Amongst the works attributed to Alcidamas is a short surviving speech called *Odysseus against the Treachery of Palamedes*. The speech is supposed to be a prosecution speech spoken by Odysseus against his old enemy, whom he accuses (falsely, according to the myth) of plotting to betray the Greek camp to the Trojans. A speech based on Greek myth fits the context of Alcidamas’ generation and the generation of his teachers: from his own time, we think of Isocrates’ speeches on Helen and Busiris and, perhaps more directly comparable, of the speeches attributed to Antisthenes for Ajax and Odysseus when claiming the armour of Achilles; from an earlier generation we recall the speeches under the name of Gorgias on Helen and in defence of Palamedes. Such similarities of genre have long since been noticed: it is surely no coincidence that the chief MSS which preserve the Odysseus speech attributed to Alcidamas are also the chief MSS for the two speeches of Gorgias.

The attribution of the *Odysseus* to Alcidamas contained in these MSS is particularly important, for there are no ancient allusions to the work. Now, there is in Plato, *Phaedrus* 261 a reference to an ‘Eleatic Palamedes’:

ΘΩ. Αλλ’ ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περί λόγων ἄκηκας, δέ ἐν Ἡλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνειγραφήσθεν, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἄκηκας γέγονες;  

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ νὰ μὴ Δί’ ἔγγον τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχον τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσά….

ΘΩ. Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγωντα οὐκ ἔχεις τέχνην, ὧς δὲ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντι τά αὐτά ὁμοία καὶ ἄνωμοι, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένουσα τε αὗ καὶ περάμενα;  

Soc.: But have you only heard of the manuals of rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure at Troy, and have you never heard of the manuals of Palamedes?

Phaed.: By Zeus, I have never heard of those of Nestor, unless you are making Gorgias into some sort of Nestor, or Thrasymachus and Theodorus into Odysseus….

Soc.: So do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes speaks with art, so that the same things appear to the audience like and unalike, and one and many, and still and moving?

and Quintilian 3.1.10 explains this as reference to Alcidamas:

Thrasy machus Chaledonius cum hoc et Prodicus Cius et Abderites Protagoras, a quo decem milibus denariorum didicisse artem, quam edidit, Euathlus dicitur, et Hippias Elius, et, quem Palameden Plato appellat, Alcidamas Elaites.

* Earlier versions of this paper were delivered to audiences in Dunedin, Christchurch and Perth. My sincere thanks go to those audiences (and to CQ’s referee) for their comments, and also to the Department of Classics at the University of Canterbury for their hospitality while I refined these ideas during some study leave spent with them in early 2005.
This explanation has sometimes been seen as a confusion on Quintilian’s part, for the ‘Eleatic Palamedes’ in Plato is normally supposed by modern scholars to be Zeno. Quintilian, on this interpretation, has mixed up Elea in Italy with Elaea in Aeolis, and furthermore has a confused recollection of Alcidamas’ being associated with Palamedes. Hence his identification, wrong though it is, is supposed to count as a testimonium to this speech, as there would be no other reason for him to link Alcidamas with Palamedes. But a strong case has quite recently been made that Quintilian’s identification is not necessarily wrong; if, as has been argued, there was a tradition of interpretation of the *Phaedrus* which regarded the ‘Eleatic Palamedes’ as a disguised reference to Alcidamas (whose Palamedic inventiveness was ‘Eleatic’ because he derived certain ideas and methods from Zeno), there is no reason for thinking that Quintilian’s statement proceeds from any confused recollection. If, on the other hand, Quintilian is mistaken, his crucial (and sufficient) point of confusion is likely to have been between Elea and Elaea; there is no need to postulate any recollection of a special connection with Palamedes.

