conceptual framework for the death-image that is informed by the philosophy of Deleuze, this chapter introduces and extends on his taxonomy of images. As outlined in the introduction this examination will be undertaken in relation to his books, *Cinema* and *Cinema 2*. This process is beneficial for my image formulation, as Deleuze’s taxonomy connects directly to the world outside of cinema. To construct his philosophy of the image he argues that ‘everything is an image’, which means that there is an intrinsic relation between the film director’s intent and the way we normally interact with the images that form lived experience. The two theorists he primarily adapts to illustrate this understanding are Henri Bergson and to a lesser extent Charles Sanders Pierce. Bergson’s ideas are examined throughout this chapter, and Pierce’s classification of signs is touched on in section 7.4, as for Deleuze all images are effectively signs, and all signs are images (Cinema 2 69).

In *Schizoanalysis of Cinema* Buchanan outlines Deleuze’s approach to cinema as distinct from the more typical methods undertaken in film theory, such as Christian Metz’s psychoanalytic film analysis. He argues that “Deleuze’s taxonomy of image types is simultaneously a catalogue of cinematic effects, the difference being that rather than conceive these effects in terms of meaning as Metz does, he conceives them in terms of sense” (3). This process highlights Deleuze’s move away from the epistemological search for what is it towards a philosophy of the encounter, which provide opportunities such as O’Sullivan’s “Possibilities of reconfiguration” (“Pragmatics” 310). Buchanan advocates the need to go beyond Deleuze’s initial project and develop his ideas by connecting them to new and seemingly unrelated ones, which is in line with the schizoanalysis project. He poses the question “what is a schizoanalysis of cinema?” (8) and as outlined in the introduction this thesis will conjointly work with the question, ‘what does a schizoanalysis of the facialised image of death provide?’. This problem constructs a frame for not only my investigation into the facialisation of death, but also ways this investigation can be expanded upon in relation to Deleuze’s work on the image.

3 As noted in the introduction, Part 1 concludes with a chapter specifically focused on schizoaanalysis. This chapter further introduces the method in a more concrete fashion, which as a framework is applied to practical case studies in Parts 2 and 3.
At the outset of his cinema books, Deleuze criticises Bergson’s notion that the cinema produces images with an abstract movement, and as such does not provide an authentic indication of the moving image. Conducive to his conception of intuition as a method, which posits that one must enter or ‘sympathise’ with the duration of things to discern a more authentic process of interpretation and becoming⁴, Bergson argues in his book *Creative Evolution* that “The mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographically kind” (132). For Bergson and Deleuze, knowledge is reductive, as it does not drive a process of ‘real’ thinking. This is due to the way it elicits a pre-existing world of lived experience that one enters, which as argued in Chapter 2 is a product of facialisation. In relation to Bergson, the term cinematographical is used to demonstrate the dormancy of representational thought (129). Cinema in this respect isolates and fragments particular points within a frame and as such is an image separated from its natural unfolding as duration. Deleuze contrasts this perspective by arguing that “Cinema does not give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image. It does give us a section, but a section which is mobile, not an immobile section + abstract movement (*Cinema* 2). Bergson’s understanding of the cinema image is thus problematic for Deleuze, as it does not account for the belief that everything is an image.

To retrieve the idea of cinema images providing real movement and a concrete form of duration, Deleuze refers to Bergson’s earlier work in, *Matter and Memory*. In this text Bergson argues that “The afferent nerves are images, the brain is an image, the disturbance travelling through the sensory nerves and propagated in the brain is an image too” (14), and that “My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image which acts like other images, receiving and giving back movement” (15). Deleuze appropriates this notion of everything as an image and in doing so equates cinema images with a concrete form of perception. Following Bergson, he argues, “The identity of the image and movement leads us to conclude immediately that the movement-image and matter are identical” (59). In this respect, as everything qualifies as an image interacting with other images as flows of matter, cinema can illustrate the images we view and undertake in our own making sense of the world.

⁴ For a detailed account of Bergson’s notion of intuition refer to *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*. In this text Bergson positions intuition as a method that supersedes the analytical process of isolating immobile points. By entering an objects particular duration intuition brings one closer to the dimension in which things operate as themselves.
Just as a physical body is an image, a media death-image is thus part of the material landscape that interacts with the viewer accordingly.

Cinema provides a way to not only discern the images that make up the world and each one of us, but also the relationship between this phenomenon and the image of thought, which as discussed is Deleuze’s terminology for representational thinking. Cinema can challenge our habitual ways of thinking as Ills Huygens argues in Deleuze and Cinema:

In his cinema books Deleuze wants to see whether and how an encounter takes place between the image of thought and the cinematographic image, and what this encounter might be. For Deleuze it is crucial that philosophy understands cinema and the concepts it has produced since it has led to a transformation of the image of thought, not only for cinema and visual arts, but also for the whole of thinking and for philosophy. (57)

As a medium cinema has the potential to create new images of thought, and in this respect it can deterritorialise thinking with the necessary disruption that Deleuze refers to in Anti-Oedipus as the “coming undone” (354). The images found in cinema facilitate a way for people to gain a deeper understanding of assemblages, as Deleuze argues “A film is never made up of a single image: thus we call the combination of the three varieties, montage. Montage (in one of its aspects) is the assemblage of movement-images, hence the inter-assemblage of perception-images, affection-images and action-images” (Cinema 72). Just as a film is a series of montages so is life outside of cinema, and Deleuze’s base images, from which he extends to the time-image in Cinema 2, provide a way to engage with the world in new ways.

Before proceeding further with this critical introduction to Deleuze’s taxonomy, it is important to illustrate my general approach to the image in relation to the movement and time image, which is introduced below. There has clearly been a shift in the visual media that supports death imagery, as Colman argues, “Moving images replaced the focus on the still photograph in terms of discerning the modality of the militarised-zone, as free video share servers such as YouTube (with its tag line of ‘broadcast Yourself’) opened in 2005” (Affective Imagery 147). The moving image is part of the digital and natural world that we live in, and as discussed, Deleuze outlines his conception of the movement-image by appropriating Bergson’s early postulation
of direct movement from the image that exists in a world, where everything is an image. Movement is not something added to the image in cinema with an abstract time, but on the contrary, the cinema image provides the viewer with a direct sense of movement. This thesis is not disputing these points, but it conjointly argues that a still image can elicit a sense of movement. As Buchanan argues, Deleuze’s images are about how we sense the world, and as such one can still feel a photographic image (Schizoanalysis of Cinema). The immobile image possesses its own resonance, as Damian Sutton argues in Photography:

Visual culture is thus a concatenation of specific machines, creating a single abstract machine that facialises signification. Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is only part of our nature, our becoming, to facialise any image in this way. In so doing they open up the potential for movement within the fixed image, in the form of intensity, that we can take to the photographic image. It is this involution, or intension, within the image that creates its enormous, achronological power, the power that leads to the immense and complex structure of the crystal. This is a different movement within the image, still a variation of speed and slowness but in intensity, made by the elements of the image running into each other. (174)

Sutton’s text is primarily concerned with the above proposition, as he aims to retrieve Deleuze’s notion of the movement and crystal image (which as a time-image is introduced in Part Two) as applicable to photographic theory. Although I contest Sutton’s notion that ‘one’ abstract machine facialises visual culture his thesis works with a conducive line as the death-image can be mobile in the physical sense of unfolding footage, but also moving or becoming in relation to the still image. (174)

In “Lessons to Live” Zsuzsa Baross presents a similar argument in relation to the image of a dead body, as “It is by virtue of this (virtual) vibration that it has the potential to recall and be recalled, to haunt and be simultaneously haunted by other images - that is, to give birth to memory that comes to pass (takes place) only in the medium of the image” (170). This is due to the point that regardless of its mobility the perceiver continues to interact with the image in nuanced ways. A sense of becoming can be derived from both the still and moving image in respect of the viewer and to some extent the image itself, as it becomes-death which is an argument articulated in

Sutton’s description of the movement created by the elements of the image colliding is related to Deleuze’s philosophy of death in Chapter 6.
relation to my examination of the a lingchi photograph in Chapter 6. Movement within the fixed image becomes more evident with the nature of duration and its removal from chronological time.  

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze illustrates his synthesis of time, which is an important notion to understand as it relates to his later work on the movement and time-image. His synthesis works as habit, memory, and a future that he relates to the *empty form of time* (76). The first synthesis is the result of a past that works through contractions of the present, which in turn is projected onto the expected future “The first synthesis, that of habit, constituted time as a living present by means of a passive foundation on which past and future depended” (79). In this synthesis the past and future provide a foundation for the now that as a living present unfolds in a largely automatic way. In *Neuro-Image* Pisters relates this process to the movement-image (as distinct from the time-image as it has a non-determined centre in the present) (138). The movement-image is largely habitual in this regard, as it generally oscillates between its perception, affection, and action poles.

The second synthesis operates as a virtual past that conjoins with the present as it unfolds. Between the past present and the present-present one reaches a synthesis that effectively brings the past into the ever unfolding now. This synthesis thus provides its own world of pure memory that one can move across in relation to, but always subject to the present as a self-affirming and effacing representation. As Deleuze argues “The second synthesis, that of memory, constituted time as a pure past, from the point of view of a ground which causes the passing of one present and the arrival of another” (80). Pisters relates this synthesis to the time-image, which is an image that takes fruition after World War II (*Neuro-Image* 139). During this period Deleuze identifies a crisis of the movement-image, as a new awareness (or process of defacialisation) is shaped by the atrocities of war, and the cinema image thus engages with the false as a ‘free floating’ form of the virtual. The indeterminate center of forces that make up the movement-image is displaced and although still employed a further layer to the image is created. This image, as the name infers, provides a pure

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6 The photograph also contains a simulacra, as it composes its own world based on repetition as a copy (*Logic of Sensation* 13), which is a notion I discuss in more detail in Part Three.
sense of passing in the way that time is an object not derived from movement, but on the contrary, movement is derived from time (78).

Time animated by this image type, therefore, operates in its own sphere, which is insubordinate to the regular movement of the first synthesis and the movement-image. The time-image thus has its own sense of movement, as Baross argues:

Incessant vibration, the false movement of perpetual exchange in the same place - this does not translate to movement-image, which is a temporal perspective, a mobile cut in duration. The effect of repetition rather than of movement, the cadaver-image and the cadaverous of the image correspond with an altogether different sort of temporal reality: that of the time-image. (“Lessons to Live” 173)

Conducive to Sutton’s argument the image of a corpse or an image of death in general arguably qualifies as a time-image, as it provides its own sense of temporality. Both Sutton and Baross relate their still image to the crystal, which is an argument I detail in Part Two, but for the current analysis the first two syntheses operate cyclically as forms of repetition that can capture the subject in its traditional, or as argued, facialised form, although in this respect the time-image is to a larger extent freer than the movement-image. The time-image, which in its traditional sense is mobile can relate to the fixed image, as the actual and virtual collide within its frame.

The third synthesis is the most dynamic in Deleuze’s formulation, as it relates to the future that is subject to the ‘eternal return’, which as a concept is critically introduced and applied to the death-image throughout parts Two and Three. In her book Pisters’ central thesis is that this synthesis constitutes an image that she calls the neuro-image such that “The neuro-image belongs to the third synthesis of time, the time of the future” (140). The forces and flows that govern this synthesis work as an assemblage that produces the agent of the future from the past and present. For example, with the selection of forces from the first two syntheses, the projection of the future changes and in this context the future is a synthesis of these forces in its own right. The previous structures give way to the empty time that decentres the circularity of the first two syntheses. One repeats, but in relation to the third synthesis, this repetition produces something new as it is open to a future not yet.
Deleuze illustrates this process in its historical precedent where “Repetition is never a historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is produced” (Difference and Repetition 113). Repetition is an historical condition that through a process of metamorphoses produces the novel as the event takes shape, and we, therefore, have the three syntheses of time, which are integral aspects of Deleuze’s thought “The first synthesis concerns only the content and the foundation of time; the second, its ground; but beyond these, the third ensures the order, the totality of the series and the final end of time” (Difference and Repetition 94). All three syntheses operate distinctively but co-exist in relation to time as it unfolds, which has implications for the death-image and the way it is perceived. For instance, an understanding of how and why the image of death operates in relation to habit and memory is an important consideration, as it locates its facisation as a repetition with historical location. It provides a way of analysing the historical conditions in which it operates, and through the third synthesis the means of producing new associations in relation to death and the images that make up the world.

Reflecting on my discussion of Sutton and his intensive image, rather than obfuscating the notion of time in relation to the image, which for the death-image operates with the three syntheses at distinct points, this thesis works with Bergson’s notion of duration, as that which has its own internal transition as integral experience. Granted Bergson, as a process philosopher argues that there is more to be derived from the mobile than the immobile, and that, in his essay An Introduction to Metaphysics, “The intuition of duration, when it is exposed to the rays of the understanding, in like manner quickly turns into fixed, distinct, and immobile concepts” (165). But as Deleuze has achieved in retrieving notions of the cinema image from Bergson’s earlier work, this thesis also works with Bergson’s earlier ideas with a formulation from his essay, which due to its relevance I quote at length:

No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct, consciousness to the precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized. By choosing images as dissimilar as possible, we shall prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would then be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that, in spite of their differences of aspect, they all require from the mind the same kind of attention, and in some sort the same degree of tension,
we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a particular and clearly-defined disposition - that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is, without any veil. (172)

This thesis works with this sentiment in respect of the problem, as this image type has no pretence of overcoming the pure intuition of duration, but to some extent, it provides a facility for intuition to experiment with. This occurs as the problem removes the perceiver from the conduits of the facialised death-image and subsequently ‘conscious time’ in relation to such topics as death. It opens up a sense of transition that requires intuition, as not only is there potential for dissimilar images to prevent the usurping of intuition as Bergson outlines, but there is also potential for dissimilar components within the image to achieve this outcome.

Part Two argues this point in relation to images, which hold intrinsic dissimilarities or localised asymmetrical spaces that facilitate the intuition of duration. The image of death is pertinent in this regard, as conducive to Sutton’s and Baross’ argument the still image has the potential to possess movement through a new reality and there is arguably an exaggeration of intensity in the death-image. As an indication of ‘the problem’, to varying degrees it provides an integral experience, which is not entirely subject to consciousness. This experience is precarious though, as to use Bergson’s terminology it can be veiled, which is a notion that can be directly related to the face, faciality, and the social production of facialised networks. In other words, facialisation constitutes a veil on an arguably more profound reality that exists outside of its encompassing frame.

Further to Deleuze’s work on the cinema image and my general analysis of faciality is his examination of the close-up. The close-up is an important facet of the death-image, as it not only illustrates the nuances of the face, as a mixed semiotic with the constituting and constituted nature of signification and subjectivity respectively, but also the encompassing nature of facialisation. In his analysis of signification in Cinema, he uses the close-up of a clock as a reflective surface that has anticipatory value, which means that something is going to happen (168). The face, as another close-up object, also provides this value and for Deleuze, the close-up shot in film is animated along a two pole system, “In film, the close-up of the face can be said to have two poles: make the face reflect light or, on the contrary, emphasise its shadows
to the point of engulfing it ‘in pitiless darkness’” (231). The former aspect of reflecting light illustrates the anticipatory value of a constituting signifier, the 0 or \( n \) point of a developing intensity that arises with the anticipation of an event that is forthcoming while the latter ‘darkness’ demonstrates an end point or the gradual process of subjectification.

For example, Part Two examines the face as it encompasses objects within the despotic and authoritarian mixed semiotic regimes. As Bogue argues in Deleuze and Guattari “The despotic signifier is always “face-ified”, tied implicitly to the approving or disapproving face, the benignant smile or hostile frown, of the centralized social authority” (140). The despotic signifier thus only works within the regime of signs it produces and is attached too while the authoritarian regime is a product of this process, but in a way that internalises the despot through subjectification. Deleuze provides an example of this process in Thousand Plateaus:

Here again, it is clear that any combination is possible between the two limit-figures of the face. In Pabst's Lulu, the despotic face of the fallen Lulu is associated with the image of a bread knife, which has the anticipatory value of foreshadowing the murder; but the authoritarian face of Jack the Ripper also ascends a whole scale of intensities leading to the knife and Lulu's murder. (204)

Deleuze’s reference to the closing scenes of the film Pandora’s Box provides an indication of a death-image through the use of lighting, and the facialised montage, which arguably operates more with sense than meaning. In the scene, an innocent Lulu invites a man to her apartment unbeknown that he is Jack the Ripper. The initially calm assailant notices a knife on the table and is struck with an intensity to kill Lulu. The despotic signification of the knife as a surface is initially dark and in a Deleuzian sense a composite of black holes that mediate Jack’s emotions (see Figure 1.0).
The knife, which is initially out of view and implied by the plate it was once on, overwhelms Jack (see Figure 1.1), and the intensity of his contorted face provides a passionate encounter. For Deleuze, this is an example of the “authoritarian process of subjectification” (*Thousand Plateaus* 201).

In *Cinema* Deleuze uses new terms to describe the face, such as *intensive series*, which put succinctly constitute blocks of intensity that link and develop together, forming a series, such as the ascent of anger (37). Just as Jack the Ripper ascends a scale of intensities as he frantically anticipates the possibility of killing Lulu his face breaks with the preceding chain of events. Noticing a nearby bread knife a process of facialisation and at points, de-facialisation occurs, as he enters an intensive series within the mobile *death-image*. A proceeding shot opens the knife’s white wall surface (see Figure 1.2) further, as the light reflection signifies possibilities, which ultimately consume Jack.
As a mixed semiotic there is then an oscillation between the two poles in relation to Lulu and her assailant with the former engulfed in darkness as she slips away and dies. In its entirety, this scene animates a contextual death-image, as through the close-up and lighting it operates through and within facialisation.

Deleuze continues his work from Thousand Plateaus, as the clock or any object such as Jack the Ripper's knife is a face as the close-up is already a face (88). Depending on the context, the face as a close-up then warrants two questions, “What are you thinking about? Or, what is bothering you, what is the matter, what do you sense or feel?” (88). The first question for Deleuze relates to the reflective face, which is a face fixed on a dominant thought or in relation to the death-face a non-thought, which entices the viewer to wonder what the face or person was or is thinking. The second question is a way of understanding the shifts in a face’s sensuality that can take the shape of a smile, grimace or look of anger, which as discussed in Chapter 2 is subject to the abstract system of the faciality machine. Importantly the face in the close-up is an intensive expression and as a result yields this intensity to the world. It reciprocates the expression of intensity with that of the viewer who can accordingly respond with an affection-image.

For Deleuze the close-up also provides a pure affect that can override its background, environment or location to become any space whatever (Cinema 97). Deleuze uses this term to describe the close-up as an overriding or more specifically an over coding system that removes the background context, which would merely identify the face or
object as a partial object (as it still relies on context for meaning). The notion of any space whatever identifies the close-up as an affection-image that has the capacity to remove itself from identity or as discussed the facialised notion of landscapification.

In the close up it does, however, arguably remain subject to semblances of identity, which is an argument I develop further in Part Two, as “What produces the unity of the affect at each instant is the virtual conjunction assured by the expression, face or proposition” (105). The virtual conjunction as an abstract machine provides meaning as:

We can therefore distinguish two states of power-qualities, that is, of affects: as they are actualised in an individuated state of things and in the corresponding real connections (with a particular space-time, particular characters, particular roles, particular objects) and as they are expressed for themselves, outside spatio-temporal co-ordinates, with their own ideal singularities and their virtual conjunction. (p. 102)

The virtual conjunction of an affect enables real connections between particular characters, roles and relations. Just as the figuration of a knife contextualises the image of the fallen Lulu, the affection-image remains conditioned and organised by the abstract machine, albeit to a lesser degree than the perception and action image. As argued in Chapter 2, this outcome highlights the propensity of the face to quickly move beyond its material surface. This point is also important as it highlights the fluidity of the affection-image. For an immediate second or two, the affection-image might facilitate any space whatsoever, but this deterritorialised space is quickly reterritorialised and subsequently subject to the facialised coordinates of the virtual conjunctions that qualify the film or platform from which the image is shown. In this sense, it is argued that among other images the death-image can also provide an affection-image. It too is, however, subject to the virtual conjunctions of the abstract machine that not only accounts for the context from which the image is shown but also the particular individuals and the wider systems of organisation and desire that are part of its social production.
3.1 The image and belief

Before turning to a more concrete illustration of desire in Chapter 4, this section examines Deleuze’s understanding of belief, which is a significant component of the death-image that further elucidates on the nature of faciality. In Deleuze’s early work on David Hume’s philosophy, Empiricism and Subjectivity he formulates his understanding of belief in conjunction with his ideas, “Through belief and causality the subject transcends the given. Literally, the subject goes beyond what the mind gives it: I believe in what I have neither seen nor touched” (24). This early thinking from Deleuze provides further clarity to his later concept of faciality as it illustrates how and why beliefs move quickly beyond the given, which is a process subject to the virtual conjunctions that inform the perception of images.

Conducive to the virtual conjunction, belief is a product of the accumulative associations that the mind enables through its evolving connections. With this understanding, the death-image can be seen as transcending the given as it is created with facialised associations. In the context of this thesis, these associations are produced and stratified through facets such as mainstream media, which accordingly develop as images of thought. Belief in this sense is not a product of a subject with an innate common sense on the meaning of death. It is a subjectivity that is malleable to the connections and associations we experience, and also subject to a habit that if left unbridled compounds the same beliefs in death over time. As a facialised representation, the death-image is predicated on belief as a constituted field from which it derives meaning.

An example of this, which Deleuze polemises at length in Anti-Oedipus, is the belief that psychoanalysis provides an insight into the desire that drives us, and Deleuze equates this sentiment to a belief in a church that only the faithful and unquestioning accept (4). This understanding of faith, which could also qualify as a belief in a political or religious system is the fabric that structures society. For Deleuze, this sensibility is detrimental, as any ubiquitous form of governance that instils belief is oppressive and he argues this point in relation to Christianity:
Christianity taught us to see the eye of the lord looking down upon us. Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself. They talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They bind us to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects. (*Anti-Oedipus* 73)

As discussed in Chapter 2 this illustration of the eye looking down on us is an exemplar of the *death-image*. The face of Christ on the crucifix and its over coding potential as the harbinger of morality works hegemonically as an arboreal belief system that contains an image of thought. As Janell Watson argues in “Face of Christ” “Capitalism and Christianity blend signification with subjectification, producing faciality in its full force” (6). The despotic gaze that works with signification is internalised by subjectification resulting in the mixed semiotic regimes of capitalism and Christianity, which is an argument I further detail in relation to my *lingchi* photograph analysis in Chapter 6.

As is the general nature of monotheistic belief systems it enables measured associations and institutional direction that to some degree does not require the devout subject to form their own suppositions about death. Questions such as its meaning are catered for and this arguably illustrates the operational value of facialisation. As a product of organised desire, which as an active force will be examined in Chapter 4, belief is reactive and as such believers desire their own subjugation, as beliefs comprise their knowledge of the world. In this context a system of sanctioned beliefs, which can stand for any system or ideal, such as democracy and freedom, substitute the productive nature of desire for desire-production. In this context, Deleuze poses a series of questions that can be directly applied to my construction of the *death-image*, which in its most obvious sense represents an image of death, but as a double also enacts a set of beliefs operating as facialised precepts:

What does belief applied to the unconscious signify? What is an unconscious that no longer does anything but “believe,” rather than produce? What are the operations, the artifices that inject the unconscious with “beliefs” that are not even irrational, but on the contrary only too reasonable and consistent with the established order? (*Anti-Oedipus* 69)
Further questions can thus be posed in the formulation of the *death-image*, such as questioning the contexts in which images of death appear normal and as Deleuze outlines, consistent with the established order. The how and why can be posed or as will be discussed in relation to the problem, the ‘where and when’. Beliefs can then be formalised as specific social productions that produce, rework and reaffirm particular images that due to the encompassment of facialisation can be found on the conscious and unconscious levels. This presenting and (re) presenting of *death-images* help to secure a facialised climate, which is an argument developed over the course of this investigation. As Deleuze argues “Belief is necessarily something false that diverts and suffocates effective production” (*Anti-Oedipus* 111). The *death-image* achieves this outcome as to varying degrees it diverts the perceiver from the complex singularity of thinking death as it is given, which has political implications for its mainstream media promulgation.

It is argued that the *death-image* is inherently a political instrument, which is increasingly evident with the 24-hour media cycle that is prevalent today. As discussed in relation to Bogard and Colman the image of death obediently moves along a continuum of apathy to affect, and the point that Deleuze makes on the reasonable and consistent nature of beliefs readily applies to the *death-image*, as images of death that promote particular ‘unquestionable’ causes are thought of in this way. Just as the Kantian common sense is for Deleuze constructed rather than *a priori*, so is the way one perceives this image type. In a Western context the world is perceived by a collective that informs the subjective, which left unbridled cuts one off from the new, as Deleuze argues in *Cinema 2* “We do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interests to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands” (20). In this sense, the conditioned viewer determines what information they derive from an image, as the perceiver enacts their own subjective but also collective facialised dispositions. To some degree, in the context of the Vietnam War the sheer barbarity of the televised images did, however, override this sentiment through a de-facialisation of beliefs, but this line of flight was to some extent arguably reterritorialised as the war ended.
In the context of the image, which as argued is wide reaching as for Deleuze everything is an image, our comprehension closes off more than the image provides. We have a tendency to only see the images that make up the world in the form of clichés, which are ultimately re-presented beliefs disseminated by the networks of social production. Deleuze’s notion of transcendental empiricism, which will be further unpacked in Part Two, adds to this understanding by considering the difference that partakes in the constituting of consciousness, as distinct to the difference that operates in the field of the constituted. Reflecting on McMahon’s argument once more “The categories of subject and object are in one sense too empirical: they belong to an already constituted world of experience whose constitution is supposed to be accounted for on the transcendental level rather than simply reproduced on this level as already given” (“Immanuel Kant” 73). A contrast between the transcendent and transcendental is important here as the transcendental is a way of approaching the intuitive aspects of a consciousness in the process of constituting itself.

Alternatively, with its adherence to recognising the constituted the transcendent imposes a hierarchy. In other words, the virtual as difference repeating is the constituting and the actual as the return of the same is the constituted. As this thesis argues, the constituted world of experience is largely determined by the centralising system of facialisation, but through such facets as the constituting ascendancy of intensity, one can break free from this determination. Therefore, just as the process of facialisation is potentially precarious and subject to processes of de-facialisation, so too is belief and the already given. In relation to cinema, Deleuze argues that from its inception it has had a special affiliation with belief, which in a tangible way one could argue is due to its depiction of the world, but he takes it further than that. For Deleuze, the world of the movement-image in cinema was based on principles of emancipation and a belief in the world as a place that with enlightened human agency had the potential for self-determination and social improvement. Whether it was the empirical composition of D. W. Griffith’s films or the dialectical montages of Sergei Eisenstein, directors of the movement-image filmed a belief in the possibility of enhancing the human condition (Cinema 36).
For Deleuze, cinema in these forms is organic in the sense that images were perceived as evolving towards a greater universal goal or telos. As discussed this conception of film was, however, displaced after World War II, which for Deleuze marks the crisis of the movement-image. Factors contributing to a break in the organic representation of the world and its capacity to successfully represent the forward orientation of civilisation are partly attributed to the atrocities of war and the exploitation of cinema for propaganda purposes. As Deleuze argues in Cinema 2 “The mass-art, the treatment of masses, which should not have been separable from an accession of the masses to the status of true subject, has degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler” (164). This statement remains pertinent today as a belief in cinema as a tool for representing truth has been diminished along with the image, which as a process continues to hold veracity for the facialised death-image.

