Framing Australianness:
Is there room for the cosmopolitan?

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Abstract

Are current shifts towards globalisation impacting Australian identity, and how is Australianness being framed in the public sphere? These questions steer this thesis and are considered through a different lens in each of the five articles that constitute its core.

Chapter One delves into the broader literature that surrounds these questions, including: national identity – its construction, pervasiveness and salience; cosmopolitan identity and its various forms; the interaction between these national and cosmopolitan identities; and the particularity of these different elements in Australia.

Chapter Two details the methodology used in the thesis. To commence, the distinction between methodological nationalism and methodological cosmopolitanism is outlined; this is followed by an explanation of Critical Realism as the ontological and epistemological foundation of this thesis. The methods used in the five articles - thematic analysis and frame analysis - are then described, and a brief discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is also included, as it informs the practice of rich textual analysis.

Four original journal articles and one conference paper constitute the bulk of this thesis. The first two articles - in Chapters Three and Four – use thematic analysis to explore constructions of Australianness by ‘ordinary’ Australians. The first paper essentially functions as a literature review of the last two decades of empirical research on Australian identity. Findings are collated and analysed to reveal Australianness today, which includes: a continuing civic/ethno-nationalist division, as well as emerging less dichotomous constructions that blur the civic/ethno divide; ‘traditional’ as well as more ‘progressive’ values; increased diversity; and a shift, for some, towards a cosmopolitan identity. The second paper looks at antithetical versions of Australianness - the ‘unAustralian’ - by exploring its usage in online discourse. Two principle identities emerge: one aligned with traditional renderings of ‘unAustralianness’ that identify the ‘unAustralian’ as someone who contravenes ‘traditional’ white Australianness; the other challenges this hegemony and suggests it is the exclusionary and intolerant that are ‘unAustralian’.
These two articles ground the subsequent three, which use Frame Analysis to explore Australian identity in the public sphere.

Article three reports representations of Australian identity (Chapter Five) in the lead up to the 2013 election on the Facebook pages of the two major Australian political parties, Liberal and Labor, and two minor parties that held the balance of power. Findings reveal that conservative values of family, whiteness and nationalism typify the framing of national identity across both major parties. Article four (Chapter Six) analyses submissions from pressure groups to the 2012 Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers to see how arguments for and against asylum seekers are framed using national, regional and global (cosmopolitan) identities. Australia is found to be framed as: a global citizen; as having an alternative, more generous character to that promoted by politicians; and as having regional responsibilities. Cosmopolitan frames also emerged, and both national and cosmopolitan identity frames serve as arguments for ‘progressive’ approaches to asylum seekers. Finally, article five (Chapter Seven) looks at the response by political cartoonists to Tony Abbott’s anti-terrorism catch phrase ‘Team Australia’. The notion of ‘Team Australia’ is portrayed as a challenge to core aspects of Australianness such as mateship, multiculturalism and the ‘fair-go’, and cartoonists frame Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ as exclusionary, unfair, politically elitist, anti-multicultural and ‘unAustralian’.

Chapter Eight draws these papers together in a comprehensive discussion and conclusion. The common threads that run through all the papers are highlighted, as well as the unique ways in which some people frame Australianness. This includes: the delineation between elite and public framings of Australianness; the continued relevance of Australian identity in public discourse; the fuzziness between ethno-national and civic identities; and the way Australianness is being redefined by some. Finally, the interaction of cosmopolitan and Australian identities is considered, and I note the ways in which a cosmopolitan identity is part of an Australian identity for some ‘ordinary Australians’, but remains largely excluded from the public sphere. There are a number of original contributions to knowledge among the findings of this thesis, namely: that the Australian public sphere remains largely exclusionary; that civic and ethno-nationalist versions of Australianness are enmeshed; and that Australian identity remains a significant construction in public discourse.
Candidature Statement and publications arising from this thesis

This thesis has been completed during the course of studies and research towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Western Australia (UWA), through the Department of Anthropology and Sociology. This work and has not been previously accepted for a degree at this or another institution.

This thesis contains published work and/or work prepared for publication, some of which has been co-authored. The bibliographic details of each paper are outlined below, as well as information about where they appear in the thesis and the contribution of each author¹. I undertook the data identification, collection, analysis and writing for each co-authored paper, while Farida Fozdar assisted with analysis and editing.

**Publications arising from this thesis**


Author contribution: Austin, C: 85%
Foizdar, F: 15%


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Foizdar, F: 20%

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¹ Please note: where possible consistency in formatting has been maintained throughout the thesis. However there may be some variance between the papers due to the formatting requirements of different journals. Additionally, the articles included in this thesis may vary from the final version that is accepted for publication.
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Chapter one. Introduction: the theoretical context and thesis question

1.1 Introduction

Finding public discourse about Australian identity is not difficult; in fact it is hard to avoid. As Billig (1995: 6) famously observed, the nation is repeatedly ‘flagged’ in everyday discourses to perpetuate a sense of national identity, as “…one might hypothesise that a whole complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices must also be reproduced…in a banally mundane way, for the world of nations is the everyday world, the familiar terrain of contemporary times.”. Australia is no exception to this, as Australianness is repeatedly flagged in the public sphere through icons, myths, stereotypes, values and ideals.

‘Australian made’ branding encourages us to buy “some of the best products in the world” (Australian Made, 2015) because they are manufactured within the national borders. ‘Australia’s favourite...’ is used to sell events, people, and products, including ‘Australia’s favourite’: band…the Seekers (Sunshine Coast Daily, 2015); paint colours (Dulux, 2015); spread – Vegemite (Merrysparks, 2015); and butter (Western Star, 2014). Even McDonalds, accused of Americani’zing the world, sought national credibility by claiming, “Macca’s...is as Aussie...as a bloke in budgie smugglers” (McDonalds Australia, 2015).

There are also more significant and destructive national ‘flaggings’. In various guises, the nation is used as a tool for ‘new racism’ (Barker, 1982; Fozdar, Wilding, & Hawkins, 2009); to avoid labels of political incorrectness that are leveled at blatant racism, racist sentiment is disguised as nationalism in comments about ‘our’ country, to which 'they' do not belong. This sentiment spans Australian society: from ‘bogans’ with ‘f@#k off, we’re full’ bumper stickers; to Dawn Fraser (a famous Australia athlete) who suggested another, younger athlete ‘go back where their parents came from’ (Tomarchio, 2015); to the Australian naval forces, under direction of the government, literally pushing boatloads of asylum seekers back to where they came from.

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2 Budgie Smugglers is Australian slang for swim briefs or Speedos.
3 Bogan is an informal, derogatory term, used to refer to people of low socio-economic status
On the flip side, some use Australianness to encourage inclusive and generous responses to refugees and asylum seekers. Journalist Justine Toh, for example, questions what Australia’s response to asylum seekers says about the national character. Drawing on Australian myths of mateship and a ‘fair go’, she argues, “a fair go and lending a helping hand are intrinsic to the Australian mythos...But somehow there is a curious disconnect in the mindset of many Australians when it comes to refugees” (Toh, 2015). Peter Drew began a campaign ‘Real Australians say welcome’ that challenged Australians to consider their national anthem’s claim of ‘boundless plains to share’ and to be generous to new migrants, regardless of their arrival method (Drewarts, 2015).

These incidents of national flagging provide insight into Australianness and its public portrayal, and drive two questions that are central to this thesis. Firstly are current shifts towards globalisation impacting Australian identity; and secondly how is Australianness being framed in the public sphere? Focus is on the elite - those who have a voice in the public sphere, such as politicians, and the media - and the way they use this voice to frame Australianness. Four snapshots are considered: media and public discourse about who is ‘unAustralian’; political campaigning on Facebook; organisational responses to the government’s asylum seeker policies; and cartoonists’ commentary about Prime Minister (PM) Tony Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’. By looking at contemporary discourse, the aim is also to consider the impact of, and response to, globalisation, with particular focus on the inclusion or exclusion of cosmopolitanism as part of the national discourse.

This introductory chapter explores the breadth of literature concerning national and cosmopolitan identities, and applies this knowledge to the Australian context. It proceeds to reveal the thesis question; and concludes with a thesis plan and a summary of the five papers that constitute the thesis’ core.

1.2 National Identity

To commence we consider national identity, focusing on three aspects: its constructed nature, exclusivity and pervasiveness.
1.2.1 Construction

What is national identity? Definitions traverse the sociocultural and political, incorporating aspects of shared culture and language; political unity; civic institutions; territoriality; shared economy and division of labour; felt sense of belonging; ethnic unity and common descent; historical myths; commitment to a common future; and the right to govern (Calhoun, 1997; Gellner, 1983; A. D. Smith, 1991). Each of these elements play a role in constructing a sense of belonging and community (Anderson, 2006; Jenkins, 1996; Rex, 1995); a place in the world (A. D. Smith, 1991); validation of governmental power (Hage, 1998; Isin & Wood, 1999; Younane Brookes, 2012); and norms, values and beliefs to guide in-group behaviour (Purdie & Wilss, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Historically, clan, tribe or family fulfilled these functions, identifying their own and offering solidarity and safety to ‘us’.

However, advances in industrialisation and mass media have empowered nation-states to assume this role for many. Millions of unknown ‘Others’ – those who are categorised as different from ‘us’, and are excluded because they do not fit with societal norm (Fozdar et al., 2009) – are now embraced as ‘us’ through national solidarity narratives (war, sport, political ideology, opportunity, justice, another feared ‘Other’) that provide a cogent past and common future in the nation-state (Anderson, 1991; Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997; Cerulo, 1997; Hall, 1999). As Guibernau (1996: 48) suggests, “while the nation [i.e. tribal groups/family] has a common culture, values and symbols, the nation-state has as an objective the creation of a common culture, symbols and values” [italics added]. As such, the nation-state has to work to inspire meaningfulness in people’s lives (Calhoun, 1997), and in this way, construct national identities that provide meaning, safety and community. As Hall (1999: 38) notes, “it has been the main function of national cultures...to represent what is in fact the ethnic hotch-potch of modern nationality as the primordial unity of ‘one people’”.

Nations have a powerful influence on behaviour and values systems, as Barrett (2000, cited in Purdie & Wilss, 2007: 70) notes, “how one conceives of one’s nation has implications for how one will behave in relation to it”. People act according to their inclusion in, and identification with, their nation, evident across a spectrum of

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4 All references to the ‘nation’ or ‘national’ should be understood as referent to the nation-state, and not in the anthropological sense of tribe or people group. Please see section 2.8 for a fuller explanation of nomenclature.
behaviours: voting; consuming news; travelling; accessing healthcare, insurance, welfare; sport; and warfare. Additionally the nation informs values systems and ways of understanding the world, from arguably trivial concerns, such as who wins the Olympics, to responses to international emergencies, such as the Rohingya refugees (Davies, 2015). These behaviours are assessed as consistent with, or in contradiction to, national norms (T. Phillips & Smith, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2001), as part of a process of differentiation and comparison that is integral to collective identity formation (Isin & Wood, 1999). Essentially, the values of a nation become so inscribed and banal (Billig, 1995) that nationalism becomes “a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness” (Calhoun, 1997: 3).

Such collective identity formation necessitates co-construction of meaning between popular and elite discourse. Wodak and Kovacs (2004: 214) suggest, “there is a process of reciprocal influence between the identity designs provided by the political elites...and those of everyday discourses”. Yet not all voices are equally welcomed to the conversation and it is the social elites (politicians, journalists, academics, and the like) who act as gatekeepers and play a key role in constructing national identities (Youanee Brookes, 2012; Gellner, 1994: 26). Hall, (quoted in De Cillia et al., 1999: 155) notes that the ‘elite’ are “designers of national identities and national cultures [and] aim at ‘linking membership within the political nation-state and identification with national culture’ (Hall, 1994: 205)”.

This reciprocal process of construction often results in the construal of similarity as sameness (Isin & Wood, 1999). Rather than encompassing the diversity within a national identity, similarities are highlighted and interpreted as uniform, while differences are veiled, thus strengthening the power of the in-group, and marginalising or expelling the ‘Other’. If national identity is monolithic and inflexible, exclusion is a likely outcome.

Yet national identities constitute only one aspect of a person, and thus defining self or ‘Other’ according to monolithic national collectives results in the essentialisation of these identities. Augoustinos, Hastie, and Wright (2011) assert that by understanding national identity as flexible, and able to assume an intermediate or superordinate level of identity formation (i.e. local, national, and global identities could be enmeshed), difference can be included under one banner, and similarity or sameness become less pertinent.
There are more national identities as there are nation-states, and so it is the ways in which these elements of society, culture and politics are knit together in any given national identity that is key to understanding the particularity of a national identity. Hall (2002: 27) states “we cannot establish identity without a cultural vocabulary, we are in that sense always culturally situated and embedded”. Thus understanding national identity to be a constructed collective identity allows for interrogation of its diverse forms, and the ways in which various elements are ‘scripted’ into national stories (Appiah, 2005; A. D. Smith, 1991).

One way that these elements have commonly been explained is by delineating national identities into two main ‘types’ - civic and ethnic (Brown, 2000; Clark, 2007; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; A. D. Smith, 1991).

A number of terms have been applied to ‘ethnic’ national identities: ‘eastern’, kulturnation, ethnic, illiberal, collectivist, gemeinschaft, and patriotic (Spencer & Wollman, 1998). Despite slight differences, and some being more colonial and Eurocentric than others, all essentially rely on historical scripts of the nation-state that ground identity in the ethnic group or tribe, with members bound by shared ancestry, like a family (S. Berger, 2009b; Calhoun, 1997; Gellner, 1994; Guibernau, 1996; A. D. Smith, 1984). The nation is viewed as a static, fully formed reality, rather than evolving and porous (Cheng, 2013). Identities are grounded in emotion, and focused inward on tradition, history and nature (Spencer & Wollman, 1998). Inclusion requires ascribed attributes such as native birth, ethnic heritage or religious affiliation. Thus, in general, ethno-nationalists are thought to be exclusionary as they value boundary maintenance (economic and geographic), and tend to hold anti-immigrant and politically ‘conservative’ views about the nation-state (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Spencer & Wollman, 1998).

This sort of nationalism is prevalent where ethnic groups or tribes have occupied a territory for centuries, and so predates the founding of the contemporary nation-state (A. D. Smith, 1984). In nations that embrace poly-ethnicity (settler nations such as Canada, USA and Australia, as well as some with histories of colonisation, such as France and UK) ethno-nationalism results from the dominance of one culture group over another, often based on, and perpetuating, unequal power distribution, rather than drawing on histories of land occupation. Fozdar and Spittles (2014: 5) note that “in the context of a settler society it equates to exclusionary nationalism, where
minorities who do not share these things [the dominant groups values, appearance, religion, and so on] are denigrated”.

In contrast to ethno-nationalism, civic nationalism is defined as a commitment to the rule of law, civic institutions, liberty, justice, and an ethos that values diversity and inclusivity (Fozdar & Spittles, 2014; Kymlicka, 2006; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). This grew out of ‘Western’ Enlightenment thinking, in search of rational ways of delineating the world, to provide civic rights to all citizens (Spencer & Wollman, 1998). Civics subscribe to a political identity achieved through citizenship (Calhoun, 1997); democracy, progress and modernity are valued; and admission depends on adherence to the political creed, regardless (supposedly) of race, colour, ethnicity, gender, religion, language, and so on. Thus membership requires no a priori attributes, it is achieved rather than applied.

Civic and ethno-nationalisms therefore, are often seen as distinct scripts of national identity. An ethno-national identity places people in bounded communities that offer less choice and freedom of expression, but greater solidarity within the community. The scripts available prioritise national pride and solidarity, offering a strong sense of belonging and certainty for those who are part of the in-group. Civic identities afford choice, freedom, movement, independence, and rights, yet these opportunities and freedoms come at the price of a reduced sense of belonging and social solidarity.

While the distinction between civic and ethno forms of nationalism has a long history that dates back to the seminal work of Hans Kohn (1944) the various ways this duality has been conceived are often inconsistent and incompatible (Spencer & Wollman, 1998). Smith (1984: 290/1), for example, argues that civic nationalism requires a “common myth of political origins, shared political history and shared political culture...over and above its territory, single economy and citizenship rights”. In this sense, the political structures and history of the nation are mythologised and there emerges a ‘civil religion’ (Bongiorno, 2014: 96), as is most obviously the case in the United States (US). As such, elements of both ‘types’ of nationalism coalesce within the one script. Indeed Hall (2002: 28) asserts:

I have never believed in the pure notion of the civic national state. I do not know a single national state that evinces a fully civic nationalism. Every civic nationalism I know requires belongingness on the part of its citizens; it requires
identification. Identification cannot be constructed in relation to a political system alone; it has to be constructed on cultural meanings. It has to be embedded, that is to say, in an imagined community.

Yet these ‘types’ of nationalism exist for a reason; they draw on stereotypes to depict differences with broad brushstrokes. As Kaldor (2004) recognised, there may be a tendency toward civic nationalism in open and democratic societies, and ethnic forms in authoritarian, closed societies. Yet care needs to be taken to avoid Orientalist discourse and thought, which associates ethnic nationalism with nations that are seen to be less ‘civilized’ and views the Eastern ‘Other’ as exotic, thus perpetuating prejudice and unequal power distribution (Said, 1977). Further, understanding these ‘types’ of civic and ethno-nationalisms as dichotomous is functionally blind to the diversity of national realities. On one hand single nation-state can contain both civic and ethno-nationalists. On the other, people’s identities and lived experiences are often both civic and ethno-nationalists, as culture and politics, and emotion and reason, are enmeshed (Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Hage, 1998; A. D. Smith, 1984; Spencer & Wollman, 1998). This is evident by highlighting just one spurious aspect of the dichotomy - inclusivity.

The notion that a civic national identity is inclusive and requires no prior achievements or attributes, and is freely accessibly to all within the territorial boundaries, is, and always has been, questionable. Historically, the exclusion from various polities of women, Indigenous and ‘coloured’ peoples, lower classes, and the poor, shows the historic limits to civic identity (Spencer & Wollman, 1998). Today, the haziness of civic inclusion remains in the treatment of asylum seekers and those charged (not necessarily convicted) with acts of terrorism. Placed in a ‘state of exception’, stripped of their legal status and judicial rights, and physically removed from within the boundaries of the nation (to places like Guantanamo Bay by the US or Nauru by Australia), such people are treated as disposable, as unhuman, and denied rights of citizenship (Agamben, 2005; Fozdar, forthcoming). This is in direct opposition to civic values that prioritise the rule of law and inclusion of all (Stevenson, 2014).

Essentially, we see that both civic and ethnic versions of nationalism construct boundaries to identify who is and who is not included in the nation. Rather than a duality, therefore, it is useful to conceive of national identities as constitutive - both cultural and civic scripts are used to construct a sense of the national self (Fozdar &
1.2.2. Exclusivity

The fundamentally exclusive nature of nationalism is a common criticism, as Spencer and Wollman (1998: 256) suggest, “at the heart of the nationalism...whatever form it takes, is an essentially exclusionary logic”. This section attempts to give examples of how this exclusion is enacted and to portray the effect this has on ingroup solidarity.

As noted above, the exclusion inherent in ethnic national identities seems obvious; non-nationals are rejected because of seemingly arbitrary attributes - skin colour, ethnicity, or religion for example. Civic national identities offer achievable inclusion to those who align with civic values and national institutions or who feel a sense of belonging (or some variant thereof). Yet even this can entail its own form of exclusion, as ‘cultural belonging’ “replaced genetic purity and functions as the coded language for race and colour” (Hall, 1999: 39). The nation is used to exclude by constructing processes of cultural belonging and non-belonging, such as citizenship tests that require cultural knowledge to pass. In Australia this famously resulted in new migrants being asked about Donald Bradman’s (a famous Australian cricketer from the early 20th Century) batting average (Fozdar & Spittle, 2009). Such processes are part of the ‘new racism’ (Barker, 1982), drawn on to legitimate Othering (Cheng, 2013; Fozdar & Low, 2015; O’Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008). As such, the variety of ways that nationalism is constructed is subsumed by the overarching construction of nationalism as exclusive.

There is an emergent form of nationalism that focuses on constructing a united, static, ‘regressive’ identity that is anarchical and potentially violent, in response to processes of globalisation (primarily migration and mobility) (Kaldor, 2004; Suvarierol, 2012). While previously national identities were constructed in contrast to the geographically removed ‘Other’, now it is the internal ‘Other’ that is feared. There has been a (re)emphasis on national identity construction and symbolism to combat the ‘threat’ resulting from “individualisation, globalisation, mobility and migration” (Suvarierol, 2012: 212).

This ‘new nationalism’, “bred in conditions of insecurity and violence” (Kaldor, 2004: 168), has manifested itself in a number of ways. Kaldor (2004) notes the linked
rise of exclusionary, fundamentalist religious groups, while Suvarierol (2012) has termed the process ‘nation-freezing’, in which national identity ‘freezes’ an imagined historically homogenous group, in contrast to the fluidity of a fast-changing and ever-expanding world. There are numerous manifestations of this. Flag-flying for example, has emerged in nations that were previously wary of ‘US-style nationalism’ (Fozdar, Spittles, & Hartley, 2014): former British PM Gordon Brown ordered that the Union Jack be flown every day of the year in response to terrorist attacks, to “create a new sense of Britishness” (G. Jones, 2007); former Australian PM John Howard made flag-flying a requirement in schools to gain access to funding (Fozdar et al., 2014); and citizenship packages have been constructed for new migrants to learn about the culture of their new nation that focus on static, historic constructions of ‘us’ (Suvarierol, 2012).

Such new nationalism differs from classical nationalism in focus, content and function (Suvarierol, 2012). The focus is on ‘citizenship as identity’ (Joppke, 2007: 38), which is distinct from citizenship as status (formal membership) or rights (legal immunities and opportunities) in that citizenship requires the ability to adapt or assimilate to cultural norms that in-group members are thought to possess (Suvarierol, 2012).

In terms of function, new nationalism is not a nation-building exercise but a nation defining exercise. Citizenship is replaced with identity, and people need to conform to the identity demands to become members of the nation. The focus is on the distinction between native cultural promotion and migrant integration. The content of ‘new nationalism’ includes a blindness to the existing diversity and societal change; a belief in a fixed and homogenous nation and national identity; and a discursive closing of society from additions or changes (Suvarierol, 2012). This includes processes of exclusion that are “increasingly complex systems of civic stratifications with differential access to civil, economic and social rights depending on mode of entry, residence and employment” (Kofman, 2005: 453).

National boundaries are spaces in which nationalism is powerfully enacted to exclude the ‘Other’. Entire government departments devoted to the task of maintaining ‘safe’ borders and excluding those who do not belong, reinforce armed guards behind fences, airport patrols with sniffer dogs, and navy personnel with inflatable dinghies. Such policies of deterrence directed at those arriving at national
boundaries without passports or visas (aka asylum seekers) are prevalent across the globe, although some are more harsh than others (Pickering & Weber, 2014). Britain, for example, allows some asylum seekers to enter the nation, and provides low-level housing and a small income of £36.62 per week, but prohibits gainful employment. Some - about 11% - are held in detention (UNHCR, 2014b), and critics accuse the government of unnecessarily harsh treatment through indefinite detention for some, including children (Morpurgo, 2014). France, in 2006, established deportation targets for undocumented immigrants and is notoriously harsh with ‘illegal migrants’ - in 2013 France accepted only 11,500 of the 66,000 people who claimed asylum (Project, n.d.).

Italy offers a more positive response, but geopolitical relations suggest that this may not last. Following the death of more than 360 people in a shipwreck off the island of Lampedusa (Alberici, 2013) and pressure from the EU, Italy shifted from policies of detention and deportation for ‘illegal immigrants’ (or as they have colloquially been termed ‘uomini tonno’ - human tunafish) (“Italy Detention Profile,” n.d.) to more progressive ‘search and rescue’ policies. Operation Mare Nostrum began in October 2013, rescuing over 140,000 people in its year of operation. Yet other European Union nations voiced concern about the increase in asylum seeker arrivals, and claimed that Italy was encouraging people to risk their lives at sea. Mare Nostrum has since been replaced by the collaborative Operation Triton, which is much cheaper and smaller, and primarily focused on surveillance and border protection (McNeill, 2014).

This discourse of exclusion continues currently as tens of thousands of stateless people, primarily from Syria, are breaking national boundaries in order to seek asylum in the European Union. In England an exclusionary and more protectionist discourse has dominated debates around accepting asylum seekers. This is seen in the words of Home Secretary Theresa May who, in an echo of former Australian PM John Howard, proclaimed "we must have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country" (Miller, 2015). Germany has been praised for their ‘humane’ response to the crisis by accepting 800,000 asylum seekers and offering expedient processing of claims of asylum. However some suggest that even Germany’s response is aimed at retaining national boundaries and excluding the non-national. Germany is considering measures to dissuade people from seeking asylum in ‘their nation’ and to expel those who have already arrived. These measures include distribution of non-cash items to
asylum seekers rather than money, which will effectively limit freedom and independence. Additionally those whose claim of asylum fails may be more quickly expelled and a five-year re-entry ban placed on them. Most of these measures are backed by public opinion (Ziebarth, 2015). Essentially the debate continues to revolve around how best to maintain ‘integrity’ of borders while (for some) being ‘humane’.

Exclusion is also evident in less tangible barriers that are used in many developed nations, particularly those with high immigrant populations, to implement structural processes of exclusion consistent with ‘new nationalism’. Tests have been used in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany and Australia to make citizenship acquisition more difficult, and to encourage integration and language learning (Betts & Birrell, 2007a; Cheng, 2013; Etzioni, n.d.; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Joppke, 2013).

The UK government’s new immigration agenda links greater immigration and asylum controls with improvements in citizenship and community across British society (Walters, 2004). In Australia citizenship testing began in December 2006, in the wake of a number of events that challenged Australia’s sovereignty and identity, such as the Cronulla riots and terrorist attacks in New York, London and Bali (Fozdar & Spittles, 2009; Noble), and linked immigration with terrorism in the minds of some. This caused people to see Australia’s recent history of pro-immigration policies and relaxed citizenship laws as devaluing the national identity. In response, the government increased the eligibility period for prospective citizens from two to four years, and introduced a more rigorous language and ‘history and values’ test (Fozdar & Spittles, 2009).

Such responses emphasise the exclusionary power of nationalism. As Wilson and Donnan (1998: 2) note “post-modern political analyses often fail to query the degree to which the state sustains its historically dominant role as an arbiter of control, violence, order and organisation for those whose identities are being transformed by world forces”. Excluding those who come to the nation’s borders is, therefore, a powerful way to reinforce the identity of those within the borders, as (McNevin, 2007: 657) suggests, “the intensified policing of borders in response to irregular migration creates a flashpoint for anxieties about an outside world encroaching upon a vulnerable inside where the legitimacy of the state as a basis for sovereign communities is at stake”.
1.2.3 Pervasiveness

Of all the collective identities in which human beings share today, national identity is perhaps the most fundamental...other types of collective identity...may overlap or combine with national identity but they rarely succeed in undermining its hold (A. D. Smith, 1991: 143).

Nations influence many spheres of activity; they constitute “the modern ‘grid’ of the inter-state system which today enmeshes all areas and populations” (A. D. Smith, 1984: 289). While modern society places individuals in a state of flux and uncertainty where roles and responsibilities have become fluid and self-defined (Beck, 1992), the nation maintains more stable and identifiable boundaries. Refocusing on the role of the nation and its inhabitants positions self and other in a global system of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that provides security and a sense of identity (Calhoun, 1997).

The pervasiveness of nationalism is by no means obvious, as Michael Billig argues compellingly in Banal Nationalism (1995). Billig (1995) exposes the rhetoric of national identity and its subtle, passive utility to create nationhood. Through media, political discourse, sport and journalism, the concept of nationality is perpetuated or ‘flagged’. The subtle ubiquity of nationalism is achieved because “the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building.” (Billing, 1995: 8). This banality of nationalism makes it ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ (Suvarierol, 2012), reinforcing an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality.

While ‘nationalism’ has often been thought of as something on the periphery, undertaken by separatists and extremists, there has been little thought for how the general populace enact and live national lives. Nations anchor experiences through citizenship rights and responsibilities; passports and international travel; history, literature, music and sport; and economic concerns (Calhoun, 1997). With De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999: 153) we view national identity as a form of Pierre Bourdieus's habitus,

that is to say as a complex of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes, (a) of related emotional attitudes intersubjectively shared within a specific group of persons; (b) as well as of similar behavioural
dispositions; (c) all of which are internalized through ‘national’ socialization.

Politics is a key arena for the discussion and promotion of national identities, as politicians discursively present a national identity that is then consumed and (re)constructed by the general populace and developed into beliefs about who ‘we’ are. Liberal, democratic political discourse is entrenched in the nationalist language of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Billig, 1995; Younane Brookes, 2012). Promoting the economic and social wellbeing of ‘our people’ places an emphasis on the commonality of those within the nation-state. Focus is on the betterment of those of ‘us’ within the territorial and ideological boundaries, and not the ‘them’ beyond. This has been reinforced in responses to globalisation. A general trend away from nationalist discourse amongst politicians changed in response to globalisation, as politicians from both the Left and Right returned to the task of building a sense of belonging that was worth maintaining in the face of trans- and international economic and social networks (Jenkins, 1996; Kaldor, 2004).

Essentially, national identity construction is concealed through everyday ordinary interactions, like political discourse; and at the same time the constructed identity becomes a naturalised expression of self, and a way of being that is embedded in the everyday (Billig, 1995). This not only constructs who we are, but also identifies who we are not and helps create an ‘Other’ who does not engage in ‘our’ social practices, habits and mores, thus reinforcing the in-group identity (Benhabib, 1998; De Cillia et al., 1999).

1.2.4 Summary

In summary, nations give rise to collective identities, draw from a range of components that are uniquely imbricated to provide frames of reference, and inform values and behaviours within a nation-state. Each version of a national identity produces a unique mosaic; however beyond these variations, the frame of each mosaic is one of exclusion. Whether the nation purports to be more civic or ethnic, each constructed national identity entails markers of insiders and outsiders to maintain boundaries and ensure in-group solidarity. These markers are pervasive, and function to delineate people into neat categories across the globe, and provide a sense of
solidarity and belonging in response to the uncertainty and risk that modern life entails (Beck, 2002).

1.3 Cosmopolitan identity

While the nation remains a source of identity for many, if not most, alternate discourses are emerging that construct a more inclusive and global form of identification.

Over the last two decades or so, cosmopolitanism has become an increasingly prevalent area of study (Beck, 2006; Lamont & Aksartova, 2002; Nussbaum, 1994; Skrbis & Woodward, 2013); perhaps primarily because of trends toward a globalised world. While globalisation has arguably existed for centuries in a ‘thin’ form of trade and commerce, people are now experiencing a ‘thick’ version, with wide-ranging, significant and intense impacts on people’s lives (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Political, legal, economic, military, and social interconnectedness have complicated the power claims and regulatory ability of the nation and this, for some, has raised questions about its continued relevance to the individual (Held, 1995). For these ‘cosmopolitans’ “interactions and relationships have a socializing effect that entails mutual understanding, empathy and respect” (Mau, Mewes, & Zimmermann, 2008: 5), and drives the need to develop a culture of openness, flexibility, fluidity, and reflexivity, to be able to understand and interact with the increasingly close ‘Other’ (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007).

Yet cosmopolitanism is a slippery term, and identifying who is cosmopolitan can be complex. Words like ‘mobile’, ‘consumers’, ‘risk taking’, ‘openness’, ‘elites’, ‘everyday’, ‘banal’, ‘rooted’ and ‘connoisseurs’ have become part of cosmopolitanism taxonomy (Beck, 2006; Skrbis & Woodward, 2013; Szerszynski & Urry, 2002). To gain a greater understanding, cosmopolitan identity has been categorised into four main ‘types’ that emerge in the literature: banal (Beck, 2002; Lamont & Aksartova, 2002), ideological/ethical (Nussbaum, 1994), geopolitical (Beck, 2006) and elitist (Peterson & Kern, 1996).

1.3.1 Ideological/Ethical Cosmopolitanism

There is a distinctive set of attitudes, values and practices that characterise the cosmopolitan ideologue. Firstly egalitarianism, with an emphasis on worldliness and
communitarianism (Nussbaum, 1994; Woodward, Skrbis, & Bean, 2008), means that action is driven by global concern, and interest is shown in global issues like human rights, forced migration and global environmental protection (Woodward et al., 2008). Openness to, and respect for, cultural difference are valued, as well as a “conscious attempt to be familiar with people, objects and places that sit outside one’s…national settings” (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007: 732). Essentially, ideological (or ethical) cosmopolitanism involves the abstract universal principle that the self is firstly human, and thus a ‘citizen of the world’ with corresponding rights and responsibilities.

Such cosmopolitan ideologues are often levelled with the charge of utopianism – of dreaming of a better, impossible and unrealistic life that transcends the current reality. Thus their ideas are criticised as merely theoretical and abstracted from normative practice. However Inglis (2014) argues that this separation between normative practices and ethical cosmopolitanism is spurious, as there are examples of cosmopolitanism actually existing in various forms throughout history, dating back to Alexander the Great.

...what Stoic political theory regarded as primarily an abstract universal – namely, cosmopolitan human brotherhood [sic]– is understood in Plutarch’s historical account as being empirically realized by Alexander [the Great]. And what Stoic philosophers regarded as primarily metaphorical, namely a world-state, Plutarch claims Alexander actually constructed. (Inglis, 2014: 105)

Further Kantian constructions of cosmopolitanism, from which many cosmopolitan ideologues draw their roots, were firmly grounded in actually achieving a cosmopolitan reality (Inglis, 2014). Kant believed that the need for peace and economic prosperity, as well as the closeness of the ‘Other’ due to mass migration, would force collectives to develop peaceful, cosmopolitan conditions. Some argue that the realisation of Kant’s vision of a moral community embodying the normative and empirical, is visible in contemporary human rights discourses that “are not merely abstractly universal (‘cosmic’), but have become concretely global, in both thought and practice.” (Inglis, 2014: 107).

In Nussbaum’s (1994) seminal work on the subject of ethical cosmopolitanism she advocated for an education system that espouses values of universality and
primary allegiance to humans, not co-nationals. She envisaged a cosmopolitan pedagogy that would teach children in the USA:

...about the rest of the world in which they live, about India and Bolivia and Nigeria and Norway and their histories, problems, and comparative successes...about the problems of hunger and pollution in India, and the implications of these problems for larger problems of global hunger and global ecology. Most important... that they are above all citizens of a world of human beings, and that, while they themselves happen to be situated in the United States, they have to share this world of human beings with the citizens of other countries (Nussbaum, 1994: 2).

This exemplifies the ethos and mission of the ethical cosmopolitan: to empower people to see the world in universalist and compassionate terms, devoid of value-laden distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

1.3.2 Banal Cosmopolitanism

Banal cosmopolitanism is the everyday counterpart of ethical cosmopolitanism. Rather than being driven by an ethical imperative, banal cosmopolitans form everyday connections with ‘Others’ that bridge divides. Banal cosmopolitanism involves “ordinary people...[bridging] boundaries with people who are different from them” (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002: 1). Essentially banal cosmopolitanism combines ethical cosmopolitanism’s commitment to universal values (Nussbaum, 1994) with locally contextualised experience and expression. As such, the banal cosmopolitan is someone who lives, works, loves and plays locally, but is characterised by engagement with difference at this local level.

Beck (2004: 151) suggests that banal cosmopolitanism is “a whole network of everyday skills and practices [that] emerges to handle the high degree of interdependence and globality” and enables individuals to engage with difference. Yet these practices are often unreflexive and unnamed, perhaps attributed to tolerance or multiculturalism, rather than cosmopolitanism.

Two studies have been undertaken that show banal cosmopolitan in situ. Lamont and Aksartova (2002) compare blue collar workers in France and the US,
considering how each group uses different discourses of universality to include the ‘Other’ (particularly the racial other) and expresses bonds of common humanity. White Americans use discourses of equal earning potential and the universality of human nature across races; black Americans note spending (as opposed to earning) potential and social inclusion as bringing about equality, and promote universality through common creation in God’s image, shared physiology, and citizenship.

The market-based equality found in American discourses (earning and spending potential) was absent amongst the French workers. French respondents spoke of the universality of human nature and need, and of good and bad workers; solidarity and egalitarianism; fighting against injustice; and used structural reasons (education, origins in a developing country) to understand and accept difference. North African migrants in France spoke of achieving moral uprightness, and the universality of physiology, destiny, morality. Essentially what Lamont and Aksartova’s (2002) work shows is that there are multiple, almost contradictory ways, that ‘ordinary people’ construct inclusive discourses, using everyday, banal understandings of the world, self and other.

Another study by, Brett and Moran (2011), looks at banal cosmopolitanism in the context of Australia and argues that ordinary cosmopolitans “draw on the resources of Australian nationalism to help them think about how to live with the increasing ethnic diversity of contemporary Australia” (p. 191). It is the resources of Australianness (perhaps a ‘fair go’ or multiculturalism) that are credited with accepting the ‘Other’ and universalist values, rather than a cosmopolitan ethic, such as valuing people merely for their humanity. Banal cosmopolitanism, then, is situated cosmopolitanism, and not necessarily viewed as contradicting nationalism.

Finally, banal cosmopolitanism may be increasing because of advances in technology and media, as these developments remove geographical barriers to information and (now particularly with web 2.0 and social media) communication, and provide a forum for perpetuating cosmopolitan values. Szerszynski and Urry (2002) undertook an analysis of global ‘flagging’ (much like Billig’s national flagging), in a 24 hour sample of British television broadcasts. Global flagging included images such as the ‘blue globe’: “earth seen in a dark space, as a whole defined against threatening emptiness, with no lines or political colouring” (Szerszynski & Urry, 2002: 467). They

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5 See section 2.9 for a full description of Web 2.0
found numerous examples of the world being routinely flagged on British television, and argue that banal globalism is part of the media cycle that influenced people’s understanding of their place in the world.

Shifts toward social media and user-generated content (UGC) have further increased the opportunity for banal cosmopolitanism as people can interact with others from different locations and backgrounds. Sobre-Denton (2015) explores the presence and efficacy of social justice and activism in social media, and how virtual cosmopolitan spaces are created that give voice to the marginalised and seek solutions to global issues. Three sites were analysed: a political group on Facebook, called Movimiento Cívico Nacional, that began as a social justice campaign to overthrow the Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom for his alleged assassination of a lawyer; Isvec’teyiz, a Facebook group established by Turkish migrants in Sweden, used for public cosmopolitanism, to provide a space for the migrants as well as to recognise the value of being close to the ‘Other’ in Sweden; and finally Space2Cre8, a social networking site working to establish a cosmopolitan pedagogy of literature for adolescents. Through analysis of these sites Sobre-Denton (2015) argues that a desire for social and political engagement is expressed, and that activism and grassroots membership are being promoted in these cosmopolitan spaces. They suggest that this enables banal ‘cosmopolitanism-from-below’, since:

> [V]irtual cosmopolitan groups, whether they exist to advocate for a political cause, provide a safe space of home and belonging to a diasporic group, or engage in the exchange of cultural capital with culturally distant and different Others, provide opportunities for cosmopolitanism-from-below, as long as the question of access can be answered (Sobre-Denton, 2015: 14).

Essentially, banal cosmopolitanism is the expression of inclusive perspectives that value being ‘human’ over particular identities by ‘ordinary’ people. Rather than perpetuating division and delineating the ‘Other’, expressions of banal cosmopolitanism are seen in the bonds made in everyday contexts between people. As media and technology advances create greater global awareness and opportunities for interaction, these expressions of banal cosmopolitanism may become more prevalent.
1.3.3 Geopolitical Cosmopolitanism

Geopolitical cosmopolitanism involves the development of trans and post-national political institutions that seek to absorb national sovereignty into a global polity (Held, 1995). Some suggest a localised version has developed in the European Union and that a ‘tame’ version arises from empowering the judicial and military powers of the United Nations (UN) (Held, 1995). The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicates progress in this direction, yet there are currently significant juridical limitations on the ICC, as its authority is subject to the consent of nation-states. Nations must be signatories to the relevant treaties for the ICC to operate within its territory or in relation to its citizens otherwise the ICC are powerless. While this may suggest steps toward a global polity, some argue that the UN and ICC, in their current forms, are actually reinforcing the ubiquity, power and sovereignty of nation-states (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002) as they maintain an international arrangement of global governance.

Other geopolitical cosmopolitan theorists see no contradiction in a form of global governance that includes the nation-state. “Rather than the decline of citizenship, I see in these instances the reconfiguration of citizenship through democratic iterations” (Benhabib, 2006: 69). Cosmopolitan values will arise from enmeshing state legislature and Universalist ethics. Rather than an emerging global government and declining nation-state, Benhabib (2006) proposes an amalgam of the two; following a Kantian tradition, cosmopolitanism would then function as a set of norms, both legal and ethical, that govern civil society.

This is the theoretical argument of Appiah (1996), who sees no contradiction in one who is a patriot, in love with her own country, and a cosmopolitan. Such a perspective values mobility and difference, and cosmopolitanism draws on this valuing of difference to empower the retention of distinct nations, rather than to homogenise them, as some claim. As Appiah (1996: 22) states:

the cosmopolitan patriot can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different, peoples.

The argument is extended further to suggest that nation-states are in essence valuable
as a means of structuring society because people live best on a smaller scale, as well as ensuring cultural variety is retained.

This view prioritises nation-states in response to international issues such as transnational migration, global economics, or human rights and assumes a shift in national identities, from primarily self-interested to focusing on the ‘Other’. As such, there is a necessary confluence of ethical and geopolitical cosmopolitanism, as Clapham (2007: 59) argues:

The actual ‘national interests’ can change. Governments are increasingly susceptible to the idea that...improving human rights abroad may indeed be in the national interest: as security threats diminish, international stability increases. In addition, we can idealistically hope that the national interest includes the idea that millions of nationals are actually altruistic, rather than selfish, and are concerned about remedying the suffering of others, where they may be.

Other theorists suggest that post-national political affiliation will destroy the nation-state (or come about as a consequence of its destruction). Wallerstein (2004) in his World Systems Theory, offers an historical explanation for the struggle between state and post-state political systems. Extending Marxist ideas (division of labour, dialectics of capitalism, accumulation and overproduction, boom and bust) to the global market in which the nation-state currently plays a central role as regulator, Wallerstein argues that the boom and bust cycles of capital production will evolve slowly to a point of impasse, when a new system will inevitably develop. Wallerstein contends that the current turbulence seen in science, such as Chaos Theory, and the dissolution of certainty central to postmodernity (Beck, 1992), signifies this point. Accordingly the world is moving toward a new world system, one potentially governed by post-national polities, and it is this system that should be the focus of sociological analysis. Whether or not Wallerstein views this as a positive step is unclear (Wallerstein, 2000).

Jeremy Waldron presents a view of geopolitical cosmopolitanism (in Benhabib, 2006) that combines with banal and ethical theories, to suggest that the expansion of banal cosmopolitanism through processes of globalisation will facilitate the
widespread achievement of cosmopolitan ideals. Cosmopolitan ideals can be achieved through pedestrian interactions and relationships, the argument goes, and as the world becomes more interconnected and relationships are established between geographically and politically diverse individuals, recognition of the need for legally binding universalistic morality will be heeded. Thus through concrete realities - shared politics, media, economic markets - a cosmopolitan polity will emerge, rather than through abstract philosophical ideals of egalitarianism and communitarianism. An example of this is a global public sphere, in which “the possibilities for developing a global civil society...are dependent on the emergence of a cosmopolitan public sphere of communication and cultural contestation that is necessary for any large-scale shift in values” (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002: 11/12).

Perhaps the foremost geopolitical cosmopolitan theorist is the late Ulrich Beck. Beck (1992; 2000a; 2004) argues that it is the threats and risks that transcend national frameworks that will result in post-national politics. “Global risks, terrorist actions, migration flows, anti-globalization movements, ecological and economic crises” (Beck, 2004: 147): these are the events that will force post-national political affiliations and global cooperation. This, he argues, does not imply that supra-state organisations will ‘take over’ from nation-states; rather political processes will start to work within, between, below and above the state and cluster around issues that require complex solutions. As such, the nation-state will be enmeshed in a web of different but equally powerful global players, including NGOs, banks, multinational organisations, international justice systems (Held, 1995; 2002).

This promotes a form of geopolitical cosmopolitanism that upholds the role of the state as a player in post-national politics, at the same time transforming the nation-state significantly. “Cosmopolitanism is... a world where political communities and states matter, but not only or exclusively” (Held, 2002: 57). In this sense, the state is weakened and changed by introducing a multiplicity of co-existing identities (or powers, or participants) but is not necessarily destroyed. Beck and Levy (2013) call for a view of the nation-state as malleable, and notes that while most social scientists view the nation as constructed (see Anderson, 1991), they fail to recognise this as an ongoing process. As Beck and Levy (2013: 5) argues, “whereas the constructed nature of nationalism is widely recognized, the national is now naturalized in the sense that the future of nationhood is no longer addressed from a constructivist perspective”.

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such, nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not dichotomous if nations are understood to be in a continuing process of construction (Calhoun, 2008; Sassen, 2012; Skrbis & Woodward, 2013; Soysal, 1994).