We rely, then, entirely on the MSS for the attribution of this speech to Alcidamas; the earliest evidence is therefore from the twelfth century. As far as we can tell, scepticism about this attribution, as with the attribution of so much classical literature, first appeared in Germany in the nineteenth century. Foss (1828), 84–9 produced a number of arguments based on the style and substance of the speech, but the detailed arguments were rejected by Vahlen and Blass after him. Still rejecting the speech, they accepted only the general argument of Foss that the work was too weak to have been written by a figure like Alcidamas. This argument from incompetence was the only one they could accept, but it seemed to them decisive and clear: ‘Überall

---

1 To the examples in Dušanić (1992), 348, n. 16 add now Russell (2001), ad loc.
2 Thus e.g. Auer (1913), 33 (whose references show that the argument was already old in his day) and most recently Muir (2001), xvii.
4 Dušanić (1992), 348 in fact does not doubt the authenticity of the *Odysseus*, and even suggests that its existence may have given ‘additional point’ to the comparison, but the epithet is significant, and he claims that the comparison is ‘primarily based upon certain Palamedean features in the Eleaean rhetorician’s theory and activity’.
5 *Pace* Dušanić (1992), 350, confusion on Quintilian’s part is not ‘improbable’, since slightly later even the learned Atticist lexicographer Aelius Dionysius (ap. Eust. in Od. vol. 2.302 St.) was apparently unsure about the towns’ locations and spellings. (Later biographers of Alcidamas were also confused: the *Suda* s.v. ᾿Αλκιδάμας says that the orator was ᾿Ελεάτης, ᾿Αλκιδάμας Ῥήγη Αἰαῖς, but s.v. ᾿Ελεά distinguishes Zeno’s city from ᾿Ελαία, It appears that Quintilian nowhere else refers to either city, nor to any Eleatic philosopher.
6 See Mariß (2002), 16–18, rejecting Dušanić’s view, and attributing the mistake in the first place to geographical confusion. Palamedes’ inventiveness (see Ar. *Rv* 1451 and Eupolis fr. 385.6 K.–A. for its proverbial status) will have justified Plato’s use of the figure here in the first place.
7 This is the date of the oldest MS. X (= Heidelberg 88); from the thirteenth (or early fourteenth) century comes A (= Burney 95 in the British Library). The *communis opinio* is that all other MSS derive from these (MacDowell [1981]), 113), but cf. Avezzù (1976) and (1982) xx–xxii (and the response in MacDowell [1983]) on the independent value of the fourteenth-century Co (=Vaticanus gr. 2207). All three MSS – and naturally their copies – bear the name of Alcidamas as the author of the speech.
und in jeder Hinsicht ist die Rede ein Erzeugnis elendester Geistesarmuth und jämmerlichster Sophistik, und 

The case against the speech's authenticity is still essentially this, and has hardly 

been added to since the nineteenth century as far as I can tell. It was, however, a case 

tackled head-on by Auer in his 1913 Münster dissertation on the speech. Following 

Vahlen in rejecting the earlier arguments as unpersuasive, Auer also rejected the view 

of Vahlen and Blass that the speech's low quality ruled it out as authentic, bolstering 

his argument by accepting alterations already proposed to particularly lame passages 

in the transmitted text. But Auer went further and also argued that some of the 

speech's apparent irrelevance suggested that this was a speech by Alcidamas, a native 

of Elaea, as we have seen. Specifically, there is rather a lot in the speech about 

Telephus, and it does not seem to be adding anything to the issue of Palamedes' guilt; 

but, following the argument of Maass, Auer took this as evidence that the work was 

composed by someone keen to play up the mythological importance of his homeland, 

for Telephus (according to one version of the myth) was born in Arcadia but was 

raised across the Aegean in a place adjacent to Alcidamas' home town. Finally, 

argued Auer, the similarities between the stories of Socrates and Palamedes — similarities which contemporary Socratic literature seems to use as well — point to a 

date of composition around the early fourth century B.C.

Just as people virtually stopped thinking up arguments against the authenticity of 

the speech in the nineteenth century, so scholars after Auer have pretty much given up 

thinking of new arguments in favour of Alcidamas as its author. I have found only 

one published discussion of any length on the question since Auer, and even that is 

more concerned about the relationship between this speech and Gorgias' Palamedes 

than the question of authenticity as such. Avezzù's 1982 edition of Alcidamas and 

Muir's 2001 edition essentially refer to or repeat Auer's arguments that the work is 

authentic.

---

8 Blass (1887–1892), 2.361 (emphasis added); the rhetorical conclusion of Vahlen (1863), 525 (=GPS 1.152) — 'Oder wird es jemand für möglich halten, daß ein Redner, der den λόγος 

Μεσσηνιακός geschrieben, dessen Gedankeninhalt wir erraten können, ein so schülerhaft 

ungeschicktes Machwerk wie der Palamedes habe verfertigen können?' — uses the same supposi-

tions and argument.