For Deleuze, the anthropocentric world ultimately constructs our images and as a consequence the link between humans and the world, as represented in organic cinema has been further severed “The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us” (Cinema 2 171). This sentiment can be directly related to the modern facialised subject in the sense that facial mediation arguably removes one from the world of experience that Deleuze advocates for. The contemporary subject is not only cynical of images found in cinema, but the dominant media flows that purport to a general cynicism. As outlined in the introduction, for the modern subject cynicism is ultimately a product of capitalistic facialisation and due to this people are less likely to believe in social and especially technological productions, such as political rhetoric and the manipulation of partisan images.

Due to this “universal schizophrenia,” which is debatable in the context of the aforementioned theistic and ideological beliefs this sentiment can be viewed as a type of postmodern condition with an incredulity of narratives (The Postmodern Condition) that contribute to Zizek’s cynical subject. The world of desire-production is manipulative as it not only severs the link between humans and the true nature of the world as a durational becoming, but in this process, it also connects people to an artificial world of illusion and subsequently the potential of resentment. Beliefs are a
component of the abstract machine, but although there might be a contemporary cynicism towards metanarratives, facialisation continues to operate with what Guattari refers to in *Machinic Unconscious* as an adjusting of formulas or as Sullivan argues in “Pragmatics” the configuration of new singularities. Discounting active proponents of alternative social systems one can here think of the cynicism that might be directed towards political rhetoric and decisions, but not necessarily the system itself, which is evident with beliefs and economic systems, such as democracy and global capitalism.

Despite the cynicism and awareness of the corruption and death that result from these systems, people continue to interact and operate within their frameworks. In relation to the *death-image*, this process remains significant, as although there might be a cynicism towards media representations there remains an underlying territorialisation of clichés or simply put, a series of stereotypes that remain largely intact. As Deleuze asserts in *Cinema 2*, death only half concerns us (171) or taking this notion further, if not directly related to one’s life the experience of images of death is largely automatic, as Colman warns in *Deleuze and Cinema*. Although there are exceptions to this outlook and movements within these fields as assemblages, this direction of sense, such as the possible distrust or hate directed towards a minority or Other group highlights the power of facialisation, as sense can be directed and manipulated for political ends. In this context, the repetition of the same provides the historical condition and platform for the exploitation and coercion of facialisation to occur.

Modern cinema can, however, negate this course by “Restoring our belief in the world - this is the power of modern cinema (when it stops being bad). Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we need reasons to believe in this world” (*Cinema 2* 172). Although this statement is contradictory in the sense that a notion of ‘this’ world requires an image of thought to believe in, Deleuze’s suggestion can be better understood as enabling a belief that supercedes the cynicism of disbelief. In this sense, the capacity to believe is a privilege that escapes many, but it is worth mentioning that due to the various belief systems that people adhere to, this grouping is minor. Believing is thus beneficial and Deleuze argues that ‘good’ cinema can only do this if it illustrates a belief in the world as it is, which means that it must avoid utopian thinking and engage the world as it is given (*Cinema 2* 180).
Belief is thus a powerful product of mediated associations that can have varying effects. In relation to this Pisters argues that “Posing knowledge as degrees of belief with varying scales of probability and acknowledging the role of the imagination in humanity as an inventive species, can help us to consider what has been lost” (The Neuro-Image 186). This sentiment is important as it positions knowledge as a field that is reliant on varying degrees of belief for its production, support and dissemination. Thinking of knowledge this way reduces its hold on imagination and as such beliefs can thus be negative in the sense of externally reducing the power to view images as they are given, and positive as a desire to believe can lead to something new, such as viewing or encountering death-images differently. This understanding reverts back to Deleuze’s understanding of the cinema image in its purely functional state. For Deleuze, the cinema, although tarnished by its history can, however, restore a belief in the world. This outlook returns to the notion of intensity, as filming the ascent of becoming provides a direct link to nature and our sense of it.

Deleuze’s taxonomy, therefore, adds further layers to his notion of faciality. His image classification invokes an additional stratum for the death-image, as it animates the way images function in relation to movement, time, and as shown death. As discussed in relation to Pisters the movement and time images are distinct from their centres of indetermination with the former constituting time as an object derived from movement and the latter constituting movement derived from time. Both the movement and time images are important for Deleuze, as they work with the premise that everything is an image, and as such provide a direct connection to reality, albeit a potentially false one. Any object that operates through the close-up becomes a face, which as a concept overcodes its surroundings with such values as anticipation. The close-up can also operate on its own as an encounter, but this process of escape is conjointly subject to varying degrees of recognition, which operate through the virtual conjunctions of the abstract machine.

This point illustrates the grid that perception places or to use Bergson’s term veils upon objects, but following his lead, there is potential to move beyond facialised understanding through the intuition of dissimilar images. Sutton’s and Baross’ conducive propositions that still images provide movement through intensity are also significant, as they work with this notion and the potential of utilising sense as a
means of interpretation. This chapter has extended the concept of facialisation to incorporate a more concrete sense of the image, as that which illuminates perception in the context that everything is an image. As part of this opening theoretical framework, the question of ethics and desire in relation to the death-image is now examined. Images of death produce affects, which as argued are potentially dangerous for power formations that facialise desire through systems of social production.
4.0 The ethics of desire

Deleuze’s conception of an active desire underpins his work with Guattari and his general philosophy, which as outlined is subject to a practical form of ethics. For instance, Deleuze’s ethics is not based on transcendent notions of morality, such as good and evil, but on base modes of being, as Miguel de Beistegui argues in *Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy* “Ethics is not concerned with values, judgment, or duty, but with ontological potentials, powers and bodily or physical states” (105). The following chapter critically introduces Deleuze’s thought in relation to Friedrich Nietzsche who is a major influence on his work, and the subject of his book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. This chapter also touches on Baruch Spinoza, as an introduction to Deleuze’s work on ethics and a philosopher he studies in *Expressionism in Philosophy* and *Practical Philosophy*, which in part he relates to Nietzsche’s writing as a conducive ethical framework. Both philosophers provide Deleuze with a way of applying a practical ethics to life, and as such, facilitate a system for discerning and living with the images of death that make up the world of lived experience.

For instance, as this thesis mobilises Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of deconstructing images of death in relation to examples of media and art, further questions can be raised. Do images of death that appear in the media dissipate the potential for active choices of desire, and in relation to the previous chapters, how and why do images of death, such as the ones promulgated during the Vietnam War evoke particular affects? This question works with my general investigation into the way faciality conditions responses to images of death as death-images. Along with a practical ethics, which is illustrated in relation to desire, it is shown that the practical nature of the image and how it functions further elicits a framework for the death-image. As argued, this image type not only produces a lack, which is shown to condition desire, but it conjointly affects bodily states. The death-image also poses a problem on the how and why one can approach death in general and more specifically in relation to Deleuze’s conceptualisation of desire and the image.

As Tasmin Lorraine (2011) argues in *Immanent Ethics*, “This is not an ethics that attempts to apply rules or principles that would hold for a universal subject, but rather
an ethics of the event that entails being as true to the singularity of events as possible and experimenting with the intensities that might enhance life's flourishing” (169). This sensibility relates directly to an ethics of the image, as following Deleuze’s lead, everything is an image and within its perception and affect are variances of intensity. Conducive to Lorraine’s commentary this outlook necessitates a break with representation, as Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*, “Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilises and moves nothing” (23). Deleuze provides the tools for this endeavour and the conditions for not discerning what is, but the possibilities of the new, and the following chapter further navigates this notion, as part of this investigation’s opening theoretical framework.

In the preface of *Anti-Oedipus* Michel Foucault describes the work as “A book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time” (xv). This edition is the first part of Deleuze’s *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* series and among many aims, it is a critical response to Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Deleuze argues that the Oedipus Complex, which situates desire as a lack formed within the familial state (father, mother and child) creates and supports oppressive social conditions. In this climate desire is mediated as Deleuze states “Your drives have been constructed, and arranged in such a manner that your desire is positively invested in the system that allows you to have this particular interest” and that “Lack appears only at the level of interest, because the social formation—the infrastructure—in which we have already invested our desire has in turn produced that lack (*Anti-Oedipus* 74). As argued in Chapter 2, desire is positive in this sense, as it is actively directed towards particular aims and goals, which largely operate without the subject being aware of his or her determination. For instance, one might desire and work towards accumulating wealth, but this desire works within the confines of a society that provides a lack of wealth. It is also based on a society that can be viewed as operating within the confines of triangles.

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7 It is worth noting in the context of *Anti-Oedipus*, that as a dominant belief system psychoanalysis was prevalent in France at the end of the 20th century, and not as prominent today. It can, however, still provide a relevant case study, as it affords an example of a generalising structure that following Deleuze’s line of argument strongly influenced its followers. In doing so this type of science reduces the potential of desire, as it invokes an image of thought that ultimately contains the individual and his or her agency.
As Reda Besmaia highlights in her introduction to Deleuze’s book *Kafka* “The familial triangle, for example, is connected to other triangles (such as commercial, economic, bureaucratic, and juridical ones), and thus the “individual concern” finds itself linked directly to the political” (19). This occurs because the production of desire, which for Deleuze can be viewed as a natural compelling force, is conditioned and directed by an institutionalised system that is ultimately coercive. In relation to the *death-image*, one can think of the individual concern with war, mortality, finitude and its media representation. Strategic war reporting attaches these sentiments to political agendas, which as argued are directly linked to State and commercial imperatives. This complex and shifting representation of death is attached to the vested interests of dominant media networks, and this process directly impacts on the family and subsequently the individual that views and engages with this aspect of visual culture. In “Question of Desire” Daniel Smith elates this sentiment to Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘herd instinct’ and the way that particular drives are socially arranged in an effort to maximise a production for the mass that takes precedence over the individual (70).

Smith posits that the texts *Anti-Oedipus* and *Thousand Plateaus* are primarily concerned with this phenomenon, which is the social ordering of drives throughout different stages of civilisation. He argues that Deleuze’s notion of desire “Is nothing other than the state of the impulses and drives. “Drives,” he writes in Anti-Oedipus, are simply the desiring-machines themselves” (71). In this sense drives as desire are not individual, but intimately caught within the drives that society values. As machines, each drive is connected to another drive and the subject is largely void in this process apart from mediating an arranged set of possibilities. As Smith outlines this valuing of drives has changed throughout different periods of history, hence Nietzsche’s genealogy project that Deleuze picks up in his own work of discerning the way desire has been directed at different stages of civilisation (70). In this context the way one views the *death-image* is also subject to the current morality frameworks that value particular drives as desires over others.

As will be argued in Chapter 7, this sentiment was and to some extent remains evident with the Kennedy assassination. The initial paroxysm of the Kennedy *death-image*
shuddered the American public’s sense of security and the facialised frameworks that established this sensibility. The Kennedy death-image superceded alternative death-images, as an image that touched the nation and beyond. On a mass scale, and this point is outlined at length in section 7.2, desire was directed to love the President of the U.S. as the harbinger of safety and security. Although the President, on the surface at least, could control the lives of U.S. citizens through dominant media channels, schools, and bureaucracies at large, his image was assembled as one of desire. One of the central aims of schizoanalysis is to deconstruct the social investment of this phenomenon, such as the facialised love for a man or woman that one has never met personally.

As argued, psychoanalysis enables Deleuze to formulate schizoanalysis, which as argued in the proceeding chapter, is largely a response to the homogenising nature of the field. The belief that desire fulfils a lack subverts its potential as a generating force in its own right. Viewing desire as active attributes it with the power to go out into the world and create something new, and as shown this self-determination and autonomous agency is problematic for the functioning of the mass. As Deleuze argues “If desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a society” (Anti-Oedipus 126). Along with the revolutionary potential of the Vietnam War images, this notion can be directly related to Foucault’s illustration of the disciplinary spectacle, which called into question the established order of the sovereign (Discipline and Punish).

As discussed in relation to Buchanan’s argument in Schizoanalysis of Cinema, it follows that if a society requires the repression of desire to function in a particular way then an unadulterated desire will be disruptive to this ordering. As Deleuze argues, “Despite what some revolutionaries think about this, desire is revolutionary in its essence, and no society can tolerate a position of real desire without its structures of exploitation, servitude, and hierarchy being compromised (Anti-Oedipus 126). As an established order, society, therefore, has a vested interest in controlling the unpredictable nature of desire, which unsullied can generate new and potentially dangerous ways of thinking and acting. For Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza this unfolding directly relates to a question of ethics.
For Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, the conatus (which translated from Latin can mean - tendency, endeavour or striving to exist (Spinoza and Jewish Philosophy 4) is the essence of a desire that is perpetually in motion, propelling the active and passive affections that result in varying levels of joy and sadness. Awareness of this process provides a way of recognising positive relationships that increase and decrease the intensity of particular modes of being. As Deleuze argues in Expressionism in Philosophy there are two types of encounters with an external body that can be situated as good and bad. The former is associated with meeting a body that successfully relates to ones own, which produces the active affection of joy and the latter produces the affect of sadness in its ‘disagreeable’ relation to another body (241). In Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, the directive basis of good and bad are entirely material and removed from anything that transcends this ontology. For Deleuze, the primary concern in Spinoza’s ethics is with what bodies can do and what these relations bring about, hence, his leitmotif: What can a body do? Furthermore, Deleuze’s work is concerned with an immanent ethics in the way that any removal from the natural world of desiring flows is unduly transcendent.

This conceptual application of the conatus and the way bodies have a predisposed life force aimed at preservation is a way of understanding an unmediated, but ultimately directed desire. Conatus is desire when it has a focus - a practical motivation as Julian Bourg outlines in Revolution to Ethics “The ethical question is: How can our capacity, essence, power of acting be augmented and amplified; how can we cease to be affected by external causes that make us suffer; how can our desires express us; and how can we express the maximum of joyful desire?” (150). Identifying the practical focus of a productive desire and its place within desire-production is important as it questions habits that develop from recognition, which in turn can cause sadness as one is desiring within the parameters of society. In relation to death, it also highlights the potentially detrimental affects of death-images that through the social production of representation impact on the individual.

One can here think of the many images of death promulgated by the media that when viewed elicit sorrow on one level. On another level they can produce climates of fear such as the War on Terror that following Bourg’s argument can be viewed as an external cause that elicits suffering. Conducive to this sentiment and the societal
containment of desire as outlined in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is aware of the corrupting affects of society and reactive forces, such as the facialised death-image “The distinction between good things and bad provides the basis for a real ethical difference, which we must substitute for a false moral opposition” (*Expressionism in Philosophy* 254). As argued in Parts Two and Three the death-image largely operates within the mixed semiotic of facialisation, which inherently adopts and produces false oppositions. In its simplicity one could argue that this notion of good and bad is reductive, but for Deleuze, it provides a platform with the necessary exclusion of moral abstractions. His understanding of desire is active and aimed at harnessing the power to be affected in positive ways.

Conducive to his appropriation of Spinoza, Deleuze appropriates Nietzsche’s philosophy for an ethics that frees desire from the stratifications of society. Both philosophers aimed at improving the human condition, as Smith argues, “In Spinoza and Nietzsche, the transcendent moral opposition (between Good and Evil) is replaced by an immanent ethical difference (between noble and base modes of existence, in Nietzsche; or between passive and active affections, in Spinoza) (“Question of Desire” 67). Nietzsche is an important influence on Deleuze, and his development of ethics is a way of understanding the physical nature of desire. Similar to Spinoza he moves beyond the categories of good and evil and conducive to Deleuze’s system constructs an immanent ethics of pure ontology (“Question of Desire” 66).

For Nietzsche, humanity’s fascination with morality was its sickness, its degradation and ultimate downfall. Morality was a product of the slave that inverts the strong, noble right to govern from within towards the impuissant projection of hate and blame onto the external. Ressentiment is the triumph of reactive forces and the negative over active ones and can be understood as the corrupting component in Nietzsche’s force dynamics. It is effectively a mode of being that reacts to the external in a way that compromises ones singularity, which as a condition has a strong affect on how one perceives death-images.

For instance, in *Jurisdiction in Deleuze* Edward Mussawir looks at the role of resentment in the jurisprudence of judgement. He identifies the resentful judge as
resenting all of existence, and due to this is unable to localise judgement to the singular jurisdiction of a particular court performance (174). If one succumbs to resentment a blanket of negativity befalls their judgement, affecting their relations and perception of others. This sentiment has direct implications for how one generalises death-images, especially images of this type that through excessive media dissemination have become loaded with dominant meanings. In the “Representation of Islam” Shahram Akbarzadeh and Bianca Smith argue this point in relation to the representation of Islam in the media, and the point that “International news articles are overall often neutral and non-inflammatory in language, but actually reproduce negative stereotyping of Muslims and Islam because they lack explanation of the wider context and do not include a range of opinions of Muslims themselves” (22). Just as the resentful judge hands out punishment to his collective subjects, responding to images of dead Muslim fighters, which although highly subjective, can provide no individuality or wider explanation of their cause.

This sentiment is particularly evident in relation to the facialisation of the War on Terror and its homogenisation of Muslims through capitalistic facialisation, “These [Western] types of international articles are situated within the context of the ‘war on terror,’ they tend to focus on physical events that occur in these ‘war zones’ and in doing so recreate the image that Muslims in the Middle East are violent jihad fighters who need to be stopped and controlled by the West” (“Representation of Islam” 34). It is important to note once more, and this notion will be further contextualised in Part Two, that how one responds to images is largely based on interpretation. While news reporting can on the surface appear objective it nonetheless informs the viewer on what to think about an issue and can thus produce a climate of negativity, which in the context of this thesis is propagated by death-images. As will be further demonstrated throughout this investigation, this is especially the case in relation to media driven campaigns such as the War on Terror.

It is my contention throughout this examination to demonstrate that resentment plays a clear role in the judgement of death-images. In Political Theory after Deleuze Katherine Wolfe argues, “For Deleuze, ressentiment emerges when inferior reactive forces lose their place in the hierarchical schema of forces, the result being that they no longer obey the superior forces that normally compel them to coordinate ‘re-
actions’” (76). As Wolfe argues, reactivity in healthy individuals provides the stimulus for a proceeding action, which reflecting on the previous chapter can be visualised as an action-image, which as argued depends on the nature of the perception-image and its proceeding affect. The death-image is significant in Wolfe’s respect, as it can illicit “power without action” (76), which has clear implications for society as it contends with media driven images of death. That is the nuances of sense attributed to the affect and effect of particular images at points in space and time, which in relation to Mussawir’s jurisprudence and Akbarzadeh and Smith’s Islamification, benefits from an appreciation of the singularity.

Deleuze theoretically examines the notion of resentment in his book *Nietzsche & Philosophy*. In this text, he argues that the forces, which make up the body constitute the particular will to power that is evident at any given time. His interpretation of Nietzsche draws on the becoming active and reactive - affirmative and negative force that forms wills that are strong enough to return. As discussed, this thought can be viewed as a cyclical process that connects the active and reactive forces in new and reworked ways. Each of these volitions is dependent on the other, as Deleuze argues:

> In Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived as a negative element in the essence … in its relation with the other the force which makes itself obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it affirms its own difference and enjoys this difference. (*Nietzsche & Philosophy* 9)

Following this line, he highlights that Nietzsche’s active forces are inherently non-dialectical, as they provide no charge for negation. Negation is reactive and complimenting Spinoza, an immanent ontology is joyful, which for Deleuze contrasts the laborious search for contradictions (9). The will to power is not willed, as Deleuze outlines, “Power is not what the will wants, but that which wants in will” (119). The will to power is thus not the will to dominate an environment, although this may result, but the strongest will that only perceives the future as creation. Perceiving will this way breaks with beliefs on innate goodness, as it shows the potential of desire to be free from negation and the more contemporaneous lack.

A certain collaboration of forces is thus evident in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s trajectory, as although forces ceaselessly change they coexist and ultimately strive to
be different. This difference does, however, produce dominating and dominated forces that constitute Nietzsche’s body where “Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a multiple phenomenon, a ‘unity of domination’” (40). Conductive to his work in *Difference and Repetition*, this unity describes the forces that are strong enough to overcome the others, but this process can also relate to the unification of the faculties on a given object or put another way the reactive coming together of our disparate senses into one overriding image of thought. Furthermore, forces subsist in the unconscious and are only realised through consciousness, which is why Deleuze defines the actualisation of consciousness or consciousness in general as reactive.

Becoming active only occurs when a durational flow of active forces ascends from the unconscious and *become* with the body. For Deleuze, the will to power, therefore, occurs when a synthesis of forces substantiates a force that overcomes the others, and as discussed above, this particular power can be viewed as genealogical where “Nietzsche calls the genealogical element of force the will to power. Genealogical means differential and genetic” (52). Deleuze recognises the influence of Spinoza on Nietzsche in the fluidity of forces and their adaption to ‘affectivity’ (62). For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s will to power is nevertheless constantly subject to a potential inversion, and the attribution of resentment can negatively form the dominant will, but this process is subject to the qualitative selection of the eternal return that only caters for the being of becoming to be returned (72).

As outlined, this notion has implications for the role of the *death-image*. Through the recognition of established values, the slave, which for Nietzsche is synonymous with the mass, herd animal, or taken further any conscious being (as consciousness in this sense is reactive) only receives a limited form of power from the external and pays homage to its image (*Nietzsche & Philosophy* 10). Representation, such as dominant Western images of Muslim fighters act as a form of identity that preconditions people to seek out the same and in doing so lose the full power of their agency or put simply the full power of their perception and subsequent affections. As Deleuze argues “The mania for representing, for being represented, for getting oneself represented; for having representatives and representeds: this is the mania that is common to all slaves, the only relation between themselves they can conceive of, the relation that
they impose with their triumph” (81). This proposition directly relates to the death-image, as its primary function is facialising death and its mass audience. In relation to faciality, its representation adheres to and conjointly facilitates the mania of representing. As is further argued, representation is effectively resentment in the way that this environment or in relation to the War on Terror, a climate of fear perpetuates a system of delegation.

I use the term delegation pejoratively, as the individual or person in question delegates their responsibility of thought to the external, which reflecting on Besmaia’s thoughts in Kafka is the political, commercial, and subsequently dominant media networks that permeate the social production of visual culture. One then becomes a slave as they are subject to the strategic motives of external agencies and ultimately the desire of others. Against these external agencies the will to power measures the quality of a force, which means the will can affirm or negate desire in its pure form at any given time. Conducive to Spinoza’s substance the active force is that which affirms its existence and says ‘yes’ to its own becoming while the passive says ‘no’. Correlating with Spinoza’s conatus thought is subject to forces that can be either affirmed or denied. The affirmative yes is the imperative of Nietzsche’s ontology of selection and Deleuze’s central concept of becoming, which he contrasts with images of thought that procure a return of the same. I argue that this perspective directly relates to Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return, which along with the will to power is an affirmation of difference and an important concept in the formulation of the death-image.

In the context of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy, repetition of difference as the eternal return can also be thought of as a recurring composite of active and reactive forces. For example, in Difference and Repetition he interprets the eternal return as:

The selective character of eternal return appears clearly in Nietzsche’s idea: it is not the Whole, the Same or the prior identity in general which returns … either as parts of the whole or as elements of the same. Only the extreme forms return …

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8 This argument, which is traced by Deleuze (and many philosophers before him) to Hellenic philosophers, such as Heraclitus who argued that: “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man” (Heraclitus quoted by Moore 546).
those which, large or small, are deployed within the limit and extend to the limit of their power, transforming themselves and changing one into another. (51)

Following on from my discussion of the future in Chapter 3, as the eternal return contrasts the return of the same as the being of becoming, it is also to some extent distinct from memory, as memory requires an identity of the past. As the expression of the will to power, the eternal return is open to the future, and this future is largely unknown. It can then be thought of as the differential process that only returns the particular forces that have been strong enough to take hold before. It is thus a selective return of intensities, which are neither physical nor quantifiable. The forces return, but due to their extreme nature they inevitably change and this change is the process that warrants the new, which as outlined in Chapter 3 relates to Deleuze’s third synthesis of time. It is argued that the eternal return and the will to power are inextricably linked, as the dominant will is the affirmation of the differential forces that are strong enough to return. The constant return provides the will with the conditions to unite and push through external forces.

Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche is, therefore, conducive to Spinoza’s in its ethic of living an active life free from harmful external forces. All three philosophers’ privilege an ethics over a morality that goes beyond the transcending notions of good and evil. As Smith argues, Deleuze contrasts morality as an abstract transcendent value system that constrains people and ethics as a way of evaluating the immanent flux of the now (Question of Desire 66). Through this wisdom of understanding desire and the drives one can attain a joyful life of self-affirmation. Spinoza and Nietzsche break with the Cartesian mind and body dualism by privileging the body as a singular entity whose conditions for affecting and being affected (affectivity) are directly related to power - the power of one’s own desire and drives. The will to power is one of affirming being as a process of ‘becoming as difference’ and the conatus contributes to this notion, as Deleuze argues in his lecture on Spinoza’s ethics:

From the point of view of an ethics, all that exists, all beings (étants) are related to a quantitative scale, which is that of power (puissance). They have more or less power. This differentiable quantity is power. The ethical discourse will not cease to speak to us, not of essences, it doesn’t believe in essences, it speaks to us only of power (puissance), that is, the actions and passions of which something is capable. (‘Ontologie-Ethique”)
The Deleuzian ethic is then one of becoming and acquiring the *puissance* to act in relation to one's affections. The notion of individual power quantity in relation to ethics is different to that of a quantitative multiplicity as people can have the individual agency to harness the power to act, which in relation to the will to power is an inherent condition. In this paradigm, each person is an individual with no general essence apart from a difference resulting from what his or her body can do. This understanding of individual agency as subject to differential forces is beneficial for my construction of the *death-image*, as this type of ethics enables a discussion on the affirmative and reactive, active and passive responses to images of death. It will move beyond the image of thought that qualifies facialised oppositions of morality, such as qualifying images of death as good and evil, which is the discourse propagated through political media agendas, such as the War on Terror. The will to power can be affirmative and in conjunction with Spinoza’s conatus facilitates the conditions for Deleuze’s immanent ethics of desire as a pure ontology to occur. Before turning to a more direct formulation of the *death-image* in Part Two with practical case studies of this image type in practice, I will now further examine schizoanalysis, as a concrete method for interrogating facialised images of death.
5.0 Schizoanalysis

In “Signatures of the Invisible” Roberts argues that as a framework schizoanalysis can move beyond the at times closed nature of Deleuze’s theory, such as his later work on cinema, which primarily focuses on the movement and time image. As argued in Chapter 3, this notion is significant as for Deleuze everything is an image, and as such schizoanalysis directly relates to lived experience and the abstract machines that govern the wider frame of a visual environment.