While globalisation is not seen as analogous to cosmopolitanism, the two are present in geopolitical theories. Current trends towards globalisation – political, economic, social, communicative – are helpful, but not sufficient, to encourage growth in cosmopolitan attitudes (Beck, 2004); but through these processes, and the associated global sharing of problems – such as injustice, global warming, poverty – individuals can identify more easily with ‘Others’ beyond national boundaries (Cleveland, Erdoğan, Arik, & Poyraz, 2011) and broaden their habitus. The cosmopolitan is the one who can sit with risk, in a blended and fluid selfhood, rather than requiring a bounded identity (Beck, 2006; Shafak, 2014). Thus, the current globalised context perhaps better facilitates cosmopolitan attitudes than any other time in history, since “globalisation does not guarantee the uptake or expression of cosmopolitan dispositions, but surely provides much of the raw material for its possibility” (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007: 733).

Finally, it is important to note the co-existence of national and post-national institutions in many of the theories; while the state is not necessary, it is also not necessarily viewed as an evil.

1.3.4 Elite Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitans can be ‘dilettantes’ as well as ‘connoisseurs’ (Hannerz, 1996: 103) who choose certain aspects of cultures to collect, and at the same time, retain an openness to new experiences and expressions of culture. While ‘possessing’ a culture of origin, they can choose to ‘switch’ and withdraw from it at any time, since “they possess it, it does not possess them” (Hannerz, 1996: 103). Highly mobile, with prestigious and valuable passports (Woodward et al., 2008), they are more than merely those who travel internationally. A tourist or businessperson is distinct from an elite cosmopolitan; the former are those who have no desire or ability to participate and blend in when away from home, and are seeking a ‘home-plus’ experience (home plus sunshine for example) (Hannerz, 1990). Rather, an elite cosmopolitanism has:

- a willingness to engage with the Other…an intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences…to turn
into an *aficionado* [of cultures], to view them as artworks...and competence...to make one’s way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting, and reflecting...[and] in manoeuvring...with a particular system of meanings. (Hannerz, 1996: 103).

Woodward et al. (2008) suggest that the cosmopolitan has a disposition (including outlook, attitude and behaviour) that is expressed and experienced through global interaction. This disposition results from particular competencies, ways of managing meaning, and mobility; and links with Bourdieu’s *habitus* to provide “simultaneously cognitive and cultural structures of thought and action” (Woodward et al., 2008: 211). Essentially the elite cosmopolitan has abilities, access and privilege that facilitate this cosmopolitan disposition.

There are some who critique this form of cosmopolitanism as a Western-centric ideal (Calhoun, 2002; Hannerz, 1990; Vertovec & Cohen, 2002). Calhoun (2002: 206) argues that the ideals of contemporary cosmopolitanism conflate globalisation and cosmopolitanisation, and prioritise the neoliberal leaders, who “use cosmopolitan rhetoric [while their] actions contribute to...inequalities”. While Calhoun acknowledges the limits of the nation-state, he claims that cosmopolitanism is too ‘thin’ and elitist to provide a basis for the Universalist values that cosmopolitans espouse, since “they – we – imagine the world from the vantage point of frequent travellers, easily entering and exiting polities and social relations around the world, armed with visa-friendly passports and credit cards” (Calhoun, 2002: 872).

This elitist critique has been analysed in gap year experiences. The gap year (taking ‘time out’ of study or work to travel; often as a volunteer, but not always; often between secondary and tertiary education) has been touted as a positive form of international engagement for young people, and a way of maturing through improved knowledge of self and other. Yet studies suggest that rather than enhancing cross-cultural understanding, tolerance and global citizenship, it is selfish motives that dominate. Hanley, Lyons, Wearing, and Neil (2012) argue that the pervasiveness of neo-liberalism in developed nations has meant that ‘gappers’ use this time to develop skills and enhance their careers; and that the experience, available only to the wealthy, Western ‘elite’, increases the status division between rich Westerners and poor host
communities (Hanley et al., 2012; Snee, 2013). As Vertovec and Cohen (2002: 2) note, elite cosmopolitanism is “arguable based on exoticism, commodification and consumer culture”.

1.4 So, what is cosmopolitan identity?

From looking at these four aspects of cosmopolitanism, a picture emerges of what cosmopolitan identity encompasses. The discourses and themes that thread through these aspects highlight key elements of a cosmopolitan identity. These include: an attitude or disposition of openness, including a concern for humanity and a Universalist perspective; fluidity and hybridity; and coexistence with, rather than opposition to, other identities (including national identity). These elements do not function as a checklist for identifying a cosmopolitan individual or group; rather they show the behaviours and attitudes available to, and exhibited by, the cosmopolitan.

Firstly, a cosmopolitan is someone who demonstrates an openness to, and embrace of, the ‘Other’ (Inglis, 2014; Skrbis & Woodward, 2013), and prioritises the values of universality and concern for humanity.

The conception of openness is for us an epistemological principle of cosmopolitanism: it limits and fixates the definitional horizon by reminding us that beyond openness lies a sphere of all things uncosmopolitan. (Skrbis & Woodward, 2013: 2)

With openness at the centre of cosmopolitanism a solution can be found for the dilemma between elite and banal versions of cosmopolitanism. For elites, access to a privileged lifestyle involving international travel and sampling other cultures does not necessarily result in a cosmopolitan perspective (Hannerz, 1990); at the same time, a cosmopolitan perspective can emerge where these conditions are seemingly absent, and people live in locally bound life-worlds (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002). As such it is the dispositional characteristic of openness that delineates the cosmopolitan, whether they traverse the globe annually or never leave their local setting. Rather than mere philosophical alignment with universalism or global citizenship, or a political stance that advocates for global governance or increased power to the UN, cosmopolitan identity involves the processes and actions of individuals towards others demonstrated through “an orientation, a willingness to engage with the ‘Other’” (Hannerz 1990: 239).

As well as openness, cosmopolitanism entails fluidity and reflexivity.
Generally, identity theory posits that an identity requires an ‘us’ against ‘them’ mentality. People know who they are by identifying who they are not, and constructing a world with rigid boundaries that allow them to maintain a cogent sense of self as part of the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In contrast, cosmopolitan identity, “is, at least in theory, a model of identity liberated from the modern grid of identity formation” (Skrbis & Woodward, 2013: 11). Since cosmopolitanism allows for multiple, fluid identities to co-exist, there is no need to demarcate boundaries around the ‘Other’ (Shafak, 2014).

In practice, the cosmopolitan engages with, and draws on a number of identities to construct a sense of self that is adaptable and comfortable in a variety of contexts. Drawing on the work of Waldron (1992), Hall (2002: 26) says that:

...the traces and residues of many cultural systems, of any ethical systems... that is precisely what cosmopolitanism means. It means the ability to stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community, whether that is a faith or tradition or religion or culture –whatever it might be—and to draw selectively on a variety of discursive meanings.

In this sense the cosmopolitan is unbounded by categories of identification, and embraces uncertainty and risk about the self and ‘Other’. Building on the reflexivity of postmodern, risk society (Beck, 1992), cosmopolitan identity is decentred and open to cultural difference (Skrbis & Woodward, 2013).

Critics of cosmopolitanism suggest such a vague, ill-defined, and positionless identity that exists without an ‘Other’ is untenable, as it offers no sense of belonging, attachment or solidarity (Calhoun, 2008; Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002; Skey, 2013). As (Commissiong, 2012: 44/45) points out:

...cultural cosmopolitanism [is] a weak form generally because its relation to action can be simply attitudinal....such an attitude is too easily turned, under the pressure of practice from love to hate. As such, compared to the strong bonds of affection and meaning that nationalism, ethnocentrism, or racism provide, it is no match at all.

However this critique fails to understand cosmopolitan identity as fluid, and maintains an ‘us’ and ‘them’ perspective. Cosmopolitan identity involves a multiplicity of uneven
and non-exclusive attachments (Caglar, 2002: 180), and so the cosmopolitan is able to belong in multiple contexts and groups, without contestation or identity damage.

Essentially, “rather than reducing human beings to a single label, cosmopolitanism insists on the reality of blended selfhoods” (Shafak, 2014: 20).

A key tenet that arises from the fluid and reflexive nature of cosmopolitanism is that it functions on a “continuum of local to global... a process working alongside nationalism” (Skrbis & Woodward, 2013: 7). This claim contradicts much of the literature, as Lamont and Aksartova (2002: 2) note:

In the literature, cosmopolitanism is generally conceptualized in terms of allegiance to the world community of humankind and almost always defined in contrast to nationalism, because national boundaries remain the chief mechanism for separating ‘us’ from ‘them’, and for hierarchizing various people along some kind of moral scale. The opposition of nationalism to cosmopolitanism perhaps conveys most vividly the fundamental tension between moral obligations to one’s local origins and group memberships, on the one hand, and to the rest of the world, on the other.

Nationalism and cosmopolitanism are frequently theorised as antithetical; the former is parochial and exclusionary, while the latter is inclusive and adjusted to the demands of a globalised world (Brett & Moran, 2011a; Calhoun, 2008). One represents the past, the other the future (Beck, 2000a). However, a cosmopolitan view of the national/cosmopolitan divide is inclusive, allowing for national identities to coexist with cosmopolitan identities (Appiah, 1996a; Beck & Levy, 2013; Calhoun, 2008). Below is an indepth discussion of the cosmopolitanism verses nationalism debate.

1.5 Cosmopolitanism verses nationalism

Colic-Peisker (2011) explicates cosmopolitanism as a civilising process (Elias, 2000) – civilising in the sense that the individual becomes more open, aware and concerned about the life of the ‘Other’ and seeks to establish common bonds despite diversity (Cleveland et al., 2011). As part of that, there is necessarily a desire and ambition to extend political rights equally to all humanity, beyond a nation-state’s territorial boundaries (geospatial, political and social). In this way, the argument goes,
realising the ideals and the practice of cosmopolitanism will result in deconstructing the nation-state that limits the provision of these rights and opportunities to some.

Others argues that to ensure civic rights, liberal values and cultural variety are maintained and available to all peoples, polities smaller than that encompassing the whole of humanity are required (Appiah, 1996; Calhoun, 2007). A ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ allows people to enjoy a sense of belonging, engage in their civic duties, and appreciate the ‘presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different, peoples (Appiah, 1996: 22). This entails a ‘live and let live’ approach to cultural and political variance, so long as they remain within the boundaries of “general ethical constraints – so long, in particular, as political institutions respect basic human rights – we are happy to let them be” (Appiah, 1996: 26). As such, Appiah claims, nations can, and indeed must, co-exist with the ethical aims of cosmopolitanism. While appealing, this argument does sound Western, elitist, and neoliberal, and raises questions about whether, and how, people can appreciate the ‘presence of the Other’ in ‘our’ place and home.

These two positions reflect the complexity of debate in the literature about whether cosmopolitanism and nationalism are oppositional or complementary. For some the two are incompatible; nations are seen to promulgate wars, violence, exclusion, hatred, insularity and subjugation. They insufficiently represent the experiences and identities of their constituents, who either possess transnational ties that bind, regardless of geography, or whose ethnic identity traverses nation-state boundaries and exists in the borderlands (Nussbaum, 1994). These are peoples that “do not fit neatly into master discourses of ethnicity, race and nation” (Isin & Wood, 1999: 18) such as Tibetans who traverse the geopolitical boundaries of China and Myanmar, and are denied independent sovereignty (Calhoun, 1997; A. D. Smith, 1991), or the Rohingya people, who are being denied citizenship by multiple countries (Davies, 2015).  

From a pragmatic, rather than ideological position, globalisation has disentangled the processes of connection, community and belonging that give meaning and value to national identity. Just as the printing press was formative in

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6 It is interesting to note that in these debates about marginal peoples, the standard solution is to provide them with their own nation-state, or citizenship in another. The idea of transcending nation-states and allowing marginal ‘stateless’ people to belong without national boundaries is currently beyond the scope of debate.
creating a national identity through erosion of familial bonds and oral culture (Anderson, 2006; Held, 1995), so emergent technologies (web 2.0 and social media; Skype; mobile phones) decrease the bonds of national belonging and community (Kaldor, 2004; Szerszynski & Urry, 2002). Thus while the two – cosmopolitanism and nationalism – may not be oppositional, the existence of both is unnecessary, or will become so as social networks become more globally interconnected. Such a thesis aligns with theorists that suggest there must be a progression from national (adolescent) to post-national (adult) realities (Nairn, 1981).

Arguments for the continued significance of national identity often locate its value in socio-political and economic change (Wellings, 2014). The constant processes of change that globalisation entails means that national identification has a place in providing a sense of belonging and safety (Calhoun, 2007; Skey, 2013). In such a case, well-functioning nationalism may be an asset that enables people to extend hospitality to the stranger (a characteristically cosmopolitan act) driven by this sense of belonging and safety. Conversely, a nation-state that is engaged in promoting a regressive national identity, such as nation-freezing processes (Suvarierol, 2012) is likely to discourage expressions of hospitality and openness. As (Shafak, 2014: 17) argues:

if a regime is based on a well-functioning democracy and a robust civil society, other discourses can counterbalance the one-sidedness of nationalism. If the state in concern is far from being democratic and pluralistic, then chauvinism emerges as the dominant discourse.

Essentially this places a high level of responsibility on the political (and other) elite, to ensure that their particular brand of nationalism encourages a ‘robust civil society’. When they fail to, and nationalism takes on an aggressive, chauvinistic tone, discourses and practices of violence emerge. Shafak (2014: 17) notes that in Turkey this results in “[a]n anonymous voice [that] orders people to make a choice once-and-for-all: ‘If you love your motherland, you should not criticize it. If you insist on criticizing, it means you are not patriotic enough, in which case just pack up and go away.’” A similar ‘logic’ is seen in Australia, both amongst the political ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary Australians’. Among the ‘elite’, the conservative Liberal Party leaders John Howard (1996-2007) and Tony Abbott (2013-2015) have promoted a discourse that implies ‘if you’re not with us, you’re against us’ (Johnson, 2007). The 2005 Cronulla
riots saw a 3000 strong mob of ‘ordinary’ Anglo-Australians wielding the Australian flag engaged in conflict with Lebanese Australians, chanting ‘we grew here, you flew here’ (Cleveland et al., 2011; Noble, 2009).

I argue that understanding national and cosmopolitan identities as incompatible is a view from within the national frame. This methodologically nationalist position (Chernilo, 2007) assumes cosmopolitans are the ‘Other’ that threaten the national ‘us’, and consequently must be thwarted. Working from this methodologically nationalist “modern grid of identity formation” (Skrbis & Woodward, 2013: 11), cosmopolitan identity is constructed as bounded and rigid, rather than fluid and reflexive.

Beck sees methodological cosmopolitanism\(^7\) as the progressive way forward. This theory suggests that “globalization challenges the fit between nation-state and society” (Levy & Sznaider, 2006: 665) to such an extent that a new form of sociological analysis is required. Rather than relying upon the theoretical proposition that nation-states contain our lives (methodological nationalism), the significance of the nation-state to people’s lives is decreasing. As a political institution, the nation-state is being corroded or transformed, and methodological cosmopolitanism permits a both/and understanding of this reality, which means “consequently, a new methodology is required for the social sciences, namely, a methodological cosmopolitanism in which differences are no longer used as the foundation on which to build political theory and social research” (Gamper, 2007: 7/8).

1.6 Summary

Thus far, both nationalism and cosmopolitanism have been explored, and considered the ways in which they interact. Three central tenets of nationalism were highlighted: its constructed nature, exclusivity and pervasiveness. National identities are constructed to uniquely combine various socio-cultural and political elements and provide frames of reference that inform in-group norms. Functionally, this excludes the ‘Other’ through maintained boundaries – physical barriers or structural processes – to ensure in-group solidarity. Finally, national identity is pervasive, as it functions to contain people, and provide a sense of solidarity and belonging in response to the uncertainty and risk that modernity entails.

\(^7\) Methodological cosmopolitanism is defined in the methodology section (Chapter 2.2).
Yet, cosmopolitan identity is emerging and offering an alternate discourse on issues of belonging, inclusion and the ‘Other’. Cosmopolitans can be ‘elite’ or working-class, but centrally they envisage universal and humanist ideals. The cosmopolitan identity is fluid and flexible, a ‘blended selfhood’ that engages with diversity and includes the ‘Other’. Cosmopolitans do not necessarily seek to abolish national identity, as it can become a part of their ‘blended selfhood’, but they do present a challenge to the ubiquity of national identity.

Various aspects of cosmopolitanism contrast, or perhaps contradict, nationalism. Where national identity is constructed to solidify the in-group and maintain borders, cosmopolitans practice openness. Geopolitical cosmopolitanism challenges national sovereignty. The fluidity and hybridity of cosmopolitans may be understood as disloyalty to the nationalist. In contrast, theorists employing a methodologically cosmopolitan frame see no contradiction in cosmopolitan and national identities. The two can co-exist as nationalism focuses on the local, bounded, community of meaning, and the cosmopolitan provides the ethical frame for Universalist values.

Whether nationalism and cosmopolitanism conflict or coexist is a core question in this thesis. Understandably the literature offers an array of perspectives, because the answer must be context specific. While we do not understand nations as containers of people’s lives, they remain a widespread, pervasive influence, informing everything from healthcare to civil rights, justice systems to banking regulators, media communication to trade agreements. As Pichler (2012: 22) notes, “different economic, cultural and social contexts...lead to different realizations of cosmopolitanism”. Additionally, the increase in global relations does not necessitate that all individuals will develop cosmopolitan identities, as Beck (2002: 29) notes, “the fundamental fact that the experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with national space, but is being subtly altered by the opening to cosmopolitanisation should not deceive anyone into believing we are all going to become cosmopolitans”. As such, it is within the (still) pervasive frame of the nation-state that a full understanding can be reached of how nationalism and cosmopolitan relate to each.

Two studies (done in England and Germany) highlight the context specific nature of national and cosmopolitan identities. Skey (2015) explores the interaction of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in Britain by analysing the media response to the
appointment of three coaches - two foreign and one English - to football (soccer) teams. In this context he notes that the nation retains a central role in framing the appointments (the British coach, whilst perhaps less qualified, is hailed because of his Britishness). Additionally a mediated form of cosmopolitanism is emerging (in that merit is esteemed more highly than nationality) but essentially this makes acceptance of non-nationals conditional on their worth to the nation.

In Germany Mau et al. (2008) looked at the impact of transnational relationships on cosmopolitan and national identities. Undertaking quantitative research with a random sample of German citizens over 16 years old, they asked about their involvement in transnational interaction and their attitudes towards global political responsibility and foreigners. Mau et al. (2008) found that German citizens who were more involved in transnational encounters are more likely to subscribe to a notion of global citizenship (through global accountability) and show more openness to the foreign ‘Other’. However, the dissemination of human rights to all people living in Germany (not just citizens) was not affected by transnational interactions, but by education. As such in Germany a cosmopolitan attitude toward the external ‘Other’ appears to be gained through cross boundary interactions and relationships, however the internal ‘Other’ remains outside the boundaries of cosmopolitan values until education is provided.

These two studies show that there are differences between British and German citizens in the way they interact with the influence of foreigners and the effect this has on the uptake of a cosmopolitan identity. As such, I suggest it remains valid to explore cosmopolitan identity from a national frame, and for this reason the following analysis focuses on the Australian context.

1.7 Australia: the state of nationalism and cosmopolitanism in context

The following section provides a broad analysis of Australian culture\textsuperscript{8} and theories of Australianness, to paint a picture of the current social and geopolitical context, and explore how the aforementioned aspects of national and cosmopolitan identities are embodied in Australia.

\textsuperscript{8} Chapter 3 of this thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of empirical research on Australian national identity and the limited research on cosmopolitan identity in Australia, over the last 15 years.
1.7.1 Origin Myths

Mewett (1999) contends that myths of Australianness, which function to unify its inhabitants, were born from a need to differentiate from ‘Mother England’ and ‘cut the apron strings’ as it were. Unlike the British imperialist class systems, Australia was ostensibly constructed as an egalitarian society. This was partly the result of perceptions that the petty crimes the first convicts were convicted of were more indicative of the British class system than their own criminality (Hearn, 2007). Meritocracy and egalitarianism are seen as fundamentally Australian, contrasting with British class structures and elitism; this is born out in myths of mateship, the ‘fair go’ and larrkinism, not directly perceptions of the Australian character. In another context, Australianness is embodied in sporty physiques and a fitness culture, in contrast with British ill-health caused by industrialisation and urbanisation (although, of course Australia was, and is, highly urbanised as well, but the cities were significantly less developed). The strong bushman working on the ‘hard land’ contrasted with the softness of British rural life. Essentially, many of the foundational myths of Australianness were constructed to contrast with Britishness (Mewett, 1999).

At the same time, and somewhat ironically, whiteness and the Anglo ideal have been mythologised and legally enshrined to ensure they remained central to Australianness. Australia’s first act of government as a newly formed nation was to establish exclusionary policies to retain the racially Anglo ideal (Castles, Foster, Iredale, & Withers, 1998). Australia strove to preserve the British race, perhaps more stringently than Britain itself, to which ‘brown’ and ‘black’ people from their colonies migrated (freely or by force), while the White Australia Policy still excluded non-whites from Australia.

From these colonial and post-colonial eras, Australian mythology and legend was born, perhaps most notably the ‘fair go’ and myths of mateship, ANZACs and bushrangers. Australia was “to be a place which aspired, if not to equality, then a more limited promise of equity – equal chances for all to share in its material benefits” (Kalantzis, 2005: 178), although from the beginning, it has been argued, the ‘fair go’ was “limited to the fair-skinned descendants of migrants from the British Isles”. (Kalantzis, 2005: 7).

Mateship, Joppke (2013: 7) notes, “stems from the convict and working-class background of Australia’s first European settlers”. Significant influences on the
construction of Australian identity from the colonial and post-colonial era include ANZACs and bushrangers (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Fozdar & Spittles, 2014; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007; 2008; 2010). ANZACs are “allegedly ill-disciplined bushmen...transformed through the sacrifices of war into pioneer-soldiers” (Tranter & Donoghue, 2007: 166) and bushrangers draw on Anglo-celtic myths of the working class, anti-authoritarian rebel and hero (Tranter & Donoghue, 2008). As Wesley (2000: 178) noted “the popularity of Ned Kelly [Australia’s most famous bushranger] lay in his rebellion against unequally distributed property and authority [and] the emotion summoned by the ANZAC landings at Gallipoli was prompted by undertones of sacrifice for the community and of solidarity with comrades”.

Essentially, the Australian nation-state has been built on myths of distinction from Mother England – mateship, a ‘fair go’, and egalitarianism – while at the same time embracing aspects of the rebellious convict heritage through bushranger myths. Throughout, whiteness prevailed as the standard of Australian cultural competence and belonging.

1.7.2 Modern trends

From Federation in 1901 until 1973, Australia instituted racially- and linguistically-based immigration policies, trying to deter all non-British, non-English speaking, and non-white migrants from entering the country through the primarily race-based White Australia Policy (Jupp, 2002; Burnley, 2001). Since then, immigration policies became ostensibly based on civic values rather than race, religion, colour or creed (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2007), and the government instituted a multicultural framework for dealing with issues of immigration and diversity. This was initially seen as a social justice initiative, providing rights to maintain cultural identity, social acceptance and economic opportunity (Koleth, 2010).

The reality that Australia is multicultural is reflected in the 2011 census; 75% of respondents claimed a non-Australian ancestry, with almost half (43%) having at least one parent born overseas, and 28% born elsewhere themselves and representing over 200 countries of origin (ABS, 2015a; NSW Government, 2013). And, while historically

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9 ‘Anzac’ is an acronym for Australia and New Zealand Army Corp. While all military personnel from these countries are technically Anzacs, it is generally used to refers to World War 1 soldiers who have become mythologised for their anti-authoritarian exploits, ‘mateship’ and their role in forging an internationally recognised identity for a ‘new’ nation.
Britain has been the principle country of origin for permanent migrants, suggesting migrants may be predominantly white, this shifted in 2010/11 to China, and this trend has continued (J. Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2014).

While Australian is becoming increasingly diverse, the government appears to be moving away from a multicultural identity. The meaning of multiculturalism altered under the leadership of PM John Howard (1997-2006). As the word ‘multicultural’ was removed from government department titles (Koleth, 2010), so the administration promoted a national identity based around ‘middle Australia’, that valued Anglo-Australian history and legend, Anglo-Celtic norms, mateship and individualism (Brett, 2005; Dyrenfurth, 2007; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Goot & Watson, 2005; Johnson, 2007; Tate, 2009), and re-affirmed Australia’s ongoing relationship with Britain, asserting that “our cultural identity is very heavily Anglo-Saxon” (Howard 2006a, cited in Johnson, 2007: 197). This shifted the meaning of multicultural from ‘Others’ standing beside ‘Others’, to a multiculturalism where Anglo-Australians stand above the migrant ‘Others’. Essentially, multicultural came to mean non-white, and during the Howard years white Australians were put back into the seat of cultural power; Hage (1998: 68) suggests such practices “reveal images...of an ideal, to-be-achieved national order” in which white Australians live a fantasy of mastery over the national space.

Numerous academics argue that under Howard, Australian identity regressed to a dominant Anglo-Celtic ideal and demanded assimilation of the ‘Other’ (Crabb, 2008; Dyrenfurth, 2007; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Holland, 2010; Robbins, 2007; Tate, 2009; Warhurst, 2007). While immigration is no longer racially determined in Australia, the imbrication of white cultural identity with a civic national identity complicates matters for those who do not meet the ideal (Fozdar & Low, 2015; Hage, 1998; 2006; Johnson, 2007). Essentially a ‘citizenship as identity’ (Joppke, 200: 38), which requires the ability to adapt or assimilate to cultural norms that in-group members are thought to possess, is demanded of migrants to Australia (Suvarierol, 2012).

This Anglo version of Australianness that has become more prevalent in the last two decades shows striking similarities with the ‘new nationalism’ (Kaldor, 2004; Suvarierol, 2012). Australianness has been constructed to exclude the un-national that dwells within the territorial boundaries. In early 2015, furore surrounded PM Abbott’s decision to give a knighthood (something he reinstated in 2014 to take place on Australia’s national holiday, Australia Day (Knott, 2015)) to the Duke of Edinburgh,
Prince Phillip, the Queen’s husband. Clearly the British, Anglo ideal was being promoted, as Federal Opposition Leader Bill Shorten poignantly remarked, “[o]n Australia Day, we’re talking about Australia, Australian identity, the government’s managed to find a British royal to give a medal to, a knighthood to” (Skynews, 2015). The entertainment industry followed the Prime Minister’s lead by entering an Australian act in the Eurovision Song Contest, “one of the most typical European traditions”, and sending Australian singer Jessica Mauboy to perform an interval act ‘Sea of Flags’, which began with a video that showed the map of Australia being airlifted and dropped on top of the map of the UK to signify Australia’s legitimate place in Eurovision (Eurovision, 2015).

Perhaps of more significance is the move toward anti-terrorist legislation that sees citizenship as dependent on behaviour. At a cost of $630 million to the Australian government, new counter terrorism measures were announced in August 2014, which enforced harsher restrictions and offered less transparency to the populace. This was necessary, PM Abbott claimed, in the face of a “terrorist threat here in this country [that] has not changed. Nevertheless, it is as high as it has ever been” (Abbott, Bishop, & Brandis, 2014). Discourse over the following weeks continued around constructing a threatening ‘Other’ – Australians being radicalised whilst fighting wars in the Middle East (Rajca, 2014), and “young Australians being radicalised and leaving Australia to join extremists overseas”(Abbott & Brandis, 2014a). Emerging political discourse seems to be taking these security measures to the next level, as the government is currently considering revoking the Australian citizenship of dual nationals who are thought to be involved in terrorist activity, even if no criminal conviction has been made (Hurst, 2015). Such laws place a premium on Australian citizenship, demonstrate the fuzziness of civic national identities (Hall, 2002), and provide evidence that Agamben’s ‘state of exception’, already applied to those seeking Australia’s asylum, may be applied to those already within the nation but deemed unworthy (Agamben, 2005).

These have been paralleled by numerous ‘acts of collective remembrance’ (Wellings, 2014) that have re-emerged and taken salient positions in the construction of the nation. Australia Day became a national public holiday in 1994, and has “become a day of significant nationalist sentiment...[and] expression of popular nationalism” (Fozdar et al., 2014: 2/3). Fozdar and Austin (forthcoming) found that as a
result of increased flag-waving and shows of nationalist behaviour on Australia Day, some migrants felt threatened and unwelcome. Anzac Day has similarly re-emerged; under the Prime Ministership of John Howard (1996-2007) “Anzac and Australian military heritage came to occupy centre stage in prime ministerial efforts to tell Australians who they really were” (Bongiorno, 2014: 83). As 2015 marks the centenary of the ‘nation forging’ Gallipoli campaign, commemorations and celebrations abounded, culminating in the April 25th Anzac Day dawn service held on the Turkish beaches where the campaign took place. At this service, PM Abbott re-emphasised the significance of Anzac Day as a day that shows, “[o]ur nation is not just a place on a map, or a mass of people who happen to live somewhere. Our nation is shaped by our collective memory, by the compact between the dead, the living and the yet to be born” (Law, Carlyon, & Mrianda, 2015). It is difficult to see how half the population who are themselves, or have one parent who is, a migrant, fit into this conception of national identity.

Anzac soldiers have been mythologised as heroes, mates, ‘down to earth’, ill-disciplined, and “willing to risk life and limb in the service of the newly formed Federation and allegedly survived due to their bush skills, daring and cunning.” (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013: 2). Thus, the Anzac legend was born.

The sacred place of this legend was made clear when an SBS sports journalist ‘tweeted’ comments that challenged the Anzac myth. His comments concerned Australia’s role as invaders of Turkey in WWI; the inappropriate behaviour of Anzac soldiers in Egypt, Palestine and Japan; Australia’s role in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; and the largely ‘white’ and alcohol fuelled contemporary Anzac Day celebrations (Bacon, 2015; Meade, 2015). He received a damning response, including a rebuke from the Federal Communications Minister, and ultimately the loss of his job. Critiquing the Anzac legend appears to be a taboo, perhaps because it challenges a core construct of Australianness.

The construction of Australianness around the Anglo ideal of colonial or post-colonial myths shows a deliberate emphasis on ‘freezing’ this version of Australianness. According to Bongiorno (2014), numerous other constructions of Australianness are available. The 1960’s and 70’s saw Australianness connected with creative achievement, as well as hopes of improved Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations, either through apology, treaty or reconciliation. The 1970s to the 1990s...
celebrated multiculturalism as a way of expressing Australianness, and inscribed multicultural values in public policy and education. Republicanism was also briefly considered in the late 1990s. Thus the tendency of political elites to propagate the white Australian ideal and Anzac myths, and relegate other forms of Australianness to the margins, signals the deliberately ‘frozen’ nature of this Australianness (Suvarierol, 2012). Through myth and legend the nation remains commemorated as a homogenous (principally white and male) collective (Wellings, 2014).

For social scientists, the task of understanding and explaining the complexities of Australianness has resulted in a general trend towards (sometimes simplistic) categorisation, to enable analysis and provide comprehensible information. The next section considers these categories.

1.7.3 Civic verses ethno-nationalism

Dichotomising civic and ethno-nationalist versions of Australian identity is fairly entrenched in the social science literature (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). Ethno-nationalists (variously termed nativist, dogmatic or literal nativist, etc.) constitute about a quarter of the population (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000) and tend to have ‘traditional’, exclusionary views, about what it means to be Australian, valuing: native birth, national pride, the ANZACs, Christian heritage, patriarchy, and boundary maintenance, and they tend to be anti-immigration (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007).

Civic identity (variously termed civic nationalist, moderate pluralist, and so on) is generally more prevalent than ethno identity (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000), and Australia has the second highest level of civic identity of the 24 nations involved in the ISSP95 (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). This orientation includes attitudes of inclusivity, low levels of national pride, belief in boundary permeability, and valuing of a felt sense of Australianness (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). Civic nationalists are more likely to espouse republican and pro-immigration views, be younger, less religious, more highly educated, and use ‘high-brow’ media (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). Civic nationalists generally view the nation as inclusive and open (Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006), yet even these ‘progressive’ civic views of
Australianness are not without cultural elements. Civic nationalism often demands cultural assimilation of migrants in order that they may partake in the political community (Fozdar & Low, 2015; Spencer & Wollman, 1998).

The civic/ethno dichotomy is also reflected in public discourse. In the 1990s Pauline Hanson entered public life as a conservative politician, and became renowned for anti-migrant views and claims that ‘ordinary Australians’ (aka middle and working class white Australians) were experiencing ‘reverse racism’. Unsurprisingly, her supporter base aligned demographically with ethno-nationalists, being middle-aged or older, blue-collar workers, of Anglo-Celtic background and lower levels of education (Salisbury, 2010). While often attacking “Aborigines, Asians or people of any particular colour, race or creed’ she identified the actual enemy as ‘cosmopolitan elites’ (Hanson, cited in Wellings, 2014: 52). For her supporter base, it seems likely that ‘cosmopolitan’ would be understood as people with ‘progressive’ or liberal views, more than global citizens; thus Hanson’s comments promote this divide between the working class ethno-nationalist and the ‘elite’ and ‘progressive’ civic Australianness.

There is some research that moves beyond this dichotomy and encompasses elements of both culture and politics, emotions and reason, civic and ethno-nationalist/nativist values (Fozdar & Low, 2015; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Johnson, 2007). Hage (1998), for instance, agrees that there is a politically-constructed Australian identity into which all are welcomed, equal and given a ‘fair go’ (civic). However this competes with a practical national identity in which authentic Australianness necessitates compliance with nativist cultural ideals such as ‘whiteness’ (and degrees there of) and native birth (ethno-nativist). Betts and Birrell (2007) see value in combining civic and ethno-nationalist constructions of national identity, as this provides familial connections and a sense of belonging, and builds patriotism within the nation. Fozdar and Spittles (2010: 140) found the two aspects were imbricated on the DIAC (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, now Immigration and Border Control) website, which clearly stated “that immigrant citizens ultimately adopt an Australian identity, with elements of both cultural and civic identification”.

This research shows that there is some progress beyond the simplistic categories of ethno-nationalist and civic Australianness. In the next section I explore the presence of identities in Australia beyond these nation-focused categories.
1.7.4 Cosmopolitanism in Australia

The rise and role of cosmopolitanism in Australia has been the subject of some research. Particularly in the more recent literature, global citizenship and cosmopolitanism have become common subjects of analysis (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; T. Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). For example Woodward et al. (2008) looked at the strength of cosmopolitan values in Australia, the consistency and coherence of cosmopolitan characteristics, and the relationship of cosmopolitanism with nationalism. Skrbis and Woodward (2007) used qualitative methods to look at national identity and ‘ordinary cosmopolitanism’ (Lamont and Aksartova, 2002) amongst seventy-six focus group participants from Queensland. From these studies a number of observations have been made about the demographic correlates of cosmopolitan identity (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; T. Phillips & Smith, 2008; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). In this section I look at the findings pertaining to views about cosmopolitanism and its uptake amongst ‘ordinary Australians’.

Brett and Moran (2011) claim that in Australian literature there is a sharp contrast constructed between the elite, cosmopolitan futurists and backward looking, parochial nationalists. However, there may be a more fuzzy reality. A prominent perspective seems to be that ‘global citizenship’ and Australianness are not antithetical. One reason for this is the high mobility and connectivity of Australians. Australians are now highly mobile, with statistics showing that 8.2 million (approximately 30%) Australian residents travelled overseas in 2012 (ABS, 2013). This suggests the widespread applicability of an elitist cosmopolitanism within Australia. Additionally mobility is not limited to the movement of physical bodies anymore as the Internet reaches globally, unrestrained by linguistic and geographic boundaries. It provides global communication, which, combined with new mobile gadgetry, provides 24/7 access to connect globally (Castells, 2004; Hills, 2009). In Australia, studies show that three quarters of the population have home Internet access (Newman, Biedrzycki, & Baum, 2012) and so there are numerous opportunities for global connections.

Another reason for the possibility of an Australian cosmopolitanness, the argument goes, is that the egalitarian and multicultural values that prevail in Australia enable a more cosmopolitan perspective. Stokes (2008: 1) claims that Australians who
attempt to “enlarge Australian notions of political identity beyond the national...are not ‘rootless cosmopolitans’...but strongly grounded in Australian society”. A version of Australianness that recognises its fluid and constructed nature, and values its characteristics of multiculturalism, generosity and acceptance, is seen to serve as a basis for arguments for inclusivity (Brett & Moran, 2011). Such perspectives would argue that the institutionalisation of multicultural policy in Australia has perhaps enabled such an inclusive Australianness (F. L. Jones, 2000), where Australians value a civic form of nationalism that prioritises rights and responsibilities, inclusivity, freedom of choice, boundary permeability and a sense of belonging, over shared ancestry and culture (Johanson & Glow, 2009; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006).

Whether these claims of an inclusive Australianness equate to cosmopolitanism is unclear. On the one hand banal cosmopolitanism is manifest in expressions of inclusivity and openness between locally bounded people (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002). The suggestion is that Australians are engaging with difference and openness, and so presumably they embody some aspects of cosmopolitanism. Yet (Beck, 2000a: 97/98) argues:

> It is certainly not useful to talk about a cosmopolitan society if the process of cosmopolitanization has begun and is continuing exclusively on an objective level, but is at the same time being (actively) masked by a dominant national project and a national self definition of society – in the political parties, in the government, in the media and in educational system. It follows that it is only meaningful to talk of cosmopolitanization once this process is not only objectively indicated but is also reflexively known, commented on and institutionalized.

Here, Beck discredits the notion of a cosmopolitan society that is unaware, in which the elite continue to engage with a global society primarily in terms of the nation. (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002) work did not address the crediting of Universalist values to national identity, and so it is unclear whether they would deem this banal cosmopolitanism. With this in mind, I have incorporated an analysis and critique of the discourses and societal definitions that are being put forward by Australia’s elite to see if a reflexive cosmopolitan perspective is emerging.
1.8 Thesis question

Nations are constituted largely...by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims [boundaries, sovereignty, history, culture, territorial rights] to produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and practices (Calhoun, 1997: 5). The discourse that surrounds the nation - its public production and perpetuity - is formative in constructing a sense of ‘who we are’. This introduction has focused on aspects of both national and cosmopolitan identity at the broad, theoretical level, and used this to paint a picture of the current Australian context. Yet the picture remains somewhat like an Impressionist painting, in which clear figures and shapes are hard to identify due to softened edges and short, thick brushstrokes. Thus, a number of questions remain unanswered.

What is Australia identity and what does it mean to people now?

How are cosmopolitanism and nationalism interacting in constructions of the Australian identity?

Does Australianness allow space for cosmopolitanism or is it seen as a threatening ‘Other’?

How are elite political and media voices representing Australianness?

Does Australia engage with the ‘Other’ with cosmopolitan openness or ethno-nationalist fear?

These are the questions that steer this thesis and are considered through a different lens in each chapter.

1.9 Thesis Outline

The principle work of this thesis is to explore the framing of national identity in Australia. As such, Chapter Three through Seven present five papers that are published or under review: two that look at ‘ordinary Australians’ views about national identity and three that consider the framing of Australianness in the public sphere. Chapter Eight undertakes a discussion of the findings from these papers and offers some conclusions and suggestions for future research. To commence, Chapter Two explores methodology.
While there is consistency in the epistemological and ontological approach throughout this thesis (i.e. Critical Realism), a mix of methods is used to best reflect the different subjects of analysis. To begin with, methodological nationalism and methodological cosmopolitanism are outlined. This is followed by an explanation of Critical Realism after which, thematic analysis and frame analysis are described, which constitute the two primary methods used. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that is used to inform the practice of rich textual analysis.

Chapter Three (Paper One), entitled ‘Australian National Identity: Empirical Research since 1998’, is essentially the literature review, and offers a summary and analysis of empirical research on Australian identity since 1998. In 1998, Tim Phillips undertook a meta-analysis to synthesise findings of research on Australian identity. He found Australia is a significant source of identity for most Australians, that analyses frame Australianness as either civic or ethno-nationalist, and age, education, socioeconomic status and political persuasion are often correlates. Our study seeks to explore the changes, if any, to Australian identity that have come about as a result of the significant shift towards globalisation (terrorism, global warming, web 2.0, increased mobility, and boundary permeability for everything except humans) and concerted political activity around the construction of a particular version of Australian identity (Anglo-centric as opposed to multicultural) since Phillips’ review.

We identified many similarities with Phillips’ findings, and some differences. Some aspects of Australian identity, and the way it is researched, have remained; for example, the civic or ethno-nationalist paradigms continue to be a principle way of delineating Australianness. Yet, there are new, less dichotomous constructions being explored; and while traditional socio-political correlates remain significant, these are now imbricated with more progressive values. Key differences arise from the increased diversity of who is seen as Australian, as well as the impact of globalisation and a shift, for some, towards a more cosmopolitan identity.

This research grounds the other papers. By knowing how Australianness is currently understood and explained within the social sciences, and how it is experienced and expressed across the population, we are better able to see the frames that are used by the ‘elite’, recognise ‘stock frames’, and contextualise findings within a broader context.
It also, in part, offers a response to critics who rightly observe that much national identity research fails to explore the views of ‘ordinary’ people (Hobsbawm, 1992; Mewett, 1999). Paper One attempts to fully explore the expanse of research into Australian identity with ‘ordinary Australians’ that has been done. Often a distinction is drawn between the views of the public and those of the ‘elite’; fundamentally, this is a crude distinction, as it fails to appreciate the reciprocal processes of collective identity construction and (re)construction that take place (see De Cillia et al., 1999). As Jonathan Hearn (cited in Wellings, 2014: 48) notes:

What is at stake [in contemporary nationalism] is contending visions of how a population within a given territory should be governed, and such visions are normally underwritten by a certain conception of the population’s common identity, embodied in shared beliefs and values […] The state must continually reach down into this process of contentious national identity-building in order to renew its legitimacy.

As such, the ‘elite’ public voices that are constructing Australianness are doing so in response to the ‘shared beliefs and values’ of the populous. Thus, it is important to study both ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ voices involved in national identity construction.

While national identity construction is a reciprocal process between the ‘elite’ and the ‘ordinary’, the political climate of a nation can impact how united the two groups’ perspectives are likely to be. The current political climate in Australia is one of considerable unrest, and many ordinary Australians are expressing disappointment in the government. In 2010 and 2013, the Labor government (slightly left leaning, similar to the US Democrats or British Labor Parties), experienced leadership spills that revealed significant disunity within the party and instilled uncertainty amongst their supporters. Since the Liberal Party (right leaning) took power in 2013, under the leadership of Tony Abbott, a number of controversial policies have caused unrest. Proposed cuts to healthcare, including the $7 co-payment for general practitioner visits, would effectively begin the destruction of free healthcare for poorer Australians. Inhumane treatment of asylum seekers, which has received international condemnation (Gordon, 2015); an attempt to change racial vilification laws so that

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10 This proposal was rejected, but still caused a great deal of concern amongst the population.
Australians have “the right to be a bigot”\textsuperscript{11} (Aston & Massola, 2014); and anti-terrorist legislation at a cost of $64 million to “lessen the terrorist threat at home and abroad” (Abbott & Brandis, 2014a); and current debates about whether to give power to the immigration minister to strip \textit{alleged} terrorists of Australian citizenship (Norman, 2015) are among the initiatives that have caused considerable public debate.

The public response to these policies and actions varies. Some sectors of Australian society received the government’s actions and apparent lack of integrity poorly; more ‘progressive’ groups – academics, justice activists, inner city dwellers, and the left-leaning crowd - have spoken up about the injustice, ‘regressive’ policies, and embarrassing state of Australian politics (Aly, 2015). Others have been emboldened by the government’s actions to voice their own conservative views. ‘Reclaim Australia’\textsuperscript{12}, for example, has re-emerged, claiming unjust treatment of the white majority as a result (primarily) of Muslims coming to Australia. As stated on their website:

If I say I love Australia and Australian values I am now labelled a “racist”.
If I criticise Islam I am labelled both a “racist” and a “bigot”.
Since when did speaking the truth about an ideology or practice become illegal in Australia. When did we agree to stop calling a spade—“a spade”? 
(Reclaim Australia, 2015)

Essentially, the current state of affairs in Australia is one of division – between the ‘elite’ and the ‘ordinary’, as well as division amongst the elite, and between the ‘progressives’ and ‘traditional’ Australians.

The following four papers are positioned to explore these different elite and ordinary voices. The knowledge gained from Paper One is used to ground this research and direct avenues of analysis through themes such as: civic and ethno-nationalism; ‘traditionalism’ and ‘progressiveness’; the impact of globalisation; and cosmopolitan identities. Research into discourse exposes the milieu of contemporary rhetoric (online) and politically contentious issues (asylum seekers; ‘Team Australia’; unAustralian), as well as more cosmopolitan framings of Australianess.

Firstly, Paper Two (Chapter Four) “I googled UnAustralian”: \textit{Analysis of who is using the term in 2013}, delivered at \textit{The Australian Sociological Association Conference} (Melbourne, 2013), includes both the ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ voices of

\textsuperscript{11} As above
\textsuperscript{12} Reclaim Australia are a conservative, right-wing grassroots organisations, self described as patriots. Others have used stronger terms, including racist and ‘neo-Nazis’.
Australians. This paper is a short conference paper that undertakes an exploration of the uses of ‘unAustralian’ online, to interrogate the interactive development of discourse. The paper focuses on issues of identity, exploring who is using ‘unAustralian’ nomenclature and to whom it is applied. Five news articles and associated comments are thematically analysed, exploring the framing of ‘unAustralian’ by the media ‘elite’ and the ‘ordinary’ commenters. This paper bridges the gap between the ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ voices in discourse about Australian identity.