9 Kennedy (1963), 172–3 adds one argument: Περί Σφιστώων 'invigehs heatedly against 

literary composition of oratory' and 'as far as we know he never changed his mind and never 

published speeches'. The claim would be hard to substantiate in the face of the various testimonia 

to his speeches and style collected by Avezzù (1982), T T 1, 7, 10, 12, 13 and 14.

10 e.g. on 9, n. 1 for §19 he accepted the alteration proposed by Wilamowitz (1900), 534–5 (= 

KS 4.112–13) κις Ναυπλίων for the transmitted ἐλαιν ἐις Αἰνα, a passage Vahlen (1863), 524–5 (=GPS 1.151) had specifically ridiculed.

11 Auer (1913), 33–4 quotes with approval this conclusion of Maass (1886), 4 and Wilamowitz 

(1900), 535 (= KS 4.113). On the sources see Auer (1913), ch. 4, 'De rebus mythologicis' (29–41).

12 Auer (1913), 48–9. He also argued (46–8) that the comparatively frequent use of τέ κοια in 

the speech suggested a date near that of Andocides 2, but the argument is worthless: the first 29 

sentences of Dio Chrysostom's first oration (with approximately the same number of words as 

Odyssey) show the combination about 21 times, much closer to Andocides (c. 16) than is 

Odyssey (5 at most). Obviously this feature tells us nothing about the dates of composition.

13 For a recent summary of arguments see Mariß (2002), 18–20. She does not add to them, but 

concludes that the work is from Alcidamas' time, remaining uncommitted on the question of his 

authorship.

14 Zographou-Lyra (1991); her conclusion is favourably disposed to authenticity. I should 

mention that I have been unable to locate Tortonesi (1967), a pamphlet edition of the speech 

reported in L'Année philologique 38 (online APh number now 38–00091).

15 Muir (2001), xviii adds two apparently new arguments to the case for authenticity ('the
With so little progress on this question evident, it may be time to try a new approach. It is surprising that little attention has been devoted to the language of this speech, for it may be thought that herein lies important evidence for the issue of authenticity. One of the few discussions of the language of *Odysseus* found it unremarkable and quite at home in the fourth century B.C., even postulating one of Alcidamas’ contemporaries as its author. As will be evident, I believe this dating to be demonstrably wrong, but the fact that it was suggested by a superficial reading of the text is itself significant. Almost all of it reads like standard Attic prose of the classical period, which means that it was either written then, or at least was written by someone imitating the prose of that time. The first option is ruled out by at least one construction which no author of the classical period would have used and also by a word usage, explicitly attested as non-classical, which does not appear before the Roman empire. We are faced, then, with the second option and so with a piece of literary, Atticizing Greek, which cannot be earlier than the first century B.C., and may well be centuries later. The two tell-tale pieces of evidence mentioned find no parallel before the third and first centuries A.D. respectively.

Here is the first key passage, from §18 of the speech. It is talking about Menelaus who, just as the handsome Trojan Paris has come to visit, is called away from Sparta, with consequences the Greeks knew all too well:

He decided to sail, and giving orders to his wife and <her> brothers to see that the guests should not want for anything until he returned from Crete, he left.

It is remarkable that no one has noticed before how strange this sentence is. First of all, the construction of a verb of striving (ἐπιμελεῖον) with ἵνα is very unusual in classical Greek, to which the rest of this paragraph applies. Grammar books distinguish between ‘pure final clauses’ and ‘object clauses’, the former taking subjunctive or optative and introduced when positive in Greek prose by ἵνα, ὡς or ἵνα, and the latter usually with a future indicative or optative introduced by ἵνα. This sentence from the *Odysseus* clearly contains an object clause, a form which is kept largely separate from the ‘pure final’ construction. Occasionally (chiefly in poetry) we find a future indicative in a pure final clause, but never, be it noted, when the clause is introduced by ἵνα. On the other hand, there are very few other passages

author of the *Odysseus* is aware of the technicalities of minting coins and there is a likely echo of this in *OWS* [i.e. *Περί Σφηστών* too; likewise musical metaphors occur in both works’], but sensibly does not press them.