Analysing the social relations between people is something that the schizoanalysis books had already been doing, and as any communication between the two projects will demand that cinema opens itself to a bit of relation to the outside (as schizoanalysis asks), then any coupling of schizoanalysis and cinema must always be more than cinema - schizoanalysis and visual culture. (Roberts 152)

As touched on in the introduction, through an application of schizoanalysis the vast field of visual culture provides infinite nuances, which ultimately elicit problematic and subsequently complex interactions. Deleuze promotes this process as a field of examining relations as intersecting assemblages that are partly compounded by flows of signs and expression.

As argued in relation to Guattari’s machinic unconscious and theorists such as Sutton, schizoanalysis highlights the abstract machines that provide these dominant plays of signification, which as a process has clear implications for the operation and comprehension of death-images within a visual environment. With the cinema image schizoanalysis already relates to its unfolding nature as it passes through the perception, affection and action image, but it also adds to the unique elements of the particular field in question, and as Roberts argues, the social relations this process elucidates. This chapter further contextualises schizoanalysis as a method for interrogating connections in relation to Deleuze’s philosophy and more specifically by looking at Guattari’s formulation of the framework. This occurs in his later article “Schizoanalysis”, which clearly articulates the method or as discussed, meta-modelling system. This process identifies schizoanalysis as a more concrete process for examining facialised images of death, which will be undertaken in Parts Two and Three.
As the name schizoanalysis infers, Deleuze’s illustration of the schizoid is important as it describes the decoding potential of the framework and systems such as capitalism. For Deleuze, the schizo, which refers to a condition of production rather than a mental illness, sets its own coordinates and is not contained by oedipal codes, such as one’s name, birth date, father and mother (Anti-Oedipus 9). In place of these categories, it gauges the ‘plurality of irreducible forces’ that make up Nietzsche’s body. Both the schizoid and capitalism enable difference where identity exists, but the latter differs from the former in its adherence to flows of capital (although capitalism largely constitutes the schizophrenic condition). Capitalism decodes the codes, as Brian Pronger argues in Body Fascism, “Capitalism frees desire of its ‘inherent’ codification in logics such as good and evil, only to recodify it according to various logics of value” (107). Media driven moralistic oppositions such as good and evil are thus arbitrary and representation in this context is subject to facialisation. This process remains fluid, which as argued in section 2.3 is the readjusting of facial formulas that accommodated Obama within white capitalist faciality.

In relation to the death-image, a commercial representation of death works with codes in the sense it can operate with existing faciality compounds or to varying degrees decode new ones. Regardless of this process desire is ultimately monetised and subsequently directed through capitalist networks for capital gain and as argued throughout this thesis, political ends such as the normalisation of events through mainstream media news programming 9. In this context death is effectively commodified, as through the support of cable charges and advertisements people tune in to watch images of this type. This is not to say that this form of social production is seamless, as Hanusch argues, “The relationship to the coverage of death in the news media should be clear. There always exist struggles over the meanings of death, and how these deaths are represented to audiences is part of this struggle” (“Representing Death” 37). Regardless of this struggle mainstream media images of death are death-images par excellence. This is due to the inherent power these networks possess to readjust perceptions, which is a process detailed in Part Three through my practical application of the death-image in a media context.

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9 As argued the War on Terror provides an example of commercial news outlets promoting State agendas, which is a process that will be detailed further in Chapter 7.
To formulate his understanding of capitalism Deleuze looks to Karl Marx “What we find most interesting in Marx is his analysis of capitalism as an immanent system that’s constantly overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against them once more in a broader form, because its fundamental limit is capital itself” (*Nietzsche & Philosophy* 171). For Deleuze, capitalist production can be animated across two poles, as he argues in *Anti-Oedipus* “If social investments can be said to be paranoiac or schizophrenic, it is to the extent that they have paranoia and schizophrenia as ultimate products under the determinate conditions of capitalism” (127). This social investment in visual culture and more specifically in the field of death-images works across the poles of schizophrenia and paranoia, which are ultimately products of a capitalism that facilitates flows of signification and subjectification. In a Deleuzian context this mixed semiotic can be illustrated as capitalism emulating signs and capturing identity through its white wall and black hole system.

The paranoiac pole invests in a “Central sovereignty; overinvests it by making it the final eternal cause for all the other social forms of history; counterinvests the enclaves or the periphery; and disinvests every free ‘figure’ of desire” (*Anti-Oedipus* 183). An instance of this disinvestment could be anything that deviates from the faciality machine. This central sovereignty system is a form of fascism that schizoanalysis aims to perturb, “These oscillations of the unconscious, these underground passages from one type of libidinal investment to the other - often the coexistence of the two - form one of the major objects of schizoanalysis” (*Anti-Oedipus* 278). As discussed in Section 2.3, poles can be used to diagrammatically illustrate the movements between the paranoiac and schizophrenic, which relates to Deleuze’s notion of the Body Without Organs (BwO), which is the organisational plane these limits subsist on. As Deleuze argues in *Anti-Oedipus*, “If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality” (26). The productive nature of desire in the real world can be elucidated further with a more concrete understanding of the BwO and the assemblage.
5.1 The assemblage

Deleuze’s concept of the Body Without Organs (BwO), which is related to practical examples of death-images in Part Three, can be understood as a virtual plane from which intensities ascend. An understanding of intensities is significant for schizoanalysis, as Nick Davis argues “Stock of unique elements in a field, mapping routes among these singularities and measuring their relative intensities, frequencies, speeds, and other traits, as well as relations between them” (77). This occurrence can be visualised as either a phase space of intensities or through the manifold, which provides a way to visually map rates of change in assemblages. As the basis and limit for intensities, the BwO is a conceptual way of understanding the non-material, virtual non-space, which has its own organisational process. This formation is separate and develops differently from the organism that works in conjunction with its movements (Powell). The BwO organises the two poles of paranoia and schizophrenia, as Deleuze argues:

The two sides of the body without organs are, therefore, the side on which the mass phenomenon and the paranoiac investment corresponding to it are organized on a microscopic scale, and the other side on which, on a submicroscopic scale, the molecular phenomena and their schizophrenic investment are arranged. It is on the body without organs, as a pivot, as a frontier between the molar and the molecular, that the paranoia-schizophrenia division is made. (Anti-Oedipus 309)

As demonstrated this had already been Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s project, as he outlines in Essays Critical and Clinical “To define the body in its becoming, its intensity, as the power to affect or to be affected, that is, the Will to Power” (131). For schizoanalysis, the BwO is a way of illustrating the grid or map from which these transitions occur and can be further understood in relation to assemblages.

In Deleuze and the Political Paul Patton argues that “Schizoanalysis offers a series of conceptual contrasts in terms of which we can analyse a given social field or process and evaluate the assemblages in play” (70). For Deleuze, assemblages are firstly territorial, which qualifies their content and expression. This means that they are at
once machinic (as in expected flows) and expressive in their operation as assemblages of enunciation (*Thousand Plateaus* 526). Ascertain content as part of the pragmatic system (bodies interacting in particular ways) and expression as part of the semiotic system (the way bodies communicate through different patterns of significance and the frameworks that facilitate this process) of an assemblage is an important first division for Deleuze, and conducive to his penchant for two pole systems he identifies dual concrete axes for the assemblage:

On the one hand, what is the territoriality of the assemblage, what is the regime of signs and the pragmatic system? On the other hand, what are the cutting edges of deterritorialization, and what abstract machines do they effectuate? The assemblage is tetravalent: (1) content and expression; (2) territoriality and deterritorialization. (*Thousand Plateaus* 525)

The assemblage can thus be any dynamic structure that has a degree of territoriality, which is identifiable through its semiotic and pragmatic system. This territory is open to sudden movements that can deterritorialise its foundations through lines of flight, but as mentioned above, they run the risk of reterritorialising or destroying themselves in the process (*Thousand Plateaus* 245). In *Deleuze’s Way* Bouge describes these lines, which referring to Deleuze’s two-poles above can be viewed as schizophrenic “A line of flight is a line of escape from any fixed and stable order. It is a line between things, between clearly demarcated entities and identities, a zigzag, unpredictable course that disrupts the coordinates of an organised space” (130). An assemblage can also be viewed as a multiplicity or as Keith Ansell-Pearson posits “The assemblage functions as an acentred multiplicity that is subject to continuous movement and variation” (“Germinal Life” 156). As a dynamic multiplicity, the assemblage illustrates the various connections that occur within organised space.

As discussed, the analytic or grid on which Deleuze conceptualises the assemblage provides the necessary grounding for schizoanalysis to occur. The axis of the assemblage can thus be schizoanalysed and in relation to the rhizome, Deleuze outlines a method for doing this in *Thousand Plateaus* by examining:

(1) The generative component: the study of concrete mixed semiotics; their mixtures and variations. (2) The transformational component: the study of pure semiotics; their transformations-translations and the creation of new semiotics.
The diagrammatic component: the study of abstract machines, from the standpoint of semiotically unformed matters in relation to physically unformed matters. The machinic component: the study of the assemblages that effectuate abstract machines, simultaneously semiotising matters of expression and physicalising matters of content.

Schizoanalysis, therefore, enables a complex set of terms that illustrate how signs such as images can operate rhizomatically. Just as machines illicit a series of connections, which can provide existing but also new formations, so does the assemblage, which connects with a series of assemblages in consistent or new ways. For example, if visual culture is a series of electronic signals and binary information, (“Signatures of the Invisible” 111) schizoanalysis will view these signals as part of a regime of signs that eventuate in particular facialised contexts. In this sense, questions or problems are posed, such as how do these signs work and transform into new signs? How do these signs connect, express and function as machines and assemblages or machinic assemblages? The contextualisation of the assemblage is an important way of animating this process, which Guattari extends on in his subsequent work to Anti-Oedipus.

5.2 Guattari’s schizoanalysis

In 1998, Guattari published an article titled “Schizoanalysis” that in a succinct way outlines the brief history of the method and its current objectives. At the start of his article, he states that the objective of schizoanalysis is, “The analysis of the incidence of assemblages of enunciation among semiotic and subjective productions within a given, problematic context” (422). While accounting for their input in the formulation of schizoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari move beyond the individual systems of speech and general systems, (although schizoanalysis can still account for these facets as subjective and collective productions) by examining the many assemblages of enunciation that make up the world. As outlined, Guattari’s use of the word ‘problematic’ is significant as the problem is difference, which through its resolution ultimately constructs and actualises an event. The scope of this method provides an analysis that accounts for change as it allows for subjective and collective
components in the form of, “Ensembles which are either material and/or semiotic, individual and/or collective, actively machinic and/or passively fluctuating” (434). Using an example to illustrate this process, Guattari argues that there are multiple singular becomings and subsequent meanings that can be derived from an ordinary everyday item.

For instance, rather than being categorised as an item of laundry, a dishcloth can take on new meanings in different contexts. It can be used as a lid for a jam jar or if waved, provide a means of surrender. For Guattari, the dishcloth used in action is thus an assemblage of enunciation and, therefore, warrants an analysis that removes it from its general form as a domestic tool. As discussed, this process relates to Deleuze’s conception of difference, as the dishcloth in its general form is an image of thought, which as a generalisation reduces its complexity. A question to pose on the problem of encountering a particular dishcloth in action can thus be: as a subjective and collective production in what way is the dishcloth, as a unique sheet of material being used in a singular context, and as an interconnecting assemblage how is this practice affecting the agent that moves it and the recipient/s of its signification? This question can be extended on with many more, but the central thesis for Guattari’s schizoanalysis is that assemblages of enunciation take account of the many singular contexts, which as outlined are often generalised with predisposed understandings of the world.

Furthermore, Guattari argues that “It is clear, then, that a schizoanalytical undertaking is never limited to an interpretation of givens [données]; it deals primarily with donors [donnants] and with assemblages, which ensure the concatenation of semantic affects and pragmatic effects” (“Schizoanalysis” 433). Guattari’s concatenation terminology refers to the ephemeral crossovers that occur when the semantic understanding of something takes shape in a situation. This form of transversal communication is discussed in more detail in Part Three, but for the current analysis, the conceptualisation of the assemblage of enunciation attempts to account for the many lines of association that occur on the virtual and actual levels. To reiterate this sentiment, Guattari argues that, “The primary task of schizoanalysis - and this point cannot be emphasised enough - is to constitute itself as a meta-modelling assemblage out of all the “available” heterogeneous fields” (436). The available heterogeneous
fields can be any field or modality that animates the concatenation of assemblages. As stated above, an analysis of these connections moves beyond the reductive process of ascertaining general knowledge towards an awareness of the intricacies that form the interconnecting and coexisting worlds of lived experience. These flows, which are not always available to the human senses, provide a means to look at the schizophrenic processes that are in a continuous motion of difference beneath the laws of the general. As will be argued this threshold relates to the movements between the mass phenomenon of the *death-image* and the molecular problem, as a process of de-facialisation.

Part One has therefore introduced and contextualised the central concepts that are used in my construction of the *death-image*. This formulation works within a facialisation framework and responds to my investigation of the image of death and its operation within spheres of influence, such as a mainstream media environment. Concepts, such as faciality and desire have been illustrated in relation to Deleuze’s work on ethics and the cinema image, which has moved beyond the cinema screen, as everything is an image in the Deleuzian sense. Schizoanalysis has been outlined as a method or as Guattari posits, a meta-modelling system that can be used to complexify the facialised image of death, which is a notion that is further explicated in the proceeding parts. The *death-image* concept has also been extended upon in relation to the problem, through the transitioning nature of de-facialisation, which is a process I have touched on throughout Part One.

This initial part has thus provided a theoretical framework that will now be animated with a practical examination of an actual image of death. Bataille’s *lingchi* photograph will serve this purpose, and facilitate an example that will be used for my concluding case studies in Part Three. This part will analyse the wider ramifications of the *death-image* in relation to media and art. As a field, art regularly encounters and experiments with images of death, which particular artists appropriate from their experience of the world. As outlined in the introduction, art can be a discursive practice that plays with notions of death, and as such it provides an opportunity to contrast and disrupt facialised networks. Part Two commences with an examination of the problem in relation to Deleuze’s specific understanding of death, which provides further context for the *death-image*, and the central aim of this thesis, which is
mobilising Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of constructing and deconstructing images of death in a media and art context.
PART TWO: THE DEATH-IMAGE

6.0 Introducing the death-image

Part One has introduced a theoretical framework for the death-image that focuses on specific concepts that can be applied to the operation of facialised images of death in a media and as will be demonstrated in Part Three, art context. It has been argued that Deleuze’s theory provides a unique insight into this mass phenomenon and the conduits of the mixed semiotic in relation to death. Before my examination of the lingchi photograph that Bataille published in Tears of Eros and its precursory role in my formulation of the death-image it is important to understand Deleuze’s general conception of the topic. Along with the mobilisation of Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of constructing and deconstructing images of death, this awareness will not only inform a wider discussion on the topic of death, but also enable a more rounded analysis on the affects this image type elicits. Deleuze’s philosophical project does not culminate in death, but as argued, it rests with a belief in the power or puissance of an affirmed life. In the context of this thesis, the affirmed life is one that attempts to disrupt facialised networks, and Part Two develops this undertaking in relation to Deleuze’s understanding of death and concepts such as the problem. This analysis informs my construction of the lingchi photograph as a death-image exemplar.

Although relatively terse considering the magnitude of its role as ‘the problem’, Deleuze’s exemplification of death is nuanced and as with his work as a whole it can be approached in a number of ways. His principle analysis of death is in Difference and Repetition, which is a project that focuses on presenting a “philosophy of difference” (18). For Deleuze, death as difference comes in two forms:

One is personal, concerning the I or the ego, something which I can confront in a struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which causes everything to pass. The other is strangely impersonal, with no relation to 'me', neither present nor past but always coming, the source of an incessant multiple adventure in a persistent question. (Difference and Repetition 112)

This conception of death is thus tiered, as Williams (2012) states, “This is why there is a double death in Deleuze: death as subject and death as difference affirming
The death of the subject is personal, which to varying degrees is encountered in the present, but introspectively the past and future are included. There is also a death that is not mine and open to the eternal return of difference.

Deleuze uses Nietzsche’s eternal return to illustrate his modes of repetition that substitute a return of the same for a return of difference. He envisages repetition in a layered fashion, as for him there is an internal repetition at the molecular or minor level. This level is not only covered by, but also connects directly to a bare repetition that submits it to general laws (*Difference and Repetition* 25). The former level is that which can return as the internal mechanics of the process and the latter is the repetition that will diminish and die. This point is insightful as representation generally functions this way. For instance, the affectivity of a facialised representation will inevitably dissipate through time as the new arrives. As argued the eternal return is thus related to the future and the constituting cycle that makes this process possible. As Williams explains in *Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time*, “This principle ensures the openness of the future and defines death in relation to it, not through any particular experience of death, but rather as a two-fold implication of the process in the passing away once and for all of the same and the becoming eternally of difference” (124). Without this continuous cycle life would become determined and largely dormant.

A specific way of conceiving this repetition, which is further illustrated in relation to time in the proceeding sections, is looking at how the image of death functions. The particular image of a person or thing that dies will at some point diminish in its affectivity and pass away into memory. If potent enough this memory can return as an image of thought. A central focus here is an understanding of the way certain images of death retain affectivity and the processes that constitute and compound facialised death-images. Death provides the navigation that makes this image type readable at different stages. For instance, through a base repetition, it provides the internal mechanics for Adkins’ shift between affective states (*Death and Desire* 187), and as Williams argues this process is the eternal becoming of difference (*Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time* 124). On another level, the repetition of the general will inevitably undergo a period of obsolescence and die, and as argued in Chapter Two this dissipation occurs over the course of repeated images.
This form of death and its transitions can be illustrated with the BwO, as Deleuze argues in *Anti-Oedipus*:

The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as a passage or becoming. It is in the very nature of every intensity to invest within itself the zero intensity starting from which it is produced … But in themselves, these intensive emotions are closest to the matter whose zero degree they invest in itself. They control the unconscious experience of death, insofar as death is what is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes happening in every becoming - in the becoming-another-sex, the becoming-god, the becoming-a-race, etc., forming zones of intensity on the body without organs … Every intensity controls within its own life the experience of death, and envelops it. And it is doubtless the case that every intensity is extinguished at the end, that every becoming itself becomes a becoming-death! Death, then, does actually happen. (330)

For Deleuze, death is the transitioning of intensity as it “rises from within” (*Difference and Repetition* 243). The zero intensity of the BwO is death, as all affective states are subject to its limits. The process of becoming inevitably diminishes to the zero point from where it commences. This qualitative scale of intensity that is evident in every affect is thus open to a differential increase in power and at some point a receding internal dissolution. This reduction of energy decreases to the zero point of intensity, which for Deleuze is death in its own right, but the energy remains for future investment.

This process relates to Deleuze’s appropriation of Freud’s death instinct. This instinct is the set of primitive impulses that are ultimately suppressed as one enters the laws and moral codes of social production. Although Deleuze commends Freud for proposing a more ‘positive’ form of repetition in this respect (in the sense that it is removed from the generality of consciousness) he moves away from Freud’s dualistic material models, such as the animate/inanimate and life/death focus of the death drive. Deleuze averts objective models as, “Death does not appear in the objective model of an indifferent inanimate matter to which the living world would ‘return’; it is present in the living in the form of a subjective and differentiated experience endowed with its prototype” (*Difference and Repetition* 26). The objective model is the *death-image*, which is parasitical to representation and subject to a general
repetition. As argued in Chapter 5, schizoanalysis works with a meta-modelling system that accounts for the available heterogeneous fields (Machinic Unconscious 436), which put succinctly is a way of looking at models as interconnecting assemblages.

In relation to positive repetition, De Bolle posits that “It is an original force that coincides with life itself and that acts independently of any representational thinking” (Deleuze and Psychoanalysis 11). Representational thinking is facilitated by facialisation and its control over consciousness, and Deleuze is thus proposing that death is part of our subjective experience, which is a reality he aims to circumvent. An intensive death is not an external transcendent model, but is ultimately a matter of forces, as Brian Massumi states in Parables for the Virtual:

Although the realm of intensity that Deleuze's philosophy strives to conceptualize is transcendental in the sense that it is not directly accessible to experience, it is not transcendent, it is not exactly outside experience either. It is immanent to it-always in it but not of it. Intensity and experience accompany one another like two mutually presupposing dimensions or like two sides of a coin. Intensity is immanent to matter and to events, to mind and to body. (33)

Death is thus a limit of intensity that is evident within the affective states of experience. This process relates directly to a positive repetition that provides the internal mechanics for life to occur, and this understanding can be further elucidated with a closer analysis of the problem and its relation to the death-image.

6.1 The problem and the death-image

Creating a new image such as the death-image requires a theoretical framework, which as a process is connected to a series of problems. For Deleuze, concepts are connected to problems, which are both virtual components that give rise to the actualisation of solutions (Difference and Repetition 16). As discussed throughout this investigation, death is also ‘the problem’, and conjointly a series of proceeding problems that in the context of this thesis require further consideration. To do this Deleuze substitutes representation, which is subject to the repetition of the same for
the notion of differentiation. Deleuze distinguishes between two types of difference - differentiation determines the idea as a problem, and differenciation is the actualisation of this problem in the form of localised solutions. Put succinctly the former type qualifies the virtual problem and latter constitutes actual solutions (Difference and Repetition 306), which is a distinction with implications for the death-image.

For instance, can the death-image be thought of as a differentiated problem, concept or a differenciated solution? This thesis argues that the image of death can be viewed as incorporating all three facets, albeit in a somewhat staggered fashion, and this process directly relates to my research focus of mobilising Deleuze’s theory of facialisation in my examination of images of death, as contextualised death-images. For example, first and foremost the image of death is a problem as at this level it generates questions rather than answers, “Death is, rather, the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions, the sign of their persistence over and above every response, the ‘Where?’ and ‘When?’ which designate this (non)-being where every affirmation is nourished” (Difference and Repetition 27). These facets are the what, where and when questions that Deleuze locates in the unconscious, as this level acts as a series of infinitesimal perceptions. These perceptions are not oppositional in the sense of producing answers, but on the contrary produce problems from which solutions such as consciousness derives, “These small perceptions are unconscious, virtual, embryonic elements that tend to form a global perception that can reach the threshold of consciousness” (De Boole 12). In a theoretical sense, this enables transversal flows of information to diverge and converge, creating new connections and associations that are to varying degrees contained by facialised consciousness.

Two of Deleuze’s influences - Bernhard Riemann and Henri Bergson provide a way of animating this process. The significance of Riemann for Deleuze lies in his conception of spatiality and the manifold and the way he posits the problem. Arkady Plotnitsky acknowledges this relationship in his chapter “Bernhard Riemann” “From Difference and Repetition to What is Philosophy? philosophical thinking is seen, on a mathematical model, as problematic (thinking defined by posing problems) rather than theorematic (thinking proceeding by deriving propositions from axioms
according to proscribed rules, in the manner of Euclid’s Elements, rather than by posing problems)” (192). As Roffe argues, this framework is also found with Bergson and Nietzsche:

The emphasis on philosophy as ‘the theory of what we are doing, not the theory of what there is has given way to an affinity with Bergsonian metaphysics and the beginnings of a philosophy of the virtual, explored both with respect to Bergson himself and to the Nietzschean theme of the will-to-power. (Philosophical Lineage 81)

Along with Riemann, Bergson provides a differential mathematics and philosophy for Deleuze to borrow and develop his own concepts on space. Bergson, whose theory Deleuze appropriates in his conception of the virtual used the method of intuition to formulate a way to pose problems. Put succinctly, intuition, which can be thought of as a way to feel the relativity of the world as a continuity of things with their own unique duration is privileged over methods, such as the categorisation of facts through knowledge (The Creative Mind). In this respect, the death-image is a grid that can reinforce particular predispositions in its facialised organisation of death. Thinking intuitively free one from these constrains by attempting to become with the object of interest, which in this case would be an image of death. This method problematises the death-image and as such enables one to enter its unique duration.

To understand Deleuze’s conception of the problem, it is also important to understand the singularity. For Deleuze, the use of the word singularity or singularities is nuanced, but can be thought of as describing unique points as a locus or reference from which formations can develop and express themselves. The singular is the point at which the virtual collides and provides a point from which movement occurs “A singularity is the point of departure for a series which extends over all the ordinary points of a system, as far as the region of another singularity which itself gives rise to another series which may either converge with or diverge from the rest” (Difference and Repetition 278). The ‘series’ is a form of ‘ordinary’ movement that can be ascribed a regularity, albeit unstable and subject to new movements and series formation. Say for example any movement that occurs, such as the grimace of a face or even the processing of binary numbers making up a new sequence. These processes provide a series and are subject to change, such as the grimace transitioning to a smile
or a binary sequence interacting with another sequence, which will alter the general code (if that is what you are using the number sequence for) creating a new series. An awareness of this topology enables one to conceptually align points of intensity, such as the point where the grimace becomes a smile. This enables a way to map out the specific points from which change or in the context of this thesis death as an image occurs.

The key action is the art of moving between problems, as they are frequently imparted alongside propositions, which in a negative sense means they are already accompanied by solutions. This is the role of knowledge, which works by providing solutions to already given problems, as Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition* “This discovery must be raised to the transcendental level, and problems must be considered not as “givens” (data) but as ideal “objecticities” possessing their own sufficiency and implying acts of constitution and investment in their respective symbolic fields” (159). This statement is important, as it not only provides an insight into the generative value of problems but also paves the way for his later conceptualisation of schizoanalysis with Guattari. The respective symbolic fields, which can be structurally viewed as assemblages, problematises the comfortable alignment of universal problems and solutions. Problems are multifaceted and as such provide differentiated structures that differ depending on the contexts they give rise to. As a virtual idea, the problem is thus an objecticity, as in its pure form it has not yet been differenciated and subsequently interpreted by a subject.

### 6.2 Bataille and the death-image

To demonstrate the uniqueness of death as a problem and its relation to the image, I will now turn to Bataille and his work on the topic, which is in ways conducive to Deleuze’s understanding. On one level, death provides an individuated unity for Bataille in the sense that it exists subjectively. One can think of this as the ultimate problem in the way it provides a temporal framework for life itself. Not necessarily a problem that should consistently inform ones’ existence, but an awareness that images of death are part of our lives in one form or the other. Death creates problems, such as
why do things exist, and images of death can strike the viewer with thoughts on the future and what happens after we die. Bataille examines this process in *Death and Sensuality*:

> What we call death is in the first place the consciousness we have of it. We perceive the transition from the living state to the corpse, that is, to the tormenting object that the corpse of one man is for another. For each man who regards it with awe, the corpse is the image of his own destiny. (97)

As discussed in Chapter Two, Meniscal argues that the corpse retains a mixed semiotic, as it strikes the viewer with a sense it could be oneself or anyone (“Deleuzian Approaches to the Corpse” 115). This sentiment correlates with Bataille’s and the wider notion of faciality, as the consciousness of death is ultimately one of struggle. On the one hand it is the death of a person, which is the ultimate escape for the facialised subject, and on the other hand, it can inspire awe. This awe is demonic, as Parr argues, “For Deleuze death is problematic, revealing a ‘demonic power’ in between life and death” (*Deleuze and Memorial* 85). If we respond to these aspects epistemologically we inevitably return to the realm of solutions as the individual death is accounted for and subject to the dominant readings of a time and place.