Paper Three (Chapter Five), “The construction of national identity on Australian political parties’ Facebook pages”, gives full attention to the political elite. This paper explores the framing of Australianness by politicians in the online social media forum Facebook (facebook.com). With this new media, political parties have the opportunity to reach a wide range of constituents with direct messages about who is, and who is not, part of the national community. Using frame analysis, this paper reports representations of Australian identity in the lead-up to the 2013 election on the Facebook pages of the two major Australian political parties, Liberal and Labor, as well as two minor parties that hold the balance of power – The Australian Greens and Palmer United Party. As such the paper draws attention to the way that contemporary, public forums are being used by the ‘elite’ to promote their message.

Continuing to look at political issues, this time from the perspective of interested and invested pressure groups, Paper Four (Chapter Six), “Framing asylum seekers: the uses of national and cosmopolitan frames in arguments about asylum seekers”, addresses the way that Australianness is used in debates about asylum seekers. Focus is on submissions to an ‘Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers’, convened in 2012 by former PM to provide advice on how to address the increasingly embarrassing issue. This paper is positioned to expose the ways in which identities are framed in relation to the national, regional, and global, to understand how a range of collectives (religious, political, academic, and ethnic organisations) constructs arguments for and against asylum seekers.

Finally, Paper Five (Chapter Seven), “‘Team Australia’: cartoonists challenging exclusionary political discourse”, analyses a response to the 2014 announcement of an increased threat of terrorist activity within Australia. Former PM Tony Abbott called on Australians to rally together as ‘Team Australia’. The public response showed some signs of a rift between ‘elite’ political and ‘ordinary’ Australian voices, with a level of
resistance evident in several quarters. This article focused on the responses from a number of political cartoonists, demonstrating the role they play in constructing and contesting the dominant discourses of political leaders and the mainstream media. Particular attention is given to the way that these cartoons frame ‘Team Australia’ as a challenge to core aspects of Australianness such as mateship, multiculturalism and the ‘fair go’. Frame analysis is used to explore how the cartoons connect with the broader populace and represent, challenge, reconstruct, or rely on implicit and explicit understandings of Australianness.

From these five papers, I hope to offer a sense of how Australianness is represented in the public sphere, thus addressing gaps in the literature that has focused mainly on the views of ‘average Australians’. Paper One provides information about the background and broader societal context. This is then used to inform the analysis in Papers Two to Five, each of which offers a snapshot of how Australianness is being framed in the public sphere. At the same time, there is a thread running through each paper that explores the presence of more global, cosmopolitan framings, to see how these are interacting with, or contradicting contemporary discourses around what it means to be Australian.

1.10 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has explored the literature on national and cosmopolitan identity, and attempted to highlight some of the issues that are currently informing debate around whether the two are exclusive or can co-exist. Finally, I have outlined each of the original papers that constitute the core of this thesis (Chapters Three to Seven). Chapter Eight presents conclusions of my analysis.
Chapter Two. Methodology

2.1 Introduction

A broad methodological approach has been taken for this thesis that ensures a meaningful, rich foundation to the research. As this thesis includes five separate papers there is some variation in the method used in each of them, however general consistency is maintained regarding theoretical perspective - that is, the master theories that guide research (epistemology and ontology). Below is a summary of the epistemological and ontological approach, which relies primarily on Critical Realism. An outline of the methodologies used follows – firstly Thematic Analysis, and secondly Frame Analysis. Finally, I include a brief discussion on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA); while CDA was not directly applied in analysis, it was heavily relied on to inform an understanding of rich textual analysis.

To commence, methodological cosmopolitanism is explored, which establishes an overarching guide for this thesis.

2.2 Methodological nationalism and methodological cosmopolitanism

Sociological research has been founded on the nation-state and national identity, as people have been viewed as primarily ‘nationals’ (Beck, 2006; S. Berger, 2009b; Gellner, 1983). This is because sociology began as a discipline at the same time as the rise of industrialisation and the creation of the modern nation-state; as such, nations have been understood as basic organisational structures of society (McCrone, 1998). Most powerfully, this is seen in the works of Ernest Gellner, who argues that the impersonalisation and mechanisation of modernity necessitated congruence between nation (cultural) and state (political). Uniformity of education and language are required, he argues, so that people working at the same machine, undertaking different roles, can achieve aggregate goals (such as Ford’s construction line) (Gellner, 1983). Without common language the production line workers would be unable to communicate to create products for the company, and at a broader level, for the nation. While a cultural nation (similar to tribe or ethnic group) has language as a foundational element, a political nation-state must manufacture this common language so that aggregate goals can be achieved.
However, critics have highlighted that this perspective is highly functionalist, assumes a teleological link between the nation and modernity, and views the modern nation as a cohesive, well-honed organism (McCrone, 1998). This basic paradigmatic assumption has been termed ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck, 1992; Chernilo, 2007; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003), which is the “all-pervasive equation between the idea of society and the formation of the nation-state in modernity” (Chernilo, 2007: 1). Methodological nationalism essentialises the nation-state as the ‘container’ of people’s lived experience (Giddens, 1994), and fails to recognise the origins of power in collective identities, shared language and group norms (Calhoun, 1997: 87).

Yet Beck argues that social scientists “misunderstand the realities and dynamics of a globalized world. In order to do their job, they have to overcome methodological nationalism and develop a methodological cosmopolitanism” (Beck, 2009: 12). Rather than seeing people as contained by nations, methodological cosmopolitanism calls for a paradigmatic shift to explain and explore people’s globally-connected realities. Maintaining cosmopolitanism as a mere ideal and nationalism as the reality fails to truly represent the twenty-first century world, which “has become cosmopolitical to the core.” (Beck, 2009: 12).

Methodological cosmopolitan, its proponents argue, is required so that the “research agenda and conceptual tools...can match the ways in which the social world itself is being transformed” (Chernilo, 2007: 15). Rather than existing in national containers, the forces of globalisation have transformed society, transmuting the socio-economic, political, legal and cultural aspects of lived experience from national to global.

The world society which, in the wake of globalisation, has taken shape in many (not only economic) dimensions is undermining the importance of the national state, because a multiplicity of social circles, communication networks, market relations and lifestyles, none of them specific to any particular locality, now cut across the boundaries of the national state (Beck, 2000c: 4).

These forces have resulted in an increase of sub- and supra- forms of identification (Hall, 1999), as supra-national economic, political, legal and social forces pose a threat to national sovereignty and its associated collective identity (Isin & Wood, 1999). Some theorists argue that nations are being marginalised and will
progressively lose relevance and power, giving way to global forms of governance (Held, Habermas, Beck, Nussbaum), as has been the hope and expectation of liberal theorists since the nineteenth century (A. D. Smith, 1991). In this sense, methodological cosmopolitanism assumes the emergence of a new collective identity that emerges from these post-national structures and norms. As Skrbis, Kendall, and Woodward, 2004: 117) suggest, “the idea of kosmopolites, the citizen of the cosmos...has existed for more than two millennia, but it has never seemed so real and tangible to so many people as it does today”.

What methodological cosmopolitanism offers, then, is a way of seeing and analysing the everyday lives of those who transcend national boundaries, and a way of recognising the effects of globalisation at multiple levels of society, including on collective identity. Rather than oppositional, these new identities – cosmopolitan identities – maintain a both/and understanding in which multiple notions of self co-exist, rather than compete.

Methodological cosmopolitanism provides an analytical framework that allows multiple, coexisting identities; as such, applying it to this research enables the exploration of various frames of Australianness, as well as cosmopolitan identities. Rather than assuming dichotomous identities, it is possible to recognise multiple, complex interactions between, and expressions of, Australian identity. Australianness can be framed according to complex interactions, or even what may appear to be contradictory frames, such as a civic and ethno-nationalism; national and regional focused; or cosmopolitan Australians. By using a methodologically cosmopolitan approach, this thesis is able to explore competing frames of identity within Australia and provide ‘rich’ information about contemporary frames of Australianness in the public sphere.

2.3 Ontology and epistemology

As is the case in much research, the process of exploring and defining ontology, epistemology, theoretical perspective and methodology in the current research was recursive (Crotty, 1998). Theory and methodology were developed through areas of interest, informed by philosophical assumptions, and combined with practical limitations, supervisory guidance, contemporary political discourse, and interdisciplinary reading. This resulted in the current research being informed by
Bhaskar’s theory of Critical Realism (1979). This theory can be applied to the social sciences to provide a perspective of ontological realism that retains epistemological relativism (Danermark, Mats, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002).

Ontological realism assumes the existence of an external world independent of individual human consciousness. This external reality is structured, stratified and ordered along multiple dimensions. Reality is delineated into three levels: real, actual and empirical.

The real is the foundational level, beyond direct experience, which...may or may not be actualised as empirically-accessible ‘events’. The actual is the level in which some of those real powers are actualised as events. The empirical is the level at which these events are experienced. Thus there is a gap between the whole of reality and what is experienceable. (Dean, Joseph, & Norrie, 2005: 8)

The understanding of epistemological relativism fills this ‘gap’. The ‘critical’ in Critical Realism recognises the subjective nature of knowledge and hence knowledge of reality is necessarily limited by individual perspective (Bhaskar, 2007).

The ontological aspect of Critical Realism differs significantly from constructivism or interpretivism, which are dominant in the social sciences. Classically, these perspectives propose reality is the construct of individuals and societies, and is non-existent beyond language and consciousness (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995; Racher & Robinson, 2003). Critical Realism aligns ontology and epistemology by acknowledging the subjective nature of knowledge. A constructivist perspective argues that knowledge does not exist beyond the consciousness and hence is in essence, subjective. Critical Realism claims knowledge and reality exist beyond consciousness and language, but are necessarily limited and mediated by individual understanding. Hence "when we attempt to understand the world we do not access it ‘as it is’, but rather, ‘as it is to us’."(Barnacle, 2001: 11).

These different positions offer different approaches to research methods. The function of methods for the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm is to create knowledge and meaning through the process of research (Rorty, 1979; Racher & Robinson, 2003). Gergen (1994, cited in Kvale & Brinkman, 2009: x) argues “constructionism replaces the individual with the relationship as the locus of knowledge”; it is the interaction, rather than the information, that is the focus. Critical
Realism assumes the function of research is to understand others’ perspectives of the external world, with the *a priori* assumption that everyone’s perspective is necessarily limited. Hence it is the meaning that individuals give to the experience of reality, contextualised within society, and limited by reality, that is the focus (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Arguably, this position privileges the opinion of the subject above the research more highly than constructivism does. Since reality exists beyond individual knowledge or experience, differing interpretations of this reality are described and explained as something of intrinsic value. Such interpretation can then reveal commonality of experiences (Racher & Robinson, 2003) and enable productive outcomes including policy recommendations. Conversely, the constructivist *a priori* assumption fundamentally devalues knowledge in that it is seen as being of very limited value beyond the subject (Parker, 1999). This severely limits the utility of any knowledge gained.

Historically, positivism or realism has been a theoretical underpinning of empirical methodologies. However a fundamental error that has pervaded this application is the reduction of reality to merely sensual perception (Danermark, Mats, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002) and the assumption that said perceptions are universal and undisputable (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995). Relativist perspectives, including social constructionism, arose to correct this error, arguing that reality is constructed through discursive interactions with others (Parker, 1999).

In their classic paper ‘Death and furniture’, Edwards, Ashmore & Potter (1995) point out that many realists base their argumentation in so called ‘bed rock’ notions of reality – factors that are ‘indisputably’ real. Firstly death, which comes to all of us and *should* not be seen as constructed, particularly in instances of murder, genocide and the like; and secondly furniture (rhetorically enacted in table-thumping) which *can* not be disputed because of its solid, physical reality. Yet the table, when viewed by a physicist, may be seen as nothing more than (non-solid) particles, so the argument goes, thus it is not ‘real’ at all. Essentially, these ‘bed rock’ arguments for realism “are inevitably semiotically mediated and communicated” (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995: 27).

These scholars see these arguments as sufficient evidence that “relativism is social science *par excellence*” (1995: 42), and that all forms of realist research require
rationalisation to overcome the cognitive dissonance they necessarily create. However, in line with Parker’s (1999) response to Edward et al., I see Critical Realism as a helpful compromise between complete relativism and naïve realism that provides a comprehensive research approach. Critical Realism removes the merely sensual lens from reality (realism), and gives meaning and value to individual interpretations by contextualising them in an actually existing reality while acknowledging the structural factors of history and society (Parker, 1999; Coole, 2005). Parker (1999) argues that relativist research fails to recognise the social context in which it is undertaken (usually elite and Western) and requires a Cartesian approach that separates the individual from their societal context. Critical Realism, however, acknowledges that knowledge of reality is limited (epistemological relativism) and yet maintains that there are ‘really existing’ factors beyond the self that impact upon the individual (ontological realism). Empirical research is then made possible beyond the observable and sensual, to consider the contextualised human experience as it is lived and experienced by individuals.

In this thesis Thematic Analysis was chosen as the empirical research method for Papers One and Two, and Frame Analysis for Papers Three, Four and Five. Thematic Analysis is a fairly ‘common sense’ and widely used method, and I have included a short explanation of its use below. The bulk of the methods section is given to exploring Frame Analysis.

2.4 Thematic Analysis

According to Braun and Clarke (2006: 81) Thematic Analysis is theoretically consistent with the ontological and epistemological perspectives employed as it can “be a ‘contextualist’ method, sitting between the two poles of essentialism and constructionism, and characterized by theories, such as Critical Realism”. This perspective influenced the process of thematic analysis in two significant ways: method of selection and recognition.

Firstly the recognition and selection of themes involves an active selection process. A constructivist perspective would understand themes as emergent from the data alone (Ezzy, 2002); however this fails to acknowledge the active, interpretive role of the researcher, and the existence of an external reality. Using a Critical Realist approach themes are actively selected and interpreted by the researcher as
representative of reality (Braun & Clarke, 2006). As such, themes are identified via both deductive and inductive reasoning, rather than placing a division between the two. Inductive themes arose from the data sets of Papers One and Two; deductive themes were drawn from prior assumptions, research and literature, and included whiteness, exclusivity and inclusivity, globalisation, and origin myths. While some argue that Thematic Analysis should rely on an emergent theory from the data, (Layder, 1998: 51) suggests, “all observations and forms of data-collection are influenced by theory and prior ‘theoretical’ assumptions in some way”.

The process of Thematic Analysis is often paralleled with ‘common sense’ as patterns in the data are selected because of their relevance and interest (King & Horrocks, 2010). However explicit detailing of theme constituents is required. Coding involves revealing common themes that arise across the data set, essentially searching for repetition within the results (Ezzy, 2002). However, repetition alone does not necessarily indicate a theme worth noting, as it needs to be assessed according to quality, not quantity alone. Significance was determined by assessing findings against the broader literature, and themes were selected to elucidate the full breadth of the results and provide a rich picture of the framing of Australianness in the different contexts (King & Horrocks, 2010).

Mapping themes involved open coding, which consisted of three phases: engaging in an initial analysis of the data sets for themes consistent with broader research; combining these with inductive themes derived from the data; and finally undertaking a process of comparison for similarities and differences (Ezzy, 2002). These themes are then clustered together and interpreted in light of the research question.

Essentially, Thematic Analysis provides a method for inductive analysis that bears in mind broader context and theoretical assumptions and allows meaningful themes to be drawn from the research.

2.5 Frame Analysis

Frame Analysis was chosen as an analytical method for Papers Three, Four and Five because it provides useful techniques to look at existing constructions of identity in the public sphere (i.e. looking at stock frames and challenges to stock frames). Instances, episodes, or context have been selected for analysis in which national and
post-national identification become highly relevant in order to explore how
Australianness is framed. While not common, there is some contemporary social
research that supports the application of Frame Analysis within a Critical Realist
paradigm (O’Flynn, Monaghan, & Power, 2014).

Erving Goffman is generally credited with pioneering the Frame Analysis
method (Goffman, 1986) as an analytical tool to understand the ways that people
make sense of their worlds. He suggested that to understand situational reality and
answer the question (asked either explicitly or implicitly) ‘What is going on here?’,
people construct frames – innate, primary frameworks that allow individuals to render
“what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is
meaningful” (Goffman, 1986: 21).

These primary frames are categorised as either physical or social; the former
refers to events that are naturally determined, with no wilful human action or
interferences; the latter, to events that incorporate the “will, aim, and controlling
effort of an intelligence, a live agency...[that] can be coaxed, flattered, affronted, and
threatened, ...[and subject to] social appraisal of his action based on its honesty,
efficiency, economy, safety, elegance, tactfulness, good taste, and so forth.” (Goffman,
1986: 22). For example, the death of an individual occurs in a physical frame; the
media presentation of the death using words like ‘suicide’, ‘celebrity’, and ‘tragic’
provides the social frame.

From these origins, Frame Analysis has become a widely used methodology,
that allows for multiple applications across a range of disciplines (Nesbitt-Larking &
Kinnvall, 2011; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Reddens 2014; Snee, 2013).
Goffman incorporated numerous facets, such as ‘keys and keying’ and ‘design and
fabrication’. These elements have largely been excluded in reiterations of Frame
Analysis, but the principles they suggest – that a frame can be understood through
another frame, a key; and that people can design or fabricate a situation to gain power
and manipulate another’s understanding – have remained.

As well as interdisciplinary variation, Frame Analysis differs in focus, from "the
identification of frames, [to] the conditions that produce frames, [to] how news frames
are activated and interact with readers/viewers...and how frames influence issue
debates” (Redden, 2014: 28). While Frame Analysis is the overarching methodology,
there are quite different emphases and applications contained within it.
Vliegenthart and van Zoonen (2011) offer sharp criticism of this heterogeneity, claiming that it results in the loss of generalisability and comparison. With Van Gorp (2007) they call for a clarification of nomenclature – ‘frames’ for studying personal frameworks are primarily cognitive, and offer tools for people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al., 1986: 464). These are largely innate and unanalysed, and work as frameworks for interpreting and making sense of the world in fairly stable ways (Van Gorp, 2007; Benford & Snow, 2000). ‘Framing’, on the other hand, is the shaping process of discourse and communication and draws from sociology to emphasise processes of social construction that are integral to framing (Price, Nir, & Cappella, 2005; Van Gorp, 2007; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). The latter is the main focus in these papers; namely, looking at how Australianness is framed in different contexts, rather than the cognitive structures that individuals use to make sense of the world.

However, the interactive processes of frames and framing are an essential aspect of Frame Analysis, as the intention of framers is often to change people’s view of the world. Snow et al. (1986) look at this in the process of framing and frame alignment that occur as people participate in movements. They identified four processes used to frame a social movement and encourage participation that highlights the link between frames and framing. Firstly ‘frame bridging’ occurs when there is ideological congruence, but structural non-alignment. People join organisations that work in areas that they have pre-existing sympathies for, but lack access to the infrastructure. So collective action occurs when awareness of the organisation is achieved. ‘Frame amplification’ focuses on making the reason for public concern clear, by highlighting the movement’s values that individuals may align with, and making beliefs – a presumed relationship between two things – stronger. People need to believe in the effectiveness of the action in order to participate. ‘Frame extension’ translates the message of the movement so that it ‘speaks to people’. Sometimes this involves adding new elements or emphasising minor ones. ‘Frame transformation’ shifts the way something is viewed, from undesirable to intolerable and unjust, for example. This can be either domain specific, and seek to alter the status of a group within society, or the perception of a particular issue, or a global interpretive frame, such as altering the primary framework within which a person functions (e.g. converting from Hinduism to Islam).
This highlights the interaction between framing and frames; through bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation, an individual’s frame can be re-constructed to incorporate shared values of a broader social framing.

2.5.1 Frame analysis and culture

From its inception Frame Analysis has also recognised the interaction with and the influence of culture. As Goffman (1986: 27) noted, “the primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture...”. Essentially, frames are drawn from, and in turn inform, cultural norms. Desrosiers (2012: 4) notes that framings are “never produced ex nihilo. Framers have social backgrounds that shape their reasoning and limit their ability to think ‘outside the box’ when developing frames.”. In this sense, even the manipulative work of a framer – by the media or politicians – is subject to cultural norms and values. Frame Analysis does not presuppose that people are rational instrumentalists and that frames are chosen for purely rational reasons. Rather they are influenced by culture and zeitgeist, fear, doubt, competition, power, and so on.

Frame Analysis can also be a helpful way of elucidating the power structures in society. Rather than interpreting framing as a manipulative action that is undertaken exclusively through the rational choices of the framer, the recognition of cultural influences helps reveal the distribution of power. As Vliegenthart and van Zoonen (2011: 111) notes:

* Sociologically informed research about framing that pertain to micro, meso and macro processes...posits that the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of individual producers are the product of professional and organizational processes...rather than traits or decisions of autonomous individuals."

Framers interact with external forces – cultural, social, political – which impact the production of frames.

Multiple, competing frames can also be used to argue different stances (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). This means that framings can be employed by opposing sides in a debate without necessarily indicating allegiance to the frame, but rather because of the frames salience in society (Redden, 2014). Atheists, for example, make use of religious framing in debates, not because they advocate its salience in
society, but because this frame reflects the power and pervasiveness of religion in society. Essentially, framers draw on shared understandings, or ‘cultural stock’, to construct meaning and argue along particular lines (Benford & Snow, 2000).

‘Cultural stock’ is a set of frames that are limited by the shared values, norms and beliefs of a society and are thus primarily external to the framer (Van Gorp, 2007). Frames are used to inform a person’s (or group’s) understanding of the world, define certain aspects of reality, and make others more salient (Redden 2014). But the success of a frame depends on it being meaningful to the target audience, and this requires making use of the right ‘cultural stock’, as well as ‘narrative fidelity’ (that it does what it says), and ‘cultural relevance’ (that it compares with the cultural understanding) (Benford & Snow, 2000). Frames are built on social norms and values, and framers must use these to connect with the audience and convincingly communicate their own framing of a situation (Desrosiers, 2012). Essentially, framers use ‘cultural stock’ to engage with the taken-for-granted and build social rapport.

Van Gorp (2007) suggests six key implications that frame analysts should consider in regard to ‘cultural stock’. Firstly, a ‘stock’ implies there is more than just that which is being presented; alternate frames are available and people can transcend the currently applied frame to be able to analyse it. Second, framing works because the receiver is familiar with the frame as an aspect of broader culture. Third, because framing makes use of known cultural phenomena, it can be invisible to the receiver, but this depends significantly on the receiver and their own level of cultural awareness. Fourth, the resulting frames are culturally constructed and relatively stable, as distinct from schemata (individual ways of understanding the world). Fifth, the stability of frames does not negate their dynamic and contested use, or the opportunity to apply different frames from the ‘stock’. Finally, frames are a product of social interaction.

Recognising this cultural aspect broaches the divide between frames and framing, and highlights the pervasive, yet subtle, influence of frames.

2.5.2 Frame analysis and identity

These subtle, pervasive framing processes provide collective identities with comparable ways of understanding the world and thus are one factor that accounts for their formation. Frames and framing are socially constructed and also interact with
internal cognitive process of how we see and understand the world, and so people internalise collective frames as ‘natural’. As such, these processes of collective frames provide a sense of identity and foreground the collective self, by delineating ‘us’ from ‘them’; ‘us’ who share a common ‘natural’ frame, and ‘them’ who do not and consequently become the ‘Other’ (Gamson, 1992).

Fredette (2014) shows the powerful influence of frames on identity as she explores the framing of Muslim identity in France. She notes that French Muslims are framed by the French elite primarily in terms of failed integration, as they fail to assimilate into the French community and in this sense become an ‘Other’ because they are not part of ‘our’ collective identity. While Gamson and Stuart's (1992) notion of framing differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’ based on the content of frames – values, ideals, norms, and so on – Fredette's (2014) research shows that ‘us’ is framed as different from ‘them’ because of who ‘they’ are. ‘They’ are adversarial to who ‘we’ are. ‘They’ are framed as categorically different, implying that frames can be used to essentialise the ‘Other’ and reinforce barriers and mechanisms of exclusion.

From this it is apparent that frames provide (some of) the content of collective identities. Content of these identity frames can vary (inclusive or exclusive; homogenous or heterogeneous), yet essentially frames are useful ways of homogenising the collective.

2.5.3 Frame analysis methodology

Frame Analysis has often been critiqued as a method that lacks generalisability or comparability (David, Atun, Fille, & Monterola, 2011; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Whether valid criticism or not, this work is qualitative, not quantitative, and so the purpose is not to quantify the phenomena under examination, for example the number of political parties or nations that share the same frame as Australia (Paper Two), or to formulate a standard set of frames for looking at human rights or asylum seekers ‘issues’ (Paper Three), or to delineate portrayals of Australianess in political cartoons into generalisable categories (Paper Four). The aim is to explore socially constructed frames, and the culturally situated framers that use them, to see what frames of Australianess dominate public discourse.

Discourse is often the subject of Framing Analysis. Entman (1993: 52) said framing requires one “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. This indicates the significance of frames, as they influence the agency of ‘ordinary’ people. ‘Elites’ construct frames to influence public debate (Price et al., 2005), and so Frame Analysis helps to elucidate the strategic side of communication (Desrosiers, 2012). It shows how and why particular frames are used to communicate information and thus, by exposing these frames, empowers people to make informed choices about the interpretive frame through which they are receiving information.

The core task of framers is to identify and highlight problems, provide solutions and motivate action from supporters (Benford & Snow, 2000). Framers work to identify problems and their causes, determine who is at fault, and suggest pathways to alternate solutions. This new solution is then used to motivate action toward the desired outcome. As such, frames are not meant to represent ‘reality’, but to provide a perspective. Rietveld (2014: 53) notes, “frames always provide only limited pictures of reality, drawing attention to particular aspects while obscuring others (Creed et al., 2002: 36–37), and these representations direct interpretation as well as action.”

Using Frame Analysis therefore highlights the multiple, competing ways that Australianness can be framed in the public sphere. Frame Analysis neither assumes an either/or construction of identity, nor views Australian identity as monolithic and universally agreed upon. Rather using Frame Analysis allows the different public presentations of Australian identity to be seen, with particular attention given to the way problems are being identified, solutions provided, and action promoted.

To fully understand and expose these frames of Australianness that are being presented, it is essential to critically engage with the public discourse on the topic.

2.6 Critical Discourse Analysis

One method that can expose the frames in a given scenario is Discourse Analysis (DA); an eclectic method that encompasses varying perspectives on the content, purpose and structure of discourse (Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2003; Nightingale & Cromby, 1999; van Dijk, 1993). This includes methods of analysis that range from conversation analysis (CA), which focuses on particular discursive and linguistic structures in language and pays little attention to context, to Critical.
Discourse Analysis (CDA), which looks at discursive repertoires and ideologies that expose the political inequality and power struggles perpetuated through discourse, and pays less attention to structural particularities. CDA considers “discourse and society, and...discourse and the reproduction of dominance and inequality” (van Dijk, 1993: 51). Rather than merely exploring the intricacies of public talk and text, CDA is a deconstructivist approach employed to understand and challenge existing forms of dominance and power – it elucidates the functionality of language in society. CDA, rather than more structural levels of analysis, informs this thesis.

More than mere methodology, CDA develops an explicitly ideological stance that seeks to systematically expose cultural, political, systemic and social power imbalances (van Dijk, 1994). Discourse is seen as fundamental to the reproduction of exclusion, such as in xenophobic, exclusionary and racist language (Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Dijk, 1996). Hence, the focus is the ‘role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance’ (van Dijk, 1993: 249) with dominance understood as “the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality”. With a focus on power and inequality, a strong neo-Marxist perspective informs CDA.

As well as structural power imbalances, discourse itself can be employed to propagate exclusion (TEO:2000il; vanDijk:1996ema; van Dijk, 1993). Examples range from the trivial to the significant; teenagers include words, cultural references and interactional norms in conversation that functionally exclude most adults; the language of many academics similarly limits access; even human rights discourse has been shown to include exclusionary language (Sarkodee, 2012). CDA explores these conversational nuances and shows how language itself can be a source of exclusion.

It may be useful to apply a broader scope that looks beyond discourse to better understand power distribution and expose some entrenched cultural norms in society. Berger (2009a) suggests that “to claim that all statements about...the social world, can be explained in terms of power interests: it seems to me very distorted”(1h:24m). While inequality may be explicit in discourse, greater contextual awareness is necessary to truly evaluate the injustice of the situation. A parent’s directive to a child, or a police officer’s instruction to a civilian for example, are seen as legitimate forms of power imbalance (van Dijk, 1993). Thus knowledge of cultural norms is important to be able to assess power imbalances in discourse.
This thesis relies on CDA theory to inform analysis by looking at the ways in which Australianness is represented, social relations are enacted, and identities are established in public discourse (Fozdar & Spittles, 2014). Further, the ideological assumption of CDA, that systemic power imbalance and injustice are perpetuated through discourse, is a fundamental assumption in this research. Critics claim this conflation of political or social ideology, and scholarship, results in poor academic practice (Billig, 2008). Rather than disputing the problem of such a conflation, this research would point out that all scholarship subscribes to an ideology and is bound by external power structures (Leonardo & Allen, 2008); CDA merely acknowledges this and therefore enables greater transparency. Thus we employ a Critical Realist perspective which prioritises the search for meaning in research, to examine, understand and contextualise discourse within the real world (Joseph & Roberts, 2004: 2).

Functioning between the domains of transitive (socially, geographically and historically specific) and intransitive knowledge (beyond individual construction), Critical Realism views society as both the cause and consequence of culture (Joseph & Roberts, 2004). Specifically in relation to discourse, texts both structure society and are socially-structured (Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer, 2004: 27). Empirical or scientific realism assumes this intransitive knowledge is attainable through rigorous scientific research; Critical Realism claims such knowledge is only attainable through the intransitive constraints of human knowledge.

Critics of Critical Realist Discourse Analysis (CRDA) dispute the amalgamation of constructionism and realism, suggesting that CRDA employs the very methods it opposes in an ad-hoc fashion (Speer, 2007). Essentially, the argument goes, CRDA is pulled between a constructivist approach that sees talk as a discursive accomplishment and a realist approach in which talk reflects reality. However, such a critique conflates epistemology and ontology, failing to understand that the individual construction or interpretation relates to the how of knowledge (epistemology), while the real world relates to what is knowable (ontology). As Fairclough et al. (2004: 24) suggest, CDA “is not only compatible with critical realism but also provides major insights into the role of semiosis in social structuration”. Critical Realism contextualises language and discourse, recognising it as a reflexive element that results from a complex reality (M. Jones, 2004: 44).
CDA is the lens through which frame analysis is approached in this thesis, particularly the focus on language contextualisation, power distribution, and textual analysis.

2.7 Methods used in each chapter

This section offers a justification of the different forms of data collection and analysis used in each paper. Essentially it outlines how the aforementioned methodologies, as well as theoretical perspective, ontology and epistemology, are applied through the methods used in each paper. The data sources for each paper – online blogs and Facebook pages, political cartoons, expert panel submissions – were chosen because they each provide opportunity to research public discourse in a variety of forms and spaces. Further, these are spaces that lack interrogation in the literature, and therefore I hope to add to the body of knowledge about public portrayals of Australianness by exploring these sites.

2.7.1. Paper One “Australian national identity: empirical research since 1998”

This paper is intended to update the field of literature concerned with Australian national identity and in so doing explores 22 studies on this topic. The limitations put in place to guide the selection of papers is informed by Phillips’ (1998) seminal review of Australian national identity literature. Thus papers selected for analysis were: written after Phillips’ 1998 study (although much of the data used in these studies predates Phillips); primarily concerned with Australian national identity (as opposed to, say, issues of inclusivity); use either qualitative or quantitative methodologies; and are within social science disciplines.

These studies were retrieved from a systematic search of journal databases between September 2012 and March 2013. Databases included: ProQuest, SAGE, JSTOR, Wiley Online Library, and Factiva, as well as the University of Western Australia library database. As noted, limitations for this search were set for date (post 1998), and search terms included: ‘Australian identity’, ‘national identity’, ‘Australia’ and ‘identity’. Google scholar was also searched for articles that cite Phillips (1998) and other seminal works. While confident in our selection process, we acknowledge that it is possible some articles have been missed, however we feel those analysed provide a comprehensive picture of findings from empirical studies.
Thematic analysis, using both deductive and inductive approaches, was conducted on the 22 studies found. Deductive themes were drawn from Phillips’ original review, as well as analysis of the broader literature on both national and cosmopolitan identity. This resulted in five themes: the civic/ethno-nationalist identity divide; the relationship between traditional and ‘progressive’ values; the significance of socio-cultural factors; the relevance of the economy in relation to socio-political issues; and the increasing influence of globalisation in national identity construction, particularly a move towards cosmopolitanism. These themes were then used to analyse the 22 papers and explore commonalities and differences, both within the current literature and as compared with Phillips’ original findings.

2.7.2 Paper Two. “I googled UnAustralian’: Analysis of who is using the term in 2013”

Paper two is an extended version of a shorter conference paper, and therefore is based on a limited data sample, though this version has an expanded literature review and analysis section. The paper is concerned with the use of the term unAustralian in public discourse, focusing on online blogs and comments made by ‘average Australians’.

Initially, Google (google.com.au) was searched in May 2013, to explore already existing uses of the term unAustralian. The first ten results included five news articles and their associated comments sections (although the comments section was only available for two of these sites), and it was decided that these provide a sufficient comparison of ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ discourse on unAustralianess.

Thematic analysis, both deductive and inductive, was then employed to explore the articles. Inductive themes arose directly from the studies, such as the etymology and the reification of unAustralian. Deductive themes were based on the findings of P Smith and Phillips (2001), as well as the researcher’s own review of Australian national identity (Fozdar & Austin, forthcoming), and included inclusive and exclusive nationalism, tolerance, a ‘fair-go’ mentality, and cosmopolitanism.

These themes were then used to explore the articles and the public’s comments, to reveal relevant uses of nomenclature. As noted, only two articles had a comments section, but it was decided that these provided a sufficient example of ordinary Australians’ uses of the term unAustralian for the purposes of this conference paper.
2.7.3 Paper Three. “The construction of national identity on Australian political parties’ Facebook pages”

This paper explores the ways national identity, political discourse and new media come together in the Australian context, using political parties’ Facebook pages as a case study. Our focus is on the two main Australian political parties – Labor and Liberal – during an election campaign.

Data collection was undertaken by periodically checking each party’s Facebook account during the entire campaign period (4 August - 7 September, 2013) to gather material progressively and avoid loss of information ‘taken down’ later. All postings were collated and explored for salience (being obvious on the page and noticeable to viewers), repetition, and relevance to the national identity literature. These criteria drove the decision about which posts to analyse in detail, which was limited to a selection of the material posted online. For example attacks on the opposition, policy comparisons, and public ‘comments’, ‘likes’ and ‘shares’, were not included. The latter may have been useful to explore the public uptake or response to party postings, however a decision was made to limit the analysis to what the political elite wished to convey – to their representational elements (Dahlgren, 2005), rather than attempt to measure uptake, given research indicates Facebook is used by politicians to proclaim rather than converse. Overall, I believe the selection of posts provides an accurate representation of each party and their portrayal and use of national identity.

This selected material was then analysed using Frame Analysis, as outlined previously. Particularly I looked at the way that stock frames – whiteness, the family, and nation centrisim - are used by each political party to develop an overarching frame of what Australianness entails.

2.7.4 Paper Four “Framing asylum seekers: the uses of national and cosmopolitan identity frames in arguments about asylum seekers”

This paper took as its data set 51 submissions, by various pressure or interest groups, to the Expert Panel on Asylum seekers (an independent panel established to advise the government on how to respond to the increase of maritime arrivals). These groups were chosen for analysis because they represent pressure, or interest, groups, which are uniquely positioned to steer political debate and advocate for policies in the public sphere.
Initially, each of these submissions was read through in detail to discover recurring themes used in arguments for or against more inclusive asylum seeker policies in Australia. These include: the rejection or acceptance of offshore processing, increased humanitarian intake, delinking on and offshore visas, and adjustments to current family reunion visa regulations; the use of human rights policies and nomenclature; identification (of Australians and asylum seekers) as primarily nationally, regionally or globally situated; and the presentation of Australia as a regional leader, or not. Simple quantitative analysis was applied to these findings to collate the data and compare the submissions. From this three deductive categories of analysis were identified that theorise national identity, cosmopolitan identity, and the construction of asylum seekers:

- **Human rights** - the inclusion or exclusion of human rights as an impetus for action;
- **Frame of reference** – the employment of a national, regional or global frame of reference;
- **Australia’s relationship to others** - how Australia is framed in relation to other nations.

Frame Analysis was then applied, using these categories of analysis to inform an understanding of how national, regional, or global framings inform a response to the ‘issue’ of asylum seekers.

### 2.7.5 Paper Five “…Team Australia’: cartoonists challenging exclusionary nationalist discourse”

Six political cartoons were the subjects of analysis in this paper. Each cartoon was selected for its engagement with the term ‘Team Australia’ – a slogan used by then Prime Minister Tony Abbott when announcing new counter terrorism measures.

Two main factors determined the choice of cartoons. Firstly, cartoon selection was based on their date of publication between August and November 2014, immediately after Abbott’s first use of the term ‘Team Australia’. Secondly they were chosen to represent the diversity of media outlets and cartoon artists active in the Australian media sphere. While some other cartoons were available that fit these criteria, we believe these six represent the diversity of views and comments arising in public discourse.
Thematic and semiotic analytical techniques were used to explore the messages in the political cartoons (Medhurst and Desousa, 2009; Manning and Phiddian, 2004). This approach supported the application of frame analysis (Goffman, 1986), enabling the exploration of how the cartoons connect, represent, challenge, reconstruct, or rely on implicit and explicit understandings of Australianness.

2.8 Summary

This section has outlined the different methods used throughout the thesis, and shown both the diversity of methods, and the uniformity of methodology, theoretical perspective, epistemology and ontology.

I began by explaining methodological cosmopolitanism, and how this perspective better reflects the current context, where globalisation is influencing people’s lives (Chernilo, 2007), and results in post-national affiliations for some (Beck, 2000a; Skrbris et al., 2004). Methodological cosmopolitanism provides an understanding of national identities that are not exclusionary and bounded, but rather can maintain multiple notions of self that co-exist, rather than compete with one another. A methodologically cosmopolitan analysis of Australianness then, allows the analysis of multiple, co-existing frames of national identity, as well as cosmopolitan identities that transcend the nation, without necessarily posing a threat to Australianness.

An explanation of a Critical Realist paradigm followed, that assumes individual knowledge is necessarily limited and perspectival, but that this knowledge reflects an external reality that exists beyond the individual’s consciousness (Bhaskar, 2007). For my research, this provides a basic assumption that the constructions of Australianness being researched reflect ‘truths’, but that they are also necessarily limited by the subject’s knowledge. By using Frame Analysis to inform theoretical perspective and methodology, another level of critical analysis is applied. Frame Analysis recognises that this process of reflecting external reality can be a deliberate practice, in which ‘truths’ are framed to accentuate certain aspects and shadow others (Benford & Snow, 2000). As such, using Critical Realism and Frame Analysis provides a rich grounding to analyse how Australianness is constructed and to critically assess this against broader societal frames.
Finally, CDA was discussed as a method of rich textual analysis that informed this thesis. CDA exposes power imbalance and inequality that are perpetuated through discourse, and seeks to systematically analyse them (van Dijk, 1994). This is a fundamental aim of this research. Further, CDA informs the way that Australianness is analysed in public discourse, to discover how both ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ Australians frame Australianness.

Before moving to the first paper, I pause here to provide some explanations of contentious nomenclature, as well as why other seemingly relevant perspectives have been excluded from this thesis.

2.9 Definitions and Disclaimers

This section includes some brief definitions of concepts and themes that are central to this thesis but may be ambiguous. Additionally disclaimers are made concerning things that have, for various reasons, been omitted.

2.9.1 The nation

The primary mandate of this thesis is to explore national identity, and so it is necessary to define what it is I am referring to as ‘the nation’. The nation, in this thesis, is essentially the nation-state, and the terms are used interchangeably. Nation-states encompass both the socio-cultural aspects of shared language, norms and mores, as well as geo-political/legal aspects that define the sovereign territory and claim the legitimate use of force (A. D. Smith, 1991). This socio/geo/political/legal collective dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), seen as the origins of the contemporary nation-state, but gained dominance during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, paralleling the rise of sociological analysis (as explored in the discussion about methodological nationalism) (Isin & Wood, 1999).

As such, it must be noted that this thesis is not using the term ‘nation’ to refer to collectives such as ‘tribe’ or ‘ethnic group’, as is common in some disciplines. All references to nation, national identity and the nation-state are concerned with the collective described above.
2.9.2 Indigenous Australians

...the management of non-White people in the White nation-space is ordered in terms of a relationship where White people assume that their place is at the centre or core of the nation, defined in relation to both internal non-White others and external non-White others who are variously placed in different parts of the nation’s margins or periphery. (Elder, Ellis, & Pratt, 2004: 209)

Australia has had a history of Whiteness since colonisation (Hage, 1998) reflected in the fact that in discussions about Australian identity it is not Indigenous Australian identity that is being referred to.

Indigenous Australians tend to be ascribed a separate identity, reflected in Australian popular culture (Jackson, 2013) and institutionalised in government (indigenous.gov.au) and academic (‘Indigenous Studies’) structures. Even in an event that apparently epitomised Indigenous inclusion – PM Kevin Rudd’s National Apology – Indigenous Australians remained an ‘Other’. As Augoustinos, Hastie and Wright (2011) point out in an analysis of Rudd’s Apology to the Stolen Generation; whilst Indigenous Australian’s were addressed as ‘Our fellow Australians’, it was clear that the apology was on behalf of non-Indigenous Australians, thus his use of ‘nation’ through out the speech “functions as a membership category that differentiates between two social groups: Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians” (Augostinos et al., 2011: 516).

I believe that to make best use of my white privilege (Elder, 2007) in this thesis, it is wise to acknowledge the ‘white fantasy’ (Hage, 1998) that envelopes Australian identity and reflect, wherever relevant, the persistent exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the national identity frame. While my research does not seek out representations that focus on Indigenous Australians, I note their rather glaring absence in the framings that I analyse.

2.9.3 Web 2.0

Web 2.0 is a term coined by Tim O’Reilly (2005), to refer to the shift towards interactive internet usage. Web 2.0 includes a range of ideas about the internet, as well as options for usage, which include (but are not limited to): viewing the internet as an endless platform of opportunity; provision of self-service options; believing better service results from more usage; the development of networks through user
generated content (UGC); and software compatible across different hardware options (OReilly, 2009). In this thesis, references to the ‘online sphere’, ‘web 2.0’, ‘the web’ and other terms used to refer to the internet all assume that this interactive model is pervasive and influential, and therefore determines how, where and when the web is used.

2.9.4 The Public Sphere

The concept of the public sphere is central to this thesis, and will be used to analyse the functionality of contemporary debate and public discourse in Australia.

The public sphere (Habermas, 1989) is understood as a space (or spaces) for the media, politicians and the public to interact and express political views. According to Habermas, it developed in post-Enlightenment Europe and therefore built on the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and the pursuit of knowledge through rational argumentation. These characteristics have now been lost to society, so the argument goes, and have now been replaced by poor journalism, the trivialisation of politics, and public relations rather than public discourse. As such, the contemporary options for public discourse are inhibited by cultural and structural problems (Habermas, 1989).

Numerous critical perspectives have arisen in response to this theory. Feminist critiques have highlighted the exclusion of women, the lower classes, and other marginal groups (Fraser, 1992). Others have questioned the implicit notion that public discourse should be primarily rational. This is seen to limit the participatory capacity of some groups and cultures, and effectively exclude other forms of communication - such as affective, rhetorical or humorous styles – from being included in public debate. Such emphasis on rationality has also been critiqued for perpetuating the divide between the public and the private – a division that is increasingly dubious in the era of web 2.0, where public and private have become more entwined (Fraser, 1992; Benhabib, 1992).

Finally there is a debate over whether one unifying public sphere or multiple co-existing spheres is preferable. This has particular relevance when
assessing the possibility of trans- or post-national communities (as this thesis does). Some claim multiple spheres reduce the capacity for the public to effect change, while others argue that they are essential to the provision of safe spaces for those with ‘diverse’ perspectives (Hauser, 1999). As Dahlgren (2008: 684) notes, “Obviously the heterogeneous quality of late modern life and its public cultures raises problematic issues for democracy, and these become particularly compelling when refracted through the prism of the public sphere”.

Dahlgren (2008) suggests there are useful ways to consider the functionality of the public sphere(s), and this involves assessing three constituent elements - structural, representational and interactional. The first – structural – relates to the universal accessibility of the sphere; if only the elite participate then structural exclusion is active. The representational element refers to whether the media output fairly and accurately represents the diversity of views amongst the public; and interactionality refers to the active, participatory role of the public, who not only consume media and elite discourse, but (re)produce it.