16 Blass (1887–1892), 2.362–3 and 372, who suggested Polycrates as the real author.
18 The typical classical parallel, with a ἵνα clause, is found in e.g. Pl. *Ap. 36c.*
19 This is the terminology of Goodwin (1889), §§317 and 339; Kühner (1898–1904), §§553 and 552 calls them ‘Adverbialeätze der Absicht’ and ‘Substantivsätze der Wirkung’ respectively, while Knuenz (1913) distinguishes ‘enuntiata finalia perfecta’ from ‘imperflecta’. The basic difference could be expressed by ‘I did this in order to capture the city’ (pure final) as opposed to ‘I made sure to capture the city’ (object).
20 Knuenz (1913) offers a very full study of the constructions with their different moods and introductory particles.
21 Knuenz (1913), 23–6, Goodwin (1889), §324.
indeed where an object clause is introduced by ἓνα, as it is in this sentence, perhaps as few as two.22

As soon as we move outside the classical era, however, the picture changes. The distinction between the two types of clause begins to disappear, so that already in Ptolemaic papyri ἓνα and δὴπῶς are both commonly used in introducing object clauses,23 and in the New Testament ἓνα has almost entirely displaced its rival: to quote the standard grammar:24 'the old Attic … combination of δὴπῶς … with the future indicative after verbs of reflection, striving, guarding is not found in the NT. ἓνα … is used throughout with these verbs'. Texts of a more literary character also show the influence of κοινή here, although δὴπῶς does not disappear from these constructions.25

The introductory particle, then, although remarkably rare with this construction in the classical period and at home in later Greek, does not establish the clause as post-classical. Its verb, ἡσυχαστέο, however does just this, for it has no business at all with ἓνα in a text of the classical era. The future optative is first attested in Pindar (Pyth. 9.116), and in classical Greek it is always used for just one purpose: to represent an original future indicative in a sentence which is now in historic sequence.26 The optative of its nature, whether expressing wish or potential, already has a future orientation, and its proper tenses are merely aspectual; the late-appearing future tense is only possible when the mood imitates the temporal qualities of the indicative's tense system.

But if the fifth century saw an expansion of use of the optative, it is well known that subsequent centuries saw a sharp decline. Again, the evidence of post-classical papyri and the New Testament is clear: although the optative can still be used in constructions when it forms the main verb of a sentence – especially in wishes, and to a lesser extent as a potential – its oblique use, whether standing for an original indicative or a subjunctive, drops off markedly.27 Eventually the mood disappears entirely, and (apart from a couple of fossilized forms28) does not exist in the modern Greek language. Its decline, however, is not a linear one and outside the κοινή it enjoyed a revival in the literary movement of Atticism. The enthusiasm of this revival for the optative, however, was seldom matched by a corresponding knowledge of actual Attic usage of the mood. Schwyzer sums up pithily:29 '… der Attizismus … führt den Optativ wieder zu einer papierenen Blüte (was sich sogar in spätern Papyri geltend macht); aber die steigende Verwirrung im Gebrauch des Optatifs zeigt, daß er dem Sprachgefühl fremd geworden ist, und selbst gebildete Schriftsteller vermögen sich im Ausgang des Altertums nicht mehr zurechtzufinden…'.

If we now return to more standard Greek usage, we can see how contrary to its canons is this optative use found in the Odyssey. Speaking only a fraction too

---

22 Knuenz (1913), 26–9 cites only Aristophanes, Ach. 654, Demosthenes 16.28 and Aristotle Eth. Nic. δ 8 (an evident slip for δ 3 = 1125α6), but the first passage can be interpreted differently: cf Olson (2002), ad loc.
25 Knuenz (1913), 28 has the figures for Polybius, Dionysius, Philo, Josephus and Dio.
26 On the future optative see Goodwin (1889), §§128–34.
27 For an overview of the optative in papyri, see Mandilaras (1973), §§603–58, as well as the more specialized studies of Horn (1926) and Harsing (1910); for optative in the New Testament, see Blass–Debrunner–Funk (1961), §§884–6.
29 Schwyzer (1950–71), 2.338; cf Mandilaras (1973), §604 for similar comments.
sweepingly, Goodwin says:

30 ‘As εν never takes the future indicative, it can never have the future optative’. Were both claims contained in that statement otherwise completely true, the anomalous construction in this speech would not help us date it. But the truth is more complicated and also more informative in this case, and can at least provide us with a rough *terminus post quem* for its composition.