Bataille argues that “Through language we can never grasp what matters to us, for it eludes us in the form of interdependent propositions, and no central whole to which each of these can be referred ever appears” (*Death and Sensuality* 274). The central whole is the problem and in its conventional sense language is ultimately solution based, as it facialises through dominant images of thought. It contains the threshold between life and death or in this context the word and silence. As Bataille states in *The Unfinished System* “To specify what I mean by nonknowledge: that which results from every proposition when we are looking to go to the fundamental depths of its content, and which makes us uneasy” (112). The fundamental depths of the death-image elude the viewer, as its meaning is subject to the dominant readings of knowledge. Knowing that facialised systems control our perception of death makes us uneasy with the awareness that there are no depths or lengths to which the face will not go. The cynical subject is arguably dumbfounded in this sense as renouncing facialisation is to renounce their life’s investment as a product of social production.
The facialised image of death operates in this fashion, as although the mixed semiotic attempts to contain the doubt over its representation, it also allows for cynicism, as Bataille outlines:

We can picture death for ourselves. We can at the same time know that this representation is incorrect. Any proposition we assert on the subject of death is always tainted with a minimum of error. Nonknowledge in particular concerning death is of the same nature as nonknowledge in general. (The Unfinished System 113)

The enlightened false consciousness of Zizek’s cynical subject does not renounce the death-image, as desire is invested in the system that allows this image type to be perceived (Anti-Oedipus 74). To fully renounce the death-image is to renounce oneself and this is the uncomfortable realisation that unsettles the enlightened facialised subject. Death as an open question and as a facet of the unknown facilitates a problematic framework. As Bataille argues in Tears of Eros death is not purely a state of unity or knowledge, but “A revelation like a flash of lightning or a moment of ecstasy” (3). Death as a form of intensity conjointly derives from problems while producing them. It not only enables the ultimate existential questions that are destined for the differenciated knowledge realm but as an image, it functions as a multiplicity. This phenomenon works with the problem of discontinuity and continuity for Bataille, and a blurring between the virtual and the actual for Deleuze. To demonstrate the notion of continuity through images of death Bataille illustrates the penal act of lingchi in Tears of Eros.

6.3 The lingchi death-image

Lingchi or slow slicing was a form of state punishment administered by Imperial China up to the year of 1905 for serious crimes such as murder and treason (Knowing Fate). The procedure, also known as ‘death by a hundred cuts’ entailed tying the victim to a pole and slowly cutting slices from his or her body to the point of death. This chastisement was based on the Confucian belief of Universal Harmony and that sins against the natural order should correspond with the severity of the punishment
(Bourgeon). In Bataille’s chapter titled “Chinese Torture,” he includes the picture (Figure 2.0) that he describes as producing a sense of “Divine ecstasy and its opposite, extreme horror” (207). In relation to my discussion of Bergson’s integral experience in Part One, these seemingly contrasting affects can be viewed as a problem removed from language. Knowledge assigns these affects opposing terms, but in a non-knowledge context, they are conducive if not inherently related. Both ecstasy and horror are ultimately products of intensity that are positioned through social-production.

Figure 2.0 Lingchi picture published in Tears of Eros (1989)

Thought in this sense responds figuratively as the generative problem that encompasses the picture and the depiction of death enables the groundless differentiation that both troubled and excited Bataille. Rather than providing an illustration of death as an end, for Bataille this image among others opened the actual onto the virtual, and to some extent make this opposition indistinguishable. The smile on the man’s face as he is dismembered, which Bataille acknowledges might be a combination of ecstasy and the opium that was at times administered to victims prior to slicing, provides him with a conundrum that could also lie with Freud’s cathartic return to the inanimate death drive. The main point is that for Bataille the meaning of the pictures never lay in the torture victim’s death as an end-in-itself or as a death-image, but as a way to work with incompatible problems, such as life and death, discontinuity and continuity. For Bataille, this image grants him an insight into ‘the problem’ that facilitates a source for life.
Death thus provides a series of problems that can at times be incompatible and also blur the lines between the actual and the virtual. For the current examination, I will now schizoanalyse the lingchi image as an assemblage, as the many forces that combine to make the image of death can be measured. As discussed in Part One, as a way of diagrammatically cutting through dominant thoughts and processes the assemblage enables a way to structurally analyse the function of things, as for Deleuze “Structural interpretation challenges all beliefs, rises above all images, and from the realm of the mother and the father retains only functions, defines the prohibition and the transgression as structural operations” (Anti-Oedipus 126). This system of interpretation is accordingly beneficial for firstly identifying the structural beliefs that position the death-image and then moving beyond them.

The assemblage provides a way of doing this as it enables the schizoanalysist to map the function and even rates of change that are evident when subjective and objective productions coalesce at specific points. The assemblage is a way to measure particular corporeal and non-corporeal functions, such as content and semiotic systems and how they come together and operate for varying periods of time depending on the deterritorialising and reterritorialising effects they produce within an abstract machine. The combination of material and non-material forces that form the assemblage can thus be applied to images and following Deleuze’s above indication, the problem in this sense can be thought of as an objectivity. To discuss this and its relation to the death-image, the lingchi photograph will now be analysed for its operational value as an assemblage.
Referring to the *lingchi* photograph, as an image that for Bataille provides the contradicting, but also the coexisting affect of ecstasy and repulsion, how can one work with this entity as a visual assemblage? To do this, I can firstly discern the image along the horizontal line that constructs it as an assemblage. The horizontal line illustrates the two components of content and expression, with the content acting as a machinic assemblage, accounting for the way bodies interact and the relational value of their actions and passions (*Thousand Plateaus* 97). Applying this first part of the horizontal axis to Bataille’s image the various intermingling of bodies is evident, which enacts the mise-en-scene of the picture. In a material sense, one can view the poles that connect to the victim’s body and the earth that holds the poles in place. We can envisage the sun that captures the gaze of the victim providing a further body, as content for the scene.

The crowd watches, but there are four central figures that foreground the picture. One figure is the assistant to the executioner who holds the victim’s body, as the slicing takes place and the other assistant provides help with the slicing. The four central actors (assistants, the victim, and executioner) can thus be viewed as operating mechanically in the sense that their bodies are interacting in new and functional ways, providing the symbiotic means for a significant happening in time and space as a singular context. Just as Deleuze likens the machinic component of feudalism to the overlord (*Thousand Plateaus* 98), although absent from the picture, but also complicit as content, is the body of the omnipotent Emperor that functions through the bodies of the scene. Among other components, these elements enable the parts that connect and form the machinic assemblage of the image.

Along the horizontal axis that provides content the viewer is immediately confronted with the expression of the interacting bodies as assemblages of enunciation. Referring once more to Deleuze’s example of the feudal assemblage, the oaths, statements and their expression in the actions displayed in the scene can be considered. The oaths to the absent, but virtually present Emperor and beliefs in Confucianism, as abstract machines are evident along with the demeanour of the agents. For example, the actors express themselves as Imperial subjects through their customary attire, and
methodical and considered movements, which apparently enact their duty without hesitation. The regime of signs that hold this gathering together is then an expression of the bodies that provide the content for the spectacle.

For Deleuze, this expression can be causal, but due to the many nuances that affect assemblages of enunciation there is potential for lines of flight. These two parts of the horizontal line thus facilitate a way of dissecting the content of the assemblage, as bodies interacting in nuanced ways as machinic assemblages and the expression of these bodies, which can be a product of the enacted customs, oaths, beliefs, and so forth. This combination of the horizontal axis thus works symbiotically, but it is subject to a further axis for its force of assembling. The alternate axis in the two-pole system works vertically and constantly interacts with the horizontal axis through a process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. For Deleuze, this axis provides constellations or positions in time and space that dismantle assemblages through lines of flight that can be reterritorialised into existing and new assemblages.

In relation to the face and as discussed, particular movements of intensity can also provide local changes. These variations are a product of at times slight transitions, which may or may not modify the globalised structure of the surface. This process can be understood through the differential mathematics of Riemann, “Riemann’s concept of spatiality as manifoldness allows one to define certain spaces as patchwork-like assemblages of local spaces, without, in general, the overall space possessing the same type of structure as these local subspaces do, while the latter may differ from each other as well” (“Bernard Riemann” 192). Just as one can look at particular deviations in a face or body movements, Riemann’s space is one of local areas that can overlap and interconnect, but also remain separate by providing distinct and at times juxtaposed linkages. One of the key concepts that Deleuze uses to describe this conception of space is that of the rhizome, which animates the root system of a plant to illustrate and contrast the arborescent structures that humans create and subsist within (Thousand Plateaus 15-23). The manifold and the face can still work within a global structure, but conducive to the rhizome they can also facilitate localised movement, which is not subject to or controlled by the external coordinates found in Euclidean geometry.
For example, as Deleuze argues in *Thousand Plateaus* “The linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined and can be effected in an infinite number of ways. Riemann space at its most general thus presents itself as an amorphous collection of pieces that are juxtaposed but not attached to each other” (535). This notion is important as it provides a way to discern that opposing forces in space can coexist without being readily connected, which further animates the contradictory formations within complex assemblages, such Bataille’s repulsion and attraction sensibility. Each localised ‘patch’ has its own expression that defines it, and for Deleuze, each space has its own world that can be diagrammatically mapped out as “Each vicinity is therefore like a shred of Euclidean space” (*Thousand Plateaus* 547). In this context geometry can be used, but only in a localised fashion with the potential for additional variables. Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome and the assemblage illustrates this notion of manifoldness as multiplicities and can be understood as non-hierarchical networks of multiple entry points or as discussed above a demonstration of why one is always in the middle or in-between (*Thousand Plateaus* 15-23). Within a rhizome one is always in-between as there is no start or end point, but a series of diverging and converging localised connections.

This process can be illustrated by the problem in the way that to varying degrees and differences in kind it refrains from an ordinary reading. For an initial period at least, it displaces and defers facialised meanings so one is always in-between another series, which in relation to death draws attention to ‘the problem’ at the genesis of existence. In this process singularities form particular unique points that as discussed above are differentiated, as Smith argues in his chapter “G.W.F Leibniz” “Any determination in general (any ‘thing’) that it is a combination of the singular and the ordinary, that is, it is a ‘multiplicity’ constituted by its singular and ordinary points (61). The concept of the manifold is important here as it can be understood as a particular base or topological multiplicity that as outlined above breaks with the fixed-point axial structures of Euclidean geometry and the use of Cartesian coordinates on two-dimensional surfaces. As Manuel DeLanda argues in *Intensive Science* for Deleuze this removal of an external axis is significant for the manifold, as it requires no extrinsic higher dimension of organisation (13). This process equates to a break with the face and its encompassing mixed semiotic.
In relation to the manifold, this diagram can be also used to measure rates of change in localised spaces, and in relation to Bataille’s image, the most obvious example of deterritorialisation is the wide smile on the victim’s face as he experiences the slicing. The smile removes the victim from the regime of signs that hold the convention of this torture and death-image in place, elevating the man to the virtual as a problem, which is not compatible with the gruesome act. Of course, if the picture were taken a moment later the man’s face might well signify pain, which could then be viewed as a reterritorialisation of the signs that previously escaped the bureaucratic configuration of the codes that facilitate meaning for this particular act of penal punishment. Viewing this image in the context of the manifold the curvature of the mouth, which deviates from the normative face can be measured and in the context of providing a localised topological reading, juxtaposed to the other spaces within the image. As discussed in relation to Riemann and his concept of the manifold, each area of the image can thus be analysed through a series of small Euclidean measurements that do not affect the map globally, as Deleuze argues in Thousand Plateaus:

Each vicinity is therefore like a shred of Euclidean space, but the linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined and can be affected in an infinite number of ways. Riemann space at its most general thus presents itself as an amorphous collection of pieces that are juxtaposed but not attached to each other. (134)

This examination enables a form of analysis to account for heterogeneous and discursive objects, such as a grimace or smile as a problem that can stand-alone or even work within the global configuration of the death-image. This is possible as these forms of expression are inherently rhythmic, which is a notion discussed in relation to Sutton (Photography). These forms can also be applied to ‘any spaces whatsoever’, and this process additionally demonstrates the power of the affection-image as it also provides this notion of dislocated space. In this context, the image can be intrinsically measured as localised spaces removed from the general or larger space that covers it.

The implications of enabling a topological reading of images of death is vast as the assemblage is always subject to change and producing consistent and novel combinations of elements in new and ephemeral ways. The image of death as a
problem can thus be diagrammatically mapped out as an assemblage, providing structural ways to produce novel readings of images. By moving beyond beliefs, which can also be accounted for on the horizontal axis and the reterritorialisation potential of the vertical axis, one can arrive at objecticities. Reading the death-image as an assemblage is, therefore, an important facet of schizoanalysis as it provides unique accounts of how things function at particular points in time and space in their relative symbolic fields. For Deleuze, the affects of the image can therefore be evaluated, but how do the affects act as an objecticity without being subject to an individual sensing them?

6.4 Percepts and affects

Deleuze explains the occurrence of the objecticity in his book *What is Philosophy?* He qualifies art, which as a field is examined in section 7.4, as an entity that can stand on its own as fixed blocs of sensation made up of percepts and affects, “Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them” (165). Good paintings for Deleuze, such as those by the painter Francis Bacon capture and hold its percepts. These percepts derive from perceptions and the affects that emerge from affections occur independently of the viewer and as such “Sensations, percepts and affects, are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived” (*What is Philosophy* 164). The work of art for Deleuze thus becomes a form of substance that is immanent to it-self. It is its own world that has its internally unique difference and repetition. Deleuze extends this further by arguing that the independent being of sensation can also be removed from man altogether in the sense that following Nietzsche’s *All too human* proclamation “The being of sensation is not the flesh but the compound of non-human forces of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman becomings” (*What is Philosophy* 183). The becoming of the painter that removes himself from the constraints of thinking like a human can then be captured in the canvas. Accordingly the painting might take on a life of its own regardless of the viewer, which poses the question, do death-images, such as the
The desired image is not, however, safe in this respect, as there is always the potential of alternate meanings rupturing, and the image breaking through and creating new meanings. As Deleuze argues, we can encounter the new as “Something in the world forces us to think” (Difference and Repetition 139). This notion is discussed in more detail in relation to the ‘shock’ that an image can provide, but for the current analysis, the problem can force one to think in the sense that it provides an encounter. This jarring to the system can, however, become desensitised over the course of repeated images. This process is also apparent in the sense that death-images can be used to fuel particular beliefs in the actual, but as argued this process is fraught with danger. The ultimately fascist attempt to control the signified is vulnerable, albeit consistent the majority of time. The death-image in the context of belief is conjointly open to at least three probabilities in the way it can facilitate the coming undone of beliefs in the form of an encounter, which relates it to the problem. Being used to reaffirm a belief in particular ideologies (which relates to the death-image) or through a process of desensitisation and simple lack of interest, have no significant bearing on the viewer.

I would argue that as an assemblage the image of the tortured man can create the blocs of sensation that the painting achieves by returning to the notion of continuity and discontinuity as coexisting opposites and their subsequent deterritorialising and reterritorialising effects. This notion also works with Bergson’s dissimilar images, which as outlined can also operate as dissimilar spaces within the canvas. This notion makes it possible to encounter the euphoric expression on the man’s face and the image as a whole as working independently of him and his situation, which relates to Deleuze’s discussion of Bacon and the photograph in Francis Bacon. Rather than using models for his paintings Bacon adopted photographs as means to explore his own feelings. However, in his book Deleuze accentuates Bacon’s belief that although photographs hold attention by capturing the eye and provide their own ‘something’ which is removed from mimicking or representing another medium, they fail to provide the same affects as painting as it remains a “perceived thing” that only provides one level of sensation (Francis Bacon 65). Through this assertion, Deleuze and Bacon are referring to the point that although the photograph can remove its figurative and narrative qualities, it cannot deform itself to the extent that painting...
can. Earlier in the book Deleuze comments on Bacon’s use of the photograph saying that he prefers the memory of a current photograph or, and this point is important, the ‘sensation’ of a current one (45). As argued this suggestion that the photograph can only elicit a singular sensation is arguably reductive in its failure to account for the intensity that derives from the work in question.

Particular images of death, such as the *lingchi* photograph can arguably be multifaceted in their juxtapositions by operating on coexisting patches of continuity and discontinuity. The way that Deleuze gives voice to Bacon (whose perspective he takes from interviews) and his view that he can only take one sensation from a photograph, which he can subsequently use to provide further layers of intensity and sensation is tenuous in the way it homogenises ‘all’ photographs as providing one level of encounter, which in-itself is problematic. Deleuze relates this process to what the painter Paul Cezanne called the “logic of the senses,” by arguing that rhythm supersedes the faculties by passing through them, and therefore: “What is ultimate is thus the relation between sensation and rhythm, which places in each sensation the levels and domains through which it passes” (*Francis Bacon* 42). This notion of rhythm arguably remains questionable or even shaky in its denial of the photograph as the photographic image still provides a rhythmic visual sensation.

Just as a painting can achieve the photograph can function as a sensational work. It produces a resonance that works with Deleuze’s theory of painting, “The important point is that the artist utilizes these intensive syntheses in order to produce “a pure being of sensation”; the work of art is a functional “machine” that produces effects of vibration, resonance, and forced movement” (*Essays on Deleuze* 103). As argued in Part One, this resonance can be evident in the photograph, as it holds and elicits an intensity, as Sutton argues, “They [Deleuze and Guattari] open up the potential for movement within the fixed image, in the form of intensity, that we can take to the photographic image” (*Photography* 174). This activity occurs as dissimilar components of the image interact with each other. As a process this notion can be related to Deleuze’s confrontation of sensations:
What matters is the confrontation of the two sensations, and the resonance that is derived from it. It is like the wrestlers whose movement was decomposed by Muybridge's photographs. What produces the struggle or confrontation is the coupling of diverse sensations in two bodies, and not the reverse, so that the struggle is also the variable Figure of two bodies sleeping intertwined, or which desire mixes together, or which painting makes resonate. Sleeping, desire, art: these are places of confrontation and resonance, places of a struggle. *(Francis Bacon 68-9)*

The struggle that intertwines as one figure illustrates the competing composites within the *lingchi* image that produce a resonance between the nuanced sensations of attraction, repulsion, and the many other affects that can be derived from the image.

Further to this critique and more interestingly, an integral part of Deleuze’s book and Bacon’s work rests in isolating the *figure* from the *figurative* or the figure from a narrative as this process can then provide a pure series of affects. In this sense the scream, which provides a *leitmotif* in much of Bacon’s work is important as an effort is made to paint the scream and not its cause. This entails painting the forces that give rise to the scream and as such capture the percept, which as discussed, is caught from perception and the affects that are wrestled from affections. Deleuze argues that “Bacon creates the painting of the scream because he establishes a relationship between the visibility of the scream (the open mouth as a shadowy abyss) and invisible forces, which are nothing other than the future” (43). This point is interesting as it highlights the nature of the disjunction that is apparent when a narrative, such as the one depicted in *lingchi* ‘comes undone’ and this can be further illustrated by Deleuze’s proceeding comment, “This is what is expressed in the phrase “to scream at” - not to scream “before or about, but to scream at death - which suggests this coupling of forces, the perceptible force of the scream and the imperceptible force that makes one scream” (43). Granted there are figurative aspects to the *lingchi* image, but the euphoric expression and the sheer horror of the scene provides a rupture in the organic form of its setting enabling the problem, as a crisis in its apparent ‘about something’. It draws the *figure* out from the scene, as the tortured man is arguably isolated from not just the world outside of the scene, but life and death itself.
Undoubtedly the man is there and being tortured as a punishment, but why is his face not screaming about his dire situation? For at least the first few sightings the general barbarity of the act also removes one from looking at the image rationally. Bataille’s photograph therefore presents a problem that is arguably more powerful than Bacon’s painted scream at death, because this man is firstly a real human being, and furthermore, widely grinning at death, which not only disrupts the narrative by advancing a figure but also highlights the potential for a still image to provide the visibility of an affect and the invisible forces that produce it. These forces subsequently inform Deleuze’s notion of the forces being none other than the future, but they also arguably provide a percept of immanence. As mentioned, this man (albeit for an ephemeral period of time) is an example of the Spinozian substance, a univocal figure of imperceptibility, and as I discuss below, a product of the will to power and eternal return.

As a result, this man’s immanent gesture deterritorialises the confines of his predicament and in doing so elicits an opening to the virtual. In this sense there is a permanent deterritorialisation and deferral of the meaning constructed by the content and expression of the assemblage. This process is testament to Bataille’s own relationship to the image as he confesses in *Tears of Eros* “This photograph had a decisive role in my life. I have never stopped being obsessed by this image of pain, at one ecstatic (?) and intolerable” (206). The percept of the tortured but contented man and the affect of his pain and ecstasy are for Bataille something that exists outside of his own finitude, and as such illustrates the continuity that the problem provides. The percept and affects of the image as a being of sensation can then exist independently of the viewer and his or her beliefs by working directly onto the nervous system, which for Deleuze and Bacon is the positive form of encounter. Rather than being processed through the brain and to borrow Deleuze’s term from his cinema books, the *hodological space* of structured pathways, which illustrate the brain’s interconnection of ideas (*Cinema* 128), the power of the images escape the connections of associations that the subject is trained to perceive.

Rather than providing an end point or a realisation of discontinuity this man in the physical sense defers death in an albeit ephemeral way and not only does he live on in the image, but also in the sensations that his ordeal facilitates. The sensations that are
contained in the picture go beyond the victim’s own identity and provide a sensational response for the viewer. Deleuze outlines this process in relation Bacon’s work “At one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through the sensation, one through the other, one in the other…I experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed” (Francis Bacon 35). Capturing the sensation or recording the fact as Deleuze outlines is the aim of real painting, and it is also the process of perceiving the figure as a being of sensation and entering its duration. Intuiting and sympathising with the lingchi figure one can enter his world, and go beyond the ‘I’ that processes the scene as a death-image. In this sense, the problem is significant in the unique way it can still confront the spectator regardless of his or her place in time and space. Just as ‘good’ art can arguably force the viewer to think in new ways so can the image of death. The adverse reality is that the more violent the image in photography, painting, and film, and the more dissimilar the competing components of the image are, the more it retains the capacity to shock and live on independently of the individual and the society from which it came.

Before examining the lingchi photograph as an affection image, it is also worth noting this image in relation to Deleuze’s notion of deformation in Bacon’s paintings. As discussed sensation works directly onto the nervous system and in doing so bypasses the organised processing of faculties onto an object. Deleuze argues that the photograph and abstract painting, such as the flat surfaces of a Mondrian, and figurative works, in general, can only convey one sensation as they pass through the brain, “They do not liberate the Figure - all because they remain at one and the same level. They can implement transformations of form, but they cannot attain deformations of bodies” (Francis Bacon 36). This sentiment is interesting because it is arguably not the case with the lingchi image as the body is undergoing a deformation in the form of slow slicing. This deformation is not necessarily a figurative transformation, but in relation to the body as a figure it quivers through the impact of forces, as “Bacon’s deformations are rarely constrained or forced; they are not tortures, despite appearances. On the contrary, they are the most natural postures of a body that has been reorganised by the simple force being exerted upon it” (Francis Bacon 59). Granted there is clearly an act of torture occurring, but the prisoner’s expression provides the sensation of subtle forces acting on the body. The
face plays a role here, but if one were to dismantle it we would arrive at a similar sensation, as the body presents no transformative resistance.

In the resignation of life for the future unknown that is death, this body is open to the simple forces that are subtly mutilating the flesh. The visible meat and the man provide a coupling, “In the end, there are only coupled Figures in Bacon (the Lying Figure in a Mirror of 1971 [see Figure 3.0] has to be unique; it counts as two Figures, it is a veritable diagram of sensation). Even the simple Figure is often coupled with its animal” (Francis Bacon 47). The becoming-animal of the man is thus a product of the visible flesh coupled with his demeanour, and if the face is permitted in this equation, the man’s expression.

Figure 3.0 Francis Bacon’s Lying Figure in a Mirror (1971)

6.5 The death-image as an affection and crystal image

The deterritorialisation of the tortured man’s face and his dismembered body, therefore, provides a sense of continuity in the way it continues to shock the viewer and generate problems, but how does this notion of affect work with the affection image, which is a product of intensity? To understand this, I discuss Deleuze’s
conception of the *time-image* and, in particular, the *crystal-image*. As introduced in Part One, Deleuze relates all things that have a center of indetermination to his three movement images, the perception-image, the affection-image, and the action-image. For Deleuze, physical beings are an assemblage of these base images, which consecutively work when one perceives something, emotionally reacts to this perception, and then acts on it.

The affection-image is always a product of perception and the precursor to a proceeding action. In relation to the discussion on Bacon’s scream, the affection image is always about something. For Deleuze it does, however, come close to providing a time-image in the way it removes one from their particular point in space and time, enabling ‘any space whatsoever,’ which in relation to the cinema comes into fruition with the close up. The intensive face of the affection image remains a movement image as it consistently reverts back to its center of indeterminacy and proceeding action. In this context, the deterritorialisation of the affection is inevitably reterritorialised by the action. For Deleuze, the only way to escape the linear of affection leading to action, and then back to perception again is to encounter the time-image, which results from the modern disruption of the movement-image.

The time-image, and more importantly for this analysis the crystal-image enables two regimes for Deleuze, the first of which is the organic that as discussed in Part One, equates to the pre-existing world in which “centers of forces in space” act as though they have always been regardless of the camera. This notion can be thought of as a functioning organism where a harmony of organisation between the coexisting parts is necessary for its general existence. It is worth noting that Deleuze distinguishes this regime as being non-subordinate to narration, as for him the narrative flows from the composite of images (*Cinema 40*). The crystalline regime enacts the blurring of the actual, as Deleuze outlines, “The real and the imaginary, the actual and the virtual, chase after each other, exchange their roles and become indiscernible. It is here that we may speak the most precisely of crystal-image: the coalescence of an actual image and its virtual image, the indiscernibility of two distinct images” (*Cinema 2* 127). Deleuze relates the actual to Euclidean space in the way that hodological pathways operate with a principle of economy, and these actions are ideally illustrated by the overtly distinguishable action-image.
As outlined at the outset of this chapter, Euclidean space provides a way to discern what is already there and as a consequence time is quantifiable and dependent on the movement-image. Conversely, Deleuze relates the crystalline regime and the crystal-image to Riemannian space, which as discussed in section 6.3, facilitates disconnected local patches. In his conception of space, it is worth noting that Deleuze relates the crystal regime to Leibniz’ theory of incompossibility, which put succinctly describes the at times incongruous nature of relations that exist within globally identified structures, such as relations within a multiplicity. Just as the complex assemblage provides inherent contradictions, these incompossible relations enable an environment where the impossible can derive from the possible and the possible from impossible and so forth (Cinema 2 131).

As discussed in relation to the lingchi photograph, it can be related to the three movement images in both the content and expression of the photograph and viewer’s response to it. Granted the image is not conventionally mobile, but as discussed it still provides a sense of movement in the way it vibrates and subsequently resonates with the viewer. The image is also a photograph taken by somebody and the expressions of the participants in the death-image. Firstly an individual captures the photograph and this perspective displays an indirect perception. Viewing the image one also perceives it and following Deleuze’s statement above, the images that he discerns in the cinema are the images that constitute the viewer, as “The brain is certainly not a center of images from which one could begin, but itself constitutes one special image among others. It constitutes a center of indetermination in the acentered universe of images” (Cinema 62-3). It is, therefore, beneficial to keep this process in mind, as the brain screen works in tandem with movement-images. There is also an affection-image in the affects that the man receives from his mutilation, and the affects that the observer obtains from witnessing the brutality of the act. For the viewer, this shock proceeds to an action that arguably oscillates between the alternate images. The image is conjointly durational, as to varying degrees it substitutes the quantitative for the qualitative or put succinctly it removes the viewer from metric perceptions of time.