For the current thesis then, attention will be paid to how these various aspects are at play in the Australian public sphere. Are structural forces inhibiting certain groups (women, the marginalised) from participation or representation? Is the media portraying the diversity that makes up the Australian public or merely promoting the views of ‘elite’ or interest groups? And are ‘average Australians’ given a voice in the public discourse or are they mere observer? These questions will be considered throughout the thesis, with attention focused on who is allowed to speak and what forces are at play to permit or prohibit participation.
Chapter Three [Paper One]
Australian national identity: empirical research since 1998

Revised and resubmitted, National Identities.
Catherine Austin and Farida Fozdar

3.1 Abstract

Uncertainty about Australian identity has re-emerged, as a shift towards global concerns and political construction of an ‘Anglo’ Australian identity have generated questions about ‘who we are’. To explore this dilemma, this paper summarises and analyses empirical research since Phillips’ (1998) seminal work synthesising findings of research on Australian identity. We found, nearly 2 decades on, that a civic/ethno-nationalist division and traditional socio-political correlates remain; yet less dichotomous constructions are being explored and more progressive values included. Key differences arise from the increased diversity and understanding of Australianness, as well as a shift, for some, towards a cosmopolitan identity.

Key words: Australian identity, civic and ethno/nativist, nationalism, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism

3.2 Introduction

It has been argued that Australians are both overly concerned about national identity and somewhat confused about what that identity might be (Castles, Foster, Iredale, & Withers, 1998; Hage, 1998). Generated through a combination of popular culture, ethnic ties and government policies, Australian-ness has morphed from being the embodiment of ‘hell on earth’ for convicts, to a place offering opportunity and egalitarian individualism for British people seeking a better life - the land of the ‘fair go’ and ‘mateship’, founded on mythic male archetypes such as Ned Kelly, pioneer farmers and the ANZACs (Elder, 2007; White, 1981). The consumerism of the post War period, the growing sporting fixation, and the country’s diversity and multiculturalism also became part of the national consciousness over the post-war decades. As a result, Smith and Phillips (2006: 825) suggest that there is not one single national identity that
binds Australians, but ‘a set of overlapping, evolving and contested themes’ that are complexly engaged with by the population in its self-construction. Who, why and how somebody is seen as ‘Australian’ is a matter of debate therefore, from requiring native birth and Christian heritage to simply having an affective attachment and sense of civic responsibility towards the nation-state (Phillips, 1998).

The years since Tim Phillips (1998) seminal review of national identity have seen an explosion of public discourse on the subject. The Australian government has taken steps to implement a range of policies around encouraging ‘Australian values’ and promoting ‘a shared identity, a common bond which unites all Australians’ (DIAC, 2013). The conservative government of former Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) particularly sought to re-embed Australian identity in an historical connection with the UK (Curran, 2004). Indeed, Howard asserted that ‘we no longer navel gaze about what an Australian is...all of us...know what an Australian has always been and always will be’ (Curran, 2004: 356). Yet this sits in contrast to trends over the past two decades.

Geo-politically defined identities are becoming less significant due to increased mobility and global communication, and it has been argued that global citizenship and identification is becoming more important than national identification (Beck, 2000; Lamont & Aksartova, 2002; Nussbaum, 2008; Skribis & Woodward, 2007; Szerszynski & Urry, 2002). Web technologies and social media expand social networks beyond the nation; the G-Summits, European Union, International Criminal Court, United Nations, and growth of non-state actors challenge national sovereignty and governance; and international ‘threats’ and challenges - global warming, humanitarian issues, terrorism, and the Global Financial Crisis - have to some extent united people globally against a common enemy, or for a common cause.

At the same time, Australian nationalism has become more visible. Flag flying and Anzac Day ceremony attendance have increased, and there is renewed interest in visiting the military sites of Gallipoli and the Kokoda trail (Bongiorno, 2014; Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Fozdar, Spittles, & Hartley, 2014; Donoghue & Tranter, 2014). Events like the Cronulla Riots, the first anti-immigrant riots in Australia since 1934 (Cleveland, Erdoğan, Arikan, & Poyraz, 2011), and more recently the ‘Reclaim Australia’ movement that has begun staging anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rallies, highlight how tense the question of ‘who we are’ actually is.
While these socio-political shifts suggest Australian identity may have changed, it is only through empirical research that such shifts can be mapped. It is thus apposite to overview research on the topic since Phillips’ ground-breaking 1998 meta-analysis. We commence with a summary of Phillips 1998 review, before discussing empirical research since.

3.3 Phillips’ Review

In 1998 Phillips sought to build a comprehensive picture of contemporary Australians’ understandings and experiences of identity by reviewing empirical social sciences literature on Australian identity, and integrating and analysing findings for the first time. Phillips was interested in popular understandings of Australian identity, including shared attitudes, practices and symbols. His selection of 17 studies was limited to those that focused on national identity and that used large representative samples.\(^{13}\)

Phillips concluded that Australia is a significant source of self-identity for Australians. Perceptions of Australian-ness cohered around two different models of allegiance to the nation-state, consistent across many countries (Connor, 2003; Kymlicka, 2006). These were inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethno-nationalist: the former driven by attachment to an ill-defined Australia and/or achieved civic values, such as citizenship; the latter focussed on innate and historically determined characteristics, as well as how threatened people felt by the Other. All researchers used this binary construction, with subtle variations, to analyse sources and correlates of identity.

Aging, religious and political affiliation, lower levels of education, native birth, mainstream television and media usage, and rural dwelling were all associated with more ‘traditional’ and exclusionary conceptualisations of Australian identity. Political knowledge was associated with civic values, while people with longer Australian ancestry were more likely to be xenophobic. Class had limited importance, although less education correlated with stronger attachment, and the effect of gender was unclear. There was little assessment of associated practices but ‘nativists’ were apparently more likely to act in ‘traditional’ and xenophobic ways, and to vote for the conservative party. Traditional views about Australian-ness were linked with ‘pro-militarism, anti-Aboriginality, anti-republicanism, anti-multiculturalism, anti-

\(^{13}\) See Phillips (1998) paper for a full explanation of his sampling methods
homosexuality and anti-feminism’ (Phillips, 1998: 296), and national pride was linked with militarism, monarchism, and opposition to activities deemed ‘unAustralian’.

Phillips argued more research, particularly qualitative research, is needed into how everyday life interacts with and promotes national identity. He identified a lack of research representing elite, immigrant and Aboriginal perspectives, and also saw a need to explore how and why traditional forms of Australian identity remain strong and why the dichotomous construction of inclusive, civic verses exclusive, ethno-nationalist national identity persists.

3.4 Methodology

Initially it was intended to replicate Phillips’ methodological restrictions, however a preliminary literature search, and Phillips’ recommendations for future research, led to some alterations. Firstly, this review is not restricted to large-scale quantitative studies using representative national sampling. Phillips (1998) set this limitation partly for pragmatic reasons, as few qualitative studies existed. Since then, numerous qualitative studies have been undertaken. While we could not cover all of these, a selection is included, based on the criterion that the specific focus must be national identity and that the paper must report empirical data. Secondly, as noted, since Phillips’ original review national identity has become complexly imbricated with issues related to globalisation. To recognise this shift, we have included in our review literature that explores cosmopolitan identity in Australia. Finally, only studies within the social sciences (as opposed to literary and cultural studies) are reviewed, as per Phillips.

Applying these parameters, 22 studies reporting Australian perceptions of national identity are analysed. These were retrieved from a systematic search of journal databases between September 2012 and March 2013, and include studies using a range of theoretical and methodological approaches. For ease of presentation, the methods, primary research questions, and principle findings of each study are included in Appendix A. It should be noted at the outset that many of these rely on old data sources, such as the 1995-96 Australian National Social Science Survey (NSSS), the

14 ProQuest, SAGE, JSTOR, Wiley Online Library, Factiva were all searched. Limitations were set for date (post 1998), and search terms included: ‘Australian identity’, ‘national identity’, ‘Australia’ and ‘identity’. Google scholar was also searched for articles that cite Phillips (1998) and other seminal works. While confident in our selection process, we acknowledge that it is possible some articles have been missed. We feel those analysed provide a comprehensive picture of findings from empirical studies.
1995 International Social Services Programme (ISSP95) and 1996 Australian Electoral Survey (AES96), the World Values Survey (1995), the 2000/2001 Australian National Identity Survey (ANIS), the 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) and the 2004 Australian Election Study. We first discuss the results of the research, and arising themes, and then limitations are highlighted and future directions for research suggested. We conclude by considering what can be inferred from these studies about Australian identity currently. Critical appraisal of the methods used by each study is not the purpose of this paper; rather we aim to collate what almost two decades of research has discovered about Australian-ness.

3.5 Integrated findings

Thematic analysis of the 22 studies, using both deductive and inductive approaches, generated the following broad themes: the civic/ethno-nationalist identity divide; the relationship between traditional and ‘progressive’ values; the significance of socio-cultural factors; the relevance of the economy in relation to socio-political issues; and the increasing influence of globalisation in national identity construction, particularly a move towards cosmopolitanism. The following summary of results uses these themes to construct analytical connections across the studies.

Firstly, national identity continues to be constructed according to ethno and civic nationalist categories for some. As well as among mainstream samples, both were evident in migrants’ perspectives, including Asian-Australians and refugees and asylum seekers; and arose across a range of issues including identification, belonging and attachment (Clark, 2009; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Hugo, 2006; Phillips, 2002; Phillips & Smith, 2000).

Civic identity was found to be more prevalent than ethno-nationalist, although there is significant variance in the figures: 75% according to Jones (2000) and 38% according to Pakulski and Tranter (2000). Jones’ figure (75%) includes what he terms ‘moderate pluralists’ (40%) and ‘civic nationalists’ (35%)15. However, moderate pluralists feel less attachment to the nation. Pakulski and Tranter’s (2000) findings (38%) relied on a strong sense of attachment to a civic society, and therefore Jones’ moderate pluralists would not be recognised in this assessment.

15 We include both as ‘civic’ in accord with Jones’ own findings.
Comparatively, Australia has the second highest level of civic identity of the 24 nations involved in the ISSP95 (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). This orientation includes attitudes of inclusivity, low national pride, boundary permeability, and a ‘felt’ sense of Australianness (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006). Civic nationalists are more likely to espouse republican and pro-immigration views, be younger, less religious, more highly educated, and use ‘high-brow’ media (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006). Ethno-nationalists (variously termed nativist, dogmatic or literal nativist), on the other hand, constitute about 25% (Jones, 2000) or 30% (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000) of the population and tend to have ‘traditional’, and, for some, exclusionary views, valuing: native birth, national pride, the ANZACs, Christian heritage, patriarchy, and boundary maintenance, and they tend to be anti-immigration (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). While neither group supports ‘hard multiculturalism’ (government support for ethnic minorities to preserve their cultures), ethno-nationalists are also much less likely to support ‘soft multiculturalism’ as both ethno-nationalists and civic-nationalists are pro-migrant but anti-multiculturalism (Goot & Watson, 2005). Pakulski and Tranter (2000) found very low levels across the board of support for the notion that ‘different ethnic and racial groups should maintain their distinct customs and traditions’ (25%). Rather most Australians believe in assimilation, i.e. that such groups should ‘blend in to the larger society’ (75%).

There were some studies that moved beyond the civic/ethno-nationalist binary. Pakulski and Tranter (2000), for example, operationalised three identities: ethno-nationals, who inhabit a ‘community of fate’ with strong attachment to the nation, and shared cultures, traditions and customs; civics, similarly attached to the nation, but valuing a community of choice; and denizens, who showed a weak attachment to the nation state (totalling 6% of respondents who were mostly new migrants). They found that in terms of attachment, both ethno-nationals and civics felt strongly connected to Australia. Tranter and Donoghue’s more recent findings on views about Ned Kelly challenge the civic/nativist dichotomy; they found that left-leaning progressive, young Australians – demographics that align with civic nationalists – valued this traditional, historical embodiment of Australian larrikinism (Tranter & Donoghue, 2010). This indicates a growing complexity within the civic/ethno-national binary, and that traditional orientations and progressive values may coalesce.
Indeed, there is a body of research showing Australian national identity is characterised by both traditional and progressive values. Traditional characteristics of mateship, a fair-go, giving it a go, and a down to earth character (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2001), are joined by a growing regard for egalitarianism, achievement, democracy, agreeableness, diversity and multiculturalism (Brett & Moran, 2011; Phillips & Smith, 2000). These findings were consistent across methodologies (Smith & Phillips, 2006).

Whilst progressive aspects exist within conceptualisations of Australian identity, traditionalism dominates. For instance 90% of Australians thought the ANZACs had an influence on national identity (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013), while sporting heroes (52%), post WWII migrants (50%), and Aboriginal peoples (14%) were seen as much less important (Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Around two thirds of Australians favour retaining the ANZAC legend, and one third support an increase in its place in the national imaginary (Phillips & Holton, 2004). Qualitative research corroborates this (Phillips & Smith, 2000). The ANZAC legend and mythology has become an important part of everyday nationalism, with the annual commemoration drawing large crowds in Australia and Gallipoli, and people keen to trace their connection to the battle through family heritage. This emphasis on a military event that occurred 100 years ago necessarily gives weight to ethno-nationalist rendering of Australian-ness (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007).

The sporting tradition also remains significant in constructions of Australian-ness (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013), seen in the value ascribed to individuals (e.g. Don Bradman), organisations (Surf Life Savers), and public sites (sporting arenas) (Phillips & Smith, 2000). Bushrangers, and Ned Kelly specifically, were also important and viewed positively, rather than as criminals (Tranter & Donoghue, 2008; 2010). Younger, working-class and left-leaning people see him as a product of unfortunate circumstances and a champion of the poor. Qualitative research shows that these traditional understandings of Australian-ness remain prevalent, even amongst migrants and children (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Purdie & Wilss, 2007).

Iconic Australian activities, occupations and characteristics remain important aspects of Australian identity. These include leisure activities (sport, BBQs, beer drinking); occupations (stockmen, farmers), colloquial language (G’day), clothing (Akubra hats), the nuclear family, work mates, home ownership, places (Bondi Beach,
Uluru, the Sydney Opera house, sporting arenas), animals (koalas, kangaroos) and the national flag (Hogan, 1999; Howard & Gill, 2001; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Australian identity is still seen in terms of middle-class white males, even among women of non-English speaking background (Phillips & Smith, 2000). The ‘unAustralian’ person is seen as selfish or arrogant (the obvious contrast with matey) (Smith & Phillips, 2001), although more recent work suggests that particular categories of Other, such as Muslims, are now more likely to be seen as ‘unAustralian’ (Kabir, 2007; Noble, 2009; Yasmeen, 2008).

The nation remains central to Australians’ identities. National identity is more important than local, state or global identities, both domestically (Phillips, 2002) and for Australians living abroad (Hugo, 2006). High levels of national pride were found among the population generally (Goot & Watson, 2005); and 94% expressed a strong or very strong attachment to Australia (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). However Clark (2007) found that for Asian-Australians national identity is less significant when compared with other identities (societal, familial, occupational). This may indicate a lower level of attachment for migrants/the visibly different when compared with native-born/mainstream Australians.

A strong sense of national identity is associated with protectionist attitudes and the primacy of economic concerns, for example the favouring of limits to foreign imports and immigration (Smith & Phillips, 2006; Woodward, Skribis, & Bean, 2008). Negativity towards immigrants, particularly regarding employment and ‘illegal’ immigration, was found across many studies (Clark, 2009; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Support for assimilation remained strong, with only 16% agreeing that migrants should ‘maintain distinct traditions and customs’ (Goot & Watson, 2005). The sense of exclusion felt by refugees (Fozdar et al., 2014); disillusionment, betrayal and injustice reported by asylum seekers (Haggis & Schech, 2010); as well as social and economic exclusion experienced by Muslims (Kabir, 2008; Noble, 2009; Yasmeen, 2008), are most likely related to this negativity.

Positive attitudes toward immigration appear to be related to a cost/benefit analysis. Goot and Watson found a growing openness to immigration during Howard’s early years, due to their economic contribution (2005). This was perhaps surprising, given the negative political rhetoric of the time. Relatedly, emigrants were evaluated by the potential economic drain caused by their departure (Hugo, 2006). However
migrants were also seen as a boon to the country in other respects, bringing openness to new ideas (Hugo, 2006) and cultural benefits, such as variety in food choices (Brett & Moran, 2011). Those with a more civic national identification valued multiculturalism. Indeed, when compared to other out-groups, migrants and people of different races were seen less negatively (for example compared to drug users, emotionally unstable people, criminals, political extremists, homosexuals and members of new religions) (Phillips, 2002).

Migrants tended to be positive about Australian-ness, emphasising the fiscal, educational and employment opportunities ‘being Australian’ offered, while viewing national identity in familial, multicultural, political and globally inclusive terms (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Kabir, 2007). British dual citizens reported high levels of national pride in Australia (Phillips & Holton, 2004). Even refugees, while articulating the tension of living between two worlds, positively linked citizenship, family and globality. For them, civic identity was valued, as citizenship was seen to provide legitimate access to Australian identity and political, legal, economic and social benefits, as well as to international belonging (Haggis & Schech, 2010).

Finally, there was some indication that Australian identity is moving towards the cosmopolitan. Certainly its association with global issues increased throughout the studies, although the extent to which this is a product of the researchers’ own interests, and therefore the focus of their research questions, is unclear. Particularly in the more recent literature, global citizenship and cosmopolitanism are a focus (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbris & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). The more recent studies found that the incorporation of traditional, somewhat stereotypical characteristics, together with commitment to democratic ideals and individualism, shaped a contemporary civic, Universalist national identity situated in the global community (Brett & Moran, 2011; Purdie & Wilss, 2007). This contrasts somewhat with the conclusion of the older studies that ‘Australian values and ideals seem to be grounded in...everyday life...rather than by the abstract [cosmopolitan] ideals of political discourse’ (Phillips & Smith, 2000: 220).

Cosmopolitanism is seen positively when positioned as a complement to, or expansion of, national identity. For example, only 11% of respondents disagree with the statement ‘I regard myself as a citizen of the world as well as an Australian citizen’ (Woodward et al., 2008). The two thirds who agreed with the statement perceive the
benefits from cosmopolitanism (seen in terms of global citizenship and globalisation), as including cultural enrichment, the opportunity to experience difference, and economic and cultural global inclusion. However, these values appeared to be consumer oriented, based in acts of ‘sampling’, ‘learning’, ‘choice’, and ‘access’ (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). The Australian diaspora abroad was similarly positive about the opportunities globalisation affords, while they continued to ‘call Australia home’ (Hugo, 2006).

Negative views about cosmopolitanism arise when it is posited against or as an alternative to national identity (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008), with national identity (45%) significantly prioritised over global identity (10%) (Phillips, 2002). While 83% of Woodward et al’s (Woodward et al., 2008) sample saw globalisation as good for democracy and human rights, national economic concerns trumped these. Fears of international interference (multinational domination, cultural homogenisation, or Americanisation) were also voiced (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Smith & Phillips, 2001). These responses were complex however, suggesting ‘Australians have contradictory, even schizophrenic, responses to globalization and American influence’ (Beasley et al., 2010: 17). Indeed, Skrbis and Woodward (2007) found binary responses signaling ambivalent cosmopolitanism. Thus while Australians enjoy economic globalisation for the personal freedom, opportunities and consumerism it offered, they are negative about its potential for exploitation, commercialisation and alienation. The authors note a tension between the desire to remove borders and unreservedly embrace others, and fears for the local/home culture and a perception of growing cultural homogenisation. Finally they identify an openness to the world resulting from technology and mobility, but experience fears of vulnerabilities to terrorism, pollution and moral decadence.

3.6 Progress, Problems, and Prospects

These studies provide a wealth of knowledge about the development, and stability, of Australian identity over the years since Phillips’ (1998) review, and respond to some of Phillips’ noted gaps in research, such as the lack of qualitative studies, offering a richer understanding of how Australians’ perceive themselves. They show that Australian identity continues to be constructed and analysed as either a civic or ethno-nationalist identity, but connections between the two are being recognised.
While traditional notions of Australian-ness prevail, more progressive values are increasingly being seen as fundamental to Australian-ness. Protectionism and economic concerns continue to be prioritised in Australians’ conception of socio-political and cultural issues related to internal diversity and orientations to globalisation. Finally, the studies show national identities are being redefined for some.

More diverse methodological approaches, most notably qualitative, are being used (8 out of the 22 studies were qualitative, detailed in Appendix A), and there is now more research involving minority/sub-populations (youth, migrants, Muslims)\(^\text{16}\) and the views of ‘everyday’ Australians (Haggis & Schech, 2010; Kabir, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Purdie & Wilss, 2007; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Smith & Phillips, 2001).

It is difficult to conclude much about contemporary understandings of Australian identity because of an overreliance on the same, now dated, sources, as noted. The ISSP95 (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000), 1997 Queensland focus groups (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2001), 2000/1 ANI survey (Phillips & Holton, 2004; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Smith & Phillips, 2006), and 2003 AuSSA (Clark, 2007; 2009; Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007) were all used multiple times. Pre-1998 data was also used extensively (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Phillips, 2002; Phillips & Smith, 2000). This limits the relevance of findings to understanding contemporary Australian-ness, however it provides a wealth of information about the last two decades. Future research would benefit from investment in large-scale social science studies specific to Australian identity and the use of contemporary data sources in timely publications\(^\text{17}\).

Some of the gaps in research noted by Phillips persist in the current literature, and the following Chapters attempt to contribute to addressing some of these ongoing questions. Firstly, there are still no studies incorporating Indigenous Australians’ perspectives on Australian identity. Indigenous Australians tend to be ascribed a separate identity, reflected in Australian popular culture (Jackson, 2013) and

\(^{16}\)Numerous qualitative studies have been conducted exploring minority perspectives, many of which engage with national identity. However, the studies discussed here were selected for their prioritisation of this topic.

\(^{17}\)We note the use of 2005 and 2007 AuSSA data is an exception to this trend, however its uses have been limited. Such data is already a decade old, and it is strange that while AUSSA data is still collected, after the flurry of articles using it in the late 90s and early 2000s, little use has been made of this data source.
institutionalised in government (indigenous.gov.au) and academic (‘Indigenous Studies’) structures. The history of relations between colonisers and the Indigenous population is a national embarrassment, and this may explain the lack of engagement with Indigenous perspectives. The reasons for the persistence of this segregation, and the interplay between cultural exclusion and cultural preservation for Indigenous Australians, is worthy of consideration in future studies of national identity.

Socio-political events such as the terrorist attacks in New York, London and Bali, and contentious asylum seeker policies, may have turned attention towards minority migrant groups rather than Indigenous Australians (Clark, 2007; 2009; Kabir, 2008). Future research with minority migrant groups may benefit from exploring how and why migrants, including refugees, are positive about Australian-ness. Qualitative results from the studies to some extent challenge Phillips’ suggestion that ‘immigrants...regard Australian identity as a symbol of exclusion’ (Phillips, 1998: 298). Migrants felt included through the economic, legal, political and familial opportunities afforded by life in Australia. Future research could explore how this relates to social inclusion and attachment, particularly in light of the growing negative rhetoric around immigration and diversity (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Yasmeen, 2008).

The literature post-Phillips continues to distinguish civic from ethno-nationalist orientations to national identity, yet this has become more complexly understood. Correlations with social, political, economic, educational, and dispositional characteristics offered a clearer picture of which types of people tend to hold more civic or more ethno-nationalist orientations (Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). However the continued use of this dichotomy may reflect its analytical functionality, rather than the reality of complex identifications. Some studies began to demonstrate this complexity (Phillips, 2002; Tranter & Donoghue, 2008; 2010), as international studies have (Brubaker, 1999; Shulman, 2002; Spencer & Wollman, 1998), and future research may benefit from re-theorising the constituent elements of the contemporary civic/ethno-nationalist dichotomy. The empirical research undertaken in the following Chapters draws on this understanding that a complex relationship exists between civic and ethno-nationalist identities, to provide a truer representation of Australianness.

In his original review Phillips suggested that ‘future research needs to pay more attention to how everyday life interactions and experiences foster, valorise and renew
the attachment of many Australians to traditional national identity...’ (Phillips, 1998: 298). ‘Everyday life’ has been the focus of some of the smaller scale qualitative studies, but many others have focused on sociopolitical and economic correlates. More research at the banal, everyday level would be useful, particularly the centrality (or otherwise) of Australian identity to peoples’ lives. Additionally, Phillips noted a lack of research amongst ‘elite’. These gaps are addressed in this thesis, with a focus on everyday interactions (Chapter Four) as well as the privileged ‘elite’ voices that participate in the public sphere (Chapters Five, Six and Seven).

Self-identification as Australian does not necessitate a strong allegiance or attachment to national identity (Beck, 2010; Clark, 2009), yet current research often seems to presume this. Further research could compare the relative importance of Australian identity with other identities, and whether this varies across different social categories, such as education and religious affiliation, or regional and global connections.

Globalisation was identified as a growing influence on Australians’ sense of identity and was related to a range of issues (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Just one example is the role of the media and technology. Earlier research identified a relationship between an ethno-nationalist identity and type of media consumption (Anderson, 1991), which other studies have corroborated. New media such as the Internet however, may support a more Universalist outlook (Smith & Phillips, 2006). New work has begun to explore the role of the Internet in identity construction and presentation (Prensky, 2009; Young, 2009), but Australia-specific studies could usefully explore the relationship between national/cosmopolitan identity and online media use. Work on this has begun\(^\text{18}\), but it is an area ripe for further examination and is therefore considered in both Chapters Four and Five of this thesis.

There was evidence that for some, processes of globalisation have entrenched national consciousness, since, as Calhoun (2007: 1) has argued, ‘nationalism helps locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and fears’. This was seen in economic parochialism (Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008), with the economy conceived nationally, despite its increasingly global

reach. Public discourse promotes an attitude of fear around economic concerns, mutually reinforcing socio-political fears, such that a unified sense of national identity is created against the threat of the Other (Corey, 2004).

For others globalisation processes are seen as opening up doors and creating avenues for cooperation and communication beyond national borders, albeit in a consumerist way (Hugo, 2006).

Thus globalisation has the potential both to challenge this fear of the Other and to encourage a response of national protectionism. Further research into Australians’ responses to globalisation may better contextualise constructions of Australian identity, and assist with the conceptualisation of policies to promote inclusion, diversity and global aims (for instance Carbon Emissions Trading or the Millennium Development Goals).

Finally, globalisation appears to be linked with more cosmopolitan identities (Woodward et al., 2008). Thus far research into the relationship has been predominantly quantitative and exploratory, employing necessarily blunt measures to try to capture a complex phenomenon. This may produce limited findings. For example, the desire to live in Australia rather than another country has been interpreted as un-cosmopolitan (Woodward et al., 2008), but this may not account for the complexities of individuals’ circumstances, such as familial or career ties, or preference for Australia based on its promotion of inclusive and Universalist (cosmopolitan) values (Brett & Moran, 2011). A mixed methods approach might be better suited to understanding these complexities.

At the theoretical level, national and cosmopolitan identities are complex and ill defined. Numerous constructions of the cosmopolitan exist, such as banal (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002), ideological (Nussbaum, 2008), political (Beck, 2009), and elitist (Peterson & Kern, 1996). This is mirrored in the growing Australian literature (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Cosmopolitanism has been found at times to co-exist with Australian national identity, and at others to be an alternate discourse (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007). Brett and Moran’s study began to explore this relationship between cosmopolitan and national identity (2011), but further research would be beneficial to clarify whether they can and do co-exist, converge or mutually-exclude one another. As such,
assessing the influence and relevance of cosmopolitan identity in Australia is a thread of analysis running through each of the following chapters.

3.7 Conclusion

To conclude we ask: what do these empirical studies on Australian identity published in the last two decades, indicate about Australian identity now? Fundamentally, we suggest that Australian-ness has become (or become conceptualised as) more diverse and more complex. Rather than dichotomous - ethno-nationalist or civic, as Phillips (1998) found - there exists a range of characteristics associated with Australian identity.

However, we do see the perseverance of both civic and ethno-nationalist constructions of national identity. The socio-political characteristics of these identities remained fairly consistent across the studies, and indeed consistent with Phillip’s own findings – ethno-nationalists are older, more religious and less educated, civic nationalists more likely to be baby boomers and younger, secular, and better educated. Yet various complexities were revealed; perhaps most obvious is the different proportions of Australians categorised as holding a civic sense of identity when evaluated against socio-economic/political correlates (75%) (Jones, 2000) as opposed to felt sense of attachment (38%) (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). This finding – that more Australians align with civic socio-economic/political correlates than feel attached to Australia for civic reasons – suggests that there may be some contradictions in the concept of civic identity. Perhaps, as other scholarship has suggested (Brett & Moran, 2011; Calhoun, 2007), a strong attachment to the nation does not negate civic values, but at the same time, civic values can be held without feeling attached to the nation, which opens up the door for other, perhaps cosmopolitan, attachments. It also suggests a growing orientation to civic values and identity, although ethno-nationalists remain at a relatively constant third of the population. Yet traditional symbols, such as Ned Kelly and the ANZACs (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Tranter & Donoghue, 2008; 2010) remain significant, suggesting the complex interplay between the two.

There is also room for cosmopolitan identities in Australia. Although the research does not provide a clear indication of whether Australians are becoming more cosmopolitan in their outlooks, this is an area of growing interest among
researchers. Certainly the correlates of cosmopolitan orientations (baby boomer and generation X, tertiary education, non-Christian) are the same as those associated with civic identities in earlier research (Phillips & Smith, 2008). Results suggest a gap between cosmopolitan attitudes/orientations and actual practices however, but these are somewhat contradictory with one study indicating high levels of cosmopolitan attitudes but lower levels of practices, and another suggesting high levels of practices (using quite different measures) disconnected from inclusive attitudes (Phillips & Smith, 2008; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Additionally, when posited as oppositional, people were more attached to national than global identity. It may be concluded that a ‘lite’ version of cosmopolitanism is developing as part of, or in addition to, Australian identity, but which form this takes (ideological, ethical, banal, or political) is unclear.

While governments over this time period have tried to articulate Australian values (Curran, 2004; Walsh & Karolis, 2008) these do not tightly overlap with everyday conceptualisations of what it means to be Australian. Values associated with Australian identity include both traditional, stereotypical aspects that associated with masculinity and sport, what might be seen as working class activities (saying g’day, barbecues, beer drinking, sports); and more progressive values including openness, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Yet these progressive values stand in contradiction to more exclusionary aspects of Australian-ness – support for economic protectionism and immigrant assimilation. These cannot be explained away as ‘regressive’ attitudes of an ethno-national minority, as they were found to be consistent across the population (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). As such, Australian-ness appears to be expressed in fairly exclusionary terms by many.

Phillips (1998: 299) concludes his paper with the observation that ‘Australian identity looks likely to continue to have an enduring and possibly increasing presence in Australian political and cultural life in the years to come’. The decade and a half since his publication suggests this remains the case, but that there has been significant diversification of what Australian-ness includes.
### Figure 1. Appendix A: Summary of selected studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source and sample type</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Analytical Focus</th>
<th>Principle Finding*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Jones, Frank**  
Diversities of National Identity in a Multicultural Society: The Australian Case  
*National Identities* Vol.2, 2 (2000) | Analysed 4 identity types - Dogmatic, Nativists, Literal, Civic, Nationalists, Moderate Pluralists – across 2 surveys to assess their stability and reliability. | How these four identities correlate with views about political and social trends, and demographic factors | Nativists constitute about 25% of the population; civic nationalists and moderate pluralists about 75%. Nativists align with more conservative, exclusive values; tend to be older, rural dwelling, and less educated, as compared to the latter group. |
| **1995 International Social Services Programme (ISSP95)**  
and **1996 Australian Electoral Survey (AES96)**  
Sample information not available | | | |
| **2. Pakulski, Jan & Tranter, Bruce**  
Civic, National and Denizen Identity in Australia  
ISSP95 | Operationalised 3 identities: civic, nationalist (ethno) & denizen. Analysed responses to the questions: ‘How close-how emotionally attached to Australia do you feel?’ and the relative importance of various factors for ‘being truly Australian’. Undertook logistical regression of socio-demographic correlates. | Social bonds of macro-social identities in Australia, focusing on differences in the strength and nature of attachment and socio-demographic correlates. | Civics comprise 38% of population, which is second highest internationally. Ethno-nationals make up 30%, denizens 6%, and remaining 26% were identified as mixed. The same general correlates were identified (as Jones, 2000), but agreement between the groups was found on economic protectionism and immigrant assimilation. |
| **3. Phillips, Tim**  
Imagined Communities and Self-identity: An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis  
World Values Survey (1995)  
n = 2048 Australians, aged 14yrs & over | Focused specifically on responses to measures of geographic identification and social distancing from outsiders (based on Bogardus’ (1959) social distance scale). | Felt sense of belonging, using Anderson’s (1983) ‘imagined community’ thesis. | Given choice (state, city, region) people identified firstly with Australia, but authors combined these to form 4 types of geographical identification: localists, local-looking nationalist, global-looking nationalists, global-looking localists. The latter were the least socially distant from outsider groups and most likely to want... |
4. Phillips, Tim & Smith, Phillip
What is ‘Australian’?: Knowledge and Attitudes Among a Gallery of Contemporary Australians

| 6 focus groups conducted in Queensland in 1997. 49 participants, representing a range of characteristics eg. Rural/urban, blue-collar/white collar workers. | QUALITATIVE Semi-structured questions; participants were asked to considered what it means to be ‘Australian’ and why, in an attempt to generate common-sense norms and concrete examples. | What “ordinary Australians” identify as Australian objects and concepts, including people, groups, places, activities, events and values. | Findings showed that across the population people relied on traditional, past-oriented attitudes about and symbols of Australianness. |

5. Smith, Phillip & Phillips, Tim
Popular Understandings of 'Un Australian': An Investigation of the Un-National

| As above | QUALITATIVE As above | What participants perceived as ‘un-national, non-national or anti-national’ | UnAustralian is: people, attitudes or activities that contravene Australian values – a ‘fair go’, mateship, easy going, etc.; ethnic groups; tourist, ethnic and urban spaces; and Americanisation. |

6. Brett, Judith & Moran, Anthony
Cosmopolitan Nationalism: Ordinary People Making Sense of Diversity

| 75 participants living in Victoria | QUALITATIVE interviews over 2 time periods – 1980’s and 2000’s. | The inclusionary potential of a ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ | Australians have a strong attachment to the nation, but also draw on inclusionary discourses, such as multiculturalism, to accept the ‘other’. |

7. Phillips, Tim & Holton, Robert
Personal Orientations Towards Australian National Identity Among British-Born Residents

| 2000/1 Australian National Identity Survey n = 2071 adults, with a focus on British migrants (n=164) | Analysis of responses from British migrants using frequency distributions; regression analysis to look at the impact of external variables (nationalism, citizenship etc.); and multivariate analysis of other socio-demographic variables. | British migrants’ understandings of Australian identity compared with Australian-born, and how this compares to civic and ethno-nationalism | British-born support civic Australianness that values multiculturalism, constitutional reform/ties to Commonwealth and Indigenous reconciliation. Less interested in ANZACs and casual lifestyle, more in Indigenous issues, and retaining ties to England. Higher education and national pride, in both Britain and Australia, was linked with civic values; yet the latter was also linked with ‘traditional’ |
Anglo-Australianness, whereas pride in neither country was linked with greater inclusive-ness.

8. Smith, Phillip & Phillips, Tim
Collective Belonging and Mass Media Consumption: Unravelling How Technological Medium and Cultural Genre Shape the National Imaginings of Australians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Survey Details</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000/1</td>
<td>Australian National Identity Survey n = 2071 adults</td>
<td>Sought to identify the effects of media exposure (amount, delivery and genre) on ‘imagined community’ formation, comparing this effect across different social correlates. Compared independent variables of national identification and media usage, as well as socio-demographic correlates.</td>
<td>They asked whether mass media: (1) reinforces closed national identities, (2) opposes national identities in favour of post-national, (3) or restructures national identities to be more universalist.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Media strengthens national pride, but internet use was associated with a more inclusive national identity. Highbrow media weakened national pride, while lowbrow promoted exclusive Australianness. Genre is more important than delivery or amount.</td>
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9. Phillips, Tim and Smith, Phillip
Cosmopolitan Beliefs and Cosmopolitan Practices: An Empirical Investigation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Survey Details</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000/1</td>
<td>Australian National Identity Survey n = 2071 adults</td>
<td>Focused on a subset of questions that constitutes individual-level indicators of cosmopolitan practice and cosmopolitan outlook.</td>
<td>The relationship between cosmopolitan outlook and practice in Australia.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The relationship between cosmopolitan outlook and practice in Australia. 40% of the population evidenced no cosmopolitan practice; 58% professed a cosmopolitan outlook. Expected socio-cultural correlates (youth, higher education level, no religion) were associated with a cosmopolitan outlook.</td>
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10. Hugo, Graeme
An Australian Diaspora?

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<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postal and online surveys (n=1477). Non-representative sample (university-educated pool) of Australians living overseas. (n=2072).</td>
<td>QUALITATIVE and quantitative analysis of submissions to two government enquiries on citizenship retention and other issues related to the Australian expatriate community. Assessed the Australian expatriate community according to Butler’s (2001) four criteria. The impact of globalisation, particularly mobility, on Australian identity. Australia’s expatriate community ‘call Australia home’ and identify with national Australian identity.</td>
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</table>

11. Tranter, Bruce & Donoghue, Jed
Colonial and Post-Colonial Aspects of Australian Identity
*British Journal of Sociology, Vol.58, 2 (2007)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Details</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) and</td>
<td>Analysed responses to: ‘Many different groups throughout Australia’s</td>
<td>Considered how colonial and post-colonial figures are</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Social Survey Program
n = 2183

history have influenced the way Australians see themselves. How much influence have each of
the following had?’

Used logistical regressions and multivariate analysis to
assess relative importances of groups, & socio-cultural correlates.

the majority of Australians. Those with
civic identity, valuing
laws and institutions,
still see the importance
of post-colonial
myths of
Australianness; while
ethno-nationalists
make these essential to
being Australian.

12. Goot, Murray & Watson, Ian
Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity.
in S. Wilson, G. Meagher, R. Gibson, D. Denemark and M. Western eds, Australian Social Attitudes : The
First Report (Sydney, 2005)

Analysed responses to
the survey in relation to
attitudes to
immigration and views
about Australianness.
Includes a factor
analysis of nativism and
national pride; and
multivariate analysis of
socio-demographic
factors on views about
immigration

Considered the impact
of social and political
factors on national
identity, specifically
whether ‘the Howard
years’ had caused
attitudes and identity
to become more
conservative and
closed.

Australians see national
identity as dependent
on achievable
attributes, such as
citizenship or felt sense
of belonging, rather
than ascribed
attributes. Australians
are generally proud of
the nation. Nativism is
a good predictor of anti-
immigration views, but
national pride is not.
Education is the most
significant determinant
of views on
immigration, with less
education resulting in
more exclusionary
views.

13. Donoghue, Jed & Tranter, Bruce
The Anzacs: Military Influences on Australian Identity
Journal of Sociology (2013)

Answers to the
questions: ‘Many
different groups
throughout Australia’s
history have influenced
the way Australians see
themselves. How much
influence have Anzacs
had?’

A binary logistic
regression analysis
identified the impact of
sex, age, education,
birthplace and political
affiliation on
perceptions of the
influence of the Anzacs

How the ANZAC legend contributes to
Australian national
identity, and correlates
with various socio-
demographic factors, in
the face of globalisation
and cosmopolitanism.

ANZACs were
associated with
national identity for
90% of Australians.
There is little socio-
demographic variation,
however older
generations, Australian-
born, Liberal party
voters, and the less
educated, are more
likely to view ANZACs
as significant.

Attitudes Towards Globalization and Cosmopolitanism: Cultural Diversity, Personal Consumption and
the National Economy
Random sample drawn from the 2004 Australian Election Study (n= 1769).

Cosmopolitan orientation was measured through the Programme on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA, 2000) to allow dual affiliation responses (national and cosmopolitan). A factor analysis compared national economy, personal consumption choice and culture, diversity and global rights, and was followed by a multivariate analysis of socio-demographic issues.

The study looked at the strength of cosmopolitan values, the consistency and coherence of cosmopolitan characteristics, and the relationship of cosmopolitanism to nationalism. The study differentiated consumptive, intellectual or ethical, and economic cosmopolitanisms.

64% of respondents identified as both a citizen of the world and nation; and 25% neither agreed nor disagreed. Generally Australians are positive about the impact of globalisation, except when it comes to negative economic outcomes. They suggest there are 3 different strands of actual cosmopolitanism: consumptive, diversity, and national economy. The socio-demographic correlates vary significantly, which highlights the separate agendas of these strands.

15. Purdie, Nola & Wilss, Lynn
Australian National Identity: Young Peoples’ Conceptions of What It Means to be Australian

242 students from 8 primary and secondary schools from diverse locations (rural/urban; low and high socio-economic status)

QUALITATIVE Students were asked ‘what do Australian adolescents think it means to be an Australian person?’. Each wrote a short essay specifying ‘typical’ Australian events, people or places. Twenty of these essays were thematically analysed, inductively and deductively.

Explore conceptions of Australian national identity held by adolescent Australians.

Nine distinct themes emerged: national and personal wellbeing; agreeableness; democracy; the environment; sport; citizenship; diversity; and a relaxed lifestyle. Overall, students understood Australianess both in traditional terms, as well as through Australia’s membership in a global community.

16. Skrbis, Zlatko & Woodward, Ian
The Ambivalence of Ordinary Cosmopolitanism: Investigating the Limits of Cosmopolitan Openness

Seventy-six Queenslanders, from a range of ethnic backgrounds, ages and occupations. (year of study not given).

QUALITATIVE Focus groups that discussed: globalisation, media consumption, food preference, travel experience, purchasing preferences, the environment, multinational corporations and immigration, and responses to familiar images related to

Investigated national identity and ‘ordinary cosmopolitanism’.

Cosmopolitanism in Australia is viewed positively because of the opportunity it brings, rather than being seen in terms of the responsibility of global citizenship, such as showing hospitality or putting human interest over national interest. Pros and cons were assessed.
globalisation (Eiffel Tower, Mickey Mouse, the ‘Australian Made’ sign) according to economic impacts, openness, and communicative opportunities.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 AuSSA n=2183 2 surveys: n = 117 &amp; n= 156 Analysed Asian Australian (n=273) responses to a question about what they saw as necessary for being truly Australian, using factor and regression analyses. Asian Australians’ perspectives on, and levels of attachment to, Australian national identity Older respondents saw Australianness as ascribed; less educated and unskilled labourers were more likely to see Australianness as important. Asian Australians viewed Australianness as a cluster of achievable traits, and pride was found in achievements (sport &amp; science) rather than historical myths.</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 AuSSA n=2183 2 surveys: n = 117 &amp; n= 156 Analysed whether different aspects of the nation state received support from the Asian-Australian population, including: attachment to the state; preference for civic or nativist nationalism, and issues of citizenship; pride in political institutions; and economic policy. Explored national attachment amongst the Asian-Australian population, and whether they feel differently about Australia compared to the rest of the population. Family and occupation are more important for Asian Australian identification than the nation; respondents held similar views on civic identity, to the rest of the population, although a number saw it in more nativist terms; favoured transnational citizenship; were more proud of Australia’s treatment of minority groups; and held similar views about economic policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 AuSSA (n – 1914) Analyses responses to the question ‘Bushrangers roamed the countryside during the early period of European settlement in Australia. Please write the names of four bushrangers below’. Used cross tabulation and multivariate analysis. Summary of bushranger knowledge, and an analysis of the socio/cultural predictors of bushranger knowledge. Ned Kelly was most commonly identified as a bushranger, and represents an ethnic (Irish) mythology, folk hero, and colonial Australianness.</td>
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|---|
2007 AuSSA (n = 2583) | Included several questions to explore the symbolic nature of Ned Kelly (the most recognized bushranger in the previous study) in Australian identity, used a logistical regression to analyse the question ‘Ned Kelly was a bushranger whose image appeared in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympic Games. How important do you think Ned Kelly is as a symbol of Australian identity?’.

The significance of Ned Kelly to Australianness; why he is still significant; and socio-demographic correlates.

57% of Australians saw Ned Kelly as an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ symbol of Australianness. He is deemed important for both positive and negative reasons (icon, brave, anti-authoritarian, a thief, loyal). Older, married, lower class, less educated and less wealthy people were more likely to view Kelly as significant.

21. Kabir, Nahid
What Does it Mean to be Un-Australian’?: Views of Australian Muslim Students in 2006

60 Australian Muslim students in NSW and WA. | QUALITATIVE interviews | Investigated Muslim Australians’ willingness to adopt Australian values and their perception of ‘Australian’ and ‘un-Australian’

The students believed Australia meant a ‘fair go’, multiculturalism, and expressed loyalty to Australia. UnAustralian meant being born elsewhere; contravening Australian values, or not valuing Australian popular culture; disloyalty; and racism (the Cronulla Riots were mentioned).

22. Haggis, Jane & Schech, Susanne
Refugees, Settlement Processes and Citizenship Making: An Australian Case Study.

37 UNHCR-sponsored refugees and unofficial entrants | QUALITATIVE Extended narrative interviews, including the broad issue of how postnational and national models of citizenship may constructively co-exist in national images of community.

To explore refugees’ understandings of Australianness, citizenship and experiences of arrival and settlement.

6 interviews detail feelings of welcome and unwelcome; stereotyping and exclusion; a belief that citizenship offers full ‘Australianness’.