The evidence of the New Testament and non-literary papyri is clear that, *pace* Goodwin, εν does indeed sometimes take a future indicative, albeit in κοινή rather than Attic Greek. For in the later language,31 ‘The future indicative has also been introduced to a very limited degree in the very places where it would not have been permissible in classical, i.e. after εν and final μή…’, while non-literary papyri from the Roman empire also show future indicatives with εν.32 As outlined above, the future indicative is occasionally found even in Attic Greek for pure final clauses, but never with that conjunction. As a corollary, we observe that the very few classical instances of εν in an object clause (mentioned above) occur not with the future indicative usual in object clauses, but with (present or aorist) subjunctives. κοινή, with its blurring of the distinction between ‘pure final’ and ‘object’ clauses, would normally have expressed this clause with εν and the subjunctive, but the author seems to have recalled that the usual classical idiom involved a future indicative. The subsequent rise of εσθίον (at the expense of ζωον – see above), however, together with the tolerance of εσθίον for that conjunction in combination with a future indicative, led him to retain it here against classical usage. If this confusion demonstrates a post-classical – and suggests an Atticizing – origin, the next step surely confirms this impression, for he dressed up the post-classical construction in garb which was distinctively classical: the oblique optative.

This oblique use of the optative is comparatively rare in papyri and the New Testament, whether it stands for an original subjunctive or an indicative,33 so the author’s use of it is clearly literary, all the more so in view of the tense he uses. Given, as we have seen, that the future optative is a late arrival which is only ever used classically in oblique constructions, we should not be surprised at its rarity in κοινή Greek: it is entirely absent from the New Testament, and very rare indeed in documentary papyri.34

---

30 Goodwin (1889), §133; so too Knaenz (1913), 31.
32 Mandilaras (1973), §413.
33 Optatives are absent in final clauses in Ptolemaic papyri and NT; they appear in Atticizing late papyri, but in primary sequence as well (and so can hardly be called ‘oblique’ here). ‘Iterative’ optatives in the past – whether relative or temporal – have virtually disappeared from all papyri and NT. In indirect discourse, optatives are largely confined to Ptolemaic papyri; of NT authors, only Luke uses them, and they are rare in later papyri (Mayser [1906–1934], 2.1.295–5, Blass–Debrunner–Funk [1961], §386, Harsing [1910], 29–38, Mandilaras [1973], §651–6, Horn [1926], 143–7, 159–61).
34 Blass–Debrunner–Funk (1961), §65.1c, Gignac (1976– ), 2.359–60, n. 8, who goes on to cite (2.361) just four examples from papyri, all of them late. Harsing (1910), 55 knew of only one, although even that (*Pgreen* 1.60.40) is but a restoration. It is interesting that these instances, certain and restored, show a distinctly non-classical construction (ει with the future optative). Much work remains to be done on the use of such future optatives in late Greek, and some scholars have even claimed that they are only alternative (‘hybrid’) forms of the aorist optative (see Fournet [1999], 1.347–8, 355–6), although the poetic precedents claimed could hardly explain the documentary use touched on above. Note, too, that the *Odyssey* έσθιον can only be interpreted as a future optative, and that there are enough other examples of indisputable (if unclassically applied) future optatives (e.g. *Procl.* in *Ptolemy* 830.5–6 ειν μή … ἀναγκασθησομέθα λέγεν. *Zonaras Epit. Hist.* 1.235.20–2 Dind. ειν … έι της των ἑκτος ἀποδιδόκι, λακωνικαί) to make a *prima facie* case for accepting the instances cited below as genuine future optatives which provide parallels to the usage found in *Odyssey*. 
The evidence collected thus far shows already that Alcidamas cannot have written this sentence: it presupposes a construction which does not appear until Koine Greek, and then applies to it an Atticizing refinement which cannot be earlier than the first century B.C. The quest for closer parallels strongly confirms this impression of lateness: my search of the TLG online database turned up no other instance of ἢν' with the future optative before the mid-third century A.D., some six centuries after the time of Alcidamas, so alien is the construction to the Greek of his time. Nevertheless, this first instance is instructive: Herodian\(^{35}\) is a writer of substance, replete with imitations of classical literature, and admired for his content as well as his style by a later tradition whose abiding criterion of quality prose is that of conformity to the works of fifth- and fourth-century B.C. Athens. The example reminds us that even authors committed to holding the Atticist line and writing extensively in this manner could overlook details.\(^{37}\)