Deleuze provides further indication that the elements within the image present movement between the virtual and the actual, “Passages from one regime to another, from the organic to the crystalline, can take place imperceptibly or there can be
constant overlapping” (Cinema 2 129). The tortured man’s incompossible grin at death is an example of the impossible deriving from the possible, continuity from discontinuity, the struggle of sensations, the virtual from the actual, deterritorialisation from reterritorialisation, de-facialisation from facialisation and so forth. The grinning at the invisible forces of the future as a meditation on death conditions the disconnect that severs the figure from the narrative as a whole. This image and, in particular, the man’s face works as a problem, as the actual and the virtual ‘coalesce’ and form an image that displaces time in relation to the figure. Granted there remain levels of the organic and the Euclidean, but these elements are patches as following Deleuze’s description of the manifold, after the initial shock of the image, each vicinity can function as a fragment of Euclidean space.

In this sense the coexisting and at times opposing forces refrain from a neat categorisation of the actual and virtual, and as Sutton argues in relation to Cindy Sherman photographs “In the continued space of the curious, we can catch a glimpse of the crystal image of time” and that in the acting of capturing an actor in the process of ‘doing’, Sherman’s images “provoke no distinct future, nor do they portray any distinct past; they only represent a point of potentiality between the two. An indivisible intensity divides past and future. This is the point of indiscernibility - the quality of the image that makes it a crystal image” (Photography 135). Put succinctly, as with a painting one can encounter a photograph and in relation to the problem, this arguably provides more violence to the senses. In addition to the notions discussed and apart from the affectivity of the fictional images of death one finds in film, which are death-images in their own right, the image of death that depicts a real person or persons can subsequently realign the faculties and connect them in new ways. The overlapping of the crystal and the organic can thus be imagined as a component of the lingchi image and subsequently any image that as a whole or in part substitutes time for the organic.
6.6 The death-image and Levinas’ face

Referring to the man’s face in the lingchi image, additional layers can be discerned for the death-image by relating Deleuze’s concept of faciality to Emanuel Levinas’ understanding of the face. As discussed in Part One, as an abstract machine the face works across a white wall and black hole system. The white wall axis of significance reflects signs while the black holes capture them and in this process capture the subject. The black holes can also be external to the face existing in any locality that works with a reflective and intensive surface. In this context, the tortured man’s face operates as a reflecting surface and his expression evokes signs of subjectivity. Further to this, the image can also potentially ‘facify’ the viewer as Deleuze argues:

The face is this organ carrying plate of nerves, which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and which gatherer or expresses in a free way all kids of tiny local movement that the rest of the body usually keeps hidden. Each time we discover these two poles in something - reflecting surface and intensive micro-movements we can say that this thing has been treated as a face – its has been facified, and in turn it stares at us and looks at us. (Thousand Plateaus 124)

Interestingly the tortured man’s face stares out at the viewer and in the context of Deleuze’s above statement it warrants a discursive response. The sacrifice of global mobility, which refers to the previous discussion on manifolds relates to the transient localisation of micro-movements, which as discussed above are more readily apparent in the moving image, but can also occur in the photograph. Any object that fits Deleuze’s criteria of internal movement within a reflective surface can thus be a face that subsequently monitors the viewer. The stare of the Other in this sense is a subjectifying entity as it draws the viewer into particular ways of being.

One can relate this sentiment to Levinas who Deleuze examines in texts such as What is philosophy? Levinas provides a notion of death through the Other in a positive fashion, as the face enables an opening to the infinite virtual. His work on the Other, although largely influenced by the phenomenological framework of Heidegger’s Being and Time, radically opposes his notion of death. In contrast to Heidegger’s conception that death provides the possibility of the impossibility, Levinas argues that death is the impossibility of possibility (Totality and Infinity 57). In his arguably more
emotive depiction of death, if one dies, they cannot do anything “Dying is agony because in dying a being does not come to an end while coming to an end; he has no more time, that is, can no longer wend his way anywhere, but thus he goes where one cannot go, suffocates” (56). For Levinas, death is not an end point from which an authentic being-in-the-world derives, but as he outlines in his book, *Totality and infinity* “Death, source of all myths is present only in the Other and only in him does it summon me urgently to my final essence, to my responsibility” (179). This conception of death and the Other provides the basis for Levinas’ ethics by arguing that the “Fundamental relation with being, in Heidegger, is not the relationship with the Other, but with death, where everything that is non-authentic in the relationship with the Other is denounced, since one dies alone” (*Ethics and Infinity* 58). For Levinas, Heidegger’s formulation of death does not provide an adequate account of the Other and, therefore, fails to acknowledge the infinite possibilities that an encounter of this type affords.

For example, in his article “Levinas and Heidegger” Tomlinson breaks Levinas’ critique of Heidegger into four distinct, but interwoven arguments; the second of which is the most relevant to this discussion. Rather than death enabling our ownmost possibility for being as Heidegger proclaims, he argues that it does the opposite, striking us as passive and unable to take control of our own destiny (30). This understanding correlates with my conception of the death-image as through social-production this image type determines the desire of the perceiver. Tomlinson argues that for Levinas, the only way for one to reach an active response to death is “That recognising the Other person as the only vessel capable of transporting us through “death” into the future allows us to understand the other person as the sole bearer of “what is not yet,” that is, of alterity” (30). The notion of alterity is problematic for Heidegger as this sensibility is not in direct relation to the intentionality of dasein and the merits of a phenomenological understanding of experience (*Being in Time*). For Levinas, a relationship with the Other provides an authentic existence and this occurs when one is inspired to act through an encounter with an Other face.

For Levinas, the face of the Other presents an opportunity for not only the possibility of the impossibility, but the possibility of infinity, as Drew Dalton argues “The face, by betraying the limits of its own presentation and thereby opening a rift in the totality
of the phenomenal field, expresses the fact that reality cannot be exhausted by phenomenological investigation, that something lies beyond that which presents itself, beyond that which is” (“The Object of Anxiety” 79). This understanding of the face moving beyond itself, which for Heidegger would subject it to a metaphysical leap, can in a negative sense be related to faciality. As outlined throughout Part One, faciality enables a framework that moves beyond the limits of the actual face, and in relation to the image of death, this abstraction transports the face of the Other to the abstract machine of the virtual.

As argued, depending on the type of virtual and actual differentiation that occurs this process can either instigate the death-image, the problem or provide a composite and blurring of the two. In relation to Levinas, the Other thus breaks with the totalising accounts of an ontology that he argues is evident in Heidegger’s phenomenology, and opens being to the possibility of infinity. This possibility of infinity through the alterity of the Other is the face, which as Tomlinson argues is often mistaken as the visual cue of an actual face “The face is what I experience when you speak to me or otherwise communicate your viewpoint and thereby add something new or different to the discussion and so to my sense of the world (”Levinas and Heidegger” 34). This notion of the face as an opening provides a positive alternative to facialisation, as although Deleuze posits the face as an opening, this transition is more of a totalising system of coordination than Levinas’ ethical communication.

Levinas thus argues that the face acts as a figure for something outside of one’s ownmost grasp and “The relation with the Other alone introduces a dimension of transcendence, and leads us to a relation totally different from experience in the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist” (Totality and Infinity 193). For Levinas, transcendence as that which transports one from the limits of the now is achieved through an encounter with the Other, which is compounded as an image of the face. Arguably this process explains Bataille’s fascination with the lingchi victim as he smiles at death. This face provides an opening to the infinite question for Bataille and this is why he repeatedly returns to its surface for intensive meditation. The black holes of the eyes, mouth and areas of mutilation draw the viewer in to a discursive navigation of a body and sensations outside of one’s own.
The face as an image, therefore, extends beyond the immediate and provides an interaction that breaks with recognition, as D. N. Rodowick argues, “What Levinasian film philosophy seeks in the concept of the face is the sense of an image that seeks neither control nor mastery of what it represents. It is a way of encountering others through images that neither mirrors nor projects onto them the prejudices of our own self-conception” (“Ethics in Film”). This understanding relates to the process of defacialisation, as this image refrains from a contained representation of the Other, and this is the not knowing or forgetting that Nietzsche prescribed in The Genealogy of Morality. It is open to what I am calling a ‘new representation of de-facialisation’, as it forms an image that moves beyond the control and mastery of faciality, which is a notion that will be examined further in Part Three.

6.7 The death-image as a model of instruction

As discussed in Part One, Guattari’s faciality is closely linked to a capitalism that strictly monitors its system of facialisation. This monitoring compounds the many different facial types into discernable frameworks, such as the normative white male face, which to a lesser extent remains prevalent today. Facialised consciousness can only perceive what it has been conditioned to see and anything that deviates from this normative system is approached with caution. The media as a social production of capitalism plays an intrinsic role in this organisation and as such continuously monitors the facialisation process and if necessary adjusts its parameters to decode and incorporate new formulas. Facialised consciousness, which for Guattari is a global phenomenon, facilitates a collective sense of identity that subjects desire to aggregated forms of social production.

Every meaning is accounted for with a particular face that is at once stratified, but as a product of capitalism, subject to change and new political investments. In this sense, the death-image can be viewed as operating on a further two levels, with the first working as an overriding repetition across the field of facial consciousness that permits internal shifts. In a schizoanalytical context, this level operates conductively with the unconscious paranoiac pole, which for efficiency can be viewed as part of an
equivalent hegemonic system. The alternate level is that which exists outside of this system and can similarly be understood as part of the schizophrenic pole and lines of flight that to varying degrees connect with flows of non-subjected desire.

As a product of facialised consciousness, this first level thus warrants a nuanced approach, but it is worth noting that the perceiver determined model that is popular in media studies is also subject to a collective facialisation process in the manner of receiving information from mainstream news agendas. This is evident within the Western media framework with homogenous images broadcasted across major news networks on pivotal topics such as the War on Terror (“Pragmatics”). Granted there are disinterested people who in particular instances are not engaged with a direct message at a particular point in time, but as a mass phenomenon facialisation is all encompassing. There remain consistencies of information across the despotic sphere of the media and society in general that through processes of facialisation produce subjects with the social production of desire.

Just as a news programme can skip from a celebrity appearance to death-images facialised consciousness works to homogenise perception and arguably anesthetise the viewing public, which is an understanding that is developed in Part Three. Celebrity and death are intertwined, as the public is navigated through images and as Guattari argues, “The all powerful political and micropolitical forces of the media reside in their capacity of developing a collective facialised consciousness that acts as a counterpoint to the globalization of anguish” (Machinic Unconscious 82). As discussed, this sense of anguish can be allayed through the cynical acceptance of ideologies, such as democracy and theocracy, good and evil. These transcendent modes of evaluation, which are inherently problematic for Deleuze provide a counterpoint of meaning that can be directed in measured ways.

In this context, the image of death can be used to preserve limits, such as the laws of Christianity affirmed by the crucifixion death-image, and in a more specific political context, Western Government agendas. As discussed a further example of this process that is examined further in Part Three, is the justification of virtual and actual wars, such as the War on Terror and the recent conflicts in the Middle East. This is evident with frequent death-images from various factions, such as Islamic State (IS) posted on
platforms such as YouTube, and as discussed in relation to Colman the digital moving image is significant in this respect (Affective Imagery 147). Through circulation and hit figures tabloid newspapers are drivers in the commodification of capitalistic death-images. In these contemporary productions, Western news networks generally adhere to the Government line and as such portray the war analogously by endorsing a particular side in the conflict - as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bush’s Wars). Another instance is the virtual and actual neutralisation of a facialised blockage such as the promulgated fall of Muammar Gadhafi whose body sent a direct message to challengers of facialised consciousness in the figurative and literal sense. In relation to images of death such as Ghadafi’s corpse, Bogard argues that in modern society the image of the dead body “Represents an ideal of the modern subject, and indeed has its own unique ‘subjectivity’, perfectly obedient, ready to serve as a model and means of instruction, to work for any purpose, and set an example to others” (“Empire of the Living Dead” 189). As argued, this is predominantly the case with death-images and the way they are produced and disseminated by facialised networks. Just as the lingchi act operated as a model of instruction for the Emperor’s subjects, the modern corpse can be used as an example to others as an articulation of political and ultimately economic power, and there are many examples of this phenomenon.

The live killing of Gadhafi, shot and by disseminated by the Western news wire service Agence France-Presse (AFP), and published across mass media networks, such as Murdoch’s Fox News (see Figure 4.0) is one example. The subsequent promulgation of the facialised corpse serving as a means of instruction, as the now obedient Gadhafi who was once an outspoken critic of the West, serves as a model of instruction to potential dissidents of the face.
Groups that profess to operate outside of the Western face attempt their own facialisation productions through means, such as the archaic beheadings of IS (or as they might argue, de-facialisation from non-fundamentalist Muslim actors). IS promulgates their death-images through Western media networks, such as the aforementioned YouTube and the below image from Fox News (see Figure 4.1). Just as Jack the Ripper’s knife acts as a despotic signifier in Chapter 3’s discussion of Pabst’s Lulu, the assailant and his knife derive from the centralised authority of the infamous terror group. His identity strategically blurred as an encompassing black hole across the white wall of the screen. The assailant’s opaque identity, which is localised through the vernacular of his ‘Western voice’, symbolises the wider movement of IS, and its transnational hegemony. Along with the orange jump suits of the victims operating with an authoritarian semiotic of capture, this image arguably attempts to elicit a process of authoritarian subjectification for the Western viewer.
For Bogard, images of death continue to have currency “We have grown accustomed to detailed, gruesome, and repeated images of the dead body’s degradation in the mass media, scenes of dismemberment, injury, murder, torture, starvation, and genocide. As a result, the display of the violated dead body has lost virtually all of the old taboos once associated with it. The corpse remains a central figure in this general social voyeurism surrounding death” (“Empire of the Living Dead”). The dead body as a facialised production retains political, economic and even social value, but as argued a focus on sense provides new ways of discerning O’Sullivan’s possibilities of reconfiguration (“Pragmatics”).

The dead body also provides an order-word, which as a concept is introduced in A Thousand Plateaus. This order solicits a death sentence in its own right, which in the context of this thesis operates as a death-image that simultaneously contains death and flight within its message. As a function, it is based on socially accepted conditions of language and the specific processes of subjectification it commands. As Phillip Goodchild argues in Deleuze and Guattari, “An order-word is not made effective by the divine fiat of the author, but functions insofar as its meaning is socially accepted” (52). To a degree, the order-word functions independently of the enunciator and, therefore, operates within a collective assemblage of enunciation, which as outlined in Chapter 5 is a way of describing the subjectivity that arises from the power of language and its associated components. Order-words operate through the social assemblages that produce and connect with collective enunciation assemblages, which incorporate and produce certain commands. These commands close off as well as open up new ways of meaning and acting. As Goodchild outlines,
this process elicits a death sentence in the way it calls an end to a particular situation, “All order-words are death sentences: a certain arrangement of bodies will never be quite the same again” (152). The order-word envelops meaning and in this process, it at once conjointly holds and cuts off particular understandings and the subsequent free agency that might eventuate.

Proclaimed by the master signifier, the order-word, which in its molar state I am relating to dominant facialised networks, is through its transformation inherently oppositional. Within its statements a tension operates between the command and its alternate course and in the process assigning death as subjectivity “In a regime of this kind, any new body requires the erection of an opposable form, as well as the formation of distinct subjects; death is the general incorporeal transformation attributed to all bodies from the standpoint of their forms and substances” (Thousand Plateaus 119). Statements, such as ‘you will do this’ and ‘you will not do this’ procure an incorporeal death sentence, as they enable an order for the recipient to discontinue their present undertaking or be held accountable through the opposing direction or consequence of the order-word. As stated operating through these words is the largely virtual conjunctions from which they derive power, but contained within the order-word assemblage and as with any assemblage, there is an inherent potential of flight, which can be thought of as a means of escaping its configurations. When this flight eventuates it can be viewed as another form of de-facialisation, as the order-word is ultimately a product of faciality.

Death in respect of a dissipation or end to a particular event is thus animated by the order-word and its directive limitations, and as a process is open to difference, as Deleuze argues, “For the question was not how to elude the order-word but how to elude the death sentence it envelopes, how to develop its power of escape from veering into the imaginary” (Thousand Plateaus 121). This phenomenon relates directly to the problem as a process of defacialisation, as it disrupts the meaning of the death-image. Due to the containment of desire as social production certain death-images, such as those promulgated by dominant media channels elicit commands and processes of subjectification that aggregate affective states. In this respect and taking the notion to its limit every order-word is a death-image, which is subject to its own laws of repetition and difference. In this context, the repetition of images, be it violent
images or words eventually reduce the affective state as they provide a limit. Death is furthermore the gradual disinterest in images, which at one point might have produced an astounding affect. The images become a memorial, but in relation to the percep, which is an argument articulated below, they still contain meaning.

The order-word is an integral facet of the facialisation process, as Deleuze argues, “A regime that involves a hieratic and immutable Master who at every moment legislates by constants, prohibiting or strictly limiting metamorphosis, giving figures clear and stable contours, setting forms in opposition two by two and expecting subjects to die in order to pass from one form to the other” (119). Due to this, facialisation is a type of ideology in its own right, but nonetheless, as with any molar configuration, there comprises a minor counteraction that can potentially unsettle or realign its normativity, as Deleuze outlines “It would be over-simplifying to say that flight is a reaction against the order-word; rather it is included in it, as its other face in a complex assemblage, its other component” (Thousand Plateaus 118). At once a capturer of meaning within its death sentence, eliciting a personal loss of intensity, there is a possibility for escape or metamorphosis into the new. In relation to the problem, this can be an image that through its aleatory release escapes the regularisation of facialised consciousness and the powers that mediate it. As a minor line of flight this attainment takes different forms, but as a problem it can be viewed as a production that generates new and unexpected ways of being.

6.8 The ethics of the death-image

As discussed, within the framework of ‘the problem’ the death-image is ultimately complexified. As an order-word, it contains a dominant instruction, which Deleuze qualifies as a death sentence. Inherent to this sentence is the difference that is intrinsic to death. Contained within any image of thought there is thus an internal repetition, which is open to flight. Contending with these unfolding exchanges is arguably an ethical concern which in-itself is a generative grounding. This argument can thus commence with Deleuze’s discussion on the theoretical predicates he outlines in Difference and Repetition. In this text, he relates the dogma of thought to a set of
natural and philosophical postulates that in a polemical way can be used to discern and formulate an ethics of the image. For example, on a surface level, the belief that nature is good is clearly challenged by death-images such as the lingchi picture. This sentiment is, however, subjective as for certain people this penal act might have been justified and this difference highlights the tentative nature of good and its different interpretations. As argued, the ethical belief that the faculties will collectively unify through common sense is conjointly challenged by this notion. Common sense is inevitably a mass phenomenon that is produced and sustained by facialised frameworks. In this field there remains, however, a problem with the way that error is constituted across the localities wider framework, as misconception in this context is ultimately a product of facialisation.

For example, rather than examining the internal individuation that the death-image generates, it consistently undergoes a ‘stripping back’. A general reduction strips the layers of complexity that provide the image of death’s individuality. This is what qualifies the death-image through the perceptual apparatus of the order-word in the first instance. This point of discernment marks the point where the perceived image becomes a representation of death and is accordingly aligned with an image of thought. When an image undergoes this devaluation it subsequently necessitates a schizoanalysis. This form of interrogation is required as it can return layers of complexity to the image and attempt to locate its constituting problems. Referring to Deleuze’s laws of repetition the internal difference is concealed by an overriding difference. This externality subjects the image to general laws, such as those that provide the localised value and content for recognition. The contemporary proliferation of death-images in the media, which will be discussed in more detail in Part Three, clearly exacerbates this process. In this context, the image of death is epistemological and rather than providing an ontology of the encounter, it is learned about though the accompanying captions, editorials, knowledge, and ultimately the political and economic motivations that locate its meaning.

Reflecting on my discussion of Spinoza in Chapter 4, the ethical question thus lies in our capacity to divert the general concepts that produce the external conditions that through representation make us sad. Following the efficiency of Spinoza’s base
modes, this process is formulated as a distinction between affects that are good and produce joy and affects that are bad and produce sadness. As Deleuze argues, this understanding can diagrammatically cut through the verbiage of representation and its mediated moral abstractions. For example, in relation to the image of death does it make us sad and reduce our agency to act in new and expressive ways? This question does not conform to the standard response that images of death make the viewer sad and as such should be avoided. What is important though is the notion that real ethical difference lies in the experimentation of what a body can do and if a particular image reduces this agency then it is bad and subsequently unethical to pursue.

For example in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Deleuze interprets the affirmative nature of the will to power as potentially life changing and its reactive force as merely preserving the same. For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s ethics is one of living with the immanent forces that affirm life and in doing so one does not avoid representation, but following his sentiment, the noble is not aware of representation in the first instance. For Nietzsche, meaning comes from within and not from the external. *Resentiment* is a product of the transcendent as this plane abstracts the play of forces that exist on the transcendental, which as discussed is the plane that facilitates Deleuze’s empiricism. As an artificial sphere, the transcendent can be viewed as the world of commercial, religious and political *death-images* that elicit feelings of pity, hate and self-restraint. In this sense images of death have negative effects, but for the noble they would be largely affirmative as problems, which in relation to Bataille, who also wrote on Nietzsche, was arguably the case. Bataille’s ecstatic approach to death might also have been endorsed by Nietzsche as he outlined in, *Genealogy of Morality* “To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more: this is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human principle. Without cruelty there is no festival, and in punishment there is so much that is *festive!*” (155). Ethics for Nietzsche is removed from reactive forces, such as images that attempt to dominate the individual. Conducive to Deleuze’s framework, this ethics is one of experimentation and rather than entertaining self-doubt, exploring what the body can do.
6.9 Part Two Conclusion

In relation to the *lingchi* photograph that Bataille published in *Tears of Eros*, Part Two has further introduced and detailed a *death-image* framework. In Part One, it was shown that an initial consideration when contending with an image of death is the sense of belief, which is a notion that has been advanced throughout this chapter. For Deleuze, belief is nuanced in the way it restrains real thinking, but as a sensation, it is important, as a belief in something is better than nothing. Deleuze relates this understanding to cinema and the potential for it to represent a sense of belief that can be associated with an affirmative ethics, which has been the topic of the previous section. An ethics of the *death-image* can facilitate an active approach that in a noble context dismantles its reactive power. The noble pays no homage to the face as social production, as desire is not restrained from making new connections.

In relation to the *lingchi* photograph, Bataille provides an indication of a noble approach to the image, as he makes his own assessment on the power of its affect. This ‘revolutionary’ process as a belief in the discontinuity and continuity of existence outside of civilisation illustrates a reduced investment in the transcendent *death-image*. This image type subsequently loses its generality and role within the facialisation process. Belief can thus be positive, but in its regular form restrains the individual and ultimately provides the reactivity of the *death-image*. In its pure form, this chapter has also outlined the problem as an encounter that dismantles this image type as a *death-image*. This is due to the point that death is in part virtual and subject to a process of differenciation, which in turn leads to the subjective and differentiated experience of the actual world. This latter sphere of differentiation is where the *death-image* operates, but it provides an indication of its antecedent, which as ‘the problem’ is the source of its power.

The image of death has also been illustrated as a composite of percepts and affects, which can hold a particular perception and set of affects in an image. This process was highlighted in relation to Deleuze’s and Bacon’s theoretical comments on painting, which I related to the *lingchi* image. As a prototype, this photograph of a tortured man has enacted a *death-image* throughout much of the chapter. Bataille’s
comments on the *lingchi* image have also been used as a means of expressing some of its associated sentiments, such as providing a visual exemplar of the order-word. The repulsion and attraction of death operate as composites of the same complex assemblage. The affectivity of the image has been examined in relation to the affection and crystal image. It has been demonstrated that along with the problem to varying degrees these image types break with the organic. Importantly it has also been argued that the face is an integral facet of this framework, as this surface becomes an organisational grid that exceeds the parameters of the head.

Faciality has been shown to provide a system that goes beyond the physicality of the individual and in doing so, we arrive at a wider encompassment. This is a notion that was challenged by Levinas’ conception of the face as a means of ethical communication. For Levinas, the face is an opening to the infinite possibility and this sensibility will be examined further in Part Three. As a method of interrogation, schizoanalysis has been developed and related to the different components of the image. It has been demonstrated that this type of analysis can move beyond the generality of the *death-image* and provide a more localised examination of subjective and collective productions. Schizoanalysis has been used to draw these different elements together and this process is further integrated into my case studies in Part Three.

It has been argued that capitalistic networks such as the media monitor and prescribe facial formulas across the world of facialised consciousness, and this analysis will now be advanced with practical examples. This concluding part provides examples of different *death-images* in practice, demonstrating that this operation necessitates a critical evaluation. Part Two has thus furthered my formulation of the *death-image*, and the central aim of this thesis, which is mobilising Deleuze’s theory of facialisation in my examination of the images that represent death in a media and art context.
PART THREE: TYPES OF DEATH-IMAGES IN PRACTICE

7.0 The media death-image

Parts One and Two have provided a theoretical framework that will now be applied to different examples of death-images in a media and art context. Through facialisation media concentration enables the subjectification process that procures the collective recognition of particular images as black holes. As argued these holes of attraction subsist on the white walls of capitalist frameworks. As an encompassing system, which in relation to dominant media networks is arguably a ‘concentrated market system,’ capitalism facilitates white walls as digital screens that visual culture as a form of social production operates on. From the period of Guattari’s, Machinic Unconscious, which was published in 1998, this process has continued today as Pavlik outlines in Media and the Digital Age:

Just as in the age of media, a small number of major companies dominate the digital media landscape. The six biggest players in the digital media age are U.S. companies, and all have interests that cut across most or all media types and in some cases have business that extend beyond the world of the media: Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, General Electric, Disney, Time Warner, Viacom and CBS Corporation. (172)

These corporations have a variety of interests, such as General Electric owning NBC Television, MSNC.com, Universal Pictures and a military weapons production facility that nets the company billions of dollars. News Corporation’s media reach, also works across a variety of platforms, as Nathan Roger argues in Image Warfare, “Across forms of international media Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation has acquired companies concerned with books, newspapers, magazines, music, radio, film studios and television broadcasting” (40). Murdoch’s media interests are particularly questionable as he openly advocates for State sponsored agendas, such as the War on Terror, which along with his public statements in support of the U.S. led initiative is a belief disseminated by his global media empire, with all his international news interests supporting the invasion of Iraq (Bothmer). As Daya Kishan Thussu states in Murdoch’s War “Murdoch’s media played a central role in preparing and then retaining public opinion in favour of the invasion” (95). These specific ‘media giant’
corporations work with agenda setting that “Feeds us much of what we read, see, hear, and “think” we know and ultimately believe” (Larson 392). Perceiver determined issues aside, as Larson proposes, this diverse media concentration informs the public on what topics to think about and this determination compounds and facilitates the facialisation process.