*These are the principle findings relevant to national identity. Where studies use the same data set we do not repeat the details.*
3. 8 References


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http://doi.org/10.1177/1440783308097128


http://doi.org/10.1080/14608940601145695


http://doi.org/10.1080/13569319808420780


http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2007.00146.x


http://doi.org/10.1080/10361140802429296


Chapter Four [Paper Two]. ‘I googled UnAustralian’: Analysis of who is using the term in 2013

An extended version of a paper presented at The Australia Sociological Association Conference, Monash University, Melbourne (2013)
Catherine Austin (nee Morris)

4.1 Abstract

The term ‘UnAustralian’\(^1\) has been part of Australian nomenclature for over a century, but the last decade has seen its formal entry into the Macquarie Dictionary, and increasing use in political discourse and common parlance. This paper undertakes an exploration of the latter by considering its use in online discourse. Capitalising on this online space to interrogate the interactive development of discourses, analytical focus was on issues of identity, exploring who is using unAustralian nomenclature and to whom it is applied. Five news articles and the respective comments of readers on blog discussions are thematically analysed. Inductive analysis identified a number of themes including: the etymology and the reification of the notion of unAustralian, aspects of both inclusive and exclusive nationalism, and arguments for tolerance, a ‘fair-go’ mentality and cosmopolitanism. Two principle identities emerge, one aligned with traditional renderings of unAustralian as found by Phillips and Smith (2001); another constructing a counter discourse that challenged that hegemony. Exploration of the commonly used discursive strategies – humour and ‘Othering’ – is undertaken, elucidating the pull between reification of the Other and a Universalist morality that reflects cosmopolitan values.

4.2 Introduction

\(\text{It’s un-Australian to imply anything or anyone is ‘un-Australian’!}\)\(^2\)

Marty of Earth (Sharwood, 2013)

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\(^1\) Scare quotes are only used in the first instance of words or phrases that require them
\(^2\) All quotes are taken directly from the web as written, and incorrect spelling and grammar have not been corrected
Wake up this is Australia, people come here for what this Country offers, don't let a minority turn it into the same hell hole they left.

Brian of Brisbane (Sharwood, 2013, January 22)

Studies in national identity have primarily focused on what is deemed ‘national’ and who are the carriers of national-ness. For example, ANZACS, a fair-go, and mateship - all characteristics of identity 'carried' by white men (Elder, 2007; Fee & Russell, 2007; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007) - exemplify notions of Australianness. Rarely are the anti- or un-national aspects of national identity interrogated. These however, offer a point of comparison that clarifies our understanding of what national identity is by demarcating what it is not (Smith and Phillips 2001). Therefore this study seeks to expand the literature on Australianness by exploring contemporary uses of the term unAustralian by 'average Australians' in the public sphere. Two key questions drive this research: how is unAustralianness understood by the general populace and what does this tell us about Australian identity.

In 2001 Smith and Phillips conducted focus groups with average Australians to garner contemporary understandings of national identity, and this included looking at popular understandings of unAustralianness. Fifteen years ago they found the term was...

...almost a proverbial 'black box'. ‘UnAustralian’ was not found to have a listing in either The Oxford Companion to Australian History (Davison et al., 1998) or The Macquarie Dictionary (1991). Nor did a systematic literature search turn up a single dedicated study of the ‘UnAustralian’. (Phillips and Smith 2001: 326).

This has since changed. Not only has unAustralian appeared in The Macquarie Dictionary, but also there are a number of articles that explore the use of the term. We begin by considering the dictionary definitions and then exploring understandings of unAustralianness in the contemporary literature.

4.2.1 Contemporary usage of unAustralian

The Macquarie Dictionary offers four definitions of unAustralianness (Macmillan Publishing Group, 2013). Firstly it is defined as "not Australian in character". This seems to offer a broad definition that includes anything or anyone
understood to be 'not Australian', while taking for granted that there is clarity about things/people that are 'Australian in character'. This definition presumably incorporates things that make no claim to be Australian in the first place, such as a British landscape or a person from Guatemala. The second definition refers to "not conforming to ideas of traditional Australian morality and customs, such as fairness, honesty, hard work, etc.". Essentially these are behaviours and values that contravene Australian values and ethics. Again, it is not specified that the perpetrator of said behaviour is Australian, although perhaps it is implied. A third definition of unAustralian is to violate "a pattern of conduct, behaviour, etc., which, it is implied by the user of the term, is one embraced by Australians". This is similar to the second definition, but focuses on contravention of practices, rather than ethics and morals, thus identifying an action as unAustralian. It also acknowledges the term's rhetorical usage, and the constructed rather than essential nature of national identity. Finally the Macquarie dictionary offers a definition it deems obsolete; that is someone who is "disloyal to the Australian nation, especially by virtue of being subject to manipulation by an influence from outside Australia". This is perhaps referring to those espousing controversial 'foreign' views, such as communism during the Cold War or perhaps Islamism in the contemporary context.

Beyond these dictionary definitions there has been a proliferation of studies on the topic, many of which offer explanations of unAustralianness that overlap with the first three dictionary definitions. Firstly the term unAustralian is used to maintain boundaries between 'us' the Australians, and 'them' the unAustralians; secondly, it is used to mark the Australianness of the speaker by identifying the other as the opposite (unAustralian); thirdly, it is used as an insult, or to designate something as offensive; and finally, unAustralian has been found to denote behaviour that contravenes human rights or is deemed inhumane. These four uses of the term unAustralian are explored in some detail below.

Firstly, Schwartz (2009) notes the way unAustralian nomenclature is used by elite voices to delineate us and them. An example of this was seen at the time of the Woomera Detention Centre controversy (2002)\(^{21}\), when a number of asylum seeker

\(^{21}\) Woomera was opened as an 'Immigration Reception and Processing Centre' in 1999 to house asylum seekers after the government instituted mandatory detention policies in the early 1990's. Since it's opening it was shrouded in controversy, with claims of child abuse and massive overcrowding. The centre was closed in 2003 due to ongoing public pressure.
detainees sewed their lips together in protest against the conditions they were enduring. In response, the Prime Minister at the time, John Howard, labelled the detainees and those who advocated for them, unAustralian. This label had a two-fold purpose.

Firstly, these asylum seekers were deemed unAustralian because their actions (sewing their lips together in protest) were deemed to be acts that no Australian should ever engage in. Rather than recognising sewing ones lips together and hunger strikes as acts of desperation or legitimate acts of protest, the Prime Minister discursively positioned these as suspect actions that contravene Australian values and character, such as being relaxed and 'easy-going' (Moran, 2011; Brett, 2005). Indeed the implicit claim made by these acts of protest - that Australians are treating the asylum seekers unjustly - was deemed unAustralian because such acts value justice over mateship (Merrillees, 2006). As Birch (2001: 21) notes, "simply 'to be' one of those who have been abused by the Australian nation is to be 'un-Australian'".

Not only were the actions of these asylum seekers seen as unAustralian, but also they were seen as intrinsically unAustralian. As Instone (2010: 360) notes, Howard used the term "to mark out a distinct boundary between those who agreed with his policies and values (Australian) and dissenting voices (unAustralian)". Effectively such a label expelled these people from the Australian political and judicial sphere and allowed unjust and inhumane treatment because they were unAustralians who did not belong within our nation (Johnson, 2007b). Placed in a 'state of exception', stripped of their legal status and judicial rights, and either physically removed from (to places like Guantanamo Bay by the US or Nauru by Australia), or detained within (as was the case with Woomera) the boundaries of the nation, such people became disposable and inhuman (Agamben, 2005; Fozdar, forthcoming). Thus, constructing these asylum seekers as unAustralians placed the individuals beyond the bounds of the nation and national responsibility, and perhaps even beyond the bounds of humanity (Agamben, 2005; Johnson, 2007b; Schwarz, 2009).

A second characteristic use of unAustralian found in the literature was its vagueness and vacuity; essentially it carries little meaning beyond simply identifying the speaker as the opposite (i.e. Australian). As Johnson (2007b: 529) notes "...the term 'unAustralian' has been marked more by its remarkable elasticity than by any adherence to a single core definition". In this sense calling someone or something
unAustralian functions to solidify the Australianness of the speaker and identify the 'enemy within', and little more. This use of unAustralian is interesting as, by seeing who is using the term, we are able to discover who deems themselves Australian.

There are currently a number of views about what it means to be Australian. Firstly some see Australia as a civic, multicultural nation (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; Brett & Moran, 2011; Soutphommasane, 2009), with an orientation toward inclusivity and openness (Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). In this sense Australianness is (theoretically) available to all who claim it, given they adhere to the civic requirements of the nation-state. Logically unAustralian nomenclature is also open to all, and anyone - even the most archetypal Australian (perhaps Steve Urwin?) - could be labelled unAustralian. Hage (1998) however, argues that there are structural power imbalances, and that there is a practical national identity in which authentic Australianness necessitates compliance with nativist cultural ideals such as ‘whiteness’ (and degrees there-of) and native birth. This aligns with a more ethno-nationalist view, and its proponents tend to have ‘traditional’, exclusionary views about what it means to be Australian, valuing: native birth, national pride, the ANZACs, Christian heritage, patriarchy, and boundary maintenance, and they tend to be anti-immigration (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). For these people then, the unAustralian would include visibly different, non-white migrants, as well as though who contravene the myths of (white) Australianness such as mateship and a fair-go. Currently it seems that this later notion of Australianness is at play in public discourse as whiteness dominates (Johnson, 2007; McNevin, 2009). This power that whiteness holds is evident in the writings of Craw (2007: 548) who reflects on her experience of coming to Australia as a New Zealander, and notes that while she is not an Australian citizen (i.e. she is literally unAustralian), she still feels like she belongs to the national 'we' primarily because of her "pale, melanin-impaired skin and English-speaking tongue".

Thirdly, Neumann (2007) noted that unAustralian was often used discursively to emphasise negative occurrences. Exploring Hansard records, Neumann found a number of events or people described as 'unbecoming', ‘bizarre’, ‘tragic’, and other similar terms, and that these were accompanied by the term unAustralian. In these instances unAustralian seemed to be added to the discourse to establish the significance of particular occurrences or people. While an event or a person's actions
may be negative, designating them unAustralian somehow amplifies the negative light in which the action or event is being constructed, while simultaneously eschewing any connection with Australia (the corollary being that it leaves Australia/n undamaged, even strengthened, by the action or event). Essentially, unAustralian is being used as a catch-all phrase to elevate the negative traits of an event or a person.

Finally, the literature suggests that unAustralian has become a term used by those opposing traditional renderings of Australianness and aspiring to more global, cosmopolitan forms of identification. From this perspective unAustralianness is (re)defined and applied to Australian abuses (and abusers) of human rights that Australia has enacted in recent years, particularly in relation to asylum seekers (Birch, 2001; Johnson, 2007; Fozdar & Pederson, 2013). Instone (2010) suggests this use of the term began as a response to the detention of asylum seekers under John Howard's Prime Ministership in the late 1990s. While Howard used the term extensively to refer to the asylum seekers and their advocates (see discussion above), these groups responded by claiming the term for themselves. They did this in a number of ways: firstly as a badge of honour - they were happy to be unAustralian if Australianness was embodied by Prime Minister Howard and the unjust actions of the Australian government (Birch, 2001); and secondly by inverting it to refer to the perpetrators of human rights abuses (Humpage, 2004), applying a civic version of Australianness, in which anyone, even the most archetypally Australian, is able to fall 'beyond the fence' (Merrilees, 2006) and become unAustralian if they do not treat people fairly.

From this review of contemporary analyses of the use of the term unAustralian it is clear that it is being used in a number of different ways, including: as a boundary between us and them; to mark the Australianness of the speaker; to intensify the negativity of an event or person; and finally, to identify behaviour that contravenes human rights or is inhumane. What these various definitions show is the fluid and contested nature of the term, and by extension, the national character. For some, the 'un-national' characterises those who arrive from other shores and indulge in other cultural norms and practices; for others it refers to those who exclude these new arrivals. While the simple discursive act of labeling someone or something unAustralian can delineate the national from the unnational, it is the meaning implicit in the use of the term as it is most commonly engaged that warrants exploration, in order to better understand how it co-constructs national identity.
4.3 Methodology

To consider the contemporary use of the term unAustralian, a simple Google search was undertaken (google.com.au) in May 2013. While perhaps a crude measure, exploring the use of the term online is principally advantageous because of the easy access it affords to its most common everyday usage. Experian’s Hitwise shows that Google is the most consistently accessed website in Australia and “digital technologies are no longer just an additional way of engaging, but are the primary means of interaction for everyday activities” (Middleton, 2014: 1. Emphasis added). In the Phillip and Smith (2001) study referred to earlier, that explored everyday understandings of the term, participants were drawn from a single Australian state (Queensland), and while they were selected to represent a range of socio-political characteristics, the study did not capture the spontaneous use of the term in everyday discourse, by average Australians, but invited commentary on how they thought it was used. In contrast, the newly available online space allows interrogation of the interactive development of discourses around the term unAustralian by diverse participants. Thus, the current research did not generate responses or participants using particular categories, but analysed the online discourse by focusing almost exclusively on issues of identity, exploring who is using unAustralian nomenclature and to whom it is applied.

The first ten results when Googling unAustralian included: a wikipedia page22, Sam Kekovich’s ‘National Lambnesia test’23, ‘It’s UnAustralian.com’ (a pro-gambling campaign)24, ABC Radio’s ‘word watch’25, a ‘Yahoo7 Answers’ discussion about an ANZAC Day ban on alcohol consumption for diggers26, and five news articles from a range of newspapers27. It must be noted that most of the top ten sites are not sites where the term unAustralian is used in discussion by ordinary Australians but are in

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25 http://www.abc.net.au/newsradio/txt/s1363486.htm
26 http://au.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20130422224848AAdG1S2
fact analyses of the use of the word. Therefore we have excluded these from our analysis. The news articles and corresponding comments sections (blogs) were selected for analysis to allow a focus on discourse from both the elite media and everyday populace (Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2013; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006).

Blogs provide an online space where multiple voices can participate (Moyo, 2009; Norris, 2001) and a 'global soapbox' for new voices to enter into once 'exclusive' conversations. "Blogging is fundamentally about giving one's opinion" (Fozdar and Pedersen, 2013: 3), and their 'public' location (the blogosphere) allows 'everyday citizens' to participate in conversations that were previously exclusive to the elite. It has been argued that this new space functions as a Habermasian public sphere (Fozdar & Pedersen, 2013) that permits rational argument to occur between multiple participants. In this context, opinions and ideas are refined as the bloggers engage in constructive discourse.

Others suggest however that the online sphere perpetuates pre-existent socio-economic divisions, as well as creating new social stratifications, due to variations in technological knowhow and accessibility (Moyo, 2009; Norris, 2001). Contradicting the thesis that the Internet limits the power of the elite and allows everyone to enter the conversation, structural processes prioritise commercial sites and application usage (Google, Bing, etc), limiting user autonomy and increasing provider power (Ampofo, 2013, Daly, 2014). Rather than levelling power distribution, it merely shifts it to new gatekeepers.

The extent to which either of these positions holds true in relation to the blogs that we are analysing is unclear. On one hand these are publically available sites with no firewall, permitting access to all. As such, they are available to be used as a new public sphere for constructive arguments to occur in. Yet at the same time, these are newspapers that have quite explicit and obvious socio-political leanings, and are thus likely to attract a certain 'type' of readership. The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age (both part of the Fairfax Media group) have a slightly left leaning agenda, while The Punch, The Courier Mail and News.com.au are all part of Rupert Murdoch's Newscorp empire and lean to the right of politics. As such, 'echo chambers' of conversation may remain an issue.

Bearing these factors in mind, thematic analysis was employed to explore the breadth and depth of data, as well as commonalities in the five news blogs. Themes
were derived both deductively and inductively. Inductive themes arose directly from the examples, such as the etymology and the reification of unAustralian. Deductive themes were based on the findings of the Smith and Phillips (2001) study, as well as the researchers' own review of Australian national identity (Fozdar & Austin, forthcoming). These themes included: inclusive and exclusive nationalism, tolerance, a ‘fair-go’ mentality and cosmopolitanism.

4.4 Results

This section summarises the content of the five news articles that arose from the Google search.

Each of the articles varied slightly in flavour; the first (Sharwood, 2013, January 22) explored the four definitions of unAustralian in the 2001 Macquarie dictionary (discussed in our introduction), one of which suggested that not stopping at a pub was considered unAustralian. Delving into the word’s origins, it’s relationship to social norms, and political employment (“the word was used 40 times last year in parliament...”), Sharwood (2013) concluded that unAustralian is an insulting term that contravenes Australian values. Thus he supports the inversion that unAustralian is best applied to the intolerant and exclusionary segments of society. Wighton (2013, January 28) explores definitions of unAustralianness with the goal of explaining Australian national identity. Using humour to outline stereotypical behaviours, people and events that others have claimed to be unAustralian, Wighton wrote her own satirical list, including "not owning thongs (for the feet)" and "taking yourself too seriously". Similar to Sharwood, Wighton advocates moving beyond the language of Australian and unAustralian, to recognise that “citizens of the world...are the true Australians”, an apparently contradictory call to cosmopolitanism.

Dubecki (2008, January 26) also used humour to explored the divisive aspects of the use of the term unAustralian in politics, sport, and common parlance. ‘UnAustralianism' was linked to Australia’s history of division and exclusion, political jingoism, and its usage as a ‘cover-all concept' to decry unfairness. Othering discourse was seen as a Universal phenomenon, rather than specifically Australian, and contra-opinions that claimed unAustralian as a positive attribute, rather than an insult, were noted. Starke (2013, January 17) also looked at its relationship to exclusion,
particularly towards “women, immigrants, indigenous citizens and non-heterosexuals”. This was followed by a comparison between inclusive and exclusive Australianness – the former typified by international promoters of the arts and high culture (food, wine, film, music); the latter by Meat and Livestock Australia’s (MLA) Lambnesia campaign, which is a “blatant example of Australia’s dopey, blokey culture”.

In the last article (“Palmer says party leaders are unAustralian,” 2013, May 31), the reporter equated unAustralianness with foreign birth. A mining billionaire who had just started his own political party, Clive Palmer, is reported to have said that the then Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Opposition Leader Tony Abbott fail to understand or represent the Australian people because of their foreign birth, with a usage of unAustralian that the Macquarie dictionary identifies as archaic. However Palmer is not reported to have used the word unAustralian himself, rather the reporter uses the term to infer meaning from Palmer’s comments.

Some initial observations can be made of these articles. The image of the Australian flag – merchandised, painted on faces (Image 1), worn on ‘wife beater’ singlets, and beer can holders – was displayed in pictures accompanying 3 of the 5 articles. Four of the articles, all of which were written on or around Australia Day (26th January), focused on the nomenclature and etymology of unAustralian and its exclusionary usage. In all of these, use of the term unAustralian was seen as divisive, unhelpful, and better applied to the intolerant than the foreign-born. In contrast the fifth article used the term to describe foreign birth as unAustralian. Two articles were published by the more liberal Fairfax Media, and three by the more conservative News Ltd.

4.5 The comments

In keeping with our interest in the general public’s use of the term, we focus at this point on the uptake of the information and arguments in these articles, found in the blog comments sections of each. A total of 263 comments were made and
accessible to be viewed. These were in response to two of the articles - Starke (2013, January 17) and Sharwood (2013, January 22). Comments sections of the other articles were not available for public viewing. Comments on Starke (2013) were structured so that commenters could either reply to an existing comment, or place a new one. A conversational and often combative dialogue ensued, exemplified in the following (reproduced as posted):

(Comment) dancan says: *You live in Australia and it's a free country do whatever the hell you want, that is what makes you Australian.*

(Replies) subotic says: *That, and a pair of testicles. Wait... what?*

Ohcomeon says: *Doing whatever the hell you want makes with no consideration of others makes you a bogan...*

Responses to Sharwood (2013) did not have the reply function, but comments often referenced those preceding. Both collections of comments allowed anonymity, however the Sharwood (2013) article requested location, which many provided. Otherwise, little demographic data could be yielded from the responses.

To explore the ways in which unAustralian was being used in these comments section a thematic analysis was undertaken. Thematic analysis is a fairly 'common sense' method, in which deductive themes were actively selected and interpreted by the researcher and inductive themes were derived from the data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Mapping themes involved open coding, which consisted of three phases: engaging in an initial analysis of the data sets for themes consistent with broader research; combining these with inductive themes derived from the data; and finally undertaking a process of comparison for similarities and differences (Ezzy, 2002).

Themes evident in the comments sections included: Othering; fear of a challenge to the hegemony; humour; and representations of Australian-ness in relation to ANZAC’s, sport and masculinity, and an easy-going attitude. There was also an emergent counter discourse, which aligned more closely with the articles and challenged traditional renderings of unAustralianess. These themes were then clustered together around the research question - how is unAustralianess understood by the general populace and what does this tell us about Australian identity?
4.6 Analysis

Two dominant versions of unAustralianness emerged from the comments - one aligned with traditional renderings of what is deemed unAustralian and used the term to describe those who contravene social, racial, and gender norms. Another constructed a counter discourse that challenged this hegemony. Whilst analytically useful to work with distinct notions of unAustralian identity, it is acknowledged that a spectrum, partly the result of the fuzzy lines of discourse, better reflects reality. However for ease of analysis these are explored separately below, as is a discourse that moved beyond unAustralianness, advocating a human-focused, rather than nation-focused, perspective.

Firstly there were a number of commenters that engaged in the construction of the foreigner as unAustralian, the 'alien in our midst', together with those who fail to conform to 'our' social and cultural norms. Othering relied on numerous stereotypes - racial, political and class based - and often saw unAustralianness in certain individuals' or groups' refusal to assimilate and the rejection of cultural norms. As John of Melbourne (comment 25, Sharwood, 2013, January 22) says: “Being Un-Australian... means, NOT ASSIMILATING after you have left your own country for a better one”. Essentially, unAustralianness is seen to be embodied by Others that do not assimilate, learn our language or adhere to Australian values (Dubecki, 2008, January 26; Starke, 2013, January 17; Wighton, 2013, January 28).

These constructions reflect traditional uses of the term (Dubecki, 2008, January 26; P Smith & Phillips, 2001) and its use by former Prime Minister John Howard (Johnson, 2007b). The unAustralian is seen as the migrant who contravenes Australian social norms and mores, and who intrinsically lacks the qualities necessary for being Australian. This suggests a nativist construction of Australianness, that sees native birth, ancestry and shared cultural heritage as essential (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000), and sits in contrast with notions of Australia as a multicultural nation based on civic principles. Further, the fear of threat to the hegemony also demonstrated insidious forms of prejudice that Hage (1998) notes align with the ‘fantasy’ of white dominance. As Levi (commenter, cited in Stark, 2013) suggests:

For some reason I suspect you would be happier if white, heterosexual males with north/west european ancestry just all
died and were replaced by a perfect version of non-discriminating, sexually ambiguous, uniformly brown skinned, muslim/buddhist hybrids with a passion for Marx and feminism.

This attempt to humorously invert the power hierarchy (sometimes called 'reverse racism') seeks to claim exclusion and prejudice toward the power-wielding white majority. Such a comment, situated in this conversation about unAustralianness, suggest that the unAustralian is the liberal leftists ('a passion for Marx and feminism') amongst us, insidiously stripping away 'our' Australianness that is embodied in heteronormative, white masculinity ('white, heterosexual males with north/west european ancestry'). White Australia has been emboldened by a resurgence of Anglo-centric discourse (Johnson, 2007; Fozdar & Spittles, 2009) to view itself as threatened by the increased numbers of internal Others, particularly Muslims (Kabir, 2008). They ('uniformly brown skinned, muslim/buddhist hybrids') are seen to be attempting to 'cross the fence' from unAustralia to Australia, but found to be wanting. Or perhaps it is that they are trying to transform Australian into unAustralian. Either way, their presence is deemed unwelcome and unAustralian.

Humour played a significant role throughout the comments section of the blogs. A lack of humour was deemed unAustralian, as Chris' (commenter on Starke, 2013, January 17) comment "when it comes to laughing at ourselves I suggest we all join in" suggests those who can not laugh at themselves are unAustralians. Humour was also used to mitigate prejudice and to claim that Othering comments were unintentional or not meant to cause harm (Due, 2011; van Dijk, 1993), and often relied on racial stereotypes. This was seen in this response by Morrgo (commenter) to Starke's (2013) article: “Ah, stereotypes, a great topic for writers to drag out any time. On this vein, Ms Starke may well be of German ancestry, and this could explain not getting the full picture on Lambnesia”. Morrgo's sarcastic comment is taking offence at the 'stereotypes' that Ms Starke has used in the article about unAustralians, while drawing on his own racial stereotypes to categorise Ms Starke's behaviour.

A second version of what it means to be unAustralian pervaded the online comments section, and this, in contrast to this Othering discourse that reified stereotypes and traditional constructions of the unAustralian, offered a counter discourse that associated unAustralianness with the hegemony. Rather than the
foreigner in our midst, it was the “Orstraliaans” (Plancko, commenter) who love “beer, pies, cricket, footy, barbies and thongs” (Tim, commenter in Starke, 2013) that were seen to personify unAustralianness.

This supports a version of Australian identity based less in ethnic and cultural traits, and more in civic values (Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). For these commenters, unAustralians are those who try to exclude others by constructing a narrow version of Australian identity based on (generally) cultural/behavioural lines. These commenters also questioned political and socio-demographic characteristics of Australianness, such as political conservatism, White Australia, and Christianity (Phillips, 1998), by deeming figures like Pauline Hanson (leader of the right-wing One Nation Party 1997-2003, who has recently regained a Senate seat at the 2016 election) and the Exclusive Brethren Christian groups, as themselves, unAustralian (Dubecki, 2008, January 26).

Ironically, central to this counter discourse were the 'traditional Australian values' of tolerance and a 'fair-go' for all. For these commenters, being Australian meant tolerating difference and offering the opportunity to participate and 'have a go' to all peoples, not just those representing an ethno-nationalist version of Australian identity. Therefore it was those who lack these tolerant, inclusive qualities that were deemed unAustralian. As 'Yes, it’s a joke, of Australia' (commenter, Sharwood, 2013) suggested, "being un-Australian is having a list of things that make someone un-Australian." Some commenters subscribed to a class-based elitism, categorising the unAustralian as “a bogan, a dero, a drunk or a “lad”” (Wes of Sydney, commenter, Sharwood, 2013). Whilst this Othered a different group (the intolerant, as opposed to the racially, politically or ethnically different), a belief that some characteristics or people are unAustralian remained. And this was still based on traditional Australian values of fairness and equality (Brett & Moran, 2011).

There were some commenters that seemed to move beyond these national confines to prioritise “citizens[hip] of the world” (Wighton, 2013, January 28). They embraced being termed unAustralian, and claimed it as “a badge of honour which identifies a different understanding of nation” (Pugliese, cited in Dubecki, 2008, January 26). This, as noted earlier, may result from a disdain for the unjust actions of the Australian government (Birch, 2001), and a desire to invert the meaning of unAustralianness and apply it to the perpetrators of human rights abuses (Humpage,
Others saw both Australian and unAustralian as irrelevant, such as Rob of Perth (commenter, Sharwood, 2013) who suggests, “I don’t care whether I’m classified as Australian or not. I would rather be classified as "Human". that way we all start with something in common.” This statement moves beyond the Australian/unAustralian dichotomy, and prioritises common bonds of humanity above those of nationality.

This approach is cosmopolitan, an emerging discourse in Australia (Woodward, Skrbis, & Bean, 2008: 210). Cosmopolitanism centres around the idea of openness, universalism and humanist ideals (Skrbis & Woodward, 2013; Brett & Moran, 2011; Calhoun, 2008). The cosmopolitan identity is fluid and flexible, a ‘blended selfhood’ that engages with diversity and includes the Other. While some see cosmopolitanism as fundamentally anti-nation, cosmopolitans do not necessarily seek to abolish national identity, as it has been argued that it can become a part of a blended selfhood (Shafak, 2014; Appaiah, 1996), however they do present a challenge to the ubiquity of national identity. Recent literature has noted the move towards cosmopolitan values, either in opposition to or as a complement to Australian identity (Beasley, Bulbeck, & McCarthy, 2009; Brett & Moran, 2011; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Austin & Fozdar, forthcoming) and this may significantly change the construction of unAustralianness, and Australianness, in the future.

Essentially, what we see in this study is that online comments about unAustralianness by everyday citizens reflect findings in the broader literature that it is an ambiguous term with multiple meanings. This study found that unAustralians are identified as the foreigner in our midst, and the Other who does not conform to our social and cultural norms. As such, the term unAustralian is used to demarcate the Other and maintain a fence around Australianness, often in implicitly racist ways.

Secondly, the meaning of the term unAustralian was inverted, and applied to those who contravene human rights or enact inhumane processes, rather than the foreigner or the culturally ‘rebellious’. This promoted a more civic version of Australianness that all can participate in, as long as they adhere to the political and civic requirements. Hence the unAustralian becomes the politically, rather than culturally, non-compliant.

### 4.7 Conclusion

This article has provided some insight into the contemporary use of the term unAustralian, and, by identifying what it is not, an understanding of Australian identity.
as well. There is very little literature in this field, and so this paper has offered an overview of previous studies, as well as some empirical analysis of blog comments pertaining to unAustralianness. From this analysis unAustralianness appears to be a term used by everyday Australians to exclude an Other. Sometimes this is done by placing a divide between 'us', the Australian-born who adhere to (white) Australian cultural norms, and 'them', who challenge these stereotypical understandings of Australianness. At other times, unAustralian nomenclature is inverted and applied to the intolerant and exclusionary (white) Australians, rather than the foreign born. These findings support the broader literature that suggests the term unAustralian is characterised by its 'remarkable elasticity' (Johnson, 2007b). Yet a comparison with Smith and Phillips' (2001) study highlights both the continuity of unAustralianness as a notion over nearly twenty years, as well as the emergence of a counter-discourse associated with cosmopolitanism. Future research would benefit from exploring the impact of cosmopolitanism on constructions of (un)Australianness, and elucidating changes and challenges to hegemonic Australian discourse and identity in a globalised world (Skrbis, Kendall, & Woodward, 2004).
4.8 References


Chapter Five [Paper Three]. The construction of national identity on Australian political parties’ Facebook pages

Minor Revisions, Continuum
Catherine Austin

5.1 Abstract
Political campaigning is not just about promoting policies, but is also concerned with promoting a particular version of national identity. Using frame analysis, this paper reports representations of Australian identity in the lead-up to the 2013 election on the Facebook pages of the two major political parties in Australia, the Liberal Party and the Labor Party. Three framings are revealed, consistent across both major parties; those of family, whiteness and nationalism. These are familiar tropes of Australianness, commonly found in the literature. However, it is argued that they appear anachronistic in the context of growing calls for post-national political formations and consciousness, and previous moves by Australian politicians to foster a more inclusive and regionally/globally orientated identity.

Key Words: National identity; social media; cosmopolitanism; frame analysis; political campaigning

5.2 Introduction
This country of ours, Australia, is one of the best countries in the world. We have a strong and dynamic economy, recognised as such around the world. We believe passionately in a fair go, and a fair go for all. We’re also by instinct a positive people and we prefer to work together rather than tear each other apart. That’s who we are as Australians. (Kevin Rudd, quoted by Guardian Media Group, 2013)

This quote, from a speech by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd during a 2013 Australian election debate, illustrates how politicians construct national identity as part of their election campaigns. Such campaigns provide opportunities for politicians
to construct versions of the national identity that align with their political ideals, while also framing their message to suit pre-existing cultural values (Curran, 2004). While previously politicians engaged in such framing using a small number of media platforms (television, radio, newspapers), new media has changed the game. It affords constant, on-demand access to news and information; multiple platforms for ‘sharing’; and new processes of ‘democratisation’ that allow the public to communicate with, or about, politicians through User Generated Content opportunities.

This paper explores the ways national identity, political discourse and new media come together in the Australian context, using political parties’ Facebook pages as a case study. There is a small but growing literature on how constructions of Australianness are woven through political discourse (Curran, 2004; Johnson, 2002; Younane Brookes, 2010; 2012), and on the use of new media by Australian politicians (Highfield & Bruns, 2012; Jericho, 2012; Gibson & McAllister, 2011; Grant, Moon, & Busby Grant, 2010). This study extends the field by looking at the ways Australian identity is framed on social media (specifically political parties’ Facebook pages) during an election campaign.

5.2.1 Nation, identity & politics

Settler nations like Australia have a fundamental problem when it comes to identity. They are composed of disparate groups of individuals, mostly of migrant stock, who may not share a common culture (Jupp, 2007). As a result, such nation-states have “...as an objective the creation of a common culture, symbols and values” [italics added] (Guibernau, 1996: 48).

It is unsurprising then, that the discourse of state leaders is permeated with constructions of national identity. The ‘elite’ are, in effect, “designers of national identities and national cultures” whose goal it is to link political membership of the nation state with a particular version of a national culture (De Cillia et al., 1999: 155). National leaders’ raison d’etre resides in the nation-state, thus one of their main foci is to present (and re-present) national identities for the general populous to consume and re-construct. This becomes a two way process, a “reciprocal influence between the identity designs provided by the political elites...and those of everyday discourses” (Wodak & Kovacs, 2004: 214).
While all sections of the community engage in identity construction, it is clear that in Australia, social elites, including politicians, play a key role (Younane Brookes, 2012). This was most evident recently in the leadership of former Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007), who articulated an anachronistic, Eurocentric version of Australianness (Tate, 2009b). Assuming his vision was shared by all, he asserted that ‘We no longer navel gaze about what an Australian is…all of us...know what an Australian has always been and always will be’ (Howard, quoted in Curran, 2004: 356). Yet Australian identity remains the subject of much debate. It has been described as fundamentally Anglo Celtic and based on the Anzac legend of larrikin mateship; or alternatively as predominantly civic, characterised by a commitment to the rule of law and valuing of diversity (T. Phillips & Smith, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006).

Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s speech, quoted earlier, offers a slightly different construction, seeing Australians as: lucky to be in ‘one of the best countries in the world’; wealthy because of a ‘strong and dynamic economy; valuing equality (‘we believe passionately in a fair go... for all’); innately ‘a positive people’; and team players who ‘prefer to work together’. While the statement was made in the context of an election campaign leadership debate, it does not present party political solutions, but attempts to generate a sense of pride in a particular version of national identity.

Any form of national identification is to some extent in tension, however, with current geo-political trends toward globalisation, international collaboration, and cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006). As ties to the nation are contested by trans- and supra-national loyalties, the relevance of national identity is increasingly threatened. In their own interests, politicians from both the Left and Right have responded by ‘ramping up’ efforts to build patriotism and a sense of national identification and belonging, even as the economy and society become more global (Hollifield, Hunt, & Tichenor, 2008; Jenkins, 1996; McNevin, 2007b).

5.2.2 The Australian Context

The two major political parties in Australia are the Labor Party (left) and the Liberal Party (right). Both are fairly centrist, but the latter has a more conservative political agenda, similar to that of the US Republican or British Tory parties. (T. Phillips, 1998) meta-analysis of research on Australian identity demonstrates a link between political affiliation and perception of Australian identity. Those on the Right are more
likely to be nationalists generally and to espouse traditional forms of nationalism. In another study, Jones (2000) found that Labor voters were less likely to see Australianness as innate, and requiring native birth, Christian heritage, and a strong sense of nationalism – what he calls a ‘nativist’ version of Australian identity. Similarly, Pakulski and Tranter (2000) reported civic nationalists (those who value citizenship and civic values, together with a sense of national attachment) favour the Labor Party – (48.7% compared to 42% nativists) and nativists the Liberal Party (46.8%, versus 39.7%). Data from the latest Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, reported shortly, supports these findings.

Political leaders play to these preferences, but also carry a significant role in their construction. In the most comprehensive review of Australia’s Prime Ministerial discourse on national identity, Curran (2004) found that until the 1960’s Prime Ministers presented Australianness as ‘Britishness’. This changed when Britain opened its doors to non-white migrants, while simultaneously loosening colonial ties; Australians no longer knew what it meant to be ‘Britishers’ and hence began a search for a new identity. Exploring versions of national identity promoted by Prime Ministers from Gough Whitlam through to John Howard (the 1970s through to 2007), Curran (2004: 237) argues that a new civic Australianness was encouraged. This emphasised “tolerance of diversity and a respect for the freedom of the individual rather than a unity deriving from the bonds of blood and culture”. Multiculturalism also came to be a significant aspect of Australian identity during this time and, it has been argued, enabled Australians to develop a diverse and inclusive national identity (Moran, 2011).

Others note that in recent years this trend has reversed. Johnson (2007: 198) argues that under Prime Minister Howard national identity was narrowed, and “although people of different ethnic origins may not, for example, be expected to pass as being ersatz Anglo-Celts, they are expected to be integrated into values that the Prime Minister has identified as British”. These ‘values’ Johnson identified as including liberal democracy, free trade, Britishness, Judeo-Christian heritage and heteronormativity. Numerous academics support the view that under Howard Australian identity regressed to an Anglo-Celtic, Christian ideal, demanding assimilation of the ‘Other’ (Crabb, 2008; Dyrenfurth, 2007; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Holland, 2010; Robbins, 2007; Tate, 2009; Warhurst, 2007).
Thus, processes of ‘Othering’ became part of the politicians’ national identity construction, and ultimately a key focus of election campaigns (Younane, 2008). In a study of spoken political communication since Australian Federation (1901), Younane-Brookes (2012) found national identity was constructed in relation to a perceived threat from the ‘Other’, notably anxiety about the Asia Pacific region. She also found this approach is pivotal in winning elections. More recently asylum seekers and Muslims have been framed as the threat (Pickering, 2001; Hage, 2004; Hollinsworth, 2006; Tate, 2009; Fozdar, 2011), with the language used to describe them “confrontational and intolerant” (Colic-Peisker, 2011: 28) towards those perceived as being outside the national norm.

The current study seek to extend this body of research by focusing on the way political parties frame Australianness in an emerging sphere of communication – social media – asking how is Australianness being promoted to ‘average Australians’ online.28

5.3 The use of social media in political campaigns

5.3.1 Global or national identities

The new world of social media was chosen as the ‘location’ to explore the portrayal of national, or global, identities by political parties because it offers a new, and as yet, ill-defined public sphere (Habermas, 1989). Historically, the media has played a fundamental role in both political discourse and national identity. According to Anderson (1991), these have been linked since the invention of the printing press, which has enabled easy dissemination of information to construct imagined, linguistically bound, national communities. National media (particularly newspapers, but also radio and television) institutionalised imagined national communities by promoting and reporting the concerns of the local above global, and doing so in the lingua franca (Deutsch, 1966; Douglas, 2009). Thus the media functioned largely within the national boundaries and cohered around national identities.

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28 Social media is a growing source of information in Australia, as elsewhere. The latest AUSSA data shows that around half the population (52.4%) spends at least 1-2 hours per day online, with little variation by political affiliation (Labor voters 51.7%; Liberals 48.6%), although Greens’ (68.5%) (and other minor parties’ – 67.6%) voters are more likely, and Nationals’ voters less likely (39.1%), to be online. It is unknown how much of this time is spent engaging with political information. Available at http://www.ada.edu.au/social-science/aussa
In contrast, the Internet reaches globally, unrestrained by linguistic and geographic boundaries. It opens up global communication channels, which, combined with new mobile gadgetry, provides 24/7 instant access to international news, communication and the opportunity to form global communities (Hills, 2009). Thus the thesis of Anderson and Deutsch - that nationalism is based in communicative communities – may be challenged by the new global reach of these communities. Distance and language can now be overcome by digital commons that enable global networks of communication (Castells, 2004).

In Australia, both global and national media remain at play. Smith and Phillips (2006) found that newspaper, radio and television continue to construct a nativist identity and promote conservative nation-centric political ideals and cultural norms. In contrast, the internet reflected global norms and promoted more universalist or cosmopolitan ideals (p. 832). This supports the idea that social media expands opportunities for global communities, and enables global identities to be formed. In this study we hope to investigate the ways in which the major Australian political parties use Facebook to maintain pre-existent social divisions, particularly national identities, or whether they also promote a more universalist ideal.

5.3.2 Interactive or declarative use of social media by politicians

Numerous international studies have explored the use by politicians of social media, and Facebook specifically (Valtysson, 2014; Gurevitch et al, 2009; Emruli et al, 2011; Baxter et al, 2011). They tend to show that it is used by political parties to ‘get their message out there’ rather than engage in dialogue with voters (see for example Valtysson, 2014). For instance, Gurevitch, Coleman and Blumler (2009) analysed the internet’s challenge to mainstream media use by politicians in the United Kingdom, arguing politicians struggle to keep up with the demands of image management in diverse media environments. Consequently such media tend to offer few interactive features. They argue government “has not proved to be a particularly good conversationalist” (Gurevitch et al., 2009: 173).

There is little Australian research investigating the political uses of Facebook specifically, although studies of social media more broadly are common. Studies have addressed how Australian politicians and government bodies use blogs (Highfield &
Bruns, 2012; (Jericho, 2012), Twitter (Grant et al., 2010), and Youtube (Gibson & McAllister, 2011), for example.

The value of politicians’ uses of online space in Australia is unclear. Some argue that the Internet provides new ways for the public to connect with politicians, and vice versa, while avoiding the mediated and contentious channels of traditional media (Grant, Moon, & Busby, 2010). However others suggest that the Web perpetuates pre-existing socio-economic divisions, as well as creating new social stratifications, due to issues of access (Moyo, 2009; Norris, 2001; Myers, 2010).

In the Australian context there is some evidence to support this latter perspective. Politicians use Twitter (Grant et al., 2010), the blogosphere (Jericho, 2012) and online engagement generally (Gibson & McAllister, 2011), as a vehicle “to broadcast their messages rather than respond or engage in conversation.” (Macnamara & Kenning, 2011: 16).

These studies show how politicians use Facebook; this paper explores what is being promoted. Focus is on the ways Australianness was presented on the Facebook pages of two key political parties in the lead-up to the 2013 Australian federal election. This site was selected for its increasing significance as a space where people work, live, play and connect. Experian’s Hitwise shows Facebook is consistently the second most accessed website in Australia, after Google. Facebook use by politicians during campaigns has increased dramatically, by 1725% between the 2007 and 2010 election campaigns (Macnamara & Kenning, 2011). Simultaneously the population is increasingly using social media to access information and engage in social interaction as, “digital technologies are no longer just an additional way of engaging, but are the primary means of interaction for everyday activities” (Middleton, 2014). During the campaign political parties were highly active on their pages, posting daily updates and changing slogans, cover images (top of screen banner), profile pictures and campaign material.

5.4 Methodology

The analysis focuses on the two key Australian parties – the Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party. This selection was partly pragmatic, as there were 57 parties registered by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC, 2014), making exploring all difficult. More importantly, these two parties represent the vast majority of Australian
voters, as pollsters Newspoll (2013), Galaxy (2013) and Essential Report (2013) report over 75% of Australian voters prefer either a Labor or Liberal/Coalition government, and official results support this (AEC, 2013). These parties (in one iteration or another) have held government since 1910 (APH, 2014). Hence to best understand the versions of Australian-ness being promoted, we focused on these two major parties.

However there are new voices entering the political sphere. The 2013 election saw a dramatic increase in micro-parties (Page 2013), as well as a continuing influence from the longer established left-wing Australian Greens’ party, which gained the balance of power in the 2010 election, securing their place as a third voice in Australian politics (McCann 2012).

This indicates that the duopoly in Australian politics’ may be changing, moving towards multiple, co-existing voices, which could perhaps signal a corresponding diversification of imagined Australian-ness. In recognition of the growing importance of these new voices, the Facebook pages of two smaller parties, the Australian Greens and Palmer United Party, who ultimately won the balance of power in the 2013 election, and are, in many ways, polar opposites - were also analysed.

Analysis was limited to a selection of the material posted online. Attacks on the opposition, policy comparisons, and public ‘comments’, ‘likes’ and ‘shares’, were not included. The latter may have been useful to explore the public uptake or response to party postings, however a decision was made to limit the analysis to what the political elite wished to convey – to their representational elements (Dahlgren, 2005), rather than attempt to measure uptake, given research indicates Facebook is used by politicians to proclaim rather than converse.

Data was collected by periodically checking each party’s Facebook account during the entire campaign period (4 August - 7 September, 2013). Periodical collection enabled material to be gathered progressively and avoid loss of information subsequently ‘taken down’. All postings were collated and explored for salience (being obvious on the page and noticeable to viewers), repetition, and relevance to the national identity literature. Mass-data analysis techniques, such as Text Mining (Ampofo, Collister, O’Loughlin, & Chadwick, 2013), were not employed; rather a qualitative approach was used, combining inductive and deductive tools, to better

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29 This trend has been evident around the world, with many democracies now governed by minority coalitions.
explore the complexity of representations. The use of both approaches acknowledges that “all observations and forms of data-collection are influenced by theory and prior ‘theoretical’ assumptions in some way.” (Layder, 1998: 51). Frame analysis was then used to explore the multiple, competing representations of Australianness.

Frame analysis was first developed by Goffman (1974) as a way to analyse how people understand social situations, but it has been taken up by media studies to identify the ways a communication source defines and constructs an issue. Framing involves selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality [to] make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52). Frame analysis literature draws a distinction between frames that are understood as primarily cognitive, and offer tools for people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al., 1986: 464); and ‘framing’, which considers the shaping processes of discourse and communication, and emphasises processes of social construction (Price et al., 2005; Van Gorp, 2007; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). It is the latter that is used for this analysis (although both are linked), namely, looking at how the political parties’ Facebook pages frame Australianness.

The process of framing does not occur outside of culture, but involves interactive cultural construction to create shared meaning (Benford & Snow, 2000). Desrosiers (2012) notes that framers make use of ‘cultural stock’, i.e. a set of frames that are limited by the shared values, norms and beliefs of a society (Van Gorp, 2007). Similar frames can be employed by opposing sides in a debate. This does not necessarily indicate allegiance to the frame, but rather demonstrates its cultural salience (Reddens, 2014).