This point is particularly relevant to the soundness of the text in the Odysseus passage under discussion, for it shows that such a mistake can occur in an otherwise generally competent Atticist document. The construction is certainly post-classical, but it is not glaringly so, and no modern scholar has noticed it; its presence in our speech, explained through the developments in Koine outlined above, need not make us suspect a corruption which can be corrected by, for example, the substitution of ἵνα for ἢν' to make the language conform to classical usage, any more than we should feel a need to alter the transmitted text of Herodian. Furthermore, the construction is never very common in Greek, and comparatively few examples are found in the TLG database.\(^{38}\) Scribal error, at least of the sort due to the substitution of a common late linguistic feature for a rarer original one, cannot be adduced as an explanation of the reading of the MSS here.

Nor is this the only place in the text where the author's less than perfect command of Attic idiom reveals itself. In §6 we have a genitive absolute ἰὸν ἥν' ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ὀλγὼν χρόνον

When there was a truce from battle for a short time

35 2.2.5: ἢν' ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ὀλγὼν χρόνον (written after 238, describing events in 193, immediately after the fall of Commodus). (It is impossible to tell whether the appearance of the construction in the epitome of Herodian's contemporary Cassius Dio 69.1.3 is due to the author or the much later epitomator.) As far as I can tell, the construction is next found early in the fourth century in the works of those bitter enemies Eusebius of Caesarea, Generalis elementaria introductio (= Eclogae propheticae) 201.2 Gaisford (= Migne, PG 22.1225c) and Eustathius of Antioch, De engastrimytho contra Origenem 9.1, 10.13 and 24.8 Simonetti (= Migne 18.628b, 633a and 664a, although Migne reads Eustathius' verbs as aorist subjunctives). Later in the century it occurs in Epiphanius, Panarion 2.188 and 3.85–6 Holf (= Migne 41.820c and 42.101d).

36 See Whittaker (1969), liv–lvi for his classical imitations and xxi–xxvii for his influence: note especially the high regard of Photius, Bibl. cod. 99 (p85b Bekker).

37 So Norden (1915–18), 1.398 n. on Herodian: ‘… daß er trotzdem so wenig wie irgend ein anderer dieser Attizisten reines Attisch schreibt, ist selbstverständlich…’. In this context we should consider Photius' comments on Herodian (see previous note): δέξει χρώματος σάρκων, μήτε ὑπερατικεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἔμφυτον ἔξυπνωτερον χάρις τοῦ σώματος, μήτε πρὸς τὸ ταπεινὸν ἐκλεμμένη καὶ τὴν ἐνέκρισεν ὑπεραρχάς γνώσιν. He was thus viewed as a moderate, not an obsessive, Atticist.

38 On my count there are about 80 instances in the entire corpus. A full-scale statistical analysis would be out of place here, but as a comparandum we can note that a search for ἢν' with only the most common form of the first person singular present active optative (i.e. ending in -ομε) yields more examples, ranging from Homer to the fifteenth century, than for all forms of the future optative.
It is found in the meaning of ‘truce’ when used in the plural (like συνθές) in Xenophon, Aeschines and Demosthenes, and in the reduplicated form ἄνωκοιχῇ in Thucydides. But the singular of the simplex does not appear at all before Hellenistic times, and not before Josephus has it replaced the plural or reduplicated form in the classical meaning. Clearly, this is another passage which will have to be emended if we want to keep Alcidamas’ name on Odysseus.

There is a more economical solution, which is to agree with those nineteenth-century scholars who thought, albeit for different and not entirely cogent reasons, that Alcidamas could not have written this speech. But why, it may be asked in closing, was his name attached to it, and what of the remaining arguments for authenticity brought forward by Auer? Let us remember that we know nothing at all about the speech until the twelfth century, and we can only speculate at this point about how and why (as distinct from when) it was composed. Perhaps it started life as a forgery, or it may simply have been an anonymous work to which someone later attached the name of Gorgias’ pupil. The basic information about Alcidamas’ personal and historic background, on which Auer was able to build his edifice of authenticity, was available to later antiquity and Byzantium as well; someone may have used it to write the speech, or at least to conjecture its author.