As a ubiquitous component in social production the media is thus a dominant organisational force that manipulates desire for its own capitalist ends, as Guattari argues “The primary function of facial capitalistic conscientialization is to mask the fact that there is nothing inescapable in the mobilization and sequence of operations that contribute to the processes of semiotic subjection” (Machinic Unconscious 83). Semiotic subjection illustrates the capitalist mediation of images that the mainstream media works to territorialise assemblages and subsequently the perceiving audience. This subjugating manifestation can be thought of as the grounding that occurs through the so-called mainstream media’s promulgation and consequent reaffirmation of the oppositional and territorialised codes, such as aesthetics, national identity, righteous wars and so forth.

As outlined in Part One, these formulas provide a framework that is consistent, but also adaptive to adjustments that to varying degrees account for instances of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. These movements continue to work, however, on a frame of minor adjustments, as Guattari outlines, “What characterises the molar politics of stratification is the constitution of a world of stratified, identified, or hierarchized objects and subjects, singularities and abstract machines there being held by systems of coordinates that authorise only the minimum degree of freedom necessary for the survival of the assemblages” (Machinic Unconscious 48). To a certain extent this freedom is admissible, but for consistent assemblages to exist there requires a regularity of connections and forms that contain and rework desire across the dominant media networks.
7.1 The 9/11 death-image

An example of a mass phenomenon death-image is the capitalist promulgation and subsequent facialisation of the Twin Tower attacks in New York in 2001, which is an event that provided the pretext for the now infamous War on Terror. If for Deleuze the catastrophic events of World War II disrupted the organic teleology of the movement-image then this incident also marks a shift in relation to the digital image. As WJT Mitchell argues in Cloning Terror ‘The destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York has provided the most memorable image of the twenty-first century so far, destined to join the iconic mushroom cloud as the principle emblem of war on terror in our time” (186). This sentiment is important as it illustrates the global zeitgeist in relation to the World Trade Tower attacks that arguably supercedes the iconographical atomic cloud image in its spectacular unfolding as a digital media image.

The World Trade Center disaster, which is commonly referred to as 9/11, is a symbolic event for North America and the global audience that viewed the incident on 24/7 real-time news coverage. Mitchell relates this destruction to the ultimate form of iconoclasm as to varying degrees it substituted one percept, the supremacy of the U.S. as an infallible global power, with one of vulnerability, which also correlates with the media saturation of the War on Terror slogan. This shift occurs on many levels, but in relation to the death-image the first component to consider is belief, as proceeding from Mitchell’s proposition, and my formulation of the death-image in Parts One and Two, this is the principle that works with and ultimately secures the position of facialised consciousness in relation to the mass spectacle of death witnessed on the day.

The 9/11 attacks killed thousands of people as a direct result of the buildings collapsing after the impact of rogue planes, and indirectly as hundreds of thousands of people have since died in Iraq and Afghanistan. These subsequent killings were initially based on a pretext of retribution, but this impetus quickly evolved into a prominent geo-political military strategy in the Middle East (Simpson). The Manichean thinking that qualifies the on-going War on Terror relies on the binarisation of the order-word. The U.S. (democracy, freedom, capitalism) and the
Middle Eastern States excluding Saudi Arabia and their allies (dictatorship, terrorism, fundamentalism) positioning is clearly reductive, as Robert E Denton (2006) argues in *Language* “The attacks became part of a larger allegory, a tale of good versus evil” (9). As with U.S. national iconography, such as the Statue of Liberty or the White House, the World Trade Centre’s grand narrative is grounded on belief, as its chief architect, Minoru Yamasaki highlighted in 1984:

> The World Trade Center is a living symbol of man’s dedication to world peace, beyond the compelling need to make this a monument to world peace, the World Trade Center should, because of its importance, become a representation of man’s belief in humanity, his need for individual dignity, his beliefs in the cooperation of men, and through cooperation, his ability to find greatness. (Yamasaki quoted in “NYSM”)

Due to the many wars that have been fought over capital resources, as a symbol of global capitalism, the World Trade Center functioning as an image of peace is clearly problematic, even more so after the proceeding wars that have taken place since the attacks. Yamasaki’s passionate comment does, however, provide an indication of the encapsulating image of thought that continues to secure the center’s meaning. I refer to the center as virtual as although a new building named the One World Trade Center has been built on the site, this is the sphere that the destroyed buildings continue to operate on as an abstract machine. Interestingly Yamasaki’s sentiment is conducive to Deleuze’s in the way that he warrants a belief in belief, which is a perception he relates to the world and the trade center as a communicative symbol, but they clearly differ in the fixed representation that Yamasaki advocates. His belief is centred on the towers as a transcendent symbol located with predicates of peace, hope, global capitalism, greatness, America and so forth, that ultimately work to conceal the multiplicity of meanings and assemblages of power that operate within its field of facialisation.

The World Trade Center continues to secure its image of contextual belief through its name and commemoration, as outlined by the official 9/11 memorial (which is also situated on the former site) mission statement, “May the lives remembered, the deeds recognized, and the spirit reawakened be eternal beacons, which reaffirm respect for life, strengthen our resolve to preserve freedom, and inspire an end to hatred, ignorance and intolerance” (“9/11 Mission”). This sentiment follows a similar line to
Yamasaki’s and works as a multiplicity of exteriority in the Bergsonian sense, which ultimately contains the meanings that operate within this image of thought (Bergsonism 49). This collective understanding works to facilitate the mass phenomenon death-image that is 9/11, as a symbol of national unity and freedom. It works to conceal the reasons for the attacks, the unmerited killings in the subsequent wars, and the voices inherent to the multiplicity of victims and persuasions that do not adhere to the War on Terror narrative or possess an unbridled belief in free market capitalism as a facilitator of global emancipation.

As a memorial this belief in the transcendent spirit attempts to secure the image of thought and the reductive binarisation that is parasitical to the 9/11 death-image, as Marc Redfield argues in Virtual Trauma “At one and the same time it [9/11] commemorates and preserves a past event for a future recollection, recalls the futurity that renders this past traumatic, hints at its own forgetfulness and forgettability, and effaces the effacement of the singularity and finitude that opens the space of its possibility” (29). Somewhat critically and in relation to my argument on memorials in Chapter 2, this comment further highlights the multifaceted nature of 9/11 remembrance, which to some extent the official line and the dominant media representation challenges or attempts to facialise. The minor adjustments that Guattari describes in relation to the territorial assemblages that secure dominant media facialisation can be related to this commemorative media sensation. This occurs in the way minor adjustments, such as the deterritorialising hints of forgetfulness and finitude that operate as lines of flight can be superseded by the image of thought as eternal belief. The sensibility of the eternal spirit of the U.S. as the greater good and bearer of freedom is at least rhetorically secured as a territorial assemblage through this specific example of facialisation.

A belief in the 9/11 death-image, therefore, predicates the organisation and functioning of its facialisation, and I now examine this particular incident as an assemblage, which will form the basis for a schizoanalysis. The structural analysis of 9/11 as an assemblage, which I have touched on in relation to territorialisation, diagrammatically navigates through the image of thought that is secured by belief. It dismantles and challenges the death-image’s rhetorical meaning and renders its sentiment incongruent with specific aspects of the assemblage and following
Deleuze’s argument that was outlined in Part One, it rises above all images, which as argued is not the case in relation to the problem. The iconic assemblage of the first and second plane impacting with the upper floors of the towers in the first instance of the attacks works along the horizontal line of content and expression. The impacting planes initially provide lines of flight from the territorial assemblage that secures the connections that facilitate this type of meaning. As mentioned, belief plays an integral role in this process along with the many connections that mediate its normativity, as large towers protruding from the aerial view of the cityscape (see Figure 5.0).

The proceeding affect is thus a problem, which as discussed in Part Two moves beyond the affection-image, as it is an indication of ‘the problem’ as the last problematic that is death. As a signifier, it can remain unstable for prolonged periods of time as illustrated by Bataille’s lingchi image, and this volatility is the question of death in its pure differentiating form. As a constituting relational and temporal source of problems, death facilitates this function as the source for other problems and questions to proceed and subsequently deterritorialise. The lines of flight that
followed the actual flights into the world trade towers are just that, lines of
deterritorialisation that are precipitated by death in its virtual and actual form.

Virtual in the sense that death is the last form of the problematic and actual in the
quantitative value of the physical death that to the largely unbeknown 9/11 audience
remains elusive. The lines of flight traversed the molar and molecular lines that held
the percept of a secure set of structural towers in place, providing new perceptual
arrangements that continue to remain open to a future not yet. As was the unfolding
nature of the real-time event on 9/11, as a problem the future of this image of thought
remains open. Just as the actualising event on the day was yet to be realised and to
some extent acted upon, to many the 9/11 problem is yet be determined and
assimilated by its contextualisation as a secure and stable death-image.

The first element of the 9/11 assemblage that relates to the content is thus the
machinic component and this aspect can identify the connections between the two
commercial carrier planes and the towers. This event provides a workable diagram of
the machinic connections as the territorial content of the assemblage instantly
effectuates new abstract machines that work to reterritorialise (which is a
deterritorialisation in its own right) and stabilise the unravelling problems. This
transition marks a disruption of the mechanistic facialised consciousness that
territorialises the global hegemony of the U.S. as a strategic image of thought and
arguably opens this sphere to the realm of the machine as this image can be used and
adapted in new ways. The regime of signs that contained the foregoing territorial
image is disrupted and conjointly the abstract machines in real time simultaneously
work with the changing physicality of the planes and buildings as territorial content
that continuously extricates meaning.

The asymmetrical unfolding of the event as it moves out to and subsequently reflects
the future scrambles for territorial connections in a deterritorialising flow. This
exacting process works with the vertical line as the expected flows of machinic
connections are subsumed by new machinic connections that subsequently produce
new fields of content that link with dynamic assemblages of enunciation. These
assemblages interconnect with the evolving content and mediate the transformations
through expression, which is a process subject to the vertical line of
deterritorialisation that affects the yet to be discerned *death-image*. Death as the future is the not yet organisation of the *death-image*, and as a problem it produces the heterogeneous and discursive flows that are constantly being captured, but as ephemera not contained. This virtual unfolding as a constituting process occurs before belief and the constituting actualisation of capitalist facialisation.

The constituting process of the 9/11 event-image is therefore purely grounded in its facility as a problem, which as discussed relates to death in many ways. Most obviously death is evident in the carnage of the spectacle, but unless one is focused on a loved or known person in the towers or the planes this awareness of death is largely impersonal and “Neither present nor past but always coming, the source of an incessant multiple adventure in a persistent question” (*Difference and Repetition* 112). Death as the future is always coming in nuanced and largely unpredictable ways and this is an indication of the last problematic as the where and when that locates the multiple adventure of a life that remains open as a question. As ‘the problem’ it is the enveloping chaos that surrounds the event, which through the piercing of the territorial assemblage by the planes was given access to perpetuate a series of more localised problems to contend with as collective assemblages of enunciation.

The 9/11 attacks were thus fundamentally creative and this somewhat stark proposition results from a structural diagrammatic analysis that is not contained by strategic beliefs, which can also be accounted for as part of the content and expression of the 9/11 assemblage. A schizoanalysis can examine this event at various stages of its evolution in a dynamic, but also surgical manner. This process can be used to highlight the problematic nature of the problem and the strategic characteristics of the *death-image*, which in its capitalistic facialisation context procures the dominant image. As an image of thought, this subjection subsumes the 9/11 fatalities as symbols of freedom, but omits the competing narratives of war, imperialism, the disenfranchised, the rejoicing and the detached and disinterested. All of which produce their own abstract machines that work in a constant struggle with modes of facialisation, and as Guattari argues in *Machinic Unconscious*, the dominant media that supports the 9/11 territorial assemblages.
The towers physically crumbled and collapsed along with the incorporeal meaning they harbourd. In relation to the strategic imagined enemy that coordinated the attacks they worked under the general recapitulation of terror, and this process constituted what Alain Badiou calls in *Infinite Thought* the “Disjunctive synthesis between two nihilisms” (158). This statement illustrates the problematic nature attributing fixed narratives to any event, as there are competing interests, each with their own forms of nihilism, which becomes increasingly evident when they interconnect. The nihilism of capitalism and terrorism collide, but more acutely Badiou’s reference can be posed as a disjunctive synthesis between the many competing 9/11 interests and beliefs. His dichotomy, albeit non-Manichean, reduces the attacks to a war between two distinct sides, which is an arrangement that does not account for the assemblages of power at stake in any political event. As a rigid and widely used term, ‘terrorism’ also requires a schizoanalysis as its generality captures meaning that equates to actual events as Luke Howie highlights in *Witnesses to Terror*. “Terrorism as spectacle as the use of terrorism in ways that translate readily into terrifying mediated images: into terrifying symbolic events” (24). As a spectacle the 9/11 *death-image* can then be stripped of its collective enunciative values that initially, at least, illustrates this mass spectacle as a problem.

This collision between different ideas and ultimately types of death further indicates a problem. For Deleuze, death from the inside and outside constitutes the two sides of the absolute, with the former from the past and the latter from the future. These two facets of the whole provide the parameters for affirmation as Deleuze argues in *Cinema 2*:

> But, between the two, what flashes of lightning there will have been; these were life itself. From one pole to the other a creation will be constructed, which is true creation only because it will be carried out between the two deaths, the apparent and the real, all the more intense because it illuminates this interstice. (209)

As discussed, this mediation is ultimately creative as the movements between the ‘I die’ and the ‘one dies’ are the primary questions that constitute life and its many questions. The 9/11 event-image as a problem and *death-image* illuminates the interstice between the, they die and the ‘I’ die, and distinct from Heidegger’s
understanding from *Being and Time*, both sides provide a continuum that coexist through acts of co-creation. Facialised death works on this continuum, as the more death becomes as an auxiliary of the *death-image*, the more epistemological meaning it captures.

Jean Baudrillard argues this point in *Spirit of Terrorism* “It is all about death, not only about the violent irruption of death in real time - ‘live’, so to speak - but the irruption of death which is far more than real: a death which is symbolic and sacrificial - that is to say, the absolute, irrevocable event” (16). This type of death, which can be related to Bataille’s *lingchi* image, is pertinent as the tortured man’s sacrifice presented a death that was more real than real, and his sacrifice for the Emperor and Confucianism was exclusively symbolic. The 9/11 image also bears more significance to the event in its pure form, and as a social production, it conjointly works within the capitalist axiomatic, as Baudrillard argues, “The image consumes the event, in the sense that it absorbs it and offers it for consumption” (*Spirit of Terrorism* 27). This practice is particularly evident with the mass consumption of 9/11 images, as to some degree the extensive *death-image*, compressed with symbology and trajectory, supercedes the actuality of the occurrence.

Nikos Papastergiadis’ argues a related point in, *Aesthetics and Politics*, and that along with the continued media replays on the day of 9/11, the ambiguity surrounding the event destabilised the function of the image to represent. As discussed, this fracturing of representation removes the image’s potential to hold an image of thought, and with the ruptured meanings we enter a field of pure problems or a new representation of the problem. Once again Papastergiadis’ proposition is, however, reductive as although 9/11 certainly provided problems it also enabled and continues to enable *death-images*, which are laden with dominant representations. Through the reterritorialisation of images as part of territorial assemblages, the facialised 9/11 *death-image* is now an event scorched by dominant meanings and competing interests. The constant bombardment and saturation of 9/11 images facilitates desensitisation and potential disinterest, but arguably the perceiving audience is to some extent already desensitised.
Granted the images have longevity, but as they have moved from the problem phase through to the *death-image* and beyond these images are inevitably taking on new meanings. This is partly due to the dissemination and transferability of the images in new media as Roger states:

> The study of visual culture, then, draws attention to the ways in which images retain a life, remaining available for continued circulation and transformation into and out of varied environments within which they can be reused, replayed and redefined: circulation and remediation are the fundamental capacities of iconic images in contemporary cultures. ([Image Warfare 37](Image Warfare 37))

As an iconic image, 9/11 will therefore increasingly move away from its initial contextualisation as a facialised *death-image*, as the downloadable, shareable and culture jamming potential of the circulated images, provide unclear destinations. A future not yet, facilitated by repetition and an open question will in some instances return their problem status, which is a notion that is examined in the proceeding sections.

As a problem and a *death-image*, 9/11 can thus be related to the *lingchi* image and this connection is problematic in the productive sense. As assemblages their connections can be discerned and schizoanalysed, and as such many questions can be posed. For instance, does the deterritorialising potential of one image supercede the other or is this arborescent posturing obsolete in relation to the rhizome? The latter proposition is more accurate in the ontological sense that Deleuze advocates, for as an ultimately free and unpredictable flow the deterritorialising line escapes a rigid measurement. Varying levels of cognition and recognition lead to hierarchies that can be more acutely discerned on the arborescent molar line, and the more free molecular line, which along with the deterritorialising component constitute an assemblage ([Thousand Plateaus 507](Thousand Plateaus 507)). For the limited human eye, there are, however, arguably more entry points in the *lingchi* image. For example, although facialisation is clearly evident in the 9/11 images, and one is drawn into the various black holes that work across the surface of the sky, planes, buildings, and billowing smoke; each with their localised singularities, the *lingchi* image provides a faciality machine in its pure form. The black holes of the victim’s eyes lure the viewer in and following Bataille this attraction is repulsed by the barbarity of the slow slicing.
At further risk of constructing a binary, as a purely visible sacrificial act, this actual image is arguably more intensive than the virtual images of the plane passengers and the office workers as they perish. Granted the actual *death-images* of the victims falling from the towers are potent, but their particular facial features cannot be discerned, and as such they subsequently operate on and as white walls with black holes that encapsulate the whole. To some extent these figures, such as the one captured in the popular *Falling Man* photograph taken by Richard Drew (see Figure 5.1) reflect the body-head system of the primitive that I outlined in Chapter 2, as the body is the polyvocal corporeal coding system that is yet to be decoded and overcoded by the face (*Thousand Plateaus* 176). To some extent the *Falling Man* refrains from the overcoding subjectification of the face, and this process can be related to what Deleuze outlines in *Francis Bacon* and other texts as ‘dismantling the face’ (20) or the *becoming-animal* that operates in the, “zone of indiscernibility or undecidability between man and animal” (47). The figure becomes animal as this is the contained force that artists such as Bacon animate, and this process can be directly related to the figure of the becoming-imperceptible falling man. The photographer who captured the image has nonetheless still devised the figure as the ‘unknown soldier’.

![Figure 5.1 Image capturing ‘The Falling Man’ included in Telegraph article (2015)](image)

As Drew suggests in a news interview, “Although he has not chosen his fate, he appears to have in his last instants of life, embraced it” and that “To me, he’ll always remain the unknown soldier” (“Daily Telegraph”). His belief is interesting as the yet to be concretely identified falling man is for him a soldier in the War on Terror. This sentiment is particularly challenging as the falling man continues to efface the
stability of the death-image, as different parties attempt to omit this man and the other suicide jumpers from the official 9/11 record. The many jumpers on the day arguably made a rational choice between death from fire and smoke and the open-air drop from the tower windows. This choice, although free within the confines of the situation, contextualises the jumpers as committing suicide, which as Susan Lurie proposes in Terror, Culture is a notion that unsettles many people. Lurie argues that not only should the images be part of the official record, but that:

If the exclusion and reformulation of the horrifying sights is central to the record I have been tracing, these sights return in the service of protesting the censorship that is integral to dangerous post-9/11 U.S. national policies. Presented as icons of truth that is obfuscated by dangerous official narratives, these images also help to formulate new possibilities for what safety might look like. (73)

For Lurie, this illustration of the falling man and the other people who leapt to their deaths from the burning towers on 9/11 can be used as means of dissent, which is part of the U.S. constitution. The state-sponsored narrative promulgated by the major news networks provides an instance of dangerous official narratives facilitating a paranoia that infects peoples thinking. The falling man as a problem can thus challenge the state sponsored capitalist facialisation process that can selectively obfuscate and subsequently subsume particular competing narratives and as Baudrillard argues, offer them up for consumption. This affirmative decision to leap to ones’ death also provides an example of the deterritorialising line of flight that the jumpers to some extent embraced as a form of pure desire. This line of flight cut through the territorialised assemblage that forbids this action and is a form of creative expression in evidently futile circumstances.

While the resentful and fearful contemplate death through the embodiment of death-images, the strong experiment with it, as Drew argues in relation to the 9/11 jumper (see Figure 5.1) “Although he has not chosen his fate, he appears to have, in his last instants of life, embraced it” (“Daily Telegraph”). The falling man’s calm exterior with a casually half lifted leg and relaxed dive angle posturing with no flailing arms suggest a calm interior. Although impossible to discern the true nature of these movements or what the man was thinking we can intuit that this figure is apparently experimenting with what a body can do, which under this dire circumstance, clearly
conforms to Nietzsche’s noble. The man not only charts a deterritorialising line of flight to his death, but through his apparent becoming-imperceptible he relinquishes his identity in the process. The period of his fall, which is estimated at approximately ten seconds, would have been obsolete for the man as he operated on his own duration and as discussed this image continues to provide a problem for the average viewer and the official 9/11 narrative that attempts to capture and secure meaning.

The series of images that facialise and to some extent de-facialise the 9/11 event, therefore, enables a working example of the death-image in practice. It has been shown that the death-image aims at contextualising this incident as a ‘meaning-event’, and that this process is volatile and fraught with danger in respect of challenging beliefs. 9/11 as an assemblage of competing flows that connect and intersect along its horizontal and vertical lines has also been considered. This diagrammatic method of schizoanalysis can illustrate the paranoid, but also fluid nature of 9/11 symbology. It has been demonstrated that as a type of schizophrenia, the problem can potentially destabilise capitalist facialisation and this develops through its proficiency for constituting new instances of meaning that in its pure form provide an indication of death as ‘the problem’. The death-image also provides an indication of this differential genesis, but this representation aims more at solutions than generating the questions that work in conjunction with problems. Granted there can be ‘capitalist deterritorialisations’ as discussed throughout Part One, but with regards to dominant media networks particular iconic images are secured as death-images, and 9/11 is a prime example of this.

7.2 The Kennedy death-image

Following on from the 9/11 examination I will now illustrate a further example of the death-image in practice, and an exemplar instance of this is the filmed assassination of the U.S. President, John F Kennedy in 1963. This assassination warranted a major event that was shown across commercial television, and as a strategic death-image, it operated and continues to operate across the field of a primarily U.S., but also global facialised consciousness. Without delving into the nuanced causality of the complex
event with different theories on how and why the President was killed. The different
stills from the ‘Zapruder’ film, which is widely accepted as the foremost footage of
the assassination continues to provide a problem that challenges the U.S.
Government’s account on what happened. This problem provides distinct persuasions,
as Philip Knight describes in *Kennedy Assassination* “Depending on one’s political
outlook, the Kennedy assassination led either to a powerful grass-roots challenge to
the establishment, or to a descent into paranoid fantasies and the politics of
disenchantment” (75). Interestingly Knight’s dichotomy animates the extreme
gradients of Deleuze’s two pole paranoid and schizo system with the obvious
exception that Knight’s paranoia is with the State machine itself. Accounting for the
assemblages of competing interests involved in the discourse surrounding the
assassination, Knight’s divide is also arguably reductive, but his binary enables a
workable framework that can be applied to the facialised narrative and its
accompanying *death-image*.

The official findings state that a lone gunman (Lee Harvey Oswald) shooting from
behind killed Kennedy, but the Zapruder footage shows the President being shot from
the front as his head snaps back from the force of the bullet entering his head. The
infamous and widely debated stills that display the head implosion illustrate this (see
Figures 6.0 and 6.1), but although it was viewed within days of the assassination and
used as primary evidence in subsequent commissions, the footage was not publically
shown on network television for twelve years after the event in 1975 (Gillon). This
delay in broadcasting the footage demonstrates what Guattari would call an essential
task of the dominant media as it adjusts and configures what is deemed appropriate
for viewing at a particular time and place (*Machinic Unconscious* 47). Not only did
the suppressed Kennedy assassination images have the potential to unsettle audiences,
but according to some commentators, it could have potentially overthrown the
Government of the time (Bothmer). This revolutionary desire was, however,
contained and for the powerful political and micropolitical forces, the subsequent
*death-image* necessitated a strategic method for monitoring its actualisation and
dissemination. Through a process of facialisation the official narrative captured the
competing narratives that questioned the official version of the event and as such the
becoming-revolutionary line of flight was delimited.
Withholding the Zapruder footage from the public not only contained their revolutionary desire, it also put this desire to work as a form of social production. The many books, films, documentaries, conferences, lectures and even music made on the assassination are a testament to this. As Richard Buyer argues in, *Assassination Still Matters*, every public opinion poll since the assassination in 1963 doubts the official explanation, so this poses the question, why no revolution? As discussed desire is directed in measured ways, and as such people can subsequently desire their own servitude. Relating to Knight’s comment, although people have suspicions that the official version is not true, there is a field of paranoia constituted by facialisation that continues to contain the revolutionary desire. The facialised paranoia facilitates the doubt and schizo lines that ephemerally escape the neuroticised territorial assemblages. Put another way, one doubts the official accounts, but due to facialisation, one also doubts the alternative theories and this paranoia harnesses the revolutionary potential of desire.

The aforementioned outlets for public dissatisfaction and its subsequent creativity are ways that desire-production works conducively with social-production, which as argued is supported by capitalism. Capitalism supports the social production and dissemination of the books and films, which to varying degrees work within the confines of capitalist deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. These mediums, which direct desire away from its true revolutionary potential, are permitted to deviate from the official line, as demonstrated by Oliver Stone’s, *JFK*, a film that openly depicts an alternative and controversial version of the assassination. The many books,
such as Buyer’s also illustrate this freedom within the expressive measures of social production. These movements refrain from physical action, but to some extent they do interfere with territorialised assemblages and the effectuating abstract machines that accompany them.

One could view this process as a virtual war or in relation to Deleuze’s notion of the war machine in Thousand Plateaus “War machines take shape against the apparatuses that appropriate the machine and make war their affair and their object: they bring connections to bear against the great conjunction of the apparatuses of capture or domination” (487). Although Stone’s film might not fully qualify as a war machine, there are certain actors within this field that eschew the state endorsed official record and the dominant forces of capitalist facialisation that work to codify and put the revolutionary desire to work. Granted they still operate within the confines of social production, but to some extent, these agents are nomadic in their thinking, as “‘Nomad thought’ does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on identity; it rides difference” (Thousand Plateaus 9). This thought process appropriates the war machine and while operating outside of facialised systems, it creates the new on a radical periphery. The State consistently retaliates though and attempts to capture lines of flight, which necessitate a retorritorialisation towards the territorialised status quo, which in this context, is the official lone gunman theory.

The State can attempt to capture nomadic movement in many ways, but in this particular case, it can be representational and conceptual in the strategic promulgation of the term ‘conspiracy theory’. This terminology attempts to capture and compound alternative narratives that challenge facialisation and ultimately flows of dissent from the official line. As Professor Lance DeHaven-Smith argues, this process is directly supported by the actual U.S. State “The CIA’s campaign to popularize the term ‘conspiracy theory’ and make conspiracy belief a target of ridicule and hostility must be credited, unfortunately, with being one of the most successful propaganda initiatives of all time” (Conspiracy Theory 48). DeHaven-Smith argues that this process has supported official narratives and that if true this CIA initiative was successful. The binarisation of official record and conspiracy theory aids in the
process of capture, as there are many movements and competing interests, which are reduced to this manifestation.