Gamson (1992) argues that framing processes are one factor that accounts for the correspondence between personal and collective identities. But this connection is also implicated in processes of Othering. Collective frames help delineate ‘us’ from ‘them’; ‘us’ who share common values and goals, and ‘them’, those who become our adversaries. Using frame analysis to explore political parties’ Facebook accounts can therefore help show the ‘Other’ both within and beyond the nation.

Primarily, this paper is concerned with the way Australianness is framed. We used deductive and inductive techniques to identify the ‘cultural stock’ used and found
three key elements: whiteness; the family; and nation-centrism. The core task of framers is to identify and highlight problems, provide solutions and motivate action from supporters (Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore we particularly focus on the ways that problems and solutions are highlighted in relation to these elements. We explore these firstly in a comparative analysis of the two major political parties, followed by snap shots of the Greens and Palmer United parties, before concluding with a discussion of the ways these intersect with broader political messages and frames of national identity.

5.5 Findings
5.5.1 Whiteness

On the announcement of the election, the Liberal Party posted a 46 second advertisement (‘New Hope’ - 5 August 30) on their Facebook account in which the leader of the Party, Tony Abbott, proclaimed Australia ‘the land of opportunity’ and ‘having a go’. He stated that the forthcoming election was an important opportunity for Australians to choose new hope, rewards and opportunities for all. Behind the speaker, scrolling background images included mothers and babies, children playing sport, men at work (in high visibility gear, suggesting blue-collar workers), women shopping, young women studying, surf life-savers, men and women exercising, and the Australian citizenship kit, including the Australian flag. Taken as a whole, the image was one of an active, sporting, working population, with men and women portrayed in traditional roles. The emphasis was on family values and an outdoor lifestyle, with a nod to civic engagement.

This is a fairly typical portrait of Australian identity using various ‘stock frames’ – the sporting nation of people who love the great outdoors, and take pride in civic values (J. Hogan, 1999; F. L. Jones, 2000; T. Phillips & Holton, 2004; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). However, beyond the expected rhetoric of Australianness was its white embodiment.

30 Reference to campaign material released by Australian Labor Party and Liberal Party of Australia is taken from their respective Facebook accounts (www.facebook.com/LaborConnect?fref=ts and www.facebook.com/LiberalPartyAustralia?fref=ts), with the date of release specified, unless otherwise stated. We have endeavoured to specify where content has been ‘taken down’, but we can not be certain that access is still available at time of publication.
All but two people in the advertisement were white. The two non-whites - an Indigenous welder portrayed with Mr Abbott surveying his work, and a man of central Asian appearance gaining Australian citizenship – signalled the ‘right’ sort of diversity, namely an Aboriginal working rather than stereotypically on welfare, and a migrant becoming a citizen and integrating rather than maintaining a separate identity. The hierarchy of race in Australia was represented through the clearly subordinate role of the Aboriginal worker. Further the provision of citizenship to a person of colour, while offering a self-congratulatory representation of Australia’s valuing of diversity, reinforces the distinction between white people who possess practical cultural acceptance and belonging in the nation, and people of colour who can only attain institutional acceptance through citizenship (Hage, 1998).

This subservience was typical of the portrayal of people of colour on the Liberal’s Facebook page. For example a video posted towards the end of the campaign (31 August) entitled ‘How well do you know Tony?’ included 8 individuals praising Abbott’s community involvement and various acts of public service. These included him surf life-saving, volunteering for the rural fire brigade, responding to the Bali Bombings (2005) and fund-raising for a women’s shelter. In the clip Abbott was depicted as a ‘good Aussie bloke’ actively helping out his mates, a stereotypical portrayal of Australianness embodied in whiteness. In relation to Aboriginal voters, a clip of Ms Alison Anderson (MLA) stating that Mr Abbott ‘understands Indigenous Australians…the poverty we all live in…and is always asking people ‘how can I make things better for you?’’ was included. While an apparently benign statement of praise for Abbott’s concern, it perpetuates the colonial image of noblesse oblige - the white man helping the colonised, to their eternal gratitude, and the stereotype of Indigenous Australians ‘all’ living in poverty and without personal agency (Hollinsworth, 2006; Moreton-Robinson, 2000).

As well as portraying people of colour as subservient, whiteness was also normalised. The first banner image pictured the leader with five colleagues – Malcolm Turnbull, Joe Hockey, Julie Bishop, Warren Truss, and Andrew Robb – all apparently white (one is in fact half Armenian) and middle aged
(and all, bar one, male). Further, in a collection of 52 portraits of Liberal MPs and candidates (28 and 29 August) only 8 included people visibly of colour.’

The Liberal party therefore appears to be (re)presenting a colour-based framing of Australianness. Through the normalisation of whiteness, and subordination of people of colour, ‘coloured’ is problematised and whiteness is correlated with ‘true’ Australianness. By drawing on stock frames of a white masculine Australia (Fee & Russell, 2007; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007) the party is highlighting whiteness as being at the centre of ‘who we are’. While this may remind some people of conservative and historic White Australia and assertions that white people are the true Australians, the party has tried to re-frame this by including approving Aborigines and formal (if not informal) acceptance of the migrant ‘Other’, providing legitimacy to their apparently benevolent hegemonic power. As such the Liberal party is complicit in framing Australianness in terms of normalised whiteness, so this framing becomes “embedded in the national subconscious” (Birch, 2001: 20).

Whiteness was also a feature of the Labor Facebook page. However, where present, people of colour were portrayed with more agency and power. From campaign announcement to election-day none of the photographs posted on Labor’s timeline included people of colour. This suggests that both Parties promote White Australianness. However Labor’s national field-day photographs (in the photo album section of Facebook - 11 Aug) included a number of non-Anglo individuals, and were subtly different from the Liberal photographs. The field-day images appeared more than a token nod to inclusivity, depicting a number of non-white individuals campaigning, supporting and embracing candidates, and standing for office themselves, including an Indigenous candidate from Northern Queensland. Thus while people of colour had a limited presence, those who were included were positioned as equals to their white peers in terms of power and agency.

The fact that people of colour only appeared in difficult to find photographs, i.e. they were not featured prominently, suggests non-whiteness is not something the party wishes to highlight in their framing of the Australian people. At best the inclusion of agentive people of colour seems to be simply an admission of their existence. This appears to parallel (Rietveld, 2014) frame analysis of the interaction between national identity and multiculturalism in Britain where she notes a ‘conservative frame’ that “downplays the significance of multicultural inequalities” (61), advocates assimilation,
sees diversity as “a result of history, but the nation itself is one: national identity in this frame trumps multiculturalism” (62). It also calls for migrants to adapt. The photographs on Labor’s page offer limited coverage of people of colour and appear to emphasise those who have adapted well.

Overall, whiteness frames were used on both major parties’ Facebook accounts, supporting the suggestion of other researchers that political support for celebrations of ethnic diversity as a core aspect of Australian identity has declined (Dyrenfurth, 2007; Hage, 1998; Johnson, 2007; Tate, 2009; Hollinsworth, 2006).

5.5.2 Family

National identity is often framed through the trope of family, reinforcing a sense of belonging and inclusion, as well as social stability (Elder, 2007; Johnson, 2007). Ethnic conceptualizations of the nation as a political and territorial collective with a shared ancestry lend themselves well to the imagery of the family. Both political parties’ Facebook pages used this imagery extensively.

On the Liberal page, over the course of the campaign, numerous photographs were posted of politicians with children (again, all white) (9, 19, and 29 August and 3 and 6 September); and the leader Mr Abbott with his own family (11 August and 7 September). While it is likely that this was partly a ploy to engage women's vote, in a context where polls signalled Abbott’s significant lack of popularity with women (McKenzie, 2013), primarily it represents who the party sees as its key constituency. Election promises featured on the page frequently focused on the family; indeed the caption supporting the party's second cover photograph (25 August) was ‘this election is about you and how a better government can help your family ...’ (italics added). This reinforces the recurring message from the Liberal Party that ‘working families’, a term coined by former Liberal PM John Howard, are the ‘real’ Australians.

Perhaps the clearest representation of who these promises were being made to, who the party sees as the Australian family, was provided on August 6th when a photograph of the ‘average family’ was posted. This consisted of a nuclear family - white mother and father, son and daughter.

Firstly the ‘stock frame’ of heteronormativity is evident. Much political, religious and legal infrastructure is built on the family, and cultural norms value the nuclear family unit. Further, Australian constructions of masculinity – mateship, beer drinking, blue collar workers – emphasise the value of heteronormativity to Australian identity (Probyn, 1999).

While this construction has been promoted by the Liberal Party (Johnson, 2007), the Australian population is in fact far more diverse (Lumby, 2010). Nuclear families are in decline and couples with dependent children constitute only a third of the population (AIFS, 2014). It has been suggested that debate around the family and family values has been co-opted to symbolise the rights, values and norms of a nation. (Lumby, 2010: 110) argues, “if the debate about the needs of Ordinary Australians revolves around fears that our public sphere is changing too quickly, the family values debate is its equally paranoid private-sphere mirror”.

Thus, promoting the nuclear family as the ‘average Australian’ family potentially reinforces fear of other formations, positing them as a problem. At best, it does not attempt to reach or represent the diversity of family formations – single people, Indigenous kinship structures, same-sex relationships, ethnic minority extended families, and so on. It serves ideologically to reinforce a conservative framing of the Australian household, linking this to Australianness.

Even when promoting an arguably ‘progressive’ policy the Liberal party maintained this heteronormative, nuclear family frame. On August 18th, the so-called ‘fair dinkum’ paid parental leave scheme was announced.31 This policy sought to address the exclusion of women from the public sphere resulting from their reproductive capacities (see Baker, 1999; Greer, 1999; Woolf, 1992) by offering substantial financial support for those in the paid workforce. However it did so within a framework of the traditional nuclear family and gender roles that assume primary parental responsibility belongs to the mother (Leslie & Manchester, 2011). Provision for those in different family structures was absent. The policy was also oddly masculinised on the site through the use of colloquial language – the phrase ‘fair dinkum’, for example.

Labor’s Facebook page, while still representing Australianness in terms of family, appeared to endorse a more inclusive version by promoting marriage equality (13 August), positive reforms for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) communities (25 August), and including representations of older people (25 August).

Suggesting an Australian identity characterised by tolerance and inclusiveness, the Labor Party launched their campaign to support same-sex marriage - ‘It’s time for marriage equality’ (itstimeformarriageequality.org/ -13 August) – as part of the election campaign. As well as this more inclusive version of the family, the ALP site included a greater range of ages, and reference to previous generations. An image of the former Prime Minister Bob Hawke (now in his 80s) emailing his supporters (6 September), as well as a Youtube posting of an elderly woman (25 August), engages with an older audience. Even the slogan used to promote marriage equality - ‘It’s time’ - was recycled from a 1972 campaign designed “to capture the mood of a nation on the threshold of rediscovering and redefining its cultural identity” (NFSA, 2014) (at that stage one of multiculturalism). The re-use of this slogan speaks to the ‘baby boomer’ generation, reassuring the older generation that changes to Australianness are not progressing too quickly.

Unlike the Liberal party’s heteronormative familial frame, Labor framed family more broadly and inclusively.

5.5.3 Nation-centric identity

The third significant frame was a firmly self-focused (even self-absorbed) version of Australianness.

The Liberal’s Facebook page had a strong inward orientation to the nation, rather than to the globe. This was visually portrayed through the permanence of the national flag in the profile picture (also the party logo). This uses ‘cultural stock’ – flags link automatically with nationalism (Billig, 1995; Fozdar et al, 2014) – to draw attention to a certain type of Australianness. In recent years,
the Australian flag has come to be associated with exclusionary forms of national identity (Connell, n.d.; F. L. Jones, 1997; Fozdar et al, 2014); and commentators have argued that the flag symbolises a history of colonisation (Kwan, n.d.) as well as contemporary voices of exclusion such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party and the Cronulla Riots (Noble, 2006; Perera, 2007; Orr, 2011). Thus there are implications for more than just simple patriotism in the prominent use of the flag.

Beyond this, the site directs voters’ attention towards Australia rather than broadening their vision. Key election promises displayed on the page, such as those to ‘scrap the carbon tax’ (22 August, and 1 and 3 September), subsumed supra-national concerns, such as global climate change, as secondary to Australian interests. Most of their policies were nation-focussed, privileging Australian interests over global concerns. As such there was no portrayal of a broader humanity. Instead Australianness is framed as essentially unique and oppositional to all other forms of identification (not just other nationalities, but other ‘level’ identities also – sub or supra-national).

Labor’s page appeared more engaged with the world and Australia’s place in it, but still retained a national focus. A Youtube mock commercial entitled ‘Selling Abbot’s internet to the world’ (27 August), shows two young men travelling globally, to try to street-sell the Coalition’s plan for Internet infrastructure. A montage of potential buyers from across the world consistently responds negatively. The advertisement concludes with the question ‘If the rest of the world laughs at this broadband plan, then why does [leader of the Liberal Party] Tony Abbott say it’s good enough for us?’.

While the question positions Australia as an important actor on the world stage, deserving to be globally competitive, its primary concern is with Australia. The focus is on how Australia is seen by, and compares with, other nations, rather than engaging with more global concerns. This may be playing on Australians’ fear of inadequacy, its ‘cultural cringe’ which is evident in “an inability to escape needless comparisons...asking ‘...what would a cultivated Englishman [sic] think of this?’” (Phillips, 2010: 55). While this also frames Australianness as distinct from the non-national ‘Other’, it differs in that it demonstrates at least some level of engagement.

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32 This was a catch phrase for a policy to end the carbon pricing introduced to decrease greenhouse emissions, an initiative of the previous Labor administration (July 1, 2012).
Labor’s Facebook page also focused to some extent on global issues including environmental issues (such as concern about global warming (21 and 31 August, and 3 September), proposed plans to ‘restore our rivers to health’ (31 August) and endorsement of a leader ‘who is serious about protecting the environment’ (21 August)). While these concerns were contextualised within the national debate, the proposals connect with broader, global concerns (clean energy and climate change), suggesting a more universalist ethic, but not at the expense of national interest.

In this sense, Labor did not frame national identity as exclusive or distinct from other identities, as did the Liberals. Thus, Australianness and a nation-centric approach remain the focus of Labor’s Facebook frame, but the framing allows elements of a global orientation.

5.6 Micro Party Identity Snap Shots

While the two major parties dominated the 2013 Australian election, numerous micro parties achieved some success, ultimately altering the balance of power. Six candidates from five micro-parties were elected to the Senate: two from Palmer United Party (PUP), one each from Family First, the Liberal Democrats, the Australian Motor Enthusiasts Party, and the Australian Sports Party. These minor parties share a centre right position (Archer 2013). The Australian Greens, a far left party, are a more established alternate voice in Australian politics, being considered a ‘third force’ in Federal politics for two decades (McCann 2012). In the 2010 election they gained 13% of the votes. This swing may reflect growing diversity in perceptions of Australian identity and interests. To explore these alternate constructions, a brief review of the Facebook pages of the two most powerful of these minor parties, the Greens and PUP, is undertaken.

5.6.1 Greens

The Australian Greens’ Facebook page appears to promote a cosmopolitan identity, perhaps reflecting the more global consciousness of their constituency33. Firstly the content of the Facebook page suggested a collaborative, approachable identity, apparent in the 44 ‘on the campaign trail’ photographs. These

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33 AUSSA data indicates Greens’ voters are more likely to see themselves as world citizens (34.3%), and less likely to be attached to the nation (mean 3.24), compared to Labor (22.9%; mean 3.44), Liberal (13.8%; mean 3.55) and National (25%; mean 3.62) voters.
portrayed approachable candidates, rather than removed leaders, with various ‘fun’ images of candidates waving hands in the air, wearing relaxed and casual attire, and engaged with popular culture, such as MP Dr Adam Bandt guest-starring as the host of a popular music video program (Sept 2nd). Approachability (offering two occasions for electors to ask questions of the Green’s policies - Sept 6th and 7th) and transparency (offering a fully costed economic policy - Sept 4th - something no other party provided) were also demonstrated, in line with the party’s goal of ‘grassroots participatory democracy’ (http://greens.org.au/about). This approach is consistent with a cosmopolitan identity that values collaboration and cooperation (Woodward et al. 2008).

Secondly, the policies presented on the page were uniformly progressive, offering a version of Australian-ness characterised by openness to others. The slogan ‘Standing up for what matters’ was used to discuss numerous issues such as: clean energy (Aug 5th), justice for asylum seekers (Aug 6th), fair trade initiatives (Aug 8th), marriage equality (Aug 19th, Sept 2nd), government funded education (Aug 23rd), and animal and environmental care (Aug 27th, 29th, 30th, Sept 3rd). The Greens also distanced themselves from the Labor Party. While similarly positioned on the issue of marriage equality, the Greens noted that ‘Right from the start, we've backed full equality for LGBTI people. Every vote. Every MP. Every time’ (Aug 19th), distinguishing themselves from Labor, who offered members a conscience vote on the proposed legislation, and whose leader had previously opposed it.

Differences were also evident in the Greens’ portrayal of whiteness/diversity. Images of the typical Australian were notably more inclusive; photographs showed men and women of diverse backgrounds, rather than primarily middle-aged, white men or young white families. Throughout the campaign, people of colour were portrayed equitably, in positions of power, and in a variety of roles such as: campaigning (Aug 13th, 18th, 24th, 25th, Sept 7th), advocating for refugees (Aug 27th), and standing for office (Aug 13th).
Additionally the Green’s page included photographs of people stereotyped as the threatening Other (Pickering 2001; Hage, 2004) - women wearing hijabs (Sept 1st) and Indigenous people in positions of power (Aug 13th, 24th).

It could be said that the Greens promoted a distinctly cosmopolitan Australian identity. They presented Australians as agents of change, people who value what is morally ‘right’ (‘Stand up for what matters’), and who promote an ethos of universalism, selflessness and communitarianism, with a responsible economic orientation ([Greens platform: caring, costed & ready to go](https://www.facebook.com/Australian.Greens/photos/a.10150632850018663.379449.6442438662/101515717222468663/?type=1&relevant_count=1) – Sept 6th). Yet this apparently universalist agenda was still packaged with an ‘Australian made’ tag. Policies focussed on ‘protecting what’s too precious to lose about Australia’ (Sept 3rd), ‘a healthy, sustainable and fair food system for Australia’ (Aug 8th) [italics added], and a map of Australia at the centre of their explanation of their economic policies (Sept 6th, [Image 7](https://www.facebook.com/Australian.Greens/photos/a.10150632850018663.379449.6442438662/101515717222468663/?type=1&relevant_count=1).

So, while the ideals presented by the Greens transcend national boundaries, practical implementation remained grounded in a national framework. This is perhaps not surprising given the context was a national election, but it remains an interesting

5.6.2 Palmer United Party (PUP)

The PUP Facebook page offered a very different construction of Australian identity – one that focused on leadership, tradition, and patriotism. As it is a character-
based party, with the leader’s name in the title (Clive Palmer is a billionaire mining magnate) this is perhaps not surprising.

Firstly, PUP’s focus on leadership was obvious in the absence of photographs of candidates interacting with their electorate. Instead, the Facebook page was used to promote policies and the leadership of Mr Palmer, functioning in a gate-keeper manner rather than as an opportunity for engagement (Lynch et al. 2014). The page was declarative. Clive Palmer was presented as the hero/leader who could ‘Unite the country and hand the power back and give hope back to all Australians’ (Aug 25th). While this might sound progressive and community-oriented, the focus is on Mr Palmer as agent, and the electorate as passive, in need of guidance and leadership. As a white male, Mr Palmer fits the stereotype of Australian-ness (Smith, 2000), and he sought to embody other ‘Australian’ characteristics during the campaign. He was presented on the page as: a larrikin (in a photograph with Dorothy the Dinosaur, a children’s cartoon character; and standing in an earth-mover); anti-authoritarian (proud of his mediatised ‘tantrum’ against Mr Rudd); a good Aussie bloke who drinks beer with his mates (3 photographs); and enjoying “Every Aussies’ favourite biscuit - Arnott’s Tim Tam” (Sept 2nd). His larrikinism and an anti-authoritarian spirit were further expressed in a spoof Youtube advertisement (Sept 5th) that portrayed the other party leaders and candidates as supporting Mr Palmer, with the tagline, ‘We just had to do one funny ad in amongst all the election Hoopla’. This approach positioned him with the average Australian, and against the other political personalities. Essentially, the PUP Facebook page presented Mr Palmer, a typically overweight, white, middle-aged male, as Australian-ness personified – a larrikin, beer-drinking, ‘good Aussie bloke’.

This image was further couched in traditional and nativist renderings of Australian-ness, perhaps best seen in the party profile picture. The image was of a blue map of Australia stamped against a yellow background, with the Australian flag inside the national borders, and the words ‘Palmer United: Reunite the Nation’ framing the
map. The national flag, as previously noted, links with Anglo-Celtic nativist, masculine, and exclusive constructions of Australian identity. Thus using this image as the party’s Facebook profile picture could present a gendered (male), coloured (white), and nativist (exclusionary) version of Australian-ness. Additionally, the visual emphasis on geographical boundaries – placing the Australian flag inside the map of Australia – emphasises a geo-political identity strongly focused on national concerns.

Essentially, the PUP Facebook page depicted an Australian identity that prioritised the leadership of an Australian larrikin and focused on the Australian populous as a unified body (denoted in the name Palmer United, united referring to Australia, rather than anything else), to the exclusion of the supra-national and internal diversity.

5.7 Discussion

To conclude I undertake a comparison of the two major party’s Facebook pages, offer some comments about the portrayal of Australianness by the Greens and PUP parties, and finally, include some suggestions for future research.

The framing of Australianness on the two major parties’ Facebook pages demonstrates both similarities and differences. Both (re)constructed a predominantly white Australian identity; both focused on the family as a significant source of Australianness; and both showed a tendency to value Australian concerns over others. While the Labor site was more likely to use less traditional representations, with some representations of ethnic family and age diversity, and some level of orientation to the wider world, at base the message was similar to the Liberals’. What do these three foci tell us about how Australian identity is being framed by Australian politicians online during an election campaign?

Firstly, the focus on family connections may be an attempt to bring bonds of familial solidarity into the political discourse of a national identity that is sometimes understood as primarily civic (Fozdar & Spittle, 2010; Curran, 2004).

For the Liberals, the emphasis on the family constructs a sense of solidarity more akin to ethno than civic nationalism. Historically the nation was understood as similar to an ethnic group or tribe, with members bound by shared ancestry – they were literally one family (Guibernau, 1996; Gellner, 1994). The Liberal framing did this through emphasising conservative family ideals that value social stability and
reproductive capacity. In this sense, the nation is framed as a blood-bonded community, able to perpetuate its own existence, thus marginalising the ‘unnecessary’ - migrants, singles, the elderly, and those in same-sex relationships.

Labor promotes a more civic construction of Australia by framing family as both intergenerational and inclusive of same-sex relationships. In this sense the family incorporates those who are not ‘useful’ to national (reproductive) growth, and Australia is based on self-identification and civic participation rather than ‘blood’ ties. As noted, civic nationalism is built on rational commitment to citizenship, economic market participation, and civic inclusion (Rex, 1995), and is essentially inorganic in nature, requiring nation-states to work to construct a sense of belonging and identity (Guibernau, 1996). Thus while the Liberal frame is trying to naturalise the national family, and by necessity exclude some from it, Labor’s frame is working, to some extent, to redefine the national family as inclusive and open.

The focus on the family within the apparently civic frame demonstrates the fuzziness between cultural and political constructions of national identity, and perhaps attests to the influence of Howard’s reconstruction of Anglo-Australianness (Betts & Birrell, 2007a; De Cillia et al., 1999; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Hage, 1998).

Imagining the nation as a family also has implications for growth and immigration, raising the question who will ‘we’ welcome into ‘our’ family and home (see Joppke, 2004; Hage, 1998)? This question is answered to some extent by the predominance of whiteness on both parties’ pages. Both emphasise whiteness in their frames, which plays into the fear of the ‘Other’, and unifies Australians by establishing the fictive blood bonds that civic notions of national identity lack. As Hage (1998: 47) observed:

A nationalist practice of exclusion is a practice emanating from agents imagining themselves to occupy a privileged position within national space... It is a practice orientated by the nationalists’ attempt at building what they imagine to be a homely nation. In this process, the nationalists perceive themselves as spatial managers and that which is standing between them and their imaginary nation is constructed as an undesirable national object to be removed from national space.

Thus the portrayal of whiteness increases the sense of entitlement and power accredited to this segment of the Australian community by the political ‘elite’. This is a
significant contrast to both parties’ decades of support for an Australian identity based on multiculturalism and diversity (Curran, 2004; Brett and Moran, 2011).

Finally, evident on both the major Parties’ Facebook accounts was the focus on a national, rather than post-national or global, identity. While Labor’s page acknowledged the nation’s global location, both parties prioritised Australia’s interests in their policy framings. In making this observation, it is acknowledged that it seems obvious that political parties, in the context of a national election, would focus on constructing a national identity rather than more global or cosmopolitan options. However, as noted earlier, there is a body of research that claims that social media, and the web more broadly, promotes global identification above national (Smith and Phillips, 2006; Castells, 2004). Hence the findings from this study that contradict this are noteworthy, and suggest that perhaps there are circumstances other than merely the online location, involved in promoting global identification online. Further research into other factors such as where participants are located, age, and content of the discourse, may clarify how a global identity is promoted online.

It has been argued that multiculturalism empowers Australian identity sufficiently to enable it to engage both national and global (cosmopolitan) values and orientations simultaneously (Brett & Moran, 2011; Castles et al., 1992). However evidence has been provided that both parties depict a white, rather than multicultural, Australian identity, and generally ignore the wider world. This emphasis on a particular version of national identity, one that is monocultural and monoracial, encourages insularity, promoting Australians’ rights over others, and detachment of Australian identity from global concerns. In terms of identity, these policies position the webpage audiences as primarily Australian, rather than, say, global citizens (Vas Dev, 2009). This is somewhat anachronistic in a context of growing calls for post-national political formations and consciousness.

In comparing these findings with the two minor parties, two significant observations can be made. Firstly, PUP differs very little from the portrayal of Australianness on the two major parties pages, although perhaps they place a greater

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34 However we draw attention to an example of national political leadership that highlights universal values as working in conjunction with national interests. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated, “I would say national interests, and what is, if you like, global interests to tackle poverty and climate change, do in the long run come together.” (http://www.ted.com/talks/gordon_brown_on_global_ethic_vs_national_interest)
emphasis on the monocultural and nation-centric aspects. This may be because PUP offers a populist portrayal of Australian identity – merely espousing the views of its constituency to garner votes. Secondly, the Greens offer a more cosmopolitan, global-focused version of Australianness than all other parties. This, however, seems to have limited popular appeal (with less than 10% of votes), and thus presents a minority view of Australian identity.

These results suggest that the two major political parties frame Australianness online during the election campaign by restating tropes that have (re)circulated since the Howard era (Johnson 2002; 2007). The emphasis on whiteness, family values or bonds, and national rather than global interests, does not reveal anything new about political framing of national identity per se. However it does demonstrate the static nature of this framing of Australian identity over the past two decades. Rather than developing over time, or differing between parties, or indeed being modified in the emerging space of social media platforms, the same ‘stock frames’ pervade both parties election discourse.

This research is limited in its capacity to explore how the public responds to these frames. Skey (2009: 336) notes that much analysis of national identity does not “take account of media theory which has long argued that audiences cannot simply be seen as either coherent or ‘empty vessels’ that uncritically absorb the media messages that they encounter”. Future research would benefit from an exploration of the ‘comments’, ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ on the parties’ pages to see how the public is responding. The similarity between the two sites suggests these frames are successfully tapping into something in the Australian psyche. Political framing does not occur in a vacuum, and this similarity tells us something about a reframing of Australian identity away from cultural and other forms of diversity. The fact that the more conservative party won the election, and the hyper conservative PUP gained votes, while the more ‘progressive’ Greens party lost traction after the last federal election (2010), suggests that the more conservative framing is currently most popular, despite the work done by previous governments to broaden Australian identity.
5.8 References


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Chapter Six [Paper Four]. Framing asylum seekers: the uses of national and cosmopolitan identity frames in arguments about asylum seekers

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6.1 Abstract:

Dilemmas around how to deal with asylum seekers who arrive in Australia by boat have been a key driver of political and public discourse for over a decade. In 2012 an ‘Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers’ was established to provide advice to the Australian government about how to deal with the increasingly embarrassing issue of asylum seekers drowning at sea and a parliamentary stalemate on the matter. This paper analyses submissions to the Panel, investigating how arguments for and against asylum seekers are framed using national, regional and global (cosmopolitan) identities. Australia was framed as a global citizen, as having an alternative character to that promoted by politicians, and as having regional responsibilities. Contrary to expectations, we found that both nationalist and cosmopolitan identity frames served as vehicles through which progressive arguments were articulated, indicating the utility of both in arguing for more humane treatment of ‘Others’.

Key words: asylum seekers; Australia; national identity; cosmopolitan identity; frame analysis

6.2 Introduction

On 28th June 2012, the then Australian Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, established an Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers to provide advice on how to address the increasingly politically embarrassing issue of asylum seekers arriving ‘unlawfully’ by boat. It came in the wake of the SIEV 358\textsuperscript{35} tragedy, where 60 asylum seekers drowned as their boat sank within metres of the Australian territory of Christmas

\textsuperscript{35} SIEV stands for Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel, and is the term given by Australian governments to boats carrying asylum seekers.
Island (SBS, 2013), and a parliamentary stalemate on how to deal with an issue that had become a political trigger point (Ireland, 2012). The Expert Panel was convened to determine a solution to the perceived problem of growing numbers seeking asylum in this way. Its remit was to consult the community, through verbal and written submissions, about how to prevent asylum seekers risking their lives, while upholding relevant international obligations, and simultaneously, Australia’s right to maintain its borders (Australian Government 2012).

We use frame analysis to understand the ways in which arguments in submissions to the panel are presented, and draw on Every and Augoustinos’ (2008) discursive study of political speeches that demonstrated how national identity can be used for both inclusive and exclusive ends. We seek to ascertain how Australianness is framed in the course of making arguments for and against asylum seekers; particularly the links between asylum seeking, human rights and cosmopolitan ethics, and the (often competing) rights of the nation-state and its citizens.

6.2.1 The Global Context

Australian concerns about asylum seekers reflect concerns elsewhere, namely the tension between the rights of asylum seekers and the rights of sovereign nation-states. As Urry (2007) and Urry and Elliot (2010) and others have pointed out, people are moving more than ever before: some as a privileged elite (Calhoun 2002; Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2003), others as forcibly displaced persons. Whilst they share a common thread of mobility (Bauman, 1998: 87) notes their experiences are very different: “All people may now be wanderers...but there is an abyss hard to bridge between experiences...at the top and at the bottom of the freedom scale”. There is abyss is based on their identity.

Of the 51.2 million displaced people worldwide, 1.2 million are identified as asylum seekers36 – people who have arrived at the borders of other nations to seek protection, but have not yet had their claim for refugee status determined (UNHCR, 2014a). Asylum seekers present a challenge for nation-states, generating a struggle between negotiation of domestic and international politics, as well as the requirements of United Nations’ treaties. Many nations respond with policies seeking

36 With O’Doherty & Lecouteur (2007), we recognise both the ‘factual’ definition of the term and its social construction, acknowledging that in Australia, asylum seeker is often used interchangeably with refugee, ‘boat people’ or ‘queue jumpers’. 

Such responses signal the sense of threat undocumented migrants are seen as posing. The threat is variously framed in terms of economic interest, national security, or population health (Pickering, 2001) but also in racial terms, and concern over the apparent loss of the right of the nation to exclude (Gale, 2004). The overarching discourse, while ostensibly around security, concerns identity, and delineating who belongs in the nation state and who does not (cf Joppke, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 2004). Nationalist discourses are used to legitimate the exclusion of asylum seekers (Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Gale, 2004; Saxton, 2003), and fear of the unknown ‘other’ generates state-centric responses (Levy & Sznайдер, 2006).

The sense of threat is exacerbated in a context where supra-national economic, political, legal and social forces associated with processes of globalisation challenge national sovereignty and self-determination. This results in the ‘liberal paradox’ (Hollifield et al., 2008), “the trend amongst contemporary states towards greater transnational openness in the economic arena alongside growing pressure for domestic political closure” (McNevin, 2007b: 611). Rather than nations progressively losing relevance and power, yielding to global forms of governance, and global, ‘cosmopolitan’, identities (as per the arguments of Held, Habermas, Beck, and Nussbaum), nation-states retain military and political power, and are a, if not the, significant source of identity. Irregular migrants challenge the right of nations to safeguard citizens’ interests, resulting in citizens requiring reassurance ‘that territorial borders remain meaningful guarantors of their privileged status vis-a`-vis non-citizens” (McNevin, 2009: 168).

Thus nations continue to draw on collective belonging and non-belonging to remain relevant (Wilson & Donnan, 1998; Skey, 2011). Excluding those who come to the nation’s borders is a powerful way to reinforce the identity of those within the borders: “the intensified policing of borders in response to irregular migration creates a flashpoint for anxieties about an outside world encroaching upon a vulnerable inside where the legitimacy of the state as a basis for sovereign communities is at stake” (McNevin, 2007a: 657).
In Australia there has been support across the major political parties for
tougher border protection measures, using a rhetoric focussed on Australian identity.
Former Prime Minister John Howard’s policies in the early 2000’s constructed an
Australianness based firmly in British heritage (Johnson, 2007) by, among other things,
creating a sense of threat from asylum seekers (Pickering, 2001; Younane Brookes,
2010). This shifted in 2012 (the time of the Expert Panel) with Australia re-constructed
as both just and humane, thwarting the ‘people smugglers’ in their illegal trade, and
primarily concerned for the welfare of the asylum seekers: “safety at sea became a
dominant rationale ... providing punitive and discredited deterrent measures with a
pseudo-humanitarian gloss” (Grewcock, 2014: 7). The result has been increasingly
harsh policies towards asylum seekers who arrive by boat (Crock & Berg, 2011).

At the same time, ‘progressive’ voices call for more porous borders, to offer a
more inclusive response to asylum seekers. It has been argued this would require “a
fundamental shift from a state-centred to a human-centred analysis” (Pickering &
Weber, 2011: 211). Such arguments suggest that nationalism and human rights are
fundamentally at odds (Beck, 2006; Sassen, 1996; 2006; Soysal, 1994). Yet it may be
that the nation can act as a source of inclusion (Appiah 1996, Skey 2011). Indeed it has
been argued that a version of Australian identity that recognises its fluid and
constructed nature, and values its characteristics of multiculturalism, generosity and
acceptance, can serve as a basis for arguments for inclusivity (Brett & Moran, 2011).
The institutionalisation of multicultural policy in Australia has perhaps enabled such an
inclusive Australianness (F. L. Jones, 2000), where Australians value a civic form of
nationalism that prioritises rights and responsibilities, inclusivity, freedom of choice,
boundary permeability and a sense of belonging, over shared ancestry and culture
(Johanson & Glow, 2009; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). Thus the
nation’s ‘immigrant nation’ status and multicultural policies encourage Australians to
simultaneously identify with national and cosmopolitan values (Brett & Moran, 2011;
Castles et al., 1998).

The general public aligns much more closely with current government policy on
the topic of asylum seekers than the arguments of more progressive political parties
and advocates. Around a third of the population supports turning asylum boats back,
and another 10% supports detention (Markus, 2014: 41). Less than a quarter support
asylum seekers being eligible for permanent residence. As Markus has observed
“These results highlight the gulf in the Australian community between Greens and advocacy groups and mainstream opinion” (2014: 41).

6.2.2 Seeking Asylum in Australia

Asylum seeking has been a divisive issue dating back to the arrival of the Vietnamese on Australia’s shores in the 1970’s, but has become particularly contentious since the 2001 Tampa incident where a Norwegian ship that had rescued asylum seekers from their sinking boat was not allowed to dock in Australian territory, and several well publicised cases of boats sinking on the way to Australia with significant loss of life (the SIEV X, SIEV 358). The government enacted a range of measures designed to deter people from seeking asylum in this manner, including The Border Protection Bill (Marr & Wilkinson, 2003). Subsequent policies from both sides of politics (such as offshore processing, the issuing of temporary protection visas, and ‘turning the boats back’) operationalise Australia’s sovereign right to determine who enters.

These policies, and political rhetoric around asylum seekers, enact a certain version of Australian identity and are therefore as much about Australians as about the issue itself. Politicians have a unique ability, as ‘elite’ voices, to construct national identity (De Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak & Kovacs, 2004). Indeed, former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, in an impassioned appeal to the Australian public against the harsh asylum seeker policies, said, “we need to realise that the Government is doing these things in our name, in the name of every Australian. Every Australian carries some part of the guilt for asylum-seeker policies that are inhumane and brutal” (Rothfield, 2013: 88 [italics added]). Such policies also represent Australian identity globally. For example a BBC article noted the negative impact of the Tampa affair on the good-will Norwegians held towards Australians (Wahlström, 2014).

A number of researchers have explored the relationship between asylum seekers, political discourse and national identity in Australia, noting the ways in which they are ‘Othered’ (O’Doherty & Lecouteur, 2007; Pickering, 2001; Saxton, 2003; Vas

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37 Offshore processing involves moving irregular maritime arrivals to detention centres in non-Australian territory for processing and resettlement, thus removing the opportunity to come to Australia. It is justified as a measure to save lives at sea, and to stop people-smuggling and “queue jumpers”. Temporary protection visas limit a person’s access to services (healthcare, welfare) and ability to travel, and demand that the recipient reapply for a visa after 3 years, thus offering no security to the holder. ‘Turning back the boats’ involves either turning back, or towing boats carrying asylum seekers out of Australian waters, to force their return to countries from whence they originated, usually Indonesia.
Dev, 2009). Most relevant are studies by O'Doherty and Augoustinos (2008), Gale (2004) and Every and Augoustinos (2008) investigating the way the nation was used in asylum seeker discourse.

O’Doherty and Augoustinos (2008: 577) analysed media coverage of the Tampa affair, concluding articles “reproduce the nation as a taken-for-granted entity and maintain national sovereignty as an indisputable right”. Gale (2004) similarly explored media representations of asylum seekers post-Tampa, noting that while some are positive, focussing on need and human rights, ultimately the rights of the nation to protect its borders are paramount. Every and Augoustinos (2008) explored constructions of nationalism in speeches by politicians on the asylum seeker issue, arguing that nationalism is used for both inclusive and exclusive ends. Asylum seekers were constructed as a threat (in terms of overcrowding and criminality), or as of benefit (great contributors) to Australia. Australia was portrayed as generous by both sides, with pro-asylum seekers arguing this was a now tarnished image, and anti-asylum seekers framing Australia’s generosity as in tension with the nation’s right to sovereignty. The ‘fair go’ ideal, a central construct of Australian identity, was also used for both pro and anti-asylum arguments - to exclude asylum seekers as violators of the principle by ‘queue jumping’, or to argue for inclusion, since the fair go should apply to all.

These articles suggest that national identity is widespread in discourse around asylum seekers and is used in both inclusive and exclusive iterations.

Our research explores how Australian identity is framed in the 51 submissions to the Panel from organisations, most of whom are pressure or interest groups (McKinney & Halpin, 2007). Interest groups include “those public groups that are above the personal realm of the family but beneath the state” (Watts, 2007: 4), and who advocate for the interests of the groups whom they represent. As such, they are uniquely positioned in the public sphere to steer political debate and advocate for policies that benefit either their members, or, as is the case with the groups under analysis, to “voice concerns of the economically or politically marginalized thus making the public sphere...more inclusive.” (Halpin, 2010: 3). We chose to focus on submissions from these groups because they play a central role in democracies by broadening public sphere discourse, equalising power imbalances, challenging political policies, and giving voice to the general public (Halpin, 2010; Warren, 2000).
These offer a counterpoint to analytical work on discourses about asylum seekers among politicians (Every & Augoustinos, 2008) and the media elite (O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008; Gale, 2004). We are interested in the construction of national identity, recognising the flexibility of discourse surrounding it, and the ways it can be used by people with divergent agendas (Every & Augoustinos, 2008; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus a focus on submissions from organisations offers a new dimension from which to understand how arguments are being made and ways in which inclusion and exclusion are framed. We are also interested in the extent to which a cosmopolitan framing is present, as asylum seeking is a human rights issue that inhabits a realm of contention between national and supra-national political, legal and socio-cultural domains. As Benhabib (2006: 61) suggests “…all future struggles…will be fought within the framework created by the universalistic principles of…commitment to human rights, on the one hand, and the exigencies of democratic self-determination, on the other”. Hence, the ways that both national and cosmopolitan identities were used by these non-state actors, and their potential for inclusion or exclusion, is of interest.

6.3 Method

We used both inductive and deductive approaches to analyse the 51 submissions to the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers from various community organisations (previously available for public display at: http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au). Three deductive categories of analysis were identified from the literature theorising national identity, cosmopolitan identity, and the construction of asylum seekers:

*Human rights* - the inclusion or exclusion of human rights as an impetus for action;
*Frame of reference* – the employment of a national, regional or global frame of reference;
*Australia’s relationship to others* - how Australia is framed in relation to other nations.

Like Betts and Birrell (2007), who analysed submissions to a government panel on the proposed Australian citizenship test, we noted the different types of organisations
making submissions to help paint a picture of responders. From here we employed frame analysis to explore the ways in which the asylum seeker debate in Australia is being formulated. Framing involves selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality [to] make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52). Framing involves consideration of the sociological shaping processes of discourse and communication (Price et al., 2005; Van Gorp, 2007; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Framing involves the process of cultural construction to create shared meaning (Benford & Snow, 2000). Framers make use of a ‘cultural stock’: a set of frames constrained by the shared values, norms and beliefs of a society, and thus primarily external to the framer (Van Gorp, 2007). But they may use these in creative ways. The same framing can be employed by opposing sides in a debate in ways that do not necessarily indicate allegiance to the frame, but rather recognise its salience in society (Desrosiers, 2012; Redden, 2014).

Framing links personal and collective identities (Gamson, 1992). Collective frames help delineate an ‘us’, who share common values and aims, from a ‘them’ who are seen as adversaries. Frames are used to identify and highlight problems, provide solutions and motivate action (Benford & Snow, 2000). In our analysis therefore we seek to elucidate who is framed as the problem, where the solution is framed as lying, and what action is framed as being required, and most importantly what identity perspective is being used.

6.4 Findings

We were able to access 51 submissions from organisations, which came from a variety of groups, including refugee, asylum seeker and migrant advocates; religious, political, academic and legal groups; and ethnic organisations. Table 1. shows submissions by organisation type.

The vast majority of submissions to the panel were in some way opposed to existing policies on ‘Illegal Maritime Arrivals’. Most of the submissions advocated greater care and concern for asylum seekers and adherence to human rights principles, rather than border protection and national security. Thus most made

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38 We did not have access to a number of submissions, including the “anonymous and confidential submissions and submissions from authors who did not provide consent to the publication of their names” (p. 149 of Expert Panel’s Report).
cosmopolitan or ‘progressive’ arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organisation</th>
<th>Number of submissions</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee, migrant and asylum seeker advocates (e.g. Refugee Council of Australia; Refugee Advocacy Network)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious (e.g. Uniting Justice Australia; Anglicare Victoria; Brotherhood of St Lawrence)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (e.g. Stable Population Party; GetUp)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic or disciplinary associations (e.g. Australian Psychological Association; Human Rights Law Centre; Australian Lawyers Alliance)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic organisation (e.g. International Federation of Iranian Refugees; Tamils against Genocide)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Submissions by organisation type.

It is interesting that the call for public submissions drew little interest from groups opposed to a more humane approach, particularly given high rates of negativity towards asylum seekers among the general population (Markus, 2014). Almost half the submissions (45%) came from refugee, migrant and asylum seeker advocates. Even groups that might be expected to be ‘anti asylum-seeker’ were not. Rather they took the opportunity to criticise government policies, as seen in the following from the Stable Population Party:

Unfortunately, certain politicians are cynically channelling peoples’ concerns over rapid population growth and the subsequent erosion of Australia's quality of life, and directing it at a relative handful of people who arrive on boats. The result of this undue focus on asylum seekers means that rapid population growth, mainly through a record-high ‘legal’ permanent immigration program, is undermining our acceptance of the people in most need of re-settlement in Australia.

Notable exceptions included the Australian Federal Police submission, which complained of an inability to apply the full force of the law to ‘people smugglers’ who
were minors (under 16 years old), as opposed to expressing concern for children exploited as crew on dangerous sea voyages. The Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights in Sri Lanka was another negative voice, expressing a particular concern about Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seekers. The Society wanted to “recommend to the Australian government to exert very stringent measures to stop these bogus asylum seekers.”

Apart from these exceptions, the majority of responses were pro-asylum seeker. This is interesting; it may be unsurprising that migrant, refugee and asylum seeker advocates should hold such views, but the fact that political, academic and religious groups also argue for a more compassionate response suggests this position is not simply one of just self-interest. Even more conservative groups, such as the aforementioned Stable Population Party or rural community organisations, argued for more inclusive policies.

There were multiple, complex representations of identity both within and across the submissions. However, these offered different framings. One demonstrated a clear national identity framing, making the case that a more humane response was somehow a requirement of Australian national character. The other, less common, was a postnational or cosmopolitan frame that emphasised an obligation to other humans and did not orient to national identity or national character in making arguments about the need for a more humanitarian response.