Is there a covert allusion in the speech to the execution of Socrates for corrupting the youth? That is quite plausible, and it is difficult for us to read §22 without thinking of that seminal event:

It is worth examining closely how he plays the intellectual in deceiving the young and falsely persuading them, saying that he invented military formations, letters, numbers…

Indeed, if the contemporary accounts of Socrates’ defence are to be believed, even before his death Socrates was drawing parallels between himself and Palamedes. However, such allusions in the Odysseus tell us nothing about the date of composition, as all of later antiquity knew about Socrates’ fate and reflected on it. In fact, subsequent ages were still seeing connections between Palamedes and Socrates where none could have existed.

---

39 Moeris 191.35 Bekker: ἄνωκοιχῇ Ἀττικοῖς, ἄνωκοιχῇ Ἐλληνες. The form ἄνωκοιχῇ is actually erroneous (LSJ s.v. ἄνωκοιχῇ), but that has no bearing on the entry as testimony for ἄνωκοιχῇ as post-classical. It is significant that other lexica also use the latter in its singular form (so showing the word was more familiar thus to later readers) to gloss ἄνωκοιχῇ (s.v. Ael. Dion., Hsch.).

40 Xen. Mem. 4.4.17; Aesch. Pl. 30 etc.; Dem. De cot. 164, 165 (decrees) etc.; Thuc. 1.40 etc. (cf Dion. Hal. Antm. 2 [† de Thuc. idiom.] 3).


42 See the testimonia in Avezzù (1982), 1–4.

43 Pl. Ap. 41b; Xen. Ap. 26. On Palamedes as a ‘mythical analogue’ for Socrates see e.g. Barrett (2001). Others have thought that Plato presents Palamedes as a deliberate contrast to Socrates – so Coulter (1964) (because of his association with Gorgias’ rhetoric) and Nightingale (1995), 149–54 (because he lurks behind the flawed god Theuth in Phdr. 274–5). The frequent presence of Palamedes in the literature, and occasional presence in the art, of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (succinctly shown by Woodford [1994]) should not, of course, lead us to overlook his continuing presence in ancient literature; for an overview see Usener (1994–5).

44 Cf. Diogenes Laerterius’ Life of Socrates (2.44), where it is speculated that Euripides’ Palamedes alluded to the execution of Socrates, a chronological impossibility (cf also the hypothesis to Isocrates’ Busiris). Curiously, Auer (1913), 49 cites the Euripidean fragment quoted
Finally, the old argument that Quintilian’s identification of the Palamedes of Plato’s *Phaedrus* with Alcidamas shows that he associated a Palamedes speech with Alcidamas can easily be turned on its head in this debate. Quintilian’s identification of Palamedes in the *Phaedrus* with Alcidamas, whether based on an exegetical tradition or originating with a (geographical) mistake of the Spaniard himself, might actually have prompted some scholar to justify Plato’s (apparent) nickname by trying to write the sort of speech about Palamedes that Alcidamas might have written, or by identifying a surviving speech about Palamedes as the work of that Sophist. Fraud or guess, it is to be hoped that the ascription can now more clearly be seen for the error that it is, not because the speech is unworthy of Alcidamas, but because it could not have been written by anyone in the fourth century B.C.

University of Western Australia

NEIL O’SULLIVAN

nosulliv@arts.uwa.edu.au

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Auer, H. (1913) *De Alcidamantis declamatione quae inscribatur Ὀλυσσών κατὰ Πολαμήδον σφαδόσα* (Diss. Münster).


Foss, H.E. (1828) *De Gorgia Leontino commentatio* (Halle).


Harsing, K. (1910) *De optativi in chartis Aegyptis usus* (Diss. Bonn).


Kneuzen, J. (1913) *De enuntiatis Graecorum finalibus* (Innsbruck).


Maass, E. (1886) *Commentatio mythographica* (Greifswald).


there without seeing that its source undermines his position. Diogenes shows that later antiquity was all too keen to regard the documents of the Socratic era as alluding to the parallel with Palamedes, even when no such parallel was conceivably being drawn. It is a reasonable guess that such tendencies were shared by the author of this speech, whether or not the false ascription to Alcidamas originated with him.