Reducing the plethora of voices and ideas to one contextualisation enables the State to function, but this hegemony is nonetheless fraught with a danger that results in an unstable environment for both the State and the nomadic actors. As Deleuze argues, “The world and its States are no more masters of their plane than revolutionaries are condemned to a deformation of theirs. Everything is played in uncertain games” (*Thousand Plateaus* 147). This sentiment is particularly evident across the global political arena with the many competing interests and assemblages of power at the nation State level, and with the largely unstable nature of conspiracy theories that as war machines attempt to challenge official State narratives and subsequently capitalist facialisation.

The exploding Kennedy headshot, therefore, continues to provide a problem for both the official State narrative and the many alternative theories that attempt to capture meaning. One could argue that the dominant conspiracy plot as depicted by Stone is now so normalised that it provides its own form of State control, which captures and homogenises competing theories. Regardless of this, the Kennedy problem and the official *death-image* provide an indication of ‘the problem’ as the sheer graphic nature of the iconic image marks a shift in facialised consciousness. In a largely unadorned way, the problem and the *death-image* require people to question their own relation to death in both the impersonal level, which was intensified by the fact that a popular President had been publically killed and on a personal, relational and temporal level. Just as the belief in the safety and invulnerability of the U.S. was ruptured by the 9/11 attacks that happened some thirty-eight years later, the public execution of Kennedy made people realise that anyone could be killed, at anytime. This sentiment is relational to the last form of the problematic that is death as the where and when provides an unknown affirmation for the strong willed as Nietzsche’s noble, and resentment for the paranoid and subjugated that becomes a question of ethics.
There are many different examples of *death-images* and infinite problems, but the ones that I have selected are archetypal illustrations of political and ultimately capitalist facialisation. The particular case studies I have chosen are both from the U.S. and this selection is particularly relevant in the context that the major media companies are all American owned and that 9/11 and the Kennedy assassination are globally iconic events in their own right. As Buyer’s argues, “The media is operated and controlled by big business conglomerates and the intelligence community (CIA, the government, and the military) as well as private interest groups” (188). This issue is apparent in the contest to secure meaning and effectively control *death-images* for potentially strategic purposes, which as Lurie argues is a dangerous strategy as it conceals the reality of death and war. Conglomerates such as News Corporation are complicit in this process as they actively construct, support and participate in State narratives.

The U.S. examples, therefore, provide a workable indication of the strategic flows that operate through capitalism. Although this mass phenomenon operates on its own economic measurements it sustains political elements that work to secure facialisation in a reciprocal fashion. In relation to the media, a ‘closed market system’ operates with secure flows operating between big business conglomerates. These entities are intertwined with the BwO of capital to the extent that they are pure capital flows in their own right and as argued operate with State actors on conducive white walls. Meaning is constructed through facialised assemblages of enunciation and death and war is profitable through increases in readership, advertising revenue that works across both print and online coverage, and military industrial production. Alternative media provides a war machine to tackle this hegemony, but as Deleuze argues, this process is fraught with danger. The role of representation and discerning who and what methods are used to control the image of thought is, therefore, an important component in the politics and economy of the image, which is particularly evident in the use of the icon. An examination of the icon can further illustrate the vested interests at play in dominant representation and accordingly the *death-image*. 
7.3 The role of the icon in the death-image

Deleuze relates the icon to Plato’s conception of representation that he examines in *Difference and Repetition* and at length in *Logic of Sense*. In his chapter “Plato and the Simulacrum,” he compounds his argument for ‘overturning Platonism’, which can be viewed as ‘overturning the icon’. He argues that in Plato’s texts, *Phaedrus, The Statesman, and The Sophist*, he creates a model of division that can be used to arbitrate claims for an authentic foundation. Foundation for Plato is facilitated by mythology, which provides a basis for judging between good and bad copies (*Logic of Sense* 254). This process is one of rivalry between claimants, and determining who is authentic and inauthentic. The authentic is supported by a mythology that secures the grounds for discernment, and the inauthentic is isolated and accordingly divided. For Deleuze, this process of selection is not necessarily one of finding the true claimant, but on the contrary, it is a model for pursuing and identifying the false claimant.

In doing this Deleuze argues that Plato privileges the icon as a copy that relates to the idea of a thing that provides a mediating relation of similitude. The idea as a transcending entity relates this pure form to the authentic claimant through a resemblance that is the measurement of ones proximity to the idea and its intrinsic foundation. This measure operates as a lineage that charts a transition from the authentic statesman through to the slave, negatively culminating in the simulacrum, which is a false copy and accordingly corrupt. In this system, the statesman thus has an essence that is protected from the fleeting appearances of the false claimant, which in the worst instance is a form of simulacra (*Logic of Sense* 267).

As an impure form Plato determines that the simulacrum should be repressed and restrained from infecting the foundation to icon lineal relation and hierarchy. As simulacra operate as an artificial copy of a copy and so on, it increasingly becomes more distant from the icon and its resemblance to the overarching idea and its direct connection to the foundation. As Deleuze argues, “We have proceeded, then, from a first determination of the Platonic motive: to distinguish essence from appearance, the intelligible from the sensible, the idea from the image, the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum” (*Logic of Sense* 260). Rather than operating productively in relation to essence the simulacrum does not have a model based on judgment and
knowledge. It is pejoratively cast away as an imitation that although may contain degrees of resemblance, this closeness for Plato is based on trickery.

Importantly Deleuze argues that the measurement of the simulacrum is outside of the model and subsequently outside of knowledge, which qualifies it as open and limitless. The simulacrum is then “Not degraded copy, rather it contains a positive power which negates both original and copy both model and reproduction” (*Logic of Sense* 272), and as outlined in *Difference and Repetition* this process “Can only occur by virtue of denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections” (66). Due to its existence outside of knowledge and the shielding measure of icons the simulacrum is free with its own internal difference. Just as Levina’s face of the Other facilitates an infinity so does the simulacrum, which in theme with Deleuze’s theoretical framework provides a mode of difference in-itself.

On the one hand, the iconic representation of the idea advocated for by Plato facilitates the return of the same, and as discussed throughout Parts One and Two, this layer provides a cloak that covers the internal mechanics of the return. Alternatively, the internal repetition is not subject to models, and as such operates in chaos, which as discussed is the radical outside of facialised knowledge or the pure exteriority of the nomadic thinker. For Deleuze, the eternal return affirms chaos and subsequently “What returns are the divergent series, as divergent: that is, each one insofar as it displaces its difference from all the others; and all, insofar as they complicate their difference in the chaos without beginning or end” (*Logic of Sense* 264). The eternal return is the qualitative selection or concrete individuation that occurs when an engagement with chaos eventuates and subsequently actualises. This individuation is an affirmation of the divergent, and chaos is the infinite virtual content that facilitates the conditions for the simulacrum to exist. Deleuze goes far enough to say that both the eternal return and the simulacrum are parasitical and require each other for their realisation. The simulacrum is thus a self-differentiating entity that’s resemblance is not related to the model as icon, but only testament to dissimilarity (*Logic of Sense* 257). This relationship between the icon as a good image and the simulacrum as a bad can be directly related to both the 9/11 and Kennedy death-image.
The 9/11 and Kennedy event-images as death-images are iconic, but not in a straightforward way. For instance, their initial iconic value derived from their position in the public sphere. As discussed, the World Trade Center and the Twin Towers remain iconic symbols of freedom, hope, world trade and so forth, and Kennedy even more so symbolised the North American nation with all of its hopes and aspirations as coded and unified machines. Their physicality and territorialised assemblages secured in part by dominant media representation formed these iconic images of thought. As icons, they resemble the transcending idea and their proximity to the origin, which in the U.S. can be viewed as the constitution and although secular, authentic attachments to God, which also works to secure their authenticity. One could argue in relation to Kennedy and the role of the President in general, this claim to authenticity that operates as a pure relation to the founding fathers is upmost the President, and then the Vice President, and so forth down the chain of command. Interestingly, the word ‘vice’ derives from the Latin meaning, ‘in the place of’ (O’Neil), which illustrates the copy of the copy position of the Vice President if a situation should displace the President.

In relation to the Kennedy assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson attempted to provide an authentic claim to the Presidency, but this was largely deemed inauthentic by the grieving public, as Robert Dallek describes in Flawed Giant “Johnson had to confront the grief and despair many people felt over the loss of a beloved leader and their antagonism toward someone who, however much he identified with JFK, seemed like a usurper, an unelected, untested replacement” (54). This sentiment demonstrates the strong attachment to origin, and the reluctance to accept the perceived inauthentic. It provides the grounds that meaning can be derived from, as Deleuze argues, in Logic of Sense “The foundation possesses something first-hand, allowing it to be shared, giving it to the claimant the second-hand possessor only insofar as he has been able to pass the test of the foundation” (270). For Johnson, this test was precarious as he was largely viewed as working ‘in the place of’ the real claimant that was John F Kennedy. As discussed above this authenticity was particularly evident with the public adoration for Kennedy, which added to the severity of his assassination, and the initial paroxysm of the problem that facilitates an uncharted intoxication in its own right. The problem feeds on the not knowing and as discussed bypasses the
orderly unification of the faculties onto an object. The Kennedy problem was so powerful that it had to be contained in fear of the chaos that could result from the potential revolution when the image of the exploding head did not collaborate with the official findings.

It took many years before the image was shown and in this time, the foundations for the death-image were fashioned. As discussed desire is potentially revolutionary and as such is put to work as desire production and social production, which in the case of Kennedy enabled the State endorsed death-image to form as an icon in its own right, regardless of the obvious preference to show Kennedy in less traumatic circumstances. 9/11 was different in the way it was instantly broadcast visually in a real-time unfolding of events. The mass spectacle presented a problem unfolding and the planes hitting the towers became iconic death-images in their own right, which on many levels superceded the World Trade Center’s prior image of thought and territorialised assemblage. The deterritorialising line that cut through this assemblage has, however, been largely reterritorialised as an image that the mind can comprehend and relate to an official narrative, which poses the question, how does this process relate to the simulacrum?

It relates to the simulacrum in the way that the initial problem, which as argued can in specific circumstances take form again, works as a simulacrum. For instance, the Kennedy head shot is of the President, but not the original Kennedy, as the good looking and intelligent icon of the West. The severity of the Kennedy problem made the President look unreal to the extent that a paroxysm was felt across the nation and beyond. Contending with this required an acceptance of its own singularity, its own authenticity, which has been an on-going problem for sections of the North American public who to this day cannot come to terms with the State endorsed version of the killing or to some extent the severity of the images (Matthews et al).

The 9/11 images functioned in much the same way, although their proliferation has arguably facilitated a form of simulacra in its own right. The constant replays have become a simulation with each representation arguably moving the viewer farther away from the origin of the towers. Facilitating a distance from their initial image of thought and importantly the origin of death as ‘the problem’. Death represented by the death-image arguably achieves this goal of providing a copy of a copy, which to some
extent paradoxically positions the death-image as also possessing elements of the simulacrum. Just as Baudrillard argued in Gulf War that “We are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual” (27). The 9/11 death-images work as a simulacrum in the way that although they are contextualised with the foundation of national mythology, and its subsequent identification, the images gradually remove the viewer from the initial origin of death. Death as ‘the problem’ thus gives way to the death-image, which provides a copy of pure death and its generative facility. Each copy of this copy diverges from ‘the problem’, which is for Deleuze the origin of the last problematic.

The difference machine that is death therefore paradoxically provides a simulacrum, but so does the death-image as it breaks away and evolves to displace the physicality of death, which can obviously be used in times of war for propaganda purposes, which relates back to Lurie’s argument that dangerous official narratives can obfuscate the reality of war and death. The simulacrum is, however, not related to any external model, and as such, death can be fluid and adaptive to particular situations. The detached 9/11 image, which begins to operate in its own right, is thus not subject to transcending notions of death, such as those purported by religious beliefs and dominant media representation. The simulacrum can thus remove one from the reality of death, but who is to say that this reality is any less meaningful and authentic? Death as ‘the problem’ is not a foundational myth, but the evolving nature of the death-image, as it moves beyond death, and its contextualisation becomes imperceptible as it continuously defers its origin. There can be resemblances, but these resemblances are more operative than territorialised, which positions death as the BwO, as it can stretch out and adapt to new investments.

The physicality of death is displaced, but this displacement does not negate its power. It merely initiates it back to the last form of the problematic that creates. In the case of the 9/11 event-image as a simulacrum, it has its own generative power that is supplemented by the qualitative eternal return of a difference that is not subsumed by any model. The simulacrum as its own entity thus exists as a multiplicity with its singular internal structure, life and death. As a type of simulacrum, ‘the problem’ is the origin of the origin and escapes both the contextualisation of the death-image and the model. The problem therefore aligns with death and the simulacrum as an image
that challenges the notion of the image. It ruptures the representational value of the image as an icon and in doing so provides an openness that connects with the future and the radical outside of facialised knowledge. The death-image has thus been further developed in relation to the simulacrum, and in the proceeding section I examine this image type in relation to visual art, as this is a field that largely contends with problems of representation. On a base level, this thesis examines artworks that deal with death as a transition within the new.

7.4 Eluding the death-image through art

In the mobilisation of Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of constructing and deconstructing images of death in relation to particular examples of media and art, this thesis engages with artworks that through an active connection to desire and death disrupt facialisation. One can argue that certain artists embrace these facets, taking them to unchartered heights and endeavouiring to work with problems, which as demonstrated is an integral part of creating something new. On a basic level, this process engages with desire, death, and repetition. It engages with desire in the sense that in its pure form it avoids the mediation of desire-production and its affiliation with social-production, although this relation will inevitably arise at some point. From a Deleuzian perspective, artists, such as the ones outlined in this section attempt to free desire from the conduits of normal society and experiment with a future not yet. A future that could bring disaster as it runs precariously along a line of flight, but in doing so, a new form or figure can be created along the way. In some respects, the artist in this context can be viewed as an explorer or an apprentice who learns, repeats and fashions the world in new ways. As Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition, rather than learning solutions based on preconceived knowledge, the apprentice constitutes and confronts problems (204). This at times tactile approach to material, can in relation to desire be revolutionary and disrupt the conventions of facialised life and death. In relation to death and the works illustrated in this section, art can provide new ways of being.

As Deleuze outlines in his Conversation with Robert Maggioli “Establishing different ways of existing, depending on how you fold the line of forces, or inventing
possibilities of life that depend on death too, on our relations to death: existing not as a subject but as a work of art” (Deleuze and Maggiori). Death as a work of art is liberated from the confines of the facialised death-image. The intensive problem is always a work of art, as it articulates a nomadic death and fleeting thoughts about the not yet. It animates an active desire that is free from social production, and as such open to new connections, all of which is a creative process that is increasingly necessary, as Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition:

The more our daily life appears standardised, stereotyped and subject to an accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption, the more art must be injected into it in order to extract from it that little difference which plays simultaneously between other levels of repetition, and even in order to make two extremes resonate - namely the habitual series of consumption, and the instinctual series of destruction and death. (372)

At its core is death, as a difference machine adds power to particular movements or expressions while culling others. The will to power is thus evident in the work of art, in both the sensuality of the artist who undertakes this process and the observer who can approach the work in new ways. Eliciting a mode of judgement that reduces the power of the work and the judger, or in the generative sense, a paroxysm that can be taken and repeated differently. To repeat that which is worth repeating is the maxim of the eternal return, and this notion is further developed over the remaining part of this thesis.

This section develops the problem in relation to visual art, as this medium can cross over the many different media of life and death while harnessing its power to form new surfaces. It is shown that the mobilised problem challenges the facialised death-image, which is a process that can be illustrated through art, as this is an experimental and ultimately malleable form that works with forces. Desire and death are inextricably linked through the work of art, as they create new relations to life, which ascends from the work as an art form in its own right. As a difference machine particular artworks become-imperceptible, encapsulating the problem as a new image of thought.

As highlighted in Part Two, in Francis Bacon Deleuze engages with art in a book length study on the paintings of the artist, but he deliberates on the topic throughout
many of his books and essays. In *Kant*, he argues that in theme with Kant’s critique of judgment, which he privileges as the most profound of his critiques, the genius expounds the suprasensible nature of the faculties as a living unity, and that this phenomenon can be expressed in art. The genius engages with the sublime as a judgment based on free reflection, and the accordance of discordant faculties, as “Each [faculty] pushes the other to the limit, but each makes the one go beyond the limit of the other. It is a terrible struggle between imagination and reason … a struggle whose episodes are the two forms of the Sublime, and then Genius” (*Kant* xii). This melee between the faculties is a pure form of reflection that stretches out and pushes each function to its limit, and subsequently new forms of creativity and expression are set in motion. This accordance of discordance differs from reason as:

The idea of reason goes beyond experience, either because there is no object which corresponds to it in nature (for example, invisible beings) or because it makes a simple phenomenon of nature into a spiritual event (death, love . . .). The idea of reason thus contains something inexpressible. But the aesthetic idea goes beyond all concepts because it creates the intuition of a nature other than that which is given to us: another nature whose phenomena would be true spiritual events, and whose events of the spirit, immediate natural determinations. (*Kant* 124)

Following Deleuze’s assertion, one can assert that the principle of reason is directly related to the *death-image* in the way that it transforms a basic element of nature, such as death, into a spiritual event. This process was demonstrated by the 9/11 commemoration outlined in section 7.1, and I posit that any facialised death as a *death-image* works with this premise. The aesthetic idea, however, supercedes reason as rather than enabling an existing knowledge framework that accounts for a nature that one learns and enters it operates as an intuition that provides the true spiritual realisation that Deleuze advocates for.

For Deleuze, this is the realm of genius that expresses the inspiration of the discordant faculty that pushes its related faculties to new lenghts. This process creates new determinations in art and its followers as “Genius is not taste, but it *animates* taste in art by giving it a soul or content. There are works which are perfect as regards taste, but which lack soul, that is to say they lack genius” (*Kant* 125). Genius frees taste from its confines within the mediocrity of formal and arguably facialised imagination.
and as a higher authority directs it. This process privileges the reflective aesthetic in art as nomadic as it operates outside of reason and models of knowledge. The genius artist in this ideal sense, is, therefore, superior in expression, but this hierarchy is not based on the Platonic model, but in line with an artist who works with simulacra. As Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition* this can “Only occur by virtue of denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections” (66). The artist in this respect does not follow a used path, but experiments with the image by destroying and resurrecting it in a new form. Between the ‘thing’ in question and the image, there is a difference that necessitates an elucidation.

In relation to signs, this system can be illustrated as the signal-sign system that Deleuze outlines in *Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*. In this organisation, signals operate as differential boundaries or physicalities that facilitate a sphere for signs to operate in. The signals provide a space between disparate elements that the sign can ‘flash’ between, as the qualitative signs to some extent ascend from the image (*Logic of Sense* 257). Deleuze relates systems that are based on dissimilarity to this process, and in *Proust*, he elaborates on art as an example of this undertaking. In his analysis of Marcel Proust’s writing, he positions the sign as partly material containing the object it arises from. He positions art as the only purely immaterial sign, as it is not based on a concrete object “The superiority of art over life consists in this: all the signs we meet in life are still material signs, and their meaning, because it is always in something else, is not altogether spiritual” (*Proust* 41). Art as a spiritual form has an essence based on difference, and as discussed, this phenomenon is at the core of being or the being of being.

Art can capacitate essences, which in this context are pure elements of difference. Deleuze relates this process directly to his notion of difference and repetition, as repetition is the cycle that the artist undertakes when he repeats what he takes from life in his work. As Deleuze argues, “This is because difference, as the quality of a world, is affirmed only through a kind of autorepetition that traverses the various media and reunites different objects; repetition constitutes the degrees of an original difference” (*Proust* 32). The artist repeats in his work, but not life as such as this representation is flawed as a copy in the traditional Platonic sense. Deleuze argues
that the essence found in art is beyond the organisation of the object and the subject, and is thus in the province of the apprentice, as he unconsciously works with an essence that he illustrates with immaterial signs rather than attempting to learn and define what it is (Proust 50).

The problem can thus be a composite of signals that animate immaterial signs that ‘flash’ ephemerally. To some extent, the image is displaced along with the knowledge it takes to perceive it, but this process is significant as it draws the viewer along new paths and durations. As Coleman argues in Deleuze and Cinema, an inverse semiology is at work when in place of the sign producing images, it is the image that produces signs. This is the agency of the problem and following Deleuze’s analysis of Peirce in his cinema books this correlates to firstness, as the sign in this context relates only to itself as emanating from difference (Cinema 198). Peirce outlines this as “It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown!” (Pierce and Hoopes 357). The conductive nature of this sign can be related to Bergson’s notion of intuition. As discussed in Chapter 3, dissimilar images have the potential to draw attention to this involuntary process that as Peirce warns can in its pure form escape comprehension.

Deleuze argues this point in Difference and Repetition “The sign is not entirely of the order of the symbol; nevertheless, it makes way for it by implying an internal difference (while leaving the conditions of its reproduction still external)” (22). The sign in this respect is the precursor to the symbol, but this is not the concern of the sign as it operates within its own world, which ascends from particular signals that operate ostensibly within the problem and more overtly in images, such as the action-image. This process can be thought of as particular areas within the global structure that through dissimilarity enable boundaries for the sign to cut across.

In Difference and Repetition Deleuze labours this point and that within the work of art there is a virtual component that avoids actual considerations, “The elements, varieties of relations and singular points coexist in the work or the object, without it being possible to designate a point of view privileged over others, a center which would unify the other centres” (260). As discussed, this decentring relates to
simulacra and the eternal return that continuously effaces representation as it raises its wares for recognition. This process works with a displaced series that is chaos “The totality of circles and series is thus a formless ungrounded chaos which has no law other than its own repetition, its own reproduction in the development of that which diverges and decenters” (82). Contrasting the cycle of habit and memory, these circles provide a series that operates on chaos, which as discussed has no formal structure.

This non-structural, non-representational, and malleable element can be found in the canvas, installation, photograph, and so forth, and its ultimate course is yet to be established, “When the modern work of art develops its permutating series and its circular structures, it indicates to philosophy a path leading to the abandonment of representation” (Difference and Repetition 82). For Deleuze, a particular sense of modern art encapsulates this process as on a basic level it challenges form, and thus creates new and unimaginable circles in the conventional sense. On another level, its only predicate is repetition as it follows the line of the simulacrum. On this line the further the copy travels the more it becomes its own self-differentiating entity, and in the context of this thesis the further it develops away from the confines of faciality the more it becomes an authentic copy in its own right.

As discussed in Chapter 6 What is Philosophy? outlines the function of art as a mode of expression that engages with and confronts chaos. For Deleuze art lives on regardless of the artist that creates the work, and the viewer who looks at it “What is preserved - the thing or the work of art - is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects (164). As outlined in section 6.4, percepts and affects are their own independent entities that exist irrespective of the external world. These entities are blocs of sensation, and it was shown that these blocs are evident in the lingchi image. Each of these sensations, percepts and affects, which are captured in the artwork are beings that exist in their own right, each with its own independent and interacting circles.

Only select works can achieve this plane of beings though, as through an intricate balance of colour and as argued facial expression the beings can arise, but equally as precarious they can dissolve. Deleuze discusses this process in relation to Cezanne, and the way his modulation technique captures blocs of sensation. Deleuze highlights
Cézanne’s sentiment and his comment that the fleeting strokes of the optical impressionist do not provide lasting affects, which are “Solid and lasting like the art of the museums” (Deleuze quoting Cézanne in What is Philosophy 165). The sensation contained in the canvas, the photograph, the sculpture, the installation, and so forth is then partly subject to the durability of its materials, but within this frame, there is an infinity, which is an understanding that further clarifies Deleuze’s appropriation of Bergson’s duration and intuitive method.

The artwork has its own world populated with beings of sensation and as Deleuze refers, ‘air’ between the blocs, as even the betwixt spaces facilitate their own impression (Francis Bacon 165). The genius artwork is not about something in the figurative sense, but as discussed in relation to Bacon, it presents the sensation of the object that is encountered. It provides an objecticity that is to some extent removed from the artist, and Deleuze succinctly outlines this process as:

By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations. (What is Philosophy 166)

This process of deterritorialising perceptions and affections combines with the aesthetic plane that contains the sensation that is brought to life with the figure. In Francis Bacon Deleuze relates the figure to the icon of the canvas, and as discussed in section 6.4, this process differentiates between the figure and the figurative.

The figure is isolated and thus becomes an image that is not immobile. This point is important because as argued it is tenable that if a painting ‘moves’ then it is justifiable that other still images can too “The important point is that they do not consign the Figure to immobility but, on the contrary, render sensible a kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure within the place, or upon itself. It is an operative field” (Francis Bacon 2). This operative field is the background to the figure or as Deleuze argues, the asignifying traits, which as discussed enable their own beings of sensation. Interestingly the isolated figure becomes its own icon or image, which in this instance is used generatively, and not comprised as a model in the platonic sense “Painting has neither a model to represent nor a story to narrate” (Francis Bacon 2). This notion of
the figure can be directly related to art that moves away from facialised figuration, and its narrative qualities.

In *Difference and Repetition* and in *Logic of Sense* Deleuze relates pop art, and specifically Andy Warhol’s work to the simulacrum “Pop art pushed the copy, copy of the copy, etc., to that extreme point at which it reverses and becomes a simulacrum (such as Warhol's remarkable “serial” series, in which all the repetitions of habit, memory and death are conjugated)” (*Difference and Repetition* 366). Throughout Warhol’s work, there is an effort to embrace repetition and ultimately efface the original of its dominant meanings in exchange for new ones. The original becomes a memory that evolves by operating within the new present that dissipates. This process works to displace faciality, such as the tendency to perceive icons in the same way, and in doing so remains open to the future, as the not yet encounters and interpretations to come. This conjugation of habit, memory and death operate as an abstract machine, which is the machine that sets assemblages in motion by facilitating the deterritorialisation of its components.

It is the abstract element that holds the functionality of the assemblage together as it opens out and conjugates with novel forces. Stephen Zepke’s book *Art as Abstract Machine* examines the abstract machine as art, and among other works, he discusses this process in relation to Warhol’s *Death and Destruction* series “Warhol succeeded in transforming mechanical reproduction into mechanical repetition, by affirming the former to the point where the distinction of model and copy are lost in productive difference” (36). Warhol’s art provides simulacrums in its own right that directly intersect with notions of death and life, as Zepke states:

> This then, would be Deleuze’s affirmation of Warhol’s *Death and Destruction* series, they are nothing less than overcoming human sadness, an overcoming of our memorial sentiment, in a work of art that eternally returns the inhuman vitality of will to power, that eternally repeats its difference in a simulacrum inseparable from our own death. And this indiscernibility, indiscernible that is from *Life*, is finally the very freedom of art. (39)

Warhol arguably undertook this endeavour that can be related to the problem, as this image type refrains from the passivity of the memorial sentiment that warrants a
repetition of the same. As a process of de-facialisation the problem ruptures this belief, and conducive to Zepke’s argument, it animates the will to power that facilitates life and death as a process of becoming. Deleuze privileges pop art in this respect, as a means of repetition that can be related to art movements and artists such as Dada and the Dadaists.