A quantitative analysis of the prevalence of each frame (see Figure 1) revealed significant overlap within individual submissions. 71% of submissions included a nationalist frame, 39% a global/cosmopolitan frame, and 51% a regional frame (most used a combination of these). So while arguments were framed in a range of ways, the national framing was most common.

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39 Studies show that, in general, the rural population of Australia is more conservative, and more likely to maintain an exclusivist, ethno-nationalist view of Australian identity (T. Phillips, 1998).
40 Percentages do not add to 100 as a result of allocation to multiple categories due to overlap.
84%) used appeals to human rights arguments, but these were spread across national, regional and global identity framings.

While quantitative analysis offers a sense of the breakdown of these framings across the submissions, more detailed analysis of the content is necessary to provide a clearer picture of how they were recruited to arguments for a more humane approach.

6.4.1 Australia as global citizen

The ‘global citizen’ frame emphasised Australia’s responsibility to the globe. The corollary is that Australians are responsible to those not just within, but beyond their borders.

In some submissions this was done by drawing attention to the universality of the asylum seeking phenomenon, and governments framed as being responsible to this global imperative.

Irregular maritime movements still remain a reality in the Asia-Pacific region as they are in other parts of the world. While the numbers of asylum-seekers arriving by boat have increased and present an operational challenge to Australia, they remain modest by international standards. [UNHCR]

The number of asylum seekers accepted by Australia is a small and arbitrary number. It could be doubled or tripled and still not be large by global standards. [Brigidine Asylum Seekers Project]

Fluctuations in the number of asylum seekers living in our region and/or seeking asylum in Australia are allied to major outbreaks of violence and conflict worldwide, far more than they are linked to Australia’s domestic refugee policies [Catholics in Coalition for Justice and Peace]

Australia is obliged to protect the human rights of all asylum seekers and refugees that arrive in Australia [Baptcare]
These extracts frame Australia as an ordinary global citizen, with concomitant civic responsibility. Rather than accepting the rhetoric that there is something unusual and unique about the asylum-seeking phenomenon, and the numbers involved, they normalise it, suggesting it is Australia’s responsibility to simply deal with the issue. These submissions re-frame the pathological construction of asylum seekers that sees their incursion as criminal, normalising asylum seeking and Australia’s role in providing protection. Australia is seen as nowhere near the ‘global standards’ of receiving asylum seekers, the numbers of whom ‘remain modest by international standards’, with claims that ‘the number of asylum seekers accepted by Australia...could be doubled or tripled’. Australia is framed as having obligations to respond to the requests of asylum seekers, whom it is ‘obliged to protect’. While other submissions (discussed shortly) see Australia’s responsibility as a result of its wealth or Western privilege, these submissions place it in a more egalitarian framework of reciprocity and common humanity.

A sense of interconnection with others and a common identity formed the basis of arguments for more inclusive responses to ‘illegal maritime arrivals’. Comments like that of the Refugee Advocacy Network – “It is human nature to ‘run for your life’ – in their circumstances we would do the same” – appeal to a cosmopolitan ethic oriented to global responsibility to all, rather than nationalism. Instead of positioning asylum seekers as a problem ‘Other’, they are framed as ‘like us’.

Comments such as these also position Australia as globally less significant in terms of generating or limiting flows of people, noting these are not the results of Australia’s supposedly ‘lenient’ policies (a common claim of politicians) but of ‘major outbreaks of violence and conflict worldwide’.

The global frame was also used in arguments about Australia’s responsibility to respond to human rights’ claims and the ethical obligations these entail.

...an effective and sustainable approach to asylum seekers must be based on respect for human dignity and not on political expediency. [Law Institute of Victoria]
The arrival of asylum seekers to Australia is... a humanitarian issue; not an issue of border control or national security. [Australian Greens Party].

The treatment of asylum seekers is a humanitarian and human rights issue rather than a security issue. [ACT Refugee Action Committee]

These extracts call for a more cosmopolitan ethic to inform asylum seeker policies, one that shows ‘respect for human dignity’, in contradistinction to nationalist ethics around ‘security’ and ‘political expediency’.

6.4.2 Australia as an apparent global citizen

Some submissions took a slightly different approach, focusing more on Australia’s appearance as a responsible global citizen. Image management, a concern about the way the nation appears to other countries, was the focus of these arguments.

The adoption of any inhumane or austerity refugee policy not just will hurt Australia’s international image and reputation, but also risking [sic] being sued by people who are harmed in the course of action of returning them to Indonesia by force. [Fed of Indo-China Ethnic].

Australia simply cannot afford to be seen as repelling asylum seekers [Project Safecom]

It is difficult to see how adopting policies that contravene our domestic and international human rights obligations could benefit Australia in our dealings with the rest of the world. [Catholics in Coalition for Justice and Peace]
These comments suggest policy decisions can have real, negative consequences, specifically - they can ‘hurt Australia’s international image and reputation’. Significant in this approach is that it ultimately appeals to national interest. The interests of Australia are used to make an argument for generosity towards asylum seekers. Thus these are not necessarily examples of cosmopolitan or ‘post-national’ thinking but are grounded in the need to bolster Australia’s good standing to ‘benefit our dealings with the rest of the world’, and to ensure harm is not done to Australia’s international image and reputation.

What is unclear from these submissions is whether the organisations actually espouse this view or, more likely, are simply using this approach to appeal to the panel, on the assumption that a focus on the reputation of the nation internationally will have more cache than genuinely more cosmopolitan arguments.

6.4.3 An alternate Australianness

Numerous submissions focused on the inadequacy of the Australian government’s response to asylum seekers, directly contrasting it with the sentiment of ‘average Australians’, concerned for a ‘fair go’ for all.

The Australian government and opposition have demonized refugees, as a way of political point scoring and in doing so have failed the Australian public [Darwin Asylum Seeker Support and Advocacy Network]

Now is the time to ‘reset’ the policy discussion as a humanitarian and human rights challenge. This will clarify the policy choices, and benefit not only asylum seekers, but the broader Australian community, by reasserting the national values of decency and a ‘fair go’ [Refugee advocacy network]
The CPN\textsuperscript{41} project has been positively supported by...ordinary Australians who want to contribute to the solution [Australian Homestay Network]

We urge the Panel to make recommendations that follow the morals and human rights laws that we as Australians wish to uphold [Catholics in Coalition for Justice and Peace]

We believe a just and humane way of minimising deaths at sea caused by boat voyages taken by asylum seekers can be found and is desired by the Australian people [Rural Australians for refugees – Bendigo]

These submissions distinguish between the beliefs and practices of the general public and those of the Australian government, some explicitly, some by implication. They suggest a schism within the collective national identity, either in terms of the content of that identity or the operationalisation of that content. Collective identification always involves contestation about the content, which is made up of group norms, rules, goals, intergroup comparisons and worldviews (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006). The extracts demonstrate such contestation, with the political elite framed as having different conceptions of the collective identity, or at least divergence of group norms, from the general public. The public are valorised as ‘average Australians’ upholding ‘the national values of decency and a ‘fair go’’; ‘ordinary Australians who want to contribute to the solution’. They want to uphold ‘human rights laws’; and desire ‘a just and humane way’. This is in contrast to ‘the Australian government and opposition [who] have demonised refugees, as a way of political point scoring’. What is interesting is the focus in every extract on Australia – ‘Australian public’, ‘Australian community’, ‘ordinary Australians’, ‘we as Australians’, ‘the Australian people’ – it is Australian identity that is relevant, even in the commentary about human rights. This indicates the continued value of the nation

\textsuperscript{41} Community Placement Network, whereby asylum seekers lived in Australian households while their claims were being processed.
state in terms of its ability to ‘contain’ identities and act as a structure for community cohesion and inclusion (cf Calhoun 2007; Skey 2011).

6.4.4 Regional identity

Over half the submissions (55%) framed Australia as a regional leader, with regional responsibilities. The basis of this claim was Australia’s wealth, and Western heritage.

Australia’s wealth and its political influence within the Asia-Pacific region...[mean] that Australia has had and will continue to have a leadership role within the region [Refugee Council Of Australia]

As Australia is one of the few signatory countries to the Refugee Convention in our region, it must lead by example. [GetUp]

...we recognise that Australia is the only country in the region that has the wealth, the resources and capacity to provide security and enduring protection for refugees. [Refugee Action Coalition]

Australia is a rich Western nation in the Asian region and therefore has particular obligations to respond to the inflows of asylum seekers and refugees into this region [Balmain for Refugees]

This emphasis on Australia’s wealth may be designed to alleviate concerns about the perceived economic pressures resulting from more progressive asylum seeker policies (i.e. the added costs of welfare and support if they were granted permanent residence in Australia), but it also brings into relief the poverty of surrounding nations, suggesting it is Australia’s responsibility to provide leadership and generosity on the issue.

Rothfield (2013) provides an examination of this phenomenon. It should be noted that submissions were given in response to the government’s failed ‘regional solution’, and therefore a focus on the region is perhaps unsurprising.
Australia’s economic stability featured strongly in many of the submissions. This is a matter of pride, but it is also rhetorically powerful as historically, economic and immigration policies have been closely linked, with prosperity associated with more positive attitudes to migrants (Goot & Watson, 2005; Bean, 2002). Asylum seekers are seen as a drain on the economy (Stevens, 2002), and this is at least in part an explanation for the widespread negativity towards them. The obvious counter to such concerns is to emphasise Australia’s position as the wealthiest country in the region.

In some ways, the above comments appeal to an Australian identity constructed as superior to its neighbours, based on ‘Western’ or Anglo-Celtic heritage, in typical Orientalist fashion (Said, 1977). GetUp notes the ethical and moral responsibility that Australia has: ‘as Australia is one of the few signatory countries to the Refugee Convention in our region, it must lead by example’. This was extended with concerns about the condition of asylum-seeking children left in Malaysian custody, with Chilout (Children out of Immigration Detention) asking ‘How could Australia possibly ensure the safety of an unaccompanied child sent back to Malaysia, beyond sending our own trained team of welfare staff to Malaysia with that child?’

This may be an expression of frustration at the Australian governments lack of care for asylum seeker children. However such framings also tap into the fear and discomfort that some Australians’ have about being ‘civilized Westerners’ situated in the ‘uncivilized’ Asia Pacific region (see McGillvray & Smith, 1997; Philpott, 2001). While moves are being made to work collaboratively with these neighbours, Australia’s immigration policy history (the ‘White Australia Policy’, and ‘Populate or Perish’) suggests fear and uncertainty about their place in the ‘uncivilised’ region (Younane Brookes, 2012). Yet, in this instance, identification as the civilised beacon, benevolent and stable, in an uncivilised space, is used to motivate a compassionate response to asylum seekers.

6.5 Conclusion: Regional-focused, global-looking, nationalists…or nation-focused, regional-looking, globalists?

So how was identity framed throughout these submissions? We found global, regional and national identities imbricated, rather than being mutually exclusive. But

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43 These references to Malaysia relate to a proposal to exchange boat arrival asylum seekers with UNCHR approved refugees in Malaysia.
what was interesting were the ways in which both global-leaning and nation-leaning discourses were used to advocate for more inclusive and progressive asylum seeker policies, a finding that extends Every and Augostinos’ (2008) analysis of how nationalism is used by politicians to argue for both more harsh, and more inclusive, asylum seeker policies. Importantly, it was Australian identity that remained the focus. Appeals to an Australian identity that supports social justice and human rights, a ‘fair go’, generosity, decency, global responsibility and leadership, were most common in arguments for less punitive treatment of asylum seekers.

These appeals to nationalist sentiment seek to do two somewhat contradictory things. Some call for the panel to remember Australian values and identity in a particular way (emphasising ‘traditional’ traits such as the ‘fair go’ and Australia’s (post) colonial position of power in the region); others seek to change the way Australianness itself is conceptualised (arguing for a recognition of human rights and challenging the perception that asylum seekers are a problem). These arguments were often found together in the same submission. In this way, different framings of Australianness (traditional and non-traditional) are employed for ‘progressive’ ends.

The focus on Australia works rhetorically in a number of ways. It ameliorates the sense of threat that much of the discourse around asylum seekers has generated by minimising the threat to ‘our’ borders, normalising asylum seekers, demonstrating they do not pose a risk to economic interests, national security or health (Pickering 2001; Fozdar and Pedersen 2013). It elevates Australia’s position in a threatenly globalising world, framing it as a leader both politically, economically and morally. Most importantly it feeds into the taken-for-granted sense that the nation-state is sacrosanct. It engages with the notion that irregular migrants pose a challenge to the right of nations to safeguard their citizens’ interests, without appearing to reduce their privileged position (McNevin, 2009: 168), by alleviating anxieties about this threat using what amounts to a form of self-flattery (pointing to position in the region, level of civilisation, moral superiority, capacity, resources etc).

These findings support Craig Calhoun’s argument that ‘nations matter’ (Calhoun, 2007). He argues nations’ value remains in their ability to enforce, through the weight of the law, the human rights of their citizens. Here something slightly

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44 Similarly the ‘We’re better than this’ campaign recently launched by high profile Australian celebrities in order to pressure the government to release asylum seeker children from detention (see ABC 2014) carries the implicit national ‘we’ in its title and message.
different is happening. Australianness is appealed to in order to argue for the protection of the rights of non-citizens. Australianness is drawn upon to promote Universalist goals – the appeals demonstrate a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ in action (Appiah, 1996). Others have argued that Australian identity is sufficiently empowered by its multiculturalism to engage both national and more globally focussed cosmopolitan values simultaneously (Brett & Moran, 2011; Castles et al 1998). The appeal to the Australian identity and the country’s political position in these submissions applies a similar rationale, demonstrating what Appiah has identified as a ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ (1996) that values its national situatedness as a foundation from which to extend an ethic of openness and humanity to others. This becomes the impetus for the action that these framings drive. Here, the interests and responsibilities of the nation are framed as being complementary, rather than in conflict, with those outside the nation.

Thus while it is common to assume that a cosmopolitan identity frame would be most valuable in making arguments for more humane policies in relation to asylum seekers, we have found nationalist-grounded arguments may be used in equally ‘progressive’ ways. Indeed they are being used in this way, not only by politicians, as per Every and Augoustinos (2008), but by organisations working between the level of the individual and the state to support the interests of those marginalised and outside the protection of the nation-state.
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Chapter Seven [Paper Five]. ‘Team Australia’: cartoonists challenging exclusionary nationalist discourse

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7.1 Abstract:
In the context of the ‘war on terror’ which is being waged internally in many countries as well as externally, Australian leaders announced an increased threat of terrorist activity within Australian boundaries in 2014 generated by young people travelling to engage in military activity in the Middle East and returning ‘radicalised’. Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott called on Australians to rally together, in the face of such a threat, as ‘Team Australia’. This article looks at the response by cartoonists to this call, focusing on the way the notion of ‘Team Australia’ is portrayed as a challenge to core aspects of Australianness such as mateship, multiculturalism and the ‘fair-go’. Frame analysis is used to explore how the cartoons connect with the broader populace and represent, challenge, reconstruct, and rely on implicit and explicit understandings of Australianness. The cartoons frame Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ as exclusionary, unfair, politically elitist, anti-multicultural and unAustralian, even while pursuing a nationalist project.

Key words: Australian identity; frame analysis; cartoons; nationalism

7.2 Introduction
On August 5th 2014, just shy of a year in office, the then Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott generated a media frenzy by using the term ‘Team Australia’ when announcing new counter terrorism measures. These laws were necessary, Abbott claimed, in the face of a “terrorist threat here in this country [that] ...is as high as it has ever been”; and he rallied all Australians to recognise that “when it comes to counter-terrorism everyone needs to be part of ‘Team Australia’” (Abbott, 2014). He declared on talkback radio that there was a threat from people returning to Australia after being radicalised while fighting in the Middle East, saying “so we do have to be vigilant against it, and my position is that everyone has got to be on Team Australia...
everyone has got to put this country, its interests, its values and its people first, and you don’t migrate to this country unless you want to join our team” (Rajca, 2014). A week later in a media release, Abbott insisted that “as Team Australia, we need to support community efforts to prevent young Australians being radicalised and leaving Australia to join extremists overseas, and to ensure those who return do not become involved in terrorist activity here” (Abbott & Brandis, 2014b).

Significantly, Mr Abbott and others continued to use the phrase. In the eleven weeks after its first use (6 August to 29 October 2014) there were 54 references to ‘Team Australia’ in Hansard and the term was quickly appropriated as a catchphrase in reference to a range of other issues (Hartcher, 2014; Nason, 2014; Parkinson, 2014; Robb, 2014; Ross, 2014).

‘Team Australia’ became the focus of public discourse in the context of a broader focus on Muslims in Australia, particularly around Shari’a law, fear of terrorist attacks, and concerns around radicalism and extremism. Like George Bush’s ‘coalition of the willing’ and ‘axis of evil’, which implied that ‘you’re either with us or against us’, the idea of ‘Team Australia’ had strong exclusionary elements, catering to the sentiments of those who felt Muslims were not loyal enough to the nation and its values (Fozdar & Low, 2015) and to the mindset of those who wished to ‘ban the burqa’ (Krayem & McCue, 2014) and expel those wishing to follow Shari’a law. As Senator Jacqui Lambie unambiguously said: “If you’re not going to show your allegiance to our constitution and to Australian law, then get out.” (ABC, 2014b; 2014c).

While it did rally some elements of the community, the use of the phrase ‘Team Australia’ also created something of a backlash, which is the subject of our analysis. Politicians, journalists, bloggers, cartoonists, and academics questioned, if not condemned, the notion. Labor MP Terri Butler called the term ‘facile’ (T. Wright, 2014); while a member of Abbott’s own Liberal ‘team’ saw it as a ‘two-word slogan’ (Bourke, 2014). Former Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser argued the term shut down debate (Cornwall, 2014), and terrorism expert Dr Clarke Jones condemned it as divisive (Belot, 2014). Academic Anne Summers identified the ways it was designed to exclude and entrench existing inequalities (Summers 2014).

45 Team leader himself (Mr Abbott) expressed discomfort with burqa wearers, saying he found the burqa ‘confronting’ and wished it wasn’t worn (Krayem & McCue, 2014).
These critics saw the use of ‘Team Australia’ as a tactic to divert attention away from other issues that were causing internal dissent, such as recently announced budget cuts, plans to allow Australia’s intelligence agency ASIO to retain the public’s web use metadata, plans to water down Australia’s anti-discrimination legislation, and a series of increasingly contentious policies relating to asylum seekers. Rather than rallying the public, Abbott’s use of ‘Team Australia’ was seen by some as an affront to long held Australian values. Indeed, a journalist in a critical piece ironically referred to the ‘real Team Australia’: those who are “protecting a social compact that has equity at its core. It is, at its very heart, about fairness” (Sylvret, 2014: 22).

‘Team Australia’ was also seen as a thinly veiled discursive device to unite people against Muslim Australians. Tim Soutphommasane, the Australian Race Discrimination Commissioner, while allowing that ‘Team Australia’ may be “short hand for an Australian liberal democratic community”, noted:

If ‘Team Australia’ is meant to suggest something else, we are entitled to ask for an explanation... it has been a strength of our multicultural experience that political and civic leaders have understood the importance of ensuring that all Australians, regardless of their faith or cultural background, can feel that they can indeed belong to the family of the nation (Grattan, 2014).

The negative reaction was particularly apparent in minority communities. The Islamic Council of Australia (ICV), with a constituency of over 150,000, said Muslims felt excluded by the term, and paralleled the demand to join ‘Team Australia’ with racist comments like ‘go back to where you came from’. They state:

This phrase, if you don’t like it here go back, or if you’re a migrant you need to sign up for Team Australia or don’t come here at all, it’s completely inappropriate for a prime minister to put a whole community in that category and it’s not even true (ABC, 2014a).

What the use of the term did was to open up a debate about what Australianess means, and this was most clearly articulated by cartoonists who resist the Prime Minister’s construction of national identity, challenging it with their own.

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46 There are 281,578 Muslim Australians, of whom 36 per cent were born here (see http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-21/green-team-australia-the-reality-of-the-figures/5685550).
7.2.1 National identity

National identities enable individuals to feel a sense of belonging in an imagined community (Anderson, 2006) with symbolic boundaries that “engage in the exclusion of the ‘other’ from the national community, according to socially and morally meaningful criteria” (T. Phillips, 1996: 114). This is a largely taken-for-granted aspect of individuals’ sense of self. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus*, (De Cillia et al., 1999) suggest that ‘who we are’ is “a complex of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes, (a) of related emotional attitudes intersubjectively shared within a specific group of persons; (b) as well as of similar behavioural dispositions; (c) all of which are internalized through ‘national’ socialization”. Internalised in this way, national identity not only defines who we are, but also who we are not, constructing an ‘other’ who, by definition, does not share ‘our’ social practices, habits and mores (Benhabib, 1998; De Cillia et al., 1999). National identities tend to remain invisible until threatened, then hegemonic belonging becomes a lens through which engagement with others occurs (Yuval-Davis, 2004).

Theorists of national identity identify two main strands - ethno-nationalism and civic nationalism (Connor, 2003; Kymlicka, 2006; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000); however these are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Brett & Moran, 2011b; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Johnson, 2007).

Ethno-nationalists rely on the historical conception of the nation as grounded in the ethnic group or tribe, with members bound by shared ancestry, like a family (Gellner, 1994; Guibernau, 1996). In Australia ethno-nationalists see certain characteristics, such as native birth, ancestry, national pride, and military and Christian heritage as fundamental to Australianness. They tend to value patriarchy, and have negative attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007; Goot & Watson, 2005; T. Phillips, 1996). It is likely that these nationalists were who Abbott was speaking to with the notion of ‘Team Australia’.

Civic nationalism is often contrasted with ethno-nationalism, and focuses more on commitment to the rule of law and an ethos that values diversity and inclusivity (Fozdar & Spittles, 2014; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). By international comparison, Australia has high rates of civic nationalism - second highest of the 24 nations involved in the ISSP95 (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). This orientation values national inclusivity,
low national pride, freedom of choice, boundary permeability, and a felt sense of
Australianness (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; P. Smith & Phillips, 2006). Theoretically
‘Team Australia’ could appeal to civic nationalists by focussing on people’s choice to
‘join the team’, but the way the term was used suggests an ethno-nationalist approach
using traditional definitions of insiders and outsiders.

The debate about what it means to be Australian and what the content of
Australian nationalism is, or indeed should be, is an important background to
understanding the range of responses to the notion of ‘Team Australia’. Constructions
of Australianness are woven through political discourse (Curran, 2004; Johnson, 2002;
Younane Brookes, 2010; 2012) and politicians play a key role in the construction of
national identity (Billig, 1995; Younane Brookes, 2012). As such, Abbott’s ‘Team
Australia’ was a calculated intervention designed to reinforce a particular notion of
Australianness that appeals to a fear of a threatening ‘other’. The responses to
Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ offer a point of comparison. Here we are interested in the
responses of political cartoonists.

7.3 Political Cartoons

Cartoonists play a role in constructing and contesting the dominant discourses
of politics and the main-stream media, using satire to critique and contest power
dynamics and bring a different voice to the public sphere (Manning & Phiddian, 2004).
In challenging commonly presented meaning, cartoons represent, in simplified form,
the symbolic contestation of issues (Gamson & Stuart, 1992). They can also be
powerful tools in the promulgation of social identities (Duffy, 2012).

Yet, the social significance and sphere of influence of cartoons is a matter of
some debate. Manning and Phiddian (2005: 128) assert that “cartoons are liminal
things, poised somewhere between being ‘the most influential thing in the paper’ and
‘just a joke’. This gives them a special license for provocation”. Political cartooning is a
form of persuasive communication, based on shared symbolic meanings between
artist and public, with a range of interpretations being made available (Medhurst &
Desousa, 2009).

In the Australian context it has been argued that political cartoons instil an
unnecessary and exaggerated cynicism and dissatisfaction in the public about
politicians (M. Hogan, 2001). Cartoonists were criticised for not acting like responsible
journalists in presenting information to the public. This suggestion has been countered with the argument that “cartoonists are not journalists, and they should be accorded extra licence to be extravagant and even unfair in their criticisms of public life...Cartoonists are not an information source” (Manning & Phiddian, 2004: 34). Indeed the political satire of cartoons fits well with the tenor of Australian humour more generally. Recently the juxtaposition of Australians’ concerns about Australian cattle being slaughtered in Indonesia yet their simultaneous lack of humanity towards asylum seekers portrayed in a number of cartoons has demonstrated the value of this symbolic contestation and provocation through humour (Fozdar and Spittles 2014).

7.4 Method and theoretical approach

Various methods and analytical techniques have been used to study political cartoons. Medhurst and Desousa (2009) offer a typology of common elements: political commonplaces (defence of the nation, economy, foreign relations, political process, campaigning, polling), literary/cultural allusions (drawing on fictional or mythical characters, narrative forms from legend, folklore, or literature), personal character traits (reflecting ‘popular perceptions’ of politicians’ personality traits) and situational/context-dependent themes (making cartoons difficult to understand out of context). These elements are combined in a range of ways by cartoonists to produce pithy commentary on public affairs.

The tone of this commentary varies however. Manning and Phiddian (2004), drawing on Press (1981), identify 3 categories of political cartoons: ‘laughing satirical’, ‘destructive satirical’, and ‘savage indignation’. The first is most common within democratic nations and shows a respect for the legitimate authority of those they criticise; destructive satirical cartoons differ in that they do not accept the legitimacy of authority or the system within which it is wielded. The savagely indignant cartoon falls between these and...

...in the Australian tradition at least, is often the most memorable and influential... a cartoonist can express quite deep reservations about the established patterns of distribution of power and resources without hating the system and its minions or seeking their wholesale destruction (Manning and Phiddian 2004: 31 & 32).
Contrast is the main rhetorical form used in cartoons (Medhurst & Desousa, 2009). This involves drawing out tension between two images or texts, between an image and a text, or between popular expectations and the artist’s depiction. Less common rhetorical forms include: commentary - simply detailing what is going on as a truism; and contradiction, which “invites no range of choice...the individual, party, or idea being exposed is condemned by all reasonable people because it is judged guilty of that most unpardonable political sin, hypocrisy” (Medhurst and DeSousa: 211).

In this study, we explore political cartoons based on ‘Team Australia’ and consider the ways these cartoons use the rhetorical styles and communicative techniques noted above.

We also apply frame analysis (Goffman, 1986) to explore how the cartoons connect with the broader populous and represent, challenge, reconstruct, or rely on implicit and explicit understandings of Australianness. Framing involves selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality [to] make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52). Consideration is given to the shaping processes of discourse and communication (Price et al., 2005; Van Gorp, 2007; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011).

Framers make use of ‘cultural stock’, a set of frames that are limited by the shared values, norms and beliefs of a society, and are external to the framer (Van Gorp, 2007; Benford & Snow, 2000; Desrosiers, 2012). However these can be used in a range of ways. A shared cultural frame can be employed by opposing sides in a debate, thus its use does not necessarily indicate allegiance to the frame, but rather recognises the frame’s salience to the audience (Redden, 2014). Gamson (1992) argues that framing processes are one factor accounting for the correspondence between personal and collective identities. Collective frames help delineate ‘us’ from ‘them’; ‘us’ who share common values and aims, and ‘them’ who become our adversaries.

The core task of framers is to identify and highlight problems, provide solutions and motivate action (Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore we use frame analysis to
elucidate what the cartoonists perceive the problem to be, and whether a solution or action is advocated.\textsuperscript{47}

We selected 6 cartoons from diverse publications to capture a range of styles and perspectives. All were published between August and November 2014 in major Australian print and online publications.

\section*{7.5 Analysis}

The cartoons all play off core Australian values, particularly the ‘fair go’, mateship, and the valuing of diversity, to make the argument that if anything, ‘Team Australia’ should be about inclusion. As such the cartoons highlight the ways in which Abbott’s use of ‘Team Australia’ generates exclusion.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image9.png}
\end{figure}

The above cartoon, appearing in the Sydney Morning Herald two months after the first rallying cry by the Prime Minister, represents the diversity of Australians in order to challenge the notion that certain groups should be excluded from ‘Team Australia’. Using some of the features identified by Medhurst and Desousa (2009) (literary/cultural allusions, personal character trait) the cartoon depicts people wearing head coverings: a nun; Tony Abbott with a pair of swimming trunks (colloquially termed ‘budgie smugglers’) pulled over his head; Ned Kelly (an (in)famous Australian bushranger who is a significant figure in Australian national imaginings (see Tranter & Donoghue, 2008; 2010); a masked surgeon; two children in an animal and a Spiderman costume; someone in a motorcycle helmet; and a person wearing a niqab.

All the eyes are turned (in suspicion?) towards the Muslim woman, who looks back at them. The cartoonist, Simon Letch, has used minimal text – just the title of

\textsuperscript{47} We do not assume that the cartoonists necessarily present a solution or action, as the act of participating in the public dialogue through cartooning may in itself be the artists’ ‘solution’, by which they seek to prompt ‘action’ by others eg further challenging of the notion of ‘Team Australia’.
‘Team Australia’ almost hidden in small black letters against the grey background—relying on the visual medium to communicate his message. Shared knowledge of the situational theme (Medhurst & Desousa, 2009) is relied upon - calls to ban women wearing the burqa in the audience gallery at Parliament House for security reasons. The cartoon exposes the hypocrisy of the suggestion, when other culturally acceptable items of clothing that conceal the face or head are deemed acceptable. By linking the burqa ban debate with ‘Team Australia’, Letch makes a connection between the rhetoric of ‘Team Australia’ and the growing set of practices designed to exclude Muslim Australians.

Beyond this, Letch frames Australian identity through the contrast or tension drawn between popular expectations and the artist’s depiction (Manning & Phiddian, 2004). Rather than depicting ‘Team Australia’ as exclusionary, it is shown to be diverse and potentially inclusive; a person wearing a burqa is joined by a range of typical Australian characters, and Tony Abbott is satirised. The more one looks at the cartoon, the more the gaze of the seven individuals looking at the Muslim woman appears sheepish – almost a gradual recognition of similarity rather than difference.

Some of the characters are fairly banal; the medical doctor, motorbike helmet wearer and two children are all fairly commonplace members of any society. Others demonstrate a more specifically Australian context, relying on knowledge of Australian history and mythology. The nun, for example, draws on Australia’s identity as a primarily Christian nation (see Fozdar, 2011a; 2011b; Maddox, 2005). By including the niqab-wearer with the habit wearer, the niqab is normalised as ‘Australian’ garb (it may be going too far to suggest that the positioning of the nun on the furthest left position represents the past, and the Muslim woman on the right the future, but it is interesting that these religious women are positioned at either end of the line-up).

Including Ned Kelly in the Team Australia line-up powerfully challenges the exclusion of niqab wearers. Ned Kelly is seen by many Australians as representing traditional Australian values of mateship, larrikinism, and anti-authoritarianism – he is the quintessential Australian and remains an important figure in the construction of Australian identity (Tranter & Donoghue, 2008; 2010). By depicting Ned Kelly together with a person wearing a niqab, the cartoonist draws the niqab wearer into a powerful myth-scape of Australianess, skilfully transferring legitimacy from one to the other.
As with much of the media and public discourse, this cartoon reframes the ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ (Benford & Snow, 2000). Abbott’s version of ‘Team Australia’ becomes the problem, as it excludes Muslims. The solution proposed is the already diverse and inclusive Australian society. Thus, a distinction is drawn between ‘average Australians’ who already include a range of ‘Others’, and the apparently exclusionary political elite. Letch uses a multicultural, inclusive frame (Brett & Moran, 2011), where the niqab-wearer, the nun, Ned Kelly and a biker are all part of the ‘team’. He suggests that we should see the niqab-wearing Muslim ‘other’ as no different from ‘us’, and applies irony to suggest Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ is the problem, not the solution.

This cartoon sits between a ‘savagely indignant’ and destructive agenda (Manning & Phiddian, 2004). The image of Prime Minister Abbott - his face concealed by ‘budgie smugglers’, and his ears protruding through the leg holes – is a rather savage caricature of his public persona (sporting ‘he-man’), implying almost a blindness (although his eyes are visible the article of clothing almost entirely covers his face) to the diversity around him. It suggests that he is too stupid to dress himself, with the implication that his leadership of the nation is questionable. Yet the cartoon simultaneously valorises traditional aspects of Australian culture, and thus cannot be read as ‘seeking the wholesale destruction’ of the system (Manning & Phiddian, 2004).

In another cartoon the concept of a team uniform is used. Ron Tandberg from The Age (August 12, 2014) presents the image of a woman wearing a maroon niqab, facing a line-up of blue clad Coalition (Liberal and National Party) Members of Parliament, including: Julie Bishop, Joe Hockey, Warren Truss, Kevin Andrews, and George Brandis, amongst others. Tony Abbott declares “You can’t play for Team Australian wearing that!” The image would perhaps be even more powerful without the caption, which suggests that it is simply the woman’s clothing that disqualifies her from playing for ‘Team Australia’, when in fact the exclusion is a much broader cultural one.

Tandberg uses a gentler ‘laughing satirical’ approach (Manning & Phiddian, 2004) compared to the first cartoon. The focus is on the uniform wearers, more than
the excluded non-uniform wearer, evident in the pictorial construction (the niqab wearer is off to one side, while Team Australia is positioned across the centre, taking up the majority of the space – the Muslim is literally marginalised). Using a reference quite the opposite of the Letch cartoon, which highlighted the way that a multicultural Australian identity can accommodate the ‘Other’, this image highlights the uniformity of the elite who (re)produce such exclusion.

‘Team Australia’ is thus framed as white and powerful. Eight apparently white Anglo Australians, 7 of whom are men, are depicted. Stock frames of a white masculine Australianness are drawn from (Fee & Russell, 2007; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007), highlighting whiteness as “the physical embodiment of an Australian” (Lentini, Halafoff, & Ogru, 2011: 410). As such, it references the ethno-nativist framing of Australianness (F. L. Jones, 2000; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). Hage (1998) has argued that the exclusion of non-white Australians is reinforced by white people believing their occupation of the privileged and powerful space in society means they can choose who is, and who is not, welcome. This cartoon graphically displays this perspective.

The association with sport is perhaps an obvious one, given that the term ‘team’ is most commonly associated with sport. The image triggers memories of childhood selections of teams, where the less able or less favoured miss out. The facial expressions are important – those already ‘on the team’ are aggressive (frowns, down-turned mouths, jaws out), the excluded is bewildered, perhaps threatened (puzzled/sad eyebrows).

In sport, particularly international competitions where teams compete against each other as representatives of nation-states, the nation is repeatedly flagged, through banal nationalism, solidifying national identity and reinforcing an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality (Billig, 1995). Sport is theorised as the contemporary equivalent of war; to forge national identity, men (generally) take to the field to defend their nation with physical force against the enemy, and are heralded as heroes (Ward, 2010). Here, the line of members already on the ‘team’, forcefully denying a place to someone quite ‘visibly different’, is emblematic of the way many Australians see their nation.
But this image has a particular resonance for Australia. In Australia, sport is highly valued\textsuperscript{48}; being a ‘sporting nation’, “means, in order to be a properly accredited member of society, with human rights and so on, you’ve got to either play sport or watch sport” (ABC, 2012). Horne, in his ironic interpretation of Australian society, said sport is the only area in which Australians seek to excel\textsuperscript{49}; and (Kell, 2000: 10) notes the moral value given to sport.

[S]port, we are told, is ‘the great leveller’ because ‘race doesn’t matter on the sportsfield’ and ‘sport brings us together’. Australians have a powerful belief that sport is one of the few social institutions where everyone still gets ‘a fair go’.

This cartoon cleverly engages this assumption about sport’s levelling ability, while suggesting that in fact sport, as a microcosm of the nation itself, is far from inclusionary.

\textsuperscript{48} In making this observation we recognise that an entire paper could be devoted to the association of Team Australia with sports and Australia’s ‘sporting nation’ status. Instead we aim to explore the breadth of stock frames drawn upon to construct Australianess. We consider sport in relation to this cartoon because it is explicitly referenced by the cartoonist.

\textsuperscript{49} In the latest AUSSA survey 89% of Australians were proud of Australia’s sporting achievements, more than those proud of its democracy (79.5%), its political influence (62%), its economic achievements (80%) and its scientific and technological achievements (90.5%).
This set of three cartoons (Cartoon 3 by Alan Moir, a regular cartoonist for the *Sydney Morning Herald*; Cartoons 4 and 5 by Matt Golding of *The Age*) demonstrate aspects of Medhurst and Desousa’s (2009) characterisation of cartoons. They each use features of the political commonplace (the economy and foreign relations), as well as popular perceptions of Abbott’s personality traits and characteristics, and draw on the culture frame of Australia as the country of the ‘fair go’ to demonstrate the unfairness of Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’.

Firstly, Moir, who always draws Mr Abbott as Popeye, diminishing his status while mocking his physical features and ‘action man’ persona, caricatures an aggressive Abbott informing marginalised members of society (students, Aborigines, pensioners and the jobless, but interestingly, no obviously Muslim characters) that they do not ‘make the grade’, and are thus excluded from ‘Team Australia’. The fact no Muslims are depicted shifts the focus to the very idea of ‘Team Australia’ as fundamentally exclusionary of a range of groups. The rather tacky amateur banner behind the desk reinforces the amateurish approach of Abbott – as though Popeye has suddenly been thrown into a leadership position, and is playing at it rather poorly.

Golding’s first cartoon (Cartoon 4) depicts Mr Abbott congratulating a family, in detention in Nauru, for being “picked for Team Australia B”; to which the family responds “let us guess...we play the away games”. This couples the notion of ‘Team Australia’ with the Abbott government’s territorial exclusion of individuals seeking asylum (those who arrive without visas are sent to offshore processing detention centres and are denied settlement in Australia, instead being settled in Cambodia). Attention is drawn to the political game being played, particularly the international image management in which Australia pretends to adhere to its’ international obligations; while the asylum seekers are excluded, they can still “play the away games”. It is a second-class form of inclusion, if that.

Golding’s second cartoon (Cartoon 5) depicts ‘visibly different’ Muslim men, women and children saying to Mr Abbott and his team of some of the most conservative members of Parliament (a similar white group to that depicted by Tandberg), “We thought Team Australia was all about social inclusion”, to which Mr Abbott responds “Yes, yes, yes...but how silly would we look if we didn’t have a team to play against?” It suggests a very cynical motivation for the discourse of ‘Team Australia’, recognising that teams require opponents for cohesion and group morale.
All these cartoons offer a satirical take on ways that ‘Team Australia’ stands against Australian values. Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ is shown to marginalise (students, Aborigines, pensioners and the jobless), exclude (asylum seekers) and ‘Other’ (Muslims) people who do not make the team. Among many civic-nationalist and more cosmopolitan Australians (Brett & Moran, 2011; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000), and even some holding more traditional views (Tranter & Donoghue, 2010), this exclusion is unacceptable, as it contravenes a stock framing of Australianness: inclusion and a ‘fair go’ for all.

The ‘fair go’ is a central tenet of Australianness that dates back to colonial myths of mateship, ANZACs and bushrangers. In contrast to the hierarchical class structures of ‘Mother England’, Australia was constructed as a nation that offered opportunity to all, and was in fact scornful of class distinctions. Australia was “to be a place which aspired, if not to equality, then a more limited promise of equity – equal chances for all to share in its material benefits” (Kalantzis, 2005: 178). However from the beginning, the ‘fair go’ was “limited to the fair-skinned descendants of migrants from the British Isles” (Kalantzis, 2005: 179).

A number of academics have looked at the continuing significance of the ideal of the ‘fair go’ in Australia. It remains important as a key aspect of Australianness for young people (Purdie & Wilss, 2007), and Australians see it as an important value to be applied in relation to Muslims, associating it with a spirit of diversity, multiculturalism, mutual or reciprocal responsibility, and equal opportunity (Lentini, Halafoff, & Ogru, 2009).

Each of these cartoons frame Abbott’s use of Team Australia as an affront to this core Australian value. ‘Team Australia’ denies a ‘fair go’ to students, Aborigines, pensioners and the unemployed (Moir), asylum seekers and Muslims (Golding). By pointing to the injustice and exclusion implicit in Abbott’s notion, they show that ‘Team Australia’ conflicts with this most fundamental of Australian values. Further, because of the centrality of a ‘fair go’ to Australian identity, these cartoons actually frame the notion of ‘Team Australia’ as, ironically, ‘unAustralian’, and in “violation of norms of civility and natural justice” (P. Smith & Phillips, 2001: 335). More broadly it signals that there are a range of people already excluded from Australian society.
A similar point is made in a complex piece by one of Australia’s most influential and internationally known cartoonists, Michael Leunig (7 November 2014). The cartoon portrays two men sitting on a park bench at night, one reading a newspaper headlined ‘Team Australia’. He says to his friend “we used to be mates…but now we’re a team...can you believe it?”.

There are (at least) two interpretations of this drawing, which differ depending on whether the characters are seen as homeless men, or as white working class men. We deal with each of these below. However first it is necessary to outline the importance of the idea of mateship to Australianness.

Mateship is a key aspect of Australian identity that draws on colonial myths. Joppke (2013: 7) notes: ‘‘mateship’...stems from the convict and working-class background of Australia’s first European settlers”. Significant influences on the construction of Australian identity from the colonial and post-colonial era include ANZACs and bushrangers (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Fozdar & Spittles, 2014; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007; 2008; 2010). ANZACs are “allegedly ill-disciplined bushmen...transformed through the sacrifices of war into pioneer-soldiers” (Tranter & Donoghue, 2007: 166) and bushrangers draw on Anglo-Celtic myths of the working class, anti-authoritarian rebel and hero (Tranter & Donoghue, 2008). As Wesley (2000: 178) notes “the popularity of Ned Kelly lay in his rebellion against unequally distributed property and authority [and] the emotion summoned by the ANZAC landings at Gallipoli was prompted by undertones of sacrifice for the community and of solidarity with comrades”. Thus the ideas of the ‘fair go’ and mateship are tied together through colonial myths, built on ethno-nationalist framings of identity.

The two men in the cartoon appear to embody these myths of colonial Australianness. Firstly the convict/working class background comes through in their appearance: ‘rough’, ‘down to earth’ or of low socio-economic standing (facial stubble, unkempt, drinking, surrounded by rubbish, sitting on a park bench at night). This typifies the characteristics of colonial Australia, and helps the audience view ‘Team Australia’ and mateship as disparate and contradictory frames of Australianness.
By referencing these characteristics Leunig is participating in the reciprocal process of building ‘stock frames’ of Australianness. Critics have pointed out that ANZAC and bush-ranger myths perpetuate a white masculine Australia (Fee & Russell, 2007; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). Leunig may be using stereotypical characteristics of ‘mateship’ to engage with this broader cultural understanding (Benford & Snow, 2000; Desrosiers, 2012; Van Gorp, 2007).

The central message of the cartoon seems to be one of discontent for the way that Abbott is reframing a strongly felt and fundamental characteristic of Australian identity, moving from mateship to team. The following comment from a member of the public in The Age newspaper puts it clearly.

I’d like mateship back [Title]

Leunig has again encapsulated our political problems: "we used to be mates but now we are a team" (8/8). Traditionally, mates are caring and look after one another, but the role of a team is to follow the leader and win at all costs. Mateship used to be a key Aussie value; I’d like it back.

Gail Reynolds, Surrey Hills [Commenter] (Reynolds, 2014)

Since mateship is such a core Australian value, and linked with key mythic figures (ANZACs and bushrangers), this shift from mateship to team is framed not merely as a change in nomenclature, but as an affront to Australianness. In this sense then, the use of stock frames may be a way of juxtaposing old white, masculine Australianness (ANZACs, bushrangers, ‘fair go’, mateship) with new white, masculine Australianness (team, exclusion, corporate, elitism).

Leunig is also positioning ‘Team Australia’ as an aspect of the non-national, anti-national, or ‘unAustralian’. In an exploration of popular understandings of unAustralian, (P. Smith & Phillips, 2001: 329) found that unAustralian characteristics can “acquire their meaning through their opposition to such orthodox ‘Australian’ attributes as mateship...”. In this sense, Leunig frames the ‘Team Australia’ idea, and perhaps by extension Mr Abbott, as unAustralian.

However, a second interpretation of this cartoon is possible. Leunig appears to challenge both the notion of mateship and of ‘team’ as simply rhetorics, drawing attention to the ways both constructs fail to include the marginalised. Rather than merely embodying mateship, in this reading the men are homeless, and the entire statement is ironic. These men are marginalised regardless of whether the rhetoric is
around mateship or team membership. Similar to Moir’s depiction of ‘Team Australia’ as exclusionary, this reading suggests that Australianness conceived as a ‘team’ or as ‘mates’ still functions to exclude certain ‘Others’. The cartoon is a pithy and poignant reminder that regardless of political rhetoric, the fact is that many Australians live marginal lives. The cartoon calls the notion of ‘Team Australia’ for what it is, another ‘dog whistle’ slogan that does not reflect the lived experience of many. And not a Muslim in sight.

7.6 Conclusion

These six cartoons provide versions of Australianness that problematise Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’, and at the same time offer solutions grounded in Australian values. Both ‘progressive’ values that align with civic nationalism, and myths of Australianness central to ethno-nationalism, are used. Yet all, at some level, suggest that a solution to Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ can be found in alternative versions of Australianness. So it is not the idea of Australia as a collective that is criticised, it is the particular version of that collective that Abbott was pushing.

In using the language of teams, Abbott draws on the framing of Australia as a sporting nation to send a message to those who ‘refuse to play the game’. This allows him to use common sports analogies, like the idea that players should leave their personal lives off the field. In a sports game, one dons the jersey and follows the captain unquestioningly in order that the team can win. Likewise, Abbott’s message goes, in coming to Australia one should leave one’s cultural baggage (and attire) behind, to put the needs of the Australian team first and represent them as a uniformed set.

Yet this message was resisted by the cartoonists whose work is discussed here, who frame Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ as exclusionary, unfair, politically elitist, and anti-multicultural. They challenge his framing of Australia as a particular type of team, offering a more inclusive alternative. All cartoons frame Australianness using concepts seen as key to who Australians are, particularly the idea of the ‘fair go’, coupled with the valuing of diversity. But there is also a secondary theme across several of the cartoons, which is that Australia is already not living up to the ideal of the ‘fair go’,

50 The Prime Minister has made several decisions which he has justified as being a ‘captain’s pick’, meaning they should be unquestioned, and did not require consultation. The most notorious was his personal decision to confer an Australian knighthood on Prince Philip.
with a range of marginalised people already not part of ‘Team Australia’. Thus some of these cartoons could be argued to uphold the idea of ‘Team Australia’ but to be pointing to those currently excluded.

Eight months on from this debate, Prime Minister Abbot continues to push his Liberal Party predecessor, John Howard’s, ethno-nationalist policies and rhetoric that base Australianness firmly in British heritage (Johnson, 2007) and an Anglo ideal (Crabb, 2008; Dyrenfurth, 2007; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Holland, 2010; Robbins, 2007; Tate, 2009; Warhurst, 2007). The ‘Team Australia’ intervention was one example of Abbott’s pursuit of this agenda. Yet these cartoonists pushed back with alternate versions of more inclusive Australianness, or challenges to the very idea that Australia is a team, given existing exclusions. The cartoonists appear to frame Australia using an inclusive, civic model built on the institutionalisation of multiculturalism and ‘immigrant nation’ status (Brett & Moran, 2011; Castles, Kalantzis, Cope, & Morrissey, 1988; F. L. Jones, 2000). However their framings were not exclusively civic, since, at the same time, traditional values such as mateship and a ‘fair go’ were central to the cartoons. Moran (2011: 168) suggests that “even inclusive, predominantly civic national identities contain an important element of inheritance; others have come before us, and they have passed on the nation to us”. Essentially, these cartoonists seemed to fuse, or perhaps transcend, the dichotomy of ethno-nativist verses civic Australianness to challenge a regressive, exclusionary political construct.

An interesting implication of several of the cartoons is that the idea of ‘Team Australia’ is unAustralian. This is not the usual construction of unAustralian used “to label non-whites and communists” or recruited as a “cloak for racism or social exclusion” (P. Smith & Phillips, 2001: 327) (arguably what Abbott himself was doing with the ‘Team Australia’ idea). Rather, just as Smith and Phillips found in their study of everyday constructions of unAustralian, the cartoonists frame Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ as unAustralian because it dissolves the bonds of mateship and ignores the values of egalitarianism and multiculturalism that are traditional and more recent stock frames of Australianness.

This suggests a disjunction between political elite and popular constructions of Australian identity, as found elsewhere (Fozdar and Austin, forthcoming). A distinction is drawn between ‘average Australians’ who uphold inclusive and multicultural values,
and the political elite who, the cartoonists suggest, exclude and marginalise those they view as ‘Other’.

As noted, cartoonists’ role in the public sphere is one of contestation of dominant discourses, as they challenge power dynamics and simplify shared meanings, using humour (Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Manning & Phiddian, 2005). These cartoonists have done just that, contesting Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ and constructing an alternate discourse about Australianness.
7.7 References


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Chapter Eight. Discussion & Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

Nearing the end of writing this thesis, a number of people asked me to define Australian identity. I usually answered that Australianness involves civic elements that prioritise inclusivity based on political commitment and citizenship, regardless of race, religion, country of birth, and so on. At the same time Australianness continues to be associated with a conservative, ethno-nationalist identity for some, which values whiteness, Christianity, patriarchy, and strong ties to Britain. What unites these approaches seems to be traditional myths – mateship, a ‘fair go’ and the Anzac legend. Civic nationalists seemed to claim the ‘fair go’ and mateship should extend to the way Australians treat ‘Others’, such as new migrants (regardless of mode of entry) and that a ‘fair go’ can be used to challenge hegemonic values (whiteness, Christianity, English language dominance). Even Anzac Day is claimed by some to be an inclusive event. The ABC, for example, claims that Anzac Day is claimed by some to be an inclusive event. The ABC, for example, claims that Anzac Day is claimed by some to be an inclusive event.

...offer a range of meanings. For some, the day is seen as one marking Australia’s coming of age as a nation. For others, it is a day to remember those who went to war and did not come home and those who came home, forever changed. It is a day to remember the sacrifice and our debt to every person who has played a role, not just in WWI but in every conflict to which Australia has since committed itself. For some it is simply a day to consider what we have in common and the values we have as a nation. (ABC, 2015)

In contrast to this attempt at broad inclusiveness, ethno-nationalists tend to limit the ‘fair go’ and mateship to the ‘homegrown’ majority; white, Christian mates deserve a ‘fair go’, but to achieve this, limitations need to be set on new migrants, and others who challenge the status quo.

Essentially, for both ethno and civic nationalists, ‘traditional’ myths of Australianness remain a relevant source of national identity.

However, this question – ‘What is Australian identity?’ – is not the key question of this thesis. Certainly Papers One and Two partially address this topic, as Paper One provides a literature review of the relevant social science studies of Australian identity,
and Paper Two engages with public portrayals of Australianness (and unAustralianness) in the comments section of online newspaper articles. However, the focus of this thesis is how Australianness is framed in the public sphere. Journalists, politicians, pressure groups and cartoonists all contribute to this discourse, and thus are the focus of analysis. By looking at these public framings, along with individual perceptions of Australianness (Papers One and Two), I have taken a number of snapshots of discourse in the national public sphere that add to the current sociological research that is primarily focused on ‘average Australians’ self-representations. Essentially then, rather than answering the question ‘what is Australian identity?’ this conclusion considers ‘how is Australianness being framed in the public sphere?’.

Included in this final chapter is a detailed analysis of the threads that run through the papers, highlighting aspects of commonality, as well as the unique ways in which Australianness is framed by some51. This includes: observations about the delineation between elite and public framings of Australianness; the continued relevance of Australian identity in public discourse; the blurred lines between ethno-national and civic identities; and the way Australianness is being redefined by some. Additionally, connections are made back to key questions posed in the introduction. Finally, I consider how cosmopolitan and Australian identities are interacting, and the ways in which cosmopolitan values are included in some framings.

To commence, I consider the use of ethno-nationalist and civic identity in public ‘elite’ frames, and amongst ‘ordinary Australians’.

8.2 Civic and Ethno-nationalist Australianness

In the empirical studies of Australian identity published since Phillip’s 1998 review, the divide between ethno and civic nationalism was generally retained. The studies show that Australians, who value native birth, ancestry, and Christian values (ethno-nationalists), are distinct from those who subscribe to civic principles of achievable citizenship, rights, and felt sense of attachment. This divide is consistent across a range of issues including identification, belonging and attachment (Clark, 2007; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Hugo, 2006; T. Phillips, 2002). However, some of the

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51 Conclusion are drawn largely from Papers Two through Five, with Paper One – the literature review – drawn on as a point of comparison and distinction.
studies move beyond this, and identify overlaps between ethno and civic understandings (Brett & Moran, 2011; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; T. Phillips, 2002; P. Smith & Phillips, 2001; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007). For respondents in these studies, the amalgamation of cultural and civic aspects of Australianness, seen in initiatives like the Australian citizenship test, are recognised as conflating ethno and civic Australian identity.

This latter group of studies that recognised the links between civic and ethno-nationalism amongst some ‘average Australians’ (Paper One) more closely reflect the public framings of Australianness analysed in this thesis. On political parties’ Facebook pages for example (Paper Three), familial bonds and whiteness are both used to perpetuate a traditional version of Australian identity. While there is a slight difference between the two major parties’ portrayals of families (the Liberal Party presents a heteronormative, white version, while Labor portrays the Australian family as more diverse), both rely on the family to link blood bonds with national identity, and demarcate those within ‘our’ family from those who belong outside of it. The general consistency in the portrayal of Australianness on the two parties’ pages suggests there is a common frame being used; one that portrays a fuzziness between cultural and political constructions of national identity (Betts & Birrell, 2007; De Cillia et al., 1999; Fozdar & Low, 2015; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Hage, 1998). Rather than a clear delineation, these political parties frame civic identity in Australia as underpinned by ethno-nationalist values.

This finding aligns with broader political discourse in Australia. Fozdar and Spittles (2010) found civic and ethno-nationalism are imbricated in representations of citizenship on the DIAC (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, now Immigration and Border Control) website, which implies “that immigrant citizens ultimately adopt an Australian identity, with elements of both cultural and civic identification” (Fozdar & Spittles, 2010: 140). Broader discourse on white dominance in Australia (Hage, 1998), and the return of the Howard government to promoting the Anglo ideal (Fozdar & Spittles, 2010; Johnson, 2007), similarly reflect this confluence, and suggest a trend toward ‘nation freezing’ (Suvarierol, 2012) amongst the political elite.

The imbrication of ethno- and civic nationalism also occurs beyond the political elite. Political cartoonists’ opposition to ‘Team Australia’ (Paper Five), albeit with a different agenda, used traditional colonial ‘stock frames’ of Australian values and
myths to contest the exclusionary portrayal of Australianness in ‘Team Australia’. Mateship, a ‘fair go’, bushrangers, and the Anzac legend (all of which are associated with masculine, white Australia and hark back to the times of the White Australia Policy (Fee & Russell, 2007; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007)), were used to argue against Abbott’s ‘regressive’ and exclusionary ‘Team Australia’. Similarly in Paper Four colonial ‘stock frames’ of Australianness were found to have been used to narrate the plight of asylum seekers, and “to ‘reset’ the policy discussion as a humanitarian and human rights challenge….by reasserting the national values of decency and a ‘fair go’” [Refugee advocacy network]. Both groups, cartoonists and advocates, therefore, promote civic values through a frame of traditional, ethno-nationalist Australianness. It may be that this reflects the popular preference for traditional renderings of Australianness, both amongst the general population (Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Purdie & Wilss, 2007), and in public discourse.

It is interesting that many studies of ‘ordinary Australians’ do not demonstrate this imbrication of ethno-nationalist and civic identities, but rather at the individual level, the divide remains. This may be because the ‘elite’ who are framing Australianness in the public sphere are attempting to reach the whole population and thus broach this divide between civics and ethno-nationalists. ‘Average Australians’ however, are less concerned with image management or the appeal of their views to the masses, and therefore can remain entrenched in their views. This supports the suggestion that there are significant divisions in Australian society along socio-demographic lines, between those espousing ethno- and civic identities (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000; T. Phillips, 1998; P. Smith & Phillips, 2001). However, this needs to be more fully explored to better understand the phenomenon, and to see why there is a difference between ‘ordinary Australians’ who predominantly embody either civic and ethno-nationalist identities, and those framing public discourse, who generally combine elements of these frames.

A useful way forward may be to apply a new analytical framework to national identity that does not rely on the widely used ethno-nationalist/civic dichotomy.

Jensen (2014), drawing on the work of Zimmer (2003), analysed the use of national identity in political discourse in Denmark, and suggests that the ethno/civic model of national identity analysis is unhelpfully reliant on the identification of cultural content. Ethno-nationalist identity is characteristically understood as based in cultural
values and mores, while civic nationalism is seen to institute universal (cosmopolitan?) principles at the national level. Jensen argues (as I have) that this is a false dichotomy, as the institution of various universal principles by civic nationalists will influence a person’s lifestyle, beliefs and social norms, and thus meld the cultural and civic. Therefore national identity, whether civic or ethno-nationalist, cannot exist without a shared distinctive cultural content (p. 566).

The solution, Jensen (2014) argues, is to assess the exclusionary capacity, or boundary constructions of national discourse, rather than the cultural content. As he states, “by making cultural content a central parameter in distinguishing types of nationhood, we obscure the fact that these are of minor importance for the exclusivity of the national self-understanding” (567). Instead of assessing the cultural content of national identities (ethno-nationalist or civic), Jensen (2014) proposes analysis based on boundary constructions. National boundaries are constructed, he argues, around the individual and the collective, which exist on a spectrum from voluntaristic to deterministic logic. So Jensen establishes a typology in which a voluntarist perspective sees an individual as capable of choosing and changing their national identity, in contrast to a deterministic perspective that views national identity as deeply rooted in the individual and unchangeable. On the collective identity spectrum, a voluntaristic perspective assumes national identity is “constructed through intentional collective action, and political actors are seen as capable of intentionally affecting what it entails to be and become a member of the nation.” (p.568). A deterministic perspective sees national identity as static, ‘frozen’ (Suvarierol, 2012) and unchangeable. Thus, as the spectrums intersect, four ideal types are revealed: individually and collectively deterministic; individually deterministic and collectively voluntaristic; individually voluntaristic and collectively deterministic; and individually and collectively voluntaristic (see diagram 8.1 below).

Essentially, the heart of this analytical framework is to consider how national identities are used and the boundaries that are drawn around them, rather than what cultural content they draw from. This is reminiscent of two seminal works on ethnic groups. Fredrik Barth (1969) argued in the introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, that ethnic groups are not the bearers of cultural content and this category should not be used to identify and delineate groups in some quasi-objective sense. Rather, boundaries are drawn between groups based on the value that group
members themselves ascribe to certain attributes. More recently, Roger Brubaker’s (2006) work *Ethnicity without groups* suggests ethnicity should not be conceptualised as groups of bounded and culturally homogenous peoples (‘groupism’). Group membership should instead be understood as variable rather than fixed. Thus, rather than static groups Brubaker suggests that practical categories, cognitive schemes, cultural idioms, discursive frames and political projects should be the subject of analysis. Jensen’s typology adds a further dimension to these earlier critiques of the notion of ethnicity, applying the focus on boundaries and their maintenance to the question of national identities.

*Figure 2. Jensen’s national identity dimensions*

It may be beneficial if future studies of Australianness use this framework to explore the construction of boundaries as a key element of national identity. However, some questions arise from this new framework that are worth considering. Does a connection remain between the ethno-nationalist content of national identities and exclusionary views? If so, what does this mean? In Australia, critics have pointed out that ANZAC and bushranger myths perpetuate a white masculine Australianness (Fee & Russell, 2007; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007), yet evidence has been provided that these tropes, when combined with others, can be used to argue for inclusive constructions. So how can ethno-nationalist content work to generate more inclusive constructions? Additionally, can this framework avoid promoting analysis that looks only at the ideal types - individually and collectively deterministic, for example – without considering the availability of a spectrum to better represent peoples’ national identities? As stated, further research using this typology would be beneficial, both to explore Australianness, and to answer some of these questions.

Regardless of inclusive or exclusive, civic or ethno-nationalist, what is apparent across all the studies is that the public representation of Australianness integrates elements of an ethnically based, Anglo-Australian framing (Johnson, 2007) into civic frames, and vice versa. In a nation that boasts people from over 200 countries, with
almost half (43%) having at least one parent born overseas, and 27.3% born elsewhere themselves (ABS, 2015b; NSW Government, 2013), an emphasis on ethno-nationalism risks excluding many from the public discourse. Rather than promoting an Australianness that includes people from ethnically and culturally diverse backgrounds, public frames that claim to uphold civic values have, at the same time, prioritised blood bonds, whiteness, and the Anglo ideal.

The pervasiveness of the Anglo ideal in Australian public discourse is not a new observation (Fozdar, 2011b; Hage, 1998; Johnson, 2007). However, I would argue that the Anglo ideal is becoming more enshrined in public discourse and more actively employed to exclude the ‘Other’. As Suvarierol's (2012) theory of ‘nation freezing’ suggests, a national identity may be ‘frozen’ as an imagined historically homogenous group, to provide stability in contrast to the fluidity of a fast-changing and ever-expanding world. Thus the prevalence of the white Australian ideal and Anzac myth in public sphere framings, and relegation of other forms of Australianness to the margins, promotes myths that celebrate national identity as a homogenous (principally white and male) collective (Wellings, 2014).

8.3 Pervasiveness of Australianness in Public Discourse

This ‘frozen’ Australian identity continues to be constructed and reconstructed in public discourse. In a recent paper Muscat (2015) looked at how tabloid current affairs programs A Current Affair and Today Tonight, which are designed to appeal to ‘ordinary Australians’, present Australian identity. She notes the prominence of Anglo-Australianness and the way ethnic minority groups are used in this discourse to maintain the white hegemony. In another example, News.com.au began an advertising campaign in May, 2015 with the catchline “At news.com.au we don’t just write the news, we write it to be read by Australians” (News Media Limited, 2015). The ABC ran a series of television programs throughout 2015 to commemorate the centenary of the landing of ANZAC soldiers at Gallipoli Cove (ABC, 2015). Media reports of international tragedies focus on the deaths or injuries of Australians, above other nationalities. In the recent Nepal earthquakes, for example, in which 3,200 people were killed, news reports in Australia focused on the death of one Australian (Browne, 2015). Finally, sport is the obvious source of national ‘flagging’, where nation competes against nation to prove its worth (Billig, 1995). In Australia, where sport is central to the
construction of ‘who we are’ (ABC, 2012; Kell, 2000; Ward, 2010), this is a powerful forum in which to reinforce the importance of the national ‘us’, as was shown in Ron Tanberg’s cartoon (Paper Five).

Such national ‘flagging’ was the common theme across the data sources analysed in this study. The Facebook accounts of political parties draw on key national identity constructs (Guibernau, 1996) – blood bonds (family) and ethnicity (whiteness) – as well as explicitly prioritising Australia in policy proposals where more cosmopolitan or global views could be taken. In submissions by community pressure groups to the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (Paper Four), a generous and diverse Australianness was a primary frame used to advocate for more inclusive policies, as well as greater involvement in regional solutions. For cartoonists, Tony Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ was seen as an affront to key Australian values of mateship and a ‘fair go’, as well as more ‘progressive’ values like multiculturalism (Paper Five), rather than as an attack on human rights more generally. Essentially, Australianness was evident throughout the various sites analysed in this thesis, as a way of framing information in the public sphere.

Such ‘flagging’ appears to be in response to a sense of threat and uncertainty. The threat of war and terror, and fear of invasion, are well-known impetuses to bolster the bonds of the ‘imagined national community’ (Anderson, 1991) and create a stronger sense of ‘us’ to rally together and combat the threat from ‘them’ (Billig, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Younane Brookes, 2012). A sense of threat from the ‘Other’ can powerfully reinforce national identities (Younane Brookes, 2012; Yuval-Davis, 2004), which tend to remain invisible until such a threat is perceived. Then hegemonic belonging becomes a lens through which self and ‘Other’ are defined (Yuval-Davis, 2004: 216).

For Australia, there is a long history of fear about its regional situation, as a white, Western nation surrounded by Asian neighbours (Walker, 2012; Younane Brookes, 2012). Australia seems to find the task of negotiating its place in the world complicated. The various frames of Australianness explored in this thesis indicate that the country is keen to retain its Anglo dominance (Abbott, 2006; Johnson, 2007) (Paper Three) and at the same time purportedly seeks to work within its neighbourhood to achieve regional solutions to what are perceived as regional problems (Paper Four).
Thus, a degree of uncertainty about where ‘we’ belong is creating tension and ambivalence about who ‘we’ are and how ‘we’ should act.

Regionalism appears to be an emerging frame, as found in Paper Four, with over half the submissions regarding asylum seeker policy incorporating a regional framing. While primarily a political response, this appears positive and inclusive, and represents, to some extent, a shift away from the Anglo ideal. However, even this regional framing, retains an ‘us’ and ‘them’ lens. Regional solutions are sought based on a logic of ‘us’, the white, wealthy, ‘western’ nation, helping ‘them’, the poor, Asian neighbours, within a noblesse oblige hierarchy of responsibility. While this is most likely used by asylum seeker advocates to reflect the broader public discourse of “promoting Australia’s national interests” (now the explicit mandate of the government body responsible for administering foreign aid (DFAT, OAD), it also bolsters a particular version of Australianness. Essentially, the notion of a regional solution appears to be one based on colonial myths and Orientalist logic (Said, 1977). While Australia may be seeking to work within its neighbourhood, it does not appear to be working with its neighbours, but rather using them to achieve its own purposes and reinforce its own identity as wealthy, developed, civilised, white and Western.

Even this regional reinforcement of national identity is being threatened however, by growing economic stability amongst some of Australia’s regional neighbours – China particularly. The ‘yellow peril’ thinking of Australia’s past and a fear of Chinese invasion has returned as wealthy Chinese buyers invest in Australian property and immigration increases significantly (Collins, 2013; J. Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2014). These changes have provided fodder for ‘Asian Invasion’ alarmists concerned about cultural change and loss of amenity (Chong, 2014). This shift typifies the rise of China in the Asian Century (Australian Government, 2011), and has perhaps confounded Australia’s sense of identity by repositioning the Oriental ‘them’ as (at least economically) equal to ‘us’.

Essentially, Australians continue to be framed as too white and culturally British to be truly Asian (and conversely perhaps Asians cannot be truly Australian), yet geographically located fearfully close to the ‘Other’.

In addition to regional uncertainty, the threat from Muslim terrorists – real or otherwise - may also account for the prevalence of national ‘flagging’ in the public sphere, as the analysis of the use of the term ‘Team Australia’ showed. Since 9/11, as
well as the Bali (2002) and London bombings (2005), terrorist activity and ‘illegal migrants’ have been central to much political and public discourse in Australia (Gale, 2004; Marr & Wilkinson, 2003; Younane Brookes, 2012). While 9/11 and the London bombings were viewed as tragic events that happened to ‘friends’, the Bali bombings “became understood as an Australian disaster, primarily narrated through national mythologies and concerns, and conceived as a threat to the Australian way of life” (West, 2008: 342).

The Cronulla riots (Fozdar & Spittles, 2009; Noble, 2009) reinforced the threat of terrorism in the minds of some and increased fear of the ‘Other’ amongst ‘us’ (Noble, 2009). Finally, the Sydney siege of 2014 brought terrorism ‘home’ when alleged ISIS (aka ISIL or Islamic State) terrorist, Man Haron Monis, held up a café in Sydney’s city centre, resulting in the death of two hostages, as well as his own. There is uncertainty about Man Haron Monis’ links to the militant extremist group ISIS, with some suggesting mental illness was the true cause of the attacks (Simon, 2014). Regardless, the media broadcast the event as an instance of terrorist activity on Australian shores (Griffith, 2014; Mills & Byrnes, 2014).

As a consequence, barriers have been raised around who can be considered ‘us’ and who cannot. Tony Abbott’s attempts to bolster Australian identity through the camaraderie and safety of ‘Team Australia’ (Paper Five) aligns with broader nationalist initiatives that include concerted activity around rituals and commemorations like Australia Day and Anzac Day (Bongiorno, 2014; Donoghue & Tranter, 2013; Fozdar & Spittles, 2014; Fozdar and Austin, forthcoming), as well as new defence measures to keep Australia safe from ‘home grown terrorists’. While the government increased defence, national security and law enforcement expenditure to $35 billion in 2015-16 (Australian Government, 2015) the foreign aid budget was reduced to $4 billion (Lowy Institute, 2015) and accompanied by closure of AusAID, the department responsible for Australia’s international aid budget (DFAT, ND). Not only does this demonstrate the government’s priority to protect its people, it also suggests its efforts to simultaneously bolster national identity. For example, one may assume that foreign aid directed to regions of unrest would decrease terrorist activity (civil unrest and dissatisfaction, and anger against the ‘West’) and the need for asylum seekers to flee to Australia. However, such a response does little to solidify national boundaries and reinforce national values, but rather reduces barriers by emphasising the humanity of
the ‘Other’. Thus the government’s response – increased protective measures for ‘Team Australia’ – shows a security focus that prioritises making the in-group feel protected and safe, and distancing the ‘Other’ by closing the borders. Essentially, the nation is being ‘frozen’ once again.

The effect (or purpose?) of this endless ‘flagging’ (Billig, 1995) is to maintain the salience and the naturalised status of the national ‘us’. By highlighting a national, as opposed to a global, frame, the nation remains at the centre of peoples’ consciousness (Billig, 1995; Skey, 2009). Identities are forged in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and become common sense, naturalised divisions of the globe, which are integral to maintaining the current geopolitical international order (Penrose, 1994). Additionally, this ‘flagging’ functions to create a sense of community cohesion and inclusion (cf Calhoun 2007; Skey 2011). By repeatedly signalling the nation in public discourse, national identity and a secure sense of self are reinforced.

8.4 Challenging frames of Australianness

As a consequence of national ‘flagging’ and the narrowing of Australianness in public discourse, the naturalised status of the nation-state is reinforced (Billig, 1995; Suvarierol, 2012). Nationalist discourse becomes an uncritical expression of norms and understandings about the ‘natural’ division of the world into insiders and outsiders based on the nation-state. The majority of frames that arose in this research remain within these safe confines of national identity; some, however, extend their narrow boundaries to include more diverse and divergent notions of what it means to be Australian.

Throughout this thesis, alternate framings of Australianness were identified. Paper Two demonstrated how some people alter the meaning of ‘unAustralian’, applying it to intolerant and exclusionary Australians, rather than the foreign-born or marginalised. Both amongst the journalists, as well as a number of the commenters, a counter discourse emerged, associating ‘unAustralian’ with the white Australian, Christian hegemony. As such they construct a version of national identity that contests the dominant discourse with a more inclusive, multicultural version of Australian identity. Asylum seeker advocates (Paper Four) highlighted the contrast between the Australian government’s and the ‘average Australian’s’ response to asylum seekers. The former constructs an exclusionary Australian identity, while the latter promotes a
broader definition of who deserves a ‘fair go’, including new arrivals. Finally, in contesting Mr Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ (Paper Five), cartoonists suggest that a solution could be found in alternative versions of Australianness. While ‘Team Australia’ is exclusionary and anti-Muslim, ‘average Australians’ are willing and able to accommodate difference as they already envisage a multicultural framing of Australianness. Therefore both of these papers show that by using nationalist discourse to advocate for their position, people with oppositional views on key issues of national identity (immigration and inclusion) can be deemed part of the same Australian collective.

This internal diversity has interesting implications for the construction of Australianness. A primary function of national identity is to create a sense of unity and commonality between people from diverse backgrounds (Anderson, 1991; Calhoun, 2007; Hall, 1999). Yet both asylum seeker advocates (Paper Four) and cartoonists (Paper Five) drew a sharp distinction between the views of the general populace and the government. Both groups represent the government as exclusionary, ‘regressive’, traditional, and unfair, while ‘average Australians’ are constructed as multicultural, inclusive and eager to offer a ‘fair go’ to all.

Whether this contrast is an accurate reflection of the views of the government and the population, or merely reflects the view of the framers or is a rhetorical tool, is unclear. Regardless, such framing contrasts with the common process of in-group identity construction that views similarity as sameness (Isin & Wood, 1999). Rather, ‘average Australians’ and the political ‘elite’ are represented as having contrasting perspectives, and the framers are engaged in attempting to create awareness among the elite (and others) about these differences. Further these findings suggest that a reciprocal process of identity construction between elite and ordinary citizens is not at play (De Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak & Kovacs, 2004). The ‘elite’ public voices that are constructing Australianness are not doing so in response to the ‘shared beliefs and values’ of the populace.

This has important implications for future study of both ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ voices involved in Australian identity construction. Skey (2009: 336) notes that much analysis of national identity does not “take account of media theory which has long argued that audiences cannot simply be seen as either coherent or ‘empty vessels’ that uncritically absorb the media messages that they encounter… we need to
challenge this ‘transmission model’ and unpack the concept of the audience by asking ‘what role – if any – the media play in the articulation of identities’ (Madianou, 2005: 7)”. While this is directly applied to the media ‘elite’, from the findings of this thesis, I suggest that this theory may be usefully applied to political discourse as well. The different constructions of Australianness that arise from the ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary Australians’ suggest that the public should not be understood as passive consumers of ‘elite’ discourse. Rather there are multiple, competing frames at play, all of which remain within the broader frame of Australianness.

The diverse frames of Australianness found in this study also call into question how construction processes are used to bolster in-group solidarity. Collective identity formation uses processes of differentiation and comparison (Isin & Wood, 1999) to define ‘us’ and ‘them’ and set limits on in-group behaviours, norms and beliefs. At first glance, such processes seem absent in this thesis; while difference is recognised, it does not appear to function as an impetus for strengthening a unified Australian identity, but rather promotes internal division between the ‘elite’ and the ‘average Australian’. However, further analysis demonstrates that the construction of the ‘unAustralian’ fulfils this purpose.

Across the public frames of Australianness, ‘unAustralians’ were defined as unfair and intolerant. Cartoonists frame Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’ as ‘unAustralian’ because it contravenes the ‘fair go’; journalists link ‘unAustralian’ with Australia’s history of division and exclusion, political jingoism, and note its usage as a ‘cover-all concept’ to decry unfairness; and online commenters (Paper Two) deem those who are intolerant ‘unAustralian’. While a ‘fair go’ and tolerance are recognised as ‘traditional’ values and tied to exclusionary Anglo constructions of Australianness (Elder, 2007; Hage, 1998; T. Phillips, 1998) they are used in all framings to advocate for ‘progressive’ outcomes of equality and fairness. Essentially, ‘unAustralian’ is applied to the white majority, rather than the marginalised ‘Other’, as it is those who refuse to tolerate and accept difference that are ‘unAustralian’. Thus, most public framings of Australianness analysed in this thesis used the notion of ‘unAustralian’ in processes of differentiation and comparison, to identify those who do not bolster the in-group, rather than those who are obviously excluded and defined as the ‘Other’.

52 See Hage (1998) for an explanation of how tolerance is used in Australia to maintain the white hegemony and merely ‘tolerate’ the migrant ‘Other’.
While this delineation of the ‘unAustralian’ shifts the focus to a more politically correct ‘Other’ (the intolerant and the unfair, as opposed to the racially, politically or ethnically different) a belief that some characteristics or people are ‘unAustralian’ remains. As such, a distinction between Australian and ‘unAustralian’ delineates those within the accepted limits and the deviant ‘Other’ who falls beyond. Thus while ‘they’ are a different, perhaps more politically correct group, the distinction still enables ‘us’ to feel safe, secure and strong in a sense of ‘who we are’, and this remains grounded in a national identity.

Some have argued (see Calhoun, 2007) that these competing frames of Australianness display the flexibility and expansiveness of Australian identity, and challenge claims of national exclusivity. Since difference can be included under one banner (Augoustinos et al., 2011), national identity is shown to be a fairly robust and pervasive construct (Calhoun, 2007). Indeed Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott, (2006) argue that contestation is a ‘natural’ aspect of collective identification, as group norms, rules, goals, intergroup comparisons and worldviews are open to interpretation by group members. Members can differ significantly on a number of issues and still retain a place in the in-group. Thus Australianness is diverse enough to incorporate a variety of individuals within one identity, the argument goes, and is perhaps even strengthened by the openness to internal dissension on a number of issues.

At another level, these competing frames of Australianness merely demonstrate the pervasiveness of national identity – even in the face of significant contestation regarding what or who is Australian, the core discourse of Australianness remains. In a sense, people seem eager and willing to work hard to retain the notion of a national identity. Obviously evidence of this is shown when the nation functions as a powerful motivator for people to go to war, and a similar ‘battles’ mentality remains in sporting contests (Ward, 2010). Yet even at a banal level, people’s desire to retain an Australianness that they can be proud of arises in debates about the national flag. As a blogpost on the West Australian Newspaper website suggests:

The problem is: A lot racist losers do wave the Australian flag and use Australia Day as an excuse to spew their own brand of hateful ignorance. It's disgusting, embarrassing and depressing that people like that exist. But if we allow the Australian flag to
be appropriated by these people, if normal Australian's [sic] refuse to celebrate Australia Day or fly the flag out of fear of being associated with the bigots, then we will lose the meaning of some of our most important national symbols.

(Taylor, blogger on thewest.com.au, January 22nd, 2011)

While some Australians refuse to fly the flag, as they understand it to be a symbol of exclusion and racism, pro-flag-flyers argue that ‘normal’ Australians must continue to use it and not allow it to be taken over by ‘racist losers’. This shows that national identity is seen as something innately valuable and worth fighting for.

Essentially, this study has found that there are a variety of ways of framing Australianness. The concept offers a level of safety and stability, while allowing considerable disagreement on the content. While people are willing to fight to advance the ‘right’ national identity (i.e. the flag-flying debate), expulsion from the national ‘us’ results only from a serious contravention (not abiding by the ‘fair go’ or tolerant ethos). As such, it seems that Craig Calhoun’s assertion that ‘nations matter’ remains a true statement in Australia.

There are some, however, who seem to be moving beyond these nation-based framings of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

8.5 Moving beyond frames of Australianness

The majority of the findings in this thesis show that Australianness is a dominant way of framing issues in politics, the media, and public discourse more broadly. These frames generally include the expected rhetoric of mateship, a ‘fair go’, and Anzacs, as well as more ‘progressive’ ideas about Australian identity, such as multiculturalism and civic values. There are some, however, who seemed to defy this nation-focused frame, either by incorporating aspects of the global into the national, or by transcending the national frame entirely.

Cosmopolitan identity, in a number of forms, was evident throughout the analyses in this thesis. Firstly, Paper One showed that some ‘ordinary Australians’ express cosmopolitan sentiments. For instance, when asked to respond to the statement ‘I regard myself as a citizen of the world as well as an Australian citizen’, only 11% of respondents disagree (Woodward et al., 2008). For the more than two
thirds who agreed with the statement, the benefits of cosmopolitanism (seen in terms of global citizenship and globalisation), were generally based on consumer oriented values found in acts of ‘sampling’, ‘learning’, ‘choice’, and ‘access’ (Brett & Moran, 2011; Haggis & Schech, 2010; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007). Essentially, the 89% of the population who appear to value cosmopolitanism subscribe to a fairly consumerist and elitist version, valuing choice, opportunity to engage with and learn from the ‘Other’, and international travel, including the ability to ‘switch’ between different cultures, are valued (Hannerz, 1996; Skrbis, Woodward, & Bean, 2013; Woodward et al., 2008). Globalisation is seen as beneficial to Australia because of the food, festivals, economic advantages and openness to new ideas that it brings (Brett & Moran, 2011; Hugo, 2006).

For some ‘ordinary Australians’ ethical and geopolitical cosmopolitanism is evident. Studies show that the majority of the population (83%) values human rights (Woodward et al., 2008) (Paper One), and in discourse about what constitutes ‘unAustralian’ (Paper Two) some commenters moved beyond national confines. Commenters suggest that both being Australian and being ‘unAustralian’ is irrelevant; rather it is the common bonds of humanity that matter. This valuing of human rights, and a prioritisation of a universal ‘human’ identity, rather than a local, national identity, indicates that an ethical cosmopolitan identity may be at play (Nussbaum, 1994). A number of the asylum seeker advocates (Paper Four), acting as intermediary pressure groups between the ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ Australians, call on Australia’s elite to employ a more egalitarian framework that values reciprocity and common humanity, aligning with ethical cosmopolitan values. Additionally calls made by these pressure groups for Australia to become a global citizen are grounded in a discourse of global rights, responsibilities and citizenship. This suggests a preference for geopolitical cosmopolitanism, instated through post-national governance structures to institute global justice (Beck, 2000a; Held, 1995).

These examples of cosmopolitan frames were not pervasive in the various data sources analysed in this thesis, but they do suggest that the exclusivity of national identity is being challenged, and that for some ‘ordinary Australians’, a more global, universalist frame of ‘human’ rather than ‘Australian’ is becoming a part of ‘who we are’. The benefits of globalisation are heralded; human rights are valued and seen as
applicable to all humans, not just those who have the ‘correct’ passport; and the common bonds of humanity are cherished.

Rarely, however, does this cosmopolitan identity completely transcend the national, but rather it is a framing included in, or added to, constructions of Australianness. By and large, cosmopolitan identity is co-opted into, or placed alongside, Australianness. For example, when Australians are asked to compare the two identities – national and cosmopolitan (Paper One) - Australian identity is significantly prioritised (T. Phillips, 2002; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007; Woodward et al., 2008). Additionally phrases like a ‘fair go’, that signal traditional Australian identity, are used to seek universal justice for asylum seekers, as well as argue for Australia’s ‘Western’ responsibility because of its wealth or privilege (Papers Four and Five). In this sense, the ideals of a cosmopolitan identity are co-opted into, or co-present with, Australianness, rather than being part of a distinct and separate identity.

There are a number of reasons that this may be the case. Firstly, a methodologically cosmopolitan view of identity construction sees no contradiction in one person identifying as both an Australian and a cosmopolitan (Beck & Szaider, 2010). Within this framework, Australianness remains a part of people’s self-hood, some aspects of which can be retained and used to meet particular aims or engage with certain discourses (mateship and a ‘fair go’, for example), while other aspects may be disregarded (whiteness or heteronormativity, for example). Similarly a cosmopolitan identity can be adopted, since national identities do not contain people’s lives (Chernilo, 2007). The disjunction that seems to exist between ‘elite’ and ‘ordinary’ citizens, shows that Australianness is no longer being framed as a cohesive, well-honed collective (McCrone, 1998). In this way, the Australian container (Beck 2000) has been opened, and multiple, diverse constructions of ‘us’, including the cosmopolitan ‘us’, are made possible.

Another explanation is that cosmopolitan practices have been adopted by those who identify primarily as nationals; again this is derived from Calhoun’s thesis that ‘nation’s matter’. Since cosmopolitanism is a ‘thin’ concept, making it difficult to provide a basis for meaningful identification, the argument goes, it is unsurprising that the practices of cosmopolitanism are grounded in a national identity. National identities are sufficiently ‘thick’ and meaningful to motivate behaviour and solidify a sense of self. As such, it may be that Australians’ engagement in cosmopolitan
practices reflects part of their national experience, such as the opportunity globalisation has offered Australians for sampling other cultures. In a similar vein others have suggested that Australian national identity is uniquely and sufficiently empowered to embrace the ‘Other’ because of its grounding in civic, inclusive, multicultural values (Brett & Moran, 2011). Appiah (1996) notes that love of country and cosmopolitan values are compatible, and that nation-states offer a functional means of structuring society at a smaller scale (than global), which best suits peoples’ lived experience.

I recognise the possible value of these arguments and indeed argued that this might be the case for asylum seeker advocates (Paper Four), who drew heavily on aspects of Australianness to seek ‘progressive’ policy outcomes. However, caution is required; while this may currently reflect Australians’ understandings of national identity, the trend toward exclusionary discourse, fear of the ‘Other’, and ‘nation freezing’ (Suvarierol, 2012) in the public sphere may see a shift away from the option of a cosmopolitan perspective for future generations (Shafak, 2014).

In contrast to the cosmopolitanism of some ‘ordinary Australians’, it is ‘nation freezing’ (Suvarierol, 2012) that pervades the public sphere, dominating public discourse with myths of whiteness, Anzacs, bushrangers, a ‘fair go’ and mateship. These framings were used by politicians (Paper Three), asylum seeker advocates (Paper Four) and political cartoonists (Paper Five). It seems that those who wish to promote cosmopolitan ideals, such as the asylum seeker advocates and cartoonists, must cloak their agenda in nationalist discourse in order to gain a hearing. This is because ‘nation-freezing’ works to prevent alternate or new constructions of national identity from being voiced. Therefore, those seeking to speak in the public sphere must adhere to the ‘frozen’ national identity as it “becomes a condition for...action” and those who fail to are precluded from “entering into a dialogue...regarding how the cultural content [of the nation] is to be interpreted or perhaps substituted” (Jensen, 2014: 568).

The lack of any banal cosmopolitan frames, either in the public sphere or amongst ‘ordinary Australians’ further supports this suggestion that cosmopolitans are silenced in the public sphere. While cross-cultural or international relationships are a part of many Australians’ lives, such relationships are framed as acts of Western generosity or an outworking of essentially Australian values (‘fair go’ and mateship),
and are not represented as grounded in banal bonds of common humanity (Lamont & Aksartova, 2002).

While it is not necessary to infer from the lack of cosmopolitan frames in the national public sphere that cosmopolitans are largely absent from Australian society (as demonstrated by the 89% of ‘ordinary Australians’ who value the benefits of cosmopolitanism, and 83% who subscribe to human rights values (Brett & Moran, 2011; Skrbis & Woodward, 2013) it does suggest that their presence is unwelcome in the public sphere. Rather, the public sphere is populated by voices that claim Australian identity is grounded in traditional Anglo myths that enables ‘us’ to be sufficiently tolerant, wealthy, resourced, and inclusive. As the until recently Prime Minister Tony Abbott claimed about Australia (which he tellingly refers to as part of the ‘Anglosphere’):

All cultures generate a strong sense of kith and kin. The difference between the...Anglosphere and almost all others is its protean ability to change and grow by assimilating what other cultures have to offer...it seeks to transcend humanity’s tendency to divide the world into “them and us”....the Anglosphere is probably less contaminated by racism than any other...I had discovered for myself the truth of Ken Minogue’s statement that “to become an Australian, no matter what your provenance, has usually been to take on board the whole heritage from Stonehenge and Magna Carta onward”. (Abbott, 2006: 40/41).

Essentially, Australia’s leader promotes a discourse in which the ‘Other’ is inferior to Anglo Australians and grounds true Australianness in its British heritage. With this view dominating the Australian public sphere, it is unsurprising that a more cosmopolitan framing of ‘who we are’ is unwelcome and, as this research has found, largely excluded.

8.6 Concluding remarks

To conclude, I summarise the main findings of this thesis and highlight the contribution these make to the existing research on Australian identity.

Firstly, national identity was found to be a pervasive frame in the ‘elite’ public sphere. As Papers Three, Four and Five showed, the ‘elite’ primarily frame public issues
through the lens of Australianness. Even in frames that challenge or stretch the boundaries of Australianness, the nation remains central. As such, national identity retains value, even when there is internal dispute about what constitutes Australianness and some within the ‘ingroup’ are seen to tarnish its image.

These findings that show the nation remains significant in public framings of Australianness contribute to the knowledge of how those with access to constructing such representations in the public sphere are responding to the demands of a globalised world. Rather than embracing the fluidity and flexibility that the risk society (Beck, 1992) affords, these framings indicate a retreat to the safety of a colloquial, ‘frozen’ (Suvarierol, 2012) national identity. As such, these findings suggest that while post-national interactions and connections are becoming mainstream, the nation remains a central source of identity being used to ‘make sense of the world’ for the public (Calhoun, 2007).

The content of these public framings of Australianness are a blend of both civic and ethno-nationalist characteristics. This is important as it represents a shift from the last two decades or more of research that found ‘ordinary Australians’ tend to espouse one or other form of nationalism. This enmeshment of civic and ethno-nationalism, rather than opening up constructions of Australianness, appears to contribute to the discourse of the ‘frozen’ nation. Rather than advancing Australianness as, say, multicultural, it is whiteness, heteronormativity, and historical myths such as the ‘fair-go’ that are integrated with civic values. These findings contribute to knowledge for those seeking inclusive policies, working with immigration issues, and advocating for minority groups. At a pragmatic level it suggests that, to achieve policy success, discourse should be grounded in ‘frozen’ frames of Australianness. Ideologically however, activity needs to occur around changing the national discourse in the public sphere to be more inclusive of those who fall outside this ‘frozen’ construction of Australian identity.

Currently it seems that the public sphere is a space in which elite voices promote narrow versions of the national ‘us’. Rather than an arena for public debate and the refinement of political ideas (Habermas, 1989; Fraser, 1992; Dahlgren, 2005), these findings offer an original contribution to knowledge by suggesting that there are few voices involved in the Australian public sphere that advocate for alternative, inclusive versions of Australianness. The public sphere appears to be a space for
declarative statements from elite voices, rather than public participation. As such, it seems that structural processes of exclusion are active and limiting the participatory capacity of marginal voices (Habermas, 1989; Benhabib, 1992).

Additionally it is important to highlight that cosmopolitan framings were largely excluded from the public sphere. Research amongst ‘ordinary Australians’ shows that there are some Australians who identify as cosmopolitan, either by co-opting it into Australianness or simply prioritising their human identity above their Australian identity (Brett & Moran, 2011; Moran, 2011; Skrbiš & Woodward, 2007). However cosmopolitanism was essentially absent amongst the ‘elite’ public framings that were analysed in this thesis. It may be that these voices partake in a separate public sphere that, as yet, has limited interaction with the broader public discourse (Dahlgren, 2005). This finding offers an original contribution to knowledge in a time when governments (as well as non-government organisations) are being called on to find global solutions to global problems. Issues of climate change, asylum seekers, terrorism and war, starvation and global poverty, trafficking, and slavery are just some examples of issues that traverse the boundaries of the nation-state. This research has found that cosmopolitan frames are present among Australians, yet largely absent in the Australian public sphere. Thus broadening the public sphere to include these perspectives, or engaging with the possibility that multiple public spheres are active, will better represent the public’s voices, and may enable Australia to be more involved in solutions that benefit all humanity. Including cosmopolitan constructions of Australianness in the public discourse creates space to advocate for more diverse ways of being, and understanding, ‘who we are’.
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