The Museum of Modern Art’s director, Glenn D. Lowry describes the Dada movement as “Responding to the disaster of World War I and to an emerging modern media and machine culture, the Dadaists led a revolution that boldly embraced and caustically criticized modernity itself” (Dada Collection 7). Dada was a discursive art movement that’s aim and works can directly animate a response to the death-image, as the founder Tristan Tzara outlined in the movement’s manifesto “In documenting art on the basis of the supreme simplicity: novelty, we are human and true for the sake of amusement, impulsive, vibrant to crucify boredom” (Tzara quoted by 391.org). This sentiment is evident throughout Dada works that cover a range of media, each united within the multiplicity of the Dada molecular machine that takes in the old and produces the new. Deleuze outlines this process in his article “Balance Sheet-Program”:

The Dadaist molecular machinery, which, for its part, brings about a reversal in the form of a revolution of desire, because it submits the relations of production to the trial of the parts of the desiring machine, and elicits from the latter joyous movements of deterritorialization that overcomes all the territorialities of nation and party. (114)

As argued the territorialities of the nation are secured through facialisation and Dada achieved its revolutionary freeing of desire by attacking the conventions of the bourgeois social production that ultimately created the First World War. There was a belief among the collective that the world had literally gone ‘dada’, and as such the group of artists attacked the logic and rationality that led to the nonsensical war, and the formality of previous art movements, as Tzara argued “We have enough cubist and futurist academies: laboratories of formal ideas” (Tzara quoted by 391.org). The trial of the parts of the desiring machine, as Deleuze outlines, can be thought of as problematising the facialised logic of nations, society and their foundations through social production.
The Berlin Dadaist Hannah Hoch’s collages and photomontages are good examples of problems that escape dominant facialisation, as illustrated by Figure 7.0. Her works facilitate a revolutionary desire and are inherently political, equally working with a ‘politics of the image’, and as Gardner describes “Hoch’s photomontages advanced the absurd logic of Dada by presenting viewers with chaotic, contradictory, and satiric compositions” (Gardner’s Art 386). As with Warhol’s practice, Hoch’s collages provide a repetition that informs the present with a new that is open to the future. The will to power is evident in the intensive positioning of the dissected photographs, and the overall work is a simulacrum that effaces the notion of an original context, although there are political associations mediated with Hoch’s choice of images and the general concept of the work.

Figure 7.0 Hannah Hoch’s *Cut with the Kitchen Knife through the Beer-Belly of the Weimar Republic* (1919)

The Hoch problems relate to the work of the Cologne Dadaist Max Ernst, as illustrated by paintings such as Figure 7.1.
As Anne Umland states, in this work Ernst, “Created a landscape filled with strange and monstrous elements alluding to both the biological and the industrial. Shapes resembling bodily organs like veins, muscles, and arteries sit alongside primitive machinery including pulleys, weights, and string” (Umland, Sudhalter and Gerson 142). One can relate Ernst’s use of the machine and biology, which was also popular among Dada artists such as Francis Picabia, to an inverted BwO, as in a figural sense it animates organs that are no longer attached to bodies. It is worth noting that the later Surrealist artist Antonin Artaud, who Deleuze credits with his concept of the BwO, also relates to the disorganisation of the problem as he outlines, “When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom” (Artaud). Ernst’s painting can be further assimilated into a Deleuzian framework, as he outlines in a Thousand Plateaus:

The organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather, it is a stratum on the BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labour from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organisations, organised transcendences. (176)

Stratified Rocks, Nature’s Gift of Gneiss Lava Iceland Moss... clearly challenges the organisation of facialised development, as we have organs not only escaping
organisation, but also the sedimentary lines that attempt to contain them with a large organ still partially attached to the stratified surface. The body is largely virtual in this work but operates outside of strata as a BwO. As a problem, the organs are dissimilar objects, which as deformations draw attention to their movement within desire-production. Through their discursive organisation, the organs revolt against these specific patterns and in doing so animate their desiring-machine potential.

As a problem, this work is comprised of intensive flows that elucidate death in different forms. Firstly, as ‘the problem’ it generates the intensity that animates the figure, and as Colebrook argues this process situates, “Death within the differential intensity that is life once life is thought beyond the figure of the bounded organism” (Meaning of Life 150). This problematic work achieves this by literally severing the organs from the organism strata and leaving only intensities that rise through the will to power. These forces rise and subside from their sediment base as lines that penetrate the facialised image of thought. The death-image is averted as knowledge is displaced by a repetition that moves beyond the same, which in this case is the organised body. This unfolding points to a future where organs as machines facilitate new functions with an unbounded desire.

Man Ray who has links with both Dada and Surrealism created photograms that he named Rayographs (see Figure 8.0). Correlating with the later pop art of Warhol the Rayograph works appropriated everyday things “Although Man Ray’s photograms are visually and indexical to the objects he used, they are not simple photographic imprints of those objects but stand alone as independent images” (Dada 227). These works repeat objects from Ray’s world and produce something new. Standing alone as simulacra they provide their own composition, which effaces the initial production value of the object as problems.
In relation to repetition, *Rayographs* operate in a conducive vein to the artist Marcel Duchamp’s work, as he placed a moustache on the iconic *Mona Lisa* in *L.H.O.O.Q* (see Figure 9.0). Duchamp effectively problematised the conventions of an art world that he aimed to disrupt. His *Readymade* series demonstrates a repetition that works with and subsequently facilitates the problem. Duchamp who is arguably the most prominent artist of the 20th century was in Dada, but not necessarily a Dadaist. His *Fountain* work (see Figure 9.1) that was lost and fittingly remade challenged the utility and aesthetic value of the at times quotidian object. As discussed it problematised the habitual nature of facialisation while also challenging the elitism and pretensions of art.
This popular work has been repeated many times in its own right by artists since its inception and encapsulates the effacement of the authentic and its original use value, as Gregory Minissale states “Duchamp’s Fountain began as a rather ordinary object - a urinal - in a mundane and anonymous context. It was then taken out of this indifferent continuum and ‘placed’ into the realm of art where it became an on-going event” (Minissale). This on-going event is a repetition that continues to operate in the present, but not as a preconfigured interpretation or prism that contains meaning and knowledge. As an event, it facilitates becoming, as Minissale argues, “The principle of becoming means that each event may be a marshalling together of many elements in the same duration. Elements or works of art in various kinds of series recombine with other series exploring and making a multiplicity of serialities” (Minissale). Duchamp’s urinal facilitates an event that is composed of nuanced serialities, such as urinating, art, the gallery, commodity, and so forth, and this work provides a dissimilar object that necessitates its own duration and accumulative problem. Its semblance is located within nomadic thought and as such Duchamp’s urinal not only challenges facialisation, but also reconfigures the faciality of art and its perceived value.

Before turning to the later work of Damian Hirst, I will now touch on Bataille’s art theory with a specific focus on the informe, and its relation to the problem that as a process of de-facialisation can be used to dismantle the death-image. Bataille’s informe, which means formless in French, was founded on his conception of base
materialism, which directly challenged the artist Andre Breton’s conception of dialectical materialism. Breton who in the Second Manifesto of Surrealism refers to Bataille as an ‘excrement philosopher’ who constructed a ‘false materialism’ (Breton) does so as Bataille’s base materialism is arguably more surreal than surrealism. Without delving into the history of the Bataille and Breton division, base materialism went further than Breton’s penchant for dialectical materialism, as Bataille outlines in the magazine Documents “The time has come, when employing the word materialism, to assign to it the meaning of a direct interpretation, excluding all idealism, of raw phenomena, and on the fragmentary elements of an ideological analysis” (Bataille quoted by Bois and Krauss). This type of materialism leads to the informe, as “Base materialism (of which the informe is the most concrete manifestation) has the job of de-classifying, which is to say, simultaneously lowering and liberating from all ontological prisons, from any “devoir eter” (role model) (Bois and Krauss 53).

The informe and its base material framework encapsulates the problem as a process that challenges faciality in possibly its most radical version. As a malleable and intensive frame, it continuously fails to accommodate the knowledge that is generally associated with form. It challenges the teleological value of dialectical materialism and the notion of the high and low that powers the dialectic, as Bataille argues in Base Materialism “Base matter is external and foreign to ideal human aspirations, and it refuses to allow itself to be reduced to the great ontological machines resulting from theses aspirations” (“Excerpter”). In a radical way, the informe reconfigures the facialised death-image machine, as it destroys the perception of facialised form and the aspirations attached to it. In this context, macabre questions can be posed in relation to the lingchi image. For instance, does slow slicing reduce the human figure to an informe? In a capitalist context the figure is ultimately removed from social production in the physical sense, but as an instrument of power it continues to operate as a compound of faciality, and base materialism reconfigures the facialised death-image.

Furthermore, one can here think of the many artworks that resist form, and as such the teleology of facialised meaning. Notably, Jackson Pollock’s popular dripping paintings provide an indication of the informe and as Bois and Krauss argue:
The power of Pollock's mark as index meant that it continued to bear witness to the horizontal's resistance to the vertical and that it was the material condition of this testimony - the shiny, ropey qualities of the self-evidently horizontal mark - that would pit itself against the visual formation of the Gestalt, thus securing the condition of the work as formless. (Formless 97)

Bataille’s art theory aimed at returning the horizontal to perception, as that which displaces the high and low opposition “Everything splits into two, but this division is not symmetrical (there is no simple separation of sides by means of a vertical axis), it is dynamic (the line of division is horizontal): the low implicates the high in its own fall” (Formless 47). The informe assemblage thus provides a way of viewing the world horizontally, which disrupts the arboreal vertical positioning of the human’s gaze as the all-encompassing frame of knowledge.

Works such as Pollock’s Number 5 (see Figure 10) exemplify this process, and as a problem it problematises meaning on one level, and on another, it provides a pure frame of differential intensity that operates and plays with death outside of the facial organism. Deleuze refers to Pollock’s work in Logic of Sensation, as “Restoring an entire world of equal probabilities, by tracing lines that cross the entire painting and that start and continue off the frame, and by opposing to the organic notions of symmetry and center the power of a mechanical repetition elevated to intuition” (108). This encounter possesses its own duration that one can attempt to enter intuitively. As an exemplar of the informe paintings such as Number 5 relates to Bataille’s base matter that in an extreme sense qualifies the problem as formless, subsequently displacing the face. The informe encapsulates ‘the problem’ as the death that operates on the nomadic periphery as base materialism deforms the social production of desire, and in doing so new revolutionary desires can emerge and dissipate on a horizontal axis.
Section 7.4’s location of the problem within visual art has provided a way to further animate a new representation of de-facialisation. This section concludes by looking at the more recent works of Damian Hirst who interacts with the simulacrum, the problem, intensive death and the death-image in distinct ways. His work deals directly with the phenomenon, “I’ve got an obsession with death … but I think it’s like a celebration of life rather than something morbid” (Hirst and Burn). Although using Hirst’s work as a way to challenge facialisation is problematic in the sense that along with popular artists such as Bacon he is arguably an institutionalised participant in the death-image economy of mainstream media, his art directly relates to death in the ironic manifestation of dead animals. Chris Townsend argues this point and that Hirst’s work can literally be thought of as death in boxes when he states “Death in a box might be a convenient shorthand for describing the artists commoditisation of the ultimate phobic limit in Western culture where indexicality limits the otherwise excessive effects of literalism, and in particular of the literal ‘real’ of death” (207). Townsend’s statement highlights the pervasive nature of capitalist facialisation in the sense that just as media conglomerates such as News Corporation profit directly and indirectly from death and the promulgation of death-images, Hirst’s work also successfully commoditises the moribund. Furthermore, his argument also illustrates the death-image in its concrete form in the way its facialisation effectively removes the viewer from the literal real of death.

Hirst’s acclaimed *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* (see Figure 11) that features a suspended tiger shark, and more recently, *Death Explained* (see Figure 11.1) and *Death Denied* (see Figure 11.2), facilitates a mediated production of the death-image that operates across his series that he named
“Coming to Terms With and Trying to Understand the Complexity of the Feelings and Ever-Changing Fears and Doubts that Every Human Being Experiences when Faced Every Moment with the Unfathomable Uncertainties of Death”. This explicit title is at once Heidegger’s ownmost and being-towards-death (*Being and Time*). Confronting the death of the Other, which in this context is a large shark, provides both the possibility of the impossibility and the inversed impossibility of the possibility that Levinas championed in response to Heidegger. The former perception derives from the possibility for life to be inanimate, drawing closer to Freud’s death drive, but also external as this death is not ones own. This death is also shrouded with doubt and the impossibility of not knowing, which for Deleuze is dissipated by the abandon of becoming.

Figure 11 Damian Hirst’s *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* (2015)
Machinically the artworks operate as abstract machines with each figure deterritorialising the composites that provide this assemblage with meaning. Confronted by the sensation of death the pieces hold the percept of the living shark that exists beyond the actual specimen and its encompassing affect that is animated by
the isolated figure. The intensive desire to live and die is arguably suspended with the shark, which is also evident with Hirst’s *A Thousand Years* (see Figure 11.3).

![Figure 11.3 Damien Hirst’s *A Thousand Years* (1990)](image)

By confronting the viewer with the flesh of being, as Bacon, who influenced and appreciated Hirst achieved (Hirst and Burn). *A Thousand Years* reduces flesh to a mechanical production that as it is consumed and decomposed dissipates its semblances to the *death-image*. Free from strategic facialised beliefs the work dematerialises corporeally and incorporeally, each minute bringing it increasingly closer to Bataille’s notion of the *informe*. Its duration is not that of a thousand years, but possibly a thousand hours, each of which is a futile estimation, as the figure exists in its own time - its individual duration. Each facet of the preconceived image of what a cow should be as an abstract machine continuously deterritorialises, encapsulating new ephemeral deformations. The cow as an image of thought is repeated but encountered as the present slips away, intertwining between the *death-image* that continuously attempts to form and contextualise. A problem is evident as the mind wrestles with the ever present displacement of the deforming flesh. The flies eat, lay maggots and die from electrocution in the cycle of life that animates the intensity of a death that operates outside of the face.
In a nuanced way, visual art can thus be used as a way to escape the death-image, which as discussed is secured by facets, such as Deleuze’s concept of facialisation. In an ideal sense the artist has the potential to jar the faculties and make them communicate in novel ways and through this process create new ways of being. It has been demonstrated that through the expediency of what I am proposing are problems, in visual art death is not evaded, but repeated creatively in the works. As Deleuze states, “Inventing possibilities of life that depend on death too, on our relations to death: existing not as a subject but as a work of art” (What is Philosophy 94). Deleuze’s argument demonstrates the need to remove death from models, such as the death-image by first problematising the image in art, as this is the medium that can capture the problem in its true form as a malleable part of life. As Deleuze argues, the more that life becomes standardised by social production and consumption the more art is needed to disrupt this facialised process and bring the elements of habit into a confrontation with the intensive death instinct. As argued, Dada aimed at doing this by attacking the facialised production and consumption of language, education, nationalism, logic and ultimately the knowledge that led to the nonsensical world war and its subsequent series of death-images.

By challenging visual conventions, artists, such as Hoch, Ernst, and Ray enabled new ways of approaching the world and the desire that is contained and put to work by society. By creating dissimilar objects, the artists demanded an intuitive reception and as Deleuze argues, they produced something in the world that makes you think. It has been proposed that repetition plays an intrinsic part in this agency, as it facilitates the process of extrication. The artist takes from their experience and observations of events and through the third synthesis makes something new. This making new is an unlimited form with infinite actualisations. It can proceed from Hirst’s unanswered questions on a facialised death to a large shark suspended in translucent formaldehyde. The potential for repetition is endless, and this eternal return is the world of simulacra and abstract machines that encapsulate a deterritorialisation, which directly relates to the process of defacialisation. In this world of problems, anything can become art, as Hirst proclaimed “The thing about 9/11 is that it's kind of an artwork in its own right. It was wicked, but it was devised in this way for this kind of impact. It was devised visually” (Hirst and Allison). The sentiment of artists such as Hirst cut through beliefs and icons and in doing so they problematise. They work with
what a body can do by freeing the bounded organism and playing with the differential intensity that is a death free from the confines of facialisation.

Art can work with assemblages by locating points of deterritorialisation that produce abstract machines. The 9/11 and Kennedy death-images can thus become problems, and as Hirst argued, works of art because beliefs that purport particular sensitivities and transcendent evaluations become a component that can be severed and reworked in new ways. The artist in this sense is the noble who like Nietzsche’s bird of prey is not concerned about the morality of eating lambs. As discussed at the outset of this section, for Deleuze following Kant, the genius animates taste and as such is not contained by the standardisation of the face. The 9/11 and Kennedy death-image can then become artworks and repeated in new ways with the former enabling an informe as it crumbled to its base material. Kennedy’s head implosion can also be viewed along this destructive vein. Although controversial this is the domain of art that can facilitate a paroxysm that as Bataille argues, disrupts the teleology of social production in a more potent way than Breton’s penchant for a dialectical materialism that still relies on the facialised form of ideas.

Can there be more potent examples of Western de-facialisation than the President of the United States head exploding and the Twin Towers crumbling to dust on a live broadcast? For Deleuze in his discussion of Proust, art is just this, an assemblage of immaterial signs that emanate from difference and as discussed repetition constitutes this infinite process of floating signs. As Peirce warned, “Stop to think of it, and it has flown!” (Peirce and Buchler 357). Modern art works with problems, which in many instances is taking death-images from the past and repeating them, such as Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ (see Figure 12) that iconoclastically repeats the iconic crucifixion death-image. Christ becomes a disposable object among other objects whose vestige is that of a future past that does not require its strategic transcendence. Christ’s death becomes just another death in the world of synthetic death-images - another imploding death star.
The only guiding principle is thus a transvaluation of values that is subject to the will to power as Nietzsche proclaimed. In relation to visual culture, a transvaluation that is mediated by one's own sense of ethics and aesthetics, which in a communicative way is illustrated by Guattari's formulation of an ethico-aesthetic that he outlines in *Chaosmosis*, “Through interacting with one another, with other objects and with other “means of expression” we create new possibilities of life just as an ‘artist creates from colours on his palette’” (7). Guattari argues for an entirely interconnected world with the many “Existential territorialities linked by the same transversal chaosmosis” (108). The chasmosis facilitates the shifting ground that schizoanalysis can operate across. With particular works of art, “The finitude of sensible material becomes a support for the production of affects and percepts which tend to become more and more eccentric with respect to performed structures and coordinates” (101). Art as an assemblage can work with finite materials, such as canvas and paint, rocks and rubble that hold affects and percepts as simulacrum that move beyond their authentic origin in the Platonic sense. This material is largely infinite in relation to the endless performed structures, which as repetitions are open to new approximations. The role of art that disrupts facialisation is thus nuanced and arguably conducive to the maxim of schizoanalysis as it *complexifies* the ordinary and standardised world.
8.0 Thesis conclusion and additional thoughts

Across the three parts of this thesis, the facialised death-image has been positioned as an image that can account for the perception and affect of death in a Western media and art environment. It has been demonstrated that the death-image provides further layers to Deleuze’s analysis of images, and extends on his notion of death, which apart from his work in *Difference and Repetition* is subject to fleeting references throughout his subsequent texts. It has been argued that in relation to the ‘the problem’ death is the differential generation for life and the most profound of repetitions that for Deleuze points “To the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played out” (*Difference and Repetition* 366). This sensibility has been charted with a contextualisation of Deleuze’s approach to death and its animation through the concept of facialisation, which has enabled a unique discourse on the death-image as for Deleuze everything is an image.

It has been demonstrated that Freud and his death drive influenced Deleuze, but his appropriation relies more on the death instinct, as this intensity is not based on models, which can be directly related to facialisation. Deleuze presents a notion of different deaths, as the death of the ‘I’ and the impersonal death that he uses in his own formulation. Heidegger has also provided a counter actualisation of death, but Deleuze’s account of the subject is arguably closer to his own thought than he stipulates. This might relate to the clear opposition that philosophers, such as Levinas had towards Heidegger’s own notion of the possibility of the impossibility, and the aversion towards his philosophy in general around this period. In relation to death, correlations between Deleuze’s last problematic and Heidegger’s ownmost can, however, be made. Levinas’ notion of the Other and his own concept of the face has also been beneficial in demonstrating the contrasting potential for the face to provide infinite possibilities, which has been used in my examination of the lingchi image.

In Part Two, Bataille’s Linghi photograph and his deliberations on it have been an invaluable source for demonstrating the complex nature of images of death that provide both death-images and problems. The photograph of the tortured man problematises habitual approaches to death and the deterritorialising potential of this
image was dissected as an abstract machine in its own right. Each deviation of the man’s face and dismembered body has been effectively schizoanalysed for its manifoldness with each topological space producing its own curvature and deterritorialisation. It has been argued in line with Bergson’s notion of intuition and more recently Sutton’s intensive image that the photograph can facilitate its own resonance and sense of movement, which as sensible material produces and holds its own affects and percepts, as Guattari outlines in *Chaosmos*.

The artwork is not constrained by a hierarchy of materials and although different to painting, the photographic image, and any poignant image for that matter can operate across a variety of media, supporting and producing percepts and affects that facilitate thinking and sensing in new ways. Bataille’s notion of base materialism has furthered this understanding as it enables a deformation in its own right, albeit arguably more radical than Bacon’s practice. More so than Heidegger, Deleuze does not examine Bataille at any length, but clear influences are evident in a variety of his concepts, such as his attack on knowledge bearing a close proximity to Bataille’s conception of non-knowledge, and privileging the animal as beyond the human, as both philosophers are indebted to Nietzsche.

Throughout this thesis, the influence of Nietzsche has been examined and animated with specific examples, demonstrating the infinite potential of the eternal return and the structural mechanics of the will to power. Both these facets have been directly related to the problem and as Deleuze has done to death. The role of Spinoza in Deleuze’s work has been touched on and his core ethics of warranting good affects that produce joy while avoiding the bad as that which causes sadness, has along with Nietzsche provided a platform for discussing Deleuze’s ethics. As argued, these ethics can be thought of as an amplification of what the body can do. This sentiment works with his notion of transcendental empiricism, as a way of breaking free from the containment of a subjectivity that inducts one into society and particular facialised ways of viewing the world.

It has been argued that the *death-image* is part of this environment and the strategic messages that secure the facialisation system that remains prevalent today with a largely concentrated media scape. As highlighted, dominant media might not make us
think in a particular way, although this can be the case, but it facilitates what we think about which acts as a powerful conduit for facialisation. As always, alternative media can challenge this hegemony, but vast sways of people continue to be informed by mainstream news channels and their inherent bias. This process was discussed in relation to Murdoch’s media empire and corporations, such as General Electric that directly and indirectly profit from war through film, media advertising and weapon production contracts to name a few. The military industrial complex, or as Adorno coined, the military industrial entertainment complex persists and capitalist facialisation has been formulated in relation to Guattari, and its initial conceptualisation in *Machinic Unconscious* and *Thousand Plateaus* as faciality.

As an abstract machine in its own right, faciality, and its fruition in the close-up has been examined along with its relation to the affection-image. It was demonstrated that the affection-image can facilitate a reprieve from the *death-image*, but that this ephemeral ‘any space whatsoever’ is quickly engulfed by the face again, which in relation to Bataille’s and my own deliberations on the *lingchi* image was shown to be problematic. Deleuze’s image taxonomy provides a workable framework for extension, as he recommends that people do, and as Buchanan argued, there is nothing to stop a person joining the dots that is a schizoanalysis of visual culture. Although he resists in doing so, Deleuze himself presents many layers of meanings to his images, which on one level are standardised; that is the cyclical process of perception, affection, action, and on a more profound level the time image, which has at its basis time itself. The crystal image has been introduced and related to the *lingchi* image, which provides a problem in its own right.

The problem is largely virtual on one level and on another it is a base material and subject to the transcendental. It emanates immaterial signs, as there is not a stable image or object from where the signs ascend. If anything, it provides signals as boundaries from where the signs flash between, as Deleuze outlines in *Logic of Sense*. Due to the inverse semiology that Deleuze incorporates it qualifies as an image that problematises its surroundings, which is why it is valuable for certain artists who take something from the world and repeat this something in a new way. Taking the image of death from the world and creating a problem has been an endeavour of this thesis, which has animated ways that de-facialisation occurs.
In relation to time, Bergson has been discussed and his notion of integral experience was examined at the outset of this thesis. In relation to Bergson, the problem provides a multiplicity of disparate elements that coalesce for varying durations, which along with his notion of intuition and entering an image (as everything is an image) is an important concept for Deleuze and this investigation. The problem contains its own internal universe that as Deleuze argues in relation to pop art enables a framework “In which all the repetitions of habit, memory and death are conjugated” (*Difference and Repetition* 370). This awareness provides further layers to the *death-image*, which contends with its own internal universe and tensions that at any moment can break free from its original facialised context and media promulgation.

In Part Three, the problem has also been positioned as a way to de-facialise iconic *death-images*. The Kennedy implosion shot, and more recently the gestalt of the 9/11 event, which has seared itself into the facialised public consciousness. It was shown that the planes hitting the Twin Towers operated machinically, as disparate objects (the two planes and the two towers) were brought together in new ways providing lines of flight within an abstract machine. In many ways, this attack symbolises the nonsensical nature that Dada attacked in the First World War and appropriated in its own disparate practice, and the world is arguably still as ‘dada’ today as it was then. For Hirst, the 9/11 attacks are great artworks, and this sentiment is an illustration of an artist who is free from the confines of taste, morality, and knowledge, which as demonstrated are facets that operate as compounds of facialisation.

Among many forms, faciality facilitates the standardising force of political correctness that along with such pejorative delineations as conspiracy theory conflates alternative accounts into one facialised discount. As the planes hit the towers, affecting their collapse, a proceeding melee took place between the faculties as they were pushed to make new connections. Comprehension was suspended and this differential intensity is an indication of the problem, which is conducive to the efforts of an ideal type of visual artist (in the Deleuzian sense) that constantly works with limits. These limits can be epic in the sense of dismantling ideology and global consciousness or minor in the sense of providing an end to an event or a image of thought. Regardless of this, conceptualising the attacks necessitated a process of
creative machinic thinking, as two dissimilar objects were brought together to create something new, which in this instance was the mass carnage of the 9/11 death-image.

This thesis has thus critically introduced a theoretical framework for the death-image in Part One, constructed this image type in Part Two, and provided a practical application of the image in Part Three. These parts have contributed to my mobilisation of Deleuze’s concept of faciality as a way of constructing and deconstructing images of death in a media and art context. Due to this undertaking, Deleuze’s image taxonomy has been extended with a wider schizoanalysis of the visual in relation to specific iconic events and instances of de-facialised art. I have also furthered an understanding of death and Deleuze’s notion of ‘the problem’ in relation to his work with Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is expansive and their ideas have been examined in this thesis, but there are many more that can be appropriated and used to support the death-image, which has provided a practical focal point or singularity for an investigation into their philosophy. It has been argued that death plays an integral role in the personal and impersonal sphere and more specifically within the differential intensity that is life. The problem as a fleeting indication of this, and the death-image, as a particular image of facialised thought are important concepts in this regard that work with Deleuze’s central notion of difference and repetition. The de-facialised problem can, therefore, be understood as the becoming-imperceptible simulacra that Deleuze advocates for and its destination is the eternal return, which as the empty form of time is open to the future.
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